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Department of External Affairs

File No. 50209-40

Volume THREE (3)

From OCTBER 16, 1953

To MARCH 31, 1954

ACCESS TO INFORMATION L'ACCÈS À L'INFORMATION	EXAMINED BY / EXAMINÉ PAR <i>G. H. Hughes</i>
DATE / DATE: <i>8 Jan 1991</i>	

50209-40
TOP SECRET

M.H. Wershof/NN
January 11, 1954

*WMB
Mr. Burt
DCA
return
& file
MHW*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING UNDER-SECRETARY

50209-40
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Continental Defence -
Letter of January 7 from General Foulkes

I have not yet sent to Washington a copy of this letter, because we are waiting to hear from General Foulkes that he has told Dr. Solandt about it.

If you do not hear from General Foulkes - or Dr. Solandt - by tomorrow, would you consider one of the following steps:

- (a) You or I might speak to Dr. Solandt;
- (b) You might speak to General Foulkes;
- (c) I could consult General Foulkes through Raymont.

It does seem to me that Dr. Solandt might have reason to complain if, without his knowledge, we sent to Washington an argument inspired by his talk with Arneson.

MHW
M.H.W.

Jan 13 In Mr. Mackay's absence I phoned Gen Foulkes. He had spoken to Solandt & is satisfied that Solandt will not disapprove of proposed letter to Washington. Foulkes agreed we should refer the correspondence to Solandt & Bryce.

M. Wershof

11-1-30(05)

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Extract from Briefing for Permanent
Joint Board on Defence - Canada -
United States - January 5, 1954.

Given by Gen. Gardiner, USAF.

Copy on 50218-970

We would like, if we may, to give you very briefly our general concept of the United States air defense problem. I might have said the United States - Canadian air defence problem without being very much in error.

Wherever a developing threat of any kind is detected, whether it be a plague, a fire, a criminal conspiracy, a hostile nation, or any other conceivable menace, the most effective, the most lasting and the most satisfactory defense is the early annihilation of that which threatens us. That which we believe may be threatening us now with physical violence within our own home country, is a developing hostile air force equipped with weapons capable of mass destruction of our people, our property and our institutions.

For several reasons, it is not likely that this menace can be eradicated before it could do any damage to us. If, however, we react wisely, we will be prepared to take immediate action to destroy this menace if and when it does damage to us.

The vehicles of an air force are airplanes and airplanes are highly vulnerable; most especially so while they are collected in numbers on their home bases. Fuel for aircraft is also vulnerable. The eradication of the airplane menace can best be effected by air attack against airplanes on bases, factories where airplanes are built, depots where parts are stored and issued and aircraft fuel in storage areas and fuel refineries. We should exploit our capabilities of effecting such destruction to a maximum degree.

Such exploitation in the situation with which we are now concerned demands that we take advantage of the opportunities to maintain, along with our allies, powerful air forces in Europe. It also demands that the opportunities of basing a powerful air force in Europe be defended and preserved. This is the equivalent of saying that we need Western Europe as much as Western Europe needs us. The assumed enemy also needs Western Europe to further his expansion of industrial capacity and manpower and, in depriving the enemy of his requirements, we retard the development of the threat and this must, therefore, be one of our major objectives. We also have treaty and moral obligations to defend Western Europe.

Not to gamble everything on our hope of being able to operate a powerful air force in Europe, we believe it is essential that we have alternate means of attacking the enemy's home bases. This we have in our Strategic Air Command with its advance bases in countries surrounding the assumed enemy and mobile carrier task forces and missile launching submarines.

We see a secondary capability of destroying some enemy aircraft in flight and en route to the United States or Canada, while they are over or within reach from Western Europe or Alaska. This capability must be exploited.

If enemy bombers should approach over the ocean areas to avoid the land-based system, we see a good capability for early detection and tracking by merchant ships equipped with radar in conjunction with AEW/ASW barriers and Hunter/Killer groups protecting shipping from submarine and air attack. Such surveillance capability should facilitate interception and attrition by carrier-based aircraft perhaps of the A3D type.

After having departed their European or Arctic bases and having passed naval carrier-based aircraft that may be located along their routes, the primary responsibility for destruction of enemy aircraft, before they reach their objectives, rests on the Royal Canadian and the United States Air Force. These air forces are well aware of their responsibilities but to be of maximum effectiveness, they must know well in advance that the enemy is on his way. The earlier they are given this information, the more airplanes they can have available to meet the enemy and the farther from target areas they can begin combat against him. Information received early enough to deploy fighters is early enough to ready artillery. We have previously stated as a principle that we should detect the enemy at the earliest time and most distant location possible, that we should track him as nearly continuously as possible, and that we should intercept and meet him in combat far enough out to utilize the maximum of our combat capability. This phase of any future war will consist of very short periods of combat following very long periods of watchful waiting and weapons that are not ready when the fight is on might as well not exist.

In order that we may give these air defense forces early warning that the enemy is preparing to undertake a mission against us or that he is en route, and in order that the defense forces may ready the maximum number of weapons, we must exploit all available intelligence agencies. We must exploit the potential of all available means for detecting and recognizing enemy aircraft in flight.

The Joint Air Defense Board believes that our own activities in Europe, the Northeast Theater and Alaska have a high potential for detection, recognition and warning that is not being fully utilized and that the same is true of Canada. We believe that ships and small vessels at sea have a great deal of capability, of which we are not taking advantage, and that this capability could be greatly increased at reasonable cost.

We are recommending that the United States and her allies plan the utilization of all their activities world-over, as far as they can be made useful for the purpose, in a world-wide aircraft surveillance recognition and warning system.

We would like to present a chart showing additional warning facilities that we plan to recommend for filling in gaps in our existing warning system. With these additions, we would have, in effect, a world-wide surveillance, recognition and warning system. It appears that plans are already partly agreed upon to construct a warning line across Canada, and other parts of the system we recommend may already be programmed.

We are not recommending that this system be completed immediately, but rather that it be accepted for ultimate development and that piecemeal developments and expansions be planned to fit into this proposed final system. We recommend utilizing the potential of all facilities and activities that can be made available quickly and economically, and making provision for utilizing less readily available potential on a longer time programme.

We are not prepared just now to suggest the selection and deployment of weapons to match our proposed system of detection, recognition and warning; but the principal feature of such a suggestion, when we make it, will be developments and plans for the range and deployment of defensive aircraft that will make it possible to fully capitalize on the warning provided, by attacking the enemy at greater distances from his objectives, and continuously from these greater distances while he progresses toward his objectives. During the last few miles and the last

few minutes of his approach, if he is permitted to progress that far, artillery and missiles will apply their full strength in the final determined action to defend the areas chosen by the enemy. It is unlikely that all areas that might be chosen as targets will be protected by artillery and missiles, but those of greatest value and importance should ultimately be covered.

Since more than one-third of the space through which our assumed enemy would have to travel to reach objectives in North America lies over Canada, the Canadian members of your Board can't but be interested in - but we hope not shocked by - our thinking. We have felt that it is much better to give you our concepts, on occasions such as this, while they are forming than to build up programs or plans involving Canada and surprise you with them - as we have so often done - after they are too far developed to be readily changed. Our Board only conceives and recommends these ideas, but if they are understood, and perhaps pretty well agreed to on a personal basis before hand, they may then be both feasible and acceptable. We are, therefore, taking the liberty of showing you this map with some marks across Canada which may or may not be new. If there are new ones, you will be the first who will have seen them and they are easily erased.

We have felt that the development of air surveillance facilities and civil-industrial facilities in Canada could very well be co-ordinated, to the advantage of both, and we are very much in favor of utilizing the advantages of established communities, weather stations, trading posts, etc., for ground observer or radar locations and, at the same time, improve the signal communications, transportation routes, power facilities, etc., with mutual benefits for the combined use of the radar system and the civil-industrial agencies.

The principal reasons why we are so anxious to exploit all the possibilities of obtaining early warning of intended air attack are that it will:

Enable us to make an earlier decision that a war emergency exists and to take actions that would not otherwise be possible.

Enable us to ready and concentrate a maximum part of our active defense ~~forces~~ forces.

Give us time to fight the enemy for the longest possible time before he reaches his objectives.

Give us time to implement emergency control of friendly air traffic and to remove it from the air battle area.

Give us time to effect controls of electronic radiations that might be useful to the enemy in his navigation.

Give us time to carry out passive and deceptive air defense measures.

Assist us in initiating early retaliatory action against the enemy - possibly before his mission is launched.

R. W. Murray/csm

December 30, 1953.

UNITED STATES DEFENCE ACTIVITIES
IN CANADA

The principle of joint participation has governed Canadian policy with respect to foreign military activities in Canada. The Ogdensburg Declaration, out of which grew the Permanent Joint Board on Defence^V emphasized the joint responsibility of Canada and the United States for the defence of North America, a theme which has dominated the work of the Board for the past thirteen years. While Canada has cooperated fully with the United States in joint defence, the Canadian Government has been insistent on the preservation and recognition of those Canadian rights which affect the sovereignty of Canada.

Developments with regard to Continued
Wartime Installations

During the last war there were many U.S. defence activities and installations on Canadian soil, notably the Alaska Highway, a

^V See separate note on P.J.B.D.

series of airfields, and weather stations. By the end of 1946 Canada had taken over nearly all of these installations. The only exclusively U.S. installations which have remained in Canada since the last war are:

(1) The three areas in Newfoundland leased to the United States for 99 years under an agreement of 1941. This agreement was modified in 1951 in accordance with the terms of a Recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, and recorded in an Exchange of Notes in February and March 1952 (tabled in the House of Commons on May 2, 1952). This was followed by the extension to Newfoundland on June 1, 1952, of the Visiting Forces (U.S.A.) Act.

In point of fact this situation has been modified by an Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States dated April 28 and 30, 1952, which makes the NATO Status of Forces Agreement applicable to the Leased Bases. This Exchange of Notes is at present classified CONFIDENTIAL, although the concurrence of the United States Government to its declassification has been requested. As soon as this is received steps will be taken to have it tabled in Parliament.

(2) Some land at the R.C.A.F. station at Goose Bay. A 20-year lease has been concluded with the United States for the use by the U.S.A.F. of certain areas at Goose Bay. The Exchange of Notes covering the Lease took place on December 5, 1952. The Notes were tabled in the House of Commons on December 16, 1952. On November 25, ¹⁹⁵² it was announced in the House of Commons that permission had been granted for the deployment of a U.S.A.F. interceptor squadron at Goose Bay.

Post-War Projects

Canadian policy on defence collaboration in the post-war period was clearly set out in a statement issued in Ottawa and Washington on February 12, 1947.^K In accordance with this policy the following U.S. activities now take place on Canadian soil:

(1) Joint Arctic Weather Stations. These are five in number and are jointly operated by Canada and the United States, each station being under the command of a Canadian officer. Strictly speaking, they are not a defence activity.

^K This is to be found attached as Appendix B to the note on the P.J.B.D.

There are 35 stations in the PINETREE Project described above. Canada is financially responsible for 11, the United States for 22. At present Canada has undertaken to man the 11 stations for which it is financially responsible and 5 stations for which the United States is financially responsible. The effective date for the operation of the whole chain is now July 1, 1954. The United States has made an additional request through the Permanent Joint Board on Defence in September, 1952, for the establishment of 9 additional temporary radar stations in Canada (5 in Ontario, 3 in British Columbia and 1 in Nova Scotia). Approval to conduct site surveys was given to the United States by Note No. D-85 of April 2, 1953. Cabinet Defence Committee has authorized the construction and operation of the stations by the U.S. Air Force, but the United States has not yet requested permission to begin work. (SECRET).

Project COMRODE (formerly Counterchange). The United States on January 30, 1953, requested Canadian concurrence in an experimental early warning project in the Arctic. Canadian permission was granted by Note No. 163 of February 27, 1953. Canadian approval was subject to a number of conditions, the most important of which was that a Joint Military Study Group should be set up to consider the whole question of Canada-U.S. air defence. (SECRET).

Fifty-fifth Parallel Early Warning Line
Following the analysis of the Continental Defence System by the Canada-United States Study Group referred to above, both the Canadian and United States Governments have approved a recommendation that an Early Warning Line be built from coast to coast roughly along the fifty-fifth parallel. The Canadian Government has informed the United States Government that Canada proposes itself to go ahead with the construction of the Line, this without prejudice to any subsequent agreement as to the division of costs. The United States Air Force has been invited to collaborate in the undertaking. The whole project has recently been assigned by the R.C.A.F. the nickname "TAMARACK". (SECRET).

(2) Extension of the Continental Radar Defense System. Canada and the United States agreed in an Exchange of Notes dated August 1st and August 7th, 1951, to an extension of the continental radar defence system in Canada. These Notes were tabled in the House of Commons on February 23, 1953. The radar defence system in Canada has been jointly planned by the Canadian and U.S. Governments as part of a coordinated continental system rather than on a national basis. This means that the United States has an equal interest with Canada in the information provided by these radar stations. The Permanent Joint Board on Defence evolved the formula, one third (Canada) two-thirds (U.S.), as an equitable division of the costs of construction, operation and maintenance of the stations. The agreement also provides that Canada may undertake to man stations which are a United States Air Force responsibility: in fact, the R.C.A.F. is already manning some of the stations assigned to the U.S.A.F. in Canada and more may be taken over at some future date if considered desirable.

(3) Global Communications Sites. The United States was granted permission by an Exchange of Notes of November 4 and 8, 1952, which were tabled in the House of Commons on February 25, 1953, to construct and operate global communications facilities near Hermon Leased Base in Newfoundland. The agreement provides for a flexible form of tenure which, in effect, permits the station to continue in operation only so long as Canada agrees that there is a continuing need for it in the mutual interest of both countries.

Similar facilities are to be constructed at Goose Bay under the terms of the Goose Bay Lease.

(4) Torbay. The right to use a number of buildings and facilities at Torbay airport for administrative purposes has been granted to the United States on a terminable basis. The airfield is controlled by the R.C.A.F.

The United States has been granted a renewable one-year lease (terminable on 30 days notice following consideration by the P.J.B.D.) to occupy all the unused buildings built at Torbay during the last war. The U.S.A.F. has established a general depot at Torbay Airport and makes extensive use of the airfield for administrative flights, since the nearby leased base at Fort Pepperrell has no airfield of its own.

(5) Frobisher Bay. In 1951, the United States was given permission to station about 150 men at Frobisher Bay to assist in U.S. operations in the Far North. The R.C.A.F. provides the commanding officer and operates the control tower.

(6) Churchill. There is a detachment of U.S. troops at Churchill working with Canadian forces on testing and experiment in cold weather.

(7) Heines-Fairbanks Pipeline. An Exchange of Notes which took place on June 30, 1953, and which was tabled in the House of Commons on November 19, 1953, authorized the United States to construct for military purposes an oil pipeline between Heines and Fairbanks, Alaska, the route of which would pass for a distance of 284 miles through the Northwest corner of British Columbia and the Yukon Territory. The United States has been granted an easement for the necessary right-of-way. In addition to meeting the United States needs, the pipeline will also be available to fill Canadian military requirements in the Northwest. When the line is not required for military purposes, civilian needs will be satisfied.

(8) Other U.S. Activities. Reciprocal arrangements under which the Air Forces of each of the two countries may intercept unidentified aircraft over the territory of the other, in accordance with a Recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, was announced in the House of Commons on December 1, 1952. Interceptor aircraft must obey the rules of interception

procedure laid down by the country over which the interception is made.

There are officers of the U.S. forces in Canadian headquarters and formations and Canadian officers in the United States. There is an exchange of students between the Staff Colleges of the two countries.

United States students attend National Defence College but no Canadian students are at the United States National War College.

Procedures for the movement of ground forces, military equipment, aircraft and ships between the two countries have been much simplified during and since the war. Many joint exercises are carried out in Canada with a minimum of formality.

File No. 50209-40

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Original on
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TOP SECRET

18 December, 1953

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Dear Mr. Rogers,

Confirming our telephone conversation this morning, the following is a draft of the text of the reply which I think should be made to General Henry's message transmitted in Telegram WA-2866 dated 16 December, 1953, begins:-

Following for Major-General Henry, Chairman U.S. Section, PJBD, from General McNaughton, Chairman Canadian Section, begins:

Dear General Henry:

I have a telegram from the Canadian Embassy, Washington, giving the text of your letter of 11 December, 1953, in reply to my message of 10 November, 1953, transmitted to you through the Canadian Embassy, Washington, the following day.

I note the actions which have been taken by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, all of which appear to be in full accord with the conclusions

B. Rogers, Esq.,
Defence Liaison Division (1),
Department of External Affairs,
Ottawa.

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reached at the Meeting of Consultation between representatives of the Canadian and United States Governments on Continental Defence, held in Washington on Friday, 6 November, 1953.

As regards the proviso made to para. (d) by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff - it is of course the intention that the planning of the proposed early warning line on the 55th parallel will continue to be the subject of close discussion between the various agencies of the two Governments concerned, and that these discussions will include the questions of cost estimates and time schedules of construction and operation.

The Combined Military Study Group is now meeting and will, I expect, report progress on various aspects of the project. This report will be given the earliest consideration by Canadian authorities concerned. I hope that both Sections of the PJBD will be in a position to discuss these matters constructively at our forthcoming meeting at Colorado Springs.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) A. G. L. McNaughton
Chairman, Canadian Section,
Permanent Joint Board on Defence.


Text ends.

I would be obliged if you would consult Mr. Ritchie on the terms of this draft, and if he agrees, despatch it as a top secret message to the Canadian Embassy, Washington, with the request that it be transmitted to General Henry.

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Copies of Telegram WA-2866 and of the reply should be sent to the Service Members of the Canadian Section, PJBD, and also to the Chairman of the Canadian Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Yours sincerely,



A. G. L. McNaughton
Chairman, Canadian Section,
Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

P.S. I attach two extra copies for your convenience.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Reference: My Letter No. 2077 of Oct. 30, 1953.

Subject: Meetings of Consultation on
Continental Defence.

~~DOWNGRADED TO SECRET~~
REDUIT A SECRET

Security: TOP SECRET

No: 2451

Date: December 29, 1953.

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail:

Post File No: 3-4-3

Ottawa File No.

50209-40

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References

CCOS - (3 copies)

Sec Cabinet
CDRB

Gen McNaughton
Mr. Winters of
RFB

D of Def. Prod.

USSEA

American Div

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Dr. Solandt had a conversation with Mr. Arneson of the State Department concerning continental defence and an officer of this Embassy was present. In the course of the conversation Mr. Arneson referred to the northern Canadian early warning line as having equal priority in the view of the United States authorities to the southern line. It appeared that there might be some misunderstanding in Ottawa of this American view, and for that reason this Embassy re-examined the record and went over it with Mr. Arneson. The latter drew to our attention a passage in the record of the Meeting of Consultation held on October 22 and forwarded with my letter under reference.

2. The passage to which Mr. Arneson drew attention as bearing on this point is found on page 10 of the Canadian record of the meeting and is, you will note, a quotation from the remarks made by Admiral Radford and based on the directive of the National Security Council. The passage is as follows:

"We seek to bring into a high state of readiness over the next two years: (a) stronger fighter interceptor and anti-aircraft forces; (b) the northern Canadian early warning line, if proved feasible by current project CORRODE and the studies now in process; (c) an air control system; (d) gap filler radars for low altitude surveillance; (e) systems for the distant detection of submarines; miscellaneous plans for relocation of parts of the government; (f) miscellaneous programs in regard to internal security and civil defense."

3. Our understanding of the view of the United States authorities is that the northern line is regarded by them as having equal priority with the southern line. It is, however, recognized in the statement quoted above that the implementation of the plan for the northern line is dependent upon feasibility as shown by current studies. It is evidently thought here that, should feasibility be established, the northern line should be constructed on a basis of equal priority with the southern

D. J. Murray

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Extract from Despatch No. 4056
of December 21, 1953, from
The Permanent Representative of Canada to the
North Atlantic Council and the OEEC

"15. Mr. Dulles (United States) then spoke about atomic matters, in reply to a question by Mr. Van Zeeland (Belgium). As he had said two days earlier, the United States Administration was going to ask Congress to relax the present restrictions on dissemination of atomic information. The present law was passed when the United States had a virtual monopoly on atomic information and wished to prevent leaks to the Soviet. However, the law was now largely out of date; the Soviets had themselves developed atomic power by their own efforts and through espionage. Some of the NATO allies, in particular the United Kingdom and Canada, had also a large body of information. "Hence it would seem more gain than loss if the United States could speak more freely to its allies".

16. In the field of atomic weapons, the United States had now developed a great variety and number applicable to all three fighting services. Atomic power was, these days, almost a "conventional weapon". Indeed it is a cheaper explosive than conventional explosives. There was no sense in making a lot of weapons "if they could not be used"; (presumably he meant "used by the allies of the United States").

17. Mr. Pleven (France), pursuing the question of atomic weapons, asked how far these were interchangeable with ordinary weapons. "The most difficult problem in the coming years is to combine old techniques and old weapons with new techniques and new weapons". Moreover, he suggested that even though atomic weapons existed, a future war might be waged without using them because each nation possessing them might hesitate to use them first.

18. Mr. Dulles said that he was not sufficiently expert to reply about interchangeability. He readily agreed that it would be politically and morally better to allow the enemy to be the first to use atomic weapons. On the other hand he warned that this would involve a very great risk. Moreover, it would be extremely expensive to prepare to fight two different sorts of war with different sorts of weapons; preparations for one sort of war were expensive enough.

19. Mr. Bidault welcomed the United States intention to lift the restrictions on atomic information. Continuation of the present secrecy would be bad both for the efficiency of the alliance and for the morale of the people.

20. Mr. Pearson turned the discussion of atomic weapons toward their possible use by the Soviets against North America. He believed that this possibility was producing a new type of continentalism over there borne of the naturally strong desire for self defence. Continental defences were now being developed by Canada and the United States and these defences should be recognized as a part of the general NATO defences because Europe could not fight very long with the industrial power of North America knocked out.

- 2 -

21. Just as the North American desire for continental defence was a part of NATO, so also should be the European desire as expressed in the EDC. Moreover, the completion of this measure of "Europeanization" within the context of NATO would strengthen the will of North America to co-operate with Europe in common defence.

22. Turning to the question of security guarantees to be discussed at Berlin, Mr. Pearson hoped that the Big Three would recognize the deep concern of the other Atlantic powers as well as themselves. A small North Atlantic power with armed forces under NATO command in Europe would be involved in those guarantees just as much as the big powers themselves. It was therefore most desirable that there should be discussions of the security issue in the North Atlantic Council which had already proved a very useful forum for informal discussions.

23. Lord Ismay confirmed the usefulness of the informal meetings of the Council and described their nature. Mr. Bidault said that the Big Three would certainly keep Mr. Pearson's suggestion in mind. He also welcomed the suggestion, which Mr. Pearson had made earlier, that the final communique should make reference to the need for holding together the defence of the two continents by means of the NATO link.

24. Mr. Dulles, continuing the discussion of continental defence, emphasized that a balance had to be struck between, on the one hand, local defence and, on the other, ability to carry out an offensive which might have a strong deterrent influence. He confirmed that there were a number of vital targets in North America which were within easy range of atomic attack. However, if the United States were to try to establish complete defence, it would eat up much of the money needed for the deterrent striking power. This striking power is a common defence for all the countries concerned. So far, he was glad to say, there had been no panic in the United States in regard to local defence."

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Extract from House of Commons Debates
December 8, 1953

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Debate on Bill respecting Department of Northern Affairs
and National Resources.

p. 699

Mr. St. Laurent: There is another aspect which makes it necessary for us to give more attention to these northern territories and that is the fact that the Canadian north-land lies between the two greatest powers in the world at the present time, namely, the United States of America and the U.S.S.R., and our own security is probably made more difficult to provide for by the fact that this north land of ours is between these two great world powers. There will, no doubt, have to be joint measures taken for the security of the North American continent. It is a continental problem that presents itself for solution by that mere fact of geology. I am not going to say any more about it than was said by the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Claxton), but all these joint undertakings are carried out under the principle which the President enunciated from the head of the table here only three or four weeks ago. They are implemented with full respect for the sovereignty of the country in which they are carried out.

We must leave no doubt about our active occupation and exercise of our sovereignty in these northern lands right up to the pole. That is something which puts these lands in a somewhat different position from other parts of Canada. From other parts of Canada we get representations from the localities about the things that are required for their development. Here I think there must be someone having ministerial responsibility to take initiatives so we will not have to wait until there are representations from the so sparse population in the area as to what is required. It was for these reasons that it was held it would be desirable to have on the statute books a department of northern affairs and to have representatives of the department of northern affairs present in various parts of these territories and symbolic of the actuality of the exercise of Canadian sovereignty over them.

DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET
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INCOMING MESSAGE

ORIGINAL

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification

SECRET

File No.

50209-40

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Priority
IMPORTANT

System
CYPHER-AUTO

No. WA-2787

Date December 4, 1953.

Departmental
Circulation

MINISTER
UNDER/SEC
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POL/CO-ORD'N
SECTION
U.N.DIV.

Mr. Batten

Reference:

Subject: Continental Defence - NATO Meetings.

Following for the Acting Under-Secretary, Begins:

Following our telephone conversations I enquired as to United States statements to be made at the forthcoming NATO meeting in relation to the defence of the North American Continent. I find that it is not intended that Collins should make any reference to this subject to the Military Committee. The Secretary of State, however, has included in his draft speech the following passage:

"In considering the problem of what forces we can commit to the defence of Europe we have had to take account, in close consultation with our Canadian neighbours, of the increased urgency of providing for the defence of the North American Continent, which is part of the NATO area. We believe that the temptation to aggression will be great if it seems that our industrial power could be knocked out by an initial blow. No perfect defence against strong air attack is possible within the resources which we can devote to this purpose. However, both we and our Canadian allies feel that some additional defensive strength in North American will improve the overall defences of NATO and reduce the likelihood of war."

2. This will be followed by a reference to the significance of the Far East and Southeast Asia and the part being played by France in the latter.

3. The above extract from the draft of Dulles' speech was obtained informally and we have been asked to treat it in the greatest confidence. The State Department hope to be able to inform us if there are any amendments made before the Secretary leaves.

4. You will want to let Foulkes know what is intended. I suppose one of our own Ministers might relate continental measures to the relevant reference in approved NATO strategic guidance. Ends.

References

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Jwe*

DONE - COMM'S SECTION

Done DEC 5 - '53

Date

Done ERM

Date Dec. 8.


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December 1, 1953.

Dear Mr. Wight,


General McNaughton asked me to send to you, for the information of the United States Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, two copies of Hansard for November 26, 1953. On pages 361 to 365 are some remarks made by Mr. Claxton in his speech in the House of Commons on that day concerning Continental Defence. General McNaughton thought these would be of interest to you.

Yours sincerely,



W. H. Barton,
Secretary, Canadian Section.

Mr. Wm. L. Wight, Jr.,
Secretary, U. S. Section,
Permanent Joint Board on Defence,
Room 6261, New State Building,
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



File on 50209-46
W.H.B.

Extract from a speech by Mr. Claxton,
(Minister of National Defence)

NOVEMBER 26, 1953

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Luffenham will move to Marville when the airfield there is completed, making a total of twelve constituting the air division which with its headquarters at Metz is fully operational. It is equipped with F-86E Sabre fighters and is, as everyone knows, one of the most formidable fighting forces in Europe today.

These operations of the air force have involved a very large-scale job of transportation of aircraft overseas. The first three squadrons were taken on H.M.C.S. *Magnificent*; the last nine flew across in a series of operations called "leapfrogs"—one, two, three, four—and I am happy to say that these were also completed without loss. This required a great deal of organization, monitoring of ships with accompanying aircraft, providing patrol ships, navigational aids, stores at every landing point, and so on. I might indicate to hon. members something of the complexities and niceties of this operation when I say that on some of the legs the Sabre fighters arrived at their destination with less than 10 minutes of fuel left. So there was not much time to go anywhere else.

The Royal Canadian Navy has continued its build-up of ships to meet its commitments to SACLAN, and that has been carried on. We expect that we will be able to meet our peacetime commitments to SACLAN, as in the case of the other services, but in the navy there is still some distance to go. We are up to date with those we have furnished, but plenty of target dates have not yet arrived and we hope to meet them.

The navy, like the air force and the army, have taken part in extensive exercises and operations with other NATO countries, indicating that NATO is now a formation of trained combat units, equipped and skilled and having the leadership, communications and other necessities for combined operations. This is a very different situation from what it was three years ago.

It can be said that while NATO is not yet close to achieving its final target, it has built up sufficient strength in Europe to add greatly to the capacity of Europe to defend itself and give time for reserves to be deployed and also for the movement of weapons of all kinds, so that the primary objective of NATO can be said to have been achieved. But there is no end to any military objective. The build-up must continue, and it has had to be related to the facts and possibilities, military, economic and financial, of the NATO countries so it could make steady progress toward the desired goal.

In concluding this part of my remarks I should like to draw the attention of hon. members to the situation regarding Canadian

soldiers, sailors and airmen overseas. Today we have 20,000 personnel of the regular forces located in seven countries outside of Canada. There are about 7,500 in the Far East; over 400 in the United States; nearly 2,000 in the United Kingdom; about 100 in Belgium; 1,500 in France and over 7,500 in Germany. That represents today about one-fifth of the total regular strength of the Canadian armed forces.

You can imagine that this presents many problems, problems which Canada has not had to face before in peacetime. For example, with regard to the personnel alone, we have problems arising out of rotation, transportation, accommodation, training, welfare, educational services, the provision of chapels, married quarters, schools and stores. We will soon have located in Germany and France a number of little communities of Canadian service personnel with their wives and children. They are dependent upon the armed forces for what they need in the way of accommodation, schooling, religious and other services, and everything that goes or should go into making up normal community life. To provide this is quite a difficult operation in Canada, but you can imagine how difficult it is to carry on abroad, not only in view of the distances and the diverse conditions in those countries but also having regard to matters like civil and criminal jurisdiction, customs and excise taxes, postal and immigration regulations and all the other things that affect the servicemen, but affect still more the civilians accompanying service units. We have to work out arrangements with all the foreign governments concerned to arrive at satisfactory agreements regarding all these points. I am happy to say that these agreements have either been made or are well on the way to being made.

Finally there are the relations of the Canadian service personnel and their dependents with the civilian population in the host country. We have to recognize how important it is for Canada that our men, their wives and children, conduct themselves as Canadian ambassadors. We have to recognize how important it is that the citizens of the host country and those who are taking their place in the bulwarks of freedom there are really working for the same cause. We are not an occupying force, we are not a garrison force. We are there for the same reasons that they have armed forces. This presents a very challenging problem in public relations, both among our forces and with other countries. We are tackling this steadily as best we can.

Now, I thought that the house would like to have me say something about continental defence. This was dealt with though, not

for the first time, on page 3 of the white paper which was issued at the last session, where it was stated:

There has also been a substantial increase in the emphasis on the defence of North America against air attack.

In the last few months there has been a lot of talk in the press and elsewhere about continental defence. The realities of the subject have sometimes been obscured by the sort of Buck Rogerish features like inter-continental pilotless aircraft, long-range guided missiles, flying saucers and even death rays, but the realities are still very real and very serious.

