

CLASSIFIED

File No. Dossier 28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION
Volume 1# From-De 83-12-06 To-À 83-12-08

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2003

VOLS ACCESSION NO. 18824

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TITLE—TITRE:

DISARMEMENT
MEASURES
PLANS AND PROPOSALS
TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION (INITIATIVES)

DESARMEMENT
MESURES
PLANS ET PROPOSITIONS
TRUDEAU MISSION DE PAIX (INITIATIVES)

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
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DATE Apr. 20/06
E. Kelly

DEPARTMENT
OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS


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2003





Government of Canada / Gouvernement du Canada

CLOSED VOLUME VOLUME COMPLET

DATED FROM / À COMPTER DU 83-12-06 TO / JUSQU'AU 83-12-08

AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE - À METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER

DO NOT ADD ANY MORE PAPERS - NE PAS AJOUTER DE DOCUMENTS

FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE - POUR CORRESPONDANCE ULTÉRIEURE VOIR

FILE NO. - DOSSIER N°

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace Mission

VOLUME

15

Prime Minister Trudeau's
Visit to Washington, December 83

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE
SUFFOCATION MEASURES

28-6-1-Trudeau

Issue:

To discuss the status of the three suffocation measures.

Background:

In his November 13 speech the Prime Minister put forward for the first time three new measures to further his strategy of suffocation. He announced that Canada would be advocating international agreement (a) to ban the testing and deployment of high-altitude anti-satellite systems, (b) to restrict excessive mobility of ICBM's and (c) to require that future strategic weapon systems be verifiable by national technical means. At Meach Lake it had been decided that while these rather technical measures would be enunciated publicly they would not be pursued personally by the Prime Minister with other governments. For that reason the Prime Minister did not raise them in his visits to European or Far Eastern capitals. On November 28-29 a member of the Task Force visited Washington in order to discuss the substance of these measures with experts in the State Department and ACDA. A discussion paper, explaining these measures, is attached.

Canadian Position:

The Canadian position is, as enunciated by the Prime Minister, that discussion papers on these measures will be tabled by Canada in the appropriate arms control forum at the appropriate time.

Position of Others:

The USA is not enthusiastic about the proposal for a ban on high altitude ASAT systems, citing problems of verification as a major weakness of this proposal. There is evidence to suggest, however, that the real explanation for the negative American reaction is that there are significant elements in this administration that see space as providing an opportunity for a technological "end run" around the Soviet Union and, therefore, do not want to be inhibited by arms control. On the question of mobility of ICBM's, USA experts reacted positively to the Prime Minister's proposal, indicating that they were working along similar lines but that it was too early to be more forthcoming. USA experts were leary about the Prime Minister's proposal in NTM's arguing that the acceptance of such a proposition would inhibit the activities of a democratic government while having no effect on an authoritarian one. The UK and the FRG have reacted cautiously, claiming that these measures are for the superpowers. Norway has expressed its support. In consultations with Pearson the Soviets would not comment in these measures but were not negative. The Chinese were non-committal.

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION A-7

ACTION
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TO/À • USS
FROM/DE • IDDZ

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • PM INITIATIVE: Briefing of Joe Clark.
SUJET

Security/Sécurité	CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	December 8, 1983.
Number/Numéro	IDDZ-0278

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

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On Monday December 5, I received a telephone call from Joe Clark asking to be briefed on an urgent basis on the Prime Minister's initiative. After checking with Messrs Pépin and Osbaldeston that there would be no objection to such briefing and that we could be frank and open with him, a meeting was arranged for Tuesday December 6 at 15:00 hours in Mr. Clark's offices in the East Block. It was agreed that the briefing would be conducted by Mr. Marchand and myself. Peggy Masson (who Mr. Clark said had a secret security clearance) sat in as a notetaker. The briefing lasted two and a half hours.

2. Mr. Clark said he was approaching this subject from a bi-partisan point of view. Peace and security was a subject that had a long tradition of support in Canada from both sides of the house as exemplified by the roles played by Lester Pearson and Howard Green. He wished to be acquainted fully with the initiative so as to contribute to it in whatever manner he could in his present capacity and to be able to carry the subject forward should there be an election and change of government. He intended to meet with experts on this subject in Canada and abroad from both the public and private sectors. For reasons that would be "obvious" he did not wish his first foreign trip to be to the United States. He was thinking in terms of starting off in the UK but was attracted to Mr. Marchand's suggestion that Bonn would be a logical starting point given its location at the centre of East-West relations and the rich variety of views that existed in Germany on peace and security issues. In response to Mr. Marchand's offer, he said he would make full use of our embassies in order to organize meetings. In particular, he said he would like to receive detailed briefings on USA thinking on East-West relations and security issues and accepted our proposal that Ambassador Gotlieb be a first stop for him in this regard.

3. On the initiative itself we gave Mr. Clark an in-depth briefing on its origins; the selection of the various proposals; the basic approach of the "third rail" and reaction to date from foreign governments. On future options we were somewhat less precise indicating that this was yet to be decided but would include visits to Washington and the UN and in all likelihood Moscow although this remained to be confirmed in light of Andropov's health, a Soviet reevaluation

of East-West relations in light of the INF breakoff as well as our own assessment as to whether such a visit would be "useful". Mr. Clark asked a number of very good questions about the initiative particularly concerning the underlying attitudes currently prevailing in Washington, Moscow and London. He also raised questions on broader issues such as USA-UK relations, the situation in the Caribbean and quality of various foreign ministries and as to whether they were staffed with professional diplomats or political appointees.

4. At the end of the meeting it was suggested that Mr. Clark might wish to meet with Geoffrey Pearson, Robert Ford and Peter Hancock on Soviet attitudes and as a starter with Derek Burney on the USA. As for more specific views on the military balance the name of Joe Beckett, Director of DNACPOL, at DND was put forward. We also suggested that he might wish to consider utilizing the new Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament which has just been set up in Ottawa (John Lamb is the Director) as a vehicle for pulling together various Canadians interested in arms control and disarmament for a round table meeting with Mr. Clark. We also mentioned that other experts on specific subjects such as START and MBFR could be made available on request.

5. Mr. Clark seemed well disposed to all the above ideas and said he would be in touch with us further as his thinking and plans developed.



Gary J. Smith
Task Force Working Group

MESSAGE

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SECURITY /
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

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TO/À

TO BNATO/DELVOIE URGENT: PLEASE ENSURE DELIVERY BY 090600 PRIOR

INFO

TO SSEA MTG WITH SHULTZ

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REF

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER *NDHQ000/CPP*

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---DPM/SSEA-SHULTZ BILATERAL: REVIEW OF NATO STRATEGY

THIS SUBJ AS YOU KNOW IS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE AND ALL HERE AGREE IT HAS TO BE HANDLED WITH GREATEST OF CARE AND FINESSE.

2. ON MEMO THAT WAS PREPARED FOR HIM PM HAS WRITTEN THAT DPM/SSEA QUOTE SHOULD MENTION TO SHULTZ THAT I MIGHT RAISE WITH PRESIDENT

REVIEW OF NATO STRATEGY UNQUOTE. *THIS WAS IN REPLY TO SENTENCE SAYING THAT IF PM INTENDED TO RAISE ISSUE WITH PRES, THEN DPM WLD WISH TO*

3. DURING LENGTHY INTERDEPTL (PMO/PCO/DND/EA) DISCUSSION OF THIS *BROACH IT FIRST WITH SHULTZ.*

PARTICULAR SUBJ THIS MORNING VIEW AT OFFICIAL LEVEL IS THAT THIS

IDEA MUST BE SOFTENED AND CAREFULLY PACKAGED IF IT IS TO STAND

CHANCE OF SUCCESS AND NOT/NOT RECEIVE IMMEDIATE NEGATIVE REACTION FROM

PRES REAGAN. SUGGESTION THEREFORE, FOR CONSIDERATION OF DPM/SSEA, IS

THAT HE MIGHT WISH TO MENTION TO SHULTZ TOMORROW THAT HE WILL BE

MTG WITH CARRINGTON NEXT TUESDAY AND WILL BROACH QUESTION OF

CARRINGTON DOING A PERSONAL ASSESSMENT, DURING HIS PERIOD AS SEC GEN

DESIGNATE, OF WHETHER CURRENT NATO POLICY AND PRACTICE (WITH NO/NO

SPECIFIC REF TO STRATEGIES OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND FORWARD DEFENCE)

IS ADEQUATE TO GET US THROUGH REST OF 1980S.

...2

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

BROACH IT FIRST WITH SHULTZ.

WARD

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

G.J. Smith
G.J. Smith/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

G.J. Smith
G.J. Smith



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~~PAGE TWO~~ IDDZ0264 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

4. INTRODUCTORY CALLS CARRINGTON WOULD BE MAKING ON NATO LEADERS IN CAPITALS (AND WE WOULD ALSO HOPE VISITS HE MIGHT MAKE TO AS MANY EAST EUROPEAN CAPITALS AS POSSIBLE) WOULD ASSIST HIM IN HIS THINKING. CARRINGTON COULD THEN REPORT HIS FINDINGS BACK TO NEXT NATO MTG IN SPRING WITH SUGGESTIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO WHETHER ANY ASPECT OF NATO POLICY OR PRACTICE SHOULD BE SUBJ TO FULL SCALE ALLIANCE REVIEW.

5. IT WOULD ALL BE PUT IN CONTEXT OF FACT THAT NO/NO ASSESSMENT OF THIS KIND HAS REALLY BEEN DONE SINCE 1967 HARMEL REPORT AND ARRIVAL OF NEW SEC GEN WOULD SEEM TO BE OPPORTUNE TIME TO HAVE LOOK AT THIS QUESTION.

6. SHULTZ COULD BE TOLD THAT SHOULD CARRINGTON BE FAVOURABLE TO SUCH AN APPROACH THAT PM WILL MENTION IDEA TO PRES REAGAN ON 15 DEC. *IF PRES WAS FAVOURABLE, THINKING HERE IS THAT PM MIGHT FOLLOW UP WITH LETTERS TO HIS OTHER ^{NATO} COLLEAGUES.*

7) ON DIFFERENT POINT, PM HAS ASKED DPM/SJEA TO ENQUIRE OF SHULTZ WHETHER THERE HAS BEEN ANY FURTHER THINKING IN WSHAC ON IDEA OF PRES REAGAN ATTENDING STKHM MTG AT SOME STAGE; ^{IDEA} PM DISCUSSED ON TELEPHONE WITH PRES /7 NOV.



MESSAGE

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INFO
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SUBJ/SUJ REF BRIEFING BOOKS

---DPM/SSEA-SHULTZ MTG


ON REREADING EXCELLENT BRIEFING BOOK PREPARED FOR SUBJ MTG, BELIEVE IT WORTHWHILE TO CLARIFY POINT (VI) ON PAGE 4 OF TAB 7 DEALING WITH PMS INITIATIVE. WHILE SOVIETS (GROMYKO AND KORNIENKO) DID NOT/NOT THREATEN TO PULL OUT OF ANY OTHER NEGS THEY DID STRESS THAT THERE WAS NO/NO VALUE IN TALK FOR TALKS SAKE AND KORNIENKO DID SUGGEST THAT CERTAIN ELEMENTS IN USSR WERE QUESTIONING VALUE OF MTGS GIVEN USA ATTITUDE. GROMYKO HIMSELF MENTIONED THAT IN NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES HE COULD HAVE BEEN EXPECTED TO ATTEND STOCKHOLM MTG BUT THESE WERE NOT/NOT NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

2. OVERALL IMPRESSION I HAD WAS THAT SOVIETS WERE CURRENTLY UNDERGOING REVIEW OF E/W RELNS IN LIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL FROM INF TALKS AND IT COULD NOT/NOT BE EXCLUDED THAT THEY WOULD PULL BACK FROM OTHER NEGS PARTICULARLY START BUT NOT EXCLUDING EVEN CDE AND MBFR.

3. YOU WILL RECALL THEY SAID EVERYTHING WAS TO BE REVIEWED THROUGH THE QUOTE PRISM UNQUOTE OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH USA AND THAT THEY MIGHT WELL HARDEN THEIR RESPONSE (EG BY WITHDRAWING FROM OTHER NEGS) IF THEY BELIEVED THEIR MESSAGE AND CONCERNS HAD NOT/NOT QUOTE

REGISTERED UNQUOTE IN WSHDC.

28-6-1 - Trudeau
Peace
mission

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG  G. Smith/sc	IDDZ	5-5912	SIG  G. Smith

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External Affairs / Affaires extérieures
Canada / Canada

IDDZ/J.McNee/5-5912/sc

TO/À MINA
FROM/DE • IDDZ

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

REFERENCE • Your memorandum of December 6
RÉFÉRENCE
SUBJECT • Responses on Conservative Party
SUJET Peace Proposals

Security/Sécurité	RESTRICTED
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	December 9, 1983
Number/Numéro	IDDZ-0267

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES
1

DISTRIBUTION

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Attached is a revised version of comments on Mr. Mulroney's proposals which has been prepared in anticipation of questions in the House.

2. This text was sent by telegram to the DPM/SSEA and Mr. Blais on December 8.

J. McNee
J. McNee
Task Force Working Group

On December 4, Mr. Mulroney put forward seven arms control initiatives. These are listed below with our comments.

1. Call on the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence to undertake immediately both a foreign and defence policy review, with special reference to existing zones of tension in the world and to examine and promote disarmament discussion in Canada.

COMMENT:

The Standing Committee already has a reference related to peacekeeping. Another reference to review foreign and defence policy would be a decision for DPM/SSEA.

2. Call on our government to resume Canada's leading role in promoting nuclear non-proliferation among those countries which now possess nuclear technology and which have the potential of developing non-peaceful uses of such technology. Further, call for continued support for full scope safeguards as a condition of supply of nuclear exports.

COMMENT:

Strengthening the non-proliferation regime of the NPT is one of the basic elements of the PM's initiative. It was stressed in both the PM's Guelph and Montreal speeches and was pursued by the PM at the recent Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in New Delhi.

Canadian government policy on nuclear co-operation with non-nuclear weapon states is to require ratification of the NPT or an equivalent binding commitment. Canadian nuclear exports are conditional on all states accepting in a bilateral agreement additional requirements designed to minimize the proliferation risk.

3. Call on our government to send an all party delegation -- at the highest levels -- to attend the conference on disarmament in Europe taking place in Stockholm in January; and encourage the use of this as a forum for discussion of disarmament issues and the promotion of measures for building confidence between East and West and the achievement of meaningful progress in arms control.

- 2 -

COMMENT:

Parliamentary observers have attended previous CSCE meetings, but they have not been part of the official delegation. To include parliamentarians in the official delegation as full-time working members would be for the DPM/SSEA to decide bearing in mind that this will be a long-term conference. The first task of this conference will be to agree on confidence and security building measures.

4. Call on the Secretary of State for External Affairs to urge consideration of a non-first-strike policy at the upcoming NATO foreign ministers meeting.

COMMENT:

"First strike" normally refers to the initiation of war through a massive surprise attack with nuclear weapons. Canada, the United States and all the European members of NATO adhere to a no "first strike" policy as is consistent with the obligations under the UN Charter. "First use" is normally used in a more restrictive sense to refer to the introduction of nuclear weapons into a conflict. At present NATO reserves the right to use any means at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, in response to aggression. Such a policy enhances deterrence because it leaves a potential aggressor uncertain as to how NATO would respond while being certain that it would. In this situation no potential aggressor can count on using conventional forces without nuclear risk.

The Warsaw Pact conventional forces heavily outweigh those of NATO. As long as this imbalance of conventional forces persists, so does the risk that nuclear weapons would be brought into action at an early stage of any conflict. The conclusion we draw is that the best way to raise the nuclear threshold is to establish a more reasonable balance of the conventional forces on each side.

The simple, though expensive, answer is for the West to increase its conventional forces until they match those of the Warsaw Pact. This is a last resort. The far more sensible approach would be for both sides to reduce their conventional forces to mutually agreed levels.

5. Call for the immediate re-appointment of an ambassador for disarmament, to give priority to encouraging support for the UN disarmament campaign.

- 3 -

COMMENT:

The appointment of an ambassador for disarmament is currently under consideration. In the interim, the PM's initiative is testimony to the importance the government attaches to disarmament.

6. Call on the Soviet Union to return to the INF disarmament talks in Geneva, failing which consideration be given to seeking a forum under which all disarmament talks can take place.

COMMENT:

The Government has already regretted the interruption of the talks and urged the Soviets to return. The PM has proposed a conference of all five nuclear powers to limit their nuclear arsenals. We do not consider it appropriate to combine all arms control and disarmament negotiations in one forum as that would create an impossible agenda.

7. Encourage efforts, both at the UN and regionally, to restrict the transfers of conventional arms especially to areas of conflict.

COMMENT:

Canada has strict controls on the export of military equipment; we oppose the introduction of offensive military equipment in areas of conflict.



MESSAGE

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---PM INITIATIVE
FLWG ARE PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ON LEADER OF OPPOSITION S ARMS CON-
TROL AND DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS PREPARED FOR ACTING SSEA FOR USE
IN QUESTION PERIOD:

(COMCENTRE PLS COPY ATTACHED QUOTE TO UNQUOTE)

*28-b-1 - Trudeau
Peace
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DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
 SIG J. McNEE	IDDZ	5-5912	 SIG G. SMITH

~~B R A F T~~

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QUOTE

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COMMENT:

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2. Call on our government to resume Canada's leading role in promoting nuclear non-proliferation among those countries which now possess nuclear technology and which have the potential of developing non-peaceful uses of such technology. Further, call for continued support for full scope safeguards as a condition of supply of nuclear exports.

COMMENT:

Strengthening the non-proliferation regime of the NPT is one of the basic elements of the PM's initiative. It was stressed in both the PM's Guelph and Montreal speeches and was pursued by the PM at the recent Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in New Delhi.

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RA

- 2 -

or an equivalent binding commitment. Canadian nuclear exports are conditional on all states accepting in a bilateral agreement additional requirements designed to minimize the proliferation risk.

3. Call on our government to send ^{AN} all party delegation -- at the highest levels -- to attend the conference on disarmament in Europe taking place in Stockholm in January; and encourage the use of this as a forum for discussion of disarmament issues and the promotion of measures for building confidence between East and West and the achievement of meaningful progress in arms control.

COMMENT:

Parliamentary observers have attended previous CSCE meetings, but they have not been part of the official delegation. To include parliamentarians in the official delegation as full-time working members would be for the DPM/SSEA to decide bearing in mind that this will be a long-term conference. *THE FIRST TASK OF THIS CONFERENCE WILL BE TO AGREE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES.*

4. Call on the Secretary of State for External Affairs to urge consideration of a non-first-strike policy at the upcoming NATO foreign ministers meeting.

COMMENT:

~~The PM has stressed that progress in MBFR is the key to increased security in Europe.~~

- 3 -

"First strike" normally refers to the initiation of war through a massive surprise attack with nuclear weapons. Canada, the United States and all the European members of NATO adhere to a no "first strike" policy as is consistent with the obligations under the UN Charter. "First use" is normally used in a more restrictive sense to refer to the introduction of nuclear weapons into a conflict. At present NATO reserves the right to use any means at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, in response to aggression. Such a policy enhances deterrence because it leaves a potential aggressor uncertain as to how NATO would respond while being certain that it would. In this situation no potential aggressor can count on using conventional forces without nuclear risk. ~~"No First Use" might be adopted by NATO as a~~

New para

~~policy if it were certain that NATO's conventional forces~~
~~were sufficient to deter any aggression. The Warsaw Pact conventional~~
forces heavily outweigh those of NATO. ~~There is an apprehension in Western Europe that the~~
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be brought into action at an early stage of any conflict. ~~That is why we say that the nuclear threshold~~
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~~How then do we achieve this balance? This question prompts the third element of my approach, The~~
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- 4
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COMMENT: 301

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- 4 -

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COMMENT:

~~THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY REGRETTED THE INTERRUPTION OF THE~~
~~The DPM/SSEA has already regretted the interruption of the~~
~~TALKS AND URGED THE SOVIETS TO RETURN.~~
~~talks and urged the Soviets to return.~~ The PM has proposed a conference of all five nuclear powers to limit their nuclear arsenals. We do not consider it appropriate to combine all arms control and disarmament negotiations in one forum as that would create an impossible agenda.

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COMMENT:

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28-6-1 - Trudeau
Peace
Mission

CONFIDENTIAL

December 8, 1983

IDDZ-0261

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (through R.R. Fowler)

Senator Charles Mathias' Request for an appointment.

Our embassy in Washington has passed on a request from Republican Senator Charles Mathias who would like to see you in Ottawa in early January to discuss East-West relations.

Mathias is a senior member of the Foreign Relations Committee and a respected, intelligent and influential Washington figure.

If your schedule permits, we recommend that you see Senator Mathias.

Do you agree?



J. L.A. Delvoie,
Chairman,
Task Force Working Group on
East-West Relations and
International Security

cc: PCO/Osbaldeston
EA/Shenstone
DND/Anderson
URR/Von Nostitz
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MINA/Dudoit

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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---SEN MATHIAS

REPUBLICAN SEN CHAS MATHIAS(MD)TOLD GOTLIEB ON WEEKEND THAT HE WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO SEE MR TRUDEAU IN OTT SOMETIME IN EARLY JAN.AS YOU KNOW,SEN MATHIAS,A SENIOR MEMBER OF FOREIGN RELATIONS CTTEE,IS A HIGHLY INTELLIGENT,RESPECTED AND INFLUENTIAL WSHDC POLITICAL FIGURE.WE UNDERSTAND HE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS EAST-WEST RELATIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER.GOTLIEB TOLD MATHIAS THAT HE WOULD RELAY MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER WHO KNEW OF AND RESPECTED HIS VIEWS.GOTLIEB ADDED HE FELT SURE PM WOULD BE HAPPY TO SEE HIM IF HIS TIMETABLE PERMITTED THIS AND THAT HE WOULD GET BACK TO HIM.PLS ADVISE IN DUE COURSE.

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MESSAGE

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---PM INITIATIVE

PM LETS TO ALL NATO HEADS OF GOVT (OCT 22-25): PM OUTLINED HIS THINKING AND CONCERNS ALONG LINES OF GUELPH SPEECH.

2. PM LETS TO SOVIET AND CHINESE LEADERS (EARLY NOV): PM EXPLAINED HIS CONCERNS AND BROACHED POSSIBILITY OF VISIT BY A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE.

3. MTGS WITH MC NAMARA ETC: PM SOUGHT TO ~~GOING~~ ^{OBTAIN} CURRENT EXPERT AND ACADEMIC THINKING ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. MTG WITH ARBATOV WAS COINCIDENTAL; IT ALLOWED PM TO GIVE PRELIM OUTLINE OF HIS INITIATIVE TO A KEY SOVIET INTERLOCUTOR.

28-6-1 - Hudson Peace Mission

OBTAIN
~~GOING~~

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

J. McNEE

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

G. SMITH



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ
FM/DE
TO/À
INFO
DISTR
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SUBJ/SUJ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0259 08DEC83
TO WSHDC DELIVER BY 081600
INFO
DISTR INFO BNATO DELIVER BY 082300
REF CNGNY PRMNY NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN

28-6-1 Trudeau Peace mission

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDR IDA RGB URR UGB
REF YOURTEL UNGR3006 07DEC ~~AND~~ KINSMAN/FOWLER/SMITH TELECON 08DEC
---PM MTG WITH REAGAN, 15DEC:MECHANICS
AS PER REFTelecon, GRATEFUL YOU (A) MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO HAVE REAGAN APPEAR WITH PM OUTSIDE WHITE HOUSE BEFORE ASSEMBLED PRESS (THIS IS FORMAT THAT OCCURRED DURING PMS WORKING VISIT TO WSHDC PRIOR TO WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT LAST MAY. YOU SHOULD ALSO BE AWARE THAT DPM/SSEA ALSO HAS VERY STRONG VIEWS TO THIS EFFECT); (B) INFORM YOUR CONTACTS THAT SHOULD LUNCHEON BE OFFERED BY SHULTZ 15DEC, PM WOULD BE PLEASED TO ACCEPT. HOWEVER WE ARE NOT/NOT PUSHING FOR THIS TO HAPPEN AND PM WILL PURSUE OTHER PLANS IF NOTHING OCCURS. PRESUME THAT SHOULD STATE DEPT ACT ON THIS IT WILL BE PURSUED THROUGH SHULTZ AND CONVEYED TO DPM/SSEA AT THEIR BILATERAL MTG IN BRU EARLY TOMORROW MORNING.
2. FOR BNATO/DELVOIE: PM IS NOT/NOT OF VIEW THAT HE IS BEING OFFERED INADEQUATE TREATMENT IN WSHDC AND REQUESTS THAT DPM/SSEA NOT/NOT PURSUE THIS POINT WITH SHULTZ.

8 DEC 83 20 08

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG <i>G. Smith</i> / SC	IDDZ	5-5912	SIG <i>G. Smith</i>

CONFIDENTIAL

08-12-83

RAFT

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace mission
WASHINGTON - OBJECTIVES OF VISIT

The PM's meeting with President Reagan should have the following essential objectives:

- (a) To reaffirm, as a starting point, Canada's place in the Western concert of nations and Canada's commitment to NATO and NORAD.
- (b) To reassure the Americans that the aim is not moral condemnation of the USA, nor is there any suggestion of moral equidistance between the two superpowers.
- (c) To elaborate on the PM's concerns regarding East-West relations and the international security situation, emphasizing need for dialogue and belief that reduction in rhetoric (including from USA) could improve climate and chances for progress in arms control.
- (d) To outline the PM's main proposals:
 - Five Power Conference (Crisis management could be referred to in this context)
 - MBFR (depending on NAC outcome)
 - CDE (PM could follow up Reagan telcon on HOG participation in CDE at appropriate time)
 - Non-proliferation
- (e) To report the PM's personal impressions on the results of his consultations with other governments (and his special emissary's visit to the Soviet Union).
- (f) To outline planned next steps, especially thinking on a Moscow visit.

...2

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

- (g) To broach idea of having Carrington undertake a study "Whither NATO in 1980's" to be submitted to NATO Summit in spring which Canada could host if USA had not planned to do so.
- (h) To secure Reagan's agreement on set of principles.
- (i) To elicit President Reagan's reactions and support.

TASK FORCE

MEMBERS

+ FILE

Dec. 8 - 5:45 p.m.

Gary:

Message from Shig:

"TORONTO STAR phoned up to know about the Institute mentioned in the Throne speech. Since I knew the guy was going to call on that subject, I spoke to Crenna, who had just spoken before to this guy, and Crenna told me what I could say and he cleared it with Archdeacon.

What I told the guy was that a number of proposals had been made at Val Morin and the Government was considering them and that something might be coming out in the next few weeks or months. But no firm decisions had been made.- still in thinking stage."

sc

MF

OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



CABINET DU
SECRETÉRIE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

MEMORANDUM

To
Office of the Under-Secretary

From
MINA

Reference
Référence

Subject
Sujet
Parliamentary-Report December 8

M. Delvaire + Took free

Security
Sécurité UNCLASSIFIED

December 8 1983

See attachment - Throne Speech

ON THE HILL

*28-6-1 - Trudeau
Peace Mission*

J.

The House met at 2:00. Following Question Period, Minister Pinard introduced amendments to the Income Tax Act (Bill C-2), Jack Burghardt moved the motion to commence the Throne Speech debate and Gaston Gourde seconded it. Mr. Mulroney will then likely seek the floor and move that debate be adjourned until tomorrow. This will permit him to speak first after Question Period tomorrow. He will followed by the Prime Minister and then Mr. Broadbent who will conclude the Leaders' Day debate speeches. Monday, the Throne Speech debate will continue with the first vote (on the NDP sub-amendment) at 5:45 p.m. Tuesday, the House will probably begin debate on the Income Tax amendments.

Yesterday, Members were summoned to the Senate where Governor-General Schreyer read the Throne Speech setting the Government's priorities for this new session (copy attached).

Q.P. questions of Departmental interest:
CDE MEETING IN STOCKHOLM; NUCLEAR FREEZE VERSUS ARMS REDUCTIONS.

Member Statements of Departmental interest:
Jean-Robert Gauthier praised the PM's peace initiative; Gordon Taylor urged the "decent burial" of the Govt that advocates the purchase of Communist farm equipment despite KAL; Aideen Nicholson wished the DPM/SSEA well in his efforts to persuade the European Community not to reduce its import quota for Canadian newsprint; Bob Ogle said relations with Honduras should be reconsidered in light of their refusal to permit 150 Nuns from Canada and the US to enter that country to participate in a peace vigil; Jim Peterson asked the Govt to continue to make representations on behalf of Refusniks in the Soviet Union and he condemned that country's treatment of Soviet Jews.

SENSE OF THE HOUSE

A buoyant Brian Mulroney led off Question Period for his Party and in the process, got off some of his best lines thus far. After welcoming back the PM from his latest trip abroad and promising his Party's cooperation in the peace pilgrimage, he asked the PM to clarify how much money was being allocated for youth opportunities. He noted that yesterday evening Minister Lalonde had said there was \$320 million in new funding while a short time earlier Minister Roberts had said the amount of new funding was \$400 million, "in fifteen minutes \$80 million slipped between the cracks." When the PM told him he thought the figure was closer to \$330 million, the Opposition Leader cracked "that's only \$80 million, the last time the Minister of Finance

DPM/SSEA (2)
MINA (11)
MINE/Jalbert/
Laverdure
MINT/Burbridge/
MacDonald
PMO/Fairbairn
PCO/Adam/Fadden

USS MCB
CMR (2) NAX
DMT PED
DMF PGB
CCB PPD
CCBR PSD
SFB RBD
TFB RCD
IFB RGB

FPR RSD
SCD
ADA SCS
APZ SCI
CCBM SCH
CCBA SFB
CGD SFP
CGE SID
CGL SIS
CGS TAD
CMD TID
CML UGB
CPD URD
EED XDX
EPB ZEP
EPD ZSP
ETD ZSS
GAD IMU
GGB
GMD ESD
IDD TGX
IDDZ
IMD TDD
JCD TED
LCD UTD
LCR
LGB

IDA RCT
IDR RBP
RCR URR

touched something, it cost us \$200 million" (this a reference to the last budget). The PM jibed "what would you have done?" Mr. Mulroney shot back "I'd have fired him and his predecessor", but he said he would have given former Minister Fleming the Order of Canada for that Member's comment that the Govt was run by "ballyhoo, cynicism and manipulation," and he offered to give the PM more advice but he wouldn't charge him \$800 per day. The PM countered that the Opposition Leader and he certainly agreed on one point - Mr. Mulroney is not worth \$800 per day.

In other debate, both Opposition Parties used the contents of the Throne Speech to attack the Govt. Jim McGrath and Nelson Riis continued the criticism of the funding for youth employment. Jake Epp and Bill Blaikie dismissed as "deceit and sham" the additional \$500 million to be allocated for Medicare. Don Mazankowski asked what new rail services would be offered and Flora MacDonald was concerned about the effects of technological change on blue-collar workers.

The employment by the Justice Dept of Mr. Jim MacDonald and his contract agency NUNIVAT was condemned as patronage by Ray Hnatyshyn and Allan Lawrence.

CDE MEETING IN STOCKHOLM

The PM told the House in answer to a planted question from Paul McRae that the DPM/SSEA had informed him this morning that the NATO Foreign Ministers had agreed that representation at the upcoming CDE meeting in Stockholm would be at the Foreign Ministers' level. The PM also praised the NATO leaders for their decision to make every effort to provide an answer as soon as possible to the Soviet counter proposals at the MBFR talks in Vienna.

NUCLEAR FREEZE VERSUS ARMS REDUCTIONS

Pauline Jewett urged the PM to advocate a verifiable nuclear freeze when he meets with Mr. Reagan next week and Mr. Andropov in the near future. The PM said the freeze proposal is "not something the super-powers would agree on since they disagree on different kinds of deployment." He claimed that before a verifiable freeze could be achieved, there must be arms reduction and this would be the aim of his talks in Washington. The PM noted that NATO had taken a step in this direction with the announcement last month that some 2000 warheads would be eliminated from the NATO arsenal.



D. Colin Robertson
Departmental Assistant

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I have the honour to inform the House that when the House of Commons did attend His Excellency the Governor General this day in the Senate Chamber, His Excellency was pleased to make a speech to both Houses of Parliament. To prevent mistakes I have obtained a copy which is as follows:

*Honourable Members of the Senate,
Members of the House of Commons:*

I have the honour to welcome you to the Second Session of the 32nd Parliament of Canada.

Canadians had the great pleasure of welcoming their Royal Highnesses, The Prince and Princess of Wales on an extended tour in June and July of this year. All who saw them were impressed by their friendly, out-going manner and their youthful dignity. As well, since April 1980, we have had the pleasant duty of hosting and meeting with fourteen foreign Heads of State visiting Canada.

We join fellow Canadians in looking forward to the scheduled visit to Canada in 1984 of Her Majesty, the Queen, and His Royal Highness, the Duke of Edinburgh, who will tour the provinces of Ontario, New Brunswick and Manitoba.

You recently completed an historic session of Parliament. The Constitution was brought home and with it came the final attainment of full Canadian sovereignty. The entrenchment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms will forever help protect the liberty of our citizens. The vital energy and transportation industries are being transformed by the passage of the National Energy Program and the Western Grain Transportation Act. A co-operative national campaign to cut the rate of inflation in half was initiated through the 6 and 5 program. Members and Honourable Senators present all played an active part in these momentous events.

We meet today in a perilous time. East-West tensions are rising. Violence stalks many lands. The resort to force is a daily occurrence. The nuclear threat preys upon the hopes and dreams of every man and woman on the planet. The pursuit of peace must be the paramount goal of mankind. In this quest we must not fail.

For the past several years Canadians, indeed all people, have coped not only with the melancholy of the nuclear threat, but with the reality of the worst recession since the 1930s. This recession, which left more than thirty million people unemployed in the industrialized nations alone, is fortunately ending. Unemployment in all countries will remain too high for too long. But Canada has dramatically reduced the inflation which was the origin of this downturn. Our regained strength, combined with the proper mix of public policies, can now return the country to economic health and move us to new achievements.

So we must work for two goals central to the well-being of Canadians—to secure peace and to secure prosperity.

Abroad, the Government has begun the task of helping to construct a global partnership for peace.

At home, the Government's efforts will be directed to building a national partnership for prosperity.

To attain these goals, a comprehensive program will be presented:

- to seek fresh approaches to world peace;
- to encourage economic growth so that more Canadians can own a home, learn a trade, expand a business, participate in the ownership of our resources and gain a fair share of the abundant benefits this country can provide;
- to develop new partnerships among business, labour, government and other groups so that together we will build a better future;
- to preserve Medicare, increase pensions for the elderly, improve public safety, extend native rights, and further protect the freedom of individuals; and
- to reinforce Canada's identity through enhanced recognition of our cultural heritage and increased support for our creative artists by new broadcasting, telecommunications and copyright policies.

I. Canada's Role in Seeking World Peace

Thirty-five million people have been killed in wars since 1945, and the possibility of a major conflict is a danger no nation can ignore. In the four decades since the Second World War, Canada and its allies have sought to preserve peace through substantial contributions to Western collective defence and sustained efforts to resolve differences with our adversaries. Yet the current international situation is cause for considerable concern, even anguish.

The Government, in close consultation with our allies, intends to devote its full resources to exploration of every possible means to restore confidence and trust to the international scene. It will continue to advance proposals to slow the steady spiral of the arms race, halt the spread of nuclear weapons and create the conditions for greater security at lower levels of armament.

Canada will continue to make a responsible contribution to collective defence, in fulfillment of its obligations to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the North American Air Defence Command. The Government will maintain its commitment to 3 percent real growth annually in defence expenditure, thus ensuring that our forces are equipped with modern conventional weapons. Canadian forces will not be armed with nuclear weapons. Announcements will be made regarding conventional weapons procurement programs.

Renewed attention, too, will be given to the contribution Canada can make to peace and stability through peacekeeping operations under the control of the United Nations, particularly where local crises risk escalation into wider conflict.

Improving the climate among nations requires knowledge, creativity and a determination to find solutions. Reflecting Canada's concern about current international tensions, the Government will create a publicly funded centre to gather, collate and digest the enormous volume of information now available on defence and arms control issues. Fresh ideas and new proposals, regardless of source, will be studied and promoted.

Canadians want more than ever to become personally involved in the quest for peace. The Government will increase its funding for voluntary associations and private research groups interested in security, arms control and disarmament issues. Resources for research and development of verification procedures, the basis of successful arms control agreements, will be expanded substantially.

Economic progress is a crucial contributor to peace and stability. Recognizing the urgent needs of developing countries, the Government will maintain its commitment to overseas development aid. Canada will achieve aid goals of 0.5 percent of the Gross National Product by 1985, and 0.7 percent of the GNP by the end of this decade. Increased involvement of voluntary organizations and the co-operative movement will be sought in the delivery of this aid. Particular attention will continue to be given to the growing world food crisis, through existing programs, and the new International Centre for Ocean Development.

II. Opportunities through Growth

Lasting employment for all Canadians wanting work is a critical national objective. Since last December, 353,000 new jobs have been created by the economy. Through the injection of close to \$5 billion in stimulus, the April 1983

Recovery Budget set in motion hundreds of needed capital projects across Canada, and helped make possible a return to much higher rates of private sector investment.

While young people will receive special attention, the employment strategy of the Government will touch every group in society. Additional funds for this winter will be allocated to the Canada Works Program. Job opportunities in forestry, mining and the fishery will be enhanced through flexible uses of Unemployment Insurance funds.

Two new programs will be introduced. Canada's massive, diverse and vital voluntary sector will receive incentives to hire Canadians through a National Voluntary Service. A conservation corps—Environment 2000—will be created to employ Canadians to carry out essential tasks in reforestation and national park development.

Developing our Regional Strengths

Direct action to create jobs is essential. But the major opportunity for increasing employment is through the expansion of our industrial and resource sectors. We must reconstruct the basis for long-term economic growth and seize the opportunities provided by the recovery.

We must start by building on our regional strengths.

To ensure a strong national economy capable of providing jobs and meeting the needs of all Canadians, wherever they may live, federal programs and funding have already been re-organized in a new Industrial and Regional Development Program. It will support recovery through concrete initiatives, taking maximum advantage of the strengths and attributes of every region.

A new era of federal-provincial planning and consultation is being launched. Federal economic development activities will more effectively support regional economic opportunities and the reduction of regional disparities. To this end, negotiations are underway to sign comprehensive Economic and Regional Development Agreements with the provinces. These agreements will include such key sectors as agriculture, forestry, minerals, tourism, transportation and industrial development. The first of these agreements was recently concluded with the Province of Manitoba. Federal purchases of goods and services, worth over \$6 billion annually, will be planned in co-operation with the private sector to maximize regional and industrial benefits.

An Aggressive Trade Drive

Canada is a trading nation and a substantial part of our future growth must be led by exports. To spur this growth, the Government proposes a series of policy initiatives.

The scope of the successful Program for Export Market Development (PEMD) will be extended to support service industries and to encourage private trading houses.

Under current import duty remission procedures, "duty free export zones" will be established for the manufacturing and processing in bond of goods for export; as well, the Customs Act will be streamlined and modernized.

Active pursuit of world product mandates by Canadian subsidiaries of multinational corporations, and the winning of additional export markets by Canadian companies, will be assisted by competition policy and direct funding.

To promote Canada's position as a Pacific Rim nation, the Government will move to facilitate establishment of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada.

While seeking new markets in the Pacific Rim, Europe and the developing world, we must continue to expand business and improve relations with our largest trading partner, the United States. Sectoral trade agreements with the United States will be examined in such areas as specialty steel products, urban transportation equipment, petrochemicals, textiles and clothing.

Competitive World-Class Industries

To compete in the world economy, Canada needs to modernize capital facilities, develop new industries and rebuild plant and equipment.

A key element in sustaining Canada's growth and creating jobs will be the increased use of micro-electronic technology. Legislation will be introduced to confirm the tax incentives for research and development announced in the April Recovery Budget. Further steps will be taken to implement the technology policy announced earlier this year, including creation of a national micro-electronics design network. The Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council will receive additional funds. A newly created Office of Industrial Innovation will work closely with Canadian industry to develop commercial application of new technologies.

The automobile industry is crucial to our economic well-being. Stabilizing employment in automobile manufacturing and its supplier industries is an essential task. The Government intends to seek a Canada-Japan Auto Agreement for the benefit of both countries, leading to additional production facilities and parts procurement in Canada.

Planning for industrial reconstruction and new investment must be based on business-labour-government consensus. Sectoral collaboration is at the core of the Government's industrial policy. Three business-labour task forces, on the automotive, aerospace and forestry industries, have now reported and are receiving responses. Another task force on the petro-chemical industry is underway. The benefits of such collaboration are already evident—in aerospace, more than 8,000 new, permanent, high-technology jobs and potential new export sales of over \$20 billion will result from the Government's initiatives with Bell Helicopter and Pratt & Whitney. Additional task forces are planned on information technology, private trading houses, textiles and clothing, shipbuilding and a deep-sea fleet, and selected elements of the service sector.

Small scale entrepreneurs are the unsung heroes of the recovery. Small businesses are a perpetual source of inventiveness, valuable export earnings, and vast job creation potential. To assist this sector, an expanded Shop Canadian program will be launched. Access to federal programs for small businesses will be improved using the Federal Business Development Bank for delivery.

Tourism is a source of income for hundreds of thousands of Canadians and is particularly important to the small business sector. A national tourism strategy, developed in co-operation with the industry and the provinces, will promote each region's special features. Canada's attractions will be aggressively marketed both at home and abroad, and especially in the United States.

Young Canadians want to know their country better. Older Canadians deserve a chance to see the land they have built. A new Canadian rail pass, similar to the Eurailpass, and other forms of discount fares will be initiated.

Additional attention will be given to the needs of the travelling public. Domestic air transportation will be reviewed with the object of reducing fares. The safety of air travel will be improved through funding for a new independent Aviation Safety Board.

The Via Rail system will be upgraded through construction of new maintenance facilities in Western, Central, and Atlantic Canada. New trains will be developed for light density routes. Passenger services will be extended 1001300 traffic volumes warrant.

As part of the Government's thrust for growth, measures will be introduced to modernize and upgrade the fishery, forestry, mining and agriculture.

The Government of Canada recently took the lead in a restructuring of the Atlantic fishing industry. Above and beyond the funds for restructuring itself, nearly \$200 million is being put to work improving fish grading, freezer facilities and for other measures of benefit to independent processors and individual fishermen. Funds for the fishing vessel assistance program will be increased for 1983-1984.

The fishery agreement with the Province of Newfoundland marked a turning point in the Government's relations with that province. It provides a promising basis for future co-operation in the best interests of Newfoundlanders.

The Pacific fishery—commercial, sports and native—is an important national resource. The Government recognizes that the problems of this essential west coast industry require urgent attention.

In addition to monies already provided for capital facilities, substantial funding to assist the Quebec fishing co-operative will be announced shortly.

Many Canadian communities depend on mining or forestry as their sole industry. The new regional development agreements will pay particular attention to the mining sector. The Government's forest renewal strategy will also be extended via these agreements, through the conservation corps—Environment 2000—and by additional funding for forestry research and development.

To help ensure that food production will continue to be one of Canada's long-term strengths, a livestock stabilization program will be established in co-operation with the provinces. Amendments will be proposed to the powers of the National Farm Products Marketing Council. A commission of inquiry will study the problems of potato marketing in Eastern Canada. The maximum for advance payments for grain will be increased. Amendments will be introduced to the Western Grain Stabilization Act to make it more responsive to the needs of producers.

Abundant clean water is a precious Canadian resource. Investment in Prairie water and soil requirements will expand, especially through the work of the new hydrology laboratory in Saskatoon. The Government welcomes the United States Government's increased recognition of our mutual problems of water quality. The negotiation of an agreement with the United States on acid rain will be pursued and efforts to reduce Canadian sulphur emissions will proceed.

Energy policy must continue to command the attention of Canadians. The framework for achieving our national goals of energy self-sufficiency and increased Canadian ownership was put in place with the passage of the National Energy Program. It now forms an integral part of the long-term planning of energy companies, large and small. Petroleum Incentive Payments, in particular, encourage both new sources of supply and enhanced Canadian ownership. The Government will continue its strong commitment to the NEP in order to ensure that our goals are reached. Legislation will also be introduced to confirm the Canada-Nova Scotia Energy Agreement—a stimulus to new large-scale development off Canada's east coast.

III. Partnership for Recovery

In its early stages the recession, in combination with high rates of inflation, caused a deterioration in our sense of community. Each major group in society sought to blame economic decline on someone else. Later, however, Canadians recognized that to avert the downward spiral they needed to turn away from past divisions and work together to restore growth and prosperity. This new co-operative spirit has already produced tangible results in sharply reduced inflation, renewed growth, and enhanced employment prospects. But more is required.

The Minister of Finance has already begun a new round of economic consultations with provincial governments and other economic partners. Building on this initiative, the Government intends to introduce more permanent mechanisms of consultation. Regular economic outlook conferences involving labour, business, government and other interested parties will be called to pool information, to exchange views about the prospects ahead and to improve the basis for co-operative action. A new Industrial and Regional Development Board, jointly chaired by representatives from labour and business, will be formed to give practical advice on how best to implement the Government's industrial policy.

Work with the other economic partners to consolidate the gains from the 6 and 5 program of June 1982 will proceed.

While stimulating job creation, the Government will hold to a fiscal policy track which will contain and then curb the federal deficit as recovery strengthens. Administered prices will not be allowed to run ahead of other prices.

Following extensive and continuing consultations with the private sector and the provinces, the Government will introduce a new competition policy to bring market forces to bear in the continuing fight against inflation. The legislation will modernize conspiracy, monopoly and merger provisions, and promote the interests of consumers and small business through a freer marketplace. Amendments will also facilitate consortia to compete abroad for export sales and development projects.

To develop new ways in which co-operative, credit unions and caisses populaires can make even more of a contribution to the economy, the Government will support the formation of a task force. It will explore how co-operatives can

work alongside the private and public sectors to pursue an expanded role in the fishery, communications, manufacturing services and international trade.

Opening the Door to Labour

Labour has been and should continue to be a full partner in the process of economic recovery. Workers deserve a fair share of the recovery's benefits and an equal voice in the resolution of issues like technological change and productivity improvement.

North American, European and Japanese experience shows that productivity is a co-operative endeavour, not a punitive process of seeking more work for less reward. Greater productivity results from a combination of progressive management, ingenious technology, and high employee morale. It is the main long-term guarantor of increased real wages for Canadians.

A system of awards will be inaugurated to recognize the contributions of companies, labour organizations and individuals to Canada's productivity and competitiveness.

New technologies are a major hope for improving the quality of many monotonous and dangerous jobs. Workers in such jobs welcome new technology that is introduced in a planned and sensitive manner and that helps to create a safer environment and more secure employment. A fund will be created for Labour Canada to support research into the effects of technological change and to conduct joint information exchanges between management and workers.

The Government has worked closely with labour and business representatives to establish a new centre for productivity and employment growth. Reconciling the advantages of technology with the needs of workers will be one of the main tasks of this centre. Consultations to create the centre are being completed and linked with efforts to forecast and plan better for future labour requirements.

This Government believes that the maintenance and improvement of workers' rights are fully consistent with, and indeed essential to, increased productivity.

A fundamental aspect of productivity is a secure, safe environment for workers. Changes will be introduced to the Canada Labour Code to improve occupational safety and health, to establish labour standards relating to sexual harassment, and to upgrade standards on parental leave. Legislation will provide for consolidation under a single act of occupational safety and health standards that apply to federally regulated industries, and for the extension of the same standards to federal public servants.

Selected Crown corporations and units of the public service will be encouraged to test new methods of co-operative productivity improvement. These may have wider application in both public and private sectors.

The framework for the accountability and control of federal Crown corporations will be improved and a bill will be introduced to confirm in law the Canada Development Investment Corporation to better manage Crown assets. Labour representatives will be invited to join the boards of directors of selected Crown corporations. For many years, there has been an exchange of senior executives between corporations and the Government. This program, Interchange Canada, will now actively seek labour participants as well.

Part-time work is a growing trend. Consultations on pension rights and fringe benefits for the part-time work force will be undertaken with provincial governments, labour and business.

IV. Strengthening the Safety Net

The number one social priority of the Government is to reduce poverty among the aged. One of the first acts of the last session was to increase by \$35 per month per household the Guaranteed Income Supplement. Indexation of the GIS means that this income has been fully protected against inflation. But more is required to help the single pensioner who is in need. Legislation will be introduced to increase the supplement for single pensioners providing additional assistance to more than 700,000 Canadians.

Beyond helping the elderly most in need, the pension system itself must be reformed to reduce poverty in the future.

The Government is committed to improving the adequacy and fairness of our retirement income system at the earliest possible date and in a manner that will not impede economic recovery. The report of the Parliamentary Task Force on Pension Reform will soon be published. Based on consensus, the Government will take steps to strengthen both public and private pension plans so that Canadians can be better assured of security, dignity and fulfillment in retirement. Reforms

to be pursued under the Pension Benefits Standards Act will include improvements in coverage, vesting, portability, survivor benefits, benefit protection and mandatory splitting of pension credits. Concurrence of provincial governments will be sought on changes to pension benefit standards and to the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans in order to ensure that pensioners receive comparable benefits wherever they live in the country.

The health care system is of central importance to all Canadians. The Government is committed to maintaining the equitable system, built up over the past two decades, for payment of medical care and hospital costs. It must not be eroded and eventually destroyed through extra charges to the sick. A new Canada Health Act will be introduced to clarify the objectives of Canada's health insurance system and ensure that universal access to health care continues.

Financial assistance to the provinces for medical care, hospital care and post-secondary education programs will be greatly increased this year. More than \$500 million, above and beyond the \$13 billion estimated at the start of the year, will be transferred to the provinces in 1983-84. This increased level of financial support, at a time when resources are limited, demonstrates the strength of the Government's commitment to maintaining the quality and integrity of our country's health services and post-secondary education.

The Government will continue its efforts to help reduce the long-term costs of health care through attention to preventive programs, health facilities design, indoor air quality, physical fitness and support for para-medical services.

New Protection for Homes and Businesses

Canadians require improved security against losing their home or business.

The Government recognizes the concerns of homeowners and potential home buyers about the uncertainty of future mortgage costs. Legislation and other measures will be proposed to further strengthen confidence in the housing market by giving greater protection to homeowners. The choice of mortgage instruments will be broadened. These measures should increase the accessibility and security of home ownership, provide a greater measure of confidence and stability to the homebuilding industry, and enhance the flexibility of the mortgage market.

Attention will also be given to the need for long-term farm, fishery and small business financing.

High interest rates have taken a substantial toll among businesses, and especially among farmers, revealing important weaknesses in our bankruptcy laws. Revisions will be sought to increase the flexibility of these laws, to introduce a system of pre-bankruptcy arbitration for farmers, and to give greater protection to the wages of workers.

Personal Safety and Security

Canadians are increasingly concerned about the incidence of violent crime. Flowing from a complete review of the Criminal Code, legislative proposals will include increased mandatory sentences for violent offenders. Law enforcement to prevent importation of illegal drugs and trafficking will be improved. Stiffer penalties and procedures will be introduced to keep drunk drivers off our roads and highways. Support for voluntary crime prevention programs such as Neighbourhood Watch will be strengthened.

Victims of crime must receive more consideration. Greater flexibility will be provided to allow restitution to victims. Amendments to the Criminal Code will help speed up the administration of justice to ensure that victims do not suffer twice—during the crime and then during the wait for a trial.

Hard core pornography, which often emphasizes violence and degradation of women, has no place in Canadian society. The Government will act immediately to introduce amendments to the Criminal Code on pornography. It will also consider further legislation after receiving the reports of two expert committees, on pornography and prostitution; and sexual offenses against children.

You will be asked to consider revised legislation to create a Canadian Security Intelligence Service. A bill will be introduced to give full protection to the personal privacy and rights of individual Canadians in the conduct of the Service's activities. Changes to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act will provide for improved attention to grievances by private citizens.

So that individual Canadians and their communities can be better prepared for unanticipated events, the federal Government will work in co-operation with the provinces to give increased attention to emergency planning, during the coming year.

Securing Individual Rights

The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Privacy and Access to Information legislation and other measures taken by the Government reaffirm our belief in the primacy of the individual. A bill will be introduced to revise all federal laws so that they conform to the Charter.

The rapid pace of social change in Canadian society has been reflected in a much higher divorce rate. You will be asked to consider a new Divorce Act to make this painful legal process more equitable and less complex. Work will continue with provincial governments to strengthen procedures for enforcement of maintenance and custody orders.

More funding will be provided for women's voluntary organizations and for research on women's issues. The recommendations of the Federal-Provincial Task Force on Family Violence will be pursued by continuing to allocate social housing units to provide shelters for the victims of such violence. The subject of day care has been placed on the agenda of a federal-provincial meeting of ministers responsible for the status of women, to be held early in the new year. A progress report on the decade since the United Nations' International Women's Year will be prepared.

Pilot projects will be undertaken to improve access to public transportation for the physically disabled. A national plan of action will continue the work of removing other obstacles to full participation of the disabled in our society, and Parliament will be given the opportunity to review progress in attaining this goal.

Action will soon be taken to respond to the report of the Parliamentary Committee on Indian Self-Government. The Government will introduce a bill to remove the long-standing grievance of discrimination against Indian women under the Indian Act. Funding will be provided for continued job creation programs on Indian reserves.

In March 1984, at the second Constitutional Conference on Aboriginal Rights, the Government will address equality rights, aboriginal title, treaties, aboriginal and treaty rights, land and resources, and aboriginal self-government.

V. Pursuing our Canadian Identity

We Canadians know that our diversity—our lack of pressure to conform to a single mold—is an integral part of our identity. Canadian variety, tolerance and civility are to be treasured and nurtured.

If Canadians are not to be strangers in their own land, however, radio and television must both inform us and enlarge our horizons. To this end, legislation will be presented to implement the new National Broadcasting Policy. This policy will assure greater Canadian content on the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, extend French language program services, improve international marketing of Canadian cultural products, enhance regional and native access to broadcasting services, and provide incentives for private production of programs.

In recognition of the proliferation of electronic technologies, new policies for film, video and sound recording will be introduced to strengthen the private production industry. Revised telecommunications legislation will also be advanced. Proposals will be made to change the copyright laws to provide greater protection for the work of artists, authors, and entertainers.

The definition of a registered charity under the Income Tax Act and related matters will be referred to a joint parliamentary task force.

Immigrants have always brought new ideas, energy, and talent to Canadian society. A new act will be introduced to give statutory recognition to the Government's policy of multiculturalism. To recognize the valuable contributions of immigrants over 65 years of age, most of the formal requirements for Canadian citizenship, aside from residency, will be relaxed for those over that age. The Government will continue to promote a wider knowledge of our two official languages, and to support the voluntary sector in over a thousand projects of heritage language instruction, offered to 125,000 students. The Government will give early attention to the report of the Parliamentary Task Force on Visible Minorities and will act to strengthen laws against hate literature.

The Government will continue to promote balanced development of the Yukon and Northwest Territories, to settle aboriginal claims, and to foster the evolution of responsible government in the North. Funds will be provided through the Northern Oil and Gas Action Plan to ensure that northerners are involved in preparing for oil and gas development. In view of the need to sustain more permanent communities in the North, an early announcement will be made regarding the taxation of northern benefits.

The Government invites all Members to support its program for growth, opportunity, security, partnership and peace. The months ahead will be decisive ones for Canada. Special efforts will be made to consult with other parties on the timing of legislative measures. Constructive amendments proposed by the Opposition will be given full consideration.

Immediate action is proposed on recommendations by the all-party committee regarding parliamentary reforms. The Government will continue to take an active interest in the work of the Senate-House Committee on Senate Reform.

Members of the House of Commons:

You will be asked to appropriate the funds required to carry on the services and expenditures authorized by Parliament. You will be asked to consider a budget. You will be asked to consider other legislation required for the resolution of specific economic, social and legal problems.

Honourable Members of the Senate:

Members of the House of Commons:

May Divine Providence guide you in your deliberations.



National Défense
Defence nationale

MAJOR FILE

ORAE 2230-155/N2 (D Strat A)

Operational Research and
Analysis Establishment
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0K2

8 December, 1983

Department of External Affairs
Lester B. Pearson Building
125 Sussex Drive
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0G2

ATTENTION: IDR
~~MR. HANSON~~

28-6-1-Tudor Peace
Mission

Reference: A. Telecon Hanson/Pritchard 1 December, 1983

1. In response to the request of Reference A, we have prepared, with assistance of your material, two chronologies of arms reduction proposals as follows:

- a. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
(first entry: 1977) (copy enclosed)
- b. Strategic Nuclear Forces
(first entry: 1980) (copy enclosed)

2. Concerning the chronologies forwarded herewith, any questions should be directed to Mr. Brian Mandell (2-6147).

John Pritchard
for K.J. Calder

Director Strategic Analysis
for Chief

Operational Research and Analysis Establishment

Enclosures (2)

RECEIVED - REÇU
DEC 9 1983
IN IDD

ARMS REDUCTION PROPOSALS
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

USA

USSR

1980

Fall 1980 election campaign, Reagan announces abandonment of SALT II Treaty in favour of treaty emphasizing actual reductions.

1981

Jan: Both sides announce they will abide by terms of unratified SALT II Treaty.

1982

May 9: Reagan Speech at Eureka College

FIRST PHASE: - Reduce deployed ballistic missile warheads to 5,000 on each side,
- limit number of land-based ballistic warheads to 2,500
- cut total of deployed ballistic missiles to 850.

SECOND PHASE: - US seeks reduction to equal levels of throw-weight
- US seeks an equal ceiling on other elements of strategic nuclear forces.

1982

Jun: USA proposed limit of 850 on deployed ICBMs and reduction of warheads to 5,000 on each side, no more than half to be on ICBMs. Discussion of aircraft and missile throw-weight to be postponed to second phase.

Jun: USSR criticized USA proposals for limiting USSR land-based systems without sufficiently constraining USA aircraft and cruise missiles.

USSR proposed aggregate limit on each side of 1,800 strategic delivery vehicles, undefined aggregate limit on "nuclear charges", and ban on cruise missiles with range greater than 600 km.

USA

USSR

1983

Jan 2: USSR offered comprehensive statement of START position.

- strategic weapons should be frozen
- stage-by-stage cuts to reach level of 1800 launchers by 1992 and reduction of warheads to an equal level
- US agreement not to increase FBS
- cruise missiles of a range greater than 600 kilometres to be prohibited.

1983

Feb-Mar: -US tabled drafty treaty on confidence building measures

- Each side would be required to provide prior notification of all missile tests launches, exercises involving more than 50 bombers in a 24-hour period and any significant increase in submarines at sea
- US also tabled "basic elements" of a START agreement; same as previous May-June proposals plus added "collateral restraints" on Soviet MIRVed ICBMs and heavy missiles
- Cruise missile restrictions were open to discussion but to include all types of cruise missiles, not only long-range.

.../3

USA

USSR

1983

1983

Jun-Jul: Reagan outlines new START proposal (8 Jun) 850 limit on deployed ballistic missile launchers to be "relaxed". The new missile launcher limit would lie between 850 and 1450 with the exact number to be offered in subsequent negotiations. Central element to be limit of 5,000 on ICBM warheads. Agreed to discuss all strategic systems. Equal ceiling for both sides on heavy bombers and bomber-carried cruise missiles, below SALT II ceiling. Offered to explore alternative approaches to limiting destructive capability and potential of ICBMs.

Jun 9: USSR offered new proposals at Geneva

- new SLBMS would be permitted such as Trident II (earlier Soviet proposals called for a ban on new SLBMS
- air-launched cruise missiles to be permitted pending subsequent negotiations
- confidence-building measures to be explored in further negotiations

Jul 7: US tabled draft treaty in Geneva

- one phase of reductions with bombers and cruise missiles covered along with ballistic missiles, but no overall launcher ceiling
- Ballistic missiles would be limited to approximately 1,250
- Bombers and cruise missiles would be limited to 400 bombers with 20-28 cruise missiles each.
- Warheads would be limited to 5,000 with no more than 2,500 land-based (same as earlier proposal)
- US offered 2 possible approaches to limiting throw-weight: an overall throw-weight of 2.5 million kilograms (or a "reasonable" number though not necessarily as low as the current US level of 1.8 million kilograms)

Jul 7: USSR offered details of treaty at Geneva

- by end of 1985: reduction to 2,250 launches, with no more than 820 MIRVed ICBMs; no more than 1,320 could be MIRVed ICBMs, MIRVed SLBMs, or bombers with ALCMs (i.e. the SALT II limits)
- by end of 1987: reduction to 2,000 launchers with no more than 750 MIRVed ICBMs and no more than 1,250 MIRVed (?) ICBMs, MIRVed SLBMs or bombers with ALCMs
- by end of 1990: reduction to 1,800 launchers

.../4

USA

USSR

Jul 7: - or, adopt indirect throw-weight limits
- proposed ban on telemetry encryption

Jul 7: - no more than 680 MIRVed ICBMs, and no more than 1,200 MIRVed ICBMs, MIRVed SLBMs, or bombers with ALCMs; of the 1,200 no more than 1,080 to be MIRVed missiles (thus 120 bombers with ALCMs are permitted
- a warhead reduction to a level below the present American level
- an offer to drop limits on Typhoon and Trident.

Jul 25: US offered verification annex for its START draft treaty proposal; includes monitoring of production of ICBMs at their assembly plants, with the possibility of verifying production and storage.

Oct-Nov: US proposed working group be established to study new US formula for reductions known as "Build-down"
- US offering of "general principles on "Build-Down": Build-down rules should create incentives favouring stabilizing systems
- in particular ~~small~~, single warhead ICBMs - and should penalize destabilizing systems such as MIRVed ICBMs (by requiring the destruction of 3 warheads, for each new warhead on a MIRVed ICBM).

Oct: - Unsigned "Pravda" article criticized "build-down" proposal on grounds it would unfairly constrain Soviet ICBMs.

.../5

USA

USSR

- Oct: - "Build-down" proposal: link reductions to modernization by using variable ratios to determine number of existing warheads to be withdrawn as new ones are deployed. Guaranteed annual build-down of approximately 5%. Pace of reductions to be determined by which ever of these provisions would produce greater reductions. Proposal for concurrent discussion of build-down of bombers, limitations on cruise missiles, and limits on USA advantage in bombers.
- DOUBLE BUILD DOWN PROPOSAL:
(To be discussed in talks parallel to the existing formal negotiating structure
 - BUILD-DOWN A: MISSILE WARHEADS
 - MODERNIZATION BUILD-DOWN: Covers missile warheads only
 - for every new fixed ICBM warhead deployed, two old warheads must be destroyed
 - for every three new SLBM warheads deployed, two old warheads must be destroyed
 - FIVE-PERCENT BUILD-DOWN:
if annual increase (due to modernization build-down) in the number of warheads deployed is less than 5% for either side, then that side must decrease its number of warheads by at least 5%
 - BUILD-DOWN B: DESTRUCTIVE CAPACITY:
 - seeks a reduction in destructive capacity of all strategic systems (i.e. Soviet missile throw-weight VS. US bombers and ALCMs)
 - no method of measuring destructive capacity offered.

SOVIET REACTION TO BUILD-DOWN

- The Soviets have rejected, build-down or any working group to study it.

Dec 7 - START SESSION ended and Soviets refused to set date for resumption of talks.

ARMS REDUCTION PROPOSALS
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF)

USA

USSR

1977

- SS-20 deployments begin European USSR

1978

Dec - 70 SS-20s deployed in and Asian USSR

1979

Oct - Brezhnev proposal for freeze on SS-20 deployments if NATO does not deploy any counter-part systems.

1979

Dec 12 - NATO "two-track decision to negotiate reduction or elimination of INF on both sides, and if necessary to modernize NATO forces in response to Soviet deployments.

- NATO "two-track" decision
- Signal of political will from West
- in response to Soviet first strike, NATO is ready to respond instantly with full range of available weapons.

1980

Jul - USSR agreed to INF negotiations having previously refused to do so if NATO did not first abandon "two-track" decision.

.../2

- 2 -

USA

USSR

1980

Oct - Preliminary talks with USSR on
INF

1980

Oct - Preliminary talks with US on
INF

1981

Feb 23 - Bilateral Moratorium

- During the 26th Congress of Communist Party, Brezhnev suggested a moratorium in Europe of new medium range nuclear missiles with a view toward freezing the quantitative and qual. level of these weapons
- US forward based nuclear weapons also to be included in this freeze.

1981

Nov 18 - INF talks begin in Geneva. Reagan "zero option" proposal to eliminate all land-based, longer-range INF missiles.

THE ZERO OPTION

- In return for cancelling deployment of American missiles, Soviets would "dismantle" all its intermediate-range missiles wherever deployed.
- reductions in other US and Soviet nuclear systems to be sought in subsequent phases
- both sides to halt deployment of shorter-range missiles as an accompanying measure
- French and British forces not to be taken into account.

Nov 23 - Moratorium and Unilateral reduction, or removal of all weapons

- Brezhnev repeated moratorium offer and said "we could unilaterally reduce a certain portion of our medium - range nuclear weapons in the European part of the Soviet Union".

1982

Feb 3 - USSR Proposal to reduce to 300 launchers
- at meeting of Socialist International, Brezhnev

USA

USSR

repeated moratorium proposal and proposed a scheme for reductions

- reduction by end of 1985 to 600 units each (NATO and USSR)
- reduction toward the close of 1990 to 300 units each
- composition of the number to be determined by each side
- main means of reduction to be by destruction (later, USSR said it retained right to transfer missiles to the Far East.

- Mar 16 - USSR unilaterally announced moratorium on INF deployments in European USSR.

UNILATERAL FREEZE

- Brezhnev announced at Congress of Soviet Trade Unions that the USSR froze as of 16 March 1982 both quantitatively and qualitatively, the medium-range weapons in the European part of the USSR
- Sites under construction are nevertheless completed and activated.

1982

1982

Jun - "Walk in the woods" proposal: European ceiling of 225 missiles launchers and aircraft each with subceiling of 75 missile launchers.

Jun - Proposal was worked out informally by USA and USSR negotiators, subsequently rejected by USSR.

.../4

- 4 -

USA

- USSR permitted to retain 75 SS-20s and the US 75 GLCM launchers (or 300 GLCMs)
- each side to reduce nuclear capable aircraft to 150
- USSR to freeze SS-20s in the Far East and SS-21s, SS-22s, and SS-23s
- US not to deploy Pershing IIs

USSR

- Aug 19 - Details on Reductions by Defense Minister Ustinov
- reductions to take place in a zone from the mid-Atlantic to the Urals and from the Arctic to Africa
 - over 5 years to reduce existing medium range weapons, both missiles and planes, to 300 units each for USSR and NATO
 - British and French forces would be counted in the NATO total
 - no new weapons would be permitted, including Pershing II and cruise missiles
 - weapons outside the zone must be deployed "in such a way that the weapons of one side could not reach targets of the other side in said zone".
- Dec 21 - Andropov proposal for sub-ceiling of 162 INF missiles in European USSR to match UK and French systems. There would thus be no USA deployments in Europe, and no limit on Soviet deployments in Asian USSR.
- USSR prepared to retain in Europe only as many missiles as kept there by Britain and France
 - if British and French forces scaled down, Soviets would reduce by same number

001312

USA

USSR

- an accord to reduce to equal levels on both sides the number of medium-range nuclear delivery aircraft stationed in this region by the USSR and NATO countries.

