

50028-B-40 (Vol. II)

Joint Intelligence Committee

~~A, B, C, 1~~ (6 to 14) Soviet Union - General File

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50028-B-40  
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SECRET

December 12, 1951.

RECENT SOVIET TACTICS AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE

DISCUSSION

In this paper we shall assess the significance of recent signs of a change in Soviet tactics.

2. Since June 1951, a number of significant developments have suggested a change in Soviet tactics. They are:

- (a) Mr. Malik's cease-fire proposal for Korea;
- (b) East German proposals for German unification;
- (c) Soviet aloofness to Middle East crises;
- (d) Soviet promotion of East-West Trade.

3. In the first two of the above instances, the Soviet Union, where once it had spoken and acted aggressively, suddenly proposed conciliation with the West. In Korea, where it had inspired and encouraged war, it called for a cease-fire; in Germany, where it flatly rejected Western conditions for unifying the country, it proposed, through the East German President, unification on terms more closely approaching the West's than ever before. In Iran, where, after the war, it had sent troops to detach Azerbaijan province, it now remained aloof from the quarrel with the United Kingdom; its efforts towards building East-West trade, formerly slight, are now greatly intensified.

4. These shifts in Soviet tactics represent, individually and in total, an intensification and broadening of the Soviet Union's "peace" campaign, and its careful and specific application to most differences with the West. As such they mark a notable change in the Soviet Union's previous tactics of threat and force. These tactics of force, culminating in the Korean adventure, began with Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe and the despatch of troops to Azerbaijan, and were continued in the rebellion in Greece, the attempt at a Berlin blockade and the encouragement of Communist



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forces throughout Asia. They were, of course, initially successful, but they have grown progressively less so. The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Berlin airlift, the United Nations stand in Korea, the rapid recovery of West Germany and Japan, and finally the establishment and strengthening of NATO have been, one after the other, major set-backs to Russian diplomacy. Even more important, Communist aggression in Korea has increased and accelerated a vast rearmament programme in the West. This rearmament programme, not only threatens the expansionist aims of the Soviet Union, but raises before it the spectre of an armament race with a united group of capitalist powers including the fast recovering defeated enemies, Germany and Japan. It is this very situation which the Soviet leaders most dreaded.

5. Thus, on the one hand the Soviet policy of threat and force has grown steadily less effective, and on the other, it has given the impetus to Western rearmament and determination to put an end to Soviet expansion. It is logical to assume, therefore, that the intensified peace campaign reflects a Soviet reaction to this dual situation.

6. While it is necessary to give full importance to evidence suggesting that the Soviet Union may now be pursuing its policy objectives by peaceful means, it is equally necessary to realize what Soviet peace campaigns in the past have been. Actually, the "peace" slogan has played a major role in Soviet foreign policy since November 1949, when the Soviet Union announced that it was to be the "pivot of the entire activity of the Communist Party and Democratic organizations". This meant that all international Communist activities were to be carried out within the framework of this campaign. Thus "peace" slogans were to take precedence over slogans for revolution or for the improvement of the

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lot of the working class, and fomenting industrial unrest or exploiting disagreements between the Western powers were to be undertaken as aspects of the peace campaign. In this way, the Soviet leaders hoped to make all those who desired peace, further, wittingly or unwittingly, the main objectives of Soviet foreign policy. They hoped that the common people of non-Communist countries would force on their governments a policy acceptable to the Soviet Union, and that the peace campaign would destroy the will of the Western people to fight and, perhaps, create a revolutionary situation in some countries. In this way "peace" was to play the role in the West that "nationalism" was to play in the East: it was to arouse the masses, create dissension, and possibly prepare the way for Soviet expansion.

7. Thus the "peace" campaign has been a weapon of Soviet policy, and the developments described above may indicate only an intensified effort to hamper the West's rearmament and weaken its will to fight.

#### Korea

When the Soviet Union proposed a cease-fire in Korea, it was attempting to pursue its objectives in this area by political negotiation. It must have realized that the Chinese and North Koreans were incapable of driving the United Nations forces out of the peninsula without substantially increased aid and without open Soviet intervention, which latter would almost certainly risk a Third World War. Furthermore, it must have realized that, even if a cease-fire were concluded, it would not necessarily lose what it had already won, since United Nations forces would be tied down in Korea while tedious negotiations were in progress, and could not be released for Western Europe. The Soviet leaders, therefore, probably proposed the cease-fire talks in the hope of gaining through an intensified peace campaign what could not be gained cheaply through force.

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### Germany

The Soviet Union, like the West, has always professed to want a united, democratic and peaceful Germany, but the terms for achieving unity and democracy could never be agreed on. The East German offer in mid-September of free elections throughout all Germany and the withdrawal of Occupation forces came nearer, however, to meeting Western conditions of unity than any previous offer. This could indicate that the Soviet Union is sufficiently disturbed at the possibility of a rearmed Germany and its integration into Western Europe to be willing to sacrifice its control of Eastern Germany to ensure demilitarization and neutrality. It is more probable however, that the East German offer is only a manoeuvre designed to embarrass the West, delay German rearmament and confuse Western Germany. This offer came at a time when the three Western allies were negotiating with the Federal Republic to substitute the present Occupation Regime by a system of contractual arrangements, and was clearly designed to confuse and delay the successful completion of these negotiations.

### Middle East

Soviet policy in this area has been to encourage nationalism and thereby weaken the position of the West. Soviet aloofness toward recent Middle East crises suggests no change in this policy but only confidence in the trend of events. The Soviet leaders realize that their position and prestige in the Middle East will be unimpeachable if they avoid open involvement. Similarly, the Soviet Union has made relatively few attacks on the ruling circles of such countries as Iran and Egypt, since the extreme nationalism these men stand for works to their advantage by weakening the West's influence in this area.



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### Soviet Promotion of East-West Trade

Soviet desires to trade with non-Communist countries are not new, though they are now being developed with special intensity in the plans for an International Economic Conference to be held in Moscow in April, <sup>1951</sup>. The conference was originally proposed by the World Peace Council, although an attempt is now being made to have it appear independent of the Peace organization. It will be a meeting of private individuals from non-Communist countries and Government representatives from Communist countries. The Soviet Union has stated, it will seek within the existing political framework, to remove trade restrictions to the mutual benefit of both East and West and to promote scientific and technical cooperation, thus raising the standard of living of all peoples. There is little doubt that the Soviet Union wants to increase its trade with the West, perhaps, in part, because it has been feeling the pinch of the blockade of strategic materials. There is also no doubt that Western Europe can benefit from more trade with Eastern Europe.

However, the decision to call an international economic conference and its accompanying propaganda can probably be explained as an economic manifestation of the "peace" campaign, attacking one of the more sensitive aspects of United States relations with Western Europe. Its aim is to divide the North Atlantic Treaty powers and to estrange people from their governments by appealing to their economic interests. Its strongest appeal is made to Western Europe which is chafing under the financial burden imposed by rearmament and rising prices, and which needs the grain, timber and coal supply of the East but cannot take advantage of markets there. It appeals also to industrializing Asian countries, like Pakistan and India, and any extension of trade in these countries provides the Soviet Union with an opportunity for political penetration by economic means.

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### Conclusions

Recent developments suggest that Soviet tactics have moved into a more defensive phase, designed to hold what has been gained rather than to expand the area under Soviet control. This change ~~may~~ reflect a failure of past Soviet tactics and represent a readjustment to the West's rearmament drive. It may, therefore, also represent a change from <sup>the</sup> ~~its~~ past <sup>tactics</sup> ~~policy~~ of threat and force, based on overwhelming military force, to a <sup>tactics</sup> ~~defensive~~ <sup>appropriate to the</sup> ~~policy of co-existence based on~~ approaching military parity with the West.

The Soviet Union's essential policies remain, however, unchanged and weakening the West remains a prime objective.



CANADA

# Department of National Defence

## CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

### JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

NO. CC 1544-1 (JIC)

SECRET

ADDRESS REPLY TO.

SECRETARY  
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE.  
OTTAWA.

7 Dec 51

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#### MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

#### Order of Battle - Russian Fleet

1. In a Cosmic message (CJSW 302 of 5 Dec) the Canadian Joint Staff, Washington notifies that the NAOR Intelligence Sub-Committee met on 4 Dec to consider the transfer recently of Russian cruisers from the Baltic to the Northern Fleet. It had previously been reported by the Norwegian representative that on 1 Sep the cruiser Tjapaje was located in the Kola Inlet, and the cruiser Tjeleznjakov was in the White Sea. In addition, a major war vessel, which the Norwegian intelligence service had been unable to identify, was reported in the White Sea.

2. At the meeting on 4 Dec the Norwegian representative stated that these ships are still in the Northern Fleet.

3. The Chairman, NAOR Intelligence Sub-Committee suggested that the whole surface order of battle of the Russian Fleet be reviewed for both the Short Term and the Medium Term NAOR Intelligence Appreciations. The provision of a Canadian estimate by 14 Jan 52 has been requested.

4. The Secretary, JIC will contact DNI regarding this request.

*J.E. Beswick*  
(J.E. Beswick)  
Major,  
Secretary.

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8 DEC 1951



*Mr. Beswick*  
*W. J. G. & file*

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IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE  
NO. CSC 1316-1 (JIC)



CANADA

## Department of National Defence

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JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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SECRETARY  
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE,  
OTTAWA.

6 Dec 51

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6 DEC 1951

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### Soviet Foreign Policy

1. I attach a copy of North Atlantic Council Deputies Top Secret document D-D(51)285 of 20 Nov 51, which is a draft summary report by the Political Working Group on the Council Deputies exchange of views on Soviet foreign policy. Copies of document D-D(51)169 of 28 Jun 51, which is referred to in the note by the Chairman, were passed to DMI, DAI, DNI and JIB on 12 Jul 51. (Copies of this document are attached for DSI and RCMP). Copies of document D-D(51)255 of 26 Oct 51, which is also referred to in the note by the Chairman, were passed to the JIC on 8 Nov.

2. As the attached are copies of a numbered document, for accounting purposes, they must remain attached to this memorandum.

*J.E. Beswick*

(J.E. Beswick)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Enc.

JEB/5459/fp

c.c. ✓ Mr. G. de T. Glazebrook,  
Dept. of External Affairs.

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JIC paper No. 30(51)

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J.I.S. (2006)

COPY NO 4

5 November 1951.

RECENT SOVIET TACTICS AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE

OBJECT

1. To determine:
  - (a) if there is any evidence to suggest a recent change in Soviet tactics;
  - (b) if there is such evidence, whether or not it indicates a basic change in Soviet policy.

CONCLUSIONS

2. We conclude that recent developments in Soviet tactics (discussed in detail below) may be explained either as a temporary tactical retreat in order to await more favourable circumstances for advance, or as part of the "peace" campaign which seeks to create disunity among the Western powers and divide Western peoples from their governments.
3. We also conclude therefore that there is no evidence to suggest a basic change in Soviet policy.

DISCUSSION

The Background

4. Soviet foreign policy since the war, while it has not succeeded in achieving all that it set out to do, has some solid achievements to show. The war was followed by a period of communist success in Europe, culminating in Soviet domination of Czechoslovakia and bright hopes for Italy and France. The Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine and, finally, the North Atlantic Treaty caused a check in the West, but Soviet successes continued in the Orient with the triumph of the communists in China and the victories of Viet-Minh in Indo-China. The quick seizure of all Korea by a North Korean government whose leaders had been trained in the Soviet Union, and who looked to Moscow for ideological and political guidance, would have permitted Soviet influence to extend over the whole area between China and Japan and ensured the defence of Vladivostok and the Far Eastern Provinces. It would, furthermore, have caused disillusionment throughout the world in the United Nations and in the effectiveness of United States power, increased Soviet prestige and created favourable conditions for further advances in other parts of the globe.

5. Events in the Far East did not follow this pattern, and throughout the past eighteen months the Soviet Union has not registered any notable gain. Soviet foreign policy has not only not succeeded in establishing any positive gains for the Soviet Union but has resulted in the consolidation and re-armament of the West and the revival of German and Japanese military power.

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6. It seems logical to suppose that the Soviet leaders, in considering their position, find themselves faced with two alternatives, apart from that of launching a "preventive" general war: either, to continue their present policy in the hope that economic crises plus the weight of re-armament and the internal contradictions of capitalism will eventually bring down the fabric of western society and present opportunities for further Soviet advances; or, to adopt policies leading towards a lessening of international tension.

7. At first sight it seems difficult to understand why the Soviet leaders should decide to continue with tactics and policies that appear to have failed. They may, however, calculate that the weight of re-armament will prove too much for the economies at least of western Europe and bring about depression in the west; but they must take into account the real fact that their present tactics are not preventing United States and North Atlantic Treaty re-armament and the creation of a formidable military machine.

8. An obvious alternative policy for the Soviet Union consists of the gradual lessening of international tension and the apparent danger of war, thus making less urgent the necessity for re-armament in the west, and having also the possibility of dividing the western alliance and restoring a measure of east-west trade. *This would require*

9. In the last few months there has been a number of significant developments which, taken together, might indicate that the Soviet leaders have decided to adopt this more conciliatory policy. Before considering whether these developments do, in fact, constitute a basic change in Soviet tactics and an attempt by the Soviet Union to lessen international tension, it is necessary to consider briefly the general nature of the Soviet "peace" campaign.

#### The Peace Campaign

10. From its inception, the peace campaign was intended as the "pivot of the entire activity of the communist party and democratic organizations". This meant that all communist activities in the international sphere were to be carried out within the framework of this campaign. It also meant that "peace" was for the time being to take precedence over revolution or the improvement of the lot of the working class as the idea around which to mobilize the masses. Thus, for example, the fomenting of industrial unrest or the exploitation of possible disagreements between the western powers were all to be undertaken in the name of "peace" and as different aspects of the peace campaign. The purpose in each case was to make those who are for "peace" contribute, wittingly or unwittingly, to all the main objectives of Soviet foreign policy.

11. The aims of the peace campaign fit in perfectly with the expansionist aims of Soviet foreign policy. According to Stalin, peace was to be achieved only if the common people of all countries took matters in their own hands, i.e., if they forced on their governments a policy acceptable to the Soviet Union. By developing this theme the Soviet leaders hoped to create a revolutionary situation in the non-communist world and destroy the will of the western people. Thus "peace" was to play the role in the west that "nationalism" is playing in the east. In both cases it was to provide the theme to arouse the masses, create a revolutionary situation and prepare the way for Soviet expansion.

#### Possible Evidence Suggesting a Change in Soviet Tactics

12. There has been a number of signs which taken together may indicate a basic change in Soviet tactics. These include:-

- (a) Mr. Malik's cease-fire proposal for Korea;
- (b) recent trends in the Soviet "peace" campaign, e.g. News, Mr. Morrison's letter and Pravda's reply, the "Peace" Pact;

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- (c) promotion of east-west trade;
- (d) east German proposals for German unification;
- (e) Soviet caution in dealing with Middle Eastern crises.

Mr. Malik's Cease-Fire Proposal for Korea

13. There are several reasons which may have led the Soviet leaders to propose the cease-fire in Korea. They probably faced a Chinese demand for substantially increased aid (particularly in tanks, artillery and vehicles) which they were unwilling to supply. In addition, the Soviet leaders must have realized that the Korean war was spurring the western powers to re-armament and threatening the military superiority that Soviet forces enjoyed. Furthermore, they must have realized that the Chinese and North Koreans were incapable of driving the United Nations forces out of Korea without open Soviet intervention, which involved the almost certain risk of a third world war. The Soviet leaders, therefore, probably proposed the cease-fire talks in the hope of furthering their aims in Korea through political negotiations, without being forced to supply the Chinese with additional assistance. They realized that, even if a cease-fire were concluded, it would not necessarily release troops for western Europe, since United Nations forces would be tied down in Korea while difficult and tedious negotiations were in progress. Thus, the Russians probably intended to regain the diplomatic initiative after the Paris talks had broken down, anticipating that there was little possibility of a general Korean political settlement at this time and that United Nations forces would still be tied down in the area.

14. It cannot be concluded from Mr. Malik's cease-fire proposal and subsequent Soviet actions in Korea that the Soviet Union had decided on a basic change in tactics. The original North Korean intervention was undertaken in the belief that an easy victory could be won without serious reaction by the western powers. Instead of an easy victory, however, they are now faced with a powerful United Nations army within striking distance of Vladivostok; and, instead of passive acceptance by the western powers of a fait accompli, with a tremendous re-armament drive both in North America and western Europe. As a result of this setback, the Soviet leaders should logically be more cautious before engaging in a second local aggression. However, it cannot be concluded that the Soviet Union will not embark on other local operations which involve risks of general war, particularly if the circumstances are such as to make an easy victory again seem possible.

Recent Trends in Soviet Propaganda

15. The first issues of the Soviet periodical News were much milder in tone than is usual in Soviet publications. The content was not, however, appreciably different, except for the concentration on east-west trade. It was claimed that better relations between the Soviet Union and western countries could be expected if the "ruling circles" of the west could be silenced by the peoples of the countries concerned. To some extent News seemed to be playing on potential differences between the United States and the United Kingdom. After only five or six issues, however, News has become almost indistinguishable from "New Times", and therefore it cannot be inferred that the publication of this periodical constituted a change in Soviet tactics. It is difficult to understand Pravda's publication of Mr. Morrison's letter but it may have been one of a series of moves intended to establish the claim that the iron curtain is a western, not a Soviet, phenomenon. Many carefully selected visitors have been received in the Soviet Union in the past year, and Soviet propaganda contrasts this with the restrictions on entry into the United Kingdom and the United States.

Soviet Propaganda for East-West Trade

16. Soviet expressions of a desire for trade with non-Communist countries are not new, though they are now being developed with special intensity in the plans for an international economic conference to be held in

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Moscow in December. The conference was originally proposed by the World Peace Council, although an attempt is now being made to have it appear independent of the peace organization. It will be a meeting of private individuals from non-communist countries and persons who are in fact government representatives from communist countries. The Soviet Union has stated that, within the existing political framework, the conference will seek to remove trade restrictions to the mutual benefit of both east and west, to promote scientific and technical co-operation and thus raise the standard of living of all peoples.

17. The advance publicity given to the organization of this conference has a familiar political ring. Its aim is to divide the North Atlantic Treaty powers and to estrange people from their governments by appealing to their economic interests. The strongest appeal is made to west Europeans who need the grain, timber and coal supplies by the east and who are chafing under the financial burdens imposed by re-armament and rising prices at home, and who cannot take advantage of markets in the east. An attempt is being made to drive a wedge between the United States and Britain. According to the propaganda, the latter must save dollars by buying grain and timber from the Soviet Union, but is not permitted to export strategic raw materials and manufactured goods to the Soviet Union in exchange for its imports. Business men in the United States are being reminded that the Soviet Union could provide a large market for machinery and machine tools, and that the Soviet Union has only exported, in the past, commodities which do not compete in the American market.

18. The Soviet desire to increase its trade with the rest of the world can be explained on economic grounds. It undoubtedly wishes to import special steels and machinery from western industrial nations. It is anxious to obtain merchant ships from any quarter. From the Asiatic countries it wishes to import rubber, jute, wool and tin. In addition, it is now ready to import consumer goods for the first time. The satellites are even more in need of imports, especially of raw materials for eastern Europe and industrial and transportation equipment for China. Commercial deals in the illegal markets are very costly, and it would seem certain that any success which attended the efforts of the Soviet Union to obtain a relaxation of trade restrictions would be welcomed in the Red Bloc.

19. The political implications of such a policy are far-reaching. Trade would bring the Soviet Union prestige as well as economic gains and enhance its position as the most powerful sponsor of the World Peace Council. Increased trade with certain countries (e.g. with India, Pakistan, and the whole of the Far East) might lead to penetration by economic means - a penetration that might later be used for political purposes.

20. The international economic conference can be interpreted as an economic aspect of a policy directed towards the lessening of east-west tension. However, such an interpretation has not been placed on previous efforts in this direction and it seems more likely that the conference and its accompanying propaganda is merely the economic manifestation of the peace campaign, attacking one of the more sensitive aspects of United States relations with western Europe. In addition the success of such a policy would give the Soviet Union the economic advantages of east-west trade plus perhaps an opportunity for political penetration by economic means.

#### Germany

21. The Soviet Union has continued to protest, particularly to France, against any re-armament of western Germany and to give every indication that it would regard this move as a very serious threat. The Soviet Union has always professed to want a united, democratic and peaceful Germany though on terms to which the west cannot agree. The east German offer in mid-September, of free elections over the whole of Germany and the withdrawal of occupation forces, came nearer to meeting western conditions for unity than any previous offer. This may indicate

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that the Soviet Union is sufficiently disturbed at the possibility of a re-armed Germany to be willing to sacrifice its control of eastern Germany, if this would ensure demilitarization and neutrality. Alternatively the east German offer may be only a delaying manoeuvre and a step calculated to cause confusion in western Germany.

#### The Soviet Attitude to the Middle East

22. Soviet aloofness from Middle East crises probably indicates Soviet confidence that the trend of events will be more advantageous for them if open involvement is avoided. The relatively few recent attacks on the ruling circles of such countries as Iran and Egypt may be explained by the fact that the present extreme nationalism in the Middle East works to the advantage of the Soviet Union by weakening the west.

#### General Soviet Policy

23. These indications of a possible change in Soviet tactics cannot be considered apart from the continuing signs of Soviet aggressive (or at least unco-operative) intentions. Soviet forces maintain their great strength and there have been no indications of unusual demobilization; the accustomed portion of Soviet industrial strength continues to be devoted to the production of armaments; Soviet attitudes (for example, in connection with interzonal trade in Berlin) continue to be unco-operative. Soviet propaganda continues its direct attacks on the North Atlantic Treaty; Krokdil's unpleasant jokes continue; there has been no indication of any change in the essential aims of the peace movement.

24. While new elements have appeared in Soviet tactics, it cannot be concluded that there has been a definite change in tactics, or by inference, in policy. If anything, these new elements indicate an intensified effort to weaken the unity of the western powers and to create divisions between western governments and their peoples. Thus, for example, the periodical News was intended primarily to weaken the bonds between the United States and the United Kingdom by exploiting anti-United States sentiment and creating the feeling that the people of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union could live in friendship. Similarly, the Soviet proposal for an international economic conference was intended to strike at a particularly sensitive spot in United States and western European relations by exploiting the economic difficulties of western Europe that have resulted partly from the re-armament programme.