The first talks with the government of the United States on joint defence began in 1938, and ever since then this subject of defence of North America has been under active consideration by representatives of Canada and the United States.

The wartime co-operation between Canada and the United States did not stop with victory. It continued on into the peace. On February 12, 1947 Mr. King made a very important statement on this subject in this chamber. Even at that time military teams of both countries were actively engaged in planning joint defence arrangements including continental air defence. This work was carried out under the chiefs of staff of both countries and was co-ordinated by the permanent joint board of defence. By the beginning of the second war it had become apparent that the continent of North America could be attacked by air.

Almost simultaneously with the development of long-range aircraft came the development of radar capable of making that attack much more difficult. This new device was invented and brought into effective use in Britain. The miracle of radar enabled skilled and courageous airmen to win the battle of Britain.

Effective air defence depends on the organized integration of three sets of operation, each one essential to do the job: first, the detection and identification of the enemy by radar, ground observers or other means; second, communication of this intelligence to a command centre and by that command centre to air and ground anti-aircraft defences and to all the various and important agencies for civil defence; third, aircraft and other anti-aircraft weapons to kill or drive off the attacking bombers.

In any country this is a highly difficult and complicated operation. In any country it is an exceedingly expensive operation. You can imagine that its complexity and expense increase enormously as the size of

the country increases. The area of North America is something between six and seven million square miles, and that fact increases greatly the difficulties and the expense of air defence. We should always remind ourselves that no means has yet been found to make any area so impregnable against air attack that no bombers will get through. Rich as our countries are, the combined resources of Canada and the United States in men, materials and money are not equal to undertake such an immense task even if it were possible.

As in all matters of defence, what we must do is to undertake first what is most urgent and most essential so we can make the best possible use of our resources available for defence. Even before 1947 service planning groups were working on plans for a system of air defence. I can say now one of its principal components was a radar chain across the far north. While such a radar chain might give us early warning of an approaching attack, between this Arctic radar chain and the main radar control system far to the south lay a vast and isolated area in which it was simply not practicable to build the complete gridwork of overlapping radar coverage which is necessary to keep attacking planes under continuous observation. Thus by the time any attackers had travelled the hundreds of miles between the first alarm and the nearest desirable target they would be completely lost to our defending control system.

Therefore such an isolated Arctic radar chain might provide an alarm which might not lead to effective action, while it might nevertheless be likely to immobilize all activities in all target areas. Moreover, it would be very easy to create this result by "spoofing" raids. That is, an enemy aircraft of any size would come in, being very careful indeed to get picked up on a radarscope. The alarm would go out 2,000 miles or 7,000 miles to the south. Activity would stop. The aircraft would either go back home or go in somewhere else. This project never reached the stage of discussion between governments.

There were a number of other developments. Something more than two years ago the two governments agreed to proceed at once to build up a system working upward and outward from the principal target areas, which would give protection to the most vulnerable areas against the most likely forms of attack. On February 25, 1953, for the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson), I tabled an exchange of notes covering this operation. Obviously everything that is done in Canada to strengthen

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the defence against air attack is done not only for the defence of Canada but, at least equally important, for the defence of targets in the United States. On this account the government and armed forces of the United States have been continuously associated with us in this operation. Arrangements were worked out so the construction and operation of roughly two-thirds of the stations in Canada would be paid for by the United States and one-third by Canada. Work on this project started at once and it has since proceeded expeditiously in accordance with our plans. That is, it has been under way for from two to three years. This system is partly in operation now, and it should be completed in a few months.

Simultaneously with the construction of these radar stations we have gone ahead with the construction of a system of communications embracing a radio relay system supported by land lines and backed up by high frequency radio. We have now largely constructed and partly in operation a military network to provide the necessary communications between the radar screens and the air defenders. You can judge something of the size of the system of communications required for air defence when I tell you that I have been informed that air defence in Britain during the war needed communication services equal to those necessary to carry all civilian traffic in peacetime.

Where existing airfields could be used, we have enlarged and opened them. We have constructed a number of satellite airfields and built emergency landing strips which are necessary in this kind of operation.

Unfortunately there were no aircraft in existence or even under design in any country which had the qualities we consider desirable to meet the threat of air attack across this continent as that threat might develop in the next few years. What was needed was a fighter aircraft with a range twice as great as any fighter in existence. It should have full instrumentation so as to make it useful at night and in all weather and over country presenting great navigational difficulties. It should have a fast rate of climb and good manoeuvrability. It should be able to take off and land using airfields of ordinary length. Finally, it had to carry a large armoury of versatile weapons and be capable of carrying air-to-air missiles when they became available.

These were some of the specifications for the CF-100 to satisfy the foreseen requirements of our own particular problem. It is the conviction of the manufacturers and of the R.C.A.F. that they have been met by the

present aircraft. Anyway, it is the only airplane in production anywhere today which can meet anything like our requirements. Indeed, no other country has an aircraft of equivalent performance in production and, so far as I know, we shall be in this position for some considerable time.

Other countries have expressed great interest in the CF-100, and it is not unreasonable to expect that later types of this aircraft will be used much more extensively, particularly as the role of the single-seater fighter comes closer to being met by virtually pilotless aircraft.

Some people seem to think that the contribution of the United States and Canada to the combined forces of the North Atlantic alliance in Europe had to do only with NATO, whereas working together for continental defence had to do only with North America. This is quite wrong, and wrong in two ways. In the first place our experience in two world wars has shown that we have had to go to Europe to fight a war for the defence of our countries, to win victory and to restore peace. Now we are doing the very much more sensible thing of going to Europe in peace so as to make it unnecessary for us to go to Europe in war. Combined defence of Europe under the North Atlantic alliance is defence of North America. North America is the citadel fortress of free peoples and free governments throughout the world. But the bastions of freedom lie also in Britain and France and in all the other 14 nations of NATO, and wherever free men stand against the menacing threat of communist imperialism.

In the second place, Canada and the United States are two signatories of the North Atlantic treaty, two partners in the North Atlantic alliance; and like the others we have formally agreed to defend each other's territory. The defence of North America is part of the defence of the North Atlantic region, and Canada and the United States constitute one of the five regional groups of NATO. In the North Atlantic treaty we—that is Canada and the United States—have agreed to plan and build up our joint defence as one of the regional groups of the North Atlantic area.

Far, therefore, from there being any conflict between our work for NATO and our work for continental defence, the two are simply two sides of the same coin, two parts of what, after all, is a world-wide objective, namely the preservation of peace and the defence of our freedom.

It has also sometimes been suggested that continental defence has been subordinated in importance and priority to the build-up of the combined forces of the North Atlantic treaty

nations in Europe. That is not the case. We have tried to build up our defences both at home and abroad as fast as both could be effectively done with the resources that were made available. It may be doubted if we could profitably have commenced work on our air defences in North America before we did because the aircraft, the means of communication and the radar equipment which we thought we needed to do this particular job were not even designed, still less in production here or anywhere else.

This job of design, development and production of the equipment for air defence in this country has been most complicated. We needed equipment of entirely new design. The operation was new because of its immense scope, and it raised problems which were new as well as difficult.

The exercises "Signpost", held in 1952, and "Tailwind" in 1953, as well as a number of other exercises, have demonstrated that the equipment has proved better than our expectations. While, of course, it is not 100 per cent effective—no air defence ever is or ever can be—it adds seriously to the hazard of attacking aircraft and so constitutes defence and a deterrent of sufficient importance to justify the large sums of money which it is costing.

As I mentioned, this part—and it is only one part—of the program of joint defence will be completed in 1954, but we are not stopping there. In the United States and here, both independently and in conjunction with the permanent joint board on defence, studies and other work are being pressed to find ways and means to improve these defences. The intelligence that the Russians had exploded an atom bomb was naturally a spur to these activities, and the production of additional long-range aircraft and atom bombs or still more destructive bombs increases the threat to North America. In time it might become possible to deliver so devastating an attack on this continent as to seriously cripple its military and industrial strength, actual and potential.

Work on continental defence has included some major research projects. In this, military and scientific experts of Canada and the United States have been working closely together. The reports on these matters are naturally highly secret, but enough has been said officially to indicate something of the magnitude of the requirements and the general character of the far-flung installations which are actually in construction or under consideration. New equipment is being subjected to the most comprehensive tests both technical and by trial in exercises and simu-

lated operations in which the best of our high-altitude, high-speed aircraft endeavour to penetrate the screens.

Much of this work has been carried on jointly through teams of Canadian and American military and scientific experts, but where they have carried on separately they have kept each other fully informed through the fullest and frankest exchange of information, subject to certain exceptions with regard to atomic information. This autumn there were several of these combined operations going on simultaneously. As a result we have received a report from a joint Canada-United States team engaged on this work, and senior officials representing both countries have had a number of meetings. There has been complete agreement. The chiefs of staff of each country have recommended that this report be acted upon, and the Canadian government has indicated its intention to proceed with this at once.

As the President of the United States said in his address in this chamber on November 14:

In our approach to the problem, we both realize that purest patriotism demands and promotes effective partnership. Thus we evolve joint agreements on all those measures we must jointly undertake to improve the effectiveness of our defences, but every arrangement rests squarely on the sovereign nature of each of our two peoples.

The equipment which is being considered for this new development has been subject to extensive tests. One type of equipment which may be used is known as the "McGill fence", and this was designed, produced and tested in Canada, largely at McGill university. Plans for surveys and production designs for this additional project are already under way and I expect that much of the equipment will be produced in Canada to Canadian design and on Canadian initiative, though what we do will, of course, be undertaken with the full agreement and support of the United States. The new development is intended to increase substantially the likelihood of our having additional time of warning, and also to give us additional assurance against the risks of paralysis through "spoofing".

It should not be thought that this new project is the only matter under study and consideration. At the same time other studies, surveys, research, development and construction are being proceeded with in each country.

To summarize:

1. Representatives of Canada and the United States have all aspects of continental defence constantly before them for study and action, and the two governments are in general agreement.

[Mr. Claxton.]

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2. Measures recommended by the chiefs of staff on the basis of recent studies have been agreed to, and we are pressing on with surveys and the design and construction of additional defences.

3. Further work will be considered with a view to agreed action in accordance with the results of studies, surveys, tests and exercises that are underway or that may be undertaken.

4. As stated in the joint communique issued by the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) and the President on November 14, there is complete agreement on the vital importance of effective methods of joint defence against direct attack.

5. Experience has shown that the machinery for planning and action for joint defence has worked well, but if any changes appear desirable they will be made.

I have taken this time, Mr. Speaker, to give the house as fully as it is possible to do this account of the background and of the actual stage we have reached with regard to the development of plans and projects for joint defence, and also with regard to the specific development that I have mentioned. This represents another step forward in the co-operation of Canada and the United States to preserve our security and our way of life on this continent as part of the operations of the United Nations and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The great need and the main problem before us was pointed up by General Gruenther, who is the supreme commander of the allied forces in Europe, when he said:

Never was there a greater need among the NATO nations for unity, for wisdom, and for perseverance. Never was there a greater need to see clearly that our lives are bound inextricably together. Never was there a greater need to continue to work together to build our defensive strength for peace.

He went on to say:

... This effort is an international one. It depends ultimately upon the understanding of the peoples we serve that the best—indeed the only—defence for each is the defence of all.

The need for unity of purpose, of will and of action, and determination and perseverance to carry it out has been pointed out on many occasions. It is a challenge to our grand alliance together. Above everything else we should have unity of purpose, agreement and understanding and continued good friendship with our neighbour, the United States.

I was struck, more struck than I have been at any time during the 13 years I have been in this house, with the way in which the Canadian people arrive at essential unity

with respect to great purposes, as was shown in this House of Commons yesterday afternoon. It struck me, as it must have struck other hon. members, when I listened to the speech of the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson), supported as he was so able, so magnificently, if I may say so, by the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Drew), and so well by the leaders of the other parties, how truly the members of this house reflected the feeling of the Canadian people that nothing must come between the United States and Canada which will affect that unity of purpose which is so necessary if we are to preserve our way of life and our security. It is our strongest defence and on it all military defence depends. If it fails in any respect, how could we possibly count with confidence on the 14 nations of NATO standing together?

I am sure the contributions made yesterday will be an added tie in preventing any such failure, and I am sure the relations between Canada and the United States with regard to continental defence and their joint work together for a common purpose will continue to be an example to other nations. I am sure too that these other nations will continue to work with us along the lines indicated by General Gruenther and his great predecessor General Eisenhower as the one way not only to deter aggression but to preserve peace and preserve our security at home and abroad.

Mr. George H. Hees (Broadview): Mr. Deputy Speaker, through you I would like to offer my congratulations to the Speaker on his appointment to his high office, and I would also like to offer my congratulations to you on your appointment. I think both appointments were among the most popular that have been made on parliament hill for quite some time.

This afternoon the matter I want to speak about is one which, although it is not a current problem, is nevertheless a matter which is very important to working people throughout this country, and particularly to municipal governments from coast to coast.

We all know from past experience that the economic pendulum swings both ways, and although today we are enjoying a buoyant economy, I think we must be prepared to look after human needs on a level comparable to Canadian standards of living in case we should be so unfortunate at some future time to be involved in a recession, with its consequent employment difficulties.

If unemployment should increase to a marked degree at some future time, then there are going to be a great many people in this country who will exhaust their unemployment insurance credits, and, through no fault of their own, will be unable to find a job. These people must go on living, and they

cannot do so unless they have the funds to provide food, clothing and shelter for themselves and their families.

These people cannot wait around while this matter is debated in this house, and the buck passed back and forth between various levels of government. I believe we must decide now who is going to bear this burden if conditions should go against us.

For several years now conferences of mayors and reeves throughout this country have been passing resolutions urging this government to accept its responsibilities in this matter, and the reasons they have put forward are five in number.

First, the federal government is the only level of government capable of financing such a program. Today the unemployment insurance fund amounts to nearly one billion dollars, and it continues to grow daily.

Second, the federal government is the only government which has the machinery to administer a program of this kind.

Third, this would avoid the duplication in administration which would occur if various levels of government were attempting to handle this program.

Fourth, uniform standards of assistance would be assured to all Canadians.

Fifth, the limited sources of revenue available to the provinces and municipalities make it impossible for these bodies to meet the financial burden.

I believe these requests by the municipalities to the federal government have been put forward on very logical grounds. They are two in number; first, that the economy of the country is guided to a very large extent by the fiscal policies of the federal government and they, in turn have a very direct bearing on employment as a whole; second, municipalities simply do not have the sources of revenue necessary to meet this problem when it arises, and the problem must be met when it does arise.

Therefore I urge the government to bring forward legislation at some time in the near future which will assure that people whose unemployment insurance credits have expired, and who through no fault of their own are unable to find jobs, may continue to receive unemployment insurance benefits. I believe we should take this decision now, so the machinery can be put into operation if and when it is ever necessary.

Now, Mr. Speaker, I would like to say that the measure I have outlined, although it is a necessary one to meet adverse conditions whenever they arise, is of necessity only a negative approach to this problem. The

[Mr. Hees.]

positive approach is that we should do everything possible to make sure that these adverse conditions do not arise.

I believe the most constructive step this government can take is to give assistance and encouragement to industries to participate in comprehensive and continuing programs of industrial research.

This kind of program, I believe, should have two objectives; first of all, to assist in the development of new sources of cheap power which will attract new industries; second, to provide inducements to industries which will encourage them to develop new and better techniques, which will enable us to process far more of our primary products than we have in the past.

An example of research leading to the possible development of an additional source of cheap power is an investigation into the possibilities of the Passamaquoddy dam project in New Brunswick. This project holds the possibility of an additional million horsepower. The preliminary surveys of this project indicate that it could be economically sound, and that it could provide the maritime provinces with a very important source of cheap power. I believe this government should make available the funds necessary to carry on a thorough investigation to find out if this is or is not a practical project; and if it is discovered to be practical, I believe it should be proceeded with without delay.

We all know that industry goes to power, and if it is possible to develop additional sources of cheap power in the maritime provinces, then industries will locate there, and that will make the economy of the maritimes far less dependent on the primary products which they produce. To me, Mr. Speaker, this is the only practical way I know to effectively decentralize industry. We hear many speeches urging and agreeing with the idea of decentralization of industry. This, I think, is a practical approach to the problem.

Now I should like to deal with an example of research leading to the development of new industries, which I think could take the form of assistance given to the potential oil and gas by-products industry in western Canada. We all know that in Alberta, and to a lesser extent in British Columbia, Saskatchewan and Manitoba, we have enormous resources of gas and oil. In recent years more than \$5 billion of these reserves have been proved up, and we know that we have discovered only a small fraction of the reserves which are confidently believed to be present.

If the incentive for exploration is continued by the opening up of additional markets for these products, and if that expansion is

CONFIDENTIAL

November 24, 1953.

Mr. Benton
Mr. Mackay
MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

50209-40

50209-40
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Subject: Continental Defence

*Seen by
H. H. Wrong*

You may be interested in seeing the attached text of the speech on continental defence which Mr. Claxton proposes to deliver in the House of Commons in the near future.

This copy of the speech contains the revisions proposed by the United States Defense Department, and also a number of changes suggested by General McNaughton. I think that these revisions have taken care of the points which we were concerned about when we saw an earlier draft.

RAH

|^u H. H. Wrong

26-11-10 (SS)
25.11.3 (JS)

000820

CONTINENTAL DEFENCE

FILE COPY

In the last few months there has been a lot of talk in the press and elsewhere about continental defence.

The realities of the subject have sometimes been obscured by the introduction into these stories of Buck Rogers' features like inter-continental pilotless aircraft, long range guided missiles, flying saucers and death rays.

The first talks with the government of the United States over joint defence began in 1938, and since then there hasn't been a moment when the subject of defence of North America has not been under active consideration by representatives of Canada and the United States.

By the beginning of the Second World War it had become apparent that the continent of North America could be attacked by air.

Almost simultaneously with the development of long range aircraft capable of making such an attack came the development of radar.

This new device was invented and brought into effective use in Britain. The miracle of radar enabled skilled and courageous airmen to win the Battle of Britain.

The wartime co-operation of Canada and the United States did not stop with victory but continued on into the peace. You may remember that on February 12, 1947, Mr. King made an important joint statement on joint defence

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in this Chamber.

Even at that time military teams of both countries were actively engaged in planning joint defence arrangements, including those for continental air defence. This work was carried on under the Chiefs of Staff of each country and it was co-ordinated through the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

As I have pointed out, on a number of occasions, an effective air defence depends on the organized integration of three sets of operations, each one essential to do the job:

First, detection and identification of the enemy by radar, ground observers or other means.

Second, communication of this intelligence to a command centre and by that command centre to air and ground anti-aircraft defences and to all the various and important agencies for civil defence.

Third, aircraft and other anti-aircraft weapons to kill or drive off the attacking bombers.

In any country this is a highly complicated and difficult operation.

In any country this is an exceedingly expensive operation.

You can imagine that its complexity and expense increase enormously as the size of the country increases.

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Now ...

- 3 -

Now the area of North America is something between six and seven million square miles. No means exist to make such an area impregnable against air attack.

Rich as our countries are, the combined resources of the United States and Canada in men, materials and money are not equal to undertake such an immense task even if it were required.

As in all matters of defence, what we must do is to undertake first what is most urgent and most essential so that we make the best use we can of our resources available for defence.

Even before 1947 service planning groups were working on plans for a system of air defence, and I can say now that one of their principal components was a radar chain across the Far North.

This draft plan had one major defect. While such a radar chain might give us early warning of an approaching attack, between this arctic radar chain and the main radar control system far to the south lay a vast and isolated area in which it was simply not practicable to build the complete gridwork of overlapping radar coverage which is necessary to keep attacking planes under continuous observation. Thus, by the time any attackers had travelled the hundreds of miles between the first alarm and the nearest desirable targets they would be completely lost to

- 4 -

our defending control system. Therefore, the only effect of such an isolated arctic radar chain would be to provide an alarm which was impossible of effective utilization and which would nevertheless be likely to immobilize all activity in all target areas. Moreover, it would be very easy indeed to create this result by "spoofing" raids.

Obviously, a system of defence in depth by radar stations arranged in overlapping circles, with the accompanying communications and supporting air stations and fighters so as to cover the whole continent was utterly out of the question.

This project never reached the stage of discussion between governments.

There were a number of other developments. Something more than two years ago the two governments agreed to proceed at once to build up one system working outwards from the principal target areas and which would give protection to the most vulnerable areas against the most likely forms of attack. On February 25, 1953, I tabled an exchange of notes covering this operation.

Obviously, everything that is done in Canada to strengthen defence against air attack is done not only for the defence of Canada, but even more for the defence of targets (which, we must admit, are frequently more attractive) in the United States.

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On this account, the government and armed forces of the United States have been continuously associated with us in this operation.

The arrangements were worked out so that the construction and operation of roughly two-thirds of the stations in Canada would be paid for by the United States and one-third by Canada.

Work on this project started at once and it has since proceeded expeditiously in accordance with our plans. This system is partly in operation now and it should be completed in a few months.

Simultaneously with the construction of these radar stations we have gone ahead with the construction of a system of communications by microwave. We have now largely constructed and have partly in operation a military microwave network to provide the necessary communications between the radar screens and the air defenders. You can judge something of the size of the system of communications required for air defence when I tell you that I have been informed that air defence in Britain during the war needed communications services equal to those necessary to carry all civilian traffic in peacetime.

Where existing airfields could be used, we have enlarged and opened them. We have constructed a number of satellite airfields and built emergency landing

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strips that are necessary in this kind of operation.

Unfortunately there were no aircraft in existence or even under design in any country which had the qualities which we considered desirable to meet the threat of air attack across this continent as that threat might develop in the next few years.

What was needed was a fighter aircraft with a range twice as great as any fighter in existence. It should have full instrumentation so as to make it useful at night and in all weather and over country presenting great navigational difficulties. It had to have a fast rate of climb and good manoeuvrability. It should be able to take off and land using airfields of ordinary length. Finally, it had to carry a large armoury of versatile weapons and be capable of carrying air-to-air missiles when these were produced.

These were some of the specifications for the CF-100 to satisfy the foreseen requirements of our own particular problem. It is the conviction of the manufacturers and of the R.C.A.F. that they have been met by the present aircraft.

Anyway, it is the only airplane in production anywhere today which can meet anything like our requirements. Indeed no other country has an aircraft of equivalent performance in production or, so far as I know, even under design.

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We ...

- 7 -

We are being approached to provide CF-100s for use in Europe and it is not unreasonable to expect that later types of this aircraft will be used much more extensively, particularly as the role of the single-seater fighter comes closer to being met by virtually automatic or pilotless interceptors.

People talk as if continental defence had been subordinated in importance and priority to the build-up of the combined strength of the North Atlantic nations in Europe.

That is not the case at all. We have built up our defences both at home and abroad as fast as possible with the resources available. Both are necessary to build up our security and preserve peace, which are the primary objectives of the free nations.

We couldn't profitably have commenced work on our air defences in North America before we did because the aircraft, the proper means of communications and the radar equipment were not even designed, still less in production. It was the right course to take advantage of the time so long as the possibility of trans-polar attack remained remote.

This job of design, development and production of the equipment for air defence in this country has been an enormously complicated one. We needed equipment of

entirely... 000827

- 8 -

entirely new design. We were engaged in an operation which was entirely novel in concept. The problems raised were themselves so new that they had to be identified before they could be answered.

I am glad to say that the exercises "Signpost", held in 1952, and "Tailwind" in 1953, as well as a number of other exercises, have demonstrated that the equipment has proved better than our expectations. While, of course, it isn't 100% effective - no air defence ever is or ever can be - it adds seriously to the hazard of attacking aircraft and so constitutes a deterrent of sufficient importance to justify the large sums of money which it is costing.

As I mentioned, this part, and it is only one part, of the programme of joint defence will be completed in 1954, but we are not stopping there.

In the united States and here, both independently and in conjunction with the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, studies are being continuously carried on to see how these defences can be improved.

Naturally, the intelligence that the Russians had exploded an atom bomb was a spur to this activity, and

the ...

- 9 -

the production of additional long range aircraft and atom bombs or still more destructive bombs increases the threat to North America. In time it might become possible to deliver so devastating an attack on this continent as seriously to cripple its military and industrial strength, actual and potential.

Work on continental defence has included some major research projects. In this, military and scientific experts of Canada and the United States have been working closely together. The reports on these matters are naturally highly secret, but enough has been said officially to indicate something of the magnitude of the requirements and the general character of the far-flung installations which are actually in construction or under consideration. New equipment is being subjected to the most comprehensive tests both technical and by trial in exercises and simulated operations in which the best of our high altitude, high speed aircraft endeavour to penetrate the screens.

Much of this work has been carried on jointly through teams of Canadian and American military and scientific experts, but where they have carried on separately, they have kept each other fully informed through the fullest and frankest exchange of information.

This autumn there were several of these combined operations going on simultaneously.

- 10 -

As a result we have received a report from a Canadian team engaged on this work and senior officials representing both countries have had a number of meetings. There has been complete agreement. The Chiefs of Staff of each country have recommended that this report be acted on and the Canadian government has indicated its intention to proceed with this at once.

As the President of the United States said in his address to this House on November 14:

"In our approach to the problem, we both realize that purest patriotism demands and promotes effective partnership. Thus we evolve joint agreements on all those measures we must jointly undertake to improve the effectiveness of our defenses, but every arrangement rests squarely on the sovereign nature of each of our two peoples."

The equipment which is being considered for this new development has been subject to extensive tests. One type of equipment which may be used is known as the "McGill Fence", and this was designed, produced and tested in Canada, largely at McGill University.

Plans for surveys and production designs of this are already under way and I expect that much of the equipment will be produced in Canada to Canadian design and on Canadian initiative, though what we do will, of course, be undertaken with the full agreement and support of the United States.

The new development is intended to increase substantially the likelihood of our having additional time of warning and also give us additional assurance against the ris

000830

- 11 -

of paralysis through "spoofing".

It should not be thought that this new project is the only matter under study and consideration. At the same time, other studies, surveys, research, development and construction are being proceeded with in each country.

To summarize:

1. Representatives of Canada and the United States have all aspects of continental defence constantly before them for study and action and the two governments are in general agreement.
2. Measures recommended by the Chiefs of Staff on the basis of recent studies have been agreed to and the R.C.A.F. is pressing on with surveys and the design and construction of additional defences.
3. Further work will be considered with a view to agreed action in accordance with the results of studies, surveys, tests and exercises that are under way or that may be undertaken.
4. As stated in the joint communique issued by the Prime Minister and the President on November 14, there is complete agreement on the vital importance of effective methods of joint defence against direct attack.
5. Experience has shown that the machinery for planning and action for joint defence has worked well, but if any changes appear desirable they will be made.

I should emphasize the fact that planning for defence and building up defence is a continuous process. While it is usually desirable to have a programme related to specific years, it should not for a moment be thought that the completion of any one programme means that we have reached the end of the road. Planning stretches forward as far as we can usefully see into the years ahead. It takes

000831

five ...

- 12 -

five years or more to design, develop and get into production any new type of aircraft. Only now after a third of a century are we getting close to the point where we may have a rifle which is a substantial improvement on the rifle we used in the Great War of 1914-1918.

What is important is that we should use the resources that are made available to us to build up our strength. This requires the exercise of foresight based on the best knowledge we can get so that we don't get into blind alleys and don't buy or make a lot of equipment which will be obsolete before it is likely to be in service.

What I have just said has particular relevance to the subject of ground defences against air attack.

We now have in Canada a number of the latest types of heavy anti-aircraft guns with the latest types of predictor and tracking equipment. We haven't got as many as we would have had if we were sure that these weapons would be the best we could get for a considerable period. We have deliberately not used our limited resources to obtain more than a minimum number of these weapons because we believe that before very long this type of equipment will be largely, though not entirely, replaced by ground-to-air guided missiles.

Similarly, we have and are making a considerable number of the latest types of naval anti-aircraft guns, the 3-inch 50. This is a remarkable weapon for use against

high-speed ... 000832

- 13 -

high-speed aircraft, but here too it may well prove to be the case that later types of guns will only come into production at about the same time as very efficient ship-to-air rockets.

No country - not even the United States - can afford to have everything of the latest and best. What must be done is to select the weapons which are most likely to enable us to meet the needs we regard as most urgent over the greatest period of time and, of course, at a cost justified by performance. In a good many cases an extra 10% or even 5% of performance may increase the cost by 100%. Such a disproportionate differential might not be justified in motor vehicles but it might be in fighter aircraft.

I want to assure you that in co-operation with our allies, particularly Britain and the United States, we have the advantage of full information about everything they have (subject only to exceptions about atomic warfare), we have scientists and military personnel integrated with their staffs and their research and development teams, just as they have with ours, and we try to use these resources of informed knowledge by getting as much as we can of the best of what any one of the three of us produce.

This leads me on to the subject of standardization. You will recall that following a suggestion I made, a

conference . 000833

- 14 -

conference of defence ministers was held at Washington in August 1951. In consequence of this a fresh attack was made on the vexing question of a standard rifle and round.

As a result of this, I can now announce that agreement has been reached on the most important element, namely, the round, by Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States and Belgium.

This will no doubt be concurred in by other countries, and Hon. Members will agree that it constitutes a great step forward.

We may hope that this will be followed by agreement upon the almost equally important matter of the rifle. Good progress is being made.

I should also refer again to the standard screw thread. As is well known, this was under consideration by the National Standardization Committee and later the National Research Council over a long period. It was to a considerable degree due to Canadian initiative and activity in the Permanent Joint Board on Defence that agreement on a standard thread was reached between the United States, Britain and Canada.

The standardized thread is the basic requirement for all our inter-nation service standardization. Standardization is now an established fact not only as

regards ...

000834

- 15 -

regards sizes, number of threads to the inch, form of thread, size of bolt head, shape and thickness of nuts, etc., but also as regards standards of fits for various kinds of use. The United States, Britain and Canada are almost at the point of interchangeability in engineering drawings so that one nation's designs can be used directly in the workshops of the others.

50209-40.



File
wrb-

MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

Ottawa, November 23, 1953.

SECRET

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Dr. R. A. MacKay,
Assistant Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
East Block,
O t t a w a.

Dear Dr. MacKay,

Mr. Claxton asked me to send you
the enclosed piece on "Continental Defence".

Yours very truly,

I. Dunn

(Miss) I. Dunn,
Private Secretary.

Note for file

Text sent to SSEA -

wrb.

23.11.32(us)

000836

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

REDUIT A SECRET

OTTAWA FILE

No. 50209-46

Letter No. 2242

Date..Novembar..21..1953.....

52 50
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TOP SECRET

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference..Your..Letter..No..D-1323..of..November..18..1953.....

Subject:...Future..Meatings..of..Consultation.....

I quite agree with you that the meetings of consultation which were resumed with such useful results on October 22 should now be continued, but that they should revert to their original purpose to provide an opportunity for the exchange of views on developments in the world situation which might necessitate the use of atomic weapons. If for any special reason the subject of continental defence needs to arise again in these meetings, I am sure that there would be mutual agreement between the United States representatives and ourselves to discuss this subject. However, as you say, it is desirable that the existing channels, i.e., the PJBD and the regular diplomatic channels, should be used normally for this purpose.