1983

Feb - USA reiterates its criteria for INF agreement: equal global limits for both USA and USSR, exclusion of third-country forces, effective verification.

1983

Feb - USSR draft treaty

- weapons to be contractually limited: those with a range between 1,000 and 5,000 kilometres, SLBMs from before 1965, nuclear-capable aircraft and, limits on missiles of 500-1,000 kilometre range
- freeze on missiles in Asia
- no GLCMs or SLCMs with a range greater than 500 kilometres anywhere in world
- zone of reductions: from the mid-Atlantic to 80 degrees East longitude and, from the Arctic to Africa
- scheme of reductions: over 5 years to reduce to 300 launchers on each side. Within the 300, each side to have equal number of missiles and equal numbers of aircraft. Some launchers to be moved, others to be dismantled.
- either side may match a subsequent increase on the other side
- after reductions, Soviet launchers and number of Soviet missiles to be lower than in 1976 before SS-20s were stationed.

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- 6 -

USA

USSR

1983

1983

Mar - NATO Defence Ministers reject Soviet subceiling proposal.

Mar 30 - US INTERIM PROPOSAL

- US to reduce planned deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs in exchange for Soviet reduction in IRBM warheads (INF) to an equal level
- the range of warheads to be anywhere between 50 and 450
- there would be no ban on specific systems
- all Soviet SS-20s, would be included in the reductions; aircraft would not be included
- short-range systems to be frozen at current levels

Apr - Gromyko rejects USA proposal for interim agreement, reiterates position on no USA deployments and compensation for UK and French systems.

May 4 - Andropov indicates willingness to count warheads as well as missiles, reiterates position on UK and French systems, refuses to address issue of deployments in Asian USSR.

May - AMERICAN REBUTTAL

- French and British forces cannot be counted
- An implicit recognition that American missiles must be deployed because non-nuclear countries cannot rely on British or French nuclear forces to defend themselves
- Soviets have more than enough aircraft to counter US aircraft; they do not also need missiles

.../7

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- 7 -

USA

- Soviets cannot claim parity with every potential advisory combined; this would give them global legemony. By seeking to match all they contradict their statement that approximate parity with the US exists (Richard Burt, State Department Current Policy Statement 2.12.81)
- NATO will continue to negotiate after deployment has begun (10.6.83 communiqué)

USSR

Aug - Andropov proposal that Soviet launchers and missiles in excess of number of UK and French systems be destroyed, provided USA deployments cancelled.

- Sep 26 - Reagan speech to UNGA outlining several additional modifications to US proposal
- US INF deployments in Europe not to offset the number of SS-20s, world wide
 - US to retain right to maintain an equivalent number of missiles and deploy them elsewhere
 - US to be flexible on issue of longer-range INF aircraft in tables, not to offset total USSR deployments in Europe, provided agreement reached on equal global ceilings; to apportion USA reductions "appropriately" between cruise and Pershing II missiles
 - US to address mix of Pershing IIs and GLCMs and possible reduction in level of Pershing IIs.

.../8

- 8 -

USA

USSR

- Oct - USA reaction to Andropov
October proposal: inadequate
in that it continues in-
sistence on compensation for
UK and French forces,
appears to recognize need to
treat INF on global basis,
details needed on aircraft
proposal.
- USSR threat to end
negotiations rejected as
unjustified
 - NPG announces withdrawal
of 1,400 warheads from
Europe.

Oct - Soviet Defence Ministry
announces preparations for
deployment of "operational-
tactical" missiles in GDR
and Czechoslovakia, in
response to NATO deployments.

- Oct 26 - Andropov clarification of
elements of Soviet proposal
to reduce SS-20 in European
USSR to 140, with 420
warheads, to match Soviet
count of UK and French
warheads. Offer to
freeze SS-20 deployments in
Asian USSR after agreement
reached on European INF,
provided USA deploys no
similar weapons in area.
Offer of "additional
flexibility" on INF air-
craft with number and type
of aircraft to be negotiated.
All SS-20s and SS-4s in
excess of the limit
would be dismantled.
- Warning that NATO
deployments will make
continuation of talks
impossible.

.../9

USA

USSR

Nov 13 - New proposal offered by
Kvitsinsky

- USSR proposed that if US abandoned attempts to deploy Pershing IIs and GLCMs, Soviets would reduce their SS-20s, in Western USSR to 120
- Kvitsinsky said framework would only be acceptable to USSR if US actually made the proposal
- Tass denied any such offer by USSR, instead contending that offer came from Nitze

Nov 14 - US tabled modifications to
INF proposal

- in exchange for a Soviet agreement to a global limit of 420 warheads (i.e. on 140 SS-20s), the US would deploy fewer than that total in Europe
- NATO to agree to a different total if USSR dropped its demand that no US missiles be deployed
- US willingness to discuss limits on bombers and Pershing IIs in the event of an agreement
- USA expressed regret over USSR action and reaffirmed that it is prepared to continue negotiations.

Nov 23 - Kvitsinsky announced "discontinuation" of present round of negotiations after vote in West German parliament reaffirming support for the deployment of Pershing IIs in December as well as votes in UK and Italian parliaments. Statement by Andropov indicates that return by NATO

- 10 -

USA

USSR

to situation existing
before deployment will
receive "appropriate
response".

MF
WJ
8.12.83
One version of mandate given WAC as result of Henderson initiative 9/12/83

The Atlantic Council, meeting at the level of Ministers, gives mandate to the regular Council, reinforced at high level, to proceed with a thorough appraisal of the East-West relations considering the present circumstances and in view of actualizing the Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance (Harmel Report), based on the one hand on credible deterrence and defence and, on the other hand, on efforts aimed at reducing tensions (§5). In this respect it particularly refers to paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance.

The purpose of this evaluation is a common definition, within the Alliance, of the proper means to reduce tensions and to give a new impetus to East-West dialogue, in view of determining a coherent allied posture.

The enlarged regular Council is invited to report to Ministers for their next Spring Session, at the latest.

28-6-1 - Bureau
Peace Mission

6

The Future Tasks of the Alliance (Harmel Report)

Report of the Council
Annex to the Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting

December, 1967

1. A year ago, on the initiative of the Foreign Minister of Belgium, the governments of the fifteen nations of the Alliance resolved to 'study the future tasks which face the Alliance, and its procedures for fulfilling them in order to strengthen the Alliance as a factor for durable peace'. The present report sets forth the general tenor and main principles emerging from this examination of the future tasks of the Alliance.
2. Studies were undertaken by Messrs. Schütz, Watson, Spaak, Kohler and Patijn. The Council wishes to express its appreciation and thanks to these eminent personalities for their efforts and for the analyses they produced.
3. The exercise has shown that the Alliance is a dynamic and vigorous organisation which is constantly adapting itself to changing conditions. It also has shown that its future tasks can be handled within the terms of the Treaty by building on the methods and procedures which have proved their value over many years.
4. Since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 the international situation has changed significantly and the political tasks of the Alliance have assumed a new dimension. Amongst other developments, the Alliance has played a major part in stopping Communist expansion in Europe; the USSR has become one of the two world super powers but the Communist world is no longer monolithic; the Soviet doctrine of 'peaceful co-existence' has changed the nature of the confrontation with the West but not the basic problems. Although the disparity between the power of the United States and that of the European states remains, Europe has recovered and is on its way towards unity. The process of decolonisation has transformed European relations with the rest of the world; at the same time, major problems have arisen in the relations between developed and developing countries.
5. The Atlantic Alliance has two main functions. Its first function is to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur. Since its inception, the Alliance has successfully fulfilled this task. But the possibility of a crisis cannot be excluded as long as the central political issues in Europe, first and foremost the German Question, remain unsolved. Moreover, the situation of instability and uncertainty still precludes a balanced reduction of military forces. Under these conditions, the Allies will maintain as necessary a suitable military capability to assure the balance of forces, thereby creating a climate of stability, security and confidence.
In this climate the Alliance can carry out its second function, to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved. Military security and a policy of detente are not contradictory but complementary. Collective defence is a stabilising factor in world politics. It is the necessary

Documentation

condition for effective policies directed towards a greater relaxation of tensions. The way to peace and stability in Europe rests in particular on the use of the Alliance constructively in the interest of detente. The participation of the USSR and the USA will be necessary to achieve a settlement of the political problems of Europe.

6. From the beginning the Atlantic Alliance has been a cooperative grouping of states sharing the same ideals and with a high degree of common interest. Their cohesion and solidarity provide an element of stability within the Atlantic area.

7. As sovereign states the Allies are not obliged to subordinate their policies to collective decision. The Alliance affords an effective forum and clearing house for the exchange of information and views; thus, each Ally can decide its policy in the light of close knowledge of the problems and objectives of the others. To this end the practice of frank and timely consultations needs to be deepened and improved. Each Ally should play its full part in promoting an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, bearing in mind that the pursuit of detente must not be allowed to split the Alliance. The chances of success will clearly be greater if the Allies remain on parallel courses, especially in matters of close concern to them all; their actions will thus be all the more effective.

8. No peaceful order in Europe is possible without a major effort by all concerned. The evolution of Soviet and East European policies gives ground for hope that those governments may eventually come to recognise the advantages to them of collaborating in working towards a peaceful settlement. But no final and stable settlement in Europe is possible without a solution of the German question which lies at the heart of present tensions in Europe. Any such settlement must end the unnatural barriers between Eastern and Western Europe, which are most clearly and cruelly manifested in the division of Germany.

9. Accordingly the Allies are resolved to direct their energies to this purpose by realistic measures designed to further a detente in East-West relations. The relaxation of tensions is not the final goal but is part of a long-term process to promote better relations and to foster a European settlement. The ultimate political purpose of the Alliance is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees.

10. Currently, the development of contacts between the countries of Western and Eastern Europe is mainly on a bilateral basis. Certain subjects, of course, require by their very nature a multilateral solution.

11. The problem of German reunification and its relationship to a European settlement has normally been dealt with in exchanges between the Soviet Union and the three Western powers having special responsibilities in this field. In the preparation of such exchanges the Federal Republic of Germany has regularly joined the three Western powers in order to reach a common position. The other Allies will continue to have their views considered in timely discussions among the Allies about Western policy on this subject, without in any way impairing the special responsibilities in question.

12. The Allies will examine and review suitable policies designed to achieve a just and stable order in Europe, to overcome the division of Germany and to foster European security. This will be part of a process of active and constant preparation for the time when fruitful discussions of these complex questions may be possible bilaterally or multilaterally between Eastern and Western nations.

13. The Allies are studying disarmament and practical arms control measures, including the possibility of balanced force reductions. These studies will be intensified. Their active pursuit reflects the will of the Allies to work for an effective detente with the East.

Documentation

14. The Allies will examine with particular attention the defence problems of the exposed areas, e.g. the south-eastern flank. In this respect the present situation in the Mediterranean presents special problems, bearing in mind that the current crisis in the Middle East falls within the responsibilities of the United Nations.

15. The North Atlantic Treaty area cannot be treated in isolation from the rest of the world. Crises and conflicts arising outside the area may impair its security either directly or by affecting the global balance. Allied countries contribute individually within the United Nations and other international organisations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the solution of important international problems. In accordance with established usage the Allies, or such of them as wish to do so, will also continue to consult on such problems without commitment and as the case may demand.

16. In the light of these findings, the Ministers directed the Council in permanent session to carry out, in the years ahead, the detailed follow-up resulting from this study. This will be done either by intensifying work already in hand or by activating highly specialised studies by more systematic use of experts and officials sent from capitals.

17. Ministers found that the study by the Special Group confirmed the importance of the role which the Alliance is called upon to play during the coming years in the promotion of detente and the strengthening of peace. Since significant problems have not yet been examined in all their aspects, and other problems of no less significance which have arisen from the latest political and strategic developments have still to be examined, the Ministers have directed the Permanent Representatives to put in hand the study of these problems without delay, following such procedures as shall be deemed most appropriate by the Council in permanent session, in order to enable further reports to be subsequently submitted to the Council in Ministerial Session.

December 8, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

cc: Mr. Osbaldeston


Initiative - DPM/SSEA Progress in Brussels:
Question in the House Today

Mr. MacEachen has obtained agreement that NATO Foreign Ministers will attend the opening session of the CDE in Stockholm. He also has agreement that NATO will make every effort to make an early response to the East's MBFR proposal of last spring. There is no decision as to whether Foreign Ministers should attend an MBFR meeting in Vienna - this would be decided after agreement had been achieved on a Western response. Mr. MacEachen made these points to the press this morning.

You might wish to consider taking an opportunity in the House (in response to a question Mr. McRae will put) to express your appreciation for Mr. MacEachen's efforts, and the cooperation so obviously forthcoming from your NATO allies.

Ralph Coleman and Joyce Fairbairn have been given this information, and Joyce Fairbairn has arranged for Mr. McRae to ask the question.

Archdeacon

A handwritten signature is written over a rectangular stamp. The stamp contains the text "28-6-1" and "R.R.F." in a box, and "Trudeau Peace Mission" written across it.

08-12-83

28-6-1-1 - Musée
Peace
Mission

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (through R.R. Fowler)

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
Romanian Initiative

The purpose of this memorandum is to inform you of the visit of a Romanian emissary, who requested that President Ceaucescu's proposals be conveyed to you and renewed an invitation for you to visit Bucharest for consultations on how Canada and Romania might cooperate in helping to find a way out of the current impasse.

The Romanian Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Georghie Dolgu, was received on December 5 by the Honourable Jean-Luc Pepin and by Deputy Minister for External Relations de Montigny Marchand. He had previously visited Moscow and Washington.

The Romanian proposals (see annex) call for the USA to halt its INF deployments in Europe, and for the USSR to reconsider the countermeasures which it has announced. They also propose USA/USSR bilateral meetings at the foreign minister and summit levels, a NATO/Warsaw Pact meeting on INF in parallel with the (hopefully resumed) USA/USSR negotiations, acceleration of the MBFR talks, and a conference on conventional weapons.

We explained that the Romanians' specific proposals on INF, which amount to a freeze at present unequal levels and require inclusion of the British and French nuclear forces, were not acceptable in terms of the present Canadian and NATO positions. Mr. Dolgu's response, after he was given a briefing on your initiative, was that we agreed on the primary objective of restoring the East-West dialogue, and that a visit by you to Romania would therefore be useful.

A more detailed report on the visit is given in the attached telegram.



for L.A. Delvoie,
Chairman,
Task Force Working Group on
East-West Relations and
International Security

cc: PCO/Osbaldeston
EA/Shenstone
DND/Anderson

ANNEX

ROMANIAN PROPOSALS ON INF

1. The new American missiles which have been shipped to Europe should be kept in storage and the USSR should stop all work connected with the emplacement of medium-range missiles on GDR and Czechoslovak territory.

2. Pending an agreement between the USA and the USSR taking into consideration the global ratio of forces between the two superpowers, two compromise formulas are suggested:

A. No USA missile should be deployed in Europe. The USSR should withdraw, dismantle and store all medium-range missiles located on the European part of its territory (or, in the version presented in the FRG, all missiles located west of 80 degrees east longitude) until an agreement is reached. The USA should accordingly reduce its INF on ships and aircraft targetting Eastern Europe;

or

B. The USA should deploy no medium-range missiles in Europe. The USSR could temporarily keep in the European part of its territory a number of nuclear warheads equal to the number of British and French nuclear warheads, and the Soviet missiles should be sited at a distance from the West German border equal to the distance of British and French missiles from the territory of the USSR,

AND

when an agreement is reached the concomitant scrapping of both Soviet and American missiles should take place.

3. A meeting of the foreign ministers of the USA and the USSR should take place this year, and a summit meeting as soon as possible (in the first half of 1984, according to the Romanian emissary to Bonn). A consultative meeting of NATO and Warsaw Pact foreign ministers should take place in parallel with the USA-USSR negotiations in Geneva in order to help the two superpowers to reach an agreement on INF.

4. The MBFR negotiations should be reactivated and there should also be a conference of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries for reduction of conventional weapons as well as military budgets.

.../2

- 2 -

5. The French and British missiles cannot be ignored; they should be included right from the beginning, but only in making a global estimation of the balance of forces between the two sides.
6. European peoples are called upon to do everything to halt the siting of new INF missiles and for the withdrawal and destruction of existing ones.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0255 06DEC83

TO BNATO DELIVER BY 070900

INFO BUCST LDN PARIS MDRID LSBN BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPFN OSLO

BRU HAGUE WSHDC MOSCO GENEV WSAW BPEST PRGUE BGRAD STKHM VMBFR

PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CIS/ADMPOL/CPD/DNACPOL/CIS PRMNY

DISTR MINA MINE USS DMF IFB UGB URR R3B RSD RSR RCD RCR RBD FPR UFP

IDRA IDA RBPⁿ ZSP RBP ZSI IDR

REF OURTEL IDR4649 05DEC

---INF:ROMANIAN INITIATIVE:SPECIAL ENVOY TO USA AND CDA

SUMMARY:ROMANIAN VICE FORMIN DOLGU 05DEC PRESENTED CEAUCESCU PROPOSALS FOR FREEZE ON INF DEPLOYMENT,RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS,AND ULTIMATELY REMOVAL OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM EUROPE.ROMANIAN INITIATIVE,HE SAID,DOES NOT/NOT STAND OR FALL BY ANY OF ITS COMPROMISE PROPOSALS: MAIN OBJECTIVE IS TO CONTRIBUTE TO RESUMPTION OF EAST/WEST DIALOGUE. HE ASKED THAT PROPOSAL BE CONVEYED TO PM TRUDEAU TOGETHER WITH RENEWED INVITATION TO VISIT BUCST FOR CONSULTATIONS.DMF EXPLAINED THAT CDA WAS COMMITTED TO NATO POSITION ON INF.ALTHOUGH CDN AND ROMANIAN INITIATIVES SOUGHT SAME ULTIMATE GOAL,IMPROVEMENT OF EAST/WEST DIALOGUE,ROMANIANS WERE CONCENTRATING ON INF WHILE WE WERE TRYING TO WORK AROUND IT.WE COULD NOT/NOT SUPPORT ROMANIAN COMPROMISE PROPOSALS,WHICH WOULD HAVE EFFECT OF PRESERVING SOVIET ADVANTAGE AND REMOVING THEIR INCENTIVE TO NEGOTIATE.DOLGU WAS PRIEFED ON PM TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE AND PROPOSALS,WHICH HE SAID WOULD BE GIVEN

...2

PAGE TWO IDDZ0255 CONF

SERIOUS CONSIDERATION IN BUCST. HE INDICATED THAT ROMANIA WAS CON-
SIDERING PARTICIPATION AT STKHM AT FORMIN LEVEL BUT NO/NO DECISION
YET TAKEN. COMPARISON OF NOTES ON RECENT CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCO
BROADENED INTO MORE GENERAL DISCUSSION OF STATE OF AFFAIRS IN SOVIET
LEADERSHIP. IN MTGS WITH BOTH MINE AND DMF DOLGU CREATED POSITIVE
IMPRESSION AS ABLE AND FORTHCOMING INTERLOCUTOR.

2. REPORT: ROMANIAN VICE MIN OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS GEORGHIE DOLGU,
ACCOMPANIED BY ROMANIAN AMB RODEAN AND HEAD OF ROMANIAN MFA NORTH
AMERICA BUREAU RACEANU, MET WITH DMF FOR TWO AND A QUARTER HOURS ON
05DEC, AND LATER WITH MINE FOR ONE HOUR. SMITH (IDDZ) AND HANSON (IDR)
PARTICIPATED IN BOTH MTGS. MAWHINNEY (RBR) AND LAVERDURE (O/MINE) ALSO
PARTICIPATED IN MTG WITH MINE. PURPOSE OF VISIT WAS TO EXPLAIN
ROMANIAN INITIATIVE, PRESENT PROPOSALS ON INF, AND RENEW INVITATION TO
PM TRUDEAU TO VISIT BUCST FOR DISCUSSIONS.

3. DOLGU HAD JUST COME FROM WSHDC AND QUOTED EAGLEBURGER AS TELLING
HIM THAT HE WOULD RECEIVE MORE FAVOURABLE HEARING IN CDA THAN USA.
IN WSHDC HE HAD ALSO SEEN BURT AND ADELMAN.

4. DOLGU EXPLAINED THAT PRES CEAUCESCU HAD BEEN DEEPLY CONCERNED BY
IMPENDING NATO DEPLOYMENTS AND ANNOUNCEMENT BY USSR OF WITHDRAWAL
FROM INF NEGS, AND HAD THEREFORE DECIDED TO UNDERTAKE SPECIAL
INITIATIVE AND DESPATCH ENVOYS TO VARIOUS CAPITALS. ROMANIA HAD NEVER
AGREED WITH USSR ON NEED FOR COUNTERMEASURES, AND HAD NEVER SUPPORTED
WSAW PACT DOCUS (PRGUE, SOFIA) PROVIDING FOR SUCH COUNTERMEASURES.

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PAGE THREE IDDZ0255 CONF

FOLLOWING ANDROPOV STATEMENT 24NOV, EXEC CTTEE OF ROMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL CTTEE HAD ISSUED DECLARATION DESCRIBING BOTH NATO DEPLOYMENTS AND SOVIET COUNTERMEASURES AS UNJUSTIFIED, LEADING TO FURTHER DETERIORATION OF SITUATION IN EUROPE AND INCREASING DANGER OF NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE. STATEMENT DID NOT/NOT SEEK TO APPORTION BLAME BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

5. ROMANIAN AIM WAS TO CONTRIBUTE TO RESUMPTION OF TALKS AND ULTIMATELY TO AGREEMENT. COMPROMISE PROPOSALS ON INF WERE NOT/NOT REPRESENTED AS ALL-INCLUSIVE, BUT AS ATTEMPT TO INDICATE FORM FIRST STEPS TO FINAL AGREEMENT MIGHT TAKE. USA WAS ASKED TO HALT DEPLOYMENT, AND USSR TO RECONSIDER COUNTERMEASURES. PROPOSALS ALSO INCLUDED MTGS BETWEEN USA AND USSR AT FORMIN AND SUMMIT LEVELS, NATO/WSAW PACT MTG ON INF IN GENEV, TO ASSIST USA AND USSR IN REACHING AGREEMENT. ACCELERATION OF MEFR TALKS WITH AIM OF ACHIEVING SOME RESULT IN 1984, AND CONF ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. DOLGU ASKED THAT THESE PROPOSALS BE CONVEYED TO PM TRUDEAU, WITH SUGGESTION THAT TWO COUNTRIES MIGHT WORK TOGETHER TO HELP FIND WAY OUT OF IMPASSE.

6. ROMANIA, SAID DOLGU, DID NOT/NOT AGREE WITH SOVIET DENIAL THAT INTRODUCTION OF SS-20S HAD RESULTED IN IMBALANCE. TO THEM ZERO OPTION MEANT NO/NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF ANY KIND IN EUROPE. SINCE UK WAS MEMBER OF NATO DEFENCE ORGANIZATION AND FRANCE OF ALLIANCE, IT WAS SUITABLE TO TAKE THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO ACCOUNT FROM OUTSET. GIVEN DIFFICULTY IN DOING SO, HOWEVER, THIS MIGHT BE DONE AT LATER

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PAGE FOUR IDDZ0255 CONF D

STAGE WITH FRENCH AND BRITISH PARTICIPATION.

7. IN RESPONSE, DMF NOTED THAT CDN POSITION ON INF WAS PREDICATED ON NATO MEMBERSHIP AND RECOGNITION OF NEED TO MAINTAIN CLEAR AND VIGOROUS SOLIDARITY IN IMPLEMENTATION OF JOINT DECISION. INF CALENDAR WAS UNFOLDING UNHAPPILY BUT INEVITABLY. FOR THESE REASONS PM, ALTHOUGH SHARING ROMANIAN CONCERN OVER GRAVITY OF INTL SITUATION, HAD DELIBERATELY AVOIDED INF ISSUE IN PURSUIT OF HIS INITIATIVE.

8. ROMANIANS, DMF NOTED, HAD OPPOSED SOVIET COUNTERMEASURES: THIS OBVIOUSLY STEMMED FROM ROMANIAN UNDERSTANDING THAT PRIOR TO NATO DEPLOYMENTS THERE HAD BEEN IMBALANCE IN EUROPEAN THEATRE CREATED BY SOVIET DEPLOYMENT OF SS-20S. OFFICIALLY, SAID DOLGU, ROMANIANS HAD NEVER BEEN THAT SPECIFIC. THEY CONSIDERED THAT STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES ON BOTH SIDES WERE SO LARGE THAT NO/NO OTHERS WERE NEEDED. IN PARTICULAR, EUROPE HAD NO/NO NEED FOR INF. OFF RECORD, HE ADMITTED THAT ROMANIANS HAD NEVER UNDERSTOOD SOVIET DECISION TO DEPLOY SS-20S.

9. DMF EXPLAINED THAT ROMANIAN INTERIM MEASURES WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR CDA TO SUPPORT. WHILE WE AGREED WITH NEED FOR DIALOGUE, ROMANIAN COMPROMISE PROPOSAL WAS TANTAMOUNT TO FREEZE AND THUS CONSERVATION OF EXISTING IMBALANCE. THIS WOULD IN EFFECT STOP CLOCK ON NEGS AND PRESERVE SITUATION IN WHICH WESTERN EUROPEAN SECURITY WAS IMPAIRED, EVEN THREATENED. ULTIMATE ROMANIAN OBJECTIVE CORRESPONDED TO ZERO OPTION, AND WE AGREED. BUT SCORE WAS PRESENTLY 360-0 IN FAVOUR OF USSR. ROMANIAN PROPOSAL WAS THAT SOVIETS REDUCE TO ZERO, BUT THIS THEY HAD CONSISTENTLY REFUSED TO DO; IF THEY DID AGREE THAT

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PAGE FIVE IDDZ0255 CONF

WOULD BE NEW BALL GAME.

10. TO DOLGU'S SUGGESTION THAT SOVIETS NEEDED TIME TO RECONSIDER, DMF ASKED WHETHER THERE WOULD BE MORE INCENTIVE FOR RECONSIDERATION IF PRESSURE WERE REMOVED. NATO TWO-TRACK DECISION HAD BEEN DESIGNED TO BUILD PRESSURE GRADUALLY WHILE MAINTAINING NEGOTIATING POSTURE. WE AGREED ON NEED TO MAINTAIN BALANCE AT LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL, AND ON ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF REDUCTIONS TO ZERO ON BOTH SIDES. BUT SOVIETS HAD INTRODUCED UK AND FRENCH NATIONAL DETERRENTS INTO EQUATION. SAYING THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO REDUCE TO THAT LEVEL. THAT WAS NOT/ NOT TRUE ZERO OPTION, AND WAS IN FACT FORM OF DOUBLE ACCOUNTING, CONSIDERING THAT UK AND FRENCH FORCES HAD ALREADY BEEN TAKEN ACCOUNT OF IN SALT.

11. DOLGU SAID THAT EMPHASIS OF ROMANIAN INITIATIVE WAS NOT/NOT ON INTERIM PROPOSALS BUT ON NEED TO CONTINUE DIALOGUE. HE CONTINUED TO ARGUE IN FAVOUR OF POSTPONEMENT, HOWEVER, SAYING THAT ONCE NATO DEPLOYMENT HAD STARTED IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO STOP AND STILL MORE DIFFICULT TO REVERSE DESPITE DECLARATIONS TO CONTRARY. RESULT WOULD BE INCREASED POLITICAL TENSION, MORE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN BLOCS, AND INCREASED REGIMENTATION WITHIN BLOCS. ROMANIA HAD DIFFERED WITH USSR ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES IN PAST (AFGHAN, KAMPUCHEA, ISRAEL) AND WISHED TO PRESERVE THIS FREEDOM OF MANOEUVRE.

12. AT HIS REQUEST, DOLGU WAS GIVEN BRIEFING ON PM INITIATIVE BY SMITH, WHICH DOLGU PROMISED TO CONVEY TO CEAUCESCU, COMMENTING THAT IT

...6

PAGE SIX IDDZ0255 CONF

DESERVED DEEP REFLECTION. HE AGREED THAT APPROACHES WERE SIMILAR ON PRIMARY QUESTION OF RESTORING EAST/WEST DIALOGUE. ON SPECIFIC POINTS OF PMS INITIATIVE, HE SAID THAT ROMANIA DID NOT/NOT EXCLUDE ATTENDANCE AT STKHM CCSBMDE BY FORMIN. ON MBFR, ROMANIA DID NOT/NOT PARTICIPATE AS FULL MEMBER ALTHOUGH IT WAS ENGAGED IN PROMOTING AGREEMENT. REGARDING DIRECT NATO/WSAW PACT CONTACTS, HE SAID THAT USSR HAD NOT/NOT BEEN FORTHCOMING, PREFERRING TO DEAL WITH USA ON BILATERAL BASIS. ROMANIAN PROPOSAL FOR NATO/WSAW PACT FORMINS MTG IN MARGINS OF INF WAS INTENDED TO COMPLEMENT USA/SOVIET NEGS BY ANALYZING AND SCRUTINIZING PROPOSALS FROM QUOTE OTHER SOURCES UNQUOTE.

13. IN COMPARISON OF NOTES ON RECENT CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCO IT EMERGED THAT DOLGU HAD BEEN RECEIVED ONLY BY KORNIENKO WHO, ALTHOUGH MTG TOOK PLACE ON 24 NOV, HAD GIVEN NO/NO INKLING OF ANDROPOV STATEMENT WHICH WAS MADE ONLY HOURS LATER. (PEARSON AND SMITH WERE RECVD BY GROMYKO AND KORNIENKO ON 25 NOV.) KORNIENKOS MAIN MESSAGE TO DOLGU HAD BEEN THAT NEGS SHOULD CONTINUE AND EVERY EFFORT BE MADE TO PREVENT ACCELERATED ARMS RACE. KVITSINSKYS STATEMENT IN GENEV ADJOURNING LAST ROUND OF INF TALKS HAD BEEN VERY CAREFULLY WORDED. DOLGU OBSERVED THAT PART OF SOVIET PROBLEM IN INF WAS FACT THAT ANDROPOV STILL NEEDED TIME TO ESTABLISH HIS AUTHORITY; UNDER BRZHNEV THINGS WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT. IT WAS UNCERTAIN WHETHER ANDROPOV WAS IN COMMAND. THERE WAS ALSO CONSIDERABLE INERTIA IN SOVIET SYSTEM; ANDROPOV WAS COMPELLED TO FOLLOW PATTERN ESTABLISHED BY BRZHNEV.

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PAGE SEVEN IDDZ0255 CONF

THESE WERE ALL REASONS FOR GIVING SOVIETS TIME TO RECONSIDER THEIR POSITION.

14. DOLGU NOTED THAT ACCORDING TO MEDIA SOVIETS WERE PARTICULARLY WORRIED ABOUT PERSHING II BECAUSE OF ITS ABILITY TO REACH TARGETS IN SOVIET COMMAND-CONTROL-COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS IN 5-8 MINUTES, THEREBY THREATENING THEIR CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. KORNIENKO, HOWEVER, HAD NOT/NOT SEEMED PARTICULARLY WORRIED BY PERSHING II. FROM VIEWPOINT OF THREAT, HE HAD MADE NO/NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN PERSHING II AND GLCM, OR FOR THAT MATTER BETWEEN USA INF AND FRENCH/UK FORCES. UK SUBMARINE IN NORTH SEA WAS ABLE TO DESTROY Leningrad NEARLY AS QUICKLY AS PERSHING II. DOLGU HAD ASKED KORNIENKO HOW SOVIETS HAD REACHED CONCLUSION THAT 140 SS-20S WERE EQUIVALENT TO UK/FRENCH FORCES. KORNIENKO HAD NOTED THAT UK POLARIS MISSILES NOW HAD MRV WARHEADS AND THAT FURTHER MODERNIZATION WAS UNDERWAY. NEW FRENCH SUBMARINE WAS BEING BUILT. SOVIETS, HE SAID, WERE CLEARLY CONCERNED ABOUT UK AND FRENCH MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS WHICH WHEN COMPLETED WOULD GIVE THEM MORE THAN ONE THOUSAND WARHEADS.

15. WHEN ASKED WHY SOVIETS HAD DECIDED TO DEPLOY SS-20S, KORNIENKO HAD CITED NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN USA FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS, INCLUDING NEW NUCLEAR-CAPABLE ARTILLERY. MAIN REASON, HOWEVER, HAD BEEN AGE OF SS-4 AND SS-5 SYSTEMS WHICH WERE OUT OF PRODUCTION AND THEREFORE REPLACED WITH NEW SYSTEMS. SS-20S WERE QUOTE SLIGHTLY UNQUOTE BETTER. (WE INTERJECTED AT THIS POINT THAT USA HAD WITHDRAWN THOR AND JUPITER SYSTEMS

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PAGE EIGHT IDDZ0255 CONF

IN 1960S WITHOUT REPLACING THEM.) IN RESPONSE TO DOLGU COMMENT THAT SS-20S WERE ACCURATE ENOUGH TO DESTROY HARDENED TARGETS, KOPNIENKO HAD DENIED THAT THEY WERE FIRST STRIKE WEAPONS. AS POSSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR SOVIET DECISION, DOLGU OBSERVED THAT MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEXES WERE NOT/NOT CONFINED TO USA OR TO CAPITALIST COUNTRIES. 16. KOPNIENKO, SAID DOLGU, HAD NOT/NOT MENTIONED ANY SOVIET EFFORT TO ACHIEVE STRATEGIC DECOUPLING BETWEEN EUROPE AND USA. ACCORDING TO KOPNIENKO, SCHMIDT HAD NEVER CLAIMED THAT INF BALANCE WAS UPS&T. IN RESPONSE TO OUR COMMENT THAT SCHMIDT HAD BEEN CONCERNED ABOUT TREND WHICH WOULD RESULT IN DECOUPLING, DOLGU REMARKED THAT IF SOVIETS HAD ACCEPTED USA ZERO OPTION THEY WOULD STILL HAVE HAD CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY AND, GIVEN BALANCE IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES, DECOUPLING PROBLEM WOULD STILL EXIST. THIS LED HIM TO WONDER WHETHER ZERO OPTION HAD BEEN SERIOUSLY ADVANCED. DMF RESPONDED THAT THIS ONLY CONFIRMED IMPORTANCE OF MBFR, AND SIGNIFICANCE OF FRG AS TURNING POINT IN EAST/WEST BALANCE. SINCE UK/FRENCH NUCLEAR UMBRELLA DID NOT/NOT EXTEND TO FRG, THERE WAS NO/NO COUNTERWEIGHT TO SS-20S. IT THUS MADE SENSE FOR FRG TO RAISE DECOUPLING PROBLEM, EVEN IF SCHMIDT DID ACKNOWLEDGE INF EQUILIBRIUM IN 1977. IT WOULD BECOME EVEN MORE ACUTE IF INF IMBALANCE WERE ADDED TO CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE. DOLGU ARGUMENT, ALTHOUGH LOGICAL, DID NOT/NOT DERAIL CREDIBILITY OF ZERO OPTION.

17. REVIEWING PROGRESS OF ROMANIAN INITIATIVE TO DATE, DOLGU NOTED THAT HE HAD BEEN TO MOSCO AND USA WHILE OTHER ROMANIAN ENVOYS HAD VISITED ...9

PAGE NINE IDDZ0255 CONFD

FRG, BELGIUM, NETHERLANDS, SPAIN, PORTUGAL, GREECE AND ITALY. GIVEN IMPORTANCE OF UK AND FRENCH FORCES IN ROMANIAN PROPOSAL, WE ASKED ABOUT ROMANIAN PLANS TO CONSULT THEM. WE UNDERSTAND THAT APPROACHES HAVE BEEN MADE, BUT THAT UK AND FRANCE HAVE NOT/NOT AGREED TO CONSULTATIONS. DOLGU SAID HIS NEXT STOP WOULD BE IN NYORK WHERE HE WOULD SEE UN SEC GEN.

18. IN CALL ON MIN. PEPIN, DOLGU COVERED ESSENTIALLY SAME GROUND IN PRESENTING ROMANIAN PROPOSALS, AGAIN EMPHASIZING PRIMARY IMPORTANCE OF RESTORING DIALOGUE. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION BY MIN PEPIN, DOLGU SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN VERY SATISFIED BY RECEPTION IN WSHDC ALTHOUGH IT HAD NOT/NOT BEEN VERY POSITIVE ON THE SPECIFICS OF ROMANIAN PROPOSAL. USA ENCOURAGED INDEPENDENT ROMANIAN APPROACH, BUT DID NOT/NOT WANT AT THIS JUNCTURE TO GIVE CONFUSING SIGNAL TO MOSCO. WHEN ASKED FOR IMPRESSION OF FEELINGS OF SOVIET GENERAL PUBLIC ON INF ISSUE, DOLGU SAID HE HAD BEEN TOLD ONLY OFFICIAL POINT OF VIEW BUT HAD BEEN ABLE TO NOTE THAT WHEN 24 NOV ANDR0P0V STATEMENT HAD APPEARED ON LARGE OUTDOOR TELEVISION IN MOSCO, HE AND ROMANIAN COLLEAGUE HAD BEEN ONLY SPECTATORS. COMMENTING ON CSCE PROCESS, DOLGU SAID THAT ROMANIA WAS NOT/NOT SATISFIED WITH DEVELOPMENTS AT MDRID. PROCESS HAD BECOME THREE-WAY DIALOGUE BETWEEN BLOCS (INCLUDING NNA) RATHER THAN INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES.

19. WE SHOULD RECORD THAT DOLGU RAISED ISSUE OF POSSIBLE PM VISIT TO ROMANIA THREE DIFFERENT TIMES DURING DISCUSSIONS RECALLING THAT
...10

PAGE TEN IDDZ0255 CONFD

PRES CEAUDESCU HAD FIRST ISSUED INVITATION WHILE PM WAS IN EUROPE.
DMF DID NOT/NOT RESPOND TO THIS PARTICULAR POINT BUT SAID WE HOPED
TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH ROMANIANS ON THEIR AND PM TRUDEAUS
INITIATIVES IN WEEKS AHEAD.

CCC/025 070125Z IDDZ0255



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

TRANSMITTAL SLIP - NOTE D'ENVOI

TO/À IDDZ

FROM/DE IDR

SUBJECT/SUJET Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces (INF) Romanian Initiative

ATTACHMENT Memorandum for the Prime Minister (with attachments)
PIÈCE JOINTE

Security <i>Sécurité</i>	CONFIDENTIAL
File <i>Dossier</i>	
Date	December 7, 1983

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For signature, please.

REQUIRED BY/DEMANDÉ POUR


A. A. Després,
Acting Director,
Defence Relations Division

*Sheila
Pls circulate*

MF

TO/À • IDDT
FROM/DE • IFB

*28-6-1-Trudeau
Peace Mission*

REFERENCE • Telegram from PMDELDELHI-0082 November 25.
RÉFÉRENCE
SUBJECT • Prime Minister's Initiative at CHOGM.
SUJET

Security/Sécurité	CONFIDENTIAL
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Date	December 8, 1983
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ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

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... Attached is the provisional record of the November 23 meeting of CHOGM at which Prime Minister Trudeau initiated the discussion on "Global Trends and Prospects". His remarks, including corrections by Bob Fowler, appear on pages 2 to 6, with some briefer remarks included on later pages. The discussion was resumed on the following morning but I do not have the text of the proceedings. These may be obtained from IMC. I believe Mr. Trudeau did not say anything more on the subject on November 24.

... 2. I also attach three versions of the text you drafted as the basis of a suggested brief declaration by CHOGM. Version "A", which was closest to your original, was what the Prime Minister finally handed to the Secretary General, as indicated in para 2 of the telegram under reference. Version "B" replaces the original points 5 and 6, with a new point 5 which accords with the Prime Minister's suggestions about conditional adherence to the NPT. Version "C" contains an alternative text of point 5 which makes the conditional element much vaguer and more ambiguous. The Prime Minister had all three of these versions in front of him when he decided to hand out version "A". It was a close-run thing.

3. The telegram indicates some of the subsequent developments on this subject before the leaders went to Goa. We have sent you separately the Prime Minister's annotated copy of the final draft of the Goa declaration as it was being negotiated. He told Fowler that during the negotiations Mrs. Thatcher came out against "fear" words such as "balance of terror" and "mutual assured destruction" and some phrases were changed to meet her point. Both she and our Prime Minister successfully opposed the inclusion of non-aligned language about the need for the two nuclear super powers to be open about their bilateral negotiations on nuclear matters. Mrs. Gandhi refused to have any mention of the NPT in the

...2

- 2 -

text and also turned down a suggestion by Mr. Trudeau to refer to "horizontal proliferation". All he got was a reference to halting the "wider spread" of nuclear weapons. This account is, of course, very fragmentary but the Prime Minister did not mention any more to Fowler. The final drafting was done among Heads of Government alone.

MS

Michael Shenstone,
Assistant Deputy Minister,
Political and International
Security Affairs.

P.S.

... Also attached is an outline of the Goa declaration circulated by Ramphal on November 25 as an aid to drafting at Goa. It is a product of the arms-length negotiations between PMs Gandhi and Trudeau as indicated in the tel under reference. The final text is of course modelled on this outline but we note one or two respects in which the final text was further watered down -- e.g. "precondition of progress on denuclearisation world-wide is halting and reversal of nuclear arms race between super powers" (point 6) has been replaced by a vaguer text, no doubt because of Mrs. Gandhi.

All this will be grist to the mill of the seekers after PhDs when they come to study the archives on the peace initiative some years hence.

MS

M.S.

A

POSSIBLE DECLARATION BY CHOGM.

We, the Heads of Government of the Commonwealth, drawn from five continents and representing a quarter of the world's population:

1. Are deeply troubled by the dangerous state of East/West tensions; by the high level of international tension; by grave instability in the international security situation; by the continuing arms race; and above all by the risk of nuclear war which threatens the survival of humanity.
2. Are convinced that the international community must work to achieve greater international security at significantly lower levels of armament.
3. Pledge to work for the restoration of a climate of confidence in East/West relations.
4. Urge the United States and the USSR to establish a genuine political dialogue, in the interests of world peace.
5. Urge the five nuclear weapons states to agree to place limits upon and then reduce their nuclear arsenals.
6. Urge all non-nuclear states to renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

B

POSSIBLE DECLARATION BY CHOGM

We, the Heads of Government of the Commonwealth, drawn from five continents and representing a quarter of the world's population:

1. Are deeply troubled by the dangerous state of East/West tensions; by the high level of international tension; by grave instability in the international security situation; by the continuing arms race; and above all by the risk of nuclear war which threatens the survival of humanity.
2. Are convinced that the international community must work to achieve greater international security at significantly lower levels of armament.
3. Pledge to work for the restoration of a climate of confidence in East/West relations.
4. Urge the United States and the USSR to establish a genuine political dialogue, in the interests of world peace.
5. Agree that non-nuclear states should renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons as the nuclear powers place limits upon and then reduce their nuclear arsenals.

C

POSSIBLE DECLARATION BY CHOGM

We, the Heads of Government of the Commonwealth, drawn from five continents and representing a quarter of the world's population:

1. Are deeply troubled by the dangerous state of East/West tensions; by the high level of international tension; by grave instability in the international security situation; by the continuing arms race; and above all by the risk of nuclear war which threatens the survival of humanity.
2. Are convinced that the international community must work to achieve greater international security at significantly lower levels of armament.
3. Pledge to work for the restoration of a climate of confidence in East/West relations.
4. Urge the United States and the USSR to establish a genuine political dialogue, in the interests of world peace.
5. Stress the need for the nuclear powers to agree as soon as possible to limit and then reduce their nuclear arsenals in parallel with the undertaking of other states to renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

CONFIDENTIAL

TO ALL HEADS OF DELEGATION

I promised last night to circulate an 'outline declarattion' on international security for consideration at Goa. It is attached. If broadly acceptable, I will have fleshed out paragraphs which we might then look at.

If we can settle this "declaration" at Goa and some communique paragraphs on Greneda as well the processes of this Meeting would have been greatly assisted. I will try to produce some Grenada paragraphs at Goa.

'Sonny'

New Delhi

25 November, 1983

*That this is the report of 15
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OUTLINE FOR DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY .

1. Shared sense of crises. Apprehension about ^{growing heightening of tension} (state of world order.)
Despite differences of approach, common perception that super power confrontation is assuming new and menacing dimensions. Danger of complete breakdown in communication between antagonists. Build up of nuclear arsenals threatens human annihilation.
2. General breakdown of stability and order in international community and increasing disregard of moral and legal principles which should govern conduct of states.
3. First objective is resumption of genuine political dialogue between super powers so as to lead to relaxation of tension.
4. Need to increase human contacts and political confidence-building measures at various levels of governments and peoples.
5. Importance of political will recognised and emphasized by all. Prime Minister Trudeau's call for new political dimension to international security welcomed. Support for his approach that more effective dialogue must take place among nuclear weapon powers.
6. Pre-condition of progress on de-nuclearisation world-wide ^{Views} is halting and reversal of nuclear arms race between super powers. The link between disarmament and development is also relevant.
7. Crisis of confidence in multilateral approach to international affairs. Renewal of support for United Nations. Importance of taking carefully considered and practical measures to make organisation better able to fulfill objectives of Charter.
8. Concern at vulnerability of small states to external attack and interference. These countries though unable to defend themselves are members of international community which has obligation to provide effective guarantees for their territorial integrity and independence. Consideration should be given to appropriate action responsive to the UN Secretary General's call for a strengthening of collective security in keeping with the Charter.
9. The ethic of non-violence is at the heart of ensuring peace and harmony in the world and of pursuing conflict resolution through adherence to the principle of peaceful settlement and the non-use of force.

Mr. Fowler

C.152/12/14

24 November 1983

COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING

NEW DELHI 1983

... Attached are copies of the Provisional Record of the Third Session of the Heads of Government Meeting held at Vigyan Bhavan on Wednesday 23 November 1983 at 3.00 p.m.

Delegations are invited to submit to the Conference Secretary in writing, within 24 hours, any amendments they wish to suggest.

Hugh Craft

Hugh Craft
Conference Secretary

Commonwealth Secretariat
Vigyan Bhavan
New Delhi

SECRET

HGH(83)3rd Session

COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING
NEW DELHI 1983

PROVISIONAL RECORD of the Third Session held at
Vigyan Bhavan
on Wednesday, 23 November 1983, at 3 p.m.

Present:

The Hon. Mrs Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India
(in the Chair)

The Hon. Mr Lester Bird,
Deputy Prime Minister & Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Antigua &
Barbuda

The Hon. Mr R.J.L. Hawke, MP,
Prime Minister of Australia

The Rt. Hon. Sir Lynden O. Pindling, MP,
Prime Minister of the Commonwealth
of the Bahamas

H.E. Lt. Gen. H.M. Ershad,
President of the Council of
Ministers of Bangladesh

The Rt. Hon. J.M.G.M. Adams, MP,
Prime Minister of Barbados

The Rt. Hon. George Price,
Prime Minister of Belize

The Hon. Mr A.N. Mogwe, MP,
Minister of External Affairs,
Botswana

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, MP,
Prime Minister of Britain

The Rt. Hon. Pierre Elliott Trudeau, MP,
Prime Minister of Canada

H.E. Mr Constantinos Michaelides,
Minister to the President, Cyprus

The Hon. Miss Eugenia Charles,
Prime Minister of Dominica

The Rt. Hon. Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara,
Prime Minister of Fiji

The Hon. L.K. Jabang,
Minister of External Affairs,
The Gambia

H.E. Mr K.K.S. Dadzie,
Special PNDC Plenipotentiary and
High Commissioner to the United Kingdom,
Ghana

H.E. The Hon. L.F.S. Burnham,
President of Guyana

The Rt. Hon. Hugh L. Shearer, MP,
Deputy Prime Minister & Minister of
Foreign Affairs & Foreign Trade,
Jamaica

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H.E.Mr Daniel T. arap Moi, MP,
President of Kenya

The Hon.E.R.Sekhonyana,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Lesotho

The Hon.Tan Sri Haji Muhammad
Ghazali bin Shafie,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Malaysia

The Hon.Anerood Jugnauth,
Prime Minister of Mauritius

H.E.Alhaji Shehu Shagari,
President of Nigeria

The Hon.Dr Kennedy A.Simmonds,
Prime Minister of St Christopher
& Nevis

The Hon.Dr Maxime Ferrari,
Minister of Planning & External
Relations, Seychelles

The Rt.Hon.Lee Kuan Yew,
Prime Minister of Singapore

H.E.Mwalimu Dr Julius K.Nyerere,
President of Tanzania

The Hon.George Chambers,
Prime Minister of Trinidad & Tobago

Tofilau Eti Alesana,
Prime Minister of Western Samoa

The Hon.Ieremia T.Tabai,
President of Kiribati

The Hon.L.C.Chaziya,MP,
Minister of Finance, Malawi

The Hon.Alex Sceberras Trigona,MP,
Minister of Foreign Affairs & Culture,
Malta

The Rt.Hon.Robert D.Muldoon,MP,
Prime Minister of New Zealand

The Rt.Hon.M.T.Somare,MP,
Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea

The Hon.John Compton,
Prime Minister of St.Lucia

H.E.Dr Siaka Stevens,
President of Sierra Leone

H.E.Mr J.R.Jayewardene,
President of Sri Lanka

H.R.H.Crown Prince Tupouto'a,
Minister for Foreign Affairs & Defence
Tonga

H.E.Dr A.Milton Obote,
President of Uganda

H.E.The Hon.Dr Kenneth D.Kaunda
President of Zambia

The Hon.Robert G.Mugabe,
Prime Minister of Zimbabwe

H.E.Mr Shridath S. Ramphal
Secretary-General

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Also present:

ANTIGUA & BARBUDA

Mr Eric Challenger
Mr Ronald Sanders

THE BAHAMAS

The Hon. Clement T. Maynard
Mr Harcourt L. Turnquest

BARBADOS

Mr F. M. Blackman
Mr H. P. B. Babb

BOTSWANA

Mr F. G. Mogae

CANADA

Mr M. Masse
Mr R. R. Fowler

DOMINICA

The Hon. Miss Judith Eleanor
Garraway
H. E. Mr Arden C. Shillingford

THE GAMBIA

Mr O. A. Sallah
H. E. Mr S. J. O. Sarr

GUYANA

The Hon. Rashleigh E. Jackson
The Hon. Dr M. Shahabuddeen

JAMAICA

Mr Frank Francis
Mr Lloyd Barnett

KIRIBATI

H. E. Mr Atanraoi Baiteke
Mr T. Kairoro

AUSTRALIA

H. E. Mr R. W. Butler
Mr John Dowan

BANGLADESH

The Hon. Mr A. R. Shams-ud Doha
H. E. Mr Fakruddin Ahmed

BELIZE

H. E. Mr Rudolph I. Castillo

BRITAIN

The Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey Howe
Sir Robert Armstrong

CYPRUS

H. E. Mr A. A. Nicolaidis
Mr Elias Ypsarides

FIJI

The Hon. Mosese Qionibaravi
Dr Isireli Lasaga

GHANA

Mr S. E. Quarm
Mr P. K. Aryene

INDIA

Mr G. Parthasarathy
Dr P. C. Alexander

KENYA

The Hon. E. W. Mwangale
Mr B. A. Kiplagat

LESOTHO

Mr J. R. L. Kotsokoane
H. E. Mr O. T. Sefako

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MALAWI

H.E. Mr C.M. Mkona

MALTA

Mr Alfred Falyon
Mr V. Camilleri

NEW ZEALAND

Mr M. Norrish
Mr G.C. Hensley

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

The Hon. A.M. Siaguru
Mr Paulias Matane

ST LUCIA

H.E. Dr Claudius C. Thomas
Mr Earl Huntley

SIERRA LEONE

The Hon. Dr Abdulai Conteh
H.E. Mr V.E. Sumner

SRI LANKA

The Hon. A.C.S. Hameed
Mr W.M.P.B. Menikdiwela

TONGA

The Hon. J. Cecil Cocker
H.E. Mr S.T. Taumoepeau-Tupou

UGANDA

The Hon. Dr A. Picho Owiny
H.E. The Hon. Shafiq Arain

ZAMBIA

The Hon. D.M. Lisulo
Professor The Hon. L.K.H. Goma

MALAYSIA

Ambassador Tan Sri Zakaria Ali
Wan Abu Bakar bin Wan Mohamed

MAURITIUS

The Hon. A.K. Gayan
Mr Vishvanaden Sooben

NIGERIA

Chief Emeka Anyaoku
Alhaji Shehu Musa

ST CHRISTOPHER & NEVIS

The Hon. S.W. Tapley Seaton
Mr Alvin Farier

SEYHELLES

Mr Calixte D'Offay
Mr Robert Delpech

SINGAPORE

The Hon. Suppiah Dhanabalan
Mr Raymond H.T. Wong

TANZANIA

H.E. Mr Salim A. Salim
The Hon. Amir H. Jamal

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

The Hon. Errol Mahabir
The Hon. Dr Basil Ince

WESTERN SAMOA

The Hon. Taua Latu Lome
Mr Maiava Iulai Toma

ZIMBABWE

The Hon. Dr Witness Magunda Mangwende
The Hon. E.D. Mnangagwa

SECRET

SECRETARIAT

Sir Peter Marshall

Mr M Malhotra

Mrs R. McLaren

Mr R. Brown

Mr A. Selvanathan

Mr J. Syson

Mr C. Gunawardena

Mr A. Couto

Mr C. Dundas

Dr B Persaud

Mr N.H. Craft

Mrs P. Robertson

Mr C. Laidlaw

Mr G. Dickson

Mr I. Thomas

Dr S.K. Rao

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MRS GANDHI in calling the meeting to order said that she wished to remedy a lacuna left in the morning session which was that when reading out the items that were considered by the Senior Officials and the Note by the Secretary General on the order of Agenda and Procedural Matters, one item on the "Proposal by Commonwealth Employment and Labour Ministers for a Working Group on the Management of Technological Change" had been omitted. She pointed out that there was a background paper on that subject by the Commonwealth Secretariat and assumed that it was agreed that it should be included with other matters to be remitted to the Committee of the Whole.

ITEM 3. WORLD POLITICAL SCENE

(a) Global Trends and Prospects

Introducing Agenda Item 3(a), she said Heads were meeting at a time of great tension, mistrust and apprehension, a time which for want of a better phrase she could only describe as one of "trigger readiness". All were aware of the trouble spots: a gathering storm in West Asia, an explosive situation in Lebanon, the problems that threatened the Gulf and the Iran - Iraq war about which no one seemed able to do anything. There was tension in Central America and now two new crises - Grenada, a country in which developments had come as a shock to all, and had sharpened the fears which many of them had been expressing. Then there were the developments in Cyprus to which the world community had reacted strongly. The Security Council had adopted a good resolution on Cyprus but it was unfortunate that one country should have chosen to vote against it. There were also longer standing problems. The New Delhi meeting had to do something about Namibia - at the very least they could pronounce clearly on what needed to be done and what they were prepared to do to hasten Namibia's independence. They could not support linkage which they considered a ruse by South Africa to keep a grip on Namibia.

They might discuss how useful the Western Contact Group was. Much had been said about the arms race. Leaders could not sit by and watch a stalemate in the negotiations between the two sides. They could not afford a breakdown in the disarmament talks. They had a responsibility to advance efforts for nuclear arms reduction and disarmament.

She felt sure that Mr Trudeau would brief them when he spoke on the initiative he had undertaken on this issue. They might wish to consider whether the present meeting should appeal to the negotiating parties on at least one or two measures of arms reduction, as a step to alleviate the prevailing fear psychosis; whether they might request them jointly to report to the Security Council or the United Nations General Assembly on the existing status of their negotiations.

She recalled that the Non-Aligned countries had met at summit level in New Delhi in March. Those outside the movement might not wholly agree with all the Non-Aligned decisions but she thought all would share the anxiety over the weakening of the United Nations. The need for such an international forum could not be denied: the role of the United Nations had to be renewed and reinforced. Could the present meeting take steps towards achieving this objective?

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Many Heads were looking for a comprehensive discussion on the basic question of East/West relations, and the linked question of national security and disarmament and its impact on the whole environment of world affairs. As these were of critical importance, she suggested that following Mr Trudeau's introduction the best part of the afternoon session could focus on these issues. All would be interested to hear the others' views on these strategic issues, especially how they impact on different regions. Following this discussion they could address themselves to some of the specific issues which she had mentioned earlier and turn to southern Africa at a later session.

MR TRUDEAU, Canada, said that he had been asked to open discussion on the world political situation and to lay particular emphasis on East/West relations, and the question of disarmament. He said he would speak at greater length on the issue of disarmament. The Secretary-General in his Agenda letter described the situation very well. He had observed that : "For the last two years the global and political environment has deteriorated markedly. It is now more troubled, more insecure, and more uncertain than at the time of the Lusaka meeting. US/Soviet relations have worsened. Mistrust and suspicion have increased and East/West confrontation has intensified. The arms race has accelerated" The Secretary-General had gone on to comment that : "These disturbing trends have continued and in some respects they have worsened since Melbourne".

Since that letter had issued the situation had worsened further. Apart from the Korean airline disaster, there was the increasingly tense situation in Lebanon, the developments in Grenada, and more recently, trouble in Cyprus. The situation had worsened and he agreed with Mrs Gandhi and Mrs Thatcher who in their morning speeches had alluded to the necessity of introducing more elements of exchange and dialogue into the situation with the aim of easing tensions through increased communication. It had been said that the Commonwealth could not negotiate on behalf of the world but that it could help the world to negotiate. He thought that, perhaps, as a result of their discussions in New Delhi they could help create a climate around which negotiations, even those between the Super Powers, could resume in an improved atmosphere. Indeed, to use Lord Carrington's phrase, there ~~was~~ currently what had been termed "megaphone diplomacy". There were exchanges between the Super Powers but ~~more~~ ^{more} at the level of public discussion ~~but~~ ultimately he believed what was lacking was high politics in trying to resolve World tensions.

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They had only to recall the period of the late 1950s and most of the 1960s indeed up until about 1975, when the Helsinki Final Act had been signed. A whole series of Treaties and Agreements had been signed between the Super Powers during that period. Since then, however, no further progress had been made. None at all. There had been SALT II, but that had not been ratified. There had been an absence of high level political dialogue between the Super Powers. None of the countries at the New Delhi meeting were participants in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (START) or Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) talks but all would suffer the consequences of any increased tension, both within their regions, and their economies, or ultimately, through a nuclear war. For those reasons, he had been arguing that it was their duty as political leaders to play their part by trying to improve the climate in relations between East and West so that negotiations were pursued in a better spirit. Though they were not participants at the Geneva talks, some of them were represented at the talks on Mutual and Balanced Forces Reduction at Vienna and would be taking part in the Conference on Disarmament in Europe which would begin in Stockholm in January. The Mutual and

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Balanced Force Reduction talks in Geneva had been going on for ten years and had indeed made some progress but ultimately had not achieved the desired objective. In both these fora members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact sat together and were supposed to negotiate.

What he had proposed, in brief, to all his NATO colleagues was that they reintroduce a political dimension in both these fora. He disclosed that at the NATO meeting in early December his Foreign Minister would propose to his colleagues that they ensure that at the Stockholm Conference they were represented at a high political level so that they could avoid the course which had been followed increasingly in Vienna, confining negotiations to ambassadors and bureaucrats without the injection of the necessary political will to unlock those ten year negotiations. There was concern that this is what might also happen in Stockholm.

He had made these remarks by way of background. This particular matter did not directly concern many of the Heads of Government present. He thought however, he would mention it so that they would all know which way those leaders to whom he had spoken in NATO and had answered his appeals, seemed willing to make concrete political decisions in order to improve the climate existing between East and West. In other words, the NATO colleagues he had spoken to seemed generally willing to take that step which would involve them politically because the negotiators, the specialists in Geneva, and in those other capitals he had mentioned, did not have the direct responsibility to their people that political leaders had to find peace. Officials were specialists charged to do a technical job.

As political leaders they had the responsibility to their people to find solutions beyond the technical exchanges and that was why he thought they should be present in those fora.

He said he would like to deal more particularly with the question of nuclear proliferation both horizontally and vertically. He had noted the Declaration by the Non-Aligned meeting held in New Delhi in March and the reference by Mrs Gandhi to the summit message which had appealed to the Great Powers to halt the arms race, to divert resources for development. The Non-Aligned summit had urged nuclear powers to adopt certain measures, including prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons; advocating a nuclear-arms freeze, and a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Most of the Declaration had been addressed to the Great Powers or to the nuclear powers, and rightly so. He would argue that even the non nuclear powers, like most of the countries represented at the present meeting, had a duty. All of them were aware that questions of disarmament and development were very closely linked. He wished to propose a way in which they could be linked logically which would lead at least to a process of nuclear reduction, disarmament and development at the same time, rather than simply observing that they were interlinked. It was necessary to propose some concrete forms of action and he would be very happy to test his own ideas with his colleagues and to hear their criticisms and responses.

It had been estimated that the combined annual world military budgets for the current year was between US\$650 billion dollars a year and 1 trillion dollars, depending on who was doing the calculation and what was included in it. About one-fifth of this expenditure was by the developing countries. That meant that something around US\$150 billion dollars a year were spent on military budgets by the developing countries. The arms trade was of the order of approximately US\$30 billion dollars a year, eighty per cent involving Third World countries.

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Tomas Wuelo

APPROPRIATE

Mrs Thatcher had mentioned, during her address in the morning, that since 1945 there had been an estimate of 140 wars. This figure could be even higher, perhaps up to 200 if smaller types of conflict and guerrilla war-fare were included. Most had been in third countries and for this reason he would argue that they, too, had a responsibility. He would urge non-nuclear countries and the Third World nations, to try at this Conference Meeting to take some steps, make some declarations and give an indication of their desire to tackle that problem directly.

What he would propose, in essence, was this: that vertical proliferation, that is to say the increase of nuclear arms held by the Five Powers, which now had nuclear arms, was against the spirit and the letter of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which some nuclear-powers had signed. The Treaty made it a specific obligation that they must reduce their nuclear arms, apart from sharing with non-nuclear countries the benefits of nuclear knowledge and technology. This is what he had suggested in his recent meetings with leaders of nuclear powers, President Mitterand, and Prime Minister Thatcher. He had a meeting scheduled with the Prime Minister of China in the next month and would proceed to Moscow and Washington if that still appeared worthwhile after seeing the other three. In essence what they were faced with was a need for those five nuclear Powers to agree on, first, a halt and then, a reduction of their nuclear arms. What he would like to see was a forum in which discussion ~~in-between~~ by those five nuclear Powers could be undertaken on a different basis from existing structures. The Soviet Union had called for a conference of the five nuclear Powers but had said it wanted the British and French deterrent counted along with the American arsenal thereby giving the Soviet Union absolute preponderance. The Soviet Union had modified this in a declaration a few weeks previously but in effect, it had not been modified, since in the end it proposed to have many more nuclear arms, particularly theatre weapons, than the United States itself. The Soviet proposal for a Five Power Nuclear Conference had been made but was unacceptable certainly to the Americans and he believed to the French Government too. The Chinese Government had proposed a Five Power Conference but had proposed that the Super Powers should first begin by cutting in half, or reducing by 50 per cent, to be more precise, their nuclear arsenals and, of course, that was not occurring because of the stalemate in Geneva.

Though he was sure Mrs Thatcher would speak for herself, his understanding of the French and British position, was that they were not against the idea eventually of a meeting of the Five Powers but they certainly did not want their nuclear arsenal to be counted and reduced until long after a contraction in the arsenals of the Super Powers which had an overwhelming preponderance, something in the order of 9,000 nuclear theatre weapons, of which the British and French had less than 200. He believed that the Chinese Government held the same position when they proposed a Five Power Conference.

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He was suggesting to the Five Nuclear Powers that they negotiate together in a forum, not on a bloc-to-bloc basis, as five sovereign Powers, each deciding what level of armaments it needed for the protection of its sovereignty in the nuclear world that they were living in. That would permit, for instance, the British, the French and the Chinese to decide as sovereign states what level of arms they needed in order to protect their sovereignty. His guess, conceptually, was that this could mean that the Chinese, British, or the French could have ~~no~~ larger nuclear arsenals than at present at least until such a time as the two Super Powers had reduced very drastically their level of armaments. But what could happen was that a ratio could be established at such a conference and once

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the ratio was established and that ceiling reached then they would be able to begin to reduce the number of their nuclear arms by adhering to that ratio.

He had had some responses to his proposals. He had not seen the leaders of the two Super Powers yet so it was too early to know what chance those proposals had but he would put to his colleagues, present, in talking of horizontal proliferation, a kind of deal which would enjoin the nuclear powers to respect their undertakings and for the non-nuclear, indeed for those countries who have not signed the Non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to adhere to it and respect it.

He recalled that the first Conference of the (NPT) had been disastrous and unproductive. The NPT would be reviewed again in 1985. The essence of the NPT was a kind of compact between nuclear and non-nuclear power states. The nuclear power states were supposed to reduce and share their nuclear technology with the non-nuclear states. The non-nuclear states for their part were, by signing the NPT, undertaking to not cross the threshold to become nuclear powers. There were several near-nuclear powers, India was one; he would not name the 6 to 10 others, who could become nuclear powers within a short period of time, if they so desired. He believed that about one-third of Commonwealth Countries had not signed the NPT for one reason or another, and he thought that after looking at most of the reasons given he had to say that he respected them - they were founded on logic from the point of view of their own geographical situation and their conceptions of politics.

What he would like to see was a way of enforcing that pact; of telling the nuclear powers that if they lived up to their undertaking on reducing the numbers of weapons then the non-nuclear powers would be prepared not to become nuclear powers on the condition that the savings made by the nuclear powers would be turned to the cause of development in whole or in part. There was something for the Third World, for the Non-Aligned, for the non-nuclear powers and for the nuclear powers. It had to be kept in mind that the Super Powers, not surprising, were more afraid of a nuclear war breaking out, not between themselves directly because they knew that they could destroy each other totally but through other conflicts breaking out which would gradually draw them in and lead to a fatal nuclear war; particularly if an increasing number of non-nuclear powers acquired nuclear capability. The nuclear powers wanted other non-nuclear Powers to sign the NPT and respect it. The non-nuclear powers would like the five nuclear powers to respect their part of the bargain and that would seem to be a conditional adherence to the NPT or a conditional expression of will to remain signatories of the NPT, because it would be up for review again in 1985 and if no more progress were made than in 1980 the chances were that the Treaty would become ineffective and people would withdraw their support for it.

There were 114, or 119 signatories at present. He knew the weaknesses of the Non Proliferation Treaty, they had been argued many times, but to use a colloquial expression "it is the only game in town". They had a year and a half from now to see if they could use that instrument as a lever by each side in order to make the world less vulnerable to nuclear destruction. This period roughly coincided with the time-frame of two years before the next Commonwealth Meeting, presumably, and they could set a deadline for themselves if they intended to follow this kind of wager, this kind of bargain made for the nuclear powers, saying that they would adhere to the NPT conditionally providing as a condition that by then, or before, the nuclear powers had reduced their nuclear arsenals. He said he looked towards a forum where these proposals might be discussed.

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Second, it was necessary that the effects of the reduction in armaments be ploughed back in whole, or in part, into Third World development and, of course, these were two very difficult conditions. He did not see that they were at risk by saying if those two things happened then, indeed, they would sign the NPT or something better if it could be devised by 1985. That was the essence of this presentation.

Mrs Gandhi had mentioned in her introduction the possibility of making a statement. He was not sure if it should appear in the final communique, but he would put forward for their consideration the possibility of having one page, maybe six two line paragraphs, which they might issue before the Retreat at Goa, or after Goa, to draw attention to this particular issue much as had occurred at Williamsburg Summit, where the seven largest industrialised countries, issued a statement on East-West relations independently from their final communique. They might want to consider such an approach and if this were the case he had something like 15 lines which might sum up the situation which he would be happy to show to the Secretariat or read out later if they reached that stage in the discussions.

