

1950-4

PTI

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

NAVY

SECURITY

RELEASE & EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

POLICY

Pass
DORMANT

FOR CROSS REFERENCES SEE INSIDE

NSS: 1950-4 VOL. 1

ROUTING				P.A. & B.F. ENTRIES				REGISTRY ONLY	
REFERRED	REMARKS	DATE OF PASS	INITIALS	DATE OF P.A.	INITIALS	DATE OF B.F.	CANCEL B.F.	DATE RECEIVED	INSPECTED
CR	PA Dormant			21/2/62	RS			FEB 22 1962	
<i>Security</i>	PER REQUEST CR JAN 7 - 1965								
RMD	PA Dormant Navy			7/14/69	RM				

PARC# AP635

SECRET FILE NO. S-
DORMANT

“B.F.” — DO NOT HOLD — THIS FILE WHEN LAPSES IN ACTION MAY EXCEED 48 HOURS

~~HQ~~. NSS. 1950-4 VOL. 1

DEAD

VOLUME..... 2FOLLOWS

NO FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE TO BE PLACED ON THIS FILE



- NAVAL SERVICE -



Ottawa, Ontario,
30th November, 1946.

122-3

Received from Naval Service Headquarters
memorandum dated 30th November, 1946, Copy No. 4.


*file number N.S.T.S. 11550-2
Vol 1 (Staff)*

K. Adams

.....
(Signature)

17 December 1946

.....
(Date)



Ottawa, Ontario,
30th November, 1946.

Received from Naval Service Headquarters
memorandum dated 30th November, 1946, Copy No. 2.

F. R. Mangin
.....
(Signature)

11th December, 1946
.....
(Date)

T.S. 11550-2.

- NAVAL SERVICE -

Ottawa, Ontario,
30th November, 1946.

Received from Naval Service Headquarters
memorandum dated 30th November, 1946, Copy No. 1.

..... *C.W. Taylor C.O.A.C.*
(Signature)

..... *11/12/46*
(Date)

TOP SECRET

N.S. T.S. 11550-2

Vol. 1 (Staff)

COPY NO. 7.....

TOP SECRET

30th November, 1946.

DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION TO OTHER COUNTRIES

In conformity with the policy of the U.K. and the U.S.A., and pending Cabinet approval, the following constitutes instructions for the Naval Service regarding the Disclosure of Military and Technical Information to Other Countries.

2. In the interest of uniformity in policy, the various Nations have been grouped in three categories, and the class of information which each may receive is as follows:

Category	Countries Concerned	Information Releasable	Remarks
A	Countries of the British Commonwealth of Nations (excluding Eire) and the U.S.A.	May receive all classified information.	
B	France, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Greece, Turkey, Sweden and Eire.	May receive up to and including Confidential information.	Requests for Secret information will be referred to NSHQ.
C	All other countries.	Not normally entitled to receive any classified information.	Requests for Restricted and Confidential information will be referred to NSHQ.

The above categorization is subject to periodic review.

3. Should a request be received from countries for information of a higher classification than listed, such a request is to be referred to N.S.H.Q. for a decision.

4. Whenever possible, the principle of reciprocity is to be considered when dealing with requests of countries in categories "B" and "C", and mention of this should be made when referring requests to N.S.H.Q.

Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast, Halifax, N.S.
 Commanding Officer Pacific Coast, Esquimalt, B.C.
 Commanding Officer, H.M.C.S. "WARRIOR"
 Commanding Officer, H.M.C.S. "UGANDA"
 Canadian Naval Mission Overseas, London, England.
 Naval Member, Canadian Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.

000008

(Over)

- 2 -

5. The categorization of Nations for disclosure purposes is a matter of utmost secrecy, and is to be made known only to such officers on your staff to whom it is essential in the performance of their duties.

R. [unclear]
DIRECTOR OF
[Signature]
NAVAL SECRETARY.
INTELLIGENCE

*901
DIDN 1
2/12*

- Copy No. 1 to Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast
- Copy No. 2 to Commanding Officer Pacific Coast
- Copy No. 3 to Commanding Officer, H.M.C.S. "WARRIOR"
- Copy No. 4 to Commanding Officer, H.M.C.S. "UGANDA"
- Copy No. 5 to Canadian Naval Mission Overseas
- Copy No. 6 to Naval Member, Canadian Joint Staff
- Copy No. 7 on file N.S. T.S. 11550-2 Vol. 1
- Copy No. 8 on D/N.R.I.'s file.

To NDA
For Despatch
Date 5-12
Staff Reh.

TOP SECRET

DIRECTOR OF NAVAL PLANS
AND INTELLIGENCE
INTERNAL MINUTE SHEET

TOP SECRET

2-1-1

FROM: Sec. of the Admiralty TO: Naval Sec.

SUBJECT: Disclosure of Technical Information to Foreign Govts.

NS FILE NO: T.S. 11550-2 F.D. 9391 DATE: 3.12.46

REFERRED TO:	INITIALS & DATE	REMARKS
3 SO(S)	JH 27/11	India will shortly have representation in Ottawa. Consider the necessary authorities be advised presenting the Govt. will adopt a similar policy. JH 27/11
SO(P) (1)	JH	
4 SO(P) (2)	JH 30/11	
SO(Q)		
5 D/DNP		
SO(I)		
NID(1)		
NID(2)		
NID(3)		
SO(T)		
SO(STAT)		Yes. An amendment should be sent to all addressees of our T.S. memo outlining this policy (T.S. 11550-2 Vol. 1) dated 30th Nov 1946 addressed to: COAC COPC CNMO NMCS "Warrior" "Uganda" JH
N INF.		
Acted SO(Sec.)	JH 27/11	
5 P/DNI	JH 27/12	
6 DNPI	JH	
7 S.O (Sec.)		
ACCESSION LIST		
8 INDEX		
SEC		
A.A.		
B.F.		

DIRECTOR OF
Naval Plans & Intelligence
DEC 27 1946

THIS MINUTE SHEET IS TO BE ATTACHED TO THE OFFICE COPY. IT IS NOT TO LEAVE THE DIRECTORATE.

D R A F T

SECURITY
PANEL
DOCUMENT

2-2

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM

SP-11 COPY NO. 5

DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION TO OTHER COUNTRIES

General

1. The policy described hereunder is one which it is suggested should be pursued with regard to the disclosure of information to other governments or their representatives, whether civilian or military.

Definition

2. "Disclosure of information" in this memorandum embraces Service matters, technical data about weapons and equipment and includes that involved in the sale of equipment.

Categorisation of Nations for disclosure purposes

3. It is proposed that the various nations should be grouped into three categories and the scale of information which each may receive should be controlled. Details are given below.

1	2	3	4
Category	Countries concerned	Information Releasable	Remarks
A	Countries of the British Commonwealth of Nations (excluding Eire), and the U.S.A.	May receive all classified information.	
B	France, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Greece, Turkey, Sweden and Eire.	May receive up to and including Confidential information.	Requests for 'Secret' information will be referred to the Joint Intelligence Committee.
C	Remainder	Not normally entitled to receive any classified information.	Requests for Confidential and Restricted information will be referred to the Joint Intelligence Committee.

This should be supplemented as soon as possible by a detailed project list which would provide an accurate basis for the disclosure of information (this project list is in the course of preparation by the Joint Intelligence Committee).

Industrial Considerations

4. In order to safeguard industrial interests it is proposed that information of concern to manufacturers, whether government-owned or privately-owned, be dealt with in the following manner.

- (a) Wholly Patentable, i.e. the whole of the information can be protected by a patent specification.

If secret, the government will in all cases acquire the right to a secret patent in Canada and disclosure to a foreign government should as far as possible be made on the following condition:

() that the information is kept secret and the Government of that country will grant to Canada on request patent protection of suitable priority.

If not secret, i.e., such that publication in a patent specification is permissible, no problem arises. Government-owned inventions should be examined to see whether foreign patents should be obtained and exploited. In the case of privately-owned inventions the recipient Government should be referred to the owner, to negotiate terms.

- (b) Wholly unpatentable, i.e. the information, while commercially valuable, is not of the kind which can be protected by a patent specification.

Government-owned information should only be supplied if a quid pro quo is obtained - strategic, monetary, or both - worth the value of the information.

In the case of privately-owned information the foreign Government should merely be put in touch with the owner, but if the nature of the information is secret the owner should be warned that he should communicate the information only to accredited representatives of the foreign Government who are pledged to maintain secrecy.

- (c) Partly patentable and partly unpatentable. The only important case is where the information as a whole is secret and unpatentable e.g. the layout, dimensions and specification of an aero engine, while some parts are patentable and may be patented without fear of disclosing the general design, e.g. a magneto.

The patented and unpatented parts should be treated separately as in (a) and (b) above but in the case of privately-owned patentable information care should be taken to inspect any patent applications before they are filed in the foreign country by the owner, to make sure that they do not disclose any secret information.

- (d) Departments who are negotiating with Foreign Governments for the communication to them of information of commercial value may, depending upon the particular circumstances, decide to carry out the negotiations themselves and may lay down the terms upon which the information may be used by those Governments, or they may decide to entrust the negotiations, under suitable conditions, to private firms or individuals.

Conditions for Disclosure

5. The following conditions should be laid down and agreed to by all nations to whom information is disclosed:

(a) Security

- (i) The information received should be safeguarded under the same rules of security as the Canadian authorities themselves impose.
- (ii) The information is disclosed only for the use of the recipient Government and such of its contractors, under seal of secrecy, as it may notify to the Canadian Government in writing. Disclosure to any other Government, or publication to the Press or in any other way would constitute a breach of the agreement.

(b) Reciprocity

The principle of reciprocity should be adopted for the disclosure of information with foreign powers.

(Cabinet decision 25 Oct 45)

Note

The section dealing with Industrial Considerations has been taken in toto from the U.K. memorandum setting forth their policy in connection with these matters. It is included merely as a basis of discussion with departments concerned i.e., the Department of Reconstruction and Supply, and the Department of Trade and Commerce.

(COPY)

M.02795/46

SECRET OFFICE MEMORANDUM NO. S.16

Disclosure of Technical Information to other Governments

The policy set out below, governing the disclosure of technical information to other Governments, has been brought up to date and is reissued for the information of all concerned. (The term "Disclosure of Technical Information" includes all disclosures inherent in the sale of equipment).

2. For convenience, nations have been categorized as follows:-

Category A. The Dominions (except Eire),
India (but see para. 7 (b)) and U.S.A.

Category B. France, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Holland, Belgium,
Greece, Turkey and Eire.

Category C. All Nations not included in Categories, A or B,
but see para. 7 (a) regarding U.S.S.R.

3. Subject to the conditions in paras. 4, 5, 6 and 7 other Governments may receive the following information.

Category A. Information up to and including that classified
as TOP SECRET.

Category B. Information up to and including that classified
as CONFIDENTIAL.

Category C. No classified information is normally to be disclosed. It is, however, emphasised that disclosure of information is permissive only. Nations are not to be given, automatically, all information within the limits laid down for each Category but only such as is desirable for political, strategic or commercial reasons.

4. Control of Disclosure. Disclosures will not be controlled locally, e.g., through Commanders in Chief, but will be centralised at the Admiralty.

5. Conditions for disclosure. The following conditions are required to be agreed to by all Nations to whom information is disclosed:-

(a) Security

- (i) The information received should be safeguarded under the same rules of security as we ourselves impose.
- (ii) The information is disclosed only for the use of the recipient Government and such of its contractors, under seal of secrecy, as it may notify us in writing. Disclosure to any other Government or publication to the Press or in any other way, would constitute a breach of the agreement.

(b) Reciprocity.

It is a condition of disclosure of information (as opposed to sale) that reciprocal facilities be given in return; even though some Nations can offer little at the present time, this condition might be of subsequent value.

- 2 -

6. Communication to Countries concerned. The above policy and the conditions laid down in the preceding paragraph has been communicated to countries in Category B through the British Naval Representative.

7. Exceptions to paragraphs 2 and 3

(a) U.S.S.R. Disclosure of information to the U.S.S.R. will be on the basis of Category C with the following conditions:-

(i) Such information may be supplied only on the strict basis of reciprocal exchange and requests for information are to be co-ordinated in London.

(ii) Before any information or intelligence, other than operational, is passed to Russia there should be consultation with the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

(b) India. Although in Category A, only such TOP SECRET and SECRET technical and other information should be given to India as is necessary for her immediate military needs. In applying this ruling Heads of Divisions, Departments and Branches should bear in mind that where information of the type previously supplied to India is now withheld, or where improvements to weapons now held are denied to India, it may be necessary to give a pretext for such action. In cases where periodical reports and similar documents have in the past been supplied to India and it is now thought desirable to cease supply because parts of the reports are of a specially secret nature, consideration should be given to the preparation of expurgated editions for supply to India only. Doubtful cases should be referred to D.N.I. who will consult the Deputy Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee on Exchange of Technical Information as necessary.

8. Requests for information of a higher security classification than that permitted by paragraphs 2 and 3, cases where advice is required on the advisability of supplying information permitted by this memorandum or difficulties arising from the conditions imposed by paragraph 7 (a) should be referred to M. Branch I who will consult D.N.I. and any Naval Staff Division concerned before obtaining Board approval. Where consultation with the Deputy Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee on Exchange of Technical Information is necessary, M. Branch I will also arrange through D.N.I. for its presentation to the Sub-Committee.

9. Industrial Considerations. In order to safeguard British industrial interests the following conditions should be complied with in cases of disclosure of information likely to affect such interests.

Information may be Government owned or privately owned; Secret or Not Secret; wholly patentable, wholly unpatentable, or partly patentable and partly unpatentable.

(a) Wholly patentable, i.e., the whole of the information can be protected by patent rights.

If Secret the Government will in all cases acquire the right to a secret patent in the U.K. and disclosure to a foreign Government should as far as possible be made on the following condition:-

- 3 -

That the information is kept secret and that the recipient Government will grant, on request, patent protection of suitable priority.

If not secret, i.e., such that publication in a patent specification is permissible, no problem arises. Government-owned inventions should be examined to see whether foreign patents should be obtained and exploited. In the case of privately owned inventions, the recipient Government should be referred to the owner, to negotiate terms.

- (b) Wholly unpatentable, e.g., the information while commercially valuable, is not of the kind which can be protected by a patent.

Government owned information should only be supplied against a quid pro quo - strategic, monetary or both - worth the value of the information.

In the case of privately owned information the foreign Government should merely be put in touch with the owner, but if secret the owner should be warned that he should only communicate the information to accredited representatives of the foreign Government who are pledged to maintain secrecy.

- (c) Partly patentable and partly unpatentable. The only important case is where the information as a whole is secret and unpatentable, e.g., the layout, dimensions and specification of an engine, while some parts, e.g., a magneto, are patentable and may be patented without fear of disclosing the general design.

The patentable and unpatentable parts should be treated separately as in (a) and (b) above but in the case of privately owned patentable information care should be taken to inspect any patent application before it is filed in the foreign country by the owner, to make sure that it does not disclose any secret information.

- (d) Government Departments negotiating with foreign Governments for the communication to them of information of commercial value may, depending upon the particular circumstances, decide to carry out the negotiations themselves and may lay down the terms upon which the information may be used by those Governments, or they may decide to entrust the negotiations, under suitable conditions, to private firms or individuals.

10. The above policy does not affect releases of classified equipment or information which has already been made beyond the limits now laid down.

(Office Memoranda S1, S6 and S12, all of 1946, are cancelled)

A.S. LE MAITRE.
U.S.S.

18th November, 1946.

FOR ISSUE IN LONDON AND BATH

CONFIDENTIAL OFFICE MEMORANDUM NO. C.39

C.E. 58042/46

Information published by the Admiralty:
Procedure for ensuring conformity with Security Policy.

The Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee of the Chiefs of Staff Committee have recently had under consideration the question of ensuring that the minimum of information is officially published which would enable foreign powers to assess our ability or readiness to wage war at any given time.

2. In pursuance of this aim it has been agreed by Ministers that the form of the Service Estimates should be modified in future and that other publications issued by Service and other Ministries should be scrutinised before issue so as to ensure that, as far as is possible, consistent with the primary responsibilities of the Ministries concerned, no information likely to be of value to a potential enemy is given away. The Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on Security have been invited to co-ordinate and advise on implementation of this policy as far as Departmental publications, other than estimates, are concerned.

3. The Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee lay particular stress on preserving secrecy about the following matters:-

- (a) Detailed strengths of all kinds, including the number of units or formation of each arm of the Service.
- (b) Details of the formation of new units and the conversion of existing units.
- (c) The location and armament of units.
- (d) Training programmes, syllabuses and details of Service schools of instruction.
- (e) Research and Development programmes, location and details of secret research establishments.
- (f) Details of planning and progress of warlike stores and works programmes.
- (g) Reserves of men and materials, including fuel stocks.
- (h) Details of expenditure on defence measures in the Colonies and defended ports abroad.
- (i) Statistics of war production.

4. In order to reach a considered judgment on the intelligence implications of a particular piece of information and to resolve differences of view between the publishing Ministry and those responsible for maintaining security, the Service Departments have set up a Working Party on Statistics, under the Chairmanship of Colonel J.M. Phillips, R.M., A.D.N.I., Admiralty, which in effect will be a Sub-Committee of the Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on Security, and Admiralty Divisions and Departments are to send to D.N.I. for submission at his discretion to the working party on statistics, advance copies of any publications

- 2 -

intended for release to the public which contain facts about or references to the matters detailed in paragraph 3 above, or other information which might assist foreign powers to assess our ability or readiness to wage war. There is no doubt, in the great majority of cases, that it will be possible to reach agreement in direct negotiations between Ministries and the Working Party, but where this is not possible, the case would normally go up before the Standing Inter-Departmental Committee for resolution.

5. The matters enumerated in paragraph 3 (a) to (i) are designed to cover the combined needs of all three Services. The security requirements of the Royal Navy do not of themselves make it necessary to preserve secrecy on items (a) to (c), as the Royal Navy has a high degree of strategic mobility. Nevertheless, in order not to weaken the position of the other Services, it is necessary for the Royal Navy to preserve secrecy on these items. From the purely naval point of view, the most important matters on which secrecy is necessary are those which determine the possibilities of rapid expansion, e.g. stocks of fuel, munitions, shipbuilding material; and on those bearing on future intentions which are reflected, for example, in new construction and research and development programmes.

6. The compilation of the published Navy Estimates and related Parliamentary publications will not be automatically subject to the procedure laid down in para. 4 above; but will continue to be dealt with as at present.

28th November, 1946.

(DRAFT)

TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 1.....

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In conformity with the policy of the U.K. and the U.S.A., and pending Cabinet approval, the following constitutes instructions for the Naval Service regarding the Disclosure of Military and Technical Information to Other Countries.

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The above categorization is subject to periodic review.

3. Should a request be received from countries for information of a higher classification than listed, such a request is to be referred to N.S.H.Q. for a decision.

4. Whenever possible, the principle of reciprocity is to be considered when dealing with requests of countries in categories "B" and "C", and mention of this should be made when referring requests to N.S.H.Q.

C.O.A.C.
C.O.P.C.
C.O. "WARRIOR"
C.O. "UGANDA"
C.N.M.O.
N.M.C.S.

(Over)

- 2 -

5. The categorization of nations for disclosure purposes is a matter of utmost secrecy, and is to be made known only to such officers on your staff to whom it is essential in the performance of their duties.

NAVAL SECRETARY.

Concut
9/11/46
X(DNP) 27/11/46

TOP SECRET

OTTAWA, 25th November, 1946

COPY NO. /.....

TS 11550-2 Vol.1

MEMORANDUM:

TO: C.N.S.


DISCLOSURE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION
TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES.References (flagged)

- (1) British policy on release of information to U.S.S.R., dated 4th October, 1945.
- (2) United States policy on disclosure of technical information to foreign governments, dated 12th October, 1945.
- (3) British policy including countries other than Russia, dated 6th December, 1945.
- (4) Canadian policy on disclosure of information to other countries, dated 30th August, 1946.
- (5) Letter from British High Commissioner, dated 31st December, 1945.
- (6) Letter from the British High Commissioner, dated 27th July, 1946.

1. Further to my minute of 16th November, 1946, the letter from the British High Commissioner dated 15th October, 1946 does not affect my original submission. Sweden was already included in the 'B' section of the Canadian memorandum (flagged 4).

2. The only difficulty which still exists in the implementation of this policy is that as yet it has not the approval of the Cabinet. The Cabinet has approved the principle that information should be exchanged on a reciprocity basis but has not agreed on the more detailed aspect whereby countries are classified in 3 groups and are entitled to receive classified information according to the group in which they have been placed.

3. It is not considered that lack of final Cabinet approval need delay adoption of this policy by the Naval Service. It is essential that the Commands should have guidance on these matters in view of the comparatively frequent visits by foreign Naval Officers (for example--there is a group of Peruvian Naval Officers in Halifax at the present time).


(G.R. Tottenham)
A/Cdr. (SB) R.C.N.,
Acting Director of Naval Plans
and Intelligence.

Copy No. 1 to C.N.S.
Copy No. 2 on D.N.P.I. file

000021

NAVAL SERVICE

MINUTE SHEET

FILE NO.

LETTER NO.

REFERRED TO

REMARKS (WITH INITIALS AND DATE)

* / D.N.S. /
[Signature]

CSC E-1 of 16 Nov '46 (one
down) rec'd. Today.

Will you please
examine its effect on
your draft memorandum
(with your memo of 16 Nov)
before I pass it to C.N.S.

[Signature]
See C.N.S.
18/11

DEPT. NUMBER

H.Q. 1024

NAVAL SERVICE - MINUTE SHEET

FILE NO. - T.S. 11550-2....
F.D. #27 (Staff)

REFERRED TO

REMARKS (With Signature, Position & Date)

C.N.S.

In order to implement the Security Panel memorandum on Disclosure of Information to Other Countries (tabbed), with your concurrence, it is proposed to send copies of the "Top Secret" draft herewith to COAC, COPC, CNMO, NMCS, C.O. "WARRIOR" and C.O. "UGANDA".

2. In addition it is proposed to circulate this memorandum to Directors and Deputy Secretaries only in N.S.H.Q., drawing attention to C.C.N.O. 30.74/3 Paragraph 5 which states that all requests from foreign countries for information must be routed through D.N.P.I.



(G.R. Tottenham)
A/Commander (S.B.) R.C.N.
A/D.N.P.I.

16-11-46.

000023

(DRAFT)

TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 1.....

DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION TO OTHER COUNTRIES

In conformity with the policy of the U.K. and U.S.A., the Cabinet Defence Committee has recently issued a memorandum on the Disclosure of Military and Technical Information to other countries; to obtain uniformity in policy the various nations have been grouped into three categories and the class of information which each may receive is as follows:

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The above categorization is subject to periodic review.

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4. The categorization of nations for disclosure purposes is a matter of utmost secrecy, and is to be made known only to such officers on your staff to whom it is essential in the performance of their duties.

NAVAL SECRETARY.

C.O.A.C.
C.O.P.C.
C.O. "WARRIOR"
C.O. "UGANDA".
C.N.M.O.
N.M.C.S.

000024



FILE NO. **CSC 8-1**
TOP SECRET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
CABINET SECRETARIAT OFFICES,
EAST BLOCK, OTTAWA

November 16, 1946.

C.A.S.
C.C.S.
✓ C.H.S.
D.G.D.R.

1470

1. Reference is made to my CSC 8-1 of 6th August, 1946.
2. Attached is a copy of a further communication from the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, which records certain changes in the document forwarded with my earlier communication.

W.F. Bean
(W.F. Bean),
Group Captain, R.C.A.F.,
Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Encl.

C O P Y

TOP SECRET

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIDNER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM
Earnscliffe,
Ottawa.

15th October, 1946.

Dear Mr. Pearson:

1470

Would you please refer to Mr. Holmes' letter of the 31st December, 1945, and the High Commissioner's letter of the 27th July, 1946, about the disclosure of technical information to other nations.

We have been asked to let you know that, in consequence of the recommendation of the informal Commonwealth Conference on Defence Science mentioned in the last paragraph of the High Commissioner's letter of the 27th July (which will of course apply only to information of United Kingdom origin until the report has been approved by other Commonwealth Governments), the following amendments should be made to the memorandum enclosed with Mr. Holmes' letter of the 31st December:-

1. Paragraph 9. Delete "should they agree to collaboration in research and development".
2. Paragraph 10. Sweden should be added to the list of "Category B" nations.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ J.J.S. Garner

L.B. Pearson, Esq.,
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
Ottawa.

