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TITLE—TITRE:

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MEASURES  
PLANS AND PROPOSALS  
TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION ( INITIATIVE )

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PLAN ET PROPOSITIONS  
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
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DEPARTMENT  
OF  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



2005





Government of Canada / Gouvernement du Canada

# CLOSED VOLUME VOLUME COMPLET

DATED FROM  
À COMPTER DU

83-12-13

TO  
JUSQU'AU

83-12-15

AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE - À METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER

DO NOT ADD ANY MORE PAPERS - NE PAS AJOUTER DE DOCUMENTS

FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE - POUR CORRESPONDANCE ULTÉRIEURE VOIR

FILE NO. - DOSSIER N°

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace Mission

VOLUME

17

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MF  
[Handwritten initials]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (through R.R. [Handwritten initials])

Peace Initiative - Visits to Peking and Moscow  
and Recommendations re Follow-up

You are aware of the results of my visits to Peking and Moscow. My principal conclusions are the following.

China

The Chinese made a special effort to receive you at a convenient time. They clearly respect your intentions and are willing to give support to the idea of high-level political discussion of arms control. However, they tend to be pessimistic about the chances of success, partly, I believe, because they themselves are not yet ready to consider favourably real reductions in their military strength, particularly their modest nuclear weapons programme. They may be ready to reconsider their major condition for a conference of The Five plus other "representative" states (a commitment to reduce by 50% superpower strategic weapons), however, if the START talks show early signs of progress. We should continue to press them on this subject. In regard to our other proposals, the Chinese are unlikely to show more than polite interest. They were inflexible on the subject of signing the NPT or urging others to do so. This is a matter of principle for them, although they said they would not encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The remarks of Deng about the prospects of nuclear war (two billion dead is a tolerable prospect) were alarming. I think we should go back to them with our own analysis of the effects of full-scale nuclear war and ask them to think again. You might do this in a letter to Deng.

yes, /  
could a  
letter be  
informed?

The USSR

In Moscow there was a less negative response to the Five Power proposal, although Gromyko was clearly sceptical. The Soviets are themselves on record some years ago with a similar proposal, designed no doubt to stop China and the others from modernizing their own weapons. I did not give Gromyko a detailed account of the rationale for this proposal, fearing that the opposition of the UK and France to it would open the way for Soviet exploitation of the issue. We must now decide how to follow up on Moscow (see below). On other subjects, the Russians made clear that their attitude is

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governed by their assessment of USA intentions. This is negative, to say the least. However, I don't think they had yet decided how far to go in reacting to INF deployment.

Gromyko would not commit himself on his attendance at Stockholm and Vienna, implying that substance was more important than process. Nor would the Russians comment on the proposals for an ASAT treaty and for verification of new strategic weapons. They will probably await USA reactions to them.

The question of a visit to Moscow is blocked by the uncertainty over Andropov. I could get no clarification of dates, but was led to believe that an answer may not be forthcoming until mid-December at the earliest. My strong impression is that they want you to come if Andropov is able to receive you, but would be reluctant to issue the invitation if he could not do so. They are aware that a visit after mid-January might be difficult, if not impossible. They are also aware that a visit ought to have "results"; if not agreement on our proposals, then at least some indication of flexibility and a "payoff" for the bilateral relationship (I hinted broadly that we wanted progress on family reunification and an answer on "compensation" for the KAL incident).

#### What Next?

There is unlikely to be agreement soon on our specific proposals, except for political attendance at Stockholm. We shall know more about the prospects for a Western initiative at the MBFR talks after the NATO meeting; without such an initiative it is unlikely that Western Ministers would be willing to attend the next meeting in January. As for our ~~ASAT proposal~~, the USA has told us at the official level that it is premature. The USSR may give support in principle, but it has a more comprehensive proposal already on the table which has received wide support at the UN. Finally, the Five-Power Conference idea has at best been received with scepticism. A revision of the rationale for such a conference which emphasizes crisis management might improve its chances of acceptance, but it seems clear that in any event the timing of such a conference will be related to progress in START. Neither the USSR nor China appear to relate such a conference to strengthening the NPT. The Chinese reaffirmed their opposition to the NPT, whether or not the superpowers agree on reductions of nuclear weapons.

*all and more*

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We have not so far initiated formal consultations with our NATO allies about possible revisions to NATO doctrine along the lines described in the October 1 briefing book. Informal USA reactions are negative. McNamara has made a number of specific proposals on the subject (see attachment) which would be worth exploring. The timing of such an initiative is delicate, however, and might best await the outcome of Soviet reactions to INF deployment, i.e. early in 1984.

Whatever the fate of our specific ideas, however, I believe that visits to Washington and Moscow would in themselves be substantive actions reflecting your main concern that East/West tensions be addressed at the political level. The Soviet leadership in particular is passing through a difficult period, whether or not Andropov recovers, and would benefit from a direct exposure to Western views, especially if these reflected your understanding of President Reagan's objectives. If Soviet leaders are looking for ways to ease tension, your visit would give them an opportunity to indicate this. If not, your visit would provide an occasion for urging them to reconsider the matter. In any event, Canada/Soviet relations could only be enhanced by such a visit, especially perhaps in the area of family reunification.

#### Measuring Success

My visits to Peking and Moscow demonstrated a high degree of interest in your initiative, agreement that new efforts must be made to reduce levels of tension and armaments, but no consensus on how to achieve these reductions. I found that our specific proposals attracted little outright support, in part because they are not formulated in sufficient detail, but also because they tend to assign responsibility for the arms race to all the nuclear weapons states and to challenge deeply held dogmas. In particular, they do not address the issue of central interest to the two powers - USA/Soviet relations.

Your visits to Moscow and Washington will be regarded as the "test" of the initiative. Given that each will blame the other for the present impasse, we might try to draw up a short catalogue of objectives which do appear to be agreed and urge that these be "adopted" in some fashion as a basis for further talks, e.g. observe SALT II in practice, continue to negotiate radical reductions of strategic weapons, preserve outer space for peaceful purposes,

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strengthen NPT, improve crisis communications, etc. At the least, you could say that you urged explicit agreement to such objectives in addition to commending our specific ideas.

In the end, assessments of the initiative will turn on this theme of its effect on USA/USSR relations. As these are unlikely to improve soon, it will be said that the initiative "failed". There are three basic responses to this charge: 1) mediation was never intended, 2) you are satisfied that the threshold of political attention to these issues has been raised and some new ground turned, and 3) the impulse to find new ways of easing superpower tensions will find other forms, perhaps amongst a like-minded group of countries, and Canada will continue to encourage such momentum.

I have sent a copy of this memorandum to the DPM/SSEA.

*Geoffrey Pearson*  
Geoffrey Pearson  
Special Representative

cc: DPM/SSEA

PCO/Osbaldeston

External/Shenstone/Delvoie

DND/Anderson

mf

TRANSCRIPT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S INTERVIEW WITH  
A GROUP OF AMERICAN JOURNALISTS, WASHINGTON,  
DECEMBER 15, 1983

TRANSCRIPTION D'UNE ENTREVUE DU PREMIER MINISTRE  
AVEC UN GROUPE DE JOURNALISTES AMÉRICAINS À  
WASHINGTON, LE 15 DÉCEMBRE 1983

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THE PRESS SECRETARY: The Prime Minister will first spend three or four minutes on the tone of the meeting with the President.

THE PRIME MINISTER: I will tell you what I told him, and then I will suggest what he told me.

Essentially, I wanted to make sure that he didn't think I was coming here to talk about technical problems, or what should be done in Geneva, and that kind of thing. I told him I wanted to talk politics. As one politician to the other, I was telling the President that many of his positive messages were getting through but that some were not. And the messages that were getting through, not only to his friends and allies but to the other side, were that he had strengthened America; he had helped the economy turn around; he had increased defence forces, strengthened the defence; he had re-established the United States as a country that would stick up for its rights and its honour; and he had succeeded in keeping the Alliance together.

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After all, the execution of the second track -- yes, the deployment -- was not certain in everyone's mind about a year ago. But that message, too, was conveyed as a very strong message.

So, all of those messages were coming through -- and no doubt the Pentagon was hearing them -- but the message of peace was not coming through.

I knew in a sense, and I told him, that I realized that he had been handed a hand in a poker game and he hadn't dealt the cards. He had been handed the carrying out of the two-track decision taken in '79; he had been handed the Harmel Report and the modernization of NATO and the demand of the Europeans to have deployment in Europe; and he had been handed what I guess was perceived by the government as the unequal status of some of their armament structure. And naturally he carried out the second of the two tracks, and he beefed up the military. And in that sense he was, by fate and events, cast in the role of the tough guy. And he proved that. He is a tough guy; he can carry out the decisions. But the other aspects of his message are not getting through to the people, and presumably not getting through to the other side. And whether the other side is refusing to see them because they are so paranoid, they are afraid of everybody and everything, or because it suits

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Suits001599

1 | propaganda purpose to pretend they don't hear the signals,  
2 | is something I couldn't comment on; but what I could comment  
3 | on, as a politician, is the fact that when he says to the Diet  
4 | in Japan that he doesn't believe a nuclear war can be won,  
5 | and it shouldn't be fought, it is an aspect of President Reagan  
6 | that doesn't make headlines. But I was pointing out  
7 | particularly that the decisions taken in Brussels just ten days ago,  
8 | to me, were exactly what I had been hoping and praying for  
9 | over the past few months. And that doesn't seem to identified  
10 | with President Reagan. You know, the statement in Brussels,  
11 | to me, is quite revolutionary in terms of -- well, no, that  
12 | is an exaggeration. The statements in Brussels are a  
13 | definite changing of the trend line, which was away from the  
14 | dialogue, which was toward megaphone diplomacy,  
15 | which was toward handing the negotiations over to the nuclear  
16 | accountants. All of these things that many others and  
17 | myself have been complaining about were changed in  
18 | Brussels. And Brussels decided and said in its statement  
19 | that the dialogue must be resumed; that genuine detente  
20 | is our aim; that we respect the other side's legitimate  
21 | security interests, just as we want them to respect ours;  
22 | that we were not looking for superiority but balance and  
23 | equality and moderation; and, to return to what the  
24 | President said to the Diet, that he wanted to make concessions  
25 | in the arms negotiations and he wanted to see arms reduced.

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1                   So in a sense what I was saying to the  
2 President is: "I feel that what I wrote you about a couple  
3 of months ago, around mid October -- that we had to change  
4 the trend line, that we had to inject a political will into  
5 the dialogue, take it away from the technicians and the  
6 nuclear accountants -- was done, essentially, in Brussels,"  
7 where they went on to say, "And, yes, we will meet at the  
8 foreign minister level in Stockholm. We believe the  
9 politicians should give it impulse."

10                   That is completely new. The decision,  
11 I think, was unforeseeable at the time of Madrid, nor in the  
12 months that followed the Madrid agreement to the Stockholm  
13 Conference. And even on the MBFR in Vienna there is an  
14 agreement to look at it and as Luns interpreted  
15 it, an inclination to make sure that the politicians  
16 review it -- whether there will be a political attendance there  
17 or not. But in a sense, if this can be understood and signalled  
18 to the other side, we will see what signals come back.  
19 We don't know yet whether the Soviets will attend Stockholm --  
20 I mean the Warsaw Pact will attend -- at the ministerial  
21 level. But we've sent the signals. And I think that those  
22 signals now are beginning to get through.

23                   Well, in essence that is what I was telling the  
24 President: "For gosh sakes, make sure that your messages, if  
25 they are sincere -- and I believe they are -- and if you are a man

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1 of peace" -- and I can't believe anybody leading the United  
2 States of America would want war -- "make that as clear, now  
3 that you have made the message of the 'strong man' clear.  
4 Negotiate from strength."

5 In essence, that is what I was saying. That  
6 is enough, I guess. We can now have questions.

7 Q. What was his reaction? Is there a  
8 difference between your theme and the theme that he has been  
9 carrying?

10 A. What is your reaction to what I just  
11 said? Is it too sycophantic? Does it look as though I have  
12 been taken in?

13 Maybe that is not the purpose of the interview.  
14 You know, I found myself telling him that he should be  
15 communicating better -- and he is the expert communicator.

16 Now look, I think their line is: "We  
17 have been saying that all along. We have been men of peace all  
18 along". This, I don't think I quite accept. Maybe they  
19 have, maybe they haven't. But certainly the language is  
20 new. Certainly in the past two months there have been  
21 the things I have been saying, and in the past six months  
22 there has been much more flexibility introduced into the  
23 START proposals, into the INF proposals.

24 His reaction? I guess it is not so much  
within my rules to quote what the others say in private

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1 meetings like that, but I don't think I would be breaking  
2 a very deeply-held confidence by saying that the President  
3 said, "Well, you know, I've got an image of" -- what was  
4 his expression? -- "my image is one of being warlike"; and  
5 I said, "Who do you blame?"; and he said, "You know, my  
6 Diet remarks weren't reported." And I had to say that  
7 in Canada they certainly were not frontpage news. I see  
8 them as a change. I don't think the Administration sees them  
9 as a change. They are saying that he has been saying that  
10 all along.

11 I would want to analyze it a bit differently  
12 in that I think politicians everywhere -- not only President  
13 Reagan, but Pierre Trudeau and the whole gang of European  
14 leaders that I have met, and those in the Commonwealth --  
15 were suddenly saying: "Hey, the crisis is too near and the  
16 danger is too great. We should really try to make this top  
17 priority."

18 I think that has been happening. It happened  
19 slowly. It is, in reality, the politicization of the  
20 disarmament question, which maybe our various populations  
21 have brought us to. As usual, the people often send the  
22 signals and catch the reality before their leaders do.

23 Q. Did you succeed in selling him on the idea of  
24 a meeting of the five major nuclear powers, which is one of  
the major elements of your proposals?

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1           A.     Can I just maybe suggest a correction, when  
2 say "major elements? My proposal, essentially, was to get  
3 the politicians involved in the peace debate and in the  
4 disarmament movement. I was looking for propositions which  
5 would lead toward that. One was to politicize Stockholm.  
6 That is now successful -- on our side, anyway. I don't know  
7 if the other side will come. The other movement on MBFR.  
8 It is not as big and as fast as I want, but I know that there  
9 is movement there, certainly amongst my friends in Europe  
10 and, I would say, without quoting anybody, in Washington, too.

11                 The third thing had to do with the ASATS,  
12 the high altitude means of deployment. That is for another  
13 forum: that is mainly the United Nations forum.

14                 The fourth thing was the five-power proposal.

15                 I made sure that I didn't ask him for an  
16 answer, because I didn't want a negative one; but I explained  
17 to him that that, to me, was a technique for ensuring that the  
18 political leaders get involved in the question of reducing  
19 nuclear arms. And I put it to him in these terms. I have to  
20 be frank. The Chinese and the British say, "Well, you  
21 know, why start with us? Sure there has to be a five-power  
22 conference at some point, but if you get us involved in one  
23 now, it will draw attention to our little 5 per cent of  
24 the total nuclear arsenal, and it should be addressed to the  
95 per cent, the two superpowers. It's a good idea, but let's

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1 | not start now."

2 |                   President Mitterand says it is a good idea,  
3 | but let's not start now -- though he seems willing to start  
4 | sooner than the others. He is not afraid of being blamed.  
5 | You know, the "force de trappe" is an article of faith in  
6 | France. It doesn't carry much weight with his opposition.

7 |                   Moscow, I don't know -- except that you all  
8 | remember that they have proposed a five-power conference,  
9 | except that they wanted to start with counting the British  
10 | and French systems with the American's, against their own.  
11 | But I mean the idea of a five-power conference is something  
12 | that they have agreed to in the past.

13 |                   So, what are we left with? We are left  
14 | with the United States. And I don't know what their answer  
15 | will be. But, as I pointed out to you, he didn't say no;  
16 | he didn't say yes. He didn't go as far as the Chinese  
17 | or the British in saying, "You know, we don't want to  
18 | consider it." Well, that's interesting.

19 |  
20 |                   My arguments to the three non-superpowers,  
21 | as opposed to the other two, is: Look, you have all wished  
22 | me good luck -- Margaret Thatcher, Chairman Deng,  
23 | Premier Chou, President Mitterand -- You have all said,  
24 | "You know, you must go ahead with your initiative. That's  
great. But don't start with us. You know, do your MBFR

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1 | thing and do your Stockholm thing, but don't ask us to" --  
2 | for the reasons I have said -- "don't draw attention to our  
3 | measly little 5 per cent. Let's get the superpowers  
4 | to make progress at Geneva. Then we feel that we can  
5 | attempt ..."

6 |                   And I just handed the ball back to them. I  
7 | said, "Look, you are wishing me luck in getting President  
8 | Reagan and Secretary Andropov to make progress in Geneva. Thank you  
9 | very much for your good wishes. I will talk to President  
10 | Reagan, and maybe I can help influence him -- after all, we  
11 | are part of the same Alliance -- but, you know, how do I  
12 | influence Andropov? And how about you three doing some  
13 | influencing of your own, putting pressure on Reagan and  
14 | Andropov and realizing that when you do meet as a five --  
15 | either at the summit level or through your personal representatives  
16 | at the outset -- that is part of the political dialogue that  
17 | you are supporting in every other field, so what about  
18 | supporting ...."

19 |                   So, this is the five-power proposal. It is  
20 | one technique among many to get both sides to renew the  
21 | dialogue. But when I succeeded in getting them -- at least  
22 | our side -- to renew the dialogue in Stockholm, I think I  
23 | have achieved much more immediately than what, hopefully, we will  
24 | achieve one day for the five-power dialogue.

Q.     Do you have a date with the Russians?

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1 A. No -- I have a date, but I don't have  
2 an appointment.

3 Q. I mean, will you tell us what's happening.

4 A. Well, I mean, you know, like when you  
5 date somebody, you have a date; but what time you are coming

6 Q. It is too long ago. I mean, they  
7 didn't say December 25th, or ...

8 A. No, no. They asked me more than a year  
9 ago to come. They asked me at the time of Brezhnev's  
10 funeral, and then they sent a message when Gorbachev  
11 came to Canada in late winter, early spring, and then  
12 Andropov, when he answered my letter on the initiative, said  
13 I was invited. And then when I saw Arbatov in Tokyo --  
14 by accident or coincidence he was there -- I got a renewal.  
15 He is the latest one I saw. And I said, "Okay, you are  
16 all telling me I am invited. When is the appointment?" And  
17 he made noises about how he thought that the President would soon  
18 be in a position to begin seeing people -- without saying how  
19 soon "soon" meant -- and saying, "And, of course, when he is  
20 well enough to come to the office, he will be faced with a  
21 pile of papers and people to see, and ministers, and so on,  
22 so you won't be the first on his list."

23 So, we have no idea when they will come  
24 forth with a date. Quite frankly, I don't think the  
people around him have much of an idea either. I guess it

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1 depends so much on his health. But I think at some point  
2 I will have to ask myself: Well, to keep the momentum of  
3 the peace initiative, do I go to Moscow anyhow and see who  
4 I can see? And that will be a difficult decision. But  
5 there are people who are coming up be it the Gorbachevs, or the  
6 Romanovs. Who else? I am not a Soviet expert. I  
7 don't think that question can be answered by us. We can  
8 speculate on it. One of the speculations is that even seeing  
9 somebody else is a problem, because where are they at in  
10 their thinking in the post-deployment field?

11 The fact that they haven't anticipated or  
12 answered the Stockholm meeting at a ministerial level is  
13 certainly a sign, I think, of indecision on their part. It  
14 is possible that they will say "We don't want to go because  
15 it is not worth talking to these guys. They are led by a  
16 President who wants war." But they would give an answer.  
17 But that they are not able to react or anticipate the Brussels  
18 announcement of ten days ago, I think, shows an element of  
19 indecision in their ranks.

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1 Q. You have told us you are keeping the momentum  
2 going. Rick Burt of the White House, after your meeting with  
3 the President, said -- and this differs, by the way, from the  
4 Canadian transcript, but I listened to my tape just a moment  
5 ago and I think this is correct -- Rick Burt said, "The main  
6 thrust of the Prime Minister's remarks was that he thinks he  
7 has substantially accomplished his objectives in launching his  
8 initiative," the suggestion being that you have felt that  
9 most of what you set out to accomplish, you have accomplished.  
10

11 A. Well, you know, no one is a prophet in  
12 his own land. Mr. Burt understands me more than my official

13 Seriously, I guess I have made  
14 substantial progress in my initiative. I suppose it will  
15 never be accomplished. After Stockholm, there will be  
16 other things. And even political interest and political will  
17 can die. Peace has been pursued for many hundreds of years,  
18 and I don't think at any one point you have sort of  
19 succeeded in a breakthrough that is final, and I suppose it  
20 is in that context that my staff has said that I haven't  
21 substantially accomplished anything if that, indeed, is what  
22 they are saying, which I ...

23 Q. Do you have plans for what comes after  
24 Moscow?  
25

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1                   A.     Yes, very much -- well, depending on  
2 the date for Moscow. I think plans must be arrived at in  
3 the preparatory meeting to Stockholm, and in the review of MBFR,  
4 and in what further measures we take. At the Commonwealth  
5 Meeting in New Delhi in November, I spent a lot of my time  
6 talking of the Non Proliferation Treaty and the fact that it  
7 is up for renewal in 1985; and that horizontal proliferation is  
8 something that we are very concerned about. I was actually  
9 counting on the fear of that horizontal proliferation --  
10 which is a fear in the hearts of all of us, including the  
11 nuclear powers -- to sort of get them, the nuclear powers,  
12 to live up to their side of the bargain; because the NPT has  
13 various undertakings, but the main one is that the nuclear  
14 powers reduce their arsenals, share their know-how in non-  
15 military fields -- medicine, agriculture and so on -- in  
16 return for which, as it were, the other powers wouldn't  
17 nuclearize themselves.

18                   But as I heard repeatedly from leader after  
19 leader in Delhi, "You know, the five haven't lived up to the  
20 bargain -- particularly the two haven't lived up to the  
21 bargain. They have increased their arsenals. Don't come  
22 to us telling us to renounce horizontal proliferation."

23                   So that is a step I have been taking, which  
24 isn't central to the argument of the NATO and Warsaw Pact  
25 countries, but which is of very great importance to peace.

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1                   As you know, many of the theorists on the  
2 whole subject are concerned that World War III will break  
3 out, not between the two superpowers, but as a result of an  
4 escalation from something happening somewhere else.

5                   Q.     While it is true that the bulk of the  
6 declaration was adopted and this invitation with regard to  
7 Stockholm, it is also true that since then, or at that time,  
8 there has been a termination of the intermediate range  
9 talks, a suspension at least of the strategic arms talks, and  
10 today an indefinite postponement of the MBFR talks. Moreover,  
11 in the Middle East, there is military action which is bringi  
12 the United States and the Soviet Union closer, geographically  
13 closer, to some conflict.

14                   In view of all of that, is it your analysis  
15 that the trend now has gone to reduction of the chances of  
16 war in the world? Or how do you put together the things  
17 that happen on the one side with those statements that have  
18 been made on the other side?

19                   A.     Well, I don't attempt to put them  
20 together.

21                   Q.     "Weigh them," I think            is what I  
22 meant.

23                   A.     Well, weigh them is a different  
24 proposition. I mean, we are always weighing the chances of  
25 war and peace. What I have attempted to do is that if war

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1 broke out, it would not be because of lack of willingness on  
2 our side to engage in dialogue, to make sure that we are not  
3 misunderstood; that war would not break out because we were  
4 determined to be stronger than the other side and they would  
5 strike before that happened; that war would break out because  
6 they misinterpreted our intentions. And all I could do was  
7 (to) make sure that, as far as our side is concerned, we  
8 sent out these signals, which we have, in Brussels and which,  
9 in a sense, they are non-aligned, and the non-aligned stepped  
10 out in New Delhi with a statement there.

11 Now, you can weigh that for what it is worth.  
12 I think that it is important that at least we be and be  
13 perceived as nations that are prepared to talk and dialogue  
14 and seek resolution of tension and conflict by exchange,  
15 peaceful exchange.

16 That, to me, weighs a lot, and that is what  
17 I was attempting to achieve, in answer to your question.

18 What the other facts weigh now? I think they  
19 weigh seriously. And if they are a permanent state, I think  
20 it is indeed very dangerous. I know the results of it will  
21 at least be that the Soviets will have to stop pretending, in the  
22 propaganda war, that they are the side suing for peace.

23 As the Brussels statement said: you know, we  
24 don't leave the table. We are prepared to continue discussions.  
And we will be prepared to even talk numbers and withdrawals

- 16 -

1 of IMFs, depending on what we get from the other side.

2 In a sense, it might be a slight political  
3 victory for our side against the other side. I don't think  
4 that weighs very much -- political victories -- if they  
5 result in increasing tensions. I would prefer to guess  
6 that the attitude of NATO will have the contrary effect;  
7 that it will lead, after a period of time, the other side to  
8 say: "Hey, we can't be those who are opposing dialogue. We  
9 can't be those who won't go to Stockholm."

10 You know, to answer your question, I guess in  
11 specifics, I would bet you a lot of money that they will go  
12 to Stockholm. But I may be wrong. They may decide to wait  
13 out until the next presidential election. If they do, I think  
14 they will put themselves in a very defensive political posture  
15 with their own peace movements, and so on.

16 Q. Just on that point, they are not in  
17 the same position with their population. They freeze all  
18 of the contacts and sit tight. The West, given the  
19 communications problems that President Reagan has and that  
20 you have discussed with him, given the political turmoil in  
21 Germany and Britain, will sooner or later feel compelled to  
22 come chasing them with some more attractive proposal, with  
23 the usual Western impulse of "my goodness, this must be our  
24 fault. There is something wrong. So, we have to do more,  
25 give more for something better."

- 17 -

1           A:     I would have been more afraid of that a year  
2 or two ago; but since then, we did deploy. We didn't lose  
3 our nerve. Since then, even little Canada, with its peaceful  
4 bent, has decided to test the cruise missile.

5                     I don't think we will lose our nerve. In  
6 other words, we will look for any peaceful avenue of  
7 progress toward peace. If we didn't crumble, if the Alliance  
8 didn't crumble when the Soviets were talking peace and we  
9 were sounding war, why would it crumble now when we are  
10 talking peace and they are the ones who are on the defensive  
11 and made to look warlike?

12                    You know, I am tempted to say, as I was  
13 answering earlier, when I went to the NPT and horizontal  
14 proliferation, there are other things to do. I don't want  
15 to discuss them in too much detail, but there will be a  
16 new Secretary General of NATO. Lord Carrington is the man  
17 who first began to denounce megaphone diplomacy. The  
18 Harmel Report is 16 years old. NATO was on the verge, I am  
19 afraid, of becoming likely irrelevant. There was one leader  
20 and the others were going along. I think that has changed  
21 now. I think that NATO is re-becoming a political alliance  
22 and not just an alliance directed by military considerations.  
23 And, you know, under Carrington it will become even more a  
24 political living body.

25                    Those are all encouraging signs. As I was

- 18 -

1 | saying earlier, I don't think the work is finished, nor that  
2 | it ever will be.

3 |           Q.     May I ask for clarification? When you  
4 | say that the tone has changed in the last couple of months,  
5 | are you contrasting with the preceding couple of months, with  
6 | the KAL plane and other events, including the Middle East,  
7 | obviously did increase tensions and the rhetoric from  
8 | President Reagan? Are you contrasting it with the previous  
9 | couple of years and the whole tone of the Reagan administration  
10 | and of the alliance in saying that things are different now  
11 | from what they have been since 1981?

12 |           A.     I did both, actually, I think there  
13 | has been a bit of a blitz since the Korean Airline disaster,  
14 | a hardening of the dialogue, followed by a NATO  
15 | statement. But I think the main thrust of my argument is  
16 | that maybe not -- I would say -- since the beginning of  
17 | the Reagan administration, but I would say over the past year,  
18 | there has been a flexibility.

19 |                    When it started out with the Zero Option and  
20 | that was it, I didn't consider that -- you know, I thought  
21 | it was perhaps a morally ideal position, but it wasn't a  
22 | very flexible negotiating approach. I think that in the  
23 | months preceding Williamsburg, to be precise, there was a  
24 | new series of proposals by the United States. I think  
Williamsburg's knock down and drag out argument was very good

- 19 -

1 for all of us . It was there that we decided that we had  
2 to send not only one message to the Soviets -- that we  
3 would deploy by the end of the year if they didn't take  
4 down their SS-20s -- we decided there had to be two  
5 messages: the other was that we were still determined to  
6 continue negotiations toward peace. And I guess the most  
7 important message of all was that -- there was a line, I  
8 guess, that was smuggled in and not noticed -- that we would  
9 give it every political priority; we would all make the  
10 search for peace a top political priority.

11 And to me, I thought it was the signal of the  
12 turning point, until the Korean airline thing happened. And  
13 quite frankly, though I am not talking about any  
14 inside knowledge -- don't quote me in that sense -- I think  
15 that following Williamsburg and without the Korean airline  
16 tragedy, I would have guessed that there would have been an  
17 Andropov-Reagan summit sometime around March of this year, of  
18 next year.

19 I mean, as I say, I have no inside knowledge of  
20 that. It just seemed to me that that was the dynamics of  
21 what we had wanted to do at Williamsburg. That was the  
22 message that was getting through to all of us. Me because of  
23 my Cruise decision and Reagan because of his image, and  
24 Thatcher, because of her surrounding leaders in Europe,  
Mitterand because of his position.

- 20 -

1                   So, you know, I am not talking of something that  
2 is four years old. I think I am talking of something that is  
3 less than a year old, but certainly before the Korean  
4 airline tragedy.

5                   Q. Sir, is there perhaps some latent implication  
6 -- intended or otherwise -- for Canada, and perhaps for other  
7 non-nuclear countries, or for other allies; namely, that if  
8 initiatives like yours and Mrs. Gandhi's keep falling on rock  
9 soil, then Canada and other such countries have some reasons  
10 to look in another context for their security, less  
11 connected to one bloc, if you will?

12                   Isn't that the direction that your initiative  
13 takes you if it doesn't go to Canada's satisfaction?

14                   A. The way you started that out, I thought it  
15 was a repeat of this question, but the way you ended it, I  
16 don't understand it, particularly if you put Mrs. Gandhi and  
17 me in (the same context). I mean, she already has another  
horse. She is a non-aligned. We are aligned.

19                   Are you suggesting that Canada and other members  
20 of the alliance might move toward non-alliance if this falls  
21 on rocky soil? I have to understand the question.

22                   Q. That is the thrust of my question, yes.

23                   A. I wouldn't think so. I don't feel the  
24 dynamics of that operating at all. I do feel, to return to  
25 the previous question, that possibly if it falls on rocky soil

- 21 -

1 that people will either become fatalistic or bored with the  
2 subject. You know, he has talked about peace for a year now  
3 and nothing has happened; let's go on to the next subject.

4 But that we will go on to some other posture in  
5 the world? -- I don't see that. In other words, to answer  
6 quite frankly,  
7 I don't see Canada, nor most of the NATO members, becoming  
8 non-aligned. In some better world we might hope that there  
9 would be no Warsaw Pact and no NATO alliance, but that is so  
10 far down the pipe I don't see much interest in speculating  
11 about it. If it comes, so much the better. But certainly  
12 not a unilateral disarmament, a unilateral disbanding of NATO  
13 That is not in the cards.

14 Even if America and Canada were to become  
15 isolationist, if I had that as an hypothesis -- and I don't  
16 think Europe would let us; you know, they are too close to the  
17 Soviets, too concerned with Soviet imperialism to let that  
18 happen.

19 I don't see what you suggest as something we  
20 can react against.

21 If I misunderstood you, ask again. The barren  
22 ground thing led me into another direction. You know, in  
23 democracies we get bored with subjects. That's why we've got  
24 to strike the iron while it's hot. That is why Stockholm is  
important and MBFR is important, and Carrington is important,  
and meetings between NATO countries and Warsaw Pact countries,

- 22 -

1 and Margaret Thatcher deciding that she must go to Budapest.

2                   You know, I don't know if that would have  
3 happened six months ago.

4                   Q. I know you emphasized political impulses,  
5 that you don't want to get tangled up in technical spaghetti;  
6 but there are three things going on in this town, to  
supplement what Don Oberdorfer (Washington Post) was saying, that go  
8 dead against what you have called the trend line. One, there  
9 is a move to develop an ABMs base; two, there is move to  
10 challenge the Russians achieving on SALT I; and three, there  
11 is a very strong move not to ---

12                   A. SALT II or ---

13                   Q. SALT I. But the ABM treatment is what I am  
14 talking about. I am specifically talking about the ABMs,  
15 which killed SALT II.

16                   And three, there is a strong move not to fuse the  
17 two negotiations, Stockholm and IMF.

18                   Did you talk about any of those things with the  
19 President? And don't you think they are pretty important?  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24

- 23 -

1           A. On your first question: I mentioned it as  
2 one of the initiatives that I did hear earlier. I think it  
3 is getting into the technical spaghetti. Their side did  
4 raise the subject of anti-missiles in order to save -- I  
5 don't speak for them. Their theory is that if we had no  
6 ICBMs at all, we just had these defensive things and we  
7 could get rid of our own, and so on. You know, what they  
8 are arguing is that this is not destabilizing -- and I  
9 don't want to carry that argument. Personally I think the  
10 fourth of my initiatives, on the ASAT, is a very important  
11 one, and it ain't one with the United States and it ain't  
12 one with the Soviets either. They have the means now -- with  
13 slight Soviet superiority on the anti-satellite engines in lower  
14 space. And the United States is practically catching up.  
15 Neither has them on the high altitudes.

16           That is part of the case in theory, and I think  
17 we've all got to work at it. But it does begin to be  
18 technical, and it is something that we will have to give over  
19 to the spaghetti factory. But even there I would, you  
20 know, if we had time when I was meeting each of the leaders,  
21 I would have talked to them a lot about that, because that  
22 is the greatest danger out there, the destabilizing systems,  
23 and the use of anti-satellites at high altitudes would, in  
24 a sense, destroy most means of verification that we have.

25           So, that is a very real concern. I am not

- 24 -

1 denying it. I don't see it is something contradicting the  
2 politicization of the question, for the reasons that you  
3 hinted at. It is a technical question, and in a sense our  
4 consciousness hasn't reached that yet. I would dare say that  
5 most of your readers are really afraid of the ICBMs, but they  
6 are not too concerned with that yet.

7 It's a return to the other question: is there  
8 not still danger of war? Yes, there is, and that is a great  
9 one.

10 Your two other examples: one was on the ABM and  
11 the SALT I and the complaint that SALT II will not ratify, a  
12 not being respected by the other side, and that was alluded  
13 to in our conversations, too.

14 Yes, that is the suspicion which we have and  
15 which they have and which may be part of the psychology, the  
16 paranoia. And, you know, you don't get rid of that right  
17 away. When you see a psychologist, a psychoanalyst, he  
18 doesn't say, "Poof", and you've got rid of your obsessions.  
19 He makes you talk a lot, and when you talk a lot, you begin  
20 to understand yourself and the others, and so on. And that  
21 is why I don't see that the points you make are contradictory  
22 to the accepted (inaudible) We've got to deal with these  
23 problems. And because we haven't seen clearly the magnitude  
24 and the scope of the big problems out there doesn't mean that  
25 we wouldn't be willing to see them and deal with them when we

- 25 -

1 reached the big bad one.

2 Q. A further question. Do you think it is  
3 barely possible that people in this town are patting you on  
4 the head and saying "Good going; great idea. Terrific philosophy.  
5 Very effective"; Go to Moscow", and then going ahead with a  
6 series of things closer to their hearts that have a lot of  
7 force and that really go very, very strongly against what you  
8 are trying to do, supplementing on the point that Don is  
9 making? And won't -- to put it even more sharply -- aren't you  
10 really, as someone who has unique access to the White House,  
11 aren't you really pretty delinquent in taking this kind of an  
12 answer, in any way positive, when you know very well, really  
13 well -- better than lots of people; maybe better than  
14 anybody -- that there is stuff going on of a semi-technical  
15 nature but not that technical; we can understand it -- you  
16 know it very, very well that it goes dead against the grain of what  
17 you're trying to do and you don't say a word about it?