25. In general, Soviet tactics were, and are, sufficiently flexible to provide for a more conciliatory line on particular questions when advantageous to the Soviet Union. The new developments in Soviet tactics may reflect a loss of the initiative by the Soviet Union - an initiative which is now particularly needed to counter western moves. Any suggestion that the "iron curtain" is being modified may suggest increased Soviet confidence in the internal political and economic situation of the USSR. In spite of these new developments, however, Soviet policy remains unchanged. It cannot be inferred from Mr. Malik's cease-fire proposal for Korea that the Soviet Union will not embark on other local operations should favourable circumstances permit. It cannot be concluded from the recent East German offer for a united Germany that the Soviet Union wishes to resolve the cold war in Europe. In fact, no evidence has yet appeared to indicate that the Soviet Union will cease to probe at every sensitive spot in the free world with the intention of bringing more and more territory under communist control. A statement in Pravda on 21st July re-affirmed the basic Soviet doctrine of "revolutionary internationalism" -- the "liberation struggle of the international working class and the oppressed nations of the world" under the leadership of the Soviet Union.



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IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

NO. CSC 1573-1 (JIC)

# Department of National Defence

TOP SECRET

## CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

ADDRESS REPLY TO:  
SECRETARY  
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE,  
OTTAWA.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

Soviet Long-Term Policy

1. Attached is a memorandum from the JIS requesting that the JIC consider the desirability of having the JIS undertake a study of Soviet long-term policies.

2. This matter will be considered at the next regular meeting of the JIC.

*J.E. Beswick*  
(J.E. Beswick)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Enc.

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1st November, 1951.

CSC 1573-1

MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY, JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

Future Joint Intelligence Staff Project

1. During the preparation of the current JIC paper on Soviet tactics and policy, one Director suggested that the opportunity should be taken to survey the domestic Soviet field, in an effort to establish Soviet intentions. The Director's memorandum continued:

"Heretofore, [such a survey] has only been [carried out] in order to establish Soviet intentions on the assumption that the Soviet Union resorts to a deliberate war. It has for three years been felt that this should be done to establish what are Soviet intentions. Such a survey would attempt to conclude what overall political and economic policy is attempting to achieve, and what direction defence policy and foreign policy are taking."

2. The JIS, in considering this Director's remarks, presumed that he was in fact suggesting a discussion of the possibilities of long-term peaceful co-existence in the framework of the development of Soviet policy from the Marxist basis to Soviet actions and Stalin's statements, together with a consideration of the possible outcome of the cold war, perhaps on the assumption that western rearmament continues.

3. The JIS consider that it would perhaps be unwise to embark on such complicated discussion merely as an offshoot of a clearly defined and much narrower paper on Soviet tactics. The JIS feel, however, that such a project (even if it failed, as is likely, to reach any usefully firm conclusions) would at least be instructive and interesting.

4. The JIS has reached tentative agreement on an object for such a study:

"To determine, from a consideration of Soviet domestic, foreign, defence and economic policies, the outcome of the cold war, and to examine the possibilities of long-term peaceful co-existence between the Soviet bloc and the western powers.

5. The JIS recommend that the JIC should consider the advisability of instructing the JIS to prepare a paper with an object on the above lines.

Joint Intelligence Staff.

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SECRET

October 27, 1951.

MEMORANDUM FOR DEFENCE LIAISON(2)

Enclosed is the paper on "Recent Soviet Tactics and their Significance" requested in your memorandum of October 19.

J. B. C. Williams  
European Division

S E C R E T

RECENT SOVIET TACTICS AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE

It has been suggested that with Mr. Malik's proposal of June 23 for a cease-fire in Korea Soviet tactics entered a new phase which was continued with such developments as the new publication News, Pravda's publication of Mr. Morrison's letter, and a campaign in favour of better East-West trade relations.

In order to determine whether Soviet tactics have changed it is necessary to have clearly in mind the main lines of Soviet tactics before the possible change is supposed to have occurred. These might be outlined briefly as follows:

- (1) The peace campaign which was the principle pre-occupation of the international Soviet communist movement, with "peace" taking precedence for the time being over revolution or the improvement of the lot of the working class. But peace, according to Stalin's interview with Pravda in February, was to be achieved only if the common people of all countries took matters into their own hands, i.e., if they forced on their governments a policy acceptable to the USSR. The peace campaign included a constant attack on the defence preparations of the West.

X —————  
(2) Opportunistic exploitation of:

- (a) areas of possible disagreement between Western powers such as the problem of re-armament and policy in Korea.
- (b) Nationalist movements, particularly in the Middle East, and independence movements in colonial areas.

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- (3) Probing of weak spots on the periphery of the area controlled by the USSR, e.g., Berlin and Korea.
- (4) Continued insistence that the two worlds could exist together peacefully and that the USSR was ready to discuss peaceful solutions of international differences.

X ———  
The major items of evidence which might be thought to suggest a change in the Soviet line appear to be, on the whole, consistent with these tactics.

- (1) Malik's proposal of a cease-fire was a new move nicely timed to hold the diplomatic initiative, taken immediately after the Paris talks of the foreign ministers' deputies had finally broken down. If the USSR had hoped for quick victory in Korea, the truce proposal could be regarded as a move to cut losses after it had become abundantly clear that the opposition was strong and determined. It seemed at the time that the truce proposed<sup>al</sup> might be intended to strengthen the Soviet bargaining position at the San Francisco Conference on the Japanese Peace Treaty. In the event the Soviet delegation at San Francisco simply went through the motions of expressing opposition to the terms of the treaty.

- (2) News, after only five or six issues, has become almost indistinguishable from New Times. The tone of the earlier issues was milder than is usually the case in Soviet publications but the content was not appreciably different, except for the concentration on East-West trade. Better relations between the Soviet Union and Western countries could be expected if the warmongers and "ruling circles" of the West could be silenced by the "peoples" of

It cannot be concluded that the P.C. will not embark on other local operations which involve risk of general war

- 3 -

- the countries concerned. To some extent News seemed to be playing on potential differences between the United States and the United Kingdom.
- (3) The promotion of East-West trade was the subject of articles in News and was stressed in Shvernik's reply, published on August 8, to the message of President Truman and the congressional friendship resolution. This idea has been developed in the plans for an International Economic Conference now to be held in Moscow in December. The conference was originally proposed by the World Peace Council but an attempt is now being made to have it appear to be independent of the peace organization. It will be a meeting of private individuals from non-communist countries and persons who are, in fact, government representatives from communist countries. Soviet expressions of a desire to trade with non-communist countries are not new. The USSR has always been willing to make hard-headed business bargains with capitalist countries. Such bargains are made because they fit in with Soviet economic plans. It is possible that the Western program to prevent the sale of strategic materials to the Soviet area has begun to have some results and that the USSR is under some pressure to increase exports to China. But even without any special reasons for wanting an improvement in trade relations it is entirely in line with traditional Soviet policy to be willing to trade, on the best terms that hard bargaining can obtain, and, at the same time, to make incidental propaganda use of this willingness to trade.



- 4 -

- (4) <sup>Germany</sup> ~~Regarding Germany~~, <sup>the</sup> USSR has continued to protest, particularly to France, against any re-armament <sup>of Western Germany</sup> ~~and to give every indication that this~~ would be regarded as a very serious threat. The USSR has always professed to want a united, democratic and peaceful Germany but the East-German offer in mid-September of free elections for a united Germany, and the withdrawal of occupation forces, came nearer to meeting Western conditions for unity than any previous offer. This may indicate that the Soviet Union is sufficiently disturbed at the possibility of a re-armed Germany to be willing to sacrifice its control of Eastern Germany if this would ensure a demilitarized and neutral Germany. Alternatively the East German offer may be only a delaying manoeuvre and a step calculated to cause confusion in Western Germany.
- (5) The other suggested items of evidence also seem, on examination, to be inconclusive. Caution in dealing with Middle-Eastern crises probably indicates Soviet confidence that the troubles in these countries will work out more to their advantage if they avoid open involvement in them at this stage. That there have been relatively few recent attacks on the "ruling circles" of such countries as Iran and Egypt is probably because the extreme nationalism of the present leaders of <sup>e</sup>those countries is consistent, at this stage, with Soviet policy. The peace movement has carried on another mass signature campaign along the lines of the Stockholm appeal, this time in favour of a "peace pact". There has been no indication of any change in the essential aims of the peace movement. It is rather difficult to understand Pravda's publica-

- 5 -

tion of Mr. Morrison's letter but it may have been part of a series of moves intended to establish the claim that the iron curtain is a Western, not a Soviet, phenomenon. A great many carefully selected visitors have been received in the USSR in the past year and Soviet propaganda contrasts this with restrictions on entry into the United Kingdom and the United States, particularly on affairs of "peace". Soviet propaganda has continued its direct attacks on the Atlantic Pact. The Soviet reply on the question of revision of the Italian Peace Treaty included a demand for Italian withdrawal from the Pact. A recent strongly worded Soviet note to the Norwegian Government again attacks Norway's participation in the Atlantic Pact, particularly in connection with defensive use of the island of Spitsbergen.

While new elements have appeared in Soviet tactics, there is as yet insufficient evidence to conclude that there has necessarily been a definite change in tactics or, by inference, in policy. Soviet tactics, as defined here, were, and are, sufficiently flexible to include a more conciliatory line on particular questions when this seems advantageous to the USSR. To the extent that any new element in Soviet tactics is apparent it may reflect a loss of the initiative by the USSR which is now required to take steps to counter Western moves, e.g. in Germany and Japan. Any suggestion that the "iron curtain" is being modified (the Morrison letter and the visit of the Quaker delegation) may reflect increased Soviet confidence in the internal political and economic situation in the USSR. A statement in Pravda on July 21 re-affirmed the basic Soviet doctrine of "revolutionary internationalism" - the "~~liberation~~ struggle of the international working class and the oppressed nations of the World" under the leadership of the C.P.S.U.(b).



CANADA

*Mr. Carleton*  
*of the*  
**Department of National Defence**

**CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE  
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE**

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

NO. CSC 1573-1 (JIC)

SECRET

ADDRESS REPLY TO:  
SECRETARY  
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE,  
OTTAWA.

*(9 + Uren 4)*

13 October, 1951.

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15 OCT 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

Recent Soviet Tactics and Their Significance

1. Enclosed is a draft directive for the JIS instructing it to prepare a paper on recent Soviet tactics and their significance.

2. Approval for this directive will be sought at the meeting of the JIC on Wednesday, 17 October. This subject will be considered under Item 4 of the agenda for that meeting.

*Approved*

*P. E. Uren*

(P.E. Uren)  
Acting Secretary.

Enc.

PEU/5459/fp

50028-B + 40  
49. 50

*for*

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

No. CSC 1573-1 (JIC)

SECRET



CANADA

## Department of National Defence

### CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

ADDRESS REPLY TO:  
SECRETARY  
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE,  
OTTAWA.

#### DIRECTIVE TO THE JIS:


##### Recent Soviet Tactics and Their Significance

1. The JIS has now practically completed all the papers on its work sheet. It is therefore instructed to undertake immediately a paper on "Recent Soviet Tactics and Their Significance". The main purpose of this paper will be to determine:

- (a) if there is any evidence to suggest a decided change in Soviet tactics;
- (b) if there is such evidence, whether or not this indicates a basic change in Soviet policy.

2. Among the points that might be discussed under (a) are:

- (1) Mr. Malik's proposal for a cease-fire in Korea and subsequent negotiations at Kaesong;
- (2) Soviet caution in dealing with the Iranian crisis;
- (3) Recent developments in the peace campaigns, e.g., four power conference, Stockholm petition;
- (4) The new Soviet periodical News;
- (5) Promotion of East-West trade, with reference to the International Economic Conference which opened in Moscow early in October;
- (6) Recent trends in Soviet propaganda, as exemplified by Mr. Morrison's letter and Pravda's reply;
- (7) Soviet tactics at San Francisco;
- (8) East German proposals to West Germany for unification;
- (9) Willingness to co-operate in practical matters, e.g., Berlin.

  
(P.E. Uren)  
Acting Secretary.

PEU/5459/fp

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*Economic / 45 49th*  
*European / 49th*

*of the*  
*Group*

JIBS 930-2117-3

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50028-B-40	
Sub. 58	SD. 50
Serial	Filed

MEMORANDUM

Ottawa, Ontario,  
5 October, 1951.

*9.20*

G. de T. Glazebrook, Esq.,  
Dept. of External Affairs. ✓

DNI  
DMI  
DAI

Attached is a copy of a working paper on Finland: Strategic  
Exports to the Red Bloc.

*J. Bowen*

(J. Bowen)  
Director

Joint Intelligence Bureau

CEH/6926/jet  
Enc.

JIBS 930-2117-3

SECRET

FINLAND

STRATEGIC EXPORTS TO THE SOVIET BLOC

1. Before World War II, Finland's exports consisted almost entirely of raw materials, forest products mainly, and some ores and metals. Since the war, however, in order to satisfy the Russian demands for reparations, Finland has supplied to the Soviet Union metallurgical products, including some capital equipment and ships, as well as pre-fabricated houses, wood products, and ores. The manufactured goods which will be sent as reparations till September, 1952, will then find a market guaranteed till 1955 by the Soviet-Finnish five year trade agreement.

2. Reparations

Originally set at \$300,000,000 (at 1938 prices) for six years, reparations payments were reduced to \$226,000,000 and spread out over a period of eight years, terminating in September, 1952. The post-war value of reparations has been practically doubled, amounting in 1950 to nearly one-fifth of free exports. More than half the reparations have consisted of products of the metallurgical industry, including machinery and ships. Many of the engineering products had not previously been manufactured in Finland, and it was necessary to import both industrial equipment and raw materials, especially steel. In order to supply 575 seagoing vessels and river boats (comprising 43,000 dead-weight tons) by 1952, Finland has had to postpone her restoration of her own merchant fleet till 1953. The remaining reparations are made up of pre-fabricated houses and other wood products.

3. Trade Agreements

A five-year trade agreement, negotiated during a deliberate lull in trade between the two countries in 1950, guarantees a market in the Soviet Union for products of the metalworking and shipbuilding industries till 1955. By that time, one-quarter of Finnish exports will go to the Soviet Union. Tri-partite arrangements with Poland and Czechoslovakia provide for part payment for exports to the Soviet Union by means

.../2



of imports from Poland and Czechoslovakia. The chief import from Poland is coal, (1,450,000 tons contracted for in 1951), and sugar, chemicals and precision instruments are the main imports from Czechoslovakia. Finland also has trade agreements with East Germany, Hungary, Roumania and Bulgaria. Exports to the Soviet Union and to the Red bloc include copper, pyrites, molybdenum, asbestos, special steels, cellulose, electronic and precision instruments, chemical equipment and machinery, the latter including electric machinery, boilers and turbines, and paper and wood products. The chief imports are grain, sugar, coal, coke and oil.


#### 4. Other Trade

It is not known how much covert trade is carried on with Finland as an intermediary, though it is known that there are a number of Soviet-controlled trade agencies operating in the country.

#### 5. Conclusion

By 1955, the U.S.S.R. is to take one quarter of all Finnish exports, and these will consist largely of manufactured products, particularly of the metallurgical industry. Other exports will consist as before of ores and wood products.

Source: for mineral exports to the Red bloc: JIB, London



CONFIDENTIAL

September 27, 1951

file  
bw.

MEMORANDUM FOR DEFENCE LIAISON (2)

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28 SEP 1951

With reference to your memorandum of September 10, I agree that it might be useful to prepare a study of the recent, apparent, change in Soviet tactics. One of the items of evidence of such change, the magazine News, now seems to have settled down on fairly routine Soviet lines and no longer differs much from New Times. However, a special appeal to the United Kingdom, couched mainly in terms of the advantages of East-West trade, has been a marked feature of recent tactics and seems to be continuing. The international economic conference, which is to open in Moscow early in October under the auspices of the World Peace Council, may produce some interesting developments of relevance to this study.

J. B. C. Warren

European Division

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SEEN

L. B. PEARSON

SEP 18 1951

September 17, 1951.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

50028-B-40	
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You may be interested in the attached paper on the general staff said to be in process of development for the U.S.S.R. and European satellites. This is based on information supplied by the Belgian representative to the M.R.C.

2. As you know, there have been recently a good many indications that the satellite forces have been enlarged and have been supplied with up-to-date equipment by the Soviet Union.

ER  
JW

A.D.P.H.

17-9-12/551  
15.9.16 (55)

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
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ADDRESS REPLY TO:  
SECRETARY  
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE,  
OTTAWA.

## Department of National Defence

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE  
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE



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PLEASE QUOTE  
NO. CSC 5-27-30 (JIC)

TOP SECRET

5 September, 1951.

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

#### Organization of Soviet and Satellites Integrated Staff

1. Further to para. 1(a) of CSC 5-27-30 (JIC) of 24 August on SHAPE intelligence, the following paragraphs contain information reported in a CJS, Washington, Cosmic Top Secret message. This message forwards additional details which have been provided by the Belgian representative to the MRC.
2. As a counter to the NATO command structure the USSR has set up an integrated Communist general staff with representatives from the USSR, Poland, East Germany, Roumania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria. Each country is to provide two delegates:
  - (a) One representing the Politburo - to organize propaganda to promote patriotism and devotion to international communism.
  - (b) A military member - to deal with the military problems of training, equipment, etc.
3. The organization which started to function on 1 April, 1951, has the following aims:
  - (a) The rearmament of the satellite nations.
  - (b) Indoctrination to make the satellite nations reliable military tools.
  - (c) Development of the thought by the satellite armies that they are national armies of sovereign powers and that they are the first line of defence of their own independence.
4. To achieve these ends a conference of political and military delegates of Russian and European satellite countries was held in Bucharest on 7-9 March. The following delegates attended:
  - (a) USSR  
Marshal Nicolas Boulganine - Member of Politburo.  
General Chtemenko - Chief of Staff.  
General Gigarev - Air Force.  
General Worontzon - Intelligence.  
General Abakoumow - Espionage.  
General Khrouliow - Supply.

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(b) Poland

Jacob Berman - Member of Politburo.  
Marshal Rokkossowsky - Commander in Chief.

(c) Eastern Germany

Walter Ulbricht - German Communist Party.  
Wilhelm Zeisser - Chief of "Volkspolizei".

(d) Roumania

Joseph Kichinewsky - Member of Politburo.  
Several other officers.

(e) Czechoslovakia

Zdenek Fierlinger - Member of Politburo.  
A few other officers.

(f) Hungary

Members of its Politburo.  
The Minister, Reway.

(g) Bulgaria

Tchapkow, Member of Politburo.  
General Kaptchewsky.

(h) Albania

A member of its Politburo.  
A Colonel.

In addition, two leaders of the Yugoslav Cominform movement (Wasily Goloubovitch, ex-Ambassador of Tito to Bucharest; Popiwoda, Chief of Montenegro "Maquis") were present.

5. The conference at Bucharest discussed and agreed to the following:

- (a) A review of the world situation and the danger of war, and military measures necessary.
- (b) The immediate establishment of an integrated general staff of all popular democracies, including Russia, permanently located in Sofia.
- (c) The purpose and function of the staff, i.e., to prepare and conduct propaganda and military operations against the Atlantic Bloc.
- (d) The integrated general staff is to have equal representation of all European nations belonging to the Soviet Bloc.
- (e) The integrated general staff is to be in charge of the political and military strategy which are considered to be of equal importance.

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6. During the conference, Marshal Boulganine emphasized the Soviet opinion that the weak point in the Atlantic Bloc is in the evaluation of the efficiency of an army in terms of its numbers, size and available quantities of arms, whereas the Soviet staff tries to attain the three-point aim of building powerful armies with a fighting spirit, and, at the same time, promoting amongst the Western armies defeatism, treason and the willingness to capitulate. Boulganine is understood to have commented that the US is deceiving itself in the hope of attaining victory by the use of their tanks, planes, etc., and that they can be beaten if the Communists succeed by the clever use of well-adapted propaganda. The Slovak division of the German Army, under General Touranic, and also the Chinese Nationalist Armies were quoted as examples.

*J.E. Beswick*  
(J.E. Beswick)  
Major,  
Secretary.

JEB/5459/fp





CANADA

ADDRESS REPLY TO.  
SECRETARY  
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE.  
OTTAWA.

## Department of National Defence

### CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE  
No. CSC 1430-1 (JIC)

SECRET

26 June, 1951.

50028-B-40  
58111

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File 472

#### MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

#### Possibility of Sabotage and Espionage in NATO Shipyards

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26 JUN 1951

1. In my memorandum CSC 1430-1 (JIC) of 22 June, 1951, I notified the contents of CJS, Washington message 624 of 20 June which recorded a memorandum from Saceur to the Standing Group on "Potential for Soviet Sabotage and Espionage in NATO Shipyards". In CJSW 637 of 25 June CJS, Washington forwards the contents of the Standing Group letter to the Council Deputies on this subject (SGM-1000-51 of 22 June):

"Para 1. The attached memorandum has been received from SHAPE requesting that action be taken by certain NATO countries to prevent the Soviet Union from building up a potential for sabotage and espionage through the medium of contracts for shipbuilding and ship repairs.

"Para 2. The SG consider that the type of activity envisaged by Saceur presents a current and real danger and one warranting most serious consideration and the strongest practicable action. You are requested to invite the attention of the Deputies to this matter and request that they take such action as they deem appropriate.

"Para 3. In due course the SG would like to advise Saceur that action has been taken on his request outlined in SHAPE 114. Therefore, the assurance that appropriate action will be taken is requested.

"Para 4. The Standing Group recommends that, in addition to the specific threat cited by SHAPE, the Council Deputies consider also the possible extension of similar Soviet activities into other maritime and NATO-command areas, and Communist infiltration into key industrial and transportation fields other than ocean shipping. In this connection, the following quotation from agreed Standing Group intelligence is cited:

"The Soviets are applying measures .. such as .. sabotage, subversion and fifth column activities. These methods can be expected to continue and be developed to the highest degree possible.. The scale of such efforts and the degree of success that might be expected would be dependent on the adequacy of allied countermeasures."

*J.E. Beswick*  
(J.E. Beswick)  
Major,  
Secretary.

JEB/5459/fp



CANADA

**Department of National Defence**

**CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE  
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE**

No. CSC 1430-1 (JIC)

**SECRET**

ADDRESS REPLY TO.  
SECRETARY  
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE,  
OTTAWA.

22 June, 1951.

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:**

**Possibility of Sabotage and Espionage  
in NATO Shipyards**

1. The following CJS, Washington message (CJSW 624 of 20 June) is copied for the information of the JIC:

"In SGM-924-51 dated 15 Jun 51 the Standing Group Intelligence Committee has been requested to consider a memorandum from Saceur on 'Potential for Soviet Sabotage and Espionage in NATO Shipyards' and to prepare a draft memorandum for presentation of this matter to the Council Deputies for consideration. Saceurs memorandum SHAPE 114 dated 9 Jun to the Standing Group follows:

'Para one. From various sources available it has been determined that Soviet vessels are being built or repaired in Western European shipyards where the building or refitting of warships for NATO countries is also being accomplished. It is also believed that the USSR is attempting to place order for new shipping and additional refitting in other NATO countries. In addition the New York Times of 2 June 1951 contained an article date-lined Antwerp, Belgium, concerning the salvage and repair of Soviet ships at Antwerp.