H.Q. 1024

Topsen
NAVAL SERVICE - MINUTE SHEET

T.S. 11550-2
FILE NO. - *F.D.M.S.*...27...

REFERRED TO

REMARKS (With Signature, Position & Date)

D.D.N.I.
[Signature]

(to Old Rankin)

For action in accordance with D.M.'s remarks please to route reply thru C.N.S.' office

Dal
Sec C.N.S.
28/10

Sec
[Signature]

Draft acknowledgment attached. Naval arrangements will be subject of special memo now in draft stage. Ref min 27 May

for concurrence, please [Signature]
1/11

C.N.S.
[Signature]

N/A D.D.N.I.
[Signature]

HFR/MWE

TOP SECRET

COPY NO. ...?....

1st November, 1946.

N.S. T.S. 11550-2 F.D.#27
(Staff)

TOP SECRET

Dear Mr. Gill:

Reference is made to your letter of 21st October, 1946, and covering memorandum prepared by the Security Panel and issued by authority of the Cabinet Defence Committee regarding the Disclosure of Information to Other Countries.

2. Arrangements are being made to ensure that the utmost secrecy is maintained in this regard.

Yours truly,

(W.G. Mills)
DEPUTY MINISTER.

E.W.T. Gill, Esq.,
Vice-Chairman, Security Panel,
Privy Council Office,
East Block,
OTTAWA, Ontario.

R

D/DNI

H. E. REID
VICE-ADMIRAL
CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF

Copy No. 1 for despatch to Mr. E.W.T. Gill
Copy No. 2 for the main file
Copy No. 3 for the Security Panel File
Copy No. 4 for D/D.N.I.'s file.



HFR/MWE

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECRET

COPY NO. ...³...

1st November, 1946.

N.S. T.S. 11550-2 F.D.#27
(Staff)

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECRET

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2. Arrangements are being made to ensure that the utmost secrecy is maintained in this regard.

Yours truly,

(W.G. Mills)
DEPUTY MINISTER.

E.W.T. Gill, Esq.,
Vice-Chairman, Security Panel,
Privy Council Office,
East Block,
OTTAWA, Ontario.

Copy No. 1 for despatch to Mr. E.W.T. Gill
Copy No. 2 for the main file
Copy No. 3 for the Security Panel File
Copy No. 4 for D/D.N.I.'s file.

*This letter approved
by CAS and signed
by D.M. 5/11*

(DRAFT)

~~TOP~~ SECRET

COPY NO. .2.....

DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION TO OTHER COUNTRIES

In conformity with the policy of the U.K. and U.S.A., the Cabinet Defence Committee has recently issued a memorandum on the Disclosure of Military and Technical Information to other countries; to obtain uniformity in policy the various nations have been grouped into three categories and the class of information which each may receive is as follows:

Category	Countries Concerned	Information Releasable	Remarks
A	Countries of the ^{British} Commonwealth of Nations (excluding Eire) and the U.S.A.	May receive all classified information.	
B	France, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Greece, Turkey, Sweden and Eire.	May receive up to and including Confidential information.	Requests for "Secret" information will be referred to NSHQ.
C	All other countries.	Not normally entitled to receive any classified information.	Requests for Restricted and Confidential information will be referred to NSHQ.

The above categorization is subject to periodic review.

2. Should a request be received from countries for information of a higher classification than listed, such a request is to be referred to N.S.H.Q. for a decision.

3. Whenever possible, the principle of reciprocity is to be considered when dealing with requests of countries in categories "B" and "C", and mention of this should be made when referring requests to N.S.H.Q.

4. The categorization of nations for disclosure purposes is a matter of utmost secrecy, and is to be made known only to such officers on your staff to whom it is essential in the performance of their duties.

NAVAL SECRETARY.

C.O.A.C.
C.O.P.C.
C.O. "WARRIOR"
C.O. "UGANDA".
C.N.M.O.
N.M.C.S.

000030

11550-2



CANADA

TOP SECRET

OCT 25 1946
D. M.
Naval Service

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE

OTTAWA, October 21st, 1946.

CABINET SECRETARIAT

1289

W. Gordon Mills, Esquire,
Deputy Minister of National Defence (Naval Services).

Dear Mr. Mills:

The accompanying memorandum which has been prepared by the Security Panel, in consultation with officials of interested government departments, is issued, by authority of the Cabinet Defence Committee, as a guide in the disclosure of military and technical information to other countries. The policy stated is similar to that being followed in the United Kingdom.

Particular attention is drawn to paragraph 3 of the memorandum showing the categorization of nations for disclosure purposes. The grouping of countries in this way is a matter of the utmost secrecy and it is requested that it be made known only to those officials who require this information in the normal performance of their duties.

I am forwarding a copy of this letter and the memorandum to your departmental Security officer.

Admiral Reed
C. N. S.

Yours sincerely,

E. W. T. Gill
E.W.T. Gill,
Vice - Chairman,
Security Panel.

To note and draft suitable acknowledgment for W. G. M.'s signature. I presume from the last para. that staff have already been advised.

E. W. T. Gill
Deputy Minister
for Naval Services.

26.10.46

T O P S E C R E T

M E M O R A N D U M

DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION TO OTHER COUNTRIES

General

1. The policy described hereunder should be observed with regard to the disclosure of information to other governments or their representatives, whether civilian or military. It should be borne in mind, however, that under this policy information will only be disclosed when appropriate authority has been obtained for such disclosure. The policy in no way relieves officials of their obligations under the Official Secrets Act.

Definition

2. "Disclosure of Information" in this memorandum embraces service matters, technical data about weapons and equipment and includes disclosures involved in the sale of equipment.

Categorization of Nations for Disclosure purposes

3. The various nations will be grouped into three categories and the class of information which each may receive will be controlled. Details are given below:

Category	Countries concerned	Information Releasable	Remarks
A	Countries of the British Commonwealth of Nations (excluding Eire) and the U.S.A.	May receive all classified information	
B	France, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Greece, Turkey, Sweden and Eire.	May receive up to and including Confidential information.	Requests for "Secret" information will be referred to the Joint Intelligence Committee.
C	Remainder	Not normally entitled to receive any classified information.	Requests for Confidential and Restricted information will be referred to the Joint Intelligence Committee.

This categorization will be subject to periodic review by the Security Panel. Should it be desired to change the category in which a particular nation falls, the advice of the Security Panel will be sought before such a change takes place.

- 2 -

The Department of Reconstruction and Supply, in conjunction with the Joint Intelligence Committee, will be responsible for the reclassification of equipment which it is proposed to sell and for the prevention of the sale of classified equipment.

Clearances from British and United States authorities will be obtained in all cases where the release of classified information of British or United States origin, or of British-Canadian or United States-Canadian origin, is concerned.

Industrial Considerations

4. In order to safeguard industrial interests information of concern to manufacturers, whether government-owned or privately-owned, will be dealt with in the following manner:

- (a) Wholly Patentable, i.e., the whole of the information can be protected by a patent specification.

If secret, consideration will be given to the possibility of acquiring a secret patent in Canada and disclosure to a foreign government should as far as possible be made on the following conditions:

that the information is kept secret and the government of that country will grant to Canada on request patent protection of suitable priority.

If not secret, i.e., such that publication in a patent specification is permissible, no problem arises. Government-owned inventions should be examined to see whether foreign patents should be obtained and exploited. In the case of privately-owned inventions the recipient Government should be referred to the owner, to negotiate terms.

- (b) Wholly unpatentable, i.e., the information, while commercially valuable, is not of the kind which can be protected by a patent specification.

Government-owned information should only be supplied if a quid pro quo is obtained - strategic, monetary, or both - worth the value of the information.

In the case of privately-owned information the foreign Government should merely be put in touch with the owner, but if the nature of the information is secret the owner should be warned that he should communicate the information only to accredited representatives of the foreign Government who are pledged to maintain secrecy.

- (c) Partly patentable and partly unpatentable. The only important case is where the information as a whole is secret and unpatentable, e.g. the layout, dimensions and specification of an aero engine, while some parts are patentable and may be patented without fear of disclosing the general design, e.g. a magneto.

The patented and unpatented parts should be treated separately as in (a) and (b) above but in the case of privately-owned patentable information care should be taken to inspect any patent applications before they are filed in the foreign country by the owner, to make sure that they do not disclose any secret information.

- 3 -

- (d) Departments which are negotiating with Foreign Governments for the communication to them of information of commercial value may, depending upon the particular circumstances, decide to carry out the negotiations themselves and may lay down the terms upon which the information may be used by those Governments, or they may decide to entrust the negotiations, under suitable conditions, to private firms or individuals.

Conditions for Disclosure

5. The following conditions should be laid down and agreed to by all nations to whom information is disclosed:

(a) Security

- (i) The information received should be safeguarded under the same rules of security as the Canadian authorities themselves impose.
- (ii) The information is disclosed only for the use of the recipient Government and such of its contractors, under seal of secrecy, as it may notify to the Canadian Government in writing. Disclosure to any other Government, or publication to the Press or in any other way would constitute a breach of the agreement.

(b) Reciprocity

The principle of reciprocity should be adopted for the disclosure of information to foreign powers in categories "B" and "C". Disclosure will not be made automatically whenever a request is received but only after the reasons behind it have been ascertained and the possibility of receiving in return some quid pro quo of value has been considered. The responsibility for applying the principles of reciprocity will be assumed by Departmental Security Officers who will, if in doubt, consult the Joint Intelligence Committee or the Advisory Scientific Security Sub-Panel.

Office of the Secretary,
Security Panel,
Privy Council Office,
October 15th, 1946.

MEMORANDUM

Privy Council Office

Ottawa.....



Lt.-Cdr. H.F. Rankin

For information.

J.A.K. Rutherford, Major,
Secretary,
Security Panel.

000035

TOP SECRET

2-1-1

OTTAWA, October 21st, 1946.

W. Gordon Mills, Esquire,
Deputy Minister of National Defence (Naval Services).

Dear Mr. Mills:

The accompanying memorandum which has been prepared by the Security Panel, in consultation with officials of interested government departments, is issued, by authority of the Cabinet Defence Committee, as a guide in the disclosure of military and technical information to other countries. The policy stated is similar to that being followed in the United Kingdom.

Particular attention is drawn to paragraph 3 of the memorandum showing the categorization of nations for disclosure purposes. The grouping of countries in this way is a matter of the utmost secrecy and it is requested that it be made known only to those officials who require this information in the normal performance of their duties.

I am forwarding a copy of this letter and the memorandum to your departmental Security officer.

Yours sincerely,

E. W. T. Gill

E. W. T. Gill,
Vice - Chairman,
Security Panel.

T O P S E C R E T

M E M O R A N D U M

DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION TO OTHER COUNTRIES

General

1. The policy described hereunder should be observed with regard to the disclosure of information to other governments or their representatives, whether civilian or military. It should be borne in mind, however, that under this policy information will only be disclosed when appropriate authority has been obtained for such disclosure. The policy in no way relieves officials of their obligations under the Official Secrets Act.

Definition

2. "Disclosure of Information" in this memorandum embraces service matters, technical data about weapons and equipment and includes disclosures involved in the sale of equipment.

Categorization of Nations for Disclosure purposes

3. The various nations will be grouped into three categories and the class of information which each may receive will be controlled. Details are given below:

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A	Countries of the British Commonwealth of Nations (excluding Eire) and the U.S.A.	May receive all classified information	
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C	Remainder	Not normally entitled to receive any classified information.	Requests for Confidential and Restricted information will be referred to the Joint Intelligence Committee.

This categorization will be subject to periodic review by the Security Panel. Should it be desired to change the category in which a particular nation falls, the advice of the Security Panel will be sought before such a change takes place.

The Department of Reconstruction and Supply, in conjunction with the Joint Intelligence Committee, will be responsible for the reclassification of equipment which it is proposed to sell and for the prevention of the sale of classified equipment.

Clearances from British and United States authorities will be obtained in all cases where the release of classified information of British or United States origin, or of British-Canadian or United States-Canadian origin, is concerned.

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that the information is kept secret and the government of that country will grant to Canada on request patent protection of suitable priority.

If not secret, i.e., such that publication in a patent specification is permissible, no problem arises. Government-owned inventions should be examined to see whether foreign patents should be obtained and exploited. In the case of privately-owned inventions the recipient Government should be referred to the owner, to negotiate terms.

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Government-owned information should only be supplied if a quid pro quo is obtained - strategic, monetary, or both - worth the value of the information.

In the case of privately-owned information the foreign Government should merely be put in touch with the owner, but if the nature of the information is secret the owner should be warned that he should communicate the information only to accredited representatives of the foreign Government who are pledged to maintain secrecy.

- (c) Partly patentable and partly unpatentable. The only important case is where the information as a whole is secret and unpatentable, e.g. the layout, dimensions and specification of an aero engine, while some parts are patentable and may be patented without fear of disclosing the general design, e.g. a magneto.

The patented and unpatented parts should be treated separately as in (a) and (b) above but in the case of privately-owned patentable information care should be taken to inspect any patent applications before they are filed in the foreign country by the owner, to make sure that they do not disclose any secret information.

- 3 -

- (d) Departments which are negotiating with Foreign Governments for the communication to them of information of commercial value may, depending upon the particular circumstances, decide to carry out the negotiations themselves and may lay down the terms upon which the information may be used by those Governments, or they may decide to entrust the negotiations, under suitable conditions, to private firms or individuals.

Conditions for Disclosure

5. The following conditions should be laid down and agreed to by all nations to whom information is disclosed:

(a) Security

- (i) The information received should be safeguarded under the same rules of security as the Canadian authorities themselves impose.
- (ii) The information is disclosed only for the use of the recipient Government and such of its contractors, under seal of secrecy, as it may notify to the Canadian Government in writing. Disclosure to any other Government, or publication to the Press or in any other way would constitute a breach of the agreement.

(b) Reciprocity

The principle of reciprocity should be adopted for the disclosure of information to foreign powers in categories "B" and "C". Disclosure will not be made automatically whenever a request is received but only after the reasons behind it have been ascertained and the possibility of receiving in return some quid pro quo of value has been considered. The responsibility for applying the principles of reciprocity will be assumed by Departmental Security Officers who will, if in doubt, consult the Joint Intelligence Committee or the Advisory Scientific Security Sub-Panel.

Office of the Secretary,
Security Panel,
Privy Council Office,
October 15th, 1946.

TOP SECRET
CLASSIFICATION
TS 11550-2 Vol.1
Reference

Date extracted 18th October 1946

CABINET DEFENCE MINUTE

The following is an extract from the minutes of the 23rd Meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee held 15th October 1946.

- ③ D.M. *26/10*
- ① D.N.I. *24/10*
- D.W.T.
- D.S.D.
- D.N.A.D.
- D.S.R.D.
- ⑤ A/C.N.S. *26/10*
- D.H.O.
- D.E.E.
- A/C.N.A.S. (E)
- A/C.N.A.S. (SD)
- ④ C.N.A.S. *[Signature]*
- D.H.R.
- ② C.N.P. *[Signature]* *PA*

[Signature]
Secretary to the Chief of
the Naval Staff.

Disclosure of information to other countries

13. Mr. Heeney submitted a memorandum from the Security Panel outlining a suggested policy to govern the disclosure of military information to other governments or their representatives.

The policy proposed was similar to that being pursued in the United Kingdom. It grouped the various countries into categories and showed the security classification of information which each might receive. It included also safeguards for industrial interests, and that part of the memorandum which dealt with this aspect had been prepared in consultation with officials of interested government departments.

The formula suggested was intended to serve as a guide to government departments, and would be complementary to the policy of reciprocity which the Cabinet had decided should be accepted as a basis for the exchange of military and technical information.

(Memorandum from Security Panel to Cabinet Defence Committee, August 30th, 1946 - Cabinet document D-73)

14. The Committee, after discussion, agreed that the Security Panel be authorized to issue an administrative memorandum on this subject for the guidance of interested government departments.

115

2-1-1

TOP SECRET

15/0 CT/46.

MEMORANDUM TO MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY PANEL

Disclosure of Information to other Countries

The Cabinet Defence Committee at their 23rd meeting held on 15th October, 1946, authorized the Security Panel to issue for the guidance of government departments and agencies, the memorandum which was considered by the Panel at their 4th meeting held on August 5th, 1946. A copy is enclosed herewith.

Copies of the memorandum have been forwarded to Deputy Ministers and Security officers of interested government departments. Particular attention was drawn to paragraph 3 covering categorization of nations, with the request that it be made known only to those officials who require this information in the normal performance of their duties.



J.A.K. Rutherford, Major,
Secretary,
Security Panel.

T O P S E C R E T

M E M O R A N D U M

DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION TO OTHER COUNTRIES

General

1. The policy described hereunder should be observed with regard to the disclosure of information to other governments or their representatives, whether civilian or military. It should be borne in mind, however, that under this policy information will only be disclosed when appropriate authority has been obtained for such disclosure. The policy in no way relieves officials of their obligations under the Official Secrets Act.

Definition

2. "Disclosure of Information" in this memorandum embraces service matters, technical data about weapons and equipment and includes disclosures involved in the sale of equipment.

Categorization of Nations for Disclosure purposes

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C	Remainder	Not normally entitled to receive any classified information.	Requests for Confidential and Restricted information will be referred to the Joint Intelligence Committee.

This categorization will be subject to periodic review by the Security Panel. Should it be desired to change the category in which a particular nation falls, the advice of the Security Panel will be sought before such a change takes place.

The Department of Reconstruction and Supply, in conjunction with the Joint Intelligence Committee, will be responsible for the reclassification of equipment which it is proposed to sell and for the prevention of the sale of classified equipment.

Clearances from British and United States authorities will be obtained in all cases where the release of classified information of British or United States origin, or of British-Canadian or United States-Canadian origin, is concerned.

Industrial Considerations

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If not secret, i.e., such that publication in a patent specification is permissible, no problem arises. Government-owned inventions should be examined to see whether foreign patents should be obtained and exploited. In the case of privately-owned inventions the recipient Government should be referred to the owner, to negotiate terms.

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The patented and unpatented parts should be treated separately as in (a) and (b) above but in the case of privately-owned patentable information care should be taken to inspect any patent applications before they are filed in the foreign country by the owner, to make sure that they do not disclose any secret information.

- 3 -

- (d) Departments which are negotiating with Foreign Governments for the communication to them of information of commercial value may, depending upon the particular circumstances, decide to carry out the negotiations themselves and may lay down the terms upon which the information may be used by those Governments, or they may decide to entrust the negotiations, under suitable conditions, to private firms or individuals.

Conditions for Disclosure

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(b) Reciprocity

The principle of reciprocity should be adopted for the disclosure of information to foreign powers in categories "B" and "C". Disclosure will not be made automatically whenever a request is received but only after the reasons behind it have been ascertained and the possibility of receiving in return some quid pro quo of value has been considered. The responsibility for applying the principles of reciprocity will be assumed by Departmental Security Officers who will, if in doubt, consult the Joint Intelligence Committee or the Advisory Scientific Security Sub-Panel.

Office of the Secretary,
Security Panel,
Privy Council Office,
October 15th, 1946.

Topssee
CLASSIFICATION

Cab Doc D-73
Reference

of 30/8/46
Rec'd 7/9/46

URGENT - BY HAND

~~CHIEFS OF STAFF~~ CABINET DEFENCE

①	D.N.P.I.	✓
	D.W.T.	
	D.S.D.	
	D.N.A.D.	
	D.S.R.D.	
②	A/C.N.S. 18	<i>W.M.W.</i>
	D.N.O. 17	
	D.E.E.	
	A/C.N.A.S. (E)	
	A/C.N.A.S. (SD)	
	C.N.A.S.	
	D.N.R.	
	C.N.P.	

Request your comments hereon for C.N.S. please,
and return to Room 3316 by *1600/19/46*
at 17/19/46

Date: *9/9/46*

Dalzell
Secretary to the Chief of
the Naval Staff

*Truly concur with the
recommendations of the Security
Panel.*

H. Lay

Comments W.M.W. 19.9.

*Copy of Action File Note
Cab Doc A-73 was on the
agenda for Cab. Def Ltr 18/9/46, but
not discussed.*

*P.A. Dalzell
Sec C.N.S. 21/9*

CABINET DOCUMENT	
No.	D 73
Copy No.	11

T O P S E C R E T

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CABINET DEFENCE COMMITTEE:

1133

Disclosure of information
to other countries.

1. The Security Panel submits for the consideration of the Cabinet Defence Committee the accompanying memorandum outlining a suggested policy to govern the disclosure of information on Service matters, including weapons and equipment, and that involved in the sale of equipment to other governments or their representatives whether civilian or military.
2. This proposes that the various nations be grouped into categories and shows the security classification of information which each may receive. It is similar to the policy being pursued in the United Kingdom and its adoption in Canada for the disclosure of information on military matters has been recommended by the Chiefs of Staff. The clauses covering sale of equipment and the safeguarding of industrial interests have been examined by the Departments of Reconstruction and Supply & Trade and Commerce which agree with the procedure proposed.
3. The Cabinet, at their meeting of October 25th, 1945, agreed that the principle of strict reciprocity be accepted as a basis for the exchange of military and technical information with foreign powers. The policy now proposed is not intended to modify that deriving from the Cabinet's decision, but rather to be complementary to it, since disclosure of information to categories B and C will not normally be made automatically whenever a request is made, but only after the reasons behind it have been ascertained and the possibility of receiving in return some quid pro quo of value has been considered.
4. In certain cases it may be desirable to authorize the release of secret information to Class "B" nations and Confidential and Restricted information to Class "C", but individual cases of this character will be dealt with by the Joint Intelligence Committee. The categorization of nations will be subject to periodic review by the Security Panel.
5. The Security Panel recommends that the policy set forth in the attached memorandum be approved for the guidance of Canadian government departments.

319 Privy Council Office,
30 August 1946.

E.W.T. Gill
Vice-Chairman,
Security Panel.

T O P S E C R E T

M E M O R A N D U M

DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION TO OTHER COUNTRIES

General

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Definition

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The patented and unpatented parts should be treated separately as in (a) and (b) above but in the case of privately-owned patentable information care should be taken to inspect any patent applications before they are filed in the foreign country by the owner, to make sure that they do not disclose any secret information.

- 3 -

- (d) Departments which are negotiating with Foreign Governments for the communication to them of information of commercial value may, depending upon the particular circumstances, decide to carry out the negotiations themselves and may lay down the terms upon which the information may be used by those Governments, or they may decide to entrust the negotiations, under suitable conditions, to private firms or individuals.

Conditions for Disclosure

5. The following conditions should be laid down and agreed to by all nations to whom information is disclosed:

(a) Security

- (i) The information received should be safeguarded under the same rules of security as the Canadian authorities themselves impose.
- (ii) The information is disclosed only for the use of the recipient Government and such of its contractors, under seal of secrecy, as it may notify to the Canadian Government in writing. Disclosure to any other Government, or publication to the Press or in any other way would constitute a breach of the agreement.

(b) Reciprocity

The principle of reciprocity should be adopted for the disclosure of information to foreign powers in categories "B" and "C". Disclosure will not be made automatically whenever a request is received but only after the reasons behind it have been ascertained and the possibility of receiving in return some quid pro quo of value has been considered. The responsibility for applying the principles of reciprocity will be assumed by Departmental Security Officers who will, if in doubt, consult the Joint Intelligence Committee or the Advisory Scientific Security Sub-Panel.

SECRET

File No. CSC 8-1 Vol. I

T.S. 11550-2

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Cabinet Secretariat Offices,
East Block.
6th August, 1946

MEMORANDUM TO: C. A. S.

C. G. S.


C. N. S. ✓

D. G. R.

1469

Subject Exchange of technical information with
foreign powers.

The following document concerning the above
mentioned subject is forwarded for your information and
retention: Memorandum of 1st Aug '46 from the Acting Under
Secretary of State for External Affairs.



(J.W.C. Barclay)
Acting Lieutenant Commander (S) R.C. 000050
Secretary.

CNS
D DNP 15/8
D DSR 17.8
D ACUS 22/8
24/8

C O P Y

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Ottawa, August 1, 1946.

TO: The Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee,
O T T A W A .