DR KAUNDA, Zambia, expressed his appreciation to Mr Trudeau for his excellent resume of how he saw the world. It made very good sense but it was also very frightening. He would like to make his own contribution but now he wished to address a question to Mr Trudeau who, in his opinion, had done a commendable job by going solo on matters that affect the whole of mankind and which worry them all a great deal. Mr Trudeau, in pursuance of his initiative, had so far met Mrs Thatcher, President Mitterrand and intended to meet the Chinese Prime Minister and later on the leaders of the two Super Powers. He wanted to know how Mr Trudeau would react to the proposal that instead of the world leaving this initiative to him alone, two or three more leaders might accompany him to some of these capitals?

He had in mind people like Mrs Gandhi, President Shagari and Mr Hawke. This would strengthen the group in terms of the Commonwealth, but they could choose their times when they visited capitals and speak on behalf of those present.

Mr Trudeau said that he reacted very positively to the suggestion by Dr Kaunda and welcomed it as supporting his ideas. He did not think any one man from any one country could find the solution to world peace but he had come to believe that a particular time had come when he should at least make an initiative. The Palme Commission had made some progress, but not much. He himself might make some progress, but not much, others would try to make some progress at some point when the time was right.

Though in a sense he had started on his own, he would be very happy to continue with a group such as one suggested by Dr Kaunda or some other group.

He wished to make a distinction, in terms of the nuclear powers and, ultimately, the nuclear aspect of the question. He thought he would be immeasurably strengthened if he were associated with some of the leaders suggested but wished to say there was another side of his proposal which did not affect some of the leaders directly. This aspect related to members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and he did not think that that aspect of the initiative could be helped by association with some of the leaders you mentioned.

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What was peculiar about the negotiations being pursued in Geneva and Stockholm was that they were, by definition, bloc to bloc, Warsaw Pact against NATO. As an aligned country, Canada, as a member of NATO, had to be extremely careful not to break the solidarity of the NATO countries in proposing outside political participation in Vienna or in Stockholm. In this context, he felt most of the leaders suggested would have no locus standi in a NATO forum or, indeed, in Warsaw Pact Councils. There would be in the Stockholm Conference, apart from the NATO and Warsaw Pact participants, some representatives from Non-Aligned countries and some neutral countries such as, Yugoslavia and Sweden.

This was his short answer. He would be very happy to work with the group suggested but they should perhaps ask if this same group should be associated with the various current initiatives, including some he was making in the United Nations, which he would not for the moment elaborate on, for instance, against the development of weaponry to be used at high altitudes. Whether they proposed that to the United Nations after this Conference would need very much the support of leaders suggested; it was necessary to make the distinction between different initiatives but certainly he agreed it would be vital if all participated in one way or another.

Dr Kaunda said that this was precisely what he had in mind because unless mankind could arrest this trend of confrontation between the two Super-Powers, there might not be a Stockholm Conference; there might not be continuing talks in Geneva. Mr Trudeau's initiative should primarily be aimed at first of all reducing tension then, if this were successful, in getting conditions in which a more balanced discussion would take place. As matters now stood, one felt anything could happen. Mrs Gandhi had referred to a situation in which anything could happen, there was a need for support for Mr Trudeau's initiative to show that this world did not belong to the two Super-Powers; it belonged to all on the planet. The Commonwealth had an advantage in not being much involved in NATO or Warsaw Pact struggles, and that was why he had suggested that the leaders of India, and Nigeria should join the Canadian initiative so that a sort of parallel balance could be reached, which could be used as a springboard for pursuing the initiative to talk to both Moscow and Washington.

There was not much time left but they could capture a mood and pursue Mr Trudeau's initiative to the Super-Powers and tell them that they were worried about the situation and affirm that the world belong to all men.

Mrs Gandhi, speaking as the Prime Minister of India, said that her country would be the least appropriate to join such a group because all men knew that although India was strongly committed to nuclear disarmament and the renunciation of nuclear weaponry, it had strong reservations about the NPT as it now stood and it had not signed it.

Mr Trudeau observed that Mrs Gandhi had used the phrase "as it now stands". She had objections about the NPT but, could there be improvements in any way that might lead India to sign the Treaty?

Mrs Gandhi said that this question could lead to a long argument because the real point was that it was an unfair Treaty as were most treaties which were between the haves and the have-nots. So far as the NPT was concerned, and other issues, no matter what was signed or what position was taken, somehow it went against those who had nothing and that was the major difficulty for them.

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DR NYERERE, Tanzania, said Mr Trudeau had mentioned correctly a number of countries which had not signed the NPT. Some of those countries, quite frankly, had no possibility of making nuclear weapons at all. One of these countries was his own country, which had not signed on a matter of principle, saying, "What is this business? The world was not losing any sleep because Tanzania had not signed NPT." But the world was very concerned about the position of the nuclear powers and the question he wanted to put to Mr Trudeau was: the NPT asked for a horizontal freeze but it did not enforce a vertical freeze.

Mr Trudeau said NPT did impose an obligation on the nuclear powers to reduce their nuclear arsenals.

Mrs Gandhi said this was something they had not done.

Mr Trudeau said that he agreed with this point.

Dr Nyerere said his question to Mr Trudeau was whether he was now saying that it was possible to exchange an enforceable horizontal freeze for an enforceable vertical freeze? Was this the idea?

Mr Trudeau, replying, said, it was possible. What would be the reaction to not fulfilling the potential for becoming a nuclear power in exchange for a reduction in nuclear arsenals? But he knew for reasons of principle, some over South Africa, some over equality of states, ~~we~~ had not wanted to sign.

Mrs Gandhi observed that, as it was, nuclear powers continued to make nuclear weapons. They were objecting to any peaceful experiment which non-nuclear powers may have. India, for instance, had several such experiments.

MRS THATCHER, Britain said that there was not the slightest doubt that the Western democracies would like to be able to secure the defence of their way of life at a lower level of weaponry. But they needed to have sufficient weapons of all kinds to be able to ensure this. Being democracies there were many other competing claims on their resources. This meant negotiating with the other side. What she had been trying to say earlier in the day was that the possession of nuclear weapons and the balance of terror implicit in those weapons had actually prevented not only nuclear war but also conventional war in Europe for a longer period than at any time in the past. Nuclear weapons were therefore something which the West could not cast aside lightly. In contrast, where there had not been nuclear weapons there had been some 140 conflicts resulting in several million deaths. It was important to avoid falling into the trap of thinking that conventional war was somehow more acceptable. Sometimes the debate about nuclear weapons gave the impression that the relationship between nuclear and conventional war was one of antithesis. It was true that nuclear war would be infinitely more terrible than conventional war, but that did not make a conventional war any more acceptable. In Europe the possession of nuclear weapons had prevented all kinds of war. That was some encouragement for those who prized peace above all else.

There was a suggestion that the number of nuclear weapons is increasing. As a matter of fact some of the older ones had actually been taken out of use. According to the information given to the United States Congress, the deployment of Cruise and Pershings missiles would reduce United States nuclear war heads in Europe by some 2,400. In fact, the United States now had one-third fewer nuclear weapons than it had in 1967. Their corresponding explosive power was only 25 per cent. of what it had been in 1960. These were the cold facts. It may be answered,

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in response to these facts, that the West does not have to increase its nuclear weapons because it already has too many. The strange reality was that nuclear weapons had prevented the outbreak of war whereas the conventional wars have continued. This of course did not mean that proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world was desirable, for that would make the world a much less safe place if too many countries acquired them.

There were at the moment a number of disarmament talks in progress and both East and West wanted to see progress at these talks. They were the appropriate venues to advance a balanced reduction in armaments, not top level meeting of the political leadership. The summit meetings were only meant to reduce tension through contact. There had been talks in Vienna on the reduction of conventional weapons but these had been stalled because NATO could not ascertain the number of weapons deployed by the Warsaw Pact in its side. In spite of some ten years of negotiations, NATO had still not succeeded in obtaining the precise figures from the Warsaw Pact Countries.

How then could tension be reduced? Like everyone else, she, too, was worried about the level of world tension. She believed that the first step towards this objective lay in increased contact between people and herein lay the problem. For unlike the citizens of the Western democracies or those of the non-aligned countries, the citizens of the Warsaw Pact countries could not travel freely. The invasion of Afghanistan first and more recently the shooting down of the Korean air liner confirmed her in the belief that only through contact could one hope to be able to influence others. It was for this reason that she herself would shortly be visiting Hungary. She did not expect to get very far very soon but a beginning had to be made.

The way to proceed however was not everyone to stream in one direction. That would not be helpful. What was important was to encourage those who had never known freedom to get out of their countries and come to visit the Western democracies. For this reason she had hoped that Mrs Gandhi's initiative at the United Nations might have led to Mr Andropov or someone of comparable standing agreeing to visit the West for talks. It would also have been an opportunity to establish informal contacts. It was important to build up these contacts from the bottom upwards rather than the other way round which was implicit in the suggestion of a five power Summit. That was a card to be played only once and at the right time, after a great deal of preparation. Part of the preparatory work would involve contact between Officials, Junior Ministers and trade delegations and politicians at all levels. These were among the first things that needed to precede any Summit meeting.

It should be remembered that the Stockholm conference had emerged from the Madrid conference, and the Madrid conference had consisted of many negotiations between East and West but on a limited range of subjects. What Mr Trudeau was now suggesting was that those negotiations be continued at the highest political level. It was a view she did not share. She did not wish to cause a split within NATO by making a suggestion which the other members could not agree to.

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Concluding, she hoped that someone else would join the party, as it were. They all wanted nuclear disarmament but she also wanted disarmament in conventional weapons. There was so much else to spend the money on but she had never been prepared to put their way of life in jeopardy by actually dropping their security. The problem now was to persuade the other side that they should co-operate with the West to secure disarmament rather than passing resolutions at the United Nations. There had been 28 such resolutions in the last session of the United Nations.

DR KAUNDA, Zambia, said he was very grateful to Mrs Thatcher for what she had said about the value of contact. He had been worried at the public positions of the political leadership in both Washington and London.

Something of a shouting match had been developing between Washington and London on the one hand and Moscow on the other; and in that context, Mrs. Thatcher's remarks had been quite helpful. For if those issues were to be settled as it were through public pronouncements, then there was little prospect of ever resolving them. For that reason he had been delighted when the media had quoted Mrs Thatcher as saying that the Russians were here to stay and that they had therefore better establish contact with them. She was making very much the same point now and that was to the good. The point of his intervention was to reinforce the spirit in which Mrs Thatcher had spoken and to underline the importance of East-West contact, because they were all in the same "boat" and the way things had been going of late, gave cause for serious concern.

Dr Kaunda believed that the Soviet Union had more reason to be frightened than did the United States, and that this could in part be explained by the fact that Soviet society only dated from 1917, whereas United States in its present form had been in existence since the eighteenth century. The relative youthfulness of the Soviet Union showed in its diplomacy, which was not as accomplished as that of the older European states. Once that fact was borne in mind, it was easy to keep matters in perspective. It would also help to create the necessary conditions for mutual understanding.

MRS THATCHER, Britain, replied that Russian expansionism had long predated the advent to power of Marxism-Leninism. As for her reported remark about having to live with the Russians, that was true. It was part of a statement taking stock of the strategic position, and that was exactly what the present agenda item was about. She for one disliked Communism intensely because it denied fundamental freedom in the Soviet Union. She saw little possibility of change, but because of the rigidity of the system, if it were to change, the change would be so fundamental that the system would almost cease to exist, which was one reason why the Soviet government would not change it. But whether one liked Communism or not, the fact was that one had to live with the Russians. It was necessary to have some relations with them, such as trade and that was to their mutual advantage. It meant one had to find some way of talking to them in an attempt to reduce world tension. For that reason she advocated political talks. But those talks should not forget the proposals tabled by the United States for reducing each sides' strategic weapons by a third. There were also the proposals for the Zero option on intermediate weapons. Then there were proposals for limiting the conventional forces to 900,000. The first two proposals would be very good, if agreed; the third would still be an enormous figure but would at least be a start.

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She believed the Western democracies were more concerned to keep down their level of weaponry and that people in these countries preferred to spend their time and money on other things than weaponry. Militarism seemed to be a virility symbol for the East; for the West it was for defence. Nevertheless, it was her hope that even the Soviet Union would wish to spend less on weaponry in order to be able to spend more on the relief of some of its internal economic problems. The Soviet people too wanted a higher standard of living than they had at present. It was therefore her hope that both sides would agree to talks which would eventually lead to disarmament and enable each side to devote greater resources to raising living standards.

MRS GANDHI said that was the dialogue they had had in mind at the Non-Aligned Summit in New Delhi, when they had suggested the meeting in New York. That was a meeting of some 27 countries and brought together leaders from both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, as well as from the non-aligned movement. In a sense it was like the present meeting, involving a free and frank exchange of views and providing an opportunity for representatives from the two military blocs to hear one another.

DR FERRARI, Seychelles, opened his intervention by saying that he would like to tailor its size to that of his country. He thought many of his colleagues would like to commend Mr Trudeau for his initiative even if, like himself, they were not all that hopeful about its outcome. Nevertheless, he thought they should give him their support. Perhaps Mr Trudeau could also consult Dr Kaunda again to find out what further help he could get from the present forum. However, he believed that many around the table, perhaps the majority, seemed more concerned about the problems of the North-South dialogue than about those of the East-West.

East-West problems were on their agenda and should be discussed, but he felt the main problem of the developing countries related to the North-South dialogue. The East-West problems affected them only in the sense that they made it more difficult to have a North-South dialogue. In other words, if there had been East-West problems, the North-South dialogue would have been that much easier. The developing countries were very concerned about the development of their people and that was the interest they sought to defend at every international forum.

On East-West issues, he believed they would all welcome Mrs Thatcher's statement on the necessity for dialogue at all political levels, but many of them were very worried at the aggressiveness between East and West at the highest political level. They were gravely concerned by the nature of the statements issuing from the political leadership in Moscow and Washington and in such an atmosphere he could not see how Ministers of Trade or of Foreign Affairs or Education could meet in an atmosphere relaxed enough to reduce tension. He drew attention to this because it was important for those around the table who could help lower the tension to do so. For its part, Seychelles was in no position to help bring about this desired climate in international relations. It had no nuclear weapons but it was prepared to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty in 1985, if that could help achieve the objective.

He therefore hoped that they would not have to spend more time discussing the issue of disarmament, which they all acknowledged to be important. It was important because a lot of money was being wasted on armaments which should have gone to development. President Rene during the non-aligned summit in New Delhi had suggested that the participants should consider setting aside one per cent of

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their respective defence budgets to create a fund which would go towards development in their countries. He believed in the power of example. Today, there was talk of parents abandoning their responsibilities towards their children. Perhaps the international community was also guilty of shirking responsibility towards one another.

What was now needed was deeds, not words. The Commonwealth represented a quarter of the world community. Perhaps it should set an example by committing itself to establish a fund out of its own members' defence budgets. For those of its members with negligible armaments the financial constitution would be small but it would represent more for those which had major armament programmes intended to defend their way of life.

MR HAWKE, Australia, said that at the outset he would like to thank and congratulate Mr Trudeau for his very thoughtful introduction to the discussion. The observations he would like to make were not confined to the proposal Mr Trudeau had outlined, although some of them had a bearing on that proposal and on its response. It was important to understand the dimension of the problems with which they were dealing. It had been referred to earlier, but it bore repetition. They were discussing a situation where the world was spending some 700 billion dollars a year on the arms race. At the opening session one speaker had quoted the figure of 1 million dollars a minute; that was perhaps rather an under-statement and it was closer to one and a half million dollars a minute: a massive waste of human resources and ingenuity.

Of course the madness of that race had been reflected increasingly in the debate, as a number of speakers had referred to the high levels of tension in relations between the two Super Powers, a relationship which was being progressively permeated with suspicion. There had even been some attempt to apportion blame, perhaps in the belief that such an approach would be rewarding. Australia did not take the view that the United States bore the greater responsibility for the present difficulties between the two Super Powers. The Meeting had to recognise that the societies from which they came were open ones in which open debates took place and demonstrations occurred. In that process the concerns and perhaps the weaknesses of their systems were exposed. It was done in a way which was of course not replicated in the Soviet Union. The latter was at present pursuing an armaments programme of unprecedented proportion, both absolutely and in terms of its proportion of its gross domestic product. He had had the opportunity to meet the leadership of the United States and while there might be criticisms of some of the observations made by that leadership, it was his contention that it was utterly sincere in wanting to bring a halt to the arms race. He agreed with Dr Kaunda that the major powers should not alone have the right to determine these issues. Their calculations and miscalculations could affect and indeed eliminate all, and for that reason all had the basic right to be concerned.

He unequivocally rejected the proposition that unilateral disarmament was an effective way of bringing an end to the arms race. What was required was a set of realistic, concrete and balanced proposals which had at their heart the sort of thing that Mrs Thatcher had referred to, and that was the recognition of the national security interests of all countries, because there could be no greater responsibility upon any of them than to ensure that they had the capacity to protect the way of life to which they were committed. As far as Australia was concerned, their judgement was that the protection of their security interests required collective arrangements; they had such an arrangement, a tripartite one in ANZUS, also embracing the United States and New Zealand. They had clarified

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the nature of that arrangement and it had been accepted by all three parties. That gave Australia a vital interest in the issues they were discussing. As a consequence of those security arrangements, they had on Australian soil joint facilities with the United States which could make Australia a target in a nuclear war. Any country which had to make that judgement was engaged in a very difficult exercise but successive Australian governments had concluded that in net terms the decision benefited the country because those facilities played a positive role in maintaining western security and were important in verifying arms control and disarmament agreements.

The new Australian Government had greatly elevated the question of arms control and disarmament within its foreign policy. Australia was a member of every multilateral disarmament negotiating body and was promoting negotiation of treaties to end nuclear testing, to ban chemical weapons and to prevent an arms race. Recognising the limitations of a country of its size, it sought to persuade the Super Powers to moderate their antagonism and he believed that Australia had some capacity to do so. Australia's disarmament objectives were guided by three general principles: first, the security to all states at the lowest possible level of armament - no sensible country wanted to spend more on that objective than was necessary; second, stability in the nuclear balance; and, third, adequate verification of disarmament agreements. In line with those objectives they attached particular priority to efforts to secure nuclear disarmament through reductions in the nuclear arsenal. They should start with the INF negotiations, progress through the up-holding of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and conclude if possible, with a complete cessation of nuclear testing. In their own region, they had been urging the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the South West Pacific. They had discussed the matter with the United States because they believed it should be consistent with the right of free passage, through that area, of nuclear-powered ships and of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, in the light of the treaty they had with the United States.

They believed the starting point to disarmament was to reduce the size of nuclear and conventional arsenals and to bring them under the control of verified and effective agreements. It seemed to him that what they were emphasising was what was involved in the contribution Mr Trudeau had made and with which, in a way, Mrs Thatcher agreed, although not with the tactic. Australia believed that an adequate and effective provision for verification was the crucial pre-condition of progress. If there were to be any agreement it would have to command the confidence of the powers involved, and that meant eliminating any grounds for suspicion of non-compliance.

In its limited way, his government wished to encourage and support action in that field, and in that respect it was actively examining the possibility of improving Australia's capacity to monitor nuclear explosions by further developing its seismic monitoring capability. The problem of proliferation was very difficult, as had been clearly reflected in the present meeting. He wished to make the point that one basic concern to the meeting should be the position of South Africa. They all shared the abhorrence of its apartheid system, and they all ought to understand that it would be utterly unacceptable if its government were to acquire nuclear weapons, which was a real possibility. That gave additional weight to the emphasis the Commonwealth ought to give to the question of proliferation. Australia took the view, and it was obviously distinct from some of the others, that the Non-Proliferation Treaty must remain the cornerstone of other international treaties to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. One could point to its weaknesses in concept and possibly in terms of particular provisions, but, as Mr Trudeau had said, there was nothing else in that field.

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After considerable debate, his country had accepted that, as a producer and exporter of uranium, it had an obligation under Article 4 of the Treaty, to facilitate the participation of other countries, particularly developing countries, in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. They believed that in such a role they had a particular responsibility to secure improved international safeguards against the diversion of uranium supplied for peaceful purposes into use for the manufacture of weapons. Australia also took the view, and would continue to press it in all relevant international fora, that there should be a comprehensive test ban treaty.

He wished to make two or three other points which had not been mentioned but were relevant and were matters in respect of which something concrete could be done. There had been no reference to chemical and biological weapons, which were second only to nuclear weapons in their capacity to inflict death and suffering. He was of the firm belief that the relevant international conventions could be strengthened and would draw the attention of the meeting to the disappointing fact that of Commonwealth countries only two-thirds were parties to the 1925 Protocol on chemical weapons and less than two-thirds had signed the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. He encouraged all Commonwealth members to consider becoming signatories to those two conventions. It was an area in which members of the Commonwealth could strengthen existing provisions so that they became capable of limiting the capacity for destruction which was so tragically evident in the world today. Australia strongly supported those two treaties and believed they should be reflected in the conclusions of the present discussions. It supported efforts to ensure that the arms race did not extend into outer space, it required little imagination to see the frightening possibilities of such an extension.

Mr Hawke concluded by emphasising that during their present meeting they would be dealing with no other issue of greater importance. They should not give up in despair but rather should reflect on the thoughtful initiative taken by Mr Trudeau. He was not sure there was not a capacity to marry his desire to move forward now on that initiative with Mrs Thatcher's more cautious note. She had argued that preparations should thus be made at lower levels. He thought there was an opportunity to marry those two approaches within the sort of timetable for the middle of the decade, to which Mr Trudeau had alluded.

SIR LYNDEN PINDLING, Bahamas, said he suspected that more leaders of small nations would sign the NPT and the treaty banning biological weapons if they believed that their doing so would, in fact, enjoin the nuclear-weapon powers to desist from making such weapons. But he suspected more leaders would probably sign the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty and a treaty banning the use of biological weapons if they felt that would have the effect of enjoining the major powers to refrain from making such weapons. But he suspected the truth was that none of them really believed that signing the treaties would stop the manufacture of any of those weapons, because history had shown to the contrary. As a leader of one of the small countries it seemed to him that dying was simply dying regardless of whether it was by nuclear explosion or by some gruesome biological poison. What he really feared most was dying by forces imposed upon his country by some outside source. He used to believe that the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter which he himself once had held dear, would be adhered to by all leaders; that small countries like his own were thus secure to pursue their own goals in their own way, commensurate with their own resources. The frightening thing was that he now knew his country was part of a world that was by one means or another, guided or misguided by the pull and thrust of a couple of Super Powers and that it was inevitably caught up at times in that struggle.

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What he would like to suggest for discussion was whether, having regard to the point just made by his colleague from Seychelles, they could, as Commonwealth leaders, think of a formula which might help to establish a system for protecting the sovereignty and independence of those member states that were too small even to be able to manufacture a gun, let alone an atomic bomb. Could this find a way to create some security system in which the whole Commonwealth would participate in order to guarantee or provide some umbrella for safeguarding those member states without the capacity to protect themselves against outside intrusion? Unless such a system were established, he feared that before the end of the century, the whole concept of an independence and sovereignty of those states which lacked the physical means to defend their independence from outside aggression might once again be called into question. In other words, did those states have the right to be independent at all? He certainly did not have the answer, and hoped he might be able to call on the wisdom of his fellow Commonwealth leaders to help throw some light on the question.

MR JUGNAUTH, Mauritius, observed that for years they had all read and heard that nations were against nuclear warfare, against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and against war. Yet the paradox was that the world had in fact been moving in the opposite direction.. There had been more and more armaments, as well as against proliferation of even more dangerous and deadly nuclear weapons, and there might be other weapons yet to be invented. Not only had these weapons been spread around but, as his friend from Seychelles had just acted, many small innocent countries, which did not want war or nuclear weapons, found they had been caught in a net and that nuclear weapons were being piled up in front of their very doors, much against their wishes. Therefore, the basic question which had to be asked was why was this happening? It was clear, from what Mrs Thatcher had said that the issue boiled down to one of survival. There were two main ideologies in the world, two ways of life, one it seemed that each one believed itself to be threatened by the other. That was what had quickened the armaments race, had increased mutual suspicion and had caused the lack of confidence, which had prevailed for so long and which had, therefore, to be reversed.

In his view, the first thing that should be done was to try to create an atmosphere of trust and to remove suspicion. All nations must provide proof that they were not bent on destroying the way of life of other nations; people should be free to choose whatever way of life they wanted because no one could or should decide for others. That was the fundamental principle by which nations must be guided if they wanted to defuse the tension between East and West which had developed since the last World War and which was worsening year by year. It should be a duty for all nations to try to promote more dialogue and discussion between both sides. That would facilitate mutual understanding of each other's attitudes and problems, and could create shared trust and confidence. As things were, nations found themselves in a vicious circle and so long as that situation prevailed there could be no question of disarmament, or of reducing nuclear weapons, as current facts proved.

He thought, therefore, the Commonwealth leaders must be realists. It was no use their issuing statements that would remain dead letters or would not at least pave the way toward the goal they ultimately wanted to reach. They must concentrate on proposals which could have a positive result. That was why he thought the dialogue that had been started by Mr Trudeau, as well as the sort of dialogue which had just been suggested by Mrs Thatcher, should be encouraged. In his view those were the necessary preliminaries to taking the positive measures to certain the goal they were all seeking. But at the same time, they should also

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work to try to limit the spreading and stockpiling of nuclear weapons all over the world. One example, which was his particular concern, was the Indian Ocean. He did not see any sufficient reason why nuclear weapons should be taken as far away from Europe as the Indian Ocean, where there was no threat whatsoever to the Super Powers. He would not agree with the argument that a nuclear base was needed in the Indian Ocean to act as a deterrent; he did not feel that there was any use for that sort of deterrent. For that reason he felt one of the things the Meeting should do would be to suggest to the Super Powers, and to all other countries involved, that they should at least start to remove the bases from those areas which were far from the Super Powers and Europe and which put at stake the security of other countries, especially small countries.

The Commonwealth could recommend that the major powers should start, by making that small but positive move towards disarmament while at the same time initiating discussion to create the indulgent sense of confidence that was necessary for further disarmament measures. The world could then move gradually towards the complete destruction of nuclear weapons.

It had been said many times that the amounts of energy, technology and money that was being put into armaments could have been used instead to benefit the whole of mankind. In fact, no reasonable person would say the contrary. Why should nations be such a threat to each other that they were compelled to waste so many resources on engines of destruction that could bring only unhappiness to mankind? He thought it was from that stand point that they should all approach a very difficult problem. It would not be an easy matter because neither Super Power had confidence in the other. Each believed it was threatened by the other. As long as both Super Powers maintained that position neither would feel secure; in such a situation there could be no reasoning with them and there could be no true peace. A feeling of security must first be created in the world, both in the East and in the West; only after that would it be possible to start making progress towards disarmament.

MR BIRD, Antigua and Barbuda, said that as the representative of the second newest member, and perhaps the second smallest, he wished to make only a brief intervention. It seemed to his government that it was important for the Commonwealth to do what it could to put forward practical suggestions to help promote disarmament and non-proliferation. Clearly the fact that some members were aligned must circumscribe any collective decisions because those countries had a more binding commitment to the allies. As the Prime Minister of Australia had indicated, if Commonwealth leaders wanted to make some practical suggestions which went beyond rhetoric, they would need to focus on what was feasible from the standpoint of the aligned members. History had shown that independent nations would always strive to gain superior military strength over each other. The world was faced with the prospect of nuclear holocaust. It was recognised that the balance of terror had reached a stage when, if nations did not take some step to try to ameliorate the situation, it could mean the end of civilization as they know it. What the Commonwealth should stress was that those problems should not be left only to the Super Powers to resolve. Members of the Commonwealth had a right to be involved at the highest level in the whole question of disarmament, because they might well be able to bring some moral suasion to bear on the issue; that, perhaps, was the most significant input they could make.

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It had already been observed that many Commonwealth members did not have the potential to make nuclear weapons. Precisely for that reason the Commonwealth as a whole should not encourage what might be called the "tyranny of the minority". At the present Meeting Heads of Government should undertake a commitment to support Mr Trudeau in his efforts to seek, at various levels in different form, some sort of understanding which might help advance the current arms control negotiations. He would wish to endorse the point raised by Dr Kaunda, that it might be helpful to offer practical support by suggesting some names, to accompany Mr Trudeau on his visits in order to pursue every possible avenue to solving the disarmament problem.

TAN SRI GHAZALI, Malaysia, said that there were two dimensions of East-West relations, which he wished to discuss. The first was that SALT II had failed to be ratified, not because of lack of agreement on conditions in the agreement itself, but because the element of the interventionism elsewhere. Yet current disarmament talks continued to focus solely on the question of arms control. Regarding interventionism, question at issue was when did legal interventionism begin to be illegal? If that issue were not squarely faced then the current arms control talks could founder it. That was why it was important that the two Super Powers concerned with detente and disarmament should also be concerned with interventionism.

Moreover it should not be forgotten that China that had to be taken into account was another major power. It had a record of interventionism in South East Asia. Since China also possessed nuclear weapons, the Meeting should consider the idea of ensuring that it was invited to participate directly at all levels of talks on detente and disarmament. The second point, of particular importance to South East Asian countries, was the genuine desire by the Soviet Union - confronted by an American President who appeared to them to act on gut feelings - to try to persuade the Chinese to take a neutral position in regard to East-West relations. There had been a great deal of mutual wooing, and when Soviet negotiators went recently to Peking to discuss a proposal to normalise bilateral relations through an increasing trade and student exchanges, it became clear they were trying to impress on China the importance of all the socialist countries closing ranks. However the Chinese made a number of conditions for normalising relations, the most important being that the Soviet Union should not support Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea. Naturally the Soviet Union claimed that it was not involved in Asian affairs, but at the same time it had not failed to respond to the signals and a member of the Soviet Politburo went to Hanoi to ask the Vietnam government to mend its fences with China. As a consequence, China offered to begin a dialogue with Vietnam provided the latter undertook to give genuine signs of making good their stated intention to withdraw troops from Kampuchea. Thus the process of normalizing relations between China and the Soviet Union had very serious element of East-West tension in South East Asia to the point of creating an opportunity for solving the Kampuchean question. Efforts were being made to work out options for troop withdrawals that could be offered by Vietnam which would not only accommodate the security needs of the surrogate nations, but would be in keeping with the dignity and the position of other South East Asian countries. This example demonstrated the relevance of the point that in East-West relations a number of other dimensions could be used to advantage in working for peace.

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MRS GANDHI, in closing the session, observed that considerable ground had been covered in what had been a most useful exchange. Heads of Government had spoken their minds and the consensus was that there should be a dialogue, which of course was what India itself had been advocating from the beginning. Referring to the point made by Dr Ferrari about the way in which North-South problems had been adversely affected by the East-West confrontation, she noted that the two sets of issues were indeed inter-linked. Moreover, some of the crises in various parts of the world were due to this linkage. Turning to one of Mr. Hawke's remarks, she commented that India was party to both the chemical and biological treaties and felt as strongly about those weapons as it did about nuclear weapons.

The Meeting adjourned at 5.10 pm.

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CBC Radio December-8; 1800
Minister MacEachen's visit to Brussels

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Security/Sécurité	UNCLASSIFIED
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File/Dossier	
Date	December 8, 1983
Number/Numéro	FPR-1181

ENCLOSURES
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CBC: The Prime Minister will go to Washington next Thursday, to discuss his Peace Initiative with President Reagan. He will fly to New York to meet with the Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. Perez de Quellar. Mr. Trudeau has already discussed his Peace Plan with a number of world leaders, a plan that includes talks among the five nuclear powers, a ban on anti-satellite systems and a stronger nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In Brussels today, the foreign ministers of NATO discussed ways to improve East-West dialogue. Allan MacEachen, Canada's Minister for External Affairs, said the NATO discussions are consistent with the Prime Minister's Peace Initiative. He urged other NATO members to adopt some of Mr. Trudeau's proposals. Details from Patrick Brown.

P.B.: Mr. MacEachen says he is not here to promote the whole of Prime Minister Trudeau's peace plan, just the parts of it that are specifically relevant to NATO. He hasn't brought up for example, the idea of a meeting of the five nuclear powers. What he is looking for is support for two suggestions, that next month's conference on European Security in Stockholm should be held at the level of Foreign Ministers rather than lesser officials and that efforts should also be made to revise the stagnant Vienna talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. Mr. MacEachen says he is confident that Foreign Ministers will go to Stockholm, although he didn't say whether he expects all 35 to show up. The proposal for breathing life into the Vienna talks seems to be meeting with less enthusiasm. However, success with one out of two he said can be interpreted as the support Mr. Trudeau wanted from NATO for his initiative.

SSEA: Where you judge whether there has been any impetus to the Prime Minister's efforts are on those two items. Those are specific, they're specifically NATO items. And if we give either of them a push then that will be good encouragement.

P.B.: As for the Soviet refusal to agree on a date for the resumption of the START talks on long-range missiles, Mr. MacEachen says it is too early to tell whether the stopping of START is a rerun of the Soviet walk-out at the medium-range missile talks. Patrick Brown, CBC News, Brussels.

D. Buckley-Jones
D. Buckley-Jones
Deputy Director
Media Relations Division

28.6-1 - Hudson
Peace
Mission

UNCLASSIFIED

FM EXTOTT MGTC9512 08DEC83

TO MINDELBNATO/DELVOIE

INFO WSHDC LDN BONN PCOOTT/OSBALDESTON/FOWLER

DISTR MINA USS DMF IDDZ

REF OURTEL IDDZ0249 06DEC

---INCORRECT SYMBOL

AMEND SYMBOL IRB IN DISTR LINE REFTTEL TO READ IFB/IFB.

UUU/146 081941Z MGTC9512

**ACTION
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*Task F.
master of file
8/12/83*

Division Phoned 1.D.D.Z
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR7180 08DEC83

TO EXTOTT IDR/IDDZ DELIVER BY 071500

*28-6-1 - Trudeau
Peace
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INFO BONN WSHDC PARIS LDN BRU HAGUE ROME MOSCO-PEKIN TOKYO VMBFR

PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/CP

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB DMFX RGB UGB RCR RSR RBD RBR IDA URR

REF BNATO TEL YBGR8677 05DEC

---DPM/SSEA BILATERAL MEETING WITH FM GENSCHER

SUMMARY:DISCUSSION BETWEEN DPM/SSEA AND FM GENSCHER

FOCUSSED ON(A)EAST-WEST RELATIONS(B)PM INITIATIVE AND

(C)NATO DECLARATION SPONSORED BY FRG(REFTEL).DPM/SSEA

SECURED GENERAL SUPPORT FROM GENSCHER FOR CDE AND MBFR

ELEMENTS OF PM INITIATIVE AND EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR FRG

PROPOSED DECLARATION.ONLY FEW MINUTES SPENT ON BILAT

QUESTIONS(SEPARATE TEL).

2.REPORT:DPM/SSEA,ACCOMPANIED BY DELVOIE,MET FOR

ONE HOUR TODAY WITH FM GENSCHER,ACCOMPANIED BY RUTH(FRG

AMB FOR DISARMAMENT).AFTER VERY BRIEF DISCUSSION OF

BILAT MATTERS,MIN MACEACHEN OUTLINED RESULTS OF PMS

VISITS TO TOKYO,DELHI AND PEKIN,AND OF PM PERSONAL REP

VISIT TO MOSCO.ON LATTER,HE SAID SOVIETS HAD DISPLAYED

CONSIDERABLE HESITATION IN REACTING TO VARIOUS ELEMENTS

OF PM INITIATIVES,AND HAD BEEN GENERALLY NON-COMMITTAL.

HE SUGGESTED THAT SOVIET HESITATION TO EXPRESS VIEWS OR TO

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PAGE TWO YBGR7180 CONF

PROVIDE SPECIFIC RESPONSE TO SUGGESTION OF PM VISIT TO MOSCO
WAS PROBABLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO STATE OF ANDROPOVS HEALTH.

3. GENSCHER SAID THAT BEYOND QUESTION OF ANDROPOVS HEALTH WAS
THAT OF SOVIET UNCERTAINTY AS TO HOW TO REACT TO BROAD RANGE OF
EAST-WEST QUESTIONS IN PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING INITIAL
DEPLOYMENT OF USA INF WEAPONS SYSTEMS. MIN MACHEACHEN AGREED AND
SAID THAT PMS PERSONAL REP, GEOFFREY PEARSON, SHARED THIS
ASSESSMENT.

4. GENSCHER ASKED HOW CHINESE HAD REACTED TO PMS PROPOSALS.
DPM/SSEA GAVE BRIEF ACCOUNT OF PMS CONVERSATIONS IN PEKIN AND
SAID THAT MAIN CHINESE MSG HAD BEEN THAT PM SHOULD CONCENTRATE
ON BRINGING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON SUPERPOWERS TO NEGOTIATE AND
REDUCE THEIR ARMAMENTS. GENSCHER QUIPPED THAT THIS OF COURSE
WAS VERY EASY FOR CHINESE TO SAY AND NO/NO DOUBT VERY FLATTERING
FOR PM SINCE IT SUGGESTED THAT HE COULD HAVE MEANINGFUL INFLUENCE
ON SUPERPOWERS.

5. AMB RUTH ASKED HOW SOVIETS HAD REACTED TO PMS PROPOSALS ON
MBFR. DPM/SSEA REPLIED THAT THEY HAD BEEN NON-COMMITTAL. HE
ADDED THAT PEARSON HAD FOUND GROMYKO IN GOOD FORM AND THAT
LATTER HAD MADE A POINT OF EXPRESSING REGRET THAT CDA HAD
SUPPORTED FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF NATO DUAL TRACK DECISION.

6. GENSCHER THEN LAUNCHED INTO PREPARED COMMENTS ON EAST-WEST
RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN CONTEXT OF INF DEPLOYMENTS AND NAC

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PAGE THREE YBGR7180 CONF D

MINISTERIAL MTG. HE SAID THAT USA SECTY OF DEFENSE WEINBERGER HAD BEEN WIDELY QUOTED AS SAYING NATO HAD ACHIEVED VICTORY ON INF DEPLOYMENTS. ON THIS GENSCHER HAD TWO COMMENTS: (A) THAT WEINBERGER HAD BEEN ONE OF THOSE WHO HAD MADE LEAST CONTRIBUTION TO QUOTE VICTORY UNQUOTE AND (B) THAT IT WAS NOT/NOT SUITABLE TO REFER TO INF DEPLOYMENTS AS QUOTE VICTORY UNQUOTE.

RATHER IT SHOULD BE SEEN AS DEMONSTRATION OF COHESION AND UNITY OF ALLIANCE AND AS SUCH A SETBACK FOR USSR. TRUMPETING QUOTE VICTORY UNQUOTE WAS UNWISE SINCE IT WOULD BE NECESSARY IN THE DAYS AND WEEKS AHEAD TO CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THOSE WHO HAD SUFFERED SETBACK. ALLIANCE DOES NOT/NOT NEED TO ENGAGE IN HYPERBOLE, SINCE IT HAS EVERY REASON TO BE SELF-CONFIDENT. USSR HAD LEFT NEGOTIATING TABLE AND WOULD IN ALL LIKELIHOOD HAVE TO RETURN TO IT.

7. GENSCHER SAID THAT PARTICULAR SETBACK FOR USSR WAS FACTOR THAT SS20 DEPLOYMENT HAD BEEN ATTEMPT TO DECOUPLE EUROPEAN FRONT FROM STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENAL OF USA, BUT THAT SOVIET DECISION TO COUNTER WESTERN INF DEPLOYMENTS BY STATIONING MISSILE-EQUIPPED SUBMARINES IN ATLANTIC HAD EFFECT OF QUOTE RECOUPLING UNQUOTE EUROPE AND USA.

8. GENSCHER INSISTED THAT ALLIANCE HAD TO KEEP THE INITIATIVE, AND THAT THAT WAS WHAT CURRENT NATO MINISTERIAL MTG WAS ALL ABOUT. ALLIANCE MUST INDICATE ITS SOLIDARITY, BUT ALSO ITS

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PAGE FOUR YBGR7180 CONF

WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH EAST. IT SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO USSR THAT ALTERNATIVES ARE COOPERATION OR CONFRONTATION. GENSCHER SAID HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT SOVIETS WOULD EVENTUALLY CHOOSE COOPERATION AS ROUTE TO FOLLOW, SINCE IT WAS IN THEIR LONG-TERM INTEREST TO DO SO; THIS WAS ALSO TRUE OF OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT FOR REASONS HE HAD CITED CURRENT NAC MINISTERIAL WAS NOT/NOT JUST ANOTHER NATO MTG. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE FRG HAD PROPOSED THAT NAC ISSUE A POLITICAL DECLARATION IN ADDITION TO THE USUAL COMMUNIQUE. HE THOUGHT IT ESSENTIAL THAT ALLIANCE UNDERLINE ITS WILLINGNESS TO PURSUE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ON ALL FRONTS -- START, INF, MBFR, CDE. HE SAID THAT IN THIS RESPECT FRG THINKING VERY MUCH PARALLELED THAT WHICH LAY BEHIND PM TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE.

9. GENSCHER SAID THAT HE WELCOMED SECTY OF STATE SHULTZ DECISION TO ATTEND OPENING OF CDE IN STOCKHOLM. HE FELT THAT WESTERN MINS SHOULD TO TO STKHM REGARDLESS OF WHETHER OR NOT/NOT GROMYKO DECIDED TO ATTEND. IF SOVIET AND OTHER EASTERN FORMINS ATTENDED, THIS WOULD PROVIDE USEFUL OPPORTUNITY FOR DIALOGUE AND CONSULTATIONS. IF THEY DID NOT/NOT ATTEND, PRESENCE OF WESTERN FORMINS WOULD STRENGTHEN THEIR POSN VIS-A-VIS THEIR OWN PUBLICS AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. GENSCHER ADDED THAT HE SUPPORTED FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR A MTG OF NATO FORMINS ON THE EVE OF

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OPENING OF THE STKHM CONF. HE SAID THAT SUCH A NATO GATHERING
WOULD NOT/NOT ONLY PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR WESTERN MINISTERS
TO DISCUSS THE MTG IN ADVANCE OF ITS OPENING, BUT WOULD ALSO
DEMONSTRATE THAT THE ALLIANCE IS SELF-CONFIDENT AS IT IMBARKS
ON THIS NEW VENTURE IN EAST-WEST RELNS.

10. DPM/SSEA COMMENTED THAT HE WAS IN GENERAL AGMT WITH REMARKS
MADE BY FM GENSCHER. HE SHARED VIEW THAT ALLIANCE SUCCESS IN
MAINTAINING ITS UNITY ON INF DEPLOYMENTS SHOULD NOT/NOT BE
TRUMPETED AS QUOTE VICTORY UNQUOTE BUT RATHER SHOULD BE VIEWED
AS STEADFAST FULFILLMENT OF WESTERN POLICIES. THIS SUCCESS
SHOULD IN FACT HELP TO IMPROVE THE WESTS POSN IN DIALOGUE WITH
EAST.

7

11. MIN MACFACHEN SAID THAT CDA HAD ADVOCATED OPENING OF STKHM
CONF AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL AND WAS PLEASED TO SEE THAT THIS IDEA
HAD GAINED ALMOST UNANIMOUS SUPPORT WITHIN ALLIANCE. HE THOUGHT
FRENCH IDEA OF A NATO MTG IMMEDIATELY BEFORE OPENING OF STKHM CONF
WAS A VERY GOOD ONE. HE ALSO WELCOMED GERMAN INITIATIVE IN
PUTTING FORWARD DRAFT NATO DECLARATION AND SAID THAT CDA WOULD
BE PREPARED TO GO AS FAR AS TO SUGGEST THAT DECLARATION BE ISSUED
AND COMMUNIQUE DISPENSED WITH.

12. GENSCHER REPLIED THAT HE SAW DECLARATION AS ADDN TO RATHER
THAN SUBSTITUTE FOR COMMUNIQUE. COMMUNIQUE CAN BE USED TO
INCORPORATE IDEAS THAT ARE NEAR AND DEAR TO MANY NATO PARTICIPANTS

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PAGE SIX YBGR7180 CONF D

AND THEREFORE SERVES USEFUL PURPOSE.

13. DPM/SSEA SAID THAT CDA WOULD LIKE TO PROPOSE SOME ADDL LANGUAGE TO DRAFT DECLARATION SUBMITTED BY FRG. THIS LANGUAGE RELATED TO CDE AND MBFR ASPECTS OF PMS INITIATIVE. HE THOUGHT THAT THIS LANGUAGE WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO ESSENTIAL PURPOSE OF DECLARATION WHICH WAS TO DISPLAY WESTERN READINESS TO ENTER INTO MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE WITH THE EAST.


14. GENSCHER EXAMINED TEXT OF ADDL LANGUAGE WHICH DPM/SSEA PASSED HIM. HE SAID THAT PROPOSED ADDNS WOULD POSE NO/NO PROBLEMS TO FRG, BUT THAT OTHERS MIGHT OBJECT TO THEM.

15. DPM/SSEA CONCLUDED MTG BY SAYING THAT HE THOUGHT FRG DECLARATION TO BE A VERY GOOD IDEA AND THAT HE PARTICULARLY WELCOMED TWO IDEAS THAT IT EMBODIED: (A) THAT WEST DEMANDS THAT ITS SECURITY INTERESTS BE RESPECTED QUOTE ON EQUAL TERMS AND TO THE SAME EXTENT THAT WE RESPECT THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES UNQUOTE AND (B) WE ARE DETERMINED TO FURTHER THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF THE ALLIANCE AND EUROPEAN-AMERICAN COOPERATION, AND HAVE THEREFORE AGREED TO HELD ADDITIONAL INFORMAL MEETINGS OF ALLIANCE FOREIGN MINISTERS UNQUOTE.

16. MTG TOOK PLACE IN VERY CORDIAL ATMOSPHERE AND BOTH MINS SEEMED VERY PLEASED WITH ITS OUTCOME.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L
FM BNATO YBGR7159 08DEC83
TO EXTOTT IDR



INFO TAVIV ANKRA ATHNS PRMNY GENEV VIENN PESCO BREEC BERUT CAIRO
LDN COPEN STKHM CNBRA HSNKI DUBLN WSHDC PARIS HAGUE BRU OSLO BONN
LSBON MDRID ROME MOSCO DELHI TOKYO PEKIN PCOOTT/FOWLER
NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DGIS/DMPC

DISTR MINA MINE MINT FPR USS DMF DMFX RGB IFB CPD RSR RSD RCR SID
SIDG IDD RCM IDDZ IDRA IMD IMU IMC JLA JLO GMD GMR ZSP ZSI URR

---DPC MEETING--GREEK/TURKISH RELATIONS

SUMMARY:GREEK PM/DEFMIN PAPANDREOU USED RESTRICTED SESSION OF DPC FOR
LENGTHY ANALYSIS OF GREEK VIEWS OF DIFFICULTIES OF REINTEGRATION INTO
ALLIANCE DEFENCE STRUCTURE INCLUDING PROBLEM OF LEMNOS,GREEK/TURKISH
REALTIONS,CYPRUS ISSUE,AND INF QUESTION.STARTING WITH CONTRAST
BETWEEN TURKISH LOYAL SUPPORT OF NATO TWO-TRACK DECISION AND GREEK
DISSENT,TURKISH DEFMIN BAYULKEN REFUTED PAPANDREOUS STATEMENTS WHILE
STATING INTEREST IN IMPROVED GREEK/TURKISH RELATIONS.APART FROM BRIEF
EXPLANATION BY SEC GEN. LUNS OF SECRETARIATS POSN ON NATO EXERCISE
ISSUE,NO/NO OTHER MINISTER JOINED DISCUSSION.

2.REPORT:PM PAPANDREOU SAID THAT GREEK PROBLEMS OF REJOINING MILITARY
STRUCTURE CONTINUED,WITH NO/NO PROGRESS CONCERNING LARISSA
HEADQUARTERS,AIR DEFENCE CONTROL AREA OF STATUS OF LEMNOS.HE CLAIMED
THAT PROBLEMS IN AEGEAN STEMMED FROM NATO COMMANDERS DEVIATION FROM
AGREED PROCEDURES,IN EFFECT CHALLENGING GREEK SOVEREIGNTY.BY

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PAGE TWO YEGR7159 CONF D

EXCLUDING LEMNOS FROM EXERCISES, NATO GAVE IMPRESSION OF TAKING SIDES IN DISPUTE AND CONTRIBUTED TO CONTINUATION OF TENSION. GREECE HAD BEEN OBLIGED TO WITHDRAW FROM EXERCISES, AND HE DOUBTED IT WOULD PARTICIPATE UNTIL NATO ATTITUDE CHANGED.

3. TURNING TO CYPRUS, HE SAID ISSUE HAD IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO AS AFFECTING PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN AREA. HE OUTLINED GREEK VERSION OF HISTORY OF PROBLEM AND CONTENDED THAT JUST AT POINT WHEN THERE HAD BEEN PROSPECT FOR SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS UNDER UN AUSPICES TURKISH CYPRIOTS HAD DECLARED UDI. HE SAID THIS WAS FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF RULE OF LAW, CONTEMPTUOUS REFUSAL TO ABIDE BY UN RESOLUTIONS, TRAGIC PRECEDENT FOR ALL STATES, AND FUNDAMENTAL BREACH OF RULES BY WHICH ALL NATO NATIONS SHOULD ABIDE WHEN ONE HAD RECOGNIZED ALLEGED REGIME. REVERSAL WAS ESSENTIAL FOR RESTORATION OF SECURITY AND COHESION OF NATO.

4. TURNING TO WHAT HE TERMED FRANTIC ARMS RACE, HE SAID NUCLEAR ARSENALS WERE BEING CONTINUOUSLY ENLARGED. INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES INTRODUCED NEW ELEMENT. HE DID NOT BELIEVE SYSTEM HAD GONE BEYOND POINT OF NO/NO RETURN. MISSILES COULD BE REMOVED, AND OTHER SIDE URGED TO FOLLOW OUR EXAMPLE.

5. SEIZING OPPORTUNITY TO CONTRAST TURKISH LOYALTY TO ALLIANCE DOCTRINE WITH GREEK DISSENT, MIN BAYULKEN BEGAN HIS RESPONSE WITH FIRM STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR 1979 TWO-TRACK DECISION AND STRESSED NEED FOR VIGILANCE IN FACE OF SOVIET ARMS BUILD UP. TURNING TO

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PAGE THREE YBGR7159 CONFD

GREEK/TURKISH ISSUES, HE SAID LEMNOS HAD BEEN DEMILITARIZED BY INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, AND NATO AGMT HAD NO/NO BEARING ON THIS. HE NOTED THAT GREEK GOVT SEEMED TO REGARD TURKEY RATHER THAN WSAW PACT AS MAJOR THREAT. TURKEY HAD NEVER REFUSED TO HAVE ANY PART OF NATO TREATY AREA DEFENDED, INCL LEMNOS, BUT ISLAND COULD NOT/NOT BE INCLUDED IN NATO EXERCISES. ITS DEMILITARIZATION MUST BE MAINTAINED. HE WAS SORRY THAT GREECE REFUSED TO TAKE PART IN EXERCISES AS RESULT, BECAUSE GREECE WOULD BE STRONGER IF IT DID SO.

6. BAYULKEN REGRETTED THAT CYPRUS ISSUE HAD BEEN RAISED. HE TRACED PROBLEMS BACK TO 1950S WHEN GREEK GOVT HAS PROMOTED ENOSIS. TURKEY WOULD ALWAYS OPPOSE CYPRUS BECOMING PART OF GREECE, BUT WOULD BE GLAD TO PROMOTE CREATION OF BIZONAL, BICOMMUNAL FEDERAL STATE. TURKISH COMMUNITY ON CYPRUS HAD BEEN FORCED TO DECLARE INDEPENDENT REPUBLIC IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE EQUALITY WITH GREEK COMMUNITY, WHICH HAD THRUST IT OUT OF GOVT. TURKEY WISHED TO LIVE IN FRIENDSHIP WITH GREECE AND WAS WILLING TO DISCUSS ALL OF ITS PROBLEMS BILATERALLY. AFTER LISTENING TO OPENING STATEMENTS, MINISTERS WERE TREATED TO MORE DETAIL FROM EITHER SIDE CONCERNING MONTREUX CONVENTION, STATUS OF LEMNOS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF ROGERS PLAN THAN THEY CARED TO HEAR, BEFORE SEC GEN LUNS WAS FINALLY ABLE TO CLOSE OFF DEBATE.

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S E C R E T

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

FM BNATO YBGR7158 08DEC83

TO EXTOTT IDR

INFO CANNILREPNATO LDN BONN BRU WSHDC MOSCO VMBFR GENEV
PARIS HAGUE OSLO COPEN ATHNS MDRID LSBON ROME PCOOTT/FOWLER
NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/PPP/CORAE/DNACPOL/DSTRATA/CIS
DISTR MINA DMF IDA RCR RBR ZSI ZSP CPD RGX IDRL IDRA IDDZ IFB
IDD

---SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP(SCG)MEETING:08DEC

SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP(SCG)MET BRIEFLY 28DEC ON MARGIN OF
NAC MINISTERIAL MTG PRIMARILY TO CONSIDER APPROPRIATE INF PASS-
AGE FOR NAC COMMUNIQUE.USA CIRCULATED NEW DRAFT INF LANGUAGE
WHICH,WITH SOME MINOR AMENDMENTS BASED ON DISCUSSION,WENT
FORWARD TO SENIOR POL CTTEE(SPC)FOR INCORPORATION IN NAC
COMMUNIQUE.WHILE WE AND UK CONSIDERED PROPOSED TEXT TOO LONG,
SCG CHMN BURT SHOWED NO/NO INTEREST IN SUBSTANTIAL CONDENSATION.
2.BURT ALSO PROVIDED OPPORTUNITY FOR MORE GENERAL DISCUSSION,
INTRODUCED BY HIS CONGRATULATIONS FOR COORDINATED ALLIED
RESPONSE TO SOVIET WALKOUT OF INF NEGS AND SUBSEQUENT SOVIET
ANNOUNCEMENT OF COUNTER-MEASURES.BURT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT
ALLIANCE COULD EXPECT FURTHER POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES AS MODERNI-
ZATION TRACK OF DEC79 DECISION PROCEEDDED.HE REPORTED THAT
ANOTHER SS20 BASE IN EASTERN USSR HAD BECOME OPERATIONAL THEREBY
RAISING UNCLAS NUMBER OF SS20 LAUNCHERS TO 359.

3.BURT COUNSELLED THAT ALLIES MUST NOT/NOT CREATE IMPRESSION
THAT BURDEN WAS ON WEST TO MAKE CONCESSIONS TO GET USSR BACK TO

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PAGE TWO YBGR7158 SECRET

NEGOTIATING TABLE; HE BELIEVED SOVIETS COULD NOT/NOT RESIST
ARMS CONTROL FOREVER. ALLIANCE MUST NOT/NOT CREATE IMPRESSION
THAT IT WOULD ABANDON ITS PRINCIPLES OR OBJECTIVES RE INF. BURT
REVIEWED TWO CURRENT AND MISLEADING PUBLIC RELATIONS THEMES:
(A) SUGGESTION OF POSSIBLE PAUSE IN USA DEPLOYMENTS; (B) POSSIBLE
MERGER OF INF TALKS AND START. HE SAID THAT CONCEPT OF PAUSE WAS
NO/NO MORE ACCEPTABLE THAN CONCEPT OF DELAY IN INITIAL DEPLOY-
MENTS. IT WOULD NOT/NOT ENHANCE PROSPECTS FOR AGMT AND SOVIETS
WOULD GEAR EFFORTS TO EXTEND PAUSE, THEREBY REJECTING FUNDAMENTAL
PRECEPT SINCE DEC79 THAT ONLY CONCRETE RESULTS WOULD LEAD NATO TO
ADJUST SCALE OF DEPLOYMENTS. CONCERNING MERGER, BURT SAID
SOVIETS MADE TACTICAL BLUNDER IN WALKING OUT OF INF TALKS AND
THEY SHOULD NOT/NOT BE ABSOLVED OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS.
SEPARATE INF NEGS HAD HELPED TO HIGHLIGHT ESSENCE OF INF PROBLEM;
THIS POLITICAL FOCUS WOULD DISAPPEAR IN MERGED NEGS. MERGER
WOULD INCREASE COMPLEXITIES AND THEREBY DELAY AGMT. SOVIET
INSISTENCE ON MONOPOLY OF LRINF MISSILES IN EUR WOULD REMAIN
REGARDLESS OF NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK AND IT WAS THAT PROBLEM WHICH
MUST BE OVERCOME. MERGER WOULD ALSO PRESENT RUSSIANS WITH NEW
OPPORTUNITIES TO DRIVE WEDGES, EG, BY CATEGORIZING USA LRINF
MISSILES IN EUR AS STRATEGIC AND PERHAPS NOT/NOT ADDRESSING SS20
AT ALL. FURTHER, UK/FRENCH FORCES ISSUE PROBABLY WOULD BE MORE
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PAGE THREE YBGR7158 SECRET

DIFFICULT TO HANDLE IN MERGED NEGOTIATIONS SINCE SOME ALREADY ARGUED THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED IN START CONTEXT. BURT SAW NO/NO REASON WHY NEGS SHOULD NOT/NOT CONTINUE ON PARALLEL TRACKS. HE ADDED THAT CLOSE CONSULTATIONS DEVELOPED RE INF COULD NOT/NOT BE EASILY DUPLICATED IF TALKS WERE MERGED. HE URGED THAT ALLIANCE STRESS RESPONSIBILITY OF USSR TO RETURN TO NEGOTIATIONS RATHER THAN FOCUS ON COUNTERPRODUCTIVE DEBATE ON STRUCTURE OF THOSE NEGS.

4. BUT SAID IT WAS NOT/NOT CLEAR IN WHAT DIRECTIONS USSR WOULD GO SUBSEQUENT TO INF WALKOUT. HE THOUGHT USSR WAS NOT/NOT QUITE SURE ITSELF WHERE IT WANTED TO GO BUT LIKELY WOULD WANT TO WAIT TO SEE EFFECT BREAKDOWN IN NEGS AND COUNTER-MEASURES WOULD HAVE ON WESTERN PUBLICS. HENCE, IT WAS VITAL ALLIES MAINTAINED UNITY, NOT/NOT BE PANICKED BY SOVIET TACTICS AND DEMONSTRATED WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE NEGS. BURT SAID USSR MAY TAKE VARIOUS STEPS IN OTHER NEGOTIATING FORA, EG, START AND POSSIBLY MEFR, ALTHOUGH IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN.

5. SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION SHOWED CLEAR WISH OF ALL CONCERNED THAT SCG MAINTAIN REGULAR SCHEDULE OF CLOSE CONSULTATIONS. THERE WAS GENERAL AGMT THAT SCG SHOULD BE READY WITH AGREED AND COORDINATED APPROACH TO POSSIBLE SOVIET MOVES, NOTABLY SUGGESTION OF MERGER OF INF AND START. FRG REP SAID MERGER ON BASIS OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, AS DEFINED BY USSR IE, EXCLUSION OF SS20 WAS UNACCEPTABLE. BELGIUM DID NOT/NOT FAVOUR MERGER. THIS ISSUE WILL BE SUBJECT TO

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CLOSER ATTN AT FURTHER SCG MTGS.

6.NEXT MTG OF SCG TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR 11JAN84.GRATEFUL
YOU ADVISE US SOONEST WHO WILL PARTICIPATE FROM OTT,TRAVEL
DETAILS,HOTEL REQUIREMENTS,ETC.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L C F O

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

FM EXTOTT IDR4847 0DEC83
TO BNATO
INFO VMBFR BONN CANMILREPNATO WSTDC LDN BRU HAGUE ROME ATHNS ANKRA
REF PARIS MOSCO GENEV PRINY STKHM NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/ CPP/DNACPOL/ CORAE/
SUBJ/SUJ DSTRATA/DMPC/CIS PCOOTT/FOWLER
BAG USAU PRGUE DPEST DUCST
DISTR DMF IFD IDDZ IDD IDRA IDRL RSD RSR RCR RGX IDA DMFX
---VISIT OF FRG AMB RUTH

SUMMARY. RUTH VISIT PROVIDED EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL IN LIGHT OF RECENT SUSPENSION OF INF, START AND MBFR AND IN RELATION TO PMS INITIATIVE WHICH WILL PLAY IMPORTANT ROLE IN SETTING ATMOSPHERE FOR RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS. FRG STRESSED BRU DECLARATION WHICH UNDERLINED NATOS READINESS TO MAINTAIN DIALOGUE WITH USSR AS MAIN THEME ON WHICH WEST SHOULD BUILD ARMS CONTROL STRATEGY DURING 1984. ALLIANCE SHOULD FIRST CONCENTRATE ON STKHM CONFERENCE AND ON MBFR WHILE LOOKING AT WAYS TO REACTIVATE INF AND START INCLUDING POSSIBLE COMBINATION OF BOTH. RUTH IS OPTIMISTIC WPO MINS WILL BE IN STKHM. MBFR WAS DISCUSSED THOROUGHLY. FIRST PRIORITY IS TO GET EAST BACK TO NEGOTIATIONS AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE. BONN IS PREPARING REVISED PACKAGE OF PROPOSALS WHICH MUST BE CLEARED WITH WASHINGTON. AIM IS TO BE READY TO TABLE IN VIENN EARLY SPRING. IN GENEV, RUTH BELIEVES WEST SHOULD PRESS ON VERIFICATION. RUTH LEFT OTT FOR VISIT TO WASHINGTON. DISCUSSION REFLECTED MTG OF MINDS BETWEEN

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
Original Signed by
Original signé par
J. R. FRANCIS

A. A. DESPRES/RL
SIG

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PAGE TWO IDR4847 CONFD CEO

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OTT AND BONN.

.PRESENT TEL REPORTING GENERAL DISCUSSIONS WILL BE FOLLOWED BY TELS ON MBFR AND UNGA 1ST CYTEE AND CD SUBJECTS.

3.REPORT.IN GENERAL INTRODUCTORY REMARKS COMMENTING ON NEWSPAPER AD IN SUPPORT OF PMS INITIATIVE,AMB RUTH SAID CHANCELLOR WOULD BE HAPPY IF HE COULD GET AS MUCH BROAD PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR HIS DISARM- AMENT AND ARMS CONTROL POLICY.BONN RECOGNIZED NEED TO PLAN RESTUR- ING OF ARMS CONTROL PROGRAM NEXT YEAR.REACTION TO DEPLOYMENT HAD NOT/NOT BEEN AS STRONG AS EXPECTED BUT IT WAS CLEAR DEBATE WAS NOT/ NOT OVER AS DEPLOYMENT WAS TO BE STRETCHED OUT OVER LONG PERIOD.ARMS CONTROL WOULD PLAY EVEN MORE IMPORTANT ROLE IN PUBLIC DEBATE IN GERMANY NEXT YEAR AND GOVT INTENDED TO SUPPORT IT.USSR HAD BANKED ON BLOCKING DEPLOYMENT.IT HAD FAILED.NEW INF MISSILES EQUATED TO MAJOR CHANGE IN USSR SECURITY POSITION IN EUROPE AS IT WOULD LOSE ITS MONOPOLY IN THIS CATEGORY OF WEAPONS.NATO HAD MANAGED DIFFICULT SITUATION SUCCESSFULLY.IT SHOULD BUILD ON COHERENCE WHICH RESULTED. BONN WAS GRATEFUL FOR CDN SUPPORT FOR BRU DECLARATION WHICH WOULD HAVE IMPORTANT POLITICAL EFFECT AS IT SETS TONE AROUND THEME OF MAINTAINING DIALOGUE WITH USSR.LATTER HAD BEEN CAREFUL TO DIFFEREN- TIATE INTERRUPTION OF INF,START AND MBFR.WEST SHOULD ADDRESS EACH NEGOTIATION SPECIFICALLY AND DEVELOP POSITION AND STRATEGY FOR EACH TAKING INTO ACCOUNT CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES DUE TO DEPLOYMENT AND NEED TO DIALOGUE WITH USSR.RUTH WAS CONVINCED USSR WOULD RETURN TO TABLE

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PAGE THREE IDR4847 CONF D CEO

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AT SOME POINT IF WE PERSEVERED. HE COULD NOT/NOT SAY WHEN OR IF USA ELECTIONS WOULD BE IMPORTANT FACTOR.

4. IFB EXPRESSED WORRY USSR HAD PAINTED ITSELF INTO CORNER ~~CORNER~~ ESPECIALLY ON INF. WE RECOGNIZED USSR HAD CAREFULLY ORCHESTRATED DIFFERENT APPROACH TO SUSPENSION IN EACH FORUM. IT HAD TAKEN DELIBERATE ACTIONS TO SHOW ANGER. IF THESE WERE TACTICS WE COULD DISCOUNT THEM TO CERTAIN EXTENT. HOWEVER MOSCO WAS IN A SENSE PRISONER TO ITS OWN TACTICS, HAVING NOT/NOT LEFT ^{MU} ~~BE~~ MUCH OPPORTUNITY TO RESUME TALKS WHEN MOMENT IS RIPE AT LEAST IN INF. IN BROADER POLITICAL CONTEXT, MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT, GRENADA TENDED TO WORK AGAINST RELAXATION OF TENSION WHILE ON POSITIVE SIDE PREPAREDNESS TO REVISIT HARMEL REPORT COULD BE BASIS NEEDED FOR COLLECTIVE ARMS CONTROL STRATEGY. HIGH LEVEL REPRESENTATION AT CDE AND ALLIANCE AGREEMENT ~~TO~~ REVIEW MBFR WERE ALSO PLUS FACTORS.

5. BASED ON PERCEPTIONS DURING RECENT VISIT TO MOSCO AS PMS EMISSARY, PEARSON CONSIDERED DECISION TO SUSPEND INF AND START WAS RESULT OF CONSENSUS AT LEVEL OF POLITBURO TO BREAK OFF NEGOTIATIONS OF WHICH WEST HAD PLENTY OF WARNING. MOSCO HAD NOT/NOT YET FIGURED OUT SCENARIO TO FOLLOW SUSPENSION. HE DOUBTED MOSCO WOULD RETURN TO NEGOTIATIONS UNLESS DEVELOPMENTS ON WESTERN SIDE ENCOURAGED THEM TO DO SO. MBFR OFFERED BEST OPPORTUNITY IF WEST COULD AGREE ON SUBSTANTIAL MOVE. HE WAS NOT/NOT SURE SIMILAR PROSPECTS EXISTED FOR START AND INF IN RUSSIAN PERCEPTION AND BROKE DOWN BECAUSE OF USA ATTITUDE AND

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ACTIONS (TEST BAN TREATIES AND RATIFICATION OF SALT II). THIS PERCEPTION SHOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY IN THE WEST. IF IT WAS VALID, IT MEANT USSR WAS NOT/NOT PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE WITH REAGAN ADMIN. GROMYKO HAD SAID WHAT GOOD WERE INTENTIONS IF FACTS POINTED IN OTHER DIRECTIONS. (REFERRING TO RECORD USA DEFENCE APPROPRIATIONS). USSR WOULD BE EXPECTED TO MAINTAIN TOUGH LINE. ARBATOV HAD STATED MOSCO WAS PREPARED TO WRITE OFF 1980S DECADE. EVERYTHING THEY DID WOULD BE LOOKED AT THROUGH PRISM OF USA/USSR RELATIONS. QUESTION NOW WAS HOW WOULD THEY DEAL WITH COUNTRIES SUCH AS CDA AND FRG.