18 THE PRESS SECRETARY: That will be the last  
19 question. It's a good one.

20 A. Well, it's too bad it's the last question,  
21 because we are getting into, not only psychoanalysis but  
22 philosophy here. I can be pedantic. I'd call on Cam  
23 Fraser and say: "Well, then, this thing can be explained in  
24 many ways."

25 My inclination is to take the most straightforward

- 26 -

1 and simple explanation. But this doesn't destroy your point.  
2 There are other explanations which may be true; but if you  
3 appeal to my integrity, as a man with inside knowledge, as you  
4 put it: yes, those things worry me. I think that's perhaps  
5 the other question I was having here, and that's a rephrasing,  
6 a much more difficult to answer, rephrasing of your  
7 preceeding question.

8 Look, there will always be people on our side,  
9 in the Pentagon , in the Kremlin, who believe that military  
10 superiority is the only way out and that we would be fools if  
11 we didn't research every possible technology and test it and  
12 deploy it to make sure that our side was ahead. You know, I  
13 cannot deny that that exists. I know there are people doing  
14 that and that there is probably a weight of advisors in the  
15 Administration who weigh heavily in that direction. But it's  
16 a good answer to turn back to at the end, because we had this  
17 knowledge all along. And it was happening. There was the  
18 so-called "Star Wars" speech; and there is this work going on  
19 in laboratories. My point is that the politicians weren't  
20 even involving themselves in a simple thing like MBFR --  
21 which is complex, too. You know, you are asking the  
22 politicians to worry about ABMs and high altitude, anti-  
23 satellites in high altitude. I am saying that you are right  
24 to worry about that but let's start worrying about things that  
25 we can do something about right now. And don't forget that

001623

- 27 -

1 when that political will is injected, you can have a whole  
2 series of successes, as existed between '62 and '75, when  
3 you know we had the agreements and treaties on outerspace,  
4 on the seabed, on the hotline, on the ABMs, on the NPT, on  
5 the partial test ban treaty. This list goes on and on and on.

6 It doesn't mean that the other side -- maybe our  
7 side too -- wasn't trying to get around them and do things  
8 that weren't quite prohibited by the treaties, and so on.  
9 It does mean that political leaders, for what they can, were  
10 acting with their suspicions and their paranoias and the  
11 reality of a manichaeistic world. We are still trying  
12 to search for peace.

13 I recommend to you Kant's essay on  
14 perpetual peace. You will see that in those days -- 1798, or  
15 whatever -- he was seeking for some of the things. We've  
16 made a lot of progress in peace, in peace research. It can  
17 be argued that we've made a lot of progress in weapons of  
18 destruction.

19 Q. Could I just understand? The sense of what  
20 you've told us this afternoon, as I understand it, is that you  
21 feel you have accomplished, or that the events, the statements  
22 in Brussels and other things, have accomplished a good deal  
23 of what you set out to do by changing the trend line of  
24 dialogue. The question on my mind is: are you satisfied  
25 with this, and are you going to continue? Or do you feel that

- 28 -

1 | you have done enough?

2 |           A. I am going to continue at least to Moscow,  
3 | and I am going to continue, as I said earlier, to monitor the  
4 | Stockholm thing. I am going to make sure that I continue at  
5 | least on the ASAT initiatives.

6 |           But if you had asked me that question back in  
7 | '78, when I talked about the concept of suffocation at the  
8 | United Nations special session on disarmament, I probably  
9 | would have given you the same answer. But there was also the  
10 | second oil shock then, and there was also the patriation of  
11 | the Constitution, and there was also our energy policy. And,  
12 | you know, I don't think any leader can do only one thing. So  
13 | I'm not giving you an undertaking to spend as much time over  
14 | the next twelve months on visiting various NATO and non-  
15 | aligned leaders and Warsaw Pact leaders as I have in the past  
16 | three or four months.

17 |           Q. Are you satisfied that you have gone as far  
18 | as you can go?

19 |           A. I am not satisfied. I am very pleasantly  
20 | surprised and almost amazed that it worked so well in  
21 | Brussels. I think I am a little amazed, too, that in New  
22 | Delhi there was not only such vocal support for my initiative  
23 | but a great deal of volunteering: "If you want us to join you  
24 | and move around in the various capitals, just call on us and  
25 | we'll do it."

- 29 -

1  
2 I still think Gil has left us with the ultimate  
3 question. I would like to try and maybe add one or more further,  
4 because, if you are thinking that way, we will have  
5 nightmares and be very sad. I think we have -- we have  
6 made some progress. And when I talk of the partial test ban  
7 treaty, it is something. It is not as good as a total test  
8 ban treaty, but it is something. And I do not think it is  
9 impossible to get both sides to agree to suffocating the  
10 technology to prevent us to destabilize from outerspace.

11 The worries are there. You can have them. I  
12 don't think they should be fairly put only onto what is  
13 happening in this town. As I say, there are scientists not  
14 only here and in Moscow but there are a lot of scientists in  
15 other countries who are thinking about these things and  
16 worrying about them.

17 THE PRESS SECRETARY: Thank you very much.  
18  
19

20 - 30 -  
21  
22  
23  
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*File*

TO/À APN/N. Valentine.

FROM/DE • IDDZ

REFERENCE • Valentine/Connick telecon of December 14  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Support staff for Task Force  
SUJET

Security/Sécurité
<b>Unclassified</b>
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
<b>December 15, 1983</b>
Number/Numéro
<b>IDDZ-0299</b>

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

ETN/Lonergan

IDR/Johnston

As explained to you in telephone conversation under reference, it is expected that the Task Force will continue to be in operation until the end of January 1984. It is therefore requested that arrangements be made to have the following temporary agency personnel extended until approximately the end of January:

OCE-2 Operator from Quantum Management Services

SCY-2 from Barbara Personnel Inc.

2. The coding for the above staff is 014-186-186-000-2301.

L. A. Delvoie  
Chairman  
Task Force Working Group



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

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REF OURTEL 0295 15DEC SCRAM/MC NEE BEATTIE/MC NEE TELCONS 15DEC

---VISIT OF RT HON JOE CLARK

MR CLARK AGREES TO PROPOSED ROUND TABLE MTG WITH IISS 19 DEC 12:00HRS AND TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY BEATTIE. ALSO, HE ~~IS PLEASED~~ AGREED TO IDEA OF BEATTIE HOSTING LUNCH FOR HIM WITH IISS FLWG MTG. HIS NEXT APPT IS 1500 HRS WITH CARRINGTON TO WHICH MR CLARK WILL GO ALONE.

2. MR CLARK S OFFICE ASK IF A MTG MIGHT BE SET UP AT HIGHCOM MON MORNING, PERHAPS AT 10:45 OR 11:00 AM, WITH SENIOR POLITICAL OFFICERS, PRESUMABLY TO DISCUSS BRIT PERSPECTIVE ON ~~EAST-WEST REL'N, BRIT UNCLEAR DETERRENT~~ <sup>SECURITY</sup> AND DISARMAMENT. (MR CLARK HAS BEEN BRIEFED ON PM INITIATIVE BY DMF AND SMITH OF TASK FORCE). IN ABSENCE OF HIGHCOMMER, <sup>MIGHT DEPUTY HIGHCOMMER</sup> CHAIR MTG? MR CLARK COULD THEN GO DIRECT TO IISS.

3. RE RAMPHAL: NOW THAT MR CLARK ARRIVES IN LDN SAT MORNING HE ASKS IF YOU COULD CHECK IF RAMPHAL COULD MEET HIM SAT AFTERNOON (MR CLARK DOES NOT KNOW WHEN RAMPHAL IS LEAVING LDN).

4. GRATEFUL YOU ADVISE BY 16 1200HRS OUR TIME.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
 SIS J. McNEE	IDDZ	5-5912	 SIG L.A. DELVOIE



MESSAGE

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---GENEV VISIT: RT HON JOE CLARK  
RE PARA 2 REFTTEL, MR CLARK AGREES TO PROPOSED WORKING LUNCHEONS 20  
AND 21DEC.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

J. MCNEE

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE



MESSAGE

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SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ

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REF BEATTIE/McNEE TELCON 15DEC

---VISIT OF RT HON JOE CLARK

TO CONFIRM REFTEL CON, MORNING 19DEC MR CLARK WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH  
BRITISH EXPERTS IN STRATEGIC FIELD. GRATEFUL YOU TRY TO ARRANGE AN  
APPT WITH LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, PROF OF WAR STUDIES, KINGS COLLEGE, UNIV.  
OF LDN. IF FRIEDMAN UNAVAILABLE, TRY FOR IISS, ROBERT ONEIL.

2. MR. CLARK DEPARTS LDN MON 19DEC SA 837 19:00 HRS.

3. HAVE EXPLAINED THAT BEATTIE WILL MEET MR. CLARK AND THAT HIGH COM  
WILL ALSO PROVIDE TRANSPORT FOR MON MTGS AND TO AIRPORT FOR DEPARTU-  
RE.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

SIG J. McNEE

DIVISION/DIRECTION

IDZ

TELEPHONE

5-5912

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG L.A. DELVOIE

*ba*



MGIC M-FILE DIARY

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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14 DEC 83 23 12 28 Z 10

SECURITY /  
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FM EXTOTT IDDZ0288 15DEC83  
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REF YOURTEL YJGR1397 OF 09DEC  
---PRIME MINISTERS INITIATIVE: ~~DANISH VIEW~~  
GRATEFUL YOU CONFIRM THAT YOU REC'D ORIGINAL LET OF 25 OCT SIGNED  
BY PM TO DANISH PM SCHLUTER.


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DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

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SIG

  
J. McNEE

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

  
L.A. DELVOIE

MF 15 dec.

DRAFT

CONFIDENTIAL

P RESIDENTIAL ADDRESS - RBR ANALYSIS

President Reagan's address on East-West relations represents a new and positive approach by his Administration to East-West relations.

Having established his credentials with the USA public and the world-at-large as a no-nonsense leader determined to reassert American primacy in international affairs; having restored <sup>in</sup> ~~if~~ his view, Americans respect for themselves; and having set the course for a militarily strong USA, the President now finds it politically feasible and perhaps necessary to begin to establish his credentials as a statesman and an international leader of responsibility.

The tone of his speech is <sup>largely</sup> conciliatory and the substance offers hope for a reduction in East-West tension. He repeats <sup>his well-known and long-standing position on major areas of difference but does not</sup> belabour them.

The President proposes to work with the USSR to improve three problem areas:

1. to find ways to reduce the threat and use of force;
2. to find ways to reduce armaments stock piles;
3. to establish a better working relationship.

The President admits that success in these three ~~problem~~ areas will be slow and that the USA, in the search for better dialogue will not ignore the problem areas between them. He notes that Soviet <sup>behaviour and its</sup> compliance with existing agreements <sup>are matters</sup> is an <sup>area of</sup> ~~area~~ <sup>continuing</sup> concern, <sup>in</sup> but in spite of ~~USA~~ concerns about Soviet

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CONFIDENTIAL

actions ~~and~~ <sup>behavior</sup>, he describes his commitment to dialogue as "firm and unshak~~e~~<sup>able</sup>". <sup>R</sup> ~~He~~ <sup>The President also</sup> reaffirms USA support for the "Zero option" in an effort to eliminate "an entire class of nuclear arms". <sup>This proposal, already rejected by the Soviets, is</sup> ~~Presumably that could mean the elimination of cruise and Pershing II missiles as well although he does~~ <sup>likely to raise the charge that Reagan speaks of peace but is doing</sup> ~~no real flexibility in the search for it.~~ <sup>not say so.</sup>

The President emphasizes the importance of improving the dialogue with the USSR. He notes that Shultz will be meeting with Gromyko in Stockholm and that the USA remains ready to resume negotiations at Geneva and Vienna, <sup>he</sup> ~~But~~ made no mention of a possible summit meeting or that it could be part of his future considerations.

President Reagan stated that the USA does not threaten the Soviet Union. He foresees a relationship based on:

1. credible deterrence
2. peaceful competition
3. constructive cooperation.

He places responsibility for peace in Soviet hands, claiming that if "the Soviet Government wants peace then there will be peace". In other words, our hands are clean, it is up to the Soviet Union to take the next step.

The speech has the usual simplistic and at times rhetorical approach to East-West relations that the President likes to employ. But this time, the tone is new and the

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emphasis quite clearly is on dialogue and cooperation. It is an important step for the President. He is responding to a national perception that strength must be balanced with responsibility. But it also involves political risks. The right wing of the country may feel that he has deserted their interests in order to prepare for the next election. The Soviet public reaction will likely be negative claiming that it represents no change in USA strategy or thinking.

The President will likely receive strong support from pro-Western circles outside the USA for his address. On the short term, he will have to be encouraged to maintain his positive <sup>tone</sup> and approach <sup>with</sup> in the face of hostile Soviet rhetoric. He should be encouraged to <sup>maintain visible and strong commitment</sup> show strength for peace through this important period of <sup>possible</sup> transition in USA-USSR relations and to look for quiet signals from the Soviets as tests <sup>they</sup> of Western interest in improving relations. The Soviet Union will not be sure how to handle this change of approach. They will wish to gauge the waters deeply before they even consider a jump into these new waters.

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SPEECH NOTES

The President of the United States has described 1984 as "a year of opportunities for peace". In saying this, he reflects the aspirations not only of the American people but of all mankind.

If, in the past few months, I have had any message to carry, it is that national leaders have a responsibility to ensure through strong political action that <sup>no</sup> opportunities are not lost in the search ~~to find ways~~ to build trust and remove misunderstanding. President Reagan's remarks have demonstrated that he is prepared to seize that responsibility and work in practical ways to improve not just the tenor but the very substance of East-West relations.

As the President has indicated, it is essential that leaders of East and West alike begin concrete steps to move to a more constructive form of dialogue and I applaud his ~~very~~ positive approach to a new relationship with the USSR.

*MR SMITH*

*MASTER FILE*

TO/À . . . . . IDDZ

FROM/DE . . . . . RBR

*Should we respond the next time Mr Jaeger calls?*

REFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • American "non-paper" on PM Trudeau's  
SUJET • Meeting in Tokyo with Georgi Arbatov

Security/Sécurité
<b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
December 15, 1983
Number/Numéro
RBR-0814

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

Bob Feron of the American Embassy left the attached "non-paper" with me on December 15. I mentioned that, to the best of my knowledge, the alleged Arbatov complaint never happened. He mumbled that the State Department had raised it with our Embassy in Washington and that he was merely passing on the paper. To my query whether he had raised the matter with one of the participants (eg. Smith/Pearson), he was evasive, replying that any contact with IDDZ would be done by Mr. Jaeger.

*R.R. Halpin*  
R.R. Halpin,  
USSR and Eastern Europe  
Relations Division

2. IN HIS ALLEGATION THAT HE IS CURRENTLY "PERSONA NON GRATA" IN THE US, GEORGIY ARBATOV INDULGED IN HYPERBOLE AND A LESS THAN ACADEMIC REGARD FOR ACCURACY. ARBATOV HAS APPLIED FOR VISAS TO THE US TWICE IN 1983. IN APRIL HE WAS AUTHORIZED A VISA FOR A 20-DAY VISIT TO ATTEND THE DARTMOUTH CONFERENCE AND VISIT VARIOUS UNIVERSITIES AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS. WHEN THE VISA WAS ISSUED, HE WAS INFORMED THAT CONTACT WITH THE MEDIA WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE VISA WAS ISSUED. THIS RESTRICTION WAS IMPOSED TO DRAMATIZE THE GREAT IMBALANCE BETWEEN SOVIET ACCESS TO US MEDIA AND ACCESS BY US SPOKESMEN TO SOVIET MEDIA.

3. ARBATOV IN AUGUST PROPOSED TO VISIT THE US STARTING SEPTEMBER 29 TO ATTEND A MEETING OF THE AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES (ACLS)/SOVIET ACADEMY OF SCIENCES COMMISSION ON THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES AND TO HAVE PRIVATE MEETINGS AND INTERVIEWS. BEFORE HE SUBMITTED A VISA APPLICATION THE SOVIET UNION SHOT DOWN KAL 007, CREATING AN ATMOSPHERE THAT THE ACLS CONSIDERED UNFAVORABLE FOR A MEETING ON SCHOLARLY COOPERATION. THE ACLS INFORMED ARBATOV IT WAS POSTPONING THE MEETING. ARBATOV DID NOT ELECT TO SUBMIT A VISA APPLICATION TO PURSUE THE OTHER PARTS OF HIS PROPOSED PROGRAM. HE HAS NOT SUBMITTED ANY OTHER VISA APPLICATIONS OR, AS FAR AS WE ARE AWARE, DISCUSSED ANY PROPOSAL TO VISIT THE US WITH EMBASSY MOSCOW (WHICH MAY WISH TO COMMENT).

4. IN INFORMING TRUDEAU OF THE ABOVE, WE WOULD NOT WANT IN ANY WAY TO OBSCURE THE FACT THAT ARBATOV, AS A LEADING SOVIET PROPAGANDIST, AROUSES CONCERN WHENEVER HE PROPOSES TO VISIT THE US. HIS VISA APPLICATIONS ARE CONSIDERED AT SENIOR POLICY LEVELS. WE WILL NOT AUTOMATICALLY APPROVE HIS APPLICATIONS OR HIS PROPOSED ITINERARIES, BUT NEITHER WILL WE AUTOMATICALLY DENY THEM. OTHER MEMBERS OF THE USA/CANADA INSTITUTE REGULARLY RECEIVE VISAS.

5. IN ADDITION TO OUR UNHAPPINESS ABOUT THE IMBALANCE IN MEDIA ACCESS, WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE NUMBERS OF SERIOUS US STUDENTS OF SOVIET AFFAIRS WHO ARE REGULARLY REFUSED SOVIET VISAS WITHOUT EXPLANATION AND USUALLY WITHOUT ANY SUCCESSFUL RECOURSE. IF TRUDEAU PLANS TO CONTINUE DIALOGUE WITH AREATOV ON THIS TOPIC, WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO PROVIDE HIM WITH THE NAMES OF SOME OF THESE SCHOLARLY REFUSEES. WE FEEL SURE THAT THERE ARE CANADIAN SCHOLARS WHO HAVE THE SAME PROBLEM. ARBATOV'S SELF-PITY FOR HIS MINOR DIFFICULTIES WOULD GO DOWN BETTER IF HE SHOWED SOME SYMPATHY FOR WESTERN COLLEAGUES WHO FIND THEIR CAREERS AS SOVIET WATCHERS HINDERED BY INABILITY TO SEE THE USSR AT FIRST HAND.

Department of External Affairs



*Mr. Smith*  
*CC: IDA Done 21/12/83*  
*se*

Ministère des Affaires extérieures

Canada

OTTAWA,

December 15, 1983

Dr. W. Epstein,  
UNITAR,  
801 U.N. Plaza,  
New York, N.Y. 10017

~~Mr. Smith~~ *John*

Dear Dr. Epstein,

In following up your recent conversation with Dr. Blanchette I am unable to find any trace of a deliberate Canadian Government decision not to develop its nuclear bomb potential. During the Second World War this was not surprising as only a handful of people knew about it. The most that was discussed in cabinet was the development of atomic energy via Eldorado and Chalk River. At the time C.D. Howe and Mackenzie King considered that they were contributing to the development of an allied bomb to be deployed by U.S. or U.K. forces. Their natural abhorrence of its destructive power led to Canadian support of allied efforts to have an international control mechanism established.

The most direct statements about Canadian policy came from C.D. Howe. On December 3, 1945 he told the House of Commons (p.2824): "Canada has not been working on the development of the atomic bomb. It has been working on the development of atomic energy for peace-time purposes". Two days later he was again pressed on atomic energy questions to which he replied (p.2959): "We have not manufactured atomic bombs, we have no intention of manufacturing atomic bombs, and therefore I should not like to have it suggested that any great sums of money have been spent in that occupation". The subsequent debate (copy enclosed) on the Truman-Attlee-King statement of November 15, 1945 brought forth no further statements. The focus of the entire discussion was on international control. Because there was no political party objecting, no recorded vote was taken although Fred Rose might have voted against it had there been one.

Thereafter Parliament's attention was on international control and domestic development of atomic energy. When Bill 165 establishing the Atomic Energy Board was before the House in June 1946 there was no mention of Canada's role in the bomb. One might have expected to find further comment when it was announced that the Soviet Union had exploded a nuclear bomb or when the British began tests in Australia but none was forthcoming. When a committee was established to examine

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operations of AECB, C.D. Howe stated: "We in Canada are not engaged in military development, but the work that we are doing at Chalk River is of importance to military developments..." (p.2010, February 17, 1953).

My quick review of approximately twenty official files and the diaries of King and C.J. Mackenzie have turned up no other references. I have also talked with a number of diplomats who for one reason or another are knowledgeable about these matters and some scholars who have worked in related fields and they have all confirmed my suspicion that there was no deliberate decision made in secret or public on this matter. I am enclosing copies of some documents which will give you some additional background information. As for our policy while on the International Atomic Energy Commission (General McNaughton and George Ignatieff) you should consult volume 12 of Documents on Canadian External Relations that I am sure can be found in your library or at our mission. The proceedings of the Commission were published but these are more readily available to you in New York than to me in Ottawa. I read two years of debates without finding any reference to what you want. One can draw many inferences from these discussions but thinking was all on international control. We could not afford to develop a bomb in any case.

I have also looked into Green's subsequent statement and found that it was made without reference to any government policy decision.

Unfortunately, to go any deeper would require an enormous amount of work. Neither the King nor the Mackenzie diaries are indexed. I could only check the entries surrounding events or meetings which I thought may have led to some comment. Our main file on the control of Atomic Energy (7949-A-40) has sixteen 2-inch thick volumes covering the period 1945 to 1951 and there are another two dozen files on various aspects of atomic energy. I have found nothing in my examination of about 2000 pages of this material. It would require a much more systematic review to rule out all possibility of a decision on the bomb but I would not hold out any prospects based on what I found. Should you wish to see this voluminous material we could make it available to you here in Ottawa. In the meantime I hope that my selection will help you. In particular, note pp.5-6 of Charles Ritchie's memo of September 8, 1945 on control, the Canadian draft of the agreement on tube alloys (October 1945) and the memo on Attlee's letter of September 25, 1945.

This is a fascinating story. It would take much work to tell it in full as you are no doubt aware from the writings of Eayrs and Holmes but I hope the enclosed documents will start you on your way.

With best wishes.

*D.M. Page*

D.M. Page,  
Acting Director,  
Historical Division

**STATEMENTS BY PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU AND PRESIDENT REAGAN, FOLLOWING  
THEIR MEETING IN WASHINGTON, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1983**

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**DÉCLARATIONS FAITES PAR LE PREMIER MINISTRE DU CANADA ET LE PRÉSIDENT  
DES ÉTATS-UNIS, M. RONALD REAGAN À LA SUITE DE LEUR RENCONTRE À  
WASHINGTON, LE JEUDI 15 DÉCEMBRE 1983**

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PRESIDENT REAGAN -- The Prime Minister and I have just concluded a very useful and a wide-ranging discussion of some of the most crucial issues that are facing the people of Canada, the United States and, indeed, facing people everywhere.

Prime Minister Trudeau briefed me on his recent discussions with leaders in Europe and Asia, on his concerns for world peace, disarmament and improving the East-West dialogue. We fully share the concerns for peace which the Prime Minister has expressed. We appreciate his strong statements supporting the joint efforts of the western allies to negotiate meaningful arms reductions and to promote dialogue with other nations.

I thank you, Mr. Prime Minister, for coming here, sharing your ideas with us. We wish you God's speed in your efforts to help build a durable peace.

PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU -- Thank you. You have just heard the President supported what is known as my peace initiative; but I think he did more than support it. I think he has been showing, through his administration in the past months at least, that, as far as we are concerned on the NATO side, we want to change the trend line. We want to make it clear not only that the Alliance is strong; that it will defend itself; that it will not be intimidated; but that it is also pursuing peace.

If I were to tell you for instance that the President agrees that we should not seek military superiority in NATO, we should seek a balance; that we do not think that a nuclear war can be won; that we think that the ideal would be to see an end to all nuclear arms -- it might come as news, at least to some of the press in Canada, because we have not been hearing that.

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But this is what the President said at the Diet in Japan and this is what our foreign ministers said just a few days ago in Brussels -- that we respect each other's legitimate security interests. Whether this is news or not, I don't know; but this, at least in perception, is the complete change of a trend line which I saw when I embarked on my initiative several months ago; one which was going downwards rather than upwards, which was, to use Carrington's phrase, characterized by megaphone diplomacy. In Brussels last week, there was no megaphone diplomacy. There was a call for dialogue, repeated two or three times in the message and in the communiqué.

So I am grateful -- not that I have said anything new this morning -- but I am grateful that I was able to hear from the President of the United States, the leader of the Alliance, that these are not just words; that these correspond to the intention of the Alliance, and that the other side can know -- the Warsaw pact can know -- that we are not trying to be superior. We are trying to recognize their legitimate security interests. We just want them to realize we want to be at least equal, on balance, and that they should recognize ours. And I think this is a great step forward.

I say nothing -- though maybe I will say something -- about the decision of NATO to send Foreign ministers to Stockholm. This is really stating that the politicians are taking hold of the peace issue. It is no longer for the nuclear accountants. It is for the political leaders themselves.

En français, en deux mots. Je pense que vous avez entendu ce que j'ai dit. J'ai en réalité cité les déclarations de Bruxelles des ministres des Affaires étrangères, les paroles du Président comme quoi il ne voulait pas qu'il y ait de guerre nucléaire et ne croyait pas qu'une guerre nucléaire puisse être gagnée. Ce sont des déclarations importantes. Elles confirment l'intention des hommes politiques de s'attaquer aux problèmes de la paix et de les poursuivre. Voilà.

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*Handwritten signature*  
SECRET - CEO

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU AND  
PRESIDENT REAGAN IN THE OVAL OFFICE AT THE WHITE HOUSE  
ON THURSDAY, DECEMBER 15 FROM 11:00 A.M. TO 12:10 P.M.

BACKGROUND:

In pursuit of his Peace Initiative, Mr. Trudeau determined in late October to visit a variety of world leaders, including the Heads of Government of the 5 nuclear powers, and wrote to all NATO leaders and subsequently to Mr. Andropov, Chairman Deng and Prime Minister Nakasone to outline his concerns and explain his purpose.

In a letter to President Reagan Mr. Trudeau indicated he hoped to pay an early visit to Washington to discuss his initiative. In a much anticipated - principally by the United States Embassy in Ottawa through ill-informed public speculation - reply, the President agreed it would be useful to meet but was not specific regarding dates.

During the Prime Minister's trip to the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in New Delhi and, one suspects particularly following Mr. Trudeau's sudden visit to Peking, the State Department, through the United States Embassy in Ottawa, began to discuss possible dates in the pre-Christmas period. The day following Mr. Trudeau's return to Canada on December 5, a one-hour meeting was fixed with the President for 11:00 A.M. on Thursday, December 15.

That meeting in fact ended at 12:10 P.M. and was followed by statements to the press by both the President and Mr. Trudeau on the South lawn of the White House. Attached are transcripts of those statements. Following the meeting with the President, Secretary Shultz hosted a luncheon for Messrs Trudeau and MacEachen at Blair House. After the luncheon, the Prime Minister met with a variety of senior editors (see attached list) at the Residence. In the evening, Mr. Trudeau called on the Vice-President at his home where there was a brief photo opportunity following which the Vice-President invited the Prime Minister and Mr. MacEachen to a private dinner. At 7:00 A.M. on Friday, December 16, the Prime Minister was interviewed live for about 10 minutes in the Washington studio of ABC on "Good Morning America", following which he returned to Canada.

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SECRET - CEO

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PURPOSE:

By his own definition, the "first stage" of the Prime Minister's Peace Initiative ended with his meeting of Premier Zhou Ziang and Chairman Deng Xiaoping in Peking on November 29. At that point he had met with a number of European leaders and with the 3 minor nuclear powers. Clearly the next phase was to meet with the 2 superpowers. The Prime Minister's Initiative had benefited greatly from the rather considerable support he had received during his visit to 6 European capitals from November 7 to 11 and particularly from the "Goa Declaration" (which specifically offered support and encouragement to Mr. Trudeau's Initiative) which was issued by Heads of Government during the Commonwealth meeting in India (November 23-30/83). His Initiative attracted considerable further support when NATO Foreign Ministers adopted on November 9 a communiqué and declaration which supported many of the Prime Minister's general and particular purposes (e.g. raising the level of representation to Ministerial level for the opening of the "Conference on Disarmament in Europe" in Stockholm and a commitment to forcefully pursue MBFR negotiations in Vienna).

DK cum SDH

The Prime Minister was pleased that the President would accord him an hour to discuss the Initiative in the busy pre-Christmas period and appreciated the fact that the President had agreed to join the Prime Minister in making 'departure statements' at the conclusion of the meeting. It was clear that some measure of public support by the President of the Prime Minister's Peace Initiative was not only vital to its success and to keeping the momentum alive over the relatively slow holiday period but also to the likely success of the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow. Thus Mr. Trudeau hoped to convince the President that the Initiative was in no way aimed against or inimical to the interests of the United States, that it sought to help the United States and, indeed, the NATO Alliance in promoting the fact that the West was steadfastly and relentlessly searching for peace in a time of increased crisis and tension and that the current climate of mistrust and misunderstanding could usefully be alleviated by a clear enunciation of Alliance purposes and objectives, particularly were such reassurance offered by the President of the United States as leader of the Atlantic Alliance.

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SECRET - CEO

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SUMMARY:

... In this the seventh meeting between Prime Minister Trudeau and President Reagan, the Prime Minister achieved all of his objectives. In fact, from the attached transcripts of the public statements made by the President and the Prime Minister following the meeting, it will be clear that the Prime Minister has, through this meeting, achieved almost all he set out to demonstrate publicly that the West, led by the United States, is deeply and genuinely interested in peace, in lowering tensions and changing the trend in relations between East and West in eschewing 'megaphone diplomacy' and, above all, in re-invigorating the search for peace by interjecting, at the highest level, the senior statesmen of the Western Alliance into the search for peace.

OVERVIEW:

... As noted in his meeting with senior editors on Thursday afternoon (a full transcript of that meeting is attached) the Prime Minister explained that he had told the President that while the Reagan Administration had been particularly effective at sending a number of complex and important signals to the world, and particularly to the Soviet Union, it had not managed to convey the impression either to the Eastern Block or the NATO allies that the current United States Government was concerned about the current state of East-West tension or genuinely interested in promoting peace. Trudeau told Reagan that under the President's stewardship, America's faith in itself, in its purposes and values had been restored. The economy had been returned to robust and even enviable health. USA military power and effectiveness had been enhanced and successfully projected thereby raising faith in the strength and commitment of the leadership of the Western Alliance. However, neither the Canadian people at large, nor many peoples in Europe, nor even significant sectors of American public opinion - as seen from Canada - considered that the pursuit of peace was a high priority of this Administration. Certainly, the Soviets did not get that impression. There had, Trudeau stressed, been important new signals in the very recent past. One example was the landmark address to the Japanese Diet in which, inter alia, Reagan had stated that a nuclear war could never be won, that he hoped nuclear weapons might be banished from the face of the earth, and that he hoped to achieve significant arms reductions in a spirit of compromise. Another signal of change in this regard was the NATO November 9 communiqué which had indicated that NATO Foreign Ministers would attend the CDE, that the Alliance's negotiating position with regard to MBFR would be renewed, and that the NATO Council would review East-West relations generally.

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The NATO declaration which had stressed mutual respect for legitimate security interests, had reiterated belief in genuine détente and had called for a constructive East-West relationship based on equilibrium, moderation and reciprocity, had been particularly welcomed in this regard. That it also had eschewed aspirations of military superiority was even more heartening.

These events had suggested, the Prime Minister allowed, that his Initiative was all but complete. He had achieved, he thought, most of what he had set out to do. The change in tone of American rhetoric and indeed of Alliance rhetoric would, he believed, tend to change the trend line. A direct personal involvement of President Reagan and Secretary Shultz in the search for a better East-West relationship was precisely the sort of injection of political will he had been advocating. Thus he would go to Moscow - if indeed the state of Soviet leadership permitted such a visit - confident in the knowledge that the United States would engage itself sincerely in any genuine negotiation aimed at lessening tension and increasing security at lower levels of armament.

REPORT:

At the meeting in the White House, the President was accompanied by Vice-President Bush, Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, National Security Adviser Bud McFarlane, Assistant Secretary of State Rick Burt, and a couple of White House officials. Mr. Trudeau was accompanied by Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs Allan MacEachen, Ambassador Gotlieb and Robert Fowler.

After the third wave of photographers had been ushered from the Oval office, the President said how pleased he was that the Prime Minister was able to accept his invitation to come to Washington to speak of his Peace Initiative and the results of his recent travel.

Mr. Trudeau thanked the President for this opportunity and for his hospitality. He said he had not come to Washington to talk of the details of nuclear accounting or indeed of grand strategy. Rather he had come to speak of politics; from one politician to another. The Prime Minister noted the President had sent some very strong signals to the Soviet Union; signals which indicated the West was strong and was confident. Reagan, Trudeau said, had demonstrated the health and resilience of our economic system. He had effectively transmitted the fact that the confidence, reputation and military strength of America would be fully restored. He had re-invigorated the Atlantic Alliance and restored unity to NATO's deliberations and sense of purposes.

SECRET - CEO

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Trudeau also noted that only a few weeks ago the President had made an extremely significant statement before the Japanese Diet in which he had been clear and explicit regarding the fact that the United States did not believe a nuclear war could be won, that nuclear weapons should be banished and that the United States was committed to arms reductions. This had been a speech, the Prime Minister said, about peace and about peaceful intentions but these signals had not been generally received or understood.

Mr. Trudeau noted that Messrs MacEachen and Shultz had managed to craft some further strong peaceful signals at the recently concluded NATO ministerial meeting and had managed to include them in the NATO communiqué and Brussels declaration. The Prime Minister said he thought it was extremely significant that these documents had been able to publicly affirm the need for both East and West to respect each other's legitimate security interests; that they had reiterated NATO's belief in genuine détente, and that they had stressed a commitment to balanced nuclear strength and eschewed all notion of superiority. These were strong signals he said, signals which were timely and vital but signals which must be understood.

Mr. Trudeau stressed that he hoped the President would correct him if he were improperly understanding or interpreting Mr. Reagan's words or intentions but from Mr. Trudeau's perspective, there was a clear message in recent American statements and actions and it was a message which few - particularly not the East - had picked up.

The Prime Minister noted that Mr. MacEachen had spoken of the generalized belief widely held at last week's NATO meeting, that the world was in a state of crisis. Certainly, he said, that was the perception of the 48 Heads of Government who had met recently at the Commonwealth meeting in New Delhi. Indeed, that was the perception of the Canadian Church leaders with whom the Prime Minister had lunched yesterday. But, Trudeau noted, none of these concerned opinion leaders had heard of the President's Diet speech; none had received this new signal.

If he was indeed interpreting correctly these American signals, the Prime Minister said that his job, with regard to the Peace Initiative, was 9/10th complete if he could go to Moscow and say that NATO, and the President of the United States, are not the least interested in achieving nuclear superiority, that NATO, and the President of the United States, accept the Soviet Union's legitimate security interests and that, given the fact that we hold firmly to the belief that a nuclear war could

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never be won, the Alliance is committed to achieving significant results at the negotiating table.

His whole purpose, the Prime Minister said, was to put a stop to what Carrington had called "megaphone diplomacy". In launching the Initiative, Trudeau said, he had sought to remove responsibility from the purview of "nuclear accountants" and restore it to those who had the political responsibility for the outcome. He had sought to change the rhetoric and thereby to change the trend line in superpower relations.