1469

With reference to our letters of February 7th and April 4th concerning the exchange of technical information with foreign powers, I am enclosing a copy of a letter dated 27th July from the United Kingdom High Commissioner. You will note that the letter sets out a revised agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom concerning the disclosure of classified information.

I am forwarding a copy to the Secretary of the Security Panel, as the policy for the exchange of information with foreign powers is at present under consideration by the Panel.

(sgd) H.H. Wrong,

Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM
Barnscliffe,
OTTAWA.

1085/8.
SECRET

27th July, 1946.

1469

Dear Mr. Wrong:

Would you please refer to Mr. Holmes's letter of the 26th March about the disclosure of technical information to other nations.

The United States Chiefs of Staff recently proposed that the existing war-time agreements covering the disclosure of classified information to third parties should be cancelled and revised by the following agreement:-

"The United States Chiefs of Staff will make every effort to ensure that the United States will maintain the military security classification established by the British authorities with respect to military material of British (including Dominion or Indian) design or manufacture, and the military security classifications established by United Kingdom-United States agreement with respect to military material of joint British-United States design; will safeguard accordingly such material and related information; and, when the security classification is SECRET or higher, will not disclose such information or material to a third nation without United Kingdom consent. The United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff will make every effort to ensure that the United Kingdom, other nations of the British Commonwealth and India will maintain the military security classifications established by the United States authorities with respect to military material of United States design or manufacture, and the military security classifications established by ~~the~~ United Kingdom-United States agreement with respect to military material of joint British-United States design; will safeguard accordingly such material and related information; and, when the security classification is SECRET or higher, will not disclose such information or material to a third nation without United States consent. This agreement applies to military material and related information disclosed by the United States to the United Kingdom or by the United Kingdom to the United States or exchanged between the United States and the United Kingdom since 1st September, 1939. This is to be considered as an interim agreement pending the establishment of governmental policies on these matters."

In reply, the United States Chiefs of Staff have been informed that the United Kingdom authorities are prepared to agree to the proposals for this interim

H.H. Wrong, Esq.,
Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
OTTAWA.

.....2

000052

- 2 -

1469

agreement classification "confidential" or above. The United Kingdom authorities are prepared to accept the risk that "restricted" information may be passed on to third parties other than those listed in categories A and B of the memorandum enclosed in Holmes's letter of the 31st December.

I have been asked to inform you of the terms of this interim agreement with the United States authorities and to express the hope that the Canadian authorities for their part will agree to co-operate in giving effect to its provisions relating to material of United States or joint United States-British design.

In this connection I would invite reference to one of the recommendations put forward by the delegates to the recent Informal Commonwealth Conference on Defence Science which, as you will be aware, was in the following terms:-

"That, although collaboration with the United States must for the present remain on an informal basis, all results of research in the Commonwealth should be made freely available to the United States without bargaining or restriction."

Yours sincerely,

(sgd) T.A. Clutterbuck.

SECRET

1950-4

SECURITY PANEL

The fourth meeting held on August 5th, 1946

MINUTES OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING

1. The minutes of the previous meeting were approved.

DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION TO OTHER COUNTRIES

2. Mr. Crean referred to a draft memorandum which had been prepared outlining the suggested policy which should be pursued in regard to the disclosure of information to other governments on service matters, technical data concerning weapons and equipment, sale of equipment and procedure to be followed for the safeguarding of industrial interests in the sale of equipment. This draft memorandum had been referred to the Departments of Reconstruction and Supply and Trade and Commerce and to the National Research Council for their comments in respect to industrial considerations.

(Security Panel Document SP-11).

3. It was agreed after discussion:
 - (a) that the draft memorandum for submission to the Cabinet Defence Committee was acceptable subject to the following amendments:
 - (i) that the Department of Reconstruction and Supply in conjunction with the Joint Intelligence Committee will be responsible for the reclassification of equipment which it is proposed to sell and for the prevention of the sale of classified equipment;
 - (ii) that the memorandum include reference to the necessity for clearance from British or United States authorities in the event of considering the release of classified material of British or United States design or of joint British-Canadian or United States - Canadian design;
 - (iii) that application of the principles of reciprocity referred to in paragraph 5(b) of the memorandum be assumed by departmental security officers who will, if in doubt, consult the Joint Intelligence Committee, or the Advisory Scientific Security Sub-Panel;
 - (b) that the question of patents be referred to the Commissioner of Patents for his opinion

CONFIDENTIAL

File 1950-4

3

Following is Item.....of the minutes of the.....
meeting of the.....*SP*.....held on.....*22 July 46*.....

EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WITH FOREIGN POWERS

8. Mr. Gill said that at the previous meeting a policy to govern the exchange of information with foreign powers had been discussed. This policy was proposed by the Chiefs of Staff on the recommendation of the Joint Intelligence Committee, related to service information and was based on a memorandum of the British War Office. Before submitting the matter to Cabinet Defence Committee it seemed appropriate to point out the Cabinet had directed that details of a reciprocal policy covering the exchange of technical information and intelligence should be prepared, and the Joint Intelligence Committee had been assigned the task of preparing it in consultation with other Government departments. Any report which which was now put before the Cabinet, therefore, should have the concurrence of other Government departments such as Reconstruction and Supply and Trade and Commerce. The policy advocated, moreover, should not be restricted to service matters but should be broadened to include research and other technical data.

(Memorandum - Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee,
13 June, 1946 - Security Panel Document SP -6)

9. It was agreed, after discussion, that other government departments concerned should be consulted before the policy recommended by the Chiefs of Staff be submitted to the Cabinet Defence Committee for approval.



CANADA

TOP SECRET

11558-2

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE

CABINET SECRETARIAT

July 19th, 1946.

R.G. Riddell, Esq.,
Department of External Affairs.

Colonel W.A.B. Anderson,
Director of Military Intelligence.

Wing Commander F.F. Lambert,
Director of Intelligence (Air).


1463

— Commander G. Tottenham,
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence.

Supt. L.H. Nicholson,
Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

Colonel W.W. Goforth,
Defence Research.

1. Attached please find minutes of the sub-committee formed under the Chairmanship of Director-General of Defence Research to discuss the problem of scientific and technical liaison with the U.K. and U.S.A.


(J.A.R. Rutherford) Major,
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

COPY NO. 4

TOP SECRET

In accordance with Minute No. 845 of the 148th Meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee, a Sub-Committee under the Chairmanship of DGDR met at 1600 hours 15 Jul 46 in Room 2062, New Army Building, to discuss the problem of scientific and technical intelligence liaison with the UK and USA. The following officers attended:

Dr. O. M. Solandt, DGDR,
Col. W.W. Goforth, D/DGDR,
Col. W.A.B. Anderson, DMI, 1468
Cdr. R.H. Macdonald, A/D of Sci. Int.,
Lt.-Col. N. Ignatieff, MI 1,
Lt-Cdr. Lucas, rep. DNPI,
S/L A.H.avent, rep. D of I (Air),
Maj. N.W. Dickson, MI 1(d), Acting Secretary

Following general discussion it was agreed that:

- (1) In the field of technical and scientific intelligence, DGDR's primary responsibility would extend up to the point where development reached the engineering design stage, at which point it would become the responsibility of the technical branches of the various Service intelligence organizations. Mutual exchange of technical and scientific intelligence, for information, as between Armed Services Intelligence agencies and DGDR, was recognized as essential.
- (2) It would be convenient to interpret the understanding in (1) above by arranging the general line of demarcation in the intelligence field to accord with that agreed upon from time to time between DGDR and the development branches of the three Armed Services in the whole field of Canadian research and development for defence.
- (3) While the Armed Services cannot be expected to effect full liaison with the scientific intelligence agencies in the UK and USA, the Services technical representatives, suitably briefed by DGDR, would endeavour to cover the scientific field, in addition to their main duties, until such time as DGDR could assume its responsibility in this matter.
- (4) DGDR would be responsible for briefing, orally and in writing, these Service technical intelligence liaison officers and Service attaches on the significant features and requirements of scientific intelligence.
- (5) Channels of communication would be through the Service Intelligence Directorates, but with provision for informal consultation on scientific matters by technical intelligence liaison officers with scientific representatives of DGDR contiguous to their posts of duty.



(N. W. DICKSON) Major
Acting Secretary

July 18, 1946.

000057

H 1024

NAVAL SERVICE - MINUTE SHEET

FILE NO. -

REFERRED TO

REMARKS (With Signature, Position & Date)

CNS
DNAI
DSRD
A/CNS
CEK. 10.8

To note both
CSCC-1 Vol 1
of 15 July +
CSCC-2 Vol 1
of 16 July please
(Top 2 papers)

Question re publication arise
frequently and it is important
put into operation some authority
able to make decisions.

R. Kemp.
D.S.R.D.
10.8.44

TS. 11550-2

SECRET

File No. CSC 8-2 Vol. I

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Cabinet Secretariat Offices,
East Block.

July 16, 1946.

MEMORANDUM TO: C. A. S.

C. G. S.

C. N. S. ✓


D. G. R.

1466

Subject **Scientific and Technical Information;
Security clearance.**

The following document concerning the above mentioned subject is forwarded for your information and retention:

Memorandum of 12th July '46 from the Security Panel
(This refers to the minutes of the 356th Meeting of the
Committee, held 26th June '46.)



(J.W.C. Barclay)
Acting Lieutenant Commander (S) R.C.N.
Secretary.

SECRET

OTTAWA, July 12, 1946.

The Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

1466

Security Clearance of Scientific and Technical
Information

The Security Panel at their second meeting held 8 July 46 considered the memorandum of the Chiefs of Staff dated 3 July 46 recommending a change in the existing arrangements for the clearance of classified information of a scientific nature.

The following extract from the minutes relative to this subject is forwarded for information.

"Scientific and technical information;
security clearance

7. Mr. Heeney referred to a memorandum received from the Chiefs of Staff Committee recommending a change in the existing arrangements for the clearance of classified information of a scientific nature. He asked Dr. Solandt to speak on this subject.

(Memo, Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee,
July 3rd, 1946, Security Panel document SP-5)

8. Dr. Solandt stated that a reorganization of present arrangements for the clearance of classified information of a scientific nature was considered

- 2 -

1466

desirable by the Chiefs of Staff and the President of National Research Council. To achieve this end, the Chiefs of Staff had recently agreed that the Joint Intelligence Committee, acting in consultation with the Director General of Defence Research, be the approving authority for such clearances. It was now proposed that an Advisory Scientific Security Sub-Panel be constituted to replace the Board on Release for Publication of Wartime Scientific and Technical Information; the composition and terms of reference of the Sub-Panel to be as follows:

(a) Membership

Chairman - Dean C.J. Mackenzie, N.R.C.;

Members - Dr. O.M. Solandt, Director
General of Defence Research;
Mr. C.S. Parsons, Department
of Mines and Resources;

Secretary- Director or Acting Director
of Scientific Intelligence,
Defence Research;

each of the above to name an alternate. In the absence of Dean C.J. Mackenzie, Dr. Solandt, as Vice-Chairman, may act for the Chairman in calling meetings or in matters arising from its minutes;

(b) Terms of Reference

- (i) to advise the Security Panel on broad matters of policy in respect of scientific considerations; and
- (ii) to reorganize, appoint and supervise consultant sub-committees in each scientific field. (Since the twelve sub-committees appointed in August, 1945, by the original Board are now largely dispersed by demobilization and reconversion, they will have to be completely revamped.);

- 3 -

1466

the said consultant sub-committees to be selected wholly or largely from scientists and technical officers of National Research Council and National Defence who are available in Ottawa. These sub-committees will serve the following purposes:

- (i) review policy of publication within their particular fields, from the standpoint of U.S.A. and U.K. practice, of the relevant portion of the security "stop lists", and recommend to the scientific Sub-Panel the general terms and conditions of release;
 - (ii) review recommendations of National Research Council and other scientific bodies regarding releases "en bloc" of certain wartime material, subject to responsible sponsoring and editing; and
 - (iii) act as individuals to advise Director General of Defence Research on the clearance of specific papers; and
- (c) to determine the conditions and limitations of information and apparatus available to Canadian universities and industry from National Research Council for research and teaching purposes.

9. The Panel, after discussion, approved the constitution of a Scientific Sub-Panel as proposed by the Director General of Defence Research and concurred in by National Research Council."


Secretary,
Security Panel.

File No.

CSC 8-1 Vol. I

TOP SECRET

TS
11550-2

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Cabinet Secretariat Offices,
East Block.

15 July '46.

MEMORANDUM TO: C. A. S.

C. G. S.

C. N. S. ✓

D. G. R.

1465

C.N.S.
DARD
D/SRD
A/CNS

Subject Exchange of Information with Foreign Powers.

The following document concerning the above mentioned subject is forwarded for your information and retention:

Memorandum of 12th July '46 from the Security Panel, (this refers to paragraphs 17 & 18 of the Minutes of the 353rd Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee held 7th June '46).

(J.W.C. Barclay)
Acting Lieutenant Commander (S) R.C000063
Secretary.

TOP SECRET

OTTAWA, July 12, 1946.

The Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

1465

Exchange of Information with Foreign Powers

The Security Panel, at their second meeting held 8 Jul 46, considered the recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff that United Kingdom practice (as amended) be adopted and agreed to recommend adoption of the policy proposed with the addition of Sweden to category "B".

The Panel were of the opinion, however, that the adoption of the practice proposed involved questions of policy and it was considered advisable to refer the matter to the Cabinet Defense Committee for their decision.

Michael J. ...
Secretary,
Security Panel.

Topsec

H.O. 1024

NAVAL SERVICE - MINUTE SHEET

356 CofS meeting

FILE NO. - *u. Security*

Clearance of Information

REFERRED TO

REMARKS (With Signature, Position & Date)

D.S.R.D. P.S.K. 10-7,
D.N.P.

(COPY)

Scientific and technical information;
security clearance

7. Mr. Heeney referred to a memorandum received from the Chiefs of Staff Committee recommending a change in the existing arrangements for the clearance of classified information of a scientific nature. He asked Dr. Solandt to speak on this subject.

(Memo, Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee,
July 3rd, 1946 - Security Panel document SP-5)

8. Dr. Solandt stated that a reorganization of present arrangements for the clearance of scientific information was considered desirable by the Chiefs of Staff and the President of National Research Council. To achieve this end, the Chiefs of Staff had recently agreed that the Joint Intelligence Committee, acting in consultation with the Director General of Defence Research, be the approving authority for such clearances. It was now proposed that an Advisory Scientific Security Sub-Panel be constituted to replace the Board on Release for Publication of Wartime Scientific and Technical Information; the composition and terms of reference of the Sub-Panel to be as follows:

(a) Membership

Chairman - Dean C.J. Mackenzie, N.R.C.;

Members - Dr. O.M. Solandt, Director
General of Defence Research;
Mr. C.S. Parsons, Department
of Mines and Resources;

Secretary - Director or Acting Director
of Scientific Intelligence,
Defence Research;

each of the above to name an alternate. In the absence of Dean C.J. Mackenzie, Dr. Solandt, as Vice-Chairman, may act for the Chairman in calling meetings or in matters arising from its minutes;

(b) Terms of Reference

- (i) to advise the Security Panel on broad matters of policy in respect of scientific considerations; and
- (ii) to reorganize, appoint and supervise consultant sub-committees in each scientific field. (Since the twelve sub-committees appointed in August, 1945, by the original Board are now largely dispersed by demobilization and reconversion, they will have to be completely revamped.);

the said consultant sub-committees to be selected wholly or largely from scientists and technical officers of National Research Council and National Defence who are available in Ottawa. These sub-committees will serve the following purposes:

- 2 -

- (i) review policy of publication within their particular fields, from the standpoint of U.S.A. and U.K. practice, of the relevant portion of the security "stop lists", and recommend to the scientific Sub-Panel the general terms and conditions of release;
 - (ii) review recommendations of National Research Council and other scientific bodies regarding releases "en bloc" of certain wartime material, subject to responsible sponsoring and editing; and
 - (iii) act as individuals to advise Director General of Defence Research on the clearance of specific papers; and
- (c) to determine the conditions and limitations of information and apparatus available to Canadian universities and industry from National Research Council for research and teaching purposes.

9. The Panel, after discussion, approved the constitution of a Scientific Sub-Panel as proposed by the Director General of Defence Research and concurred in by National Research Council.

CONFIDENTIAL

File 1950-4

Following is Item.....of the minutes of the.....²
meeting of the.....^{SP}.....held on.....^{8 July 46}.....

EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WITH FOREIGN POWERS

10. Colonel Anderson reported that the Chiefs of Staff, acting upon the advice of the Joint Intelligence Committee, had recommended the adoption of a policy similar to the employed in the United Kingdom for the exchange of information with foreign powers.

This grouped foreign powers into three categories for the receipt of classified information, and provided that special cases be submitted to the Joint Intelligence Committee for their authorization. Detailed project lists were in the course of preparation, and would be available in due course.

(Memo CSC 8-1, Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, June 13th, with attachment - Panel document SP-6)

11. Mr. Gill observed that the Cabinet, at their meeting of October 25th, 1945, had agreed that technical information be exchanged with foreign powers on a strictly reciprocal basis. The present proposals appeared to be workable within a policy of reciprocity, and they would, no therefore conflict with the earlier decision by Cabinet.

CSC 8-2

28 Jun 46

1467

Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

Scientific and technical
information; security clearance

1. The Chiefs of Staff, at their 356th meeting held 25 Jun 46, reconsidered the decision taken at their 352nd meeting held 21 May, regarding the security clearance of scientific and technical information, which I notified to you in my memorandum CSC 8-2 of 30 May 46.
2. It was agreed generally to accept the recommendations of the J.I.C. and that:
 - (a) since all scientific papers on which questions of clearance for publication now arise describe work done, directly or indirectly, on behalf of the Armed Services, the Joint Intelligence Committee, acting in consultation with and on advice of Director General of Defence Research, shall be the approving authority for such clearance; and, without restriction to the authority aforementioned; and
 - (b) questions of security policy concerning the release of scientific information have until now been dealt with by "the Board on Release for Publication on Wartime Scientific and Technical Information" under the Chairmanship of the President, National Research Council. Since a Security Panel has now been established for dealing with all higher questions of security policy, it was considered that President, National Research Council might wish to discuss with Security Panel some reorientation of his present Committee so that their policy recommendations on security control of scientific information may be subject to review and coordination by the Security Panel.

(Sgd.) J. W. C. Barclay

(J.W.C. Barclay),
A/Lt. Cdr. (S) R.C.N.,
Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

000069

356th Meeting of
THE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

The following minute is promulgated for information
and for necessary action.

Meeting held Tuesday, 25th June, 1946.

File No. N.S. T.S.11550-2


V. Scientific and Technical Information; Security clearance

The D.G.R. referred to the minutes of the 352nd meeting of the Committee held 21 May 46 when the matter of Security Clearance for Scientific and Technical Information had been under discussion. He stated that the decision registered in paragraph 3(a) of the minutes had been found unsatisfactory, and suggested that the decision should be amended as follows:-

"It was agreed generally to accept the recommendation of the Joint Intelligence Committee and that:-

- (a) since all scientific papers on which questions of clearance for publication now arise describe work done, directly, on behalf of the Armed Services, the Joint Intelligence Committee, acting in consultation with and on the advice of Director General of Defence Research shall be the approving authority for such clearance; and, without restriction to the authority aforementioned;
- (b) questions of security policy concerning the release of scientific information have until now been dealt with by "the Board on Release for Publication on Wartime Scientific and Technical Information" under the Chairmanship of the President, National Research Council. Since a Security Panel has now been established for dealing with all higher questions of security policy, it was considered that President, National Research Council might wish to discuss with Security Panel some reorientation of his present Committee so that their policy recommendations on security control of scientific information may be subject to review and co-ordination by the Security Panel."

The Committee agreed to accept the D.G.R.'s recommendation.



(D.A. Collins)
A/Lieutenant Commander (S)
SECRETARY TO THE CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF.

2nd July, 1946.

TOP SECRET
CSC 8-1

SECURITY
PANEL
DOCUMENT

13 June 46

SP-6

COPY NO. 5

Mr. A.D.P. Heeney,
Chairman,
Security Panel.

Exchange of information with foreign powers

1. The Chiefs of Staff, at their 353rd meeting held 7 June 46, considered the question of exchange of technical information with foreign powers.

2. This matter has been under examination during the past few months and the Joint Intelligence Committee have now recommended, as an interim measure, the adoption of the British practice as set forth in the attached British War Office letter - O160/2451 (G.S. (W)) dated 1 Jan 46, with the following amendments:

- (a) that the following changes be made in the type of category shown on page 2 of the above-mentioned letter:
 - (i) the "special category" to be deleted leaving only the three categories (a), (b) and (c);
 - (ii) Russia to be included in category (c); and
 - (iii) in column 4 delete the words "War Office" in both instances and substitute "Joint Services Security Bureau".
- (b) that, when the Joint Services Security Bureau is unable to decide on a particular case, the matter is to be referred to the Joint Intelligence Committee.

3. The Joint Intelligence Committee also reported that each Service had been engaged in preparing detailed 'project lists' as a basis for the exchange of technical information. The preparation of these project lists was proving lengthy, involving as it does several government

000071

- 2 -

departments and a wide range of technical subjects. It was likely to be some time until adequate project lists were prepared and it was desirable to release certain technical information at once.

4. The Committee agreed to recommend acceptance of the British practice, as amended, for the guidance of the three Services and I am to request that this matter may be considered by the Security Panel.

(Sgd.) J. W. C. Barclay

(J.W.C. Barclay)
A/Lt. Cdr. (S) R.C.N.,
Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Att.

APPENDIX "A"

THE WAR OFFICE,
WHITEHALL,
S.W.1,
1 Jan 46.

0160/2451 (G.S. (W)).

S E C R E T

(and Amendment of
24 Jan 46.)

Sir,

I am commanded by the Army Council to inform you that it is considered desirable to issue for the guidance of all concerned revised instructions regarding the policy of H.M. Government towards the Disclosure of Information on Service matters to other Governments or their representatives whether civilian or military.

2. I am to say that in order that requests for information etc., may be treated in as consistent a manner as possible it has been decided to divide the various nations into categories, and to control the scale of information which each may receive as shown in the Appendix hereto.

3. It is not desirable that disclosure of information within the limits of this letter shall be made automatically whenever a request is made but only after the reasons behind it have been ascertained and the possibility of receiving in return some quid pro quo of military value has been considered. It is therefore normally necessary to ensure that initial enquiries on any subject are submitted to the War Office through the normal channels, i.e. through the Service Attache of the Government concerned in London. An exception to this would be routine requests for information required by Dominion Governments. Also in the case of a British Military Mission attached to a foreign Government for the specific purpose of advising on some aspect of its training or defence, enquiries should normally be dealt with by the Mission in accordance with the Directive it has received from the War Office.

4. In certain circumstances it may be possible to authorise the release of Secret information to Class B nations and Confidential or Restricted information to Class C nations but requests for information of this character should invariably be referred to the War Office for a Decision.

5. The scope of this Directive should be treated as covering information regarding the organisation, tactical handling and training of British Military Forces, publications relating to weapons defences and equipment, information derived from courses and attachments and information of a technical and scientific character. It does not include Intelligence, disclosure of which must invariably be treated as a matter for War Office decision on the merits of each case.

6. I am to add that no weapons or equipment may be supplied to any nation, outside the United Kingdom, except after consideration as to their availabilities and the competing claims for their supply. The authority for controlling the physical supply of all weapons and equipment is the War Office. If and when any weapon or equipment is available for supply as above, it is necessary, before supply is approved, in the case of any classified equipment, to consider whether there is any objection to such supply on Security grounds as indicated in this letter.

7. War Office letter 0160/2451 (L.M.5/SD(W)) dated 3rd January, 1944, as subsequently amended by War Office letter 0160/2451 (L.M.5/SD(W)) dated 10th October, 1944, 10th February, 1945 and 1st July, 1945, containing previous instructions on this subject are cancelled by this letter.

S./.....

S E C R E T

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
- Army -

JSSB 3-5-9 (M.I.3)
Ottawa, Ontario,
4 July, 1946.

Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

War Office Letter O160/2451 (GS(W)2)
Release of Information to Foreign Powers.

1. The following is a recently received amendment to the m/n document:

The War Office, London,
17 May, 1946.


"I am commanded by the Army Council to refer to War Office letter O160/2451 (GS(W)) dated 1 Jan 46 as amended by War Office letter O160/2451 (GS(W)) dated 24 Jan 46, which contained the revised policy for disclosure of technical information to foreign nations.