2. From our talks with the State Department, and particular Mr. Arneson, I gather that these views are generally shared by them. They are quite prepared to have a further meeting, possibly after the tripartite conference at Bermuda. We gather that they have not yet resumed meetings of consultation with the British since the new Administration took over. I suppose that, in effect, some of the discussion at the Bermuda conference will take the form of the type of tour d'horizon which usually takes place at these meetings of consultation. I do not know whether you wish us to raise again the possibility of putting the meetings of consultation on a tripartite basis. Of course, if we are to discuss continental defence in such meetings, there might be a disadvantage in such an arrangement.

3. When we do have the next meeting, Mr. Arneson has suggested informally that Mr. Bowie, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, might make a more detailed statement on the developments in the world situation and the way in which the new Administration regards the various danger spots. We have not yet had the views of the new Administration in this way. I do think, however, that if we are to have this type of discussion, it would be useful to have some assistance from the Department in the form of questions that might be asked, and if possible some comments on the way in which we regard some of the more important situations which might give rise to war.

4. As to participation in these meetings, I gather that the State Department are quite content to have General Foulkes and Admiral Radford participate in

- 2 -

further meetings, if this is desired on our side. It seems to me that the participation of the Chiefs of Staff in these discussions is useful and should be encouraged.

D. J. P. Murray

INCOMING MESSAGE

ORIGINAL

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

File
WMB

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification

S E C R E T

File No.

50209-40

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Priority
IMMEDIATE

System
CYPHER-AUTO

No. **WA-2678**

Date **November 20, 1953.**

Departmental
Circulation

MINISTER
UNDER/SEC
D/UNDER/SEC
A/UNDER/SEC'S
POL/CO-ORD 'N
SECTION
U.N.DIV.

Reference:

Subject: Text of your proposed statement on continental defence.

Following for Mr. Claxton from Heeney, Begins:

The text you sent me was taken up promptly with the State Department and the Department of Defense. As I reported in my previous message, Bedell Smith and all others concerned fully appreciate the desirability of an affirmative statement by you on continental defence, putting this matter in its proper perspective. They have asked for a number of changes, however, to reflect the fact that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff have so far not (repeat not) taken action on the proposals put to the United States authorities by Foulkes and myself at the meeting of consultation on November 6. The fact, therefore, is that neither the Joint Chiefs of Staff, still less the President, has actually approved our latest proposals on joint action on these proposals, and this approval is not expected for another week.

2. The first change requested is to omit the last sentence of the fifth paragraph beginning "As a result we have received", i.e., the sentence to be omitted is the following: "As the President indicated in his speech here this also has full governmental approval in the United States". Instead, it has been suggested here that you might wish to add the following sentence to the end of the third paragraph beginning "Much of this work". This sentence would read as follows "As the President of the United States said in his address to this House on November 14, 'in our approach to the problem, we both realize that purest patriotism demands and promotes effective partnership. Thus we evolve joint agreements on all those measures we must jointly undertake to improve the effectiveness of our defenses, but every arrangement rests squarely on the sovereign nature of each of our two peoples.'"

.....2

Hon. B. Claxton
National
Defence

Done RLO

Date 20 Nov. 53

Date

- 2 -

3. The second change occurs in the sixth paragraph beginning "The equipment which will go into this new development.....". As the decisions have not yet been made on the equipment, it is suggested that this first sentence be changed to read: "The equipment which is being considered for this new development has been subject to extensive tests".

4. Three changes have also been suggested in the summary at the end of your text:

(a) Because our latest proposals have not yet been agreed to, the United States authorities would prefer that you omit the second point in the summary which reads, "every proposal put forward by either country has been agreed to and acted upon"; instead, they would prefer that you add to the first point the following words: "and the two governments are in general agreement". Thus, point one would read, "Representatives of Canada and the United States have all aspects of continental defence constantly before them for study and action and the two governments are in general agreement."

(b) In the third point, they would prefer you omit the words "The further" at the beginning of the sentence and conclude this sentence at the words "additional defences". Thus, point three would read: "Measures recommended by the Chiefs of Staff on the basis of recent studies have been agreed to and the RCAF is pressing on with surveys and the design and construction of additional defences".

(c) Finally, they would prefer to have point six reworded to read as follows: "As stated in the joint communique issued by the Prime Minister and the President of the United States on November 14, there is complete agreement on the vital importance of effective methods of joint defence against direct attack".

RECEIVED
COMMUNICATIONS
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1953 NOV 11 AM 9 40

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INCOMING MESSAGE

ORIGINAL

Copies No.../...of 20 copies.

FROM:

THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

~~DOWNGRADED TO SECRET~~

REDUIT A SECRET

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification

TOP SECRET

File No.

50209-40

52 58

Priority

System

No. WA-2658

Date November 19, 1953.

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER - AUTO

Reference:

Subject: Continental defence.

Following for Mr. Claxton from Heeney, Begins:

On receipt this morning of your message of yesterday's date about your proposed intention to make a statement on continental defence in the course of the debate now in progress in the House, I saw General Bedell Smith. He told me that he was entirely favourable to the idea that you should make a statement along the lines you have suggested, putting the whole subject of continental defence into a proper perspective. He also made arrangements to have the draft of any text cleared without delay through Assistant Secretary, Livingston Merchant, who was present at the interview. Ends.

Departmental
Circulation

MINISTER
UNDER/SEC
D/UNDER/SEC
A/UNDER/SEC'S
POL/CO-ORD'N
SECTION
U.N. DIV.

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10 NOV 1953
References

Claxton
(DND)

one CMC

date Nov. 19/53

CLEARED
COMMUNICATIONS
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1953 NOV 19 PM 3 : 16

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DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
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Ext. RA

Copy on 50028-BD-40

OTTAWA FILE
No. 50209-40

52 50
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
TOP SECRET

Letter No. 2206
Date November 18, 1953

Jm (W)

FROM: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference: Your Letter No. D-1165 of October 15, 1953.

Subject: Continental Defence.

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19 NOV 1953

I return herewith the copy of NIE-90 entitled
"Soviet Bloc Capabilities Through Mid-1955" in accordance with your request.

[Signature]
The Embassy.

Copies Referred To

No. of Enclosures
1

Post File
No.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO:.....The Canadian Embassy,.....
.....WASHINGTON, D.C.

Security:.....TOP SECRET.....

No:.....D-1323.....

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Date:.....November 18, 1953.....

Enclosures:.....

Air or Surface Mail:.....Surface.....

Post File No:.....

Reference:..Your Letter No.: 2173 of November 11, 1953.
Subject:....Future Meetings of Consultation.....

Ottawa File No.

50209-40

54

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References

A/Secretary
to Cabinet;

Chairman,
Chiefs of
Staff.

I should like to comment on the final paragraph of your Letter No. 2173, in which you express the view that unless there are other matters in the field of continental defence which require the immediate attention of the United States authorities at a high level, we should allow a little time to elapse before requesting any further meetings.

2. I think we should bear in mind that the original purpose of these meetings of consultation (which are essentially informal in character) was only to exchange views on developments in the world situation which might necessitate the use of atomic weapons. I do not question the propriety of discussing continental defence under this heading, and under the particular circumstances I think we were right in using the meeting as a means of notifying the United States Government of the Canadian decisions with respect to the Southern Early Warning Line. I wonder, however, if in future we should not limit the functions of these discussions solely to that of consultation, and make use of the channels established for the purpose (i.e., the PJBD and regular diplomatic channels), whenever we desire to take up any matter of policy with the United States Government. I agree with you that Meetings of Consultation should be held infrequently and only when there is an appropriate problem of great importance on which it is desired to exchange views.

3. I should be grateful for your comments on these thoughts regarding the purpose and character of the Meetings of Consultation.

C. S. A. RITCHIE

for

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Internal
Circulation

American Div.
Defence Liaison (2) Div.

Distribution
to Posts

18.11.28 (05)

E X T R A C T

from

Text of Address by President Eisenhower prepared for delivery to Members of the Canadian Senate and House of Commons, delivered in the Chamber of the House of Commons, Ottawa, On Saturday, November 14, 1953.

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My third observation is this: you of Canada and we of the United States can and will devise ways to protect our North America from any surprise attack by air. And we shall achieve the defense of our continent without whittling our pledges to Western Europe or forgetting our friends in the Pacific.

The basic threat of Communist purpose still exists. Indeed the latest Soviet communication to the Western world is truculent, not to say arrogant, in tone. Our security plans must now take into account soviet ability to employ atomic attack on North America, as well as on countries friendly to us, lying closer to the USSR. Their atomic stockpile will, of course, increase in size, and means of delivery will improve as time goes on.

Each of our two nations seeks a secure home for realization of its destiny. Defense of our soil presents a challenge to both our peoples. It is a common task. Defensively, as well as geographically, we are joined beyond any possibility of separation. This element in our security problem is an accepted guide of the service leaders, the government officials and the legislatures on both sides of the border. In our approach to the problem, we both realize that purest patriotism demands and promotes effective partnership. Thus we evolve joint agreements on all those measures we must jointly undertake to improve the effectiveness of our defenses, but every arrangement rests squarely on the sovereign nature of each of our two peoples.

Canada and the United States are equal partners and neither dares to waste time. There is a time to be alert and a time to rest. These days demand ceaseless vigilance. We must be ready and prepared. The threat is present. The measures of defense have been thoroughly studied by official bodies of both countries. The permanent joint board on defense has worked assiduously and effectively on mutual problems. Now is the time for action on all agreed measures.

D.L.(1) K.W.MacLellan/ams

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO:MR.. WERSHOF.....

.....MR.. BARTON.....

FROM:K.W.MacLellan.....

REFERENCE:~~DOWNGRADED TO SECRET~~.....

.....~~REDUIT A SECRET~~.....

SUBJECT:Continental Defence.....

SecurityTOP..SECRET.....

Date...November..12.,1953..

File No.

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file copy on 50045-E-40

copy on 50210-B-40

General Foulkes reported to this morning's briefing meeting on his and Mr. Heeney's meeting with Bedell Smith and General Ridgway to discuss continental defence. The General stated that the U.S. had been informed that Canada was prepared to establish the "McGill Fence" at the 55th parallel line and that the Canadian Government had agreed in principle that the R.C.A.F. should make the survey. Canada would take the initiative in construction of the "Fence" subject to the review of the question of sharing costs. If the line should cost less than \$50 million, Canada may bear the cost itself. But if the cost exceeded that amount, the question of cost-sharing might be discussed by the P.J.B.D. The General said that the U.S. had been informed that Canada had no interest in a far northern line, and the U.S. had informed Canada that they intended to establish Picket ships forthwith. The General commented that it would be much better if Canada could avoid any obligation for manning Picket ships. The U.S. agreed that the Study Group should consider the question of equipment.

2. The General commented that no references to the 55th parallel should be made in future. It was senseless, he said, to make it any easier for the Russians than it is now and he informed the

- 2 -

meeting that the title "Southern Canadian Early Warning Line" had been tentatively agreed upon as an appropriate title. The Representative of the Chief of the Air Staff mentioned that Air Commodore Clements had been using a different title and he would attempt to clarify the question.



K. W. MacLellan.

Ext. L

US/SEA
to note

Refer

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

REQUIRE A SECRET
OTTAWA FILE
No. 50209-40

Letter No. 2173

Date... November 11, 1953

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference... My teletype No. WA-2519 of November 4, 1953

Subject... Further Meeting of Consultation on Continental Defence

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Copies of this letter
To:

No. of Enclosures
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Post File
No.

Seen by
Mr. Ritchie
Mr. Mackay

I enclose for your information six copies of our record of the further meeting of consultation on continental defence which took place in the State Department on November 6.

2. Our notes were compared with those taken on the United States side and the records were found to be substantially in agreement.

3. There are two further points that I might make in comment on this meeting. There was no doubt about the sincerity with which General Bedell Smith and General Ridgway welcomed the prompt action taken in Ottawa as a result of the previous meeting of consultation on October 22. As evidence of the desire here to make rapid progress with the matter, you might be interested to know that a record of the meeting was requested from the State Department by the White House and by the Department of Defense early on Monday morning to enable the United States Joint Chiefs to deal with the matter without delay.

4. The second point, which is perhaps worth noting, is the forthcoming attitude of the United States authorities to the question of developing co-operation with the British and ourselves in the matter of training troops in atomic warfare. As it turned out, it was fortunate that General Foulkes raised the question at the meeting. The response was cordial and the prospects of our limited request being met seem to be good.

5. Because of the importance of the matter I thought it might be useful to report the record taken on the United States side of the understanding reached at the meeting on the next step to be taken. The record made by Mr. Arneson reads as follows:

"General Smith suggested that General Foulkes might reduce his requirements to writing and pass them on to General Ridgway on an informal basis. If it was found, after consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that further action was required by higher authority, the matter might be referred to the Special Committee of the National Security Council where it would be given, he was confident, prompt attention. This Committee could also consult with the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy if this proved necessary."

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

6. As you will see, the Under-Secretary, General Bedell Smith, expressed a willingness to have further meetings of this kind whenever we desire. Unless you believe there are other matters in this field which require the immediate attention of the United States authorities at a high level, I think we should allow a little time to elapse before requesting any further meetings. In my opinion the meetings should be called only when decisions on matters of real importance in the defence field are urgently required.

A. J. Murray

FILE COPY

No. 1 OF 10 COPIES

TOP SECRET

November 10, 1953.

Record of the Meeting of Consultation Between
Representatives of the Canadian and United
States Governments on Continental Defence,
Friday, November 6, 1953.

**UPGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET**

The meeting which was held in the State Department under the Chairmanship of General Walter Bedell Smith, the Under-Secretary of State, was attended by

General Mathew B. Ridgway, Chief of Staff,
United States Army,
Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under-Secretary of State,
Mr. Livingston Merchant, Assistant Secretary of
State for European Affairs,
Mr. Robert Bowie, Director of the Policy Planning
Staff of the State Department and State
Department Representative on the National Security
Council Planning Board,
Mr. R. Gordon Arneson, Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State on Atomic Energy Matters,
Mr. Hayden Raynor, Director of the Office of Common-
wealth and Northern European Affairs, State
Department,

for the United States Government and by

Mr. A.D.P. Heeney, Canadian Ambassador to the
United States,
Lieutenant General Charles Foulkes, Chairman of the
Canadian Chiefs of Staff,
Rear Admiral H. G. DeWolf, Chairman of the Canadian
Joint Staff, Washington,
Mr. George Ignatieff, Canadian Embassy,
Mr. J.J. McCardle, Canadian Embassy,

for the Canadian Government.

2. The Chairman suggested that since the meeting had been called at the initiative of the Canadian Government it might be best if Mr. Heeney led off the discussion. Mr. Heeney said that the Canadian Government had requested this further meeting in order that United States authorities might be told immediately at a high level of certain conclusions which had been arrived at by the Canadian Government as a result of the earlier consultations on continental defence with United States authorities on October 22. He said that the informal and high level approach which had been made at that time by the United States Government had enabled Canadian officials to bring the matter to the attention of the Cabinet Defence Committee which had reached the following decisions:

- (a) The Canadian Government accepted the advice of the Canada-United States Military Study

-2-

Group that an early warning line should be established along the 55th parallel of latitude.

- (b) The Canadian Chiefs of Staff should instruct the Canadian Section of the Joint Study Group to urge that the Study Group complete the selection and specifications of equipment for the early warning line.
- (c) The Royal Canadian Air Force in consultation with the United States Air Force should carry out a detailed survey of the proposed early warning line and the sites along it.
- (d) Canada should undertake the planning and construction of the early warning line without prejudice to any later decisions which might be taken on the division of costs. And,
- (e) The views of the Canadian and United States Governments on the need for additional warning facilities in the vicinity of the 55th parallel of latitude should be recorded in the Journal of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence at its next meeting.

3. Mr. Heeney said that, because of the importance it attached to the problem of continental defence, the Canadian Government had acted with the greatest possible speed in order that the measures considered necessary by the two Governments might be instituted as rapidly as possible. The Canadian Government had been able to determine its policy quickly because the requirements had been evolved jointly from the earliest stages through the medium of the Canada-United States Military Study Group. The Canadian Government was of the further opinion that by vesting responsibility for construction of the early warning line in a single authority the project might be carried through with the greatest possible rapidity and administrative convenience. Mr. Heeney said that in the view of the Canadian authorities the importance of the subject had warranted the convening of this informal meeting even though it was realized that it would be necessary subsequently to make the arrangements more formal by discussion in the Permanent Joint Board of Defence and possibly by an exchange of correspondence between the Governments.

4. The Chairman expressed the gratification of United States authorities at the speedy action taken on this important matter by the Canadian Government. General Ridgway said he would anticipate that the reaction of the United States Chiefs of Staff to the Canadian proposals would be favourable.

5. General Foulkes supplemented Mr. Heeney's remarks with a statement on behalf of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff. He said that the new United States assessment of the risk of Soviet attack which had been outlined at the meeting on October 22 had been accepted by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff were of the opinion that the new assessment of Russian capabilities

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created a requirement to have in operation by 1956 a reasonable early warning system and they considered that an early warning line along the 55th parallel, as recommended by the Canada-United States Military Study Group, was a reasonable project which could, if energetically pursued, be put into operation by 1956. The Chairman intervened to confirm the fact that the early warning line along the 55th parallel was the "southern line". It was agreed that certain misgivings existed on both sides with respect to the "northern early warning line", i.e. project CORRODE.

6. General Foulkes said that it was the opinion of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff that, even though Canada might take the initiative and leadership in the project, there should be the closest collaboration between the Royal Canadian Air Force and the United States Air Force in order that the early warning line would be sited in such a way as to provide an early warning which would be acceptable in all respects to the United States authorities. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff had already instructed the Canadian Section of the Joint Study Group to urge the Study Group to complete its recommendations on the selection and specification of the necessary equipment and it was hoped that the United States Chiefs of Staff would give similar instructions to the United States Section. He said that as soon as decisions had been taken on this point Canadian authorities would undertake to supply all the equipment so that there would be no delay in installing the line once the necessary construction work had been completed. He said it was the opinion of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff that it might be possible to guarantee greater security for the project if responsibility for construction was assumed by a single rather than a joint authority.

7. It would only be possible to arrive at a firm estimate of the cost of the project when the site survey was completed and when final decisions were taken with respect to the selection and specification for the equipment. The question of cost-sharing could then be considered. It was the opinion of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff that responsibility for working out the details of the project might now be given to operating agencies which for Canada would be the Royal Canadian Air Force and for the United States might possibly be the United States Air Force. Canadian service authorities were prepared to carry on with the project as soon as the agreement of the United States Chiefs of Staff had been secured to the proposals made at this meeting with the understanding that the problem of cost-sharing would be considered when firm estimates were available. Any joint arrangements might be made formal through the Permanent Joint Board of Defence.

8. The Chairman said that what had been proposed seemed completely acceptable and it now remained to obtain the opinion of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible. General Ridgway said that he was in complete personal agreement with the proposals, but that he was not in a position at this meeting to commit the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. In his capacity

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as Acting Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff he undertook to call a meeting early next week with the purpose of getting the agreement of the Chiefs of Staff to the proposals.

9. General Foulkes commented on the usefulness of this type of high level and informal meeting. In this instance it had made possible prompt action by the Canadian Government on a subject which had been raised as a matter of urgency by the United States Government. He expressed the hope that if, in the future, a Canadian problem arose which required immediate attention it would be possible to arrange for a similar exchange of views. The Chairman said that he would be willing to meet at any time it was thought necessary, and also that he thought that the two meetings which had been held under his chairmanship had been useful. He pointed out that the President and the National Security Council were especially interested in the problem of continental defence and he was pleased that such satisfactory progress in the field could be reported to the President.

Training in Defence Against Atomic Warfare

10. General Foulkes said he would like to raise one further point which was related to the co-operation of the two Governments in the defence of the continent. While he realized the legal limitations under the MacMahon Act, it was increasingly difficult to explain why Canadian forces could not ~~use~~^{utilize} facilities in the United States for training in defence against atomic weapons. If the Canadian forces were to be able to co-operate effectively with United States forces in defence against atomic attack on the continent it seemed essential that

- (a) they be provided with instruction for personal defence, and
- (b) that the adequacy of Canadian equipment in the event of atomic attack be tested.

General Foulkes said that he was not pressing for immediate action but that sooner or later something would have to be done to ensure the effectiveness of Canadian co-operation in the field of atomic defence. He wondered if it would be possible for the United States to permit access to United States training courses to a limited number of Canadian instructors and to provide opportunities for the testing of Canadian equipment.

11. General Ridgway said that he appreciated the difficulties being faced by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and that "short of going to jail" he would do everything possible to take care of any Canadian requests which might be made in this respect. The Chairman agreed with General Ridgway that an effort should be made to meet any reasonable Canadian requests in spite of the "ponderous and difficult machinery" which existed in the United States Government

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to clear the release of information in the atomic field. He suggested that General Foulkes might make his requests in an informal letter to General Ridgway. Whatever General Ridgway could not arrange himself could be passed to the Board made up of representatives of the President, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of Defense and the State Department which could recommend release of atomic information. It might even be necessary to have a request examined by the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. In any event, the Chairman said, he, as the representative of the State Department on the Board, would recommend favourable action on a Canadian request on the basis of the necessity of co-operation between the two Governments to meet the problems of continental defence. It was agreed, therefore, that General Foulkes would follow this course of action.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

T O P S E C R E T

November 9, 1953.

Secretary to the Cabinet,
Privy Council Office,
East Block,
O t t a w a .

50209-40
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Further Meeting of Consultation
on Continental Defence

Attached for your information is a
copy of Telegram No. WA-2557 dated November 7,
1953, reporting on a Meeting of Consultation
which took place on Friday, November 6, 1953.
In view of the highly classified nature of the
subject under discussion, it would be appre-
ciated if this telegram could be shown only to
those with a need to know.

M. H. WERSHOF

FOR THE

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

50209-40	
59	1/1

TO: American Division

S E C R E T

November 9, 1953.

FROM: Defence Liaison (1) Division

SUBJECT: President Eisenhower's Visit - Brief for the Prime Minister

Attached are two copies of a draft text dealing with Canada - United States defence arrangements for inclusion in the brief you are preparing for the Prime Minister.

You will note that in paragraph 2, reference is made to the joint statement on defence co-operation of February, 1947. It is suggested that this might be attached as an appendix to the brief. If you wish copies for this purpose, they are available in the Canada Treaty Series, 1947, No. 43.



Defence Liaison (1) Division

November 9, 1953.

Canada - United States Defence Arrangements

Both the Canadian and United States Governments have recently decided that the existing arrangements for the defence of North America against possible air attacks need to be strengthened and that as a first step the facilities for detecting such attacks should be improved by the construction of an early warning line (i.e., a type of radar fence) from Alaska to Greenland approximately along the fifty-fifth parallel of latitude. On November 6, 1953, the Canadian Ambassador in Washington informally advised the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Canadian Government was taking steps to survey the early warning line at once and that in due course it proposed to build the line, without prejudice to any financial arrangements which might in due course be made between the two Governments. Agreement on any joint arrangements is to be formalized through the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

2. These, and any other arrangements made between the two Governments for the defence of North America, are developed in the spirit of the principles expressed in the Joint Statement by the Governments of Canada and the United States of America regarding defence co-operation between the two countries, made on February 12, 1947.

(See Appendix _____).

3. In view of the importance attached to the work of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence in furthering joint defence arrangements, the United States Government is now considering the strengthening of the United States Section of the Board, and has indicated informally to the Canadian Government that it is considering the appointment of Governor Dewey as the Chairman of the United States Section.

Extract from the Minutes of the 548th Meeting
of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, November 9, 1953.

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IV. CONTINENTAL DEFENCE

(TOP SECRET)

14. The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff reported on the meeting which had taken place in Washington on 5 November, 1953 between Canadian and US officials, a summary of which was contained in External Affairs telegram No. WA-2557 of 7 November, 1953, which would be circulated to the members of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

15. The Committee noted the remarks of the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff.

INCOMING MESSAGE

COPY 1 / OF 31 COPIES

ORIGINAL

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

~~DOWNGRADED TO SECRET~~

~~REDUIT A SECRET~~

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification

TOP SECRET

File No.

50209-4
52 50

Priority
IMPORTANT

System
CYPHER-AUTO

No. WA-2557

Date November 7, 1953.

Departmental
Circulation
MINISTER
UNDER/SEC
D/UNDER/SEC
A/UNDER/SEC'S
POL/CO-ORD'N
SECTION
U.N.DIV.

Reference: Your teletypes Nos. EX-1891 of November 4 and EX-1898 of November 5, 1953.

Subject: Further Meeting of Consultation on Continental Defence.

The further meeting of consultation, arranged in accordance with instructions contained in the messages under reference, took place Friday, November 6. The measure of interest in this meeting on the United States side may be judged from the fact that unexpectedly all those who had attended the previous meeting held on October 22 were present, except Admiral Radford who is in Europe and Livingston Merchant who is occupied with Trieste. General Matthew B. Ridgway, Chief of the Army Staff and Acting Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, substituted for Admiral Radford. General Foulkes, Admiral Dewolf, Ignatieff, McCardle and I attended as Canadian representatives.

2. In opening the discussion on the lines suggested in your EX-1898, I explained that we had suggested a further meeting in order to inform the United States officials at the highest level of certain conclusions reached by the Canadian Government at a meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee on November 3 concerning continental defence. After outlining these conclusions, I stressed that the speed with which the Government had acted and communicated its views in this manner to the United States indicated the importance we attached to the problem of continental defence. I also said that the Canadian Government had been able to determine its policy quickly because the requirements for the southern early warning line had been evolved jointly through the Canada-United States Military Study Group. I explained that in being willing to assume responsibility for the construction of the line without prejudice to any financial arrangements which might in due course be made between the two governments, it was the opinion of the Canadian Government that the project would be carried through with the maximum speed and convenience by vesting responsibility for construction in a single authority. Finally, I suggested that since this meeting was informal, it would be necessary subsequently to formalize arrangements later by discussion in the PJED and possibly by an exchange of correspondence.

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References

American Dir
DL(1)
CCOS (2 copies)
MND
Sec Cabinet
Cdn Section, RJBD

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3. General Foulkes supplemented my presentation with a statement on behalf of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, explaining the nature of the recommendations which they had made to the government in the light of the United States views on continental defence presented at the meeting of October 22. He stressed that in accordance with the decision of the government it was important that certain measures should be undertaken forthwith, such as the detailed survey of the early warning line and the finalization of the selections and specifications of equipment. To this end there should be consultation between the RCAF and the USAF on the survey of the line and the detailed estimate of the cost. The Joint Study Group should be urged to finalize selection and specification of the equipment. He also suggested that as soon as these details had been cleared up, Canada would undertake the necessary steps as regards equipment so that there would be no delay in establishing the line once construction is completed. He suggested also that the operating agencies from now on should be the RCAF and the USAF, it being understood that the Chiefs of the Air Staff of both countries would report progress through the respective Chiefs of Staff. Finally, General Foulkes suggested that the Canadian authorities would be prepared to go ahead with the immediate steps he had indicated as soon as the proposals had been agreed by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff; agreement on any joint arrangements could be formalized through the PJBD.

4. The Chairman, General Bedell Smith, commenting on our presentations, remarked that he could not say how gratified he was at the quick action which had been taken by the Canadian Government. He said that what had been proposed seemed completely acceptable and it now seemed to be up to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff to take prompt action.

5. General Ridgway said while he was personally in complete agreement he was not in a position to commit the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff at the present meeting. However, in his capacity as Acting Chairman he undertook to call a meeting early next week to report what had been said on behalf of the Canadian Government and to approve necessary action.

6. Both Bedell Smith and Ridgway expressed satisfaction on the progress which had been made. Bedell Smith mentioned that the National Security Council was keeping a close watch on the continental defence problem and that he was glad that ~~he~~ would be able to report some progress.

7. As regards further meetings of consultation, Bedell Smith said that it was for the Canadian representatives to call a meeting at any time they wished to have one. He thought that it was not desirable to have meetings at set periods, but he was impressed with the usefulness of the two meetings which had been held.

8. After the discussion on continental defence had been concluded, General Foulkes raised the question of the participation of personnel from the Canadian armed forces in United States exercises involving atomic weapons. He explained that, at present, experience in the Canadian armed forces was extremely limited because they could draw only upon Canadian facilities in view of the restrictions

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placed upon co-operation between Canada and the United States in the McMahon Act of 1946. It was becoming difficult to explain why at least a selected group of officers and other ranks from Canada could not take part in United States exercises and thus be in a position to train Canadian forces in order to prepare them for possible joint operations. He realized that it might not be possible to obtain an immediate answer, but he hoped that this matter would be considered urgently by the United States authorities, and particularly the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.

9. Both Bedell Smith and Ridgway immediately replied that they were most sympathetic to the desirability of having co-operation between Canada and the United States along the lines suggested by General Foulkes. General Bedell Smith said that he hoped that the Canadian authorities would bear with the "ponderous procedure" which had to be followed in the United States. He suggested, however, that if the Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff were to submit a specific requirement in writing to the Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff for training facilities for personnel from the Canadian armed forces in regard to effects of atomic weapons, the United States authorities would go as far as possible under the law to meet this request. He said that this request would come before the special committee set up under the National Security Council to deal with atomic matters consisting of representatives of the USAEC, the State Department, and the Department of Defence. He said that he represented the State Department on this committee and would be glad to make the presentation on behalf of Canada, basing his justification on the special needs of co-operation in defence between Canada and the United States, particularly in continental defence. He suggested that in the first instance, it would be desirable to have the approach from Canada go through the service-to-service channel, to be handled informally. If it were necessary, the arrangements might be formalized later through the diplomatic channel.

10. After the meeting we were told by Arneson in confidence that only on the previous day arrangements had been authorized by the President, after consulting members of the Joint Congressional Committee, to make special arrangements with the British and ourselves to receive information on atomic weapons' effects. We judged that these arrangements developed largely as a result of the talks which Cherwell and Cockroft recently had in Washington. The quasi-legal basis for these arrangements is to be the tripartite modus vivendi of 1948 which envisaged exchange of information on factors concerning "health and safety". The Chairman of the USAEC, Admiral Strauss, is to talk further about these measures with Makins and myself next Tuesday at lunch. Arneson said that he was giving us this information in private to indicate that in submitting a request for co-operation in the field of atomic weapons' effects, we would be "pushing at an open door".

11. As you see, this further meeting proved to be justified and the results were pretty satisfactory from our point of view. The usual record will follow later after it has been compared with the notes taken on the United States side.