Now, the Prime Minister said, NATO had issued a statement which answered most of these concerns. There would be a high level presence at the CDE. The MBFR negotiations were on the right track ("if I combine what you said in your letter - to me yesterday with what was said about MBFR in the NATO communiqué"). Clearly, the United States was now no longer speaking of nuclear superiority "if, indeed, you ever were". The key negotiations are now firmly in the hands of the leaders of the Alliance, the Prime Minister allowed, and no longer the problems of technicians.

If the Warsaw Pact countries did not participate in the Stockholm meeting (opening of the CDE on January 17), then the error would be theirs. The Prime Minister thought they would indeed participate but if they did not, the West would have scored a major propaganda victory.

President Reagan assured the Prime Minister that he had made comments such as those made in the Japanese Diet on other occasions and that he would continue to make such statements. Certainly, like a good advertising slogan, they could never be repeated enough. However, he was dismayed - but did not disagree - that such signals had not in fact been received or even picked up. The President credited this fact to a worldwide campaign of Soviet propaganda. Regarding the disinclination of North American media to report such statements, the President said that many North American journalists only saw what they wanted to see; only printed that which conformed to their pre-conceived impressions.

The Prime Minister wondered whether it was enough simply to blame the press (although, he said, he was perfectly prepared to do so when they didn't interpret him correctly). Was there not, he asked, more the President could say?

Secretary Shultz said he would like to take a stab at answering the Prime Minister's question as to why such peaceful signals had not been received in Moscow. At the outset, however,

SECRET - CEO

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he agreed that indeed they had not been received by the Soviets. The Soviets, however, through misguided policy or lack of leadership, seemed almost incapable of changing tactics and strategy. A few years back they had set themselves the task of stopping INF deployments. They had not succeeded but they kept trying. He said they seemed to have decided that their best continuing tactic would be to continue to sow a sense of crisis and unease in the West. In view of the fact that this tactic had only resulted in a firm commitment to deploy and in greater Alliance cohesion than ever before, Shultz said he did not see how the Soviets could consider such tactics to be bearing fruit but the fact remained they continued to pursue such tactics. Through such tactics they had tried and failed to defeat Helmut Kohl, and to de-stabilize the Williamsburg Summit.

Shultz believed the Soviets still seemed to consider they could "scare us to death".

However, the Secretary of State noted that he considered the principal source of public unease to be the current situation in the Middle East rather than lack of progress on arms control question on which there was relative silence. The Soviets seemed equally preoccupied with the Middle East and not terribly concerned, following deployment, with the state of disarmament negotiations. Noting that the last SALT offer made by the Americans had been balanced and sincere, Shultz pointed out that the Soviets simply had not bothered to respond. In sum, the Secretary noted, we in the West simply didn't know very much about the current state of Soviet leadership; about what motivated it, what its priorities were or indeed, who - representing what constituencies - were in charge. /At this point, and at subsequent points, both during the meeting and at lunch, the Secretary seemed to be suggesting - although rarely explicitly - that the Americans would appreciate picking up from Mr. Trudeau's eventual visit to Moscow, any information which might help them to assess what currently made the Soviets run\_7.

The President interjected that the Soviets also had shown no interest in the genuine offer to entirely eliminate intermediate nuclear weapons from Europe; that as this was clearly so obviously a good and fair proposal the American side had been careful to leave it on the table.

At this point Secretary of Defense Weinberger also offered to try to answer the Prime Minister's question regarding non-receipt of peaceful signals in the Soviet Union. The Soviets, he considered, were totally preoccupied with de-coupling Europe from America. Thus they were not interested in receiving any signals which did not suit such a strategy. America had never

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SECRET - CEO

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sought nuclear superiority, Weinberger said. He also said that no American had ever suggested that was the case. The Reagan Administration had simply sought to restore the nuclear balance, which, they believed, had become badly eroded. Of course, nuclear war was not winnable, Weinberger insisted, and therefore should never be fought.

President Reagan interjected that this message was not picked up simply because it didn't fit the perception of others of his image.

Prime Minister Trudeau agreed this was exactly the problem but not the whole problem. The strength of our democracies allowed a number of officials and politicians to voice publicly views which were not always widely shared or shared at the top in any government. Certainly, Trudeau insisted, there had been statements from prominent Americans (but not, he allowed, from the President) which suggested conclusions other than the affirmations made in the Diet and just reiterated by Casp Weinberger.

Trudeau referred to the deep seated sense of Russian paranoia and the fact that 3 years ago the Reagan Administration was dealt a set of cards over which they had little or no control. They had not participated in NATO's two-track decision nor had they contributed to what Mr. Weinberger had suggested was the erosion of American military power. Trudeau suggested that Reagan, as a consummate politician, had realized that the American people needed an infusion of strength and confidence in order that America might fill its leadership role. However, the moves that Reagan had had to take to restore strength and confidence had only fuelled Soviet paranoia. Not only were the Russians seared by the lessons of history, Trudeau suggested, they were deeply afraid of Western technology. No doubt, Trudeau suggested, the Soviets knew that free men fought better than those produced by the Soviet system.

It was vital, the Prime Minister insisted, that President Reagan be perceived by his Alliance partners as a man of peace but it was even more important that that perception be held in Moscow.

If, Trudeau suggested, at Stockholm, at Geneva and at Vienna, the West were seen to be seriously demonstrating a desire for peace, the Soviets would have no other option but to adapt their strategy to one of compromise. They could not afford the propaganda implications of doing otherwise.

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If he went to Moscow, Trudeau said, it would be to ease tensions. He would say to the Soviet leadership, "look at Reagan's Diet speech, look at the Brussels declaration and the NATO communiqué and look at the number of other statements by the President and other senior officials" and he would insist that these were genuine and significant and worthy of serious consideration by the Soviets.

At this point, Vice-President Bush said that he thought the President might usefully explain to the Prime Minister what was really behind the high space proposal.

President Reagan noted that the idea had been first mooted in a meeting of the joint Chiefs of Staff. The President had asked his military advisers whether it would not be possible to develop a weapon which would rather than make the missiles of the other side obsolete "just make it impossible for their missiles to get here". Were such a weapon to be developed, the President noted the Americans would have both their missiles and the capacity to stop enemy missiles from reaching American shores. Then America could say to the Soviets "look, we are fully capable of stopping yours so we're going to get rid of ours. Why don't you do the same?".

Secretary Weinberger insisted that this was indeed a noble prospect; "protecting our people rather than avenging them". It was a way, the Secretary of Defense insisted, "to free mankind from the tyranny of these weapons".

The Prime Minister noted that the Vice-President would remember the Prime Minister's reaction in Ottawa when Bush had spoken of the proposal when it was still not clear whether it would be included in the President's speech that same evening. At that time, Trudeau had insisted the scheme was potentially deeply de-stabilizing and he considered it remained so.

Bush pointed out that Helmut Schmidt's reaction had been along the lines of "well, if those are really your intentions...." but he had missed the point. There was no "if". Such indeed are American intentions as outlined by the President.

The Prime Minister said that he did not wish to discuss the proposal again in detail at this time but rather would wish to pursue his moratorium on high space weaponry in the appropriate fora.

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*strategy*

Mr. Trudeau said he wished to raise a delicate issue; an issue on which he did not expect the President to comment at this time. It was important, he considered, to look carefully at the strategic cards we have all been dealt over the past many years. NATO was, he said, saddled with certain strategic elements which clearly created some significant problems and he cited "non-first use" as one. Our NATO position, Trudeau said, was honest. The Soviet position, against first use, might or might not be honest. But surely NATO would eventually have to "get out from under our first use reliance". Clearly, he said, there was need for a new Harmel report.

President Reagan, referring perhaps to the earlier conversation, said that it was important to remember that every Russian leader had made clear that their goal was world revolution; that they would help revolution wherever it had occurred. He agreed with the Prime Minister that the Russians did feel constantly threatened and indeed history had taught them to feel so threatened. However, he considered there had in recent months been a rash of increasing strident and bellicose statements emerging from Soviet military leaders and he was disturbed by this turn of events.

Trudeau said "well why don't you test them?". The Prime Minister recalled that after speaking to Mrs. Thatcher on November 11 in London he had phoned the President before leaving for Japan to suggest that leaders might attend the opening of the CDE in Stockholm to bring home the sincerity with which the West is attracted to the principles which the President outlined in his Diet speech. He thought that this would be an occasion to bring the Soviet and American leaderships together but that whether or not this were the right venue, it would be extremely useful if the Soviets and the Americans could agree on certain fundamental principles; on the fact that neither was seeking nuclear superiority, only balance; on a number of further confidence-building measures. Such principles would be totally separate from on-going theatre or strategic negotiations. If the Soviet leadership refused to espouse such principles, there would be no doubt as to who was the worm under.

The danger of Summit meetings in general was that they led to expectations which could not be fulfilled. However, Trudeau said, such would not be the case were leaders to meet in Stockholm at the opening or in the early days of the disarmament conference. It would be too early for such expectations to have been nurtured. The Prime Minister asked the President to think about such a Summit meeting, perhaps in the Stockholm context, but stressed that he did not expect the President to answer or

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or to comment now. If such a meeting could be organized it would have a dramatic effect on the international climate, Trudeau insisted.

Regarding the specific proposals Trudeau had proposed in his letter to NATO leaders and in his travels, he reminded the President that the ASAT high space proposal "could be pursued in New York". On the 5-power proposal, most of those with whom he had spoken - including 3 nuclear powers - had said that eventually, following major reductions by the superpowers, it might make sense. Trudeau said he was not pushing this proposal, rather it was a way of putting pressure on the Soviets. In this regard, Trudeau said that such pressure had to be maintained on the Soviets. It was easy enough to put pressure on the Americans as our system allowed visits as the current meeting to take place and ideas to be exchanged freely. Regarding CDE and MBFR, the NATO meeting had dealt effectively with those proposals. On the matter of horizontal and vertical proliferation, efforts would continue, but the Prime Minister was not saying when great progress could be achieved.

President Reagan assured the Prime Minister that the Americans were trying to keep channels opened with the Soviets in every way. He reminded Trudeau that there had been "one President" who had proceeded to hold a Summit meeting without assuring useful results which had caused the people to be "terribly let down".

Reagan then proceeded to tell the Prime Minister /note: as he had done on at least 2 previous occasions 7 that from his hospital bed following the assassination attempt, Reagan had handwritten a personal letter to Brezhnev, reminding Brezhnev of an earlier meeting in California and telling him of the aspirations to peace, health, wealth and freedom to which all peoples everywhere aspired. In this letter Reagan had pointed out that no one wanted war and suggested they get together to discuss what clearly must be mutual and shared objectives. For a long time there had been no reply. Eventually he had received a typed, dry, bureaucratic and polemical reply.

Trudeau suggested he might try with Andropov.

Reagan quickly noted that he had done so in another personal letter. Shultz quickly interjected to say that this was not known outside very few people in the Administration and beseeched the Prime Minister to carefully protect this information. ///

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Reagan said he agreed with Trudeau that there had been far too much "front page diplomacy" between the super-powers. Nixon and Brezhnev had worked extremely effectively by working quietly. Nixon, in bringing home to Brezhnev the political realities of power broking in the United States, had been able to secure the emigration of over 40,000 Soviet Jews because Brezhnev had understood that he would have to appreciate Nixon's political needs as a basis for further action. He assured Trudeau that he would keep trying to forge an effective working relationship with the Soviet leadership.

In closing, Bud McFarlane said that if Trudeau were to go to Moscow it might be extremely useful if he could pick up whether or not Andropov had received the President's message. The Prime Minister said he would be happy to get such information; he would not, of course, indicate that he knew a letter had been sent nor would he have even raised it without American permission. He would of course report back with whatever information he was able to pick up.

At this point the meeting, having run 10 minutes longer than budgeted, ended and the President and Prime Minister proceeded to the podium at the diplomatic entrance where they made their departure statements.

Robert Fowler  
Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet  
(Foreign and Defence Policy)



*Mr. Smith  
Comments?  
MF*

TO/A : IDDZ (through IDD/Francis)  
FROM/DE : IDA

Security/Sécurité
RESTRICTED
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
28-7-5-1-2
Date
December 15, 1983
Number/Numéro
IDA-1425

REFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •  
SUJET • PM Initiative: Suggestion of possible additional mechanism for improving East-West and North-South Climate: An NSA Agreement

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

- ETN
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- DND/DNACPOL

Since 1979, the CD working group on Negative Security Assurances (NSA) has been seeking to elaborate a common formula to assure NNWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by NWS (copy of UNGA 38 brief on this subject is attached for your background info).

2. It is interesting to note that the Soviet UNGA 38 resolution on the subject, for the first time, does not insist on its usual "convention". This is a welcome development which might make it possible to reach some agreement in 1984 - this would be most helpful in the period leading up to NPTRC III.

3. The elusive search for a common formula of binding negative security assurances/guarantees is of vital concern to many NNA and is important in the context of NPT (which provides only "positive" not "negative" assurances). A common assurance, binding on all five NWS, in time for the third NPT Review Conference in 1985 would be a major and highly visible accomplishment.

4. You might wish to bear this development in mind for your future planning.

*O.A. Chistoff*  
O.A. Chistoff,  
Acting Director  
Arms Control &  
Disarmament Division

GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
38th Session, 1983  
First Committee  
Agenda Item 52 and 53

RESTRICTED  
M.R. Grinius  
IDA/6-6320  
Oct 7/83

52. CONCLUSION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE STRENGTHENING OF THE SECURITY OF NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES AGAINST THE USE OR THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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53. CONCLUSION OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS TO ASSURE NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES AGAINST THE USE OR THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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#### ISSUE

Negative security assurances/guarantees - elusive search for a common formula.

#### BACKGROUND

##### (a) In the General Assembly

##### (1) Item 52 (Soviet resolutions)

The item entitled "Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear states" was included in the agenda of UNGA 33 in 1978, at the request of the Soviet Union (A/33/241). At the session, the Assembly considered it necessary to take effective measures for the strengthening of the security of the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) through appropriate international arrangements; requested the Committee on Disarmament (CD) to consider, to that end, the drafts of an international convention on the subject, as well as proposals and suggestions concerning effective political and legal measures at the international level to assure the NNWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; and decided to include in the provisional agenda of UNGA 34 an item entitled "Strengthening of guarantees of the security of NNWS" (Resolution 33/72A). This resolution was adopted by a vote of 137 (Canada) -2 (China, Albania) - 4 (France, Pakistan, Somalia, Turkey).

At UNGA 34, in Resolution 34/84, the General Assembly, after welcoming the consideration by the CD of the item "Effective international arrangements to assure NNWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" and the establishment of an ad hoc working group to conduct negotiations on the subject, noted with satisfaction that in the

Committee there was no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention; requested the Committee to continue the negotiations on the subject on a priority basis during its 1980 session with a view to their early conclusion with the elaboration of a convention to assure NNWS against the use of threat of use of nuclear weapons, and decided to include in the provisional agenda of UNGA 35 an item entitled "Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of NNWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". Resolution 34/84 was adopted by a vote of 114 (Socialist, NNA) - 1 (Albania; China did not participate in the vote) - 25 (Barton Group, Austria, Brazil, Sweden, India).

At UNGA 35, in Resolution 35/154, the General Assembly, inter alia, welcomed the conclusion of the CD that there was continuing recognition of the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure NNWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; noted that in the CD there had been no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention; requested the CD to continue on a priority basis, during its session to be held in 1981, the negotiations on the question of strengthening of security guarantees of NNWS; called upon all NWS to make solemn declarations, identical in substance, concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons against NNWS having no such weapons on their territories, as a first step towards the conclusion of such an international convention; and recommended that the Security Council should examine declarations which might be made by NWS regarding the strengthening of security guarantees for NNWS and, if all these declarations were found consistent with the above mentioned objective, should adopt an appropriate resolution approving them. Resolution 35/154 was adopted by a vote of 110 - 2 (Albania, USA - China was absent during the vote) - 31 (rest of Barton Group, Austria, India, Israel, Sweden).

At UNGA 36, Resolution 36/94 was very similar in substance to Resolution 35/154. However, some new objectionable preambular language resulted in a shift of vote by most Barton Group countries from abstention to against. Resolution 36/94 was adopted by a vote of 115 - 17 (Barton Group less Greece, Ireland and Japan which abstained) - 12 (Austria, India, Israel, Sweden). China did not vote.

At UNGA 37, Resolution 37/80 was identical to its predecessor 36/94 except that it also included four new paragraphs condemning the first use of nuclear weapons and encouraging NNWS not to have nuclear weapons stationed within their territories. Voting results were 108 (Greece)

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- 17 (Barton Group less Ireland and Japan which abstained)
- 19.

(2) Item 53 (Pakistani resolutions)

This item was included in the agenda of UNGA 33 in 1978 at the request of Pakistan (A/33/241). At that session, the Assembly urged that efforts should be made to conclude effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure the NNWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, including consideration of an international convention and of alternative ways and means of achieving that objective, and decided to include in the provisional agenda of UNGA 34 an item entitled "Strengthening of the security of NNWS against the use of nuclear weapons" (Resolution 33/72B, adopted by a vote of 124 (Canada) -0-14 (USA, Socialists, Greece, India).

At UNGA 34, in Resolution 34/85, the General Assembly affirmed the conclusion of the CD that there was a wide recognition of the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure NNWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, noted with satisfaction that in the Committee there was no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention, recommended that the CD should conclude, during its 1980 session, effective international arrangements to assure NNWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; and decided to include in the provisional agenda of UNGA 35 an item entitled "Conclusion of an international convention to assure NNWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". Resolution 34/85 was adopted by a vote of 120 (Canada, Socialists, NNA, Spain, China, Turkey) - 0 - 22 (NATO less Canada and Turkey, Australia, Austria, India, Ireland, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden).

At UNGA 35, in Resolution 35/155, the General Assembly, inter alia, reaffirmed the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure NNWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; noted with satisfaction that in the CD there had been no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention to that end; appealed to all states, in particular the NWS, to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a common approach which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character; recommended that the CD should actively continue negotiations with a view to reaching agreement and concluding effective international arrangements during its next session to assure NNWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; and decided to include in the provisional agenda of UNGA 36

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item entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure NNWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". Resolution 35/155 was adopted by a vote of 121 - 0 - 24. Canada and Turkey were again the only NATO countries to vote for the resolution.

At UNGA 36, Resolution 36/95, in its final form, was an improvement on Resolution 35/155 - more balanced and objective. As a result, most Barton Group countries (for the first time) and several NNA joined Canada and Turkey in supporting the Pakistani resolution. Resolutions 36/95 was adopted by a vote of 145 - 0 - 3 (USA, UK, India).

At UNGA 37, Resolution 37/81 was identical to 36/95. It was adopted by a vote of 144 (Barton Group less UK, US) - 0 - 3 (India, UK, US).

(3) UNGA 34 USA resolution

In the course of its consideration of the item entitled "Strengthening of the security of NNWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", the General Assembly, in Resolution 34/86, after recalling that each of the five NWS had stated its willingness to take action to affirm its support for and to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure NNWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; welcomed the report of the CD on the subject; requested the CD to continue its efforts at its next session with a view to reaching agreement on arrangements to strengthen the security of NNWS and to report to UNGA 35; and decided to include in the provisional agenda of UNGA 35 an item entitled "Strengthening the security of NNWS". The resolution was adopted by a vote of 110 (Barton Group, Romania, China, most NNA) - 1 (Albania) - 29 (Socialists, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Brazil, Ghana, India). A similar resolution has not been tabled since UNGA 34.

(b) In the Committee on Disarmament

The Working Group on Negative Security Assurances (NSA), the only working group in the CD in 1979, one of four in 1980, 1981, 1982 and one of five in 1983 continues with its work.

In 1980 the unilateral assurances of the five NWS were dissected and analyzed; but the working group could not agree on a common single assurance since serious disagreements remain on both the substance and form of possible common approach. Furthermore, the supporters (USSR and

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Pakistan) and opponents (USA, UK, France) of an "international convention" have not budged from their respective positions. The report of the working group of the CD clearly demonstrated that no progress was made on this issue since the group's report of 1979.

In 1981 prolonged discussions took place on this subject and showed that it is illusory for the time being to expect the five NWS to agree on a common formula as a basis for a legally binding instrument that would guarantee NNWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by NWS. As the Chairman of the CD said in August 1981, "in our efforts to draft international arrangements to ensure NNWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, the Committee has not yet got beyond the pre-negotiating stage". The Group of 21, however, is unwilling to concede that there is a deadlock; accordingly they have not yet accepted the Dutch proposal of July 1981 that the Security Council be invited to adopt a resolution based on elements common to the five unilateral declarations of the NWS (in contrast to the Soviet proposal contained in Resolutions 35/154 and 36/94 that the Security Council would be asked to adopt a resolution approving the called for NWS declarations which should be identical in substance). Although the Dutch had emphasized that such a resolution would only be an interim measure pending further negotiations, and despite evidence that a Security Council resolution at least would be a measure of progress likely to offer a basis for the CD to continue negotiations, the Group of 21 holds the position that the CD must not give any impression that it is giving up on a "legally binding common formula".

In 1982, discussion continued on the idea of interim arrangements, particularly proposals for an appropriate Security Council resolution. The Netherlands and Pakistan submitted draft resolutions. The Dutch draft contained a "common formula" - an "understanding by the NWS not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any NNWS that has committed itself not to manufacture or receive nuclear weapons (or other nuclear explosive devices) or to acquire control over them, provided that state does not undertake, or partake in, an attack upon (the territory or the armed forces of) a NWS or its allies with the support of another NWS". Support for the Dutch initiative (which we supported) was luke-warm at best. The USSR continued to insist that any common formula must include the Soviet "non-stationing" provision, as suggested in their resolutions 35/154 and 36/94. The Pakistani draft was received even less enthusiastically than the Dutch text, particularly by NPT supporters like Canada. It called for an NSA to cover all

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NNWS "not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of the two major military alliances" - the NNWS would not be required to offer anything in return (i.e., a binding non-proliferation commitment). Most non-aligned delegations were not impressed with any of the proposed Security Council resolutions - stressing that any "interim arrangements" cannot be substitutes for an international convention or other instrument of a legally binding nature.

The impasse continued in 1983. The only consensus that could be reached was that in 1984 the Working Group should closely look at whether it has outlived its usefulness.

#### ANTICIPATED DEVELOPMENTS

It can be expected that the USSR and Pakistan will again table their respective resolutions.

#### CANADIAN POSITION

In recognition of the great importance that the Non-Aligned attach to this subject, and consistent with our non-proliferation objectives, Canada has taken and maintained a positive approach to this problem, despite the hortatory nature of the assurances involved. The proper place for an assurance of this nature would be as part of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but amendment of the Treaty in this sense is out of the question: the second NPT Review Conference in 1980 was unable to agree on a final declaration which might have encompassed stated assurances of this kind. We had been encouraging our allies, without success, to examine the possibility of an international convention incorporating the five unilateral pledges. At this point in time, however, it is highly unlikely that a convention could be concluded, unless the USSR agrees to amend its assurance to bring it more in line with those of the USA and UK (i.e., give up non-stationing provisions which the USSR continues to refuse to do).

At UNGA 35, in our explanation of vote (Canada and Turkey were the only NATO countries to support the Pakistani resolution), we said that although we agreed with the substance of the Pakistani draft, we continued to have some problems with it (as we did with the text submitted by Pakistan in 1979), namely, "the considerable extent to which it favours an international convention over other possible mechanisms". The original Pakistani draft at UNGA 36 was much stronger than the previous year's and would have warranted a change in our vote to an abstention, in good

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company. The original draft made a preambular reference to "the increasing danger of the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". It also went further than the previous year's in favouring an international convention (i.e. the Soviet approach) over possible mechanisms for a common NSA formula. The draft was substantially amended and considerably improved as a result of negotiations between the Pakistani and Dutch delegations. The final product was an objective and balanced resolution which represented a positive approach to this subject.

Canada, after having abstained on Soviet resolutions 34/84 and 35/154, voted against resolution 36/94 and 37/80 because the latter two contained new objectionable preambular language: a reference to the "increased danger of recourse to use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" was propagandistic, and a comment on "plans for further stationing of nuclear weapons" was clearly aimed at the NATO INF modernization decision of December 1979. As well the non-first use of nuclear weapons runs counter to stated NATO policy.

SOURCES OF FURTHER INFORMATION

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Arms Control and Disarmament

Visit of Church Leaders

December 14, 1983

Background Notes

Since the Prime Minister's meeting with Canadian church leaders on December 14, 1982 disarmament issues have continued to be major agenda items in various religious fora.

In the course of the year, the cruise missile issue has been a major cause for the high-level of church interest in disarmament issues. The cruise missile issue is, however, more of a symbolic, rather than substantive, focal point for Canadians who are concerned about the perceived shift in US strategic policies and, linked to this, the Canadian Government's moral complicity in escalating the arms race.

Various church groups continue to develop positions on specific aspects of Canadian Government arms control and disarmament policy. What is different from last year is that there is a more informed discussion of the issues, as was demonstrated at the Anglican Church Synod. Also, as indicated in the Canadian Churches Pastoral Letter of February 7, 1983, there is a recognition of the "ambiguities" in the position of the churches which criticizes the "nuclear umbrella" which protects us all. The Canadian churches have, overall, been relatively quiet compared to their outspokenness in 1982.

--- Notes on the positions of the various church groups are attached.

Ottawa, December 13, 1983

## ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

The Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops endorses those ideas found in the pastoral letter published by the US National Conference of Catholic Bishops in May 1983. This letter stresses the moral obligation to pursue peace. It condemns nuclear war and strongly opposes the first use of nuclear weapons while conditionally accepting the concept of deterrence. The letter recommends taking specific measures towards disarmament. These measures include a halt to new nuclear weapon systems, deep bilateral cuts in nuclear arsenals, a comprehensive test ban, limitations on short-range systems, better command and control of nuclear weapons, new efforts to prevent horizontal and vertical proliferation and mutual reductions in conventional forces. Specifically, the former head of the Canadian Conference advocated the stoppage of cruise missile testing in Canada.

Some Canadian Catholic universities have adopted the Pontifical Academy of Sciences document which was presented to Pope John Paul II. The document emphasizes scientific concern for the increasing potential of nuclear war and suggests many of the recommendations found in the pastoral letter as steps in preventing nuclear war and progressing towards nuclear disarmament. It agrees that "the sole purpose of nuclear weapons, as long as they exist, must be to deter nuclear war".

## ANGLICAN CHURCH

The following "acts" were adopted by the Synod of the Anglican Church of Canada (ACC) during the week June 4-12, 1983. They represent an accurate description of the policies and moods of the ACC today:

Act 34 - The Synod lent its formal support to Bill C678 (a private members bill) which calls for the establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Canada.

Acts 86 and 87 - The Synod reaffirmed its position, as stated in the Synods of 1955, 1962 and 1965, that weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological) are contrary to the will of God. They go on specifically to call upon the Government to pursue mutual and verifiable disarmament to ban sales of nuclear and weapons technology, to commit the Canadian Armed Forces to peacekeeping and to encourage the USA and USSR to redirect their military spending towards social development.

Act 88 - Resolves that the first use of even "small-scale" nuclear weapons is morally unacceptable.

Act 89 - Resolves that the production of chemical and bacteriological weapons be universally outlawed.

The Primate of the ACC, the Most Reverend Edward W. Scott, has also been in recent contact, by letter, with the Prime Minister supporting the creation of the special East-West Task Force to ease international tension.

LUTHERAN CHURCH OF CANADA

Generally the Lutheran Church in Canada has chosen to be heard on disarmament issues in concert with other Christian church groups. In the past, representatives of the Lutheran Church have voiced their sincere concern for the overall nuclear arms race. The single recent representation to the Canadian Government advocated a multilateral, verifiable freeze on the production, testing, stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons and delivery systems as a step toward the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

UNITED CHURCH OF CANADA

The Moderator of the Church, the Right Reverend Clarke MacDonald, who is also chairman of Project Ploughshares, has not taken the same high-profile approach to disarmament issues as his predecessor, the Right Reverend Lois Wilson. He is, however, active in promoting disarmament, as demonstrated by his visit to the Soviet Union as part of the ecumenical Christian Initiative for Peace delegation.

Various United Church Conferences and individual ministers continue to submit resolutions or letters seeking, among others, Government refusal of cruise missile testing and support to declare Canada a nuclear weapon free zone.

A number of United Church lay people involved in church policy formulation have attended some of the NGO conferences sponsored by organizations such as the World Peace Council and have returned to Canada enthusiastic about the Soviet peace movement and Eastern sincerity in arms control and disarmament negotiations. These church members appear to have been particularly impressed by Eastern hospitality towards representatives of Western peace groups and by the apparent ease in making informal contacts with East bloc citizens.

CANADIAN CHURCHES PASTORAL LETTER, FEBRUARY 7, 1983

On February 7, 1983 a joint pastoral letter was issued by the Lutheran Church in America (Canadian Section), the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, the Canadian Council of Churches, the United Church of Canada, the Anglican Church of Canada and the Presbyterian Church in Canada.

Emphasizing the belief that war can be prevented, the pastoral letter rejected any nuclear weapons policy based on the assumption that a nuclear war is inevitable. While recognizing the importance of the doctrine of deterrence to prevent nuclear war, the Churches expressed concern that the superpowers have moved beyond their deterrence strategy to a position of intimidation through readiness to use nuclear weapons at the least sign of being attacked. The Churches, however, were encouraged by Canada's desire to work for peace and justice.

## PROJECT PLOUGHSHARES

Project Ploughshares has consolidated its position as a research and educational organization of the churches. It has been at the forefront in bringing the cruise missile issue to the public's attention through its sponsorship of large full-page advertisements in major Canadian newspapers with the endorsement of prominent Canadians such as Pierre Berton, Patrick Watson and the leaders of the Canadian churches.

Despite their anti-cruise activity and their advocacy of Canada as a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the organization also continues to do a credible job of sensitizing Canadians about the economic consequences of the arms race on developing countries. For this purpose, CIDA has provided a contribution of \$85,000 this fiscal year. Since last year, the organization has also received funding from Employment & Immigration, Secretary of State and External Affairs for specific projects.

Project Ploughshares researchers are closely scrutinizing Canadian voting at the United Nations. They have also been trying to clarify what they perceive as a contradiction between the Prime Minister's strategy of suffocation and Canadian agreement to test the cruise missile.

While the organization has good researchers, some of their material, such as Ernie Regehr's book, Canada and the Nuclear Arms Race, contains inaccurate information and takes an anti-American position which detracts from the objectivity of the research.

# Churches: Peacemaking *not* optional

In the following article, we have summarised some of the recent developments in North American religious institutions. We have done so, not to imply that the following churches are any more pacifist than the religious organisations not represented here, but simply to demonstrate the attention that the world's religious leaders are focusing on the issue of disarmament.

This is by no means a comprehensive list. We feel that it is important for such a list to be available, but we have neither the space nor the resources necessary to present it. There are, however, ways people can find out about the policies of other religious institutions. For more information, please contact your local Project Ploughshares office, CANDIS, or the administration of the church in question.

The Editors

## World Council of Churches

July and August 1983 — At its Sixth assembly, held in Vancouver, the WCC approved a *Statement on Peace and Justice* which included

these positions and recommendations:

- Under no circumstances can nuclear war be just or justifiable, given that the devastation caused will be far out of proportion to any advantage derived.
- Nuclear war is unlikely to remain limited, as any contemplation of "limited" use of nuclear weapons should be discouraged.
- To build confidence, all present or future nuclear powers should renounce policies of "first use."
- The concept of deterrence is to be rejected as morally unacceptable and as incapable of safeguarding long-term peace and security.
- The production, deployment and use of nuclear weapons constitute a crime against humanity, and there should be a complete halt in production, research and development in all nations, to be enforced through a treaty.
- All nations should ratify a comprehensive test ban treaty.
- All means leading to disarmament should be welcomed, including multilateral, bilateral and unilateral initiatives.

**Roman Catholic Church**  
**November 28, 1980** — the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops issued a statement urging Catholics not to buy war toys.  
**October 1981** — The CCCB issued a statement under the title: *The Neutron Bomb — Enough is Enough!* An excerpt:  
 "We therefore join our fellow bishops in the United States and the growing number of American citizens in condemning the decision of their government on the neutron bomb. We also ask members of the Catholic community and the people of Canada to oppose virouously the build-up of nuclear arms by all nations and especially the United States and the Soviet Union. At some point we must say STOP. That time is now."  
**May 3, 1983** — After a two-day meeting in Chicago, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops approved a pastoral letter titled *The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response*. The letter is over 30 pages long, and is directed both to Catholics and to non-Catholics. The following are excerpts from this letter.

"The present nuclear arms race has distracted us from the words of the prophets, has turned us from peacemaking and has focused our attention on a nuclear buildup leading to annihilation. We are called to turn back from this evil of total destruction and turn instead in prayer and penance toward God, toward our neighbor and toward the building of a peaceful world."  
 "I set before you life or death, a blessing or a curse. Choose life; then, so that you and your descendants may live in the love on Yahweh your God..." (Dt. 11:26)."  
 "Sensible and successful diplomacy, however, will demand that we avoid the trap of a form of anti-Sovietism which fails to grasp the central danger of a superpower rivalry in which both the United States and the Soviet Union are the players, and fails to recognize the common interest both states have in never using nuclear weapons.... Soviet behaviour in some cases merits the adjective: reprehensible, but the Soviet people and their leaders are human beings created in the image and likeness of God."  
 "The evil of the proliferation of nuclear arms becomes more evident every day to all people. No one is exempt from their danger. If ridding the world of the weapons of war could be done

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## Roman Catholic Church

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"Sensible and successful diplomacy, however, will demand that we avoid the trap of a form of anti-Sovietism which fails to grasp the central danger of a superpower rivalry in which both the United States and the Soviet Union are the players, and fails to recognize the common interest both states have in never using nuclear weapons... Soviet behaviour in some cases merits the adjective reprehensible; but the Soviet people and their leaders are human beings created in the image and likeness of God."

"The evil of the proliferation of nuclear arms becomes more evident every day to all people. No one is exempt from their danger. If ridding the world of the weapons of war could be done

(mirror of our unmerited success) — face endless cuts in their meagre necessities, and despair. We would ignore the star, enshrine the wise men in legend, forget the meaning of their response to the promise God gives in Christ.

*An old man greeting the newborn Christ* sees that he is the rising sun, to give light to those who live in darkness and the shadow of death, and to guide our feet into the way of peace.

*Christmas* is all the hungry, the homeless, the helpless.

*Christmas* is hope, and homage to human vulnerability, and the power of love.

*Christmas* is bringing to the One who would be with us our hearts, hands, minds, and things, so there may through us be healing of human hurts.

*Christmas* is the peace of God's response to those who take Christ's way of reconciliation.

Phyllis Creighton  
November 1983

easily, the whole human race would do so gladly tomorrow. Shall we shrink from the task because it is hard?"

"In the words of our Holy Father, we need a "moral about-face." The whole world must summon the moral courage and technical means to say no to nuclear conflict; no to weapons of mass destruction; no to an arms race which robs the poor and the vulnerable; and no to the moral danger of a nuclear age which places before humankind indefensible choices of constant terror or surrender. Peacemaking is not an optional commitment. It is a requirement of our faith. We are called to be peacemakers, not by some movement of the moment, but by our Lord Jesus."

## Canadian Church Leaders

A statement on Canada's Nuclear Weapons Policies was presented to Prime Minister Trudeau on December 14, 1982. The statement was presented by:

—Archbishop Henri Legare, president of the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops;

—Dr. Russel Legge, president of the Canadian Council of Churches;

—Dr. Robert Binhammer, president of the Lutheran Church (Canada);

—Archbishop E.W. Scott, primate, Anglican Church of Canada;

—Rev. Clarke MacDonald, Moderator of the United Church of Canada;

—Dr. Wayne Smith, moderator of the Presbyterian Church in Canada.