6. ^{RUTH} ~~DESB~~ GAVE FOLLOWING BROAD DRUSH APPROACH. HE THOUGHT WEST SHOULD CONSIDER IN ACD. HE AGREED USSR FIXATION ON USA WAS IMPORTANT BUT MOSCO HAD NEED TO PROTECT AND DEVELOP RELATIONS WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF ALLIANCE. THESE RELATIONS COULD PROVIDE UNDERPINNING ^{FOR} ~~OF~~ USA/USSR RELATIONS. BONN HAD NOTED EAST EUROPEANS WERE KEEN ON ARMS CONTROL. WPO WOULD SOON DECIDE ON LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION AT OPENING OF STKIM CONFERENCE. THERE WERE INDICATIONS NON-SOVIET WPO FAVOURED MINISTERIAL LEVEL. GROMYKO PRESENCE WAS IMPORTANT PARTICULARLY IF HE MET WITH SHULTZ. RUTH THOUGHT WEST SHOULD ACTIVELY PUSH VERIFICATION POLICIES IN GENEV. WHILE WE COULD NOT/NOT AGREE TO SOVIET PRECONDITION OF CANCELLING DEPLOYMENTS FOR RESUMPTION OF INF, SITUATION WAS DIFFERENT FOR MBFR. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE BE SEEN TO MAINTAIN INITIATIVE ^{IN} ~~ALL~~ ARMS CONTROL FORUMS. INACTIVITY WOULD CONFIRM TO OUR PUBLICS WE WANTED ONLY DEPLOYMENT. IN ORDER OF PRECEDENCE ALLIANCE SHOULD

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CONCENTRATE ON STKHM CONFERENCE. NEXT ON AGENDA WAS M^B FR. ~~EST~~ ^{WEST} SHOULD DO THIS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND TRY TO BRING EAST BACK TO TABLE 26 JAN. WESTERN INITIATIVE COULD BE READY FOR TABLING EARLY SPRING. IT WAS BETTER TO TAKE ACTIONS TO CONTINUE COOPERATION INSTEAD OF CONFRONTATION. WE SHOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR USSR NOT/NOT TO COOPERATE. OTHER AREAS OF COOPERATION SUCH AS ECONOMIC FIELD SHOULD BE PURSUED. THIS WOULD HAVE POSITIVE EFFECT ON COOPERATION IN ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY. IT WAS IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, NOT/NOT TO PRECIPITATE PM TRUDEAU'S INITIATIVE WAS IMPORTANT IN THIS SENSE AND WE SHOULD BUILD ON POSITIVE POLITICAL PERCEPTIONS IT IS CREATING. CHANCELLOR KOHL AND FM GENSCHER WERE INTENT ON GIVING SIMILAR MESSAGE.

7. RUTH WAS ASKED ABOUT PROSPECTS OF ALTERING COMPOSITION OF NATO INF FORCES IN DIRECTION OF QUOTE WALK IN WOODS UNQUOTE FORMULA, I.E. EXCLUDING PERSHING II MISSILES. RUTH WAS OF VIEW THAT WE SHOULD NOT/NOT BEGIN TO DISMANTLE POSITION ESTABLISHED IN DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES TO ENCOURAGE USSR TO RETURN TO TABLE, AS LATTER WOULD CONCLUDE ITS BLACKMAIL TACTICS WERE SUCCESSFUL AND THIS WOULD ENCOURAGE MORE DELAYS. USA READINESS TO REDUCE PII AS WELL AS GLCM PROVIDES SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY. THERE SHOULD BE NO/NO CHANGE OF POSITION IN INF EXCEPT IN NEGOTIATING CONTEXT.

8. QUESTION OF MERGING INF AND START WAS RAISED. RUTH AGREED IT WAS ATTRACTIVE PUBLIC THEME. DIFFERENT VARIATIONS OF MERGER SHOULD BE STUDIED. IT RAISED NUMEROUS PROBLEMS, HOWEVER? THERE MAY BE PROCEDURAL

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ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD NOT/NOT MEAN GIVING AWAY SUBSTANTIAL POINTS AND WHICH WOULD ENCOURAGE SOVIETS TO RETURN. SCG HAD AGREED INF SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED IN START CONTEXT BUT AS SEPARATE TALKS. RUTH WAS OF OPINION WE SHOULD BEGIN SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION AT 11 JAN SCG MTG. HE STRESSED IT WAS IMPORTANT DURING HIATUS IN NEGOTIATIONS TO MAINTAIN GOOD LEVEL OF CONSULTATIONS WITH WASHINGTON AND TO CONTINUE TO INFLUENCE USA POSITION ON INF AS WE HAVE DONE SINCE 79.

9. PMS INITIATIVE WAS DISCUSSED BRIEFLY AT MORNING SESSION AND IN MORE DETAIL DURING WORKING LUNCH. WE EXPLAINED TO RUTH THAT PMS INITIATIVE, UNLIKE RUMANIAN WHICH DEALT DIRECTLY WITH INF, CONCENTRATED ON BUILDING SAFETY NET WHICH TOOK INTO ACCOUNT SUSPENSION OF NEGOTIATIONS AND WAS GEARED TO REBUILD ATMOSPHERE OF POLITICAL CONFIDENCE NEEDED FOR RESUMPTION OF DIALOGUE. RUTH AGREED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO WORK ALONG LINES PMS INITIATIVE WHILE DOING WHAT WE COULD IN STKHM, MDR AND GENEV(CD). HE STRESSED NECESSITY TO AGREE ON DIRECTION TO TAKE WITHIN ALLIANCE TO AVOID SPEAKING WITH 16 VOICES. RUMANIAN INITIATIVE COULD NOT/NOT BE SUPPORTED BECAUSE IT SUPPORTED SOVIET MONOPOLY IN INF MISSILES. WEST MUST SEND CLEAR MESSAGE THAT IT REMAINS READY TO CONTINUE INF NEGOTIATIONS. BONN REMAINED CONVINCED ELEMENTS OF USA POSITION IN INF WERE GOOD. WITH DEPLOYMENT, SOVIET ARGUMENT THAT WEST WAS ASKING UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT FROM USSR WAS INVALIDATED. HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT AT SOME POINT

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MOSCO WOULD AGREE ON PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY WITH USA. WESTERN OBJECT-
IVE SHOULD BE TO CREATE CIRCUMSTANCES PROPITIOUS TO THEIR RETURN
TO NEGOTIATIONS, FIRST IN MBFR WHERE CHANCES WERE RELATIVELY GOOD.

28-6-1 - Judeau Peace Mission

UNCLASSIFIED

FM EXTOTT IDR4727 08DEC83

TO BNATO DELIVER BY 081700

INFO GENEV VMBFR MOSCO LDN WSHDC BRU MDRID LSBON HAGUE BONN PARIS
OSLO COPEN ATHNS ANKRA STKHM ROME CANMILREPNATO PMOOTT/FOWLER
NDHQOTT/MND/ADMPOL/PPP/DNACPOL/CIS WSAW BPEST BUCST PRGUE BGRAD
DISTR MINA MINE USS DMF IFB RGB UGB IDD IDDZ IDRL IDRA IDA RBD RBR
RCR RSR ZSP ZSI

---START:SUSPENSION OF NEGOTIATIONS

FOLLOWING IS SUGGESTED REPLY PREPARED FOR HOUSE OF COMMONS BOOK.

QUOTE WE ARE FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT IT IS IN THE INTEREST NOT/NOT ONLY
OF THE USA AND THE USSR, BUT ALSO OF ALL OTHER COUNTRIES, THAT THE
START AND INF NEGOTIATIONS BE RESUMED AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE. WE HOPE
THAT THE SOVIET UNION WHEN IT HAS RE-EXAMINED THE ISSUES, WILL COME
TO THE SAME CONCLUSION. UNQUOTE.

UUU/146 081602Z IDR4727

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM LDN XNGR4324 08DEC83

TO EXTOTT RCR DELIVER 081000

INFO BNATO/MINDEL/NOBLE DELIVER 081500 BNATO WSHDC BREEC

BONN PARIS ROME MOSCO VMBFR PEKING GENEV BERUT TAVIV PERMNY

DISTR MINA RCD RGB DMF RBD RBR LCD LCR GMD GMR EED EER FEA EEF

IDDZ IDR IDA IFB IMC IMD GAD GAA RCM PED PER RSR JLE VRT ZSI

REF OURTEL XNGR4179 23NOV

---DPM/SSEA UK VISIT:MTG WITH HOWE

WE EXPECT HOWE TO PROPOSE THAT 12DEC TALKS BEGIN WITH EAST/WEST ISSUES AND THAT BILATERAL/EEC ISSUES BE DEALT WITH JUST BEFORE LUNCH.FCO HAS BRIEFED HOWE ON LIST OF ITEMS IN OURREFTEL.AS WE SHALL NOT/HAVE SCENARIO BRIEFING BOOK UNTIL LATE TOMORROW AFTERNOON IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR YOU TO WARN US BY 090900 OF ANY ADDITIONAL ITEMS CDN SIDE WOULD WISH TO RAISE.BELOW WE SUMMARIZE LATEST UK POSITION ON MAIN INNATL ISSUES.

2.ON EAST/WEST RELS WE EXPECT HOWES STATEMENTS AT NATO MINISTERIAL TO SHOW GREATER UK CONCERN ABOUT LOW STATE OF EAST/WEST RELS AND READINESS TO SUPPORT ALLIANCE EFFORTS TO PROMOTE DIALOGUE AND,IF POSSIBLE,RETURN OF USSR TO INF NEGS.UK CAN SUPPORT NATO DECLARATION TO REFLECT THESE VIEWS ALTHOUGH IT IS ANXIOUS ALLIANCE STANCE NOT/PROMOTE CRISIS VIEW OF EAST/WEST RELS.HOWE CAN POINT TO BRITISH READINESS TO FIELD MINISTER AT

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PAGE TWO XNGR4324 CONFD

STOCKHOLM(AND ATTEND HIMSELF IF SCHULZ AND GROMYKO GO)AND PM
THATCHERS PLANNED VISIT TO HUNGARY IN NEW YEAR AS EVIDENCE OF UK
DESIRE TO PROMOTE DIALOGUE.GIVEN MOSCOW COOLNESS FCO TENDS TO
FAVOUR FOCUSING ATTENTION ON EASTERN EUROPEAN CAPITALS AND FAVOURS
EASING ALLIANCE RELS WITH POLAND.SSEA MAY WISH TO SOUND OUT HOWE
WHETHER HE ENVISAGES VISITING MOSCOW IN COMING YEAR.

3.HOSTS WILL LOOK TO SSEA FOR COMMENTS ON EVOLUTION OF PMS
INITIATIVE.HOWE CAN BE EXPECTED TO REFER POSITIVELY TO ITS GENERAL
IMPETUS AND OBJECTIVES BUT TO BE SKEPTICAL THAT AREA OF ARMS
CONTROL IS LIKELY TO OFFER MUCH OPPORTUNITY TO REDUCE TENSION
AND PROMOTE DIALOGUE IN NEAR FUTURE.HOWE MAY RECOGNISE NEED FOR
GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN APPROACH TO USSR BY WSHDC BUT WILL BE
SENSITIVE TO ANY IMPLICATION THAT POSITIONS OF SUPERPOWERS SHOULD
BE VIEWED FROM EQUIDISTANT POSITION BY USAS ALLIES.RE SPECIFIC
ARMS CONTROL ELEMENTS OF PMS INITIATIVE,HOWE WILL PROBABLY BE
NEGATIVE.UK SEES NO/NO ATTRACTION IN FIVE NUCLEAR POWER MTG
AND IS HIGHLY SKEPTICAL THAT NEW MBFR INITIATIVE CAN BE FOUND
WHICH WILL BE COMPATIBLE WITH NATO SECURITY INTERESTS.

4.MIDDLE EAST:HAVING GONE THROUGH PERIOD OF STRAIN IN RELS WITH
USA OVER GRENADA,UK GOVT IS SEEKING TO CONTAIN UNEASE IN CONSERV
PARTY ABOUT USA MIDEAST POLICY HEIGHTENED BY USA AIR STRIKE AND TO
STICK BY MNF PARTICIPATION AS CONTRIBUTING TO LEBANESE

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PAGE THREE XNGR4324 CONF

RECONCILIATION. LIKE EUROPEAN PARTNERS HOWEVER IT IS DEEPLY TROUBLED BY DIM PROSPECTS FOR RECONCILIATION AND SYRIAN/ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND CONCERNED ABOUT CONSEQUENCES OF USA OVER-COMMITMENT IN LEBANON AND HEIGHTENED CONFRONTATION WITH SYRIA (GEMAYEL WILL BE IN LDN 12DEC TO SEE MRS THATCHER AS PART OF HIS POST-GENEV CONSULTATIONS). BRIT VIEWS ON ARAB/ISRAELI CONFLICT AND WEST BANK SITUATION TEND TO BE EQUALLY PESSIMISTIC AND TO REFLECT FRUSTRATION OVER WSHDC RELUCTANCE TO PRESS ISRAELIS.

5. CENTAM? CARIBBEAN: WHILE BRITS MAY PRIVATELY SHARE MANY OF OUR CONCERNS ABOUT USA POLICY IN CENTAM, THEY DETERMINEDLY AVOID TAKING ISSUE WITH WSHDC. IN FOREIGN OFFICE ATTENTION HAS BEEN GIVEN TO PROBLEM OF SECURITY OF CARIBB SMALL ISLANDS AND ANY CDN COMMENTS SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT UK MAY DRAW ANALOGY BETWEEN THIS SUBJECT AND SECURITY OF BELIZE. RE GRENADA, UK IS PREPARED TO LEAVE MAJOR ROLE TO USA AND CARIBB NEIGHBOURS AND WILL ITSELF TAKE CAUTIOUS STANCE, ASSISTING GRENADA WITH POLICE TRAINING.

6. SOUTHERN AFRICA: SOUTH AFRICAN FM BOTHA SAW HOWE IN LDN 02DEC DURING VISIT TO SEVERAL EUROPEAN CAPITALS. DISCUSSION BROKE NO/NO NEW GROUND AND CONFIRMED SOUTH AFRICAN DETERMINATION TO SEEK DEPARTURE OF CUBANS FROM ANGOLA AS KEY TO SETTLEMENT OF NAMIBIA QUESTION.

7. ARGENTINA: BRITS HAVE WELCOMED ADVANT OF DEMOCRATIC GOVT IN BAIRS

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PAGE FOUR XNGR4324 CONFD

BUT, NOTWITHSTANDING BUDGETARY PRESSURES ARISING FROM FORTRESS FALKLANDS POLICY, HAVE INDICATED NO/NO WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS SOVEREIGNTY OF FALKLANDS WITH NEW GOVT. CHANGE IN BAIRS HAS MADE EASIER UK GOVTS ROLE IN FINANCIAL RESCUE OPERATION. UK IS GRATEFUL TO CDA AND OTHER FRIENDS FOR ABSTAINING IN UNGA RESLN AND SEE VOTE AS HELPFUL IN MAINTAINING UK POSITION.

8. CYPRUS: HOWE MAY SPEAK OF UK EFFORTS TO LAUNCH TRIPARTITE TALKS WHICH TO DATE HAVE MADE NO/NO PROGRESS. UK WILL SHARE CDN CONCERNS ABOUT FUTURE OF UNFICYP.

9. HKONG: LATEST ROUND IN UK/CHINESE TALKS WILL CONCLUDE THIS WEEK. FCO APPEARS MORE SANGUINE ABOUT CHINESE WILLINGNESS TO LEAVE ASIDE PRINCIPLES IN ORDER TO FOCUS ON ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR POST-1997.

10. COMWEL AFFAIRS POST-CHOGM: DELHI OUTCOME HAS LEFT CDA AND UK AS ADVANCE COUNTRY REPS ON CONSULTATIVE GROUP TO CONSIDER FUTURE OF IFIS. UK EXPECTATION IS CDA/UK WILL WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER TO ENCOURAGE USEFUL AND REALISTIC APPROACH. WISHING TO LESSEN PRESSURES FOR WORLD MONETARY CONFERENCE AND RADICAL REFORM, UK IS READY TO STUDY COMPLAINTS OF COUNTRIES IN GENUINE DIFFICULTIES WITH EXISTING INSTITUTIONS AND TO SEEK PRACTICAL WAYS TO MAKE PRESENT SYSTEM WORK BETTER.

11. USA EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND UNITARY TAXATION: HOWE MAY REFER

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PAGE FIVE XNGR4324 CONFD

TO NEED FOR CONTINUED CLOSE COOPERATION AND TO KEEP UP PRESSURE ON USA.

12. INNATL ECONOMY: HOWE MAY EXPRESS SATISFACTION WITH PROGRESS OF UK RECOVERY BUT WRING HANDS ABOUT USA BUDGET DEFICITS, INTEREST RATES AND PROTECTIONISM (AS IN STEEL). HE CAN BE EXPECTED TO SHOW LESS WORRY ABOUT DEBT PROBLEM AND OTHER NORTH/SOUTH ISSUES.

DECISION OF USA ON IDA VII WILL BE DECISIVE IN DETERMINATION OF UK POSITION (UK IS OPPOSED TO TOPPING UP ARRANGEMENT IN LIGHT OF FIRM STAND ON FAIR BURDEN SHARING).

13. EC: UK GOVT IS ENJOYING MORE PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR UK MEMBERSHIP IN EC (AND HENCE LABOUR PARTY IS ABANDONING OPPOSITION) BUT IN EXPECTATION GOVT WILL BE FIRM IN DEMANDING AGRICULTURAL REFORM, EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF EC SPENDING AND PERMANENT SETTLEMENT OF UK BUDGET PAYMENTS PROBLEM. HOWE AND PM THATCHER HAVE RETURNED FROM ATHENS SUMMIT DISAPPOINTED BUT NOT/NOT SURPRISED BY OUTCOME. CHARGES ON CONTINENT OF UK INFLEXIBILITY WILL NOT/NOT BE POLITICALLY HARMFUL AT WESTMINSTER. UK WILL CONTINUE TO HOLD HARD LINE IN VIEW THAT TIME IS ON THEIR SIDE AS INTERNAL BUDGETARY PRESSURES CONTINUE TO BUILD UP. CRITICAL JUNCTURE IN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS COULD BE SUBJECT OF LUNCHEON DISCUSSION.

CCC/170 081421Z XNGR4324

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR4206 08DEC83

TO EXTOTT RBP DELIVER BY 081130

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR RBD RBR FPR IDDZ

REF YOURTEL RBP1359 06DEC

---JOURNALIST EXCHANGE

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

YOUR REFTEL HAS JUST ARRIVED. ARE YOU AWARE THAT OUR COMCENTRE IS WORKING UNDER SPECIAL DIFFICULTY FOR NEXT FEW DAYS?

2. I STRONGLY SUPPORT IDEA OF EXCHANGE AND HOPE WE CAN MAKE IT WORK. I DO NOT/NOT SEE HOW WE CAN BOTH NOMINATE SOMEONE AND ASK UNION OF JOURNALISTS TO DO SAME. I SUGGEST THEREFORE THAT YOU AUTHORIZE ME TO ADVANCE CALL, ALREADY PLANNED, ON NEW EDITOR OF IZVESTIA TOLKUNOV, AND ASK HIM TO NOMINATE SOMEONE. IZVESTIA SEEMS TO ME MOST SUITABLE OF PRINT MEDIA IF ONLY BECAUSE IT IS NEITHER PARTY PAPER NOR SPECIALIZED PAPER, AND ALSO BECAUSE TEN DAYS HENCE CDN TEAM WILL BE PLAYING IN IZVESTIA CUP HOCKEY SERIES. PEARSON KNEW TOLKUNOV AND SPOKE WELL OF HIM TO ME. I WOULD OF COURSE INFORM MFA OF THIS DEMARCHE.

3. WHEN YOU COME TO THINKING ABOUT RECIPROCAL VISIT BY CDN JOURNALIST, YOU WILL HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT TWO OUTSTANDING APPLICATIONS, ONE FROM JACK BEST IN EFFECT REFUSED BY SOVS (AS I RECALL THEY WERE PREPARED TO GIVE HIM VISA BUT NOT/NOT TO ARRANGE APPOINTMENTS) AND ONE FROM PAT WATSON TO INTERVIEW GROMYKO.

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PAGE TWO XYGR4206 CONFD

WATSON REQUEST IS SPECIAL ONE BUT I THINK IT WOULD STILL BE
IMPORTANT TO TALK TO HIM BEFORE NOMINATING SOMEONE ELSE. BUT
IF SOVS AGREED TO RECEIVE SOMEONE I THINK IT WOULD BE HARD
NOT/NOT TO GIVE FIRST CHANCE TO BEST.

4. WE ARE ENTHUSIASTIC AND AWAIT YOUR FURTHER THOUGHTS

ROBERTS

CCC/144 081330Z XYGR4206

Answer 1DDZ 0272 of [unclear]

send to 1DDZ

9/12/83

Mr. [unclear]

you might check with LCR about this.

SJ 9/12/83

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM HAVAN YYGR3027 08DEC83

TO EXTOTT LCR

DISTR LCD (IDD IDA

---TRUDEAU PEACE INITIATIVE

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

SENIOR OFFICIAL OF CUBAN NATL RADIO HAS INVITED US TO MAKE 3 TO 5 MINUTE PRESENTATION ON CUBAN RADIO PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAM. SHE SUGGESTED PRESENTATION DEAL WITH TRUDEAU PEACE INITIATIVE. FORMAT WOULD BE SET SPEECH, NOT/NOT DISCUSSION. PROGRAM IS BROADCAST NATIONWIDE. WE CONSIDER INVITATION SHOULD BE ACCEPTED. IF YOU AGREE, GRATEFUL YOU PROVIDE APPROPRIATE TEXT. GRATEFUL REPLY ASAP AS OFFICIAL PREFERRED THAT WE SPEAK THIS MONTH.

CCC/233 082020Z YYGR3027

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

JLB
28-6-1 = Trudeau Peace Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR3009 08DEC83

TO EXTOTT UGB IDDZ PCOOTT/FOWLER FLASH

INFO MOSCO BNATO ROME LDN BONN PARIS HAGUE BRU PEKIN PRMNY CNGNY

TOKYO DELHI NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/CPD PMOOTT/AXWORTHY

DISTR MINA USS DMF IDR IDA RGB IFB RBD RBR RCR URR

---PM TRUDEAU VISIT 15DEC:BUSH DINNER

AS DISCUSSED THIS MORNING WITH FOWLER, BUSH'S EXEC ASST ASKED THIS MORNING IF PM TRUDEAU CLD POSSIBLY HAVE DINNER WITH VICE PRES NIGHT OF 15DEC. SETTING WLD BE SOCIAL. BUSH THOUGHT IT WLD BE QUOTE A LOT OF FUN UNQUOTE AND WAS ABLE TO RESERVE TINY AND CHARMING WSHDC PRIVATE CLUB QUOTE THE ALIBI UNQUOTE FOR PURPOSE. DINNER WLD BE FOR ABOUT A DOZEN.

2. SINCE IT SEEMS YOU JUDGE MTG WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR CLD BE SCHEDULED 16DEC, WE THINK THAT POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THIS INVITATION FROM BUSH IS TO BE RECOMMENDED. MISS FITZGERALD STRESSED, AND SHE HAD BUSH ON OTHER LINE, THAT THIS WAS VERY MUCH PERSONAL WISH OF BUSH TO HAVE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO BE WITH PM TRUDEAU IN RELAXED SETTING.

3. OBVIOUSLY THIS WLD OPEN UP REST OF DAY FOLLOWING MTG WITH REAGAN, AND LUNCH WITH SHULTZ WHICH WLD BECOME VIRTUALLY DE RIGUEUR. WE HAVE NOW TOLD MEDAS THAT IF SHULTZ WISHES TO PROPOSE SUCH LUNCH (WHETHER OR NOT/NOT PM STAYS ON FOR BUSH EVENT), PM TRUDEAU WLD FEEL HONOURED.

4. IF HE STAYS, PM TRUDEAU CLD DEVOTE REST OF AFTERNOON TO VARIETY OF VERY USEFUL ACTIVITIES, WE WLD NEED TO SEE IF APPROPRIATE MTG

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PAGE TWO UNGR3009 CONFD

WITH MEMBERS OF SENATE FOREIGN RELS CTTEE TO DISCUSS PEACE INITIATIVE
WLD BE AVAILABLE (CONGRESS IS NOT/NOT AT PRESENT IN SESSION THOUGH
A NUMBER OF SENATORS WLD BE IN TOWN) AND WHAT SORT OF MEDIA AND OTHER
CONTACTS WLD SUIT PMS WISHES. GOSSAGE HAS IDEAS ON THIS WHICH WE
CLD ADDRESS IN SEPARATE MESSAGE BUT PRESS INTEREST DURING DAY HE
SEES REAGAN WLD BE AT HEIGHT.

5. OBVIOUSLY VP BUSH WLD WELCOME INDICATION FROM PM ABOUT DINNER
POSSIBILITY ASAP.

6. WE SHALL APPROACH ISSUE OF WHITE HOUSE EXIT AFTER REAGAN MTG IN
CAREFUL BUT EFFECTIVE WAY ONCE PROGRAM LINES ARE ESTABLISHED.

CCC/230 081849Z UNGR3009

D I F F U S I O N R E S T R E I N T E

DE CANDELNY WKGR2889 08DEC83

A EXTOTT IDA

INFO GENEV


DISTR IDAO IDAN IMU IDR IDRL IDRA IDD IDDZ

---REUNION DE LA COMMISSION DU DESARMEMENT(UNDC)JEUDI 8 DEC.

1.UNDC S EST BRIEVEMENT REUNIE POUR ELIRE PAR ACCLAMATION VICTOR
G BEHO(GHANA)AU POSTE DE PRESIDENT POUR LA SESSION 1984.CINQ
VICE-PRESIDENTS DEVRONT ETRE DESIGNES,DONT UN POUR GROUPE
AFRICAIN,DEUX POUR CHACUN DES GROUPES SUIVANTS,ASIATIQUE ET
LATINO-AMERICAIN.

2.LE PRESIDENT SORTANT SOUZA E SILVA(BRESIL)A ANNONCE QUE LA
SESSION 1984 SE DEROULERA DU 7 MAI 1ER JUIN.

CCC/017 091754Z WKGR2889



MF

28-6-1 - Judeau Peace mission

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BNATO YBGR2512 08DEC83

TO EXTOTT FPR DELIVER BY 081700

INFO LDN WSHDC PARIS BRU MOSCO TOKYO PCOOTT/FOWLER

PMOOTT/COLEMAN GENEV PRMNY CNGNY NDHQOTT/DGINFO

DISTR MINA MINT MINE USS IFB UGB URR IDDZ IDA RGB RCR RCD RBD

RBR IDR

---DPM/SSEA PRESS CONF BRUSSELS/NATO

FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT OF DPM/SSEA PRESS CONF BRUSSELS

1730 HRS 07DEC.

Q.DO YOU THINK THERE MIGHT BE A MOVE WITHIN THE NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS AMONG THE EUROPEANS TO MOVE BEHIND YOU AND TO PUSH THE UNITED STATES INTO ACCEPTING A MORE INTERESTING DIALOGUE.

SSEA.WELL I THINK THAT ALSO REMAINS TO BE SEEN,WE HAVE TWO NOTIONS THAT WE ARE PUTTING FORWARD,ONE ON THE MBFR AND THE OTHER ON THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE AND BOTH OF THEM INTENDED TO BE MANIFESTATIONS OF AT LEAST IF NOT RENEWED DIALOGUE,A WILLINGNESS TO PURSUE THE DIALOGUE IN A MORE INTENSIVE FORM AND THEN WE WILL SEE WHAT THE OUTCOME WILL BE.I THINK AT THE MBFR,IAM CERTAIN WE WILL BE ASKING FOR AT LEAST A REVIEW OF PRESENT NEGOTIATING POSITION OF THE NATO COUNTRIES AND WITH THE INTENTION OF FORMULATING IF POSSIBLE SOME RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSALS THAT ARE NOW ON THE TABLE FROM THE EAST.IF THAT WORKS OUT,THE

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POSSIBILITY OF A MINISTERIAL ON THE MBFR. IT IS UNCLEAR HOW THAT WILL COME OUT. I WILL BE SEEING MR GENSCHER IN THE MORNING. I HAVE A BREAKFAST MEETING WITH HIM SO THAT WILL BE REALLY THE FIRST CONTACT I WILL HAVE HAD WITH THE MINISTERS.

Q. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID IN AN INTERVIEW THAT HE WAS WAITING FOR RESULTS AT THE NATO MEETING TO DETERMINE WHETHER THIS INITIATIVE WAS IN FACT, NOT/NOT A MAKE OR BREAK SITUATION, BUT HE WAS EXPECTING AN ENCOURAGING RESULT. WHAT IN YOUR VIEW WOULD BE A DISCOURAGING RESULT? HOW COULD HE FAIL, HOW CAN YOU FAIL IN YOUR MISSION HERE?

A. WELL, I DON'T BELIEVE THAT THE OVERALL INITIATIVE WOULD FAIL BECAUSE OF A NEGATIVE CONCLUSION ON EITHER OR BOTH OF THESE ITEMS BECAUSE I THINK AS IVE SAID AD NAUSEA IN CANADA THAT THE INITIATIVE AS SUCH HAS A LOT OF MERIT BUT APART FROM SPECIFIC PROPOSALS, IF THERE WAS NO/NO WILLINGNESS TO EXAMINE THE MBFR SITUATION THEN I THINK THAT WOULD BE A DISAPPOINTMENT.

Q. YOU DIDN'T GET TO FINISH THE SECOND ITEM—WHAT IS IT YOU ARE SEEKING IN RESPECT TO THE STKHM CONFERENCE? SSEA. WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER STARTED OUT HE HOPED THE STKHM CONFERENCE WOULD BE OPEN AT A HIGH POLITICAL LEVEL, BUT AT A

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POLITICAL LEVEL THE LEVEL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS. THAT IS INTENDED OF COURSE TO GET THE TALKS GOING AND TO ATTACH HIGH IMPORTANCE TO THEM AND HOPEFULLY THEY WONT HAVE THE SAME EXPERIENCE AS THE MBFR. NOW THERE SEEMS TO BE A FAIR BIT OF INTEREST IN THAT IDEA SO IT WOULD MEAN IF IT WERE REALIZED THE NATO MINISTERS WOULD AGREE TO MEET AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL IN STKHM AND PRESUMABLY EXPECT THEIR EASTERN EUROPEAN COLLEAGUES TO ATTEND AS WELL, THAT WOULD BE OF SOME VALUE.

Q. MR MINISTER, THAT SEEMS TO BE TAKING SHAPE AT LEAST IN TERMS OF STKHM, THE AMERICANS HAVE INDICATED THAT IF THE EUROPEANS LIKE THE IDEA THEN THEYLL DO IT. THERE DOESNT SEEM TO A GREAT OBSTACLE BUT ON MBFR MY UNDERSTANDING IS THAT THERE WAS A WESTERN SET A NATO SET-OF OF PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE AND THAT THERE WAS POSSIBLY SOME RELUCTANCE FOR THE WEST GERMANS TO FIDDLE WITH THE MBFR UNTIL THERE HAS BEEN SOME WARSAW PACT RESPONSE, MAYBE IVE GOT IT BACKWARDS, CERTAINLY FROM YOUR INTRODUCTION SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS THE OTHER WAY AROUND, THAT THERE NEEDS TO BE A WESTERN RESPONSE BEFORE THERE IS A CHANGE TO THE GROUND RULES. COULD YOU MAYBE EXPLAIN A LITTLE MORE WHAT CHANGES IN GROUND RULES WE NEED?

SSEA. THE WEST AND NATO COUNTRIES DID PUT FORWARD A DRAFT TREATY, I GUESS IN 1982, JUL82, AND THIS YEAR THE EASTERN COUNTRIES

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HAVE UNVEILED A SERIES OF COUNTER-PROPOSALS, FINALLY CONCLUDED THEIR PROPOSALS IN JUN. THERE ARE THREE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS THEY HAVE PUT FORWARD OR COUNTER-PROPOSALS-THE WEST HAS NOT/NOT YET MADE A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY, I SHOULD SAY WE HAVE NOT/NOT ALTERED OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION ON THE COUNTER PROPOSALS SINCE THEN AND THE EAST HAVE BEEN ASKING SO WE HAVE MADE OUR COUNTER-PROPOSAL AND THEY RE GOING TO GIVE US SOME ANSWERS.

Q. SO WHAT WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE DONE TO THE MBFR? HOW DOES THE TRUDEAU INITIATIVE AFFECT IT ASIDE FROM PERHAPS THE INJECTION OF POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT BEING CURRENTLY AT THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL? SSEA. PUTTING THIS CONFERENCE ON THE CDE TO ONE SIDE, WE RE FINISHED WITH THAT. IS WHAT YOU WERE TALKING ABOUT, THE MBFR?

WHAT CANADA IS TALKING ABOUT TWO THINGS: IS IT NOT/NOT NOW TIME FOR NATO TO TAKE A LOOK AT ITS NEGOTIATING STANCE, WORK AT IT AND SEE WHETHER WE CAN COME UP WITH SOME NEW IDEAS OR SOME COUNTER-PROPOSALS AND WE CAN, WE OUGHT TO UNDERTAKE A REVIEW.

THE NEGOTIATING TEAM IN VIENN HAS BEEN ASKING FOR THIS REVIEW, HAS ASKED FOR IT SEVERAL TIMES AND WE WILL BE PUSHING THEM. IF THE RESULT OF THE REVIEW IS PRODUCTIVE OR WE COME UP WITH SOMETHING THEN IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO HAVE A MEETING OF THE MBFR ALSO AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL.

Q. JUST TO FOLLOW UP, THERES A SUGGESTION I BELIEVE, TO GET AWAY FROM THE INTERMINABLE ARGUMENT OVER NUMBERS AS TO WHAT IS

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ACTUALLY ON THE GROUND IN THE EAST AND WEST AND TO MOVE ON TO TALK ABOUT REDUCTIONS AT FROM WHATEVER LEVEL IT IS AT THE MOMENT, IS THAT PART OF THE NEW IDEA?

SSEA. WELL, THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN HUNG UP BECAUSE OF THEY WOULD NOT/NOT AGREE ON WHAT THE DATABASE IS, HOW MUCH EACH SIDE HAS IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES. THE EASTERN PROPOSALS ARE WELL

LETS START NOW BY A MUTUAL VOLUNTARY WITHDRAWAL ON EACH SIDE. I THINK IT IS 13,000 OR REDUCTION ON EACH SIDE.

13,000 OR SO BY THE NATO SIDE AND 20,000 OR SO BY THE EASTERN SIDE, THEN WE LL HAVE A FREEZE OR NO/NO INCREASES AS A SECOND STEP AND THEN OVER A THREE YEAR PERIOD WE LL REDUCE TO PARITY MAINLY TO AN AGREED LEVEL OF 900,000 BOTH GROUND AND AIR ON EACH SIDE. THE DEFECT OF THAT IS THAT YOU COME AT THE END OF THREE YEARS YOU MAY BE SURPRISED BECAUSE THERE HAS BEEN NO/NO VERIFICATION IN THE INTERIM YOU MAY HAVE REDUCED AND YOU MAY FIND THAT YOUR PARTNER HAS NOT/NOT REDUCED AT ALL. SO THAT IS YOU KNOW THE DATABASE THAT IS THE NATO COUNTRIES HAVE SAID WE SHOULD DECIDE HOW MUCH WE HAVE ON EACH SIDE, VERIFIED BEFORE WE START ANYTHING.

Q. YOU SAID THAT THERE WAS A SECOND ELEMENT OF THE MBFR TAKING THE FIRST AS A REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATING STANCE AND THE SECOND IS CONTIGENT UPON THE FIRST AT BEING IF THE REVIEW PRODUCES NEW IDEAS THEN THOSE SHOULD BE THE STEPS?

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SSEA.I WOULD EXPECT THE MINISTERS HERE WOULD PROBABLY BE CAUTIOUS IN COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO A MINISTERIAL UNTIL THEY SEE WHAT THE REVIEW REVEALS.

Q.DO YOU EXPECT TO KNOW ONE WAY OR ANOTHER IF THEY WOULD AGREE TO A REVIEW BY THE END OF THE WEEK?

SSEA.YES I WOULD THINK WE WOULD NOW.

Q.WHERE WOULD YOU EXPECT THE OBJECTIONS TO A REVIEW AND ON WHAT GROUNDS?

SSEA.I BEGIN NOW BY SAYING THAT I DONT KNOW OF A GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL BE REJECTED OR(OBJECTIONS)ILL JUST WAIT AND SEE.

Q.SIR CAN I GET YOU BACK TO THE ACTUAL MEETING ITSELF AT THE MOMENT.THE PHYSCHOLOGICAL CLIMATE IN WHICH IT IS TAKING PLACE I BELIEVE MINISTERS ARE QUITE CONCERNED ABOUT THE LEVEL OF PUBLIC OPINION IN EUROPE,THE FEARS OF PUBLIC OPINION IN EUROPE.DOES THIS LEAD YOU TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE MOMENT MIGHT BE RIPE TO PUSH AN INITIATIVE THAT DOES NOT/ NOT HIT AT SECURITY AND LEADS TO PUTTING NATO ON THE RIGHT TRACK AS FAR AS THE PUBLIS IS CONCERNED BECAUSE AS YOU KNOW IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS WITH THE CLIMATE AND BEFORE THERE HAS BEEN A WAR SCARE.WHAT ARE THE NATO MINISTERS GOING TO DO ABOUT THAT AND WILL THIS IN ANYWAY GIVE AN OPENING TO THE TRUDEAU INITIATIVE?

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A.WELL I THINK NO/NO DOUBT ABOUT IT THE NATO COUNCIL I THINK IS MEETING IN A PERIOD OF DIFFICULTY AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THATS NOT/NOT EXAGGERATING TO SAY IT IS A DIFFICULT PERIOD. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS BEEN EXPLAINING THE EXISTENCE OF INCREASED TENSIONS,A VERY BAD POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE AT THE PRESENT TIME,A LOT OF MISTRUST AND NO/NO APPARENT OPENINGS TO NEW FORMS OF DIALOGUE.THAT IS APPARENT TO A LARGE NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS HERE AT THE NATO COUNCIL AND THERE WILL BE,AM SATISFIED THE READINESS TO EXPRESS THE NECESSITY OF DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION. THE NATO COUNCIL IS ALSO MEETING IN A NEW SITUATION THE DEPLOYMENT IS TAKING PLACE-A YEAR AGO WE MET TO STEEL OURSELVES IN A SENSE,TO CARRY OUT DEPLOYMENT AND EVERYBODY SAID THAT THIS IS THE YEAR OF DECISION 1983. AND I THINK RIGHTLY SO IT WAS FORECAST TO BE A DIFFICULT YEAR AND IT WAS A DIFFICULT YEAR AND WE MUSTNT WAIVER BECAUSE THE SOVIET UNION IS ATTEMPTING TO DEFLECT THE INTENTION OF NATO,TO WEAKEN PUBLIC OPINION AND TO OBTAIN ITS PRINCIPLE OBJECTIVE OF NON DEPLOYMENT.A DEPLOYMENT THAT PARLIAMENTS IN A NUMBER OF CAPITALS,FRG AND BRITIAN AND ITALY,THE DEPLOYMENT IS GOING AHEAD AND THAT DOESNT ILLIMINATE EXISTING CONCERN IN THE PUBLIC OF THE OVERALL STATE OF RELATIONSHIPS AND YET WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN MAINTAINING OUR SOLIDARITY.BUT WE HAVE ...8

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COME OFF IN A SENSE SECOND BEST BECAUSE OUR FIRST BEST WAS TO
ACHIEVE A DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION A
REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR MISSILES IN EUROPE OR NO/NO MISSILES AT ALL
AND SO WE HAVE DEMONSTRATED OUR SOLIDARITY AND WE ARE GOING TO
DEPLOY BUT THAT WAS NOT/NOT THE PREFERRED ASPIRATION OF ANY OF THE
MINISTERS A YEAR AGO, LET ME TELL YOU THAT.

Q. IF I CAN STILL IN THE CONTEXT OF WHAT HAPPENS TOMORROW GO BACK
TO YOUR OPENING STATEMENT ABOUT STKHM AND THE MBFR YOU SAID
THAT THE CHANCES OF AN AGREEMENT ON MBFR WAS MORE UNCERTAIN, DO
YOU MEAN TO EVENTUALLY GET IT TO THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL OR TO
ACHIEVE A CONSENSUS ON A REVIEW?

SSEA. I CANT BE SURE ABOUT EITHER YET BECAUSE I HAVENT HEARD
FROM OTHER MINISTERS, I HAVENT HEARD FROM SUCH A KEY MINISTER
AS THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, WHAT HE
THINKS WHETHER THEY RE READY NOW TO ESPOUSE FORMALLY
A NATO MINISTERIAL TO SAY YES WE ARE INSTRUCTING AND
CALLING FOR A REVIEW OF OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION IN THE MBFR.
IM NOT/NOT SURE THAT THAT WILL TAKE PLACE, I HOPE IT WILL, BUT
IM NOT/NOT SURE.

Q. I WONDER IF YOU CAN ALSO TELL US A LITTLE ABOUT CDAS
POSITION THE QUESTION WHICH SEEMS LIKELY TO COME UP
TOMORROW AND THAT IS THE FEELINGS OF SOME EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
ANYWAY THAT THERE IS SOME MERIT IN THE UNITED STATES

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CONSIDERING A MELDING OF THE INF, AND START. THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN QUITE CATEGORIAL THIS FAR IN THEIR OBJECTIONS WITH THAT, BUT I WOULD BE INTERESTED IN KNOWING HOW CDA FEELS ABOUT SUCH AN AMALGAM.

SSEA. I DOUBT VERY MUCH IF IT WILL BE AN ITEM OF THE AGENDA. IM NOT/NOT COMING TO ADVOCATE OR PUSH FOR THE MELDING OF THESE TWO AT ALL, I WOULD BE SURPRISED IF IT CAME FORWARD IN ANY SERIOUS WAY.

Q. BUT DOES CANADA THINK IT IS A GOOD IDEA IF IN FACT IT SEEMS THAT OTHER LIKELIHOODS OR FORMS FOR INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES ARE CLOSED. SHOULD IT BE CONSIDERED BY THE AMERICANS?

SSEA. I THINK THAT AT THIS STAGE WE SHOULD BE CALLING THE SOVIET UNION BACK TO THE INF NEGOTIATIONS. I DONT THINK WE SHOULD JUST CLOSE THEM DOWN THAT QUICKLY—SAY OK LETS TOOS THE WHOLE PROBLEM INTO ANOTHER FORUM.

Q. BUT DESPITE DEPLOYMENT IM SURE THE ORIGINAL SPLIT OR THE GENERAL SPLIT IN NATO BETWEEN COUNTRIES WHO FEEL THAT WE SHOULD PURSUE DIALOGUE TO THE VERY LAST ALLY AND THOSE WHO SAY WE SHOULD HANG TOUGH AS SUCH, STILL EXISTS. ON WHAT SIDE WOULD YOU PUT CDA AT THE MOMENT? ARE YOU JOINING UP WITH THE EUROS ON CERTAIN LEVELS?

SSEA... BOTH—THAT IS WHY THE DECISION OF 79 WAS CALLED THE TWO-TRACK DECISION. IT WAS SUPPOSED TO BE CLEARLY

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A WILLINGNESS TO DEPLOY BUT A WILLINGNESS TO AVOID DEPLOYMENT THROUGH NEGOTIATION AND WE ALWAYS WANTED TO PUSH THE SECOND TRACK AS MUCH AS THE FIRST. IN FACT MORE URGENTLY BECAUSE IF THE NEGOTIATING TRACK HAD SUCCEEDED WELL THE DEPLOYMENT WOULD NOT/ NOT HAVE BEEN NECESSARY. BUT THAT TRACK DIDNT SUCCEED.

Q. IT DIDNT SUCCEED AND WHERE DOES CDA STAND AT THE MOMENT. IN WHAT MUST BE PERCEIVED AS STILL A LINGERING SPLIT IN NATO BETWEEN THE TWO?

SSEA. I DONT AGREE THERE IS A SPLIT BETWEEN THE TWO, AND THERE IS NOT/NOT A CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THEM, BECAUSE IF WE HAD SUCCEEDED WITHIN THE YEAR, THE LAST TWO YEARS, WE WOULDNT BE DEPLOYING AT THE MOMENT. IT SEEMS THAT THE EVENTS DONT ARGUE FOR LESS RELIANCE ON THE NEGOTIATING TRACK, THEY ARGUE FOR MORE RELIANCE I WOULD ARGUE THAT THE ALLIANCE HAS CHALKED UP THE SUCCESS. IT HAS HELD TOGETHER AND IT HAS WITHSTOOD THE PRESSURE TO CHANGE ITS DEPLOYMENT DECISION. I THINK THIS MEETING WOULD BE TAKING PLACE IN QUITE A DIFFERENT ATMOSPHERE IF THE GERMAN PARLIAMENT OR THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT HAD SAID NO/NO WE WONT DEPLOY WE WOULD BE IN RATHER A SHAMBLES. I WOULD SAY THAT THE RUSSIANS MUST BE ASKING WHAT TO DO NEXT BECAUSE THEY CERTAINLY HAVE PLACED ALOT OF INSISTANCE ON BRINGING ABOUT CHANGE OF POLICY THAT HAS NOT/NOT SUCCEEDED. PROBABLY THEY ARE ASSESSING IN SAYING WELL THIS DEPLOYMENT TAKES PLACE

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OVER A FIVE YEAR PERIOD AND WE RE NOT/NOT THROUGH YET.

Q. JUST LOOKING AHEAD FROM THAT, IT SEEMS TO ME WE RE HEADING INTO THE KEY MOMENT OF THE TRUDEAU MISSION WHICH WILL BE MOSCOW. HE GOT SUPPORT HERE, HE GOT SUPPORT IN DELHI AND SOME SORT OF ASSENT SIMILAR SUPPORT FROM CHINA, BUT IT REALLY DOESNT AMOUNT TO ANYTHING UNTIL YOU GET TO THE SUPERPOWERS. AND AS YOU SAY THE OBJECTIVE HAS TO BE BRINGING THEM BACK TO THE TABLE IN GENEVA BUT I DONT QUITE SEE WHAT LEVERAGE HES GOT TO ARGUE THAT PLOT UNLESS THERE IS SOME PACESETTING FORMULA AND I DONT SEE HOW THEY CAN TURN AND SAY YEAH OK WE LL DO THAT BECAUSE YOU SAY SO MR TRUDEAU.

SSEA. I DONT AGREE WITH YOU, I THINK MR TRUDEAU HAS DONE WHAT HE CAN DO WITHIN THE LIMITS OF CDN DIPLOMATIC POWERS AND POSSIBILITIES AND CERTAINLY TO CHANGE THE SITUATION REQUIRES NOT/NOT ONLY THE MAJOR CONSENT OF THE SUPERPOWERS BUT ALSO NOT/NOT ONLY THE SUPPORT BUT THE ACTION OF OTHER COUNTRIES AS WELL. I DONT THINK THAT CDA CAN TAKE THIS ON ITS OWN BACK ALONE.

Q. DOES THAT MEAN THERE IS NO/NO REASON WHY THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD GO ALONE TO MOSCO OR TO WSHDC? IS THERE ANY POINT IN DOING THAT?

SSEA. MY VIEW IS THAT THE EFFORT WOULD BE INCOMPLETE UNTIL HE

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HAS MET WITH THE LEADERS OF THE SUPERPOWERS.

Q.I MISUNDERSTAND YOU THERE BECAUSE IF BY GATHERING SUPPORT IN DELHI AND FROM EUROPEAN LEADERS NOW AT NATO AND SOME SORT OF TACIT ACCEPTANCE PERHAPS ANYWAY IN PEKING,THE PRIME MINISTER HAS DONE WHAT HE CAN DO WITHIN THE LIMITS OF CDN DEPLOMATIC POWERS,WHAT MESSAGE DOES HE CARRY TO MOSCO? SSEA.I THINK HE CARRIES PERCISELY THE SAME MESSAGE THAT HE HAS CARRIED ELSEWHERE.HE HAS NEVER INTENDED TO SET HIMSELF UP AS A MEDIATOR TO GO TO WSHDC AND VICE A VERSA TO MOSCO WITH A DEAL TRYING TO SELL IT ONE PLACE OR THE OTHER,YET HE HAS BEEN TRYING TO CREATE A BETTER POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IS ONE WAY OF PUTTING IT,THAT IS THE WAY I LIKE TO PUT IT OR TO CREATE A BETTER ATMOSPHERE OF TRUST.WHEN YOU TALK ABOUT ROLLING THE INF TALKS INTO THE START TALKS,DOES THAT MEAN THERE IS A BETTER CHANCE OF SUCCESS IN GETTING THE RUSSIANS BACK TO THE TABLE?

Q.IT STRIKES ME THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WAS LOOKING FOR A PARTICULAR KIND OF SUPPORT WHEN HE WENT FIRST TO EUROPE AND CERTAINLY WHEN HE WENT TO DELHI,HE MADE IT CLEAR THE KIND OF RESULTS HE HOPED

THAT YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE HERE.WHAT DOES HE TAKE TO MOSCO BEYOND SAYING IVE GOT THIS ENDORSEMENT FROM VARIOUS OTHER FORUMS-IS THERE ANY PARTICULAR THING HE CAN SAY TO MOSCOW WHICH INCREASES THE CHANCES OF THE SUPERPOWERS TALKING? SSEA.I THINK IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS A PRETTY GOOD IDEA FOR A WESTERN PUBLIC PERSON LIKE MR TRUDEAU TO BE TALKING TO

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THE SOVIET UNION, TO BE TALKING TO THEM ABOUT WHAT WESTERN ATTITUDES ARE AND HOW THE WEST SEE THINGS. TO EXPRESS THAT ESSENTIAL CALL FOR RESUMPTION OF DIALOGUE AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE. YOU SAY WHAT DOES HE BRING? I SAY HE BRINGS A MESSAGE THAT OUGHT TO APPEAL TO THE RUSSIANS SELF INTEREST BECAUSE THEY HAVE A STAKE IN THIS WORLD AS WELL AS THE REST OF US.

Q. HAVE YOU HAD ANY DIRECT INDICATION FROM WSHDC THAT THE REAGAN ADMIN THINKS IT IS A PRETTY GOOD TIME FOR A WESTERN PUBLIC LEADER TO GO TO MOSCO?

SSEA. YES, I THINK THAT THE PUBLIC POSTURE OF THE AMERICAN GOVT HAS BEEN FAVOURABLE TO WHAT MR TRUDEAU IS DOING.

Q. IN A GENERAL SENSE, BUT SPECIFICALLY IN GOING TO WSHDC, I BEG YOUR PARDON GOING TO MOSCO?

SSEA. I HESITATE TO INTERPRET FOR THEM (IE USA) BUT MY CONCLUSION IS THAT THEY HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO/NO OBJECTION TO THAT, ABSOLUTELY NO/NO OBJECTION.

Q. THE FIVE POWER CONFERENCE WOULD YOU BE DISCUSSING THAT AT THIS MEETING?

A. I DOUBT VERY MUCH, NOT/NOT IN THE ROUND TABLE.

Q. WHAT ABOUT IN YOUR BILATERAL MEETING.

SSEA. I CERTAINLY WOULD REFER TO IT WHEN ITS APPROPRIATE IN MY BILATERAL MEETINGS WE WILL BE ASKING ABOUT IT, WHAT THE REACTIONS HAVE BEEN AND SO ON, THAT IS ANOTHER ELEMENT OF THE PROGRAM, OF THE PROPOSAL ONE OF THE PROPOSALS WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER HAS MADE BUT IT IS THERE BUT IT HASNT BEEN IMPLEMENT AND SOME HAVE RAISED

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OBJECTIONS TO IT BUT I DONT THINK BECAUSE OF THAT IT SHOULD DIE.IT DOESNT HAVE MERIT BUT WE OUGHT TO BE PUSHING THESE IDEAS OVER AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME.

Q.IN THE MAIN YOU SEEM TO BE QUITE OPTMISTIC IN FACT BECAUSE AT ONE POINT IN THE TRUDEAU MISSION IT WAS SAID THAT THE FIRST OBSTACLE WAS WSHDC,THE SECOND OBSTACLE WAS MOSCO.NOW IF WSHDC NO/NO LONGER SEEMS AN OBSTACLE I DONT THINK THAT RUSSIA IS NOT/NOT SO GLAD,I MEAN THE RUSSIANS HAVE SAID AND HAVE INDICATED TO YOU AM SURE THAT ALL PEACE PLANS INTEREST US AND WELL WHY NOT/NOT SO YOU SHOULD BE IN THE GENERAL BE SATISFIED THAT THIS MISSION IS GOING TO WHAT YOU SAID IS ITS LOGICAL CONCLUSION-GO TO WSHDC AND MOSCO.

SSEA.WELL I THINK AS FAR AS MR TRUDEAUS VISIT,HIS PROGRAM IS CONCERNED IT WOULD BE INCOMPLETE IF HE DIDNT VISIT BOTH THOSE CAPITALS.I DONT THINK THE PEACE PROCESS IS OVER WHEN THAT EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT A BETTER SITUATION IS OVER WHEN HE COMPLETES THOSE TRIPS.

Q.CAN WE EXPECT A TRUDEAU VISIT TO MOSCO BEFORE CHRISTMAS?

SSEA.I THINK YOU SHOULD ASK THE PRIME MINISTER ABOUT THAT,I WOULD THINK IT UNLIKELY BUT IT MAY HAPPEN.

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Q. BEFORE STKHM?

SSEA. NO/NO IDEA. THAT DIFFERENT ITS THE NEW YEAR THEN.

IT IS A QUESTION PRESUMABLY WHEN A MEETING IS
CONVIENT TO THE RUSSIANS AS WELL TO MR TRUDEAU

THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

UUU/298 081817Z YBGR2512

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDA1391 08DEC83

TO LDN PARIS WSHDC BONN

INFO BNATO CANMILREPNATO BRU OSLO COPEN ROME MDRID LSBON HAGUE ATENS
ANKRA VIENN BERN VMBFR PMOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DNACPOL

DISTR MINA IFB DFM DFMX IDDZ IDD IDR RSR RGB RBX IDAO IDAN

---CDE: PRESENCE OF PARLIAMENTARIANS

DURING SPEECH IN TORONTO LAST WEEKEND LEADER OF OFFICIAL OPPOSITION
CALLED ON GOVT TO SEND QUOTE AN ALL-PARTY DELEGATION REPRESENTING
EVERYBODY TO ATTEND CDE...AND ENCOURAGE THIS AS FORUM FOR PROMOTING
PEACE UNQUOTE. PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE AT BNATO ON
QUESTION WITH COMMON VIEW THAT PARLIAMENTARIANS WILL BE INVITED TO
OBSERVE BUT THAT THEY WILL NOT/NOT BE INCLUDED IN NATIONAL DELS.

2. IN ORDER TO PROVIDE TIMELY ADVICE TO DPM/SSEA WE WOULD APPRECIATE
RECEIVING MORE DEFINITIVE VIEWS OF INTENTION OF HOST GOVTS. SPECI-
FICALLY (A) DO HOSTS ENVISAGE INCLUSION OF PARLIAMENTARIANS IN NAITL
DELS AND (B) WILL PARLIAMENTARIANS BE INVITED TO CONFERENCE AS OB-
SERVERS?

3. WOULD APPRECIATE IF INFO ADDRESSEES COULD MAKE SIMILAR ENQUIRIES.

4. GRATEFUL REPLY BY 120900.

CCC/291 090114Z IDA1391

28-6-1 - Judean Peace Mission

C O N F I D N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDA1388 08DEC83

TO CANDELNY DELIVER BY 081600

INFO GENEV WSHDC LDN BONN ANKRA VIENN BNATO PARIS HAGUE ROME MOSCO

TOKYO CNBRA NDHQOTT/DIPOL/CORA/DNACPOL

DISTR IFB IDDZ IDD IDR IDRL IDRA RBR IMU IDAN IDAO ETN

REF YOURTEL WKGR2783 01DEC AND KERGIN/CHERKASKY TELECON 06DEC

---UNGA38: FIRST CTTEE: ITEM 50(C): RESOLUTION L.53

WE UNDERSTAND THAT REPS OF QUOTE SMALL GROUP UNQUOTE (PARA SIX REF-
TEL: CDA, FRANCE, FRG, TURKEY, USA) MET 06DEC AND DECIDED TO BEGIN
LOBBYING POSSIBLY SUPPORTIVE COUNTRIES (WITH CDA CONCENTRATING ON
CARIB AND SOME FRANCOPHONE AFRICANS) TO VOTE IN FAVOUR OF WFTERN
INF RESOLUTION IN PLENARY 15DEC. WE FULLY SUPPORT THIS AND WISH
GROUP EVERY SUCCESS.

2. IN LIGHT OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM INF TALKS (AND UNCERTAINTY ABOUT
RESUMPTION OF START) IT IS NOW PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO HAVE WES-
TERN RESOLUTION ON SUBJECT WITH AS MUCH SUPPORT AS POSSIBLE.

SHOULD NOT/NOT BE WITHDRAWN REGARDLESS OF WHAT HAPPENS TO ANY OF
OTHER THREE INF RESOLUTIONS (ROMANIA, L.3/REV.2; NNA, L.42 AND WPO,
L.65/REV.1), ONE OR MORE OF WHICH MIGHT DISAPPEAR, FOR WHATEVER
REASON, BEFORE PLENARY VOTE.

3. FOLLOWING ARE TALKING POINTS FOR YOUR POSSIBLE USE IN LOBBYING
EFFORT AS WELL AS IN DEFENDING WESTERN POSITIONS ON INF IN ANY

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PAGE TWO IDA1388 CONF

DEBATE ON SUBJECT THAT MIGHT TAKE PLACE IN PLENARY:

-ON 17NOV83, IN INTRODUCING WESTERN DRAFT RESOLUTION L.63, CANADA STATED THAT QUOTE THE COSPONSORS ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT A NEAK-DOWN OF BILATERAL NUCLEAR ARMS NEGOTIATIONS COULD IMPEDE EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN PEACE AND SECURITY AND TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS TOWARDS DISARMAMENT UNQUOTE AND COMMENDED RESOLUTION TO FIRST CTTEE AS QUOTE GIVING EXPRESSION OF THE FIRMEST POSSIBLE ENCOURAGEMENT AND SUPPORT TO THE NEGOTIATING PARTIES TO BRING THEIR EFFORTS TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION UNQUOTE;

-PRESSURE ON NEGOTIATORS BY THOSE WHO HAVE NO/NO DIRECT INPUT IN NEGOTIATIONS BUT WHO ARE AFFECTED BY THEIR RESULTS CAN BE IMPORTANT AND EFFECTIVE IF PROPERLY APPLIED, AS WESTERN RESOLUTION DOES;

-USSR HAS UNILATERALLY SUSPENDED INF AND START TALKS AND NO/NO DATE HAS BEEN SET FOR NEXT ROUNDS. USA IS PREPARED TO CONTINUE BOTH NEGOTIATIONS;

-WE DEPLY REGRET THE SOVIET MOVE, WHICH WE DO NOT/NOT CONSIDER TO BE JUSTIFIED AND WHICH WILL ONLY DELAY AND COMPLICATE THE NEGOTIATION OF AN AGREEMENT;

-SOVIET UNION HAS KNOWN FOR NEARLY FOUR YEARS THAT NATO INF DEPLOYMENTS WOULD TAKE PLACE IF NO/NO AGREEMENT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED BY THE END OF THIS YEAR;

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PAGE THREE IDA1388 CONFD

-WHILE THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE GOING ON, THE SOVIET UNION DEPLOYED OVER 100 SS-20 MISSILES, THEIR WALKING OUT BEFORE A SINGLE NATO MISSILE HAD BEEN DEPLOYED SUGGESTS THEY HAVE ONE STANDARD FOR THEIR OWN BEHAVOIR AND ANOTHER FOR THAT OF NATO;

-DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE SOVIET UNION HAD ALWAYS INSISTED THAT IN EFFECT IT SHOULD MAINTAIN A MONOPOLY OF LAND-BASED INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE. THIS INEQUITABLE POSITION HAS PREVENTED AGREEMENT AND MADE THE NATO DEPLOYMENTS INEVITABLE.;

-THE NEW SOVIET MISSILES IN EAST GERMANY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA WERE INTENDED TO

REPLACE OLDER MISSILES THERE. THIS DEVELOPMENT WAS EXPECTED. INDEED, SOME OF THE NEW MISSILES MAY ALREADY BE IN PLACE. THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN DEPLOYING SEA-LAUNCHED MISSILES FOR SOME YEARS. MR. ANDROPOVS 24NOV83 STATEMENT PUTS TOGETHER IN ONE PACKAGE VARIOUS THREATS WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN MAKING SINCE BEFORE THE NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN. IF THEIR PURPOSE WAS TO PERSUADE NATO TO RENOUNCE ITS TWO-TRACK DECISION, THEN THEY HAVE FAILED;

-WE HOPE THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL SOON BE RESUMED: THAT WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF ALL COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION;

-DEPENDING ON THE TERMS OF AN EVENTUAL AGREEMENT, ANY NATO DEPLOYMENTS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE CAN BE HALTED OR REVERSED. NATO GOAL REMAINS THAT IN FUTURE THERE SHOULD BE NEITHER SOVIET NOR AMERICAN INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES.

CCC/044 081741Z IDA1388

C O N F I D E N T I A L
FM EXTOTT RBR0765 08DEC83
TO BUCST

28-6-1 - Trudeau
Peace
mission

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CIS/ADMPOL/CPD/DGIS
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR RBD FPR
IDD IDR IDA IDDZ RBRD IDZ ZSP RBP ZSI ZSS
REF IDDZ TEL 0255 06DEC

---MTG WITH RACEANU

AT HIS REQUEST DURING VISIT TO OTT DEC 5 IN CONNECTION WITH DOLGU
MISSION, RACEANU CALLED ON RBR TO REVIEW NUMBER OF MATTERS ON
BILATERAL AGENDA. THIS TEL DEALS WITH INVITATION TO PM, ANDREI VISIT
AND POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS AND VISA/STAGE B QUESTION. DISCUSSION
OF CONSULAR CONVENTION, FAMILY REUNIFICATION AND CULTURAL ITEMS
ARE REPORTED SEPARATELY.

2. INVITATION TO PM: RACEANU REPEATED INVITATION CONVEYED EARLIER
BY DOLGU TO DMF FOR PM TO VISIT BUCHAREST IN CONNECTION WITH PEACE
INITIATIVE. HE MADE IT CLEAR MOSCO SHLD NOT/NOT BE ONLY WPO CAPITAL
PM VISITS AND THAT HE WOULD RECEIVE WARM WELCOME IN BUCHAREST.

3. ANDREI VISIT: FOREIGN MIN STILL HOPED TO COME TO CANADA AND
RACEANU TOOK PAINS TO ASSURE US THAT NOTHING POLITICAL VIS-A-VIS
CANADA SHOULD BE READ INTO HIS MINISTERS INABILITY TO CARRY
THROUGH HIS INTENTION THIS YEAR. COMPLICATIONS IN RELATIONSHIP
WITH USA COUPLED WITH BROKEN ANKLE HAD INTERFERRED WITH TRAVEL
PLANS. ANDREI WAS NOW THINKING IN TERMS OF VISIT TOWARDS END

PAGE TWO RBR0765 CONF

OF JAN OR EARLY FEB 84. ROMANIANS WOULD BE SUBMITTING PROPOSED DATES TO US VERY SHORTLY. RACEANU SAID A POSSIBLE VISIT BY PRES CEAUSESCU IN 1984 WOULD BE AMONG MATTERS ANDREI WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS.

4. WE SAID WE TOO STILL WISHED VISIT TO GO AHEAD AND THAT TIME FRAME SUGGESTED MAY FIT INTO DPM/SSEAS OWN PROGRAM THOUGH WE NATURALLY HAVE TO CONSULT HIM ONCE ROMANIANS PROVIDE SPECIFIC DATES.

5. FOR YOUR INFO MEMO HAS GONE FORWARD TO DPM/SSEA WHICH RECOMMENDS, INTER ALIA, THAT HE RECEIVE ANDREI AT A MUTUALLY AGREEABLE DATE SHORTLY AFTER HIS RETURN FROM DAVOS (JAN 26-FEB 2), POSSIBLY WEEK OF FEB 6-10. DPM/SSEA HAS YET TO RESPOND AND PROBABLY WILL NOT/NOT DO SO UNTIL AFTER HIS RETURN FROM NATO MINISTERIAL AND VISIT TO U.K. (DEC 5-15).

6. POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS: RACEANU SAID HIS AUTHORITIES ATTACHED GREAT DEAL OF IMPORTANCE TO POLITICAL DIMENSION OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND HOPED WE COULD SCHEDULE MANY AD HOC EXCHANGES EITHER HERE OR IN BUCHAREST ON TOPICAL INTL ISSUES OF MUTUAL CONCERN. BUCHAREST HOPED DOLGU VISIT MIGHT SET PRECEDENT FOR SIMILAR MEETINGS IN FUTURE. PARALLEL CHARACTER OF CEAUSESCU AND TRUDEAU INITIATIVES TESTIFIED TO CONVERGENCE OF CDN AND ROMANIAN APPROACHES ON HOW TO REDUCE TENSION. HE SINGLED OUT SPECIFICALLY ARMS CONTROL, CDE, CSCE/HUMAN RIGHTS AND NORTH/SOUTH AS PROPITIOUS

PAGE THREE RBR0765 CONFD

AREAS FOR CONSULTATION IN COMING MONTHS. WITHOUT SUGGESTING WE FOLLOW SAME PATTERN HE CITED HUMAN RIGHTS ROUND TABLE IN FEB WITH USA AS FRUITFUL FORM OF EXCHANGE. HE SAID HIS AUTHORITIES WOULD WELCOME CANADIAN EMISSARY ON OTTAWA HUMAN RIGHTS MTG.

7. VISA CLEARANCES: OVER LUNCH IN HONOUR OF MINISTER ROSU AND DOLGU EARLIER SAME DAY RACEANU TOLD US THAT HIS AUTHORITIES WERE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT STEADY SUCCESSION OF VISA REFUSALS FOR EMBASSY STAFF REPLACEMENTS. HE HAD BEEN GIVEN STRICT INSTRUCTIONS TO RAISE MATTER WITH US AND TO INDICATE TOUGH ATTITUDE ON PART OF CDN AUTHORITIES WAS DIFFICULT TO COMPREHEND ESPECIALLY SINCE OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES WERE NOT/NOT NEARLY SO RESTRICTIVE. HE ALLOWED THAT HE WAS FULLY AWARE OF SENSITIVITY OF QUESTION BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO BE FRANK IN ORDER TO AVOID REACHING STAGE WHEN MATTER BECAME SERIOUS IRRITANT IN OUR RELATIONS. WE TOOK NOTE OF WHAT HE SAID, STRESSED THAT WE WERE AS CONCERNED AS THEY WERE ABOUT THIS SITUATION AND WITH ROMANIAN COOPERATION WE COULD AVOID PROBLEMS IN FUTURE.