'Para two. It is known that work performed for the USSR by Western European countries is continuously observed and inspected by Soviet representatives. It must be assumed that no group of Soviet citizens is permitted outside the Soviet Union unless accompanied by MVD and MGB agents.

'Para three. Therefore, it follows that the opportunities for Soviet espionage in Western European nations are increased by additional construction and repair of products and facilities for the USSR.

'Para four. General Eisenhower is primarily concerned with the Soviet potential for sabotage and espionage against his forces on the outbreak of war. This potential is greatly increased by any work performed for the Soviet Union such as that indicated in para 1 above.

'Para five. This aspect of the security of the forces and facilities of the Supreme Allied Commander appears to be of sufficient importance to bring to the attention of the various national authorities with a view to taking the necessary measures to nullify the activities of these groups against his command.

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23 JUN 1951

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'Para six. It is therefore urged that steps be taken to put this matter before the appropriate national authorities so that the Supreme Allied Commander may be assured that this problem will not require his attention in the event of war.'"

2. DNI has been asked to obtain any additional information that may be available on this subject and present this to the JIC at the next meeting.



(J.E. Beswick)  
Major,  
Secretary.

JEB/5459/fp

June 7, 1951

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MEMORANDUM FOR EUROPEAN DIVISION

Opposition Activities in the  
Soviet Ukraine

50028-B-40
Sub. 58 Recd. .... Filed.....

When the NATO Deputies recently took up the situation in the Soviet Union, one of the first points set down for discussion was the strength of opposition groups. In preparing for this discussion it was apparent that we had very little information in the Department on this subject and it would obviously be desirable for us to obtain more. Such information would be of value from an intelligence point of view and would also be useful in psychological warfare.

We might well be able to make a special Canadian contribution of information about opposition in the Soviet Union because of the large number of persons of Ukrainian origin in Canada. Last March, for instance, two representatives of the Supreme Ukrainian Council of New York, Mr. Lebed and Dr. Hymniok, visited the Department. They claimed that the Ukrainian underground was active both politically and in semi-military operations but we have not yet been able to obtain confirmation of these claims. I think that we should be able to obtain information on these and other reports from the Ukrainian Colony in Canada. No doubt a number of these persons may correspond in some way with relatives now in the Ukraine. In addition, there have recently arrived in Canada a number of Ukrainian DP's, which would include soldiers who served in units under the German army, and these might be able to furnish information. It, therefore, would seem worthwhile that a proper study should be made to determine what information is available.

If there is agreement in the Department that such a study is desirable, I would suggest that we should take up the matter with the R.C.M.P., the Citizenship Branch and possibly

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other intelligence agencies such as the Joint Intelligence Bureau. It might be arranged that one of these agencies should undertake the study. The person or persons assigned the job should obviously know something of Ukrainian history and of the local organizations and personalities in Canada. It would probably be necessary, too, that one person at least should know the Ukrainian language. I would suggest that this Department should not undertake the study but it might well be that one of the other departments could do so.

I should be glad to have your observations on this proposal. I am sending a copy of this memorandum to Mr. McCordick.

G. de T. GLAZEBROOK

Defence Liaison (2).

## Department of National Defence

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, Canada,

4 May 51

TOP SECRET  
 DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
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Defence Liaison Division,  
 Department of External Affairs,  
 East Block,  
 Ottawa.

Attn. Mr T Le M. Carter

Fill. Soviet Union  
 Discussion  
 Appreciation  
 tk

Comments by DMI on Despatch No.A32/51, d/29 Mar 51  
from Mr. J.B.C.Watkins, Cdn Embassy, Moscow

1. General comments on the marginally named despatch, as requested by Mr. Carter in recent conversation with Major Webster, are noted hereunder.
2. With Mr. Watkin's general reading of the evidence, namely, that the USSR cannot afford a major war ~~and does not want a major war, at least at this time~~, DMI is in agreement.
3. In Para 3, Mr.Watkins refers to the number of automobiles seen inside the USSR. Most observers have reported only very small numbers of motor cars in towns and cities outside the capital. This tends to support the present estimate that trucks form the bulk of the annual output of motor transport. Such observations form an important part of the evidence used in the study of the motorization of the Army. Mr. Watkins may be speaking primarily of MOSCOW, but clarification of this point and of his impressions in provincial centres, would be welcomed.
4. In Para 10, the author of this despatch refers to the release from the armed forces of a greater number than has been called up. This statement is contrary to the bulk of the evidence available. Within the USSR, such evidence is particularly slender, and frequently based on casual observations. Amplification of Mr. Watkin's evidence for this statement, including all possible details on location, date, and circumstances of his observations would be gratefully received.
5. The relationship between CHINA and the USSR is obviously a vital factor in the collation of Soviet strategy. In Para 12, Mr.Watkins makes an interesting statement about the Soviet lack of confidence in CHINA. His review of the evidence which has led to this conclusion would be of great interest to this Directorate.
6. It would be appreciated if, after Mr.Watkins return to Ottawa, Major Webster of this Directorate has the opportunity of interviewing him.

*A.F.B. Knight*

(A.F.B. Knight)  
 Colonel  
 DMI

LES/tk

TOP SECRET





*File Soviet Union  
miscellaneous  
Appreciations*  
CONFIDENTIAL

CIRCULAR DOCUMENT

NO. A.32/51

Ottawa, April 20, 1951.

I transmit herewith the document  
listed below.

*James L. ...*

*for a* Secretary of State  
for External Affairs.

To the Heads of

Canadian Missions Abroad.

No. of copies 1

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SUBJECT

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Unnumbered Despatch of March 29, 1951 from the Canadian  
Chargé d'Affaires, a.i., Moscow, recording Final Impressions  
of Moscow.

Ext. 180 C

DUPLICATE

OTTAWA FILE

No. ....

Despatch No. ....

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Date... ~~March 29~~.. 1951.....  
(Copenhagen, Denmark)

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: Canadian Chargé d'Affaires, a.i., Moscow.

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference.....

Subject: ... ~~Final Impressions of Moscow~~.....

1. On leaving Moscow after approximately two and a half years in the Soviet Union, it might be useful to record a few final impressions. What truth there is in the observation that to write about any country one should have been there either ten days or ten years, however, is peculiarly applicable to a country so vast and varied, so full of inconsistencies and contradictions, as the Soviet Union. A two-year term spent mainly in the isolated society of the Moscow diplomatic corps is barely enough to scratch the surface. The impressions so acquired are inevitably superficial and often, no doubt, misleading. The Kremlin divulges none of its secrets to the diplomatic corps. Attempts to divine them are less confident in Moscow than in the Western press. A few of the foreign specialists on Soviet affairs in Moscow develop a kind of sixth sense which enables them to extract a good deal from the atmosphere but experience has taught them to be undogmatic in their interpretations and cautious in their predictions. One of their most useful functions is to discourage facile speculation. In this despatch I shall merely note some of the changes I have observed since arriving in the Soviet Union in September, 1948, and record a few more general impressions derived mainly from conversations with Soviet citizens in several widely separated regions of the country.

2. All the more experienced foreign observers in Moscow warned me on my arrival of the futility of comparing conditions in the Soviet Union with conditions in the West. The only valid standard of comparison was with conditions as they had been in Russia itself before and after the Revolution, and during the last World War. Russian soldiers who had served in Germany and other central European countries had been able to compare their own living conditions with those abroad and had been so critical on their return that it had been necessary to put on a propaganda campaign to "correct" the opinions they were disseminating, but the great masses of the people knew almost nothing of life in the West and their only standard of comparison was with what they had experienced in their own country. Hence the actual level on which they were living was much less important than the direction of the curve.

3. During the war the Soviet standard of living had declined sharply from the level it had reached in the Thirties. This was to be expected and

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Moscow

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was accepted as part of the cost of the war. The changeover from war-time to peace-time production, however, seems to have been more complicated and to have proceeded more slowly than had been anticipated, with the result that in 1947 there was a serious production crisis with widespread discontent. By the middle of 1948 this critical point had been passed and the trend was again upwards. This upward trend has gradually gained momentum and the increase in the amount and variety of consumer goods available in the shops during the last eighteen months has been almost incredible. To the foreign observer it has been most noticeable in the appearance of the people. Two years ago they were all so badly dressed that foreigners were conspicuous wherever they went, merely by their clothes. Now they attract no particular attention even at the theatres, and the task of the militia men guarding foreign embassies has become increasingly difficult: they can no longer distinguish their own citizens by their clothes and are frequently embarrassed to find that they have asked non-Russians about to enter a foreign embassy if they are not perhaps "making a mistake". The rapid increase in production is also apparent in the large number of new shops of all kinds and new restaurants that have opened, in the fleets of new taxis and cars, etc. When it is remembered that heavy industry is always given priority, this increase is still more impressive. It has been easily the most striking phenomenon of the last two years in the Soviet Union.

4. Food rationing had been dropped some time before I arrived, but there were still long queues for all sorts of supplies. Now there only are seasonal shortages -- the new lemon crop had just come in when I left, but the hens were staging their annual spring strike -- but flour is the only important item of food that is restricted. It is sold only twice a year before festivals which call for a high consumption of griddle-cakes. Nobody supposes that flour is scarce, and the only probable explanation is that the State does not want people to bake their own bread or eat too many blinis. Together with the increase in the supply of consumer goods, there have been three substantial price reductions in the last two years. Food, clothing, shoes, and all sorts of everyday commodities are still fantastically high if the price is translated into dollars at the official rate of the rouble. Many of the prices seem high also in terms of Soviet wage averages as we know them, but it has been very obvious recently that the great majority of the people have money to spend and are spending it. In the lower income groups the explanation seems to be that rents are almost negligible, that all the adult members of the family are gainfully employed, and that there are various supplements to the basic pay, of which we know very little. I was surprised to discover, for instance, that a schoolteacher is paid extra for every paper she marks, that a hotel maid gets a month's holiday at Sochi on the Black Sea with all expenses paid, etc. People in the higher income brackets are buying jewellery and other luxury items, possibly as an investment. There are many big signs admonishing citizens to save their money and put it in the bank, but it is likely that most of the people who got one rouble for ten when the currency was changed in 1947 prefer to spend it.

5. The appearance of the city of Moscow itself has also improved greatly in the last two years. The street on which our Embassy stands, for instance, has changed almost beyond recognition. The cobblestones have been replaced by asphalt and all the old, tumbledown houses on both sides of the street have been remonted so that they look almost like new buildings. The same is true of many other streets in different parts of the city. There are still many very shabby sections, of course, but no doubt they

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will all be tackled in turn according to plan. In spite of a great deal of new building, some of it apparently very good and some incredibly bad, the housing situation in Moscow is still unsatisfactory even by Russian standards. The Government is now taking steps to reduce the metropolitan population and it has become very difficult for people living in the provinces to get permission to move to Moscow. Apartment space is allocated on a rigidly graded scale -- at least in theory. A university professor, for instance, is entitled by law to two rooms of specified dimensions. If his wife is also doing scientific work, she is entitled to two additional rooms. The combination is a hypothetical four-room apartment plus kitchen, bath, etc. The only problem that remains is the purely physical one of finding the space. At present it is usually insoluble. At this point private enterprise may rear its ugly head and the professor may succeed in subletting an apartment at six or seven hundred roubles a month instead of the one hundred which the original lessee is paying to the State. It is safe to say that even those people, who were fortunate enough to have had a four or five room apartment before the war are now living in unhygienically crowded conditions, for they all seem to be surrounded by a host of poor relations. Lower down in the scale the crowding is still worse, of course, and the resulting congestion is one of the militiamen's most difficult problems, since they are apparently expected to reduce it. "As soon as a family gets a proper apartment", one of them complained, "their relations swarm in like bedbugs and what can we do about it?" It would be a mistake to suppose, however, that this overcrowding is anything like the hardship to a Russian family (or to an Italian or an Icelandic family, for that matter) that it would be to a Canadian. In many cases it is a matter of choice. What the average Russian could not bear to contemplate would be the horror of having to live alone.

6. As long as the standard of living continues to improve, however gradually, there is not likely to be acute discontent with the regime. The Russian people are satisfied with so little that it is hard for us to imagine it. On the political side their demands are still more modest. They have never known political freedom as we understand it, and except for a few intellectuals they have no idea what it means. Their elections and their Supreme Soviet, which to us seem merely an elaborate farce, they take very seriously. Somehow or other the Government has managed to persuade the average citizen that his vote is extremely important. From talking to ordinary people in different parts of the country I feel sure that it is this conviction, more than the pressure from Party officials, which accounts for the large vote even in the far northern regions where it is not easy to get to the polling stations. The fact that they have no choice of parties or even of candidates does not seem in the least strange to them. It is sufficient to know that if they think a certain candidate has not taken his duties seriously enough, they can stroke out his name on the ballot. More intelligent or better informed people can understand that the single-party system strikes westerners as odd and undemocratic, but seem content with the explanation that the Communist Party is doing everything that could be done, or that it is surely more efficient to have a single party than the confusing multiplicity of parties one finds in a country like France, for instance. Some foreign writers have explained that the present system in the Soviet Union is educational and that as people become more experienced in the exercise of the franchise they will be given more choice. There may be some truth in this, but I can see nothing at present to indicate that the Communist Party plans to share its authority with any other.

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7. In spite of the lack of opposition parties, however, the Politburo cannot entirely disregard public opinion. There are other ways in which it can make itself felt than in elections. One of them is in declining production, and to this the Politburo is extremely sensitive. Hence the constant propaganda to explain to the masses that what is being done is in their best interests. This is cleverly done and is generally successful. The ordinary citizen seems genuinely convinced that he has a share in all the great State enterprises, and the recent announcement of the vast new irrigation and power projects has obviously fired the popular imagination, as it was intended to do, in all parts of the country. In the case of the collectivization of agriculture in the Ukraine in the Thirties, however, the Government did not succeed, as Stalin explained to Churchill, in convincing the farmers that it would ultimately be to their advantage. Those who could not be convinced were starved out or transported to Siberia. But such ruthless methods are dangerous to the regime, and if it had not been for the threat from Germany, it is probable that a more gradual transformation would have been preferred. In Great Russia the Bolsheviks were frequently forced to come to terms with recalcitrant groups and they refer to avoid a showdown if they can. However badly they may gauge Western psychology in their propaganda efforts, it is generally admitted that they understand the psychology of their own people, including the non-Russian races, extremely well. A tremendous effort is constantly being made, by both positive and negative means, to mould public opinion. The intensity of the effort illustrates at once the importance of the task and the difficulty of it.

8. The isolation of the Russian people is about as complete as the Kremlin intends it to be. Soviet citizens can apparently travel to any place they wish within the boundaries of the Soviet Union and they are still nomadic enough to take as full advantage of this as their means permit. Indeed, many seem to travel without much means and for no good reason. They would be no less eager to travel abroad but only very few can get exit visas even for the neighbouring satellite countries. The ban on travel abroad, however, is probably much less felt in such an enormous country with such a great variety of climates, landscapes, languages, and cultures than it would be in most European countries. It is about as difficult for foreigners to obtain entry visas to the Soviet Union as for Soviet citizens to obtain exit visas. A good many cultural or peace delegations come for brief visits, but their programmes are always carefully planned and their contacts with the natives must be relatively few. The Soviet press is, of course, completely controlled and prints only what the authorities want the people to read. Occasionally they reproduce speeches, articles, or diplomatic notes from abroad which come as a surprise to foreigners in Moscow and can hardly be less of a surprise to Soviet readers. It is not easy to guess the reasons for these exceptions to the general rule. For the most part, the Soviet press is extremely dull. It gives a ridiculously distorted picture of the West, and it was refreshing to find that a good deal of this nonsense is received with healthy skepticism. Its half-truths are more frequent and insidious than its untruths, and unfortunately the Western press, and especially the American, provides excellent material for the Soviet propaganda machine. Quotations from senators and congressmen are popular and the most outrageous ones are almost invariably exact translations. Foreign radio programmes are so effectively jammed that they cannot be heard at all in Moscow and only with great difficulty in other parts of the country.

9. All observers in Moscow agree that the Soviet people in all parts of the country in which we have had any contact with them want peace. They suffered horribly in the last war and in

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the devastated regions particularly are still suffering from its effects. Their losses were enormous and almost everybody one meets has lost one or more close relatives. In a defensive war they would undoubtedly fight and fight well, but unlike the Germans they are not a bellicose people. As Toynbee points out, they have been more aggressed against than aggressing in their history, and many of them have experienced two German invasions and the war of intervention in their own lifetime. If their rulers wanted war, of course, all the vast propaganda machine would be brought into operation to convince them that their country was not the aggressor and that their cause was just, but they are not stupid or uncritical and the Government would have to choose its ground very carefully. A threat from Germany would rally them more quickly around their Government than a threat from any other quarter.

10. Most observers here agree that the Soviet Government does not want to risk war at the present time. Whatever they can get by other methods or by local wars in which they need not become involved, they will, of course, take. They know quite well that they could occupy Western Europe in a comparatively short time but they also know that this would inevitably bring them into conflict with the United States and that their productive capacity is and will remain for a long time much below that of the United States. They know, too, that the industrial progress they have made and the great industrial projects they have planned would be set back for years if they were involved in a World War, and the people as a whole know this just as well as the Kremlin does. It has been argued that if they have decided that war is inevitable it would be much more to their advantage to have it now than later, when Western Europe has built up its defences. This seems logical, but there are no indications at present that they would be willing to take the risk. As far as can be seen in the parts of the country open to us, it appears that just now they have reached a low point, for them, in the number of men they have under arms. They seem to have released a large proportion of their older classes without calling in an equivalent number - perhaps because of the demands on manpower made by the new industrial projects announced last year. It is probable that the deficiency will soon be made up, but if they had expected to be involved in war very soon, it is unlikely that they would have released so many. It is also interesting to note that so far as we can discover no attempt is being made to provide bomb shelters in large cities like Moscow and Leningrad.

11. The peace campaign, as seemed probable from the beginning, is being pressed to the limit. Until recently the propaganda has been reassuring: the broad masses of the people everywhere are opposed to war and will not permit the instigators of war to plunge the world into misery again. Stalin's PRAVDA interview was less reassuring. Although he said that war was not inevitable, he was not so certain that the people might not be deceived and led into it by the instigators of war. The more intelligent part of the population seems to have taken this as a warning and the recent increase in the military budget must have confirmed it, nor could Stalin's statement that their present military forces were only about half those of their potential enemies have made them feel any more secure. In spite of this, however, the peace campaign continues at full blast in the press and, however insincere it may be, it is not the best preparation for a war mentality and would certainly have to be changed if war in the near future were contemplated. For this reason it is important to watch closely for changes in the propaganda line.

12. The feeling of confidence so obvious last year when the Chinese Nationalists were defeated seems to have ebbed somewhat, partly, no doubt, as a result of the Korean war and partly,

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perhaps, because the Russians still do not feel very sure of China. From various small pointers observed by Western diplomats here, it seems clear that China is not regarded and does not regard itself as a satellite in the sense that Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the rest are satellites. The Russians are still being elaborately careful in how they handle the Chinese and must be secretly grateful for the circumstances which have prevented any closer relationships between the Chinese and the West. Whether they are really afraid of Mao-Tse-Tung turning out to be another Tito, I should not venture to guess, but at least they have not forgotten their great disappointment in Chiang Kai Shek in 1927. It has been suggested, too, that the Russians are by no means averse to having the Chinese wear themselves down a little more on fighting the United Nations in Korea. If having convinced ourselves that Tito, although a Communist, is not such a bad fellow after all, it would not strain our principles too much to discover a few ingratiating traits in Mao-Tse-Tung, (once the Korean business is settled, of course) it would, I believe, worry the Kremlin as much as anything else we could do. At a public lecture recently the speaker asked sarcastically what the West was offering the Asian countries, and answered it as follows:

"The return of the feudal system and the bankers, and such discredited figures as Chiang Kai Shek, Syngman Rhee and Bao Dai, but these offers do not tempt the nationalist populations of Asia."

It costs the Russians nothing to play up nationalism in Asia just as energetically as they crush it in Eastern Europe, but perhaps this game could be made less easy for them.

13. Social conditions in the Far East facilitate the Soviet propaganda effort and so, I fear, do social conditions in the Middle East. It may be that as the Communist parties in Western Europe continue to lose ground, the Soviet Union will decide to concentrate more on Asia. It is clear that unless it becomes involved in war the Soviet Union will make vast progress in industrialization in the next few years. Looked at from Asia the progress of the Soviet Union in the last thirty years is already sufficiently impressive, and if it continues at the present speed it is bound to influence Asian opinion more and more, unless the West can assist the Asian countries to meet their difficult problems more rapidly and effectively than it has been able to do so far.

(Sgd.) J.B.C. Watkins.



Excerpt from N.Y. Times Mar. 19 1951

BRITISH GIVES COUNT OF BIGGEST ARMIES

War Office Says Soviet and  
Red China Have Total Forces  
of 4,000,000 Each

Special to the New York Times

LONDON, March 18 -- Britain opened her military intelligence files today to disclose some new facts about the strength of the world's two largest armies. The files indicated that the combined armed forces of the Soviet Union and Communist China totaled more than 8,000,000 men well disciplined and efficient, although low paid and harshly treated.

Appraisals issued by the War Office put the military manpower of Russia and China at 4,000,000 each, including the armies, navies, air forces and secret police, with the Soviet Army numbering 2,800,000 and the Chinese 2,500,000. No estimate was made of the East European satellite forces.

In a note to Britain published Feb. 25 the Soviet Union declared that the total strength of its army, navy and air force had been reduced to approximately the same figure obtaining in 1939, or 2,500,000, and that the armed forces of Britain, France and the United States were twice the size of those of Russia.

In a speech today at Dundee War Secretary John Strachey, elaborating on the War Office notes, said that, although the Soviet Union maintained twice as large a standing army in proportion to its population as did Britain, the Western powers with a population of 350,000,000 could expand their forces to meet any Soviet threat.

Mr. Strachey maintained that the number of men the Soviet kept under arms was "not altogether out of proportion" to its population of 200,000,000 but that such a large force could not exist without forcing the West to build up its defenses.

The Soviet Union's 175 line divisions are exceedingly well equipped and efficient, Mr. Strachey asserted. He said that the Russian enlisted man fared far worse than soldiers of the Western powers in the matter of pay, living conditions, leave and discipline.

The Russian private, the War Office reported, receives 1 shilling ninepence (about 23 cents a day) until he has served for three years.

On the other hand a Soviet major general in occupied Europe was said to receive the equivalent of more than £7,000 (\$19,600) a year.