CLEARED
COMMUNICATIONS
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1953 NOV 9 AM 10:12

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Security ... TOP SECRET

MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

File No. 50209-40	
54	50

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: Head of Post,

WASHINGTON, D. C.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

Message To Be Sent		No. EX 7898	Date November 5, 1953.	For Communications Section Only SENT - NOV 05 1953
AIR CYPHER				
EN CLAIR				
CODE				
CYPHER	AUTO			
Priority				
Immediate	XXX			
ORIGINATOR		REFERENCE: Your Telegram No. WA-2519 dated November 4, 1953.		
(Signature)		SUBJECT: Further Meeting of Consultation on Continental Defence.		
W. H. Barton/BB		Following from the Under-Secretary.		
(Name Typed)		BEGINS:		
Div. D. L. (1)		(1) I think that in keeping with the procedure followed at previous Meetings of Consultation, you, as Canadian Ambassador, should present to the Meeting the conclusions of the Canadian Government as reached at the meeting of Cabinet Defence Committee on November 3. The text of the discussions and conclusions is being sent to you in a separate telegram. General Foulkes, who was present at the Cabinet Defence Committee Meeting, will be present to collaborate with you in the presentation.		
Local Tel. 7509		(2) It is suggested that you might make the following points in the course of the discussion:		
APPROVED BY		(a) Because of the importance it attaches to the problem of continental defence, the Canadian Government has acted with the greatest possible speed in order that the measures considered necessary by the two Governments might be instituted as rapidly as possible. The Canadian Government has been able to		
(Signature)				
(Name Typed)				
Internal Distribution:				
S.S.E.A. U.S.S.E.A.				
American Division				
D. L. (2) Division				
Done BB				
Date Nov. 5, 1953.				
Copies Referred To:				
CCOS				
Canadian Section				
PJBD (4 members)				
Done BB				
Date Nov. 5, 1953.				

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determine its policy quickly because the requirement has been evolved jointly from the earliest stages through the medium of the Canada - United States Military Study Group.

(b) When informing the meeting of the decision of the Canadian Government that it should take responsibility for construction of the line, without prejudice to any financial arrangements which may, in due course, be made between the two Governments, you might explain that it is the opinion of the Canadian Government that by vesting responsibility for construction in a single authority, the project will be carried through with the greatest possible rapidity and administrative convenience.

(c) You might point out that this Meeting is informal and that it will be necessary subsequently to formalize the arrangements by discussions in the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, and possibly by an exchange of correspondence.

(3) In view of the proposal made by General Henry in a letter to General McNaughton dated October 20, that the Permanent Joint Board on Defence should meet at an early date to discuss this matter, I am of the opinion that as a matter of courtesy, General Henry should be informed of what is taking place. My immediately following telegram is a message for General Henry from the Secretary, Canadian Section, PJBD, which, if you agree, could be delivered to the Secretary, United States Section, PJBD, tomorrow, November 6.

ENDS.

MESSAGE ENDS

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

SecurityTOP SECRET.....

MESSAGE FORM
OUTGOING

File No. 572 09-40	
54	50

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO:Head of Post,.....
.....Washington, D.C.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

Message To Be Sent	No. <i>1900</i> EX-1898	Date November 5, 1953.	For Communications Section Only SENT — NOV 05 1953
AIR CYPHER			
EN CLAIR			
CODE			
CYPHER	AUTO		
Priority	XXXX		
Immediate	<i>RAM</i>		

REFERENCE: Our Telegram No. / of November 5, 1953.
EX-1898

SUBJECT: Continental Defence

ORIGINATOR
(Signature)
<i>W. H. Barton/BB</i>
(Name Typed)
Div... <i>D. L. (1)</i>
Local Tel. <i>7509</i>
APPROVED BY
(Signature)
(Name Typed)

The following is the text of the minute of the meeting of Cabinet Defence Committee held on November 3, 1953, concerning continental defence. This is sent to you with the permission of the Acting Secretary to the Cabinet who requests that its distribution be strictly limited.

BEGINS:

CONTINENTAL DEFENCE

The Minister of National Defence referred to the work of the Military Study Group on which a progress report had been made at the previous meeting of the Committee. The interim report of the Group, which had now been completed, recommended a new early warning line generally along the 55th parallel between Alaska and Newfoundland. The Canadian and U.S. Chiefs of Staff had approved the report of the Military Study Group and recommended an early warning system providing a minimum of two hours' notice of advancing aircraft. It would first be necessary to make a detailed survey of the early warning line, only on completion of which would it be possible to arrive at a firm estimate of cost.

Internal Distribution:
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Done... <i>ma L</i>
Date... <i>Nov. 6/53</i>

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The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, reported on talks in Washington between Canadian and U.S. officials. He explained that the recent U.S. emphasis on continental defence was closely related to the successful thermo-nuclear explosions in the Soviet Union. It was now clear that the Soviet Union could manufacture weapons of formidable power and advanced design and would soon be able to provide the means of delivering them. In these circumstances, North America, and particularly the Strategic Area Command bases and atomic energy facilities, became increasingly attractive targets.

An explanatory memorandum had been circulated.

(Minister's memorandum, October 29, 1953, "Continental Air Defence" - Document D45-53).

In the course of discussion the following points emerged:

(a) The assumption by Canada of the cost of the new early warning line might be justified since it might be difficult to explain large U.S. expenditures of U.S. resources on Canadian soil while Canada was maintaining substantial forces abroad.

(b) It was too early to make any reliable estimate on the cost of the line, and the problems of northern construction would likely make the final charges very high; nevertheless, the cost of Canadian construction would probably be substantially lower than of U.S. construction.

(c) No decision was necessary at present on the division of costs for a new early warning line; it would be preferable at this stage of negotiations to give no indication to the United States of the likelihood or size of a Canadian contribution to the line.

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(d) Canada should assume the leadership in the planning and construction of this line without prejudice to a decision on the division of costs.

(e) It would be desirable to record in the records of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence the views of each country on the need for additional early warning facilities on the 55th parallel line; it was, however, not necessary to await a meeting of the Board to inform the U.S. authorities of the views of the Canadian Government.

The Committee, after further discussion, agreed that:

(a) an early warning line should be established along the 55th parallel of latitude;

(b) The Chiefs of Staff should instruct the Canadian Section of the Study Group to urge the Study Group to complete the selection and specifications for equipment for the early warning line;

(c) The R.C.A.F., in consultation with the U.S.A.F., should carry out a detailed survey of the proposed early warning line and the sites along it.

(d) Canada should undertake the planning and construction of the early warning line, without prejudice to a later decision on the division of costs.

(e) the views of the Canadian and U.S. Governments on the need for additional warning facilities in the vicinity of the 55th parallel of latitude should be recorded in the Journal of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence at its next meeting; meanwhile, however, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff and officials of the Department of External Affairs might meet in advance with U.S. officials to inform them of Canadian views. ENDS

MESSAGE ENDS

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Security TOP SECRET

MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

File No. 50209-40	
54	50

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: HEAD OF POST, WASHINGTON, D.C. ~~DOWNGRADED TO SECRET~~
~~REDUIT A SECRET~~

Message To Be Sent		No. <i>EX</i> 1899	Date November 5, 1953	For Communications Section Only SENT — NOV 05 1953
AIR CYPHER		REFERENCE: My immediately preceding telegram		
EN CLAIR				
CODE				
CYPHER AUTO	XXXX			
Priority IMMEDIATE <i>RRM</i>		SUBJECT: Continental Defence		
ORIGINATOR		<p>The following message is for Major-General Guy V. Henry, Chairman, United States Section, Permanent Joint Board on Defence from the Secretary, Canadian Section. MESSAGE BEGINS:</p> <p>I am making this interim reply to your letter to General McNaughton of October 20, 1953, as General McNaughton is in Western Canada and will not be back in Ottawa until November 10.</p> <p>2. The Canadian Government has reached certain decisions with respect to the proposed construction of a southern early warning line. These decisions will be communicated informally to senior members of the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Canadian Ambassador and the Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, at a meeting to be held at the State Department today.</p> <p>3. The Canadian Government considers that it would be most desirable for the Permanent Joint Board on Defence in due course to discuss and record in its Journal, the views of the two Governments on the need for the southern early warning line, and to give joint consideration to the preparation of an Agreement which</p>		
(Signature)				
W.H.Barton/elb				
(Name Typed)				
Div. D.L.(1)				
Local Tel. 7509				
APPROVED BY				
(Signature)				
(Name Typed)				
Internal Distribution: S.S.E.A. - U.S.S.E.A.				
American Div.				
D.L.(2)				
Done. <i>BB</i>				
Date. Nov. 5, 1953				
Copies Referred To:				
PJBD Members (4)				
CCOS				
Done. <i>BB</i>				
Date. Nov. 5, 1953				
Ext. 97 (Rev. 1/52)		2 . . .		

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will reflect the interests of the two countries in the establishment and operation of the early warning line. General McNaughton will take up with you on his return the question of when the Board should meet for this purpose. In the meantime, the Canadian Government considers that the information to be given at today's meeting will satisfy the United States Government that all necessary measures are being taken without delay.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

R.A. MacKay/PS

SECRET

November 5, 1953.

NOTE FOR FILE

Continental Defence

It was agreed with Mr. Wrong that the telegram of instructions to Mr. Heeney for tomorrow's consultation meeting in Washington should be cleared with General Foulkes who will be attending the meeting. Unfortunately General Foulkes had left for the airport before this could be done. I accordingly called Mr. Ignatieff and asked him to see that General Foulkes was informed that we had intended to clear this telegram with him but unfortunately were unable to do so and that if there were any questions about instructions before the meeting tomorrow the Embassy might telephone us.

R.A.M.

INCOMING MESSAGE

ORIGINAL

COPY NO. OF 31 COPIES.

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES.

File WMB

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification

TOP SECRET

File No.

50209-40

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Priority
IMMEDIATE

System
CYPHER-AUTO

No. WA-2519

Date November 4, 1953. *g h*

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

Reference:

Subject:

Further Meeting of Consultation on Continental Defence.

We have just been informed by the State Department that Under-Secretary Walter Bedell Smith and General Ridgway agree to the holding of a further meeting next Friday, November 6, at 5:00 p.m. The meeting would be in the Under-Secretary's office. Pending receipt of written instructions from you, we have indicated that the purpose of the meeting is to put forward certain reactions to the discussion on continental defence at the previous meeting held on October 22, with particular reference to what might be done as the next step.

2. We have been told that it is desired to keep the meeting as small as possible. Apart from Bedell Smith, there will only be General Ridgway and one or two State Department officials. General Ridgway has indicated that he will represent the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff in the absence of Admiral Radford, and prefers not to have any other subordinate officers, such as General White.

3. I assume that apart from General Foulkes we need be represented only by myself and Ignatieff.

4. As to the agenda, the United States side want to keep the meeting short and directed to a discussion on continental defence. They assume that there will be no discussion on a statement on defence matters since there have already been informal consultation between Ottawa and Washington on this matter in connection with the preparation of a draft of a possible communique to be issued on the occasion of the President's visit to Ottawa. In fact, it is my understanding that the idea of issuing a separate statement on defence at this time has been dropped; it would certainly come as a surprise here and might well be resented.

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COMM'S SECTION

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References

Jim Foulkes
- 2 copies
M. Cloutier

Done

Date *Nov 5, 1953*

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subject file

RECORD OF CABINET DEFENCE COMMITTEE DECISION

96th meeting: Tuesday, November 3, 1953.

Item I

50209 - 40
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Continental Defence

vide
very
Memorandum, Minister of National Defence,
October 29, 1953, "Continental Air Defence" - Document
D45-53.

The Committee agreed that:

(a) an early warning line should be established
along the 55th parallel of latitude;

(b) the Chiefs of Staff should instruct the
Canadian Section of the Study Group to urge the
Study Group to complete the selection and specifi-
cations for equipment for the early warning line;

(c) the R.C.A.F., in consultation with the
U.S.A.F., should carry out a detailed survey of
the proposed early warning line and the sites
along it;

(d) Canada should undertake the planning and
construction of the early warning line, without
prejudice to a later decision on the division of
costs;

(e) the views of the Canadian and U.S. govern-
ments on the need for additional warning facilities
in the vicinity of the 55th parallel of latitude
should be recorded in the Journal of the Permanent
Joint Board on Defence at its next meeting; mean-
while, however, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff
and an official of the Department of External Affairs
might meet in advance with U.S. officials to inform
them of Canadian views.

revised decision

R.A. MacKay/NN

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Ottawa, November 2, 1953

Dear General Foulkes:

I enclose two copies of Letter No. 2077 of October 30, and two copies of the record prepared by Mr. Ignatieff of the meeting of Consultation on Continental Defence held on October 22, in Washington. I understand that you wish an extra copy for your Minister.

Yours sincerely,

Rd R. MacKay

See...

Lieut.-General C. Foulkes,
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff,
"A" Building,
Ottawa.

Mr. W. J. [unclear]
Do we need to
refer this to CCOS?
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1746 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.,
 Washington 6, D.C.
 November 2, 1953.

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Dear Mr. Ulman,

I regret to inform you that the authorities in Ottawa do not see their way clear at this time to assist in providing material for your proposed article on continental defence. As I understand it, the feeling in Ottawa is that it would be difficult to add to, or comment effectively upon, the numerous articles on this subject which have appeared in the last few weeks, without becoming involved in problems of security.

Yours truly,

[Signature]
 First Secretary.

Mr. William A. Ulman,
 2122 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.,
 Washington, D.C.

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L.B. PEARSON

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November 2, 1953

DKU
MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

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Summ
Meeting of Consultation in Washington -
October 22.

2

I enclose one copy of Letter No. 2077 of October 30 from Washington, and one copy of the record prepared by Mr. Ignatieff of the meeting of Consultation held in Washington on October 22. You might find it useful, if you have time to read this over, before the Cabinet Defence Committee meeting tomorrow morning.

General Foulkes is most anxious that paragraph 21, which quotes the United States National Security document, should be specially guarded because of its highly sensitive nature.

H.H. Wrong
H.H. Wrong

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Mr. Ignatieff
to note & return please
WAB

November 2, 1953

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WAB file.

Sorry to have
kept this.
It was with
some papers
left by
Lloyd George

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

Meeting of Consultation in Washington -
October 22.

2

I enclose one copy of Letter No. 2077 of October 30 from Washington, and one copy of the record prepared by Mr. Ignatieff of the meeting of Consultation held in Washington on October 22. You might find it useful, if you have time to read this over, before the Cabinet Defence Committee meeting tomorrow morning.

General Foulkes is most anxious that paragraph 21, which quotes the United States National Security document, should be specially guarded because of its highly sensitive nature.

LMP

L.B.P.

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November 2, 1953.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

Subject: Item No. 1 on the Agenda of the
November 3, 1953, Meeting of
Cabinet Defence Committee.

Continental Air Defence

File
WJ

You will recall that the Canada - United States Military Study Group submitted an Interim Report to the Chiefs of Staff in Canada, and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the United States, recommending that there be established at the earliest practicable date, an early warning line located generally along the fifty-fifth parallel between Alaska and Newfoundland. Subsequently, at the recent Meeting of Consultation held in Washington and attended by Mr. Mackay, Mr. Bryce and General Foulkes, Admiral Radford presented an outline of United States proposals for continental air defence (See Appendix "A" to attached Memorandum for Cabinet Defence Committee). At the same time the Chairman of the United States Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence sent a letter to the Chairman of the Canadian Section reporting that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved the recommendation of the Military Study Group and had requested the United States Section of the Board to initiate discussions with the Canadian Section to seek agreement on the need for the early warning line and on the principles under which the project might be carried forward.

2. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff have recommended:

- (a) that approval in principle be given to the establishment of an early warning line along the fifty-fifth parallel;

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- (b) that approval be given to instruct the Canadian Section of the Military Study Group to urge the Study Group to finalize the selection and specifications of the electronic equipment;
- (c) that approval be given for Canadian authorities, in consultation with the United States, to carry out a detailed survey of the line and sites.

3. Although sub-paragraph (c) above does not say so, it is my understanding that the Chiefs of Staff intended that the RCAF should be responsible for and meet the costs of the survey, but that this would be without prejudice to any arrangement which might be made subsequently between the two Governments regarding the costs of the whole project. In any case it is essential that the United States Air Force should be consulted in the planning and conduct of the survey.

4. Subject to clarification of this point it is recommended that the Department of External Affairs should support the above proposals of the Chiefs of Staff.

5. It has been suggested that the Canadian Government might construct the whole of the early warning line across Canada. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff have drawn attention to the fact that they are about to give consideration to the extension of the early warning chain off the Atlantic coast immediately, and have indicated by implication that Canada might undertake the construction of the continental portion of the whole system as its share of the project. The view of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff that a decision on this matter should be deferred until more information on the costs of the project is available would seem to be a sensible one.

6. The principal question which remains to be decided at this time is the method by which the United States Government is to be informed of the Canadian

decisions. The most obvious method would be for the Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence to accept the proposal of the Chairman of the United States Section that a meeting of the Board should be arranged at the earliest opportunity. General McNaughton was invited by Mr. Claxton to attend the meeting of Cabinet Defence Committee, but as he was going to be out of the city, he asked Mr. MacKay, as the External Affairs Member of the Board, to represent him. He informed Mr. MacKay that in his opinion if the Board was not to be used for this purpose, some explanation to the United States Chairman would be required.

7. Paragraph six of the Cabinet Defence Committee paper puts forward the view that further informal consultations are required at higher level (i.e., a further "Meeting of Consultation" such as was held recently in Washington) before the problem of negotiations for the implementation of the programme could be handled by the Joint Board. However, because the discussions between the two Governments have so far been carried on only between the members of a working group (i.e., the Military Study Group) and between more senior officials at an ad hoc meeting (i.e., the Meeting of Consultation), I am inclined to think that it would be valuable for the Permanent Joint Board on Defence at this time to get into its Journal a record of the views of both Governments on the need for the project, an outline of the problems which are likely to arise, and statements of the course of action which both Governments propose to follow at this time. While it is true that this could be done by an Exchange of Notes, it seems to me that a record in the Journal of the PJBD of a discussion along the lines indicated above, in which both military and civilian officials participated, would be most useful. I am very doubtful that a further Meeting of Consultation would be fruitful at this time, since the ad hoc character of such a gathering makes it more suitable for discussion of broad policy problems than a specific project of this sort.

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R.A. MacKay/NN
November 2, 1953.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRYCE

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Meeting of Consultation in Washington -
October 22.

I enclose one copy of Letter No. 2077 of October 30 from Washington, and one copy of the record prepared by Mr. Ignatieff of the meeting of Consultation held in Washington on October 22. You might find it useful.

General Foulkes is most anxious that paragraph 21, which quotes the United States National Security document, should be specially guarded because of its highly sensitive nature.

R. A. MacKAY

R.A.M.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

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TO:FILE No..50209-40.....

FROM:K.W.MacLellan.....

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT:Consideration by Chiefs of Staff Committee of
Interim Report...Canada-U.S. Military Study Group.....

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Date.....November.2.,1953.

File No. 50209-40
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A special meeting of Chiefs of Staff Committee was held on October 15, 1953 in the office of General Foulkes, to discuss an Interim Report of the Canada-U.S. Military Study Group, in which it was agreed that the Canadian action should be:

- (a) to seek authority of Cabinet Defence Committee for agreement to a further detailed investigation of the early warning line on the 55th parallel;
- (b) to agree to a detailed survey of this line and sharing the cost of such survey;
- (c) to complete the further study of the types of equipment most suitable for this line; and
- (d) to work out a detailed estimate of the initial costs and annual recurring costs.


After this detailed study had been completed, the Government would be in a position to make a decision as to what part, if any, it would take

- 2 -

in implementing the recommendations of the Standing Group. The Committee also agreed that the machinery to conduct the investigations referred to above be as follows:

- (a) arrangements for the detailed survey of the line to be made jointly by the USAF and the RCAF under the auspices of the Canada-U.S. Military Study Group;
- (b) the Study Group to report on the equipment and to be authorized to obtain whatever technical and engineering assistance they require; and
- (c) the Study Group to report on an estimate of the costs after the survey of the line and study of types of equipment have been made.

Only one copy of the minutes of this special meeting was sent to this Department, and it is filed on 50045-40 -- "Chiefs of Staff Committee Minutes File".



K. W. MacLellan.

Ext/

Copies referred Mr. [unclear]

General Butler (2)
(1 for Mr. Clayton)
The Minister
the Prime Minister

Letter No. 2077

Date..October.30..1953.....

OTTAWA FILE

No. 50209-40

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference.. My WA-2429 of October 23, 1953.....

Subject: Meeting of Consultation on Continental Defence, held in the State Department, Washington, October 22, 1953.

I enclose herewith six copies of the record of the meeting of consultation on continental defence between representatives of the Canadian and United States Governments, which took place in the State Department in Washington on October 22. Since it was agreed by both sides that the discussion should be informal and without commitments to either Government, no agreed minutes were kept. Each side, therefore, made its own record of the meeting and later checked with the other for accuracy.

2. The attached record was checked for accuracy with Mr. R. Gordon Arneson of the State Department, who kept the record for the United States side. This check revealed that there was a general concordance between the two records, although as might be expected, there were semantic differences and a variance in emphasis. In four passages in our record, however, it was found desirable to take note of textual differences in order to clarify statements which had been made by United States representatives.

3. The first of these concerns the explanatory comment attached to Admiral Radford's statement of United States views on continental defence. While agreeing generally with this explanatory comment, Mr. Arneson suggested that the second sentence, which appears in parentheses on page 11, should read as follows:

"This paper therefore expressed United States over-all continental defence objectives of which air defence, requiring co-operation between the two Governments, was only a part."

4. The second passage relates to Admiral Radford's remarks about Operation CORRODE, at the end of paragraph 24 on page 12. In Mr. Arneson's text Admiral Radford was recorded as having spoken as follows:

"Admiral Radford said that the United States had reached no conclusion yet concerning the distant early warning line. Such conclusions could not be arrived at until the results of CORRODE were available. If the distant early warning line is proved feasible, the United States would hope that it might be installed within two years. As to the

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seaward extensions of the southern Canadian line, the United States was proceeding to line up the requisite ships and aircraft to man such extensions. This project was, of course, a very expensive one; the chief bottleneck, however, was not money but trained personnel."

(This text adds substantially to the record that we were able to make of Admiral Radford's remarks and is important.)


5. The third is a minor point relating to General Bedell Smith's reference to the remark made to him by Mr. Pickersgill during the visit of the Prime Minister to Washington last spring (This occurs towards the end of paragraph 25 on page 13.). Mr. Arneson recorded General Bedell Smith as making the additional remark that with the United States flag come United States troops and other contributions to the defence of Canada.

6. The last point relates to the final sentence on page 14. According to Mr. Arneson's record, it should read as follows:

"In view of the fact that Admiral Radford would not be back in Washington until November 18, it was thought that Admiral Carney might sit in for the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

7. I think that the meeting generally was a useful one. It provided some valuable information about United States strategic thinking and their appraisal of the Soviet Government's intentions, as well as on their views on continental defence. It also marked the resumption of meetings of consultation which had been interrupted since the change of Administration. It was the first of such meetings attended jointly by military as well as civil representatives on both sides. The presence of both General Foulkes and Admiral Radford contributed substantially to the usefulness of the discussion.

8. As I indicated at the meeting, I think that such consultations should be convened only as may be necessary. There is always a danger that if they are held too frequently and for no particular reason, they may deteriorate into a routine discussion. As you will see, however, from the record, the next move to hold a meeting has been left up to us. Accordingly, I shall await further guidance from you before getting in touch with the State Department about another meeting.


For the Ambassador.

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RECORD OF THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION BETWEEN
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CANADIAN AND UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENTS ON CONTINENTAL DEFENCE,
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1953

The meeting, which was held in the State Department, was attended by

General Walter Bedell Smith, Under-Secretary of State,
Admiral A.W. Radford, Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under-Secretary of State designate,
Mr. Livingston Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for
European Affairs,
Mr. Robert Bowie, Director of the Policy Planning Staff
and State Department Representative on the N.S.C.
Planning Board,
Mr. R. Gordon Arneson, Special Assistant to the Secretary
of State on Atomic Energy Matters,
Mr. Hayden Raynor, Director of the Office of Commonwealth
and Northern European Affairs

for the United States Government and by

Mr. A.D.P. Heeney,
Lt. General Charles Foulkes,
Mr. R. B. Bryce,
Mr. R. A. MacKay,
Rear Admiral H.G. DeWolf,
Mr. George Ignatieff

for the Canadian Government.

2. General Walter Bedell Smith was Chairman of this meeting. In opening the discussion, General Smith said that he was happy to have the privilege of convening this meeting. He said it had been too long since the last meeting of consultation with Canadian Government representatives on the world situation and the risks of war. Since the last meeting, continental defence had come to loom larger in the strategic problems confronting both Governments, and it was therefore desirable that there should be a free and frank exchange of views on this problem. He said that there was no set agenda for the meeting, but if it was agreeable to the Canadian representatives, he proposed that Mr. Bowie would give a tour d'horizon of the world situation and the United States estimate of Soviet policy. Admiral Radford would then make a statement on United States estimates of Soviet atomic capabilities and the risks of attack on North America and give an exposition of the plans which the United States Government had under consideration to meet this threat. He also emphasized that he wished to have the discussion proceed on a round-table basis and anyone should feel free to interject comments as seemed desirable. He stressed the desirability of keeping these meetings as informal as possible. Mr. Heeney said that this procedure was satisfactory and agreed that the meeting should be kept as informal as possible.

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Review of the World Situation and United States
Estimate of Soviet Intentions:

3. The Chairman asked Mr. Bowie to proceed with his review of the world situation and the risks of war, with particular reference to the United States estimate of Soviet policy, stressing that he would like to have this analysis challenged by the Canadian representatives on any point in the presentation. Mr. Bowie prefaced his exposition by observing that he hoped that what he had to say would not seem particularly novel to the Canadian representatives since he believed that in general the Canadian and United States Governments would not differ in any important respect on current estimates of the world situation and Soviet intentions. He said that there was no evidence that events since Stalin's death had weakened the Soviet regime. Internal political developments may have produced some confusion in the Soviet bureaucracy and some strains in the relations between the Soviet Union and the satellites, but it was still necessary to proceed on the assumption that the Soviet bloc were basically hostile in their intentions, that the power of the new regime had been consolidated, and that their ultimate objective was still world domination. The tactics of the Soviet bloc were directed to an effort to divide the allies and to create false hopes by peaceful gestures.

4. Mr. Bowie, however, did not rule out the possibility that for tactical reasons the Soviet Government may be willing to establish a détente with the Western Powers. Although at present there were no signs that the Soviet Government may be willing to make sufficient concessions to make a modus vivendi possible, it was necessary to bear in mind the possibility that through negotiations now or in the future, the Soviet Government may be willing to work for a détente.

5. Turning to an analysis of Soviet relations with East Germany and the satellites, Mr. Bowie said that available evidence pointed to the fact that the Soviet Government had not fully subjugated these peoples. The events of last June showed that satellite regimes had to rely upon the strength of Soviet forces to retain power. It was also possible to assume that the satellite armed forces were not altogether reliable to the communist cause and would become increasingly so in the event of an outbreak of war. This may reflect a significant strain upon the exercise of Soviet leadership. Actual Soviet power to control the satellites, however, had not been impaired so long as the Soviet Government could maintain substantial Soviet forces in the satellite countries. His conclusion was that there was no evidence that it would be practicable to detach any satellite country from the Soviet orbit (or in other words "liberate" it by peaceful means), so long as Soviet military dispositions remain as at present. There was also no substantial advantage to be gained in trying to detach the satellites, in so far as this might affect over-all Soviet military strength, since such a detachment would not significantly affect Soviet military power, either in atomic or conventional weapons.

6. Mr. Bowie next turned to a discussion of the relations between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist regime. He said that the regime was in firm control over the territory which it administered and there was little likelihood of this

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control being threatened or shaken by domestic forces or any rival regime, short of general war. The relations of Communist China to the U.S.S.R. was that of an alliance based upon a common ideology and common interests. He believed that the Communist Chinese Government may increasingly assert its own interests, however, possibly to the detriment of Russian control of Communism in the area, particularly if there is a stabilization of the situation in Korea. Termination of hostilities in Korea will make Communist China's economic and military dependence on the U.S.S.R. less urgent, though this continued economic dependence will tend to limit Communist Chinese capacity for independent action. He did not rule out the possibility of a break between the two allies. However, co-operation between the two added strength to both.

7. Summing up his analysis of Soviet intentions in relation to the risks of war, Mr. Bowie said that this estimate was based upon an analysis of Soviet bloc capabilities through mid-1955. For the period of this estimate, there was nothing to indicate that the Soviet Union intends to launch a general war. The reasons for this assumption included the following:

- (a) uncertainty about the outcome of war;
- (b) change in Soviet leadership;
- (c) United States capabilities of atomic retaliation; and
- (d) unrest among the satellites.

8. In considering the possibility of general war, Mr. Bowie said that it should not be overlooked that the Soviet Union in following its hostile aims does not exclude resort to war if its essential interests are challenged. Moreover, it is difficult to judge at this time what the effects of the growing Soviet atomic capabilities might be upon Soviet readiness to go to war. At present, the United States and the Soviet Union obviously have the capacity to do each other terrible damage, but it was doubtful if either of these two powers could knock the other out with an atomic attack. This situation might produce a condition of stalemate because neither side can contemplate general war and its terrible effects with equanimity. The danger remains, however, that if the Soviet Union thought that they had a margin of superior strength, they might be tempted to strike with a surprise attack. Moreover, in a continued condition of stalemate, there was always the danger that the Soviet Union might embark on further limited aggressions in the belief that the United States would not be willing to employ its atomic capability in such circumstances, because of the horrors of atomic war. It was therefore necessary to make it clear that the Soviet Union could not get away with local aggressions, despite the psychological inhibitions arising from the horrors of atomic war.

9. Turning to the particular situations which might give rise to the risks of general war, Mr. Bowie said that Korea represented, in his judgement, the main area which might be regarded as a "tinder box". Here the Communists have the capability of embarking upon war, but there was no indication that such was their intention. In the main, the Soviet Government would continue to rely on political and psychological methods of pursuing its aims, including propaganda, subversion, and the exploitation of the fear of atomic warfare. They would also be expected to continue to try to divide the allies. The factor of atomic "blackmail" may be

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expected to play an increasingly important part in Soviet psychological warfare, as well as their exploitation of the strong desire for peace among peoples everywhere.

10. Looking into the future, beyond the period through mid-1955 under consideration in the current United States estimate, Mr. Bowie did not rule out the possibility of "peaceful co-existence" between the Soviet bloc and the Western Powers. He thought that it was possible to assume that revolutionary zeal among Soviet leaders might tend to decline. Domestic developments, such as popular pressures for increased supply of consumption goods and the development of vested interests in peaceful development on the part of a new bourgeoisie drawn from the managerial classes, might produce trends favouring this status quo. However, he was now talking in terms of the next decade or two. If the free world could maintain its strength and remain cohesive in its aims and policies while exploiting any Soviet weaknesses, particularly their lack of control over satellite populations, it was possible that the Soviet Government might prove to be more amenable about entering into negotiations and accepting peaceful co-existence over the long term.

11. The Chairman, commenting on Mr. Bowie's presentation, said that in his judgement the Soviet intentions might be summed up in the comment which Stalin is supposed to have made to Dimitrov (one-time head of the Comintern) to the effect that "we do not desire war any more than the West does, but we are less anxious to preserve peace than they are". This was the neatest analysis he had heard of Soviet aims. The danger in Soviet policy lay in the fact that while pursuing by "peaceful" means policies which were ultimately hostile to the aims of the Western Powers, the Soviet Union did not rule out the possibility of armed conflict.