CCC/072 081853Z RBR0765

28-6-1-*Trudeau*
Peace
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BUCST UYSV0566 08DEC83

TO EXTOTT RBR MGTC

INFO LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO RRU HAGUE

WSHDC MOSCO BNATO GENEV WSAW BPEST PRGUE BGRAD STKHM VIENN PCOOTT/

FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CIS/ADMPOL/PPP/DGIS PRMNY VMBFR

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RBD FPR IDD IDR IDA IDDZ RPRD

IDX ZSP ZSI

REF OURTEL UYGR3105 07DEC YOURTEL MGTC9893 07DEC

---PM TRUDEAU INITIATIVE:FOLLOW-UP

CORRECT DISTR LINE REFTL TO READ UGB/UGB VICE UGR.

MGTC:PSE PROTECT.

CCC/181 081140Z UYSV0566

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28-6-1 - Trudeau
Peace
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L
FM EXTOTT RSR0455 8DEC83
TO VIENN

INFO CANMILREPNATO LDN WSHDC BNATO GENEV VMEFR MOSCO WSAW BPEST BRU
BUCST PRGUE BGRAD BONN ROME PARIS OSLO COPEN STKHM PMOOTT/FOWLER
NDHQOTT/ADMPOL CPP/DNACPOL DSTRATA/CIS

DISTR (IDDZ IDD IDA IDR IDRL IDRA RSD RBD RBR

---DR HINTEREGGER VISIT-EAST/WEST RELATIONS

ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS AUSTRIAN SECGEN NOTED THAT HIS COUNTRYS
APPEAL FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS REFLECTED GROWING CONCERN OF PEOPLE
AND GOVT OF AUSTRIA OVER HEIGHTENED TENSION IN RELATIONS BETWEEN
EAST AND WEST. SECGEN WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC OF EARLY RESUMPTION OF INF
NEGS AND EXPRESSED VIEW THAT SOVIETS MAY DO MORE TO QUOTE CHILL
UNQUOTE RELATIONS WITH SOME WESTERN COUNTRIES. AUSTRIA FAVOURS IDFA
OF GIVING POLITICAL IMPETUS TO CDE AND MBFR AND SUPPORTS EFFORTS
CONTAINED IN PMS INITIATIVE TO ENCOURAGE HIGH LEVEL DIALOGUE BETWEEN
SUPERPOWERS. SECGEN EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT CDE REMAINS ONE OF FFW
CHANNELS OPEN FOR DIALOGUE WITH EAST. ANOTHER FORUM WHERE DIALOGUE IS
PROCEEDING SMOOTHLY IS IN ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY IN VIENNA. SECGEN
NOTED THAT STATE OF HEALTH OF ANDROPOV HAS RESULTED IN STALEMATE IN
SOVIET HIERARCHY.

2. SECGEN OBSERVED THAT PUBLIC OPINION IN AUSTRIA HAS CHANGED OVER
PAST TWO YEARS AS RESULT OF HEIGHTENED TENSION IN RELATIONS BETWEEN
FAST AND WFST AND ALSO SPILLOVER OF PEACE MOVEMENTS FROM OTHER
WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR FRG. WHILE PFACE

PAGE TWO RSR0455 CONFD

MOVEMENT IS LESS ACTIVE IN AUSTRIA THAN IN MANY OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AUSTRIAN GOVT IS SENSITIVE TO GROWING PUBLIC CONCERN AND TO STATEMENTS FOR EXAMPLE BY CATHOLIC BISHOPS ON NUCLEAR ISSUE. SEC GEN STRESSED THAT AUSTRIAN APPEAL FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS IS SIGNIFICANT IN THAT IT REPRESENTS DEPARTURE FROM PAST POSITION TAKEN BY AUSTRIA TO REFRAIN FROM COMMENTING ON SUCH ISSUES, EITHER NATO 2 TRACK DECISION OR SS20S. AUSTRIANS HAD HOPED THROUGH APPEAL TO FIND QUOTE BALANCED INTERPRETATION UNQUOTE AND TO FIND SOME SOLUTION BEFORE CRITICAL DEPLOYMENT DATE. AUSTRIANS DO NOT INTEND TO MODIFY THEIR APPEAL IN LIGHT OF BREAKOFF OF INF NEGS.

3. INF SEC GEN WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC OVER PROSPECT OF EARLY RESUMPTION OF NEGS AND EXPRESSED VIEW THAT SOVIETS ARE UNLIKELY TO RETURN TO NEGOTIATING TABLE SOON UNLESS THERE ARE CHANGES IN FORMAT OF NEGOTIATIONS E.G. POSSIBLE COMBINATION OF START AND INF. IT WAS NOTED THAT SOVIETS HAVE NOT ELECTED OR THREATENED TO BREAKOFF PARTICIPATION IN START (DISCUSSION PREDATED MORE RECENT SOVIET DECISION) AND MBFR AND OPINION WAS EXPRESSED THAT THIS MAY NOT BE KIND OF MESSAGE THEY WOULD WANT TO GIVE PUBLIC IN WEST. INDEED SEC GEN STATED THAT SOVIETS HAVE DENIED TO HIM ANY SUGGESTION THAT THEY MIGHT WITHDRAW FROM MBFR. AUSTRIA ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO MBFR AND WOULD SUPPORT IDEA OF FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING IN VIENNA.

4. ON CDE SEC GEN NOTED THAT PRELIMINARY MEETING IN HELSINKI WENT SMOOTHLY AND HE OBSERVED THAT CDE REMAINS ONE OF FEW CHANNELS OF

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PAGE THREE RSR0455 CONFD

COMMUNICATION OPEN FOR DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. AUSTRIA SUPPORTS IDEA THAT CONFERENCE SHOULD BE OPENED AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL BUT IT DID NOT EXPECT ALL COUNTRIES WOULD BE REPRESENTED AT THAT LEVEL. SEC GEN SAID THAT CHANCES OF GROMYKO GOING WERE NOT CONSIDERED VERY GOOD. AUSTRIA HAS FALL BACK POSITION WHICH WOULD CALL FOR BALANCED REPRESENTATION AT MIN LEVEL FROM EAST AND WEST IN EVENT MINISTERIAL LEVEL REPRESENTATIVES FROM ALL COUNTRIES IS NOT POSSIBLE. HE NOTED THAT REACTION OF EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WAS GENERALLY POSITIVE TO MINISTERIAL OPENING OF CDE.

5. PMS INITIATIVE: CDN SIDE PROVIDED DETAILED BACKGROUND TO PMS INITIATIVE ALONG WITH OBJECTIVES AND INTERNATIONAL REACTION. SEC GEN NOTED THAT AUSTRIANS HAVE OBSERVED PMS INITIATIVE WITH CONSIDERABLE INTEREST AND THAT SOME ASPECTS ARE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THEM. AUSTRIA IS IN FAVOUR OF GIVING POLITICAL IMPETUS TO CDE AND MBFR AND NOTED THAT CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF PMS INITIATIVE ARE SIMILAR TO THOSE CONTAINED IN AUSTRIAN APPEAL INCLUDING NEED TO ESTABLISH HIGH LEVEL POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND EMPHASIS ON QUOTE TRUST UNQUOTE AND QUOTE CONFIDENCE UNQUOTE. DR HINTEREGGER EXPRESSED STRONG INTEREST IN KNOWING HOW SOVIETS WILL REACT TO PROPOSED INCLUSION OF CHINA IN 5 NATION CONFERENCE.

6. WHEN ASKED TO PROVIDE HIS ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET LEADERSHIP SITUATION, SEC GEN OBSERVED THAT STALEMATE EXISTED BETWEEN ON ONE

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PAGE FOUR RSR0455 CONFD

HAND COALITION WHICH BROUGHT ANDROPOV TO POWER (RED ARMY, KGB AND FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS) AND OLD BREZHNEV GROUP. HE SAID THAT STATE OF HEALTH OF ANDROPOV WILL BE DECISIVE FACTOR IN WHETHER THIS STALEMATE SITUATION CAN BE BROKEN.

7. IN COMMENTING ON RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO SUPERPOWERS, SEC GEN OBSERVED THAT THEY TEND TO THINK MUCH IN BILATERAL TERMS AND THAT USA IS NOT ALWAYS SENSITIVE TO PUBLIC OPINION IN EUROPE. HE QUESTIONED FOR EXAMPLE WHY PUBLIC IN WESTERN EUROPE HAS REACTED SO STRONGLY TO PROPOSED DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE MISSILE AND NOT TO SS20S AND SAID THAT PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN US HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO PROBLEM.

8. IN CONCLUSION, SEC GEN DID NOT CONVEY IMPRESSION OF OPTIMISM FOR EARLY POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS BUT UNDERLINED AUSTRIAN DETERMINATION TO ACTIVELY PROMOTE ATTEMPTS FOR IMPROVED ATMOSPHERE.

CCC/291 082305Z RSR0455

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0264 08DEC83

TO BNATO/DELVOIE DELIVER BY 090630-ENSURE DELIVERY PRIOR TO
SSEA MTG WITH SHULTZ

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/CP

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDR IDA UGB RBR URR

REF OURTELS IDDZ0258 07DEC IDDZ0259 08DEC

---DPM/SSEA/SHULTZ BILATERAL:REVIEW OF NATO STRATEGY

THIS SUBJ AS YOU KNOW IS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE AND ALL HERE AGREE IT HAS TO BE HANDLED WITH GREATEST OF CARE AND FINESSE.

2.ON MEMO THAT WAS PREPARED FOR HIM PM HAS WRITTEN THAT DPM/SSEA QUOTE SHOULD MENTION TO SHULTZ THAT I MIGHT RAISE WITH PRESIDENT REVIEW OF NATO STRATEGY UNQUOTE.THIS WAS IN REPLY TO SENTENCE SAYING THAT IF PM INTENDED TO RAISE ISSUE WITH PRES,THEN DPM WLD WISH TO BROACH IT FIRST WITH SHULTZ.

3.DURING LENGTHY INTERDEPTL (PMO/PCO/DND/EA)DISCUSSION OF THIS IDEA MUST BE SOFTENED AND CAREFULLY PACKAGED IF IT IS TO STAND CHANCE OF SUCCESS AND NOT/NOT RECEIVE IMMED NEGATIVE REACTION FROM PRES REAGAN.SUGGESTION THEREFORE, FOR CONSIDERATION OF DPM/SSEA, IS THAT HE MIGHT WISH TO MENTION TO SHULTZ TOMORROW THAT HE WILL BE MTG WITH CARRINGTON NEXT TUES AND WILL BROACH QUESTION OF CARRINGTON DOING A PERSONAL ASSESSMENT, DURING HIS PERIOD AS SEC GEN DESIGNATE, OF WHETHER CURRENT NATO POLICY AND PRACTICE (WITH NO/NO SPECIFIC REF TO STRATEGIES OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND FORWARD DEFENCE) IS

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28-6-1 - Judean
Peace
Mission

PAGE TWO IDDZ0264 CONFD CEO

ADEQUATE TO GET US THROUGH REST OF 1980S.

4. INTRODUCTORY CALLS CARRINGTON WOULD BE MAKING ON NATO LEADERS IN CAPITALS (AND WE WOULD ALSO HOPE VISITS HE MIGHT MAKE TO AS MANY EAST EUROPEAN CAPITALS AS POSSIBLE) WOULD ASSIST HIM IN HIS THINKING. CARRINGTON COULD THEN REPORT HIS FINDINGS BACK TO NEXT NATO MTG IN SPRING WITH SUGGESTIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO WHETHER ANY ASPECT OF NATO POLICY OR PRACTICE SHOULD BE SUBJ TO FULL SCALE ALLIANCE REVIEW.

5. IT WOULD ALL BE PUT IN CONTEXT OF FACT THAT NO/NO ASSESSMENT OF THIS KIND HAS REALLY BEEN DONE SINCE 1967 HARMEL REPORT AND ARRIVAL OF NEW SEC GEN WOULD SEEM TO BE OPPORTUNE TIME TO HAVE LOOK AT THIS QUESTION.

6. SHULTZ COULD BE TOLD THAT SHOULD CARRINGTON BE FAVOURABLE TO SUCH AN APPROACH THAT PM WILL MENTION IDEA TO PRES REAGAN ON 15 DEC. IF PRES WAS FAVOURABLE, THINKING HERE IS THAT PM MIGHT FOLLOW UP WITH LETTERS TO HIS OTHER NATO COLLEAGUES.

7. ON DIFFERENT POINT, PM HAS ASKED DPM/SSEA TO ENQUIRE OF SHULTZ WHETHER THERE HAS BEEN ANY FURTHER THINKING IN WSHDC ON IDEA OF PRES REAGAN ATTENDING STKHM MTG AT SOME STAGE; IDEA PM DISCUSSED ON PHONE WITH PRES 17 NOV.

CCC/258 090054Z IDDZ0264

*I've given 3 points to
SSEA*



file

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY/SECURITE **C O N F I D E N T I A L** CDN EYES ONLY 121 10

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0264 08DEC83

TO/A TO BNATO/DELVOIE URGENT: PLEASE ENSURE DELIVERY BY 090600 PRIORITY

INFO TO SSEA MTG WITH SHULTZ

DISTR INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER *NAHQ000/cpp*

SUBJ/SUJ DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDR IDA UGB RBR URR

REF OURTELS IDDZ0258 07DEC, IDDZ0259 08DEC

---DPM/SSEA-SHULTZ BILATERAL: REVIEW OF NATO STRATEGY

THIS SUBJ AS YOU KNOW IS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE AND ALL HERE AGREE IT HAS TO BE HANDLED WITH GREATEST OF CARE AND FINESSE.

2. ON MEMO THAT WAS PREPARED FOR HIM PM HAS WRITTEN THAT DPM/SSEA QUOTE SHOULD MENTION TO SHULTZ THAT I MIGHT RAISE WITH PRESIDENT REVIEW OF NATO STRATEGY UNQUOTE. *THIS WAS IN REPLY TO SENTENCE SAYING THAT IF PM INTENDED TO RAISE ISSUE WITH PRES, THEN DPM WOULD WISH TO*

3. DURING LENGTHY INTERDEPTL (PMO/PCO/DND/EA) DISCUSSION OF THIS *BROACH IT FIRST WITH SHULTZ.*

PARTICULAR SUBJ THIS MORNING VIEW AT OFFICIAL LEVEL IS THAT THIS IDEA MUST BE SOFTENED AND CAREFULLY PACKAGED IF IT IS TO STAND CHANCE OF SUCCESS AND NOT/NOT RECEIVE IMMEDIATE NEGATIVE REACTION FROM PRES REAGAN. SUGGESTION THEREFORE, FOR CONSIDERATION OF DPM/SSEA, IS THAT HE MIGHT WISH TO MENTION TO SHULTZ TOMORROW THAT HE WILL BE MTG WITH CARRINGTON NEXT TUESDAY AND WILL BROACH QUESTION OF CARRINGTON DOING A PERSONAL ASSESSMENT, DURING HIS PERIOD AS SEC GEN DESIGNATE, OF WHETHER CURRENT NATO POLICY AND PRACTICE (WITH NO/NO SPECIFIC REF TO STRATEGIES OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND FORWARD DEFENCE) IS ADEQUATE TO GET US THROUGH REST OF 1980S.

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DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG <i>[Signature]</i> G.J. Smith/sc	IDDZ	5-5912	SIG <i>[Signature]</i> G.J. Smith

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~~PAGE TWO~~ - IDDZ0264 CONF D CDN EYES ONLY

4. INTRODUCTORY CALLS CARRINGTON WOULD BE MAKING ON NATO LEADERS IN CAPITALS (AND WE WOULD ALSO HOPE VISITS HE MIGHT MAKE TO AS MANY EAST EUROPEAN CAPITALS AS POSSIBLE) WOULD ASSIST HIM IN HIS THINKING. CARRINGTON COULD THEN REPORT HIS FINDINGS BACK TO NEXT NATO MTG IN SPRING WITH SUGGESTIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO WHETHER ANY ASPECT OF NATO POLICY OR PRACTICE SHOULD BE SUBJ TO FULL SCALE ALLIANCE REVIEW.

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MP

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TRANSMISSION

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Our file/no. dossier:

28-6-1 - Trudeau
Peace
Mission

NYC

NO. GRPA - 22

DATE 08 DECEMBER 1983

PAGES 2
(incl. cover)
(y compris la page
couverture)

FROM: Canadian Consulate General
DU : Consulat général du Canada
NEW YORK

SECTION: GRPA
Mr./Ms.
M./Mad. WEATHERUP

TO : Mr./Ms.
A : M./Mad.

Department: EXTOTT: | IDDZ URR
Service :

Phone :
Téléphone :

Subject : New York Times: "Trudeau Agenda: Peace & Jobs"
Objet :

08 December 1983

|| TRUDEAU
SPEECH ||

2/2

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1983

The New Trudeau Agenda: Peace and Jobs

By MICHAEL T. KAUFMAN

Special to The New York Times

OTTAWA, Dec. 7— The Government of Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau opened Parliament today with a message outlining a national agenda that emphasized the search for peace and disarmament abroad and the creation of jobs for young people at home.

The Government is mindful of public opinion polls showing Mr. Trudeau's Liberal Party to be trailing the Conservative opposition by nearly 30 percentage points and a budgetary deficit this year of nearly \$25 billion as well as an approaching deadline for new elec-

tions. It presented a legislative program that promises to keep new expenditures down while stimulating more work, more trade and more productivity through measures such as a \$1 billion youth job program, a conservation corps and policies stressing labor-management cooperation.

The speech was immediately attacked by members of the opposition with characterizations such as "a grab bag of generalities."

The Government's message was contained in the Speech from the Throne, the traditional ceremony that marks the opening of every new session of Parliament here. In keeping with tradi-

tion, the speech was read by Edward Schreyer, the Governor General, as he and his wife sat on carved wooden thrones at the head of the crowded Senate chamber.

Mr. Trudeau, who returned three days ago from India and China, where he sought support for his recent disarmament proposals, sat to the Governor General's right on a lower, more common chair befitting a man who though head of Government is not head of state.

Although the speech made no direct reference to Mr. Trudeau's recent attempts to rekindle the almost cold ashes of détente and broaden the quest

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for disarmament beyond the superpowers, it clearly stressed in its opening section "Canada's role in seeking world peace."

The Government, the Governor General read, acting as representative of the Queen, "intends to devote its full resources to exploration of every possible means to restore confidence and trust to the international scene." He said it would "continue to advance proposals to slow the steady spiral of the arms race, halt the spread of nuclear weapons and create the conditions for greater security at lower levels of armament."

Such language is consistent with the campaign that Mr. Trudeau began last month to generate some momentum for disarmament talks among nuclear powers by seeking the active involv-

ment of nuclear powers other than the United States and the Soviet Union while also urging potential nuclear powers to shun atomic military development.

Mr. Trudeau has received a tepid and publicly polite response from the nuclear nations, all of whom have dismissed his most concrete notion, for a conference by the nuclear powers on disarmament.

He did, however, obtain the endorsement of most Commonwealth nations that met in New Delhi, and he has declared that he is now prepared to begin phase 2 of the program by taking his case to Washington and Moscow.

The major specific innovations outlined in addition to the comprehensive job program for young people included a commitment to set up a center to col-

late and digest what was described as "the enormous volume" of information on military and arms control issues while also increasing Government financing for voluntary associations and private research groups active in security, arms control and disarmament issues.

Another proposal dealt with the examination of a free trade proposal with the United States covering areas such as petrochemicals, textiles and urban transportation equipment. The speech said labor representatives would be asked to join the boards of directors of some Crown corporations, the Government-owned companies that include the post office, airlines, railroads, engineering concerns and communications organizations.



MESSAGE

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SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ **C O N F I D E N T I A L / CDN EYES ONLY**

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0258 07DEC83

TO/À TO BNATO/DELVOIE **URGENT: PLS ENSURE DELIVERY BY 080600 PRIORITY TO SSEA S MTG WITH GENSCHER.**

INFO DISTR DMF IFB

REF YOURTEL YBGR8680 OF DEC 07

SUBJ/SUJ ---PM INITIATIVE - REVIEW OF NATO STRATEGY



UNABLE TO CONTACT PM TODAY ON SUBJECT OF REAGAN MTG. EXPECT TO HAVE INDICATION FROM PM DURING COURSE OF DAY THURS IN TIME TO INFORM YOU PRIOR TO DPM/SSEA MTG WITH SHULTZ. (THERE WILL ALSO BE EA/PCO/DND MTG OF OFFICIALS THURS TO EXAMINE ALL ASPECTS OF REAGAN MTG ABOUT WHICH WE WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED).

2. WHEN GERMAN AMB RAISED QUESTION WITH DMF DEC 06 OF WHETHER DPM/SSEA WLD TAKE UP ISSUE OF REVIEWING NATO STRATEGY AT NAC MTG (AMB MAY HAVE ^GNOT THIS FROM CONSERVATIVE PARTY PROPOSALS OF LAST WEEKEND AND SAID GERMAN GOVT HAD QUOTE SERIOUS RESERVATIONS UNQUOTE ABOUT IT) AMB WAS TOLD THIS WAS UNLIKELY AT FORMAL MTG BUT DPM/SSEA MIGHT RAISE ~~IT~~, IF HE SO WISHES, IN MARGINS DURING BILATERAL CONVERSATIONS.

3. YOU MAY RECALL PM IN PASSING DID MENTION IDEA OF POSSIBLE REVIEW OF NATO STRATEGY TO PMS/LUBBERS, MARTENS AND CRAXI IN EUROPE.

4. IF DPM/SSEA DOES WISH TO RAISE ISSUE WITH GENSCHER IN BILATERAL SUGGEST ^{HE} DO IT IN TERMS OF FLOATING ^A IDEA OF HAVING CARRINGTON DO STUDY OF WHETHER NATO IN 1980 S WHICH ^{WLD} INCLUDE STRATEGY, RATHER THAN ON STRATEGY ^{ALONE} ~~ALONE~~ CARRINGTON REPORT CLD BE SUBMITTED TO POSSIBLE NATO SUMMIT IN SPRING.

Handwritten: 28-6-1 - Hudson Peace Mission

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG G. SMITH 	IDDZ	5-5912	SIG G. SMITH 



MESSAGE

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SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ
CONFIDENTIAL

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0257 07DEC83
TO/À TO MINDEL/BNATO DELIVER BY 07²²⁰⁰~~1900~~
INFO INFO WSHDC BONN LDN PARIS ^{Rome} NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPPO~~DIPOL~~/DNACPOLI/~~DCINFC~~
DISTR PCOOTT/FOWLER
REF
SUBJ/SUJ DISTR MINA DMF IDR RBR RCR IDA

---PM INITIATIVE : KOHL LETTER TO PM TRUDEAU

FLWG IS TEXT OF LET OF 05 DEC FM KOHL TO PM FOR BACKGROUND FOR
DPM/SSEA GENSCHER BILATERAL. IT WAS PASSED TO DMF BY GERMAN

AMBASSADOR.

(COMCENTRE PLS COPY ATTACHED QUOTE TO UNQUOTE)

28-6-1 - Trudeau
Peace
Mission

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

J. McNEE
SIG J. McNEE

IDDZ

5-5912

G. SMITH
SIG G. SMITH

Federal Republic of Germany
The Federal Chancellor

Bonn, 5 December 1983

His Excellency
The Right Honourable
Pierre Elliott Trudeau,
P.C., Q.C., M.P., LL.L., M.A., F.R.S.C.,
Prime Minister of Canada
Ottawa

QUOTE

Dear Pierre,

Thank you very much for your letter of 18 November 1983 informing me of the course and results of your trip to Europe and of your future intentions. I wholly agree with you that, in view of the tense East-West relationship, it is urgently necessary to impart fresh impetus to the dialogue between East and West and to work for the creation of a climate of trust. For us Germans, a dialogue with the East is of central importance and has long been the guiding principle of our policy.

Our policy aimed at detente will be successful if the West shows unity in the now necessary implementation of the NATO double-track decision. Systematic execution of the Alliance's decisions of 12 December 1979 in the face of powerful pressure constitutes a great success for the Alliance.

However, at the same time we must make it clear to the East that we are prepared for dialogue and co-operation at all levels. We must also convince our own public of this. Our citizens are prepared to shoulder the burdens we need to incur to assure our defence. They will do so all the more readily if our defence efforts are accompanied by lasting endeavours for arms control and accommodation with the East.

- 2 -

The forthcoming ministerial meeting of the NATO Council in Brussels affords us an excellent opportunity to send a clear signal to the East of our will for genuine and lasting detente.

As long as the continuation of the Geneva INF talks is in doubt, it is all the more important to make use of existing forums for arms control. These include the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. I advocate high-ranking representation of the participating countries at the opening ceremony. Hans-Dietrich Genscher will speak in Stockholm on behalf of the Federal Government.

The CSCE process, of which the CDE is a product, is yielding stabilizing effects for East-West relations. Madrid has shown that agreement is possible even at a difficult juncture. The CSCE and the CDE demonstrate that the dialogue continues despite the interruption in Geneva. We must use the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document as a comprehensive programme for giving substance to East-West relations.

P3 A new Western initiative is required at the MBFR talks in Vienna. [The three rounds of negotiations this year were increasingly determined by the Eastern proposals of February and the draft treaty of June. However, it is in our own interest to hold the discussions in Vienna on the basis of our own, Western concept. Purely reactive arguments confined to defending our draft, which is now over a year old, are not suitable for this purpose. We, too, are therefore advocating a new Western initiative at the negotiations and will gladly discuss with our partners the ideas that we have already developed on this subject.

The Federal Government supports every attempt at consolidating and strengthening the international non-proliferation regime. I also feel it is worth considering

- 3 -

your proposal of a conference of the five nuclear powers as a forum to consider arms control measures in respect of the nuclear potentials of Britain, France and China. This would also do justice to the undertaking entered into in Article VI of the non-proliferation treaty by the signatory states.

Direct contact between President Reagan and General Secretary Andropov is important for East-West relations. A well-prepared summit meeting, which - as you know - I have repeatedly advocated in Washington and Moscow both in private and in public, could contribute towards mutual understanding.

Yours sincerely,
UN9007 (sgd.) Helmut Kohl,
Federal Chancellor

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

4-7
28-6-1- TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION
25
44
K. J. S. C.

C O N F I D E N T I A L
FM BUCST UYGR3105 07DEC83

TO EXTOTT/RBR

INFO LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU HAGUE
WSHDC MOSCO BNATO GENEV WSAW BPEST PRGUE BGRAD STKHM-VIENN PCOOTT/
FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CIS/ADMPOL/ CPP/DGIS PRMNY VMBFR

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGR URR RGB RBD FPR IDD IDR IDA IDDZ RBRD
IDX ZSP ZSI

---PM TRUDEAU INITIATIVE:FOLLOW-UP

AT DINNER YESTERDAY AMB C FLITAN, HEAD OF THE BUREAU OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS AND INNATL ORGS OF THE MFA, REITERATED THAT DOLGUS VISIT TO OTT WAS NOT/NOT OF COURSE A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE PERSONAL INVITATION FROM PRES CEAUSESCU TO PM TRUDEAU TO COME THROUGH BUCST IF PM DECIDED TO UNDERTAKE SECOND PHASE OF HIS INITIATIVE. I WAS ASKED AGAIN TO MAKE SURE THAT MY AUTHORITIES WERE AWARE OF THE HIGH INTEREST REGARDING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND PM INITIATIVE.

2. STEVE HANDLEMAN, CDN JOURNALIST FROM TOR STAR WHO JUST SPENT FEW DAYS IN ROMANIA, WAS GRANTED ON 05DEC AN INTERVIEW BY PRES CEAUSESCU. HE WAS THE FIRST CDN JOURNALIST TO OBTAIN THIS HONOUR. IN THIS INTERVIEW (WHICH WILL BE PUBLISHED EDITED IN STAR, DEC10-FULL TEXT BY BAG), PRES CEAUSESCU STATES THAT QUOTE WE GREATLY APPRECIATE PM PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAUS PROPOSALS TO GET OUT OF CURRENT SITU AND RESUME NEGS IN ORDER TO COME TO ACCORD. THERE ARE MANY COMMON OR VERY CLOSE POINTS BETWEEN ROMANIAS AND CDN PMS PROPOSALS AS WELL AS ...2

PAGE TWO UYGR3105 CONFD

BETWEEN THEIR PROPOSALS AND THOSE SET FORTH BY OTHER PERSONALITIES. OF COURSE, THE WORDING DIFFERS—AND IT IS ONLY NATURAL THAT IT SHOULD DO, BUT ALL OF THEM ARE AIMED AT HALTING DEPLOYMENT OF MEDIUM—RANGE MISSILES, SCRAPPING OF ONES IN PLACE, ACHIEVEMENT OF DISARMAMENT AND A LASTING PEACE. FROM THAT ANGLE, THERE ARE MANY POINTS ROMANIAS AND CDAS PROPOSALS HAVE IN COMMON—AND WE DO HOPE THAT OUR COUNTRIES WILL COOPERATE EVEN MORE ACTIVELY FOR DISARMAMENT, FOR PEACE AND EQUAL COOPERATION AMONG ALL WORLD NATIONS. UNQUOTE. SAME VIEWS ARE DEVELOPED ELSEWHERE IN INTERVIEW. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT CEAUSESCUS APPARENT UNDERSTANDING OF PMS INITIATIVE MIGHT BE SOMEWHAT INCOMPLETE IN SENSE THAT HE APPEAR TO NARROW IT PARTICULARLY SOLUTION OF THE INF STALEMATE.

CCC/181 071140Z UYGR3105



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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DEC 83 20 172
28-6-1-TRUDEAU
20-1-1-1
17-7
11
PAGE 10
MISSION

SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I E L

FM/DE
TO/A
INFO
DISTR
REF
SUBJ/SUJ

DE EXTOTT RCR0540 07DEC83
A BNATO **FLASH**
INFO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP/DIPOL/BONN WSHDC PARIS ROME LDN HAGUE
MOSCO
DISTR MINA IDD IDDZ RBR RGB DMF IDA IDR RSR PSR EER FPR URR IDRL
IDRA
---INITIATIVE PM ET PROJET DECLARATION RFA: RENCONTRE AMBASSADEUR
RFA-DMF
PRIERE PORTER TEL A CONNAISSANCE SEAE AVANT SON PETIT-DEJEUNER
AVEC MAE GENSCHER 08DEC.
2.AMB A REMIS LORS DE RENCONTRE REPONSE CHANCELIER KOHL (TEXTE
ENVOYE PAR TER IDDZ0257,07DEC) A RECENTE LETTRE DU PM AVISANT
KOHL PROGRES DE SON INITIATIVE. KOHL ENCOURAGE PM A POURSUIVRE ET
IL EST CLAIR QU INITIATIVE A DEJA POUR EFFET D ENCOURAGER RFA A
POURSUIVRE SON PROPRE EFFORT DANS MBFR. AMB A PAR AILLEURS REMIS
LETTRE DE GENSCHER A SEAE REQUERANT SOUTIEN CDN AU PROJET DE
DECLARATION ALLEMANDE POUR REUNION MINISTERIELLE OTAN (REF TELS
BNATO YBGR8676,8677,05DEC).
3.SUR PROJET DECLARATION GENSCHER, AMB SOULIGNAIT IMPORTANCE QUE
RFA Y ATTACHE ET FAISANT PARALLELE AU SOUTIEN ALLEMAND POUR
INITIATIVE PM DISAIT COMPTER SUR APPUI DU CANADA. DMF A DIT
QU EXAMINERIONS PROJET AVEC GRANDE SYMPATHIE ET QU A MOINS D Y
.../2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

[Signature]
SIG F NADEAU/YDL

RSR

6-6399

[Signature]
SIG L FRECHETTE



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
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PAGE DEUX RCRO540 CONFD

12

10

DECELER PROBLEMES IMPORTANTS ESPERIONS POUVOIR SUPPORTER.
TEL IDR4669 05DEC SUPPORTANT INITIATIVE RFA, REFÈRE DONC.
4.AMB S INTERESSAIT AUSSI AUX VUES CDNES SUR REUNION OTAN.DMF A
RAPPELE GRANDS POINTS DE NOTRE POSITION: A)SEAE EXPRIMERAIT AVEC
EMPHASE SATISFACTION D AVOIR VU ALLIANCE MAINTENIR UNITE DE
DETERMINATION MALGRE EFFORT ENORME CONSENTI PAR SOVIETS POUR
SUBVERTIR NOS OPINIONS PUBLIQUES;B)SEAE PRET A EXPLIQUER MOTIVATION
DERRIERE INITIATIVE DU PM ET EMPHASE ET DIRECTION PRESENTE POUR
REVIGORER DIALOGUE ENTRE SUPER-UISSANCES;C)SEAE TENTERA OBTENIR
CONSENSUS PARMi SES COLLEGUES POUR QUE CDE SOIT LANCEE AVEC UN
PROFILE POLITIQUE ELEVE, DONNANT SIGNAL CLAIR D UNE VOLONTE POLITI-
QUE, CE QUE NOUS SAVONS ETRE CHER AUX ALLEMANDS ET D)SEAE DEFENDRA
IDEE QU UN ACCORD OCCIDENTAL SOIT REALISE POUR PRESENTATION LPTP
AUX MBFR ET POUR PRESENTATION AU NIVEAU DES MINISTRES ,
5.ORIENTATION STRATEGIQUE D OTAN: EN REPOSE A QUESTION D AMB
VOULANT SAVOIR SI C ETAIT INTENTION SEAE SOULEVER CETTE QUESTION
SUR LAQUELLE BONN A DES RESERVES SERIEUSES, DMF A SOULIGNE QUE
VUES CDNES REJOIGNAIENT CELLES RFA ENONCEES PAR AMB SAVOIR QUE
SEAE NE SOULEVERAIT PAS FORMELLEMENT MAIS PRENDRAIT PEUT-ETRE
APPROCHE PLUS DISCRETE DE SONDER CIT PRIVEMENT FINCIT SES COLLEGUES.
6.EN RENCONTRE SEPARÉE, G SMITH IDDZ, A INFORME AMB DE DEROULEMENT
VISITE RECENTE PEARSON A MOSCOU.

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

RETURN TO REVOYER	MF 3100	FOR FILING POUR - EYRE PORTE AU DOSSIER
ACC	REF	DATE
FILE	DOSSIER	
28.6.1-Trudeau Peace Mission		

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR3003 07DEC83

TO EXTOTT UGB IDDZ DELIVER BY 080830

INFO MOSCO BNATO ROME LDN BONN PARIS HAGUE BRU PEKIN PRMNY GNGNY

TOKYO DELHI PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/PPP PMOOTT/AXWORTHY

DISTR MINA USS DMF IDR IDA RGB IFB RBD RBR RCR URR

--PM MTG WITH REAGAN 15DEC:POSSIBLE SCENARIO

SUMMARY:MTG WITH REAGAN WILL BE WIDELY PERCEIVED AS KEY TO FUTURE SUCCESS OF PM TRUDEAU EFFORTS.PRIME MINISTER IS BEST JUDGE OF HOW TO DEAL WITH REAGAN,HAVING SPENT SO MUCH TIME WITH HIM ALREADY IN BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL FORMATS.BUT OVERALL PURPOSE IS TO GAIN REAGAN SUPPORT FOR RENEWED DIALOGUE WITH EAST BASED ON MUTUALITY OF INTEREST.TO ACHIEVE THIS,BOTH CONTENT AND FORM OF MTG HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY ADDRESSED.IN OUR VIEW,PAINS SHOULD BE TAKEN TO AVOID POSSIBILITY REAGAN CLD INTERPRET CDN EFFORTS AS BEING CRITICISM OF HIMSELF OR HIS POLICIES.ANY SUCH INTERPRETATION WLD OBVIOUSLY SERIOUSLY DAMAGE PMS MISSION.

2.IN CONTENT,MTG SHLD CONCENTRATE ON HOW JOINT INTEREST OF USA AND USSR IN PEACE CAN BE FURTHERED IN PRACTICAL AREAS AND HOW PM TRUDEAUS EFFORTS CAN BE SEEN AS SUPPORTIVE OF REAGANS OWN EXPRESSED INTEREST IN THESE OBJECTIVES.IN FORM,REAGAN SHLD BE ENCOURAGED TO DO AS MUCH OF THE TALKING AS POSSIBLE.IF SUCCESSFUL,MTG SHOULD LEAVE REAGAN KEENLY INTERESTED IN WHAT PM TRUDEAU WILL ACCOMPLISH IN MOSCO BUT WITHOUT THE FEELING PM TRUDEAU IS CUTTING ACROSS USA

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR3003 CONF

PREROGATIVES OR THAT REAGAN IS BEING PUSHED IN DIRECTIONS HE DOES NOT/WANT TO GO.

CLD
MOFA

3. FOR ALL OF THESE REASONS, AND GIVEN LIMITED TIME AVAILABLE, SPECIFIC PROPOSALS OF PROCESS AND ARMS CONTROL SHLD NOT/NOT BE INTRODUCED, APART FROM 5 POWER FORMAT. EMPHASIS SHLD BE ON THEME OF NEED TO AVOID NUCLEAR WAR BY ACCIDENT, ESCALATION OR MISCALCULATION AND THE REQUIREMENT TO DEFUSE WORLD TENSION AND CREATE APT CRISIS COMMUNICATION AND MANAGEMENT AS WELL AS STRICTER CONTROLS ON PROLIFERATION.

4. REPORT: DISCUSSION WITH PRES REAGAN IS OBVIOUSLY DIFFERENT FROM ANY OF THE OTHERS PM TRUDEAU HA HAD IN CONTEXT OF HIS INITIATIVE. NOW HE WILL BE ADDRESSING ONE OF THE TWO PRINCIPALS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. OTHER INTERLOCUTORS SO FAR CLD DISCUSS STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, WORLD TENSION, AND PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY FROM NUCLEAR WAR WITH SOME DETACHMENT AS IF THESE WERE PRIMARILY RESPONSIBILITY OF OTHERS. BUT REAGAN IS DIRECTLY IMPLICATED.

5. HOWEVER, REAGAN VIEWS USSR AS BEING PRINCIPALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR WORLD PROBLEMS. HE ALSO DOES NOT/NOT SEE STATE OF TENSIONS AS BEING PARTICULARLY DANGEROUS. HE JUDGES BEST DETERRENT IS STRENGTH AND UNITY OF WEST AGAINST USSR. TO THE EXTENT HE SEES PM TRUDEAU INITIATIVE AS BREACH OF THAT UNITY, HE WILL CONSIDER IT COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE.

6. THERE IS NO/NO POINT IN DEBATING ISSUES WITH REAGAN. WE HAVE TO WORK WITH WHAT WE HAVE AS BEST WE CAN. HE IS DEEPLY CONVINCED HE

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR3003 CONFID

IS RIGHT AND WE ARE TOLD HE TENDS TO WITHDRAW FROM CONVERSATIONS
IN WHICH HE IS CHALLENGED LEAVING HIS AIDES TO DO THE TALKING.
BEST WAY TO DEAL WITH MATTER AT ISSUE THEREFORE IS TO COME AT HIM
FROM COMMON GROUND. (CDN GOVT IMPRESSED WHITE HOUSE ENORMOUSLY WITH
OPEN LETTER PM ADDRESSED TO CDN PUBLIC ON CRUISE WHICH EMPHASIZED
STRENGTH OF NATO COMMITMENT). COMMON GROUND HAVING BEEN ESTABLISHED,
PM TRUDEAU CLD SAY PRIMARY QUESTION IN WEST TODAY, AS SEEN BY OUR
PEOPLES, IS NOT/NOT THAT OF RELATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OR EVEN OF
RIGHT OR WRONG, BUT THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR RISK AND PRACTICAL WAYS
TO DEFUSE IT IN INTERESTS OF ALL CONCERNED. REAGAN MAY ARGUE THAT
RISK IS EXAGGERATED BUT CLD BE PERSUADED BY REASONING THAT (A) IT
IS ITSELF A RISK TO COUNT ON THAT BEING TRUE AND (B) DEPTH OF CONCERN
OF OUR PUBLICS IS NOT/NOT EXAGGERATED, AND THIS CONCERN, PM TRUDEAU
HAS DISCOVERED, IS WORLD WIDE.

7. THIS BEING SAID, PM COULD MAKE SEVERAL QUICK POINTS. (A) THE DEMANDS
PUT ON LEADERS OF DEMOCRACIES ARE QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT THAN
THOSE PUT ON OTHERS. IT IS THEREFORE INCUMBENT ON THESE LEADERS TO
BE CONSTANTLY TAKING THE INITIATIVE NOT/NOT ONLY IN ARMS CONTROL
BUT ALSO IN THE BROADER AREA OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

(B) NUCLEAR RISK HAS TO BE DIMINISHED, PARTICULARLY IN A WORLD WITH
CRISES BREAKING OUT ALL OVER;

(C) SINCE NOBODY WANTS NUCLEAR WAR, PRINCIPAL INGREDIENTS OF RISK
ARE MISCALCULATION, ESCALATION, AND PROLIFERATION;

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR3003 CONF

(D) SECURITY CAN BE PARTIALLY PROVIDED BY ARMS CONTROL BUT AGREEMENTS ARE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN;

(E) IN MEANTIME GREATER CONFIDENCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND UNDERSTANDING OF RESPECTIVE INTENTIONS, PARTICULARLY AS THEY RELATE TO CRISES, ARE NECESSARY AND IN THE MUTUAL INTEREST;

(F) TAKING CARE NOT/NOT TO DETRACT FROM WESTERN UNITY, OR TO INSERT HIMSELF INTO DIRECT ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS NOW GOING ON, PM TRUDEAU IS WORKING ON HOW BEST TO IMPROVE THE CLIMATE AND THE TECHNIQUES FOR STIMULATING GREATER CONFIDENCE, AND BETTER COMMUNICATION, AND HAS FOUND REMARKABLE DEGREE OF UNANIMITY ABROAD THAT THESE EFFORTS ARE NECESSARY. PM MIGHT ACKNOWLEDGE THAT REAGAN IS DOING ALREADY SOME WORK ON MECHANICS OF CRISIS COMMUNICATION VIA UPGRADING OF HOT LINE.

8. PM CLD TRY TO DRAW OUT PRESIDENTS VIEWS.

9. IN COURSE OF CONVERSATION, PM CLD HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO SKETCH OUT 5 POWER PROPOSAL, AS IDEA WHICH MOST OF 5 DO NOT/NOT REJECT AND WHICH HE CLD ASSESS IS GOOD ONE TO SEE EXPLORED, PARTICULARLY ON PROLIFERATION QUESTION, EVEN IF CHINESE ARE RESISTANT. SUCH A MTG CLD DEAL WITH BROAD THEME OF MEASURES TO REDUCE RISK OF WAR.

10. ANOTHER POINT WE BELIEVE SHLD BE MADE, IF IT SEEMS PROPITIOUS, IS KOHLS POINT ON NEED FOR REAGAN AND ANDROPOV TO GET TOGETHER FOR A WELL-PLANNED MTG. REAGAN WILL ANSWER HE HAD BEEN THINKING OF IT BEFORE KAL INCIDENT, AND NOW ANDROPOVS HEALTH IS FURTHER

...5

PAGE FIVE UNGP3003 CONFID

COMPLICATION. BUT POINT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT. MTG WLD PUT IN TRAIN IN BOTH COUNTRIES PLANNING FOR POSSIBLE AREAS OF AGREEMENT.

11. WE HAVE ALSO DEBATED HERE WHETHER THERE IS A WAY TO GET THROUGH TO PRESIDENT ON PROBLEM OF THE MANNER IN WHICH HE ADDRESSES USSR IN PUBLIC DISCOURSE. ISSUE IS THAT OF LEGITIMACY OF SOVIET REGIME AND ITS SECURITY INTERESTS. OBVIOUSLY, IT IS A HIGHLY IMPORTANT MATTER BUT DIFFICULT TO PUT ACROSS WITHOUT APPEARING TO CRITICIZE PRESIDENT DIRECTLY AND PERSONALLY. WE SUGGEST POSSIBLE APPROACH ALONG FOLLOWING LINES. PRIME MINISTER HAS SENT EMISSARY TO MOSCO AND HE HAS FRESH REPORTS FROM HIM, OUR AMBASSADOR IN MOSCO AND OTHERS. FROM ALL ACCOUNTS SOVIET LEADERS HAVE RECEIVED PRESIDENTS SIGNAL THAT HE WANTS A STRONG USA AND ALSO THAT HE HAS THE WILL AND CAPACITY VIGOROUSLY TO DEFEND WESTERN INTERESTS. THEY HAVE ALSO RECEIVED SIGNAL THAT USA WANTS A UNITED WEST AND IS DETERMINED TO STAND WITH ITS NATO PARTNERS AND THEY HAVE RECEIVED SIGNAL OF COLLECTIVE WESTERN DETERMINATION TO DEFEND OURSELVES. BUT THEY DO NOT/NOT SEEM TO HAVE RECEIVED SIGNAL THAT PRESIDENT GENUINELY IS ANXIOUS FOR AND TRULY COMMITTED TO PEACE. NOR/NOR THAT HE IS PREPARED TO RECOGNIZE THAT THEY THEMSELVES HAVE LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS. IT IS ALSO APPARENT SOVIETS HAVE BEEN ALIENATED BY PUBLIC CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THEMSELVES AND THEIR SYSTEM. IN VIEW OF ALL THIS, PRESIDENT MIGHT ACCORDINGLY NEED TO MAKE SPECIAL NEW EFFORT TO REACH OUT AND ADDRESS SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO DEMONSTRATE DEPTH

...6

PAGE SIX UNGR3003 CONFD

OF HIS COMMITMENT TO A DIALOGUE THAT WLD ADVANCE SECURITY OF BOTH EAST AND WEST.

12. ALL OF ABOVE IS MEANT ONLY TO SKETCH OUT POSSIBLE COURSE WHICH WE SEE AS BEING MOST PRODUCTIVE IN GAINING POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM REAGAN AND IS NOT/NOT MEANT TO DEFINE OR RE-DEFINE INITIATIVE. BUT IF INITIATIVE IS TO BE FULLY EFFECTIVE, IT NEEDS SOME SUPPORT FROM REAGAN.

13. AS OVERALL POINT OF FORM, WE STRESS IT IS KEY TO KEEP REAGAN FROM GOING ONTO DEFENSIVE. POSITIVE PARTICIPATION OF SHULTZ, BOTH IN REAGAN BRIEFING BEFOREHAND, AND PARTICULARLY IN MTG ITSELF (ASSUMING HE IS THERE), WLD BE GREAT ASSET. IF REAGAN TAKES CONSTRUCTIVE LINE IN MTG, SHULTZ WILL BE EVEN MORE SUPPORTIVE. MTGS CONCLUSIONS WLD THEN BECOME SOMETHING REAGAN TEAM WILL WORK WITH.

14. OBVIOUSLY REAGAN WILL BE INTERESTED IN PM TRUDEAUS MTGS AND CONTACTS. BUT IN CONCLUSION, INTEREST IN WHAT THE PM WILL GET FROM MOSCO WILL BE MOST OBVIOUS FORM OF USA INTEREST IN FUTURE OF INITIATIVE. FACTOR THAT CAN WORK IN FAVOUR OF PMS GOALS IS THAT ADMIN IS OBVIOUSLY AWARE THAT SOME MORE AUTHENTIC SUBSTANTIATION OF REAGAN AS MAN OF PEACE WILL BE NECESSARY IN 1984 AND IF CDN EFFORTS CAN INDIRECTLY IMPROVE POSSIBILITIES OF THIS, THEY WILL BE SUPPORTED DOWN THE ROAD. HOWEVER, WE SHLD RECOGNIZE THERE WILL BE LITTLE EFFORT MADE TO GIVE PM TRUDEAU CREDIT FOR WHATEVER DOES LATER EMERGE IN WAY OF PROGRESS

GOTLIEB

CCC/241 080041Z UNGR3003



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
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SECURITY/SÉCURITÉ **C O N F I D E N T I A L** 12 10

FM/DE **FM EXTOTT IDOZ0256 07DEC83**

TO/A **TO MOSCO/AMB ROBERTS DELIVER BY 071500**

INFO

DISTR **DISTR RBR DLF RBD**

REF **---PM INITIATIVE: VISIT TO USHDC**

SUBJ/SUJ **PM VISIT TO USHDC NOW SET FOR THURS 15 DEC. IT WILL BE ONE HOUR MTG.
NOVIKOV OF SOV EMB WILL BE INFORMED LATE THIS AFTERNOON OTTAWA TIME.**

*28-6-1 Trudeau
Peace
Mission*

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG G. SMITH	IDOZ	995-5912	SIG L.A. DELVOIE

MESSAGE PREPARATION

- 1) Use OCR element and set typewriter for 10 pitch. Observe right margin marked "10". If typewriter capable of 12 pitch only, ensure that right margin, marked "12", is observed.
- 2) Use full capitals and double line feed at all times.
- 3) Security Classification: "UNCLASSIFIED" is to be typed without spacing between letters. All other classifications are to have one space between the letters, e.g. C O N F I D E N T I A L
- 4) Use only one space between words in the address portion of the message, e.g.
TO LDN PARIS IMMED WSHDC
DISTR PUA APO APR MFP
- 5) Subject line is indicated by three dashes in front of the subject, e.g. --- REVISED FSDS
- 6) First paragraph is neither numbered nor indented. All subsequent paragraphs are numbered. Do not use space between the paragraph number and the first letter of the text, e.g. 3. THE POST...
- 7) Do not use space before or after punctuation marks, e.g. WILL ARRIVE BERNE, 15 JUN. THE etc.
- 8) Use only the following punctuation: period, comma, semi-colon, colon, dash, oblique stroke, brackets and question mark.
- 9) Following signs must be spelled out: \$ (DOLLARS), % (PERCENT), # (NUMBER), " (QUOTE), and " (UNQUOTE). In English the apostrophe is omitted to form a single word, while in French the apostrophe is replaced by a space.
- 10) Always repeat negatives NO and NOT as NO/NO and NOT/NOT. DO NOT/NOT underline.
- 11) End of page of multi-page messages is identified on a separate line, at left margin with only three periods and the number of the following page, e.g.
...2
- 12) Do not use punctuation at the end of the message when there is a signature.

PRÉPARATION DES MESSAGES

- 1) Employer le LOC et régler la machine au pas "10". Placer la marge droite à "10". Si vous avez une machine de pas "12", placer la marge droite à "12".
- 2) Toujours utiliser les majuscules et le double interligne.
- 3) La cote de sécurité "NONCLASSIFIÉ" doit être dactylographiée sans espace entre les lettres. Toutes les autres doivent l'être avec un espace, par exemple: C O N F I D E N T I E L
- 4) Pour l'adresse, utiliser seulement un espace entre chaque mot, par exemple:
A LDN PARIS IMMED WSHDC
DISTR PUA APO APR MFP
- 5) Faire précéder le sujet de trois tirets, par exemple: ---DSE REVISÉES
- 6) Le premier paragraphe n'est jamais numéroté et commence à la marge. Tous les paragraphes suivants sont numérotés. Ne pas laisser d'espace entre le numéro du paragraphe et la première lettre du texte, par exemple: 3. LA MISSION...
- 7) Ne pas laisser d'espace avant ou après les signes de ponctuation, par exemple: ARRIVERAI À BERNE, 15 JUN. LE etc.
- 8) Utiliser seulement les signes de ponctuation suivants: point, virgule, point virgule, deux points, tiret, barre oblique, parenthèses et point d'interrogation.
- 9) Les signes suivants doivent être dactylographiés en toutes lettres: \$ (DOLLARS), % (POUR CENT), # (NUMÉRO), " (CITATION) et " (FIN DE CITATION). En anglais, omettre l'apostrophe et ajouter la terminaison au mot pour en faire un seul mot. En français remplacer l'apostrophe par un espace.
- 10) Répéter toujours les négatifs NO et NOT comme ceci: NO/NO NOT/NOT (en français les négatifs ne sont pas répétés).
- 11) Sur les messages comportant plus d'une page, indiquer sur une ligne séparée, à la marge à gauche, le numéro de la page suivante en le faisant précéder de trois points seulement, par exemple:
...2
- 12) Ne pas mettre de ponctuation à la fin du message quant il comporte une signature.

ACTION
NOTE A BONNER
CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS

John

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM BNATO YBGR8630 07DEC83

TO EXTOTT LIDR/SMITH

DISTR DMF IFB

FROM DELVOIE

28-6-1-
Nuclear
Peace
mission

---PM INITIATIVE-REVIEW OF NATO STRATEGY---

HAVE SHOWN TO DPM/SSEA THE TWO TELS RECEIVED FROM PMDEL LDN ON DEC5, AS WELL AS COPY OF MY MEMO TO FOWLER OF SAME DATE. HAVE ALSO GIVEN HIM ORALLY NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL REASONS WHY I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE PREMATURE FOR HIM TO RAISE FORMALLY AT THIS NAC MINISTERIAL QUESTION OF REVIEW OF ALLIANCE STRATEGY. WHILE DPM/SSEA HAS PROVIDED NO/NO CLEAR REACTION (AND MAY WELL NOT/NOT BEFORE OFFICIAL BRIEFING SESSION WITH DEL LATER TODAY), I BELIEVE HE IS INCLINED TO CONFINE HIMSELF TO CDE AND MBER ASPECTS OF PM INITIATIVE IN HIS NAC INTERVENTIONS.

2. SEPARATE ISSUE IS WHETHER DPM/SSEA SHOULD RAISE QUESTION OF NATO REVIEW IN GENERAL TERMS DURING BILATERAL WITH SHULTZ. IDEALLY I THINK HE SHOULD NOT/NOT, BUT RATHER ALLOW US TO DO SOME DIPLO SPADEWORK WITH SELECTED EUROPEANS IN NEW YEAR BEFORE PUTTING IDEA TO AMERICANS. HOWEVER, IF PM INTENDS TO ADVANCE THIS PROPOSAL DURING MTG WITH PRES REAGAN DEC15, I THINK IT MOST DESIRABLE THAT DPM/SSEA SO ADVISE SHULTZ ON DEC9. IN LATTER CASE, YOU MAY WISH TO DEVISE

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PAGE TWO YBGR8680 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

SUITABLE LANGUAGE WHICH COULD BE INJECTED INTO SCENARIO
BRIEF WHICH VON NOSTITZ WILL BE BRINGING WITH HIM.

3.PLS ADVISE PMS INTENTIONS ON THIS QUESTION RE MTG WITH
PRES REAGAN BY 080800.

CCC/070 071245Z YBGR8680

C O N F I D E N T I A L
FM BNATO YBGR7156 07DEC83
TO EXTOTT IDR

28-6-1 - Bureau
Peace
Mission

INFO CANMILREPNATO LDN BONN BRU WSHDC MOSCO VMBFR GENEV PARIS
HAGUE OSLO COPEN ATHNS MDRID LSBON ROME PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DM/
ADMPOL/PPP/CORAE/DNACPOL/DSTRATA/CIS
DISTR MINA DMF IDA RCR RBR ZSI ZSP CPD RGX IDRL IDRA IDDZ IFB
---DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE MEETING:

ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

SUMMARY: ONLY FOUR DEFMINs CHOSE TO INTERVENE ON ARMS CONTROL
ISSUES AT DPC MTG DEC07. FRG MIN STRESSED NEED TO MAINTAIN
ALLIANCE COHESION WHICH HAD LED TO SUCCESS IN INITIAL INF
DEPLOYMENT, AND MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF OTHER ARMS CONTROL FORUMS
TO DEMONSTRATE NATOS PEACEFUL INTENTIONS. DANISH FM EXPRESSED
FOLKETING'S RESERVATIONS ON NATOS INF DEPLOYMENT. NORWEGIAN
URGED PROGRESS IN MBFR. MIN BLAIS REFERRED TO SUPPORT SO
FAR GIVEN PMS PEACE INITIATIVE, INDICATED DPM/SSEAS INTENTION
TO TAKE UP MBFR ISSUE AT NAC LATER THIS WEEK AND URGED
DEFENCE MINS TO ENCOURAGE THEIR FORMINS TO SUPPORT HIM.
2. REPORT: MIN WOERNER SAID THAT BEGINNING OF DEPLOYMENT
WAS POLITICAL SUCCESS FOR NATO AND FAILURE FOR SOVIET UNION
LATTER NOW HAD TO FACE WHAT THEY DID NOT/NOT WISH: DEPLOYMENT
OF INF MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE AND COHESION OF NATO.
SOVIET UNION WOULD NOW HAVE TO REFLECT; IT HAD NOT/NOT WANTED
TO BE PARTY TO AGMT WHICH WOULD PERMIT NATO DEPLOYMENT, BUT MUST
NOW DEVELOP NEW POLICY. NATO MUST MAKE CLEAR THAT IT WAS
PREPARED TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT THERE WAS NO/NO NEED FOR

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PAGE TWO YBGR7156 CONFID

SPECIAL OFFERS OR HECTIC ACTIVITY. SOVIET UNION MUST DECIDE IF IT WOULD RETURN TO INF TABLE, BUT WE HAD OTHER TABLES FOR CDE, MBFR AND START. WE MUST MAKE FULL USE OF THESE AND TAKE OFFENSIVE. SOVIET UNION MUST RECEIVE MSG THAT IT HAS TO TAKE EUROPEAN SECURITY INTERESTS INTO ACCOUNT. THERE MUST BE NO/NO PAUSE IN DEPLOYMENT, AND OTHER COUNTRIES (FOR WHICH READ BELGIUM AND NETHERLANDS) MUST FOLLOW INITIAL ONES IN ACCEPTING WEAPONS. WE MUST DEMONSTRATE WILL TO CONDUCT GOOD AND EXTENSIVE DIALOGUE WITH EAST, ALONG LINES OF HARMEL REPORT. DOUBLE TRACK DECISION HAD OPENED UP INTENSIVE DEBATE ABOUT ALLIANCE STRATEGY. MINS HERE ALL AGREED FLEXIBLE RESPONSE WAS WITHOUT ALTERNATIVE. WE MUST EMPHASIZE TO PUBLIC THAT ALLIANCE IS DEFENSIVE IN CHARACTER AND THAT PRESENT POLICY HAS ACTED AS DETERRENT AND HENCE PRESERVED PEACE. WE HAD TO STRENGTHEN CONVENTIONAL ELEMENT OF OUR FORCES. WITHOUT THIS WE COULD NOT/PRESERVE PEACE AND FREEDOM. WE MUST ALSO CONTINUE CLOSE CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN US WHICH HAD BEEN KEY TO INF SUCCESS.

3. DANISH MIN ENGELL OUTLINED POLITICAL BACKGROUND TO RECENT FOLKETING DEBATE REPUDIATING NATOS INF POSITION, AND READ OUT RESOLUTION. HE INDICATE HE WOULD HAVE TO EXPRESS HIS COUNTRY'S RESERVATION IN COMMUNIQUE.

4. NORWEGIAN MIN SJAASTAD REGRETTED SOVIET DECISION TO WALK OUT OF INF TALKS, WHICH WAS WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION, AS IT HAD CONTINUED DEPLOYING SS-20S THROUGHOUT NEGOTIATIONS. BUT WE SHOULD

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PAGE THREE YBGR7156 CONF

AVOID CREATING IMPRESSION THAT DANGER OF EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION HAD INCREASED. WE MUST GET ACROSS TO PUBLIC THAT OTHER NEGOTIATIONS WERE CONTINUING AND CDE WOULD SOON BEGIN. ON MBFR, HE NOTED TALKS HAD BEEN CONTINUING FOR TEN YEARS WITHOUT RESULT. THERE WAS NEED FOR NEW WESTERN INITIATIVE. AGMT IN VIENN, HOWEVER MODEST, COULD HAVE POSITIVE EFFECT ON PUBLIC OPINION. 5. MIN BLAIS WOUND UP THIS SECTION OF MTG BY REFERRING TO PMS PEACE INITIATIVE, CONCERNING WHICH HE REMINDED MINS THERE HAD BEEN NO/NO DISSENTING VOICES WITHIN ALLIANCE. HE THEN OUTLINED CDN APPROACH TO MBFR. WEAKNESS OF NATO DETERRENT TO CONVENTIONAL ATTACK IN EUROPE STEMS FROM DISPARITY IN STRENGTH OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES DEPLOYED IN EUROPE. PM HAS SUGGESTED THERE ARE TWO WAYS OF DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM; EITHER TO INCREASE OR TO DECREASE CONVENTIONAL FORCES UNTIL BALANCE IS REACHED. HE IS NOT/NOT PRE-JUDGING WHICH OF TWO APPROACHES IS BETTER. IN CONSIDERING BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS OPTION, PM IS MERELY ENUNCIATING ONCE AGAIN INITIATIVES WHICH ARE TO BE FOUND IN 1967 HARMEL REPORT. MIN BLAIS SAID DPM/SSEA WOULD BE DEALING WITH THIS SUBJ IN NAC LATER IN WEEK. HE HOPED THAT DEFENCE MINS WOULD COMMUNICATE THEIR VIEWS TO FORMINS SO LATTER COULD SUPPORT DPM/SSEA AND COME TO AGMT ON THIS QUESTION.

CCC/298 071549Z YBGR7156

INFO

28-6-1 - Bureau
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C O N F I D E N T I A L
FM BNATO YBGR7153 07DEC83
TO MOSCO

INFO CANMILREPNATO EXTOTT IDR RBR IFB RGB RBD IDD (IDDZ IDA ZSP ZSI
CPD NDHQOTT/ADM POL/CPP/DNACPOL/CORAE/DSTRATA/CIS
REF YOURTEL XYGR4200

---SOVIET PRESS CONFERENCE ON INF DEPLOYMENT

WE NOTE FROM MEDIA COVERAGE, INCL PHOTOS, OF PRESS CONF REPORTED
REFTEL THAT OGARKOV/KORNIENKO/ZAMYATIN MADE USE OF CHARTS
WITH DETAILED FIGURES COMPARING USA AND SOVIET INF AND START
POSITIONS. YOU POINT OUT IN REFTEL THAT OGARKOV STATED USA INF
PROPOSALS WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN TWICE AS MANY LAUNCHERS AND
THREE TIMES AS MANY WARHEADS FOR USA VIS-A-VIS USSR.

DO YOU HAVE DATA PROVIDED AT PRESS CONF?

CCC/298 071348Z YBGR7153

MF

28-6-1 - Trudeau
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**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I E L ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT
DE PARIS WIGR5487 07DEC83

**CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

A EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO LDN BONN BNATO WSHDC BRU TOKYO HAGUE ROME MOSCO PEKIN
NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/PPP
DISTR IFB RCD RGB RBD RBR IDR IDA
REF NOSTELS WIGR5466 05DEC 5477 06DEC

---INITIATIVE DU PM-COMMENTAIRES SUR POSITION FRANCAISE
SUITE A POSITION FRANCAISE RELATEE DANS NOTRE REFTEL 5466, CROYONS
UTILE D AJOUTER QUELQUES PRECISIONS SUSCEPTIBLES DE LA MIFUX
ECLAIRER ET D EN EXPLIQUER APPARENTE TIEDEUR SUR CERTAINS ASPECTS
DE INITIATIVE CDNNE.

2. CONSTATONS DABORD QUE SUR ANALYSE ET MOTIVATIONS QUI PRESIDENT
A INITIATIVE, UNE REELLE CONCORDANCE DE VUES EXISTE AVEC PERCEPTIONS
FRANCAISES. EN FAIT, SEULE PRECISION QU IL NOUS A FALLU APPORTER
JUSQU A PRESENT A NOS INTERLOCUTEURS A CE CHAPITRE PORTAIT SUR
LOCALISATION DANS LE TEMPS DES CAUSES DE DEGRADATION ACTUELLE DES
RAPPORTS EST/OUEST. CECI CONSTITUE FACTEUR IMPORTANT POUR FRANCAIS
PUISQU ILS CONSIDERENT, COMME CDA, QUE SITUATION N EST PAS/PAS LE FRUIT
SEULEMENT DES SEULS EVENEMENTS RECENTS. CECI EXPLIQUE EGALEMENT
ATTITUDE DE FRANCE VISANT A NE PAS SUCCOMBER A UNE DRAMATISATION DE
SITUATION ACTUELLE. C EST POURQUOI AVONS SOULIGNE A NOS INTERLOCUTEURS
QUE DES EVENEMENTS TELS NEGS SUR FNI/DESTRUCTION DU BOEING DE KAL ET
MONTEE

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REFUS
REFUS
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PAGE DEUX WIGR5487 CONFID ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

DU PACIFISME N ONT ETE, DANS ANALYSE CDNNE, QUE DES CATALYSEURS QUI NE RESUMENT PAS POUR AUTANT MOTIVATIONS PROFONDES AYANT CONDUIT PM CDN A AMORCER SON INITIATIVE. SEULE CRAINTE A DISSIPER ETAIT DONC QUE INITIATIVE SOIT PERCUE COMME UNE REPOSE OU UNE REACTION AUX PRESSIONS D UNE OPINION PUBLIQUE INQUIETE ET DONC SENSIBLE A UTILISATION DE LA PEUR FAITE PAR SOVIETIQUES SUR OCCIDENTAUX. COMPREHENSION FRANCAISE SUR CE POINT EST ENTIERE ET A CET EGARD INITIATIVE EST PLEINEMENT RECONNUE DANS SA PERTINENCE.

3. S IL Y A DONC UNE TRES LARGE CONCORDANCE SUR LES ANALYSES, C EST ESSENTIELLEMENT SUR LES MOYENS ENVISAGES DANS CADRE DE INITIATIVE CDNNE QUE SE FONT SENTIR PRINCIPALES NUANCES ET RESERVES FRANCAISES. POURQUOI?

4. BREF RAPPEL CI-APRES FOURNIT DEJA UNE PREMIERE INDICATION: (A) FRANCE N EST PAS ASSOCIEE AUX NEGS MBFR; (B) FRANCE NEST PAS PARTIE AU NPT; (C) FRANCE N EST PAS MEMBRE DU COMMANDEMENT INTEGRE DE OTAN; (D) SON DISPOSITIF NUCLEAIRE (SERVANT DES FINS DISSUASIVES NTLES) NE SAURAIT ETRE PRIS EN COMPTE DANS NEGS BILATERALES EUA/URSS QUE CE SOIT FNI OU START. D AUTRE PART (A) FRANCE EST ACTIVE AU SEIN DE CE (SURTOUT EN MATIERE DE CW/BW), (B) CDE EST SOUVENT CONSIDEREE COMME UNE INITIATIVE LARGEMENT FRANCAISE, ET (C) SON INTERET A CSCE NE S EST JAMAIS DEMENTI.

5. PAR AILLEURS, IL IMPORTE DE GARDER EGALEMENT EN MEMOIRE INDICATIONS ...3

PAGE TROIS WIGR5487 CONF D ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

ADDITIONNELLES FOURNIES PAR CONDITIONS POSEES PAR FRANCE POUR SA PARTICIPATION A UNE CONFERENCE DES CINQ PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES, A SAVOIR: (A) REDUCTION PREALABLE ET SIGNIFICATIVE DES ARSENAUX NUCLEAIRES DES DEUX GRANDS, IMPLIQUANT UN CHANGEMENT A LA FOIS QUANTITATIF ET DE NATURE (B) REDUCTION DU NIVEAU DES ARMES CLASSIQUES; (C) INTERDICTION DES CW/BW, DES ARMEMENTS ANTI SOUS-MARINS, ASAT ET ABM.

6. CECI NOUS SUGGERE LES QUELQUES CONSIDERATIONS SUIVANTES:

(A) D'ABORD QUE VALEUR/IMPORTANCE/PORTEE/SIGNIFICATION PROFONDE DE L'EXISTENCE D'UNE FORCE DE DISSUASION NUCLEAIRE FRANCAISE PLACEE SOUS SON CONTROLE EXCLUSIF ET REPOUNDANT A SES FINS PROPRES NE SAURAIENT ETRE MINIMISEES. PAR DELA LES EVIDENCES, IL EST DE CONSTATER QUE CET ELEMENT CONSTITUE UN FACTEUR DETERMINANT QUI APPUIE/COMMANDE/CONDITIONNE LARGEMENT SON APPROCHE DES QUESTIONS DE DESARMEMENT TOUT AUTANT QUE SON ATTITUDE A EGARD DES RELATIONS EST/OUEST ET DES DEUX SUPER PUISSANCES.