I am to say that it has been decided that SWEDEN should be placed in Category 'B' and therefore the necessary amendment should be made to Appendix 'A' of the above mentioned letter".

(Signed) E.W. Lambert.

2. The above subject is on the agenda of the forthcoming meeting of the Security Panel.

3. It is therefore recommended that this amendment be brought to the attention of the Security Panel in order that it can be included in the Canadian Policy pertaining to the Release of Information to Foreign Powers.


Lieut-Colonel,
JSSB

3. In conclusion I am to add that the terms of this letter have been approved by the Admiralty and the Air Ministry in so far as they relate to weapons and equipment common to more than one Service.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(signed) G.W. Lambert

The categorisation of nations shown below
will be subject to periodical
review

1	2	3	4
Category	Countries concerned	Information Releasable	Remarks
Category A.	British Empire and U.S.A.	May receive all classified information.	
Category B.	France, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Greece and Turkey. Eire (★) <i>Soviet</i>	May receive up to and including Confidential information.	Requests for 'Secret' information will be referred to War Office. <i>8333</i>
Category C.	Remainder (and Russia)	Not normally entitled to receive any classified information.	Requests for Confidential and Restricted information will be referred to War Office. <i>8333</i>
Special Category	Russia		All requests to be referred to War Office.

(★) EIRE is placed in Category B by authority of W.O. letter 0160/2451 G.S.(W), d/24 Jan 46.

Note: Alterations in Red indicates amendments proposed by J I C.

H.Q. 1024

NAVAL SERVICE - MINUTE SHEET

FILE NO. -

REFERRED TO

REMARKS (With Signature, Position & Date)

D.N.P.

~~AD~~

This will be discussed further by CTIC on question of implementation of policy.
See also "8371-56

~~AD~~
DION
24/6

Please
P.L.
24/6

TOP SECRET

353rd Meeting of
THE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

The following minute is promulgated for information and for necessary action.

Meeting held Friday, 7th June, 1946.

N.S. T.S. 11550-2 Vol.1

VIII. Exchange of information with foreign powers.

The Secretary referred to a recommendation from the Joint Intelligence Committee in which interim procedure for exchange of technical information with foreign powers was proposed. He stated that, at the 341st meeting of the Committee held 8 Jan 46, the Chiefs of Staff had considered a report by the Joint Planning Committee regarding this matter which was not approved in the light of some more recent information received from the United Kingdom government and they had agreed that it should be re-examined by the Joint Intelligence Committee assisted by other government departments concerned in order that further recommendations might be submitted in due course.

The Joint Intelligence Committee reported that each Service had been engaged in preparing detailed project lists as a basis for the exchange of technical information and that the preparation of such lists was proving lengthy, involving as it does several government departments and a wide range of technical subjects. They felt that it was likely to be some time before adequate project lists were available and it was desirable to release certain technical information at once. In this regard, they recommended that, as an immediate interim procedure, the British practice be followed with certain amendments.


This British procedure, with the proposed amendments by the Joint Intelligence Committee, classed nations to which information might be released into the three following categories:

- (a) - countries which might receive all classified information;
- (b) - countries which might receive up to and including confidential information and secret information on request, after approval by the Joint Services Security Bureau; and
- (c) - countries which would not normally receive any classified information but might receive confidential and restricted information on approval by the Joint Services Security Bureau.

When the Joint Services Security Bureau was unable to decide on a particular case, the matter was to be referred to the Joint Intelligence Committee.

(Memorandum JIC 7-2 of 22 May 46 from the Joint Intelligence Committee - CSC 8-1 of 23 May 46).

The Committee agreed to recommend to the Security Panel acceptance of the British practice as amended for the guidance of the three Services in this matter.


(D.A. Collins)
A/Lieutenant Commander (S)
SECRETARY TO THE CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF.

14th June, 1946.

D/DNI

I hope know of any reason why
the attached got in the file in
view of your minute (Hazel)?

Suggest correspondence be placed
on our T.S. file on the subject
and the C.B. be sent AND A for
distribution as it is now outdated.

Or

The correspondence be placed on with
the new C.B.

W.H.
22/11

Yes please
W.H.



NAVAL SERVICE - MINUTE SHEET

FILE NO. -

REFERRED TO	<u>REMARKS</u> (With Signature, Position & Date)
-------------	--

N.D.A.

This was discussed with Mr Barnes and in view of forthcoming discussions on this subject on a high govt level it was agreed to postpone further action.

Suggest B.F. on 15th Nov.

[Signature] DIDN

Notes: Books issued to RCN

FWL:MA

S E C R E T

C.B. O Form U2D (3)(46)

Redraft for C.B.C.N.

OUTER COVER - Revised if necessary to allow for new
C.B.C.N. number.

PAGE ONE - Revised if necessary to allow for new
C.B.C.N. number.
Lower Left Hand Corner re-worded as
necessary.

PAGE TWO - Reworded as necessary.

PAGE THREE - Para. 1, line 1. - For "H.M. Government"
read "The Government of Canada".

Para. 2, sub-para. (a)(i), line three:
for "The Dominions (except Eire), India and
U.S.A." read "The United Kingdom, the Dominions
(except Eire), India and U.S.A."

sub-para. (a)(ii) - for "Admiralty discretion"
read "the discretion of the Naval Board"
or "the Minister's discretion".

sub-para. (d), line 5 - for "London" read
"Ottawa".

sub-para. (d), line 6 - for "U.S. Chiefs of
Staff" read "U.K. and U.S. Chiefs of Staff".

PAGE FOUR - Para. 4, line 2 - For "H. M. Government" read
"the Canadian Government".

line 3 - For "British" read "Canadian".

line 5 - For "Admiralty" read "the Naval Board"
or "the Minister".

sub-para. (a) line 4 - For "U.K." read "Canada".

PAGE FIVE - Delete para. 6

para. 7 - For "C.B." read "C.B.C.N."

para. 8 -line 2 - For "Commanders in Chief"
read "Flag Officers in Command"

line 3 - For "Admiralty" read "Naval Service
Headquarters".

line 5 - For "Admiralty approval" read "the
approval of the Naval Board" or "the
approval of the Minister".

OTTAWA, 12th June, 1946.

000080

File No *T.S. 11550-2*

NAVAL SERVICE

HEADQUARTERS

MINUTE SHEET

Exchange of Information

REFERRED TO:

REMARKS

~~A/C.I.N.S.~~
A/C.I.N.S.
cap
27/5

*request your
comments for CIVS
please, by pm 31/5/46
Del. Sec. CIVS
27/5-*

*Concur with the recommend-
ations of the J.I.C.
Concur
H.W.L.M. 29/5-
J.H. Ray
28/5*

*CNS.
29/5*

TOP SECRET

File No. CSC 8-1 Vol. I

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Cabinet Secretariat Offices,
East Block.

23rd May '46.

MEMORANDUM TO: C. A. S.
C. G. S.
C. N. S. ✓
D. G. R.

T.S. 11550-2

1464

Subject **Exchange of information with Foreign Powers.**

1. The following document concerning the above mentioned subject is forwarded herewith: **Memorandum JIC 7-2 of 22May'46 from Joint Intelligence Committee.**

2. This matter will be placed on the agenda of the **353rd** meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee to be held **Tuesday 28 May '46.**



(J.W.C. Barclay)
Acting Lieutenant Commander (S) R.C.N.
Secretary.

JIC 7-2

TOP SECRET

22 May 46

Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

1461

Exchange of Technical Information with Foreign Powers

1. The Chiefs of Staff Committee in a letter from the Secretary, CSC 120 and 500-1, d/11 Jan 46, directed that the JIC make recommendations on the exchange of technical information with foreign powers.

2. The JIC at its 144th meeting on 17 May 46 reviewed the progress of this matter to date. Each service has been engaged in preparing detailed project lists as a basis for the exchange of technical information. The preparation of these project lists is proving lengthy, involving as it does, several government departments and a wide range of technical subjects. As it is likely to be some time before adequate project lists are prepared and as it is desirable to release certain technical information at once, an immediate interim procedure is necessary.

3. The Committee agreed to recommend to the Chiefs of Staff Committee that approval be given to the JIC to adopt for the guidance of the three Canadian services the procedure set forward in the attached War Office letter, O160/2451 G.S.(W) d/1 Jan 46, with the following amendments:

(a) That the following changes be made in the table of categories shown on page 2 of a/m letter:

- (i) The "special category" to be struck out, leaving only the three categories A, B and C.
- (ii) Russia to be included in Category C.
- (iii) In column 4, strike out the words "War Office" in both instances and substitute "JSSB".

(b) That when the JSSB is unable to decide in a particular case, the matter is to be referred to the JIC.

J.F. Leys
(J.F. Leys) Major,
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

APPENDIX "A"

THE WAR OFFICE,
WHITEHALL,
S.W.1,
1 Jan 46.

0160/2451 (G.S. (W)).

S E C R E T

(and Amendment of
24 Jan 46.)

Sir,

I am commanded by the Army Council to inform you that it is considered desirable to issue for the guidance of all concerned revised instructions regarding the policy of H.M. Government towards the Disclosure of Information on Service matters to other Governments or their representatives whether civilian or military.

2. I am to say that in order that requests for information etc., may be treated in as consistent a manner as possible it has been decided to divide the various nations into categories, and to control the scale of information which each may receive as shown in the Appendix hereto.

3. It is not desirable that disclosure of information within the limits of this letter shall be made automatically whenever a request is made but only after the reasons behind it have been ascertained and the possibility of receiving in return some quid pro quo of military value has been considered. It is therefore normally necessary to ensure that initial enquiries on any subject are submitted to the War Office through the normal channels, i.e. through the Service Attache of the Government concerned in London. An exception to this would be routine requests for information required by Dominion Governments. Also in the case of a British Military Mission attached to a foreign Government for the specific purpose of advising on some aspect of its training or defence, enquiries should normally be dealt with by the Mission in accordance with the Directive it has received from the War Office.

4. In certain circumstances it may be possible to authorise the release of Secret information to Class B nations and Confidential or Restricted information to Class C nations but requests for information of this character should invariably be referred to the War Office for a Decision.

5. The scope of this Directive should be treated as covering information regarding the organisation, tactical handling and training of British Military Forces, publications relating to weapons defences and equipment, information derived from courses and attachments and information of a technical and scientific character. It does not include Intelligence, disclosure of which must invariably be treated as a matter for War Office decision on the merits of each case.

6. I am to add that no weapons or equipment may be supplied to any nation, outside the United Kingdom, except after consideration as to their availabilities and the competing claims for their supply. The authority for controlling the physical supply of all weapons and equipment is the War Office. If and when any weapon or equipment is available for supply as above, it is necessary, before supply is approved, in the case of any classified equipment, to consider whether there is any objection to such supply on Security grounds as indicated in this letter.

7. War Office letter 0160/2451 (L.M.5/SD(W)) dated 3rd January, 1944, as subsequently amended by War Office letter 0160/2451 (L.M.5/SD(W)) dated 10th October, 1944, 10th February, 1945 and 1st July, 1945, containing previous instructions on this subject are cancelled by this letter.

3./.....

8. In conclusion I am to add that the terms of this letter have been approved by the Admiralty and the Air Ministry in so far as they relate to weapons and equipment common to more than one Service.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(signed) G.W. Lambert

The categorisation of nations shown below
will be subject to periodical
review

1	2	3	4
Category	Countries concerned	Information Releasable	Remarks
Category A.	British Empire and U.S.A.	May receive all classified information.	
Category B.	France, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Greece and Turkey. Eire (*)	May receive up to and including Confidential information.	Requests for 'Secret' information will be referred to War-Office. JSSB
Category C.	Remainder (less Russia)	Not normally entitled to receive any classified information.	Requests for Confidential and Restricted information will be referred to War-Office. JSSB
Special-Category	Russia		All requests to be referred to War-Office.

(*) EIRE is placed in Category B by authority of W.O. letter O160/2451 G.S.(W), d/24 Jan 46.

NOTE: Alterations in Red indicate amendments proposed by JIC.

352nd Meeting of
THE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE.

The following minute is promulgated for information and for necessary action.

Meeting held Tuesday, 21st May, 1946.

File No. N.S. T.S.11550-2

I. Scientific and Technical Information; Security Clearance

The Committee considered a memorandum from the Joint Intelligence Committee concerning methods of clearance of classified information upon which an interim agreement had been reached at their previous meeting.

(Memorandum JIC 7-2 of 9 May 46 from the J.I.C. - CSC 8-2 of 11 May 46).

It was agreed to generally accept the recommendation of the Joint Intelligence Committee and that:

- (a) insofar as releases of classified information on purely service subjects was concerned, the Joint Intelligence Committee, in consultation with the Director General of Defence Research should be the approving authority; and
- (b) the Security Panel might establish a sub-committee to deal with releases of other classified information which would in fact take over the duties of the "Board on Release for Publication on Wartime Scientific and Technical Information", and the Secretary was directed to refer this matter to the Security Panel and Dean Mackenzie for their consideration.



(D.A. Collins)
A/Lieutenant Commander (S)
SECRETARY TO THE CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF.

23rd May, 1946.

H.Q. 1024

NAVAL SERVICE - MINUTE SHEET

FILE NO. - N.S. TS 11550-2 Vol. 1
(Staff)

REFERRED TO

REMARKS (With Signature, Position & Date)

C.N.S.

This is essentially a security matter, and since the Joint Services Security Bureau is C.J.I.C.'s security agency, it is suggested that this type of clearance be handled by J.S.S.B.

2. J.S.S.B. maintains a "stop and release" list, and a representative of D.G.D.R. is a member of the Bureau; the Bureau should, therefore, be in a position to clear scientific and technical information for publication. Special cases might be referred to J.I.C. and to the Committee for Release of Scientific Information.


for (H.N. LAY)
Captain, R.C.N.,
Director of Naval Plans
and Intelligence.

20-5-46.

000087

H.Q. 1024

NAVAL SERVICE - MINUTE SHEET

[Handwritten signature]

FILE NO.

Wesley *Chief of Staff*

REFERRED TO

REMARKS (With Signature, Position & Date)

- ~~1. D.S.R.~~
- 2. D.N.P.
- 3. A/C.I.V.S.

*Request your
comments for C.I.V.S.
please.*

N A V A L S E R V I C E

ROK/LMH

N.S. T.S. 11550-2 Vol. 1
(Equip.)

MEMORANDUM TO C.N.A.S.
C.N.S.

Security clearance of Scientific and Technical information is a very difficult problem and D.S.R.D. has already been engaged in some discussion about it.

2. It is clear that if restrictions are placed on pure research, which is fundamental to everything, eventually none will be done. On the other hand, restrictions may properly be placed on Technical developments.

3. D.G.D.R. is to be responsible for Research and Development and consequently the recommendation that he should advise in respect of publication appears to be a suitable arrangement.

R.O. King
(R.O. King)

DIRECTOR OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT.

O T T A W A
16th May, 1946.

351st Meeting of
THE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

The following minute is promulgated for information and for necessary action.

Meeting held Tuesday, 14th May, 1946.

File No. N.S. T.S.11550-2 Vol.1

IV. Scientific and Technical Information; Security Clearance.

The D.G.R. referred to a recommendation from the Joint Intelligence Committee concerning the methods of clearance of classified information and stated that he had brought this matter up as there was a certain amount of urgency for release of such information in certain cases which had come to his attention.

(Memorandum JIC 7-2 of 9 May 46 from the Joint Intelligence Committee - CSC 8-2 of 11 May 46).

The Committee agreed that, as an interim measure prior to discussing this matter at the next meeting, the D.G.R. with the Director of Intelligence concerned, should rule on such classified papers which he had in mind for release.



(D.A. Collins)

A/Lieutenant Commander (S)
SECRETARY TO THE CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF.

17th May, 1946.

CONFIDENTIAL

File No. CSC 8-2 Vol. I

P.R.

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Cabinet Secretariat Offices,
East Block.

May 11, 1946.

MEMORANDUM TO: C. A. S.

11550-2

C. G. S.

0777

C. N. S. ✓

D. G. R.

Subject. **Scientific and Technical Information;
Security Clearance.**

1. The following document concerning the above mentioned subject is forwarded herewith: **Memorandum JIC 7-2 of 9th May '46 from the Joint Intelligence Committee.**

2. This matter will be placed on the agenda of the **352 nd** meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee to be held **Tuesday, 21st May, 1946.**



(J.W.C. Barclay)
Acting Lieutenant Commander (S) R.C.N.
Secretary.

JIC 7-2

CONFIDENTIAL.

9 May 46

0777

Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Security Clearance of Scientific and Technical Information

1. The Joint Intelligence Committee at its 143rd meeting, 3 May 46, agreed to submit the following statement and recommendations in order to simplify and expedite the security clearance of scientific and technical information for publication.
2. The present situation is as follows:
 - (a) The responsibility for protection and interpretation of security "stops" is officially vested in CSC but is delegated to the Joint Intelligence Committee.
 - (b) Since, until recently, JIC had no scientific representative, the advisory function, of stating what should or should not be released, was delegated by CSC to "the Committee for Release of Scientific and Technical Information relating to the war effort", under Dean CJ Mackenzie.
 - (c) Dean Mackenzie's committee established a series of technical sub-committees on various fields, and all, or nearly all, of these have now recommended the sectors and conditions of release, taking into account current publication policy in USA and UK. These recommendations have NOT as yet been forwarded to CSC or JIC for consideration.
 - (d) Even if and when these recommendations are received, it would be exceedingly difficult for JIC and JSSB to clear specific scientific papers for publication, without specially qualified technical advice.
 - (e) The net result is that USA and UK scientists are proceeding to publish papers, often dealing with matters to which Canadian scientists have made material contributions, but which are technically still restricted by the "stop" list. Canadian scientists, however, are precluded from doing so, to their serious disadvantage.
 - (f) Representatives have been made by several Canadian scientists that a continuance of this impasse would result in discouraging Canadian scientists and scientific organizations from engaging in projects of defence research.

- 2 -

- (g) In the meantime, a representative of the Director General of Defence Research has been appointed to JIC and to JSSB. With contacts to all scientific and technical authorities on the one hand, and dealing with security policy on the other, Defence Research would therefore appear to be uniquely situated to advise promptly and intelligently on the conditions of clearance of such information.
3. It is, therefore recommended for approval that:
- (a) President NRC, in his capacity of Chairman of Committee for Release of Scientific Information..., be respectfully requested to forward his general recommendations at the earliest convenient date.
 - (b) Notwithstanding any delay in receipt of such recommendations, JIC be instructed to refer to DGDR all questions involving release of scientific and technical information, and generally to be guided by the advice received.
 - (c) It would be understood, in formulating his advice, that DGDR would take into consideration:
 - (i) The present security Stop Lists.
 - (ii) Current policy of publication in USA and UK relative to the Stop Lists.
 - (iii) Other matters of Canadian Government policy which may be involved.
 - (iv) The necessity for dealing with each reference on its merits, and for editing of specific papers before publication.
 - (v) Pending such editing and final decision on release, to authorize drafting of scientific papers under a classified, - or other appropriate, - label by the persons concerned.
 - (d) JIC would promptly notify the appropriate authority at Washington and London of the action being taken by Canada in each case.
 - (e) Concurrently with the foregoing, JIC to be authorized to press for revision of Stop Lists by UK authorities, to accord with the current publication policy and with the realities of security requirement.
 - (f) The Committee for Release of Scientific Information be kept in being as a consultative body, with an additional member representing Defence Research, so as to consider new questions of policy which may be referred to it from time to time by Director General of Defence Research, acting on behalf of JIC.

J.F. Leys
(J.F. Leys) Major,
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

NATOR
 DIRECTORATE DNPI
 OFFICER At. Cdr. J. J. J. J.
 ROOM NO. 531
 PHONE NO. 1259

URGENT

1950-4

NAVAL ORDER FILE

DRAFT
 NAVAL ORDER
 OR

AMENDMENT TO REGULATIONS
 OR

SUBMISSION
 TO TREASURY BOARD OR PRIVY COUNCIL

1/5/46
 JF
 PH

ALL SUPPORTING INFORMATION IS TO BE PLACED ON THIS FOLDER UNTIL ACTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED.

PLEASE NOTE:

1950-1-3

1. THIS FOLDER IS USED FOR THE PURPOSE OF TRANSMITTING THE ENCLOSED SUBMISSION FOR APPROVAL OF OFFICIALS.
2. THE PURPOSE OF THIS FOLDER IS TO EXPEDITE THE PROMULGATION OF NAVAL ORDERS AND AMENDMENTS. PLEASE ASSIST THE FULFILMENT OF ITS PURPOSE.
3. QUERIES CONCERNING THE CONTENTS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THE OFFICER DESIGNATED IN THE TOP LEFT-HAND CORNER.
4. FILE ROOMS ARE TO RECORD NUMBER SHOWN IN TOP RIGHT-HAND CORNER IN THE SAME MANNER AS C.R. FILES.

1950-13 P.1

HEADQUARTERS FILE REFERENCE N.S. 1000-70 vol. 1-108

REFERRED TO	DATE	INITIAL	REFERRED TO	DATE	INITIAL
in Sec Ro	1.4.46	ye			
6 N.S. per request	4.4	DM			
n/sec	17/4	no			
Staff (DNPI)	21/5	JH			
Staff	21/5	JH			
n/sec. (RO)	28/5	no			
D.N.R.	30-5	ye			
A.C.N.S.					
N. Sec. (RO)	3.6.46	tu			
M. Sec.	5-6	ye			
Staff (C.N.S.)	6/6	JH			
n Sec Ro	30.8	ye			
Staff (C.N.S.)	4-9	ye			
n Sec Ro	7-9	ye			
le R. PA	26-9-46	law.			

Sec 1
 2/5/6

H.O. 1024

NAVAL SERVICE - MINUTE SHEET

FILE NO. -

REFERRED TO REMARKS (With Signature, Position & Date)

See C.N.S.
N.Sec (RO)
agree.
F.N.A.
see 109/8

The matter under discussion by C.S.C is "Canadian Naval Attachés". This order deals with foreign U.A.'s (except for para 6) - recommend promulgation of paras 1-5. - Para 6 to be held over pending final recommendations of J.I.C + C.S.C.

[Signature]
DON

000095

H.Q. 1024

NAVAL SERVICE - MINUTE SHEET

FILE NO. -

REFERRED TO

REMARKS (With Signature, Position & Date)

D.D.N.T.
DNPI
208
15/8

His has been held up awaiting discussion by Chief of Staff of the Naval Attache picture generally. Question was discussed at 360th meeting, copy held 9/8/46. Extract of minute is on file 1420-11 Vol 1 F.N.A. please

Del
Rec ENS
15/8/46

CONFIDENTIAL

Naval Service Headquarters

Ottawa, Ont.,
2nd May, 1946.

Draft Naval General Order

(For the approval of the Chief of the Naval Staff.)

Subject: R.C.N. Policy and Procedure Regarding Naval Attaches,
Foreign Naval Attaches or Other Foreign Naval Representatives.

Security of Information

(1) For the purpose of this order, foreign representative means:

- (i) Naval Attache of a foreign state,
- (ii) other foreign officials or representatives who may be working or visiting in Canada in connection with naval matters, and
- (iii) Naval officers connected with foreign embassies or legations, who have no diplomatic status but who to some extent carry out the duties of Naval Attaches.

(2) Naval information belongs to the State and not to the individual and it is the exception rather than the rule for it to be divulged to foreign powers.

(Note:- When the Armed Forces are on active service this policy is considerably relaxed between allies.)

(3) The normal channel by which authorized information is passed to a foreign State is through the Naval Attache of that State accredited to Ottawa. Conversely if Canada desires information from Foreign Sources, the Canadian Naval Attache in the country concerned is asked to obtain it. It is not the function of Naval Attaches to give out information. According to custom their principal and well recognized function is to obtain information by all proper means. The extent to which any particular Attache is favoured with facilities and information is affected by various political and naval considerations, and the reciprocation shown to the Canadian Naval Attache in a particular State may bear on the matter.

(4) (a) So that proper overall control is exercised respecting the extent information on any matter or thing relevant to the Naval Forces may be released to Foreign representatives (or to another service or department for such release), the responsibility shall be centralized in the Directorate of Naval Plans and Intelligence (D.N.P.I.)