12. The Chairman asked Assistant Secretary Livingston Merchant whether he had anything to add to Mr. Bowie's presentation on particular situations which might give rise to war. Mr. Merchant said that during his recent consultations with United States Heads of Mission in Europe, it had been recognized that Berlin remains another important "tinder box". Especially if there were any popular uprisings in East Germany, the possibility should not be ruled out that West Germans, owing to public feeling, might try to intervene with incalculable results. Mr. Merchant also said he would like to add a word about Trieste. The continued stalemate between Italy and Yugoslavia on this issue had been giving the United States increasing anxiety. Unless there were a rapprochement between the two countries, there could be no real collaboration for the defence of the Eastern Mediterranean. Effective defence of this area required co-operation between Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. Once it was realized that it was impossible to obtain or negotiate a settlement between Italy and Yugoslavia, it was decided to impose a solution. This was the background to the decision of October 8 announced by the United States and the United Kingdom Governments. The reactions in both Italy and Yugoslavia were surprising. The Italians proved to be more jubilant over the decision than had been expected, and Tito was more violent in opposing it. Since then, however, Tito had tended to retreat from the exposed

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position he had taken immediately after the decision was announced, and the Italians tended to be less exultant. The tactics of the United States were now directed to bringing about a five-power conference in the hope of getting Yugoslavia and Italy to sit down to a round-table discussion of the situation with the hope that with the passage of time and continued exercise of moderating influences on the two countries by the United States and the United Kingdom, a final and peaceful solution might be worked out.

13. Mr. Heeney asked whether there was any basis for anticipating that Tito may be edging toward resuming co-operation with the Soviet Union. Mr. Merchant said that he was satisfied that there was no real danger of this, despite rumours (mainly emanating from Italy) to that effect. He said that Tito in fact had "no house to go back to". The United States had been surprised by the extent of the lingering suspicions existing in Belgrade of the purposes of the Western Powers. There was no doubt that Tito had been sincerely shaken at the abrupt decision and his suspicions had probably been fed by rumours emanating from Italy. He was now tending to accept the fact that there had been no secret consultations with Italy before the decision of October 8 had been made. The Chairman added the remark that perhaps both the United States and the United Kingdom had over-estimated Tito's influence in the country as a result of his visit to London and also his amenability to a settlement in Trieste. It should not be overlooked that he has a hard core of Communists to deal with who are not sympathetic to the closer-knit partisan group which surrounds Tito. A serious problem of leadership would arise in Yugoslavia if Tito were removed. So far as he knew, the only successors in sight were Ra^{sk}ovic or Kardelj.

14. The Chairman asked Mr. Heeney whether he had any comments on the general analysis which had been presented. Mr. Heeney said that he was not disposed to question the estimate of Soviet intentions and capabilities which had been presented. The Canadian Government had fewer sources to draw upon in producing estimates of this kind. However, the views presented at this meeting did not differ substantially from those discussed in other forums, such as in the North Atlantic Council. Mr. Heeney said that he had some difficulty in following the time span involved in the discussion. Mr. Bowie had said that the estimate he was talking about applied to Soviet policies and capabilities through mid-1955. Was this date related to estimates of Soviet atomic progress? The Chairman intervened to say that the dates used were purely arbitrary and for planning purposes only. He was not assuming that the Soviet Government was committed to any time schedule of aggression. Their tactics were flexible and they showed a willingness to retreat when necessary. Mr. Heeney said that he had no quarrel with this assumption. There was no doubt that although the Soviet long-term aims seemed to be fairly constant, he was glad to note that there was agreement that a détente for tactical reasons should not be ruled out. It was important that the Western Powers should take advantage of any evidence of willingness on the part of the Soviet Government to develop such a détente through negotiations. These might accomplish something to the

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advantage of the Western Powers. Mr. Heeney also noted that whether we liked it or not, it must be accepted that relaxation of international tension already had some effect on the actions of NATO governments. The Chairman said that he had been rather heartened by talks which he had with M. Hervé Alphand about French prospects for the ratification of the EDC. M. Alphand seemed to be confident that there would be a steady effort in France to ratify the Agreement. The Under-Secretary realized that there were some strong opponents of this policy, but he was encouraged nonetheless. If the EDC were ratified, the Western Powers would be in a much stronger position to negotiate with the Soviet Union with profit.

16. Mr. MacKay noted that there had been no reference in Mr. Bowie's presentation to the situation in the Middle East. Could this be taken to mean that there was no potentially explosive situation in that area? Mr. Bowie replied that he was not trying to be entirely comprehensive at this meeting. However, there was no evidence that any particular situation in that area might give rise to general war. In Iran, the Government of General Zahedi was providing stability in the country, as well as working towards a settlement of the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute. The Chairman intervened to say that the situation on the Israel-Jordan border was serious. The Israeli Government had been highly provocative in their actions. The United States Government had to suspend further financial aid and support consideration of the dispute in the Security Council of the United Nations. Mr. Eric Johnston had been sent out to review the possibilities of exploiting, under multi-lateral arrangements, the water resources of the border. The Chairman said that if it were possible for Israel to reach agreement on peace terms with any one of the Arab states, he was sure that agreement between Israel and all the other Arab states would follow quickly. However, so long as the present tense situation exists, chances of this were slim. He added that the dispute in the Buraimi area seemed to be on the road to satisfactory solution. With regard to Iran, the Chairman added that Mr. Hoover's mission was to further a settlement of the oil dispute. The attitude of the British Government was helpful. Mr. Hoover, who had broad experience in oil marketing problems, was trying to seek, among other things, how resumed supplies of oil from Iran could be fitted into the world markets. During the period of the oil dispute the buyers of Iranian oil had turned to other sources of supply. If anybody could find the solution to this problem, Mr. Hoover, he felt sure, would make a good attempt.

17. Before concluding the discussions on Soviet intentions and the risks of war, Mr. Heeney said he wanted a clarification as to whether there was any connection between the reference to mid-1955 in the discussion and growing Soviet atomic capabilities. The Chairman elaborated his previous comment on this point. He said that the use of target dates was purely an administrative convenience to meet the requirement of planning two or three years ahead. However, in choosing dates the United States planners had taken into consideration certain developments in the USSR, affecting its military capabilities, such as the successive

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five-year plans. But these target dates had been chosen arbitrarily to facilitate budgetary and military planning. The growing Soviet atomic stockpile had particular significance in what he described as its "trade value" in the relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. In estimating this value, however, consideration had to be given not only of the relative size of the two stockpiles, but also to other factors, such as the relative concentration of industrial and military targets in the United States and the effectiveness of public pressure on the Government of the United States, as compared with the apathy of public opinion in the Soviet Union. Admiral Radford confirmed this understanding that the choice of target dates for planning purposes was arbitrary.

United States Estimate of Soviet Atomic Capability:

18. Admiral Radford prefaced his remarks by observing that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff do not overlook the fact that the Soviet menace presents itself in three aspects: the military, ideological, and economic. If there were any tendency to relax tension on the military front, it would be unsafe to be less vigilant on the other fronts. He then gave the most recent estimate of Soviet atomic capability, based on a Joint Intelligence Committee report which had just been submitted to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said that this report estimates that the Soviet Union has a sufficient number of TU4 aircraft to carry the full present stockpile of atomic weapons in the Soviet Union in attacks against the United States. Since, however, these aircraft are capable only of one-way missions, it could be assumed that most of these aircraft and their crews would be lost. It could also be assumed that some of these missions would lose some of the advantage which might be gained from surprise, because some of the flights would have to be launched from bases in the Baltic area. It would also have to be assumed that the TU4 aircraft would be able to refuel on the way, at least once. It would also have to be assumed that a large proportion of such strikes would be on Strategic Air Command bases in the United States as well as abroad. The report concluded, however, that there was no basis for the belief that such a Soviet attack was imminent. In support of this conclusion the following reasons were given:

- (a) the fear of United States capability of retaliation with atomic weapons;
- (b) questionable effectiveness of available means for attack as well as of the capability to stop United States retaliation;
- (c) basic cautiousness of the Soviet Government; and
- (d) success which could be gained from using other methods.

The report gave the following estimate of the numbers of TU4 aircraft and their capabilities: number - about 1,000; radius of action - 1700 nautical miles; bomb-carrying capacity - about 10,000 pounds. Regarding the availability of other aircraft capable of carrying atomic weapons, the report said that it was believed that the Soviet Union was developing type 31 aircraft capable of two-way missions.

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This aircraft had been seen in prototype but no numbers of estimated production rates were given. The report said that one bomber of the B47 type had been seen, but there was no evidence that this aircraft would be in operation for several years. Summing up Soviet capabilities in other associated techniques, the report said that in navigational radar, it was thought that the Soviet Union Air Force would be able to equip only lead crews. As regards in-flight refuelling, there was insufficient evidence available to affirm or deny that the Soviet Union had developed this technique. In regard to counter measures to our radar, it was believed that the Soviet Union had available only the technique developed in the last war referred to as CHAFF. As regards navigational skill, it was believed that it was adequate for over-water and trans-polar flights. In respect to targetry, it was believed that the Soviet Union had at its disposal adequate information on the target system in the United States. The bombing equipment available to the Soviet Air Force was thought to be equivalent to the best developed by the United States Air Force during World War II. The report said that the launching sites which would be used by the Soviet Union are located in Northeastern Siberia, the Kola Peninsula, and in the Baltic area. In summing up his conclusions on the basis of this report, Admiral Radford said that while the Soviet Union had the capability to launch a serious attack against the United States, such an attack would not be sufficient to destroy the retaliatory capability of the United States or its industrial base. It was therefore thought that the Soviet Union was not likely to launch such an attack, at least until it had further improved its potential in this kind of warfare.

19. General Foulkes expressed general agreement with the estimate given by Admiral Radford. He said that according to Canadian estimates the Soviet Union was thought to have from between 600 to 1,000 TU4 aircraft. It was his belief that these aircraft could do one refuelling, but not two, in flight. The question of the usefulness of carriers was so closely related to refuelling, that this had been included in the list of indicators. General Bedell Smith hoped that there were arrangements to exchange information between the two Governments on indicators. He indicated that the United States would welcome such an exchange of information. The refuelling problem, he agreed, was important so long as there was no evidence that the type 31 aircraft was in current operational use in the Soviet Union. If the difficulties of the refuelling techniques were overcome, or the T31 aircraft was in quantity production, it would be necessary to expect a serious threat to North America.

20. General Foulkes said that since the last atomic explosion in the Soviet Union, with the evidence which it gave that the Soviets had developed a fusion bomb, it now appeared that Russia was developing the capability of mounting serious attacks against North America. He wondered whether these latest developments might not result in a change in Soviet strategy. In the past, it had been envisaged that the Soviet main attack would be against Western Europe, with only "diversionary" attacks against North America. If the Soviet Union achieved anything approaching parity with the United States in atomic stockpiles, it had to be assumed that the Soviet Union would then have

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a distinct advantage, in that the Soviet Government would be in a position to make a surprise attack, whereas it had to be assumed that the Western Powers would never take the initiative to attack. He suggested that consideration should be given to the serious implications of a possible change in Soviet strategy resulting from its growing atomic capabilities. It was possible that the Soviets might see the advantage of devoting a large part of their atomic arsenal, provided they continued the development of the means of delivering their new weapons in an effort to cripple North America. At the same time, they might use a limited portion of their stockpile in an attack against the United Kingdom, while using their predominance in ground forces to secure Western Europe as rapidly as possible and with as little damage to the industrial complex as may be necessary. In the course of such an action the Soviet Union would, of course, expect a certain amount of retaliation on the Soviet Union but would have gained the war potential of West Europe. The Chairman agreed with General Foulkes' argument about the possibility of a change in Soviet strategic concept. He also agreed with General Foulkes that should the Soviet Union proceed on this basis, (including the occupation of Western Europe) it would present a difficult problem to North America as we would be loathe to use atomic bombs against European cities even if they contained elements of the Soviet war-machine. In this connection, he recalled the opposition encountered in the last war in bombing German targets in France. The Chairman said that consideration of Soviet atomic capabilities and its threat to North America inevitably brings one up squarely with the problem of continental defence and what to do to meet this menace. He invited Admiral Radford to continue the discussion with an informal presentation of United States views on this subject.

United States Views on Continental Defence:

21. Admiral Radford proceeded to read from notes based upon a directive on planning for continental defence recently approved by the National Security Council as policy guidance to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and the United States departments. Admiral Radford said:

"The United States objective is to achieve in a rapid and orderly manner and to maintain, in collaboration with Canada, a readiness and capability which will give us reasonable assurance of :

- a) contributing to deterring Soviet aggression,
- b) preventing devastating attack that might threaten our national survival,
- c) minimizing the effects of any Soviet attack so as to permit our successful prosecution of a war,
- d) guarding against Soviet inspired subversive activities,
- e) preventing the threat of atomic destruction from discouraging freedom of action or weakening national morale.

"It is considered that Canadian participation on an adequate scale is essential to any effective continental defense system. This requires a common

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appreciation of the urgency and character of the threat to U.S.-Canadian security and the measures required to meet it. We naturally seek to determine the extent to which Canada may wish to take leadership in parts of the system and to contributing to its expense.

"We recognize the full importance of research and development in order that the weapons and equipment actually procured will be suitable to cope with the threat at the time that they become available in quantity and are made operational.

"We feel that the following program should be completed with all possible speed:

- a) The southern Canadian early warning system and seaward extensions thereof.
- b) The extension to seaward of contiguous radar coverage in selected areas.
- c) Methods of aircraft identification.
- d) Completion of defense plans.
- e) Development of a device for the detection of fission-able material.

"We seek to bring into a high state of readiness over the next two years: (a) stronger fighter interceptor and anti-aircraft forces; (b) the northern Canadian early warning line, if proved feasible by current project CORRODE and the studies now in process; (c) an air control system; (d) gap filler radars for low altitude surveillance; (e) systems for the distant detection of submarines; miscellaneous plans for relocation of parts of the government; (f) miscellaneous programs in regard to internal security and civil defense.

"It is considered that an early warning system providing a minimum of at least two hours is an immediate necessity. The southern Canadian detector line and the Alaska and Northeast air control and warning systems should be completed as early as possible. Seaward extensions should be provided beginning with the Atlantic extension.

"The U.S. Chiefs of Staff are studying these matters with a view to making recommendations for phased increases in forces and facilities to meet the increasing threat.

"Contrary to reports in press and magazines, the program is being pressed forward at high priority but without hysteria or a tendency to overcommit resources to purely defensive measures which would detract from other essential programs involved in our security and worldwide commitments. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff do not tend either to over-emphasize or underestimate the threat and are fully aware of their responsibilities to build up reasonable effective defenses which will provide the best defensive posture consistent with the funds invested.

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On the 20th of October the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded to the U.S. Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense a request that necessary action be initiated to obtain agreement with the Canadians on the requirement for an early warning system in Canada as outlined in the interim report submitted by the Canada-U.S. Military Study Group, and to obtain such other agreements as may be appropriate and necessary for the early implementation of the project."

(We were told by Messrs. Arneson and Raynor after the meeting that the paper on which Admiral Radford based his remarks was a document of policy guidance recently approved by the National Security Council for the purpose of directing the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and the United States Departments concerned with planning continental defence. This paper therefore expressed United States objectives and was only partially concerned with measures of air defence requiring co-operation between the two countries. This explains the comprehensive nature of its coverage in mentioning various measures which would have to be planned for, if an effective continental defence system is to be established. Admiral Radford's presentation should be considered in the light of this explanatory comment.)

22. General Foulkes in commenting on Admiral Radford's presentation said that the present discussion dealt mainly with the immediate threat. What of course would be of greatest assistance in solving this problem of continental defence was an estimate of the magnitude of the threat for the period two or three years ahead. Admiral Radford said that the United States were seriously concerned with the character and extent of the threat which might be developed in two or three years' time, but certain things had to be done now as the potential threat was growing every day. General Foulkes said that if Soviet atomic developments proceed as fast as was now expected, the Soviet Union might have the capability to deliver crippling attacks on North America by 1956 or 1957. Admiral Radford observed that it should not be assumed, of course, that the Soviet Union would be able to concentrate its entire atomic capability on North America. The Soviet Union, in the event of war, would have to strike at U.S. bases abroad, as well as at the United States atomic capability and industrial base in the United States. In addition, there were the aircraft carriers which represent mobile bases from which atomic strikes could be launched. He said that the United States could not discount the necessity of making every effort of bolstering its continental defences, as it may conceivably risk retaliatory attack from the Soviet Union. Admiral Radford added that he was also concerned about the possibility of sabotage of key atomic plants through the introduction by clandestine means of fissionable material.

23. General Foulkes said that the Soviet atomic capability should be regarded as substantially increased by the ability of the Soviet Union to take the initiative in an atomic strike. United States retaliation after an initial attack from the Soviet Union would obviously be less effective. He also suggested that consideration should be given to the effect of Soviet atomic capability on the other members of NATO as well as upon North America.

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Discussions on continental defence were inevitably alarming to our friends in NATO. He suggested that this consideration might be met by reference to the NATO strategic guidance paper [M.C. 14/1(Final) "Strategic Guidance"]. This guidance provides for increases in the defence of North America by 1956 in the following words:

"However in 1956 the Soviet Union may have a formidable atomic potential against North America, and an adequate defence for this area thus becomes essential in order to permit NATO to accomplish its military objectives."

General Foulkes suggested that it would be more reassuring to the NATO partners of Canada and the United States if it could be explained that the efforts of the two countries to strengthen the air defence of North America are in line with this NATO concept. Further, it should be emphasized that the increased defence of North America directly contributes to the defence of the alliance as a whole, because these defence measures are intended as a protection of the war-making potential to support our allies. This would tend to meet the tendencies towards neutralism which may be observed in Europe. General Foulkes suggested that this kind of explanation might be given at the next meeting of the Military Committee. The Chairman agreed that the considerations advanced by General Foulkes were absolutely essential. He mentioned that Admiral Radford was about to go to Europe. Admiral Radford said that he would bear this argument in mind in the discussions which he expected to have during his visit in Europe.

24. General Foulkes said it was also necessary to consider the need for some kind of joint statement on continental defence to meet the public interest on the question aroused by current press rumours and reports. From the point of view of public presentation, he was glad that the Admiral had used the term "southern Canadian early warning system" instead of the phrase sometime employed "line on the 55th parallel". Public statements on defence should avoid disclosures of defence secrets. General Foulkes went on to say that the interim report of the Canada-United States Military Study Group had been examined by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff. He believed that certain immediate steps could now be taken to facilitate work on this project. These steps would include detailed reconnaissance of the proposed location of the southern Canadian line, further study of the types of equipment most suitable for this line, and an estimate of its initial and recurring costs. All this preparatory work would be done so that necessary Government decisions should not have to be delayed. General Foulkes noted from Admiral Radford's presentation that any action on the northern Canadian early warning line would be undertaken only if the project proved feasible by Operation CORRODE and the studies now in progress. Admiral Radford said that there was a manpower problem involved in obtaining the services of the necessary trained technical personnel for radar work.

25. The Chairman said that he was most encouraged by the comments made by General Foulkes. The question now was how to proceed to the next step. General Foulkes said that as the next step the recommendations of the Canadian-United States Military Study Group would have to be considered by both Governments. In the preparation of such recommendations it was noted that the United States

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Chiefs of Staff had referred this matter to the Permanent Joint Board. The Board, however, he said, did not settle policy, but worked out details of plans and recommendations for submission to the respective Governments. The Board would require guidance in the preparation of such recommendations. The Chairman observed that there seemed to be an organizational problem involved, and that the proper machinery seemed to be lacking. The P.J.B.D. might be not enough and he wondered whether the time had not come to consider the establishment of a Combined Chiefs of Staff. General Foulkes said that he would now go back to Ottawa and report the views expressed at the meeting, and in particular the suggestion that as the next step, the recommendations should be prepared to go ahead with the southern Canadian early warning system for submission to the respective Governments. The discussion then turned to the public relations problem. Articles on this subject in the press tended to mislead people and General Foulkes suggested that a prepared statement on continental defence might serve to put the discussion into proper focus. Mr. Heeney observed that when the President went to Ottawa on November 13, attention would inevitably be directed to the defence problem. The Chairman agreed with Mr. Heeney that the issuance of a statement on that occasion might be desirable. Mr. MacKay said that it might be desirable not to focus too much attention specifically on continental defence, and to refer to the defence relationships existing between the two countries generally. The Chairman said that he would be agreeable to such a statement. Mr. Heeney said that before concluding this discussion, he would like to emphasize that continental defence presented certain special problems to the Canadian Government. Important policy considerations were involved with grave implications, such as the balance between forces and commitments abroad and at home and the Canadian problem was, on a smaller scale, much the same as that facing the United States. But, for Canada, there was also the question of the balance to be maintained between a powerful and less powerful neighbour in cooperating in defence on Canadian soil. Unless such considerations were appreciated fully on the United States side, the capacity of the Canadian Government to cooperate effectively in such matters as continental defence might be seriously affected. In working out joint defence measures, moreover, it was necessary to take into account the important issue of Canadian sovereignty. The Chairman replied that he appreciated this kind of consideration very thoroughly. He recalled a conversation which he had with Mr. Pickersgill on this theme during the Prime Minister's visit to Washington last spring. He had not forgotten what Mr. Pickersgill had said about his feelings on seeing a foreign flag flying over Canadian soil (in Newfoundland). General Foulkes said that while the objective should be to work toward an effective and co-ordinated air defence system, it was necessary to bear in mind the important policy considerations mentioned by Mr. Heeney. The Chairman said that in working out measures of co-operation on continental defence, the United States Government would like to be guided by the Canadian Government on the effect of these on the relations between the two countries. The object that the United States had in mind was to develop a complete mutuality of understanding.

26. The Chairman said that he was open to suggestions about a further meeting. Mr. Heeney said that while this meeting had been undoubtedly useful, he thought that such

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consultations should take place only as necessary. If they were held too frequently, they might lose some of their usefulness. General Foulkes said that he welcomed this kind of meeting and had found it extremely useful. He would be glad to come down at any time when a meeting was desired. The Chairman, in concluding the meeting, said that it would be up to the Canadian Government to suggest a convenient date for another meeting. He noted that Admiral Radford would be away from Washington until November 18, but if a meeting were desired before then, perhaps one of the United States Chiefs of Staff might attend, possibly General Ridgway.

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MESSAGE FORM
OUTGOING

File No. 50209-40	
54	50

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR WASHINGTON

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REMIT A SECRET

Message To Be Sent

AIR CYPHER
EN CLAIR
CODE
CYPHER AUTO

No. EX-1829 Date October 29, 1953

For Communications Section Only

SENT - OCT 29 1953

REFERENCE:

Priority

IMMEDIATE

SUBJECT: Report ~~XX~~ of Consultation Meeting

Following for Ignatieff from MacKay, begins:

1. General Foulkes suggested the following changes
in the first draft of the report:

Page 16, line 2

Delete the word "quickly".

Page 16, line 3

After the word "Europe" add the following

"as rapidly as possible and with as little damage to
the industrial complex as may be necessary".

Page 19, paragraph 22

Delete the first two sentences and substitute
the following: "General Foulkes in commenting on
Admiral Radford's presentation said that the present
discussion dealt mainly with the immediate threat.
What of course would be of greatest assistance in
solving this problem of continental defense was an
estimate of the magnitude of the threat for the
period two or three years ahead."

Page 21, line 11

After the word "potential" delete the words
"of the" and substitute the words "to support our".

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Copies Referred To:

Done. *M. A. Z.*
Date. *Oct 29/53*

Done.....

Date.....

- 2 -

Page 21, paragraph 24, line 2

After the word "on" insert the word "continental".

Page 22, line 1

Delete the word "should" and substitute the words
"could now".

Page 22, line 2

Delete the words "to go ahead" and substitute the words
"to facilitate work on".

Page 22, paragraph 25, line 7

After the word "recommendations" add the following
"it was noted that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff had referred
this matter to". Delete rest of sentence after the word
"Board ".

Page 23, line 1

Before the word "recommendations" insert the word "the".

Security **CONFIDENTIAL**.....

MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

File No. 50209-40	
59	50

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: Head of Post,
..... Washington

Message To Be Sent		No. <i>Ex-1832</i>	Date October 29, 1953	For Communications Section Only SENT — OCT 29 1953
AIR CYPHER		<p><u>REFERENCE:</u> Your letter No. 2029 dated October 22, 1953.</p> <p><u>SUBJECT:</u> Proposed article on continental defence for COLLIER'S.</p> <p>We took up with the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff the proposal that defence officials in Ottawa might cooperate with William Ulman in the preparation of another article on continental defence to be written from the Canadian point of view. General Foulkes discussed this matter with Mr. Claxton and reports that he is not at all agreeable to any further articles being written on continental defence by Mr. Ulman or anyone else. We leave it to your discretion as to how you will inform Mr. Ulman of this decision.</p>		
EN CLAIR				
CODE				
CYPHER <i>ALVIN</i>	<i>XX</i>			
Priority				
ORIGINATOR				
(Signature)				
..... <i>W.H. Barton</i>				
(Name Typed)				
Div... <i>D.L.(1)</i>				
Local Tel... <i>7509</i>				
APPROVED BY				
..... <i>R.A.M.</i>				
(Signature)				
..... <i>M.H. Wershof</i>				
(Name Typed)				
Internal Distribution:				
S.S.E.A. <i>✓</i> U.S.S.E.A. <i>✓</i>				
Done... <i>mat</i>				
Date... <i>Oct 30/53</i>				
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Date... <i>Oct 29, 1953</i>				
Ext. 97 (Rev. 1/52)				

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL



OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, CHIEFS OF STAFF

OTTAWA

File
29 October, 1953.

R.A. MacKay, Esq.,
Department of External Affairs,
East Block,
Ottawa, Canada.

50209-40
54150

Dear Mr. MacKay:

Reference our conversation regarding the proposed article on continental defence for Collier's. I discussed this question with Mr. Claxton and he is not at all agreeable to any further articles being written on continental defence by Mr. Ulman or anyone else.

Yours sincerely,

Charles Foulkes
(Charles Foulkes)
Lieutenant-General
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff



OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, CHIEFS OF STAFF

OTTAWA

28 October, 1953.

R.A. MacKay, Esq.,
Department of External Affairs,
East Block,
Ottawa, Canada.

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Report of Meeting of Consultation in Washington

1 With reference to your letter of 26 October enclosing the first draft of a report of the meeting of consultation in Washington, I have read the report with interest and have a few comments. If it is proposed to circulate this document wider than to a few Ministers and a half-dozen senior officials who have a real necessity to see it, I have grave doubts about including verbatim the U.S. Chiefs of Staff plans, which I understand is almost a verbatim copy of the instructions given to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff by the National Security Council. When I secured a copy of Admiral Radford's paper I undertook not to reproduce it in its entirety and to seriously restrict its distribution. However, I realize that it will be difficult to eliminate very much of the report from this document and, therefore, I feel very strongly that recipients of this document should be warned that under no consideration should the plans of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff be quoted. As I am actually quoting certain sections of Admiral Radford's paper in the Cabinet Defence document, it is my intention to ask that all copies of this paper be returned after the Cabinet Defence Committee meeting.

2 I have a few amendments to the first draft of the report which I would like to pass on to you as follows:

Page 16, line 2

Delete the word "quickly".

Page 16, line 3

After the word "Europe" add the following "as rapidly as possible and with as little damage to the industrial complex as may be necessary".

Page 19, paragraph 22

Delete the first two sentences and substitute the following: "General Foulkes in commenting on Admiral Radford's presentation said that the present discussion dealt mainly with the immediate threat. What of course would be of greatest assistance in solving this problem of continental defence was an estimate of the magnitude of the threat for the period two or three years ahead."

Page 21, line 11

After the word "potential" delete the words "of the" and substitute the words "to support our".

- 2 -

Page 21, paragraph 24, line 2

After the word "on" insert the word "continental".

Page 22, line 1

Delete the word "should" and substitute the words
"could now".

Page 22, line 2


Delete the words "to go ahead" and substitute the words
"to facilitate work on".

Page 22, paragraph 25, line 7

After the word "recommendations" add the following
"it was noted that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff had referred
this matter to". Delete rest of sentence after the word
"Board".

Page 23, line 1

Before the word "recommendations" insert the word
"the".


(Charles Foulkes)
Lieutenant-General
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff

The report is returned herewith as requested



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RESTRICTED

EXTRACT from Letter No. 2063 of October 28, 1953
from Washington, reporting on the October 19th
Press Conference of the Secretary of Defence.

"4. When questioned concerning developments in the field of continental defence Secretary Wilson repeated what he had said at an earlier press conference concerning the priority of consideration which was being given to the topic, although he added wryly, "The capacity of the National Security Council and of the Defense Department exceeds the ability to consider one thing only so we are working on some more things besides that". He thought there was no reason for the American people to become hysterical about the problem; he suggested that the Russians probably had more reason for concern at the power ranged against them by the free world. Mr. Wilson has already been criticised for his rather unfortunate phrasing in this context at earlier press conferences but the criticism does not seem to have caused him to change his argument. In answer to a question as to what aspects of the problem of continental defence might be singled out for special attention, Mr. Wilson replied that the main effort in the field would probably be two-fold, directed in the first instance to development of the best early warning radar screen and followed by increasing emphasis on the provision of interceptor aircraft. Proper weight would also be given to the threat of possible attack from submarines off the coast of the United States although Mr. Wilson suggested that the most obvious danger was that of air attack."

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Mr. Boulton
File 50209-40

TOP SECRET

October, 1953

50.209-40	
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Dear Mr. Claxton,

I have your Top Secret note of today's date in regard to the questions of Continental Air Defence which are under debate with our United States colleagues and which we will need to discuss in the PJED in response to the request which the United States Chairman has put forward, the text of which is given in Telegram WA-2418 dated 23 October, 1953 from our Ambassador in Washington, and of which I presume you have a copy.

I appreciate your suggestion that I might be present at the Cabinet Defence Committee meeting next week, when the subject is to be considered, but my difficulty is that on Friday of this week I have to leave for Spokane, Washington, and Trail, British Columbia, on International Joint Commission business to fulfil a long-standing commitment which it is not desirable should be broken. I will be back in Ottawa on Sunday, 8 November.


Honourable Brooke Claxton,
Minister of National Defence,
Ottawa.

2

Dr. MacKay, the External Affairs member of the Canadian Section of the PJBD, is fully familiar with the developments in regard to Continental Defence which have taken place both in the PJBD and otherwise, and this morning he represented External Affairs at the Chiefs of Staff meeting on the subject. In view of the impossibility of my being at the Cabinet Defence Committee meeting next week, may I venture to suggest that Dr. MacKay should attend with the responsibility of presenting the position as known to the Canadian Section of the PJBD.

I feel sure that if this arrangement is made there will be no difficulty in Dr. MacKay giving me the information and points of view on which I should be informed before we meet our United States colleagues in the PJBD.

Yours sincerely,



A. G. L. McNaughton
Chairman, Canadian Section
Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

Extract from the Minutes of the 547th Meeting
of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, October 27, 1953.

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III. CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENCE

(TOP SECRET)

7. The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff reported to the committee on recent discussions concerning Continental Air Defence which were held in Washington between US and Canadian authorities. He stated that the US and Canada are in general agreement on the re-assessment of the risk of war with the USSR. The views of the US Chiefs of Staff on the report of the Canada-US Military Study Group were as follows:

It was agreed at the Washington meeting that joint action for the present should be confined to the early warning project in southern Canada and the implementation of the flank coverage. The US Chiefs of Staff have indicated that they are about to give consideration to the extension of the early warning chain off the Atlantic Coast and that they would welcome Canadian views as to what portion or portions of the program Canada would be prepared to consider.