(B) DISSUASION FRANCAISE EST BIEN SUR FONDEMENT DE SA STRATEGIE MILITAIRE ET DE SA POLITIQUE DE DEFENSE, MAIS ELLE CONSTITUE AUSSI UNE COMPOSANTE FONDAMENTALE DE SA POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE. CETTE DISSUASION EST FACTEUR DE DIFFERENCE ET DE SPECIFICITE, VOIRE MEME, DE CREDIBILITE, ET COMPORTE DES IMPLICATIONS IMMEDIATES AU PLAN INTERIEUR EN TANT QUE POINT DE CONTINUITE (TOUTES TENDANCES CONFONDUES), D'UNITE POLITIQUE ET SOCIALE ET D'ASSURANCE CONTRE

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PAGE QUATRE WIGR5487 CONF D CDNS SEULEMENT

PRESSIONS EXTERNES ET DESTABILISATRICES DU TYPE PACIFISME. CELA, ON LE COMPREND FACILEMENT, NE SAURAIT A AUCUN PRIX SOUFFRIR QUELCONQUE DEVIATION OU COMPROMISSION.

(C) AUTRE NOTION CENTRALE DU DISCOURS FRANCAIS EST CELLE D EQUILIBRE (DES FORCES). SEUL CET EQUILIBRE PEUT GARANTIR LA PAIX. CECI A ETE DIT ET REDIT PAR TOUS LES DIRIGEANTS FRANCAIS AU COURS DES DERNIERS MOIS. OR C EST POURQUOI IL LUI IMPORTE QUE JUSTES PROPORTIONS SOIENT ETABLIES ET RESPECTEES ET QUE LE COMPARABLE SOIT ETABLI AVANT MEME QU ON NE PROCEDE AUX COMPARAISONS. EN FAIT, FRANCE NE S ASSOCIERA AU DESARMEMENT NUCLEAIRE ET N'ACCEPTERA PRISE EN COMPTE DE SON DISPOSITIF NUCLEAIRE QUE SI EXISTENCE MEME DE CELUI-CI INFLUE SUR CE DIFFICILE EQUILIBRE. DANS SON ANALYSE ACTUELLE, CECI N EST PAS LE CAS; D OU POSITION FRANCAISE DE FAIRE APPEL AUX USA ET A URSS POUR TOUTE PREMIERE INITIATIVE EN MATIERE DE DESARMEMENT NUCLEAIRE.

RESPONSABILITE DU GESTE PREMIERE ET SIGNIFICATIF LEUR INCOMBE DABORD ET AVANT TOUT. (D) ENFIN, POLITIQUE EXTERIEURE FRANCAISE PROCEDE PAR INTERET. POUR INSTANT, CONVICTION N EST PAS ACQUISE DE UTILITE POUR ELLE DE S ASSOCIER A UNE CONFERENCE DES CINQ NUCLEAIRES PAS PLUS QUE D ADHERER AU NPT OU DE S ASSOCIER AUX MBFR. FRANCE NE SE LIE OU NE S ENGAGE QUE DANS MESURE OU ELLE EST ASSUREE D EXERCER UN CONTROLE OU TOUT AU MOINS UNE INFLUENCE EFFECTIVE SUR LA MARCHE DES CHOSES. SI L ON CONSIDERE LES SECTEURS DANS LESQUELS S EXERCE SON ACTIVITE

...5

PAGE CINQ WIGR5487 CONFD CDNS SEULEMENT

EN MATIERE DE DESARMEMENT (CD/CDE/CW/BW), ILLUSTRATION EST FOURNIE
DE L'INTERET DE LA FRANCE PAR RAPPORT AUX PAYS TIERS A ETRE VUE
POURSUIVANT ACTIVEMENT SON ACTION EN FAVEUR DU DESARMEMENT
NON-NUCLEAIRE EN PRESERVANT SA SITUATION PARTICULIERE ET LES
ACQUIS DE SA DISSUASION NUCLEAIRE, CREDIBLE, MAIS MINIMALE PAR
RAPPORT AUX NIVEAUX ACTUELS DES ARSENAUX AMERICAINS ET SOVIETIQUES.

7. AUSSI CONVIENT-IL DE RAPPELER QUE SI LA FRANCE A EMIS DES RESERVES
ET DES NUANCES, CE NE SONT QUE SUR LES MOYENS QUI ACCOMPAGNENT
INITIATIVE CDNNE ET NON PAS SUR ANALYSE. CELA EST TRES IMPORTANT ET
DOIT ETRE APPRECIE. C'EST POURQUOI, SI GLOBALEMENT ON PEUT QUALIFIER
POSITION FRANCAISE DE TIEDE, CETTE TIEDEUR N'EST QUE TOUTE RELATIVE
SURTOUT SI ON PREND EN COMPTE PRECEDENTES CONSIDERATIONS QUI
DELIMITENT CE QU'ELLE PEUT ET NE PEUT PAS FAIRE ET QUI FIXENT LES
PARAMETRES DE TOUT ENGAGEMENT DE SA PART DANS L'ETAT ACTUEL DES CHOSSES.

8. CELA DIT, RAPPELONS QUE LA FRANCE DEMEURE FERMEMENT ATTACHEE A CAUSE
DU DESARMEMENT. CELA FUT SOULIGNE ET REAFFIRME NOTAMMENT PAR PRES
MITTERRAND DANS SON DISCOURS DE SEPT DEVANT L'AGNU. MAIS ELLE DEMEURERA
INTRANSIGEANTE SUR LES MOYENS ET SON PROPRE ENGAGEMENT POUR CE FAIRE
DES LORS QUE SELON SON ANALYSE ACQUIS QUI LUI SONT PROPRES POURRAIENT
S'EN TROUVER COMPROMIS.

9. SOMMES PORTES A CROIRE QUE L'ATTITUDE FRANCAISE SUR INITIATIVE CDNNE

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PAGE SIX WIGR5487 CONFD CDNS SEULEMENT

VARIERA PEU DE LIGNE DE CONDUITE DEJA EVOQUEE DANS NOTRE TEL SOUS
RUBRIQUE. SOMMES AUSSI ASSURES, PAR AILLEURS, QUE SON INTERET NE
SAURAIT ETRE MIS EN DOUTE. IL EST DANS NOTRE INTERET DE CONSERVER
AUPRES DE FRANCE IMPRESSION QUE NOUS LA CONSIDERONS PARTENAIRE
DE PREMIER PLAN SUSCEPTIBLE D UNE EVENTUELLE CONTRIBUTION
DETERMINANTE TANT POUR INITIATIVE PM QUE POUR L ENSEMBLE DE LA
PROBLEMATIQUE DU DESARMEMENT, CE SUR QUOI DIALOGUE SUBSTANTIEL ET
COLLABORATION SECTORIELLE FRANCO-CANADIENNE SE POURSUIVENT DEPUIS
PLUSIEURS ANNEES.

CCC/118 081525Z WIGR5487

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDR4722 07DEC83

TO BNATO DELIVER BY 080900

INFO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/PPP/DIPOL/DNACPOL

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD IDDZ RBR IDA PSR EER FPR IDRL IDRA

REF YOURTELS YBGR8673 02DEC 8674 8675 05DEC

--NAC MINISTERIAL MTG BRU:COMMUNIQUE

HAVE WITHHELD COMMENTS UNTIL NOW KNOWING THAT ALL IS WELL AND IN CAPABLE HANDS OF OUR REPS IN BRU AND IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO EXAMINE CURRENT DRAFT TEXTS IN PERSPECTIVE OF FINAL DPC MIN MTG COMMUNIQUE (YOURTEL YBDR1869 07DEC). FOLLOWING ARE OUR COMMENTS ON NAC COMMUNIQUE WHICH YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER WITH DEL MEMBERS.

2. QUOTE

AT THAT STAGE, OUR ATTN IS FOCUSED PRINCIPALLY ON DRAFT FRG COVERING DECLARATION WHICH WE BELIEVE WILL BE MAJOR FOCUS OF PUBLIC ATTN (AND WHICH WE HOPE SURVIVES GENERALLY INTACT). COMMENTS ON COMMUNIQUE THEREFORE ARE INTENDED TO POLISH EXISTING LANGUAGE AND ENSURE CONSISTENCY OF MESSAGE. IN THIS PERSPECTIVE WERE OFFERED OUR VIEWS ON NORWEGIAN PROPOSAL, IE IF FRG DECLARATION MAKES CASE FOR IMPORTANCE OF DIALOGUE AND IF COMMUNIQUE IS REWORKED SO THAT ARMS CONTROL IS GIVEN, IN TERMS OF PUBLIC PERCEPTION, UNDUE PROMINENCE, WRONG MESSAGE MAY INADVERTENTLY BE CONVEYED.

3. ON INITIAL READING OF DPC COMMUNIQUE, THERE APPEARS TO US IN THAT TEXT TO BE SOMEWHAT MORE FORTHCOMING LANGUAGE THAN IN NAC COMMUNIQUE,

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28-6-1 - Hudson
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PAGE TWO IDR4722 CONFD

ALTHOUGH AGAIN THIS MAY NOT/NOTBE OF REAL CONCERN GIVEN FRG DECLARATION (AND AT THIS STAGE WE DO NOT/NOT EXPECT JUXTAPOSITION OF TWO COMMUNIQUE TEXTS WILL LEAD TO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES TO NAC WORDING). WOULD WELCOME YOUR VIEWS ON WHETHER OR NOT/NOT YOU AGREE WITH THIS PERCEPTION.

4.PARA TWO:WE DO NOT/NOT FEEL STRONGLY OVER FRG PROPOSED REFERENCE TO SHORT RANGE SYSTEMS.IF FRG PERCEIVES SUCH LANGUAGE AS NECESSARY REQUIREMENT,WE CAN AGREE.

5.PARA FOUR:WE STILL FAVOUR DELETION OF FRENCH PROPOSED LANGUAGE AS BEING UNDULY HARSH AND AS NOT/NOT FITTING WELL WITH OVERALL MESSAGE BEING CONVEYED.EVEN ABBREVIATED VERSION CARRIES WITH IT CONNOTATION OF CONDITIONALITY,WHICH MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS ESTABLISHING NORMS BY WHICH USSR MUST ABIDE BEFORE RELNS CAN IMPROVE.IN THIS SENSE, ALLIES MIGHT BE CREATING SITUATION WHICH THEY MAY LATER COME TO REGRET IF PUBLIC HOLDS THEM TO THEIR STATEMENTS.

6.PARA FIVE:WOULD ASK THAT YOU CONSIDER OUR PROPOSED LANGUAGE ON POLAND WITH SSEA TO DETERMINE HIS FEELINGS AND WHETHER OR NOT/NOT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE ALTERNATIVES INTO MIN MTG ITSELF FOR CONSIDERATION.WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT CDN WORDING IS MORE APPROPRIATE TO CURRENT STATEOF AFFAIRS ,BUT DRAFTING WILL NO/NO DOUBT DEPEND ON TERMS IN WHICH POLAND IS RAISED DURING DELIBERATIONS.

7.PARA SEVEN:IN VIEW OF CIRCUMSTANCES,BELIEVE WE SHOULD SUPPORT COMPROMISE TEXT AGREED TO IN PARIS.

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PAGE THREE IDR4722 CONF

8.PARA TWELVE:WE ARE SOMEWHAT CONCERNED WITH USA ARGUMENTS ON CDE WORDING.USA OBJECTION TO TERMS TRANSPARENCY AND RESTRAINT IS PROBABLY BASED MORE ON THEIR RELUCTANCE TO CONSIDER CDE BEYOND TRANSPARENCY PHASE RATHER THAN INABILITY OF PUBLIC TO UNDERSTAND. PROBLEMS COULD BE RESOLVED BY USING SOME FORM OF LANGUAGE ALREADY DEVELOPED IN POLITICAL CTTE(REF YOURTEL YBGR7048 24OCT).IF MEASURES TO BE ADOPTED QUOTE MIGHT PAVE THE WAY FOR FURTHER MEASURES IN THE ARMS CONTROL FIELD RELATING TO SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE WHICH COULD BE NEGOTIATED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A NEXT STAGE OF THE CDE,IF SUCH A DECISION IS TAKEN.ACCORDING TO THE CONDITIONS SET FORTH IN THE MANDATE AGREED IN MDRID UNQUOTE.

9.PARA FOURTEEN:WE CAN SUPPORT REFERENCE TO OUTER SPACE,BUT IF MAJORITY WISH IT DELETED WE WOULD HAVE NO/NO DIFFICULTIES.AGREE ALSO TO RETENTION OF WORD QUOTE EVIDENCE UNQUOTE WITH RESPECT TO CW PARTICULARLY SINCE ADJECTIVE QUOTE STRONG UNQUOTE FROM PARIS COMMUNIQUE IS ABSENT.

10.PARA SEVENTEEN:WE AGREE THAT REF TO MDRID CONCLUDING DOCU ADDS NOTHING TO LANGUAGE ON TERRORISM AND,INDEED,MAY WORK TO DISADVANTAGE OF TURKISH OBJECTIVES BY MAKING IT APPEAR CONCERNS WITH TERRORISM RELATE ONLY TO MDRID DOCU.

11.PARA EIGHTEEN:DO NOT/NOT UNDERSTAND WHY DANES WISH STRONGLY TO SUPPRESS TEXT.WE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED IT BE INCLUDED IN MINUTES PUT IF OTHERS FEEL STRONGLY IT NEEDS TO BE RETAINED IN COMMUNIQUE.WE HAVE NO/NO STRONG OBJECTIONS.

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PAGE FOUR IDR4722 CONF

12. AGREED MINUTES: BELIEVE YOU CAN HANDLE THIS AS TASK SEEMS TO BE ESSENTIALLY ONE OF ENSURING SQUARE BRACKETED REFS TO ARMAMENTS COOPERATION AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES JIBE WITH DPC COMMUNIQUE TEXT.

13. GOOD WORK AND HOPE THAT THERE WILL BE NO/NO MIDNIGHT DRAFTING SESSIONS. WHILE COMMUNIQUE FOLLOWS TRADITIONAL LINES WHICH REDUCES IMPACT, BELIEVE CURRENT PRODUCT IS NOT/NOT AS BAD AS IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN FROM INITIAL INDICATIONS AND FRG DECLARATION WILL BE OF BENEFIT. WE SHALL SEE WHAT TOMORROW BRINGS.

CCC/258 072303Z IDR4722

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDR4714 07DEC83

TO BNATO DELIVER BY 080900

INFO LDN NDHQOTT/ADM POL/CPP/DIPOL/DNACPOL PCOOTT/FOWLER WSHDC

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD IDDZ RGB RBR RCD RCR EER

---VISIT OF DPM/SSEA TO UK:MTG WITH LORD CARRINGTON

DPM/SSEA IS TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED TO MEET LORD CAPRINGTON TUESDAY,

13DEC DURING HIS VISIT TO UK.YOU MAY WISH TO TAKE OPPORTUNTIY TO

DISCUSS THIS WITH MR MACEACHEN WHILE HE IS IN BRUSSELS.

REFER TO IDDZ TEL 0131 14NOV REPORTING ON PMS 11NOV TELECON WITH

LORD CARRINGTON.

2. IN CASE IT MAY BE HELPFUL FOLLOWING ARE EXTRACTS FROM ANALYSIS WE HAD EARLIER PREPARED FOR DPM/SSEA ON LORD CARRINGTONS 21APR83 ALASTAIR BUCHAN MEMORIAL LECTURE TO IISS/WE REALIZE,OF COURSE, YOU MAY HAVE YOUR OWN REFLECTION WHICH YOU MAY WISH TO ADD.

3. QUOTE IN HIS SPEECH, LORD CARRINGTON WARNS WESTERN NATIONS THAT THE QUOTE DEHUMANIZATION UNQUOTE OF RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION COULD LEAD US DOWN THE ROAD OF CONFRONTATION WHICH THE WEST, HE SAYS, COULD LATER COME TO REGRET. HE STATES THAT IT IS A MISTAKE TO BASE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON WHAT HE TERMS QUOTE NUCLEAR ACCOUNTANCY UNQUOTE, A CLEAR REFERENCE TO THE PITFALLS OF ASSESSING THE MILITARY BALANCE ON THE BASIS OF NUMBERS ALONE.

4. LORD CAPRINGTON DISCUSSES FRANKLY PAST AND CURRENT STRAINS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. HE BELIEVES THAT, ON BALANCE, THE WEST POSSESSES

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28-6-1 / Bureau
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PAGE TWO IDR4714 CONF D

POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY STRONG SOCIETIES. A SUFFICIENT MILITARY DETERRENT, AND THE WILL TO DEFEND AGAINST AGGRESSION. WHAT HE SAYS THE WEST DOES NOT/HAVE IS A POSITIVE POLITICAL STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH THE SOVIET UNION. HE CRITICIZES INTEMPERATE PUBLIC RHETORIC IN THE EAST/WEST RELATIONSHIP AS BEING COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. THERE ARE SEVERAL OTHER IMPLICIT BUT SHARP REPROACHES TO THE POLICIES BEING PURSUED BY THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND, IN PART, BY THE CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM.

5. MUCH OF WHAT LORD CARRINGTON HAS TO SAY PARALLELS THE CONCLUSIONS WHICH EMERGED FROM THE NATO EAST/WEST POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES WHICH ORIGINATED AT LA SAPINERE. LORD CARRINGTON SAYS THE WEST MUST RECOGNIZE THE LIMITS OF ITS INFLUENCE IN SHAPING POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND LIFE IN EASTERN EUROPE; HE REJECTS THE NOTION THAT THE WEST CAN HASTEN THE DEMISE OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM; AND HE SUPPORTS THE IDEA OF MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS EAST/WEST TRADE IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES.

6. LORD CARRINGTON ALSO OFFERS SOME INTERESTING VIEWS ON THE EUROPEAN ROLE IN NATO. WHILE SUGGESTING THAT EUROPEAN ALLIES CAN PULL THEIR WEIGHT MORE EFFECTIVELY, IN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY TERMS, HE IS ALSO SUPPORTIVE OF GREATER EFFORTS TOWARDS EUROPEAN UNITY. PARTICULARLY AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL. THE UNITED STATES MAY WELL INTERPRET THIS AS ADVOCATING GREATER EUROPEAN COHESION IN ORDER TO RESIST THE IMPOSITION OF UNITED STATES POLICIES AND VIEWS.

...3

PAGE THREE IDR4714 CONFD

7. THIS SPEECH, WE BELIEVE, IS BALANCED IN THAT IT OFFERS ALTERNATIVES TO A HARD-LINE APPROACH TO EAST/WEST RELATIONS WHILE CLEARLY SUPPORTING THE NEED FOR ALLIED POLITICAL UNITY, A STRONG MILITARY POSTURE, AND A TOUGH NEGOTIATING STANCE VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION. WHILE HIS GENERAL TONE CAN BE PERCEIVED AS IMPLICITLY CRITICAL OF THE UNITED STATES, IT DOES NOT/NOT REALLY GO BEYOND A DIAGNOSIS OF THE STRAINS WHICH THE ALLIES HAVE GENERALLY ACKNOWLEDGED OVER THE PAST TWELVE MONTHS UNQUOTE.

CCC/279 072013Z IDR4714

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

MF
WDB

(2)

C O N F I D E N T I A L
FM OSLO WGGR4412 07DEC83
TO EXTOTT (IDD)
INFO VMBFR BNATO PRMNY PCOOTT/FOWLER
DISTR MINA DMF RGF RSD IDR RSR IDA DMFX
--PMS INITIATIVE:NORWEGIAN RESPONSE

*28-6-1 - Trudeau
Peace
Mission*

NORWEGIANS AT BOTH POLITICAL AND OFFICIAL LEVEL CONTINUE TO CONSIDER PMS INITIATIVE.

2.GOV'T HAS PASSED TEXTS OF PMS GUELPH AND MONTREAL ADDRESSES TO LEADING PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORTERS AND THERE ARE POSSIBILITIES IMMEDIATE DEFENCE DEBATE WILL PROVIDE OCCASION FOR FAVOURABLE COMMENT IN STORTING.

3.FOREIGN MIN STRAY ON EVE OF DEPARTURE FOR NATO MIN MTG INDICATED TO ME THAT NORWAY WAS PREPARED TO SUPPORT CDN INITIATIVE IN THAT FORUM AND HOPED THERE WOULD BE OPPORTUNITY FOR CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION.

4.MFA DIRECTOR GEN OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS RAVNE CONFIRMED GIST OF STRAYS BRIEFING MATERIAL.HE THEN VOLUNTEERED THAT IT WAS PLANNED TO UTILIZE PMS PRE-CHRISTMAS PRESS CONFERENCE TO BE BROADCAST COUNTRY WIDE ON DEC21 WHICH IS TRADITIONALLY DEVOTED TO NATIONAL ISSUES AS OCCASION TO GIVE SUPPORTIVE RESPONSES TO QUOTE INSPIRED UNQUOTE QUESTIONS FED TO SELECTED MEMBERS OF THE PRESS(THIS IDEA WAS SCOUTED EARLIER WITH PM WILLOCHS STATE SECTY COLDING WHO APPRECIATED DESIRABILITY OF PUBLIC STATEMENT)

WARDROPER

CCC/061 071216Z WGGR4412

28-6-1 - Hudson
Peace
Mission

R E S T R I C T E D

FM LDN XNGR4317 07DEC83

TO EXTOTT/IDR

INFO BNATO NDHQOTT/ CPP/ DNACPOL/ DSTRATA HAGUE BRU WSHDC MOSCO

BONN ROME GENEV PRMNY PARIS PCOOTT/ FOWLER WSAW BUCST BPEST

VIENN TOKYO MDRID CNBRA WLGTN COPEN STKHM ATHNS

DISTR CPD RCR RCD RBR IDD IDA ZSI MINE MINA IDDZ

REF OURTEL XNGR4117 16NOV

---INF:BRITISH REACTION:IS THE TEMPERATURE RISING?

SUMMARY:NOTWITHSTANDING OBVIOUS SETBACK WHICH CRUISE MISSILE ARRIVAL HAS GIVEN THE CAMPAIGN FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT,CND ANNUAL CONFERENCE THIS PAST WEEKEND INDICATES ANTINUCLEAR LOBBY IS FAR FROM GIVING UP:VOTING STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF INTENSIFIED DIRECT ACTION,CONFERENCE HAS SET IN MOTION PLANNING TO MOUNT BLOCKADES THROUGHOUT BRITAIN TO PREVENT MISSILES REACHING POTENTIAL LAUNCHING SITES.EFFECTIVELY REJECTING LESS RADICAL NUCLEAR FREEZE CAMPAIGN,CND HAS DECIDED TO FOCUS INSTEAD ON CANCELLATION OF TRIDENT,AND EVENTUAL BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM NATO.IMMEDIATE ACTION WILL CENTER ON QUOTE REFUSE CRUISE DAY UNQUOTE SCHEDULED FOR 12DEC(FIRST WORKING DAY FOLLOWING SATURDAYS TV SHOWING OF QUOTE THE DAY AFTER UNQUOTE).CND WILL SEEK UNION SUPPORT FOR INDUSTRIAL ACTION BOTH ON 12DEC,AND IN MOUNTING ANTI-CRUISE AND TRIDENT DIRECT ACTION CAMPAIGNS.DEFENCE SECRETARY ...2

PAGE TWO XNGR4317 RESTR

HESELTINE NOT ONLY ATTEMPTED TO PREEMPT PRESS ATTENTION TO CND CONFERENCE THROUGH REPEATING ALLEGATIONS THAT CND IS BECOMING STEADILY POLITICIZED AND INFILTRATED BY EXTREME LEFTWING GROUPS, AND IS ENDANGERING ARMS NEGOTIATIONS AND HEIGHTENING RATHER THAN REDUCING INTERNATIONAL TENSION, BUT HAS NOW FORMALLY COMPLAINED AT POLITICAL CONTENT OF QUOTE THE DAY AFTER UNQUOTE AND HAS DEMANDED OPPORTUNITY TO REDRESS WHAT HE DESCRIBES AS IMBALANCE IN FILM PORTRAYAL.

2. REPORT: SOMEWHAT TO MINISTRY OF DEFENCE UNEASE, SOME 2000 EXUBERANT CAMPAIGN FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT (CND) SUPPORTERS GATHERED THIS PAST WEEKEND FOR ANNUAL CONFERENCE, APPARENTLY UNCOWED BY IMMINENT DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE MISSILES HERE. JUNCTURE OF THIS CONFERENCE, COUPLED WITH CONCERN OVER POSSIBLE PUBLIC REACTION TO SHOWING SATURDAY 10 DEC OF US FILM QUOTE THE DAY AFTER UNQUOTE LED DEFENCE SECRETARY HESELTINE TO ATTEMPT TO DISTRACT PRESS ATTENTION FROM CONFERENCE RESOLUTIONS BY SUGGESTING IN EVE-OF-CONFERENCE QUOTE COUNTERSTRIKE UNQUOTE THAT CND WAS DANGER TO PROSPECTS OF ARMS NEGOTIATIONS AND LOWERING OF INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS, AND IS IN FACT INCREASINGLY LINKED TO LEFT-WING ELEMENTS, INCLUDING SOVIETS THEMSELVES. IN ADDITION, HE HAS NOW DEMANDED OPPORTUNITY TO REBUT WHAT MOD REGARDS AS ESSENTIALLY POLITICAL MESSAGE OF DAY AFTER FILM.

...3

PAGE THREE XNGR4317 RESTR

3. UNDETERRED BY HESELTINES ATTACK, CND CONFERENCE REAFFIRMED ITS INTENTION TO PURSUE INTENSIFIED DIRECT ACTION PROGRAMME AGAINST CRUISE MISSILES, ANNOUNCING THAT CND WILL SEEK LABOUR UNION SUPPORT FOR MASS ACTION TO BLOCK ESSENTIAL ROADS THROUGHOUT BRITISH COUNTRYSIDE IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE SORTIES OF MISSILES FROM GREENHAM COMMON, AND WILL BE PREPARED TO GENERATE MASS INCREASE IN CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE TO THIS END.

4. MOST IMMEDIATE MANIFESTATION OF CND DETERMINATION WILL COME MONDAY, 12 DEC, WHICH CND HAS DESIGNATED AS QUOTE REFUSE CRUISE DAY UNQUOTE. CND HAVE CALLED ON LABOUR UNIONS TO SUPPORT 12 DEC PROTESTS THROUGH QUOTE WARNING STRIKES AND OTHER INDUSTRIAL ACTION UNQUOTE. WHILE MOD EXPECTS OUTCOME TO BE DISAPPOINTING TO CND, 12 DEC WILL PROVIDE FIRST POSTARRIVAL MEASURE OF LEVEL OF PUBLIC CONCERN AND WILLINGNESS TO TAKE ACTIVE ROLE IN OPPOSITION TO CRUISE .

5. IN LONGER TERM, CND HAS REJECTED PROPOSALS BY LESS RADICAL MEMBERS IN SUPPORT OF NUCLEAR FREEZE CONCEPT AND HAS INSTEAD EMBARKED ON A BROADER CAMPAIGN TO STOP TRIDENT MISSILE PROGRAMME, AND IN FAVOUR OF BRITAIN LEAVING NATO AS PART OF POLICY AIMED AT DISMANTLING OF BOTH NATO AND WARSAW PACTS.

CCC/083 071615Z XNGR4317

28-6-1 - Bureau Peace
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR4202 07DEC83

TO EXTOTT RSR

INFO TAVIV ANKRA ATHNS PRMNY GENEV VIENN BNATO PESCO BREEC
BERUT CAIRO LDN COPEN STKHM CNBRA HSNKI DUBLN WSHDC PARIS
HAGUE BRU OSLO BONN LSBON MDRID ROME DELHI TOKYO PEKIN NDHQOTT/
ADMPO/DIPOL/CIS/DMPC PCOOTT/FOWLER
DISTR MINA MINE MINT PFR USS DMF DMFX REG PBR IFB CPD RSD
RCR SID SIDG IDD IDDZ IDR IMD IMU IMC JLA JLO GMD GMR ZSP ZSI
URR

REF OURTEL XYGR4149 29NOV

---TURK-CYPRIOU UDI:SOVIET POSITION

THERE HAS BEEN VERY LITTLE COVERAGE OF CYPRUS AND TURK-CYPRIOU
UDI AND EVEN LESS COMMENTARY IN SOVIET PRESS SINCE TASS
STATEMENT IN REFTEL. IF ONLY FOR THIS REASON ARTICLE IN 01DEC83
PRAVDA ENTITLED QUOTE BITTER LEMONS OF CYPRUS UNQUOTE BY A
VASILYEV IS WORTH NOTING.

2. DESCRIPTION OF SOVIET POSITION IS VERY STRAIGHTFORWARD:QUOTE
CYPRUS MUST REMAIN INDEPENDENT, SOVEREIGN, TERRITORIALY
INTEGRAL, FREE FROM ALL FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE AND FREE
TO PURSUE A POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT UNQUOTE. IN ADDITION USSR
SUPPORTS QUOTE RESUMPTION OF AN INTER-COMMUNAL DIALOGUE WITH
THE UN SECGENS MEDIATION UNQUOTE.

...2

PAGE TWO XYGR4202 CONFD

3. LESS STRAIGHT FORWARD HOWEVER, AND REFLECTING CONTINUING SOVIET DIFFICULTY IN PLEASING IMMEDIATE PARTIES TO CYPRUS DISPUTE, IS SOVIET EXPLANATION FOR RECENT DEVELOPMENTS. HERE CONSPIRACY THEORY AND CONCERN ABOUT ISLAND OF CYPRUS BECOMING PART OF NATO COMBINE TO PRODUCE ALLEGATION THAT IMPERIALIST FORCES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR TURNING CYPRUS INTO QUOTE YET ANOTHER SEAT OF TENSIONS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN UNQUOTE. USA WISHES QUOTE TO TRANSFORM CYPRUS INTO ITS OWN MILITARY JUMPING-OFF GROUND UNQUOTE AND THE AUTHOR NOTES THAT THE ISLAND IS 10/10 TO 30/30 MINUTES FLYING TIME FROM SYRIA, LEBANON, ISRAEL AND EGYPT AND IS IDEAL FOR NATO INSPIRED OPERATIONS IN MID EAST AND PERSIAN GULF. THE BRITISH, IT IS SAID, HAVE OFFERED THEIR BASES ON CYPRUS FOR USE BY AMERICAN RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE.

4. GREECE AND TURKEY ARE MENTIONED ONLY IN TERMS OF WSHGTS INTENTION TO SPUR MILITARY RIVALRY BETWEEN ATHENS AND ANKARA SPECIFICALLY TO FORCE LATTER TO SPEED UP REARMING AND FORMER TO ABANDON ITS INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY. SUPPORT IS EXPRESSED FOR SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION BUT TURKISH RECOGNITION OF UDI IS NEVER ACKNOWLEDGED.

5. AS FOR THE CYPRIOTS THEMSELVES PRAVDA AUTHOR BELIEVES QUOTE THERE ARE OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS UNQUOTE FOR THE GREEK AND TURKISH COMMUNITIES TO FIND COMMON GROUND, QUOTE ALTHOUGH THEY DO HAVE CERTAIN DIFFERENCES UNQUOTE. IF ONLY WSHDC AND LONDON WLD NOT/NOT INTERFERE ALL WLD BE WELL.

CCC/095 071157Z XYGR4202

NONCLASSIFIE

DE BONN ZQGR4128 07DEC83

A EXTOTT RSR LIVRAISON 071200

INFO BREEC BRU BNATO ATHNS PARIS LDN ROME HAGUE COPEN DUBLN LSBON
MDRID OSLO WSHDC MOSCO TOKYO PRMNY GENEV PCOOTT/FOWLER DELHI
NDHQOTT/ADMPL/DGIS/DMPC

DISTR MINA MINE FPR DMF DMFX RGB GGB RCM RCD IFM CPD RSD RCR SID
SIDG IDD IDDZ IDR IMD IMU IMC JLA JLO GMD ZSP ZSI URR

--DECLARATION KOHL AU BUNDESTAG 07DEC-SOMMET D ATHENES

VOUS FOURNISSONS TRADUCTION-MAISON D EXTRAIT DISCOURS KOHL

PRONONCE 0900 07DEC DEVANT BUNDESTAG.CETIE DECLARATION FUT

FAITE DANS CADRE DU DEBAT DE 3/3 JOURS DU BUNDESTAG SUR

BUDGET:CIT MALGRE RAPPROCHEMENTS DANS SERIE DE QUESTIONS.

DIFFERENCESD DANS SECTEURS VITAU N ONT PU ETRE RESOLUES.

JE NE CACHE PAS MA DECEPTION PROFONDE(...)NOUS APLANIRONS

LE CHEMIN PAR CONTACTS BILATERAUX AU COURS DES PROCHAINS MOIS

(...)ATHENES NE DOIT PAS SERVIR D OCCASION A RESIGNATION.

IL N EXISTE NI POUR NOUS NI POUR MES PARTENAIRES EUROPEENS

UNE ALTERNATIVE VALABLE A LA CEE.

PARA.VOICI POINTS OU NOUS DEMEURERONS FERMES:

(1)CRISE ACTUELLE DE CEE SE PREPARAIT DEPUIS DES ANNEES.

TOUTE SOLUTION(...)DOIT ETRE GLOBALE ET A LONG TERME(...)

NOUS NE DEVONS PAS DANS 1 OU 2 ANS NOUS RETROUVER DEVANT

PORBLEMES IDENTIQUES OU SEMBLABLES..

...2

28-6-1 - Hudson
Peace
Mission

PAGE DEUX ZQGR4128 NONCLAS

(2) POUR NOUS LE PAQUET DE STUTTGART EST UNE ENTITE INDIVISIBLE.

(3) CEE NE POURRA SORTIR DE CRISE QUE PAR DISCIPLINE BUDGETAIRE SEVERE. IL EST POLITIQUEMENT INACCEPTABLE QU E/M IMPOSE MESURES DIFFICILES A LEURS CITOYENS POUR METTRE DE L ORDRE DANS BUDGET NATIONAL ET QU ILS LAISSENT EN MEME TEMPS BUDGET DE CEE S AGRANDIR SANS LIMITE.(...)

3. NOUS APPUYONS ENTREE ESPAGNE ET PORTUGAL. NEGOCIATIONS DEVRAIENT ETRE TERMINEES AVANT ETE 84(...)

4. GOUV FEDERAL APPUYERA AUGMENTATION DE SA CONTRIBUTION A CEE. NECESSAIRE SUITE A ENTREE D ESPAGNE ET PORTUGAL. CEPENDANT, BUDGET COMMUNAUTAIRE DOIT ETRE STOPPE SURTOUT DANS DYNAMIQUE DES DEPENSES DU SECTEUR AGRICOLE. IL DOIT Y AVOIR UNE LIMITE MAXIMALE POUR LES CHARGES INSUPPORTABLES(...)

PARA. NOUS NOUS APPROCHONS D UNE SOLUTION DU PROBLEME PAIEMENTS COMPENSATOIRES AUX FRONTIERES, QUI JOUENT ROLE IMPORTANT DANS NOS RELATIONS AVEC FRANCE. RFA, SUR BASE DE SA FORCE ECONOMIQUE, FOURNIRA ENCORE A L AVENIR CONTRIBUTION LA PLUS IMPORTANT AU BUDGET COMMUNAUTAIRE. NOS PARTENAIRES RECONNAISSENT TOUTEFOIS QUE CONTRIBUTION ALLEMANDE NE PEUT PAS ETRE LA SEULE QUI SOIT ILLIMITEE.

PARA. NOUS N AVONS PAS PERMIS DE DETACHER LE PAQUET DE STUTTGART ET NOUS NE LE PERMETTRONS PAS A L AVENIR.

PARA(...). NE PAS PERDRE DE VUE LE GRANDE CADRE POLITIQUE DE

...3

PAGE TROISD ZQGR4127 NONCLAS

NOTRE POLITIQUE EUROPEENNE. NOUS, ALLEMANDS, DEVRIONS PERCEVOIR
ET ENCOURAGER CEE TOUT PARTICULIEREMENT DE SA PERSPECTIVE
HISTORIQUE ET POLITIQUE (...) ECONOMIQUEMENT, CEE A UNE
SIGNIFICATION EXISTENTIELLE POUR RFA.

PARA. EN ALLEMAGNE, NOUS NE DEVRIONS PAS OUBLIER QUE NOTRE DESIR
DE VAINCRE LE MUR ET LA DIVISION ALLEMANDE SE SITUE DANS UN
CADRE EUROPEEN. QUESTION ALLEMANDE ETAIT AUSSI UNE QUESTION
EUROPEENNE. NOUS AVONS BESOIN DE COMPREHENSION ET APPUI DE
NOS PARTENAIRES POUR REMPLIR DESIR DE NOTRE PEUPLE A
AUTODETERMINATION (...)

TOUS PARTENAIRES SONT APPELES A FAIRE DES COMPROMIS.

UUU/005 071510Z ZQGR4128

C O N F I D E N T I A L
FM BUCST UYGR3105 07DEC83
TO EXTOTT RBR

28-6-1- Trudeau
Peace
Mission

INFO LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU HAGUE
WSHDC MOSCO BNATO GENEV WSAW BPEST PRGUE BGRAD STKHM VIENN PCOOTT/
FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CIS/ADMPOL/PPP/DGIS PRMNY VMBFR
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGR URR RGB RBD FPR IDD IDR IDA IDDZ RBRD
IDX ZSP ZSI

---PM TRUDEAU INITIATIVE:FOLLOW-UP

AT DINNER YESTERDAY AMB C FLITAN, HEAD OF THE BUREAU OF ECONOMIC
AFFAIRS AND INNATL ORGS OF THE MFA, REITERATED THAT DOLGUS VISIT TO
OTT WAS NOT/NOT OF COURSE A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE PERSONAL INVITATION
FROM PRES CEAUSESCU TO PM TRUDEAU TO COME THROUGH BUCST IF PM DECIDED
TO UNDERTAKE SECOND PHASE OF HIS INITIATIVE. I WAS ASKED AGAIN TO MAKE
SURE THAT MY AUTHORITIES WERE AWARE OF THE HIGH INTEREST REGARDING
EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND PM INITIATIVE.

2. STEVE HANDLEMAN, CDN JOURNALIST FROM TOR STAR WHO JUST SPENT
FEW DAYS IN ROMANIA, WAS GRANTED ON 05DEC AN INTERVIEW BY PRES
CEAUSESCU. HE WAS THE FIRST CDN JOURNALIST TO OBTAIN THIS HONOUR. IN
THIS INTERVIEW (WHICH WILL BE PUBLISHED EDITED IN STAR, DEC10-FULL
TEXT BY BAG), PRES CEAUSESCU STATES THAT QUOTE WE GREATLY APPRECIATE
PM PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAUS PROPOSALS TO GET OUT OF CURRENT SITU AND
RESUME NEGS IN ORDER TO COME TO ACCORD. THERE ARE MANY COMMON OR
VERY CLOSE POINTS BETWEEN ROMANIAS AND CDN PMS PROPOSALS AS WELL AS

...2

PAGE TWO UYGR3105 CONF

BETWEEN THEIR PROPOSALS AND THOSE SET FORTH BY OTHER PERSONALITIES. OF COURSE, THE WORDING DIFFERS-AND IT IS ONLY NATURAL THAT IT SHOULD DO, BUT ALL OF THEM ARE AIMED AT HALTING DEPLOYMENT OF MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES, SCRAPPING OF ONES IN PLACE, ACHIEVEMENT OF DISARMAMENT AND A LASTING PEACE. FROM THAT ANGLE, THERE ARE MANY POINTS ROMANIAS AND CDAS PROPOSALS HAVE IN COMMON-AND WE DO HOPE THAT OUR COUNTRIES WILL COOPERATE EVEN MORE ACTIVELY FOR DISARMAMENT, FOR PEACE AND EQUAL COOPERATION AMONG ALL WORLD NATIONS. UNQUOTE. SAME VIEWS ARE DEVELOPED ELSEWHERE IN INTERVIEW. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT CEAUSESCUS APPARENT UNDERSTANDING OF PMS INITIATIVE MIGHT BE SOMEWHAT INCOMPLETE IN SENSE THAT HE APPEAR TO NARROW IT PARTICULARLY SOLUTION OF THE INF STALEMATE.

CCC/181 071140Z UYGR3105

MF

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

28-6-1 - Trudeau
Peace
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR3006 07DEC83

TO EXTOTT UGB IDDZ PCOOTT/FOWLER DELIVER BY 080830

INFO MOSCO BNATO ROME LDN BONN PARIS HAGUE BRU PEKIN PRMNY CNGNY

TOKYO DELHI NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/CPD PMOOTT/AXWORTHY

DISTR MINA USS DMF IDR IDA RGB IFB RBD RBR RCR URR

4 + 4 (+BUSH)

---PM MTG WITH REAGAN DEC15:MECHANICS

MEDAS SAYS MTG WITH REAGAN WILL BE IN OVAL OFFICE(RATHER THAN CABINET ROOM).THIS IS PREFERRED FORM OF MTG BUT OBVIOUSLY LIMITS NUMBERS TO 4 PLUS 4 PLUS BUSH(BUSH HAS DROIT D ENTREE FOR WLL

WHITE HOUSE MTGS AND THEREFORE IS NOT/NOT COUNTED).USA FOUR WOULD BE REAGAN,NSC ADVISER MCFARLANE,SHULTZ AND NOTE TAKER.

2.ON EXIT FROM WHITE HOUSE,STANDARD FORMAT FOR HEAD OF GOVT AFTER SUCH MTG IS DEPARTURE FROM WEST WING EXIT AT FRONT(FACING PENNSYLVANIA AVE).REAGAN DOES NOT/NOT APPEAR OUTSIDE WITH THE VISITOR.THERE IS BANK OF MICROPHONES BEFORE ASSEMBLED PRESS AND VISITOR MAKES STATEMENT AND THEN CAN TAKE QUESTIONS OR NOT/NOT AS HE WISHES.

CCC/241 072238Z UNGR3006

28-6-1 - Judean
Peace
Mission

R E S T R I C T E D

FM BNATO YBGR2507 07DEC83

TO EXTOTT IDR DELIVER BY 071400

INFO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD/DIPOL PCOOTT/FOWLER MDRID DELIVER BY
071900

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD IDDZ RGB RSD RSR TDO TAD TAF RST

REF YOURTEL IDR4705 07DEC

--NATO MINISTERIAL:SSEA/SPANISH FM BILATERAL

SPANISH DEL INFORMED US THAT DUE TO MDRID AIRPORT TRAGEDY
FM MORAN CANNOT/NOT TAKE OFF FROM MDRID TONIGHT AND WILL HAVE
TO LEAVE MDRID EARLY MORNING 08DEC ON MILITARY AIRCRAFT
TO MAKE IT JUST IN TIME FOR BEGINNING OF NAC.SSEA/MORAN MTG
HAS NOW BEEN POSTPONED UNTIL(TENTATIVELY)1430 DEC08.

CCC/298 071745Z YBGR2507

MF

R E S T R I C T E D

FM EXTOTT IMU2082 07DEC83

TO PRMNY

INFO WSHDC CNGNY

DISTR LDDZ

REF MIDDLETON/LEE TELECON 07DEC83

28-6-1 - Hudson
Peace
Mission

---VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER TO NEW YORK

AS YOU MENTIONED TO US THE SECRETARY GENERAL CAN SEE THE PRIME
MINISTER AT 4:30 PM ON THUR 15DEC. WE SHALL OBVIOUSLY PROVIDE YOU
WITH FURTHER DETAILS BUT FOR MOMENT WE UNDERSTAND THAT PM WILL
ARRIVE FROM WSHDC AFTER HE HAS MET WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN IN THE
MORNING. HE WILL SPEND THE NIGHT IN NEW YORK, GIVE A TELEVISION
INTERVIEW EARLY 16DEC AND RETURN TO OTT THAT DAY.

CCC/099 072225Z IMU2082

send to IDDZ

*Blk
7/12/83*

*28-6-1 - Bureau
Peace
Mission*

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BNATO YBDR1869 07DEC83

TO EXTOTT IDR

DELIVER BY 071300

INFO NDHQOTT/ADM(POL)/CPP/DIPOL/DSTRATA/CORAE/DGINFO WSHDC LDN
PARIS BONN ROME COPEN HAGUE ATHNS ANKRA LSBON OSLO BRU MOSCO
WSAW PRGUE BPEST BUCST BGRAD VMBFR TOKYO PEKIN PCOOTT/ARCHDEACON
DISTR MINA MINE USS DMF IFB IDD IDA CPD RBR RCM RSR PSR GMR ZSI FPP

--DPC MINISTERIAL:FINAL COMMUNIQUE

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE RELEASED AT END OF DPC
MINISTERIAL.

2.QUOTE:

- 1.THE DEFENCE PLANNING CTTEE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY ORGANIZATION MET IN MINISTERIAL SESSION IN BRU ON
6TH AND 7DEC 1983.
- 2.MINISTERS REAFFIRMED THAT NATO PRESERVES THE PEACE,
FREEDOM AND SECURITY OF ITS MEMBERS THROUGH THE MAINTENANCE
OF MILITARY FORCES SUFFICIENT TO DETER AGGRESSION AND THROUGH
POLICIES DESIGNED TO PROMOTE STABLE INNATL RELATIONS.
THE STRENGTH OF THE ALLIANCE DERIVES FROM THE COHESION AND
SOLIDARITY OF ITS MEMBERS IN PURSUING THESE COMMON OBJECTIVES.
- 3.NATO IS A DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE AND IS COMMITTED TO
PRESERVE THE PEACE AT THE LOWEST LEVEL OF FORCES CAPABLE
OF DETERRING THE WARSAW PACT THREAT.IN THIS RESPECT
MINISTERS RECALLED THE RECENT ALLIANCE DECISION AT MONTEBELLO

...2

PAGE TWO YBDR1869 UNCLAS

TO WITHDRAW 1,400 NUCLEAR WARHEADS FROM EUROPE. THIS DECISION, TAKEN TOGETHER WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF 1,300 WARHEADS IN 1980, WILL BRING TO 2,400 THE TOTAL NUMBER OF WARHEADS TO BE REMOVED FROM EUROPE SINCE 1979. THE RESULTING STOCKPILE WILL BE THE LOWEST IN EUROPE FOR SOME 20 YEARS. FURTHERMORE ANY DEPLOYMENT OF LAND-BASED LRINF MISSILES WILL BE MATCHED BY ONE FOR ONE WITHDRAWALS. THIS IS IN CLEAR CONTRAST TO THE RELENTLESS SOVIET BUILDUP. MINISTERS URGED THE SOVIET UNION TO MATCH NATOS RESTRAINT AND TO REDUCE RATHER THAN CONTINUE TO INCREASE THE LEVELS OF ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

4. DETERRENCE AND ARMS CONTROL ARE INTEGRAL AND COMPLEMENTARY PARTS OF THE SECURITY POLICY OF THE ALLIANCE. BOTH ARE FUNDAMENTAL TO NATOS LONG-STANDING OBJECTIVES OF SAFEGUARDING THE PEACE AND PURSUING, THROUGH DIALOGUE AND MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS CO-OPERATION, A CONSTRUCTIVE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP AIMED AT GENUINE DETENTE. THEREFORE, WHILE SEEKING A STABLE BALANCE AT LOWER LEVELS OF FORCES THROUGH MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT, EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, NATO MUST CONTINUE AT THE SAME TIME TO PROVIDE THE CAPABILITIES NECESSARY TO ENSURE DETERRENCE OF AGGRESSION BY MEANS OF A STRONG DEFENCE.

5. THE SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE DEPENDS ON THE MAINTENANCE OF A STABLE MILITARY BALANCE: THIS BALANCE HAS

...3

PAGE THREE YBDR1869 UNCLAS

BEEN GRAVELY DISTURBED BY THE RENLENTLESS SOVIET DEPLOYMENT OF SS-20 MISSILES. MINISTERS EMPHASIZED THEIR DETERMINATION TO MOVE AHEAD WITH THE DUAL-TRACK APPROACH OF LRINF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL AS OFFERING THE OPPORTUNITY TO REDRESS THIS IMBALANCE AND REAFFIRMED THAT THIS APPROACH REMAINS THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF SAFEGUARDING THE SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE.

-THEY NOTED WITH GREAT REGRET THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD UNILATERALLY ENDED THE LATEST ROUND OF THE INF NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA WITHOUT AGREEING ON A DATE FOR THEIR RESUMPTION. THERE IS NO/NO JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS ACTION BY THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH HAS, DURING THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS SINCE THE UNITED STATES PROPOSED TO ELIMINATE THIS ENTIRE CLASS OF WEAPONS, EXPANDED ITS SS-20 FORCE BY OVER 300 WARHEADS. MINISTERS EMPHASIZED THEIR DESIRE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS BE RESUMED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT ON EQUAL GLOBAL LIMITS ON UNITED STATES AND SOVIET LRINF MISSILE WARHEADS AT REDUCED LEVELS, PREFERABLY ZERO FOR BOTH SIDES.

-THEY REAFFIRMED THAT NATO IS PREPARED, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF ANY INF AGREEMENT

...4

PAGE FOUR YBDR1869 UNCLAS

THAT MAY BE REACHED, TO HALT, MODIFY OR REVERSE
ITS DEPLOYMENTS, WHICH ARE NOW UNDERWAY IN
CONFORMITY WITH THE 1979 DECISION.

-THEY WELCOMED THE CONTINUING CLOSE CONSULTATIONS
WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ON INF NEGOTIATIONS. THE
INTENSITY OF THESE CONSULTATIONS HAS REFLECTED THE
COHESION OF THE ALLIANCE. THEY STRESSED THAT
ALLIANCE FIRMNESS IN RESOLUTELY CARRYING OUT THE
DUAL-TRACK DECISION WAS A MAJOR FACTOR IN BRINGING
THE SOVIET UNION TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE AND WILL
CONTINUE TO BE A CRITICAL FACTOR IN INDUCING THE
SOVIET UNION TO RECOMMENCE INF NEGOTIATIONS IN A
SERIOUS FASHION. (1) FOOTNOTE (1) DENMARK AND GREECE RESERVE
THEIR POSITIONS ON PARA 5.

6. MINISTERS WELCOMED THE PROPOSALS THE UNITED STATES
HAS MADE IN THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS TO REDUCE THE
MOST DESTABILIZING WEAPONS AND TO REDUCE SUBSTANTIALLY THE
LEVEL OF UNITED STATES AND SOVIET STRATEGIC ARMS, INCLUDING
THE BUILD-DOWN CONCEPT RECENTLY TABLED IN GENEV. MINISTERS
REEMPHASIZED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED STATES POSITION IN
THE TALKS, ON WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KEPT FULLY INFORMED, AND
WELCOMED THE UNITED STATES INITIATIVES TO MOVE THE TALKS
FORWARD. MINISTERS REAFFIRMED THE NEED TO STRIVE FOR A
MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE ISSUES STILL BARRING

...5

PAGE FIVE YBDR1969 UNCLAS

PROGRESS IN THE MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS(MBFR) TALKS IN VIENN.THEY ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACH TO THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE(CDE)AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO NEGOTIATE POLITICALLY BINDING,MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT AND VERIFIABLE MEASURES WHICH WILL COVER THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AND WHICH WOULD INCREASE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND REDUCE THE THREAT OF SURPRISE ATTACK.

7.MINISTERS NOTED WITH CONCERN THE PACE OF MODERNIZATION OF WARSAW PACT FORCES ACROSS THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM,STRATEGIC TO CONVENTIONAL.IN THE FACE OF THIS STEADY ACCUMULATION OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER,THE ALLIANCE MUST TAKE THE NECESSARY MEASURES TO PRESERVE THE SECURITY OF ITS PEOPLES.NATOS STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND FORWARD DEFENCE REMAINS VALID AND CONTINUES TO BE THE BASIS FOR NATO DEFENCE.THIS REQUIRES A BALANCED TRIAD OF FORCES: THE STRENGTHENING OF THE CONVENTIONAL COMPONENT IS PARTICULARLY URGENT.AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND MINISTERS DISCUSSED THE RESULTS OF THE 1983 ANNUAL DEFENCE REVIEW AND ADOPTED THE NATO FORCE PLAN FOR 1984-1988.MINISTERS WELCOMED THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED BY NATIONS,AND AGREED TO DO THEIR UTMOST TO MAKE AVAILABLE THE RESOURCES NEEDED FOR THE ESSENTIAL ENHANCEMENT OF THEIR DEFEPRENT AND DEFENCE FORCES.

...6

PAGE SIX YBDR1869 UNCLAS

8. THEY RECOGNIZED THAT IN CURRENT ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES ACHIEVING THE REQUIRED IMPROVEMENTS TO NATOS DEFENCE POSTURE CONSTITUTES A CONSIDERABLE CHALLENGE. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT NATIONAL CONSIDERATION OF ANY CHANGE TO EXISTING COMMITMENTS TAKES INTO ACCOUNT ALLIANCE NEEDS AND PRIORITIES. THE BEST USE OF SCARCE RESOURCES REMAINS A CENTRAL PROBLEM. IMPROVEMENTS TO THE COMBAT CAPABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF NATOS CONVENTIONAL FORCES MUST BE ACHIEVED.

9. IN THIS CONTEXT MINISTERS EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF MAKING THE MOST EFFECTIVE USE OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES AND OF EXPLOITING NATOS TECHNOLOGICAL STRENGTH THROUGH GREATER EMPHASIS ON:

-CO-OPERATION AND CO-ORDINATION IN DEFENCE PLANNING AND IN THE FIELD OF RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION;

-IMPROVED CO-ORDINATION OF NATO INFRASTRUCTURE PLANNING TO BRING SUPPORT FACILITIES MORE INTO LINE WITH THE PROJECTED NEEDS OF NATO FORCES, AT THE SAME TIME AS PROVIDING AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF FUNDING TO ENSURE THEIR OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS;

-A MORE EFFECTIVE AND BALANCED FRAMEWORK OF

...7

PAGE SEVEN YBDR1869 UNCLAS

TRANSLANTIC CO-OPERATION;

-THE POTENTIAL OFFERED BY TECHNOLOGIES, AVAILABLE
OR EMERGING, TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL AND YET AFFORDABLE
IMPROVEMENTS IN THE CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE OF THE
ALLIANCE PARTICULARLY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE
TWO-WAY STREET;

-THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PRIORITIES BASED ON THE
APPLICATION OF RIGOROUS CRITERIA OF MILITARY VALUE
AND COST EFFECTIVENESS;

-ADEQUATE USE OF THE INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITIES OF
MEMBER COUNTRIES IN THE FIELD OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT;

-EFFECTIVE STEPS TO RESTRICT THE TRANSFER OF
MILITARILY RELEVANT TECHNOLOGY TO THE WARSAW PACT;

MINISTERS ACKNOWLEDGED PROGRESS MADE IN THE APPROPRIATE NATO
BODIES TOWARDS CO-ORDINATING NATIONAL EFFORTS GENERALLY AND IN
ENSURING THE SUCCESSFUL EXPLOITATION OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES.

10. MINISTERS AGAIN STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF GREECE,
PORTUGAL AND TURKEY HAVING ADEQUATE ALLIED ASSISTANCE TO
CARRY OUT THEIR MISSIONS MORE EFFECTIVELY TO THE ADVANTAGE
OF ALL. MINISTERS AGREED THAT DESPITE COMMENDABLE EFFORTS
BY SOME ALLIES MORE AID, AND BY MORE NATIONS, IS ESSENTIAL.

11. WHILE THE PURPOSE OF NATO IS TO PRESERVE THE
SECURITY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY AREA, MINISTERS AGAIN,

...8

PAGE EIGHT YBDR1869 UNCLAS

ACKNOWLEDGED THAT DEVELOPMENTS OUTSIDE THE NATO TREATY AREA MIGHT THREATEN THE VITAL INTERESTS OF MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE. THEY RECALLED THEIR AGREEMENT TO TAKE FULL ACCOUNT OF THE EFFECT OF SUCH DEVELOPMENTS ON NATO SECURITY, DEFENCE CAPABILITIES AND THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF MEMBER COUNTRIES AND THE NEED TO CONSULT AND TO SHARE ASSESSMENTS ON THE BASIS OF COMMONLY IDENTIFIED OBJECTIVES. THEY ALSO RECALLED THE BONN SUMMIT STATEMENTS AND REENDORSED THEIR COMMUNIQUE OF JUNE 1983 WHICH STATED THAT ON THE BASIS OF NATIONAL DECISION: THOSE COUNTRIES, SUCH AS THE UNITED STATES, WHICH HAVE THE MEANS TO TAKE ACTION, SHOULD DO SO IN TIMELY CONSULTATION WITH THEIR ALLIES; THERE COULD BE CASES WHERE OTHER INDIVIDUAL ALLIED NATIONS WOULD MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE BY MAKING AVAILABLE FACILITIES TO ASSIST DEPLOYMENTS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE IN SUCH AREAS; AND MEMBER NATIONS, AS THEY MAY DECIDE, HAVE A WIDE AND DIVERSE RANGE OF POSSIBILITIES FROM WHICH TO CHOOSE IN MAKING USEFUL CONTRIBUTIONS TO PROMOTE STABILITY AND DETERRENCE IN REGIONS OUTSIDE THE TREATY AREA INVOLVING VITAL WESTERN INTERESTS.

12. AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF UNITED STATES PLANNING FOR ITS RAPIDLY DEPLOYABLE FORCES AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR DEFENCE OF THE NATO AREA, MINISTERS NOTED WORK IN PROGRESS

...9

PAGE NINE YBDP1869 UNCLAS

TO REVIEW MEASURES NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN DETERRENT AND DEFENCE CAPABILITIES WITHIN THE NATO AREA AND AGREED THAT MEASURES THAT COULD BE TAKEN BY COUNTRIES WOULD BE DEALT WITH IN THE DEFENCE PLANNING PROCESS, THE NEXT STAGE OF WHICH IS THE ADOPTION OF FORCE GOALS IN SPRING 1984.

13. NATOS TASK OF PRESERVING PEACE AND FREEDOM AND PREVENTING WAR REQUIRES A FULL SPECTRUM OF CREDIBLE MILITARY FORCES, A STABLE MILITARY BALANCE AND THE STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. THE FIRM SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLES OF THE ALLIANCE AND THE PROVISION AND EFFECTIVE USE OF ADEQUATE RESOURCES ARE ESSENTIAL TO FULFIL THESE AIMS. WHILE MILITARY STRENGTH ALONE CANNOT/NOT PROVIDE LONG-TERM SECURITY IT PROVIDES THE FOUNDATION FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEACEFUL RELATIONS THROUGH DIALOGUE AND COMMUNICATION.

THE MINISTERS OF DEFENCE OF SPAIN INFORMED THE DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE ABOUT THE REVIEW UNDERTAKEN REGARDING SPANISH PARTICIPATION IN THE ALLIANCE AND IN CONSEQUENCE RESERVED HIS GOVTS POSITION ON THE PRESENT COMMUNIQUE.
UNQUOTE.

UUU/298 071559Z YBDR1869

CORRECTED COPY
EXEMPLAIRE CORRIGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CORRECTED COPY PARA 7/7(E)

FM CNBRA YASV1582 08DEC83

TO EXTOTT PED IMD IMMED

INFO PRMNY WSHDC LDN DELHI WLGTN SPORE KNGTN BNGKK BDGTN TAVIV

PCOTT/OSBALDESTON/FOWLER/DURAND/CARON FINOTT/CLORIEUX IMMED

DISTR USS MINA MINE DMF DMT IDDZ RSR IMC GAA PER PPR GAT PSR LCD

LCR EFB EED EPD EER EEF EEA EPT

REF OURTEL YAGR1907 07DEC KGNTN TEL XHGR2833 07DEC83

---VISIT OF PM HAWKE TO BNGKK AND DELHI

H/W CORRECTED PARA 7/7(E) OF REFTEL.QUOTE...

(E)CHOGRM: THROUGH BILATERAL AND INFORMAL MTGS WITH PACIFIC ISLAND
PMS IT WAS AGREED THAT NEXT CHOGRM SCHEDULED FOR PNG 1984 WOULD BE
LTD TO HALF DAY MTG ON OCCASION OF OPENING OF NEW PNG PARLIAMENT
BLDG. IT MAY WELL BE THAT WE HAVE SEEN LAST FORMAL CHOGRM MTG TAKE
PLACE; (F)ETC...UNQUOTE.

CCC/040 072155Z YASV1582

28-6-1 - Trudeau
Peace
Mission

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

D I F F U S I O N R E S T R E I N T E

DE MDRID XQGR1121 07DEC83

A EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO LDN BONN ANKRA COPEN OSLO HAGUE WSHDC TOKYO PEKIN GNGNY PRMNY
MOSCO DELHI BRU VMBFR PARIS LSBON ROME ATHNS

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB RGB RSD RCD IDD IDR IDA FPR RSR

---REACTIONS PRELIMINAIRES ESPAGNOLES A LETTRE DU PM DU 16NOV

A L OCCASION D UN DEJEUNER AVEC JUAN MANUEL CABRERA, CONSEILLER
DIPLOMATIQUE A PRESIDENCE DU GOUVERNEMENT, CE DERNIER NS A INDIQUE
QUE REPONSE DU PRESIDENT GONZALEZ A LETTRE DU PM DU 16NOV ETAIT EN
VOIE DE PREPARATION ET QUE, SI ELLE NE POUVAIT NS ETRE TRANSMISE
AVANT VOYAGE DU PRESIDENT EN ARGENTINE LE 09 COURANT, ELLE NS SERAIT
COMMUNIQUEE PEU APRES SON RETOUR A MADRID.


2. D APRES CABRERA, LETTRE DU PRESIDENT AU PM APPUIERA PROPOSITION
D UNE REPRESENTATION POLITIQUE DE HAUT NIVEAU A LA CDE. (PRESIDENT
POURRAIT S Y RENDRE ADVENANT QUE PARTICIPANTS A CONFERENCE CROIENT
UTILE PRESENCE A CE NIVEAU). LETTRE APPUIERA EGALEMENT PROPOSITION
SUR MBFR BIEN QUE REUNION DE VIENNE NE CONCERNE PAS DIRECTEMENT
L ESPAGNE QUI NE PARTICIPE PAS A SES TRAVAUX. ENFIN, LETTRE EXPRIMERA
PROBABLEMENT SOUHAIT DU PRESIDENT GONZALEZ DE RENCONTRER LE PM A
MADRID ADVENANT QU IL DECIDE D EFFECTUER UNE SECONDE TOURNEE
EUROPEENNE DANS CADRE SON INITIATIVE DE PAIX.

3. CONTACT AVEC CABRERA RECONFIRME INTERET REEL DU PRESIDENT POUR
INITIATIVE TRUDEAU; MEME SI APPUI EST ASSURE, IL NE SEMBLE PAS QU
PROPOSITIONS ADDITIONNELLES DOIVENT ETRE ATTENDUES DU PRESIDENT
GONZALEZ.

CCC/290 071730Z XQGR1121

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
mission

C O N F I D E N T I E L
DE EXTOTT RCR0540 07DEC83
A BNATO FLASH



INFO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/PPP/DIPOL/BONN WSHDC PARIS ROME LDN HAGUE
MOSCO

DISTR MINA IDD (IDDZ RBR RGB DMF IDA IDR RSR PSR EER FPR URR IDRL
IDRA

---INITIATIVE PM ET PROJET DECLARATION RFA:RENCONTRE AMBASSADEUR
RFA-DMF

PRIERE PORTER TEL A CONNAISSANCE SEAE AVANT SON PETIT-DEJEUNER
AVEC MAE GENSCHER 08DEC.

2.AMB A REMIS LORS DE RENCONTRE REPONSE CHANCELIER KOHL (TEXTE
ENVOYE PAR TER IDDZ0257,07DEC) A RECENTE LETTRE DU PM AVISANT
KOHL PROGRES DE SON INITIATIVE.KOHL ENCOURAGE PM A POURSUIVRE ET
IL EST CLAIR QU INITIATIVE A DEJA POUR EFFET D ENCOURAGER RFA A
POURSUIVRE SON PROPRE EFFORT DANS MBFR.AMB A PAR AILLEURS REMIS
LETTRE DE GENSCHER A SEAE REQUERANT SOUTIEN CDN AU PROJET DE
DECLARATION ALLEMANDE POUR REUNION MINISTERIELLE OTAN (REF TELS
BNATO YBGR8676,8677,05DEC).

3.SUR PROJET DECLARATION GENSCHER,AMB SOULIGNAIT IMPORTANCE QUE
RFA Y ATTACHE ET FAISANT PARALLELE AU SOUTIEN ALLEMAND POUR
INITIATIVE PM DISAIT COMPTER SUR APPUI DU CANADA.DMF A DIT
QU EXAMINERIONS PROJET AVEC GRANDE SYMPATHIE ET QU A MOINS D Y

.../2

PAGE DEUX RCR0540 CONF

DECELER PROBLEMES IMPORTANTS ESPERIONS POUVOIR SUPPORTER.

TEL IDR4669 05DEC SUPPORTANT INITIATIVE RFA,REFERE DONC.

4.AMB S INTERESSAIT AUSSI AUX VUES CDNES SUR REUNION OTAN.DMF A
RAPPELE GRANDS POINTS DE NOTRE POSITION: A)SEAE EXPRIMERAIT AVEC
EMPHASE SATISFACTION AVOIR VU ALLIANCE MAINTENIR UNITE DE
DETERMINATION MALGRE EFFORT ENORME CONSENTI PAR SOVIETS POUR
SUBVERTIR NOS OPINIONS PUBLIQUES;B)SEAE PRET A EXPLIQUER MOTIVATION
DERRIERE INITIATIVE DU PM ET EMPHASE ET DIRECTION PRESENTE POUR
REVIGORER DIALOGUE ENTRE SUPER-PUISSANCES;C)SEAE TENTERA OBTENIR
CONSENSUS PARMY SES COLLEGUES POUR QUE CDE SOIT LANCÉE AVEC UN
PROFILE POLITIQUE ELEVE.DONNANT SIGNAL CLAIR D UNE VOLONTE POLITI-
QUE.CE QUE NOUS SAVONS ETRE CHER AUX ALLEMANDS ET D)SEAE DEFENDRA
IDEE QU UN ACCORD OCCIDENTAL SOIT REALISE POUR PRESENTATION LPTP
AUX MBFR ET POUR PRESENTATION AU NIVEAU DES MINISTRES.

5.ORIENTATION STRATEGIQUE D OTAN:EN REPOSE A QUESTION D AMB
VOULANT SAVOIR SI C ETAIT INTENTION SEAE SOULEVER CETTE QUESTION
SUR LAQUELLE BONN A DES RESERVES SERIEUSES,DMF A SOULIGNE QUE
VUES CDNES REJOIGNAIENT CELLES RFA ENONCEES PAR AMB SAVOIR QUE
SEAE NE SOULEVERAIT PAS FORMELLEMENT MAIS PRENDRAIT PEUT-ETRE
APPROCHE PLUS DISCRETE DE SONDER CIT PRIVEMENT FINCIT SES COLLEGUES.

6.EN RENCONTRE SEPARÉE,G SMITH IDDZ,A INFORME AMB DE DEROULEMENT
VISITE RECENTE PEARSON A MOSCOU.