The following is a summary of their recommendations for alternative Canadian policies.

● a comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban is essential.

● Canada should insist on a no-first-use policy within NATO, and urge all nuclear weapons states to take a similar pledge.

● Canada should refuse to test the cruise or any other nuclear weapons delivery vehicles.

● Canada should refuse to produce components for nuclear weapons systems.

● Canada should declare itself a nuclear weapons-free-zone, since it supports the U.N.'s belief that NWFZ's are a confidence-building measure.

● Canada should strengthen its peacekeeping capacity.

The statement also urges the Canadian government to support the principle of the *Waldheim proposal* to fund research and disarmament education at home as well as internationally through the World Disarmament Campaign.

## United Church

In response to a specific call of the 28th General Council, the United Church prepared a policy statement on disarmament and militarisation, entitled *The Search for Peace in the Eighties* (August 1982). The following are some of their recommendations:

A. To the Church:

● That we wholeheartedly endorse the "Canada as a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone" campaign of Project Ploughshares; that we commend this program to the congregations for study/action/reflection;

(See Churches, Page 8)

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## Churches

From Page 5

and that we increase our financial support for Project Ploughshares.

● That professors of theological ethics be encouraged in the next biennium to place a priority on peace and conflict studies.

● That the United Church encourage church involvement in exchange programs, especially with eastern bloc countries, and underdeveloped countries.

● That the United Church commend to its members for moral and financial support the following organisations and areas of peace and disarmament work in which church people are already active and resources available: The "Noon-Day Prayer Vigil for Peace"; the Peace Tax Fund; the Pacific Life Community's campaign to stop Trident; the Cruise Missile Conversion Project; the campaigns for a Nuclear-Free Pacific and for a Nuclear-Free Arctic; and the campaign for a Global Referendum.

B. To the Private Sector:

● That all private sector production for cruise missiles be phased out, and gradually converted to non-military production.

C. To the Government:

● That the United Church urge the government to enact legislation permitting re-direction of taxes from war preparations to peace research, education and action programmes.

● That the United Church reaffirm its support for the Waldheim proposal (that 1 per cent of military spending go for peace research, education and action).

● That the United Church urge that the post of Ambassador for Disarmament be upgraded to full Cabinet rank.

### Anglican Church of Canada

National:

May 1982 — National Executive Council passes resolution stating that the ACC opposes the testing in Canada of the cruise missile.

4-12 June 1983 — General Synod passes resolutions:

● urging Parliament to pass Bill C-678 declaring Canada a NWFZ.

● urging that the production and use of biological and chemical weapons be universally outlawed.

● judging that there is a moral obligation on all countries (including NATO nations) to forswear the first-use of nuclear weapons in any form, because of the high risk of escalation to full-scale nuclear warfare.

● urging the government of Canada to work at developing a truly effective international surveillance authority empowered by all nations

to investigate and enforce restrictions on war preparations.

● calling Anglicans to be bearers of hope and peacemakers.

● declaring that the development, production or use of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons of mass destruction are contrary to the will of God and the mind of Christ.

● asking each parish and diocese to commit itself to giving peace-making a primary place in its liturgy and program.

● directing the Program Committee to promote discussion and disseminate information on problems of violence and human conflict resolution.

Local:

September 1982 — Synod of the Diocese of Toronto resolved that it:

● supports a global freeze on the production, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, as a first step to mutual, balanced verifiable nuclear disarmament.

● urges local congregations to undertake nuclear disarmament education, and every effort to persuade MPs and the Canadian government to implement nuclear disarmament policies.

September 1983 — Synod of the Diocese of Toronto resolved that it urges each parish of the diocese to:

● undertake as a duty the support of its people in examining through prayer and study the nature of arms race.

● encourage their members to fulfil their democratic duty by informing electoral candidates of their concerns.

● to support its Bishops in whatever initiatives they take to foster greater understanding and trust between the people of our two neighbouring nations.

Information for this article was compiled and edited by Phyllis Creighton and Joe C.

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# SPECIAL REPORT: Religion and the peace movement

## Swords into ploughshares

By Harriet Eisenkraft

On November 17, unnamed Reagan administration officials at a New York conference called Prime Minister Trudeau's current peace proposals a "cop-out" because Canada's financial contribution to NATO is "insufficient."

External Affairs Minister Allan MacEachen was quick to respond to the U.S. criticism, telling reporters it "would seem to rest on the idea that the sole way of promoting peace is through arms build-up."

Nevertheless, in the face of criticism from the opposition Conservative Party that the Canadian government spends less than 2% of its gross national product on defense, the Liberal government felt compelled to defend Canada's military spending and its contributions to NATO. In doing so, the government, despite the initial reaction of MacEachen, seemed to accept the logic that peace initiatives are more credible if they go hand-in-hand with military spending.

One of the national peace groups supporting Trudeau's initiatives has a different perspective on the relationship between defence spending and the promotion of peace.

Project Ploughshares, a research and educational organisation, asks the question: "Why is military spending increasing in a world that

already has an overabundance of weapons, but apparently lacks the resources to meet the most basic needs of millions of people?"

Project Ploughshares is well qualified to question the human costs of military spending, since its main concern is the relationship between militarism and underdevelopment.

Since it was founded in 1977, Project Ploughshares has been conducting research on the Canadian military industry and Canada's participation in the global arms race. It also acts as an educational resource body for information on Third World development.

Ernie Regehr, the group's research director, believes Canada could play an important role in disarmament discussions. But, he adds, "Canada would have increased moral authority if it had acted more consistently and put forward clear policies on matters like cruise missile testing."

Project Ploughshares attempts to contribute to the development of a more peace-oriented national policy by conducting research into and providing information on the Canadian economy and military production, as well as the economic effect of its arms sales to developing countries. This data, published in a quarterly newsletter, is sent to members, MPs and the Department of External Affairs.

The organisation is sponsored by

most of the major Canadian churches, as well as several development agencies, including the Canadian University Services Overseas (CUSO) and the Development Education Centre (DEC). Project Ploughshares also receives money from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and Regehr says 2,000 individual Ploughshare Associates throughout Canada provide a major amount of additional funding. These individuals have formed local chapters in 25 centres.

Some of the group's church sponsors also participate in lobbying efforts before MPs in Ottawa, and Project Ploughshares acts as a support and resource agency in this area.

Michael Cooke, a Project Ploughshares board member, agrees that Trudeau's peace crusade is "a good start." But, he says, it must be coupled with a strong development policy, including increased aid to the Third World.

"The arms race is not only an east-west situation, but also a north-south one," Cooke says. "There is a link between peace and justice."

Project Ploughshares can be contacted by writing to them at Conrad Grebel College, Waterloo Ontario, N2L 3G6, or by calling them at (519) 888-6541.

## Churches: Peacemaking *not* optional

*In the following article, we have summarised some of the recent developments in North American religious institutions. We have done so, not to imply that the following churches are any more pacifist than the religious organisations not represented here, but simply to demonstrate the attention that the world's religious leaders are focusing on the issue of disarmament.*

*This is by no means a comprehensive list. We feel that it is important for such a list to be available, but we have neither the space nor the resources necessary to present it. There are, however, ways people can find out about*

these positions and recommendations:

● Under no circumstances can nuclear war be just or justifiable, given that the devastation caused will be far out of proportion to any advantage derived.

● Nuclear war is unlikely to remain limited, as any contemplation of "limited" use of nuclear weapons should be discouraged.

● To build confidence, all present or future nuclear powers should renounce policies of "first use."

● The concept of deterrence is to be rejected as morally unacceptable and as incapable of safeguarding long-term peace.

### Roman Catholic Church

November 28, 1980 — the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops issued a statement urging Catholics not to buy war toys.

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"We therefore join our fellow bishops in the United States and the growing number of American citizens in condemning the decision of their government on the neutron bomb. We also ask members of the Catholic community and the people of Canada to oppose vigorously the build-up of nuclear arms by all nations and especially the

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TO/A DMF  
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File/Dossier	28-2-1
Date	December 20, 1982
Number/Numéro	DFP-1429

REFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE  
SUBJECT • Arms Control and Disarmament:  
SUJET Lunch for Church Leaders

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

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SACROL 5/1/82

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise you of some of the highlights of the lunch for church leaders on December 14, hosted by Ambassador Beesley at the Prime Minister's request. The date had been changed from December 2 to December 14, and the SSEA was hosting a lunch for the Brandt Commission on December 14.

2. Billed as a working lunch, it was exactly that. The Prime Minister stayed well beyond his 2:00 p.m. deadline and this made a favourable impression. After he departed, the discussion was continued until the church leaders had to leave for an appointment with the Leader of the Opposition. Throughout, discussion was extremely friendly and courteous but did not dodge any difficult or controversial issues.

3. The lunch began with an outline of areas of common ground and then moved on to areas of known differences of view. At the request of the Prime Minister, little time was spent on areas of common ground: Ambassador Beesley mentioned a number of points and there was no demur, up to and including the Charter right of collective self-defence and even seemingly the suggestion that NATO had played an important and even essential role in keeping Western Europe from becoming Eastern Europe. There was also visible interest in the concept of deterrence as a "no win" scenario and satisfaction at the distinction drawn between Reagan rhetoric and Canadian policy.

4. The church leaders' brief (copy attached), which was provided in advance, had been written by two officers of Project Ploughshares. It alerted us to the fact that cruise missile testing in Canada was likely to be a pre-occupation. The leaders did in fact return again and again to that issue, citing its "symbolic" value for those opposed to the nuclear arms race and claiming its inconsistency with the strategy of suffocation.

5. The Prime Minister, in addressing that issue in forthright and firm terms, stressed that the decision to modernize NATO's theatre nuclear forces through the deployment of long-range land-based systems was at the behest of the Europeans not the USA. The Prime Minister also took the

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opportunity to underline a number of important points on arms control and disarmament including:


- (a) it had been safer and cheaper for Canada to be a member of NATO rather than go it alone;
- (b) one had to decide whether arms control and disarmament should be viewed as an end or rather as a means to the end of a more secure world;
- (c) an immediate nuclear freeze would in the end be a unilateral move;
- (d) what most protesters wanted was not a unilateral freeze but an obligation by governments to negotiate a halt to the nuclear arms race;
- (e) the subject of arms control and disarmament was one of the most difficult questions to deal with morally and intellectually;
- (f) the peace movement should continue to lobby strongly but responsibly to make sure that the West (and the East) followed both tracks of the two-track approach to security.

6. With strong support from the Prime Minister, Ambassador Beesley stressed the variety of arms control and disarmament issues on which Canada was active and on many of which our positions were not those of the USA (e.g., comprehensive test ban, arms control and outer space, investigation of allegations of the use of chemical weapons). The leaders seemed to be receptive to the suggestion that they should explain to their communities what Canada was doing on the full range of issues.

7. The church leaders felt that they had been given a fair hearing while remaining aware that they may not have altered policy. They emphasized the desirability of further contacts and exchanges. The press release (copy attached), issued by the church leaders that afternoon, had been prepared before the lunch.

8. In addition to meetings with Mr. Clark and Mr. Broadbent, the leaders met with the Liberal Caucus and later with parliamentarians who belong to Parliamentarians for World Order.

9. Also attached are the background notes and a commentary on the brief, which we provided to PCO at its request.



R.P. Cameron,  
Assistant Under-Secretary,  
Bureau of International Security

001674

PARTICIPATING IN THIS REPORT:

(2)(3)(4)(7) & file 28.2-1

Canadian Council of Churches  
Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops  
Anglican Church of Canada  
United Church of Canada  
Presbyterian Church of Canada  
Lutheran Church of Canada

FOR RELEASE: Immediately

December 15, 1982

CANADA'S ROLE IN NUCLEAR ARMS DISCUSSED BY  
CHURCH AND GOVERNMENT LEADERS

On December 14th, the leaders of Canada's largest Christian Churches met with federal government leaders to discuss Canada's role in the nuclear arms race. The Church leaders asked that Canada refuse to accept a role in the building up of nuclear arsenals and to develop instead alternative policies and actions that will lead to the building up of a world in which peace is possible.

In a brief addressed to the Prime Minister, the Church leaders encouraged the government to continue the actions it has already taken to attempt to de-escalate the nuclear arms race. At the same time they expressed deep concern about those government policies that contribute to the build-up of nuclear arms. They pointed to government funding and facilities that encourage Canadian industry to participate in producing component parts for nuclear weapons systems such as the MX and the Cruise Missiles systems. They also questioned government policies that support U.S. efforts leading to the building up of nuclear arsenals capable of threatening the Soviet Union with pre-emptive attack and conducting a prolonged nuclear war.

- M O R E -

- 2 -

Dr. Russell D Legge, President of the Canadian Council of Churches said the Church leaders wanted to dialogue with federal leaders because "we know they share our beliefs that reconciliation and support of the world's oppressed and persecuted calls us to stand against the forces of injustice and destruction".

"We have confined ourselves on this occasion to the problem of the nuclear arms race because it is an urgent issue. We believe there will be major opportunities for Canada to make constructive contributions to international reconciliation" said Archbishop Henri Légaré, President of the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops.

As a contribution to Canada's role in this important world-wide question, the Church leaders presented several alternative policies for the government to consider. Such measures would, they believe, lead to a more stable strategic environment in which mutual reductions of nuclear weapons, even their eventual elimination would have a better chance for success.

The alternative Canadian policies recommended were as follows: continuation of Canadian efforts to achieve a comprehensive nuclear test ban; insistence upon a no-first use policy within NATO and for all nuclear weapons states; support for the "strategy of suffocation" and a nuclear freeze; refusal to test ~~nuclear~~ <sup>the</sup> and Cruise Missile <sup>and other nuclear</sup> weapons delivery systems within Canadian territory, refusal to produce components for nuclear weapons systems; declaring Canada to be a nuclear weapon free zone within a specific time; increased Canadian participation in efforts to strengthen peace keeping, including support for the proposed International Satellite Monitoring Agency; allocation of public funds for peace research and public education concerning disarmament and the peaceful settlement of <sup>disparities</sup> ~~disparities~~.

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- 3 -

The Churches in Canada have undertaken a variety of education programs and are planning additional means of bringing issues related to the nuclear arms race to the attention of their membership. The visit of these six Church leaders to Parliament is part of what they hope can be ongoing dialogue to bring about peace in a world built on justice as the foundation of social and economic security.

The Church delegation included Dr. Russell Legge, President of the Canadian Council of Churches, Archbishop Henri Légaré, President of the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, Archbishop E.W. Scott, Primate of the Anglican Church of Canada, Dr. Robert Binhammer, President of the Lutheran Church in America (Canada Section), Dr. Wayne Smith, Moderator of the Presbyterian Church in Canada and Dr. Clarke MacDonald, Moderator of the United Church of Canada.

The six Church leaders had a luncheon meeting with Prime Minister Trudeau and the Secretary of State for External Affairs and Mr. Alan Beesly, Ambassador for Disarmament. This was followed by a meeting with the Rt. Honourable Joe Clark, Leader of the Opposition and some of his advisors. Later in the afternoon they visited with Mr. Ed Broadbent, Leader of the New Democratic Party. In the evening the Church leaders met with the Liberal Party Caucus. The following morning was spent with an all-parties group of Parliamentarians for World Order.

- 30 -

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION:

Bonnie Brennan - (613) 236-9461 (Ottawa)

Roger Cann - (416) 921-4152 (Toronto)

001677

D R A F T

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DEPARTURE STATEMENT

1. I have had a very productive meeting with the President.
2. We share a deep commitment to the cause of peace, to reducing world tensions and the risks of nuclear war. I share fully the Presidents view that a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought and his desire to banish nuclear weapons from the face of the earth.
3. We agreed to work for a constructive relationship with the East based on equilibrium, moderation and reciprocity eschewing aspirations to military superiority.
4. I have told the President of my recent consultations with other world leaders who share my concerns and largely support the central purpose of my initiative which is the requirement for an injection of political energy into the East-West relationship.
5. I may visit Moscow in the coming months. I will not be bearing a message from the President, rather my aim would be to met directly with the Soviet leadership in support of the goal of better communication and understanding which we all share and to assure them again of the West's deep desire for mutual security at lower levels of armaments.

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NEW YORK

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A : M./Mad.

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Subject : New York Times "Trudeau Assails U.S. .. ?"  
Objet :

15 December 1983

NEW YORK TIMES

2/2

THE NEW YORK TIMES, 7

# Trudeau Assails U.S. on the Eve of His Visit

MICHAEL T. KAUFMAN

Special to The New York Times

TORONTO, Dec. 14 — Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, in an address before Liberal Party supporters Tuesday night, assailed Canadian critics who he said cowered "when some pipsqueak at the Pentagon criticizes our peace initiative."

Mr. Trudeau is to discuss his global peace plans with President Reagan in Washington on Thursday.

In his speech before 4,000 people gathered at a fairgrounds exhibition hall here, Mr. Trudeau actively defended his nationalistic vision of Cana-

da, criticizing the conservative opposition and, somewhat less often, the United States.

The Prime Minister sought to link his disarmament campaign with earlier examples of Canadian pathfinding such as this country's pioneer step in recognizing Peking and its welcoming response to third world appeals for new economic relationships.

"A country is not strong because of the size of its armies and it is not powerful because of its great balance sheets," the 64-year-old leader said. "A country can be influential in the world because of the size of its heart and the breadth of its mind."

Many of those who turned out at the gala thought they might hear Mr. Trudeau announce his resignation or set a timetable for national elections that must be held within a little more than a year.

There were, however, no elements of farewell in the speech. "I'm sorry that this may be the last supper for some of you," Mr. Trudeau joked at the outset. "I'll miss you next year and the year after that."

Mr. Trudeau moved to defend the Liberal Party's record in power with pointed references affirming national sovereignty against challenges from the United States.

Citing what he termed "the great example of U.S.-Canada relations," he asked: "Who decides? Is it Canada, is it the U.S., or is it both together? And what happens to trade when you have great trading blocks; will we be part of a continental United States? These are difficult choices."

But what appeared to many to be the most dramatic part of the speech was his reference to the disarmament initiative and the Pentagon.

"When the extraterritorial application of American laws falls on us, it is because we are not confident in ourselves and because we are not prepared to stand up to these, our best friends, and say, 'Your law, its writ will not run in our country,'" he said.

**REMEMBER THE NEEDIEST!**

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

MF

R E S T R I C T E D

FM ROME WTGR0468 15DEC83

TO EXTOTT (IDDZ IMMED

DISTR RCR

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0281 13DEC

---PM INITIATIVE:CRAXI

PM CRAXIS ENTIRE SPEECH DURING INF DEBATE IN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES  
CONVERGED IN APPROACH AND TONE TO PM TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE WITH  
FOLLOWING TWO SPECIFIC REFS:(A) IN CONTEXT OF AN ILLUSTRATION OF  
VARIOUS PROPOSALS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON INF QUOLAW

NXJFNJBUUND

HEAD OF CDN GOVT HAS IN HIS TURN PRESENTED, AND INTENDS TO PRESENT,  
PROPOSALS WITHIN ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND, IN THIS REGARD, HAS EFFECTED  
A ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS WHICH HE WILL COMPLETE IN JPN AND WHICH  
AIM AT PROPOSING THE ESTABLISHMENT, DURING COMING YEAR, OF A FORUM  
WHERE THE FIVE DECLARED NUCLEAR POWERS (USSR USA CHINA UK AND FRANCE)  
CAN CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE GLOBAL LIMITS OF ARMAMENTS  
UNQUOTE. (B) QUOTE IN A RECENT CONVERSATION WITH CDN PRESIDENT  
(SIC) WE AGREED ON USEFULNESS OF PROPOSING A POLITICAL RE-LAUNCHING  
OF VIENN NEGOTIATIONS AT LEVEL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF ATLANTIC  
ALLIANCE AND WSAW PACT UNQUOTE.

CCC/191 160933Z WTGR0468

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

R E S T R I C T E D

FM PEKIN WJGR0974 15DEC83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 150900

DISTR PER

REF YOURTEL 0280 13DEC

---PM INITIATIVE--THANK YOU LETTERS

FOLLOWING ARE TEXTS OF SUGGESTED LETTERS TO CHAIRMAN DENG  
XIAOPING AND PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG.

2. DENG: QUOTE (I FIRST WISH TO THANK YOU FOR HAVING RECEIVED ME  
AT SO SHORT NOTICE. I WAS PARTICULARLY PLEASSED TO BE ABLE TO  
SEE YOU AGAIN AND TO HAVE THE OCCASION TO TALK ABOUT THE PRESENT  
DIFFICULT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

3. I HAVE SPOKEN TO A NUMBER OF LEADERS ABOUT MY INITIATIVE AND  
ITS VARIOUS ELEMENTS BUT I ESPECIALLY WANTED TO HAVE THE VIEWS  
OF MY CHINESE FRIENDS. I GREATLY VALUED THE OPPORTUNITY TO COME  
TO PEKIN BECAUSE AS A STATE POSSESSING, AS YOU SAID, ONLY A  
SYMBOLIC NUCLEAR FORCE, CHINA HAS, LIKE OTHERS, AN INTEREST IN THE  
REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

4. IF I WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT YOU WERE UNABLE AT THIS STAGE TO LEND  
SUPPORT TO MY PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE OF THE FIVE NUCLEAR  
WEAPONS STATES, I DID APPRECIATE YOUR ENCOURAGEMENT FOR THE BASIC  
PRINCIPLE OF MY EFFORTS TO IMPROVE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE. I LOOK  
FORWARD TO PREMIER ZHAOS VISIT IN JAN WHEN I WILL HAVE THE  
OCCASION TO BRING HIM UP TO DATE ON THE PROGRESS MADE SINCE MY  
...2

SECRET

PAGE TWO WJGR0974 RESTR

DEPARTURE FROM BEIJING.UNQUOTE.

5. ZHAO:QUOTE I WAS PLEASED THAT DURING MY RECENT TRIP TO ASIA YOU AND CHAIRMAN DENG XIAOPING WERE ABLE TO RECEIVE ME IN PEKIN AT VERY SHORT NOTICE. AS I MENTIONED TO BOTH YOU AND CHAIRMAN DENG, CHINA HAS A SPECIAL ROLE IN THE WORLD AS A NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATE. I WAS THEREFORE PARTICULARLY PLEASED TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY OF A FRANK EXCHANGE WITH YOU AND TO BE ABLE TO OUTLINE TO YOU THE REASONS BEHIND MY INITIATIVE AS WELL AS TO EXPLAIN ITS VARIOUS ELEMENTS. ~~WHILE I WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT YOU WERE UNABLE TO OFFER YOUR SUPPORT FOR MY PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE OF THE FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES AT THIS STAGE,~~ I NEVERTHELESS VALUED YOUR ENCOURAGEMENT FOR MY EFFORTS.

6. WHEN WE MEET IN OTT IN JAN I SHOULD ~~BE~~ <sup>like</sup> ABLE TO INFORM YOU OF THE RESULT OF THE <sup>meetings</sup> ~~DISCUSSIONS~~ I HAVE HAD WITH OTHER LEADERS SINCE WE LAST MET. <sup>\*// PARA</sup> IN THE MEANTIME I MIGHT NOTE THAT THE DECISIONS OF THE RECENT NATO MINISTERIAL MTG OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL REGARDING THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE AND THE MUTUALLY AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION TALKS HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGING TO ME. I VERY MUCH LOOK FORWARD TO OUR NEXT MTG.UNQUOTE.

CCC/002 150739Z WJGR0974

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

~~OPTIONAL MAIL~~  
Person  
1300

*Done*  
*20.12.83*

R E S T R I C T E D

FM DUBLN YPGR1188 15DEC83

TO EXTOTT *(LDA)* 1DDZ DELIVER BY 151300

DISTR RSR

---PMS INITIATIVE

COUNSELLOR IN DFA RESPONSIBLE FOR DISARMAMENT ASKED TODAY  
WHETHER WE COULD PROVIDE UP-TO-DATE ASSESSMENT OF REACTION  
TO PM TRUDEAUS PEACE INITIATIVE WHICH HE COULD USE TO BRIEF  
FM BARRY BEFORE XMAS.

CCC/288 151630Z YPGR1188

*MSF*

*MR SYLVA*

*D left a msg for  
Mr Delworth.*

*Jan 15/12/83*

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

UNCLASSIFIED

FM COPEN YJGR1415 15DEC83

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ

DISTR RSC

REF YOUR TEL IDDZ0288 15DEC

---PM INITIATIVE

WE CONFIRM WE RECEIVED ORIGINAL LET BY PM TRUDEAU TO DANISH PM  
SCHLUETER. LETTER WAS PASSED ON TO SCHLUETER THROUGH MFA.

UUU/237 151522Z YJGR1415

INFO

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PMOOTT PM01518 15DEC83

TO FAX WSHDC/GOSSAGE PMDEL/COLEMAN/HUDON IMMED DE OPM  
INFO EXTOTT IDZ

STATEMENTS BY PM TRUDEAU AND PRESIDENT REAGAN, FOLLOWING  
THEIR MTG IN WSHDC, THUR, 15DEC.

PRESIDENT REGAN--THE PM AND I HAVE JUST CONCLUDED A VERY USEFUL  
AND WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION OF SOME OF THE MOST CRUCIAL ISSUES THAT  
ARE FACING THE PEOPLE OF CDA, THE USA AND, INDEED, FACING PEOPLE  
EVERYWHERE.

PM TRUDEAU BRIEFED ME ON HIS RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH LEADERS IN  
EUROPE AND ASIA, ON HIS CONCERNS FOR WORLD PEACE, DISARMAMENT AND  
IMPROVING THE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE. WE FULLY SHARE THE CONCERNS FOR  
PEACE WHICH THE PM HAS EXPRESSED. WE APPRECIATE HIS STRONG STATEMENTS  
SUPPORTING THE JOINT EFFORTS OF THE WESTERN ALLIES TO NEGOTIATE  
MEANINGFUL ARMS REDUCTIONS AND TO PROMOTE DIALOGUE WITH OTHER NATIONS.

I THANK YOU, MR PM, FOR COMING HERE, SHARING YOUR IDEAS WITH US.  
WE WISH YOU GODS SPEED IN YOUR EFFORTS TO HELP BUILD A DURABLE PEACE.

PM TRUDEAU--THANK YOU. YOU HAVE JUST HEARD THE PRESIDENT SUPPORTED  
WHAT IS KNOWN AS MY PEACE INITIATIVE; BUT I THINK HE DID MORE THAN  
SUPPORT IT. I THINK HE HAS BEEN SHOWING, THROUGH HIS ADMINISTRATION  
IN THE PAST MONTHS AT LEAST, THAT, AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED ON THE  
NATO SIDE, WE WANT TO CHANGE THE TREND LINE. WE WANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR  
NOT/NOT ONLY THAT THE ALLIANCE IS STRONG; THAT IT WILL DEFEND ITSELF;

...2

PAGE TWO PM01518 UNCLAS

THAT IT WILL NOT/NOT BE INTIMIDATED; BUT THAT IT IS ALSO PURSUING PEACE.

IF I WERE TO TELL YOU FOR INSTANCE THAT THE PRESIDENT AGREES THAT WE SHOULD NOT/NOT SEEK MILITARY SUPERIORITY IN NATO, WE SHOULD SEEK A BALANCE; THAT WE DO NOT/NOT THINK THAT A NUCLEAR WAR CAN BE WON; THAT WE THINK THAT THE IDEAL WOULD BE TO SEE AN END TO ALL NUCLEAR ARMS--IT MIGHT COME AS NEWS, AT LEAST TO SOME OF THE PRESS IN CDA, BECAUSE WE HAVE NOT/NOT BEEN HEARING THAT.

BUT THIS IS WHAT THE PRESIDENT SAID AT THE DIET IN JPN AND THIS IS WHAT OUR FOREIGN MINISTERS SAID JUST A FEW DAYS AGO IN BRUSSELS-- THAT WE RESPECT EACH OTHERS LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS. WHETHER THIS IS NEWS OR NOT/NOT, I DONT KNOW; BUT THIS, AT LEAST IN PERCEPTION, IS THE COMPLETE CHANGE OF A TREND LINE WHICH I SAW WHEN I EMBARKED ON MY INITIATIVE SEVERAL MONTHS AGO; ONE WHICH WAS GOING DOWNWARDS RATHER THAN UPWARDS, WHICH WAS, TO USE CARRINGTONS PHRASE, CHARACTERIZED BY MEGAPHONE DIPLOMACY. THERE WAS A CALL FOR DIALOGUE, REPEATED TWO OR THREE TIMES IN THE MESSAGE AND IN THE COMMUNIQUE.

SO I AM GRATEFUL--NOT/NOT THAT I HAVE SAID ANYTHING NEW THIS MORNING--BUT I AM GRATEFUL THAT I WAS ABLE TO HEAR FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE LEADER OF THE ALLIANCE, THAT THESE ARE NOT/NOT JUST WORDS; THAT THESE CORRESPOND TO THE INTENTION OF THE ALLIANCE, AND THAT THE OTHER SIDE CAN KNOW--THE WSAW PACT CAN KNOW--THAT WE ARE NOT/NOT TRYING TO BE SUPERIOR. WE ARE TRYING TO RECOGNIZE THEIR

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PAGE THREE PM01518 UNCLAS

LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS. WE JUST WANT THEM TO REALIZE WE WANT TO BE AT LEAST EQUAL, ON BALANCE, AND THAT THEY SHOULD RECOGNIZE OURS. AND I THINK THIS IS A GREAT STEP FORWARD.

I SAY NOTHING--THOUGH MAYBE I WILL SAY SOMETHING--ABOUT THE DECISION OF NATO TO SEND FOREIGN MINISTERS TO STKHM. THIS IS REALLY STATING THAT THE POLITICIANS ARE TAKING HOLD OF THE PEACE ISSUE. IT IS NO/NO LONGER FOR THE NUCLEAR ACCOUNTANTS. IT IS FOR THE POLITICAL LEADERS THEMSELVES.

EN FRANCAIS, EN DEUX MOTS. JE PENSE QUE VOUS AVEZ ENTENDU CE QUE J AI DIT. J AI EN REALITE CITE LES DECLARATIONS DE BRUXELLES DES MINISTRES DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES, LES PAROLES DU PRESIDENT COMME QUOI IL NE VOULAIT PAS QU IL Y AIT DE GUERRE NUCLEAIRE ET NE CROYAIT PAS QU UNE GUERRE NUCLEAIRE PUISSE ETRE GAGNEE. CE SONT DES DECLARATIONS IMPORTANTES. ELLES CONFIRMENT L INTENTION DES HOMMES POLITIQUES DE S ATTAQUER AUX PROBLEMES DE LA PAIX ET DE LES POURSUIVRE. VOILA.

UUU/204 152145Z PM01518



PAGE TWO UNGR3033 CONF D CEO

OCCASION TO RAISE GENERAL SUBJ OF STRATEGY. SHULTZ CHARACTERIZED PMS VISIT AS QUOTE USEFUL, STIMULATING, CONDUCTED IN COMFORTABLE AND RELAXED WAY BUT WITH LOTS OF SUBSTANCE UNQUOTE.

2. REPORT: CDE: SHULTZ, IN RESPONSE TO PMS QUESTION, SAID GROMYKO HAD NOT/NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER TO ATTEND STKHM CONF. EAST EUROPEANS, FOR THEIR PART, WERE APPARENTLY ADOPTING POSITIVE VIEW. BURT SAID THEY HAD RECEIVED SAME REPORT AS WE (MOSCO TEL XYAG4228 14DEC) QUOTING ACCOUNT OF TURKISH CHARGE TO EFFECT THAT IF GROMYKO DID GO HE WILL NOT/NOT MEET WITH SHULTZ. PM STATED THAT HE WLD BET HIS BOTTOM DOLLAR THAT GROMYKO WLD BE THERE. HE CLD GO SAFELY AT BEGINNING WHEN CONF WLD BE DEALING MAINLY IN GENERALITIES: NOT/NOT TO GO WLD BE PROPAGANDA DEFEAT AND WLD NOT/NOT BE CONSISTENT WITH LETS PM HAD EXCHANGED WITH MOSCO. PM RESPONDED TO SHULTZ THAT HE HAD NOT/NOT RECEIVED ANY QUOTE SIGNED UNQUOTE LET FROM ANDROPOV, ONLY TELEGRAPHIC VERSION. WHILE BURT NOTED USA HAD ANDROPOVS MOTORCADE STAKED OUT THERE HAD BEEN NO/NO CONFIRMED SIGHTING OF HIM SINCE SOUTH YEMEN AMB CLAIMED TO HAVE SEEN HIM IN SEPT. EAGLEBURGER MENTIONED THAT ARMAND HAMMER STATED HE HAD APPT WITH ANDROPOV FOR 17DEC.

3. BILATERAL AND NATO MTGS: SHULTZ INDICATED THAT HIS MTGS WITH DPM/SSEA WERE USEFUL DIALOGUE. PM REFERRED TO ARRANGEMENT TO MEET FOUR TIMES A YEAR AS A QUOTE BREAKTHROUGH UNQUOTE. LA SAPINIÈRE MTG OF NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS HAD ALSO BEEN OF VALUE. SHULTZ AGREED AND SAID THEY SHLD HAPPEN MORE OFTEN. IT WAS PERFECT VENUE AWAY FROM CITY WHICH ALLOWED PARTICIPANTS TO THINK.

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PAGE THREE UNGR3033 CONF D CEO

4.MBFR:PM POINTED OUT THAT PRESIDENTS LET OF 14DEC WAS QUOTE LESS POSITIVE UNQUOTE ON MBFR THAN NATO COMMUNIQUE HAD BEEN.SHULTZ RESPONDED THAT MBFR POSITION WAS UNDER ACTIVE REVIEW BUT OUTCOME REMAINED TO BE SEEN.PM ASKED WHY USA WAS SO CAUTIOUS IN MBFR;IT SEEMED TO HIM TO BE QUOTE FAIR BARGAIN UNQUOTE TO AGREE TO COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING THAT WLD BE VERIFIABLE IN RETURN FOR SKIRTING DATA ISSUE.SHULTZ SAID VERIFICATION WAS KEY.THERE HAD TO BE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THAT MEANT BEFORE USA BEGAN REMOVING TROOPS. HISTORY OF THIS SUBJ WAS THAT THERE WAS CONSTANT PRESSURE TO MOVE USA TROOPS OUT,AND THAT IF ADMIN INTENDED TO QUOTE PLAY AROUND WITH THIS WITH CONGRESS UNQUOTE RESULT CLD BE WITHDRAWAL OF USA TROOPS AND VACUUM IN EUROPE.ADMIN WAS FIGHTING NOT/NOT TO HAVE THIS HAPPEN OR TO LET THIS SUBJ GET OUT OF CONTROL.SHULTZS OWN IMPRESSION WAS THAT SOVS WERE VERY ABLE NEGOTIATORS WHO KNEW WHAT THEY WANTED AND HOW TO GET IT.THEY WERE PARTICULARLY ADEPT AT CREATING QUOTE LOOPHOLES UNQUOTE IN AGMNTS BYWHICH THEY CLD GET OUT OF AGMNT BUT USA CLD NOT/NOT.THIS BEHOVED USA NOT/NOT TO START PROCESS THAT CLD NOT/NOT BE CONTAINED UNTIL PROCESS WAS WORKED OUT.ON-SITE VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS WERE REQUIRED;WHILE SOVS SEEMED READY TO ACCEPT THIS NOW IT WAS VERY LIMITED IN CHARACTER. ADELMAN STRESSED MBFR WAS NOT/NOT HERMETICALLY SEALED NEGOTIATION. ONE HAD TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF PROCESS OF RETRENCHMENT IN USA;GERMAN DEMOGRAPHIC PROBLEM WITH ITS ARMED FORCES AND WEARING DOWN OF

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR3033 CONF D CEO

BRITISH ARMY OF THE RHINE. USA DID NOT/WANT TO START PRECEPTUOUS RUSH FOR REDUCTIONS WITHOUT PROPER AGRMT. IN 1970S USSR ANNOUNCED IT WAS WITHDRAWING 20,000 TROOPS FROM CENTRAL EUROPE BUT THEY HAD ALL SLIPPED BACK. END RESULT OF LACK OF PROPER AGMT CLD BE REDUCTION IN OUR CONVENTIONAL DETERRENT.