Lieutenant-General Foulkes raised the question of whether the program should be carried out on a cost sharing basis or whether it would be more appropriate for one or either country to assume responsibility for the implementation of a particular portion of the program. In either case there would be no question but that the air defence scheme would operate as a joint project. The military aim should be to have the necessary equipment installed and fully operational by mid-1956.

8. The Representative of the Chief of the Air Staff pointed out that the Canada-US Military Study Group has not yet studied the entire air defence system but it has agreed that an obvious early requirement is a southern Canadian line. He presented an estimate of the order of magnitude of the cost to be \$80 million of which approximately \$15 million would be for electronic equipment and the balance for construction and maintenance costs. There would be a recurring maintenance cost of between \$5 to \$10 million a year. He stated that it would probably take two years to complete the project from receipt of authority to start but that a beginning could not be made until a final decision is reached on the type of equipment to be used. He again pointed out to the Chiefs of Staff that the minimum operational requirement for this early warning line should be:

- (a) a high degree of detection capability against all forms of penetration by hostile aircraft; and
- (b) capability of discrimination between incoming and outgoing aircraft.

9. The Representative of the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs agreed with the urgent necessity of carrying out the survey but noted that as the line is an agreed North American defence requirement that it must be done in full consultation with the US.

(c) the Chiefs of Staff recommend:

- (i) that approval in principle be given to the establishment of an early warning line along the 55th parallel,
- (ii) that approval be given to instruct the Canadian Section of the Study Group to urge the Study Group to finalize the selection and specifications for the equipments, and
- (iii) that approval be given for Canadian authorities in consultation with the US to carry out a detailed survey of the line and sites.

10. Air Vice Marshal Miller stated that it was within Canadian capability to complete the survey as quickly and efficiently alone as with American assistance but that the survey cannot proceed very far until a decision is reached on the specific equipment to be used, although certain aspects of the preliminary survey can be started immediately. He reiterated the need for immediate approval to start the survey and determine the equipment necessary and recommended that any question of cost sharing with the US should not be allowed to interfere with the urgent necessity for an immediate decision from the Government on these two points. Any decision on cost sharing should in any case wait until the initial survey is completed to enable further cost figures being obtained.

11. The Committee have given further consideration to this project and the views expressed by the US Chiefs of Staff and have reached the following opinion:

- (a) that the new assessment of Russian capabilities by 1956-1957 create a requirement to have in operation a reasonable early warning system by 1956, and consider that an early warning line along the 55th parallel as recommended by the Study Group is a reasonable project which could, if energetically pursued, be put into operation by 1956;
- (b) to achieve this objective, action on the preliminary measures should be undertaken at once without waiting for the final report of the Study Group. These measures to include a detailed survey of the early warning line and the finalization of the selection and specifications for the equipments. When the survey is completed and the finalization of the selection and specifications for the equipments completed, it will be possible to arrive at a firm estimate of the cost.
- (c) the Chiefs of Staff recommend:
 - (i) that approval in principle be given to the establishment of an early warning line along the 55th parallel,
 - (ii) that approval be given to instruct the Canadian Section of the Study Group to urge the Study Group to finalize the selection and specifications for the equipments, and
 - (iii) that approval be given for Canadian authorities in consultation with the US to carry out a detailed survey of the line and sites.

- (a) contributing to deterring Russian aggression,
- (b) preventing diversionary attack that might threaten our national survival,
- (c) minimizing the efforts of any Soviet attack so as to permit us successful prosecution of a war,
- (d) guarding against Soviet-inspired subversive activities,
- (e) preventing the threat of atomic destruction and discouraging freedom of action which would weaken the national morale.

They will recommend that the following program should be completed with all possible speed:

- (a) the southern Canadian early warning system and seaward extensions thereof,
- (b) the extension to seaward of contiguous radar coverage in selected areas,
- (c) methods of aircraft identification,
- (d) the completion of defence plans,
- (e) the development of a device for the detection of fissionable material.

They consider that an early warning system providing a minimum of at least two hours is an immediate necessity. The southern Canadian detector line and the Alaska and northeast air control and warning systems should be completed as early as possible. Seaward extensions should be provided beginning with the Atlantic extension.

The US Joint Chiefs of Staff do not intend either to over-emphasize or under-emphasize the threat but are fully aware of their responsibilities to build up reasonably effective defences which will provide the best defensive posture consistent with funds invested. They naturally seek to determine the extent to which Canada may wish to take 14000912 ship in parts of the system and to contribute to its ex



CANADA

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

No. ... CSC 2-1
CSC 1855-1

Department of National Defence

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CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

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26 OCT 1953

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs ✓

Acting Secretary to the Cabinet

Continental Defence of North America

1. I have been directed to advise you that a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff will be held at 1000 Tuesday, 27 October, 1953, in the Office of the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, "A" Building, National Defence Headquarters.
2. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss Continental Defence of North America.
3. I shall arrange for a service staff car to be at the Main Entrance of the East Block at 0945 Tuesday, for your use.

A. O. Solomon

(A.O. Solomon)
Commander (SB), RCN
Secretary

ACS/3729/md

(Please return
to Mr. Bant
DL(11))

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FILE NO. CSC 1855-1

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS
OTTAWA

26 October, 1953

MEMORANDUM TO: Chairman, Chiefs of Staff
C.G.S.
C.N.S.
C.A.S.
C.D.R.B.

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SUBJECT: Continental Air Defence

1. The following document concerning the above mentioned subject is forwarded herewith:

Draft CDC document on above subject

2. This matter will be placed on the agenda of the..... meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee to be held..27 October, 1953....

A. O. Solomon
(A.O. Solomon)
Commander (SB), RCN,
Secretary.

cc: Deputy Minister
Secretary to the Cabinet - *Mr. Mackay*
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Co-ordinator, Joint Staff

D R A F T

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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

MEMORANDUM FOR CABINET DEFENCE COMMITTEE:

Continental Air Defence

1. It will be recalled that at the meeting of Cabinet Defence Committee on 6 October a report on the progress of the Study Group was presented which indicated that an interim report would be available within a few days. The interim report has now been received and has been considered by the Chiefs of Staff of both Canada and the United States. The report states as follows:

"Following a thorough review of all information available to the Group, it was determined that the amount of early warning time which will be provided by the presently-programmed air defence system of the two countries is inadequate to;

- (a) permit maximum utilization of the available active air defence forces,
- (b) meet the needs of strategical air forces,
- (c) provide for implementation of civil and other military defence measures."

2. The report recommends that there be established at the earliest practicable date an early warning line located generally along the 55th parallel between Alaska and Newfoundland. The minimum operational requirements for this early warning line should be;

- (a) a high degree of detection capability against all forms of penetration by hostile aircraft,
- (b) capability of discrimination between incoming and outgoing aircraft.

3. The Chiefs of Staff studied the report on 15 October and reached the following conclusions:

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"There is every indication that the United States Chiefs of Staff will ask for immediate consideration of the recommendations of the Study Group.

It is, therefore, suggested that the following should be the Canadian action:

1. To seek authority of Cabinet Defence Committee for agreement to a further detailed investigation of the early warning line on the 55th parallel.
2. To agree to a detailed survey of this line and sharing the cost of such survey.
3. To complete the further study of the types of equipment most suitable for this line.
4. To work out a detail estimate of the initial costs and annual recurring costs."

4. In the meantime the U.S. Chiefs of Staff had also considered the report of the Study Group and at a meeting held in the State Department in Washington on 22 October the Chairman of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff outlined the U.S. proposals, which are briefly as follows:

"Our objective is to achieve in a rapid and orderly manner and to maintain in collaboration with Canada a readiness and capability to give us reasonable assurance of;

- (a) contributing to deterring Russian aggression,
- (b) preventing diversionary attack that might threaten our national survival,
- (c) minimizing the efforts of any Soviet attack so as to permit us successful prosecution of a war,
- (d) guarding against Soviet-inspired subversive activities,
- (e) preventing the threat of atomic destruction and discouraging freedom of action which would weaken the national morale."

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"The U.S. Chiefs of Staff recommend that the following programme should be completed with all possible speed:

- (a) The southern Canadian early warning system and seaward extensions thereof,
- (b) the extension to seaward of contiguous radar coverage in selected areas,
- (c) methods of aircraft identification,
- (d) the completion of defence plans,
- (e) the development of a device for the detection of fissionable material.

"We seek to bring into a high state of readiness over the next two years:

- (a) stronger fighter-interceptor anti-aircraft forces,
- (b) a Canadian early warning line (if proved feasible by current project CORRODE and studies now in progress),
- (c) an air control system,
- (d) gap filler radar for low altitude surveillance,
- (e) systems for distant detection of submarines,
- (f) programmes in regard to international security and civil defence,
- (g) miscellaneous plans for re-allocation of parts of the Government.

It is considered that an early warning system providing a minimum of at least two hours is an immediate necessity. The Southern Canadian detector line and the Alaska and Northeast air control and warning systems should be completed as early as possible. Seaward extensions should be provided beginning with the Atlantic extension.

"Contrary to the reports in the press and magazines, the programme has been pressed forward at high priority but without hysteria or a tendency to over-commit resources to purely defensive measures which would detract from other essential programmes involving our security and world-wide commitments. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff do not intend

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either to over-emphasize or under-emphasize the threat but are fully aware of their responsibilities to build up reasonably effective defences which will provide the best defensive posture consistent with funds invested. We naturally seek to determine the extent to which Canada may wish to take leadership in parts of the system and to contribute to its expense."

5. On 20 October the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded to the U.S. Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence a request that necessary action be initiated to obtain agreement with the Canadians on the requirement for an early warning system in Canada, as outlined in the interim report submitted by the Canada-U.S. Military Study Group, and to obtain such other agreements as might be appropriate and necessary for the early implementation of the project.

6. In further discussion of the U.S. Chiefs' views in the Washington meeting, it was generally agreed that there was need for further study at the governmental level, and perhaps further informal consultations at a higher level, before the problem of negotiations for the implementation of the programme could be handled by the Joint Board. Admiral Radford confirmed that he was not too clear about the functions of the Joint Board and agreed that perhaps it was necessary to clarify, on a higher level, the policy matters before the project was handed to the Board. While the U.S. Chiefs of Staff have outlined their tentative views on an extensive programme for continental air defence, it is agreed that joint action for the present should be restricted to the early warning project in southern Canada and the implementation of the flank coverage. It was suggested that a further meeting of the Washington group might be held within two weeks, after the views of the Canadian Government could be formulated, and at that time consideration could be given to the question of a joint statement to be issued by both countries.

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7. The RCAF, in conjunction with the Defence Research Board, have made a preliminary estimate of the cost of the southern Canadian line and report as follows:

8. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff have indicated that they are about to give consideration to the extension of the early warning chain off the Atlantic Coast immediately, and they would welcome Canadian views as to what portion or portions of the programme Canada would be prepared to consider. There appear to be some advantages in each country undertaking a certain proportion of the early warning chain instead of attempting to reach agreement on a cost-sharing joint programme, especially as the complete programme is still of a tentative character. It was considered that if it appears more appropriate for either country to assume responsibility for the implementation of a particular portion of the programme that this should not in any way interfere with the operation of the whole air defence scheme as a joint project.

R.A. MacKay/NN

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October 26, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL FOULKES

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Report of Meeting of Consultation in Washington

Attached is the first draft of a report prepared by Mr. Ignatieff. He has asked our comments and meantime is getting those of the State Department. This should be regarded as a first draft only and Ignatieff has suggested that it should be destroyed after the final report is received.

In view of your apprehensions about quoting Admiral Radford's statement, perhaps we might suggest to Ignatieff that in the final report he paraphrase and summarize. If this procedure were followed it would permit of wider circulation of the report.

Since this is the only copy of the draft, perhaps you would be good enough to return it to me so that we can make some comments.

If you have any comments to make please send them to us and we shall forward them immediately to Washington.

R.A. MacKay

INCOMING MESSAGE

ORIGINAL

COPY NO. 1... OF 31 COPIES.

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

REDUIT A SECRET

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification

TOP SECRET

File No.

50209-410

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Priority
IMPORTANT

System
CRYPTER-AUTO

No. WA-2429

Date October 23, 1953.

Departmental
Circulation

MINISTER 1

UNDER/SEC 3

D/UNDER/SEC 4

A/UNDER/SEC'S 5

POL/CO-ORD'N 6

SECTION

U. N. DIV. 7

Sum 31.

Reference: My WA-2346 of October 15, 1953.

Subject: Continental Defence: Meeting of Consultation in Washington.

1. The meeting was held as planned in the State Department yesterday. For the United States it was attended by Under-Secretary Bedell Smith (who acted as Chairman), Admiral A. W. Radford, Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Livingston Merchant, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Robert Bowie, Director of Policy Planning, Gordon Arneson and Hayden Raynor. As Canadian representatives, in addition to myself, there were General Foulkes, R. B. Bryce, R. A. MacKay, Admiral De Wolfe, and Ignatieff.

2. The discussion at the meeting took the form outlined in my message under reference. Bowie, after some introductory remarks by the Chairman, led off with a United States estimate of Soviet policy and the risks of war. Admiral Radford gave an appreciation of Soviet atomic capabilities and followed this up with an exposition of United States views on action which the administration thinks should be taken to strengthen continental defence. There was a round-table discussion on an informal basis on the views presented. A full report of the meeting will be sent forward early next week. This teletype is intended as an interpretative summary of the highlights of the meeting.

3. Bowie's analysis of Soviet intentions and his estimate of risks of war were reassuring. The views he presented, we understand, were based upon up-to-date appreciations prepared for the National Security Council. The main point in this appreciation was that, while the Soviet Union, in continuing to follow its ultimately hostile aims, might resort to war if its essential interests were challenged, the United States authorities do not consider that the Soviet Government intends to launch a general war in the near future. The reasons for this assumption included the following:

- (a) Uncertainty about the outcome of general war,
- (b) Change in Soviet leadership,
- (c) United States capabilities of atomic retaliation, and
- (d) Unrest among satellites.

Moreover, although Soviet military, political and economic strength are assumed to be increasing (particularly their atomic capability), and although the ultimate objective of the Soviet Union may be world domination, the United States appreciation is that for

DONE-COMM'S SECTION

Done

OCT 24 '53

Date

References

McNaughton
R. A. M. Creevy
Major Gen. Sparling
Mr. Miller

Mr. Claxton

ADM of ND

CCOS - 2 copies

CDRB

ADM of Def Prod

Sec Cab

American Dir

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tactical reasons the Soviet Government may be prepared to establish a detente with the Western powers by negotiation. He entered the caveat, however, that there was at present insufficient evidence that the Soviet Government may be willing to make sufficient concessions to enable a modus vivendi to be arrived at. Another encouraging feature of Bowie's presentation was that, looking forward into the future a decade or more, the United States appreciation does not exclude the possibility of peaceful co-existence on the assumption that revolutionary zeal may diminish in the Soviet Union and that a vested interest in the status quo may develop from popular pressure and the growing managerial class.

4. The United States appreciation of Soviet atomic capabilities given by Admiral Radford was also somewhat reassuring. Based on a recent J.I.C. report to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, he said that although the Soviet Union should be assumed to have the potential to deliver its existing stockpile against the United States, the J.I.C. report concluded that no such Soviet attack was thought to be imminent. The following reasons were adduced:

- (a) The danger of United States atomic retaliation;
- (b) The questionable effectiveness of existing Soviet equipment, particularly reliance on TU4 aircraft capable only of one-way mission;
- (c) Basic Soviet cautiousness; and
- (d) Greater success might be expected of pursuing Soviet aims by other means.

Thus, Admiral Radford concluded that although the Soviet Union launch atomic attacks against the United States, such attacks would not be sufficient to destroy United States retaliatory capability and its industrial base, and that the Soviet Union was not thought likely therefore to launch such an attack at least until its atomic potential was further developed.

5. After furnishing this background, Admiral Radford outlined United States views on continental defence. These views were based upon a directive issued by the National Security Council as guidance to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and to United States departments concerned with planning for continental defence. These views proceeded from the assumption that "Canadian participation on an adequate scale is essential to any effective continental defence system" and that "this requires a common appreciation of the urgency and character of the threat to United States-Canadian security and the measures required to meet it." In this connection, Admiral Radford said: "We naturally seek to determine the extent to which Canada may wish to take leadership in parts of the system and to contribute to its expense". Among the immediate objectives listed were - the "Southern Canadian" early warning system, the extension to seaward of contiguous radar coverage in selected areas, consideration of methods, of aircraft identification, completion of defence plans, and development of a device for the detection of fissionable material introduced by clandestine means.

6. In connection with "the Southern Canadian early warning system", which is the term employed by Radford, MacKay has sent a separate message to McNaughton, transmitting a letter from General Henry suggesting an early meeting of the P.J.B.D. to consider the recommendations of the joint military Study Group, which have apparently already been approved by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.

- 3 -

7. In commenting on these United States views, we stressed the informal nature of the discussion. We found little to quarrel with in Bowie's presentation, which as I say, was admirable and reassuring. We stressed, of course, the importance of not missing any chance of negotiations leading to a possible modus vivendi. In the discussion of Soviet atomic capabilities and the United States contemplated measures, we stressed that it would be more reassuring to our NATO partners if it could be explained that efforts in strengthening the air defences of North America are in line with the NATO concept and are essential for the defence of the war-making potential of the NATO alliance. Bedell Smith and Radford were sympathetic to this view. Likewise, we underlined the various high policy considerations which the Canadian Government has to take into account in considering proposals for increased measures of continental defence, including balance of forces and commitments at home and abroad. We found a cordial and understanding reception for the points we made.

8. There was also ready agreement that hysteria or exaggeration in the public press in the discussion of continental defence problems was harmful and that a joint statement might help to put the issues into proper perspective. Bedell Smith, in concluding the meeting, said that apart from continuing such a series of meetings of consultation for the purpose of discussing risks of war generally, he welcomed this kind of free exchange of views on problems of continental defence and suggested that it might be desirable to hold another meeting shortly. He said he would be ready to meet just as soon as we desired another meeting and threw out the suggestion that there might be a case for another consultation before the President goes to Ottawa preparatory to any statement that might be issued then.

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October 23, 1953.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER:

M. de Laboulaye of the French Embassy came to see me yesterday for one of his periodic general talks. He said that he had noticed that the Canadian reply on the Annual Review contained a reference to the responsibilities of Canada in the sphere of continental defence.* I said that while this was the case it was not a new development. We had had such responsibilities since before the inception of NATO, and they continued. M. de Laboulaye agreed, but said that it was obvious and particularly since the Soviet successful explosion of the H bomb that the Americans were growing more and more concerned with problems of continental defence and that it was likely that they would be making increasing proposals to us for co-operation in ambitious and expensive projects for the defence of the North American continent. This he thought might face Canada with some difficult decisions, while the United States might go on for a prolonged period with its present expenditures on NATO and at the same time undertake new and costly projects for the defence of North America he wondered whether Canada would be able or willing to bear this double burden.

2. Apart from the financial problem there appeared to be a manpower problem for Canada. He wondered, for instance, whether it would be possible for us to maintain our R.C.A.F. squadrons overseas indefinitely, in view of the problems which continental defence presented to us in the preservation of our national sovereignty. I said that I had heard of no suggestion that our manpower commitments in Europe, either in terms of squadrons or of ground forces might be modified.

3. M. de Laboulaye said that he wondered whether it would be possible for us in the coming fiscal year to maintain the level of our NATO commitments in view of the new situation. It was difficult

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for European nations to know where they stood if they had no assurance that Canada would continue throughout the coming year her NATO defence contribution at the present level. It would be most reassuring if there could be some public pronouncement prior to the forthcoming Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, giving a firm indication that there would be no reduction in Canada's NATO contribution during the coming year. This might be particularly useful in view of the reference in the Canadian statement on the Annual Review to continental defence, and might do much to assuage any doubts and questions in the minds of our European North Atlantic partners.

4. I pointed out to M. de Laboulaye that in this last phase of "stretch-outs" and concealed and semi-concealed reductions in defence expenditures, Canada had fully maintained her defence contribution and lived up to all her NATO obligations. Surely this was a reassuring record, more so, perhaps, than the recent record of some of our NATO partners.

5. I did not give M. de Laboulaye any encouragement to think that any public pronouncement would be made prior to the NATO meeting foreshadowing the level of our defence expenditure for the coming year, or the scale of our NATO contribution.

6. M. de Laboulaye emphasized that he was not speaking on the instructions of his Government and asked that this conversation be considered a personal one.

C. S. A. RITCHIE

C.S.A.R.

* Section A of the Canadian reply stated:

"Looking to the future, it is clear that defence planning will have to take into consideration both the increasing requirements for the defence of the North American Continent..."

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** Our delegation in Paris has informed the NATO Secretariat that the Canadian authorities, although not prepared to depart from the rule that precise forecasts of government expenditures cannot be given in advance of the tabling of the estimates in Parliament, nevertheless hoped by late December to be able to give some indication as to whether or not our defence expenditures would be going to be significantly higher or lower than for the current year.

cc. Mr. MacKay
Defence Liaison (1) Division.

Draft
to

(Rough Notes prepared by
G. Ignatieff; unchecked with
either Canadian or U.S. par-
ticipants)

GI/gmd

Oct. 23, 19 53

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No.

**RECORD OF THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION BETWEEN
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CANADIAN AND UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENTS ON CONTINENTAL DEFENCE,
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1953**

The meeting, which was held in the State
Department, was attended by

General Walter Bedell Smith, Under-Secretary
of State,
Admiral A.W. Radford, Chairman U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under-Secretary of
State Designate,

Mr. Livingston Merchant, Assistant Secretary
of State for European Affairs,

Mr. Robert Bowie, Director of the Policy Planning
Staff and State Department Representative
on the N.S.C. Planning Board,

Mr. Gordon Arneson, Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State on Atomic Energy Matters,

Mr. Hayden Raynor, Director of the Office of
Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs

for the United States Government and by

Mr. A.D.P. Heeney,

Lt. General Charles Foulkes,

Mr. R. B. Bryce,

Mr. R.A. MacKay,

Plus - Admiral ^{H.G.} DeWolf,

Mr. George Ignatieff

for the Canadian Government.

2. General Walter Bedell Smith was Chairman
of this meeting. In opening the discussion, General
Smith said that he was happy to have the privilege
of convening this meeting. He said it had been too
long since the last meeting of consultation with
Canadian Government representatives on the world ^{Situation}

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(Note -
this is the
draft
referred to
in Gen Foulkes
letter of
Oct 28 to
Mr MacKay)
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and the risks of war. Since the last meeting, continental defence had come to loom larger in the strategic problems confronting both Governments, and it was therefore desirable that there should be a free and frank exchange of views on this problem. He said that there was no set agenda for the meeting, but if it was agreeable to the Canadian representatives, he proposed that Mr. Bowie would give a tour d'horizon of the world situation and the United States estimate of Soviet policy, ~~and that~~ Admiral Radford would then make a statement on United States estimates of Soviet atomic capabilities and the risks of attack on North America ^{and five} ~~as well as~~ an exposition of the plans which the United States Government had under consideration to meet this threat. He also emphasized that he wished to have the discussion proceed on a round-table basis ^{and anyone} ~~with any~~ ^{should feel} one free to interject comments as seemed desirable. He stressed the desirability of keeping these meetings as informal as possible. Mr. Heeney said that this procedure was satisfactory and agreed that the meeting should be kept as informal as possible.

Review of the World Situation and United States Estimate of Soviet Intentions.

3. The Chairman asked Mr. Bowie to proceed with his review of the world situation and the risks of war, with particular reference to the United States estimate of Soviet policy, stressing that he would like to have this analysis challenged by the Canadian representatives on any point in the presentation. Mr. Bowie prefaced his exposition by observing that he hoped that what he had to say would not seem particularly novel to the Canadian representatives since he believed that in general the

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Canadian and United States Governments would not differ in any important respect on current estimates of the world situation and Soviet intentions. He said that there was no evidence/^{that events} since Stalin's death had weakened the Soviet regime. Internal political developments may have produced some confusion in the Soviet bureaucracy and some strains in the relations between the Soviet Union and the satellites, but it was still necessary to proceed on the assumption that the Soviet bloc were basically hostile in their intentions, that the power/^{of the new regime} had been consolidated ~~in the new regime in Moscow~~^{there}, and that ~~the~~ ultimate objective was/^{still} world domination. The tactics of the Soviet bloc were directed to an effort to divide the allies and to create false hopes by peaceful gestures.

4. Mr. Bowie, however, did not rule out the possibility that for tactical reasons the Soviet Government may be willing to establish a détente with the Western Powers. Although at present there were no signs that/^{the} Soviet Government may be willing to make sufficient concessions to make a modus vivendi possible, it was necessary to bear in mind the possibility that through negotiations now or in the future, the Soviet Government may be willing to work for a détente.

5. Turning to an analysis of Soviet relations with East Germany and the satellites, Mr. Bowie said that available evidence pointed to the fact that the Soviet Government had not ~~xxx~~^{fully} subjugated these peoples. The events of last June showed that satellite regimes had to rely upon the strength of Soviet forces to retain power. It was also possible to assume that the satellite armed forces were not altogether reliable to the communist cause and would ~~xxxx~~^{become} increasingly

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so in the event of an outbreak of war. This may reflect a significant strain upon the exercise of Soviet leadership. Actual Soviet power to control the satellites, however, had not been impaired so long as the Soviet Government could maintain substantial Soviet forces in the satellite countries. His conclusion was that there was no evidence that it would be possible to detach any satellite country from the Soviet orbit so long as Soviet military dispositions remain as at present. There was also no substantial advantage to be gained in trying to detach the satellites, in so far as this might affect over-all Soviet military strength, since such a detachment would not ^{significantly} substantially affect Soviet military power, either in atomic or conventional weapons.

6. ^{next turned to a discussion of} Mr. Bowie ~~had some interesting things to say~~ about the relations between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist regime. He said that the regime was in firm control over the territory which it administered and there was little likelihood of this control being threatened or ~~shakened~~ by domestic forces or any rival regime, short of general war. The relations of Communist China to the U.S.S.R. was that of an alliance based upon a common ideology and common interests. He believed that the Communist Chinese Government may increasingly assert its own interests, however, possibly to the detriment of Russian control of Communism in the area, particularly if there is a stabilization of the situation in Korea. Termination of hostilities in Korea will make Communist China's economically and militarily dependence on the U.S.S.R. less urgent, though this continued economic dependence will tend to limit Communist Chinese capacity for independent action. He did not rule out the possibility of

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a break between the two allies. However, co-operation between the two added strength to both.

7. Summing up his analysis of Soviet intentions in relation to the risks of war, Mr. Bowie said that this estimate was based upon an analysis of Soviet bloc capabilities through mid-1955. For the period of this estimate, there was nothing to indicate that the Soviet Union intends to launch a general war. The reasons for this assumption included the following:

- (a) uncertainty about the outcome of war;
- (b) change in Soviet leadership;
- (c) United States capabilities of atomic retaliation; and
- (d) unrest among the satellites.

8. In considering the possibility of general war, Mr. Bowie said that it should not be overlooked that the Soviet Union does not exclude in following its hostile aims, resort to war if its essential interests are challenged. Moreover, it is difficult to judge at this time what the effects of the growing Soviet atomic capabilities might be upon Soviet readiness to go to war. At present, the United States and the Soviet Union obviously have the capacity to do each other terrible damage but it was doubtful ^y either of these two powers could knock the other out with an atomic attack. This situation might produce a condition of stalemate because ^{neither} ~~either~~ side can contemplate general war and its terrible effects with equanimity. The danger remains, however, that if the Soviet Union ^{they} thought that ~~it~~ ^a ~~any~~ margin of ^{superior} strength, they might be tempted to strike with a surprise attack. Moreover, in a continued condition of stalemate, there was always

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the danger that the Soviet Union might embark on further limited aggressions in the belief that the United States would not be willing to employ its atomic capability in such circumstances, because of the horrors of atomic war. It was therefore necessary to make it clear that the Soviet Union could not get away with local aggressions despite the psychological ^{inhibitions} ~~limitation~~ arising from the horrors of atomic war.

9. Turning to the particular situations which might give rise to the risks of general war, Mr. Bowie said that Korea represented, in his judgement, the main area which might be regarded as a "tinder box". Here the Communists have the capability of embarking upon war, but there was no indication that such was their intention. In the main, the Soviet Government would continue to rely on political and psychological methods of pursuing its aims, including propaganda, subversion, and the exploitation of the fear of atomic warfare. They would also be expected to continue to try to divide the allies. The factor of atomic "blackmail" may be expected to play an ^{increasingly} ~~particularly~~ important part in Soviet psychological warfare, as well as their exploitation of the strong desire for peace among peoples everywhere.

10. Looking into the future beyond the period through mid-1955 under consideration ^{in the current U.S. estimate}, Mr. Bowie did not rule out the possibility of "peaceful co-existence" between the Soviet bloc and the Western Powers. He thought that it was possible to assume that revolutionary zeal among Soviet leaders might tend to decline. Domestic developments, such as popular pressures for increased supply of consumption goods and the development of vested interests in peaceful development on the part of a new bourgeoisie drawn from the managerial

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^{might produce trends favoring the status quo}
classes, ~~was also a possibility~~. However, he was now talking in terms of the next decade or two. If the free world could maintain its strength and remain cohesive in its aims and policies, while exploiting any Soviet weaknesses, particularly their lack of control over satellite populations, it was possible that the Soviet Government might prove to be more amenable ^{about entering} ~~to enter~~ into negotiations and ^{accepting} ~~accept~~ peaceful co-existence.

11. The Chairman, commenting on Mr. Bowie's presentation, said that in his judgement the Soviet intentions might be summed up in the comment which Stalin is supposed to have made to Dimitrov ^[One time] ~~when he was~~ head of the Comintern] to the effect that "we do not desire war any more than the West does, but we are less anxious to preserve peace than they are". This was the ^{nearest} best analysis he had heard of Soviet aims. The danger in Soviet policy lay in the fact that while pursuing policies which were ultimately hostile to the aims of the Western Powers, the Soviet Union did not rule out the possibility of ^{armed} conflict.

12. The Chairman asked Assistant Secretary Livingston Merchant whether he had anything to add to Mr. Bowie's presentation on particular situations which might give rise to war. Mr. Merchant said that during his recent consultations with United States Heads of Mission in Europe, it had been recognized that Berlin remains another important "tinder box", Especially if there were any popular uprisings in East Germany, the possibility should not be ruled out that West Germans, owing to public feeling, might try to intervene with incalculable results. Mr. Merchant also said he would like to add a word about Trieste. The continued stalemate between Italy and Yugoslavia on this issue had been giving the United States

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increasing anxiety, ^{unless there was} ~~since without~~ a rapprochement between the two countries, there could be no real collaboration for the defence of the Eastern Mediterranean. Effective defences ^{of this area} required co-operation between Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. ~~Without this common effort there was no hope of achieving any strength.~~ Once it was realized that it was impossible to obtain or negotiate a settlement between Italy and Yugoslavia, it was decided to impose a solution. This was the background to the decision of October 8 announced by the United States and the United Kingdom Governments. The reactions in both Italy and Yugoslavia were surprising. The Italians proved to be more jubilant over the decision than had been expected, and Tito ^{was} more violent in opposing it. Since then, however, Tito had tended to retreat from the exposed position he had taken immediately after the decision was announced, and the Italians tended to be less exultant. The tactics of the United States were now directed to bringing about a five-power conference in the hope of getting Yugoslavia and Italy to sit down to ^{a round table} reasoned discussion of the situation with the hope that with the passage of time and continued ^{exercise of} moderating influences being brought ^{by the U.S. and U.K.} to bear on the two countries, a final and peaceful solution might be worked out.