CCC/025 072017Z RCR0540

PAGE TWO UNGR2500 CONF

5. IT THEREFORE APPEARS THAT VISIT TO WSHDC WOULD BE FOR PURPOSES OF MTG WITH REAGAN ONLY. STATE DEPT HAS INFORMALLY ASKED WITHOUT HAVING CONSULTED MR SHULTZ IF LUNCH HOSTED BY SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD BE IN ORDER AND WE SAID THAT WE UNDERSTOOD PM TRUDEAU WOULD HAVE TO GET AWAY TO NYORK RIGHT AFTER MTG WITH REAGAN. WE PRESUME THIS IS CORRECT AND WOULD ALSO APPLY IF LUNCHEON HOSTED BY BUSH WERE PROPOSED. BUT SHORT MTG WITH VP BUSH WOULD BE IN ORDER IF PM TRUDEAU AGREES. WE INFORMED BUSH'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER THIS MORNING THAT VISIT DATES WERE NOW SET. IN VIEW OF MTG WHICH PM HAD IN OTT WITH BUSH WHICH WE KNOW PM HAD VALUED, WE THOUGHT IT LIKELY PM WOULD AT LEAST LIKE TO SAY HELLO AND HAVE A CHAT JUST BEFORE OR AFTER REAGAN MTG, PARTICULARLY IF BUSH WERE NOT/NOT ATTENDING MTG WITH PRESIDENT.

6. PLS ADVISE.

CC/241 062330Z UNGR2500

CCC/230 071457Z UNGR2500



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

FM/DE
TO/À
INFO
DISTR
REF
SUBJ/SUJ

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0255 06DEC83
TO BNATO DELIVER BY 070900
INFO BUCST LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO
DISTR BRU HAGUE WSHDC MOSCO GENEV WSAW BPEST PRGUE BGRAD STKHM VMBFR
REF PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CIS/ADMPOL/PPP/DNACPOL/CIS PRMNY
SUBJ/SUJ DISTR MINA MINE USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR RBD FPR IDD
IDRA IDA RBRD ZSP RBP ZSI **IDR**
REF OURTEL IDR4649 05DEC
---INF:ROMANIAN INITIATIVE:SPECIAL ENVOY TO USA AND CDA
REC 5
SUMMARY:ROMANIAN VICE FORMIN DOLGU PRESENTED CEAUCESCU PROPOSALS FOR
FREEZE ON INF DEPLOYMENT, RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND ULTIMATELY
REMOVAL OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM EUROPE. ROMANIAN INITIATIVE, HE
SAID, DOES NOT/NOT STAND OR FALL BY ANY OF ITS COMPROMISE PROPOSALS:
MAIN OBJECTIVE IS TO CONTRIBUTE TO RESUMPTION OF EAST/WEST DIALOGUE.
HE ASKED THAT PROPOSAL BE CONVEYED TO PM TRUDEAU TOGETHER WITH
RENEWED INVITATION TO VISIT BUCST FOR CONSULTATIONS. DMF EXPLAINED
THAT CDA WAS COMMITTED TO NATO POSITION ON INF. ALTHOUGH CDN AND
ROMANIAN INITIATIVES SOUGHT SAME ULTIMATE GOAL, IMPROVEMENT OF EAST/
WEST DIALOGUE, ROMANIANS WERE CONCENTRATING ON INF WHILE WE WERE
TRYING TO WORK AROUND IT. WE COULD NOT/NOT SUPPORT ROMANIAN COMPRO-
MISE PROPOSALS, WHICH WOULD HAVE EFFECT OF PRESERVING SOVIET ADVAN-
TAGE AND REMOVING THEIR INCENTIVE TO NEGOTIATE. DOLGU WAS BRIEFED ON
PM TRUDEAU'S INITIATIVE AND PROPOSALS, WHICH HE SAID WOULD BE GIVEN

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG *[Signature]* HANSON/SMITH/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG *[Signature]* G. SMITH



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PAGE TWO. IDDZ0255 CONFD

12

10

SERIOUS CONSIDERATION IN BUCST. HE INDICATED THAT ROMANIA WAS CON-
SIDERING PARTICIPATION AT STKHM AT FORMIN LEVEL BUT NO/NO DECISION
YET TAKEN. COMPARISON OF NOTES ON RECENT CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCO
BROADENED INTO MORE GENERAL DISCUSSION OF STATE OF AFFAIRS IN SOVIET
LEADERSHIP. IN MTGS WITH BOTH MINE AND DMF DOLGU CREATED POSITIVE
IMPRESSION AS ABLE AND FORTHCOMING INTERLOCUTOR.

2. REPORT: ROMANIAN VICE MIN OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS GEORGHIE DOLGU,
ACCOMPANIED BY ROMANIAN AMB RODEAN AND HEAD OF ROMANIAN MFA NORTH
AMERICA BUREAU RACEANU, MET WITH DMF FOR TWO AND A QUARTER HOURS ON
05 DEC, AND LATER WITH MINE FOR ONE HOUR. SMITH (IDDZ) AND HANSON (IDR)
PARTICIPATED IN BOTH MTGS. MAWHINNEY (RBR) AND LAVERDURE (O/MINE) ALSO
PARTICIPATED IN MTG WITH MINE. PURPOSE OF VISIT WAS TO EXPLAIN
ROMANIAN INITIATIVE, PRESENT PROPOSALS ON INF, AND RENEW INVITATION TO
PM TRUDEAU TO VISIT BUCST FOR DISCUSSIONS.

3. DOLGU HAD JUST COME FROM WSHDC AND QUOTED EAGLEBURGER AS TELLING
HIM THAT HE WOULD RECEIVE MORE FAVOURABLE HEARING IN CDA THAN USA.
IN WSHDC HE HAD ALSO SEEN BURT AND ADELMAN.

4. DOLGU EXPLAINED THAT PRES CEAUCESCU HAD BEEN DEEPLY CONCERNED BY
IMPENDING NATO DEPLOYMENTS AND ANNOUNCEMENT BY USSR OF WITHDRAWAL
FROM INF NEGS, AND HAD THEREFORE DECIDED TO UNDERTAKE SPECIAL
INITIATIVE AND DESPATCH ENVOYS TO VARIOUS CAPITALS. ROMANIA HAD NEVER
AGREED WITH USSR ON NEED FOR COUNTERMEASURES, AND HAD NEVER SUPPORTED
WSAW PACT DOCUS (PRGUE, SOFIA) PROVIDING FOR SUCH COUNTERMEASURES.

3



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12 | 10

PAGE THREE IDDZ0255 CONFD

FOLLOWING ANDROPOV STATEMENT 24NOV, EXEC CTTEE OF ROMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL CTTEE HAD ISSUED DECLARATION DESCRIBING BOTH NATO DEPLOYMENTS AND SOVIET COUNTERMEASURES AS UNJUSTIFIED, LEADING TO FURTHER DETERIORATION OF SITUATION IN EUROPE AND INCREASING DANGER OF NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE. STATEMENT DID NOT/NOT SEEK TO APPORTION BLAME BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

5. ROMANIAN AIM WAS TO CONTRIBUTE TO RESUMPTION OF TALKS AND ULTIMATELY TO AGREEMENT. COMPROMISE PROPOSALS ON INF WERE NOT/NOT REPRESENTED AS ALL-INCLUSIVE, BUT AS ATTEMPT TO INDICATE FORM FIRST STEPS TO FINAL AGREEMENT MIGHT TAKE. USA WAS ASKED TO HALT DEPLOYMENT, AND USSR TO RECONSIDER COUNTERMEASURES. PROPOSALS ALSO INCLUDED MTGS BETWEEN USA AND USSR AT FORMIN AND SUMMIT LEVELS, NATO/WSAW PACT MTG ON INF IN GENEV, TO ASSIST USA AND USSR IN REACHING AGREEMENT, ACCELERATION OF MBFR TALKS WITH AIM OF ACHIEVING SOME RESULT IN 1984, AND CONF ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. DOLGU ASKED THAT THESE PROPOSALS BE CONVEYED TO PM TRUDEAU, WITH SUGGESTION THAT TWO COUNTRIES MIGHT WORK TOGETHER TO HELP FIND WAY OUT OF IMPASSE.

6. ROMANIA, SAID DOLGU, DID NOT/NOT AGREE WITH SOVIET DENIAL THAT INTRODUCTION OF SS-20S HAD RESULTED IN IMBALANCE. TO THEM ZERO OPTION MEANT NO/NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF ANY KIND IN EUROPE. SINCE UK WAS MEMBER OF NATO DEFENCE ORGANIZATION AND FRANCE OF ALLIANCE, IT WAS SUITABLE TO TAKE THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO ACCOUNT FROM OUTSET.

GIVEN DIFFICULTY IN DOING SO, HOWEVER, THIS MIGHT BE DONE AT LATER



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12 | 10
PAGE FOUR IDDZ0255 CONF D
STAGE WITH FRENCH AND BRITISH PARTICIPATION.
7. IN RESPONSE, DMF NOTED THAT CDN POSITION ON INF WAS PREDICATED ON
NATO MEMBERSHIP AND RECOGNITION OF NEED TO MAINTAIN CLEAR AND
VIGOROUS SOLIDARITY IN IMPLEMENTATION OF JOINT DECISION. INF CALENDAR
WAS UNFOLDING UNHAPPILY BUT INEVITABLY. FOR THESE REASONS PM, ALTHOUGH
SHARING ROMANIAN CONCERN OVER GRAVITY OF INNATL SITUATION, HAD DELIB-
ERATELY AVOIDED INF ISSUE IN PURSUIT OF HIS INITIATIVE.
8. ROMANIANS, DMF NOTED, HAD OPPOSED SOVIET COUNTERMEASURES: THIS
OBVIOUSLY STEMMED FROM ROMANIAN UNDERSTANDING THAT PRIOR TO NATO
DEPLOYMENTS THERE HAD BEEN IMBALANCE IN EUROPEAN THEATRE CREATED BY
SOVIET DEPLOYMENT OF SS-20S. OFFICIALLY, SAID DOLGU, ROMANIANS HAD NEVER
BEEN THAT SPECIFIC. THEY CONSIDERED THAT STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES ON
BOTH SIDES WERE SO LARGE THAT NO/NO OTHERS WERE NEEDED. IN PARTICULAR,
EUROPE HAD NO/NO NEED FOR INF. OFF RECORD, HE ADMITTED THAT ROMANIANS
HAD NEVER UNDERSTOOD SOVIET DECISION TO DEPLOY SS-20S.
9. DMF EXPLAINED THAT ROMANIAN INTERIM MEASURES WOULD BE VERY DIFFI-
CULT FOR CDA TO SUPPORT. WHILE WE AGREED WITH NEED FOR DIALOGUE,
ROMANIAN COMPROMISE PROPOSAL WAS TANTAMOUNT TO FREEZE AND THUS CON-
SECRATION OF EXISTING IMBALANCE. THIS WOULD IN EFFECT STOP CLOCK ON
NEGS AND PRESERVE SITUATION IN WHICH WESTERN EUROPEAN SECURITY WAS
IMPAIRED, EVEN THREATENED. ULTIMATE ROMANIAN OBJECTIVE CORRESPONDED
TO ZERO OPTION, AND WE AGREED. BUT SCORE WAS PRESENTLY 360-0 IN
FAVOUR OF USSR. ROMANIAN PROPOSAL WAS THAT SOVIETS REDUCE TO ZERO,
BUT THIS THEY HAD CONSISTENTLY REFUSED TO DO; IF THEY DID AGREE THAT

EXT 518-2

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~~PAGE FIVE~~ IDDZ0255 CONF D

WOULD BE NEW BALL GAME.

10. TO DOLGU S SUGGESTION THAT SOVIETS NEEDED TIME TO RECONSIDER, DMF ASKED WHETHER THERE WOULD BE MORE INCENTIVE FOR RECONSIDERATION IF PRESSURE WERE REMOVED. NATO TWO-TRACK DECISION HAD BEEN DESIGNED TO BUILD PRESSURE GRADUALLY WHILE MAINTAINING NEGOTIATING POSTURE. WE AGREED ON NEED TO MAINTAIN BALANCE AT LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL, AND ON ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF REDUCTIONS TO ZERO ON BOTH SIDES. BUT SOVIETS HAD INTRODUCED UK AND FRENCH NATIONAL DETERRENDS INTO EQUATION, SAYING THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO REDUCE TO THAT LEVEL. THAT WAS NOT/ NOT TRUE ZERO OPTION, AND WAS IN FACT FORM OF DOUBLE ACCOUNTING, CONSIDERING THAT UK AND FRENCH FORCES HAD ALREADY BEEN TAKEN ACCOUNT OF IN SALT.

11. DOLGU SAID THAT EMPHASIS OF ROMANIAN INITIATIVE WAS NOT/ NOT ON INTERIM PROPOSALS BUT ON NEED TO CONTINUE DIALOGUE. HE CONTINUED TO ARGUE IN FAVOUR OF POSTPONEMENT, HOWEVER, SAYING THAT ONCE NATO DEPLOYMENT HAD STARTED IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO STOP AND STILL MORE DIFFICULT TO REVERSE DESPITE DECLARATIONS TO CONTRARY. RESULT WOULD BE INCREASED POLITICAL TENSION, MORE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN BLOCS, AND INCREASED REGIMENTATION WITHIN BLOCKS. ROMANIA HAD DIFFERED WITH USSR ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES IN PAST (AFGHAN, KAMPUCHEA, ISRAEL) AND WISHED TO PRESERVE THIS FREEDOM OF MANOEUVRE.

12. AT HIS REQUEST, DOLGU WAS GIVEN BRIEFING ON PM INITIATIVE BY SMITH, WHICH DOLGU PROMISED TO CONVEY TO CEAUCESCU, COMMENTING THAT IT



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PAGE SIX IDDZ0255 CONFD

DESERVED DEEP REFLECTION.HE AGREED THAT APPROACHES WERE SIMILAR ON
PRIMARY QUESTION OF RESTORING EAST/WEST DIALOGUE.ON SPECIFIC POINTS
OF PMS INITIATIVE,HE SAID THAT ROMANIA DID NOT/NOT EXCLUDE ATTEND-
ANCE AT STKHM CCSBMDE BY FORMIN.ON MBFR,ROMANIA DID NOT/NOT PARTI-
CIPATE AS FULL MEMBER ALTHOUGH IT WAS ENGAGED IN PROMOTING AGREE-
MENT.REGARDING DIRECT NATO/WSAW PACT CONTACTS,HE SAID THAT USSR HAD
NOT/NOT BEEN FORTHCOMING,PREFERRING TO DEAL WITH USA ON BILATERAL
BASIS.ROMANIAN PROPOSAL FOR NATO/WSAW PACT FORMINS MTG IN MARGINS
OF INF WAS INTENDED TO COMPLEMENT USA/SOVIET NEGS BY ANALYZING AND
SCRUTINIZING PROPOSALS FROM QUOTE OTHER SOURCES UNQUOTE.

13.IN COMPARISON OF NOTES ON RECENT CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCO IT
EMERGED THAT DOLGU HAD BEEN RECEIVED ONLY BY KORNIENKO WHO,ALTHOUGH
MTG TOOK PLACE ON 24NOV,HAD GIVEN NO/NO INKLING OF ANDROPOV STATE-
MENT WHICH WAS MADE ONLY HOURS LATER.(PEARSON AND SMITH WERE RECVD
BY GROMYKO AND KORNIENKO ON 25NOV.) KORNIENKOS MAIN MESSAGE TO
DOLGU HAD BEEN THAT NEGS SHOULD CONTINUE AND EVERY EFFORTI BE MADE
TO PREVENT ACCELERATED ARMS RACE.KVITSINSKYS STATEMENT IN GENEV
ADJOURNING LAST ROUND OF INF TALKS HAD BEEN VERY CAREFULLY WORDED.
DOLGU OBSERVED THAT PART OF SOVIET PROBLEM IN INF WAS FACT THAT
ANDROPOV STILL NEEDED TIME TO ESTABLISH HIS AUTHORITY;UNDER BREZHNEV
THINGS WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT.IT WAS UNCERTAIN WHETHER ANDROPOV
WAS IN COMMAND.THERE WAS ALSO CONSIDERABLE INERTIA IN SOVIET SYSTEM:
ANDROPOV WAS COMPELLED TO FOLLOW PATTERN ESTABLISHED BY BREZHNEV.

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PAGE SEVEN IDDZ0255 CONF D

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THESE WERE ALL REASONS FOR GIVING SOVIETS TIME TO RECONSIDER THEIR POSITION.

14. DOLGU NOTED THAT ACCORDING TO MEDIA SOVIETS WERE PARTICULARLY WORRIED ABOUT PERSHING II BECAUSE OF ITS ABILITY TO REACH TARGETS IN SOVIET COMMAND-CONTROL-COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS IN 6-8 MINUTES, THEREBY THREATENING THEIR CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. KORNIENKO, HOWEVER, HAD NOT SEEMED PARTICULARLY WORRIED BY PERSHING II. FROM VIEWPOINT OF THREAT, HE HAD MADE NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN PERSHING II AND GLCM, OR FOR THAT MATTER BETWEEN USA INF AND FRENCH/UK FORCES. UK SUBMARINE IN NORTH SEA WAS ABLE TO DESTROY LENINGRAD NEARLY AS QUICKLY AS PERSHING II. DOLGU HAD ASKED KORNIENKO HOW SOVIETS HAD REACHED CONCLUSION THAT 140 SS-20S WERE EQUIVALENT TO UK/FRENCH FORCES. KORNIENKO HAD NOTED THAT UK POLARIS MISSILES NOW HAD MRV WARHEADS AND THAT FURTHER MODERNIZATION WAS UNDERWAY. NEW FRENCH SUBMARINE WAS BEING BUILT. SOVIETS, HE SAID, WERE CLEARLY CONCERNED ABOUT UK AND FRENCH MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS WHICH WHEN COMPLETED WOULD GIVE THEM MORE THAN ONE THOUSAND WARHEADS.

15. WHEN ASKED WHY SOVIETS HAD DECIDED TO DEPLOY SS-20S, KORNIENKO HAD CITED NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN USA FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS, INCLUDING NEW NUCLEAR-CAPABLE ARTILLERY. MAIN REASON, HOWEVER, HAD BEEN AGE OF SS-4 AND SS-5 SYSTEMS WHICH WERE OUT OF PRODUCTION AND THEREFORE REPLACED WITH NEW SYSTEMS. SS-20S WERE QUOTE SLIGHTLY UNQUOTE BETTER. (WE INTERJECTED AT THIS POINT THAT USA HAD WITHDRAWN THOR AND JUPITER SYSTEMS

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IN 1960S WITHOUT REPLACING THEM.) IN RESPONSE TO DOLGU COMMENT THAT
SS-20S WERE ACCURATE ENOUGH TO DESTROY HARDENED TARGETS, KORNIENKO
HAD DENIED THAT THEY WERE FIRST STRIKE WEAPONS. AS POSSIBLE EXPLANA-
TION FOR SOVIET DECISION, DOLGU OBSERVED THAT MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL
COMPLEXES WERE NOT/NOT CONFINED TO USA OR TO CAPITALIST COUNTRIES.
16. KORNIENKO, SAID DOLGU, HAD NOT/NOT MENTIONED ANY SOVIET EFFORT TO
ACHIEVE STRATEGIC DECOUPLING BETWEEN EUROPE AND USA. ACCORDING TO
KORNIENKO, SCHMIDT HAD NEVER CLAIMED THAT INF BALANCE WAS UPSET. IN
RESPONSE TO OUR COMMENT THAT SCHMIDT HAD BEEN CONCERNED ABOUT TREND
WHICH WOULD RESULT IN DECOUPLING, DOLGU REMARKED THAT IF SOVIETS HAD
ACCEPTED USA ZERO OPTION THEY WOULD STILL HAVE HAD CONVENTIONAL
SUPERIORITY AND, GIVEN BALANCE IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES, DECOUPLING
PROBLEM WOULD STILL EXIST. THIS LED HIM TO WONDER WHETHER ZERO OPTION
HAD BEEN SERIOUSLY ADVANCED. DMF RESPONDED THAT THIS ONLY CONFIRMED
IMPORTANCE OF MBFR, AND SIGNIFICANCE OF FRG AS TURNING POINT IN EAST/
WEST BLANCE. SINCE UK/FRENCH NUCLEAR UMBRELLA DID NOT/NOT EXTEND TO
FRG, THERE WAS NO/NO COUNTERWEIGHT TO SS-20S. IT THUS MADE SENSE FOR
FRG TO RAISE DECOUPLING PROBLEM, EVEN IF SCHMIDT DID ACKNOWLEDGE INF
EQUILIBRIUM IN 1977. IT WOULD BECOME EVEN MORE ACUTE IF INF IMBALANCE
WERE ADDED TO CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE. DOLGU ARGUMENT, ALTHOUGH LOGICAL,
DID NOT/NOT DERAILED CREDIBILITY OF ZERO OPTION.
17. REVIEWING PROGRESS OF ROMANIAN INITIATIVE TO DATE, DOLGU NOTED THAT
HE HAD BEEN TO MOSCO AND USA WHILE OTHER ROMANIAN ENVOYS HAD VISITED

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FRG, BELGIUM, NETHERLANDS, SPAIN, PORTUGAL, GREECE AND ITALY. GIVEN
IMPORTANCE OF UK AND FRENCH FORCES IN ROMANIAN PROPOSAL, WE ASKED
ABOUT ROMANIAN PLANS TO CONSULT THEM. WE UNDERSTAND THAT APPROACHES
HAVE BEEN MADE, BUT THAT UK AND FRANCE HAVE NOT/NOT AGREED TO CON-
SULTATIONS. DOLGU SAID HIS NEXT STOP WOULD BE IN NYORK WHERE HE
WOULD SEE UN SECGEN.

18. IN CALL ON MIN PEPIN, DOLGU COVERED ESSENTIALLY SAME GROUND IN
PRESENTING ROMANIAN PROPOSALS, AGAIN EMPHASIZING PRIMARY IMPORTANCE
OF RESTORING DIALOGUE. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION BY MIN PEPIN, DOLGU
SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN VERY SATISFIED BY RECEPTION IN WSHDC ALTHOUGH
IT HAD NOT/NOT BEEN VERY POSITIVE ON THE SPECIFICS OF ROMANIAN
PROPOSAL. USA ENCOURAGED INDEPENDENT ROMANIAN APPROACH, BUT DID NOT/NOT
WANT AT THIS JUNCTURE TO GIVE CONFUSING SIGNAL TO MOSCO. WHEN ASKED
FOR IMPRESSION OF FEELINGS OF SOVIET GENERAL PUBLIC ON INF ISSUE,
DOLGU SAID HE HAD BEEN TOLD ONLY OFFICIAL POINT OF VIEW BUT HAD
BEEN ABLE TO NOTE THAT WHEN 24NOV ANDROPOV STATEMENT HAD APPEARED
ON LARGE OUTDOOR TELEVISION, ^{IN MOSCO} HE AND ROMANIAN COLLEAGUE HAD BEEN ONLY
SPECTATORS. COMMENTING ON CSCE PROCESS, DOLGU SAID THAT ROMANIA WAS
NOT/NOT SATISFIED WITH DEVELOPMENTS AT MDRID. PROCESS HAD BECOME
THREE-WAY DIALOGUE BETWEEN BLOCS (INCLUDING NNA) RATHER THAN INDEPEN-
DENT COUNTRIES.

19. WE SHOULD RECORD THAT DOLGU RAISED ISSUE OF POSSIBLE PM VISIT TO
ROMANIA THREE DIFFERENT TIMES DURING DISCUSSIONS RECALLING THAT

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PAGE TEN- IDDZ0255 CONFD
PRES CEAUCESCU HAD FIRST ISSUED INVITATION WHILE PM WAS IN EUROPE.
DMF DID NOT/NOT RESPOND TO THIS PARTICULAR POINT BUT SAID WE HOPED
TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH ROMANIANS ON THEIR AND PM TRUDEAUS
INITIATIVES IN WEEKS AHEAD.



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

REFERRED BY THE OFFICE
OF THE SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS, MINISTER'S
REGISTRY - LETTERS

TRANSMIS PAR LE CABINET
DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT
AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES
DOSSIERS DU MINISTÈRE -
LETTRES

5-2723

To/À
AU

IDDZ

- FOR INFORMATION AND ANY NECESSARY ACTION
POUR EXAMEN ET SUITE À DONNER, S'IL Y A LIEU
- THIS LETTER HAS BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED
ON A ACCUSÉ RÉCEPTION DE CETTE LETTRE
- BY TELEPHONE/PAR TÉLÉPHONE
- BY LETTER (Copy attached)/PAR LETTRE (Copie-jointe)

REMARKS/REMARQUES

To file pls.

RP

Signature

83-12-09

D:001512



IDDZ/J.McNee/996-5912

TO/À • MINA/Dudoit
FROM/DE • IDDZ

W. Bob d'Amont
PA

REFERENCE • BNATO tel 8677 of 05December
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • German Political Declaration: Genscher
SUJET • Letter to DPM/SSEA.

Security/Sécurité	CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	December 6, 1983.
Number/Numéro	IDDZ-0254

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

-1-
DISTRIBUTION

The attached letter from Mr. Genscher to the DPM/SSEA was given by the FRG ambassador to DMF at noon today.

2. We have sent the text to MINDEL/BNATO.

28.6.1. Trudeau Peace Mission

Garry J. Smith

Garry J. Smith
Task Force Working Group

Botschaft
Bundesrepublik Deutschland
Embassy
of the Federal Republic of Germany
Ambassade
de la République fédérale d'Allemagne

No. Pol 201/83
- 2 enclosures -

The Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany presents its compliments to the Department of External Affairs and has the honour to submit herewith a letter received by telex from the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Herr Hans-Dietrich Genscher, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, The Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, P.C., M.P.

A courtesy translation is attached.

The Embassy would be most grateful if the letter could be conveyed to its high destination and avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of External Affairs the assurances of its highest consideration.

Ottawa, December 6, 1983



Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Ontario

"Sehr geehrter Herr Kollege,

bei der bevorstehenden Tagung des NATO-Rats halte ich es für besonders wichtig, dass die Allianz ein deutliches Zeichen ihrer Einheit und Geschlossenheit, ebenso wie ihrer Bereitschaft zu Verhandlungen, Dialog und Zusammenarbeit mit dem Osten setzt. Zu diesem Zweck habe ich vorgeschlagen, dass wir neben dem zu verabschiedenden Kommuniqué eine gesonderte politische Erklärung abgeben.

Der Entwurf einer solchen Erklärung ist in Brüssel bereits eingeführt worden. Ich wäre dankbar, wenn Sie sich nachdrücklich für die Verabschiedung einer solchen politischen Erklärung einsetzen und Ihren Ständigen Vertreter in Brüssel entsprechend anweisen würden.

Ich freue mich darauf, mit Ihnen am 8. Dezember in Brüssel zusammenzutreffen.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen

Ihr

Hans-Dietrich Genscher"

Courtesy translation

Dear Colleague:

At the forthcoming ministerial meeting of the NATO Council I regard it as especially important that the Alliance gives a clear sign of its unity and solidarity and at the same time makes it clear that the Alliance is ready for negotiations, dialogue and co-operation with the East.

For this purpose I have proposed a separate political declaration to be issued in addition to the joint communique.

The first draft of such a declaration has already been submitted at Brussels. I should appreciate if you could strongly support such a political declaration and instruct your Permanent Representative at Brussels accordingly.

I am looking forward to meet you at Brussels on December 8, 1983.

Yours sincerely,

Hans-Dietrich Genscher



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

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FM EXTOTT IDDZ0253 06DEC83
TO BRU
INFO BNATO VMBFR PEKIN MOSCO LDN PARIS HAGUE OSLO COPEN BONN LSBON
REF MDRID ATHNS ROME WSHDC GENEV NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/PPP PCOOTT/FOWLER
SUBJ/SUJ PRMNY

28-6-1 - Middle East
Mission

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RCR RCD RSO RSR UGB URR IDD IDA DMFX
REF YOURTEL ZVGR0562 02DEC

---SECOND LETTER OF PM ON EAST/WEST RELNS:OFFICIAL BELGIAN REACTION
IN RESPONSE TO PARA 4 REFTEL,CDN POSITION IS THAT THERE SHOULD BE
REVIEW OF WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSITION WITH VIEW TO PRESENTING
COUNTERPROPOSAL OR NEW INITIATIVE IN EARLY 1984.WE DO NOT/NOT HAVE
OURSELVES ALTERNATIVE TO PROPOSE AS THIS IS,IN FIRST INSTANCE,MORE
APPROPRIATE FOR THOSE WHOSE TERRITORY IS AFFECTED OR WHO HAVE
SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER FORCES IN AREA.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG <i>K. Calder</i> /sc	IDDZ	5-5912	SIG <i>[Signature]</i>



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM/DE
TO/À
INFO
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REF
SUBJ/SUJ

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0252 06DEC83
 TO MINDEL/BNATO **DELIVER BY 070800**
 INFO WSHDC BONN LDN NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPDPOL/DNACPOL/DGINFO
 DISTR MINA DMF IDR RBR RCR *PROOTT/FOWLER*
 REF IDRTEL 4669 OF 05DEC

---NAC MIN MTG:GERMAN POLITICAL DECLARATION
 FLWG MSG FM GENSCHER TO DPM/SSEA WAS PASSED BY FRG AMB TO DMF AT
 12:00 06DEC.

(COMCENTRE PLS COPY ATTACHED QUOTE TO UNQUOTE)

*28-6-1 - Hudson
Peace
Mission*

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG <i>J. McNEE</i>	IDDZ	995-5912	SIG <i>G. SMITH</i>

QUOTE

Courtesy translation

Dear Colleague:

At the forthcoming ministerial meeting of the NATO Council I regard it as especially important that the Alliance gives a clear sign of its unity and solidarity and at the same time makes it clear that the Alliance is ready for negotiations, dialogue and co-operation with the East.

For this purpose I have proposed a separate political declaration to be issued in addition to the joint communique.

The first draft of such a declaration has already been submitted at Brussels. I should appreciate if you could strongly support such a political declaration and instruct your Permanent Representative at Brussels accordingly.

I am looking forward to meet you at Brussels on December 8, 1983.

Yours sincerely,

Hans-Dietrich Genscher

UNQUOTE

28-6-1 - Bureau
Peace
Mission

CONFIDENTIAL

December 6, 1983

IDDZ-0251

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (through R.R. Fowler)


Your Initiative: Letter from Chancellor Kohl

Attached is a letter addressed to you from Chancellor Kohl in response to your letter of November 18. It was handed over this morning by the German Ambassador to de Montigny Marchand.

An analysis will follow, but on first reading it is quite positive, emphasizing again that the Chancellor's views are closer to yours than probably any other ally. The German Ambassador also said that the Chancellor's decision to move forward on their own MBFR initiative was largely the result of your own support and efforts in drawing attention to the importance of action in the MBFR field.

Also attached is a German declaration that Mr. Genscher would like to see issued at the end of the NATO Ministerial Meeting this week. It is very much in line with your initiative and the Department has informed our NATO Delegation that we should support it.

Could we please have your agreement to send the text of Chancellor Kohl's letter to Mr. MacEachen in Brussels as well as to several other embassies?



Gary J. Smith
Task Force Working Group

cc: PCO/Osbaldeston
EA/Shenstone
DND/Anderson

CONFIDENTIAL

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL: PROPOSED GERMAN POLITICAL DECLARATION.

Following is proposed German political declaration.

For three and one-half decades, the Atlantic Alliance has been dedicated to the maintenance of peace in freedom. The framework of collective security which it has built has ensured the longest period of stability in the history of modern Europe.

We, the representatives of the sixteen countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, reaffirm our commitment to the Bonn Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government of the member states on June 10, 1982. We do not threaten anyone with either nuclear or conventional weapons. We shall always oppose external threats or intimidation. We do not aspire to superiority, nor will we tolerate the superiority of others over us. Our precept is, now as ever: none of our weapons will ever be used except in response to attack. We expect the legitimate security interests of the European and the American members of our Alliance to be respected on equal terms and to the same extent that we respect the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries. Security and stability in Europe can only be guaranteed through Europe's firm linkage to the United States.

Pursuing our commitment to dialogue and the achievement of a more productive East-West relationship we have brought to a successful conclusion the three-year Madrid follow up meeting of the Thirty-five Nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Standards relating to human rights in all signatory countries were reviewed and the Western proposal for the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe was adopted.

Pursuing our commitment to maintain our defense forces at the lowest level necessary for deterrence, the governments concerned have decided in October on a significant further reduction of the stockpile of nuclear weapons in Europe.

The achievements of the past year have been based upon the closest and most intimate consultations among us. We are determined to further the political dimension of the Alliance and European-American cooperation, and have therefore agreed to hold additional informal meetings of Alliance Foreign Ministers.

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- 2 -

Implementation of the double-track of the Alliance of December 12, 1979 is a further manifestation of our firm will to ensure our security and at the same time to achieve equilibrium at the lowest possible level through arms control negotiations. We reaffirm that every American intermediate-range missile deployed now can be removed in consequence of an equitable negotiated agreement. We would welcome a corresponding Soviet declaration on the Soviet missiles that have long been deployed and continue to be deployed. It remains our goal that in the future there should be neither Soviet nor American intermediate-range missiles. We also agree to a limitation of these American and Soviet weapons at the lowest possible level in conformity with the principle of equality between the United States and the Soviet Union.

It is in this spirit that we collectively call on the Soviet Union to return to the INF-negotiations. We extend to the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries the offer to work together with us to bring about a long-term constructive and stable East-West relationship on the basis of equilibrium, moderation, and reciprocity. We advocate an open, comprehensive political dialogue. We shall never be the first to leave the conference table. We are prepared for comprehensive cooperation-politically, economically, and culturally, to the benefit of mankind and for the protection of the environment.

The nations of the Atlantic Alliance are convinced that the coming year offers opportunities for building on this basis a more balanced and constructive East-West relationship. We appeal to the countries of the Warsaw Pact to undertake joint efforts to achieve progress in:

- the Vienna negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR),
- the endeavours for a complete ban on chemical weapons,
- the strategic arms reduction talks (START).

We are resolved to use the Stockholm Conference, which will cover all of Europe, as a unique opportunity to broaden the East-West dialogue on security issues, to negotiate confidence building measures and enhance stability and security in Europe.

We assure everyone in East and West that we shall do our utmost to create stable foundations now for a safe and peaceful future in which there is no fear for survival and in which human rights are respected.

Federal Republic of Germany
The Federal Chancellor

Bonn, 5 December 1983

His Excellency
The Right Honourable
Pierre Elliott Trudeau,
P.C., Q.C., M.P., LL.L., M.A., F.R.S.C.,
Prime Minister of Canada
Ottawa

Dear Pierre,

Thank you very much for your letter of 18 November 1983 informing me of the course and results of your trip to Europe and of your future intentions. I wholly agree with you that, in view of the tense East-West relationship, it is urgently necessary to impart fresh impetus to the dialogue between East and West and to work for the creation of a climate of trust. For us Germans, a dialogue with the East is of central importance and has long been the guiding principle of our policy.

Our policy aimed at detente will be successful if the West shows unity in the now necessary implementation of the NATO double-track decision. Systematic execution of the Alliance's decisions of 12 December 1979 in the face of powerful pressure constitutes a great success for the Alliance.

However, at the same time we must make it clear to the East that we are prepared for dialogue and co-operation at all levels. We must also convince our own publics of this. Our citizens are prepared to shoulder the burdens we need to incur to assure our defence. They will do so all the more readily if our defence efforts are accompanied by lasting endeavours for arms control and accommodation with the East.

- 2 -

The forthcoming ministerial meeting of the NATO Council in Brussels affords us an excellent opportunity to send a clear signal to the East of our will for genuine and lasting detente.

As long as the continuation of the Geneva INF talks is in doubt, it is all the more important to make use of existing forums for arms control. These include the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. I advocate high-ranking representation of the participating countries at the opening ceremony. Hans-Dietrich Genscher will speak in Stockholm on behalf of the Federal Government.

The CSCE process, of which the CDE is a product, is yielding stabilizing effects for East-West relations. Madrid has shown that agreement is possible even at a difficult juncture. The CSCE and the CDE demonstrate that the dialogue continues despite the interruption in Geneva. We must use the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document as a comprehensive programme for giving substance to East-West relations.

A new Western initiative is required at the MBFR talks in Vienna. The three rounds of negotiations this year were increasingly determined by the Eastern proposals of February and the draft treaty of June. However, it is in our own interest to hold the discussions in Vienna on the basis of our own, Western concept. Purely reactive arguments confined to defending our draft, which is now over a year old, are not suitable for this purpose. We, too, are therefore advocating a new Western initiative at the negotiations and will gladly discuss with our partners the ideas that we have already developed on this subject.

The Federal Government supports every attempt at consolidating and strengthening the international non-proliferation regime. I also feel it is worth considering

- 3 -

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your proposal of a conference of the five nuclear powers as a forum to consider arms control measures in respect of the nuclear potentials of Britain, France and China. This would also do justice to the undertaking entered into in Article VI of the non-proliferation treaty by the signatory states.

Direct contact between President Reagan and General Secretary Andropov is important for East-West relations. A well-prepared summit meeting, which - as you know - I have repeatedly advocated in Washington and Moscow both in private and in public, could contribute towards mutual understanding.

Yours sincerely,
(sgd.) Helmut Kohl,
Federal Chancellor

Botschaft
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
Embassy
of the Federal Republic of Germany
Ambassade
de la République fédérale d'Allemagne

No. Pol 200/83
- 2 enclosures -

The Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany presents its compliments to the Department of External Affairs and has the honour to submit herewith a letter received by telex from the Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Dr. Helmut Kohl, to the Prime Minister of Canada, The Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau.

A courtesy translation is attached.

The Embassy would appreciate if this letter would be conveyed to its high destination and avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of External Affairs the assurances of its highest consideration.

Ottawa, December 5, 1983

Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Ontario

Bundesrepublik Deutschland
Der Bundeskanzler

Bonn, den 5.12.1983

Seiner Exzellenz
dem Premierminister von Kanada
Herrn Pierre Elliott Trudeau,
P.C., Q.C., M.P., LL.L., M.A., F.R.S.C.
Ottawa

Lieber Pierre,

Vielen Dank für Ihr Schreiben vom 18. November 1983, in dem Sie mich über den Verlauf und die Ergebnisse Ihrer Europareise und über Ihre weiteren Absichten informieren. Ich stimme Ihnen ohne Einschränkung darin zu, dass es angesichts des angespannten Ost-West-Verhältnisses dringend geboten ist, dem Dialog zwischen Ost und West neue Impulse zu geben und uns für die Herstellung eines Klimas des Vertrauens einzusetzen. Für uns Deutsche ist der Dialog mit dem Osten von zentraler Bedeutung und seit langem Leitlinie unserer Politik.

Unsere auf Entspannung gerichtete Politik wird Erfolg haben, wenn der Westen bei der nun notwendig gewordenen Durchführung des NATO-Doppelbeschlusses Geschlossenheit zeigt. Die konsequente Durchführung der Bündnisentscheidungen vom 12. Dezember 1979 trotz starken Drucks ist ein grosser Erfolg für die Allianz.

Zugleich ist jedoch erforderlich, dass wir dem Osten unsere Bereitschaft zum Dialog und zur Zusammenarbeit auf allen Ebenen deutlich machen. Dies müssen wir auch gegenüber unserer Öffentlichkeit überzeugend bekunden. Unsere Bürger sind bereit, die für die Sicherung unserer Verteidigung nötigen Lasten mitzutragen. Sie tun dies umso eher, wenn unsere Verteidigungsbemühungen von nachhaltigen Anstrengungen um Rüstungskontrolle und Ausgleich mit dem Osten begleitet sind.

- 2 -

Der bevorstehende NATO-Ministerrat in Brüssel gibt uns die ausgezeichnete Gelegenheit, an den Osten ein klares Signal des Willens zur echten und dauerhaften Entspannung zu richten.

Solange die Fortsetzung der Genfer INF-Verhandlungen in Zweifel steht, ist es umso wichtiger, die vorhandenen Rüstungskontrollforen zu nutzen. Dazu gehört die Konferenz über vertrauens- und sicherheitsbildende Massnahmen und Abrüstung in Europa. Ich befürworte eine hochrangige Vertretung der Teilnehmerstaaten an der Eröffnung. Hans-Dietrich Genscher wird für die Bundesregierung in Stockholm sprechen.

Der KSZE-Prozess, aus dem die KVAE hervorgeht, entfaltet stabilisierende Wirkungen für das Ost-West-Verhältnis. Madrid hat bewiesen, dass auch in einer schwierigen Phase Einigungen möglich sind. KSZE und KVAE demonstrieren: trotz der Unterbrechung in Genf geht der Dialog weiter. Wir müssen die Schlussakte von Helsinki und das Madrider Schlussdokument als umfassendes Programm für eine inhaltsreiche Gestaltung der Ost-West-Beziehungen nutzen.

Bei den MBFR-Verhandlungen in Wien ist eine neue westliche Initiative erforderlich. Die drei Verhandlungsrunden dieses Jahres wurden zunehmend durch die östlichen Vorschläge vom Februar und den Vertragsentwurf vom Juni geprägt. Unser Interesse muss es aber sein, die Diskussion in Wien auf der Grundlage unseres eigenen, westlichen Konzepts zu führen. Hierzu ist eine rein defensive Argumentation, beschränkt auf die Verteidigung unseres nun schon mehr als ein Jahr zurückliegenden Entwurfs, nicht geeignet. Wir setzen uns daher ebenfalls für einen neuen westlichen Verhandlungsschritt ein und sind gerne bereit, mit unseren Partnern Vorstellungen zu erörtern, die wir zu diesem Thema bereits entwickelt haben.

Die Bundesregierung unterstützt jeden Anstoss zur Festigung und Stärkung des internationalen Nichtverbreitungs-Regimes.

- 3 -

Ich halte auch Ihren Vorschlag einer Konferenz der fünf Nuklearmächte für erwägenswert, für die Frage der Rüstungskontrollpolitischen Behandlung der Nuklearpotentiale Grossbritanniens, Frankreichs und Chinas eine Perspektive zu schaffen. Dies würde auch der Verpflichtung der Unterzeichnerstaaten aus Artikel VII des Nichtverbreitungsvertrages Rechnung tragen.

Für die Beziehungen zwischen West und Ost ist der direkte Kontakt zwischen Präsident Reagan und Generalsekretär Andropow bedeutsam. Ein gründlich vorbereitetes Gipfeltreffen, für das ich mich, wie Sie wissen, mehrfach und auch öffentlich in Washington wie in Moskau eingesetzt habe, könnte zum beiderseitigen Verständnis beitragen.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen

Helmut Kohl,

Bundeskanzler der Bundesrepublik Deutschland



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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7 DEC 83		02	262	10
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SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ: C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0250 06DEC83
 TO/À TO MINDELBNATO/DELVOIE **DELIVER BY 070830**
 INFO INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER
 DISTR DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR FPR
 REF ---PM INITIATIVE:TRIP TO WSHDC
 SUBJ/SUJ

28-6-1 - Hudson Peace Mission

PM HAS AGREED TO VISIT WSHDC 15DEC FOR ONE-HOUR MTG AT 1100 HRS WITH PRES REAGAN. AWAITING FINAL CONFIRMATION FROM WHITE HOUSE.
 2.PM ALSO INTENDS TO SEE UN SEC GEN PEREZ DE CUELLAR LATE AFTERNOON 15DEC AND THEN STAY OVER IN NYORK FOR USA TV INTERVIEW IN MORNING OF 16DEC.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
G. Smith/sc  SIG	IDDZ	5-5912	SIG  G. Smith



MGTC M. FILE DIARY

MESSAGE

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SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ
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DELIVER BY 070900

INFO INFO WSHDC LDN BONN PC00TT/OSBALDESTON/FOWLER

REF DISTR MINA USS DMF IRB

SUBJ/SUJ REF OARTEL IDDZ 0248 06DEC
---PM INITIATIVE

*28-6-1-Tudor
Peace
Mission*

RE PARA 3 REFTEL, BRIEFING OF RT HON JOE CLARK WILL BE BY DMF AND
SMITH NOT/NOT ARCHDEACON.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG <i>J. McNEE</i> J. McNEE	IDDZ	5-5914	SIG <i>G. SMITH</i> G. SMITH



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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FM EXTOTT IDDZ0248

DELIVER BY 061800

TO MINDEL/BNATO/DELVOIE

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB

---PM INITIATIVE

IN SPEECH ON FOREIGN POLICY TO WORLD CONGRESS OF FREE UKRANIANS IN TORONTO 4 DEC LEADER OF OPPOSITION MULRONEY IS REPORTED TO HAVE
UR MNGED NATO TO CONSIDER A QUOTE NON-FIRST STRIKE UNQUOTE COMMITMENT QUOTE IT IS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE THE DESTRUCTION WHICH THE MODERN ARSENALS OF WAR, IF UNLEASHED, WOULD WREAK UNQUOTE.

2. HE SAID THAT IN THE THRONE SPEECH THE GOVT SHOULD:

- (A). ORDER THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENCE TO REVIEW FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICIES, CONCENTRATING ON QUOTE EXISTING ZONES OF TENSION IN THE WORLD AND TO EXAMINE AND PROMOTE DISARMAMENT DISCUSSION IN CANADA. UNQUOTE
- (B). PLACE CANADA IN THE FOREFRONT OF NATIONS PROMOTING LIMITS ON NUCLEAR ARSENALS.
- (C). REAFFIRM SUPPORT FOR QUOTE FULL SCOPE SAFEGUARDS AS A CONDITION OF SUPPLY OF NUCLEAR EXPORTS. UNQUOTE
- (D). CALL FOR THE SOVIETS TO RETURN TO DISARMAMENT TALKS IN GENEVA AND SEEK ANOTHER FORUM FOR THE TALKS IF THE SOVIETS REFUSE.
- (E). REAPPOINT AN QUOTE AMBASSADOR FOR DISARMAMENT UNQUOTE WITH A PRIORITY TO ENCOURAGE SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT CAMPAIGN.

28-6-1 - Hudson Peace Mission

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

J. McNEE

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

G. SMITH



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PAGE TWO IDDZ0248 CONF

12

10

(F).ORGANIZE AN ALL-PARTY CANADIAN DELEGATION FROM THE QUOTE
HIGHEST LEVELS UNQUOTE TO ATTEND THE STOCKHOLM DISARMAMENT CONFE-
RENCE IN JANUARY.

(G).INCREASE CANADIAN EFFORTS QUOTE TO RESTRICT THE TRANSFER OF
CONVENTIONAL ARMS,ESPECIALLY TO AREAS OF CONFLICT.UNQUOTE
3.WITH APPROVAL OF MR.PEPIN,OSBALDESTON AND DMF,SMITH AND ARCHDEA-
CON WILL BE BRIEFING RT HON JOE CLARK,LATER TODAY.

28-6-1 - Judeau Peace Mission

CONFIDENTIAL

no date
Dissemination Sec.
MF
D

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (through R.R. Fowler)

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
Romanian Initiative

The purpose of this memorandum is to inform you of the visit of a Romanian emissary, who requested that President Ceausescu's proposals be conveyed to you and renewed an invitation for you to visit Bucharest for consultations on how Canada and Romania might cooperate in helping to find a way out of the current impasse.

The Romanian Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Georghie Dolgu, was received on December 5 by the Honourable Jean-Luc Pepin and by Deputy Minister for External Relations de Montigny Marchand. He had previously visited Moscow and Washington.

The Romanian proposals (see annex) call for the USA to halt its INF deployments in Europe, and for the USSR to reconsider the countermeasures which it has announced. They also propose USA/USSR bilateral meetings at the foreign minister and summit levels, a NATO/Warsaw Pact meeting on INF in parallel with the (hopefully resumed) USA/USSR negotiations, acceleration of the MBFR talks, and a conference on conventional weapons.

We explained that the Romanians' specific proposals on INF, which amount to a freeze at present unequal levels and require inclusion of the British and French nuclear forces, were not acceptable in terms of the present Canadian and NATO positions. - Mr. Dolgu's response, after he was given a briefing on your initiative, was that we agreed on the primary objective of restoring the East-West dialogue, and that a visit by you to Romania would therefore be useful.

A more detailed report on the visit is given in the attached telegram.

for L.A. Delvoie,
Chairman,
Task Force Working Group on
East-West Relations and
International Security

cc: PCO/Osbaldeston
EA/Shenstone
DND/Anderson

*Je préfère Delvoix
55912*

Josephine M. McKea - 1DDX
C-5

le 6 décembre

M. le Sous-ministre,

2B-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

MA

Colette Marcil de Radio-Québec demande votre participation à l'émission "Droit de parole" le mercredi 14 décembre.

L'émission est en direct des studios de Montréal. Un panel de 8 personnes est invité. Le public est invité à répondre par un oui ou un non à la question débattue qui sera en l'occurrence: "Pierre Trudeau a-t-il des chances de réussir dans sa mission de paix?". Un ruban magnétique indique au bas de l'écran la réponse des téléspectateurs.

On avait pensé inviter des observateurs ou correspondants des 5 puissances nucléaires, mais on y a renoncé à cause des problèmes de langue.

Voici la liste des participants: (je n'en garantis pas l'orthographe)

- Umbrei SANDAKOV - Agence Novosti
- Simon SERFATI, professeur, Relations étrangères, John Hopkins
- Bernard GUETTA, Le Monde, Washington
- Gérard HERVOUET, politicologue (Cda-Asie), Université Laval
- Pauline HENSEN-VAILLANCOURT, Université du Québec, Montréal
- Gilbert BRUNET, Le Devoir

Un autre observateur de la scène canadienne sera invité. M. Hudon (?) a suggéré votre nom en tant que répondant politique (personne autorisée).

Montréal
521-2424 poste 2466

12 Dec: I briefed Hervouet extensively
13 Dec. MINA/Robertson advised that no other MP could be found

OFFICE OF

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



MEMORANDUM

CABINET DU

SECRETÉRIE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

To
A IDDZ

From
De MINA

Reference
Référence

Subject
Sujet Conservative Party Peace Proposals

28-6-1 - Trudeau
Peace
Mission

Security Unclassified
Sécurité

Date December 6, 1983

IDA
IDR
IDD
MINT
MINE
USS
DMF
IFB

We would be grateful for your assessment of the initiatives designed to achieve a "mutual, balanced and verifiable disarmament" put forward by H.M. Opposition Leader Brian Mulroney on Sunday, December 4 to the World Congress of Free Ukrainians. It is the first speech by the new Opposition Leader in which he has proposed substantive policy initiatives in the foreign policy field.

While previous speeches (e.g. Mike Wilson Fund Raising Dinner on September 28; Party Fund Raisers in Toronto, November 24, Montréal radio interview) have addressed external relations in a general fashion (e.g. criticism of Govt role over Grenada, KAL; strong support for US, NATO, Israel) Mr. Mulroney has avoided making substantive policy announcements. Having now done so, we would expect both him and Mr. Clark to push their proposals during Question Period and outside the House. Inevitably, the PM and DPM/SSEA will be asked to respond.

Alain Dubois

THERE ARE, HOWEVER, SOME MATTERS WHICH DESERVE

IMMEDIATE ATTENTION.

FOR EXAMPLE IF I WERE PUTTING BEFORE PARLIAMENT AND

THE CANADIAN PEOPLE, A SPEECH FROM THE THRONE ... AS WILL

THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT NEXT WEEK ... I WOULD SEEK FROM

PARLIAMENTARIANS OF ALL PARTIES, SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGEMENT

FOR CANADIAN INITIATIVES IN ACHIEVING MUTUAL, BALANCED AND

VERIFIABLE DISARMAMENT.

I WOULD CALL ON MY COLLEAGUES TO URGE THE GOVERNMENT

TO PURSUE WITH RENEWED VIGOUR, AND AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL,

THE DIFFICULT TASK OF SUSTAINING THE TROUBLED PEACE BETWEEN

EAST AND WEST.

INDEED, I WOULD PUT BEFORE PARLIAMENT A RESOLUTION

... SEEKING SUPPORT FROM ALL PARTIES ... WHICH WOULD

EXPLICITLY REQUEST THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TO ENDORSE THE

FOLLOWING INITIATIVES:

1. CALL ON THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

AND NATIONAL DEFENCE TO UNDERTAKE IMMEDIATELY BOTH A

FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW, WITH SPECIAL

REFERENCE TO EXISTING ZONES OF TENSION IN THE WORLD

AND TO EXAMINE AND PROMOTE DISARMAMENT DISCUSSION IN

CANADA.

2. CALL ON OUR GOVERNMENT TO RESUME CANADA'S LEADING

ROLE IN PROMOTING NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AMONG

THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH NOW POSSESS NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY

AND WHICH HAVE THE POTENTIAL OF DEVELOPING

NON-PEACEFUL USES OF SUCH TECHNOLOGY. FURTHER, CALL

FOR CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR FULL SCOPE SAFEGUARDS AS A

CONDITION OF SUPPLY OF NUCLEAR EXPORTS.

3. CALL ON OUR GOVERNMENT TO SEND AN ALL PARTY

DELEGATION -- AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS -- TO ATTEND THE

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE TAKING PLACE IN

STOCKHOLM IN JANUARY; AND ENCOURAGE THE USE OF THIS

AS A FORUM FOR DISCUSSION OF DISARMAMENT ISSUES AND

THE PROMOTION OF MEASURES FOR BUILDING CONFIDENCE

BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF

MEANINGFUL PROGRESS IN APMS CONTROL.

4. CALL ON THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

TO URGE CONSIDERATION OF A NON-FIRST-STRIKE POLICY AT

THE UPCOMING NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING.

5. CALL FOR THE IMMEDIATE RE-APPOINTMENT OF AN

AMBASSADOR FOR DISARMAMENT, TO GIVE PRIORITY TO

ENCOURAGING SUPPORT FOR THE UN DISARMAMENT CAMPAIGN.

- 35 -
6. CALL ON THE SOVIET UNION TO RETURN TO THE INF

DISARMAMENT TALKS IN GENEVA, FAILING WHICH

CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO SEEKING A FORUM UNDER WHICH

ALL DISARMAMENT TALKS CAN TAKE PLACE.

7. ENCOURAGE EFFORTS, BOTH AT THE UIN AND REGIONALLY, TO

RESTRICT THE TRANSFERS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS

ESPECIALLY TO AREAS OF CONFLICT.

THE ALTERNATIVE TO SUCH A COMMITMENT IS UNIMAGINABLE

AND UNACCEPTABLE. THE ROAD TO PEACE IS A ROAD THE NATIONS

OF THE WORLD MUST WALK TOGETHER.

FLEXIBILITY AND INGENUITY HAVE ALWAYS BEEN THE

HALLMARK OF PRODUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS.

NO SUCH NEGOTIATIONS HAVE EVER SUCCEEDED WITHOUT A

SENSE OF REASONABLENESS AND A BECOMING DEGREE OF

OBJECTIVITY IN THE ANALYSIS OF REQUIREMENTS, BOTH FOR

OURSELVES AND THE OTHER SIDE.

THERE CAN BE NO GREATER CHALLENGE TO THOSE IN PUBLIC

LIFE THAN TO CONTRIBUTE WITH ALL OUR MIGHT TO THIS PROCESS.

I AM LIKE MANY OF YOU HERE ^{TODAY} ~~TONIGHT~~; I HAVE THREE

YOUNG CHILDREN AND I WANT TO LEAVE FOR THEM A WORLD FREE OF

THE MANACE OF NUCLEAR WAR; THAT WOULD BE OUR GREATEST GIFT

TO THE CHILDREN OF THE WORLD,

NO ONE CAN BETTER UNDERSTAND THE HORROR OF WAR AND

THE INHUMANITY OF MAN THAN A PEOPLE SCARRED BY BOTH.

THIS IS WHY UKRAINIANS, WHILE ARDENT DEFENDEPS OF

FREEDOM, HAVE ALWAYS SOUGHT A JUST PEACE.

I AM BOTH TOUCHED AND OVERWHELMED BY THE SANCTITY OF
THIS OCCASION AND BY THE STRONG AND DETERMINED BONDS WHICH
BRING SO MANY PEOPLE TOGETHER IN COMMON PURPOSE AND
REMEMBRANCE.

LONG LIVE THE UKRAINE. THANK YOU AND GOD BLESS.

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

send to 1DD2
12/12/83

MF

D I F F U S I O N R E S T R E I N T
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A EXTOTT LIDD
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28-6-1-Trudeau		Peace Mission

---PROGRAMME DE PAIX DU PM-REACTION TURQUE
MINISTRE DES AFF ETRANGERES A TENU PAROLE.PORTE-PAROLE DU MAE A FAIT
DECLARATION A LA PRESSE SELON LAQUELLE CIT TURQUIE APPUIE LA
PROPOSITION DE TRUDEAU FINCIT.MALHEUREUSEMENT SEULEMENT CUMHURIYET
(100,000 CIRCULATION)ET JOURNAL EN ANGLAIS ONT REPRODUIT NOUVELLE.
TEXTE DE CUMHUPIYET SUIT:CIT ASKED HIS VIEW ON CDN PM P TRUDEAUS 25
POINT PROPOSAL FOR STABILIZING EAST-WEST RELATIONS,SPOKESMAN OF THE
FOREIGN MINISTRY AMB NAZHI AKIMAN SAID,QUOTE WE AGREE WITH THE POINTS
COVERED BY PM TRUDEAUS PROPOSALS.IN PARTICULAR,THE MOST NEGATIVE
CHARACTERISTIC OF THE PRESENT ERA IS THE LACK OF A DIALOGUE BETWEEN
THE USA AND THE USSR UNQUOTE.AMB AKIMAN POINTED OUT THAT QUOTE WITH
HIS EVALUATIONS BASED ON SOUND LOGIC UNQUOTE,PM TRUDEAU UNDERTOOK A
BRAVE INITIATIVE AND MADE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO WORLD PEACE.
AKIMAN SAID,CONSIDERING THE PRESENT INATL SITU HE DID NOT/NOT THINK
THAT THE PROPOSALS WOULD YIELD RESULTS IMMEDIATELY,AND CONTINUED AS
FOLLOWS:QUOTE ALL THE BIG POWERS MAY NOT/NOT FIND IT POSSIBLE TO REACT
RAPIDLY TO THESE PROPOSALS.NEVERTHELESS,WE THINK THAT THEN FACT THAT
PM TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE HAS COME AT A TIME WHEN TENSION BETWEEN USA AND
USSR GROS MAY HELP TO BRING ABOUT AN ALLEVIATION.WE APPRECIATE THIS

PAGE TWO ZEGR1729 RESTR

UNQUOTE.FINCIT.

2. AUTRE GRAND QUOTIDIEN MILLIYET(200,000)A PUBLIE EN BONNE PLACE
06DEC TEXTE BEAUCOUP PLUS LONG QUI CONSISTAIT EN UNE PARAPHRASE SOUS
MA SIGNATURE DES DEUX DISCOURS DU PM

MATHIEU

CCC/244 061257Z ZEGR1729

IDA/Christoff
IDR/Barton
IDR/Després
IDDZ/Smith

AU *turn four numbers*

Edward Broadbent, M.P.

This was in my mail box Monday evening. I circulate it in the event you have not seen or received copies.

Friday evening.

Brian
Brian Herman (IDR)
December 6, 1983

Dear Friend,

88-6-1-Trudeau Peace Mission

The world's atomic clock ticks towards midnight.

American-Soviet tensions build as the Soviets needlessly shoot down a Korean airliner filled with civilian passengers. President Reagan exploits this tragic incident in order to pursue his fanatical determination to introduce the Cold War into Central America. The Nicaraguans threaten to get arms from whatever source to protect themselves. Grenada is invaded. Marines are murdered in Lebanon. The danger escalates inexorably.

You have every reason to be frightened.

This is the nuclear arms race.

Earlier this year, Prime Minister Trudeau and his senior cabinet ministers put our country into the nuclear fray. In a secret cabinet session, it was decided to bend to U.S. requests to test the cruise missile in Canada. These cruise missiles will be used on U.S. based long range bombers as part of a B-52 and B-1 bomber nuclear strike force.

The New Democratic Party, joined by thousands of Canadians, demanded a debate and vote in Parliament to properly determine the role Canada can play in world peace. On June 14th the NDP took the initiative and pressed Parliament to adopt a motion rejecting the cruise missile tests. Ninety-eight per cent of Liberal and Conservative MPs voted for the tests. All NDP MPs voted against the tests.

Are you surprised?

The NDP has been trying to move the world away from the edge of the nuclear precipice. But the Liberal government moves us closer.

With your tax dollars the Liberal government helps build nuclear weapons for other nations. The government also allows, and indeed encourages, the visits of nuclear armed warships into Canada's

ports. And the government has signed, without question, a new NORAD agreement that will open the frontiers of space to nuclear warfare.

And the Conservatives. . . ?

Brian Mulroney recently appointed Toronto MP Sinclair Stevens as the Conservative Party's external affairs critic. The appointment represents a dramatic and dangerous move towards arms escalation. Stevens' approach to Canada and the world has been described by another Conservative MP as -- and I quote -- "the militarisation of foreign affairs, with limited nuclear war not ruled out, foreign aid slashed, and repressive regimes bolstered."

The NDP is the only major political party in our country clearly opposed to the use of nuclear weapons.

The hundreds of thousands of Canadians who recently walked in peaceful protest marches from coast to coast to oppose cruise missile tests have only one voice in Parliament -- the NDP. The hundreds of thousands of Canadians represented by professional associations, church, labour organizations and community groups working for Soviet -- American arms reduction have only one political party which speaks for them -- the NDP.

Your concerns must be heard. This is why I am asking you to respond to a special NDP financial call so we may expand our work to change government policy. With your support and help, we can put Canada in the forefront of efforts to end the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The NDP believes Canada has a special and important role to play in the world today. Renewed Cold War tensions, the undermining of the United Nations, the spiralling nuclear arms race -- present this country with a challenge to act in new and bold directions for security and peace.

This past July at the NDP's fiftieth anniversary convention, two thousand New Democrats from every province and territory went on record opposing the cruise missile tests and calling for urgent and serious talks on disarmament treaties. This democratic decision clearly signals to Canadians that the NDP believes there is something better for Canada than the nuclear arms race policies of the Liberals and Conservatives.

Mr. Trudeau claims our NATO membership obligates us to the Cruise. This is simply not so. Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands have all refused the cruise without jeopardizing their role in NATO.

And Mr. Mulroney is now calling for closer links with U.S. defence and foreign policies firmly placing Canadians in President Reagan's back pocket.

Do you believe that the world can control fifty thousand nuclear warheads spread around the globe and keep the state of political relations on an even keel?

George Kennan, former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, writes. . .

"At the end of our present path of unlimited military confrontation lies no visible destination but failure and horror. What is needed here is only the will -- the courage, the boldness, the affirmation of life -- to break the spell that the severed atom has cast upon us all; to declare our independence of the nightmares of nuclear danger; to turn our minds and hearts to better things."

Former NDP Leader Tommy Douglas turned to these "better things" this past summer when he asked thousands gathered to hear him in Regina. . .

"Did you ever stop to think about what would happen if we were to demolish nuclear weapons? Did you ever stop to think about the billions upon billions of dollars that would be liberated. . . to destroy poverty. . . to rid the earth of misery. . . to provide health care for the people in the far corners of the earth. . . to build decent homes, and schools, and hospitals. . . to train nurses and doctors and teachers. . . to raise the standards of mankind -- so that humanity could go marching forward to the great goal towards which we ought to be marching."

Canada's march for peace has started. The thousands of Canadians who walked in city and villages from coast to coast this past year to protest the cruise missile took that first step. Many of them and other concerned Canadians have also recognized the political strength that will make their voices heard in Ottawa by donating to the NDP.

You can give to the New Democratic Party and know that you have strengthened Canada's political will for peace and security.

All donations are tax deductible to encourage your interest and participation in our democratic government and, of course, will be used for disarmament work in Parliament and across Canada.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Ed Broadbent". The signature is stylized with a large, sweeping initial "E" and "B".

Ed Broadbent

P.S. The current session in the House of Commons will see the NDP again putting the cruise missile testing on the nation's agenda. Donate today in this special appeal to ensure support for the only political party with the courage to say "NO" to nuclear arms.

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Mr. McVee

Action pls-

SJ

7/12/83.

UNCLAS

FM SFRAN WVFC2462 DEC 6/83

TO EXTOTT (IDDZ

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REF YR TEL IDDZ 0241 OF 2 DEC 83

---PM INITIATIVE

28-6-1 - Hudson Peace Mission

YR REF TEL PROVIDES USEFUL BACKGROUND REFERENCE LIST. WE HAVE BEEN PROVIDED WITH INFORMATION ON MOST OF THE EVENTS. WE WOULD APPRECIATE FURTHER INFORMATION ON EVENTS 3, 5, AND 14, THAT WE MAY PROVIDE TO INTERESTED MEDIA, ACADEMIC, AND GOVERNMENTAL CONTACTS.
UUU/815 062330Z WVFC2462

TO/À IDA
FROM/DE • IDR

All task force members

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Possible York University Conference on
SUJET Confidence-Building Measures

Security/Sécurité UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date December 6, 1983
Number/Numéro IDR-4680

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

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Rogers

RBR/Mr.
Fairweather

Mr. Anstis

IDDZ

28-6-1 - Hudson Peace mission

I received a telephone call yesterday, December 5th, from Professor David Dewitt, Department of Political Science, York University. Dewitt works with Rod Byers of the York Research Programme in Strategic Studies, and attended the recent conference at York on "realism and radicalism in Canadian defence", where we met.

2. Dewitt was calling to say that York was giving serious consideration, at Rod Byers' initiative I take it, to holding a conference on CBMs, possible in the second or third week of October, 1984. This conference is to be a part of some broader activities on verification being undertaken by the university.

3. Rod Byers apparently is visiting New York where he discussed this idea with John Muroz of The East/West Institute (this organization is unfamiliar to me, but Dewitt described it as a new venture with a \$10 million endowment). The Institute is giving consideration to co-sponsoring the CBMs conference, if it takes place.

4. Dewitt's principal reason for calling was to see if he or Byers could be provided with in-depth information on the CDE, its purposes and Western approaches. He also asked if it would be possible for one or two representatives from York to attend the CDE for a short period as observers. I indicated simply that I would pass this information, and the request, to you for consideration. I also agreed that someone would call him back to obtain more details and discuss the issue (his number in Toronto is 667-3675).

5. At the York conference on defence (in which Bob Cameron and Arthur Mathewson also participated), Dewitt struck me as a serious-minded and realistic researcher, although I take it that strategic studies is a secondary interest of his.

Brian Herman
Brian Herman
Defence Relations Division

28-6-1- Bureau Peace
Mission 1000
CPP

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR8679 06DEC83

TO EXTOTT IDR DELIVER BY 061500

INFO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP/DIPOL/DNACPOL

DISTR MINA IDD IDDZ RBR IDA PSR EER FPR IDRL IDRA

REF OURTEL YBGR8673 02DEC 8674 05DEC

---NAC MIN MTG BRU:COMMUNIQUE-NORWEGIAN PROPOSAL

NORWEGIAN SPC REP JUST CIRCULATED UNDER COVER OF LETTER TO
DANNENERING A PROPOSAL FOR RESTRUCTURING COMMUNIQUE.PURPOSE,
ACCORDING TO LATTER, IS TO GIVE MORE PROMINENCE TO DISARMAMENT
SECTION OF COMMUNIQUE,INCLUDING INF.(AN APPROACH WE TRIED
EARLIER ON DURING DRAFTING EXERCISE).LETTER ALSO POINTS OUT
THAT NORWEGIAN FM INTENDS TO PURSUE MATTER AT MIN MTG IF SPC
HAS NOT/NOT REACHED AGREEMENT.