The War Office said Communist China had a field force of approximately eighty "armies (roughly the equivalent to British corps) and these were composed of tough, intelligent troops who are receiving more and better equipment from Russia every day.





# Department of National Defence

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE  
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

NO. CSC 7-17 (JIC)  
CSC 4-6-4 (JIC)

SECRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA

19 March, 1951.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE:

## Information Book on Russia

1. I refer to Item III of the minutes of the 486th meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. A copy of this item has been forwarded to you with the letter on "Provision of Intelligence Material for NDC Exercises" (CSC 4-6-4 (JIC) of 19 March).

2. It will be noted that the Deputy Minister indicated the value of a tri-service book containing all available information on the USSR. The book envisaged is to include information on all branches of the Soviet armed forces and also, economic intelligence.

3. I have been asked to advise if such a book exists, and, if not, whether the production of one is considered desirable.

4. This matter will, therefore, be included on the agenda of the 263rd meeting of the Committee to be held on Wednesday, 21 March.

*J.E. Beswick*  
(J.E. Beswick)  
Major,  
Secretary.

JEB/5459/fp

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File 100-105

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MINUTE

Despatch No. 866 of March 12 from  
Washington.  
Soviet intentions and the prospective Four-  
Power meeting

Insert particulars of despatch, memorandum or other attached document.

DUPLICATE  
EXT 105  
general

SECURITY GRADING

secret

DATE

March 12, 1951.

INITIALS OF AUTHOR

PTM/cl

CIRCULATION

with minute:  
Mr. Collins  
European Div.  
Mr. Léger (on  
return)  
Commonwealth  
Am. & P.E. Div.

Refer with  
minute to:

SSHA - USSEA  
Sec. to Cab.  
Def. Liaison I  
and II  
Mr. McCordick

Refer without  
minute to:

Sec. Chiefs of  
Staff Comm.  
Sec. Cab. Def. Comm.  
Mr. Claxton  
J.I.C. - N.D.C.  
London  
Paris  
Bonn  
Moscow  
& file

Eur/P.T. Molson

Mr. Wrong reports that two members of his staff discussed with Mr. Reinhardt and Mr. Cox of the State Department the subject of Soviet intentions and the prospective Four-Power meeting.

Meeting of the Deputies of the Four Powers in Paris

The United States wishes to have a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers in Washington, provided the agenda is so drafted as to avoid prejudicing the discussion of the issues involved. In the Soviet policy towards Germany there are certain contradictions which are, in Mr. Reinhardt's view, bound to have an adverse effect on relations between the two countries.

Balance of Power between the Soviet Union and the Western Democracies.

The bargaining position of the West vis-à-vis the Soviet Union has shown a remarkable improvement during the last six months. This has prompted a renewal of the Soviet peace offensive which is designed to slow down Western mobilization. Mr. Reinhardt is not aware of any indication that the Soviet Government will resort to force in Europe in the near future. He feels that the Soviet Union has calculated that it could not win an all-out war involving the United States.

Soviet Mobilized Strength

Of an all-over total of approximately four million men in the three Soviet services, approximately seven hundred thousand are estimated to be serving outside the Soviet Union. There is no sign of increased military mobilization or significant troop movements, although Mr. Reinhardt doubts whether the Soviet Union could step up its mobilization without going into an all-out war.

Possibility of Communist "limited liability" Moves

In Mr. Reinhardt's judgment the most dangerous area is the Middle East.

Personal Position of Stalin

Mr. Reinhardt believes that the disappearance of Stalin from the scene might well bring about profound changes in the Soviet Union.

Many State Department officers feel that, since the Communists would fare so poorly in free elections in Eastern Germany and also in free elections in a unified Germany, the Soviet authorities will not risk proposing unification of the country on the basis of free elections. It is considered more probable that they will make some compromise proposal designed to drive a wedge between France, on the one hand, and the United Kingdom and the United States on the other. Mr. Cox himself thinks that the Soviet Union is so anxious to prevent the re-militarization of Western Germany that it may propose free all-German elections.

	<div>DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS</div> <div>MINUTE</div> <div>ON</div> <div>- 2 -</div> <div>Insert particulars of despatch, memorandum or other attached document.</div>	<div>EXT. 105</div> <div>SECURITY GRADING</div> <div>DATE</div> <div>INITIALS OF AUTHOR</div>
<div>CIRCULATION</div>	<div>In that event, the United States would not agree to a de-militarised and neutralised Germany as a <u>quid pro quo</u>. It is the State Department's view that the Soviet authorities will use any conference of the Foreign Ministers to attempt to split the Western Powers on the question of Germany and also to derive propaganda advantages.</div> <div>Mr. Wrong concludes that serious consideration is being given in Washington to the possibility of a Four-Power meeting the Soviet Government might accept the safeguards demanded by the Western Powers for German unification based on free elections subject to the condition of the de-militarization of the whole of Germany.</div> <div>THIS MINUTE TO BE STAPLED TO, AND FILED WITH, THE DOCUMENT TO WHICH IT REFERS, UNDER THE DATE OF THE DOCUMENT.</div>	



Ext. 18<sup>o</sup> C

DUPLICATE

OTTAWA FILE

No. ....

Despatch No. .... 866

Date. .... March 12th, 1951.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

FROM: The Canadian Ambassador, Washington, D. C.

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference. ....  
Soviet Intentions and the Prospective Four-Power Meeting.

Subject: .....

1. Since the possibilities of a conference between the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France are being developed to the point at any rate of the preliminary meeting between their Deputies in Paris, I have thought it well to make inquiries at the State Department about their present estimate of Soviet intentions in Europe. Mr. Ignatieff has therefore discussed the position with Mr. Frederick Reinhardt, the Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, and Mr. Wallis has also seen Mr. Henry Cox of the Office of German Affairs. The State Department is short-handed in officers with substantial experience in the Soviet Union since the posting of Mr. Bohlen in Paris and the departure of Mr. Kennan to the Institute of Advanced Studies. Mr. Reinhardt is the senior Soviet expert in the Department. Mr. Bohlen, however, is about to return to his previous post as Counsellor of the Department.

2. Mr. Ignatieff has given me a memorandum of his discussion with Mr. Reinhardt, extracts from which are quoted below.

Meeting of the Deputies of the Four Powers in Paris. The United States, Mr. Reinhardt said, wanted to have a meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Washington, so long as the agenda was drawn up in such a way as it would not prejudice the discussion of any of the issues. The United States Government, moreover, was quite prepared to discuss on its merits any subject the Soviet Government proposed. They were not prepared, however, to have separate subjects linked together conditionally, he cited the Austrian Treaty and Trieste as an instance of this kind of Soviet manoeuvre. He noted the way in which Gromyko had omitted any reference to German unity in his original proposals on Germany for the agenda and had placed all the emphasis on demilitarization and the prohibition of remilitarization of Germany. The emphasis placed on German unity by the three Allies had not passed unnoticed by German public opinion. He observed that there was a curious obtuseness in the way Russia conducted its business with Germany, both in the past and in the present. He recalled how, in the period between 1939 and 1941, under the Hitler-Stalin Pact, the Soviet Government had

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increased its demands both in the Baltic and in the Balkans in such a manner as was bound to strain relations with Germany at a time when a policy of restraint would have been more to the interest of the Soviet Union.

Likewise, since the war, there was a dichotomy in Soviet policy vis-a-vis Germany. On the one hand, the Soviet Government had deprived Germany of a large slice of its territory and had worked against its unification, while, at the same time, trying to pose as its friend and protector against Western imperialism. Mr. Reinhardt did not draw any conclusions, but thought that these contradictions in Soviet policy were bound to have their effect upon Soviet-German relations. He expressed the opinion that the Soviet Government would welcome a return to the Potsdam Agreement on Germany, whereby the forms of four-power control would be re-established, involving a free hand for the Soviets in the Eastern Zone and a veto over the policies of the Western Powers in the rest of Germany. He did not think that the Soviet Government was prepared to accept the idea of the unification of Germany, based upon free elections.

Balance of power between the Soviet Union and the Western Democracies. Mr. Reinhardt considered that the most striking development in relation to the Soviet Union in the last six months had been the way in which the balance of power had moved radically in favour of the Western democracies. Although the implementation of the rearmament plans of the North Atlantic countries was yet in its earliest stages, a remarkable change in the relative bargaining positions of the Soviet Government and the Western democracies could already be observed. The mobilization of the war potential of North America and Western Europe (including Western Germany) was something which the Soviet Government feared. Their reaction had been to step up their propaganda efforts in a renewed peace offensive, which was intended to bring pressure on the Governments of the Western democracies through their peoples to slacken mobilization efforts and to make concessions to the Soviet Government. It was likewise accompanied by efforts to bring about a four-power conference and a five-power "Peace Pact".

Mr. Reinhardt recalled that the present rearmament effort of the Western Powers really stemmed from the last adventure of the Soviet Government to gain their ends by the overt use of force in Europe through the blockade in Berlin. He was not aware of any indication that the Soviet Government would resort to the use of force in Europe in the near future. He emphasized that this view was based on the hypothesis that the Soviet Union, having calculated the risks of general war, would have come to the conclusion that they could not win an all-out war involving the United States. Two factors, however, still remain to be taken into account:-

- (a) the enormous mobilized strength of Soviet forces in being;
- (b) the continuing opportunities for gaining advantages by Communist moves of a "limited liability" nature.

I asked Mr. Reinhardt whether he would hazard an opinion about the extent and significance of defections

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and dismissals from the Communist Party in Western Europe, as well as in the Eastern European satellite countries. He was very guarded in his reply, saying that while the news from Europe on this point was very encouraging, the United States authorities had not reached any definite conclusions either as to the extent of these developments or the significance to be attached to them.

Soviet mobilized strength. Mr. Reinhardt estimated the total mobilized strength of all Soviet forces - ground, naval and air - at approximately four million; of these, approximately two and a half million were Soviet ground forces in being. Approximately 700,000 men were thought to be serving outside the borders of the Soviet Union, according to U.S. Intelligence estimates. (This was only a rough estimate, based upon the knowledge that the Soviet law requires that every 100,000 Soviet citizens serving in the armed forces abroad should be represented by one military Deputy in the Supreme Soviet. As it is known that there are seven such Deputies, this may mean that there are approximately 700,000 troops serving abroad.) In addition, the Soviet Union had large trained reserves, the exact numbers of which were difficult to determine.

In view of the present state of mobilization of Soviet forces, the Western Powers would continue to emphasize the importance of further measures of demilitarization of Soviet forces as a necessary condition for the reduction of international tension. There was, however, no sign of any increased tempo in military mobilization in the Soviet Union, nor of any significant troop movements. Referring to recently published figures on the Soviet budget, which included certain figures on military expenditures, Mr. Reinhardt said that the release of these figures was mainly intended for propaganda purposes, to show that the Soviet Union intends to keep up with the Western democracies in the armament race. As a considerable portion of the Soviet military effort is hidden in other items of the Soviet budget, it was difficult to form any accurate estimate of the state of Soviet militarization on the basis of published figures. He expressed some doubt, however, whether the Soviet Government could, in fact, increase its military mobilization substantially over its present level without going into an all-out war. He thought that the reference in Stalin's interview to the difficulties in multiplying a country's armed forces and armaments without curtailing severely civilian industry, construction and consumption of goods, reflected the serious quandary in this respect which confronts the Soviet Government.

Possibility of Communist moves of a "limited liability" nature. Mr. Reinhardt observed that, in his judgment, the most dangerous area for such possible moves in the near future was the Middle East. The assassination of the Premier of Iran showed how the Communists could easily exploit the instability of the regimes in the countries adjoining the Soviet Union in this area. The United States Government had no reason to suppose that the Communists had been responsible for the assassination, but he was sure that they would not overlook any opportunity for creating trouble.

Personal position of Stalin. Mr. Reinhardt said that during his period of duty in Moscow, he had been impressed

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by the important personal role which Stalin played as the supreme Dictator. Stalin was always available to intervene in all phases of activity in Russia and to step in as the supreme arbiter in any dispute. Also, by distributing threats and favours, he was able to overcome the inertia inherent in the Russian character as well as in its present autocratic regime. He observed that Stalin had been very clever in controlling the military chiefs in the Soviet Union. Military representation in the politburo was restricted to political bosses such as Bulganin and cronies such as Orosilov. The Chiefs of Staff and other military officers were kept severely under control by Stalin, and their advice, he thought, was only sought on points of information and detail and not on matters of high strategy. He could not help thinking that if Stalin disappeared from the scene, profound changes might follow in the Soviet Union.

3. The conversation between Mr. Wallis and Mr. Cox concerned the estimate of Soviet intentions with regard to Germany at a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers if it were to take place. The following is an extract from Mr. Wallis' report of this discussion.

Mr. Cox said that according to State Department estimates the Communist Party in Eastern Germany would not gain more than 5 to 15% of the vote if free elections were held in the Soviet Zone. If free elections were held in a unified Germany, he thought that the Communist Party would not get more than 10% of the vote in both Zones combined. This would mean that the Party would get less than 10% representation in an all-German parliament, and their influence in German politics would therefore be small.

Because of this fact, many State Department officials consider that the Soviet Union will not risk proposing unification on the basis of genuinely free democratic elections in exchange for a neutralized and demilitarized Germany. They think it more likely that the Soviet Government will only go part way towards agreeing to free elections; for instance, the U.S.S.R. might propose that Western Germany should send two-thirds of the delegates of a national convention and Eastern Germany one-third. As the East Zone representatives would be chosen by the East German Government, they would all be Communists. This proposal would sound superficially reasonable, since it would recognize the difference in the size of the population of both Zones, and the Soviet Government would hope to split the three Western Powers on this issue. Their proposal would be aimed particularly at France. Naturally, this was the sort of proposal which the United States would not accept.

Mr. Cox himself, however, thought that the Soviet Union was so anxious to prevent the remilitarization of Western Germany that they were likely to propose genuinely free elections throughout the whole of Germany. If they did this, it would be hard for the French to resist, and they would certainly be able to derive considerable propaganda advantage from it. He said that even if the Soviet Government went so far as to propose free all-German elections, the United States would not agree to a demilitarized, neutralized Germany as a quid pro quo. This

- 5 -

point of view was also expressed by Mr. Davis when I spoke to him about Germany last week.

In conclusion, Mr. Cox said that in the State Department's view the conference would not bring practical results. The Soviet authorities probably realized this and would go to the conference with two ends in view:- (a) to attempt to create a split between the three Western Powers respecting Germany, and (b) to use the conference for propaganda purposes.

4. There is certainly a good deal of thought being given in Washington to the possibility that at a four-power meeting the Soviet Government might accept the safeguards demanded by the Western Powers for German unification based on free elections subject to the condition of the demilitarization of the whole of Germany. I have already reported what Mr. Perkins told me on this matter in telling me of his discussion with Chancellor Adenauer at Bonn. Mr. Perkins then expressed his agreement with the opinion of Mr. Cox that the conception of a unified but neutralized Germany was unacceptable because it would be bound to be a transitory arrangement which could be employed to its own advantage by the Soviet Government.

(Sgd.) H.H. Wrong



Cominform

N. Y. TIMES

OCT 22 1950

# The Communiqué of the Soviet Bloc Foreign Ministers' Conference in Prague

PRAGUE, Oct. 21 (AP)—Text, translated unofficially from Russian, of the Soviet bloc's communiqué.

Sept. 19 this year a communiqué was published concerning secret consultations of the foreign ministers of the United States, Great Britain and France, held in New York where a few separate agreements on the German issue were reached.

In the communiqué it is said that the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France intend to submit the question of the termination of a state of war with Germany and at the same time the preservation of the Occupation Statute imposed upon Germany is certified.

The communiqué goes on to say that previous decisions concerning prohibited sectors of German industry will be revised while the inadmissibility of the revival of the German war potential is not taken into account.

The communiqué makes clear that the main issue on the agenda of the three ministers' consultations was the rebuilding of a German army, the issue of the remilitarization of Western Germany.

An enumeration of the basic points of the communiqué clearly shows that the separate New York decisions of the Governments of the United States, Britain and France on the German question are a new gross violation of engagements, which these governments undertook in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement that maintain the threat to peace in Europe and contradict the interests of all peace-loving nations, including the interests of the German people.

1. A declaration of the Governments of the United States, Britain and France on an intention to submit the question concerning the "termination of a state of war with Germany" is thoroughly feigned and has nothing in common with the long-matured necessity of a peaceful arrangement of Germany, without which a renewal of the unity of the German state is impossible. Speaking of the termination of a state of war with Germany, the communiqué emphasizes that "it does not concern the rights and statutes of the three powers in Germany" in which they have retained, under the Occupation Statute, unlimited jurisdiction in Western Germany.

Thus, the three Governments again declare the integrity of the Occupation Statute, the validity of which they intend to extend indefinitely in order to be able

to hold their rule in Western Germany as long as possible.

And moreover, the communiqué says that the three Occupation Powers will "increase and strengthen their forces in Germany." From published news it is known that in connection with that, occupation expenditures will increase to almost twice as much, which in turn mightily increases tax burdens. It is not necessary to prove that the decision of the three governments concerning the new strengthening of the occupation forces in Germany is unexplainable except by the continuously growing aggressive efforts of these powers in Europe.

It is now declared that the false phrases of the so-called "termination" of a state of war with Germany are only a camouflage to disguise the policy of the powers heading the aggressive Atlantic Pact. These powers endeavor to free their hands so as to be able to make full use of Western Germany's sources of manpower and materials, in their imperialist interests, for the realization of their strategic plans, behind which the efforts of the ruling circles of the United States are concealed.

Under the pretext of a termination of the state of war with Germany, they try to create conditions for an open integration of Western Germany into the aggressive bloc of the so-called Atlantic Pact and to make it (Germany) definitely a tool of their aggressive, war-strategic plans in Europe.

## "Pledge" on Peace Treaty

At the same time, it is clear that the issue of a termination of a state of war with Germany is accelerated in order to enable them to postpone as long as possible the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and thereby to postpone also the unification of Germany.

It is no accident that in the lengthy New York communiqué nothing is said on a peace treaty with Germany nor on the preparation of such a treaty. At the same time, only five years ago the Governments of the United States, Britain and France pledged, under the Potsdam Agreement, to prepare for a peace treaty with Germany, which engagements they are now evading under various pretexts. It shows how distant is the current policy of the United States, Britain and France from the Potsdam Agreement of the Four Powers. It also indicates that the current policy of the United States, Britain and France, grossly violating the Potsdam Agreement, is in direct contrast to the interests

of all peace-loving nations of Europe.

2. The communiqué says that the "ministers of foreign affairs agreed that a revision of the agreement on prohibited branches of industry, or those branches of industry which were to have been subject to controls, have to be judged in the light of mutual relations which are established with the Federal Republic, that is, with Western Germany." At the same time, not a single word is said on the prohibition of a revival of the war industry, required by the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements, as well as other agreements of the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union. However, the communiqué says that the production of steel is granted above quotas for the sake of war.

Thus the communiqué of the three ministers virtually abolishes prohibitions of the German war industry, whereto, unanimously established, unalterable decisions of the Four Powers exist. The complete meaning of the New York communiqué lies in the fact that the Ruhr heavy industry adjusts itself to the accomplishment of the war-strategic tasks of the Western Powers.

Through their New York communiqué, the Three Powers open the door to a revival of the military potential of Western Germany which at the time mainly supported German imperialism and Hitlerite aggression.

All that evidences how grossly and flatly those common agreements of the Four Powers are now denied that were reached with participation of the Soviet Union which tended to ban German war industry and to prevent renewal of German militarism and which were accepted with tremendous relief by the peace-loving nations of Europe and all the world.

The attempts to create super-monopolist aggregates of coal and metallurgical industries of Western Germany and France, with the participation of other European States, serve the same aims of revival of the military and industrial potential of Western Germany and readjustment of the West German economy to the plan of the American military bloc. These attempts of Western and French capitalist monopolies performed under the dictate of the United States Government and leaning toward the most reactionary groups in Western Germany, conceal in themselves a serious danger of the revival of German aggressive forces and will naturally run into decisive repudiation from the side of democratic circles of France, Western

Germany and other European countries.

This policy of the three powers of the United States, Great Britain and France clearly contradicts the basic principles of the Potsdam Agreement, the aim of which is the rehabilitation of Germany as a peace-loving, democratic German State leaning toward the revival and further development of peaceful German industry, agriculture and the other branches of the German economy. The policy of the three powers tends to mislead the development of the German economy onto the road of preparations for a new war in Europe instead of granting to the German people all the necessary opportunities for the development of a peaceful economy for the relief of war-afflicted wounds, the rebuilding of towns and the betterment of material conditions of the life of the working people upon which the Soviet Union unconditionally insists.

## German Army and Police

3. As was said above, the main issue discussed in the New York consultations of the foreign ministers of the United States, Britain and France was the issue of the revival of the German Army, even though in the text of the communiqué everything was done to hush up this question. According to the communiqué, the three ministers agreed that in addition to the police troops and units existing in Western Germany, "it is necessary to permit the creation of mobile police units," and besides that they took into account the possibility of "the participation of Germany in unified armed forces"—that is, the creation of a German Army is actually taken into account, although in the same communiqué there is the feigned statement that the "revival of a German National Army would correspond to the higher interests neither of Germany nor of Europe."

According to published accounts it is estimated that in the Western zones of Germany there are 456,000 people, among them "displaced persons," belonging to German and foreign military formations, and various police corps, the latter made up principally of former soldiers and officers of the Hitler army. The military equipment of these troops and formations, their triangular organization and army training, preparation of officer cadres for them in special schools and their participation in military maneuvers with occupation forces of the Western Powers indicate these formations and corps are essentially army troops. To these for-

BEDRICH BRUEGEL

58. ✓  
After my resignation from the service of the Czechoslovak Ministry for Foreign Affairs two questions were put to me everywhere: Are there really no Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia? How do Soviet diplomats transmit their demands?

The first question is easy to answer. There are, to the best of my knowledge, apart from the enclave of Jachymov, no Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia. They are unnecessary, because Czechoslovakia, like all countries of the Eastern bloc, or all Satellite countries if that expression is preferred, is geographically and politically so placed that her occupation by Soviet forces would be only a question of a few hours or days.

The second question needs a more detailed answer, for it goes right to the heart of the true nature of the relations between the Satellites and the Soviet Union. In all Eastern bloc countries after the war the position of the Communist Parties was such that it was impossible to take a decision, especially in foreign policy, in opposition to their policies. Communist Parties in these countries thus controlled the general trend of their foreign policy. It later became clear that the Soviet Union desired not only co-operation on general lines, but one identical policy for the Satellite countries down to the smallest detail, dictated by the interest of the Soviet Union alone. To achieve this purpose, however, the Soviet Union had first to await a certain point in the general evolution after the war. This point and the subsequent attempt to bring these former enemy countries into the United Nations. In this waiting period, Czechoslovakia was able to try out certain independent moves. The best known move of this kind was the Czechoslovak attempt to participate in the Marshall Plan. Lesser known, but perhaps more significant, is the memorandum transmitted by Czechoslovakia to the Deputies of the Foreign Ministers in London on Czechoslovak policy towards Germany. The Czechoslovak memorandum made it absolutely clear that, in view of Czechoslovak interests in the vital question of Germany, the preservation of the unity of the great Powers was an essential preliminary condition.