5. PM SAID HE ACCEPTED THIS ARGUMENT BUT IF VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS WERE RIGHT WE CLD THEN SEIZE INITIATIVE AND RESPOND TO EASTS PROPOSALS. PRESIDENTS LET HAD HARKED BACK TO DATA ISSUE. IF VERIFICATION CLD BE ACHIEVED WE CLD SKIRT DATA ISSUE AND ACHIEVE BREAKTHROUGH. ADELMAN AGREED IT WLD BE BREAKTHROUGH. SHULTZ INDICATED THAT USA HAD MADE PROPOSALS ON VERIFICATION. KEY WAS TO HAVE VERIFICATION SYSTEM IN PLACE THAT WE WERE CONFIDENT IN. DAM SAID ONE WORRY WAS THAT USA WLD BE PRESSURED TO QUOTE SPLIT DIFFERENCE UNQUOTE WITH SOVS IN ANY VERIFICATION NEG AND THEREBY END UP WITH LESS THAN WE WANTED. PM INDICATED THIS WAS PROBLEM FOR POKER GAME; FOR OUR PUBLICS ISSUE WAS TO RAISE NUCLEAR THRESHHOLD AND NEED TO RESPOND TO EAST. FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES WE HAD TO PUT BALL IN EASTERN COURT. PUBLIC CLD UNDERSTAND NEED FOR GOOD VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENT. BURT ACKNOWLEDGED THERE WAS POLITICAL UTILITY IN REPLYING BUT QUESTION WAS HOW TO HAVE VERIFICATION SCHEME QUOTE IMPLEMENTED AND IN PLACE WITH SATISFACTION THAT IT WLD BE CARRIED OUT BEFORE REDUCTIONS TOOK PLACE UNQUOTE. ON SALT, SOVS WERE ENCRYPTING UP TO 95 PERCENT OF THEIR MISSILE TESTING WHICH MADE VERIFICATION DIFFICULT.

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PAGE FIVE UNGR3033 CONF D CEO

VERIFICATION OF MBFR AGMT WITH ALL ITS MEN AND EQUIPMENT WLD BE MUCH HARDER TO ACHIEVE THAN VERIFICATION OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS.ONCE TROOP REDUCTIONS STARTED IT WLD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO TURN THEM OFF WITH CONGRESS JUST BECAUSE FEW BUREAUCRATS DID NOT/NOT LIKE VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS.ADELMAN INDICATED THAT IN LAST SIX MONTHS THERE HAD BEEN TWO FULL NSC AND NUMEROUS LESSER MTGS ON MBFR(THIS WAS QUOTE RECORD UNQUOTE).SHULTZ SAID THERE HAD BEEN CONSIDERABLE DEBATE ON MBFR WITHIN USA ADMIN.PM NOTED THIS BUT SUGGESTED DEBATE SHLD BE EXTENDED OUTSIDE ADMIN.FRIENDS OF USA KNEW IT WAS NOT/NOT WAR MONGERER BUT SOME OTHERS DID NOT/NOT.USA HAD QUOTE IDEAS BUT NOT/NOT INITIATIVE UNQUOTE.PM CONCLUDED THAT HE NOW HAD BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF USA POSITION ON MBFR BUT HIS HOPE WAS THAT WSHDC CONCENTRATE ON VERIFICATION RATHER THAN DATA AS REAGAN LET HAD IMPLIED.

6.PM THEN SAID HE WLD RAISE ISSUE OF NATO STRATEGY EVEN THOUGH DPM/SSEA HAD RECOMMENDED AGAINST THIS.HE ASKED WHETHER SHULTZ THOUGHT NATO STRATEGY AS OUTLINED IN 1967 HARNEL REPORT SILL FIT 1980S.CLD NOT/NOT THERE BE LOOK AT NATO STRATEGY AT QUOTE SOME POINT,SOME TIME UNQUOTE.BY IMPLICATION ISSUE WAS AMONG US.ONE OF REASONS FOR NATOS REMOVING 1400 WARHEADS WAS THEIR FORWARD LOCATION AND NEED TO USE THEM EARLY OR LOSE THEM.GENERAL ROGERS HAD MENTIONED IDEA OF NO/NO EARLY FIRST USE.PM SAID HE REALIZED ISSUE OF REVIEW CLD NOT/NOT BE RAISED NOW BEFORE INF DEPLOYMENT AND WHILE(LUNS?)

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PAGE SIX UNGR3033 CONFD CEO

WAS STILL AROUND BUT WAS STAGE BEING SET FOR IT IN NATOS AGMNT TO REVIEW HARMEL REPORT?SHULTZ ACKNOWLEDGED THAT NATO REVIEW AS PROPOSED BY TINDEMANS ONLY DEALT WITH POLITICAL DIMENSION BUT IT WLD BE PRESENTED TO MINS IN MAY AND IN HIS VIEW THIS WAS QUOTE FAST TRACK UNQUOTE.NEXT NATO MIN MTG MIGHT BE QUOTE OCCASION TO RAISE THIS GENERAL SUBJ UNQUOTE.PM SAID HE HAD RAISED SUBJ WITH TINDEMANS MONTH AGO.WHAT NATO AGREED WAS TREMENDOUS FIRST STEP. THERE WAS DANGER HOWEVER OF NATO BECOMING OBSOLETE AS POLITICAL ALLIANCE UNLESS IT REVIEWED ITS POLICY.

7.NATO MTG:SHULTZ EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH RECENT NATO MTG BUT GAVE EXCERPT FOR MINS HAVING TO SPEND TWO AND A HALF HRS ON RE-DRAFTING COMMUNIQUE.MTG HAD NOT/NOT BEEN VIEWED AS OCCASION FOR QUOTE VICTORY UNQUOTE ON INF BUT RATHER OPPORTUNITY TO ISSUE STATEMENT TO USSR THAT NATO WAS READY FOR DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION. PM CALLED BRUSSELS DECLARATION A QUOTE SEA CHANGE UNQUOTE IN ATTITUDE.MTG IN WHITEHOUSE WLD HAVE BEEN MORE DIFFICULT WITHOUT DECLARATION.WHAT PM WAS SAYING WAS NOW BEING CLAIMED BY EVERYONE IN ALLIANCE.SHULTZ SUGGESTED THAT USA POSITION TODAY WAS NO/NO DIFFERENT FROM LAST JUNE WHEN HE HAD GIVEN TESTIMONY TO SENATE FOREIGN RELS CITEE.PERHAPS DIFFERENCE WAS THAT NATO DECLARATION SAID IN PAGE AND A HALF WHAT HE HAD SAID IN 40.PM POINTED OUT THERE WAS ALSO DYNAMICS INVOLVED OF SAYING MESSAGE AS 15 MEMBERS OF ALLIANCE RATHER THAN JUST ONE COUNTRY.DPM/SSEA ADDED THAT NATO WAS ...7

PAGE SEVEN UNGR3033 CONFD CEO

NOW IN VERY GOOD POSITION OF HAVING HUNG TOGETHER ON DEPLOYMENT WHILE AT SAME TIME HAVING ISSUED DECLARATION. THIS LEFT US IN GOOD POSITION OF SOV UNION BEING ON DEFENSIVE RATHER THAN NATO.

8. SHULTZ CONCLUDED THAT PMS VISIT HAD BEEN USEFUL AND STIMULATING; IT HAD BEEN CONDUCTED IN COMFORTABLE AND RELAXED WAY BUT WITH LOTS OF SUBSTANCE. HE ADDED THAT THERE WAS GOOD RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES WHICH WAS NOT/NOT APPRECIATED BY PUBLIC. THIS RELATIONSHIP WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO USA.

9. USA SIDE AT LUNCH INCLUDED SHULTZ, DEPTY SEC DAM, ACDA HEAD ADELMAN, UNDER SEC EAGLEBURGER, UNDER SEC (ECONOMIC) WALLIS, AMB ROBINSON, NSC EXEC SEC KIMMIT, ASST SEC BURT AND DEPTY ASST SEC MEDAS.

CCC/059 160019Z UNGR3033

~~MR SMITH~~ - Koltz ON S Power

②MF

ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE BONN ZQGR4136 15DEC83

A EXTOTT LIDDZ

INFÔ PARIS PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/CPD BNATO LDN BRU WSHDC

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDR IDA RCR

REF NOTRETEL 4134 13DEC

---INITIATIVE DU PM

SUIT TRADUCTION EXTRAIT DISCOURS DE CHANCELIER KOHL DU 13DEC

PRONONCE DEVANT ASSEMBLE NATIONALE DE CDU:

CIT GOUVERNEEMENT FEDERAL EST AUSSI PRET A APPUYER AUTRES

SUGGESTIONS ET INITIATIVES, LORSQU ELLES CONTRIBUENT A UNE

REDUCTION DES ARMEMENTS A LOUEST ET A LEST. DANS CE SENS,

CONSIDERONS SUGGESTION DUNE CONFERENCE DES 5/5 PUISSANCES

NUCLEAIRES CERTES COMME DIGNE DE DEXAMEN. NS UTILISERONS

AUSSI, TEL QUE MENTIONNE AU DEBUT, TOUTE OPPORTUNITE DE

COOPERATION DANS AUTRES SECTEURS: POLITIQUE, ECONOMIQUE, CULTUREL,

SECTEURS HUMANITAIRES TANT A EGARD URSS QUE DES AUTRES ETATS

DU PACTE DE VARSOVIE. FINCIT.

CCC/242 151020Z ZQGR4136

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

**CDN EYES ONLY  
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM LDN XNGR4386 15DEC83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER WSHDC MOSCO PARIS BONN BNATO PERMNY GENEV

VMBFR NDHQOTT/CPD/DNACPOL

DISTR MINA MINE DMF RGB RCD RCR RBD RBR URR UGB IFB IDD IDR IDA

ZSI CPD

---SSEA VISIT TO UK:MTGS WITH HEALEY AND CALLAGHAN

WHILE IN LDN 12DEC SSEA RECEIVED SEPARATE CALLS BY DENNIS HEALEY AND JIM CALLAGHAN.HEALEY TOOK PLACE OF KINNOCK(WHO WENT TO IRELAND ON WEEKEND).HEALEY WAS FULLY SUPPORTIVE OF GENERAL THRUST OF PMS INITIATIVE(HE HAD QUOTED GUELPH SPEECH IN COMMONS)BUT PESSIMISTIC ABOUT ITS SUCCESS IN MOVING SUPERPOWERS.HE DID NOT/NOT THINK FIVE NUCLEAR POWER MTG WO LD COME ABOUT BUT THOUGHT IT WORTHWHILE TO MAKE ATTEMPT TO MOVE FORWARD ON MBFR.HE WAS SCATHING IN HIS CRITICISM OF USA BLAMING IT FOR INFLEXIBILITY IN INF NEGS.HE IS NOW COMMITTED TO OPPOSING CRUISE DEPLOYMENT IN UK.HE INSISTED IT WAS NECESSARY TO SHIFT USA POSITION ON DEALING WITH MOSCOW BUT HE DOUBTED ANYTHING WAS POSSIBLE BEFORE USA ELECTIONS.COMMENTING ON PERSONALITIES,HEALEY THOUGHT SHULTZ WAS NOW HAWK IN WSHDC.HE HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT EFFECTIVENESS OF HOWE IN FCO.HEALEY WELCOMED CARRINGTON APPOINTMENT BUT WONDERED IF HIS STYLE SUITED JOB.HEALEY HAD IMPRESSION FROM RECENT MTG WITH EAGLEBURGER THAT USA ADMIN WAS

...2

PAGE TWO XNGR4386 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

FFD UP WITH EUROPE AFTER INF PROBLEM AND WOULD TAKE GREATER INTEREST IN JPN AND PACIFIC. HEALEY SAID USA HAD TO BE KEPT EUROPE ORIENTATED (IGNORING I THOUGHT HIS OWN CONTRIBUTION TO ANNOYING WSHDC).

2. IN DISCUSSION WITH (ALLAGHAN HE SPOKE TO SSEA LARGELY ON LINES HE HAD EARLIER TO ME OF HIS VISIT TO USSR (MYTEL XNGR2080 25OCT) HE PASSED SSEA PIECE OF PAPER FOR PM GIVING VIEWS ON HIS MOSCOW VISIT; HE SAID HE HAD ALREADY GIVEN COPY TO KISSINGER TO PASS TO REAGAN ADMIN. HE WELCOMED PMS ROLE BELIEVING IT ESSENTIAL TO PROMOTE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE. HOWEVER HE DID NOT/NOT THINK FIVE NUCLEAR POWER MTG WAS GOOD IDEA FOR HE BELIEVED FOCUS HAD TO BE KEPT ON SUPERPOWERS TO WORK OUT RELATIONSHIP. REVIEW OF MBFR WOULD DO NO/NO HARM BUT HE DID NOT/NOT RANK IT HIGH. HE WAS SCEPTICAL OF HEADS OF GOVT MTG IN STOCKHOLM FEARING THAT IF IT DID NOT/NOT MARK REAL PROGRESS EFFECT COULD BE NEGATIVE.

3. CALLAGHAN REFERRED TO GROMYKO IDEA OF SITUATION BEING EASED BY CONTACT BETWEEN TWO TRUSTED EMISSARIES. GROMYKO HAD SUGGESTED TO HIM THAT PROGRESS IN MAKING POLITICAL ADJUSTMENTS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE OVER AFGHANISTAN, LEBANON/SYRIA, AND CENTRAL AMERICA. CALLAGHAN WAS NOT/NOT ALARMIST ABOUT DANGERS IN POST-INF DEPLOYMENT PERIOD. HE DID NOT/NOT THINK RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR IN EUROPE HAD BEEN INCREASED. ALL PARTIES WOULD CONTINUE TO EXERCISE MAXIMUM CAUTION. CALLAGHAN SAID HE HAD

...3

PAGE THREE XNGR4386 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

SPOKEN TO MRS THATCHER RECENTLY ABOUT CONTACTS WITH EAST.HE WAS SURE HUNGARIANS HAD CLEARED HER VISIT TO BUDAPEST WITH MOSCOW. MRS- THATCHER HAD TOLD HIM SHE DID NOT/NOT EXPECT TO BE INVITED TO MOSCOW.CALLAGHAN SAID HE HAD ARGUED RUSSIANS COULD NEVERTHELESS BE PERSUADED TO COME TO LDN.FUTURE USA/USSR CONTACT WOULD BE HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY REAGAN FORTUNES.CALLAGHAN SAID HE HAD RECENTLY SEEN GERALD FORD AND ELLIOTT RICHARDSON WHO WERE NOT/NOT CONVINCED REAGAN WILL WIN RE-ELECTION.

JAMIESON

CCC/224 161107Z XNGR4386

*Revised*: TEL 100-0000  
15 DEC 83

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

Division Phoned	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Person	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Local Time	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM GENEV YTGR8296 15DEC83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 150900

INFO LDN PRMNY WSHDC MOSCO BNATO PARIS BONN

DISTR MINA USS DMF IDAO IDAN RGB RCR IDA IDR IMC

REF OURTEL YTGR8292 14DEC PRMNYTEL WKGR2958 14DEC YOURTEL IDDZ287

14DEC

---GENEV VISIT-RT HON JOE CLARK

I AM PROPOSING TO HOST TWO LUNCHEONS IN HONOUR OF MR CLARK  
 INTENDED TO BE WORKING LUNCHEONS DIRECTED TOWARD A FRANK  
 EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AMONGST PARTICIPANTS(SIMILAR TO THAT HELD HERE  
 ON CTB SHORTLY BEFORE COMMENCEMENT OF FIRST CTTEE WORK AT 38TH  
 UNGA).PLS PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO MR CLARK.

2.GRATEFUL TO LEARN(BY TELEPHONE IF POSSIBLE)IF YOU WOULD  
 AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN TWO WORKING LUNCHEONS INTENDED TO PROVIDE  
 OPPORTUNITY FOR FRANK EXCHANGE OF VIEWS REFLECTING SPECTRUM OF  
 POSITIONS,AS FOLLOWS:

TUES DEC20,1:15 PM:MESSR CLARK,BEESLEY,SKINNER AND BUTLTER(AUSTL)  
 EKEUS(SWEDEN)AND AHMAD(PAK):

WED DEC21,1:15 PM:MESSRS CLARK,BEESLEY,SKINNER AND CROMARTIE(UK),  
 WEGENER(FRG),TURBANSKI(POLAND).ROSE(GDR)AND DUBEY(INDIA)

3.DISARM AMBS HERE ARE PROVING EXTREMELY COOPERATIVE AND FLEXIBLE  
 CONCERNING MTGS WITH YOU AND PROPOSED LUNCHEONS COULD GO AHEAD  
 OR BE CANCELLED DEPENDING ON YOUR PERSONAL WISHES.

BEESLEY

CCC/125 151030Z YTGR8296

*action*



External Affairs / Affaires étrangères  
Canada

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

57-7-1 AND 57-7-5

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
Alignez le premier caractère de la SA sous cette flèche

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION  
UNCLASSIFIED

121 10

FM/DE SEATL UAGR 15DEC83 5953  
TO/A EXTOTT IDD SEA 002/16  
INFO SFAX WSHDC/PUBLIC AFFAIRS DE SEA 003/16  
DISTR EXTOTT/IDR IDA PPR UGP URR MINA DE OTT  
REF  
SUBJ/SUBJ ---PM PEACE AND SECURITY INITIATIVE

*10/2-*

ATTACHED IN FIRST MENTION WE HAVE SEEN IN OREGON PRESS (QUOTE  
THE OREGONIAN UNQUOTE OF PORTLAND, OREGON).

INWAFTR RECEIVED

RECEIVED

RECEIVED

APPROVED/APProuvé

BY A.D. ROWE/cn

GENERAL RELATIONS

(206) 223-1777

SIC ALAN D. ROWE

*Alan D. Rowe*

The Oregonian  
Dec. 9, 1975

2 of 2

# Trudeau party plays peace theme to Parliament

By MICHAEL T. KAUFMAN  
New York Times News Service

OTTAWA, Canada — The government of Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau opened Parliament this week with a message outlining a national agenda that emphasized the search for peace and disarmament abroad and the creation of jobs for young people at home.

The government is mindful of public opinion polls showing Trudeau's Liberal Party to be trailing the Conservative opposition by nearly 30 percentage points and a budgetary deficit this year of nearly \$25 billion, as well as an approaching deadline for new elections. It presented a legislative program that promises to keep new expenditures down while stimulating more work, more trade and more productivity through measures such as a \$1 billion youth job program, a conservation corps and policies stressing labor-management cooperation.

The speech was immediately attacked by members of the opposition with characterizations such as "a grab bag of generalities."

The government's message was contained in the Speech from the Throne, the traditional ceremony that marks the opening of every new session of Parliament. In keeping with tradition, the speech was read by Edward Schreyer, the governor general, as he and his wife sat on carved wooden thrones.

Trudeau, who returned three days ago from India and China, where he sought support for his recent disarmament proposals, sat to the governor general's right on a lower, more common chair befitting a man who, though head of government, is not head of state.

Although the speech made no direct reference to Trudeau's recent attempts to rekindle the almost cold ashes of detente and broaden the quest for disarmament beyond the super-

powers, it clearly stressed in its opening section "Canada's role in seeking world peace."

The government, the governor general read, acting as representative of the queen of England, "intends to devote its full resources to exploration of every possible means to restore confidence and trust to the international scene." He said it would "continue to advance proposals to slow the steady spiral of the arms race, halt the spread of nuclear weapons and create the conditions for greater security at lower levels of armament."

Such language is consistent with the campaign that Trudeau began last month to generate some momentum for disarmament talks among nuclear powers by seeking the active involvement of nuclear powers other than the United States and the Soviet Union while also urging potential nuclear powers to shun atomic military development.

Trudeau has received a tepid and publicly polite response from the nuclear nations, all of whom have dismissed his most concrete notion for a conference by the nuclear powers on disarmament.

He did, however, obtain the endorsement of most Commonwealth nations that met in New Delhi, India, and he has declared that he is prepared to begin phase 2 of the program by taking his case to Washington and Moscow.

The major specific innovations outlined in addition to the comprehensive job program for young people included a commitment to set up a center to collate and digest what was described as "the enormous volume" of information on military and arms control issues while also increasing government financing for voluntary associations and private research groups active in security, arms control and disarmament issues.

MF  
ed

December 14, 1983

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU - WASHINGTON  
INFORMATION SHEET

Canadian Delegation - Arriving on Plane

Prime Minister P. E. Trudeau	Madison Hotel Rm 1007/9
Deputy Prime Minister and SSFA	
Allan MacEachen	Madison Hotel Room 1015/7
Thomas Axworthy	
Principal Secretary to PM	Madison Hotel Room 1001
Robert Fowler	
Foreign Policy Adviser to PM	Madison Hotel Room 1019
Ted Johnson	
PM's Executive Assistant	Madison Hotel Room 1003

Others - Arriving December 14, 1983

Ralph Coleman - Press Secretary to PM	Madison Hotel Room 1008
Vaughan Johnstone - Assistant Chief of Protocol - DEA	
Martha Durdin - Special Assistant to PM	Madison Hotel Room 1004
Jacques Hudon - Associate Press Secretary to PM	Vista Hotel Room 812
Yves Beaulieu - Special Security Liaison Officer to PM - RCMP	Vista Hotel Room 709
Robert Cooper - Official Photographer - PMO	Madison Hotel Room 1004
	Madison Hotel Room 1029
Press Hospitality Suite	Vista Hotel Room 710
Press Room	Vista Hotel Sherwood Room 429-1700 Ext. 1471

Others - Arriving December 15, 1983

Louis Delvoie - DEA	Madison Hotel Room 1002
John Noble - DEA	Madison Hotel Room 1006
Gary Smith - DEA	Madison Hotel Room 1023

Key Embassy Phone Numbers:

Embassy: 785-1400.

- 2 -

After 6:00 p.m.: 785-1412

Ambassador Gotlieb: Call Embassy, Local 276  
Car - 845-3094  
Residence - Embassy, Local 280

Jeremy Kinsman: Call Embassy, Local 286  
Home: 364-0486

Ralph Lysyshyn: Call Embassy, Local 288  
Home: 244-1364

Jim Judd: Call Embassy, Local 361  
Home: 942-0419

Patrick Gossage: Call Embassy, Local 207  
Home: 244-2809

Cliff Garrard: Call Embassy, Local 203  
Home: 320-2541

Pam Chappell: Call Embassy, Local 209  
Home: 320-4707

Secretarial Assistance - Denise Turcotte - 785-1400, Extension 287  
Tara Holtby - 785-1400, Extension 289

- Car 1: PM's Limousine - License
  - Car 2: DPM/SSEA's Limousine - License L-1118
  - Car 3: Ambassador's Car - License DPL 79
  - Car 4: License DPL 11742
  - Car 5: License DPL 11739
  - Car 6: License DPL 10297
  - Car 7: License L-1097
  - Car 8: (J. Roy's Car) - License DPL 11740
- Car 2A is provided by USA side.

- 3 -

PROGRAM  
VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU

Thursday, December 15, 1983

09:40 Depart Emb for Andrews Air Force Base

Car 3: Kinsman  
Roy  
Lysyshyn

Car 5: Beaulieu  
Johnstone  
Rioux

Cars 2 and 8 to follow

10:20 Arrive Andrews Air Force Base:

Plane to be met by Chief of Protocol Mrs. Selwa Roosevelt  
Ambassador Robinson  
James Medas, State Department

J. Roy, Minister, Embassy of Canada  
J. Kinsman, Minister, Embassy of Canada  
R. Lysyshyn, Counsellor, Embassy of Canada  
G. Rioux, Third Secretary, Embassy of Canada  
Yves Beaulieu, RCMP  
Vaughan Johnstone, Protocol

10:25 Depart Andrews for White House:

Car 1: PM  
Mrs. Roosevelt  
Ambassador Gotlieb

Car 2: DPM/SSEA  
Amb Robinson  
R. Lysyshyn

Car 2A: J. Medas  
R. Fowler  
T. Johnson

- 4 -

10:30 Depart Andrews for Madison Hotel

Car 3: (Amb's car) J. Roy  
Jeremy Kinsman  
Tom Axworthy

Car 5: G. Rioux  
V. Johnstone

Car 8: Back up

10:55 Arrive White House - Enter by N.W. Gate  
Met by Deputy Chief of Protocol Tim Towell

11:00 Meeting with President Reagan

PM	President Reagan
DFM/SSEA	Secretary Shultz
Ambassador Gotlieb	Ambassador Robinson
Bob Fowler	Rick Purt

11:45# Depart Hotel for Blair House

Car 3: (Amb's car) Jeremy Kinsman  
Tom Axworthy

Car 6: L. Devoie  
G. Smith

Car 5: V. Johnstone

11:50 Meeting with Reagan ends

11:30 Car 4 arrives at White House - South West Entrance

11:55 Departure  
Statements at Colonnade

001706

- 5 -

12:00

Depart White House

Car 1: PM  
Secretary Shultz  
Ambassador Gotlieb

Car 2: DPM/SSEA  
Mr. McFarlane  
Amb Robinson

Car 2A: R. Fowler  
R. Burt  
R. Lysyshyn

Car 4: Robert Cooper  
Ted Johnson

12:05

Arrive Blair House

12:05

Lunch with Secretary of State Shultz

P.M.	Secretary Shultz
DPM/SSEA	Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam
Ambassador Gotlieb	NSC Advisor Robert McFarlane
Tom Axworthy	Under Secretary Larry Eagleburger
Robert Fowler	Under Secretary Allan Wallis
Louis Delvoie	Ambassador Robinson
Jeremy Kinsman	NSC Executive Secretary Robert Kimmit
G. Smith	Assistant Secretary Burt
T. Johnson	Deputy Assistant Secretary Medas

12:05#

Lunch in Staff Room available for Cooper, Noble, Lysyshyn,  
Garrard and Johnstone

13:30

Lunch ends

13:35

Depart Blair House for Official Residence

Car 1: PM  
Ambassador Gotlieb

- 6 -

Car 4: T. Johnson  
R. Cooper  
R. Lysyshyn

Car 5: V. Johnstone

13:50 Arrive Official Residence

13:40# DPM/SSEA departs for Vista. (See separate program, page 9).

Car 2: DPM/SSEA  
John Noble

Car 3: (Amb's car) J. Kinsman  
T. Axworthy  
R. Fowler

Car 6: Louis Delvoie  
G. Smith

14:45 Staff Briefing

15:00 Meeting with Senior Editors

16:15 Depart Residence for Madison Hotel

Car 1: PM  
Ambassador Gotlieb

Car 4: Ted Johnson  
Robert Cooper  
R. Lysyshyn

16:30 Arrive Hotel

16:35# Ambassador departs Hotel for Embassy in Car 3.

- 7 -

18:00#            Ambassador addresses Columbia Society

18:15#            Ambassador departs for residence

18:30            PM departs hotel for Vice President's residence in Car 1.  
Car 4: R. Lysyshyn  
T. Johnson  
B. Cooper

18:45            Arrive Vice President's residence

19:00#            Ambassador departs Residence for Madison Hotel

19:15            PM departs Vice President's residence for Alibi Club,  
1803 I (Eye) Street, N.W.

19:20#            DPM/SSEA and Gotliebs depart Hotel for Alibi Club  
Car 2 and Car 3

19:30            Arrive Alibi Club for dinner with V.P. Bush

21:30 (?)        Return to Hotel  
Cars 1, 2 and 3

Friday, December 16, 1983

06:30#            Ambassador departs Residence for Hotel  
Car 3

- 8 -

06:50 PM departs hotel for APC Studios

Car 1: PM  
Ambassador Gotlieb

Car 7: Coleman  
Hudon

Car 4: Cooper  
Johnson  
Lysyshyn

07:00 Arrive APC Studio 1717 Desales Street

07:00 Car 5: Johnstone departs for airport with luggage

07:15# Depart hotel for airport

Car 3: Kinsman  
Fowler

Car 8: Axworthy  
Roy

07:30 Depart ABC Studio for Andrews AFB  
(Cars 1, 2, 4, and 6)

08:00 Arrive Andrews AFB

08:15 Depart Andrews for Montreal

001710

- 9 -

VISIT OF DPM/SSFA

PROGRAM

14:15 Press Briefing, Vista Hotel  
- on the record

15:00 Return to Madison Hotel

Car 2: DPM/SSEA  
John Noble

15:30 Interview with As It Happens.  
They will call your suite.

19:15 Gotliebs arrive at Hotel.

19:20 Depart for Alibi Club

Car 2: DPM/SSEA  
Mr. and Mrs. Gotlieb

21:30 (?) Return to Hotel

Friday, December 16, 1983

06:45 Depart Hotel for CTV (ARC Studios, 1705 Desales St  
Suite 206)

Car 2: DPM/SSEA  
John Noble

Car 6: Louis Delvoie

- 10 -

06:55 Arrive CTV Studios  
For Canada A.M.

07:00 CTV Interview

07:30 Depart for Andrews Air Force Base in PM's motorcade

Car 2: DPM/SSFA  
John Noble

08:00 Arrive Andrews



F A C S I M I L E  
MESSAGE

NGTC

FILE DOSSIER

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ **C O N F I D E N T I A L** 12 10

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDZ0294 14DEC83

TO/A TO USHDC DELIVER BY 14 1900 HRS

INFO REF YOUR TEL UNGR3024 OF 13DEC AND LYSYSHYN/SMITH TELCOM OF 14DEC

DISTR ---PL VISIT:DRAFT DEPARTURE STATEMENT.

REF FOLLOWING IS A DRAFT DEPARTURE STATEMENT WHICH YOU SHOULD HOLD AND

SUBJ/SUJ NOT/NOT HAND OVER TO USA UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

(CONCENTRE: PLEASE FAX ATTACHED TEXT)

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG <i>G. SMITH</i>	IDZ	5-5912	SIG <i>A.A. DELVOIE</i>

## MESSAGE PREPARATION

- 1) Use OCR element and set typewriter for 10 pitch. Observe right margin marked "10". If typewriter capable of 12 pitch only, ensure that right margin, marked "12", is observed.
- 2) Use full capitals and double line feed at all times.
- 3) Security Classification: "UNCLASSIFIED" is to be typed without spacing between letters. All other classifications are to have one space between the letters, e.g. C O N F I D E N T I A L
- 4) Use only one space between words in the address portion of the message, e.g.  
TO LDN PARIS IMMED WSHDC  
DISTR PUA APO APR MFP
- 5) Subject line is indicated by three dashes in front of the subject, e.g. --- REVISED FSDS
- 6) First paragraph is neither numbered nor indented. All subsequent paragraphs are numbered. Do not use space between the paragraph number and the first letter of the text, e.g. 3. THE POST...
- 7) Do not use space before or after punctuation marks, e.g. WILL ARRIVE BERNE, 15 JUN. THE etc.
- 8) Use only the following punctuation: period, comma, semi-colon, colon, dash, oblique stroke, brackets and question mark.
- 9) Following signs must be spelled out: \$ (DOLLARS), % (PERCENT), # (NUMBER), " (QUOTE), and ' (UNQUOTE). In English the apostrophe is omitted to form a single word, while in French the apostrophe is replaced by a space.
- 10) Always repeat negatives NO and NOT as NO/NO and NOT/NOT. DO NOT/NOT underline.
- 11) End of page of multi-page messages is identified on a separate line, at left margin with only three periods and the number of the following page, e.g.  
...2
- 12) Do not use punctuation at the end of the message when there is a signature.

## PRÉPARATION DES MESSAGES

- 1) Employer le LOC et régler la machine au pas "10". Placer la marge droite à "10". Si vous avez une machine de pas "12", placer la marge droite à "12".
- 2) Toujours utiliser les majuscules et le double interligne.
- 3) La cote de sécurité "NONCLASSIFIÉ" doit être dactylographiée sans espace entre les lettres. Toutes les autres doivent l'être avec un espace, par exemple: C O N F I D E N T I E L
- 4) Pour l'adresse, utiliser seulement un espace entre chaque mot, par exemple:  
A LDN PARIS IMMED WSHDC  
DISTR PUA APO APR MFP
- 5) Faire précéder le sujet de trois tirets, par exemple: ---DSE REVISÉES
- 6) Le premier paragraphe n'est jamais numéroté et commence à la marge. Tous les paragraphes suivants sont numérotés. Ne pas laisser d'espace entre le numéro du paragraphe et la première lettre du texte, par exemple: 3. LA MISSION...
- 7) Ne pas laisser d'espace avant ou après les signes de ponctuation, par exemple: ARRIVERAI À BERNE, 15 JUN. LE etc.
- 8) Utiliser seulement les signes de ponctuation suivants: point, virgule, point virgule, deux points, tiret, barre oblique, parenthèses et point d'interrogation.
- 9) Les signes suivants doivent être dactylographiés en toutes lettres: \$ (DOLLARS), % (POUR CENT), # (NUMÉRO), " (CITATION) et ' (FIN DE CITATION). En anglais, omettre l'apostrophe et ajouter la terminaison au mot pour en faire un seul mot. En français remplacer l'apostrophe par un espace.
- 10) Répéter toujours les négatifs NO et NOT comme ceci: NO/NO NOT/NOT (en français les négatifs ne sont pas répétés).
- 11) Sur les messages comportant plus d'une page, indiquer sur une ligne séparée, à la marge à gauche, le numéro de la page suivante en le faisant précéder de trois points seulement, par exemple:  
...2
- 12) Ne pas mettre de ponctuation à la fin du message quant il comporte une signature.

D R A F T

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTURE STATEMENT

1. I have had a very productive meeting with the President.
2. We share a deep commitment to the cause of peace, to reducing world tensions and the risks of nuclear war. I share fully the Presidents view that a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought and his desire to banish nuclear weapons from the face of the earth.

TO CONTINUE

3. We agreed to work for a constructive relationship with the East based on equilibrium, moderation and reciprocity eschewing aspirations to military superiority.
4. I have told the President of my recent consultations with other world leaders who share my concerns and largely support the central purpose of my initiative which is the requirement for an injection of political energy into the East-West relationship.
5. I may visit Moscow in the coming months. I will not be bearing a message from the President, rather my aim would be to met directly with the Soviet leadership in support of the goal of better communication and understanding which we all share and to assure them again of the West's deep desire for mutual security at lower levels of armaments.



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

14 DEC 83 232 282 10	
----------------------	--

SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ UNCLASSIFIED

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0292 14DEC83  
 TO/À *PORTA-TEST SYSTEMS*  
 INFO TO TLX NO. 037-3319 PORTA TEST EDM  
 DISTR ~~FOR~~ MRS L SWANN  
 REF TELEPHONE NUMBER FOR MR PEARSON IS 234-4229/234-4229.  
 SUBJ/SUJ

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

SIG *J. McNee* / sc

DIVISION/DIRECTION

IDDZ

TELEPHONE

5-5912

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG *L.A. Devvoie*

ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER

234 4229

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PORTA TEST EDM

TO EXTOTT        IDZ/PEARSON

DO YOU HAVE PHONE NUMBER FOR MR. PEARSON.