(b) D.N.P.I. is responsible for

- (i) procedure and general supervision of all matters relevant to foreign representatives, and
- (ii) regulating the conduct of business with them in so far as the Navy is concerned.

- 2 -

(5) When considering the release of Naval information to a foreign representative, in every case the Captain shall:

(a) ensure that the foreign representative has complied with the requirements of D.N.P.I. ;

(b) if difficulties are encountered, request guidance or an interpretation of existing policy from D.N.P.I. ;

(c) submit the details to D.N.P.I. for clearance.

~~(6) Canadian Naval Attachés.~~

~~(a) While Canadian Naval Attachés, by the nature of their office, come under certain direct jurisdiction of the Embassy or Legation to which they are credited, one of their chief functions is to serve the interests of the Department of National Defence for Naval Services.~~

~~(b) Directorates may correspond direct with Canadian Naval attaches, and shall send copies of all outgoing correspondence and telegrams to D.N.P.I. for filing and quick reference.~~

Effective date: On promulgation.

File No. N.S. 1000-10 Vol. 1

Approved to be promulgated
as a Naval General Order.

4.....
VICE-ADMIRAL, R.C.N.
CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF.

JUN 7 1946

Memorandum to the Naval Secretary:

It is requested that approval may be obtained for promulgation of the attached ~~amendment to K.R.G.N.~~ (or Naval General Order).

SUBJECT: R.C.N. Policy and Procedure Regarding Naval Attaches, Foreign Naval Attaches or Other Foreign Naval Representatives.
DIRECTORATES CONCERNED
AND THEIR CONCURRENCE: D.N.P.I. *3 Concurs* *DBN* *31/3*

REASON FOR NECESSITY OF PROMULGATION:

Naval Board Decision 170-5 of 15th March, 1946.

INCREASE IN COMPLEMENT: Nil.

INCREASE IN FINANCIAL EXPENDITURE: Nil.

IF APPLICABLE Identical.

Practice in other Services:

Practice in R.N.: Similar.

Interservice Committee Recommendation:
(Designate committee and date of recommendation)

EFFECTIVE DATE:

Dated: 30th May, 1946.

[Signature]
A.C.N.S.
(HEAD OF BRANCH) 1/6

II

RECOMMENDATION

C.N.S. 49.

DATED

c/c/rc
BRN
104

[Signature]

NAVAL SECRETARY.

000099
MAY 30 1946

CONFIDENTIAL

Naval Service Headquarters

Ottawa, Ont.,
2nd May, 1946.

Draft Naval General Order

(For the approval of the Chief of the Naval Staff.)

Subject: R.C.N. Policy and Procedure Regarding Naval Attachés,
Foreign Naval Attachés or Other Foreign Naval Representatives.

Security of Information

(1) For the purpose of this order, foreign representative means:

- (i) Naval Attaché of a foreign state,
- (ii) other foreign officials or representatives who may be working or visiting in Canada in connection with naval matters, and
- (iii) Naval officers connected with foreign embassies or legations, who have no diplomatic status but who to some extent carry out the duties of Naval Attachés.

(2) Naval information belongs to the State and not to the individual and it is the exception rather than the rule for it to be divulged to foreign powers.

(Note:- When the Armed Forces are on active service this policy is considerably relaxed between allies.)

(3) The normal channel by which authorized information is passed to a foreign State is through the Naval Attaché of that State accredited to Ottawa. Conversely if Canada desires information from Foreign Sources, the Canadian Naval Attaché in the country concerned is asked to obtain it. It is not the function of Naval Attachés to give out information. According to custom their principal and well recognized function is to obtain information by all proper means. The extent to which any particular Attaché is favoured with facilities and information is affected by various political and naval considerations, and the reciprocation shown to the Canadian Naval Attaché in a particular State may bear on the matter.

(4) (a) So that proper overall control is exercised respecting the extent information on any matter or thing relevant to the Naval Forces may be released to Foreign representatives (or to another service or department for such release), the responsibility shall be centralized in the Directorate of Naval Plans and Intelligence (D.N.P.I.).

(b) D.N.P.I. is responsible for

- (i) procedure and general supervision of all matters relevant to foreign representatives, and
- (ii) regulating the conduct of business with them in so far as the Navy is concerned.

(5) When considering the release of Naval information to a foreign representative, in every case the Captain shall:

- (a) ensure that the foreign representative has complied with the requirements of D.N.P.I.;
- (b) if difficulties are encountered, request guidance or an interpretation of existing policy from D.N.P.I.;
- (c) submit the details to D.N.P.I. for clearance.

Effective date: On promulgation.

File No. N.S. 100-10 Vol. 1

Approved to be promulgated
as a Naval General Order.



.....
VICE-ADMIRAL, R.C.N.,
CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF.

CONFIDENTIAL

G, ORD;

GEN. 30.74/3

P.I. 23/46

TECH.

n. Sec. (RO)

Sw.

H.Q. 1024

NAVAL SERVICE - MINUTE SHEET

FILE NO. -

REFERRED TO

REMARKS (With Signature, Position & Date)

D.N.I. *10/1*

The attached redraft of proposed C.G.O. is forwarded for your concurrence.

The information that has been omitted is considered to be internal organization of Headquarters and therefore it is suggested that it be incorporated in D.N.I.'s Terms of Reference.

[Signature]
NAVAL SECRETARY.

Concur

DNPI
23/5

[Signature]

D/DNI

23/5

22/5

Dep Sec Staff

Suggested by DNI
read 3/27
Yes! corrected

CONFIDENTIAL NAVAL ORDER

R.C.N. POLICY AND PROCEDURE REGARDING
NAVAL ATTACHES, FOREIGN NAVAL ATTACHES
OR OTHER FOREIGN NAVAL REPRESENTATIVES

Security of Information

1. Naval information is inherently something which belongs to the State and not to the individual. It is the exception rather than the rule for it to be divulged to foreign powers, although as between Allies, during a war, this policy is very considerably relaxed in the common interest.
2. The normal channel by which authorized information is passed to a foreign State is through the Naval Attache of that State accredited to Ottawa. Conversely if Canada desires information from Foreign Sources, the Canadian Naval Attache in the country concerned is asked to obtain it. It is not the function of Naval Attaches to give out information, in fact their instructions inform them they are not to do so. According to custom their principal and well recognized function is to obtain information by all proper means. The extent to which any particular Attache is favoured with facilities and information is affected by various political and naval considerations, and the reciprocation shown to the Canadian Naval Attache in a particular State may bear on the matter.
3. In addition to Naval Attaches, other foreign officials or representatives who may be working or visiting in Canada in connection with naval matters, may be permitted information within the scope of their particular assignment. Likewise, there are connected with certain foreign Embassies or Legations, naval officers who to some extent carry out the duties of Naval Attaches but have no diplomatic status.
4. In order that proper overall control can be exercised in regard to the extent information on any matter or thing pertaining to the Royal Canadian Navy may be released to Foreign Naval Attaches or other representatives (or to another Service or Department for such release) co-ordinating responsibility is centralized in D.N.I. in accordance with the following.
 - (a) The release of naval information to foreign representatives, whether representing their country as Naval Attaches or in some other capacity, must first be cleared through the Directorate of Naval Intelligence.
 - (b) When D.N.I. has cleared the release of information, whether by allowing a foreign representative to visit a naval establishment or by approving the disclosure of reports, etc., then it is the responsibility of the Directorate concerned that the release will be limited to that specifically cleared by D.N.I.
5. So that uniformity will exist between the Navy and the other Services and various Departments concerned, such as External Affairs and Reconstruction and Supply, it is

- 2 -

the responsibility of D.N.I. to keep in close touch with the general policy and when indicated ensure that the particular Service or Department is duly consulted.

Foreign Naval Attaches or Naval Representatives

6. D.N.I. is responsible for procedure and general supervision of all matters pertaining to foreign Naval Attaches or naval representatives and for regulating the conduct of business with them so far as the Navy is concerned. In this connection the following practice obtains:

- (a) D.N.I. is the established channel for all dealings between the Navy and foreign Naval Attaches and other foreign naval representatives.
 - (1) In this regard, the Naval Attaches are familiar with the procedure but in the case of other foreign Officers, it is not so well known. It is the responsibility of officers to ensure that the requirements of D.N.I. in this connection are being complied with if approached by foreign representatives.
- (b) D.N.I. will consider the nature of the request or business in the first instance and refer same to the appropriate Directorate indicating, if necessary, any special matter of policy to be taken into account. In requests which entail the assembling of data and detailed information, this will be done by the Directorate concerned and then forwarded to D.N.I. who will assess the material and make the reply.
- (c) Visits and interviews will be arranged by application to D.N.I. in the first instance.
- (d) In the case of visits by Naval Attaches or foreign representatives to activities pertaining to the Navy outside N.S.H.Q., it is normal for the application to be made in writing, showing size of party, purpose of visit and allowing sufficient time for the request to be considered. D.N.I. will clear the visit with the Directorate concerned who, in turn, will be responsible for clearing with the Command concerned and working out details of itinerary in close co-operation with D.N.I.

Canadian Naval Attaches

7. While Canadian Naval Attaches, by the nature of their office, come under certain direct jurisdiction of the Embassy or Legation to which they are accredited, nevertheless, it is one of their chief functions to serve the interests of this Department.

8. The following procedure is applicable subject to the overall responsibility of D.N.I. in respect to policy and matters pertaining to employment and duties of the Naval Attaches generally:

- 3 -

- (a) Directorates may correspond direct with Canadian Naval Attaches but copies of all outgoing correspondence or telegrams will be sent to D.N.I. where they are filed for quick reference.

9. This Directive is intended as a general outline of policy and procedure. In the matters to which it applies there is a tendency for new or special aspects to develop in particular cases. In such cases it is a function of D.N.I. to interpret policy and give guidance and assistance. Where difficulties are encountered or advice required the matter should be taken up immediately with D.N.I.

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N.S. 1837-56

MEMORANDUM TO DIRECTOR NAVAL INTELLIGENCE & PLANS

Attention: Staff Officer (Intelligence)

Subject: C.B.O. Form U2D(3)(1946) - Disclosure of
Technical Information to Foreign Nations
- 1946

A copy of the above Secret C.B. is being issued on loan to Director of Naval Intelligence under cover of Supply and Receipt Note.

2. In confirmation of conversation with Lt. Cdr. Tottenham on the 17th instant, it is recommended for consideration that the information contained in the above C.B. should be published in a C.B.C.N. which will permit of any desired changes to cover His Majesty's Canadian Government, and it will also permit of a much wider distribution within the R.C.N. It will be appreciated that there are many authorities in the Canadian Naval Service who should be made aware of the contents of this C.B. but under the Admiralty distribution, they would not be provided with a copy.

3. If the recommendation in paragraph 2 is acceptable, security printing of such a pamphlet can be arranged by N.D.A. In this connection, attention is invited to K.R.C.N., Articles 1.21 and 25.72. The Editor of Manuals is Lt. Cdr. L.D. Hall, R.C.N., Room 4110, Navy Building, Telephone 7398.


(J. Elder Fraser)
Naval Distributing Authority

20th April, 1946
O T T A W A

C.B.O. form U2D(4) copy no 496 to 514

held in safe in Mr. Fraser's office
N.D.A.

000110

DIRECTOR OF NAVAL PLANS
AND INTELLIGENCE.
INTERNAL MINUTE SHEET

SUBJECT *Confidential Reports Intelligence Subjects*
NS FILE NO. *1837-56 U2D* DNPI FILE NO. DATE *26/4*

REFERRED TO	INITIALS & DATE	REMARKS
SO(S) SO(P) SO(Q) D/DNP SO(I) SO(T) MMS N INF. N HIST. D/DNI DNPI D/DNI to retain U2D(3) (1946)	 <i>26/4</i>	 <i>Recommend publication as CBCN in view of arguments in para 2.</i> <i>26/4</i> <i>agree. Will you discuss the matter with External Affairs and if necessary draft an official letter admiralty's permission will also have to be obtained.</i> <i>27/4</i>
SEC		
A.A.		
B.F.		



~~THIS MINUTE SHEET IS TO BE ATTACHED TO THE OFFICE COPY. IT IS NOT TO LEAVE THE DIRECTORATE.~~

H.Q. 1024

NAVAL SERVICE - MINUTE SHEET

FILE NO. -

REFERRED TO

REMARKS (With Signature, Position & Date)

N.D.A.

Reference DNPI's
minute below; is
Admiralty's concurrence
necessary? If so
will you please take
necessary steps.

~~DNPI~~ DNPI
ids


D/DNI - No. ~~PNDA~~ 16/5/46.

Cor. Tottenham, 10/07/71

noted and file returned.
Pde cause delay in
returning this file.

This has been of
considerable value in
studying the problem from an
point - view. Recommended
for 000113

10.6.46



000114

~~TOP SECRET~~
CSC 8-1

QUOTE NO.



Department of National Defence

Ottawa, Canada,

10 Apr 46

Chiefs of Staff Committee.

0642

C.A.S.
C.G.S.
~~C.H.S.~~
D.G.R.

Exchange of information with foreign powers

1. The attached letters from the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs are forwarded for information and retention -

- (a) External Affairs letter of 7 Feb 46, concerning position of Eire; and
- (b) External Affairs letter of 4 Apr 46, concerning further information on the findings of Sir William Palmer's Committee.

2. The above correspondence has been forwarded to the Joint Intelligence Committee who have the matter under examination as a result of the Chiefs of Staff direction at their 341st meeting held 8 Jan 46.

3. I am also enclosing with the D.G.R.'s copy of this letter the following previous correspondence on this subject:

- (a) External Affairs letter of 12 Dec 45, together with enclosures;
- (b) Report of the Joint Planning Sub-Committee (file HQ 5199-R-A - F.D.3 (DLO&P)) of 18 Dec 45; and
- (c) External Affairs letter of 3 Jan 45, together with enclosures.

Done by Secy 14

(J.U.C. Barclay)

114 62- (S) R C 7

C O P Y

Department of External Affairs,
Canada

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, April 4th, 1946.

To: The Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee.

With further reference to our letter of February 7th concerning the exchange of technical information with foreign powers, I am enclosing a copy of a letter, dated 26th March, from Mr. Stephen Holmes. This letter is in answer to an enquiry of ours asking for more information on the findings of Sir William Palmer's Committee referred to in the original communication from the Office of the High Commissioner. You will observe that the Committee is prepared to give further information on any particular points.

(sgd.) G.P. Glazebrook

Under Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

1085/8
March 26

C O P Y

TOP SECRET

Office of the High Commissioner
for the United Kingdom,
Earnscliffe, Ottawa.

26th March, 1946.

Dear Mr. Robertson,

We have received further information from London on the question of the disclosure of technical information to other nations, about which I wrote to you on the 18th March.

The views contained in paragraph 13 of the enclosure to my letter of the 31st December represent the specific recommendations of Sir William Palmer's Committee and these views were not accompanied by any more detailed findings. In making these recommendations the Committee had in mind two basic principles which had emerged during an earlier discussion on a similar proposal. These two principles were:-

(a) the post-war exchange of privately-owned information can only take place with the co-operation of the owners and to the extent that they are willing to co-operate. Any non-observance of this policy, or any attempt to apply compulsion, would lead to the rupture of good relations with industry and a consequent reluctance to communicate information to government departments, so that the success of the exchange would be prejudiced from the outset.

(b) Any commercial, as distinct from defence, value of the information ought to be protected for the benefit of the original owner, and through him of his domestic industry, whether he is the government or a private person or firm. Experience during the war has shown that this protection ought to be obtained before the information is handed over, and it must be recognized that post-war exchange will not, therefore, occur at such an early stage as during the war period.

In the case of secret patentable information this view will make it necessary for the recipient government to grant protection substantially equivalent to that secured by a secret patent of the United Kingdom, e.g., an undertaking to grant a patent on request with suitably early priority.

The Committee did not hear evidence, nor did it issue any formal report, but it will be happy to give further consideration to any points which the Canadian authorities may consider still require elucidation.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) Stephen L. Holmes.

N.A. Robertson, Esq.,
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
Ottawa.

1950-4

THE NAVAL BOARD

The following Minute is promulgated for information and /or necessary action.

Meeting held on MARCH 15TH, 1946.....FILE NS C 1000-10 Vol.1

170-5. R.C.N. POLICY AND PROCEDURE REGARDING NAVAL ATTACHES, FOREIGN NAVAL ATTACHES OR OTHER FOREIGN NAVAL REPRESENTATIVES

D.N.I. has proposed a paper outlining details of security of information, with particular regard to handling of same by Foreign Naval Attaches or Naval Representatives and Canadian Naval Attaches.

Naval Board observed that this paper merely outlines the duties that should be carried out by Naval Attaches, both Canadian and Foreign, as regards to security of information, and is not a new departure. It is merely an effort to lay down rules and regulations on present procedure for the handling of such matters.

DECISION:

Naval Board approved of this paper and desired that it should be put into effect with the least possible delay.

A.C.N.S.
For action.

MP 26/3

J. G. Robertson
SECRETARY, NAVAL BOARD.

No. File 00260

Minute - For necessary action plan.
MP 26/3 ma. 30/3
see naval order file attached
000-10
DL's
26/1
000118

File No

NAVAL SERVICE

HEAD QUARTERS

MINUTE SHEET

REFERRED TO:	REMARKS
	<p><u>2/Dec</u> Request this item be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the Naval Board.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">12/3 12/3</p>

NAVAL SERVICE --- MINUTE SHEET

FILE NO.

LETTER NO.

REFERRED TO

REMARKS (WITH INITIALS & DATE)

~~Dept.~~ *Amens* *11/3*

in line with the Army

ACNS

I have drafted a

1/15/43
P/D. of *1/15/43*
S.O. (P) *1/15/43*
S.O. (CS) *1/15/43*

directive which should

I submit be circulated

to all Directorates of

NSHQ and to CAC

+ COPC. with Board

approval.

Concur.
Plan in
agrees for work
Board meeting 11/3.
[Signature]

At present the only

naval attaches in Ottawa

are U.S.N. + the only

Canadian attaché is in Washington

but we should be ready for any event
of this -

Confidential Naval Code

HQS 9022-2(D.M.I.)

CONFIDENTIAL

NSHQ
File No.?

OTTAWA, 20 Feb 46.

(THIS DIRECTIVE DEFINES) R.C.N. POLICY AND
PROCEDURE REGARDING NAVAL ATTACHES,
FOREIGN NAVAL ATTACHES OR OTHER
FOREIGN NAVAL REPRESENTATIVES

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HQS 9022-2(D.M.I.)

CONFIDENTIAL

OTTAWA, 20 Feb 46.

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- (b) D.N.I. will consider the nature of the request or business in the first instance and refer same to the appropriate Directorate indicating, if necessary, any special matter of policy to be taken into account. In requests which entail the assembling of data and detailed information, this will be done by the Directorate concerned and then forwarded to D.N.I. who will assess the material and make the reply.
- (c) Visits and interviews will be arranged by application to D.N.I. in the first instance.
- (d) In the case of visits by Naval Attaches or foreign representatives to activities pertaining to the Navy outside N.S.H.Q., it is normal for the application to be made in writing, showing size of party, purpose of visit and allowing sufficient time for the request to be considered. D.N.I. will clear the visit with the Directorate concerned who, in turn, will be responsible for clearing with the Command concerned and working out details of itinerary in close co-operation with D.N.I.

Canadian Naval Attaches

7. While Canadian Naval Attaches, by the nature of their office, come under certain direct jurisdiction of the Embassy or Legation to which they are accredited, never theless, it is one of their chief functions to serve the interests of this Department.

8. The following procedure is applicable subject to the overall responsibility of D.N.I. in respect to policy and matters pertaining to employment and duties of the Naval Attaches generally:

- (a) Directorates may correspond direct with Canadian Naval Attaches but copies of all outgoing correspondence or telegrams will be sent to D.N.I. where they are filed for quick reference.

- 3 -

9. This Directive is intended as a general outline of policy and procedure. In the matters to which it applies there is a tendency for new or special aspects to develop in particular cases. In such cases it is a function of D.N.I. to interpret policy and give guidance and assistance. Where difficulties are encountered or advice required the matter should be taken up immediately with ~~the Foreign Liaison Section of~~ D.N.I.

C 1000-10

H.Q.S. 9022-2 Vol 2.

Ottawa, 22 Feb 46.

CONFIDENTIAL


SECURITY OF INFORMATION - FOREIGN MILITARY ATTACHES

10507

1. In view of the recent transfer of responsibility in NDHQ for all matters relating to Foreign Military Attaches in Ottawa from DMO&P to DMI, it is appropriate to stress again the importance of the attached directive covering security of military information. This directive is a revision of that issued under reference HQS 9022-2 dated 1 Aug 45.

2. It is essential in time of peace that matters pertaining to the military potential of Canada are not discussed or divulged to unauthorized persons; indeed the requirements of security must now be applied to the type of information which was exchanged with our Allies during hostilities.

3. All Staff Officers at NDHQ are to be made thoroughly familiar with the contents of the attached directive. Directors will ensure that in future these instructions are brought to the attention of all Staff Officers reporting for duty to NDHQ.


Lieut. General
Chief of the General Staff

Distribution List

- Heads of Branches
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- All Directorates NDHQ
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- Chief of the Naval Staff
- Military Secretary
- Commander, Canadian Army Staff, Washington

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Index M. 1/3

FEB 27 AM

HQS 9022-2(D.M.I.)

CONFIDENTIAL

OTTAWA, 20 Feb 46.

THIS DIRECTIVE DEFINES ARMY POLICY AND
PROCEDURE REGARDING MILITARY ATTACHES,
FOREIGN MILITARY ATTACHES OR OTHER
FOREIGN MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES

Security of Information

1. Military information is inherently something which belongs to the State and not to the individual. It is the exception rather than the rule for it to be divulged to foreign powers, although as between Allies, during a war, this policy is very considerably relaxed in the common interest.
2. The normal channel by which authorized information is passed to a foreign State is through the Military Attache of that State accredited to Ottawa. Conversely if Canada desires information from Foreign Sources, the Canadian Military Attache in the country concerned is asked to obtain it. It is not the function of Military Attaches to give out information, in fact their instructions inform them they are not to do so. According to custom their principal and well recognized function is to obtain information by all proper means. The extent to which any particular Attache is favoured with facilities and information is affected by various political and military considerations, and the reciprocation shown to the Canadian Military Attache in a particular State may bear on the matter.
3. In addition to Military Attaches, other foreign officials or representatives who may be working or visiting in Canada in connection with military matters, may be permitted information within the scope of their particular assignment. Likewise, there are connected with certain foreign Embassies or Legations, military officers who to some extent carry out the duties of Military Attaches but have no diplomatic status.
4. In order that proper overall control can be exercised in regard to the extent information on any matter or thing pertaining to the Canadian Army may be released to Foreign Military Attaches or other representatives (or to another Service or Department for such release) co-ordinating responsibility is centralized in D.M.I. in accordance with the following.
 - (a) The release of military information to foreign representatives, whether representing their country as Military Attaches or in some other capacity, must first be cleared through the Directorate of Military Intelligence.
 - (b) When D.M.I. has cleared the release of information, whether by allowing a foreign representative to visit a military establishment or by approving the disclosure of reports, etc, then it is the responsibility of the Directorate concerned that the release

/will. . .

- 2 -

will be limited to that specifically cleared by D.M.I.

5. So that uniformity will exist between the Army, the other Services and various Departments concerned, such as External Affairs and Reconstruction and Supply, it is the responsibility of D.M.I. to keep in close touch with the general policy and when indicated ensure that the particular Service or Department is duly consulted.

Foreign Military Attaches or Military Representatives

6. D.M.I. is responsible for procedure and general supervision of all matters pertaining to foreign Military Attaches or military representatives and for regulating the conduct of business with them so far as the Army is concerned. In this connection the following practice obtains:

- (a) D.M.I. is the established channel for all dealings between the Army and foreign Military Attaches and other foreign military representatives.
 - (1) In this regard, the Military Attaches are familiar with the procedure but in the case of other foreign Officers, it is not so well known. It is the responsibility of officers to ensure that the requirements of D.M.I. in this connection are being complied with if approached by foreign representatives.
- (b) D.M.I. will consider the nature of the request or business in the first instance and refer same to the appropriate Directorate indicating, if necessary, any special matter of policy to be taken into account. In requests which entail the assembling of data and detailed information, this will be done by the Directorate concerned and then forwarded to D.M.I. who will assess the material and make the reply.
- (c) Visits and interviews will be arranged by application to D.M.I. in the first instance.
- (d) In the case of visits by Military Attaches or foreign representatives to activities pertaining to the Army outside N.D.H.Q., it is normal for the application to be made in writing, showing size of party, purpose of visit and allowing sufficient time for the request to be considered. D.M.I. will clear the visit with the Directorate concerned who, in turn, will be responsible for clearing with DOC or Commandant concerned and working out details of itinerary in close co-operation with D.M.I.