The Soviet Union offered no reaction to this memorandum; not the slightest hint was given that the Soviet Union was not utterly in agreement with it. But at the same time that Czechoslovakia transmitted the memorandum the Czechoslovak Minister of Information, Mr. Kopecky, a leading Communist, attacked the Czechoslovak policy vis-a-vis Germany on one characteristic point, the question of Lusatia, because the memorandum put forward no political demands on this point at all. That was very interesting and significant because Lusatia is in the Soviet zone and the solution of the whole problem was in the power of the Soviet Union.

After the peace treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, Roumania, after the Czechoslovak attempt to participate in the Marshall Plan, after the memorandum to the Deputy-Foreign Ministers, deliberations certainly took place

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in Moscow on the means of procuring closer co-ordination of foreign policy in the whole area between the borders of the Soviet Union and the West. The first step in this direction was connected with the preliminaries for the establishment of the Cominform. During the course of negotiations on the foundation of the Cominform there appeared the first signs of Yugoslav reluctance to submit completely to the interest of Soviet foreign policy. The first signs of this reluctance were already being given serious consideration in Moscow because, at this stage, the whole matter was a purely inter-Party one. After the Yugoslav dissidence, Moscow decided to place the whole technique of the relations between the Soviet Union and the Satellites into a new framework. After a period of delay to see whether it might not be possible to smooth out the Yugoslav deviations, the new technique was put into force in all Satellite countries.

The pre-condition of the new technique is that all key positions in foreign policy, foreign trade, and international cultural relations should be firmly in the hands of the Party; that means that the holders of all the above-mentioned offices must not only be Party members, but members of the cadre, and this is much more than being a mere holder of a membership card. In Czechoslovakia that was not yet the case. For this reason all Czechoslovak ministries had first to be reorganized. Under this reorganization, in every ministry a representative of the secret branch of the Interior was put into power as Deputy-Minister. This secret branch later became the independent Ministry of State Security, the most important ministry of all, and the real Government of Czechoslovakia.

In every ministry the Deputy-Ministers, in charge of all staff matters and in control of current affairs, were thus established. The Deputy-Ministers keep direct contact with the personnel branch of the Party, that is, with the Cadre Commission. Each Deputy-Minister maintains a secret number of watchers and informers in his ministry, and without his consent nothing can be done. He had no need for advisers, he acts on his own; he is only responsible to the General Secretariat of the Party and to the Ministry for State Security.

All ministries in the Satellite countries are constructed on these lines. The knowledge of this construction is essential for an understanding of how it is possible to concentrate in a few brains such a large number and such a variety of proceedings. In the special case under consideration it provides the key to an understanding of how the knowledge of foreign policy, and above all, the technique of relations with the Soviet Union may be concentrated in a very few hands.

The new technique governing the relations between the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc countries is a return to the methods of the Communist International dissolved during the war. Every Communist Party of a satellite country has a representative in Moscow. The rule is that the official diplomatic representative should not know who is the representative of the Party.

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The representative may be in Moscow under official cover as a minor employee of the legation, or he may be the official representative of the broadcasting system of his country, or in the service of the Economic Committee of the Satellite countries, or a representative of a trade mission, or a State trust. He knows of course all about his legation, he has his agent there, he has his own cypher, unknown to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and known only to the Ministry for State Security. The wireless operator in his legation is likewise a man of the State Security Ministry.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has its representatives in the capitals of the Satellite countries too. I suppose that the relation between the Soviet Ambassador in Prague and the representative of the Bolshevik Party there is a kind of co-operation. In Berlin, for instance, the Soviet Ambassador Semionov, who was political adviser to the Military Governor, worked in close collaboration with the Party representative, Tulpanov. It is of course possible that the head of a Soviet diplomatic mission may not know who is the representative of the Bolshevik Party in the same capital.

The Party representative naturally has priority in every case and in all matters. His report is decisive, and it is accepted as the final word not only in matters of business, but also in the personal affairs of the diplomat.

The Communist Parties in the Satellite countries also have their representatives in the different capitals. In Prague there is an Embassy of the Eastern German Republic. But there is a representative of the Socialist Unity Party, the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland, in Prague too. And in Berlin there is a Czechoslovak Ambassador to the Government of Herr Pieck. But above all there are representatives of the Czechoslovak, Polish, Hungarian, and other Communist Parties to the Secretariat of the S.E.D., and the dealings of these representatives are decisive--not the notes and actions of the ambassadors and ministers.

In practice this machinery works as follows: if the Soviet Union desires Czechoslovakia to take certain steps, the Politbureau in Moscow calls the man in the Secretariat of the Bolshevik Party in charge of relations with Eastern bloc countries, and explains to him its wishes. He calls the representative of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in Moscow, this man gets in touch with the Ministry of State Security in Prague, and the Ministry of State Security handles the affair either through its official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who is the Deputy-Minister, or, if it is a delicate matter, through the General Secretariat of the Party. So it is not at all necessary to employ the official diplomatic representatives; the whole affair can be easily handled by Party representatives alone without interference from non-cadre members of the Party. The official diplomatic representatives are informed at the last stage of the proceedings, just before it is necessary to inform the public.

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The whole procedure is of course illegal because State affairs are in this way given into the hands of private agents not responsible to the State but to the Party. The responsible official machinery of the State is now no more than the façade behind which the serious affairs are dealt with, without knowledge and influence of the official agents at all. All this is in fact a new kind of secret diplomacy and much more dangerous than the condemned old-fashioned secret diplomacy of the second half of the nineteenth century, when men like Bismarck or Disraeli were in the last resort responsible to Parliament and Government. The new secret diplomacy is most dangerous by reason of its irresponsibility and of its irregular and conspiratorial dealings. The most difficult thing to discover today is who is precisely responsible for an act of foreign policy. The Soviet Government or the Czechoslovak Government? What ministry decided on the question? Perhaps the Secretary General of the Party may know the truth? But is he responsible, or the Secretary for International Affairs of the Bolshevik Secretariat in Moscow? Or somebody else?

This system began to work after March 1949. The reorganization of the ministries in Czechoslovakia began in January 1949, and it was to be completed by the end of the year 1949. But the whole procedure was speeded up and the reorganization of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Information, and Ministry of Foreign Trade was finished between 15 February and the end of April 1949. From April 1949 onwards this second machinery of foreign representation has been under construction. It is a machine not official but real, not of the State but of the Party which rules the State, it is not controllable, and in its every move and every branch it is secret. But it is very effective, and it is in fact one of the means through which the Soviet Union not only governs the Satellites, but simultaneously co-ordinates them in a very efficient way.

The second very palpable means of dominating the Satellite countries is the organization and work of the Soviet Ministry of State Security. It is the only branch of State Administration which works directly with corresponding institutions in the Satellite States. Because this institution in each Satellite State is the real Government of the country, it follows that this very far reaching direct co-operation with the U.S.S.R. is comparable much more to the co-operation of member States of a federation than to the co-operation between foreign Powers.

The Ministries of Interior or State Security (or whatever name they use to cover the same thing, namely, secret police) are responsible for keeping the population quiet in each State. This work is centrally directed from the Ministry of State Security in Moscow. And not only that; where Czechoslovakia supposes herself to have special interests, she has her official in the Ministry of Interior in the foreign country. I know, for instance, that, before the establishment of the Eastern German Republic and before the reorganization of the Czechoslovak ministries, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Interior had its representative in the Central Administration of the

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Interior of the Soviet Zone of Occupation (Zentralverwaltung für Inneres in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone). And it may be supposed that there was in Prague the corresponding representative of the Soviet zone. The contact between the Czechoslovak and Polish Ministries of State Security is especially close. That this co-operation is a very strong weapon against every opposition needs no further explanation.

But the activity of the ministries of Interior is significant in a further sense. Members of the ministries are in direct control of the official diplomatic and commercial machinery abroad. In every legation and in every mission abroad a member of the ministry is employed under some title, nobody there knows his real capacity; his task is to report directly to his ministry on the personal conduct of his colleagues and chiefs and on all matters concerning the legation or mission. In this way the Ministry for State Security receives reports on the legation from two sources, first, from the Party representative and, second, from its own representative.

In countries other than Eastern bloc countries the most important activity of the representative of the Ministry of State Security is Political Intelligence work. The construction of the network for this was completed before February 1948. It began in fact immediately after the last war in Italy, Austria, and Germany. That was easily possible in the chaotic economic conditions then. It was only necessary to exploit the situation. Its main architect, a man named Toman, was arrested for personal corruption in February 1948. The principle which enabled him to be corrupt was--as formulated by the Minister of the Interior, Nosek--that Political Intelligence must earn all money it needs for its own work on the spot. For this reason agents of the Ministry of Interior began business of all kinds in Germany, Italy, Austria, and maybe in other countries. Book-keeping in cases like this is very difficult, and it is not easy to distinguish where business for the State ends and where private enterprise begins. When Toman was arrested the Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior was the owner of many houses, shops, factories, and night clubs in various countries, and it became directly interested in many jobs, in the fluctuations of Western and Eastern marks, in the evolution of the lira, in the Stock Exchange in Paris. They now have money of all kinds, employees of all types, they are not dependent on the official budget of the State. They have all the means for quick action, without considerations of money and conscience. And the organization is so constructed that only a very few men know the whole extent of this enterprise.

There are similar organizations in all Satellite countries. They do not work together in these enterprises. I cannot say whether the areas of activity are divided between the Satellites. But somewhere there must be a centre where all news and knowledge gained by these means is compared, examined, tested, and communicated to those interested, and I suppose that this is in the Ministry of State Security in Moscow. When I first became aware of this activity I had the feeling that I was seeing a fantastic novel by Oppenheim coming to life. But this whole network is real, and very alive, and very active.



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Thus, the three most efficient methods of ensuring the absolute domination of the Satellite countries are in my opinion:

1. The general trend of policy created by big Communist Parties with all their network of organizations.
2. The organization of Party representatives in the Soviet Union and in other countries and the work of cadre members in each country. This organization enables Moscow to transfer its will directly to the capitals of the countries in a very quiet and secret way. It enables the Politbureau to co-ordinate the policy of all countries in the same manner. There is further a direct co-operation between the Bolshevik Politbureau and the Cominform, but I think that the real work is done chiefly by the Politbureau without much advice from the Cominform. The Cominform is more accurately an instrument of propaganda of the Politbureau than an independent body.
3. The police work of the Ministry of State Security in each country and its co-operation, under control of the Soviet ministries, inside the countries and abroad.

Economic exploitation and domination, and propaganda and cultural relations, provide two further methods, but these are a story apart.

So it is clear that the Soviet Union has no need to employ armies and diplomats. She has her own technique for this job and it is a quiet, efficient method. But there is one close comparison with the position of the Satellite countries. In the Soviet Constitution it is enacted that every member-republic has the right to leave the Union. It has never been attempted. For one reason: the Union is clamped together by means very similar to those used for the domination of the Satellite countries; big Party and trade union organizations provide a basis for a general political trend; above them are the cadre members and the State Security Ministry and, in addition, the propaganda. In short, the only difference is that in the Satellite countries there is still in existence a national State apparatus inside the countries and for diplomatic representation abroad. But it has its advantages for the Soviet Union, votes in the United Nations, cleverly distributed roles in foreign policy, and so on. But the question remains: How far has the concept of sovereignty become a mere formality without importance and sense? It presents no obstacle to the Soviet Union in her domination of the Eastern bloc countries.



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IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

NO. JIC 14-6-2

**REDUIT A SECRET**  
**Department of National Defence**

**TOP SECRET**

**CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE**  
**JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE**

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA

14 December 1950

*G. de T. Glazebrook*  
*Wicks*  
*Edgipic Div*  
*TLZ*

G. de T. Glazebrook,  
Department of External Affairs,  
DMI  
DAI  
DNI  
~~DAF-231~~  
O i/c SB.

Petroleum Situation in a War Beginning  
in 1954

Enclosed is one copy of US JIC 526/10  
dated 7 Nov 50 entitled "Petroleum Situation in a War  
Beginning in 1954", for your information and retention.

*J.E. Beswick*  
(J.E. Beswick)  
Major  
Secretary

JEB/5459/mck

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Excerpt from Minutes of the Joint  
Intelligence Committee's 243rd  
Meeting - November 1, 1950.

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VI. SOVIET UNCONVENTIONAL USE  
OF WEAPONS

18. The Committee had before them a memorandum from the Secretary, U.S. Joint Intelligence Committee, in which it was indicated that the United States Joint Intelligence Committee had accepted the amendments proposed by the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee to the paper "Soviet Unconventional Use of Weapons". In accepting the Canadian amendments, the U.S. Joint Intelligence Committee had made further amendments to the paper, copies of which were before the Committee for consideration.

(JIC 14-8-11-4 of 26 October, 1950)

19. It was agreed, after considerable discussion:

- (a) to approve the amendments by the United States Joint Intelligence Committee, on the understanding that the agreed paper and its appendices would become supplements to ACAI 9 and 10, or be given separate ACAI numbers relating them to those documents; and,
- (b) that the agreed paper be forwarded to the Chiefs of Staff Committee for approval.

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JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA

26 October, 1950.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE:

Soviet Unconventional Use of Weapons -  
US JIC 491/8 dated 23 May, 1950

1. It will be recalled that at the 235th meeting of the Committee held on 23 August, 1950, a Joint Intelligence Staff paper containing suggested Canadian comments on the above-noted document was approved. These comments were subsequently forwarded to the U.S. Joint Intelligence Committee for consideration.
2. The Secretary of the U.S. Joint Intelligence Committee in his memoranda JICM-1271 dated 19 October and JICM-1272 dated 20 October, 1950, (copies attached), has advised:
  - (a) that the U.S. Joint Intelligence Committee have accepted the amendments proposed by the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee; and
  - (b) that, concurrent with this acceptance, the U.S. Joint Intelligence Committee have made further amendments to J.I.C. 491/8.
3. Also attached is a copy of the Supplemental Decision on J.I.C. 491/8 reflecting the Canadian amendments as well as the further amendments by the U.S. Joint Intelligence Committee.
4. The Committee have been asked to comment on or concur in the amendments made by the U.S. Joint Intelligence Committee.
5. This subject will be included on the agenda of the next meeting of the Committee to be held on Wednesday, 1 November, 1950.

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27 OCT 1950

*G.H. Newsome*  
(G.H. Newsome)  
Wing Commander, R.C.A.F.,  
Secretary.

Enc.(3)

c.c. J.I.S.

For information.

C O P Y

TOP SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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JICM-1272  
20 October 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CANADIAN JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

Subject: Preliminary and Tentative Study of  
Soviet Unconventional Use of Weapons

References: a. J.I.C. 491/8  
b. JICM-1271

Enclosure: Supplemental Decision on J.I.C. 491/8,  
Copies 39 - 58

1. As indicated in JICM-1271, the U.S. Joint Intelligence Committee has accepted the amendments to J.I.C. 491/8 proposed by the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee.
2. Concurrent with the foregoing acceptance of amendments, the U.S. Joint Intelligence Committee has made further amendments to J.I.C. 491/8.
3. Twenty (20) copies of the Supplemental Decision on J.I.C. 491/8 reflecting the amendments proposed by the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee as well as the further amendments by the U.S. Joint Intelligence Committee, are enclosed herewith. The Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee is invited to comment or concur with the further amendments made by the U.S. Joint Intelligence Committee.

FOR THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE:

(Sgd.) C.R. Peck

Secretary.

No. JIC 14-8-11-4

# Department of National Defence

TOP SECRET

## CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA

29 August, 1950.

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*Mr. Stogdill to see  
+ file  
R*

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE:

#### Soviet Unconventional Use of Weapons

1. Enclosed for your information is a copy of a memorandum to the Secretary of the U.S. Joint Intelligence Committee dated 29 August, 1950, together with enclosure, on the above-noted subject.

*J.H. Trotman*

(J.H. Trotman)  
Acting Secretary.

Encs.

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JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA

29 August, 1950.

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The Secretary,  
U.S. Joint Intelligence Committee,  
Joint Chiefs of Staff,  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

Soviet Unconventional Use of Weapons

1. With reference to your JICM-1085 dated 17 July, 1950, the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee have considered Appendices "A" and "B" to document JIC 491/8, enclosed with your letter.
2. The Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee's comments on these appendices are attached hereto. (Copies 1-20 inclusive). The Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee will be glad to receive the U.S. Joint Intelligence Committee's views on these comments in due course.

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(J.H. Trotman)  
Acting Secretary.

Encs.

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JIC 14-8-11-4

COPY NO 21

24 August, 1950.

CANADIAN JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

Suggested Amendments

to Appendix "A" and Appendix "B"

to United States Joint

Intelligence Committee Document JIC 491/8

Soviet Unconventional Use of Weapons, Mid 1951 and Mid 1954

1. APPENDIX "A" - Mid 1951.

- (a) Paragraph 1, second sentence.  
Insert word "chemical" after "biological"

- (b) Paragraph 2 (b).  
Delete paragrah and substitute the following:-

"3 (b) Atomic bombs clandestinely laid as mines in key harbours by merchant ships (not necessarily of Soviet registry) or submarines. Laying of atomic bombs inside key harbours by merchant vessels presents no serious problems. It is desirable that such vessels should have an external opening in the hull from which the bomb would be laid but this is not essential as bombs could be easily disguised as any item of normal deck cargo. The probability of detection of an atomic bomb by existing geiger counters or other radiation detection devices is small. The use of time delay actuating mechanisms to initiate detonation would permit the laying of a number of bombs up to periods of the order of 400 days in advance of D-Day and the fissile of an atomic bomb would keep for much longer than this period. Inasmuch as conventional type atomic bombs could be used, it is considered that the Soviets would be capable of employing this method by mid-1951."

- (c) Paragraph 2(e)  
Insert new sentence after word "tubes" as follows:-

"The development of such a weapon would be extremely difficult and the Soviet Union might consider the cost to be prohibitive considering the number of atom bombs available and the other possible means of delivery."

- (d) Paragraph 5.  
Delete sub-paragraph (b) and (c) and add the following to sub- para (a):-

"Use of R.W. agents by saboteurs would be difficult due to radiation hazard and their use is considered improbable."

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2. APPENDIX "B" - Mid 1954.

General - there are two paragraphs "2"

- (a) Paragraph 1, second sentence  
Insert word "chemical" after "biological".

- (b) Paragraph 2 (b) (Page 10)  
Delete paragraph and substitute the following:

"3(b) Atomic bombs clandestinely laid as mines in key harbours by merchant ships(not necessarily of Soviet Registry) or submarines. Laying of atomic bombs inside key harbours by merchant vessels presents no serious problems. It is desirable that such vessels should have an external opening in the hull from which the bomb would be laid but this is not essential as bombs could be easily disguised as any item of normal deck cargo. The probability of detection of an atomic bomb by existing geiger counters or other radiation detection devices is small. The use of time delay actuating mechanisms to initiate detonation would permit the laying of a number of bombs up to periods of the order of 400 days in advance of D-Day and the fissile material of an atomic bomb would keep for much longer than this period. Inasmuch as conventional type atomic bombs could be used, it is considered that the Soviets would be capable of employing this method prior to mid-1954."

- (c) Paragraph 2 (e) (Page 12)  
Insert new sentence after word "tubes" as follows:-

"The development of such a weapon would be extremely difficult and the Soviet Union might consider the cost to be prohibitive considering the number of atom bombs available and the other possible means of delivery."

- (d) Paragraph 4 (Page 16)  
Delete sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) and add the following to sub-paragraph (a) :-

"Use of R.W. Agents by saboteurs would be difficult due to radiation hazard, and their use is considered improbable."

No. CSC 14-8-11-5



# Department of National Defence

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## CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA

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9 August, 1950.

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### MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE:

#### Comments on U.S. Scientific Estimates

1. Enclosed for your information is a copy of JIS(517) dated 8 August, 1950, from the Joint Intelligence Staff.
2. If time permits, this document will be considered at the meeting of the Committee this afternoon.

*J.H. Trotman*

(J.H. Trotman)  
Acting Secretary.

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JIS(517)

COPY NO. 1

8 August, 1950.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

Comments on U.S. Scientific Estimates

Soviet Unconventional Use of Weapons, Mid 1951 (JIC 491/4) 491/8

Soviet Unconventional Use of Weapons, Mid 1954 (JIC 491/5)

1. As instructed by the Joint Intelligence Committee in its memorandum CSC 14-8-11-4 Vol. 3 dated 20 July, 1950 as amended 7 August, 1950 the Joint Intelligence Staff has prepared the following brief on the subject papers pointing out the main points of difference between the Canadian and U.S. Papers.

2. Comments have been kept to a minimum and the following paragraphs of the US Joint Intelligence Committee's letter of transmittal (JICM - 1085, 17 July, 1950) have been noted.

" 2. On 17 July 1950, the U.S. Joint Intelligence Committee approved the enclosed estimates with the proviso that they be considered preliminary and somewhat speculative examinations of the subject.

3. Accordingly, the comment or concurrence of the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee on the enclosed estimates is invited with the view of furnishing agreed Canadian-U.S. intelligence on the subject to the Military Cooperation Committee as supplements to the estimates contained in A.C.A.I. 9 and A.C.A.I. 10. "

Suggested Amendments

3. APPENDIX "A" - Mid 1951.

(a) Paragraph 1, second sentence.

Insert word "chemical" after "biological"

(b) Paragraph 2 (b).

Delete paragraph and substitute the following:-

"3 (b) Atomic bombs clandestinely laid as mines in key harbours by merchant ships (not necessarily of Soviet registry) or submarines. Laying of atomic bombs inside key harbours by merchant vessels presents no serious problems. It is desirable that such vessels should have an external opening in the hull from which the bomb would be laid but this is not essential as bombs could be easily disguised as any item of normal deck cargo. The probability of detection of an atomic bomb by existing geiger counters or other radiation detection devices is small. The use of time delay actuating mechanisms to initiate detonation would permit the laying of a number of bombs up to periods of the order of 400 days in advance of D-Day and the fissile of an atomic bomb would keep for much longer than this period. Inasmuch as conventional type atomic bombs could be used, it is considered that the Soviets would be capable of employing this method by mid-1951."

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- (c) Paragraph 2(e).  
Insert new sentence after word "tubes" as follows:-

"The development of such a weapon would be extremely difficult and the Soviet Union might consider the cost to be prohibitive considering the number of atom bombs available and the other possible means of delivery."