PLEASE TELEX TELEPHONE NUMBER TO TLX NO. 037-3319 PORTA-TEST  
SYSTEMS, LTD. FOR MRS. L. SWANN

THANK YOU

J.J. FRIGON

TLX NO. 037-3319

PORTA TEST EDM

UUU/067 12228Z TLX0565

*Sherrin*  
*Could you pls do a telex for*  
*~~ref: yr telex~~*  
*this ~~addr~~ J.O.*  
*Pearson's tel ~~no~~*  
*number is 234-4229*



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

14 DEC 83 21 12 02 10

SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM/DE  
TO/À  
INFO  
DISTR  
REF  
SUBJ/SUJ

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0291 14DEC83  
TO WSHDC DELIVER BY 141800  
INFO BNATO VMBFR LDN PARIS BONN BRU HAGUE ROME MOSCO PEKIN  
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDR IDA UGB URR RGB RBD CPD  
---PM INITIATIVE:LET FROM PRES REAGAN  
WE REPRODUCE BELOW FOR YOUR INFO TEXT OF LET PASSED TO US THIS  
AFTERNOON BY USA EMB OTT.  
2.TEXT BEGINS.  
(COMCENTRE: PLEASE COPY ATTACHED)  
TEXT ENDS.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
L.A.Delvoie/sc SIG	IDDZ	5-5912	<i>L.A. Delvoie</i> SIG L.A. Delvoie



CONFIDENTIAL

EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Ottawa, December 14, 1983

Mr. R. R. Fowler  
Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet  
Privy Council Office  
Langevin Block  
Ottawa

Dear Mr. Fowler:

Enclosed is the text of a letter received telegraphically today from President Reagan in response to Prime Minister Trudeau's letter of November 18. It would be appreciated if you could have the text of the President's letter delivered to the Prime Minister as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

  
John H. Rouse  
Minister

Enclosure

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEAR MR. BEE:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF NOVEMBER 18 IN WHICH YOU WERE KIND ENOUGH TO SHARE YOUR FURTHER THOUGHTS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND IN PARTICULAR ON CDE AND MBFR.

I AGREE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO DEMONSTRATE OUR COMMITMENT TO CDE. THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE IMPORTANT IN OUR COMMON EFFORT TO ACHIEVE GENUINE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. IN LINE WITH SUGGESTIONS I RECEIVED FROM YOU AND A NUMBER OF OUR

OTHER ALLIES THAT ALL NATO MEMBERS BE REPRESENTED AT A HIGH POLITICAL LEVEL AT THE INAUGURAL MEETING IN STOCKHOLM. I HAVE DECIDED TO SEND GEORGE SHULTZ TO THAT SESSION.

OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS WE CONDUCTED AN EXTENSIVE REVIEW OF MBFR. ON THE BASIS OF THAT REVIEW, I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT FOR THE CURRENT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS, A DATA AGREEMENT AND A COMPREHENSIVE NATO VERIFICATION PACKAGE ARE ESSENTIAL PREREQUISITES FOR A TREATY SIGNATURE AND FOR ANY INITIAL REDUCTIONS. I BELIEVE THAT NATO SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR ELABORATION AND MOVEMENT ON VERIFICATION MEASURES PROPOSED BY THE EAST. WE ARE AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, CONTINUING OUR INTERNAL REVIEW OF ALTERNATIVE MBFR OPTIONS AND POTENTIAL STRATEGIES FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATING ROUNDS.

I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS WITH YOU PERSONALLY YOUR ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE AS WELL AS THE WHOLE RANGE OF CURRENT EAST-WEST ISSUES IN GREATER DETAIL. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 15.

SINCERELY, RON. END TEXT.

THE RIGHT HONORABLE  
PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU. P.C., M.P.  
PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA  
OTTAWA

CONFIDENTIAL



Government of Canada

Gouvernement du Canada

**ACTION FICHE DE REQUEST SERVICE**

To - À  <i>Mr. Delors</i>	File No. - Dossier N°
	Date <i>20/12/83</i>

From - De  
*[Signature]* **MF**

<input type="checkbox"/> Please call Prière d'appeler	Tel. No. - N° de tél.	Ext. - Poste
--	-----------------------	--------------

<input type="checkbox"/> Returned your call Vous a rappelé	<input type="checkbox"/> Will call again Vous rappellera	<input type="checkbox"/> Wants to see you Désire vous voir
---	---	---

Date	Time - Heure	Message received by Message reçu par
------	--------------	---

<input type="checkbox"/> Action Donner suite	<input type="checkbox"/> Approval Approbation	<input type="checkbox"/> Note & return Noter et retourner
<input type="checkbox"/> Comments Commentaires	<input type="checkbox"/> Draft reply Projet de réponse	<input type="checkbox"/> Note & forward Noter et faire suivre
<input type="checkbox"/> As requested Comme demandé	<input type="checkbox"/> Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Note & file Noter et classer

*Both Fowler and De Montigny wanted a report on the various aspects Pmo correspondence secretary was furious about this & was going to inform Pmo about it.*

*So what?*



MASTER

IDDZ/J.McNee/5-5912/cf

TO/A Mr. Delvoie and Mr. Smith  
FROM/DE • IDDZ/J.McNee

Security/Sécurité	RESTRICTED
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	December 14, 1983.
Number/Numéro	IDDZ-0290

REFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • PM's October 25 Letters to Heads of  
SUJET • Government of France, Luxembourg and  
Belgium: Errors in the Text.

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

There were errors in the text that went by tel and even more errors in the originals which the PM signed.

According to Jim Harlick, the sequence of events was:

- 1) the initial translation was done by the department's translation division (TRAN)
- 2) André Burelle of PMO then made fairly extensive revisions to the text; there were so many changes that the revised text could not be put on the Tran word processor and instead they were entered on the IDDZ machine.
- 3) the IDDZ word processor was malfunctioning and entering errors.
- 4) the texts were proof-read here and sent to Fowler's secretary for, it was presumed, a second proof-reading.

It would seem that when the telegraphed version was copied into our word processor that its mistakes were copied and some new errors committed.

What sort of report are we to make (and to whom) on this?

*None what's done is done. To try to correct anything at this late date would appear peculiar, if not absurd.*

John McNee  
Task Force Working Group

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

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SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ

~~RESTRICTED~~

14 DEC 83 23 29 Z 121 10

FM/DE  
TO/À  
INFO  
DISTR  
REF  
SUBJ/SUJ

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0289 14DEC83  
TO LDN DELIVER-BY 150900  
INFO GENEV BNATO  
DISTR MINA DMF RGB RCR IDA IDR IMC  
REF OURTEL 0283 OF 13DEC

---VISIT BY RT HON JOE CLARK

MR CLARK S OFFICE (PEGGY MASSON) CALLED TO ASK IF YOU COULD BOOK HOTEL FOR HIM (SWB) FOR 17-18 DEC (LIKELY MID-MORNING ARRIVAL 17DEC AT HOTEL). HE DOES NOT/HAVE SPECIAL PREFERENCE, BUT WANTS A CENTRAL HOTEL (MASSON NOTED THAT CARRINGTON MTG IS AT STANHOPE GATE NEAR DORCHESTER).

2. MASSON SAID THAT BRITS HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH YOU DIRECT RE TRANSPORT FOR MTG WITH LORD CARRINGTON. GRATEFUL YOU ARRANGE FOR CAR TO MEET MR. CLARK AT HEATHROW AND PRESUME CAR WILL BE AT HIS DISPOSAL THROUGHOUT VISIT. MR CLARK IS BOOKED ON AC856 ARRIVING HEATHROW 180730 AND <sup>IS ON</sup> WAIT LIST FOR AC866 ARRIVING 170930. WILL CONFIRM ASAP.

~~3. FOR GENEVA UNDERSTAND MR. CLARK HAS SPOKEN WITH BEESELY AND ALL IS IN HAND.~~

3. MASSON REPORTS THAT MR CLARK HAS SPOKEN WITH RAMPHAL WHO WILL NOT/NOT BE IN LDN MON 19DEC. MR. CLARK <sup>now</sup> WISHES TO MEET WITH BRITISH EXPERTS IN STRATEGIC FIELD MON AM. WE HAVE SUGGESTED PROF MICHAEL HOWARD, ~~ALL~~ SOULS COLLEGE, OXFORD AND LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, PROF OF WAR STUDIES,

*[Handwritten mark]*

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG <i>[Signature]</i> J. McNEE	IDDZ	5-5912	SIG <i>[Signature]</i> L. A. DELVOIE



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ **R E S T R I C T E D** 12 10

FM/DE **FM EXTOTT IDDZ0287 14DEC83**

TO/À **TO GENEV *INT. DIV.***

INFO

DISTR **DISTR NINA USS DMF IDA RGB RCR**

REF **REF YRTEL 8292 OF 14DEC**

SUBJ/SUJ **---VISIT OF RT HON JOE CLARK**

**HAVE DELAYED MSG TO MR CLARK S OFFICE AS PER PARAS 2-4 REFTEL.**

**2. THEY CONFIRM HE WILL DEPART THURS 22DEC 0900HRS SA722.**

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG <b>J. J. CHEE</b>	<b>IDDZ</b>	<b>5-5912</b>	SIG <b>L.A. DELVOIE</b>

## MESSAGE PREPARATION

- 1) Use OCR element and set typewriter for 10 pitch. Observe right margin marked "10". If typewriter capable of 12 pitch only, ensure that right margin, marked "12", is observed.
- 2) Use full capitals and double line feed at all times.
- 3) Security Classification: "UNCLASSIFIED" is to be typed without spacing between letters. All other classifications are to have one space between the letters, e.g. C O N F I D E N T I A L
- 4) Use only one space between words in the address portion of the message, e.g.  
TO LDN PARIS IMMED WSHDC  
DISTR PUA APO APR MFP
- 5) Subject line is indicated by three dashes in front of the subject, e.g. --- REVISED FSDS
- 6) First paragraph is neither numbered nor indented. All subsequent paragraphs are numbered. Do not use space between the paragraph number and the first letter of the text, e.g. 3. THE POST...
- 7) Do not use space before or after punctuation marks, e.g. WILL ARRIVE BERNE, 15 JUN. THE etc.
- 8) Use only the following punctuation: period, comma, semi-colon, colon, dash, oblique stroke, brackets and question mark.
- 9) Following signs must be spelled out: \$ (DOLLARS), % (PERCENT), # (NUMBER), " (QUOTE), and ' (UNQUOTE). In English the apostrophe is omitted to form a single word, while in French the apostrophe is replaced by a space.
- 10) Always repeat negatives NO and NOT as NO/NO and NOT/NOT. DO NOT/NOT underline.
- 11) End of page of multi-page messages is identified on a separate line, at left margin with only three periods and the number of the following page, e.g.  
...2
- 12) Do not use punctuation at the end of the message when there is a signature.

## PRÉPARATION DES MESSAGES

- 1) Employer le LOC et régler la machine au pas "10". Placer la marge droite à "10". Si vous avez une machine de pas "12", placer la marge droite à "12".
- 2) Toujours utiliser les majuscules et le double interligne.
- 3) La cote de sécurité "NONCLASSIFIÉ" doit être dactylographiée sans espace entre les lettres. Toutes les autres doivent l'être avec un espace, par exemple: C O N F I D E N T I E L
- 4) Pour l'adresse, utiliser seulement un espace entre chaque mot, par exemple:  
A LDN PARIS IMMED WSHDC  
DISTR PUA APO APR MFP
- 5) Faire précéder le sujet de trois tirets, par exemple: ---DSE REVISÉES
- 6) Le premier paragraphe n'est jamais numéroté et commence à la marge. Tous les paragraphes suivants sont numérotés. Ne pas laisser d'espace entre le numéro du paragraphe et la première lettre du texte, par exemple: 3. LA MISSION...
- 7) Ne pas laisser d'espace avant ou après les signes de ponctuation, par exemple: ARRIVERAI À BERNE, 15 JUN. LE etc.
- 8) Utiliser seulement les signes de ponctuation suivants: point, virgule, point virgule, deux points, tiret, barre oblique, parenthèses et point d'interrogation.
- 9) Les signes suivants doivent être dactylographiés en toutes lettres: \$ (DOLLARS), % (POUR CENT), # (NUMÉRO), " (CITATION) et ' (FIN DE CITATION). En anglais, omettre l'apostrophe et ajouter la terminaison au mot pour en faire un seul mot. En français remplacer l'apostrophe par un espace.
- 10) Répéter toujours les négatifs NO et NOT comme ceci: NO/NO NOT/NOT (en français les négatifs ne sont pas répétés).
- 11) Sur les messages comportant plus d'une page, indiquer sur une ligne séparée, à la marge à gauche, le numéro de la page suivante en le faisant précéder de trois points seulement, par exemple:  
...2
- 12) Ne pas mettre de ponctuation à la fin du message quant il comporte une signature.



MF

TO/À ZSSG  
FROM/DE • IDDZ

REFERENCE • Building Pass #08835  
RÉFÉRENCE  
SUBJECT • Extension of building pass  
SUJET • for Lynn Cross

Security/Sécurité
Unclassified
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
December 14, 1983
Number/Numéro
IDDZ0286

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

As the Prime Minister's Task Force (IDDZ) is now expected to continue for several more weeks, it would be appreciated if you could please extend the above building pass for a further eight weeks.

  
Gary J. Smith  
Task Force Working Group



CONFIDENTIAL

EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

① *Stodd*  
② *MF*

Ottawa, December 14, 1983

Mr. R. R. Fowler  
Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet  
Privy Council Office  
Langevin Block  
Ottawa

Dear Mr. Fowler:

Enclosed is the text of a letter received telegraphically today from President Reagan in response to Prime Minister Trudeau's letter of November 18. It would be appreciated if you could have the text of the President's letter delivered to the Prime Minister as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

*John H. Rouse*  
John H. Rouse  
Minister

Enclosure

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEA PIERRE:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF NOVEMBER 18 IN WHICH YOU WERE KIND ENOUGH TO SHARE YOUR FURTHER THOUGHTS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND IN PARTICULAR ON CDE AND MBFR.

I AGREE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO DEMONSTRATE OUR COMMITMENT TO CDE. THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE IMPORTANT IN OUR COMMON EFFORT TO ACHIEVE GENUINE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. IN LINE WITH SUGGESTIONS I RECEIVED FROM YOU AND A NUMBER OF OUR

OTHER ALLIES THAT ALL NATO MEMBERS BE REPRESENTED AT A HIGH POLITICAL LEVEL AT THE INAUGURAL MEETING IN STOCKHOLM. I HAVE DECIDED TO SEND GEORGE SHULTZ TO THAT SESSION.

OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS WE CONDUCTED AN EXTENSIVE REVIEW OF MBFR. ON THE BASIS OF THAT REVIEW, I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT FOR THE CURRENT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS, A DATA AGREEMENT AND A COMPREHENSIVE NATO VERIFICATION PACKAGE ARE ESSENTIAL PREREQUISITES FOR A TREATY SIGNATURE AND FOR ANY INITIAL REDUCTIONS. I BELIEVE THAT NATO SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR ELABORATION AND MOVEMENT ON VERIFICATION MEASURES PROPOSED BY THE EAST. WE ARE AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, CONTINUING OUR INTERNAL REVIEW OF ALTERNATIVE MBFR OPTIONS AND POTENTIAL STRATEGIES FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATING ROUNDS.

I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS WITH YOU PERSONALLY YOUR ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE AS WELL AS THE WHOLE RANGE OF CURRENT EAST-WEST ISSUES IN GREATER DETAIL. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 15.

SINCERELY, RON. END TEXT.

THE RIGHT HONORABLE  
PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU, P.C., M.P.  
PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA  
OTTAWA

CONFIDENTIAL

HOUSE OF COMMONS BOOK - BRIEFING NOTE  
LIVRE DE LA CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES - NOTES D'INFORMATION

Section

Subject/Highlights / Sujet/Points saillants

MBFR- Negotiations will continue but no date is set for the beginning of next round.

In advance of the last plenary meeting of the current MBFR Round scheduled for Dec. 15, the East has made an informal statement on December 13 to the effect that they were not in a position to set the date for the beginning of the next round and proposed that this be done through diplomatic channels. A news report on December 14 refers to an Eastern statement confirming that the negotiations will nevertheless continue without preconditions.

Source

Le Devoir article and Radio news December 14.

Assessment / Évaluation

Classification

CONFIDENTIAL

By announcing that they wish to continue the MBFR talks without any preconditions but that they cannot agree to a date for the beginning of the next Round due to the unhelpful attitude of the West which has shown a lack of spirit of innovation, the Warsaw Pact is attempting to crank up tensions further between East and West in the eyes of Western public opinion, while trying to avoid being accused of lacking the will to negotiate in these arms control negotiations. On the basis of current reports which may be confirmed at the last plenary meeting of the current MBFR Round December 15 we can conclude that the negotiations will not be broken off but that the beginning of the next Round could be delayed. The NATO Ministers agreed last week in Brussels that the West should review its position in the talks in light of proposals made by the East earlier this year in order to agree on a response to these proposals. It is doubtful that a counterproposal by the West could be ready by the end of January when the winter Round normally begins. Therefore a delay of a few weeks would not necessarily be inconvenient for the West.

Suggested Reply / Réponse suggérée

- I understand that the East has proposed that the date for the beginning of the next Round of MBFR should be set through diplomatic channels rather than at the last Plenary Session of the current Round scheduled for December 15 which has been normal practice. A news item this morning, however, referred to an Eastern statement to the effect that the Warsaw Pact was prepared to continue the MBFR talks without any preconditions.
- We hope that Eastern delegations will not resort to the tactic of unduly delaying the next Round of MBFR talks at a time when these negotiations could achieve real progress.
- In the communiqué issued last week at the NATO Ministerial Meeting we expressed the hope that the recent Eastern statements indicated a new willingness to address the longstanding basic issues of the Vienna negotiations and we pointed out that the Allies are reviewing the state of these negotiations in the light of these statements.
- I could add that the Prime Minister's proposal to give new impetus to these talks was well received by my colleagues. The current NATO review of MBFR has the full backing of Ministers who will be following it closely.

Prepared by / Préparé par  
A.A. Després

Division / Direction  
IDR

Date  
Dec. 14/83

Tel. no. / N° de té  
2-6205

# Et Damas renforcent leurs mesures de sécurité après l'attentat

Après les attentats de lundi, le dispositif de sécurité entourant les édifices gouvernementaux de Koweït a été renforcé et les ambassades de France, des États-Unis, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie (les quatre pays de la force multinationale au Liban)) sont gardées par des véhicules militaires blindés, armés de mitrailleuses.

Les attentats de lundi, dirigés contre les ambassades de France et des États-Unis, un immeuble résidentiel occupé par des étrangers, l'aéroport de Koweït, un bureau gouvernemental et un complexe industriel, ont indigné les États de la région qui tentent depuis longtemps de mettre fin à la guerre du Golfe.

Les dirigeants des pays du Golfe ont eu des conversations téléphoniques et réaffirmé leur soutien au Koweït. Certains diplomates estiment que les attentats pourraient renforcer la cohésion

et la détermination des six membres du Conseil de coopération du Golfe (Koweït, Arabie saoudite, Bahreïn, Qatar, Oman et Émirats arabes unis).

Les Palestiniens, qui constituent un quart de la population koweïtienne, et les ressortissants de plusieurs pays du Proche-Orient actuellement au Koweït sont soumis à une interdiction temporaire de quitter le pays. Les personnes arrêtées lundi après les attentats sont toujours interrogées par la police.

L'ambassade des États-Unis, qui déplore cinq morts et 30 blessés parmi ses employés, est restée fermée hier. Des « marines » armés et protégés de gilets pare-balles patrouillent à l'intérieur de l'enceinte.

L'attentat commis par un camion-bombe, dont le chauffeur a péri dans l'explosion, a gravement endommagé le bâtiment de trois étages de l'ambassade et provoqué des dégâts à l'immeuble de la chancellerie.

L'administration Reagan a déclaré que les attentats perpétrés par le groupe chiite étaient un avertissement lancé par l'Iran aux pays de la région, qui soutiennent l'Irak dans la guerre du Golfe.

De son côté, Le Conseil du peuple (parlement) koweïtien a « vigoureusement condamné » hier la série d'attentats commis la veille et recommandé des « mesures très strictes » contre tous ceux qui tentent de « mettre en danger la sécurité et la stabilité du pays ».

A Lisbonne, où il se trouve,

le secrétaire d'Etat américain, M. George Schultz, a affirmé que le gouvernement disposait d'information sur les auteurs de l'attentat de lundi contre l'ambassade des États-Unis. Si ces derniers peuvent « être clairement identifiés, je doute qu'il y aura une manière de les poursuivre », a-t-il déclaré.

Au cas où un gouvernement apparaîtrait être l'instigateur de cet attentat, M. Schultz a déclaré qu'il faudrait « prendre des mesures » à son encontre, tout en précisant qu'il s'agissait là d'un problème international et que les États-Unis n'étaient pas les seuls concernés dans cette affaire.

## Les MBFR sont aussi suspendus

VIENNE (Reuter) — Les pourparlers Est-Ouest de Vienne sur une réduction des arsenaux conventionnels en Europe (MBFR) seront suspendus demain sans qu'aucune date de reprise ne soit fixée, a-t-on appris hier de source diplomatique occidentale.

De même source, on précise que l'Union soviétique a fait savoir hier à une réunion des ambassadeurs des deux blocs que la date de leur reprise devrait être fixée par les canaux diplomatiques, alors qu'elle aurait dû être annoncée demain lors de la dernière séance avant la fin de l'année.

Selon les coutumes établies depuis dix ans que durent ces conversations, la

première séance de la nouvelle année aurait dû avoir lieu soit le dernier jeudi de février, soit le premier jeudi du même mois.

De source occidentale, on déclare ne pas être surpris de la suspension sine die des pourparlers de Vienne après le retrait soviétique des négociations de Genève sur les euromissiles, le mois dernier, et la suspension des négociations START sur les missiles stratégiques le 8 décembre.

Lors de la réunion d'hier, l'ambassadeur soviétique, M. Victor Mikhailov, a déclaré que le forum de Vienne demeure important mais a imputé aux Occidentaux l'absence de tout progrès aux négociations.

## turcs

### Ozal

Après un ancien ministre ayant étudié aux États-Unis. Le gouvernement compte qu'un ancien ministre, M. Abdullah Tenekeci, 57 ans, qui sera ministre de l'Intérieur. Ancien général de l'armée de l'air, il a représenté de 1971 à 1973 la Turquie au sein de l'OTAN à Bruxelles.

Il apparaît ainsi que M. Ozal ne s'est fait imposer aucune « personnalité extérieure » dans ce qui constitue le 16e gouvernement de la république turque.

Ce nouveau cabinet a tenu sa première réunion hier après la passation de pouvoirs au premier ministre sortant, Turgut Uslu, à M. Ozal. Il devait immédiatement passer les décrets permettant sa transformation en un gouvernement très ramassé comportant 14 ministères et 7

Au bout de chaque cigarette

Un seul filtre: vos poumons



# Aidez les plus mal pris de la terre



MEMORANDUM

CJ

To Office of the Under-Secretary

From MINA  
De

Security UNCLASSIFIED  
Sécurité

Reference  
Référence

Date December 14, 1983

Subject Parliamentary Report - December 14  
Sujet

ON THE HILL

The House met at 11:00. Following Question Period, it began the third day of debate on the Speech from the Throne.

Yesterday evening, our Parliamentary Secretary, Suzanne Beauchamp-Niquet defended this Department during the Proceedings on the Adjournment Motion when she debated the diplomatic recognition of East Germany with Benno Friesen and the dual nationality issue regarding Csechoslovakia with Don Munro.

Q.P. questions of Departmental interest:  
US ITC RULING ON POTATOES; POLITICAL REFUGEES FROM GUATEMALA.

SENSE OF THE HOUSE

The Conservatives turned all of their questioning on Minister Bussières and the "questionable practices of Revenue Canada" in its tax assessment and follow-up action. Led by Perrin Beatty, Members Chris Speyer, Bob Corbett, Frank Oberle, David Crombie, Walter McLean, Ron Stewart, John Bosley, Eric Nielsen, Gordon Taylor and Joe Clark all directed a series of questions at Minister Bussières, who in a variety of ways, argued that his Dept was only trying to ensure proper tax assessment and equity and respect for the taxpayer.

NDP Leader Ed Broadbent attacked bank profits. He claimed the increase in interest rates had ensured \$1.8 billion in profit for Canada's banks and he said his source was no less an authority than the Globe and Mail. Minister Lalonde noted that the prime rate had not changed from the 11% mark in several months and he pointed out that it is the same as that of the US. He also drew attention to the fact that the banks' financial return on assets - .54% in 1982, was not substantially different from that in 1981 (.43%).

US ITC RULING ON POTATOES

In response to a planted question from Frank Hamilton, Minister Regan said he welcomed the decision from the US ITC tribunal and said that he was pleased with the finding of "no damage." The Minister noted that, as in the case last year with the threat to Canadian lumber exports, the US has shown it supports judicial proceedings as a means of settling disputes. Before being drowned out by the jeering Opposition, and the Speaker's call for order, the Minister paid a tribute to the horticultural capital of Canada.

- DPM/SSEA (2)
- MINA (11)
- MINE/Jalbert/  
Laverdure
- MINT/Burbridge/  
MacDonald
- PMO/Fairbairn
- PCO/Adam/Fadden

- USS MCB
- CMR (2) NAX
- DMT PED
- DMF PGB
- CCB PPD
- CCBR PSD
- SFB RBD
- TFB RCD
- IFB RGB

- FPR RGX
- ADA RSD
- APZ SCD
- CCBM SCS
- CCBA SCI
- CGD SCH
- CGE SFB
- CGL SFP
- CGS SID
- CMD SIS
- CML TAD
- CPD TID
- EED UGB
- EFB URD
- EPD XDX
- ETD ZEP
- GAD ZSP
- GGB ZSS
- GMD IMU
- IDD ESD
- IDD TGX

- IMD TDD
- JCD TED
- LCD UTD
- LCR
- LGB

- URT
- LCP

POLITICAL REFUGEES FROM GUATEMALA

Dan Heap was worried that 60 Guatemalan families, accepted for settlement by Quebec, but turned down by the Federal Govt faced danger to life and limb if they were deported back to Guatemala. Minister Roberts doubted that the number was quite as high as that indicated by Mr. Heap. He assured him, however, that the procedure for refugee assessment, as determined by the UN, had been followed by his dept and that his officials were conducting a study of this matter which involved further contact with the UN.



D.C. Robertson  
Departmental Assistant

TO/A MINA  
 FROM/DE IDA  
 REFERENCE/RÉFÉRENCE Snider/Dudoit conversation December 14.  
 SUBJECT/SUJET CDE: Organization of the First Week.

Security/Sécurité	CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	28-4-6
Date	December 14, 1983
Number/Numéro	IDA-1421

ENCLOSURES  
 ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

- w/o attach
- MINE
- MINT
- DMF
- DMFX
- IFB
- RGB
- RGX
- RCD
- RCM
- RSD
- RSR
- RBD
- RBR
- IDR
- IDDZ
- XDV
- CMR
- BNATO

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide a preliminary overview of how we expect the first week of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) to unfold. We expect to be able to provide more definitive information in the form of a Memorandum to the DPM/SSEA early in January.

2. As you are aware, Ministers agreed last week at NATO to meet in Stockholm on the eve of the Conference to review NATO objectives and strategy. The timing and location of the meeting were not set but as the Conference opens on Tuesday, January 17, we assume the meeting will take place on Monday, January 16. In our memorandum IDA-1121 of October 6, we informed the Minister that, in keeping with previous CSCE practice, we intended to offer to act as host for the NATO caucus. This offer has been accepted. However, as we were unable to take possession of our delegation offices until December 1, it is unlikely that the conference room in the delegation will be ready for use on January 16. In these circumstances, would the Minister wish to offer the official residence in Stockholm as the location for the Ministerial meeting?

3. The Conference will open on the morning of January 17 with the Swedish Foreign Minister in the chair. It is not clear yet what form the formal opening will take except that it will include an address by "a representative" of Sweden, presumably Prime Minister Palme. Following the formal opening, there will be an official luncheon given by the Swedish Foreign Minister. The delivery of the opening statements by representatives of participating States will begin Tuesday afternoon and carry through the morning and afternoon sessions of Wednesday, Thursday and Friday. On Tuesday evening, the King and Queen of Sweden will host a gala at the Opera House (possibly black tie). On Wednesday evening there will be a dinner at Stockholm City Hall and on Thursday evening a reception will be given by the Foreign Minister.

.....2

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

4.           Speeches: The order of opening speakers was established at the Preparatory Meeting in November by the drawing of lots. Canada speaks ninth, following the Soviet Union (eighth) and will probably do so on Wednesday morning. It may be that the Soviet Union will wish to be the last speaker on Tuesday. If this is the case, we may be asked by our allies to give the first response to any Soviet propaganda charges. The position and possible timing of the other important Western speakers are as follows: FRG-20 (late Wednesday afternoon or Thursday morning); France-24 (Thursday morning); USA-31 (late Thursday afternoon or Friday morning); and UK-33 (Friday morning).

5.           We understand from RBR that it is common CSCE practice for Ministers to remain at the Conference for the whole ministerial portion of the session, i.e., Tuesday, January 17 to Friday, January 20. This will mean that NATO ministers may be required to be in Stockholm from January 16 to 20. Should Mr. MacEachen wish to hold bilateral meetings with his East European counterparts during this period, RBR has indicated a preference for the Soviet Union, Romania (because of Ceausescu's support for the Prime Minister's initiative and his own INF proposals) and Czechoslovakia (because of the probability that a visit by the DPM/SSEA to Prague will not take place) in that order. Other East European Foreign Ministers may seek bilateral meetings with the Minister.

6.           A copy of the Decisions of the Helsinki Preparatory Meeting is attached for your information.

*O.A. Chistoff*  
O.A. Chistoff,  
Acting Director,  
Arms Control & Disarmament  
Division

001734

See Attachment  
in File Pocket

CONFIDENTIAL  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

December 14, 1983

IDDZ-0285

Memorandum for the Prime Minister

Initiative: Visit to Washington

Attached for your consideration is a briefing book for your visit to Washington, December 15-16, 1983.

On reading the scenario brief for your meeting with President Reagan, you will notice that we have not suggested that you raise with him the question of a review of NATO military strategy. Our reasons for not suggesting that you take up this idea with President at this time are:

- (a) Secretary Shultz reacted vigorously and negatively to the idea when it was broached with him by Mr. MacEachen on December 9.
- (b) On his own initiative, the West German ambassador in Ottawa indicated to us last week that his government would have "serious reservations" about such a review being launched at this time.
- (c) A canvass of our ambassadors to NATO countries, who met in Brussels last week, indicates that only the Netherlands and Norway might perhaps support the idea at this time.
- (d) Lord Carrington, who had four years ago suggested such a review, indicated to Mr. MacEachen on December 13 that he had doubts about the usefulness of pursuing the idea in the immediate future. (Carrington said that when he first advanced the proposal a few years ago, he had ended up with a "bloody nose").

On the basis of these reactions, we have come to the conclusion that a review of NATO military strategy is an eminently worthwhile idea whose time has not quite yet come. It may have better prospects for success once NATO has completed its review of the Alliance's political strategy in East-West relations (see Tab 3) and once Lord Carrington has taken office as Secretary General of NATO (i.e. after June 1984)

*L.A. Delvoie*  
L.A. Delvoie,  
Chairman,  
Task Force Working Group



TO/À FILE

FROM/DE FPR

REFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •  
SUJET

CBC 0800 December 14 -  
Prime Minister's Peace Plan -  
Washington Visit

Security/Sécurité	UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	December 14, 1983
Number/Numéro	FPR-1196

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

- DISTRIBUTION
- SSEA
  - MINA/Robertson
  - Riley
  - Dudoit
  - MINE
  - MINT
  - USS
  - DMF
  - DMT
  - SCI
  - SCS
  - FPR/Quinn
  - DIARY
  - CIRC
  - FILE
  - IDDZ
  - IDA
  - IDD
  - IDR
  - IFB
  - UGB
  - URR
  - RBR
  - ZSI
  - WSHDC FAX

CBC: Our correspondent in Washington, Hal Jones, says Americans are a little puzzled as to the purpose of Mr. Trudeau's visit that the best way to sum up the Reagan Administration's view of Mr. Trudeau's peace efforts is polite curiosity. Canada's Ambassador in Washington, Allan Gotlieb, has told reporters here that Mr. Trudeau would like an indication from President Reagan that he is prepared to join a conference of the world's five nuclear powers to reduce tensions. But, according to Mr. Gotlieb, the Prime Minister is not visiting Washington as part of a crusade or even to make a big pitch. Instead he wants to increase the political will in favour of peace at a time when super-power tensions are growing. However, the Americans know that Mr. Trudeau has not been able to round up much support for his ideas from the other nuclear powers on the grounds that the real danger to world peace lies in the arms race between the super-powers. The Reagan White House has already pointed out that until very recently the U.S. was negotiating reductions in both intermediate and strategic nuclear weapons with the Soviet Union. Furthermore this Administration is convinced that Soviet negotiators will return to the bargaining table in Geneva whether Mr. Trudeau becomes involved or not. Hal Jones, CBC News, Washington.

D. Buckley-Jones  
Deputy Director  
Media Relations Division

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

*MF*

Phoned IDDZ  
Person CF  
Time 10:16

*Mr. Smith  
for actions pls*

*m m n g e*

*Dove*

*JAN*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM GENEV YTGR8282 14DEC83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 140900

DISTR MINA USS DMF IDA IDAO IDAN RGB RCR IDR IMC

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0283 13DEC IDA1410 13DEC(NOTAL)

---POSSIBLE VISIT BY RT HON JOE CLARK-ARMS CONTROL AND  
DISARM CONSULTATIONS

GRATEFUL TO RECEIVE ANY INFO YOU MAY HAVE ON POSSIBLE PLANS OF  
RT HON JOE CLARK TO VISIT GENEV DURING WEEK OF 19DEC IN CASE WE  
ARE UNABLE TO CONSULT WITH HIM BY TELEPHONE TODAY.

BEESLEY

CCC/125 141415Z YTGR8282

MF

INFO

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UNCLASSIFIED

FM WSHDC UNFC8129 14DEC83

TO ATNTA BOSTN BFALO CHCGO CLVND DALAS DTROT LNGLS MNPLS NRLNS

PHILA SFRAN SEATL CNGNY IMMED

INFO EXTOTT LIDDX UGP

---PM VISIT TO WSHDC-PRESS

GOTLIEB HOSTED BREAKFAST YESTERDAY FOR 20 WSHDC JOURNALISTS WHO WILL BE COVERING PM VISIT, INCLUDING REPS FROM THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, LA TIMES, CHICAGO TRIBUNE AND TOLEDO BLADE, AS WELL AS MAJOR WIRE SERVICES AND NETWORK CORRESPONDENTS.

2. IT WAS CLEAR THAT SOME CONFUSION REMAINS CONCERNING PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF MTG WITH REAGAN, ALTHOUGH THERE IS ADEQUATE KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT TRUDEAU HAS DONE AND WHERE HE HAS BEEN IN STAGE I OF HIS MISSION. CLEARLY US PRESS IS LOOKING FOR STORY BY WHICH THEY CAN LINK TRUDEAU'S INITIATIVE TO THE ADMINISTRATION'S OWN AGENDA. WE WILL REALLY NOT KNOW UNTIL TOMORROW WHETHER SUCH A STORY MATERIALIZES.

IN THE MEANWHILE, FOLLOWING IS SCHEDULE:

3. THE MTG WITH PRES IS AT 11 AM & FOUR ON EACH SIDE. WE ARE EMPHASIZING THAT IT IS A CONCENTRATED WORKING SESSION. MTG WILL LAST APPROX ONE HOUR - SHULTZ AND MACEACHEN IN ATTENDANCE, AND WILL BE FOLLOWED BY PUBLIC STATEMENTS FROM THE PRES AND PM. WE WILL ATTEMPT TO GET YOU TRANSCRIPT OF PMS REMARKS FRIDAY. THIS WILL BE FOLLOWED BY WORKING LUNCH WITH SEC OF STATE SHULTZ, ATTENDED BY LARGER NUMBER OF OFFICIALS ON EACH SIDE. OFFICIALLY THERE IS A SHORT TETE-A-TETE WITH BUSH IN

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PAGE TWO UNFC8129 UNCLAS

THE LATE AFTERNOON, FOLLOWED BY A PRIVATE DINNER WITH THE VICE PRES.  
THE DPM/SSEA WILL GIVE A QUOTE ON THE RECORD UNQUOTE PRESS CONFERENCE  
AT APPROX 2:15. AGAIN, WE WILL TRY TO GET THE TRANSCRIPT OF THIS TO  
YOU BY FRIDAY. (UGB COULD YOU PLEASE HELP EXPEDITE THIS TO POSTS).