/Can...

Canadian Military Attaches

7. While Canadian Military Attaches, by the nature of their office, come under certain direct jurisdiction of the Embassy or Legation to which they are accredited, nevertheless, it is one of their chief functions to serve the interests of this Department.


8. The following procedure is applicable subject to the overall responsibility of D.M.I. in respect to policy and matters pertaining to employment and duties of the Military Attaches generally:

- (a) Directorates may correspond direct with Canadian Military Attaches but copies of all outgoing correspondence or telegrams will be sent to D.M.I. where they are filed for quick reference.

9. This Directive is intended as a general outline of policy and procedure. In the matters to which it applies there is a tendency for new or special aspects to develop in particular cases. In such cases it is a function of D.M.I. to interpret policy and give guidance and assistance. Where difficulties are encountered or advice required the matter should be taken up immediately with the Foreign Liaison Section of D.M.I.

10. This directive supersedes and brings up to date HQS 8213 FD 151 dated 21 Dec 43 and HQS 9087-1 dated 11 Nov 44 and HQS 9022-2 of 1 Aug 45.

GENERAL STAFF
D.M.I.



C O P Y

TOP SECRET

Department of External Affairs, Canada

0642

Ottawa, February 7th, 1946.

To: Lt.-Col. E.W.T. Gill, Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

With reference to our letter of January 3rd enclosing a letter from the Acting High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, together with a copy of a memorandum concerning the exchange of technical information with foreign powers, I am enclosing a copy of a further letter received from the High Commissioner of the United Kingdom clarifying the position of Eire.

(sgd.) G.P. Glazebrook

Under Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

C O P Y

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM
EARNSCLIFFE, OTTAWA.

1085/8

5th February, 1946.

TOP SECRET

Dear Mr. Robertson,

With reference to paragraph 10 of the enclosure to my letter of the 31st December regarding the policy to be followed by the United Kingdom authorities on the disclosure of technical information about weapons and equipment, it has now been decided that Eire should be treated in this connection as a nation in category B.

Yours sincerely,

(sgd) Stephen Holmes.

N.A. Robertson, Esq.,
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Ottawa.

cg

~~TOP SECRET~~
CSC 120 & 500-1

11th January, 1946.

The Secretary,
Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee.

Exchange of information with foreign powers

1. At their 341st meeting, held 8 Jan 46, the Chiefs of Staff considered the report of the Joint Planning Sub-Committee regarding exchange of information with foreign powers (memorandum to Chiefs of Staff Committee - Army file HQS 5199-R.A. FD3 (DNO&P) dated 18 Dec 45).
2. The Chiefs of Staff felt that the procedure proposed in this report might be susceptible of some simplification in view of further despatches which had been received from the U.K. government outlining their practice in these matters.
3. The Chiefs of Staff did not approve the Planners' report and directed, in the light of the more recent information received from the U.K. government, that this report be re-examined by the Joint Intelligence Committee, assisted by other government departments concerned, and that further recommendations be submitted in due course.
4. I am therefore enclosing a copy of the despatches containing information regarding the U.K. government's policy in these matters.

E. W. T. Gill
(E.W.T. Gill)
Lieutenant-Colonel,
Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Att. 3

C O P Y

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM
EARNSCLIFFE
OTTAWA.

31st December, 1945.

1085/8
TOP SECRET

Dear Mr. Robertson,

I have been informed by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs that the United Kingdom authorities have recently been giving consideration to the policy to be pursued with regard to the disclosure of technical information about weapons and equipment to other members of the Commonwealth and to foreign nations.

The policy to be followed by the United Kingdom authorities as approved by the United Kingdom Government in this matter is set out in a memorandum, a copy of which I enclose herewith.

I have been asked to inform you that the United Kingdom Government have authorized departments to disclose to the Governments of the Dominions and of India all information of use to them up to and including the categories of "Secret" and "Top Secret".

The policy of strict reciprocity at present being applied in the case of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to which reference is made in paragraph 12 of the memorandum, was described in the Secretary of State's Saving telegram Circular D. No. 412 of the 18th September.

I understand that for the present Eire is not being treated on the same lines as the other members of the Commonwealth. For this purpose, therefore, the word "Dominions" in the memorandum should be read as exclusive of Eire. Special consideration is, however, being given to this particular point and I may later be able to acquaint you with a ruling as to category into which that country is to be regarded by the United Kingdom authorities concerned as falling.

N.A. Robertson, Esq.,
Under-Secretary of State for
External Affairs, Ottawa.

Yours sincerely,
(sgd.) Stephen Holm

000135

C O P Y

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM

DISCLOSURE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION
TO OTHER NATIONS

General

1. The end of the war calls for a revision of policy regarding the disclosure to other nations of technical information about weapons and equipment. The existing rulings were based upon war-time conditions and in most respects no longer apply.

Definition

2. "Disclosure of technical information" in this memorandum includes disclosures involved in the sale of equipment.

Purpose of disclosure of information

3. Disclosure of technical information to foreign nations is considered desirable:-

(a) When it is in accordance with foreign policy

and

(b) If it does not conflict with anything in strategic policy, and

(c) If it is likely to be of benefit commercially.

Need for continued secrecy

4. There will always be some information about British research and development about which secrecy must be maintained. This is kept to a minimum by frequent review. The secrecy of a weapon or item of equipment must vary with the number of people who handle it. If it is about to be widely used, it will be manufactured on a large scale and therefore cannot be kept secret. Secret items, therefore, should normally only be those which are not yet in quantity production, although there will be exceptions to this rule.

Agreement with the U.S.A.

5. Despite the end of the war, it is still desirable to keep in line with the United States authorities in respect of disclosure of classified information to foreign countries. Only thus can it be assured that neither side discloses to a third party information which the other wishes to keep secret.

Re-equipment of Foreign Nations

6. The United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff have already proposed that the United Kingdom should assist the rebuilding of the armed forces of France, Belgium, Denmark, Holland and Norway. If this is to be done effectively, some secret information may have to be disclosed.

7. These proposals have been approved (with minor alterations) by the United Kingdom Government. The United States Government was consulted, and proposals were then made by the United Kingdom Government to various nations, as a result of which the United Kingdom Service Departments now have commitments in various degrees for the re-equipment of all the countries above named, and also of Greece, Czechoslovakia and China.

/Categorisation of Nations

Categorisation of Nations for disclosure purposes

8. In the light of the foregoing considerations, a standard policy has been approved by the United Kingdom Government in which nations are categorised as described below for disclosure purposes. In each category the nations may, in matters of interest and use to them, receive at the discretion of departments, information up to and including the classification for that category.

CATEGORY A

9. Nations in this category may receive up to and including "Top Secret" information. The nations entitled to receive this special treatment are first the Dominions and India, and secondly the U.S.A., should they agree to collaboration in research and development.

CATEGORY B

10. Nations in this category may receive up to and including "Confidential" information. This category will include the following near and friendly neighbours:-

France
Norway
Denmark
Holland
Belgium
Greece
Turkey

Any further refinement by way of sub-dividing Category "B" and allowing more information to some nations in it and less to others is considered undesirable and likely to cause confusion.

If, however, it is at any time considered that Secret information should be given to a category "B" nation in accordance with paragraph 6 above, each case will be referred for further consideration by the authorities concerned.

CATEGORY C

11. This category should include all nations not placed in Category "B". It could perhaps be assumed that any 'Classified' information passed to such nations would be liable to be circulated among them so that it would cease to be 'Classified'. They should, therefore, normally not be given any 'Classified' information although they might be given "confidential" or "restricted" information with the approval of all U.K. Services concerned.

Position of the U.S.S.R.

12. Disclosure of information to the U.S.S.R. should be on the basis of Category 'C' classification, but subject to special directives laid down from time to time by the Chiefs of Staff. The directives at present in force require a strict reciprocity in exchange, and the co-ordination in London of all requests for disclosure of information. It has also been agreed with the U.S. Chiefs of Staff that:-

- (a) there should be consultation before information or intelligence, other than operational, is passed to Russia;
- (b) neither party should pass information or intelligence derived wholly or in part from the other party's sources without the latter's consent.

/Industrial Considerations

Industrial Considerations

13. The views of Sir William Palmer's Committee as to how industrial interests may best be secured under this policy are accepted.

Information may be Government-owned or privately-owned; secret or not secret; wholly patentable, wholly unpatentable, or partly patentable and partly unpatentable.

- (a) Wholly patentable, i.e. the whole of the information can be protected by a patent specification.

If secret the U.K. Government will in all cases acquire the right to a secret patent in the U.K. and disclosure to a foreign Government should as far as possible be made on the following condition:

that the information is kept secret and the Government of that country will grant to the U.K. on request patent protection of suitable priority.

If not secret, i.e., such that publication in a patent specification is permissible, no problem arises. Government-owned inventions should be examined to see whether foreign patents should be obtained and exploited. In the case of privately-owned inventions the recipient Government should be referred to the owner, to negotiate terms.

- (b) Wholly unpatentable, i.e. the information, while commercially valuable, is not of the kind which can be protected by a patent specification.

Government-owned information should only be supplied if a quid pro quo is obtained - strategic, monetary or both - worth the value of the information.

In the case of privately-owned information the foreign Government should merely be put in touch with owner, but if the nature of the information is secret the owner should be warned that he should communicate the information only to accredited representatives of the foreign Government who are pledged to maintain secrecy.

- (c) Partly patentable and partly unpatentable. The only important case is where the information as a whole is secret and unpatentable e.g. the layout, dimensions and specification of an aero engine, while some parts are patentable and may be patented without fear of disclosing the general design, e.g. a magneto.

The patented and unpatented parts should be treated separately as in (a) and (b) above but in the case of privately-owned patentable information care should be taken to inspect any patent applications before they are filed in the foreign country by the owner, to make sure that they do not disclose any secret information.

- 4 -

- (d) Departments who are negotiating with Foreign Governments for the communication to them of information of commercial value may, depending upon the particular circumstances, decide to carry out the negotiations themselves and may lay down the terms upon which the information may be used by those Governments, or they may decide to entrust the negotiations, under suitable conditions, to private firms or individuals.

Conditions for Disclosure

14. The following conditions should be laid down and agreed to by all nations to whom information is disclosed:-

(a) Security

- (i) The information received should be safeguarded under the same rules of security as the U.K. authorities themselves impose.
- (ii) The information is disclosed only for the use of the recipient Government and such of its contractors, under seal of security, as it may notify to the U.K. Government in writing. Disclosure to any other Government, or publication to the Press or in any other way, would constitute a breach of the agreement.

(b) Reciprocity

It should be a condition of disclosure of information (as opposed to sale) that reciprocal facilities be given in return; even though some nations can offer little at the present time this condition might be of value later.

Duration of proposed policy

15. It is considered that the basic policy of disclosure by categories should continue indefinitely, although its application will depend on changing strategic and political factors which will necessitate periodical review. It is therefore proposed to review periodically the countries to be placed in each category.

Control

16. Disclosures should not be controlled locally, e.g. by theatre commanders. Control should be exercised in London.

Date of Implementation

17. All departments should put the above policy into force as an interim measure, though it may be liable to modification in the light of the policy to be adopted by the U.S. authorities.

Conclusions

18. (a) The various war-time policies respecting exchange of information should be revised to accord with long term policy with regard to the re-equipment of the Armed Forces of foreign countries.
- (b) For this purpose the nations should be classified in three categories to which material of varying security classifications may be given, subject to such exceptions as may be agreed from time to time.

- 5 -

- (c) Disclosure should be subject to maintenance of security comparable to that obtaining in the U.K. and reciprocity.
- (d) To protect the interests of industry, suitable procedure should be adopted to cover patented and unpatented information.
- (e) The duration of this policy should have no fixed terminal date, but its implementation should be reviewed periodically.

C O P Y

S E C R E T

No: A.609

6th December, 1945.

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your despatch No. 1993 of the 9th November concerning the disclosure of technical information and intelligence. I have communicated to the appropriate United Kingdom authorities the decision of the Canadian Government to adopt a policy of exchanging technical information and intelligence with the Soviet Union on a basis of strict reciprocity.

2. A detailed memorandum has been prepared by the Chiefs of Staff Committee here to govern the execution of the similar policy which is being followed by the United Kingdom in this matter. This memorandum has now been approved by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet and has been transmitted to the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Ottawa. A full statement of the position on the lines laid down in the Chiefs of Staff's memorandum is shortly to be communicated to you.

3. In the meantime, you might wish to have a short summary of the contents of the memorandum, which Mr. Le Pan of my staff has been allowed to see. Three categories have been established among countries which may receive technical information and intelligence:

- (a) the first category comprises the nations of the Commonwealth and the United States. Documents up to and including "top secret" may be communicated to any of the nations in this category.
- (b) The second category comprises a number of nations which, for one reason or another, have relations with the United Kingdom of special intimacy. They are:

France
Belgium
Holland
Norway
Denmark
Greece
Turkey.

Technical information marked "confidential" may be communicated to these countries without any reference to London.

- (c) All other countries. No information under any security marking may be communicated to these countries.
- (d) The Soviet Union is in a special category by itself. In the case of information to be communicated to the Soviet Union, it has been laid down, first, that no information will be transmitted unless comparable information is received in return and, second, that each separate request for information must be

- 2 -

referred to a special sub-committee of the Chiefs of Staff Committee which has been set up for this purpose. It has also been agreed with the United States Chiefs of Staff that there will be continual consultation with them over any proposed releases of information to the Soviet Union and, in particular, that care will be taken not to communicate any information which came originally from a United States source before the United States Chiefs of Staff have had full opportunity to consider the matter.

4. I gather that United Kingdom Military Attaches in those countries included in categories (a) and (b) will be free to communicate to the Governments to which they are accredited technical information up to and including the security markings authorized in the Chiefs of Staff's memorandum without reference to the United Kingdom Government. Requests, however, from any other country to receive security information must, in all cases, be referred to the special Sub-Committee which has been set up for this purpose.

5. It will be observed that the scheme of categories established by the Chiefs of Staff's memorandum is not without interest in relation to the United Kingdom's foreign policy. It sets up a system of concentric circles. In the innermost circle are the nations of the Commonwealth and the United States; in the second ring, are the countries of Western Europe and two other countries which are bound by special ties to the United Kingdom; all other countries are consigned to the outermost circle; there is then a special category established for the Soviet Union with which exchanges must be conducted with special caution.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(sgd.) Vincent Massey.

The Secretary of State for
External Affairs,
O T T A W A.

OTTAWA, November 9, 1945.

SECRET

No. 1993

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the Government has given consideration to the question raised in telegram Circular D. 112 of September 18th from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, concerning exchange of technical information and intelligence. We were informed that in future the United Kingdom authorities propose to supply intelligence to the Soviet Union on the basis of strict reciprocity.

The Canadian Government has decided to adopt a similar policy for the exchange of technical information and intelligence to the Soviet Union and details in connection with the implementing of this policy are being considered by the appropriate service officers in consultation with members of this Department.

In working out a detailed procedure it would be helpful to have from the United Kingdom authorities some indication as to the means by which this policy is to be applied. We are particularly interested in the practice governing the exchange of information through Service Attaches since our contact with foreign forces is largely through such channels.

It would also be valuable to know what type of information the United Kingdom is considering for this exchange. Is it, for example, proposed on the basis of reciprocity to exchange information classified as secret or under any other security marking?

I should add that the Canadian authorities would not, of course, consider the disclosure of any information supplied originally by the United Kingdom without the authority of the senders of such information.

I should be glad if you would inform the United Kingdom authorities of our decision in this matter and consult them in relation to the questions I have raised.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,

J.E. Read.
For Acting Secretary of State for
External Affairs.

The High Commissioner
for Canada in Great Britain,
LONDON, S.W.1.

H'S 5199-R-A FD 3 (DMO & P)

OTTAWA, 16 Dec 45

SECRET

The Chiefs of Staff Committee

1. The United Kingdom Government recently advised of a change in their policy for the disclosure of technical information and intelligence to the USSR.
2. Under this new policy, which it is understood has also been adopted by the United States, information is to be supplied on a basis of strict reciprocity whereas the previously agreed policy permitted of freely divulging considerable information to Allied Nations on the basis it would help bring about early German defeat.
3. On 25 Oct 45 the Cabinet agreed that the principle of reciprocity be adopted for the exchange of technical information and intelligence with Foreign Powers generally. The Cabinet directed that the Armed Services in consultation with other Departments concerned, work out procedures necessary to implement this policy.
4. The matter has now been studied by the Joint Planning Sub-Committee in conjunction with the Joint Intelligence Committee and a representative of External Affairs.
5. Mention should be made of certain factors which bear on the exchange of information with Foreign Powers. In working out any procedure there will be need of flexibility to meet a wide variety of conditions.
6. The Army (DMO & P) has, during the past three years, developed a Foreign Liaison Section which functions much along the lines of the US War Department's Foreign Liaison Office. Considerable experience has been gained in control and passage of information to foreign Military Attaches. Procedure and practice has been worked out in conjunction with External Affairs and Munitions and Supply. Considerable policy has been established respecting Military Attaches generally, both Canadian and foreign Military Attaches. This can be of assistance to the other services.
7. Certain of these factors relate on the one hand to (a) Security and Control of Information while on the other is the general question of (b) Policy and Relationship vis-a-vis a Foreign Power.
8. (a) Security and control of information will require:
 - (1) Recognition of the fact that unless good security exists leakage of information will defeat the policy. (This particularly applies to safeguarding of information originating in the UK and US).

- (11) A system whereby information to be released and requests for information from Foreign Powers will be funneled to negotiating channels.
- (111) The exchange of technical and research information of military implication should be handled on the same basis and governed by similar principles as non-technical information. Evaluation and security requirements of technical information should, however, be rendered by experts in an advisory capacity.
- (b) Policy and relationship vis-a-vis a Foreign Power is exemplified as follows:
 - (1) With countries which it is desired to assist such as the United States there would be considerable exchange of information. Reciprocation would be on a very general basis.
 - (11) The other extreme would be in exchanging information with a country it is not desired to assist and negotiations would be carried out on a strict "quid pro quo" basis.

9. The Sub-Committee therefore recommends as follows:

- (a) That a Foreign Liaison Advisory Committee be created which would report to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and its membership comprise the Joint Planning Sub-Committee, the Joint Intelligence Committee, a representative of External Affairs and a representative of National Research Council.
- (b) That the Secretary of the CSC be appointed Secretary of the Committee to ensure continuity, background and information on matters which will come before it.


10. The Terms of Reference proposed for this Committee are:

- (a) That the Committee be responsible for formulating and keeping under review policy regarding the security and release of information to Foreign Powers which may be of military import or concerning Canada's war potential. The application of the policy will remain the responsibility of the respective Service or Department receiving the request for information with the proviso that the Committee will act in an advisory capacity in dealing with the release or obtaining of information affecting more than one Service or where the Service concerned is in doubt.

- 3 -

- (b) That the Committee keep under review the general policy regarding Service Attaches and representatives of Foreign Powers in Canada concerned in obtaining information of military implication and provide co-ordination in matters affecting relationship, dealings, protocol, handling of requests and general uniformity and supervision in the restraint or freedom permitted such Service Attaches or Representatives in obtaining such information.
- (c) The Committee will as appears necessary maintain a record of the more important exchanges of information and provide a medium whereby information required by one Service may be obtained against information supplied by another Service.
- (d) That the Committee will take under consideration and give guidance on appropriate matters that may be referred to it by the Armed Services or other Departments and may advise on any matters that will make for general uniformity and co-ordination in matters falling within (a), (b) and (c) above.
- (e) That the Committee will meet from time to time as may be necessary but to ensure continuity and overall supervision and co-ordination of policy, meetings will be held at not greater intervals than two months apart.


Chairman
(Cdr. Dunlap) Air Commodore, RCAF


(J.H. Jenkins) Colonel, G.S.


(H.S. Rayner) Captain, R.C.M.

COPY

TOP SECRET
CSC 120 & 500-1

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

OTTAWA, Canada,

11th January, 1946.

Chiefs of Staff Committee

The Secretary,
Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee.

Exchange of information with foreign powers

1. At their 341st meeting, held 8 Jan 46, the Chiefs of Staff considered the report of the Joint Planning Sub-Committee regarding exchange of information with foreign powers (memorandum to Chiefs of Staff Committee - Army file HQS 5199-R.A. FD3 (DMO&P) dated 18 Dec 45).
2. The Chiefs of Staff felt that the procedure proposed in this report might be susceptible of some simplification in view of further despatches which had been received from the U.K. government outlining their practice in these matters.
3. The Chiefs of Staff did not approve the Planners' report and directed, in the light of the more recent information received from the U.K. government, that this report be re-examined by the Joint Intelligence Committee, assisted by other government departments concerned, and that further recommendations be submitted in due course.
4. I am therefore enclosing a copy of the despatches containing information regarding the U.K. government's policy in these matters.

(signed) E.W.T. Gill,
Lieutenant-Colonel,
Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Att.3

SECRET
CSC 110

S 1550-2 203182

11th January, 1946.

The Chairman,
Joint Planning Sub-Committee.

Exchange of information with foreign powers

1. At the 341st meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, held 8 Jan 46, consideration was given to the report of the Joint Planning Sub-Committee, dated 18 Dec 45, concerning the above subject and the recommendations put forward were not approved.
2. In view of further despatches which have been received from the United Kingdom government, the Chiefs of Staff decided to direct the Joint Intelligence Committee in consultation with other government departments concerned, to re-examine the above-mentioned report in the light of the more recent information.

20(9)
P.S.S.
A/D. of P.
S.O. (P)
18/1
19/1
19/1

E. W. T. Gill
(E.W.T. Gill)
Lieutenant-Colonel,
Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

cc - D of P, Navy ✓
DMO&P, Army.

14 JAN 1946



34152

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

The following minute is promulgated for information and for necessary action.

Meeting held Tuesday, January 8th, 1946. File No. N.S. 1550-2

IV. Exchange of Information with Foreign Powers (CSC 121)

The Secretary reported that, following a decision by the Cabinet that the principle of reciprocity be adopted for the exchange of technical information and intelligence with foreign powers, the Joint Planning Sub-Committee had been directed, in consultation with officials of other government departments, to recommend the procedure for implementing this policy.


That Committee had now recommended that a Foreign Liaison Advisory Committee be created which would report to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and that its membership include the Joint Planning Sub-Committee, the Joint Intelligence Committee and representatives of External Affairs and the National Research Council. The new Committee would become responsible for the formulation of policy regarding the security and release of technical information and intelligence to foreign powers.

(Report of Joint Planning Sub-Committee, 18th December, 1945, Army file H.Q.S. 5199-R-A F.D. 3 (D.M.O. & P.))

Since the report had been submitted, despatches had been received from the United Kingdom government outlining their practice on these matters.

The Committee:

- (a) noted the report submitted and agreed that the procedure outlined therein might be susceptible of some simplification; and
- (b) agreed to direct the Joint Intelligence Committee to re-examine the Planners' report in the light of the recent information received from the United Kingdom, and make further recommendations.


Lieutenant-Commander (S),
ADMIRAL'S SECRETARY.

January 10th, 1946.

Concern
The information after 4037
was provided me by another source
to P/Secret. B

80 (2) 5
11/1/46
D.N. 1-8
D of P
A/D. of P.
S.O. (CP)

C.R.
This
should be a
TOP SECRET
FILE
11/1/46

C O P Y

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM
EARNSCLIFFE
OTTAWA.

31st December, 1945.

1085/8
TOP SECRET

Dear Mr. Robertson,

I have been informed by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs that the United Kingdom authorities have recently been giving consideration to the policy to be pursued with regard to the disclosure of technical information about weapons and equipment to other members of the Commonwealth and to foreign nations.

The policy to be followed by the United Kingdom authorities as approved by the United Kingdom Government in this matter is set out in a memorandum, a copy of which I enclose herewith.