- (d) Paragraph 5.  
Delete sub-paragraph (b) and (c) and add the following to sub-para (a):-

"Use of R.W. agents by saboteurs would be difficult due to radiation hazard and their use is considered improbable."

4. APPENDIX "B" - Mid 1954.

General - there are two paragraphs two.

- (a) Paragraph 1, second sentence.  
Insert word "chemical" after "biological".

- (b) Paragraph 2(b) (Page 10)  
Delete paragraph and substitute the following:

"3(b) Atomic bombs clandestinely laid as mines in key harbours by merchant ships (not necessarily of Soviet Registry) or submarines. Laying of atomic bombs inside key harbours by merchant vessels presents no serious problems. It is desirable that such vessels should have an external opening in the hull from which the bomb would be laid but this is not essential as bombs could be easily disguised as any item of normal deck cargo. The probability of detection of an atomic bomb by existing geiger counters or other radiation detection devices is small. The use of time delay actuating mechanisms to initiate detonation would permit the laying of a number of bombs up to periods of the order of 400 days in advance of D-Day and the fissile material of an atomic bomb would keep for much longer than this period. Inasmuch as conventional type atomic bombs could be used, it is considered that the Soviets would be capable of employing this method prior to mid-1954."

- (c) Paragraph 2(e) (Page 12)  
Insert new sentence after word "tubes" as follows:-

"The development of such a weapon would be extremely difficult and the Soviet Union might consider the cost to be prohibitive considering the number of atom bombs available and the other possible means of delivery."

- (d) Paragraph 4 (Page 16)  
Delete sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) and add the following to sub-paragraph (a):-

"Use of R.W. Agents by saboteurs would be difficult due to radiation hazard, and their use is considered improbable."

*T.R. McCoy*  
(T.R. McCoy),  
Lieutenant-Colonel,  
FOR THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE STAFF.

50028-B-40

No. CSC 14-8-11-4

Department of National Defence

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CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE  
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA

17 July 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

Canadian - United States  
Scientific Estimate

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1. Reference is made to Item II of the minutes of the 224th meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee, held on 31 May, 1950. At this meeting, the Committee considered the report by Lieutenant Colonel McCoy, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Staff, on the recent intelligence discussions in Washington. The Committee noted Lieutenant-Colonel McCoy's recommendation that the Joint Intelligence Committee arrange for Canadian - United States approval of a separate scientific estimate based on the agreed conference estimate.

2. In this connection, the attached documents have been received from the Director of Scientific Intelligence:

Soviet Scientific Potential - 1 July 1951

" " " - 1 July 1954

Unconventional Employment of Weapons - 1 July 1951

" " " " - 1 July 1954

It is requested that Joint Intelligence Committee approval be given to these papers and that arrangements be made for their transmission to the United States Joint Intelligence Committee.

3. I suggest that, with the Committee's approval, these documents be examined by the Joint Intelligence Staff and thereafter presented to the Joint Intelligence Committee as agreed estimates. Approval of this procedure will be sought at the next meeting of the Committee.

*J.H. Trotman*  
(J.H. Trotman)  
Acting Secretary.

4 Encls. - NOT to D.S.I.

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SOVIET SCIENTIFIC POTENTIAL - 1 JULY 1951

Prepared by Division of Scientific Intelligence  
Defence Research Board  
4 July, 1950

1. OBJECT

To prepare an agreed USA-Canadian estimate of the scientific potential and weapons development of the Soviet Union assuming that a major war begins on 1 July 1951, for which the Soviet Union has not had sufficient time to create any sudden alteration in its rate of industrial or scientific potential.

2. SCIENTIFIC POTENTIAL

The efforts of the Soviet Union to increase its scientific potential have resulted in a large increase in the number of training institutions and in students receiving higher education. The Soviets have many first class scientists whose work compares favorably with the best in the Allied countries. However, below the top level, there is a marked shortage of really good research workers. The Soviet Union will continue to expand its training facilities and to increase the output of scientists and technicians, but this increased output probably will be achieved at the expense of quality. It is unlikely that there will be any sudden change in the scientific potential of the Soviet Union between now and mid-1951.

3. DEVELOPMENT OF NEW WEAPONS

General

The Soviets have attached a high priority to research and development. However, there is little doubt that the vast effort concentrated in the nuclear energy program has reduced the scientific resources available for research and development in other fields. Nevertheless, significant progress is to be expected in several lines of endeavor and the discussion in the following paragraphs credits the Soviet Union with rather extensive capabilities. However, these capabilities must be assessed within the framework of total scientific potential, the limitations of which will preclude the Soviets from

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achieving parity with the Western powers in all fields of research and development. By mid-1951, it is improbable that the Soviet Union will be able to equal the total capability of the Western powers in atomic warfare, guided missiles, aircraft development and electronics. It is likely that the weapons available to the Soviet armed forces by mid-1951 will be modifications of the weapons in use or under development at the end of World War II.

#### 4. ATOMIC WEAPONS <sup>A</sup>

The atomic explosion within the Soviet Union in August 1949 brought into focus information not previously integrated into estimates of Soviet atomic capabilities. Considering the effects of known Soviet espionage activities, it is estimated, assuming plutonium bombs of roughly 20 kilotons explosive power (e.g., the Nagasaki weapon) that the atomic bomb stock pile available to the Soviet Union will be:

Mid-1950	10 - 20
Mid-1951	25 - 45

#### 5. RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Although the Soviet Union has the basic facilities for producing small quantities of radiological warfare agents, it is believed these will not be a factor between now and mid-1951. However, the employment of the atomic bomb to neutralize harbor installations with the residual radiations from an underwater bomb burst must be considered as possible.

#### 6. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW)

Soviet capacity for producing biological agents for use against personnel, animals and plants will be adequate for sabotage and probably for small-scale military operations. However, there is no intelligence on development of the necessary military equipment and techniques. It is unknown whether the Soviet production capability

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<sup>A</sup> Canada has no means of estimating Soviet capabilities to produce atomic bombs. The estimates in this paragraph are those of the USA.

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is sufficient for large scale BW. Facilities and trained scientists now available will permit an extensive BW research program.

#### 7. CHEMICAL WARFARE (CW)

(a) The Soviet Union has exhibited an active interest in chemical warfare and is reported to have had during World War II a stockpile of standard CW agents adequate for retaliatory use. It is reasonable to assume that the Soviet Union has maintained stocks of these agents and is now capable of their large scale employment.

(b) In 1945, the Soviets captured intact the only German full scale plant (rated capacity 1,000 tons per month) for the production of GA, and a 100-ton-per-month plant for GB which had not commenced production. These plants were dismantled and removed, presumably to the Soviet Union. The Soviets also obtained the services of a number of G series specialists who would be useful in the production of G agents. There is no direct evidence that the Soviets have reassembled any of the captured plants but there is reason to believe that they may have done so. It is estimated that the Soviets will be capable of extensive employment of G series gases by mid-1951.

#### 8. GUIDED MISSILES

There is no evidence that the Soviet Union had undertaken a program of guided missile research and development before the end of World War II. Its present program began when it took over from Germany guided missile test equipment and facilities, completed weapons, weapons under development, and trained scientific and technical personnel. Available intelligence pertains almost exclusively to development by German personnel, under Soviet supervision, of German missiles upon which research had been completed. There is little evidence to indicate development of a native Soviet missile. However, for a number of years, Soviet scientists and technical schools have been capable of training personnel for work on the development of guided missiles. Because of the priority apparently accorded air defence and close support of ground troops, it is believed that emphasis is placed upon surface-to-air, air-to-surface, and surface-

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to-surface missiles in that order. It is believed that the guided missiles which the Soviet Union is capable of having in operational use by mid-1951 would be essentially copies of German types.

(a) Surface-to-Air

Germany had no surface-to-air missiles in operational use but was developing Schmetterling (a visually guided radio-controlled subsonic aircraft), Wasserfall (a radio-controlled supersonic rocket), Rheintochter III (a visually guided radio-controlled subsonic rocket) and Enzian (a visually guided radio-controlled subsonic missile). Proximity fuzes and radar tracking were planned for each of these missiles. The first three missiles were quite promising in their prototype form. If the production of German-type surface-to-air guided missiles was begun at an early date the anti-aircraft defences of important Soviet areas could include these weapons by mid-1951. The basic limiting factor, qualitatively and quantitatively, would be guidance and control, not the missiles or the fuels. However, the necessity for relying upon visual or other suboptimum methods of guidance would not deter the Soviets from maximum utilization of these weapons.

(b) Air-to-Surface

While there is no direct evidence of Soviet development, it is reasonable to believe that the Soviet Union is interested in the German air-to-surface missiles--the HS 293 (a radio-controlled glide bomb, rocket powered and guided visually from an aircraft), and the Fritz X (FX-1400) which was a radio-controlled bomb guided visually from an aircraft. It is conceivable that these missiles could be in production and that the production could be on a large enough scale to meet Soviet air-sea warfare requirements without prejudice to aircraft equipment.

(c) Surface-to-Surface

Germany had two operational weapons in this class--the V-1 (FZG-76) and the V-2 (A-4). There was also a program to develop two variations of the V-2 in the forms of the A-4b, a winged

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version of the A-4 with slightly longer range and the A-10 which was an ultra long-range multi-stage rocket projectile for use against transatlantic targets. In the V-1 and V-2 missiles, the Germans had produced two of the outstanding scientific developments of the war but because of their methods of control were useful only against area targets. The Soviet Union acquired enough material and experienced German scientific talent to reconstruct these missiles as they existed at the end of the war. The Soviets also acquired sufficient testing facilities, equipment and experienced personnel to enable them to establish a first-class proving ground for these missiles.

(1) V-1 Depending largely on the priority assigned, the Soviets by mid-1951 could employ, on a large scale, copies of the V-1 somewhat improved in range and accuracy. Small scale assembly from captured German parts for experimental purposes has taken place, but there is no evidence that original Soviet production is intended or in progress.

(2) V-2 It is known that there is available a V-2 pilot production line which could supply the requirements for experimental and operational training purposes. Observing the adequate testing facilities, equipment and experienced personnel available, it is estimated that the Soviets could employ limited numbers of the V-2 (A-4) and possibly the A-4b, by mid-1951.

(d) Air-to-Air

It is unlikely that the Soviet Union would consider use of the German missiles under development at the end of World War II since they were subsonic and visually guided. There is little evidence to show that the Soviet Union is interested in this category of missile, but the lack of information does not remove the possibility that there may be some activity. However, it is believed that the Soviets would favour the development of air-to-air rockets or unguided missiles rather than the guided type because of the large increase in complexity and production imposed by the guidance and control system.

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9. UNGUIDED ANTI-AIRCRAFT ROCKETS

The Soviet Union acquired the supersonic Taifun which was developed by the Germans and had approached the production state at the end of World War II. This rocket was designed to be effective against aircraft at altitudes of at least 50,000 feet. The Soviet Union is capable of producing improved versions of Taifun type anti-aircraft rockets, and there is some evidence of test firing. Solid and liquid propellants are available in large quantities. Utilization of an electrostatic type impact fuze appears to be most likely. Taifun should appeal to the Soviets because of ease of manufacture, operational mobility, and minimized electronic requirements. If a lead time of one year was provided for, operational quantities could be available for employment in close-in defenses of important Soviet areas by 1951; however, adequate numbers of radar sets and directors might not be available.

10. AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT

Since 1945 the Soviet Union has made remarkable progress in aircraft development. In addition to aircraft and engines in various stages of development, they acquired complete factories as well as several thousand skilled specialists from Germany. Exploitation of the German aircraft industry has permitted the Soviet Union to advance its technical development tremendously. This advance has been assisted by the availability of American and British aircraft and engines. Although Soviet experience in the aircraft industry was rather limited at the end of World War II, it has now greatly reduced the lead of the West in this field. If Soviet advances during the past three years are taken as a norm, considerable additional progress will have been accomplished by mid-1951. Undoubtedly, there will be a constant effort on the part of the Soviets to increase speeds, ranges and ceilings by modifying existing aircraft and by the use of new operational techniques.

(a) Bombers

- (1) The TU-4 (Soviet version of the B-29) was demonstrated approximately three years after the Soviet Union obtained

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an American B-29. It is logical to assume, therefore, that the next step in their development of medium and heavy bomber aircraft would be in the direction of an improved TU-4 with B-50 capabilities and a bomber with the range capabilities of the B-36. By mid-1951, it is quite possible that an improved TU-4 could be demonstrated. Also, there is some possibility that a bomber with the range characteristics of the B-36 could have been developed to a prototype stage. However, there is no evidence to indicate development of these types.

- (2) There is evidence of Soviet development in the medium jet bomber field based on improvements of the German types obtained at the end of the war. Two Soviet four-engine jet bomber prototypes (type 10) have been observed in the Moscow area as early as 1947. It is therefore quite possible that the development of this type aircraft

~~will have been completed by mid-1951.~~

10(a) (3) Three twin-engine jet light bomber prototypes have been observed during the past three years in the Moscow area; ~~observed during the past three years in the Moscow area;~~ type 9 in 1947; type 12 in 1948; and type 17 in 1949. It was ~~type 9 in 1947; type 12 in 1948; and type 17 in 1949.~~ reported that a formation of twenty four type 27 jet bombers was ~~It was reported recently that a formation of 22 type 12~~ observed in the 1950 May Day Fly Past. This may indicate that the ~~jet bombers were sighted in the Moscow area. This~~ type 27 jet bomber has been selected for series production. This ~~indicates that the type 12 jet bomber may have been~~ bomber is reported to have the following estimated performance. ~~selected for series production.~~

Max speed 505 knots per hour at sea level; 485 knots per hour at

(b) Fighters

10,000 ft.; 460 knots per hour at 35,000 ft. Service ceiling

(1) Information available in the summer of 1948 indicated 40,000 ft. - 45,000 ft. Shell Air Range 1,250 nautical miles.

Soviet acquisition of three rocket-propelled aircraft

types; the German ME 163, ME 263 (JU 248), and the Blohm and Voss DFS-346. The latter was designed as supersonic research aircraft. Three models were built by the Siebel Plant in Germany before it was moved to the Soviet Union. A research aircraft similar to the

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an American B-29. It is logical to assume, therefore, that the next step in their development of medium and heavy bomber aircraft would be in the direction of an improved TU-4 with B-50 capabilities and a bomber with the range capabilities of the B-36. By mid-1951, it is quite possible that an improved TU-4 could be demonstrated. Also, there is some possibility that a bomber with the range characteristics of the B-36 could have been developed to a prototype stage. However, there is no evidence to indicate development of these types.

(2) There is evidence of Soviet development in the medium jet bomber field based on improvements of the German types obtained at the end of the war. Two Soviet four-engine jet bomber prototypes (type 10) have been observed in the Moscow area as early as 1947. It is therefore quite possible that the development of this type aircraft will have been completed by mid-1951.

~~(3) Three twin-engine jet light bomber prototypes have been observed during the past three years in the Moscow area; type 9 in 1947; type 12 in 1948; and type 17 in 1949. It was reported recently that a formation of type 12 jet bombers were sighted in the Moscow area. This indicates that the type 12 jet bomber may have been selected for series production.~~

b) Fighters

(1) Information available in the summer of 1948 indicated Soviet acquisition of three rocket-propelled aircraft types; the German ME 163, ME 263 (JU 248), and the Blohm and Voss DFS-346. The latter was designed as supersonic research aircraft. Three models were built by the Siebel Plant in Germany before it was moved to the Soviet Union. A research aircraft similar to the

Three (3) (S)  
observed during  
type 9 in 1947; type  
reported that a formation  
observed in the 1950  
jet bomber has  
is reported to  
speed for future  
1 400 ft. - 45,000 ft.

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DFS 346 has been observed in the Moscow area. It is, therefore, considered that the Soviet Union is actively engaged in the development of supersonic aircraft.

- (2) By mid-1951, the Soviet jet fighter position should not have changed significantly. However, existing types will have been improved resulting in increased performance. In addition, the ME-263 rocket type interceptor may be in operational use by mid-1951.

(c) Engines

Prior to the end of World War II, the Soviet Union appeared to have had a good basic theoretical knowledge of jet engines and their capabilities. This knowledge is currently considered to be comparable with that of the United States. Following the war, the Soviets acquired German turbo-jets and Walther rocket engines under development. British turbo-jets, i.e. Nene and Derwent V were imported by the Soviets in 1947.

- (1) There are indications that the Soviet Union is developing the high powered German jet engines Jumo-012 and BMW-018 (6,000-8,600 pounds static thrust). This development may have been completed, but there is no evidence to show that the engines have been flight-tested or fitted to operational aircraft.
- (2) There is evidence that the Soviet Union is developing the Walther rocket engine which originally was designed for installation in the ME 163 and 263 interceptors. It is quite possible that this engine could be fully developed for operational use by mid-1951.
- (3) It is highly probable that the Soviet Union has exploited the British Nene jet engine, nevertheless, it is equally probable that due principally to known metallurgical deficiencies and inadequately developed manufacturing techniques, the first Soviet-built Nene engine had less than the rated static thrust of 5,000 pounds. However, recent information indicates improve-

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ment in the quality and quantity of Soviet high temperature alloys. There is also evidence that the French have achieved the rated thrust for this engine and that complete data on all French turbo-jet production techniques and processing have been made available to the Soviets.

#### 11. AIRCRAFT WEAPONS

Standard aircraft weapons will be the 12.7 mm (50 caliber) machine gun with AP, API and APIT ammunition and 20 mm aircraft cannon employing high explosive and incendiary ammunition. In addition, it is known that at least one type of Soviet aircraft, the MIG-9, is equipped with a 53 mm cannon. Air-to-ground unguided rockets will probably range in size from 82 mm to 132 mm. Unguided air-to-air rockets will probably be high on the priority list and their operational use by mid-1951 should be expected. The use of optical computing gun sights, similar to the US K-14, the British Mark II and comparable German sights, will become more extensive. There is no intelligence pertaining to Soviet development of radar gun sights; however, it is known that they are interested in the application of infrared. Little is known about Soviet capability to produce the bombing-navigation radar APQ-13 and APS-15 captured in US B-29's or similar equipment captured from the Germans.

#### 12. ELECTRONICS

The Soviet Union had detailed knowledge and samples of most of the wartime British, US and German electronic equipment, together with equipment which was being developed in Germany at the end of World War II. There are indications that the Soviet Union is encountering difficulty in mass producing many of the necessary electronic components, including proximity fuze tubes and magnetrons. This is bound to affect the program for a number of weapons systems. By concentration of effort, the Soviets may be able to advance in some phases at the expense of a general advance in all phases of electronics. It is believed that the Soviet Union has given priority to the development of electronics for the nuclear energy program and

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for the air defense system. However, it is believed that there will not be any significant advances in Soviet electronic developments between now and mid-1951.

(a) Communications

Communications facilities are capable of meeting the minimum requirements imposed by war in the western area of the Soviet Union. Most important, they are adequate for the support of an air defense system in the western area. The communications structure includes a radio network which is well developed and which is closely integrated with the telegraph and telephone systems. The total facilities are relatively secure. While satisfying current needs, the eastern system is not adequate for the full support of large-scale military and air defense operations and is relatively insecure. The development and modernization of the communications system is a major objective of the Soviet technical program but by mid-1951, the communications capabilities will not have changed significantly.

(b) Early Warning Radar

Some micro-wave radar is known to be in use in the early warning networks presently established at both western and eastern approaches to the Soviet Union. Much of this radar is probably lend-lease equipment. Radar of native design is believed to be rather crude as compared to Western standards. Such inadequacies as may exist in the design and quantity of equipment will probably be minimized by effective coordination of early warning networks through the communication system. Effective early warning coverage at medium and high altitudes may exist at present and can be expected by mid-1951.

(c) Air Interception (AI) and Ground Control Interception (GCI)

Under lend-lease the Soviets received British and American AI equipment. This equipment is not suitable for use at high altitudes or with modern high-speed aircraft. There is no intelligence to indicate whether the Soviets are copying this equipment or whether they are developing native equipment. Although little evidence

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exists to indicate the use of passive radar equipment. It is believed to have been developed and its operational use by mid-1951 can be expected. It is expected that Soviet bombers will be equipped with tail warning radar. It is possible that the Soviet Union has developed GCI radar which could be available in limited quantities by mid-1951. However, radar developed primarily for other purposes may be utilized for GCI.

(d) Fire Control Radar and Directors

Under lend-lease, the Soviets received British and American automatic gun laying radar and directors. The American equipment made available to the Soviets up to 1945 was of the most advanced design in existence at that time. In addition, the Soviet Union acquired German equipment. There is no information to indicate whether they are copying any of this equipment, nor is there evidence to indicate their own developments. It is believed that the US and British equipment is too complex for extensive re-production by mid-1951. However, in view of the priority apparently accorded air defence, it is reasonable to assume that the Soviet Union is developing automatic gun laying radar and that at least limited quantities will be available by mid-1951. It should be noted that this fire control equipment would be used not only with conventional anti-aircraft guns but also with unguided anti-aircraft rockets.

(e) Electronic Countermeasures

(1) Jamming of Radio Communications

At the present time the Soviet Union is engaged in extensive jamming of radio communications at lower frequencies. This jamming has been confined almost entirely to the Voice of America and British Broadcasting Corporation broadcasts. However, the experience gained by the Soviet Union in this field is such that jamming could become a serious obstruction to radio communications in general. It is believed that the Soviets will be capable of jamming communi-



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cations traffic at frequencies at least as high as VHF.

(2) Jamming of Radar

The Soviet Union has used "window" in the past. This and similar reflection devices will almost certainly be encountered in the future. In addition, electronic jamming will probably be encountered at all frequencies up to the 1,000-mc range by mid-1951. However, it is believed that by mid-1951, the Soviets will not be capable of jamming BTO ("Bombing Thru Overcast") radar which operates at frequencies in excess of 3,000-mc.

(f) Proximity Fuzes

There is no information upon the degree of effort being applied to proximity fuze projects in the Soviet Union. Interest has been shown in German electrostatic and photoelectric type fuzes, but there is no evidence that these are being produced. American manufacturing techniques for radio type fuzes are believed to be known to the Soviet Union and the fact that Sweden and other European countries have developed proximity fuzes suggests that the Soviets may have developed and produced similar fuzes. If so, the fuzes available by mid-1951 will probably be in limited quantities of questionable efficiency. Even if the Soviet Union has developed an effective radio proximity fuze, it is doubted that the quantities which would be available by mid-1951 would be sufficient for operational significance for anti-aircraft and ground artillery. However, it is considered that the Soviets are capable of producing operational quantities of proximity fuzes for guided missiles because of the less exacting engineering requirements.