4. AS PREVIOUSLY INDICATED, THE PM APPEARS ON QUOTE GOOD MORNING  
AMERICA UNQUOTE BETWEEN 7-7:30 EASTERN TIME FRIDAY MORNING. YOU  
MAY WISH TO ADVISE MEDIA CONTACTS OF THIS-THE FIRST MAJOR FOREIGN  
INTERVIEW TRUDEAU HAS GIVEN SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE INITIATIVE.  
WE CANNOT PREDICT THE LEVEL OF NATIONAL PRESS COVERAGE WE  
WILL GET ALTHOUGH INTEREST IS HIGH HERE. HOWEVER, WE WILL BE COUNTING  
ON YOU TO FOLLOW UP WITH EDITORIAL WRITERS AND COMMENTATORS.

5. AS EXAMPLES OF INTL SUPPORT FOR PM INITIATIVE YOU MIGHT WISH TO  
DRAW ON FLWG PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF HEADS OF GOVT AND HELMUT SCHEMIDT.  
THESE OF COURSE ARE IN ADDTION TO SUPPORT PM HAS RECD IN PRIVATE  
MTGS WITH HEADS OF GOVT TO WHICH PM HAS REFERRED IN MTGS WITH PRESS:  
A) ITALIAN PM CRAZI IN DEBATE IN ITALIAN PARLIAMENT ON INF 14-16 NOV  
COMMENDED THE PM INITIATIVE (SEE ROME TEL 0432 OF 21 NOV.

B) COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVT AT NEW DELHI CHOGM SPECIFICALLY ENDORSED  
THE PMS INITIATIVE IN THE GOA DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY  
QUOTE A CONCERTED EFFORT IS REQUIRED TO RESTORE CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE  
TO THE CONDUCT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. ONLY THUS, CAN A CLIMATE OF  
CONFIDENCE BE REBUILT IN PLACE OF THE PREVAILING ONE OF FEAR AND  
MISTRUST. IN ALL THESE PURSUITS, WE EMPHASIZE THE SUPREME IMPORTANCE

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PAGE THREE UNFC8129 UNCLAS

OF POLITICAL WILL. WE THEREFORE WELCOME PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU'S CALL FOR A NEW POLITICAL DIMENSION IN THE QUEST FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. WE SUPPORT HIS EFFORTS TO RESTORE ACTIVE POLITICAL CONTACT AND COMMUNICATIONS AMONG ALL THE NUCLEAR WEAPON POWERS AND ARE WILLING TO HELP THESE AND OTHER SUCH EFFORTS IN ALL APPROPRIATE WAYS. AS PM INDIRA GANDHI HAS SO CONSISTENTLY EMPHASIZED, THE CENTRAL ISSUE IN SECURING WIDER PROGRESS ON DISARMAMENT IS THE STOPPING OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE.

C) JAPANESE PM NAKASONE ENDORSED PM INITIATIVE IN CTTEE OF JAPANESE DIET:

NOV21: QUOTE PM TRUDEAU AND I ARE IN AGMT THAT IN LIGHT OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, THE NUCLEAR SUPER-POWER AND OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS SHOULD EXERCISE GREATER MODERATION. THAT THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND OTHER THIRD POWERS SHOULD BE GIVEN ASSISTANCE IN THE PEACEFUL APPLICATION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY.... UNQUOTE.

NOV22 QUOTE PM TRUDEAU AND I SHARED THE VIEW THAT IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF BANISHING NUCLEAR ARMS AND PREVENTING WAR WOULD BE UNATTAINABLE UNLESS THE 5 NUCLEAR POWERS—THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, BRITAIN, FRANCE AND CHINA—COULD BE BROUGHT TOGETHER TO SIT DOWN AT THE SAME TABLE AND TALK SENSIBLY ABOUT COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO TOTALLY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

D) HELMUT SCHMIDT IN PUBLIC SPEECH IN TORONTO 08NOV STRONGLY BACKED THE INITIATIVE (AND 5 POWER PROPOSAL IN PARTICULAR) (SEE IDDZ 0292).

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PAGE FOUR UNFC8129 UNCLAS

6. IN ADDITION, SENDING TO ALL POSTS TODAY PKGS OF SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT  
CANADA TODAY-A FOUR PAGE REVIEW OF PMS INITIATIVE WHICH INCLUDES  
RESUME OF HIS ACTIVITIES AND STATEMENTS PRIOR TO HIS VISIT HERE.  
THIS SUPPLEMENT WILL APPEAR IN THE NEXT MAILING OF CANADA TODAY,  
BUT WE HAVE SUFFICIENT COPIES FOR OTHER DISTRIBUTION IF NUMBERS  
SENT ARE NOT SUFFICIENT.

UUU/231 141713Z UNFC8129

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

**CDN EYES ONLY  
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

Division Phonod  
Person CL  
Local Time 2:00

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rd*

C O N F I D E N T I E L ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

DE PARIS WIGR5524 14DEC83

A EXTOTT IDDZ LIVRAISON 141300

INFO BONN BNATO BRU WSHDC LBN PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/CP

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDR IDA RCR

REF VOTRETEL IDDZ0269 09DEC NOTRETEL WIGR5512 13DEC

--- INITIATIVE DU PM-POSITION FRANCAISE

SUITE NOTRETEL EN RFF, REALISONS QUE DEMEURE UNE QUESTION A LAQUELLE  
N AVONS PAS FOURNI DE REPONSE A SAVOIR INITIATIVE A-T-ELLE ETE  
ABORDEE PAR MITTERRAND/KOHL AU COURS DE LEURS ENTRETIENS.

2. AVONS DONC SOULEVE QUESTION AUPRES MME RENOARD (AFF STRAT/  
DESARMEMENT AU QUAI). CELLE-CI NOUS A INDIQUE QU ELLE N AVAIT PAS  
REPONSE A CETTE QUESTION ET QUE SI TEL AVAIT ETE LE CAS, A SAVOIR  
QUE INITIATIVE AVAIT ETE ABORDEE, CELA AVAIT EU LIEU AU COURS  
ENTRETIENS EN TETE A TETE ET QUE RIEN DE PERTINENT NEN AVAIT  
TRANSPIRE.

3. INTERLOCUTRICE A SOULIGNE DE PLUS QUE DANS EVENTUALITE D UNE  
DISCUSSION A CE SUJET POSITION QUI AURAIT PU ETE EXPRIMEE PAR  
PRES MITTERRAND, PARTICULIEREMENT SUR RENCONTRE DES CINQ PUISSANCES  
NUCLEAIRES, AURAIT SANS DOUTE ETE CELLE DEJA CONNUE ET EXPRIMEE A  
MAINTES OCCASIONS. CETTE POSITION TOUCHE ELEMENTS TELLEMENT FONDA-  
MENTAUX POUR LA FRANCE QUE FORMULE DERIVEE PEUT DIFFICILEMENT ETE  
ENVISAGEE.

4. PAR CONSEQUENT, MME RENOARD A PRECISE QUE TOUT COMMENTAIRE  
POUVANT ETE VEHICULE PAR PRESSE SUR QQCONQUE EVOLUTION DE  
POSITION FRANCAISE TIENDRAIT DE LA SPECULATION.

CCC/190 141601Z WIGR5524

Division Phone \_\_\_\_\_  
Person \_\_\_\_\_  
Local Time \_\_\_\_\_

**ACTION** **CDN EYES ONLY**  
**SUITE A DONNER RESERVE AUX CDNS**

*MF*  
*19*

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM MINDEL LDN XNGR4370 14DEC83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 140900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER WSHDC BNATO

DIST USS DMF IFB IDR IDA UGB FPR

---DPM/SSEA MTG WITH LORD CARRINGTON NATO SEC GEN ELECT

SUMMARY: DPM/SSEAS 45 MINUTE MTG WITH CARRINGTON ON 13DEC DID NOT ELICIT MUCH ENTHUSIASM BY CARRINGTON FOR IDEA OF NATO REVIEW AND DEMONSTRATED CARRINGTON UNLIKELY TO ROCK BOAT VIS-A-VIS USA (WHICH HAD INITIAL DOUBTS ABOUT HIS APPOINTMENT AS SEC GEN) IN SIX-MONTH PERIOD PRIOR TO TAKING OVER FROM LUNS. CARRINGTON WAS NOT/NOT OPTIMISTIC THERE WAS MUCH CHANCE OF ANY REAL MOVEMENT IN USA/USSR RELATIONS UNTIL AFTER USA PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. CARRINGTON NOTED THERE HAD BEEN QUOTE SEA CHANGE UNQUOTE IN MRS. THATCHER'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS NEED FOR DIALOGUE WITH EAST (PRES MIGHT FOLLOW AFTER RE-ELECTION) AND HE FELT HER TRIP TO HUNGARY WAS PRELIMINARY FOR TRIP TO MOSCOW WHERE SHE WOULD BE GOOD INTERLOCUTOR WITH SOVIETS AND CAME TO REALIZE RUSSIANS DO NOT/NOT ALL HAVE FORKED TAILS AND HORNS. CARRINGTON INDICATED HE WOULD BE VISITING ALL NATO CAPITALS BEFORE JUNE AND WANTED TO COME TO OTT. HE DEMURRED HOWEVER WHEN DPM/SSEA SUGGESTED HE SHOULD COME ASAP, PERHAPS EVEN BEFORE POSSIBLE PM'S TRIP TO MOSCOW, ON GROUNDS SUCH VISIT, WITHOUT ALSO GOING TO WSHDC, WOULD BE AWKWARD. HE COULD CONTEMPLATE MTG

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Local Time

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PAGE TWO XNGR4370 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

PM IN EUROPE SHOULD THEIR PATHS CROSS.

REPORT: DPM/SSEA, ACCOMPANIED BY HICOM JAMIESON AND NOBLE,  
REVIEWED RESULTS OF NATO FOR MINISTERIAL MTG AND REACTIONS TO PM'S  
INITIATIVE IN VARIOUS CAPITALS. CARRINGTON ASKED IF ANDROPOV WAS  
DEAD AND AFTER SSEA REPLY SAID HIS AFFLICTION SOUNDED LIKE PILES!  
SSEA URGED CARRINGTON TO COME TO CDA PRIOR TO DISCUSS WHAT SHOULD  
BE DONE NOW IN LIGHT OF NATO DEPLOYMENT. CARRINGTON WAS OF VIEW  
THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN DISASTROUS IF NATO HAD NOT/NOT DEPLOYED.  
HE BELIEVED IMPORTANCE WAS POLITICAL NOT MILITARY. KEY QUESTION  
NOW WAS HOW TO KEEP PUBLIC OPINION IN EUROPE ON SIDE SINCE NATO  
WOULD NOT/NOT KEEP IT INDEFINITELY UNLESS EFFORT WAS MADE TO  
IMPROVE DIALOGUE. HOWEVER CARRINGTON THOUGHT PRES REAGAN UNTIL NOV  
WAS NOT/NOT IN POSITION TO LOOK TOO COZY WITH MODERATES. IT WOULD  
BE ABOUT YEAR BEFORE ANY REAL PROSPECT OF CHANGE, BUT IT MIGHT COME  
DRAMATICALLY IN HIS SECOND TERM.

2. DPM/SSEA NOTED PRES HAD WAR-LIKE IMAGE WITH FEMALE VOTERS.  
USSR WAS LESS AND LESS LIKELY TO WANT TO DO BUSINESS WITH REAGAN  
ADMIN. CARRINGTON'S CONCLUSION WAS THERE WOULD NOT/NOT BE MUCH  
MOVEMENT FOR FEW MONTHS BUT WE HAD TO GO ON LOOKING FOR DIALOGUE  
EVEN IF IT DID NOT/NOT COME OFF.

3. SSEA AGREED IT WOULD BE BAD IF WE BACKED AWAY FROM DIALOGUE. NATO  
HAD SCORED VICTORY ON DEPLOYMENT, USSR HAD SUFFERED REVERSAL.

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PAGE THREE XNGR4370 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

CARRINGTON AGREED BUT REITERATED THAT PRES WOULD BE CAREFUL NOT/NOT TO ALIENATE HIS VOTERS EVEN IF HE WANTED TO SUCK UP TO LADIES.

4. CARRINGTON RECALLED RECENT CONVERSATION WITH LARRY EAGLEBURGER, ESSENCE OF WHICH WAS THAT USA ADMIN WAS INCREASINGLY OF VIEW THAT EUROPE WAS QUOTE HOPELESS AND FEEBLE UNQUOTE AND THAT FAR EAST WAS MORE IMPORTANT TO USA THAN EUROPE AND THERE WAS GOING TO BE SHIFT OF USA EMPHASIS FROM EUROPE TO PACIFIC. SSEA RECALLED SHULTZ DEC 9 COMMENT THAT EUROPEANS DID NOT/NOT UNDERSTAND IMPORTANCE OF JAPAN. CARRINGTON SAID IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY UNWISE TO DISREGARD EUROPE.

5. SSEA RECALLED PM'S NOV 4 CONVERSATION WITH CARRINGTON AND RAISED ISSUE OF NATO REVIEW OF MILITARY STRATEGY. CARRINGTON SAID NO BUT THAT IF ONE WANTED REVIEW NOW THAT DEPLOYMENT HAD OCCURED, REVIEW COULD BE UNDERTAKEN WITHOUT ACCUSATION THAT WE WERE CONDUCTING REVIEW OUT OF WEAKNESS RATHER THAN STRENGTH. HE HAD STARTED IDEA OF REVIEW THREE OR FOUR YEARS AGO AND GOT QUOTE BLOODY NOSE UNQUOTE. CARRINGTON SAID MCNAMARA ARTICLE HAD BEEN TOTALLY LOGICAL UNTIL END WHEN IT SUGGESTED SAVINGS FROM USA NUCLEAR WEAPONS COULD BE USED TO BOLSTER USA CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE. CARRINGTON SAID USA WOULD NOT/NOT USE SAVINGS FOR LATTER PURPOSE AND HE DID NOT/NOT SEE EUROPEANS INCREASING THEIR CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

6. SSEA FELT REVIEW WOULD BE JUSTIFIED BY RESTIVENESS OF WHERE NATO

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PAGE FOUR XNGR4370 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

WAS AT MOMENT AND CONCERN OF WHETHER WE WERE IN RIGHT PEW.  
(IE ARE NATO POLICIES RIGHT). THIS WOULD BE JUSTIFICATION FOR  
REVIEW. CARRINGTON AGREED AS LONG AS REVIEW DID NOT/NOT DIG UP  
NATOS'S ROOTS, THEN WE WOULD BE WORSE OFF.

7. CARRINGTON AGREED UNEASE OF UK POPULATION WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
WAS NO/NO LONGER LIMITED TO BAREFOOT PARSONS BUT EVEN TO LOT OF  
PEOPLE WHO WOULD VOTE CONSERVATIVE. SOME PROGRESS ON DIALOGUE  
WAS NECESSARY AND WE COULD NOT/NOT STAY WHERE WE ARE.

8. IN NON ATTRIBUTABLE REMARKS CARRINGTON NOTED FRANCE HAD MOST  
SUCCESSFUL DEFENCE POLICY IN EUROPE BECAUSE IT WAS PUBLICLY  
PERCEIVED AS INDEPENDENT WHEN IN FACT IT WAS NOT/NOT. REST OF  
EUROPEAN PUBLICS EQUATED NATO TO USA POLICY AND THERE WAS NEED FOR  
GREATER PERCEPTION THAT NATO POLICY WAS MORE EUROPEAN. HE NOTED  
THAT 85 PERCENT OF UK PUBLIC SUPPORTED UK NUCLEAR DETERRENT WHILE  
SUPPORT FOR USA NUCLEAR BASES IN UK WAS MUCH LESS. THERE HAD TO  
BE MUCH MORE IDENTIFIABLE EUROPEAN CONTENT TO DEFENCE. CARRINGTON  
SAID HE HAD NO IDEA WHAT PRES INTENDED TO DO WHEN SSEA NOTED BURT  
REMARKS THAT INF WERE NOT/NOT DISARMAMENT TALKS BUT ISSUE OF  
ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT. CARRINGTON SAID THAT WAS TRUE INITIALLY BUT  
NOT/NOT SUBSEQUENTLY.

9. CARRINGTON SAID HE HAD TRIED, WHEN FOREIGN SECRETARY, TO GET

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PAGE FIVE XNGR4370 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

MRS. THATCHER TO TALK TO SOVIETS AND HAD FAILED. WHEN HE HAD GONE TO MOSCOW UNDER GUISE OF EEC PRESIDENCY, SHE HAD BEEN VERY UPSET. CARRINGTON THOUGHT MRS. THATCHER HAD GONE THROUGH QUOTE SEA CHANGE UNQUOTE UPON RETURN FROM NORTH AMERICA AND THAT TRIP TO HUNGARY WAS LIKELY IN PREPARATION OF HER TRIP TO MOSCOW. MRS. THATCHER WILL BE GOOD INTERLOCUTOR WITH USSR BECAUSE OF HER DIRECT FORCEFUL MANNER. SHE MIGHT ALSO LEARN THAT SOVIETS DO NOT/NOT ALL HAVE QUOTE FORKED TAILS AND HORNS, ONLY HALF OF THEM UNQUOTE. CARRINGTON DID NOT/NOT EXCLUDE QUOTE SEA CHANGE UNQUOTE BY PRES REAGAN AFTER HIS REFLECTION.

10. DPM/SSEA URGED CARRINGTON TO COME TO OTTAWA ASAP, PERHAPS EVEN BEFORE POSSIBLE PM TRIP TO MOSCOW. CARRINGTON SAID THIS WOULD BE AWKWARD VIS-A-VIS NOT/NOT GOING TO WSHDC, BUT INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO MEET PM IN EUROPE. HE PLANS TO GO TO OTT LATER IN SPRING.

11. CARRINGTON EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE FRUSTRATION THAT LUNS DECIDED TO STAY ON UNTIL JUNE. SSEA SAID WE TRIED TO HASTEN DEPARTURE. ON LEAVING CARRINGTON NOTED THAT HE HAD DROPPED PHRASE QUOTE MCGAPhone DIPLOMACY UNQUOTE WHEN HE DELIVERED SPEECH (TEXT OF WHICH HAD WORDS) BECAUSE HE THOUGHT IT TOO PROVOCATIVE.

COMMENT: DPM/SSEA AND HICOM BELIEVE CARRINGTON CAUTIOUSNESS STEMS FROM REALIZATION THAT HE CAN NOT/NOT AFFORD TO GET OUT OF STEP WITH USA IN RUN UP TO ASSUMING NATO SEC GEN POST. WHILE NOT/NOT OPPOSED IN PRINCIPLE TO IDEA OF NATO REVIEW, CARRINGTON IS UNLIKELY TO BECOME PROPONENT OF IDEA IN FACE OF USA/UK RESISTANCE.

CCC/170 141542Z XNGR4370

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

*MF*  
Division Phone IDDZ  
Person DL  
Local Time 12:53

S E C R E T

FM ROME WTGR0465 14DEC83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 140900

INFO ROME WSHDC MOSCO BNATO LDN BONN PARIS NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPO/ CPP PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY

DISTR MINA USS DMF IDR IDA RGB IFB UGB RBD RBR RCR URR

---SOVIET ATTITUDE ON DISARMAMENT AND ARMC CONTROL(DAC)NEGOTIATIONS LEVESQUES VISIT TO ROME REGRETFULLY PREVENTED ME FROM JOINING HEADS OF MISSION MTG IN BRU IN TIME TO PARTICIPATE IN DISCUSSION ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.I HAD INTENDED TO BRING TO ATTENTION OF GROUP A THESIS WHICH USA AMBASSADOR MAXWELL RABB HAS FOR SOME DAYS BEEN EXPOUNDING TO A FEW OF HIS MORE TRUSTED WESTERN COLLEAGUES IN ROME,AND WHICH HE ATTRIBUTES TO PAUL NITZE,ABOUT BASIC POLIITICAL OBJECTIVE PURSUED BY USSR IN CURRENT DAC NEGOTIATIONS.RABB WAS ADVISER TO PRES EISENHOWER AND IS A LONG-TIME FRIEND OF PAUL NITZE;LATTER IN FACT HAS BEEN STAYING WITH HIM AT USA OFFICIAL RESIDENCE ON OCCASION OF HIS REPEATED VISITS TO ROME DURING COURSE OF INF NEGOTIATIONS.

2.ACCORDING TO RABB,NITZE IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY CONVINCED THAT ESSENTIAL POLITICAL OBJECTIVE OF USSR IN INF AND RELATED DAC NEGOTIATIONS,WAS WITHDRAWAL OF USA MILITARY PRESENCE FROM EUROPE. THEY APPEARED TO BE NO/NO LONGER PREPARED TO ACCEPT TO BE A PARTY TO ANY DAC AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD IN ONF WAY OR ANOTHER, RECOGNIZE,CONSOLIDATE,LEGITIMIZE OR PERPETUATE USA MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE.ACCORDING TO THAT THEORY,THEY HAD COME TO CONCLUSION THAT WESTERN EUROPE WAS INCREASINGLY IN A POSITION

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PAGE TWO WTGR0465 SECRET

TO DEFEND ITSELF BY ITS OWN MEANS, BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL, AND THAT IT WAS IN THEIR INTEREST TO HASTEN THAT EVOLUTION BY WORKING TOWARDS SOME NEW POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING WITH IT TO THAT END.

3. IT IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO ASSESS WHAT DEGREE OF VALIDITY AND REALITY THIS THESIS MAY CONTAIN. CERTAINLY, IT WOULD EXPLAIN TWO RIGID FUNDAMENTAL PRECONDITIONS WHICH USSR HAS DEMANDED FOR ANY SUCCESS OF INF NEGOTIATIONS, NAMELY THAT NOT/NOT A SINGLE USA MISSILE MUST BE DEPLOYED ON WESTERN EUROPEAN SOIL, WITH USSR IN RETURN EQUATING ITS OWN INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO THOSE OF FRANCE AND UK. IT WOULD ALSO EXPLAIN SOVIET DECISIONS TO BREAK INF NEGOTIATIONS AND TO SUSPEND START NEGOTIATIONS. ALONG SAME LINE OF REASONING, ONE WOULD EXPECT THAT SOVIETS WOULD EQUALLY CHOOSE TO THROW MBFR NEGOTIATIONS IN LIMBO AT END OF CURRENT ROUND. THEY WOULD ALSO PRESUMABLY, SOONER OR LATER, OPENLY OR MORE LIKELY IN PRIVATE SUGGESTIONS, ARGUE AT STKHM THAT CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURE PAR EXCELLENCE THAT CDE SHOULD CONTEMPLATE WOULD BE PRECISELY WITHDRAWAL OF USA FORCES AND ARMAMENTS FROM WESTERN EUROPE, AND THAT ALL FUTURE EAST-WEST DAC NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE CONDITIONED BY THIS CENTRAL GEO-POLITICAL REALIGNMENT.

4. I DID NOT/NOT REPORT ON THAT INTRIGUING THESIS WHEN RABP FIRST CONFIDED IN ME ABOUT IT SOME TEN DAYS OR SO AGO. WHILE IT CONFORMED WITH WELL-KNOWN SOVIET AIM OF ALIENATING WESTERN EUROPE FROM USA, IT SOUNDED TO ME AS BEING TOO AMBITIOUS AS A

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PAGE THREE WTGR0465 SECRET

DELIBERATE DESIGN AND TOO PRECISE AS AN OBJECTIVE AND A MOTIVATION TO BE CAPABLE OF PRACTICAL APPLICATION IN FORESEEABLE FUTURE AND THEREFORE READILY CREDIBLE. I WAS ALSO STRUCK BY FACT THAT IDEA HAD NOT/NOT FOUND ANY ECHO IN REPORTING OF ANY OF OUR NATO MISSIONS, IN ANY INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE TO WHICH WE HAVE ACCESS, OR IN ANY PRESS COMMENTARY OR SPECULATION. EXCEPTION MAY BE WELL THOUGHT-OUT ARTICLE WHICH APPEARED IN NEW YORK TIMES AND REPRODUCED IN INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE OF 12 DEC ENTITLED QUOTE A CASE FOR DEAMERICANIZING EUROPEAN DEFENCE UNQUOTE BY MELVYN B KRAUSS, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS AT NEW YORK UNIVERSITY AND A SENIOR FELLOW AT HOOVER INSTITUTION ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE. BUT PUBLICATION OF ARTICLE MAY BE NOTHING MORE THAN A COINCIDENCE.

5. CLEARLY, SUCH A MAJOR POLITICAL DESIGN AND RE-ORIENTATION ON PART OF USSR WOULD HAVE FUNDAMENTAL IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE SHAPING AND DIRECTION OF PMS INITIATIVE, IF ONLY BECAUSE IT WOULD UNDERLINE THAT SOVIETS ARE NO/NO LONGER INTERESTED IN PURSUING DAC ACHIEVEMENTS FOR THEIR OWN SAKE OR FOR BENEFICIAL EFFECTS WHICH THEY MAY HAVE ON REHABILITATION OF DETENTE PROCESS AS SUCH.

HARDY

CCC/050 141120Z WTGR0465

*action 1/2*

DEX-3502  
(212) 246-7424

UNCLASSIFIED  
NONCLASSIFIE

Facsimile  
TRANSMISSION  
fac-similé

Our file/no. dossier:  
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NYC \_\_\_\_\_

NO. GRPA - 37 . DATE 14 December 1983

PAGES TWO  
(incl. cover)  
(y compris la page  
couverture)

FROM: Canadian Consulate General  
DU : Consulat général du Canada  
NEW YORK

SECTION: General Relations & Public  
Mr./Ms. Affairs  
M./Mad. Weatherup

TO : Mr./Ms.  
A : M./Mad. \_\_\_\_\_

Department:  
Service : EXTOTT: IDDZ

Phone :  
Téléphone : \_\_\_\_\_

Subject :  
Objet : Wall Street Journal - Editorial "The Yawn After"

2/2

ORIGINAL AS IS

## The Yawn After

Can it be that the European "peace" movement has been mostly hype? We expected to be racing to the shelters to dodge fallout from recent events: Last month, the Soviets left the INF talks, then last week stopped the Start talks. This ended negotiations on both intermediate and intercontinental missiles. To top this off (shock, horrors!), ABC's "The Day After" was shown on European TV.

In fact, this one-two-three punch rolled right off, and you'd be hard pressed to find a continent more bored with these current affairs. True, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl raced to announce that the East-West standoff wasn't "irreversible." But last week the NATO allies met and went about business as usual, patting themselves on the back for the successful and largely uneventful deployment of U.S. missiles, and deciding to upgrade conventional weapons.

Now, none of this means that everything is rosy. The conventional weapons upgrade could go much further than it does, the new systems going into Europe are not well designed militarily, much work needs to be done improving defense doctrine, and the anti-nuclear hysteria could again dominate the news with the first buds of spring.

Yet surely, it means something that Europeans were startlingly unscathed from the Soviet decision to pick up their intercontinental missiles marches in Geneva and walk away from Start. This bit of information didn't even make page one in most papers. The London Times and Le Monde of France, for example, both relegated this piece of news to a half-dozen paragraphs on page six. This is a far cry from the ravings you might have expected judging by television screens

full of Western Europe's anti-defense demonstrators.

Britain's Independent Television Network, meanwhile, pioneered "The Day After" in Europe this past weekend, and learned not to trust ABC. In London, a third of the viewers turned their sets off when Jason Robards & Co. came on, resulting in limited nuclear revenues. Pro-NATO governments on the Continent are resting a little easier now, and programmers will be careful not to run "The Day After" against heavy hitters like, say, "Dallas" reruns. Luckily for disappointed viewers, "Jaws 3-D" is about to open in major European markets.

This relaxed reaction from Europe is news. The U.S. missiles are deployed or on their way. Leaders Thatcher, Kohl, Mitterrand, Craxi and others get their best public-opinion results for their tough handling of foreign policy. Related to this new calm, we'd argue, was the rapid squelching of the initial anti-U.S. outbursts over Grenada. These have been replaced by a vague feeling that America's use of force to liberate an ally from a totalitarian threat wasn't such a bad thing after all.

The Soviet shove from the negotiating tables is a good time for some renewed leadership from the U.S. We particularly look forward to the national security affairs study of Soviet arms-control violations. Western leaders, starting with President Reagan, can feel more calm about unleashing the details of Soviet violations of SALTs I and II and the yellow-rain breaches of the chemical-weapons ban.

Recent events have shown that Western publics can take this strong dose of reality without becoming hysterical. There is nothing wrong with the public, even in supposedly queasy Europe. What is needed is leadership, from the Western governments and most of all from the U.S.

D R A F T 13-12-83

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTURE STATEMENT

1. I have had a very productive meeting with the President.
2. We share a deep commitment to the cause of peace, to reducing world tensions and the risks of nuclear war. I share fully the Presidents view that a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought and his desire to banish nuclear weapons from the face of the earth.
3. We agreed to work for a constructive relationship with the East based on equilibrium, moderation and reciprocity eschewing aspirations to military superiority.
4. I have told the President of my recent consultations with other world leaders who share my concerns and largely support the central purpose of my initiative which is the requirement for an injection of political energy into the East-West relationship.
5. I may visit Moscow in the coming months. I will not be bearing a message from the President, rather my aim would be to met directly with the Soviet leadership in support of the goal of better communication and understanding which we all share and to assure them again of the West's deep desire for mutual security at lower levels of armaments.

DEC 13 1983

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**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

Division Phoned \_\_\_\_\_  
Person \_\_\_\_\_  
Local Time \_\_\_\_\_

RESTRICTED

CHCGO YFGR3151 13DEC83

EXTOTE URR DELIVER BY 1130

PCOOTT/FOWLER

WSHDC - 001/13

UGB DMF USS MINA

PRIME MINISTERS INITIATIVE-CHCGO REACTIONS

Bico

ACC	REF	DATE
313606		
28-6 FILE TRUDELL PEACE MISSION DOSSIER		
20-1-1-1		

URR	
DEC 13 1983	
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1	WA
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WE HAVE HAD SEVERAL COMMENTS OVER WEEKEND AND LATE LAST WEEK FROM SENIOR BUSINESS LEADERS HERE ON PRIME MINISTERS INITIATIVE, AND ON MINISTERS VISIT. THESE MAY BE OF INTEREST IN VIEW OF VISIT TO WSHDC THIS WEEK.

2. MOST COMMENTS ARE PRIMARILY COMPLIMENTARY, ALTHOUGH SOME COULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS CARRYING MORE CONCERN FOR THE PRACTICABILITY OF THE PROPOSALS AS UNDERSTOOD TO DATE; THAT IS, A READINESS TO ADMIT THAT NOT/NOT MUCH THAT IS CONCRETE IS KNOWN ABOUT THE PROPOSALS AND IN THAT CONTEXT WE HAVE HAD SOME FEW EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN THAT THE INITIATIVE SUGGESTS A LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN THE ABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO QUOTE HANDLE UNQUOTE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS. AMONG THOSE WHO EXPRESS SUCH CONCERN THERE TENDS TO BE RESENTMENT, PARTICULARLY FROM SENIOR BUSINESSMEN WHO ARE REPUBLICANS, THAT THE PRIME MINISTER MAY THINK HE WOULD KNOW HOW TO DO IT BETTER. A SORT OF QUOTE BUTT OUT, THIS IS OUR PROBLEM UNQUOTE ATTITUDE. SOME OTHERS ASK WHETHER IT IS PRACTICAL TO THINK THAT FIVE CAN SETTLE A PROBLEM THAT TWO HAVE NOT/NOT BEEN ABLE TO RESOLVE.

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2/3

PAGE TWO YFGK31514RESTR

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3. THIS OF COURSE REFLECTS ONE OF THE CHIEF PROBLEMS MANY RESPONSIBLE AMERICANS HAVE IN THINKING ABOUT DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS, THE IDEA THAT THE PROBLEM CAN BE QUOTE SOLVED UNQUOTE, RATHER THAN THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE PROBLEM HAS A CONTINUING NATURE THAT CALLS MORE FOR MANAGEMENT THAN RESOLUTION.

4. BUT THE VAST MAJORITY OF THOSE WHO HAVE SPOKEN TO US SAY SPECIFICALLY THAT THEY WISH THE PRIME MINISTER WELL. THE LESS PEOPLE ARE COMMITTED TO A REAGAN REELECTION, WHICH MAY BE TO SAY THE MORE OBJECTIVELY THEY REFLECT ON THE INITIATIVE, THE MORE THEY SPEAK IN TERMS OF THE NEED FOR SUCH AN INITIATIVE. SOME, PARTICULARLY DEMOCRATS, TALK OF THE INCREASED LIKELIHOOD OF A REAGAN DEFEAT IF SOME MEASURABLE PROGRESS IS NOT/NOT MADE IN THE SOVIET RELATIONSHIP.

5. ALL THIS IS TO BE TAKEN IN THE LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT VERY LITTLE HAS BEEN PUBLICIZED IN LOCAL PRESS SINCE THE CHINESE MEETING AND PUBLIC ATTENTION HAS BEEN CALLED TO OTHER EVENTS. BUT AMONG THOSE AWARE OF THE INITIATIVE THERE IS PROBABLY A MAJORITY SYMPATHETIC TO ITS GOAL, WITH AN EVEN SPLIT BETWEEN THOSE WHO THINK IT MIGHT BE BETTER THAN BILATERAL SUPERPOWER TALKS AND THOSE WHO SEE IT AS A MORE OR LESS USELESS DISTRACTION FM THE STANDARD METHOD OF QUOTE DEALING WITH THE RUSSIANS UNQUOTE.

6. THIS MESSAGE IS CLEARLY BUILT ON A LIMITED SURVEY BUT IS WELL ILLUSTRATED BY THE REACTION OF FOUR PEOPLE WHO ATTENDED THE

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PAGE THREE YFGR3151 RESTR

MINISTERS PRESENTATION TO THE CHCCO CTTEE. ALL WERE PLEASED BY THE  
PRESENTATION AND IMPRESSED BY THE MINISTERS FORTHRIGHT AND GOOD  
HUMOURED MANNER. ALL WERE ANNOYED WITH THEMSELVES FOR NOT/NOT HAVING  
EXPRESSED THEIR REACTION DURING THE QUESTION PERIOD: TWO HAD  
THOUGHTS OF CONCERN ABOUT THE PRACTICALITY OF THE INITIATIVE  
AND TWO WERE WISHING THEY HAD EXPRESSED THEIR PERSONAL SUPPORT  
FOR IT.

ACC	313615	AI:
FILE	<del>20-1-1-1</del>	C
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URR	DEC 17 1983	INFO					
		ACTION	1	2	3	4	5

**ACTION SUITE A DONNER PEACE MISSION**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR3022 13DEC83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ UGB/URR PCOTT/FOWLER

DELIVER BY 140830

INFO PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN

---PM INITIATIVE: BRIEFING FOR WASH MEDIA

GOTLIEB HOSTED BREAKFAST THIS MORNING FOR 20 WASH JOURNALISTS WHO WILL BE COVERING PM VISIT. FOLLOWING AMBS INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ON GENESIS AND PROCESS OF INITIATIVE TO DATE, WIDE RANGE OF QUESTIONS WHICH WENT ON FOR NEARLY HOUR REVEALED FOLLOWING NEGATIVE FEATURES.