13. Mr. Heeney asked whether there was any basis for anticipating that Tito may be edging toward resuming co-operation with the Soviet Union. Mr. Merchant said that he was satisfied that there was no real danger of this, despite rumours ^{mainly emanating from Italy} to that effect. He said that Tito in fact had "no house to go back to". The United States had been surprised by the ^{extent of the}

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that he had no quarrel with this assumption. There was no doubt that although the Soviet long-term aims seemed to be fairly constant, he was glad to note that there was agreement that a détente for technical reasons should not be ruled out. It was important that the Western Powers should take advantage of any evidence of willingness on the part of the Soviet Government to develop such a détente through negotiations, ^{These} ~~which~~ might accomplish something ^{to the} ~~with~~ advantage of the Western Powers. Mr. Heeney also noted that relaxation of international tension had already had effect on the actions of the Governments. The Chairman said that he had been rather heartened ~~with~~ by talks which he had with M. Hervé Alphand about French plans for the ratification of the EDC. M. Alphand seemed to be confident that there would be a steady effort in France to ratify the Agreement. The Under-Secretary realized that there were some strong opponents to this policy but he was encouraged nonetheless. If the EDC was ratified, the Western Powers would be in a much stronger position to negotiate with the Soviet Union with profit.

16. Mr. MacKay noted that there had been no reference in Mr. Bowie's presentation to the situation in the Middle East. Could this be taken to mean that there was no potentially explosive situation in that area? Mr. Bowie replied that he was not trying to be ^{entirely} ~~comprehensive~~ at this meeting. However, there was no evidence that any particular situation in that area might give rise to general ~~war~~ ^{conflict}. In Iran, the Government of General Zahedi had ~~given the opportunity to develop its~~ ^{was providing} stability in the country, as well as working towards a settlement of the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute. The Chairman intervened to

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say that the situation on the Israel-Jordan border was serious. The Israeli Government had been highly provocative in their actions. The United States ^{Government} had had to suspend further financial aid and support consideration of the dispute in the Security Council of the United Nations. Mr. Eric Johnston, ~~moreover~~, had been sent out to review the possibilities of exploiting, under multi-lateral arrangements, the water resources of the border. The Chairman said that if it were possible for Israel to ^{reach agreement on} agree to peace terms with any one of the Arab states, he was sure that agreement between Israel and all the ^{other} Arab states would ~~follow~~ follow quickly. However, so long as the present tense situation exists, chances of this were slim. He added that the dispute in the Buraimi area seemed to be on the road to satisfactory solution. With regard to Iran, the Chairman added that Mr. Hoover's mission was to further a settlement of the oil dispute. The attitude of the British Government was helpful. Mr. Hoover, who had broad experience in oil marketing problems, was trying to seek, among other things, how resumed supplies of oil from Iran could be fitted into the world markets. During the period of the oil dispute the buyers of Iranian oil had turned to other sources of supply. If anybody could find the solution to this problem, Mr. Hoover, ^{he} felt sure, would make a ^{first attempt} contribution.

17. Before concluding the discussions on Soviet intentions and the risks of war, Mr. Heeney said he wanted a clarification as to whether there was any connection between the reference to mid-1955 in the discussion and growing Soviet atomic capabilities. The Chairman elaborated his previous comment on this point. He said that the use of target dates was purely an administrative convenience.

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However, in choosing dates the United States planners had taken into consideration certain developments in the U.S.S.R. affecting its military capabilities, such as the successive five-year plans. But these target dates had been chosen arbitrarily to facilitate budgetary and military planning. The growing Soviet atomic stockpile had particular significance in what he described as its "trade value", in the relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. In estimating this value, however, considerations had to be given not only of the relative size of the two stockpiles; but also to other factors, such as the relative concentration of industrial and military targets in the United States and the effectiveness of public pressure on the Government of the United States, as compared with the apathy of public opinion in the Soviet Union. Admiral Radford confirmed this understanding that the choice of target dates for planning purposes was arbitrary.

United States Estimate of Soviet Atomic Capability

18. Admiral Radford prefaced his remarks by observing that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff do not overlook the fact that the Soviet menace presents itself on three ^{aspects} fronts: the military, ideological, and economic. If there were any tendency to relax tension on the military front, it would be unsafe to be less vigilant on the other fronts. He then gave the most recent estimate of Soviet atomic capability, based on a Joint Intelligence Committee report which had just been submitted to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said that this report estimates that the Soviet Union has a sufficient number of TU4 aircraft to carry the full present stockpile of atomic weapons in the Soviet Union ^{in attacks} against the United States. Since, however, these aircraft are capable only of one-way missions, it

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could be assumed that most of these aircraft and their crews would be lost. It could also be assumed that some of these missions would lose some ^{of the} advantage which might be gained from surprise, because ^{same of} the flights would have to be launched from bases in the Baltic area. It would also have to be assumed that the TU4 aircraft ^{would be} were able to refuel on the way, at least ^{once} to some extent. It would also ^{have to} be assumed that ^a large proportion of such strikes would be on Strategic Air Command ~~bases~~ ^{bases} in the United States as well as abroad.

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The report concluded, however, that there was no basis for the belief that such a Soviet attack was imminent. In support of this conclusion the following reasons were given:

- (a) the fear of United States capability of retaliation with atomic weapons;
- (b) questionable effectiveness of available means for attack as well as ^{of the} capability ^{to stop} of stopping United States retaliation;
- (c) basic cautiousness of the Soviet Government; and
- (d) success which could be gained from using other methods.

The report gave the following estimate of the numbers of TU4 aircraft and their capabilities: number - about 1,000; range - 1700 nautical miles; bomb-carrying capacity - about 10,000 pounds. Regarding the availability of other aircraft capable of carrying atomic weapons, the report said that it was believed that the Soviet Union was developing type 31 aircraft capable of two-way missions. This ^{aircraft} type had been seen in prototype but no numbers of estimated production rates were given. The report said that one bomber of the B47 type had been seen, but there was no evidence that this aircraft would be in operation for several years. Summing up Soviet capabilities in other associated techniques, the report said that in navigational radar, it was thought that the Soviet Union Air Force would be able to equip only lead crews. As regards in-flight refueling, there was insufficient

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evidence available to affirm or deny that the Soviet Union had developed this technique. In regards to counter measures to our radar, it was believed that the Soviet Union had available only the technique developed in the last war referred to as CHAFF. As regards navigational skill, it was believed that it was adequate for over-water and trans-polar flights. In respect to targetry, it was believed that the Soviet Union had at its disposal adequate information on the target system in the United States. The bombing equipment available to the Soviet Air Force was thought to be equivalent to the best developed by the United States Air Force during World War II. The report said that the launching sites which would be used by the Soviet Union are located in Northeastern Siberia, the Kola Peninsula, and ⁱⁿ the Baltic area. In summing up his conclusions on the basis of this report, Admiral Radford said that while the Soviet Union ^{had the capability} could launch a serious attack against the United States, such an attack would not be sufficient to destroy the retaliatory capability of the United States or its industrial base. It was therefore thought that the Soviet Union was not likely to launch such an attack, at least until it had further improved its potential in this kind of warfare.

19. General Foulkes expressed general agreement with the estimate given by General Radford. He said that according to Canadian estimates the Soviet Union was thought to have from between 600 to 1,000 TU4 aircraft. It was his belief that these aircraft could do one refueling but not two in flight. The question of the usefulness of carriers was so closely related to refueling, that this had been included in the list of indicators. General Bedell Smith hoped that there were arrangements to exchange information between the two Governments on indicators.

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He indicated that the United States would welcome such an exchange of information. The refueling problem, he agreed, was important so long as there was no evidence that the type 31 aircraft was in current operational use in the Soviet Union. If the difficulties of the refueling techniques were overcome, or the T31 aircraft was in quantity production, it would be necessary to expect a serious threat to North America.

20. General Foulkes said that since the last atomic explosion in the Soviet Union, with the evidence which it gave that the Soviets had developed a fusion bomb, it now appeared that ~~the~~ Russia was developing the capability of mounting serious attacks against North America. He wondered whether these latest developments might not result in a change in Soviet strategy. In the past, it had been envisaged that the Soviet main attack would be against Western Europe, with only divergent attacks against North America. If the Soviet Union achieved anything approaching parity with the United States in ~~the~~ atomic stockpiles, it had to be assumed that the Soviet Union would ^{then} have a distinct advantage, in that the Soviet Government ^{might be} was in a position to make a surprise attack, whereas ~~it~~ had to be assumed that the Western Powers would never take the initiative ^{to attack} in this regard. He suggested that consideration should be given to the serious ^{implications} ~~import~~ of a possible change in Soviet strategy resulting from its growing atomic capabilities. It was possible that the Soviets might see the advantage of devoting a large part of their atomic arsenal, provided they continued the development of the means of delivering their new weapons, ⁱⁿ to an effort to cripple North America. At the same time, they might use a limited portion of their stockpile in an attack

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against the United Kingdom, while using their pre-
dominance ⁱⁿ of ground forces ~~quickly~~ to secure Western
Europe. ^{as rapidly as possible and with as little damage to the industrial complex} In the course of such an action the Soviet Union ^{as may be necessary} would, of course, expect a certain amount of retaliation
on the Soviet Union. The Chairman agreed with General
Foulkes' argument about the possibility of a change in
Soviet strategic concept. He also agreed with General
Foulkes that should the Soviet Union proceed on this basis,
^{[including} that/the occupation of Western Europe], it would present
a difficult problem to North America as we would be loath
to use atomic bombs against European cities even if they
contained elements of the Soviet war-machine. In this con-
nection, he recalled the opposition encountered in the
last war in bombing German targets in France. The Chairman
said that consideration of Soviet atomic capabilities and
its threat to North America inevitably brings one up squarely
with the problem of continental defence and what to do to
meet this menace. He invited Admiral Radford to continue
the discussion with an informal presentation of United States
views on this subject.

United States Views on Continental Defence.

21. Admiral Radford proceeded to read from notes
based upon a directive ^{on planning for Continental Defence} recently approved by the National
Security Council as policy guidance to the United States
Joint Chiefs of Staff and ~~the~~ United States departments,
~~concerned on planning for continental defence.~~ Admiral
Radford said:

"The United States objective is to achieve in a
rapid and orderly manner and to maintain, in collaboration
with Canada, a readiness and capability which will give
us reasonable assurance of:

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- a) contributing to deterring Soviet aggression,
- b) preventing devastating attack that might threaten our national survival,
- c) minimizing the effects of any Soviet attack so as to permit our successful prosecution of a war,
- d) guarding against Soviet inspired subversive activities,
- e) preventing the threat of atomic destruction from discouraging freedom of action or weakening national morale.

"It is considered that Canadian participation on an adequate scale is essential to any effective continental defense system. This requires a common appreciation of the urgency and character of the threat to U.S.-Canadian security and the measures required to meet it. We naturally seek to determine the extent to which Canada may wish to take leadership in parts of the system and to contributing to its expense.

"We recognize the full importance of research and development in order that the weapons and equipment actually procured will be suitable to cope with the threat at the time that they become available in quantity and are made operational.

"We feel that the following program should be completed with all possible speed:

- a) The southern Canadian early warning system and seaward extensions thereof.
- b) The extension to seaward of contiguous radar coverage in selected areas.
- c) Methods of aircraft identification.
- d) Completion of defense plans.
- e) Development of a device for the detection of fission-able material.

"We seek to bring into a high state of readiness over the next two years; (a) stronger fighter inter-

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ceptor and anti-aircraft forces; (b) the northern Canadian early warning line, if proved feasible by current project CORRODE and the studies now in process; (c) an air control system; (d) gap filler radars for low altitude surveillance; (e) systems for the distant detection of submarines; miscellaneous plans for relocation of parts of the government; (f) miscellaneous programs in regard to internal security and civil defense.

"It is considered that an early warning system providing a minimum of at least two hours is an immediate necessity. The Southern Canadian detector line and the Alaska and Northeast air control and warning systems should be completed as early as possible. Seaward extensions should be provided beginning with the Atlantic extension.

"The U.S. Chiefs of Staff are studying these matters with a view to making recommendations for phased increases in forces and facilities to meet the increasing threat.

"Contrary to reports in press and magazines, the program is being pressed forward at high priority but without hysteria or a tendency to overcommit resources to purely defensive measures which would detract from other essential programs involved in our security and worldwide commitments. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff do not tend either to over-emphasize or underestimate the threat and are fully aware of their responsibilities to build up reasonable effective defenses which will provide the best defensive posture consistent with the funds invested. On the 20th of October the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded to the U.S. Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense a request that necessary action be initiated to obtain agreement with the Canadians

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on the requirement for an early warning system in Canada as outlined in the interim report submitted by the Canada-U.S. Military Study Group, and to obtain such other agreements as may be appropriate and necessary for the early implementation of the project."

(We were told by Messrs. Arneson and Raynor after the meeting that the paper on which Admiral Radford based his remarks was a document of policy guidance recently approved by the National Security Council for the purpose of directing the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and the United States Departments concerned with planning continental defence. This paper therefore ~~was~~ expressed United States objectives and ^{therefore} was ^{with measures requiring} only of partial concern ~~to Canada and to~~ co-operation between the two countries on air defence. ^{This explains} It was obviously ^{the} more comprehensive ^{in its coverage} in its coverage in mentioning various measures which would have to be planned for if ^{in the view of its authors} an effective continental defence system ^{is} were to be established, ^{Admiral Radford's presentation} and should be considered in ^{this explanatory comment} that light.)

22. General Foulkes in commenting on Admiral Radford's presentation said it might be helpful to ~~the United States~~ ^{have some} if they were to get ~~Canadian~~ ^{possible} views on the extent of the character and magnitude of the threat to the United States. ^{The discussion had related mainly to the immediate threat} Canadian security. What, of course, would be of greatest help would be to have an estimate of the magnitude ~~and~~ ^{expected} character of the threat in two or three years' time. Admiral Radford agreed that the United States were seriously concerned with the extent of the threat which might be developed in two or three years' time, but certain things had to be done now as the potential threat was growing every day. General Foulkes said that if Soviet atomic developments proceed as fast as was now expected, the Soviet Union might well

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have the capability to deliver crippling attacks on North America by 1956 or 1957. Admiral Radford observed that it should not be assumed, of course, that the Soviet Union would be able to concentrate its entire atomic capability on North America. The Soviet Union, in the event of war, would have to strike at U.S.A.E.C. bases abroad, as well as at the United States atomic capability and industrial base in the United States. In addition, there were the aircraft carriers which represent mobile bases from which atomic strikes could be launched. He said that the United States could not discount the necessity of making every effort of ~~increasing~~ ^{bolstering} its ~~atomic capabilities~~ ^{Continental Defence} ~~as it may~~ even though conceivably they risk retaliatory attack from the Soviet Union. Admiral Radford added that he was also concerned about ^{the possibility of} sabotage of key atomic plants through the introduction by clandestine means of ^{fissionable} ~~official~~ material.

23. General Foulkes said that the Soviet atomic capability should be regarded ^{as} ~~has~~ substantially increased by the ability of the Soviet Union to take the initiative in an atomic strike. United States retaliation after ^{an} ~~the~~ initial attack from the Soviet Union would obviously be ~~of~~ less effective. He also suggested that consideration should be given to the effect of Soviet atomic capability on the ^{other members of} ~~NATO partners of Canada and the United States~~ as well as upon North America. Discussions on continental defence were inevitably alarming to our friends in NATO. He suggested that this consideration might be met by reference to the NATO strategic guidance ^{paper} ~~MC14/1(Final)~~ "Strategic Guidance". This guidance provides for increases in the defence of North America by 1956 in the following words:

"However in 1956 the Soviet Union may have a formidable atomic potential against North America, and ^{an} ~~adequate~~ defence

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for this area thus becomes essential in order to permit NATO to accomplish its military objectives."

General Foulkes suggested that it would be more reassuring to the NATO partners of Canada and the United States if it could be explained that ^{the} efforts of the two countries to strengthen the air defence of North America are in line with this NATO concept. Further, it should be emphasized that the increased defence of North America directly contributes to the defence of the alliance as a whole because these defence measures are intended as a protection of the war-making potential ^{to support an} of the allies. This would tend to meet the tendencies towards neutralism which may be observed in Europe. General Foulkes suggested that this kind of explanation might be given at the next meeting of the Military Committee. The Chairman agreed that the considerations advanced by General Foulkes were absolutely essential. He ^{mentioned} recalled that Admiral Radford was about to go to Europe. Admiral Radford said that he would bear this argument in mind in the discussions which he expected to have during his visit in Europe.

24. General Foulkes said it was also necessary to ^{Consider} ~~bear~~ in mind the need for some kind of joint statement on defence ^{Concluded} to ^{meet} ~~deal with~~ the public interest on the question ^{aroused} ~~stimulated~~ by current press rumours and reports. From the point of view of ~~the~~ public presentation, he was glad that the Admiral had used the term "southern Canadian early warning system" ^{the phrase sometimes employed} instead of "line of the 55th parallel". He ~~hoped that the~~ ^{should} public statements ~~would~~ avoid unnecessary disclosures of defence secrets. General Foulkes went on to say that the interim report of the Canada-United States Military Study Group had been examined by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff.

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He believed that certain immediate steps ^{could now} should be taken ^{to facilitate work or} to go ahead with this project. These steps would ^{include} involve detailed reconnaissance of the proposed location of the southern Canadian line, further study of the types of equipment most suitable for this line, and an estimate of its initial and recurring costs. All these ^{preparatory work} steps would be ^{done} taken so that necessary Government decisions should not have to be delayed. General Foulkes noted ^{from Admiral Radford's presentation} that ^{any} action on the Northern ^{the project} Canadian early warning line would be undertaken only if ^{operation} proved feasible by the ~~current project~~ CORRODE and the studies now in progress. Admiral Radford ~~stated~~ said that there was a manpower problem involved in obtaining the ^{services of the} necessary trained technical personnel ^{for radar work.}

25. The Chairman said that he was most encouraged by the comments made by General Foulkes. The question now was how to proceed ^{to} the next step. General Foulkes said that as the next step the recommendations of the Canadian-United States Military Study Group would have to be considered by both Governments. In the preparation of such recommendations, ^{it was noted that the US chiefs had referred the matter to the} the Permanent Joint Board, ^{should} might be involved. The Board, however, he said, did not settle policy, but worked out details of ~~the~~ plans and recommendations for submission to the ^{respective} Governments. The Board would require guidance in the preparation of such recommendations. The Chairman observed that there seemed to be an organizational problem involved, and that the proper machinery ^{seemed to} might be lacking. ^(The P.J.B. might be not enough and) He wondered whether the time had not come to consider the establishment of a Combined Chiefs of Staff. ~~He~~ General Foulkes said that ~~as the next step~~ ^{now} he would go back to Ottawa and report the views which ~~had been~~ expressed at the meeting, and in particular the suggestion that as the ^{next} first step ~~the~~

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the recommendations should be prepared ^{to go ahead with} ~~on~~ the ~~Southern~~ Canadian ^{respectively} early warning system for submission to the ~~two~~ Governments.

The discussion then turned to the public relations problem.

Articles on the Subject

~~The discussion~~ in the press tended to mislead people and

General Foulkes suggested that a statement on continental

^{might serve to put the discussion into proper focus.}
~~defence in the context of Canada-United States defence~~

~~relations generally might be desirable.~~ Mr. Heeney ob-

served that when the President went to Ottawa on November 13,
attention would inevitably be directed to the defence problem.

The Chairman agreed with Mr. Heeney that the issuance of a

statement on that occasion might be desirable. Mr. MacKay

said that it might ~~not~~ be desirable ^{not} to focus ^{too} much attention ^{specifically}
on continental defence, ^{and} ^{refer} ~~but~~ to relate it to the defence

relationships existing between the two countries generally.

The Chairman said that he would be agreeable to such a

statement. Mr. Heeney said that before concluding this

discussion, he would like to emphasize that any ~~discussion~~

~~of~~ continental defence presented ^{Certain} special problems to the

Canadian Government. Important ^{policy} considerations were in-

volved, with grave ~~political~~ implications, such as the

balance between forces and commitments abroad and at home.

There was also the question of the balance ^{the maintained} between a powerful

and less powerful neighbour in ^{cooperating in defence} ~~undertaking large and ex-~~

~~pensive joint defence enterprises.~~ Unless ^{such} these considerations

were ^{appreciated fully} ~~borne in mind~~ on the United States side, the capacity

of the Canadian Government to be useful in such matters as

continental defence might be seriously affected. In working

out joint defence measures, moreover, it was necessary ^{to take} ~~not~~
^{into account} ~~to overlook~~ the important issues ~~of consideration~~ of Canadian

sovereignty. The Chairman replied that he ~~thoroughly~~

appreciated that this ^{kind} ~~type~~ of consideration ^{very thoroughly} ~~could not be~~

~~overlooked.~~ He recalled a conversation which he had ~~had~~

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with Mr. Pickersgill on this ~~scheme~~^{theme} during the Prime Minister's visit to Washington ~~during the~~^{last} spring. He had not forgotten ~~about~~^{what Mr. Pickersgill had said about his feelings on} seeing a foreign flag flying over Canadian soil. General Foulkes said that while the objective should be to work toward ~~the~~^{an} effective and co-ordinated air defence system, it was necessary to bear in mind the important policy considerations mentioned by Mr. Heeney. The Chairman said that in working out measures of co-operation on continental defence, the United States ~~would be~~^{governed by} guided by the Canadian Government ~~in the kind of considerations~~^{on the effect of these on the relations between the two countries.} which had been mentioned. The object that the United States had in mind was to develop ~~the~~^a complete ~~mutuality~~^{mutuality} of understanding. ^{p26.} The Chairman said that he was open to suggestions about a further meeting. Mr. Heeney said that while this meeting had been ~~of undoubted use~~^{undoubtedly useful}, he ~~did not think~~^{thought} that such consultations should take place ~~unless they were~~^{only as} necessary. If they were ~~merely a routine~~^{held frequently}, they would lose ~~for~~^{might} their usefulness. General Foulkes said that he welcomed this kind of meeting and had found it extremely useful. He would be glad to come down at any time when a meeting was desired. The Chairman, in concluding the meeting, said that it would be up to the Canadian Government ~~to suggest~~^{a convenient date for} another meeting ~~whenever it was convenient~~. He noted that Admiral Radford would be away from Washington until November 18 but if a meeting ~~was~~^{here} desired before then, perhaps one of the ~~other~~^{United States} Chiefs of Staff might attend, possibly General Ridgeway.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Reference:.....
Subject: A proposed article on Continental
Defence for COLLIER'S.

Security:.....
No: 2029 WNB
Date: October 22, 1953.

Enclosures: 0.

Air or Surface Mail: Surface.

Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.	
50209-40	
19	50

References

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OCT 26 1953

William Ulman, who wrote the controversial COLLIER'S article "Red Planes are Raiding Canadian Skies", has asked whether defence officials in Ottawa would co-operate in the preparation of another article on continental defence, to be written from the Canadian point of view. Both the text and the title of the proposed article would be cleared with us before publication.

2. Ulman said his request was prompted because of his belief that the Canadian authorities should have an opportunity to correct the unfortunate impression given by the title of his last article. He disclaimed any responsibility for this title and said that, as a result of the repercussions it aroused, the responsible editor in COLLIER'S had been asked to resign. Ulman claimed that he had been personally commended by President Eisenhower on the article.

3. Ulman hopes to write his proposed article within a short time and has asked for your reaction at your earliest convenience.

Internal
Circulation

D. T. Hurley

The Embassy.

Distribution
to Posts

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Security Unclassified.....

MESSAGE FORM
OUTGOING

File No.	
50209 - 40	
59	50

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE AMBASSADOR, CANADIAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON *DL*

Message To Be Sent		No.	Date	For Communications Section Only	
AIR CYPHER		<i>1975</i>	October 21, 1953	SENT OCT 21 1953	
EN CLAIR	XXXX	REFERENCE:			
CODE		SUBJECT:			
CYPHER					
Priority					
IMMEDIATE					
ORIGINATOR		Bryce and MacKay arriving national airport			
(Signature)		Washington American Airlines flight 119 10.30 AM			
R.A. MacKay/NN		Thursday morning.			
(Name Typed)					
Div. USSEA					
Local Tel. 4803					
APPROVED BY					
(Signature)					
(Name Typed)					
Internal Distribution:					
S.S.E.A. - U.S.S.E.A. ✓					
Done. <i>MAZ</i>					
Date. <i>Oct. 22/53</i>					

Copies Referred To:

Done.....


Date.....

Ottawa, October 21, 1953.

SEEN
L. B. PEARSON

RESTRICTED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER



I thought you might be interested in
the attached, self-explanatory press report from
the October 11 edition of the New York Times
which indicates that the Senate Armed Services
Sub-committee on Preparedness is proposing to
carry out a full study of continental defences
against atomic attack. It will be interesting
to see whether the hearings will be given wide
publicity or whether, as is to be hoped, the
investigation is carried out quietly and with
discretion.

For your information, I have sent a
copy of this press account to Mr. Claxton.

J. W. Holmes

for C. R.

21-10-31(55) E. ad.

21-10-31(55) (55/05)

EXTRACT FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES, October 11, 1953

SENATORS TO STUDY ATOMIC DEFENSES

NYT Oct 11/53

Industrialist Is Named to Head
Project as Kefauver Calls
for 'Complete Review'

By JOHN D. MORRIS

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, Oct. 10.—The Senate Armed Services subcommittee on preparedness today ordered a full study of continental defenses against hydrogen or atomic attack and named an outstanding industrialist to conduct the project.

The undertaking was announced by Senator Leverett Saltonstall, Republican of Massachusetts and chairman of both the full committee and the subcommittee. It coincided with a demand by Senator Estes Kefauver, Democrat of Tennessee, for a "complete review" of the subject. Mr. Kefauver asked for prompt hearings by the Armed Services Committee.

Robert C. Sprague, chairman of the board of the Sprague Electric Company of North Adams, Mass., will direct study for the subcommittee, Senator Saltonstall announced. He will be assisted by the unit's regular staff.

Whether this will be followed by a formal investigation and hearings, as requested by Senator Kefauver, will depend on what Mr. Sprague reports to the Saltonstall group, according to committee sources.

Other members of the subcommittee are Senator Styles Bridges, Republican of New Hampshire, and Richard B. Russell, Democrat of Georgia.

Problem Under Study

The unit "has been considering the problem of continental defense," Senator Saltonstall reported in a prepared statement, adding:

"The subcommittee concluded that this highly technical problem must be reduced to lay terms in order that the Senate Armed Services Committee can better understand the ramified details which face the United States in preparing its defenses."

The preparedness unit was "fortunate," he said, in securing the services of Mr. Sprague "to head up this important study."

Mr. Saltonstall noted that the Massachusetts industrialist was experienced in technical subjects of this sort and called him "uniquely qualified to act as adviser to the Senate group."

"I have great confidence," he

added, "in his ability, energy and thoroughness, and I know he will do a fine job on this very responsible assignment."

Mr. Sprague, a graduate of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is a recognized authority on electronic devices and presumably will give the Senators an expert analysis of various proposals for protecting the United States against air attack by radar fences of one sort or another.

Declined Air Post

He was President Eisenhower's choice for Under Secretary of the Air Force but declined to sell his holdings in the Sprague company in order to take the post.

The study that he will direct arises from the growing concern over Soviet Russia's capability of mounting an atomic or hydrogen attack on the United States and the controversy over methods of defense—particularly whether primary reliance should be placed on our ability to retaliate or whether radar and air defenses should be stepped up drastically.

In that connection, Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense, recently indicated that an airtight build-up of continental defenses would be impossible. No more than \$500,000,000 could be spent on such a project next year, because of physical limitations, he held. Programs costing at least \$10,000,000,000 have been suggested.

Senator Kefauver's request for an investigation and hearings by the full Armed Services Committee, of which he is a member, were made in a letter to Senator Saltonstall.

"Recent statements by officials of the Federal Government in high places as to Russia's current ability to deliver these weapons over population centers of the United States have contributed greatly to public concern," he wrote.

"It has been stated by high authorities at various times that the only effective defense against delivery of these bombs in the United States is the ability to retaliate promptly. Under this philosophy, it is apparent, no genuinely effective protection would be attempted. This would mean, inevitably, a write-off, as unprotectable, of a large portion of our population and a massive portion of our industrial capacity."

Seeks Radford Testimony

"The hearings which I hereby request should determine, as fully as problems of military secrecy will permit, the philosophy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which is now guiding our armed services in their plans for continental defenses against attack by atomic and thermonuclear weapons."

"It should also be determined whether arbitrary budget limitations for the armed services are preventing the establishment of fully effective defenses, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff such defenses would be effective."

Mr. Kefauver suggested that the committee seek prompt testimony on such questions by Secretary Wilson, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Lewis L. Strauss, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

"Informed persons," he added, "have suggested within recent days that very large sums would be required for protection against delivery in this country of these terrible weapons. These suggestions have been met with determined statements by other persons, many in high positions, that no such sums can be appropriated."

"The hearings which I request would go far to provide our committee and the country with the factual information which will be required in assessing the validity of these various positions."

"I do not request these hearings with any desire to create any additional fears on the part of the public."

"On the contrary, I am of the opinion that a calm attainment of the facts, whatever they may be, will be requisite to any reasonable dispassionate judgment of the effectiveness of our defense effort."

"The sooner the facts can be obtained, the sooner our committee and the Congress can take such steps, if any are required, to meet the situation which is revealed."

Meanwhile, Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Republican of Iowa and member of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, told reporters that the American atomic program "is going along very vigorously and I am not prepared to say we should pyramid it" in the face of thermonuclear developments in Russia.

Senator Ralph E. Flanders, Republican of Vermont, declared that it was possible this country had reached the point of diminishing returns in atomic preparations. He explained that if 500 bombs were enough to defeat any aggressor, the accumulation of 5,000 bombs would not make this nation ten times as safe.

M.A. Crowe

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

722013

TO: Mr. R. A. Mackay

Security ... TOP SECRET

Date ... October 21, 1953

FROM: European Division

File No. 50209-40		
59	✓	

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: Soviet Atomic Capacities and the Threat to North America,
in the light of Document NRE-93I. General

1. Soviet capabilities in atomic weapons have increased faster than expected. The limiting factor at present is delivering capacity.

2. This means that their strategy--in war--might change, and the threat to North America as a primary target would increase. It does not mean, however, that their willingness to go to war is increased.