I have been asked to inform you that the United Kingdom Government have authorized departments to disclose to the Governments of the Dominions and of India all information of use to them up to and including the categories of "Secret" and "Top Secret".

The policy of strict reciprocity at present being applied in the case of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to which reference is made in paragraph 12 of the memorandum, was described in the Secretary of State's Saving telegram Circular D. No. 112 of the 18th September.

I understand that for the present Eire is not being treated on the same lines as the other members of the Commonwealth. For this purpose, therefore, the word "Dominions" in the memorandum should be read as exclusive of Eire. Special consideration is, however, being given to this particular point and I may later be able to acquaint you with a ruling as to category into which that country is to be regarded by the United Kingdom authorities concerned as falling.

Yours sincerely,

(sgd.) Stephen Holmes

N.A. Robertson, Esq.,
Under-Secretary of State for
External Affairs, Ottawa.

C O P Y

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM

DISCLOSURE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION
TO OTHER NATIONS.

General

1. The end of the war calls for a revision of policy regarding the disclosure to other nations of technical information about weapons and equipment. The existing rulings were based upon war-time conditions and in most respects no longer apply.

Definition

2. "Disclosure of technical information" in this memorandum includes disclosures involved in the sale of equipment.

Purpose of disclosure of information

3. Disclosure of technical information to foreign nations is considered desirable:-

(a) When it is in accordance with foreign policy

and

(b) If it does not conflict with anything in strategic policy, and

(c) If it is likely to be of benefit commercially.

Need for continued secrecy

4. There will always be some information about British research and development about which secrecy must be maintained. This is kept to a minimum by frequent review. The secrecy of a weapon or item of equipment must vary with the number of people who handle it. If it is about to be widely used, it will be manufactured on a large scale and therefore cannot be kept secret. Secret items, therefore, should normally only be those which are not yet in quantity productions, although there will be exceptions to this rule.

Agreement with the U.S.A.

5. Despite the end of the war, it is still desirable to keep in line with the United States authorities in respect of disclosure of classified information to foreign countries. Only thus can it be assured that neither side discloses to a third party information which the other wishes to keep secret.

Re-equipment of Foreign Nations

6. The United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff have already proposed that the United Kingdom should assist the rebuilding of the armed forces of France, Belgium, Denmark, Holland and Norway. If this is to be done effectively, some secret information may have to be disclosed.

7. These proposals have been approved (with minor alterations) by the United Kingdom Government. The United States Government was consulted, and proposals were then made by the United Kingdom Government to various nations, as a result of which the United Kingdom Service Departments now have commitments in various degrees for the re-equipment of all the countries above named, and also of Greece, Czechoslovakia and China.

/Categorisation of Nations

Categorisation of Nations for disclosure purposes

8. In the light of the foregoing considerations, a standard policy has been approved by the United Kingdom Government in which nations are categorised as described below for disclosure purposes. In each category the nations may, in matters of interest and use to them, receive at the discretion of departments, information up to and including the classification for that category.

CATEGORY A

9. Nations in this category may receive up to and including "Top Secret" information. The nations entitled to receive this special treatment are first the Dominions and India, and secondly the U.S.A., should they agree to collaboration in research and development.

CATEGORY B

10. Nations in this category may receive up to and including "Confidential" information. This category will include the following near and friendly neighbours:-

France
Norway
Denmark
Holland
Belgium
Greece
Turkey

Any further refinement by way of sub-dividing Category "B" and allowing more information to some nations in it and less to others is considered undesirable and likely to cause confusion.

If, however, it is at any time considered that Secret information should be given to a category "B" nation in accordance with paragraph 6 above, each case will be referred for further consideration by the authorities concerned.

CATEGORY C

11. This category should include all nations not placed in Category "B". It could perhaps be assumed that any 'Classified' information passed to such nations would be liable to be circulated among them so that it would cease to be 'Classified'. They should therefore, normally not be given any 'Classified' information although they might be given "confidential" or "restricted" information with the approval of all U.K. Services concerned.

Position of the U.S.S.R.

12. Disclosure of information to the U.S.S.R. should be on the basis of Category 'C' classification, but subject to special directives laid down from time to time by the Chiefs of Staff. The directives at present in force require a strict reciprocity in exchange, and the co-ordination in London of all requests for disclosure of information. It has also been agreed with the U.S. Chiefs of Staff that:-

- (a) there should be consultation before information or intelligence, other than operational, is passed to Russia;
- (b) neither party should pass information or intelligence derived wholly or in part from the other party's sources without the latter's consent.

/Industrial Considerations

Industrial Considerations

13. The views of Sir William Palmer's Committee as to how industrial interests may best be secured under this policy are accepted.

Information may be Government-owned or privately-owned; secret or not secret; wholly patentable, wholly unpatentable, or partly patentable and partly unpatentable.

- (a) Wholly patentable, i.e. the whole of the information can be protected by a patent specification.

If secret the U.K. Government will in all cases acquire the right to a secret patent in the U.K. and disclosure to a foreign Government should as far as possible be made on the following condition:

that the information is kept secret and the Government of that country will grant to the U.K. on request patent protection of suitable priority.

If not secret, i.e., such that publication in a patent specification is permissible, no problem arises. Government-owned inventions should be examined to see whether foreign patents should be obtained and exploited. In the case of privately-owned inventions the recipient Government should be referred to the owner, to negotiate terms.

- (b) Wholly unpatentable, i.e. the information, while commercially valuable, is not of the kind which can be protected by a patent specification.

Government-owned information should only be supplied if a quid pro quo is obtained - strategic, monetary or both - worth the value of the information.

In the case of privately-owned information the foreign Government should merely be put in touch with owner, but if the nature of the information is secret the owner should be warned that he should communicate the information only to accredited representatives of the foreign Government who are pledged to maintain secrecy.

- (c) Partly patentable and partly unpatentable. The only important case is where the information as a whole is secret and unpatentable e.g. the layout, dimensions and specification of an aero engine, while some parts are patentable and may be patented without fear of disclosing the general design, e.g. a magneto.

The patented and unpatented parts should be treated separately as in (a) and (b) above but in the case of privately-owned patentable information care should be taken to inspect any patent applications before they are filed in the foreign country by the owner, to make sure that they do not disclose any secret information.

- (d) Departments who are negotiating with Foreign Governments for the Communication to them of information of commercial value may, depending upon the particular circumstances, decide to carry out the negotiations themselves and may lay down the terms upon which the information may be used by those Governments, or they may decide to entrust the negotiations, under suitable conditions, to private firms or individuals.

Conditions for Disclosure

14. The following conditions should be laid down and agreed to by all nations to whom information is disclosed:-

(a) Security

- (i) The information received should be safeguarded under the same rules of security as the U.K. authorities themselves impose.
- (ii) The information is disclosed only for the use of the recipient Government and such of its contractors, under seal of security, as it may notify to the U.K. Government in writing. Disclosure to any other Government, or publication to the Press or in any other way, would constitute a breach of the agreement.

(b) Reciprocity

It should be a condition of disclosure of information (as opposed to sale) that reciprocal facilities be given in return; even though some nations can offer little at the present time this condition might be of value later.

Duration of proposed policy

15. It is considered that the basic policy of disclosure by categories should continue indefinitely, although its application will depend on changing strategic and political factors which will necessitate periodical review. It is therefore proposed to review periodically the countries to be placed in each category.

Control

16. Disclosures should not be controlled locally, e.g. by theatre commanders. Control should be exercised in London.

Date of Implementation

17. All departments should put the above policy into force as an interim measure, though it may be liable to modification in the light of the policy to be adopted by the U.S. authorities.

Conclusions

18. (a) The various war-time policies respecting exchange of information should be revised to accord with long term policy with regard to the re-equipment of the Armed Forces of foreign countries.
- (b) For this purpose the nations should be classified in three categories to which material of varying security classifications may be given, subject to such exceptions as may be agreed from time to time.

- 5 -

- (c) Disclosure should be subject to maintenance of security comparable to that obtaining in the U.K. and reciprocity.
- (d) To protect the interests of industry, suitable procedure should be adopted to cover patented and unpatented information.
- (e) The duration of this policy should have no fixed terminal date, but its implementation should be reviewed periodically.

D&P

This mainly
concerns DNI + T,
but is could be
tied up with DNI + T's
memo regarding
liaison officers

R. J. [Signature]
et,

File No.

NAVAL SERVICE

HEADQUARTERS

----- MINUTE SHEET -----

REFERRED TO

REMARKS

DNIST 972311
22. of R. G. H. 7/1
28/27 12

*S: any comments, please,
before meeting on the
4th Jan?*

A.A.S.

*Sec. C. N. S.
28/12.*

*This memo will give us a clear lead
in our dealings with foreign Powers.
This will however be of little value
unless we have the requisite security
to prevent such powers obtaining the
information they want without asking
officially for it!*

R. Brand

4037

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

~~1277-18~~

SECRET

CSC 121

Date 26 Dec 45

C. A. S.

C. N. S. ✓

C. G. S.

209993

15-50-2

Forwarded herewith is copy of Report

from the Joint Planning Sub-Committee
dated 18 Dec/45
in regard to Exchange of information with foreign powers.

This matter will be placed on the Agenda of
the 341st meeting to be held 4 Jan/45

Copies of despatches exchanged
between External Affairs and Canadian
High Commissioner in U.K. on this
subject also attached.

E. W. T. Gill
(E.W.T. Gill)
Lieutenant-Colonel
Secretary.

HQS 5199-R-A PD 3 (DMO & P)

OTTAWA, 16 Dec 45

SECRET

The Chiefs of Staff Committee

1. The United Kingdom Government recently advised of a change in their policy for the disclosure of technical information and intelligence to the USSR.
2. Under this new policy, which it is understood has also been adopted by the United States, information is to be supplied on a basis of strict reciprocity whereas the previously agreed policy permitted of freely divulging considerable information to Allied Nations on the basis it would help bring about early German defeat.
3. On 25 Oct 45 the Cabinet agreed that the principle of reciprocity be adopted for the exchange of technical information and intelligence with Foreign Powers generally. The Cabinet directed that the Armed Services in consultation with other Departments concerned, work out procedures necessary to implement this policy.
4. The matter has now been studied by the Joint Planning Sub-Committee in conjunction with the Joint Intelligence Committee and a representative of External Affairs.
5. Mention should be made of certain factors which bear on the exchange of information with Foreign Powers. In working out any procedure there will be need of flexibility to meet a wide variety of conditions.
6. The Army (DMO & P) has, during the past three years, developed a Foreign Liaison Section which functions much along the lines of the US War Department's Foreign Liaison Office. Considerable experience has been gained in control and passage of information to foreign Military Attaches. Procedure and practice has been worked out in conjunction with External Affairs and Munitions and Supply. Considerable policy has been established respecting Military Attaches generally, both Canadian and foreign Military Attaches. This can be of assistance to the other services.
7. Certain of these factors relate on the one hand to (a) Security and Control of Information while on the other is the general question of (b) Policy and Relationship vis-a-vis a Foreign Power.
8. (a) Security and control of information will require:
 - (1) Recognition of the fact that unless good security exists leakage of information will defeat the policy. (This particularly applies to safeguarding of information originating in the UK and US).

- 2 -

- (11) A system whereby information to be released and requests for information from Foreign Powers will be funneled to negotiating channels.
- (111) The exchange of technical and research information of military implication should be handled on the same basis and governed by similar principles as non-technical information. Evaluation and security requirements of technical information should, however, be rendered by experts in an advisory capacity.
- (b) Policy and relationship vis-a-vis a Foreign Power is exemplified as follows:
- (1) With countries which it is desired to assist such as the United States there would be considerable exchange of information. Reciprocation would be on a very general basis.
- (11) The other extreme would be in exchanging information with a country it is not desired to assist and negotiations would be carried out on a strict "quid pro quo" basis.
9. The Sub-Committee therefore recommends as follows:
- (a) That a Foreign Liaison Advisory Committee be created which would report to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and its membership comprise the Joint Planning Sub-Committee, the Joint Intelligence Committee, a representative of External Affairs and a representative of National Research Council.
- (b) That the Secretary of the CSC be appointed Secretary of the Committee to ensure continuity, background and information on matters which will come before it.
10. The Terms of Reference proposed for this Committee are:
- (a) That the Committee be responsible for formulating and keeping under review policy regarding the security and release of information to Foreign Powers which may be of military import or concerning Canada's war potential. The application of the policy will remain the responsibility of the respective Service or Department receiving the request for information with the proviso that the Committee will act in an advisory capacity in dealing with the release or obtaining of information affecting more than one Service or where the Service concerned is in doubt.

- (b) That the Committee keep under review the general policy regarding Service Attaches and representatives of Foreign Powers in Canada concerned in obtaining information of military implication and provide co-ordination in matters affecting relationship, dealings, protocol, handling of requests and general uniformity and supervision in the restraint or freedom permitted such Service Attaches or Representatives in obtaining such information.
- (c) The Committee will as appears necessary maintain a record of the more important exchanges of information and provide a medium whereby information required by one Service may be obtained against information supplied by another Service.
- (d) That the Committee will take under consideration and give guidance on appropriate matters that may be referred to it by the Armed Services or other Departments and may advise on any matters that will make for general uniformity and co-ordination in matters falling within (a), (b) and (c) above.
- (e) That the Committee will meet from time to time as may be necessary but to ensure continuity and overall supervision and co-ordination of policy, meetings will be held at not greater intervals than two months apart.


Chairman
(C.R. Dunlap) Air Commodore, RCAF


(J.H. Jenkins) Colonel, G.S.


(H.S. Rayner) Captain, R.C.M.C.

MEMORANDUM

Privy Council Office

Ottawa..... Dec. 15, 1945.

dup
C. A. S.

~~C. N. S.~~ *WLO*

One copy of CJSM 58 re our CSC
1033.

E.W.T. Gill.

JAN 7 - A.M.

000163

CIPHER

ARMY MESSAGE

FILE CSC 450

(OUTGOING)

PLACE

DATE

TO Lieutenant-Colonel F.I. Walter, . OTTAWA, Ont. 11 Dec 45
 Joint Secretary,
 Canadian Joint Staff Mission,
 CMHQ
 London, England

1550-2
3987

502938

CSC 1033

SECRET (.)

~~follow~~ FOLLOWING FOR CANADIAN JOINT STAFF MISSION
 LONDON FROM CHIEFS OF STAFF OTTAWA (.)

PARA ONE

WE ARE INFORMED BY CJSM WASHINGTON THAT BRITISH
 JOINT STAFF HAVE MADE REPORT TO LONDON ON THE
 QUESTION OF THEIR POST WAR SERVICE REPRESENTATION
 IN THE USA (.) THIS REPORT IS BASED ON THE
 ASSUMPTION THAT USA WILL AGREE TO UK PROPOSAL FOR
 FULL COLLABORATION IN EXCHANGING TECHNICAL
 INFORMATION AND COVERS FIELDS OF (A) INTELLIGENCE
 (B) TECHNICAL AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND
 DEVELOPMENT (C) TRAINING AND COMMUNICATIONS BUT
 DOES NOT COVER BJSM PROPER OR STAFFS FOR LIQUIDATION
 SUPPLY
 OF WORK IN FIELDS OF PROCUREMENT APPLY AND FINANCE (.)
 WASHINGTON

16/12/12
DA/CNS
2) D. S. & B. 17/12
3) D. of P. 19/12
12/12
20605
9295
CMHQ
14/12
A/D. of P.
S.O. (P)

PARA TWO

CJSM WASHINGTON STATE THAT THEY TOOK NO PART IN
 PREPARATION OF REPORT BUT REPRESENTATIVES ATTENDED
 DISCUSSIONS AS OBSERVERS (.)

PARA THREE

WE ARE PASSING THIS INFORMATION TO YOU SINCE THE
 REPORT IS SAID TO ~~KE~~ CONTAIN RECOMMENDATION THAT

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS

THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER

IF THIS MESSAGE IS LIABLE
TO BE PUBLISHED,
INDICATE BELOW.

DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

COPY 4 - D.S.D. INFORMATION COPY

CIPHER

ARMY MESSAGE

FILE

(OUTGOING)

PLACE

DATE

TO

PAGE TWO

uk

UK SERVICE AUTHORITIES IN LONDON SHOULD INFORM
DOMINIONS OF STEPS BEING TAKEN TO INSURE CONTINUED
COLLABORATION WITH USA IN THE VARIOUS FIELDS

Distribution by CSC

Army Sigs.....(2)
C.A.S.
C. N.S. *905 12/10*
C.G.S.
File

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS

THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER

IF THIS MESSAGE IS LIABLE
TO BE PUBLISHED,
INDICATE BELOW.

DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

Ken Bell
(E.N.T. 011) Lt. Col.

IMPORTANT

111430Q

1430

COPY 4 - D.S.D. INFORMATION COPY

C O P Y

S E C R E T

No: A.609

6th December, 1945.

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your despatch No. 1993 of the 9th November concerning the disclosure of technical information and intelligence. I have communicated to the appropriate United Kingdom authorities the decision of the Canadian Government to adopt a policy of exchanging technical information and intelligence with the Soviet Union on a basis of strict reciprocity.

2. A detailed memorandum has been prepared by the Chiefs of Staff Committee here to govern the execution of the similar policy which is being followed by the United Kingdom in this matter. This memorandum has now been approved by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet and has been transmitted to the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Ottawa. A full statement of the position on the lines laid down in the Chiefs of Staff's memorandum is shortly to be communicated to you.

3. In the meantime, you might wish to have a short summary of the contents of the memorandum, which Mr. Le Pan of my staff has been allowed to see. Three categories have been established among countries which may receive technical information and intelligence:

- (a) the first category comprises the nations of the Commonwealth and the United States. Documents up to and including "top secret" may be communicated to any of the nations in this category.
- (b) The second category comprises a number of nations which, for one reason or another, have relations with the United Kingdom of special intimacy. They are:

France
Belgium
Holland
Norway
Denmark
Greece
Turkey.

Technical information marked "confidential" may be communicated to these countries without any reference to London.

- (c) All other countries. No information under any security marking may be communicated to these countries.
- (d) The Soviet Union is in a special category by itself. In the case of information to be communicated to the Soviet Union, it has been laid down, first, that no information will be transmitted unless comparable information is received in return and, second, that each separate request for information must be

- 2 -

referred to a special sub-committee of the Chiefs of Staff Committee which has been set up for this purpose. It has also been agreed with the United States Chiefs of Staff that there will be continual consultation with them over any proposed releases of information to the Soviet Union and, in particular, that care will be taken not to communicate any information which came originally from a United States source before the United States Chiefs of Staff have had full opportunity to consider the matter.

4. I gather that United Kingdom Military Attaches in those countries included in categories (a) and (b) will be free to communicate to the Governments to which they are accredited technical information up to and including the security markings authorized in the Chiefs of Staff's memorandum without reference to the United Kingdom Government. Requests, however, from any other country to receive security information must, in all cases, be referred to the special Sub-Committee which has been set up for this purpose.

5. It will be observed that the scheme of categories established by the Chiefs of Staff's memorandum is not without interest in relation to the United Kingdom's foreign policy. It sets up a system of concentric circles. In the innermost circle are the nations of the Commonwealth and the United States; in the second ring, are the countries of Western Europe and two other countries which are bound by special ties to the United Kingdom; all other countries are consigned to the outermost circle; there is then a special category established for the Soviet Union with which exchanges must be conducted with special caution.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(sgd.) Vincent Massey.

The Secretary of State for
External Affairs,
O T T A W A.

C O P Y

T F . S E C R E T

4037

6th December, 1945.

No: A.609

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209993

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- (b) the second category comprises a number of nations which, for one reason or another, have relations with the United Kingdom of special intimacy. They are:

- France
- Belgium
- Holland
- Norway
- Denmark
- Greece
- Turkey

*except
Ire (Ireland) (K.)
B. Jones*

Technical information marked "confidential" may be communicated to these countries without any reference to London.

- (c) All other countries. No information under any security marking may be communicated to these countries.
- (d) The Soviet Union is in a special category by itself. In the case of information to be communicated to the Soviet Union, it has been laid down, first, that no information will be transmitted unless comparable information is received in return and, second, that each separate request for information must be referred to a special sub-committee of the Chiefs of Staff Committee which has been set up for this purpose.

- 2 -

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I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(signed) Vincent Massey.

ENTERED
ON CARDS

CJSM(5-1)

London.

CANADIAN JOINT STAFF MISSION

3973

TOP SECRET

27th November 1945.

FROM: Secretary,
Canadian Joint Staff Mission
c/o Canadian Military Headquarters,
2 Cockspur Street,
London, S.W.1.

TO: Secretary,
Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee,
East Block,
Parliament Buildings,
Ottawa, Canada.

Collaboration with the U.S. on Research and Development

1. It will be recalled that, in conformity with arrangements made with the British Chiefs of Staff, the Canadian Joint Staff Mission are from time to time invited to view papers which may be of interest to your Committee.
2. Today the Canadian Joint Staff Mission was able to examine a minute on the m/n subject. This minute was addressed to the British Chiefs of Staff Committee by the Secretary of that body and is dated 22 Nov 45.
3. In this document the British Chiefs of Staff are reminded of a telegram from the British Prime Minister to President Truman which was forwarded on 16 Aug 45 and in which it was suggested to the President of the United States that Anglo - U.S. collaboration and exchange of information on research and development in the field of defence should continue in the post-war period. President Truman replied on 17 Aug 45 and stated that the appropriate U.S. agencies would make a study of the Prime Minister's proposal.

.....2

- 2 -

4. The minute goes on to state that the British Prime Minister, on the occasion of his recent visit to Washington, again drew President Truman's attention to this question. The subject was discussed notably on 15 Nov 45 at which time the Prime Minister made a note of the conversation, later agreed by the President of the United States and which reads as follows:-

"I discussed the matter of post-war co-operation in defence resources stressing the point of the great advantage of our keeping in line with regard to equipment and weapons and also having a common defence doctrine. I expanded these points at some length, and the President entirely agreed with me. I drew his attention to my letter of August, and he said the matter was now being taken up with their Chiefs of Staff. I pointed to the need for the matter being brought to a head in order to prevent our going separate ways."

(Sgn) F.H. Walter

(F.H.Walter) Lt-Col.
Secretary
Canadian Joint Staff Mission

FHW/BC

H.C. 24

NAVAL SERVICE - MINUTE SHEET

FILE NO. -

REFERRED TO

REMARKS (With Signature, Position & Date)

Memorandum to
2 JSRD
1 DMS
CMEC
DNO
ACNS

This matter was
the subject of a
meeting of the J.P.C. &
JIC Combined ordered
by the Chief of Staff.

[Signature]
145

No Minutes have yet
been received but the decisions
were kept. These recommendations
NMCs has forwarded

20/11/145

a paper outlining the
policy to be followed
with reference to the
disclosure of technical
information to Foreign
Governments or Nationals.

2.

It represents a policy
whereby very little information

be given to foreign governments
or nationals except after
consideration of requests in
writing by various divisions
of the Navy Department.

3. On the other hand very
much greater scope is given
to representatives of the
British Commonwealth
of Nations.

4. It is considered of great
importance to announce
a policy of reciprocity
at once in acknowledgment
of the benefits given to
us by the USR policy
and in order to ensure
that every possible step
be taken to keep
the door for free interchanges

H.O

NAVAL SERVICE - MINUTE SHEET

FILE NO. -

REFERRED TO

REMARKS (With Signature, Position & Date)

5.

of information between
the two countries.

It is therefore
recommended that
DND OT should draw
up a similar policy
for approval by CNS
and for early transmission
to ^{RCS} USN and RN
authorities.

6.

It is considered
that our policy should
include a statement
that no information ⁰⁰⁰¹⁷⁶

which emanates from
USN or RN will be
given to any foreign
government or nation
without first obtaining
the permission of the
originator.

D. L. Raymond
16/11

NAVAL SERVICE

NMA/IMH

1550-2.
N.S. ~~1420-146/36~~ Vol. 1
(Staff)

MEMORANDUM TO (1) ~~D.S.R.D.~~
(2) ~~S.O.A/S~~
(3) D.W.T.

Disclosure of Technical Information to Foreign
Governments

Reference copy of U.S.N. Administrative
Order re m/n subject, two folios down.