(g) Infrared

For some years prior to World War II, Soviet scientists were actively investigating the military application of

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infrared. During the war, the Germans carried out extensive research and development in the field of infrared and produced a large amount of equipment, including night driving and firing devices. Because of the advanced state of German developments, the relative ease of reproduction and the great advantages of night viewing and firing devices, it is highly probable that the Soviet Union will exploit the potentialities of infrared.

#### 13. WALTHER TYPE SUBMARINE

There are indications that the Soviet Union may be making progress in the adaptation of the Walther turbine to submarine propulsion. It is known that the Soviets have transferred their Walther turbine laboratory together with key German personnel from the Soviet Zone to Leningrad. At the time of the transfer (August 1948) one turbine had been successfully assembled and this also was taken to Leningrad. More recently, German specialists in submarine hull design and construction were forcibly moved from Germany to the Soviet Union. This may indicate that Soviet development has progressed to the point where they are preparing to construct a submarine in which to install the Walther engine. By mid-1951, the prototype may have reached the trial stage.

#### 14. INFLUENCE MINES

Large quantities of the latest German types of mines and components were captured by the Soviet Union together with leading German mine experts. By mid-1951 the Soviets can have available copies of all operational World War II German influence mines. Therefore, it is possible that any combination of pressure, magnetic and acoustic actuating mechanisms may be in production.

#### 15. TORPEDOES

By mid-1951, the Soviets can have operational quantities of most of the types of torpedoes which were in use

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during World War II. These will include electric air or oxygen propulsion units. There is no evidence to indicate the types of torpedoes upon which the Soviets are concentrating their efforts, nor is there any evidence available which would indicate that they will adopt torpedoes of foreign type in preference to those of strictly Soviet design. The standard German or Allied air driven torpedoes had approximate speed/range settings of 30 knots to 13,000 yards, 40 knots to 7,650 yards and 44 knots to 5,470 yards. When considering torpedoes in which tracklessness is not the prime factor, it is possible that the Soviet designers may be influenced by the very superior performance of the Japanese oxygen driven torpedo which, in comparison with the air driven types described above, has a performance of 45 knots to 13,000 yards and 50 knots to 9,840 yards.

Little is known of the Soviet air driven torpedo performance but it is reported that they possess a torpedo which has a maximum range of 16,500 yards. However, in absence of knowledge of the size and the speed of this weapon no satisfactory comparison can be made.

When tracklessness is considered to be a prior requirement to speed and range, the Soviets may produce a version of the German electric torpedo which had a performance of 30 knots to 8,200 yards.

In developing torpedoes for use from surface craft, it is possible that the Soviets will base their design upon the Japanese oxygen driven type which had performance of 50 knots to 22,000 yards, 40 knots to 35,000 yards and 36 knots to 44,000 yards.

Influence or contact exploder mechanisms and pattern running devices may be fitted in any of these types of torpedoes. Active and/or passive acoustic homing heads can be produced for use in electrically driven types.

D R A F T

SOVIET SCIENTIFIC POTENTIAL - 1 JULY, 1954

Prepared by Division of Scientific Intelligence  
Defence Research Board  
4 July, 1950

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1. OBJECT

To prepare an agreed US-Canadian intelligence estimate of the Scientific Potential and weapons development of the Soviet Union assuming that a major war begins on 1 July, 1954, for which the Soviet Union has had insufficient time to create any sudden alteration in its rate of industrial or scientific development.

2. SCIENTIFIC POTENTIAL

The efforts of the Soviet Union to increase its scientific potential have resulted in a large increase in the number of training institutions and in students receiving higher education. The Soviets have many first-class scientists whose work compares favorably with the best in the Allied countries. However, below the top level, there is a marked shortage of really good research workers. The Soviet Union will continue to expand its training facilities and to increase the output of scientists and technicians. There will be a significant improvement in the scientific potential of the Soviet Union between now and mid-1954 particularly as to the number of junior technical people.

3. DEVELOPMENT OF NEW WEAPONS

The Soviets have attached a high priority to research and development. There is little doubt that the vast effort concentrated in the nuclear energy program has reduced the scientific resources available for research and development in other fields. These capabilities must be assessed within the framework of the total scientific potential, which is not adequate to permit the Soviets to achieve parity with the Allied Powers in all fields of research and development. By mid-1954, it is improbable that the Soviet Union will be able to equal the total capability of the Allied powers in atomic warfare, guided missiles, aircraft development and electronics. The state of development, quality mass production and main-

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tenance of electronic equipment may well be the limiting factor in Soviet weapons advance. With the possible exception of biological and chemical warfare, it is likely that the weapons available to the Soviet Armed Forces in mid-1954 will be modifications of weapons in use or under development at the end of World War II, or copies of postwar Allied weapons.

4. ATOMIC WARFARE (AW) \*

(a) Production

Available intelligence does not produce a very meaningful estimate of Soviet atomic capabilities as of mid-1954. However, if the simplest types of atomic bombs developing roughly 20 kilotons explosive power are assumed for calculation, the Soviet atomic bomb stockpile in mid-1954 is estimated to be from 120 to 200 bombs.

(b) Research and Development

There is essentially no information on Soviet atomic bomb research and development. However, as the Soviet Union is considered capable of continued progress in nuclear techniques, the bombs possessed by mid-1954 probably will be more destructive than the Nagasaki weapon. The present Soviet heavy water program will provide certain raw materials essential for thermo-nuclear research and development. If such research and development is prosecuted vigorously and assuming that accomplishment of a thermo-nuclear explosion is feasible, it is possible that the Soviets could develop such a bomb by mid-1954. Emphasis on the latter development may divert facilities and personnel from production and improvement of conventional atomic weapons.

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\* Canada has no means of estimating the capability of the Soviet Union to produce atomic bombs. The estimates in this paragraph are those of the USA.

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5. RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE (RW)

The Soviet Union has the basic facilities for producing small quantities of RW agents. Depending on the emphasis placed on construction of additional facilities between now and mid-1954, the Soviets may be capable of producing large quantities of RW agents. In any case, the employment of the atomic bomb to neutralize harbor installations with residual radiations from an underwater bomb burst must be considered as probable.

6. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW)

Although it is known that the Soviet Union is conducting research in the field of BW, there is no information as to the types of agents which have been, or are being developed. The Soviets had access to the German and Japanese data and they are undoubtedly familiar with the unclassified information in the United States. If the Soviet Union so desires, it should be capable of large scale production of BW agents by mid-1954. This estimate is based upon probable utilization of relatively inefficient production methods which have substantially greater man-power requirements than bulk plants of the type under development in the United States. However, it is considered that the Soviets could have at least one plant of the latter type in operation by mid-1954. While there is no intelligence on the status of the equipment and techniques for military use of BW, it is probable that they will have been developed sufficiently to permit extensive but not full scale employment in support of military operations. Equipment for military dissemination can include bombs and other devices dropped from aircraft, and guided missiles.

7. CHEMICAL WARFARE (CW)

- (a) The Soviet Union has exhibited an active interest in chemical warfare and is reported to have had during World War II a stockpile of standard CW agents adequate for retaliatory use. It is reasonable to assume that the Soviet Union has maintained stocks of these agents and is

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now capable of their large scale employment.

- (b) In 1945, the Soviets captured intact the only German full scale plant (rated capacity 1,000 tons per month) for the production of GA, and a 100-ton-per-month plant for GB which had not commenced production. These plants were dismantled and removed, presumably to the Soviet Union. The Soviets also obtained the services of a number of G series specialists who would be useful in the production of G agents. There is no direct evidence that the Soviets have re-assembled any of the captured plants but there is reason to believe that they may have done so. It is estimated that the Soviets will be capable of extensive employment of nerve gases in mid-1954.
- (c) Although there is no evidence that the Soviet Union has discovered any novel CW agents there is always the possibility that an agent more toxic or more effective than known agents may be discovered by systematic research or by accident. It is considered that the Soviet capacity for such discovery is equal to that of the Anglo American powers.

#### 8. GUIDED MISSILES

There is no evidence that the Soviet Union had undertaken a program of guided missile research and development before the end of World War II. Its present program began when it took over from Germany guided missile test equipment and facilities, completed weapons, weapons under development, and trained scientific and technical personnel. Available intelligence pertains almost exclusively to development by German personnel, under Soviet supervision, or German missiles upon which research had been completed. There is little evidence to indicate development of a native Soviet missile. However, for a number of years, Soviet scientists and technical schools have been capable of training personnel for work on the development of guided missiles. By mid-1954, a large number of

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Soviet specialists should have been trained in known technical schools, and new industrial facilities could be available for, at least, moderate production of guided missiles. While it is improbable that the Soviets could, or would, emphasize early quantity production of all missile types, there is no doubt that promising missiles and guidance systems will receive emphasis and will be available for operational use by mid-1954. Because of the priority apparently accorded air defence and close support of ground troops, it is believed that emphasis is placed upon surface-to-air, air-to-surface and surface-to-surface missiles in that order.

(a) Surface-to-Air

Germany had no surface-to-air missiles in operational use but was developing Schmetterling (a visually guided radio-controlled subsonic aircraft), Wasserfall (a radio-controlled supersonic rocket), Rheintochter III (a visually guided radio-controlled supersonic rocket) and Enzian (a visually guided radio-controlled subsonic missile). Proximity fuzes and radar tracking were planned for each of these missiles. The first three missiles were quite promising in their prototype form. Missiles available to the Soviet Union in mid-1954 will probably be based upon utilization of the most promising of the German missiles which was Wasserfall. If the production of German-type surface-to-air guided missiles was begun at an early date, the anti-aircraft defences of important Soviet areas could include these weapons by mid-1954. The basic limiting factor, qualitatively and quantitatively, will continue to be guidance and control, not the missiles or the fuels. While the necessity for relying upon visual or other suboptimum methods of guidance would not deter the Soviets from maximum utilization of these weapons, it is probable that missiles included in such defences in mid-1954 will incorporate an electronic guidance and control system.

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(b) Air-to-Surface

While there is no direct evidence of Soviet development, it is reasonable to believe that the Soviet Union is interested in the German air-to-surface missiles -- the H.S.293 (a radio-controlled glide bomb, rocket-powered and guided visually from an aircraft) and the Fritz X (FX-1400) which was a radio-controlled bomb guided visually from an aircraft. It is conceivable that these missiles could be in production, and that the production could be on a large enough scale to meet Soviet air-sea warfare requirements without prejudice to aircraft equipment. Prior to mid-1954, the Soviets could have produced and stockpiled a planned operational quantity of improved versions of these missiles. There is no assurance that the Soviets could not develop prior to mid-1954 a native missile better suited to modern high-speed, high-altitude bombers than the German World War II missiles.

(c) Surface-to-Surface

Germany had two operational weapons in this class -- the V-1 (FZG-76) and the V-2 (A-4). There was also a program to develop two variations of the V-2 in the forms of the A-4b, a winged version of the A-4 with slightly longer range and the A-10 which was an ultra long-range multi-stage rocket projectile for use against transatlantic targets. In the V-1 and V-2 missiles, the Germans had produced two of the outstanding scientific developments of the war but because of their methods of control were useful only against area targets. The Soviet Union acquired enough material and experienced German scientific talent to reconstruct these missiles as they existed at the end of the war. The Soviets also acquired sufficient testing facilities, equipment and experienced personnel to enable them to establish a first-class proving ground for these missiles.

(1) V-1 Type

Small scale assembly of German V-1 missiles from

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10. AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT

Since 1945, the Soviet Union has made remarkable progress in aircraft development. In addition to aircraft and engines in various stages of development, they acquired complete factories as well as several thousand skilled specialists from Germany. Exploitation of the German aircraft industry has permitted the Soviet Union to advance its technical development tremendously. This advance has been assisted materially by the availability of American and British aircraft and engines and technical data pertaining thereto. Although Soviet experience in the aircraft industry was rather limited at the end of World War II, it has now greatly reduced the lead of the West in this field. To date, the basic tendency of the Soviets is apparently to copy, exploit and improve foreign developments. It is not known whether this tendency is apparent only because of the lack of intelligence on native Soviet developments or whether the Soviets are unable to develop and produce native aircraft with comparable performance characteristics. However, if Soviet advances during the past three years are taken as a norm, very considerable additional progress will have been accomplished by mid-1954. By that date, the Soviet Union will have had an adequate period of time to exploit completely German research and development. In addition, it must be assumed that the Soviets will be familiar with current American aircraft developments. Nevertheless, it is considered that in mid-1954, the Soviets' over-all capabilities in aircraft development will be below those of the United States.

(a) Bombers

(1) The TU-4 (Soviet version of the B-29) was demonstrated approximately three years after the Soviet Union obtained an American B-29. It is logical to assume, therefore, that the next step in their development of medium and heavy bomber aircraft would be in the direction of an improved TU-4 with B-50 capabilities and a bomber with range capabilities of the B-36. In mid-1954, it is anti-

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in this category of missile, but the lack of information does not remove the possibility that there may be some activity. However, it is believed that the Soviets would favour the development of air-to-air rockets or unguided missiles rather than the guided type because of the large increase in complexity and production imposed by the guidance and control system. By mid-1954, unguided air-to-air weapons probably will be available in large quantities as the basic armament for Soviet interceptor aircraft. However, if guidance and control systems for air-to-air missiles are emphasized at a sufficiently early date, a limited number of beam riding and/or homing missiles could be available.

9. UNGUIDED ANTI-AIRCRAFT ROCKETS

The Soviets acquired the supersonic Taifun which was developed by the Germans and had approached the production stage at the end of World War II. This rocket was designed to be effective against aircraft at altitudes of at least 50,000 feet. The Soviet Union is capable of producing improved versions of Taifun-type anti-aircraft rockets, and there is some evidence of test firing. Solid and liquid propellants are available in large quantities. Taifun should appeal to the Soviets because of ease of manufacture, operational mobility, and minimized electronic requirements. By mid-1954, close-in defence of important Soviet areas could contain heavy concentrations of Taifun type unguided anti-aircraft rockets. By that date, an improved electrostatic type impact fuze appears likely. It is also possible that effectiveness will have been increased to altitudes in excess of 60,000 feet. Considering the priority of Soviet air defence requirements, and the adequacy of this weapon against aircraft flying at near sonic speeds, it seems probable that sufficient radar sets and directors would be allocated to these weapons to provide effective fire control.

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10. AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT

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cipated that an improved TUE will be the main vehicle for Soviet long-range air operations. However, the Soviets are capable of developing a bomber with superior range characteristics. Principal performance improvement will be attributable to improved engines and probable application of turbo-props. Such an aircraft, with a bomb load of 10,000 pounds, would probably have a maximum speed of between 350 and 385 knots at a combat altitude of 40,000 feet, combat range of 7,000 to 8,000 nautical miles, and service ceiling not exceeding 43,000 feet. Depending on the priority and the success of the Soviet engine program, this bomber could be in production by mid-1954. However, there is no information to indicate development of this aircraft.

(2) There is evidence of Soviet development in the medium jet bomber field based on improvements of the German types obtained at the end of the war. Two Soviet four-engine jet bomber prototypes (type 10) were observed in the Moscow area as early as 1947. Three twin-engined jet light bomber prototypes have been observed during the past three years in the Moscow area; type 9 in 1947; type 12 in 1948; and type 17 in 1949. It was reported recently that a formation of twenty-four type 27 jet bombers was observed in the 1950 May Day fly-past. This may indicate that the type 27 jet bomber has been selected for series production. By mid-1954, the Soviets probably will be capable of producing light and medium jet bombers with speeds of about 500 knots, service ceiling of about 43,000 feet, and combat ranges up to 3,500 nautical miles with a 10,000-pound bomb load.

(b) Fighters

(1) Information available in the summer of 1948 indicated Soviet acquisition of the rocket-propelled Blohm and Voss

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DFS-346 which was designed as a supersonic research aircraft. Three models were built by the Siebel Plant in Germany before it was moved to the Soviet Union. A research aircraft similar to the DFS-346 has been observed in the Moscow area. It is, therefore, considered that the Soviet Union is actively engaged in the development of supersonic aircraft, but it is doubted that this development will have progressed beyond the prototype stage by mid-1954.

(2) There is also information to indicate that the Soviets obtained the German rocket-propelled interceptors; ME-163 and ME-263 (JU-248). It is probable that Soviet versions will be in operational use prior to mid-1954.

(3) By mid-1954, jet fighters will have improved considerably. The maximum advancement will be in improved engines allowing higher ceilings and greater speeds. It is estimated that the best interceptors will have maximum speeds of about 610 knots at sea level, a combat ceiling of 50,000 feet, and a combat radius of 250-300 nautical miles. Major developments will probably center around improvements in the pressurization systems and more reliable operation of engines at high altitudes. Soviet night fighters will probably be capable of speeds of about 610 knots at sea level, combat ceiling of approximately 47,000 feet, and will have a combat radius of about 600 nautical miles.

(c) Attack

It is estimated that both conventional and jet aircraft will be available in mid-1954. Conventional types can be expected to have an 850-nautical mile combat range and a maximum speed of 350 knots. Jet types can be expected to have a 750-nautical mile combat range and a maximum speed of 500 knots.

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(d) Engines

Prior to the end of World War II, the Soviet Union appeared to have a good basic theoretical knowledge of jet engines and their capabilities. This knowledge is currently considered to be comparable with that of the United States. Following the war, the Soviets acquired German turbo-jets and Walther rocket engines development and design status. British turbo-jets, i.e., Nene Mk I and Derwent Mk V were imported by the Soviets in 1947.

(1) There is evidence that the Soviet Union is developing the high-powered German jet engines Jumo-012 and BMW-018 (6,000-8,600 pounds static thrust). This development may have been completed, but there is no evidence that the engines have been flight tested or fitted to operational aircraft. It is estimated that the Soviets are capable of increasing the thrust of these engines by approximately 40 per cent by mid-1954. Emphasis will probably be placed upon the BMW-018 because of its anticipated performance at high altitudes.

(2) There is evidence that the Soviet Union is developing the Walther rocket engine which originally was designed for installation in the ME-163 and ME-263 interceptors. It is probable that this engine will have been fully developed for operational use prior to mid-1954.

(3) It is highly probable that the Soviet Union has fully exploited the British Nene jet engine, nevertheless, it is equally probable that due principally to known metallurgical deficiencies and inadequately developed manufacturing techniques, the first Soviet-built Nene engine had less than the rated static thrust of 5,000 pounds. However, recent information indicates improvement in the quality and quantity of Soviet high temperature alloys. There is also evidence that the French have achieved the

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rated thrust for this engine and that complete data on all French turbo-jet production techniques and processing have been made available to the Soviets.

#### 11. AIRCRAFT WEAPONS

It is estimated that Soviet jet and rocket fighter aircraft will utilize both conventional automatic guns and unguided air-to-air rockets. The guns may be of calibre up to 53 mm with ammunition for 10 to 15 seconds of continuous fire. Unguided air-to-air rockets, with and without proximity fuzes, will probably range in size from 82 mm to 132 mm. It is probable that automatic rocket launchers installed internally will be used extensively in addition to presently developed launchers. Improved computing, gyro-stabilized gun and rocket sights will be available in quantity. There is no intelligence pertaining to development of radar gun sights; however, it must be assumed that the Soviets are capable of developing these sights by mid-1954. It is known that they are interested in the application of infra-red. Little is known about Soviet capability to produce the bombing-navigation radar APQ-13 and APS-15 acquired in the US B-29 or similar equipment captured from the Germans. However, in view of the requirement for this equipment for the Long Range Air Force, it is likely that its development will receive relative emphasis.

#### 12. ELECTRONICS

##### (a) General

Electronic systems and devices are essential to the effectiveness of all modern weapon systems. The more advanced the development of a weapon system, the more dependent it is on electronics for communications, navigation, target location, identification and fire control. The priorities in electronics will be determined by the priorities of the basic weapon system. The state of development, quality mass production and maintenance of electronic equipment may well be the limiting factor in

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Soviet weapons advance. The Soviet Union obtained detailed knowledge and samples of most of the wartime British, US and German electronic equipment, together with equipment which was under development in Germany at the end of the war. There are indications that the Soviet Union is encountering difficulty in mass producing many of the necessary electronic components, including proximity fuze tubes and magnetrons. Many of these component bottlenecks will have been eliminated by mid-1954. It is believed that the Soviet Union has given, or will give, priority to the development of electronics for:

- (1) The nuclear energy program.
- (2) The air defence system (including surface-to-air guided missiles and proximity fuzes for air defence).
- (3) Strategic air operations.
- (4) Pro-submarine operations.

It must be assumed that there will be major advances in Soviet capabilities in electronics by mid-1954. However, it is unlikely that the competing requirements of all the above priority programs can be met.

(b) Communications

Soviet communications facilities will be capable of meeting the essential requirements imposed by war in the western area of the Soviet Union in mid-1954. Most important, they are adequate for the support of an air defence system in the western area. The total facilities are relatively secure. The eastern system is not adequate for the full support of large-scale military and air defence operations. However, the development and modernization of the communications system is a major objective of the Soviet technical program and by mid-1954 there will be major advances in this field.

(c) Early Warning Radar

Some micro-wave radar is known to be in use in the early

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warning networks presently established at both western and eastern approaches to the Soviet Union. Much of this radar is probably lend-lease equipment. Radar of native design is believed to be rather crude as compared to western standards. Such inadequacies as may exist in the design and quantity of equipment will probably be minimized by effective coordination of early warning networks through the communication system. Effective early warning coverage at low, medium and high altitudes can be expected by mid-1954.

(d) Air Interception (AI) and Ground Control Interception (GCI)

Under lend-lease, the Soviets received British and American AI equipment. This equipment is not suitable for use at high altitudes or with modern high-speed aircraft. There is no intelligence to indicate whether the Soviets are copying this equipment or whether they are developing native equipment. However, because of the apparent priority of the air defence system, it is to be expected that the Soviets will have effective high altitude AI equipment in limited numbers by mid-1954. Although little evidence exists to indicate the use of passive AI equipment, it is believed to have been developed and early operational use can be expected. Soviet bombers probably will be equipped with tail-warning radar. It is probable that the Soviets will have developed GCI radar which could be available in quantities by mid-1954.

(e) Fire Control Radar and Directors

Under lend-lease, the Soviets received British and American automatic gun-laying radar and directors. The American equipment was of the most advanced design at that time. In addition, the Soviets acquired German equipment. There is no information to indicate whether they are copying any of this equipment, nor is there evidence to indicate their own developments. However, in view of the priority apparently

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accorded air defence, it is reasonable to assume that the Soviets are developing automatic gun-laying radar and that considerable quantities will be available by mid-1954. It should be noted that this fire control equipment would be used not only with conventional anti-aircraft guns but also with unguided anti-aircraft rockets. The Soviets will in addition have limited numbers of specialized radar sets and directors to support their surface-to-air guided missile program.