3. The fact that they are straining every effort to increase their capability in production and delivery is not necessarily to be continued as threatening an attack as soon as ready. With Allied capacity to produce and deliver in mind, it should be viewed at least as much as a defence mechanism of re-establishing and maintaining the uneasy equilibrium in world affairs, in order that our knowledge that the threat of retaliation existed, we would think twice before raining bombs on them or before threatening to do so in order to obtain a Soviet withdrawal from positions, however ill-gotten, acquired during and as a result of end-of-the-1945-war settlements. The more so as the Soviet ideology believes in the ultimate fall into the Soviet baskets of ripening capitalist plums. War is not the only means, it is the most dangerous and bloodiest of expanding the Soviet world.

4. A state of uneasy equilibrium, with continued vigilance on both sides, may well be as safe a one as

- 2 -

one can hope for in years to come--a de facto freezing of world positions, with fencing continuing to gain advantages in areas where the lines are not clearly drawn, but mainly with the end in view everywhere of achieving conquest by internal upheavals.

II. Comments on points in NIE-95

1. Although the Soviet Government may be convinced "that permanent hostility exists between the Communist and the free worlds", it does not necessarily follow that their basic objective is expansion of their sphere of power and eventual domination of the non-Communist world. Convinced of this hostility, and taking a realistic view of their own strength, their basic objective might equally well be self-defence, if possible of their entire "bloc", but certainly of the home territory of the U.S.S.R. (reference para. 1 of NIE-95) *They may be convinced of our hostility, as we are of theirs.*

2. Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 assume that any "more conciliatory" policy apparently adopted by the U.S.S.R., in the past, present, or future, has been and will be only a trap. While it is proper to examine Soviet policies with great skepticism, we should perhaps give some weight to the view reiterated in almost every Malenkov statement since Stalin's death, namely, that all international problems, including those involving the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., can be peacefully solved. The paper asserts that they will "almost certainly be unwilling to settle any East-West differences at the cost of major concessions". Not if the concessions must be entirely from the one side. But if compensating concessions from our side are envisaged the conclusion might be different. For example, in paragraphs 31 and 32 of the paper, there is some speculation on whether the Russians would pay the price of getting out of East Germany if they could thereby receive a neutralized, even though united, Germany, and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Germany. Have they any reason to think they could get such terms from the West?

3. The conclusion in paragraph 8 (supported

- 3 -

by the arguments in paragraph 22) on Soviet economic policies has an element of self-contradiction. If they are going "to adjust their economic programme in order to allow greater incentives for industrial workers and peasants", they cannot, simultaneously, give "highest priority to the rapid development of heavy industry" and have no curtailment of military effort.

III. Conclusions

As a general comment on the paper, more weight might be given to the possibility that the Soviet Union is now motivated primarily by consideration of defence. And I would caution against taking the view that semi-conciliatory approaches on the part of the U.S.S.R. are a symptom of a weak and divided Government. I would think that the West is the unlikeliest quarter from which Malenkov might seek support in fighting his internal opposition. Only a strong Government can afford to offer or make concessions. We should, therefore, take a less negative attitude towards signs that the U.S.S.R. may be more conciliatory in foreign policy and that its concern in raising the general standard of living at home is a genuine one, although in the long run it will have the effect of increasing the war potential of its population.

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MESSAGE FORM

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OUTGOING

File No.	
50209-40	
59	✓

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE AMBASSADOR, CANADIAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON

Message To Be Sent

AIR CYPHER
EN CLAIR
CODE
CYPHER

No.

Date

October 20, 1953

For Communications Section Only

Priority

Immediate

REFERENCE: Your WA-2346 of October 15

SUBJECT: Continental Defence - Consultation Meeting
Washington

ORIGINATOR

(Signature)

R.A. MacKay
J.W. Holmes, NN
(Name Typed)

Div. USSEA

Local Tel. 4803

APPROVED BY

(Signature)

(Name Typed)

Internal Distribution:

S.S.E.A. - U.S.S.E.A.

Done.

Date.

Copies Referred To:

Office of
General Foulkes-
Department of
National Defence
Ottawa

Done.

Date.

Ext. 97 (Rev. 1/52)

Ottawa officials for the meeting will be General Foulkes, R.B. Bryce and R.A. MacKay. Bryce should be billed as Secretary to Cabinet designate or something to that effect rather than as Secretary of Treasury Board. Although Dr. Solandt's presence at the meeting would be very useful, it was felt that it might not be quite appropriate since the U.S. team does not include a technical scientist. There was also the possibility that the press might discover that both Foulkes and Solandt were present in Washington at the same time and might ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ indulge in undesirable speculation.

2. General Foulkes has made his own arrangements to go down today. MacKay and Bryce will go by train to New York Wednesday night and fly from New York to Washington Thursday morning. ^{Bryce} They plan to return by ^{MacKay hopes to remain over for a day or two,} the same means Thursday night. It is hoped that a meeting of the Ottawa delegation with you can be arranged for late Thursday morning.

21, 10, 27 (JS)

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to be accompanied
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INCOMING MESSAGE

File 1000

ORIGINAL

COPY NO. 1 OF 31 COPIES.

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES
DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
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TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

19

Security Classification	
TOP SECRET	
File No.	
50209-40	
59	58

Priority	System	No.	Date
	CYPHER-AUTO	WA-2375	October 19, 1953.

Departmental Circulation
MINISTER 2
UNDER/SEC 3
D/UNDER/SEC 4
A/UNDER/SEC 5
POL/CO-ORD 6
SECTION 7
U.N. DIV. 7
Sum 31

Reference: Your EX-1738 of October 16.

Subject: President's visit to Ottawa and continental defence.

Following for the Acting Under-Secretary, Begins:

I agree that it may be difficult to avoid a statement on continental defence in connection with the President's visit to Ottawa in view of the current public interest in this matter.

2. As to the text of the proposed statement, I have one or two suggestions for changes. In para. 1 of the text, third sentence, perhaps the words "defence of freedom" could be changed to "support of collective security" or "to resist aggression by collective action"; and the next sentence, instead of "for the first time, etc" the text might read "moreover, there is increasing evidence that the North American continent is faced with the possibility of attack, etc.". Also, I wonder if we could avoid the use of the cliché "arsenal of the free world" and have the sentence end "are capable of dreadful destruction". In the last sentence of para. 1, perhaps it would be desirable to add the words "political and" before "military situation".

3. In para. 2 of the text, sub-para 6, I am not happy with the sentence "each country will continue to determine the extent of its practical collaboration in respect of each and all of the foregoing principles". I wonder if the same idea might be expressed by omitting that sentence and changing the preceding sentence, i.e., the beginning of sub-para. 6, to read as follows: "the two governments are in continuing consultation on joint defence matters, especially through the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, although, as was the case when they issued the statement of February 12, 1947, actual decisions on defence are, of course, taken by each on its own account (or responsibility)." Ends.

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Reference 53
OCT 20
American Div.
Done
Oct 20, 1953
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Done _____
Date _____

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"Canadian Eyes Only"



OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, CHIEFS OF STAFF
OTTAWA

50209-40

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19 October, 1953.

Mr. A.D.P. Heeney,
Canadian Ambassador to the United States

Dr. R.A. MacKay,
Department of External Affairs

50209-40
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1 Attached is a brief on Russian Nuclear Capabilities and some notes on the Threat to North America, the UK and to Western Europe. It should be emphasized that, in the present state of our knowledge, estimates of the Russian stockpile of fissionable material, of their state of progress in developing thermonuclear weapons, and of their ability to deliver the weapons, must be considered as only very approximate. It should also be noted that these estimates have been prepared by the Joint Intelligence Bureau after a study of NIE 90, amended as of 16 October, 1953, and other sources of information which we have available. These papers should form a background for any opinions on the offensive capabilities of Soviet Russia which may be expressed by our delegation.

2 It appears to me that if we are pressed we should be prepared to state that from the information available to us it now appears that Russia has the capability of mounting serious attacks against North America, and these latest developments indicate that a change in Russian strategy is now possible. In the past we have envisaged a Soviet main attack against Western Europe with only divergent attacks against North America. The Russians now appear to have weapons capable of rendering crippling attacks on North American war potential provided that they continue the development of the means of delivering these new weapons in step with the development of new weapons.

3 It is possible for the Russians to develop a different strategy whereby they devoted a large part of their atomic arsenal in an effort to cripple North America, a limited portion against the UK, and using their predominance of ground forces to quickly secure Western Europe. In this course of action the Soviet Union would expect a considerable amount of retaliation on Russia, therefore, it is logical to consider that they would attempt to secure as much of Western Europe as possible without destruction, so that they would be in a much more formidable position to continue the war against North America as we would be loathe to use atomic bombs against European cities even if they contained elements of the Soviet war machine.

4 If the discussion goes further than the capabilities of the Russians to mount serious attacks on North America and the ways and means of providing more adequate defensive measures are discussed, we should be prepared to discuss the Interim Report of the Military Study Group and suggested Canadian action. If the opportunity presents itself it would appear to be very useful to put forward our ideas on an approach which could be made regarding

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
"Canadian Eyes Only"

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the increased defence of North America without unduly alarming our friends in NATO. It seems to us that this is quite possible if it is carefully done. NATO Strategic Guidance provides for an increase in the defences of North America by 1956, an extract from M.C. 14/1 (Final) "Strategic Guidance" in which the last sentence of paragraph 56 reads as follows:

"However, in 1956 the Soviet Union may have a formidable atomic potential against North America, and an adequate defence for this area thus becomes essential in order to permit NATO to accomplish its military objectives."

It would be more reassuring to our NATO partners if it could be explained that our efforts in strengthening the air defences of North America are in line with the NATO concept. Further, it should be emphasized that the increased defence of North America is for the defence of the war-making potential and not to make North America safe for North Americans. We are all aware that the air defence of Europe is wholly inadequate and care should be taken to avoid any suggestion that we are giving greater priority to the defence of North Americans than is being given to the defence of Europeans. Therefore, the civil defence side of the project should not be given too great an emphasis at this particular time. As there has been a great deal of press comment on this aspect of defence it might be useful if any additional measures for air defence for North America are carefully explained in their proper context to the Military Committee and the Council at the next meetings. In this manner our efforts for defence in this direction should not in any way cause a deterioration in Western Europe and create feelings which may lead to a spread of "neutralism".


(Charles Foulkes)
Lieutenant-General
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff

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S U M M A R Y

- 1) The Russian stockpile of fissionable material is now believed to be larger than was estimated six months ago.
- 2) Before the Russian thermonuclear explosion of 12 August, 1953, their stockpile of weapons of 30 kt to 100 kt was:

	<u>Most Probable Number</u>	<u>Possible Range</u>
Mid-53	120	80 to 240
Mid-54	200	120 to 400
Mid-55	300	200 to 600

- 3) Based on our interpretation of their thermonuclear explosion of 12 August, 1953, the Russians are now considered capable of making weapons ranging from 5 kt to about 1,000 kt.
- 4) They may also modify their previous stockpile of atomic weapons to:
 - a) increase the number of 30 to 100 kt weapons;
 - b) increase the energy yield of the same number of weapons as they now possess;
 - c) produce weapons of up to a 1,000 kt, but thereby reduce the total number of weapons available.
- 5) We believe the Russians can transport and deliver weapons up to possibly about a megaton yield, but there is considerable doubt if they could at present transport or deliver weapons yielding many megatons. *1,000 kt = 1 megaton*
- 6) In the near future their ability to damage critical targets by nuclear air attack will not be limited by availability of numbers or types of nuclear weapons but by their ability to deliver them.
- 7) The Russians are expected to adopt a strategy involving as big a strategic air effort against North America as their capabilities would permit.

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CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 8) Their assessment of their capability depends not only on the availability of numbers and types of nuclear weapons but on their ability to deliver them in the face of our defences.
- 9) They have, or will soon have, enough nuclear weapons to destroy sufficient targets to cripple North America, provided that they could be delivered on the necessary targets.
- 10) There is no way of assessing whether they would regard their present types of aircraft as suitable for an attempt to cripple North America by strategic air attack.
- 11) Increasing Russian nuclear capabilities increase an already grave threat to the United Kingdom, which would be greatly intensified if the enemy gained the Channel Coast.
- 12) As Russian nuclear capabilities increase the chances that nuclear weapons might be used on Western Europe will increase. However, the material advantage to the Russians if they could acquire the industrial plant of this area intact may lead them to confine nuclear weapons to strictly tactical military targets in Western Europe.
- 13) If it became widely known in Western Europe that the Russians had significantly increased their nuclear capabilities, fear of war and consequent vulnerability to political pressure might grow rapidly in parts of Western Europe.

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RUSSIAN NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES

1. In the last six months two developments have taken place in our knowledge of Russian nuclear activities which may seriously affect our estimates of their capabilities. At present, however, we are unable to assess the full significance of one of these developments and our estimates must be a great deal less reliable than those available to the US authorities.
2. A new estimate of Soviet plutonium production was made after a joint US-UK study during the summer of 1953. This latest estimate still involves considerable uncertainty about Russian plutonium production. There is even greater uncertainty about the Russian level of U-235 production, which is even more important than plutonium in the production of very large weapons. The US estimate of the Russian stockpile of atomic weapons was considerably increased as a result of this study, compared with their estimate of December 1952. The last CIA Estimate before the Russians exploded their thermonuclear device gave them in mid-55 a stockpile of approximately 300 atomic weapons with a yield of 30 to 100 kt. In view of the uncertainties about the production of fissionable materials the number of atomic weapons might at that time have been as low as 200 or as high as 600.
3. The second major discovery is the Russian explosion of a thermonuclear device on 12 August, 1953. On the basis of the information we have on this explosion and the reactions involved in it, we consider that they are now able to augment the energy released by a fission reaction, by energy derived from a number of thermonuclear reactions using a number of different materials. We believe that the materials involved in the thermonuclear reactions are readily available and cheap compared with fissionable material. Since the Russians must still use a fission explosion to initiate a thermonuclear reaction the limiting factor in the availability of weapons augmented by thermonuclear reactions is still the amount of fissionable material available.
4. We believe that some augmentation of energy output using some of these reactions and materials can be obtained with small fission explosions, possibly even with the smallest amount of fissile material which will support a fission explosion. As the amount of fissile material is increased we believe that additional materials become involved in the reactions, with release of even more energy, so that the ratio of the total energy released to the energy from fission increases as the amount of fissile material is increased, and may increase very sharply when large amounts of fission materials are involved.
5. These new technical capabilities give the Russians considerable choice in their use of their fissionable material, and it is impossible to foresee how they would weigh the competing advantages of increasing the number or the size of their weapons.
6. One alternative is that they can increase the number of weapons giving low energy yields. To make the previous range of fission weapons yielding 30 to 100 kt they had to use about three times as much fission material to make each 100 kt fission weapon as to make each 30 kt fission weapon. With the new techniques, any weapon in the range of 30 to 100 kt could now be made, using only the amount of fissionable material which would previously have produced a 30 kt fission explosion, the difference in energy being supplied by different amounts of added materials. It is our guess that they could perhaps double the number of weapons available in the 30 to 100 kt range by this means.

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7. If the fission weapons which were made previously were now modified to contain the maximum amount of added materials, each weapon would yield perhaps three to four times the original amount of energy, the number of weapons remaining the same.

8. If yields of the order of thousands of kilotons (i.e. megatons^{*}) are to be obtained, then very powerful fission weapons will be required to initiate the reaction; in this case the total number of weapons will be reduced considerably.

9. We believe that the volume and weight of fusion material added to the fission bomb is not very great, so that transporting them by heavy bomber is feasible. We are less certain of the Russians' current ability to deliver bombs of several megatons. A free falling bomb of several megatons, bursting at the optimum height to maximize ground damage, would also destroy the carrying aircraft by blast at any altitude below about 40,000 feet. Special delivery methods are, therefore, necessary using delayed fall of bombs or terminal delivery by missiles or by parasitic or drone aircraft. We have absolutely no knowledge of the Russian standing in this respect. It is entirely possible that the achievement of megaton weapons this early was not contemplated by the Russians until very recently, and that the development of collateral equipment for delivery, such as heavy aircraft and terminal delivery systems, is far behind their technical nuclear capabilities.

*Bombs are described according to their energy yields and may be described in terms of tons of TNT, which would yield equivalent energy, or in terms of Nominal Bombs (N) of 20,000 tons (20 kt) yield. Thus a megaton bomb (million tons of TNT equivalent) could also be described as a 1,000 kt or a 50 N bomb.

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VEHICLES FOR DELIVERING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN NORTH AMERICA

12. It is considered that very large atomic and any thermo-nuclear weapons would be delivered on North America only by bomber aircraft. Although other methods of delivery are possible for small atomic bombs, it is believed that the vast majority would be delivered by bomber aircraft.

13. There is no reliable information in Canada on the size, weight, or the method of end delivery of very large weapons. Indirect evidence suggests that weapons up to about one megaton could be carried and delivered by TU-4 aircraft. It is believed that an aircraft larger than the TU-4 would be required to carry weapons yielding several megatons and it is assumed that the Type 31 heavy bomber would be suitable. For the reasons given in Para 4 above, it cannot be assumed that the Russians are at present able to deliver weapons of several megatons.

14. During June and July, 1953, seven or eight aircraft larger than a TU-4 medium bomber were observed at Ramenskoye Airfield, and five aircraft believed to be similar were later sighted at Kazan. These aircraft are possibly in the Type 31 heavy bomber class. In addition, it is probable that one of these larger aircraft is different from the others and may possibly be a prototype jet heavy or near heavy bomber, or modified Type 31 heavy bomber.

15. It is not possible yet to establish whether the Type 31 is in series or pre series production. With the highest priority given to producing a heavy bomber, series production of Type 31 aircraft could have started early in 1953, in which case the Soviets could have up to 100 bombers in operational units by mid-1954 and up to 300 by mid-1955.

16. If the unique aircraft sighted proves to be a successful prototype heavy or near heavy all jet-bomber it is still unlikely that all jet heavy bombers would be available in operational units much before 1957.

17. The Russians have sufficient TU-4 aircraft to attempt the delivery in North America of the entire stockpile of atomic weapons which is likely to exist any time up to 1955, and even later. The performance of TU-4 aircraft has not changed from that given in previous estimates for many years.

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THE THREAT TO NORTH AMERICA

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18. The Russians must regard opposition to their domination of the world as being centered in two areas, namely, North America and Western Europe, including the UK. There are great attractions to a strategy involving the elimination of North American resistance as the initial objective of a general war. Because of the great dependence of Western European defence upon North American aid there is a very good chance that this in itself would be a decisive act, leaving only the defeat of the UK, and of scattered military resistance elsewhere. Concentration on the elimination of European resistance, even including the UK, is intrinsically a much less attractive strategy, as they must still encompass the defeat of the US, by cold war means after a negotiated peace, or by building up the necessary capabilities to defeat the US by direct military action.

19. For these reasons, the Russians can be expected to adopt a strategy involving as big a direct effort against North America as their capabilities would permit. If they considered that they possessed the necessary capability to do critical damage to sufficient North American targets they would be likely to adopt a strategic concept with the following initial objectives-to be achieved mainly by heavy air attack with nuclear weapons:

- (a) To protect the Soviet Union by surprise attack on Allied retaliatory forces and bases;
- (b) to cripple or neutralize North America;
- (c) to cripple or neutralize the UK.

They would thus expect to confront the remaining nations of NATO and of the British Commonwealth with a military task of such proportion as to discourage them from further prosecution of a war. They would use against them the minimum forces, backed by the threat of further force, to seize critical objectives in Eurasia.

20. Their assessment of their capability to adopt such a strategy would depend not only upon their own ability to provide the necessary numbers and types of weapons and delivery systems, but also on their assessment of our defensive capabilities.

21. It is a matter of pure surmise what number of North American targets they might consider it necessary to destroy in order to eliminate further effective North American participation in a world war, or what levels of attrition of their attacking force they would consider acceptable.

22. The best guess that can be made in the absence of detailed information on US targets is that there are not more than 100 targets, the destruction of which would make the recovery of North American industry so slow that the result would in effect be a knockout blow. There would at the same time be the loss of tens of millions of lives, and an undermining of the whole structure of society, which would bring the country close to, if not to, a state of collapse. Now that they have the capability to make a weapon as large as may be necessary to destroy practically any target with one weapon, they would need to have a capability to deliver on their targets in North America upwards of 100 nuclear weapons of appropriate sizes.

23. They might appreciate that the attrition by all forms of defence would be upwards of 20% at present, rising to about 60% as our defences are built up in response to their present threat. To achieve the

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above levels of weapons delivered at their targets, they might, therefore, plan on despatching 200 to 250 nuclear weapons of appropriate sizes.

24. Whatever strategy might be pursued against North America it is envisaged that a general war would start with a surprise attack on Allied retaliatory forces both in North America and overseas, in order to protect the Soviet population and their own war making potential and armed forces. In a general war the Soviet leaders would not expect the UK to withdraw unless defeated by successful invasion or neutralized by various means, including heavy bombing. It is impossible to say what attrition rates they would allow for in allocating atomic weapons to these two objectives, or how many targets they would seek to destroy.

25. In the absence of detailed information on UK targets, a very rough guess might place the number of nuclear weapons required for both purposes (excluding attacks on air bases in North America) at upwards of 100 weapons of appropriate sizes.

26. With their current nuclear stockpile and production capabilities the Russians are rapidly approaching the required level of nuclear capabilities for all these purposes. This creates a new situation, as it has previously been considered that the limiting factor in the threat to North America has been the availability of atomic weapons. With adequate numbers and types of nuclear weapons becoming available the limiting factor becomes the Russian availability to deliver them, that is, to provide enough, and good enough, aircraft to keep the attrition rates imposed by our defences at acceptable levels.

27. They have sufficient aircraft to attempt to deliver the required number of weapons, but this would almost certainly involve the expenditure of most of the attacking TU-4 aircraft on one way missions. It is impossible to conclude whether the Russians would regard their present aircraft capabilities as adequate to undertake a very large scale attack against North America as the critical campaign in their world strategy.

28. It is concluded that

- (i) the increased number of atomic weapons and the Russian ability to make a wide range of weapons appropriate to particular targets has increased the threat to North America appreciably over previous estimates;
- (ii) they have, or will soon have, enough nuclear weapons to destroy sufficient targets to cripple the US, provided that they can be delivered on the necessary targets;
- (iii) there is no way of assessing whether the Russians would regard their present types of aircraft as suitable for an attempt to cripple the US by strategic air attack.

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THE THREAT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

29. With Russian capabilities as they have existed up to the present it has been appreciated that a large part of the Russian strategic air effort and of their atomic stockpile would be used against the UK. Its elimination is particularly vital to the Russians as it is one of the principal Allied retaliatory base areas, one of the main bases for Allied operations in Western Europe and the Atlantic, and the main base from which Allied forces could threaten the USSR should Allied forces be withdrawn from Western Europe. In addition, the elimination of the UK would strengthen the Russian position in any negotiations with the US.

30. Any increase in Russian nuclear capabilities will increase the threat to the UK in many ways. Their increased stockpile will increase the number of weapons available for use against the UK. The availability of larger weapons than previously increases the threat to the largest cities and industrial concentrations. The availability of weapons in smaller sizes will make it possible for the enemy to use high performance light jet bombers, and missiles such as the V-1 or V-2, to deliver sizable atomic weapons with increased chances that they will be delivered on their targets. In particular, if the Russians establish themselves on the Channel coast the threat from V-2 missiles with atomic warheads becomes particularly menacing.

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THE THREAT TO WESTERN EUROPE

31. With Russian capabilities as they have existed up to the present it has been considered that very few atomic weapons would be used against Western Europe, because of the requirements of the campaigns against the UK and US, in which the principal military action open to the Russians required the use of all available atomic weapons. The increased Russian atomic stockpile has increased the chances that atomic weapons would be available for use against Western Europe, if the devastation of that area was required by their plans.

32. If it became widely believed in Western Europe that the Russians had significantly improved their atomic capabilities, fear of war and consequent vulnerability to political pressure would grow rapidly in parts of Western Europe. It is possible that the Russians would use their increased capabilities to exert political pressure on Western European countries in order to stimulate strong movements in support of neutralism, which would weaken their military effort and possibly even in some cases lead to their withdrawal from NATO.

33. However, in a war in which the principal Russian effort was concentrated against North America, it is possible that nuclear weapons would be used in Western Europe only against strictly military targets. They would hope thereby to acquire Western Europe's industrial plant practically intact, and possibly might possess the only major industrial capacity available to either side, after extensive strategic bombing had been suffered by both North America and the USSR. The industrial plant of Western Europe (exclusive of the UK) is of roughly the same size as that of the USSR itself. In spite of many difficulties (dependence on imports of raw materials and food, organized demolitions, continued subversion and sabotage, and unfamiliar and diversified types of manufacturing equipment), by comparison with the destruction and disorganization of industry and of the whole national life in North America, the UK and the USSR, they would command an extremely valuable asset for the further prosecution of their war objectives.

Suggested Course of Action for Interim Report
of Canada-United States Military Study Group

15 Oct 53

There is every indication that the United States Chiefs of Staff will ask for immediate consideration of the recommendations of the Study Group.

It is, therefore, suggested that the following should be the Canadian action:

1. To seek authority of Cabinet Defence Committee for agreement to a further detailed investigation of the early warning line on the 55th parallel.
2. To agree to a detailed survey of this line and sharing the cost of such survey.
3. To complete the further study of the types of equipment most suitable for this line.
4. To work out a detail estimate of the initial costs and annual recurring costs.

After this detailed study has been completed then the Government will be in a position to make a decision as to what part, if any, it will take in this scheme.

The suggested machinery for these further investigations:

- (a) Arrangements for the detailed survey of the line to be made jointly by USAF and RCAF under the auspices of the Study Group.
- (b) The Study Group to be asked to bring in a report on the equipment and also authorized to draw in whatever technical and engineering assistance they require.
- (c) The Study Group to bring in an estimate of the costs after the reports on 2 and 3 above.

The Government may be invited by the United States to take a decision before a detailed survey and costing is made in order that an announcement of joint action on this project can be undertaken. In any event the above procedure is that which the Chiefs of Staff recommend should be followed.

INCOMING MESSAGE

ORIGINAL

COPY NO. ... OF 31 COPIES

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

File

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification

TOP SECRET

File No.

50209-40

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Priority

System

CYPHER-AUTO

No. WA-2350

Date October 16, 1953.

Departmental
Circulation

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A/UNDER/SEC'S

POL/CO-ORDIN

SECTION

U. N. DIV.

Reference: Your letter No. D-1165 of October 15, 1953

Subject: Continental Defence - Meeting of Consultation

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REDUIT A SECRET

Thank you for your copy of document NIE 90.

Text of its revision was transmitted by Canadian Joint Staff, Washington, to Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee in message CJSW 901 of October 16.

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DONE - CHIEF'S SECTION

Done

1953

Reference

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Date

Ed. 230 (rev. 8/52)

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COMMUNICATIONS
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1953 OCT 17 AM 8 : 57

000974

Security ...TOP SECRET.....

MESSAGE FORM
OUTGOING

File No. 50209-40	
57	50

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: HEAD OF POST,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Message To Be Sent		No. <i>1738</i>	Date October 16, 1953.	For Communications Section Only SENT OCT 16 1953
AIR CYPHER		REFERENCE:		
EN CLAIR				
CODE				
CYPHER	AUTO	SUBJECT: The President's Visit to Ottawa and Continental Defence. <i>Following from acting under secretary.</i> It is the view of the Minister that even though the President's visit to Ottawa is intended to be purely social, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to avoid a statement on Continental Defence at that time. The following is a draft statement which was prepared before the Prime Minister's visit to Washington, in anticipation of a joint statement at that time. However, it was then decided not to pursue the matter. This draft might serve as a starter for a new statement. We should be grateful for your comments. You will appreciate that it is not repeat not intended that the draft should be shown to the State Department at this time. Text of proposed statement follows: Proposed Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the United States of America regarding defence co-operation between the two countries		
	XXX			
Priority				
ORIGINATOR		Done.....		
(Signature)				
W. H. Barton/BB (Name Typed)				
Div. D. L. (1)		Date.....		
Local Tel. 7509				
APPROVED BY				
(Signature)		Done.....		
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S. S. E. A. U. S. S. E. A.		Date.....		
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16.10.13/251

On February 12, 1947, the Governments of Canada and the United States of America made a joint statement on the extent to which the wartime co-operation between the armed forces of the two countries should be maintained in the post-war period. Since that time the expectation that the world was entering upon a prolonged period of peace has been severely shaken. Both countries, as members of the United Nations, have had to take up arms in defence of freedom, and both countries have become signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty. For the first time, the North American continent has been faced with the threat of possible attack by weapons which are capable of destruction of this arsenal of the free world. As a consequence, Canada and the United States have had to institute on the North American continent a co-operative programme of defensive installations on a much larger scale and of a completely different character than ever before. This programme is constantly being modified to reflect the changing military situation and to take advantage of new technological developments.

2. Although the statement of 1947 was made under quite different circumstances than exist to-day, it has provided a highly effective basis for the development of the defensive arrangements which have since proved necessary. Nevertheless, it is considered desirable at this time to restate, in the light of the current situation, the principles upon which collaboration for the joint defence of the two countries is founded. These are as follows:

- (1) Interchange of selected individuals so as to increase the familiarity of each country's defence establishment with that of the other country.
- (2) General co-operation and exchange of observers in connection with exercises and with the development and tests of material of common interest.

- (3) Encouragement of common designs and standards in arms, equipment, organization, methods of training and new developments.
- (4) Mutual and reciprocal availability of military, naval and air facilities in each country; this principle to be applied as may be agreed in specific instances. Reciprocally each country will continue to provide, with a minimum of formality, for the transit through its territory and its territorial waters of military aircraft and public vessels of the other country.
- (5) As an underlying principle, all co-operative arrangements will be without impairment of the control of either country over all activities in its territory.

3. As was the case when the two Governments made the statement of February 12, 1947, the decisions of each of the two Governments on joint defence matters are taken independently in continuation of the practice developed since the establishment of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence in 1940. Each country will continue to determine the extent of its practical collaboration in respect of each and all of the foregoing principles. Neither country will take any action inconsistent with the charter of the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty which remain the basis of the foreign policy of each.

4. The principles announced to-day are in continuance of the pattern of co-operation between the two countries first instituted in August, 1940, by the creation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. The object of the two Governments in restating these principles at this time is to give assurance that the close relationship between Canada and the United States in matters of common defence is being carried on in order to strengthen the effective participation of each country within the broader framework of the North

Atlantic Treaty and the United Nations.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

TOP SECRET

October 16, 1953.

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The Chairman,
Chiefs of Staff,
Department of National Defence,
"A" Building,
O t t a w a , Ontario.

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Continental Defence - Meeting of Consul-
tation in Washington

Attached are two copies of Telegram Number
WA2346 dated October 15, 1953, in which our Embassy
in Washington outlines the arrangements being made
for the Meeting of Consultation which is to take place
next Thursday, October 22.

I should be grateful if you would telephone
me when you have had an opportunity to study the tele-
gram, in order that we might discuss some of the
matters which it raises.

G.S.A. RITCHIE

Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

*Marcel told letter
to H. Bldg.
12.35 Oct. 16 (M.N.)*

16.10.22 (us)