2.PROPOSAL CONSISTS OF REORDERING PARAS OF DRAFT COMMUNIQUE
AS FOLLOWS:PARA10 I/S DRAFT(INF)TO BECOME PARA3;
PARA9 TO BECOME PARA4;PARA11(START)TO BECOME PARA5;
PARA12(CSDMS-CDE)TO BECOME PARA6;PARA13(MBFR)TO
BECOME PARA7;PARA14(CD)TO BECOME PARAS;PARA3 TO
BECOME PARA9;PARA5(POLAND)TO BE
PARA10;PARA6(AFGHANISTAN)TO BE PARA11;PARA7(TRADE)
TO BE PARA12,PARA8(CSCE)TO BE PARA13;PARA15(BERLIN)
TO BE PARA14;PARA16(OUT-OF-AREA)TO BE PARA15;AND PARA
17(TERRORISM)TO BE PARA16.

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PAGE TWO YBGR8679 CONF

3. FINALLY, NORWEGIANS NOT/NOT SURPRISINGLY REQUEST DELETION
OF PARA4(FRENCH)PARA)AND OF FIRST PART OF PARA2.

4. BELIEVE WE COULD GO ALONG WITH REASONING AND MOST ELEMENTS OF
PROPOSAL OF NORWEGIANS, INCLUDING DELETION OF PARA4.PARA ON POLAND
WLD BE PUSHED BACK SIGNIFICANTLY, HOWEVER.

5. GRATEFUL YOUR VIEWS BY 27DEC, 1200.

CCC/298 061743Z YBGR8679

28-6-1 - Hussein
Peace
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L
FM ATHNS ZFGR5811 06DEC83
TO EXTOTT RSR

INFO TAVIV ANKRA PRMNY GENEV VIENN BNATO PESCO BREEC BERUT CAIRO
LDN COPEM STKHM CNBRA HSNKI DUBLN WSHDC PARIS HAGUE BRU OSLO
BONN LSBON MDRID ROME MOSCO DELHI TOKYO PEKIN
NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DGIS/DMPC PCOOTT/FOWLER
DISTR MINA MINE MINT FPR USS DMF DMFX RGB IFB CPD RSD PCR SID SIDG
IDD IDDZ IDR IMD IMU IMC JLA JLO GMD GMR ZSP ZSI URR RCM
REF OURTEL ZFGR5785 28NOV

---CYPRUS

WITH MOST IF NOT/NOT ALL GREEK INTERLOCUTORS TAKEN UP ONE WAY OR
ANOTHER WITH ATHNS EC SUMMIT,GREEK THOUGHTS ON CYPRUS ISSUE HAVE
NOT/NOT BEEN AVAILABLE.WITH POSSIBLE KYPRIANOU/PAPANDREOU DIVERGENCE
OF VIEWS(REFTEL)NOW SEEMINGLY PATCHED UP.NEXT MAJOR EVENT HAS
BEEN THATCHER/PAPANDREOU DISCUSSION OF CYPRUS THIS PAST WEEKEND
ON EC SUMMIT MARGIN.ARE HOPING FOR USEFUL BRIEFING FROM BRIT
EMB HERE WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS.

2.ALTHOUGH KYPRIANOU/PAPANDREOU HARMONY RESTORED,AT LEAST OUTWARDLY,
BRIT AMB HERE(MORE HELLENOPHILE THAN MOST)IS TAKING
LESS SANGUINE VIEW THAN BEFORE THAT PM PAPANREOU WILL PLAY HIS
CARDS RIGHT AND INDICATED ANNOYANCE AT GREEK PUBLIC SUGGESTIONS
THAT THERE IS A QUOTE THATCHER PLAN UNQUOTE.NO/NO SUCH PLAN EXISTS
FOR TIME BEING,ACCORDING TO BRIT AMB,AND PAPANREOU WILL HAVE

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PAGE TWO ZFGR5811 CONFD

QUOTE TO PULL HIS OWN CHESTNUTS OUT OF THE FIRE UNQUOTE. IN HIS VIEW, PAPANDEOU DECISION TO MAKE OF PRIOR TURKISH TROOP WITHDRAWAL A CONDITION FOR RESUMPTION OF DIALOGUE WAS A NATURAL AND PERHAPS LOGICAL HARDENING OF POSITION IN RESPONSE TO TURKISH RECOGNITION OF TRNC, BUT BRITS DID NOT/NOT THINK DECISION WISE AND WERE VERY LEEERY OF GETTING CAUGHT BETWEEN GREEKS AND TURKS. AS IS CLEAR PAPANDEOU HAS BEEN INVITING A BRIT INITIATIVE (PLAN) BUT BRITS ARE NOT/NOT SO FAR RESPONDING AND IT REMAINS DOUBTFUL PAPANDEOU HAS CONVINCED MRS THATCHER OTHERWISE.

3. GREEK COMMUNIST PARTY (KKE) HAS IN MEANTIME AGAIN DECLARED ITS OPPOSITION TO TRIPARTITE CONSULTATIONS ON CYPRUS AND PROMPTED GREEK GOVT TO AFFIRM IT HAS NO/NO INTENTION OF QUOTE DE-INTERNATIONALIZING UNQUOTE THE ISSUE AND TO SEEK QUOTE NATO UNQUOTE (IF WESTERN) SOLUTION. SPOKESMAN MAROUDAS STATED 02 DEC THAT GREEK GOVT REMAINS OF VIEW THAT CYPRUS PROBLEM IS NOT/NOT A GREEK-TURKISH DISPUTE BUT A MAJOR INTERNATL PROBLEM WHOSE SOLUTION MUST BE ARRIVED AT THROUGH UN PROCEDURES, EVEN THOUGH INTERCOMMUNAL DIALOGUE WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF UN SEC GEN INITIATIVE WAS NO/NO LONGER FEASIBLE BECAUSE OF RECOGNITION IMPLICATIONS.

4. THERE HAS BEEN NO/NO COMMENT LOCALLY ON CREATION OF COMWEL ACTION GROUP ON CYPRUS.

CCC/216 070955Z ZFGR5811

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

manuel F de

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE PARIS WIGR5477 06DEC83

A EXTOTT LIDDZ

INFO LDN BONN ROME TOKYO MOSCO BNATO PEKIN WSHDC

NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD

DISTR IFB RGB UGB RCD RBR RCR IDR IDA

REF NOTRETEL WIGR5466 DU 05DEC

--- INITIATIVE PM - NON ADHESION DE FRANCE AU NPT

28-6-1 - Hudson Peace Mission

PROPOS QUI SUIVENT SONT DESTINES A ECLAIRER POSITION FRANCAISE CONCERNANT SA NON-ADHESION AU NPT SUITE CONVERSATION QU AVONS EUE AVEC RESP DU CEA.

2. SELON NOTRE INTERLOCUTEUR, FRANCE N A AUCUN INTERET A ADHERER AU NPT DES LORS QU ELLE EN RESPECTE, D UNE PART, L'ESPRIT ET LA LETTRE ET, QUE D AUTRE PART, MAJORITE DES ARTICLES DU TRAITE NE SONT PAS RESPECTES PAR SIGNATAIRES. INTERLOCUTEUR APPORTE DEUX EXEMPLES: D ABORD DANS CAS DU REACTEUR IRAKIEN, CE PAYS ETAIT SIGNATAIRE DU TRAITE ET ACCEPTAIT CONTROLES DE AGENCE ATOMIQUE INNTLE. CECI N A PAS EMPECHE ISRAELIENS DE BOMBARDER REACTEUR PRESUMANT FINALITES AUTRES QUE CIVILES. DANS CAS INDE ET AFRIQUE DU SUD, AMERICAINS SE SONT TROUVES DANS EMBARRAS LORSQUE LIES PAR TRAITE, ILS N ETAIENT PAS EN MESURE DE FOURNIR URANIUM ENRICHI AUX CONDITIONS SOUHAITEES SANS ENFREINDRE ENGAGEMENTS. C EST DONC POURQUOI EUA SE SONT RETOURNES VERS LA FRANCE POUR POURVOIR CES

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PAGE DEUX WIGR5477 CONFD

PAYS EN COMBUSTIBLE, EVITANT QUE CEUX-CI N ENFREIGNENT ASSURANCES FOURNIES QUANT AU RETRAITEMENT DES DECHETS QUI S ACCUMULENT ET LAISSANT PLUSIEURS ANNEES POUR TROUVER SOLUTION SATISFAISANTE ET COMPATIBLE.

3. INTERLOCUTEUR CONSTATE QUE SELON TERMES DU TRAITE, ADHERENTS SE SONT ENGAGES A AMORCER NEGS EN VUE DU DESARMEMENT. CELA A-T-IL, SELON LUI FOURNIR UNE INCITATION SUFFISANTE? ATTITUDE FRANCAISE APPARAIT DONC COMME UN CHOIX ENTRE ATTITUDE REALISTE ET IDEALISTE. DES LORS QUE NPT NE SERT PAS EFFICACEMENT/CONCRETEMENT LES FINS DE NON-PROLIFERATION ET DU DESARMEMENT, ATTITUDE A PRENDRE APPARAIT D EVIDENCE ET C EST CELLE POUR LAQUELLE OPTE LA FRANCE QUI EN TIRE AUSSI, DOIT-ON RECONNAITRE, SON PROFIT. DANS CONTEXTE ACTUEL ET EXEMPLE EUA/INDE EN ATTESTE, ATTITUDE RIGOUREUSE PEUT PRODUIRE EFFETS INVERSEES A CEUX RECHERCHES ET C EST CE CARCAN QUE FRANCE VEUT PRECISEMENT EVITER.

4. PAR CONSEQUENT, AUSSI LONGTEMPS QUE PRINCIPAUX ARTICLES DU NPT NE SERONT PAS RESPECTES, ATTITUDE FRANCAISE NE SE MODIFIERA PAS.
CCC/118 061650Z WIGR5477

R E S T R I C T E D

FM MOSCO XYGR4200 06DEC83

TO EXTOTT RBR DELIVER BY 060900

INFO BNATC DELIVER BY 061500

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

WSHDC LDN PARIS BONN GENEV PRGUE WSAW BUCST BPEST ROME BRU
HAGUE COPEN OSLO STKHM HSNKI NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CIS PCOOTT/FOWLER
DISTR IFB RGB RBD IDD IDDZ IDR IDA ZSP ZSI CPD

---SOVIET PRESS CONFERENCE ON INF DEPLOYMENT

SUMMARY:PRESS CONFERENCE FEATURING CHIEF OF STAFF MARSHAL
OGARKOV, FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MIN KORNIENKO AND HEAD, INNATL
DEPT. C.C. CPSU ZAMYATIN WAS HELD ON 05DEC. PURPOSE OF CONF
APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN REBUTTAL OF WESTERN CHARGES THAT USSR
WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR BREAK OFF OF GENEV TALKS AS WELL AS REASSUR-
ING SOV AND ALLIED PUBLICS THAT COUNTERMEASURES BEING TAKEN
BY USSR WERE FULLY ADEQUATE. SOME ELABORATION WAS PROVIDED AS TO
NATURE OF SEA BASED SYSTEMS THAT WLD BE DEPLOYED OFF USA COAST
AS WELL AS INDICATION THAT CONTINUATION OF START TALKS MAY BE
JEOPARDIZED BY DEPLOYMENT. ANDROPOVS ACTIVE ROLE IN FOREIGN
POLICY/DEFENCE DECISION-MAKING WAS REAFFIRMED.

2. REPORT: DEC05 CONFERENCE BY THE NOW ACCOMPLISHED TRIO OF
OGARKOV, KORNIENKO AND ZAMYATIN WAS PROMPTED BY REGIME PERCEPTION
THAT SOV UNION WAS BEING CONSIDERED SPOILER IN TERMINATION OF
GENEV TALKS AND THAT CERTAIN DOUBT MIGHT EXIST AMONG THEIR
OWN PUBLIC AS TO STRENGTH OF ANNOUNCED COUNTERMEASURES.

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PAGE TWO XYGR4200 RESTR

ZAMYATIN AND KORNIENKO OPENED WITH CONVENTIONAL ACCOUNTS OF HOW USA MUST BEAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR PRESENT SITUATION, BUT IT WAS LEFT TO ORGAKOV TO REITERATE IN AUTHORITY AND QUANTITATIVE FASHION, SOV CASE FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM GENEV NEGS. HE STATES THAT AMERICAN PROPOSALS WLD HAVE RESULTED IN TWICE AS MANY LAUNCHERS AND THREE TIMES AS MANY WARHEADS FOR USA VIS A VIS USSR. OGARKOV CHARACTERIZES USA POSITION AT GENEV TALKS AS QUOTE ABSURD UNQUOTE AND ACCUSES USA OF SEEKING TO ATTAIN FIRST STRIKE ADVANTAGE OVER USSR. THIS IS IMPOSSIBLE AIM ORGANKOV EMPHASIZES AND ONE THAT WLD BE PURSUED ONLY BY QUOTE ADVENTURISTS AND SUICIDES UNQUOTE.

3. IN REFERRING TO COUNTERMEASURES DESCRIBED IN ANDROPOVS 24NOV STATEMENT OGARKOV SAYS QUOTE I WISH ONLY TO STRESS THEIR ADEQUACY UNQUOTE. HE CONTINUES BY DESCRIBING SEA BASED SYSTEMS TO BE DEPLOYED AGAINST TERRITORY OF USA AS EQUAL IN TERMS OF RANGE, EXPLOSIVE POWER, ACCURACY AND QUOTE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT IN THEIR FLIGHT TIME TO TARGET UNQUOTE TO AMERICAN MISSILE SYSTEMS CURRENTLY BEING DEPLOYED IN EUROPE.

4. IN QUESTION AND ANSWER SEGMENT, SOVS POINTEDLY REFUTE CHANCELLOR KOHLS INTERPRETATION OF SENTENCE IN ANDROPOV LET TO HIM TO EFFECT THAT USSR WLD BE READY TO RETURN TO BARGAINING TABLE. THEY DESCRIBE KOHL AS QUOTE HARPING ON HIS OWN UNQUOTE AND SAY QUOTE ONE WLD HAVE TO HAVE INCREDIBLY RICH IMAGINATION TO INTERPRET THAT PHRASE IN WAY KOHL DOES UNQUOTE.

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PAGE THREE XYGR4200 RESTR

5. OGARKOV ALSO SPECIFIES THAT OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL MISSILES BEING STATIONED IN GDR AND CZECHOSLAVIA WILL QUOTE NEUTRALIZE ADVANTAGE WHICH USA HOPES TO ACHIEVE DUE TO SHORT FLIGHT TIME OF PERSHING 2 MISSILES UNQUOTE. THEIR RANGE WILL BE SUFFICIENT TO QUOTE REACH MOST OF THE DEPLOYMENT AREAS OF THE USA MISSILES BEING INSTALLED IN WEST EUROPE UNQUOTE. OGARKOV ALSO STATES THAT QUOTE POSSIBILITIES OF OUR ARMED FORCES ARE FAR FROM LIMITED TO MISSILES ALONE UNQUOTE AND REFERS TO OTHER MEASURES (WHICH HE SAYS HE IS UNABLE TO SPECIFY) WHICH WILL BE TAKEN TO ENSURE SOV SECURITY.

6. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ON START TALKS, SOVS RESPOND THAT USA MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES DEPLOYED IN EUROPE WILL BECOME STRATEGIC WEAPONS WITH RESPECT TO USSR, AND ACCORDINGLY FACT OF THEIR DEPLOYMENT QUOTE CANNOT/NOT FAIL TO HAVE AN EFFECT ON STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS UNQUOTE. SOVIET SPEAKER MENTIONS THAT LAST MTG OF PRESENT ROUND OF TALKS WLD BE HELD 08DEC AND ADDS CRYPTICALLY QUOTE BUT AS TO WHAT THE OUTCOME WILL BE - WAIT A LITTLE, YOU WILL SOON KNOW UNQUOTE.

7. INTERESTINGLY, TASS ACCOUNT ALSO INCLUDED QUESTION ON STATE OF ANDROPOV'S HEALTH AND RESPONSE TO EFFECT THAT ANDROPOV WAS RECOVERING FROM HIS QUOTE COLD UNQUOTE AND WAS QUOTE TO A FULL EXTENT OCCUPIED WITH PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS INCLUDING QUESTIONS OF DEFENCE COUNCIL OF USSR UNQUOTE. LAST ELEMENT PRESUMABLY INTENDED TO DEPICT ANDROPOV AS FULLY INVOLVED IN CURRENT

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PAGE FOUR XYGR4200 RESTR

POLITICAL/MILITARY DECISION MAKING.

8. OGARKOV'S EARLIER REF TO ANDROPOV IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT ALSO DISTINGUISHED ITSELF FROM THAT OF HIS CIVILIAN COLLEAGUES (WHO SIMPLY REFER TO COMRADE ANDROPOV) BY USING FORMULA QUOTE LEADER OF OUR PARTY AND STATE UNQUOTE AS IF TO UNDERLINE MILITARY'S RECOGNITION OF SUPREMACY OF HIS POSITION. (REF TO ANDROPOV'S ROLE ON DEFENCE COUNCIL REINFORCES THIS IMPRESSION.)

9. IN CONCLUSION, CONF DOES NOT/NOT INTRODUCE SIGNIFICANT NEW ELEMENT BUT DOES DARKLY HINT AT ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF DEPLOYMENT ACTION (END OF START TALKS, INCREASED SOV MILITARY PRESSURE IN SOME OTHER FORM?). CONF WAS INTENDED TO SQUELCH WESTERN SPECULATION THAT USSR WLD BE READY TO RETURN TO GENEV TALKS DESPITE PERSHING AND CRUISE DEPLOYMENT. IN ADDITION IT SERVED DOMESTIC PR FUNCTION IN SUGGESTING THAT SOV COUNTER-MEASURES WILL FULLY COMPENSATE FOR UPSETTING OF EUROPEAN NUCLEAR BALANCE REPRESENTED BY AMERICAN INF DEPLOYMENT.

CCC/144 061300Z XYGR4200

CORRECTED COPY
EXEMPLAIRE CORRIGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CORRECTED COPY

FM WSHDC UNGR2500 06DEC83

TO EXTOTT URR DELIVER BY 070900

INFO MOSCO BNATO ROME LDN BONN PARIS HAGUE BRU PEKIN PRMNY CNGNY

TOKYO DELHI PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/CP

DISTR MINA DMF IDR IDA RGB RBR LIDDZ RCP ZSI UGB

---PM TRUDEAU VISIT TO WSHDC

15DEC IS NOW AGREED FOR WHAT HAS BEEN THUS FAR IDENTIFIED AS
ONE-HOUR MTG WITH PRESIDENT. WE UNDERSTAND INTENTION IS THAT PM
TRUDEAU WILL LEAVE RIGHT AFTER MTG FOR NY.

2. OTHERWISE, APPEARANCE AT NATIONAL PRESS CLUB CLD STILL BE
CONSIDERED. THIS WOULD NOT/NOT NEED TO BE SPEECH BUT COULD BE
DESCRIPTION OF WHAT PM TRUDEAU HAS BEEN DOING AND WHY, FOLLOWED
BY QUESTIONS. MEDIA COVERAGE WOULD BE VERY HIGH.

3. DOWNSIDE OF SUCH APPEARANCE WOULD BE TO QUALIFY IMPORTANCE OF
MTG WITH REAGAN. IT IS NOT/NOT THAT REAGAN PEOPLE WOULD SUSPECT
PM TRUDEAU WERE COURTING PUBLIC OPINION IN USA AND RESENT IT, BUT
MORE THAT REAGAN WOULD BE LESS PRONE TO SPEAK IN FULL CONFIDENCE
KNOWING PM WLD BE GOING DIRECTLY TO PRESS CLUB.

4. ON BALANCE, THEREFORE, DECISION TO GO RIGHT ON TO NYORK IS
GOOD ONE. BUT MEDIA EXPOSURE IN USA REMAINS IMPORTANT AND WE URGE
JUDICIOUS USE OF OPPORTUNITIES IN NYORK DEC15 AND 16 AS WELL AS
IDENTIFICATION ASAP OF RIGHT PUBLIC FORUM FOR MAJOR ADDRESS JAN19
AS SUGGESTED.

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28-6-1 - Trudeau Deal
Mission

PAGE TWO UNGR2500 CONFD

5. IT THEREFORE APPEARS THAT VISIT TO WSHDC WOULD BE FOR PURPOSES OF MTG WITH REAGAN ONLY. STATE DEPT HAS INFORMALLY ASKED WITHOUT HAVING CONSULTED MR SHULTZ IF LUNCH HOSTED BY SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD BE IN ORDER AND WE SAID THAT WE UNDERSTOOD PM TRUDEAU WOULD HAVE TO GET AWAY TO NYORK RIGHT AFTER MTG WITH REAGAN. WE PRESUME THIS IS CORRECT AND WOULD ALSO APPLY IF LUNCHEON HOSTED BY BUSH WERE PROPOSED. BUT SHORT MTG WITH VP BUSH WOULD BE IN ORDER IF PM TRUDEAU AGREES. WE INFORMED BUSH'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER THIS MORNING THAT VISIT DATES WERE NOW SET. IN VIEW OF MTG WHICH PM HAD IN OTT WITH BUSH WHICH WE KNOW PM HAD VALUED, WE THOUGHT IT LIKELY PM WOULD AT LEAST LIKE TO SAY HELLO AND HAVE A CHAT JUST BEFORE OR AFTER REAGAN MTG, PARTICULARLY IF BUSH WERE NOT/NOT ATTENDING MTG WITH PRESIDENT.

6. PLS ADVISE.

CC/241 062330Z UNGR2500

CCC/230 071457Z UNGR2500

MF

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2500 06DEC83

TO EXTOTT URR DELIVER BY 070900

INFO MOSCO BNATO ROME LDN BONN PARIS HAGUE BRU PEKIN PRMNY CNGNY

TOKYO DELHI PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/PPP

DISTR MINA DMF IDR IDA RGR RBR (IDDZ RCP ZSI UGB

---PM TRUDEAU VISIT TO WSHDC

15DEC IS NOW AGREED FOR WHAT HAS BEEN THUS FAR IDENTIFIED AS ONE-HOUR MTG WITH PRESIDENT. WE UNDERSTAND INTENTION IS THAT PM TRUDEAU WILL LEAVE RIGHT AFTER MTG FOR NY.

2. OTHERWISE, APPEARANCE AT NATIONAL PRESS CLUB CLD STILL BE CONSIDERED. THIS WOULD NOT/NOT NEED TO BE SPEECH BUT COULD BE DESCRIPTION OF WHAT PM TRUDEAU HAS BEEN DOING AND WHY, FOLLOWED BY QUESTIONS. MEDIA COVERAGE WOULD BE VERY HIGH.

3. DOWNSIDE OF SUCH APPEARANCE WOULD BE TO QUALIFY IMPORTANCE OF MTG WITH REAGAN. IT IS NOT/NOT THAT REAGAN PEOPLE WOULD SUSPECT PM TRUDEAU WERE COURTING PUBLIC OPINION IN USA AND RESENT IT, BUT MORE THAT REAGAN WOULD BE LESS PRONE TO SPEAK IN FULL CONFIDENCE KNOWING PM WLD BE GOING DIRECTLY TO PRESS CLUB.

4. ON BALANCE, THEREFORE, DECISION TO GO RIGHT ON TO NYORK IS GOOD ONE. BUT MEDIA EXPOSURE IN USA REMAINS IMPORTANT AND WE URGE JUDICIOUS USE OF OPPORTUNITIES IN NYORK JAN15 AND 16 AS WELL AS IDENTIFICATION ASAP OF RIGHT PUBLIC FORUM FOR MAJOR ADDRESS JAN19 AS SUGGESTED.

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PAGE TWO UNGR2500 CONF

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6. PLS ADVISE.

CCC/241 0623307 UNGR2500

Handwritten signature

N/R

**CORRECTED COPY
EXEMPLAIRE CORRIGE**

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Division Phoned	<i>DDZ</i>
Person	<i>SC</i>
Local Time	<i>1145</i>

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CORRECTED COPY

FM WSHDC UNGR2497 06DEC83

TO EXTOTT (IDDZ DELIVER BY 061900

*28-6-1 - Hudson
Peace
Mission*

INFO MOSCO BNATO ROME LDN BONN PARIS HAGUE BRU PEKIN PRMNY CNGNY

TOKYO DELHI PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/CP

DISTR MINA DMF IDR IDA RGB RBR URR RCP ZSI UGB

---REVIEW OF THE ALLIANCE

WE NOTED FROM RECENT PMDEL LDN TEL THAT THERE IS STILL QUESTION OF CDA PROPOSING IN CONTEXT OF PM PEACE INITIATIVE A REVIEW OF STATE OF THE ALLIANCE AND POSSIBLY OF ITS STRATEGIC DOCTRINE. WE GATHER THAT DPM/SSEA WILL NOT/NOT BE MAKING EXPLICIT PROPOSAL IN THAT SENSE AT NAC MTG DEC7-8. HOWEVER, IDEA IN BROAD SENSE COULD HAVE SOME REAL MERIT LATER ON.

2. TAB 8 OF PEACE INITIATIVE BLUE BOOK SETS OUT SOME OF THE CONSIDERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO NATO DOCTRINE. WE JUDGE THAT IN FACT THE GEOPOLITICAL FABRIC OF THE ALLIANCE ALSO NEEDS REJUVENATION. THERE IS REAL CONCERN IN WSHDC THAT NEGATIVE POLITICAL EFFECTS IN WESTERN EUROPE OF INF DEPLOYMENT WILL NOT/NOT REALLY BE FELT FOR A FEW YEARS AND POSSIBLY NOT/NOT UNTIL OPPOSITION PARTIES WHICH HAVE TAKEN STANCES AGAINST DEPLOYMENT EVENTUALLY ASSUME OFFICE. OBVIOUS FOCUS OF THIS CONCERN IS FRG.

3. THIS IS NOT/NOT TO BE ALARMIST BUT IT IS TO RECOGNIZE THAT BROAD SWATH OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION MAY WELL BE ENCOURAGED TO LOOK CRITICALLY AT STATE OF ALLIANCE IN NEXT FEW YRS AND OPPORTUNITY

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PAGE TWO UNGR2497, CONF

WHICH REPLACEMENT OF LUNS BY CARRINGTON PRESENTS CLD BE USED BEFOREHAND TO DEPICT ALLIANCE AS DYNAMIC ENTITY THAT IS RESPONSIVE TO THE REAL NEEDS OF ALL ITS MEMBERS. POSSIBILITY THAT CARRINGTON HIMSELF MIGHT BE ASKED TO UNDERTAKE SUCH A REVIEW IN COMPANY OF QUOTE WISE MEN UNQUOTE IS ONE OPTION. IT CERTAINLY APPEALED TO BOB MACNAMARA ON WHOM GOTLIEB TRIED IDEA AT LUNCHEON YESTERDAY. HE THOUGHT SUCH A REVIEW, CONDUCTED UNDER CARRINGTON, WLD INDEED BE VALUABLE. PRESUMABLY CARRINGTON CLD BEGIN AFTER APPOINTMENT ANNOUNCED BUT BEFORE HE TAKES OVER IN JUNE.

4. THERE ARE OF COURSE, OBJECTIONS TO SUCH STUDY. SOME MEMBER STATES WLD BE RELUCTANT TO OPEN WHAT MIGHT BE SEEN AS CAN OF WORMS. IF STUDY, WHICH WLD HAVE TO BE MADE PUBLIC, OPENS UP SENSITIVE ISSUES, INCLUDING STRATEGIC DOCTRINE. THE PROBLEM WITH THE STRATEGIC DOCTRINE IS ONE SYMPTOM OF BASIC PROBLEMS IN ALLIANCE TO WHICH NEW WOUNDS HAVE BEEN INFLICTED. ONE IS THE SPLIT CAUSED BETWEEN PUBLICS AND GOVTS OVER INF DEPLOYMENT. THE OTHER IS THE EXTREME TO WHICH THE REAGAN ADMIN HAS PUSHED THE NORMAL TENSION BETWEEN ITSELF AND THE ALLIES CONCERNING THE EXACT NATURE OF THE ALLIANCE DECISION MAKING PROCESS.

6. WHILE IT IS TRUE THE ALLIANCE NEEDS HELP IN CURING ITS PROBLEMS, SOME MAY ASK IF WE WANT TO OPERATE ON A PATIENT THAT MAY BE AT THIS POINT TOO WEAK TO WITHSTAND THE OPERATION. BUT ALLIANCE HAS ALWAYS HAD WEAK STRESS LINES INHERENT IN ORGANIZATION OF DIVERSE

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PAGE THREE UNGR2497 CONF

DEMOCRACIES. MUCH OF THIS ARGUES PRINCIPALLY THAT ITS MANDATE WOULD HAVE TO BE VERY CAREFULLY THOUGHT ABOUT AND THAT IT WILL HAVE TO BE RECOGNIZED THAT RESULTS, IF ANY, WILL COME FROM SOME VERY POLITICAL ASSESSMENTS RATHER THAN DETACHED ONES.

8. WHETHER STUDY WOULD PROCEED TO SUMMIT OR SPECIAL POLITICAL LEVEL MTG TO REVIEW ITS CONCLUSIONS IS ANOTHER MATTER AND THAT THAT CAN BE JUDGED ONLY WHEN FINAL SHAPE CAN BE SEEN. BUT HANDLING AND TIMING OF INITIAL PROPOSAL AND ITS RECEPTION BY ALLIANCE ARE KEY POINTS IN DEVELOPMENT OF IDEA WHICH IS GOOD ONE AND WHICH MUST THEREFORE BE PROTECTED.

9. PERHAPS MOST REALISTIC POSSIBILITY FOR A SUCCESSFUL INITIATION OF A REVIEW WOULD BE TO USE OCCASION OF CARRINGTON INCUMBENCY TO AUTHORIZE, IN LOW-KEY AND VERY GENERAL WAY, A LOOK AT WHETHER NATO IN THE NEXT TEN YEARS OR SO. TERMS OF STUDY COULD BE LEFT GENERAL AND UP TO HIM AND THERE WOULD THUS BE NO/NO IMPLICATION OF ANY PRE-JUDGMENT ABOUT ADEQUACY OR OTHERWISE OF NATO DOCTRINE. AUTHORITY TO ALLOW CARRINGTON TO CONSULT OR APPOINT WISE-MEN ADVISERS MIGHT ALSO BE USEFUL WAY TO CREATE SOME MOMENTUM IN RIGHT DIRECTION.

CCC/241 062214Z UNGR2497

action

28-6-1 - Bureau
Peace
Mission

UNCLAS

FM SFRAN WVFC2462 DEC 6/83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO URP

REF YR TEL IDDZ 0241 OF 2 DEC 83

---PM INITIATIVE

YR REF TEL PROVIDES USEFUL BACKGROUND REFERENCE LIST. WE HAVE BEEN PROVIDED WITH INFORMATION ON MOST OF THE EVENTS. WE WOULD APPRECIATE FURTHER INFORMATION ON EVENTS 3, 5, AND 14, THAT WE MAY PROVIDE TO INTERESTED MEDIA, ACADEMIC, AND GOVERNMENTAL CONTACTS.

UUU/815 062330Z WVFC2462

ACTION

D I F F U S I O N R E S T R E I N T

DOUBLE POSSIBLE

DE ANKRA ZEGR1729 06DEC83

A EXTOTT IDD

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER DELHI LDN BONN WSHDC PEKIN MOSCO BRU VMBFR PARIS
DISTR MINA DMF RGB RSD RSR IDA IDR

---PROGRAMME DE PAIX DU PM-REACTION TURQUE

MINISTRE DES AFF ETRANGERES A TENU PAROLE. PORTE-PAROLE DU MAE A FAIT
DECLARATION A LA PRESSE SELON LAQUELLE CIT TURQUIE APPUIE LA
PROPOSITION DE TRUDEAU FINCIT. MALHEUREUSEMENT SEULEMENT CUMHURIYET
(100,000 CIRCULATION) ET JOURNAL EN ANGLAIS ONT REPRODUIT NOUVELLE.
TEXTE DE CUMHURIYET SUIT: CIT ASKED HIS VIEW ON CDN PM P TRUDEAUS 25
POINT PROPOSAL FOR STABILIZING EAST-WEST RELATIONS. SPOKESMAN OF THE
FOREIGN MINISTRY AMB NAZHI AKIMAN SAID, QUOTE WE AGREE WITH THE POINTS
COVERED BY PM TRUDEAUS PROPOSALS. IN PARTICULAR, THE MOST NEGATIVE
CHARACTERISTIC OF THE PRESENT ERA IS THE LACK OF A DIALOGUE BETWEEN
THE USA AND THE USSR UNQUOTE. AMB AKIMAN POINTED OUT THAT QUOTE WITH
HIS EVALUATIONS BASED ON SOUND LOGIC UNQUOTE, PM TRUDEAU UNDERTOOK A
BRAVE INITIATIVE AND MADE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO WORLD PEACE.
AKIMAN SAID, CONSIDERING THE PRESENT INATL SITU HE DID NOT/NOT THINK
THAT THE PROPOSALS WOULD YIELD RESULTS IMMEDIATELY, AND CONTINUED AS
FOLLOWS: QUOTE ALL THE BIG POWERS MAY NOT/NOT FIND IT POSSIBLE TO REACT
RAPIDLY TO THESE PROPOSALS. NEVERTHELESS, WE THINK THAT THEN FACT THAT
PM TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE HAS COME AT A TIME WHEN TENSION BETWEEN USA AND
USSR GROS MAY HELP TO BRING ABOUT AN ALLEVIATION. WE APPRECIATE THIS

...2

001574

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

PAGE TWO ZEGR1729 RESTR

UNQUOTE.FINCIT.

2. AUTRE GRAND QUOTIDIEN MILLIYET(200,000)A PUBLIE EN BONNE PLACE
06DEC TEXTE BEAUCOUP PLUS LONG QUI CONSISTAIT EN UNE PARAPHRASE SOUS
MA SIGNATURE DES DEUX DISCOURS DU PM

MATHIEU

CCC/244 061257Z ZEGR1729

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L
FM PRGUE WOGRI371 06DEC83
TO EXTOTT RBR

INFO PRCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DMPOL/DGIS BNATO WSHDC LDN PARIS
PRMNY CNGNY WSAW MOSCO BGRAD BPEST BUCST BRU GENEV VIENN
BAG TOKYO PEKIN DE OTT BERN COPEN HSNKI OSLO LSBON STKHM HAGE DE PAR
DISTR MINA MINE MINT USS DMF RBD RCD TSD RBRD IDD IDR ETT ZSP FPR
PER PPR PED SIO SIOA SID IDDZ IFB SIC JLO JLA JCD LDC LDR LGB ZSI
IDA

REF OURTELS WOGRI319 23NOV WOGRI321 24NOV

---REACTION TO SOVIET MISSILE DEPLOYMENT IN CSSR

SUMMARY:FURTHER LOOK AT DEVELOPMENTS REPORTED IN REFTELS
AND AT CONTINUING TREATMENT BY LEADERS AND MEDIA HERE OF
DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET MISSILES INDICATES CONCERN AT THE TOP
THAT SOME OF POPULATION IS NOT/NOT HAPPY WITH SITUATION.
IT CAN EVEN BE SUGGESTED THAT LEADERSHIP RECOGNIZES ITS
ACCEPTANCE OF MISSILES,INEVITABLE THOUGH IT WAS,IS IN
HARMONY WITH SOVIET BUT PERHAPS NOT/NOT WITH CZECHOSLOVAK
NATL INTERESTS AND THAT IT IS LETTING MOSCO KNOW THAT THERE
ARE LIMITS TO HOW FAR CZECHOSLOVAKIA CAN BE DRAWN.AT
LEAST,IT CAN BE SAID THAT CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAS NOT/NOT GIVEN
DEPLOYMENT UNQUALIFIED SUPPORT THAT MOSCO WOULD HAVE
EXPECTED FROM THIS FAITHFUL SATELLITE.

2.REPORT:THERE HAVE BEEN NO/NO UNUSUAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE

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PAGE TWO WOGRI371 CONFID

REFTELS WITH SPECIAL BEARING ON MISSILE DEPLOYMENT. WHAT IS STRIKING, HOWEVER, IS EXTENT TO WHICH AUTHORITIES HAVE ALLOWED ANXIETY OF PEOPLE TO BE SEEN AND REFLECTED IN MEDIA. AUTHORITIES HAVE OF COURSE TO SOME EXTENT NURTURED THIS ANXIETY, EVEN FEAR, BY THEIR REFERENCES TO QUOTE WAR HYSTERIA UNQUOTE IN USA; THEY HAVE PERHAPS GONE FURTHER IN THIS DIRECTION THAN THEY INTENDED. AS NOTED PREVIOUSLY, WE HAVE NO/NO REAL WAY OF GAUGING PUBLIC OPINION HERE, BUT GENERAL SENSE OF MOOD GATHERED FROM MEDIA APPROACH IS REINFORCED BY REMARKS BY CITIZENS ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF WAR, ABOUT PEOPLE LOSING THEIR POLITICAL APATHY FOR FIRST TIME IN FIFTEEN YEARS AND SUCH EXAMPLES AS NIGERIAN AMBS REPORT THAT HEAD OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS INSTITUTE TOLD HIM THAT IF THERE WERE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION HERE, DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST SOVIET MISSILES WOULD BE BIGGER THAN PEACE RALLIES IN WEST. MEDIA AND PARTY OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO EXPLAIN DECISION AND INNATL SITUATION THROUGH SPEECHES, ARTICLES AND PROGRAMS (SOME QUITE SOPHISTICATED) DESIGNED TO CONVINCCE POPULATION THAT IS CONCERNED, NOT/NOT ONE THAT LACKS INTEREST.

3. CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERS HAVE OF COURSE, CONTINUED TO ENDORSE USSR-CSSR DECISION TO BEGIN PREPARATIONS FOR MISSILE DEPLOYMENT. HUSAK MENTIONED IT SPECIFICALLY IN INTERVIEW WITH TRYBUNA LUDU BEFORE HIS VISIT TO POLAND LAST WEEK, AS

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PAGE THREE WOGR1371 CONF

DID JARUZELSKI IN COUNTERPART RUDE PRAVO PIECE, ALTHOUGH JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF 01DEC REFERRED ONLY TO APPROVAL BY HUSAK AND JARUZELSKI OF ANDROPOVS 24NOV STATEMENT, A SOFTER WAY OF DOING SAME THING. SLOVAK PREMIER COLOTKA KEPT SAYING IT MILDLY DURING VISIT TO FRG LAST WEEK. COMMUNIQUE FOLLOWING VISIT OF BULGARIAN FM MLADENOV 25NOV REFERRED TO ANDROPOV STATEMENT BUT SPECIFICALLY STRESSED APPROVAL OF DECISION TO DEPLOY. THERE WERE PERHAPS MUTUAL CONCESSIONS HERE, AS FM CHNOUPEK HAD ENDORSED BULGARIAN PROPOSALS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE IN BALKANS IN HIS DINNER SPEECH TO MLADENOV.

4. IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT COMMUNIQUE ON 10NOV VISIT OF KADAR (OURTEL WOGR1286 14NOV) DID NOT/NOT MENTION DECISION ON MISSILE DEPLOYMENT. ROMANIAN OPPOSITION TO MISSILE DEPLOYMENT BY BOTH SIDES AND INITIATIVES FOR TALKS HAVE GONE UNREPORTED HERE, AS HAVE RELATIVELY MODERATE STATEMENTS OF HONECKER AND FISCHER IN GDR. PRESUMABLY LEADERS DO NOT/NOT WANT TO ENCOURAGE ANY OPPOSITION HERE BY INDICATING THAT THERE ARE OPINIONS IN THE WPO OTHER THAN THEIR OWN AND SOVIET ONES.

5. MAJOR ENDORSEMENT AT IDEOLOGICAL LEVEL WAS BILAK SPEECH TO CENTRAL CTTEE PLENUM REPORTED SECOND REFTEL. LOOKED AT AGAIN, THAT SPEECH CAN BE SEEN TO HAVE CURIOUS ELEMENT INDICATING IT WAS PERHAPS NOT/NOT ENTIRELY INTENDED FOR

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PAGE FOUR WOGRI371 CONF D

LOCAL CONSUMPTION. BILAKS IMAGERY WAS DESIGNED TO BE UNDERSTOOD BY RUSSIANS: REAGAN AS HITLER CAN HAVE EUROPEAN COMPREHENSION, BUT REAGAN AS GENGHIZ KHAN STIRS RUSSIAN RATHER THAN EUROPEAN SOULS. HE ALSO MADE REFERENCES TO EFFORTS TO DISTORT SOVIET ROLE IN WORLD WAR 2, TO ATTEMPT TO REVISE POTSDAM AND YALTA AGREEMENTS, TO REAGAN AS NOT/NOT HAVING BEEN DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED, TO USA AS NAZI GERMANY AND RESULTS LAST TIME IMPERIALISM WAGED WAR AGAINST USSR, TO WW2 BRINGING SUFFERING TO EUROPE, WEALTH TO USA AND ENOUGH OTHER SUCH EMOTIONAL DISTORTIONS AS TO ATTRACT SOVIET ATTENTION TO WHAT HE WAS SAYING. WHAT HE WAS SAYING, AS WE REPORTED, WAS THAT THERE IS NERVOUSNESS AND UNEASE AMONG POPULATION ABOUT SOVIET MISSILE DEPLOYMENT HERE. IT IS REASONABLE INTERPRETATION OF WAY HE SAID IT THAT HE WAS SPEAKING DIRECT TO MOSCO AS WELL AS UNDERLINING TO PARTY NEED FOR STRONGER LOCAL COUNTERMEASURES. MESSAGE TO MOSCO WAS OTHER SIDE OF THIS COIN: THIS ISSUE IS FIRST SINCE SOVIET INVASION IN 1968 TO HAVE AWAKENED POLITICAL ANXIETY IN THIS COUNTRY; WHILE WE HAVE IT UNDER CONTROL WE MUST NOT/NOT GO TOO FAR FOR THERE ARE SOME HERE WHO DO NOT/NOT WANT TO YIELD TO SOVIET PRESSURE. BILAK, UKRAINIAN BY ORIGIN, THE PARTYS IDEOLOGUE AND STRONG SUPPORTER OF INVASION IN 1968, IS ONE OF FEW CZECHOSLOVAKS SOVIET LEADERSHIP MIGHT TAKE SERIOUSLY.

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PAGE FIVE WOGRI371 CONF

6. ONE LOCAL JOURNALIST TO WHOM WE HAVE SPOKEN AND WHO IS WELL INFORMED SAID THAT ALL CZECHOSLOVAKS CAN TELL FROM WHAT THEIR LEADERS (NOT/NOT ONLY AT TOP PARTY LEVEL) ARE SAYING AND HOW THEY ARE SAYING IT THAT EVEN THEY ARE UNHAPPY ABOUT HAVING TO TAKE DECISION TO ACCEPT PUBLICLY NEW SOVIET NUCLEAR MISSILES. THERE IS ALSO FEELING THAT COUNTRY HAS BEEN PUSHED INTO THIS POSITION—FURTHER INTO SOVIET EMBRACE—BY NATO DEPLOYMENTS. (THIS IS NOT/NOT A NEW FEELING HERE; WEST HAS DONE REMARKABLY LITTLE FOR THIS ESSENTIALLY WESTERN COUNTRY FOR 45 YEARS.) JOURNALIST SAID THERE IS ENOUGH CONCERN ABOUT MISSILE ISSUE FOR THERE TO BE SERIOUS OPPOSITION TO REGIME BUT OF COURSE NO/NO LEADER HAS EMERGED AND CONTROL OF AUTHORITIES IS SUCH THAT NONE CAN ORGANIZE ITSELF. BECAUSE THERE IS NOTHING PEOPLE CAN DO TO CHANGE THEIR SITUATION GIVEN GEOPOLITICAL REALITIES, THEY TEND TO BECOME RESIGNED TO IT.

7. PRESENT PAUSE IS TO SOME EXTENT BEING FILLED WITH UNUSUAL AMOUNT OF HIGH LEVEL VISITING AND VISITORS. WE HAVE INFORMED YOU OF SOME OF IT; OTHER EXAMPLES ARE CURRENT VISIT OF CUBAN FM MALMIERCA, PM STROUGAL TO GDR THIS WEEK. BILAK IN YUGOSLAVIA AND PERHAPS TO FRANCE NEXT WEEK. WE DO NOT/NOT KNOW EXTENT TO WHICH THIS IS CONNECTED TO ISSUE OF MISSILE DEPLOYMENT. NOW THAT INF TALKS HAVE ENDED, INCREASING REFS

...6


PAGE SIX WOGRI371 CONF

ARE BEING MADE TO STKHM CONF NEXT MONTH. FM CHNOUPEK HAS SUGGESTED TO SOME AMBS THAT HE HOPED TO ATTEND TO PRESENT QUOTE PRGUE DECLARATION UNQUOTE OF WPO; HOWEVER, AMERICANS HAVE LEARNED THAT MLADENOV AND CHNOUPEK AGREED, PRESUMABLY ON WORD FROM KREMLIN, THAT THEY WOULD NOT/NOT ATTEND.

8. IN THIS UNCERTAIN PERIOD, WITH POPULATION UPSET ABOUT BOTH USA AND USSR DEPLOYMENTS OF NEW MISSILES, THERE IS TIME FOR OTHER CONCERNS. IT MAY BE ONLY COINCIDENCE, BUT CHRISTMAS ORANGES AND BANANAS APPEARED IN PRGUE IN LATE NOV AND SEASONAL DECORATIONS ARE MORE WIDESPREAD THAN THEY HAVE BEEN FOR YEARS - PERHAPS AN EFFORT BY AUTHORITIES TO REMIND CZECHOSLOVAKS OF THAT IMPLIED BARGAIN OF CONSUMER GOODS IN EXCHANGE FOR POLITICAL APATHY THAT WORKED SO WELL THROUGH 1970S AND THAT LEADERSHIP MUST WISH IT COULD STILL ENFORCE.

CCC/175 0615007 WOGRI371

C O N F I D E N T I A L
FM EXTOTT RBP1359 06DEC83
TO MOSCO
INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER
DISTR RBD RBR FPR IDDZ
JOURNALIST EXCHANGE



IN LIGHT OF STRONG POSSIBILITY PM WILL VISIT MOSCO IN NEW YEAR, WE HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING POSSIBILITY OF AN EXCHANGE OF JOURNALISTS WITH SOVIET UNION TO PREPARE GROUND.

2. AS INITIAL GESTURE, SOVIET JOURNALIST WOULD BE INVITED TO CDA FOR 7-10 DAY TOUR. ITINERARY HAS NOT/NOT BEEN PREPARED BUT WOULD INCLUDE DISCUSSIONS WITH OFFICIALS, JOURNALISTS AND ACADEMICS CONCERNED WITH, IN GENERAL, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND, SPECIFICALLY, EAST-WEST RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY CDA-SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS. UNLIKELY WE COULD GUARANTEE PM OR MINISTERIAL INTERVIEWS BUT WE DO NOT/NOT RULE OUT.

3. AS FOR CANDIDATES, WE HAVE IN MIND SEVERAL JOURNALISTS AMONG THEM BOVIN AND PORTUGALOV. WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR OWN SUGGESTIONS AS TO WHICH SOVIET JOURNALIST COULD MOST PROFITABLY BE INVITED.

4. UNION OF SOVIET JOURNALISTS WOULD BE REQUESTED TO NOMINATE SUITABLE INDIVIDUAL. AMONG OTHER QUALIFICATIONS, IT MIGHT BE STIPULATED THAT INDIVIDUAL NOMINATED HAVE A STRONG INTEREST IN CDA, IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS, DISARMAMENT TALKS AND, IDEALLY, SPEAK ENGLISH OR FRENCH. WE WOULD OF COURSE PREFER PRINT JOURNALIST OF SOME REPUTE.

...2

PAGE TWO RBP1359 CONF

5. AS MENTIONED ABOVE, THIS INVITATION IS SEEN AS PART OF AN EXCHANGE, NOT/NOT RELATED TO RENEWAL OF GENEXAG. IN RETURN FOR VISIT OF SOVIET JOURNALIST TO CDA, SOVIET SIDE WOULD INVITE CDN JOURNALIST TO USSR. AS WOULD BE CASE WITH SOVIET JOURNALIST, HOST SIDE WOULD COVER ALL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH VISIT. FYI, WE HAVE NOT/NOT YET APPROACHED ANY CDN JOURNALISTS WITH THIS PROPOSAL BUT SHOULD EXCHANGE MATERIALIZE WE WOULD LIKE TO BE IN POSITION TO SUGGEST TO SOVIETS WHICH CDN JOURNALIST SHOULD BE INVITED.

6. GRATEFUL YOUR REACTIONS TO ABOVE PROPOSAL (WHICH IS CONCEIVED AS PROJECT WHICH COULD LEND IMPETUS TO PMS INITIATIVE) AND YOUR COMMENTS ON ITS FEASIBILITY, ESPECIALLY GIVEN RATHER SHORT TIMEFRAME AVAILABLE FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION. IF WE ARE TO CAPTURE MOMENTUM GENERATED BY PMS TRAVELS AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS WE WILL NEED TO MOVE QUICKLY. YOU SHOULD NOT/NOT APPROACH SOVIET AUTHORITIES ON THIS MATTER JUST YET.

7. GRATEFUL FOR EARLY RESPONSE.

CCC/022 071556Z RBP1359

**CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

22-6-1 - Hussein Peace
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I E L ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

DE ROME WTGR0455 06DEC83

A FXTOTT GMR LIVRAISON 071000

INFO VATCN LDN BONN WSHDC HAGUE BRU MOSCO PARIS BNATO

NDHQOTT/MND/ADMPOL/PPP

SAC MILAN DE ROM

DISTR MINA USS DMF UGB IFB IDD IDR IDA IDDZ RGB RCD PSR RSD

RBR ZSS ZSI GMD

---CONTINGENT ITALIEN A BERUT:RETRAIT(GRADUEL)PRESQU INEVITABLE
RESUME:CONSENSUS VIRTUEL DE L OPINION ITALIENNE VEUT MAINTENANT LE
RETRAIT DU CONTINGENT ITALIEN A BERUT.RAIDS AMERICAINS DU WEEKEND
ONT SEME LE DOUTE,MEME PARMY LES PLUS ATLANTISTES,QUE LA
PARTICIPATION ITALIENNE SOIT CONCILIABLE AVEC SON MANDAT ORIGINAL.
PAR FIDELITE ENVERS SES ALLIES ET SOUCI DE NE PAS FAIRE LE JEU
D UNE DESTABILISATION TOTALE,RETRAIT GRADUEL APPARAIT FORMULE LA
PLUS PROPABLE.MAIS A MOINS QUE LES MAF DES QUATRE PAYS MEMBRES
PUISSENT CREER UN NOUVEL ACCORD A BRU SUR ROLE DE LA FORCE ET
OBJECTIFS QU ELLE POURSUIT,CE RETRAIT SEMBLE PRESQU INEVITABLE.
2.RAPPORT:JUSQU AU RAID FRANCAIS SUR BAALBEK,SEULE L OPPOSITION
DE GAUCHE DEMANDAIT LE RETRAIT DU CONTINGENT ITALIEN DE LA FMV
DE BERUT.BAALBEK A RALLIE LA DEMOCRATIE-CHRETIENNE DERRIERE MAF
ANDREOTTI:CES REPRESAILLES ONT VIOLE L ENTENTE A QUATRE DE LA
CELLE-SAINT-CLOUD SUR UNE DEFINITION DE LA NATURE POLITIQUE
ET PACIFICATRICE DE LA FORCE.PRECIPITATION DES EVENEMENTS DEPUIS
...2

PAGE DEUX WTGR0455 CONFID ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

LORS, DONT ATTAQUES EUA DE CES DEUX DERNIERS JOURS NE SONT QU'UNE MANIFESTATION DE PLUS, A MAINTENANT POUSSE L'ENSEMBLE DE LA COALITION A DOUTER QUE LE ROLE ORIGINAL DE LA FMN PUISSE ETRE PRESERVE. MEME LES PARTIS ATLANTISTES INCONDITIONNELS, LIBERAUX, SOCIO-DEMOCRATES ET REPUBLICAINS ANNONCENT CE MATIN LEUR VOLONTÉ DE REVOIR LA PARTICIPATION ITALIENNE. PRESSE RAPPORTE QUE LE PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE PERTINI AURAIT REJOINT PM CRAXI A ATHENS HIER POUR DEMANDER LE RETRAIT DU CONTINGENT ET L'AVERTIR QU'IL LE CRITIQUERAIT PUBLIQUEMENT SI, A LEUR TOUR, LES FORCES ITALIENNES DEVAIENT SUBIR DES PERTES.

3. MAE (SCARANTINO) A ACCEPTE DE NOUS FAIRE PART DES NUANCES D'UNE SITUATION EXTREMEMENT DIFFICILE ET DONT L'ITALIE CHERCHE AVANT TOUT A LIMITER LES DEGATS. LE CONTINGENT ITALIEN EST D'ABORD LIE PAR UN STRICT MANDAT PARLEMENTAIRE DE MAINTIEN DE L'ORDRE JUSQU'A L'AFFERMISSEMENT D'UN GOUVT LIBANAIS LEGITIME. SA PRESENCE EST AUTORISEE TANT QUE SE POURSUIVront LES EFFORTS DE CONCILIATION A GENEVE ET CORRESPOND A UNE NOUVELLE VOLONTE DE L'ITALIE D'ASSUMER EN MEDITERRANEE UN ROLE A SA MESURE. MAIS LA POSITION ITALIENNE EST FONDAMENTALEMENT DIFFERENTE DE CELLE DES AUTRES PAYS MEMBRES: MILITAIREMENT, A CAUSE DU REFUS DE CHYPRE DE LUI CONSENTIR DES DROITS D'ATTERRISSAGE ELLE NE DISPOSE PAR DES MOYENS QUI POURRAIENT FACILEMENT APPUYER SES FORCES SUR LE TERRAIN. POLITIQUEMENT, ELLE NE RESSENT NI LA RESPONSABILITE HISTORIQUE DE LA FRANCE COMME

...3

PAGE TROIS WTGR0455 CONFIDENTIEL ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

CREATRICE VIRTUELLE DU LIBAN ET NI CELLE QUI ONT ASSUMÉ LES ÉTATS
COMME GARANTS D'ISRAËL ET DE L'ÉQUILIBRE EST/OUEST DANS LA RÉGION.

4. DIPLOMATIE ITALIENNE, UNE FOIS DÉMONTREE LA FAIBLESSE DE GEMAYEL,
S'EST EMPLOYÉE À SOUTENIR LES EFFORTS DE CONCILIATION À GENÈVE.

ELLE ÉTAIT RELATIVEMENT SATISFAITE DES RÉSULTATS OBTENUS À DATE.

ELLE S'EST EFFORCÉE DE VÉRIFIER QUE CHACUN DES PARTICIPANTS, DES
PHALANGISTES AUX GROUPES LIÉS À LA SYRIE, AVAIT LA CONVICTION D'EN

AVOIR OBTENU QUELQUES AVANTAGES. ELLE S'EST PARTICULIÈREMENT

APPLIQUÉE À OBTENIR DES ASSURANCES DE BIENVUEILLANCE DE LA PART DE
LA SYRIE, QU'ANDREOTTI A VÉRIFIÉ AUPRÈS D'ASSAD PERSONNELLEMENT.

UNE RÉCONCILIATION ACCEPTABLE À DAMAS REPRÉSENTE POUR ELLE LA SEULE
POSSIBILITÉ D'UNE PACIFICATION DURABLE AU LIBAN. TOUT AUTRE ISSUE

SERAIT IRRÉALISTE ET POLITIQUEMENT INACCEPTABLE: SOIT QU'ISRAËL

ENTREPRENNE LA DÉFENSE DU LIBAN, EN ASSUMANT QU'ELLE EN AIT LA

VOLONTÉ; SOIT UN AFFRONTÉMENT DIRECT AMÉRICANO-SYRIEN ET

L'ÉTABLISSEMENT D'UN NOUVEAU POINT DE TENSION DIRECT EST/OUEST.

5. POUR L'ITALIE, TOUS LES DÉVELOPPEMENTS DE LA POLITIQUE AMÉRICAINE
DE CES DERNIÈRES SEMAINES COMPROMETTENT LES POSSIBILITÉS DE CET

ACCORD ENTRE LIBANAIS: ON NOTE QUE WSHDC A MIS UN MOIS AVANT DE
RECEVOIR GEMAYEL ET L'A LAISSÉ PARTIR LES MAINS VIDES ET

QU'ENTRE-TEMPS, AMÉRICAINS ET ISRAËLIENS ONT RENFORCÉ LEURS LIENS

ÉCONOMIQUES ET STRATÉGIQUES POUR CONTENIR LA SYRIE. ON SOUPÇONNE QUE

...4

PAGE QUATRE WTGR0455 CONFID ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

LES RESTES DE CAMP DAVID OU DU PLAN REAGAN ONT ETE MIS AU RANCART.
ET L ON EN EST A UN POINT DE CONCLURE QUE L UNITE D OBJECTIFS QUI
DONNA NAISSANCE A LA FMN N EXISTE PLUS.

6. EN MEME TEMPS, L ITALIE DEMEURE CONSCIENTE DE SES RESPONSABILITES.
UN RETRAIT PRECIPITE, EN PLUS D UNE DESTABILISATION BRUTALE, PAR
RAPPORT A SES PARTENAIRES, NE POURRAIT QUE CONTRIBUER A LA
DESTABILISATION TOTALE DU PAYS. ELLE GARDE A L ESPRIT QUE PAR VOTE
DU CONGRES, LA PRESENCE AMERICAINE EST SUJETTE AU MAINTIEN DE SES
PARTENAIRES. LA SOLUTION QUI COMMENCE A S IMPOSER ICI COMME
EVIDENCE EST CELLE D UN RETRAIT GRADUEL DES TROUPES: LES SOLDATS
ITALIENS QUI EFFECTUENT AU LIBAN UN SERVICE DE TROIS MOIS,
CESSERAIENT TOUT SIMPLEMENT D ETRE REMPLACES. EN MOINS D UN AN
COMME LE DISAIT A ATHENS EN BOUTADE, LE PM CRAXI CIT LA PARTICIPATION
ITALIENNE SE REDUIRA A UN SEUL HOPITAL FINCIT.

7. LE CONSEIL DES MINISTRES ETUDIE LA QUESTION DEMAIN. AUX
DELIBERATIONS MINISTEPIELLES DE BRU DU OSDEC, LA CONTRIBUTION
ITALIENNE SE VOUDRA AUSSI LOYALE QUE CONSTRUCTIVE. MAIS SA FIDELITE
A SA CONCEPTION DE LA FMN ET AU ROLE QU IL LUI APPARTIENT D Y
JOUER EXIGERA UNE RARE CREATIVITE POUR MAINTENIR LES APPAPENCES
D UNE POSITION COMMUNE.

CCC/191 0710247 WTGR0455

External Affairs / Affaires extérieures
Canada / Canada

1/3

WDC004/06

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

TOR/TOD
COMMUNICATIONS

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

Dec 6 11 55 '83

12

10

SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ

UNCLASSIFIED

CANADIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

action

-M/DE

WASHDC PA 252 6DEC83

FO/A

~~EX 1011~~
IDDZ UFG FPR

NFO

DISTR

REF

SUBJ/SUJ

COMMONWEALTH TIES ENDURE ACROSS CONTINENTS & CULTURE AND
TRUDEAU TRAMPS FOR PEACE

COMCENTRE:

PLEASE FAX ATTACHED ARTICLES TO ABOVE.

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

[Signature]
P. GOSAGE/AM

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

X 206

SIG

[Signature]
P. GOSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

Handwritten: 2/3
E.S.

Subject _____

Objet _____

Date 4/December/83 Publication New York Times

Commonwealth Ties Endure Across Continents and Cultures

By WILLIAM K. STEVENS

NEW DELHI — When London's writ ran around the world, the lands now known as the Commonwealth of Nations formed a red girdle across the map. Today, as befits autonomous countries diverse in geography, politics and culture, the 48 Commonwealth members are marked in many colors. Place names rich in associations that resonate in the imagination testify to their variety — from Mount Kilimanjaro and Victoria Falls in Africa to Pitcairn Island in the Pacific, Montego Bay in the Caribbean, the Canadian Rockies, the Australian outback and the great cities of the Indian subcontinent.

Yet something binds them to this day. Last week, Commonwealth leaders completed their biennial meeting in New Delhi. No votes were taken; all conclusions were by consensus. It was a measure of their success that despite sharp divisions over Grenada, they emerged with a forward-looking position on the invasion that avoided recrimination. They offered the Commonwealth's services to help organize a Caribbean peace-keeping force that would replace the American troops on the island.

Why do the Commonwealth countries still stick together, a generation after the British Empire was broken up? What do Commonwealth nations, most of them in the third world, get out of it? Does their association have meaning or usefulness for the rest of the world?

The rationale goes back to Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime Minister, who wanted to retain the benefits of his newly independent country's long association with Britain. "Why should you throw away the good bits of imperial rule?" Patsy Robertson, a Commonwealth spokesman, said last week. "When people become independent, they need friends. How could a small country talk to the Prime Minister of Britain otherwise? And it helps them because the Prime Ministers of Britain and Canada are important links to the North." The "North" refers to the Western industrialized countries, including the United States. Britain's Margaret Thatcher and Canada's Pierre Elliott Trudeau are conduits who carry the force of Commonwealth opinion to the big powers on issues such as disarmament and independence for South-West Africa, or Namibia.

In 1931, the members of what was then called the British Commonwealth agreed to accept Britain's monarch as the group's symbol. Queen Elizabeth, who has been on the throne ever since, has made her Commonwealth role a special concern. She travels widely among member nations. At New Delhi, she met with each of the heads of government. Among the Commonwealth's ties, not the least is the English language. Around the oval conference table, the lilt of Caribbean English mixed with the clipped Indian version, the Americanized Cana-

dian accent, British Oxbridge and the equally distinct inflections of East Africa, the Pacific islanders and the East Asians of Singapore and Malaysia.

The democratic ethic is another strong tie, although some members are military dictatorships. Many are functioning democracies and others appear to be in varying stages of evolution toward democracy. Dovetailing with this are two British bequests, commitment to the rule of law and, in most member countries, a civil service that gave them a much-needed leg up at independence. Many of the leaders were educated in Britain, which gives something of an old-boy flavor to Commonwealth conferences. Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada went wind-surfing during this year's weekend break on the beaches of Goa, but Lester Bird of Antigua-Barbuda and J. M. G. Adams of Barbados attended a cricket match in Bombay between the West Indies and India.

Student exchanges are widespread and growing. Because of language and ease of travel, some workers go to other Commonwealth countries for training. The organization's headquarters in London arranges training for refugees from troubled countries. "There are lots of little Namibian girls learning typing in Malta and Jamaica," Mrs. Robertson said. The Commonwealth helped to train thousands of Zimbabwean refugees who have returned since independence, which was achieved largely through Commonwealth intercession. Officials are proud of what they call a "latticework" of Commonwealth groups, including associations for lawyers, doctors and teachers. There is even a Commonwealth chess organization.

Cutting across regions and cultures, the Commonwealth is well situated to bridge North-South and East-West divisions. Leaders such as Mr. Trudeau, strengthened by the Commonwealth consensus developed at last week's meetings, can talk to the United States and the Soviet Union about the dangers of the arms race. Mrs. Thatcher will also be in a position to convey the feelings of the Commonwealth's large and diverse membership to President Reagan and her other NATO allies. How effectively these opportunities will be exploited remains to be seen. But Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was hopeful last week. "If you keep knocking on the door," she said, "sooner or later it will open."

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Trudeau tramps for peace

OTTAWA

Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, who has dominated Canadian politics for 15 years, has appointed himself a one-man commission to break the "ominous rhythm of crisis" that he says threatens world peace.

At a time when his popularity with Canada's voters is at a record low, Mr. Trudeau has held meetings with leaders in Western Europe, Japan, India and China. He may go to Moscow and Washington by spring. His main proposal is for a 1984 summit conference of the U.S., Soviet Union, Britain, France and China.

Puzzled Canadians are asking what exactly Mr. Trudeau can do to ease East-West tensions that President Reagan, Yuri Andropov, NATO, the Warsaw Pact and the United Nations can't do.

Never awed by their prime minister's reputation outside Canada as a world statesman, they are wondering out loud whether he really is building a peace platform to run on in an election that must be held by early 1985.

By early 1984, Mr. Trudeau must make clear whether he will lead his Liberal Party in the next federal parliamentary election, or retire from politics beforehand, as he pledged he would when he came back to power in 1980 after only eight months of Conservative Party rule.

Mr. Trudeau, who recently turned 64, first became prime minister in 1968 on a wave of what was called Trudeauomania for the young French-Canadian who was widely expected to unite the country. He

retains a youthful image. Legally separated from his much younger wife, Margaret, he recently dated Barbra Streisand in New York City.

But Trudeauomania has long since faded. Many Canadians blame Mr. Trudeau and the Liberals for the deep recession the country recently went through, and few seem inclined to credit them for partial recovery. Public opinion polls give the Conservatives under their new leader, Brian Mulroney, 44, a nearly 2-to-1 edge. As for national unity, some Canadians have commented that if Mr. Trudeau does as well bringing East and West together internationally as he has done bringing Eastern and Western Canada together, they had better start preparing for World War III.

As usual, Mr. Trudeau has acknowledged such criticisms and has not let them deter him. But neither has he revealed how he will apply what he calls his "high-level political energy" to world problems, or whether he means to concentrate it on the Canadian electorate as a peace candidate.

If his peace mission turns out to be as ineffective as it is vague, Mr. Trudeau may finally quit politics. It's even suggested that his international initiative could give him a graceful exit. His retirement probably would lead to selection of former Finance Minister John Turner as Liberal leader, and a 1984 election fight between Mr. Mulroney and Mr. Turner as politicians who are strikingly similar in their glamorous but pragmatic styles.

But if Mr. Trudeau sticks it out as both statesman and politician, he could have a disturbing impact on the Western Alliance and on Canada as a vital U.S. ally, whatever his own fortunes.

While outwardly encouraging his initiative, U.S. and West Euro-

pean officials have implicitly warned of the danger of dividing NATO during a delicate period in East-West relations. This could happen if, following the start of deployment of equalizer missiles in Western Europe in the next few months, Mr. Trudeau went to Moscow next spring and supported nuclear-arms reductions that permitted the Soviets to keep their intermediate-range missile advantage.

Mr. Trudeau has emphasized Canada's membership in NATO and its close ties to the United States. But a vocal minority of Canadians oppose testing of the guidance system of U.S. cruise missiles over Canadian territory — similar to Soviet territory — and the prime minister announced his peace mission at the height of an uproar in Canada over U.S. invasion of Grenada, a fellow Commonwealth member.

By repeating in a domestic election campaign his view that super-power words and actions are leading the world toward war, Mr. Trudeau could bring to the surface latent anti-American sentiments harbored by many Canadians. By suggesting that anyone criticizing him was against peace, he could divide the country in a new and bitter way. The Conservatives, who have called for closer political and economic ties with the United States, might be vulnerable in the first election campaign in Canada in two decades to stress international issues.

On the other hand, it is just possible that Mr. Trudeau can find a way to ease East-West tensions, and will earn the thanks of Canadians and the Western world. Then, as he recently hinted, he may stay around for another 15 years as Canada's prime minister.

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