(f) Electronic Countermeasures

(1) Jamming of radio communications

At the present time the Soviet Union is engaged in extensive jamming of radio communications. This jamming has been confined almost entirely to the Voice of America and British Broadcasting Corporation broadcasts. However, the experience gained by the Soviet Union in this field is such that jamming could become a serious obstruction to radio communications in general. It is believed that the Soviets will have capabilities for extensive jamming of radio communications at frequencies at least as high as VHF by mid-1954.

(2) Jamming of Radar

The Soviets have used "window" in the past. This and similar reflection devices will almost certainly be encountered in the future. In addition, electronic jamming will probably be encountered at all frequencies up to the 3,000-mc range by mid-1954. However, it is believed that the Soviets will not be capable of jamming BTO ("Bombing Thru Overcast") radar which operates at frequencies in excess of 3,000-mc.

(g) Proximity Fuzes

There is no information upon the degree of effort being applied to proximity fuze projects in the Soviet Union.

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Interest has been shown in German electrostatic and photo-electric type fuzes, but there is no evidence that these are being produced. American manufacturing techniques for radio type fuzes are believed to be known to the Soviets and the fact that Sweden and other European countries have developed proximity fuzes suggests that the Soviets may have developed and produced similar fuzes. It is probable that by mid-1954 the Soviets will have produced an effective radio-proximity fuze which will be available in sufficient quantities for significant use for anti-aircraft and ground artillery, and for guided missiles.

(h) Infra-red

For some years prior to World War II, Soviet scientists were actively investigating the military application of infra-red. During the war the Germans carried out extensive research and development in the field of infra-red and produced a large amount of equipment, including night driving and firing devices. Because of the advanced state of German developments, the relative ease of reproduction and the great advantages of night viewing and firing devices, it is highly probable that the Soviets will exploit the potentialities of infra-red.

13. WALTHER TYPE SUBMARINE

There are indications that the Soviets may be making progress in the adaptation of the Walther engine to submarine propulsion. It is known that the Soviets have transferred their Walther engine laboratory together with key German personnel from the Soviet Zone to Leningrad. At the time of the transfer (August 1948) one engine had been successfully assembled and this also was taken to Leningrad. More recently, German specialists in submarine hull design and construction were forcibly moved from Germany to the Soviet Union. This may indicate that Soviet development has progressed to the point where they are preparing to construct a submarine in which to install the Walther

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engine. If this development is continued, it is believed that, by mid-1954, the first Walther type submarines may have reached the sea trial stage. Operating depths and speeds of conventional type submarines will have increased noticeably to make the Soviet submarine fleet a much more difficult weapon to combat than at present.

#### 14. INFLUENCE MINES

The Soviets were actively engaged in the research and development of magnetic mines prior to World War II. These researches produced one magnetic type mine, the Mirab but which was only a small river defence mine for use in very shallow waters against small craft. The Soviets did not produce any large magnetic mines for general use in offensive or defensive operations. In addition, large quantities of the latest German mines and components were captured together with leading mine experts. By mid-1954, the Soviets can have produced quantities of influence mines of both German and native design. It is probable that any combination of pressure, magnetic and acoustic actuated mines incorporating elaborate delay-arming and ship-counter ("PDM") mechanisms will be in production.

#### 15. TORPEDOES

By mid-1954, the Soviets can have operational quantities of most of the types of torpedoes which were in use during World War II. These will include electric air or oxygen propulsion units. There is no evidence to indicate the types of torpedoes upon which the Soviets are concentrating their efforts, nor is there any evidence available which would indicate that they will adopt torpedoes of foreign type in preference to those of strictly Soviet design. The standard German or Allied air-driven torpedoes had approximate speed/range settings of 30 knots to 13,000 yards, 40 knots to 7,650 yards and 44 knots to 5,470 yards. When considering torpedoes in which tracklessness is not the prime factor, it is possible that the Soviet designers may be influenced by the very superior performance of the Japanese oxygen-driven torpedo which, in comparison with the air-driven types described above, has a performance of 45 knots to 13,000 yards and 50 knots to 9,840 yards.

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Little is known of the Soviet air-driven torpedo performance but it is reported that they possess a torpedo which has a maximum range of 16,500 yards. However, in absence of knowledge of the size and the speed of this weapon no satisfactory comparison can be made.

When tracklessness is considered to be a prior requirement to speed and range, the Soviets may produce a version of the German electric torpedo which had a performance of 30 knots to 8,200 yards.

In developing torpedoes for use from surface craft, it is possible that the Soviets will base their design upon the Japanese oxygen-driven type which had performance of 50 knots to 22,000 yards, 40 knots to 35,000 yards and 36 knots to 44,000 yards.

Influence or contact exploder mechanisms and pattern running devices may be fitted in any of these types of torpedoes. Active and/or passive acoustic homing heads can be produced for use in electrically-driven types.



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D R A F T

UNCONVENTIONAL EMPLOYMENT OF WEAPONS  
BY THE SOVIET UNION - 1 JULY, 1951

Prepared by the Division of Scientific Intelligence  
Defence Research Board  
6 July, 1950.

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1. OBJECT

To prepare an agreed US-Canadian intelligence estimate of unconventional employment of weapons against North America by the Soviet Union assuming that a major war begins on 1 July, 1951, for which the Soviet Union has had sufficient time to deploy its forces and materials, but not sufficient time to create any sudden alteration in its rate of industrial or scientific development.

2. GENERAL

Unconventional attack with atomic, biological, chemical, radiological and other weapons offers a high potential of effectiveness, particularly when employed concurrently with, or just prior to, the initiation of conventional, overt military operations. Many of the methods of delivery could be used prior to D-Day. However, detection and identification, as enemy action, of such pre-D-Day delivery would cost the Soviets complete loss of strategic surprise. On the other hand, under present internal security measures, detection of some methods of introducing atomic weapons into key harbours is improbable, as is the identification of certain types of BW.

WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT

3. ATOMIC WARFARE (AW)

The following paragraphs summarize possible unconventional methods of delivery of atomic weapons which must be considered in estimating Soviet capabilities for war in mid-1951.

- (a) TU-4 bombers disguised with US markings.
- (b) Atomic bombs clandestinely laid as mines in key harbours by merchant ships (not necessarily of Soviet registry) or submarines. Laying of atomic bombs inside key harbours by merchant vessels presents no serious problems. It is desirable that

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such vessels should have an external opening in the hull from which the bomb would be laid but this is not essential as bombs could be easily disguised as any item of normal deck cargo. The probability of detection of an atomic bomb by existing geiger counters or other radiation detection devices is small. The use of time delay actuating mechanisms to initiate detonation would permit the laying of a number of bombs up to periods of the order of 400 days in advance of D-Day. Inasmuch as conventional type atomic bombs could be used, it is considered that the Soviets would be capable of employing this method by mid-1951.

- (c) Atomic bombs detonated in the hold of a merchant ship while in a key harbour. While an atomic bomb exploded in the hold of a ship might not be as effective as an underwater or an air burst bomb, the damage and contamination would still be great with attendant disruption of the normal activities of the port. This method does not involve any special engineering problems, or unusual skills, and is probably within the present capabilities of the Soviet Union.

- (d) V-1 type guided missiles with atomic warheads launched from merchant ships or submarines.

Depending upon the success achieved by research in the field of V-1 type missiles and in the production of electronic control equipment generally, the development of a V-1 type guided missile with an atomic warhead by mid-1951 is within the bounds of possibility. Such a missile would necessitate modification of the submarine to permit inboard stowage, but this would not present any major con-

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structional problems. By means of a homing device and a beacon or by monitoring with two submarines, the required accuracy could be obtained. A local Soviet agent could easily assemble a beacon from components purchased openly at almost any radio supply store. Inasmuch as the overall size of such a beacon would not be much larger than a portable typewriter, it could be concealed near the target without difficulty. This method could be employed for a war starting in mid-1951.

- (e) Diplomatic Immunity. Under the cover of diplomatic immunity, shipment of atomic bomb components as household effects or supplies consigned to Soviet diplomatic representatives would be feasible and practicable. Shipment of an assembled atomic bomb by this method is possible. The size and weight of the package for an assembled bomb creates a substantial risk of compromise of the operation. The probability of shipment of disassembled bombs is discussed in paragraph (g) below.
- (f) Shipment of Atomic bombs as "in transit" commercial shipments. Commercial shipments from abroad received at American and Canadian ports of entry and consigned to points other than the port of entry, are usually transshipped without customs inspection, to a bonded carrier, for transportation to destination. Customs inspection is made before final delivery to the consignee, but substitution or "switching" en route is possible. However, the size and weight of the package of an assembled bomb creates some risk of detection, a fact which might militate against the employment of this method. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that "free ports" in which goods are deposited

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in a bonded warehouse as a temporary measure and without customs inspection pending trans-shipment by another vessel to another place, present a major hazard to such ports.

- (g) Smuggling of disassembled atomic bombs. An atomic bomb, including the fissionable material, can be broken down into components, which could be shipped separately over a period of time. The nuclear explosive could be so packaged that unusual handling precautions would not be required. However, radiation detection might be possible by alerted inspectors. For a war starting in mid-1951, it is doubtful that the Soviets would endeavor to introduce a disassembled atomic bomb into Canada or the United States, although the risk of discovery may be less than that involving an assembled bomb. This estimate considers the technical difficulties of bomb assembly and adjustment, and the probable shortage of specialized personnel.

#### 4. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW)

- (a) The Soviet Union is considered capable of sabotage employment of biological weapons against personnel, plants, animals and food and water supplies. The technical qualifications required for a saboteur, including local procurement and reproduction of biological warfare materials, are not great. Therefore, it must be assumed that the Soviets have personnel who are technically qualified for sabotage.
- (b) There are innumerable methods of introducing and disseminating BW agents. The following are examples:
- (1) BW agents which withstand drying could be smeared on cloth, leather, etc., or perhaps under the postage stamp of a letter. Those agents which cannot persist in this form could be preserved

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in tubes small enough to be concealed in clothing, letters, or a cigarette.

- (2) The initial material need not be in the form of a culture. Infected animals, birds or insects might be released to spread the disease.
  - (3) BW agents may be disguised as cosmetics in personal baggage.
  - (4) Contaminated letters may be sent directly to the intended victims, without risk of detection.
  - (5) The contents of a quart thermos bottle introduced into the air-conditioning system of a large office building might produce infection in the majority of the personnel, within 4 hours to 30 days, depending upon the BW agent employed.
- (c) Sabotage employment of BW agents during periods of nominal peace is facilitated by the resemblance of the results of such sabotage to natural occurrences. These weapons are particularly well-suited for incapacitating personnel of key installations, particularly those having common food and water supplies.

##### 5. CHEMICAL WARFARE (CW)

- (a) The term CW agents as used herein refers to those toxic chemical agents suitable for employment in mass quantities for conventional chemical warfare. No account is taken in this paper of the almost countless number of poisonous chemical compounds which are readily available from commercial sources in the United States for employment by Soviet agents for contaminating food and water supplies and for poisoning key individuals.
- (b) By mid-1951, the Soviet Union could have smuggled into the United States or Canada two CW agents well-suited for unconventional attack:

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- (1) GA. This agent is an odorless, colorless liquid of low viscosity which becomes an effective anti-personnel agent when dispersed as a fog or invisible vapor.
- (2) GB. GB is similar to GA in external characteristics and manner of employment, but is two and a half times more toxic.
- (c) Both of the above agents can be transported in glass or suitably lined containers, tightly stoppered, but not necessarily sealed. Hence, these agents could be shipped in any desired quantity disguised as innocuous liquids, such as champagne or perfume.
- (d) As indicated above, these agents become effective anti-personnel weapons when dispersed as a fog or an invisible vapor. For unconventional attack involving smuggling, this may be best accomplished by an aerosol bomb such as those used for insecticides. Therefore, as an alternative to shipment of the agents disguised as harmless liquids, the Soviets might choose to ship completed aerosol bombs. External appearance would be indistinguishable from harmless aerosol bombs labelled as insecticides.
- (e) When effectively disseminated throughout a confined space of 100,000 cubic feet, about one ounce of GA and about one half ounce of GB is sufficient to incapacitate or kill substantially all of the persons in the area. In the case of the Pentagon Building, which has 75,000,000 cubic feet of enclosed space, 50 pounds of GA or 20 pounds of GB would have to be dispersed throughout the building to cause the above effect, assuming no significant extraction by the air conditioning system.

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6. RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE (RW)

- (a) It is not known how much effort will be placed on the production of RW agents per se within the Soviet Union. However, assuming that there will be a determined effort to obtain quantities at the earliest possible time without interfering with atomic bomb production, it is believed that by mid-1951, the Soviet Union could have sufficient RW agents for limited use only. The principal effects would be psychological. Use of RW agents by saboteurs would be difficult due to the radiation hazard.

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D R A F T

UNCONVENTIONAL EMPLOYMENT OF WEAPONS  
BY THE SOVIET UNION - 1 JULY, 1954

Prepared by the Division of Scientific Intelligence  
Defence Research Board  
11 July, 1950.

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1. OBJECT

To prepare an agreed US-Canadian intelligence estimate of unconventional employment of weapons against North America by the Soviet Union assuming that a major war begins on 1 July, 1954, for which the Soviet Union has had sufficient time to deploy its forces and materials but not sufficient time to create any sudden alteration in its rate of industrial or scientific development.

2. GENERAL

Unconventional attack with atomic, biological, chemical, radiological and other weapons offers a high potential of effectiveness, particularly when employed concurrently with, or just prior to, the initiation of conventional, overt military operations. Many of the methods of delivery could be used prior to D-Day. However, detection and identification as enemy action of such pre-D-Day delivery would cost the Soviets complete loss of strategic surprise. On the other hand, under present internal security measures, detection of some methods of introducing atomic weapons into key harbours is improbable, as is the identification of certain types of biological warfare.

WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT

3. ATOMIC WARFARE (AW)

The following paragraphs summarize possible unconventional methods of delivery of atomic weapons which must be considered in estimating Soviet capabilities for war in mid-1954.

- (a) Bombers disguised as US A/C. These aircraft may be either piloted or remote-controlled.
- (b) Atomic bombs clandestinely laid as mines in key harbours by merchant ships (not necessarily of Soviet Registry) or submarines. Laying of atomic bombs inside key harbours by merchant vessels presents no serious problems. It is



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desirable that such vessels should have an external opening in the hull from which the bomb would be laid but this is not essential as bombs could be easily disguised as any item of normal deck cargo. The probability of detection of an atomic bomb by existing geiger counters or other radiation detection devices is small. The use of time delay actuating mechanisms to initiate detonation would permit the laying of a number of bombs up to periods of the order of 400 days in advance of D-Day. Inasmuch as conventional type atomic bombs could be used, it is considered that the Soviets would be capable of employing this method prior to mid-1954.

- (c) Atomic bombs detonated in the hold of a merchant ship while in a key harbour. While an atomic bomb exploded in the hold of a ship might not be as effective as an underwater or an air burst bomb, the damage and contamination would still be great with attendant disruption of the normal activities of this port. This method does not involve any special engineering problems, or unusual skills, and is probably within the present capabilities of the Soviet Union.
- (d) V-1 type guided missiles with atomic warheads launched from merchant ships or submarines. By mid-1954, the Soviet nuclear techniques and guided missile developments probably will have advanced to the extent that they could have a number of V-1 type missiles fitted with atomic warheads. The numbers of such missiles would depend partly upon the extent of the allotment of atomic warheads from their stockpile and partly upon their selection of methods of delivery of atomic explosives. These missiles would be submarine launched and could have ranges of the order of 500 miles and

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speeds of slightly less than that of sound. Such a missile would necessitate modification to the submarine to permit inboard stowage. The electronic guidance and control devices which the Soviets will probably have available in mid-1954 could be used in this method of delivery in order to obtain the desired degree of accuracy. Another method would be by means of a homing device and a beacon operated by a Soviet agent. Such an agent could easily assemble a beacon from components purchased openly in any radio supply store. Inasmuch as the overall size of a beacon would not be much larger than that of a portable typewriter, it could be concealed near the target without difficulty.

(e) Diplomatic Immunity. Under the cover of diplomatic immunity, shipment of atomic bomb components as household effects or supplies consigned to Soviet diplomatic representatives would be feasible and practicable. Shipment of an assembled atomic bomb by this method is possible. The size and weight of the package for an assembled bomb creates a substantial risk of compromise of the operation. The probability of shipment of disassembled bombs is discussed in paragraph (g) below.

(f) Shipment of atomic bombs as "in transit" commercial shipments. Commercial shipments from abroad received at American and Canadian ports of entry and consigned to points other than the port of entry, are usually trans-shipped without customs inspection, to a bonded carrier, for transportation to destination. Customs inspection is made before final delivery to the consignee, but substitution or "switching" en route is possible. However, the size and weight of the package

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for an assembled bomb creates some risk of detection. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that "free ports" in which goods are deposited in a bonded warehouse as a temporary measure and without customs inspection pending trans-shipment by another vessel to another place, present a major hazard to such ports.

- (g) Smuggling of disassembled atomic bombs. An atomic bomb, including the fissionable material, can be broken down into components, which could be shipped separately over a period of time. The nuclear explosive could be so packaged that unusual handling precautions would not be required. However, radiation detection might be possible by alerted inspectors. Prior to mid-1954, it is probable that Soviet atomic bombs will be well enough engineered that the smuggling of unassembled bombs will be technically feasible. In addition, specialized personnel required for bomb assembly and adjustment will probably be available. This availability of specialized personnel requires that consideration be given to the possibility that all components, with the exception of the fissionable material, could be manufactured clandestinely in Canada or the United States. It is expected that the size of the bomb stockpile will be large enough to permit the use of a limited number for smuggling operations.

4. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW)

- (a) The Soviet Union is considered capable of sabotage employment of biological weapons against personnel, plants, animals and food and water supplies. The technical qualifications required for a saboteur, including local procurement and reproduction of

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biological warfare materials, are not very great.

Therefore, it must be assumed that the Soviets have personnel who are technically qualified for sabotage.

(b) There are innumerable methods of introducing and disseminating BW agents. The following are examples:

- (1) BW agents which withstand drying could be smeared on cloth, leather, etc., or perhaps under the postage stamp of a letter. Those agents which cannot persist in this form could be preserved in tubes small enough to be concealed in clothing, letters, or a cigarette.
- (2) The initial material need not be in the form of a culture. Infected animals, birds or insects might be released to spread the disease.
- (3) BW agents may be disguised as cosmetics in personal baggage.
- (4) Contaminated letters may be sent directly to the intended victims, without risk of detection.
- (5) The contents of a quart thermos bottle introduced into the air-conditioning system of a large office building could produce infection in the majority of the personnel, within 4 hours to 30 days depending upon the BW agents employed.

(c) Sabotage employment of BW agents during periods of nominal peace is facilitated by the resemblance of the results of such sabotage to natural occurrences. These agents are particularly well-suited for incapacitating personnel of key installations, particularly those having common food and water supplies.

### 3. CHEMICAL WARFARE (CW)

- (a) The term chemical warfare (CW) agents as used herein refers to those toxic chemical agents suitable for employment in mass quantities for conventional chemical warfare. No account is taken in this paper of the

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almost countless number of poisonous chemical compounds which are readily available from commercial sources in the United States for employment by Soviet agents for contaminating food and water supplies and for poisoning key individuals.

(b) Prior to mid-1954, the Soviet Union could have smuggled into the United States or Canada two CW agents well suited for unconventional attack:

- (1) GA. This agent is an odorless, colorless liquid of low viscosity which becomes an effective anti-personnel agent when dispersed as a fog or invisible vapor.
- (2) GB. GB is similar to GA in external characteristics and manner of employment, but is two and a half times as toxic.

(c) As indicated above, GA and GB become effective anti-personnel weapons when dispersed as a fog or an invisible vapor. For unconventional attack involving smuggling, this is best accomplished by an aerosol bomb such as those used for insecticides. Therefore, as an alternative to shipment of the agents disguised as harmless liquids, the Soviets might choose to ship completed aerosol bombs. External appearance would be indistinguishable from harmless aerosol bombs labelled as insecticides.

(d) When effectively disseminated throughout a confined space of 100,000 cubic feet, about one ounce of GA and about half an ounce of GB is sufficient to incapacitate or kill substantially all of the people in the area. In the case of the Pentagon Building,

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which has 75,000,000 cubic feet of enclosed space, 50 pounds of GA or 20 pounds of GB would have to be dispersed throughout the building to cause the above effect, assuming no significant extraction by the air-conditioning system.

4. RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE (RW)

It is not known how much effort will be placed on the production of RW agents per se within the Soviet Union. However, assuming that there will be a determined effort to obtain quantities at the earliest possible time without interfering with atomic bomb production, it is believed that prior to mid-1954, the Soviet Union could have sufficient RW agents for extensive use.

Use of RW agents by saboteurs would be difficult due to the radiation hazard. The principal effects of RW agents would be psychological.

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

No. CSC 14-6-1-1



# Department of National Defence

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## CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA

May 19th, 1950.

G. de T. Glazebrook, Esq.,  
Dept. of External Affairs.  
D.M.I.  
D.N.I.  
D.A.I.  
D.S.I.  
J.I.B.

*uk papers*

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### Soviet and European Satellite Manpower and the Extent of its Adequacy for a Major War

1. Enclosed herewith, for your information and retention, is one copy of each of the three papers on the marginally-noted subject, whose references are:

J.I.C. (50) 28 (Final) dated April 20th, 1950.

J.I.C. (50) 28/1 (Final) dated April 26th, 1950.

J.I.C. (50) 28 (Final) dated May 8th, 1950.

*Refused  
European  
May 20*

*G.H. Newsome*  
(G.H. Newsome)  
Wing Commander, R.C.A.F.,  
Secretary.

Encs.

**NOTE:** In accordance with the direction given at the 206th meeting of the Committee, a copy of this memorandum, without attachments, has been sent to:

D.C.I. - R.C.M.P.



IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

No. CSC 14-6-1-1

*Mr G Glazebrook*

**Department of National Defence**

**TOP SECRET****CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE**


JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS

OTTAWA

April 18th, 1950.



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*Gund*

G. de T. Glazebrook, Esq.,  
Department of External Affairs.

D.M.I.

D.A.I.

D.N.I.

D.S.I.

J.I.B.

1. Enclosed herewith, for your information and retention, is the following U.K. Joint Intelligence Committee document:

J.I.C. (50) 35 dated April 4th, 1950, entitled "Chemical Warfare: The Enemy Threat".

*G.H. Newsome*  
(G.H. Newsome)  
Wing Commander, R.C.A.F.,  
Secretary.

Enc.

**NOTE:** In accordance with the direction given at the 206th meeting of the Committee, a copy of this memorandum, without attachment, has been sent to:

D.C.I. - R.C.M.P.

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