It is recommended:-

- (a) that a similar order be drawn up for R.C.N. showing no restriction on disclosures to members of the British Commonwealth, the same preference in disclosures to U.S.N. as accorded by them to Canada, and practically no disclosure whatsoever to other Governments.
- (b) that copies be forwarded, as quickly as possible, to N.M.C.S. for U.S.N.

2. It is considered that if U.S.N. is aware that R.C.N. is taking approximately parallel security precautions, such knowledge might, in itself, be enough to turn the balance for the granting of clearance for disclosure on items which might otherwise be in doubt.

3. It is submitted that every effort is worthwhile to hold open the door for the receipt of information as widely and as long as possible.

4. It is submitted that such an order is desirable for our own protection.

NMA

(A/S RESEARCH)

ROK. 14.11.45
WB 14.11.15
14.11.45

000178

OTTAWA, November 9, 1945.

SECRET

No. 1993

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the Government has given consideration to the question raised in telegram Circular D. 112 of September 18th from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, concerning exchange of technical information and intelligence. We were informed that in future the United Kingdom authorities propose to supply intelligence to the Soviet Union on the basis of strict reciprocity.

The Canadian Government has decided to adopt a similar policy for the exchange of technical information and intelligence to the Soviet Union and details in connection with the implementing of this policy are being considered by the appropriate service officers in consultation with members of this Department.

In working out a detailed procedure it would be helpful to have from the United Kingdom authorities some indication as to the means by which this policy is to be applied. We are particularly interested in the practice governing the exchange of information through Service Attaches since our contact with foreign forces is largely through such channels.

It would also be valuable to know what type of information the United Kingdom is considering for this exchange. Is it, for example, proposed on the basis of reciprocity to exchange information classified as secret or under any other security marking?

I should add that the Canadian authorities would not, of course, consider the disclosure of any information supplied originally by the United Kingdom without the authority of the senders of such information.

I should be glad if you would inform the United Kingdom authorities of our decision in this matter and consult them in relation to the questions I have raised.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,

J.E. Read.
For Acting Secretary of State for
External Affairs.

The High Commissioner
for Canada in Great Britain,
LONDON, S.W.1.

C O P Y

OTTAWA, November 9, 1945.
S E C R E T

No. 1993

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the Government has given consideration to the question raised in telegram Circular D. 112 of September 18th from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, concerning exchange of technical information and intelligence. We were informed that in future the United Kingdom authorities propose to supply intelligence to the Soviet Union on the basis of strict reciprocity.

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I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

J.E. Read,
for Acting Secretary of State for
External Affairs.

The High Commissioner
for Canada in Great Britain,
LONDON, S.W.1.

ENTERED
ON CARDS

3734

203310

1550-2

(NAVAL SERVICE)

N.S. ~~1420~~ 146/26

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

The following is an extract from the minutes of a meeting of the Cabinet held October 25th, 1945:

II. Exchange of Technical Information with Foreign Powers

The Secretary reported that, consequent upon the end of the war, a new policy was being adopted by the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States in respect to the exchange of technical information and intelligence with foreign powers. The Cabinet Defence Committee had recommended that Canada pursue a similar course.

The Cabinet, after discussion, agreed that the principle of strict reciprocity be accepted for the exchange of technical information and intelligence with foreign powers, procedures for implementing this policy to be worked out by the Services in consultation with officials of the departments concerned.

October 30th, 1945.

W.R.C.N.S.

Lieutenant (S) W.R.C.N.S.

Staff
3/11
D.W.T.
D.N.T.S.T.
D.A.P.
A.C.N.S.
10/11
10/11
10/11
S.O.(P)
5/4



OUR FILE TS. 24-14-7(D/AMAS)
REF. YOUR
DATED

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

Ottawa, October 26, 1945.

SECRET

Colonel J.H. Jenkins,
DMO & P

In reply to your HQS.5199-R-A PD 3 (DMO&P) dated 24 October, 1945, I consider that a joint meeting of the Planning and Intelligence Committee as suggested would be most desirable, and therefore propose that we assemble in my office on Tuesday, November 6, 1945, at 1430 hours.

I would be grateful if you would communicate with the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, and request that he notify his members of this meeting.

(C.R. Dunlap)
Air Commodore
D/AMAS

Handwritten signature of C.R. Dunlap
P.J.B. W.M. 27/10

Handwritten notes:
A/D & P. - You will probably be the only real planners at this meeting, as I may be on my way to New York
Noted JH 29/10

CC - Captain Rayner:
This meeting will consider exchanges of information with foreign countries.

Handwritten notes:
→ BE 6/11 meeting held 5/11 JH

H.Q. 15

NAVAL SERVICE - MINUTE SHEET

FILE NO. - D. of P. Folio 227.

REFERRED TO	REMARKS (With Signature, Position & Date)
-------------	---

D.N.I. + T.

for comments and suggestions, please.

~~the~~ Round
see D. of P.
19.10.45

D of P
24/10

The balance of what they know about us & what we know about them is so very unfavourably against us at present. That whatever arrangements are worked out we must make sure that we really are getting something useful from them before we give anything! Other wise the policy seems that + worked

B.F. when
Comm. for
Chairman
Joint Planning
Dir. ⁱⁿ _{responsible}
Admiral

CSC 110

QUOTE NO.



Department of National Defence

Ottawa, Canada,
18 Oct 45

Chiefs of Staff Committee.

The Chairman,
Joint Planning Sub-Committee.

Exchange of technical information and
intelligence with foreign powers.

1. The Chiefs of Staff, at their 336th meeting held 12 Oct 45, considered the question of policy governing the exchange of technical information and intelligence with the U.S.S.R. in the light of Army memorandum HQS 9078 of 4 Oct 45 (copy of which has been distributed to the Chiefs of Staff).

2. They agreed to recommend the adoption of a policy of reciprocity as outlined in the Army memorandum and, at the same time, directed that the Planners should work out details of procedure so as to ensure the uniform application of this policy by the three Services. These details should include, if practicable, schedules releasing information which might, or might not, be transmitted under the terms of the new policy.

3. The Cabinet Defence Committee, at their meeting of October 16th, also considered this matter and agreed to recommend to the Cabinet that the principle of reciprocity should govern the exchange of information with all foreign powers as, in their opinion, such a policy was actually being followed in the majority of cases at the present time.

4. While, therefore, the matter must still go before the Cabinet before the new policy of reciprocity is formally accepted, the details of the policy will, without doubt, be left to the Services to work out. There would seem to be no reasons, therefore, to await Cabinet's decision before asking your Committee to carry out the direction of the Chiefs of Staff.

File
AKW of P-19/20
S.O.(P) M/B

MM
circulate to
DND for
comments
of suggestions



- 2 -

5. Joint Planning Sub-Committee are requested, therefore, to work out, in consultation with officials of other departments concerned, the procedures for implementing the policy for the exchange of technical information and intelligence with foreign countries based on the principle of reciprocity.

E. W. T. Gill
(E. W. T. Gill)
Lieutenant-Colonel,
Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

cc - D of P, Navy ✓
DMO&P, Army

*JS/317/6
D.H. 2 '6*



CANADIAN JOINT STAFF
2222 "S" STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON

1420-146/36
IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE
No. *130*

50343 / 550-2

NAVAL MEMBER

.....19th October, 19 45.

FROM: Naval Member, Canadian Joint Staff,
WASHINGTON 8, D.C.

TO: Secretary, Naval Board,
Naval Service Headquarters,
OTTAWA, Ont.

Subject: DISCLOSURE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION TO FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS - U.S. NAVY ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER

Submitted for the information of the Department.

Forwarded herewith is copy of U.S. Navy Department, Bureau of Ships, Administrative Order No. 45-92 dated 12th October, 1945, outlining the policy to be followed with reference to the disclosure of technical information to Foreign Governments or Nationals.

*S O (10) 24/10
825 23/10*


*J.N.I. 24/10
D. OF P. 28/10
A.C.N.S. 29/10*

*2.0 (10) 29/10
2.0 (10) 29/10
Encl.*

*34/10
N.M.A. seen
D.W. seen
A.P.L.*

(H. E. Reid)
Rear Admiral, R.C.N.,
Naval Member, Canadian Joint Staff.

OCT 23 AM
54-545 (1767)



12-10-95

C O P Y

NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF SHIPS
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 45-92

Subj: Technical Information to Foreign Governments or Nationals -
Disclosure of

1. Administrative Order Canceled: This Administrative Order revises paragraphs 3(a)-(c) of Administrative Order 45-25 which is hereby canceled. It also incorporates in paragraph 6 information which was included in paragraph 7 of Administrative Order 45-62.

2. Establishment of: In accordance with directive of the Secretary of the Navy that a central office for the control of disclosures of classified technical information to foreign governments be established, the Lend Lease Branch Code 1730, of the Contract Division is hereby designated to represent the Bureau of Ships in all matters pertaining to such disclosures of classified technical information.

3. Designation of: Each Division of the Bureau of Ships will designate a Foreign Disclosures Clearance Officer who will be responsible for approving for the Division recommendations for the release of classified technical information under the cognizance of the Division. The Lend Lease Branch Code 1730 will be responsible for seeing that all recommendations for the release of technical information to foreign governments on items under the cognizance of the division have been cleared by this Division Foreign Disclosures Clearance Officer.

4. Procedure: In order that the required coordination and control of the disclosure of technical information by the Bureau of Ships may be maintained, all personnel of the Bureau of Ships are directed to comply with the following procedures:

- (a) Effective immediately, all requests by the representatives of foreign governments (other than the British Commonwealth of Nations) for U.S. classified technical information, not previously disclosed to that government, shall be in writing. The foreign government's request should preferably be addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations (Office of Naval Intelligence) in which case ONI would endorse the request to the Bureau of Ships requesting information on which to base a reply. If, however, a written request for classified technical information is received by the Bureau of Ships directly from a representative of a foreign government (other than the British Commonwealth of Nations), the Bureau of Ships will endorse the request to the Chief of Naval Operations (ONI) incorporating the Bureau of Ships recommendation as to disclosure or non-disclosure in the endorsement. If the Bureau of Ships recommends to the Office of Naval

Intelligence that the information be disclosed, the requested classified technical information should also be incorporated in the Bureau of Ships endorsement. In either instance, the Office of Naval Intelligence, will answer the inquiry by supplying to the foreign government the requested information or advising the foreign government that the requested information cannot be supplied. In all instances the Bureau of Ships endorsement to the Chief of Naval Operations (ONI) recommending approval or disapproval of the disclosure of requested technical information to Foreign Governments shall be routed via the Division Foreign Disclosures Clearance Officer and via Code 1730 for review with respect to prevailing security regulations and for signature.

- (b) Classified technical information transmitted by the Bureau of Ships by letter to representatives of the British Commonwealth of Nations shall be addressed directly to the foreign government representative and the letter of transmittal shall be routed via the Division Foreign Disclosures Clearance Officer and Code 1730. Such letters of transmittal shall include 2 copies (less enclosures) for Code 1730. In instances where established procedure is to forward certain types of classified information to representatives of the British Commonwealth of Nations via the Office of Naval Intelligence such procedure may be continued.
- (c) Discussions of classified subjects between the Bureau personnel and foreign government representatives, other than representatives of the British Commonwealth, shall be strictly limited to matters already disclosed to the government in question and shall not enlarge the disclosure which has been made either by the addition of new topics or later developments on topics already discussed.
- (d) If the provisions of paragraph (c) above are complied with, neither the request for information nor the disclosure need be referred to Code 1730 or to the Office of Naval Intelligence. Any request from a foreign government representative, the compliance with which would constitute a violation of paragraph (c) must be handled in accordance with the procedure outlined in paragraph (a) above.
- (e) Discussions of classified subjects between Bureau personnel and representatives of the British Commonwealth of Nations may include later developments on topics already discussed or disclosed. Proposed discussions or disclosures of classified subjects relating to new topics or developments not previously disclosed to representatives of the British Commonwealth of Nations shall be referred first to the Division Foreign Disclosures Clearance Officer and then to Code 1730 for clearance by higher authority.
- (f) Personnel of the Bureau will not initiate arrangements for visits by any national or representative of a foreign government to any Naval activity beyond the bounds of the Bureau of Ships T-3, T-4 and T-5 buildings, or to any private research or industrial plant.

NOTE

- 3 -

Such visits can be arranged only pursuant to a request by the interested foreign representative by letter to the Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Intelligence). The Lend Lease Branch will provide special assistance when it is necessary for visits to be approved on short notice.

5. Functions of Code 1730: The Lend Lease Branch is hereby directed to maintain all Bureau of Ships records and to prepare all Bureau of Ships reports on the release of classified technical information to foreign governments which may be required by the Secretary of the Navy, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, or the Bureau of Ships in the discharge of duties assigned by this order. It will be the responsibility of the Lend Lease Branch to develop and promulgate the procedures to be followed in the Bureau of Ships for the execution of this order.

6. Liaison: The Lend Lease Branch will maintain liaison for the Bureau with OP16B-4 in recommending the extent to which specific representatives for foreign governments may inspect activities, including Naval Establishments, manufacturing Bureau of Ships material.

/s/ E. E. Roth
Captain, USN
Director of Administration

Authenticated
"E.M. Jangle"



1550.2

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

The following minute is promulgated for information and for necessary action.

Meeting held 12th October, 1945.

File No. N.S. ~~1420-146/37~~ Vol. 1

VII. Exchange of Technical Information with U.S.S.R.; Canadian Policy (CSC 100)

C.G.S. referred to Army memorandum H.Q.S. 9078 of 4th October, 1945, dealing with the question of exchange of technical information with the U.S.S.R. According to information received from External Affairs, the present British policy was that such information was to be supplied on a basis of strict reciprocity and it was understood that the U.S. authorities were pursuing a similar policy.

It was therefore recommended that the Canadian policy be as follows:

- (a) no information that originated in Great Britain or United States, or Canadian information which resulted from joint projects with either country should be released without first obtaining the concurrence of the country concerned; and
- (b) Canadian information, the release of which was not prohibited on security grounds, should only be made available to the U.S.S.R. on a reciprocal basis, except on matters of minor importance unconnected with specific technical developments or research when the condition of strict reciprocity might be waived.

It seemed desirable to work out details of this policy for the guidance of those Officers who dealt with the Russian Attaches, otherwise it would be difficult to apply.

The Committee:

- (a) agreed to the policy, as outlined; and
- (b) directed the Joint Planning Sub-Committee to work out a procedure for the uniform application of this policy by the Services involving, if practicable, the preparation of schedules listing information which may or may not be transmitted within the agreed policy.

Staff

J.M. Archer

Lieutenant (S) W.R.C.N.S.

October 15th, 1945.

W.M. 18/10
D.W.T.S.
H.W.M. 26/10

A/D off.
S.O. (P) R.H.S.
S.O. (P) R.H.S.
24/10
L. Shore D.S. 24/10

NAVAL SERVICE ----- MINUTE SHEET -----

FILE NO. _____ LETTER NO. _____

REFERRED TO

REMARKS (WITH INITIALS AND DATE)

Staff

for comments please.

DNMT

Concur with DMO Quarterly
+ particularly in Para 6.

D/P Comm. 11/10
2nd P.

ACNS

Technical details of the
limesweeper still being delivered
to U.S.S.R. by Mutual aid

~~Comm~~
~~WALSH~~
A/B. P. 11/10
S.E. (P) 11/10

must of course be an temporary
exception to the suggested
new policy.

Adrian

DEPT. NUMBER

4 CNS

✓
1550-2

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE
OTTAWA

SECRET

CSC 100
9 Oct 45

C. A. S.
C. G. S.
C. N. S. ✓
Maj. Gen. Pope

57322

~~1420-146/37~~

Forwarded herewith is copy of Army ~~3571~~ memorandum

from C.G.S.
dated 4 Oct 45
in regard to Exchange of Technical Information with USSR;
Canadian Policy

This matter will be placed on the Agenda of
the 336th meeting to be held Friday, 12 Oct 45.

E. W. T. Gill
(E.W.T. Gill)
Lieutenant-Colonel
Secretary.

J/VW

HQS.9078 Vol 2 (DL.O&P)

(Oprs 204-Z)

OTTAWA, 4 Oct 45.

S E C R E T

CGS

1. Attached is a copy of Dominion's Office Circular D.112 that was forwarded by Mr. Wrong of External Affairs to the Minister of National Defence dealing with a change in the British policy regarding the release of information to the USSR. The new policy is that British information is to be supplied on a basis of strict reciprocity and it is understood in London that the US authorities are pursuing a similar policy.

2. In requesting the views of the Minister, Mr. Wrong was of the opinion that Canada should also conform to this policy to the extent required. He however, considered that as there is no indication that the Soviet authorities have themselves been informed of the change in policy, it would be necessary to bring the matter to the notice only of persons in the three Services and the Dept of Munitions and Supply who might be dealing with requests from Soviet officials for technical information and intelligence.

3. In the past the authorized channel at NDHQ for passing information to the USSR has been through DMO&P and before such information is passed out, the security aspects are checked with D Int. A somewhat similar arrangement is in effect in the other two Services. In the case of information which originated from British or US sources or dealing with Canadian studies in which the British or the US cooperate, the policy has been only to release such information with the concurrence of the country concerned.

3571

4. The new British policy of only supplying information to the USSR on a reciprocal basis is considered sound, insofar as it applies to important technical subjects

5. This Department has frequent enquiries from the USSR Military Attache for certain publications or information of minor importance and which are supplied as a matter of courtesy. In cases like this, it would appear undesirable to apply strictly a "tit for tat" basis. Incidentally, in this connection, the USSR LA supplies us from time to time with copies of their various military periodicals and bulletins. (This indirectly might be considered as a reciprocal gesture).

- 2 -
Secretary
CSC

Please place
on Agenda of
an early
meeting.

Lieut-General
CGS

4 Oct 45.

/2

- 2 -

6. In view of the above, the following is suggested as a basis for Canadian policy covering the handing out of information to the Soviet representatives.

- (a) No information that originated in Great Britain or the US nor Cdn information which resulted from joint projects with these two countries should be released on any basis to the USSR without first obtaining the concurrence of the nation concerned.
- (b) Any Cdn information on technical subjects or developments and intelligence - that it is permitted to release on security grounds - should only be made available to the USSR on a reciprocal basis.
- (c) An exception to (b) may be made in the case of matters of minor importance unconnected with specific technical developments or research.

7. It would appear desirable to seek clarification from the UK (and the US) as to whether the "reciprocal" basis limits the exchange to items dealing with similar projects such as tanks or whether it can be interpreted broadly, for example information on radar might be exchanged for equally valuable information on infra-red development.

8. As this is a matter which effects the other two Services, it is recommended that it be referred to the CSC. It is understood that Mr. Wong will be approaching the Dept of Munitions and Supply when the views of the Services have been obtained.

9. D Int concurs in Para 6.

J. H. [Signature]
Colonel,
DLO & P.

COPY/VW

TELEGRAM

FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

SECRET

EN CLAIR

CIRCULAR D.112 SAVING

LONDON, September 18, 1945
(Rec'd September 24, 1945)

CIRCULAR D.112 Saving. Secret.

By telegram 8th July, 1944, Circular D 992.

In view of end of war, policy for disclosure of technical information and intelligence has been revised.

2. British information is, in future, to be supplied on basis of strict reciprocity.

3. With regard to German information and targets located within British zone of occupation, Commander-in-Chief has been instructed to permit conducted Russian visits to German intelligence targets for strictly limited periods, subject to exclusion of certain specific targets. Commander-in-Chief is authorized to bargain as strongly as he wishes in any cases of worthwhile objectives in Russian zone of occupation.

4. United States authorities have been informed, and are understood to be pursuing similar policy.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

FILE NUMBER

N.S.S. 1550 - 2

F.D.6061

SECRET FALSE DOCKET

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE (NAVAL SERVICE)

CROSS REFERENCE

LIAISON & CO-OPERATION

EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL MILITARY INFORMATION WITH
FOREIGN GOV'TS

Dec 8/45
Sh

REFERRED

FOR REMARKS

DATE OF PASS

INITIALS

DATE OF P.A.

CENTRAL REGISTRY

DATE OF B.F.

INSPECTED
IN C.R.
By

BMS 502 748 DEC 1 0 1945

C 14/12

DEC 1 5 1945

000199

FILE NUMBER: N.S.C. 1550 - 2

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act / Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

VOL. 1

CONFIDENTIAL SERIES

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE (NAVAL SERVICE)

CROSS REFERENCE

LIAISON & CO-OPERATION
EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL MILITARY
INFORMATION WITH FOREIGN GOV'TS

TS.1550-2 FMB.
See also TS. File
1320-6
TS.1023-4-20 COMB.

VOL. 1

1550 - 2

REFERRED	FOR REMARKS	DATE OF PASS	INITIALS	DATE OF P.A.	INITIALS	DATE OF B.F.	CENTRAL REGISTRY	INSPECTED IN C.R. By
<i>Staff ans. 209</i>	<i>28 345</i>							

000201

N.S., 1550 - 2

VOL. 1

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE (NAVAL SERVICE)

CROSS REFERENCE

LIASISON & CO-OPERATION

EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL MILITARY INFORMATION WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS.

REFERRED	FOR REMARKS	DATE OF PASS	INITIALS	DATE OF P.A.	INITIALS	DATE OF B.F.	CENTRAL REGISTRY	INSPECTED IN C. R. BY
EMS	63645	APR 16 1947						
Equip	OSRD	24-47	gc					
Staff	D.W.T.	25-4	Sh	10-5-47	gc		MAY 12 1947	
Staff	P. 06887	JAN 26 1948		2-2-48	all		FEB 3 1948	
Staff	Requisition C.R.	FEB 13 1948		11-2-48	all		FEB 19 1948	
Staff	Requisition C.R.	MAY 4 1948		10-5-48	all		MAY 11 1948	
Staff	Requisition C.R.	OCT 7 1948		11-10-48	all			
<p>Correspondence combined</p> <p>1550-9 & C 1420-146/12</p> <p>1420-146/37</p>								

TO BE PASSED BY HAND OF OFFICER ONLY
MOST SECRET FALSE DOCKET

FILE NUMBER: N.S.M.S.11550-2

F.D. No. 726

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE (NAVAL SERVICE)

CROSS REFERENCE

EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL MILITARY INFORMATION WITH

FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS.

Main File Chgd. to DNPI.23.12.46

REFERRED	FOR REMARKS	DATE OF PASS	INITIALS	DATE OF P.A.	INITIALS	DATE OF B.F.	CENTRAL REGISTRY	INSPECTED IN C.R. By
<i>Suppl.</i>	<i>431 Wick papers.</i>	<i>17.3.47</i>	<i>YD.</i>	<i>2/6/47</i>	<i>HAG</i>		<i>JUN - 2 1947</i>	

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CROSS REFERENCE

LIAISON & CO-OPERATION.

EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL MILITARY INFORMATION

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Main File Chgd. CNS.12/10/46.

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<i>DM (n)</i>	<i>1289 (W.P.)</i>	<i>25/10/46</i>	<i>JD</i>					
<i>Staff</i>	<i>CAS - by hand</i>	<i>28-10</i>	<i>my</i>					
<i>Staff</i>	<i>D.D. N.1</i>	<i>5/11</i>	<i>G</i>					

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CROSS REFERENCES

FILE No.	SUBJECT
1970-8	Ex port controls on Arms & Strategic Materials

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FILE NUMBER	SUBJECT	Cross References
N.S. TS 11550 - 2	LIAISON & COOPERATION	
Vol. No. "1"	EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL MILITARY INFORMATION	
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If purpose for which referred cannot be expressed on one line, add minute to file and enter here "With Minute"							
PR 23 1946	24.4.46	PA	mt	C.N.S. N.P. (642)	15/4/46		
M 26 1946	26.6.46	PA	mt	C.N.S. N.P. (777)	15/5/46		JUN 26 1946
G 21 1946	21.8.46	PA	mt	C.N.S. Bergeant			4/7/46
SEP 26 1946	24.9.46	P.A.	J.H.	C.N.S. N.P. (1133)	7/9/46		
OCT 5 - 1946	10/46	PA	mt	Staff (D.N.S.) Bergeant	28/9/46		
				C.N.S. Bergeant	12/10/46		
				Staff			
				D.N.S.			
				Staff	C.N.S.		
DEC - 9 1946	12.46	P.A.	mt	Staff	D.N.S.		
9.1.49	7.1.49	P.A.	mt	Staff	(D.N.S.) Bergeant		

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See Also TS. File

11320-6

Combined File

TS. 1023-4-20

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