A) IN EVIDENT SEARCH FOR PROVOCATIVE NEWS STORY, WSH PRESS CORPS IS ANXIOUS TO TRY TO PLAY TRUDEAU APPROACH TO RELNS WITH EAST AGAINST REAGAN RHETORIC AND SABRE RATTLING;

B) MEDIA HERE BARELY AWARE OF CONSTRUCTIVE TENOR OF NAC MINISTERIAL DECLARATION OR OF CDN ROLE IN ITS CONSTRUCTION;

C) OUR UNWILLINGNESS TO BECOME INVOLVED IN SPECIFICS OF START OR INF NEEDED TO BE EMPHASIZED AS DID PMS DETERMINATION NOT TO BE HONEST BROKER OR MESSAGE CARRIER BETWEEN TWO SUPER POWERS;

D) USA PRESS CONTINUES TO FEEL THAT QUOTE CHEMISTRY UNQUOTE BETWEEN PM AND PRESS IS NOT GOOD;

E) THERE IS EXPECTATION ADMIN WILL SIMPLY DENY USA-USSR RELNS ARE WITHOUT WORKING CHANNELS OR ARE IN DANGEROUS OR VOLATILE STATE;

F) SOME MEDIA PRESENT HAVE IMPRESSION THAT PM IS BACKING AWAY FROM SPECIFIC PROPOSALS OF INITIATIVE AND BECOMING INCREASINGLY PHILOSOPHICAL IN APPROACH TO HIS MISSION;

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A BOMBER

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2. WE DEALT WITH ABOVE POINTS. WE WILL HAVE TO AWAIT ADVANCE STORIES TO SEE HOW WE SUCCEEDED BUT IT WAS EVIDENT THAT THE PURPOSE OF PMS MISSION AS ITNERNATL NEWS STORY WILL NEED CONCRETE CLARIFICATION. WE EMPHASIZED SUCCESSFULLY NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUE AND CRISIS MGMT, NOT IN CONTEXT OF FIVE-POWER MTG BUT AS THEMES PM HAD BEEN PURSUING WHERE THERE WAS CLEARLY A MUTUALITY OF INTEREST BETWEEN THE USA AND SOVIET UNION. THIS WAS WELL RECD BY MEDIA PRESENT. ON FIVE-POWER IDEA, WE NOTED THAT WE HAD HAD NO CLEAR RESPONSE TO IDEA FROM ADMIN AS YET. CLEARLY THIS IDEA REMAINS THE MOST UNDERSTANDABLE AND CONCRETE ASPECT OF THE INITIATIVE FOR USA, AS WELL AS CDN PRESS.

3. WE WERE STRUCK BY NEED TO COMMUNICATE PMS PERSONAL COMMITMENT AND PHILOSOPHY FACING INCREASED DANGER OF NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION, BUT ALSO BY DIFFICULTY AT BEING ADEQUATE SPOKESMAN FOR DYNAMICS HE BRINGS TO HIS MISSION. WE FEEL STRONGLY THAT THE MORE OPPORTUNITY THE PM HIMSELF HAS TO GET THIS DIMENSION OF HIS MISSION ACROSS TO MEDIA, THE MORE POSITIVELY IT WILL BE RECD AND COMMUNICATED TO WIDER AMERICAN PUBLIC, WHICH IS NECESSARY FOR SUCCESS OF HIS MISSION ON EVERY LEVEL.

CCC/059 132321Z UNGR3022

URR	DEC 13 1983	INFO	<i>[Handwritten signature]</i>
		ACTION	<i>[Handwritten signature]</i>
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TO A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR3024 13DEC83

TO EXTOTT UGB URR IDDZ PCOOTT/FOWLER DELIVER BY 140830

INFO MOSCO BNATO ROME LDN BONN PARIS NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/CPH HAGUE

PMOOTT/AXWORTHY BRU PEKIN PRMNY CNGNY TOKYO DECHI

DISTR MINA USS DMF IDR IDA RGB IFB RBD ,RBR RCR

---PMS VISIT 15DEC:DEPARTURE STATEMENT

DEPARTURE STATEMENT SHOULD BE BRIEF.WE NEED TO

OR AT LEAST BE ABLE TO MENTION BASIC POINTS WHICH WOULD BE MADE

WITH MEDAS 14DEC.HE WILL LET US KNOW WHAT WHITE HOUSE PROPOSES

REAGAN SAY.WE REALIZE PM MAY CHOOSE TO MAKE POINTS DIFFERENTLY OR

INDEED MAKE DIFFERENT POINTS IN LIGHT OF DISCUSSION WITH REAGAN

ITSELF BUT BEGGING THIS EVENTUALITY FOR TIME BEING,WE WOULD PROPOSF

AS STARTING POINT SOMETHING GENERAL ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

A) I HAVE HAD A VERY PRODUCTIVE MTG WITH THE PRESIDENT AND HAVE RENEWED AGAIN MY SENSE OF HIS DEEP COMMITMENT TO REDUCING WORLD TENSION.

B) THE DISCUSSIONS I HAVE HAD WITH MANY WORLD LEADERS HAVE SHOWN TO ME THAT WE ARE ALL COMMITTED TO THAT GOAL.

C) I MAY BE GOING TO THE SOVIET UNION AT SOME POINT AND I WILL BE ABLE TO TELL THEM OF MY FINDINGS.I WILL NOT/NOT BE GOING THERE WITH ANY MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN WHO CAN SEND HIS OWN MESSAGES BUT I WOULD BE GOING IN SUPPORT OF THE GOAL OF BETTER COMMUNICATION AND UNDERSTANDING WHICH WE ALL SHARE.

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PAGE TWO UNGR3024 CONF

D) I HAVE NOT/NOT RAISED ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSALS WITH THE PRESIDENT  
THOUGH I HAVE MENTIONED SOME IDEAS FOR HIS FUTURE CONSIDERATION  
AND WE WILL BE ABLE TO FOLLOW UP ON SOME OF THESE.

2. YOU CAN NO DOUBT DO MUCH BETTER. GRATEFUL RESPONSE ASAP.

CCC/059 132322Z UNGR3024

**TRANSCRIPT OF REMARKS BY THE PRIME MINISTER AT A LIBERAL PARTY FUNDRAISING DINNER,  
TORONTO, TUESDAY, DECEMBER 13, 1983**

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**TRANSCRIPTION DE L'ALLOCUTION PRONONCÉE PAR LE PREMIER MINISTRE À UN DÎNER-BÉNIFICE  
DU PARTI LIBÉRAL, TORONTO, LE MARDI 13 DÉCEMBRE 1983**

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I think, Keith, I may as well say it right up front: I am sorry that this will be the last supper for some of you. I will miss you next year and the year after that.

I want to thank you for coming in such great numbers. I want to thank you for letting Keith and his organizers and the many volunteers part you with your hard-earned money, and I want to thank you for the support you have shown through your applause.

I knew that this would be a very big dinner. I had the notion that something was afoot when, at the Commonwealth Conference in New Delhi a couple of weeks ago, this Thibetan monk came down from the Himalayas and he burst into the room and he said, "Thank you, Mr. Trudeau, for the invitation." It should reassure those Toronto Liberals who sense that the love affair between this city and the Liberal Party has known, shall we say, more passionate moments.

I want to encourage them, as indeed I was encouraged when I was in Peking, and I saw on the Chinese temple these words: No matter how dark the sky -- it was engraved in stone -- no matter that the petals on the lotus blossom fade away...remember who won the Grey Cup.

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As I say, I am moved by your friendship and by the support shown to me by the head table guests. I will try not to embarrass them by being too partisan. As a matter of fact, I am told that we tried to have some very outstanding Toronto Tories at the head table. We asked David Crombie, but I understand that he was putting together his cultural policy and he was delayed because he had some trouble convincing one of the film companies to change its name to 19th Century Fox. As for Sinclair Stevens, he was grounded by Mr. Mulroney himself because he had to do more studying on the North-South dialogue; when he was asked about the North-South dialogue, he said, "It is in hand, I have been talking to Florida on the telephone yesterday."

It is really nice to be here at this time of the year because we have these great Christmas carols. I want to thank the singers and the steelband and all those who made it such a joy today.

At this time of year, most of us in our personal lives look back before the new year comes in and take stock on what we have accomplished. We look ahead to see what resolutions we want to take for the new year in order to try and fulfill ourselves. That is, I think, the criterion on which all of us judge the past and plan for the future. Whether we have molded our own destiny in a way that our potential permits us to, or whether we have been buffeted by the winds and influenced by others; whether we have been, as the expression was in the 50s, "inner-directed" or "other-directed." And we judge our successes and failures by our ability to follow our path and fulfill ourselves.

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I think it is the same for nations.

They must ask themselves where they come from and where they are going. In looking at where they come from and where they are going, they must ask if they are really fulfilling their duty, their essence and their identity as a nation, or whether they are letting themselves be governed in any which way by outside forces, by influences in other countries; whether they are, as a nation, molding their own destiny, carving their own future, or whether they are being buffeted by the winds and sands of fortune.

Using that test, I thought since this is the twentieth year, going back to 1963, except for a short hiccup, that the Liberals have been in power, that I would spend a few moments before looking into the future, looking back over those twenty years and seeing, indeed, how this country has been governed and, more importantly, by what principles it has been guided. I go back to Mr. Pearson and I do so with great affection.

I remember his great resolve in dealing with the unsolved problems of the past. Even such a simple thing as the national flag, the symbol of our identity that nobody had ever had the nerve of giving to Canada -- even with the minority government with which he was saddled, he managed to give us that flag of which we are so proud today. That is how I see the duty of a leader and of a political party and of a government: to sort of clear up the path so that you can tackle the future. And tackle the future he did.

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You will recall that, in those postwar years, we were entering perhaps the longest period of prosperity that this country had ever known. And what did Mr. Pearson do? He shared that wealth. He took a very healthy balance sheet and he decided that it should be shared with all Canadians and particularly with those Canadians in need. So he brought in medicare, and he brought in the Canada Pension Plan, and he brought in the Guaranteed Income Supplement and the Canada Assistance Plan, of course -- and health insurance above all. He brought these in, so that, in this wealthy and fortunate land, people would not dread the economic difficulties of being sick, poor, or old.

And that is some of the great, not only, measures of Mr. Pearson, but the great principle he had of making sure that those who were in need in this country would get first priority in his legislation.

I thought that tonight would be a good night to find some way in which Mr. Pearson would be remembered in this the metropolis of his province. In agreement with Lloyd Axworthy, the Minister of Transport, I want to announce that on January 1, Toronto International Airport will become the Pearson International Airport.

Then, around about 1968 -- a time for changing when the baby boom was beginning to gather steam and age, some six million strong; the new Canadians who had immigrated to Canada in the postwar period were taking roots and bringing in new cultures and new values; and of course Canada, which had been after the Second World War amongst the four or five of the strongest

nations in trading and in its economy, was being overtaken by many of the other nations in Europe, by Japan, who had rebuilt their economies after the war and who were regaining their former great stature -- Canada was looking inwards; Canada was beginning to sense that, in order order to survive in this tough developing strong world, it would have to take greater conscience of its identity. Nationalism was coming out in Quebec where people were saying: Well, if we cannot speak our language in this country, if we cannot talk to the government in Ottawa in our language, we may as well go off on our own. And that is when, looking at people, our government brought in the Official Languages Act, and said to French-speaking Canadians: You can be at home anywhere in this country with federal institutions.

Today, when you see tens of thousands of young Canadians all across the land going to school and learning the other official language -- French or English -- you realize what a great thing was done for this country. But in those days -- and still today -- it is not completely accepted. Remember those who fought us in those days: They were sitting on the other side of the House.

In the same way, we took the problem of Canada itself which was being challenged in many ways -- whether it was being challenged notably by the sea-faring nations, the great trading nations of the world, which were testing... well, for one, they were going through the Northwest passage -- or attempting to -- challenging our fishing rights. At that time, our government took a series of measures to establish Canadian territory well beyond its land borders. We have the fisheries closing line; and in the Arctic (inaudible)...

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(inaudible) we went from the three-mile limit to the twelve-mile limit; we established our rights to the territorial sea; and finally, all of this was sanctioned in the Law of the Sea. But when we were doing it in the late 60s and early 70s we were being challenged by our friends -- by the United States, by Great Britain, by many, once again, of the sailing nations. We did it because we knew that Canada had to take this advance in international law even though we were told, once again, by our opposition, that we should not proceed this way. Well, we increased the area over which the grid of Canada runs by about 50 per cent in those short years. Some of you will remember that we established that the Northwest passage was Canadian waters. And we did this in spite of the fact that it was our friends to the South who were trying to get through there. The land was strong, but we made it stronger.

So with the people, and so with the land, and so with the institutions. Remember the Constitution that people had discussed for 52 years: "How could they bring it back?" and "Would they bring it back?" And finally, we brought it back. And it is now Canadians (inaudible) ... way, in our own land.

And remember who was fighting to prevent that Constitution from being patriated at that time. I am trying not to be partisan so I am not putting any names on here.

And we brought the Election Expenses legislation in, changing that institution, so that the electoral advantage not go to the wealthy vested interests, but that democracy have a true play in our country. And in that sense, we put our country ahead of many of the other democracies.

Society was being transformed too.

With the baby boom was being ushered in first

baby food, and then baby clothes, and then the primary schools and the high schools and the universities, and the styles and the rock music and the new values. And, as I was saying, the new Canadians were coming in each with their own culture.

Suddenly we had to realize that if we wanted to catch up to the latter half of the twentieth century, we had to change some of our basic values. We took the notion of sin out of the Criminal Code, and we took the State out of the bedrooms of the nation, and we passed laws which ended that period -- not so long ago, fifteen years ago -- when every divorce had to go before the House of Commons and the Senate, and you had to go through that sham of having private detectives. That was just fifteen years ago and that is changed too.

We abolished capital punishment and we brought in gun laws and controls. And remember again that those reforms were not easy. They were fought by various vested interests in the country who did not want the country to move into the second half of the twentieth century.

Then in the economy. Well, I think I can talk of at least one aspect here, because the man who put it on the agenda is Walter Gordon when he talked about the Canadian control of its own domestic economy. There was the catching up with the past there, and we had a lot of catching up to do. Walter, you remember that in your manifesto you had a certain number of things; I think we have not gone to the end of them, but we have touched upon

- 8 -

them all I think: the Canada Development Corporation, and now the Canadian Development Investment Corporation; and with Petro Canada and with the Foreign Investment Review Agency. So that now, we have lowered considerably the amount of foreign ownership generally in certain industries, in the petroleum industry.

Finally, there was international affairs. Once again, we had to catch up with the past. One of the first things we did was to recognize the People's Republic of China, the Beijing Government. And that too was not easy. You will recall that in those days there was the "two China" policy with Taiwan. I remember now, across the House, they said we were too far ahead of our friends in the United States and in Europe because we were recognizing Peking and they had not done it yet, and we should not break unity on a question of timing and tactics. Except that when we did recognize Peking, then they all followed and then we had realistic politics. Eight hundred million people in China who had not been recognized officially. Well, that was catching up with the past.

There is another area. We see His Holiness Pope John Paul II bringing the message of peace, bringing the message of love to every country of the world -- and he will be in Canada just next fall. We have to remember that even there, our government finally decided to recognize the Vatican. What a fight it was then! And it was not only a fight with the Protestants, though a lot of them said that they were going to object to it. Do you know who objected most? I think you know, Your Eminence. It was a lot of the Catholic bishops. They did not like

the idea that, suddenly, there would be state-to-state relations between the Government of Canada and the Vatican. It was better when it went through the bishops. But that is all over now. We sort of cleared up the past in that area. In a sense, all these measures were initiatives of tidying up, of saying Let us assert our identity. Let us make sure that Canada is well into the twentieth century, so that we can face the future as a united country; so that we have begun to solve the problems in Canada which divided us.

Then we tackled the Native problems, the aboriginal problems and finally we recognized their rights through the Constitution. And then we began to deal with the problem of the status of women. We began to deal with the problem of the disabled. And in all these areas, Canada was suddenly becoming a modern nation and a strong nation.

And as I will show later, it was the people who were supporting the government in those things. It was not the elite and it certainly was not the Opposition. Because if you ask yourselves who was opposing the abolition of capital punishment, and who was opposing bilingualism, and who was opposing the reform of the Divorce Act, and who was opposing the recognition of the Peking Government, it was always the people across the aisle. When I worry about that alternative

government, it is not because they are not prepared to tell us their policies now and take positions now. I understand, in a sense, the Deputy from Yukon, Mr. Nielsen, when he says: Well, if we were going to put our policy out now, the Liberals would steal it. Sure, any good idea we take and we would do that with the Tory ideas -- if they had some.

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My concern is not that they are not putting out their whole program. My concern is looking back at the things they did not want to be done, like patriating the Constitution: They always had some excuse to say; well, not now. It is not time. It is divisive. We will do it later. And on the national energy policy: Let's not have any. Let the multi-nationals decide what the national energy policy is. And on patriation: Let's not take the lead. Let the provinces tell us when it is time to do it. And on abolition of capital punishment: Let's not take the lead. Let's wait until it is accepted by everybody, everywhere. When it is the question of natural resources: Let the provinces, let the private sector decide. When it's the 6 and 5: Let the market decide.

That is not governing. That is not taking the lead. That is waiting for the parade to form and when the parade forms then you jump in front of it and you say, "I am going to lead." Well, that is not the way you build a country, my friend. It is by meeting the tough challenges and by making some people mad, by knowing that you cannot please all the people everywhere all the time with everything. That is what governing is about.

I think that is a particularly important consideration now when we realize that we are almost into the twenty-first century and that the great challenges out there will not be met by Canada, unless Canada comes out a strong nation and a united nation. Because the world out there is a tough world. The great problems of U.S.-Canada relations: Who decides? Is it Canada? Is it the United States? Is it both together? And what happens

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to our trade? Will we have great trading blocs? Will we be part of a continental United States? These are difficult choices and we have to see them coming. And the North-South dialogue: another difficult choice. And the huge debt of the Third World nations: How will it be met? How will we reform present world institutions?

Canada has to go into these challenges as a strong united country. It has to develop the leadership that will permit us to meet these problems. We know what can happen when this country is divided. Remember when General De Gaulle came here in the 60s and exploited one of our weaknesses in a way which cannot be easily forgiven. He encouraged separatism in Quebec. He could do that because we were divided and a weak nation. And when the extraterritorial application of American laws falls on us, it is because we are not confident in ourselves and we are not prepared to stand up to these, our best friends, and say, "Your law -- its writ shall not run in our country". And yet, when some editorialist in the Wall Street Journal comes out with an article criticizing our energy policy, for instance, well, the boardrooms tremble and the businessmen say, "Oh, the Americans don't like us." And when some pip-squeek in the Pentagon criticizes our peace initiatives, the press runs to say: "Oh, look, they don't like what we are doing!"

A country is not strong because of the size of its armies and it is not powerful because of its great balance sheet. A country can be influential in the world by the size of its heart and the breadth of its mind, and that is the role that Canada can play.

And see how the people of Canada feel this

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and see how they support it. Take the Canadian Charter of Human Rights. Remember how it was opposed in the House of Commons and opposed in eight of the ten provinces. It was not time. We would do it later somehow when we were unanimous about it. And who supported us then. Association after association across the country was telling our government, "You are right, we want a charter of rights. We want every Canadian to have equal rights and never mind what the provinces are saying; and never mind what the opposition is saying. Bring in that charter of rights." And when, in order to compromise, to get some agreement, we dropped a few things like Indian rights and women's rights, the Indians and the women broke down the door of Premier Blakeney's and Premier Lougheed's offices and said: "We want those back in there." And they went back in. The people decided what was good government for Canada.

Another example in the economic area: When we have this terrible inflation and the unemployment that was caused by it -- and which is still a burden on this country, and one of which we have to be anguished and all put to shame; when we were pricing ourselves out of the world market; when our inflation was at 12.8 while it was down at 6 and 5 in the United States, 4 in Germany, and 3 in Japan; and we had to find some way to get that inflation down. The government appealed to the provinces and appealed to the Canadian people and appealed to the various opinion leaders. And who opposed, my friends? Well, for one thing, the Opposition opposed us; for another the provinces opposed us; I guess another thing I did not like, the bishops

opposed us, too. That was my quarrel with Your Eminence.

It was not because they are not entitled to talk about unemployment. It is because they said the 6 and 5 was a bogus thing and it was not right. Well, the Canadian people accepted the 6 and 5, and they brought inflation down so that, now, it is below 5 per cent, the lowest it has been in eleven years.

(inaudible)

It was the Canadian people, willing to share the difficulties, willing to participate in the leadership.

Another example of that is when you find from past years, some 300,000 workers are prepared to share some of their benefits and some of their work time so that they will give jobs to another 100,000 workers. That is the kind of spirit that you need in this country, and that is what we found with the 6 and 5.

It is the same story with the peace initiative.

It is the same story that the people of Canada are concerned with that, and they don't care what the Pentagon or the State Department says. They know that peace is too important to be left to the super-powers, and that it is the right and the duty of leaders in countries like Canada -- particularly that we are a member of an alliance, the NORAD alliance -- to put pressure on ourselves and on the other side in order that the politicians take the subject in hand and not leave it to the negotiators or the diplomats and the nuclear accountants and all those who will sit forever to try and balance throw-weights and trust and everything else.

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And there again, I want to remind you that in '69 and '70 and '71, Canada was criticized by some of our opposition and some of our allies, because we decided to denuclearize our forces.

We had four forms of nuclear arms in those days and we got rid of them. We got rid of the Bomarc. Then we got rid of the nuclear tipped weapons on our CF-104s in Europe. Then we got rid of our Honest Johns, the nuclear artillery. And finally we are getting rid now -- the last one will go this summer after the 1st of July -- of the nuclear arsenal on the CF-101 when they are going to be replaced by the CF-18.

Canada was not just preaching non-nuclear proliferation. It was practicing it. It was practicing it five or six years before Jim Schlesinger, the great minister of defence of the United States, began to formulate the concept of increased or heightened, nuclear thresholds, by which the last NATO meeting last fall in Montebello decided to get rid of some 1,400 nuclear weapons, mostly of the kind that we had got rid of ourselves -- the artillery ones, the ones that were going to go off at the beginning of the war, early first use. So, we heightened the nuclear threshold as we are working to do now in Stockholm, where we convinced not only the NATO countries but, through them, we convinced the Warsaw Pact countries to be in Stockholm so that the politicians could sit down face to face and carry on that dialogue, because we have to assume that every sane leader wants peace.

There again, it is the people who have been writing us, supporting us by the hundreds of thousands in spite of the somewhat nervous criticism of some of our media.

- 15 -

So, ladies and gentlemen, that is the kind of looking back and looking ahead that I wanted to put before you tonight close to the turn of the year and not so far from the turn of the century.

We know that this country has no guarantees given to any of its citizens. There is no blank cheque handed to any of the young people here saying, "you have an assured future; you are Canadian, you have it made".

We know that the problems of the next ten and twenty years will have to be solved by us. We know particularly the once-baby boom is now rolling on in years, and it is now the senior citizens that will have to be provided for -- that baby boom which will be transformed into the ages of retirement.

That is when they will need better pension plans. And that is when they will really need medicare. And that is why it is time now to be defending medicare and not leaving it to the provinces who are saying, "medicare is a sacred trust," but not saying that you will prevent extra billing, not saying that you will prevent user charges. You have to make sure that these reforms, which are part of the infrastructure, part of the (inaudible) of Canadians, will be available when that large "tranche" of Canadians gets into retirement age.

Alors, c'est dans ce sens-là que, lorsque nous parlons de politique, nous devons regarder non seulement le passé, pour essayer de nous mettre à jour, mais il faut regarder également l'avenir. Regarder l'avenir pour savoir quels sont les défis

- 16 -

qui se présentent à nous afin que nous mettions en poste des gouvernements qui n'ont pas peur de rencontrer ces défis. And that is the moral that I want to draw from this little discussion: that the Canadian people know what the sound values are. They have the institutions now to ensure that they will be represented electorally, but there are still more changes to come. We still have to make sure that the provinces are better represented at the centre, and that is why we are looking at a reform of the Senate.

I do not want to go into all these details.

I do want to tell you that the business of politics is not for procrastinators; it is not for befuddlers; and it is not for those who raise obfuscation into the state of an art. It is for people who are prepared to make decisions even if they are not popular, if they are right, if they are good for the people -- that is the kind of men and women that you want at the head of this country, and that is what the Liberal Party stands for and that is why I am proud to be their leader.

- 30 -



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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TO WSHDC DELIVER BY 140900

DISTR MINA USS DMF UGB URR

REF YOURTEL 3018 OF 12DEC

---PM INITIATIVE:MTG WITH PRES REAGAN 15DEC

GIVEN THAT WE WILL BE LIMITED TO FOUR IN SUBSTANTIVE MTG WITH  
PRESIDENT (YOUR REFTEL PARA 5), CDN SIDE WILL BE PM, DPM/SISEA, AMB,  
PMOOTT/AXWORTHY. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES GRATEFUL IF AMB COULD TAKE  
NOTES *AND PREPARE REPORT* ~~IN ORDER TO DEBRIEF TASK FORCE AND OTHER OFFICIALS AND FOR  
THE RECORD.~~

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

SG

J. McNEE

DIVISION/DIRECTION

IDDZ

TELEPHONE

5-5912

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SG

L.A. DELVOIE



MESSAGE

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RT How  
---POSSIBLE VISIT BY JOE CLARK

HAVE LEARNED FROM MR CLARKS OFFICE (PEGGY MASSON) THAT ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING MADE THROUGH BRIT HICOM FOR MTG IN LDN WITH LORD CARRINGTON ON 19DEC. MR CLARK IS ALSO ATTEMPTING TO SPEAK WITH SONNY RAMPHAL BY TELEPHONE WITH POSSIBLE VIEW TO ORGANIZING MTG WITH HIM AS WELL AND PERHAPS ALSO WITH AMB BEESLEY IN GENEV.

2. WE OFFERED TO HAVE YOU ARRANGE PROGRAM OF BRIEFINGS AND MTGS FOR MR CLARK ON SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT ISSUES (AS YOU KNOW, HE HAS BEEN NAMED SPECIAL ADVISER TO PC PARTY ON THESE SUBJS) BUT WERE TOLD BY MASSON THAT HE WISHED TO LIMIT HIMSELF ON THIS FIRST VISIT ABROAD.

3. WE WERE ASKED TO ARRANGE TRANSATLANTIC FLIGHT (MS MASSON WAS INFORMED SHE WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS) AND FOR CAR TO BE MADE AVAILABLE TO MR CLARK IN LDN (WE OFFERED SUPPORT OF HICOM IN THIS REGARD).

4. MASSON SAID SHE WOULD CALL BACK WITH TRAVEL DETAILS AS SOON AS KNOWN TOGETHER WITH ANY OTHER REQUESTS MR CLARK MIGHT HAVE.

5. SINCE DICTATING ABOVE, MASSON HAS NOW ASKED IF YOU COULD ARRANGE MTG FOR MR CLARK WITH SONNY RAMPHAL FOR ANY TIME MONDAY MORNING, 19DEC. MTG WITH CARRINGTON IS FOR EITHER 1500 OR 1700 HRS SAME DAY.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

G. J. Smith/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L.A. Delvoie





MGTC M. FILE DIARY  
FILE/DOSSIER

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TO/À TO WSHDC **IMMED**

INFO INFO MOSCO PEKIN WSAW BUCST PRGUE BONN PARIS LDN MDRID LSBON ROME

REF ANKRA ATHNS OSLO COPEN HAGUE BRU ~~PERMISSNY~~ ~~FRMNY~~

SUBJ/SUJ DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB PCOOTT/FOWLER

REF TELS TOKYO 3064 OF 09DEC; PMDEL 0107 OF 27NOV; IDDZ0268 OF 09  
DEC; ROME 0432 OF 21NOV

---PM INITIATIVE

*AS EXAMPLES OF*  
~~TO HELP COUNTER SOME SUGGESTIONS IN MEDIA THAT~~ INTL SUPPORT FOR PM  
INITIATIVE ~~HAS BEEN TEPID~~, YOU MIGHT WISH TO DRAW ON FLWG PUBLIC  
STATEMENTS OF HEADS OF GOVT AND HELMUT SCHMITZ. THESE OF COURSE ARE  
IN ADDITION TO SUPPORT PM HAS RECD IN PRIVATE MTGS WITH HEADS OF  
GOVT TO WHICH PM HAS REFERRED <sup>IN MTGS</sup> WITH PRESS:

1. ITALIAN PM CRAXI IN DEBATE IN ITALIAN PARLIAMENT ON INF 14-16 NOV  
COMMENDED THE PM INITIATIVE (SEE ROME TEL 0432 OF 21NOV).
2. COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVT AT NEW DELHI CHOGM SPECIFICALLY ENDOR-  
SED THE PM S INITIATIVE IN THE GOA DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY QUOTE A CONCERTED EFFORT IS REQUIRED TO RESOLVE THE CONSTRUC-  
TIVE DIALOGUE TO THE CONDUCT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. ONLY THUS,  
CAN A CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE BE REBUILT IN PLACE OF THE PREVAILING  
ONE OF FEAR AND MISTRUST. IN ALL THESE PURSUITS, WE EMPHASISE THE  
SUPREME IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL WILL. WE, THEREFORE, WELCOME PRIME

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG  M. McNEE	IDDZ	5-5912	L.A. DELVOIE



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12 | 10

PAGE TWO IDDZ0282 UNCLAS

MINISTER TRUDEAUS CALL FOR A NEW POLITICAL DIMENSION IN THE QUEST  
FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. WE SUPPORT HIS EFFORTS TO RESTORE  
ACTIVE POLITICAL CONTACT AND COMMUNICATIONS AMONG ALL THE NUCLEAR  
WEAPON POWERS AND ARE WILLING TO HELP THESE AND OTHER SUCH EF-  
FORTS IN ALL APPROPRIATE WAYS. AS PRIME MINISTER INDIRA GANDHI  
HAS SO CONSISTENTLY EMPHASISED, THE CENTRAL ISSUE IN SECURING WI-  
DER PROGRESS ON DISARMAMENT IN THE STOPPING OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS  
RACE. THESE ARE ESSENTIAL STEPS FOR PROGRESS AND WORKING TOWARDS  
THE WORLDS RELIEF FROM THE MENANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THEIR  
WIDER SPREAD. UNQUOTE

3. JAPANESE PM NAKASONE ENDORSED PM INITIATIVE IN COMMITTEE OF  
JAPANESE DIET:

NOV 21: QUOTE PM TRUDEAU AND I ARE IN AGMT THAT IN LIGHT OF THE  
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, THE NUCLEAR SUPER-POWER AND  
OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS SHOULD EXERCISE GREATER MODERATION, THAT THE  
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND OTHER THIRD POWERS SHOULD BE GIVEN  
ASSISTANCE IN THE PEACEFUL APPLICATION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, AND  
THAT WE SHOULD PRESS MORE VIGOROUSLY FOR FULFILLMENT OF THAT  
COMMITMENT. UNQUOTE

NOV 22: QUOTE PM TRUDEAU AND I SHARED THE VIEW THAT, IN THE FINAL  
ANALYSIS, THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF BANISHING NUCLEAR ARMS AND PRE-  
VENTING WAR WOULD BE UNATTAINABLE UNLESS THE 5 NUCLEAR POWERS-

...3

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PAGE THREE IDDZ0282 UNCLAS

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THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, BRITAIN, FRANCE AND CHINA-  
COULD BE BROUGHT TOGETHER TO SIT DOWN AT THE SAME TABLE AND  
TALK SENSIBLY ABOUT COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO TOTALLY BANNING  
OR REDUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ON THIS POINT, WE AGREED THAT A  
FORUM SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED WHERE THE 5 NUCLEAR POWERS CAN DIS-  
CUSS THIS QUESTION. UNQUOTE ... QUOTE CDA AND JPN ARE MAKING  
TANGIBLE AND REALISTIC EFFORTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RESPEC-  
TIVE POSITIONS TO RID THE WORLD OF NUCLEAR WAR, DO AWAY WITH  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND CARRY OUT DISARMAMENT. UNQUOTE  
NOV 26: QUOTE I TOLD PM TRUDEAU THAT I ADMIRE HIM FOR ACTING,  
OUT OF CONCERN FOR THE DEADLOCK IN INTERNATIONAL RELNS, TO TAKE  
THE INITIATIVE IN CREATING A MOOD WHICH WOULD HELP TO BREAK  
THIS STALEMATE IN INTERNATIONAL RELNS AND THAT WE ALSO FEEL THE  
NECESSITY OF RESOLVING THE STALEMATE. I ALSO SAID THAT I HAD A  
VERY HIGH REGARD FOR THE INITIATIVE HE DISPLAYED IN VISITING  
COUNTRIES IN W EUROPE TO PRESENT SPECIFIC PROPOSALS (TO HALT  
THE ARMS RACE) AND IN COMING ALL THE WAY TO JPN WITH HIS MESSAGE.  
4. HELMUT SCHMIDT IN PUBLIC SPEECH IN TORONTO 08NOV STRONGLY  
BACKED THE INITIATIVE (AND 5 POWER PROPOSAL IN PARTICULAR) (SEE  
OURTEL IDDZ0268 OF 09DEC.



MESSAGE

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TO ROME IMMEDIATE

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REF YOURTEL 0432 21NOV

---PM INITIATIVE: CRAXI

GRATEFUL YOU PROVIDE US WITH CITATION OF PM CRAXI S REFERENCES TO  
PM TRUDEAU INITIATIVE DURING INF DEBATE IN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 14-  
16 NOV (PARA 9 REFTL)

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG J. McNEE

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG L.A. DELVOIE



MESSAGE

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TO PEKIN

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---PM INITIATIVE: THANK YOU LETTERS.

GRATEFUL YOU PROVIDE US ASAP WITH DRAFT THANK YOU LETTERS FROM PM  
TO DENG AND PREMIER ZHIAO. THEY SHD BE NO/NO MORE THAN 2 PARAS LONG.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

G. SMITH

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG L. A. DELVOIE

Canada

Canada

MR SMITH (O/R)

TO/À • CML

FROM/DE • IFB

REFERENCE • USS Memorandum CML-039 of November 1, 1983  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • POLICY RESERVE AUCTION - DECEMBER 1983  
SUJET

Security/Sécurité	SECRET
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	5-1-3-IDA
Date	December 13, 1983
Number/Numéro	IFB-1407

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

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--- Attached is an arms control and disarmament initiative requiring funding from the Policy Reserve auction.

Michael Shenstone,  
Assistant Deputy Minister  
Political and International  
Security Affairs

FILE DIV. DIARY (002)

5-1-3-IDA

IDA-1414

SECRET

Cabinet Committee on Foreign  
and Defence Policy  
External Affairs and Aid Envelope  
Non-ODA Policy Reserve  
Banking Day, December 19, 1983

---

Department of External Affairs

Disarmament Fund

The 7 December 1983 Speech from the Throne announced that there would be increased funding for voluntary associations and private research groups interested in security, arms control and disarmament issues.

Present budgetting for the Disarmament Fund, from which such contributions would normally be drawn, provides for only a \$50,000 increase (from \$338,000 in 1983/84 to \$388,000 in 1984/85). A standing grant of \$50,000 is also being sought for the recently established Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament. Such modest funding increases do not appear consistent with the Government's intentions as announced in the Throne Speech.

The Disarmament Fund of the Department of External Affairs, with contract and class contributions components, was established in 1979 to encourage research and stimulate information activities in the arms control and disarmament field. The contributions component was restricted primarily to assisting groups to defray speakers expenses. The terms and conditions for contributions were expanded in 1982 to provide assistance to research and teaching facilities in Canada. In view of the Throne Speech, an increase in funds by \$312,000 this fiscal year and an additional \$100,000 annually in succeeding years, and an expansion of eligibility criteria through the establishment of a class grants component is being sought. The fund would thereby double from the present \$338,000 to \$650,000. The existing controls for class contributions will be applied to class grants to ensure that funding is only provided to ensure a balanced discussion of arms control and disarmament issues.

Part of the increase in the Fund will be allocated to the operational budget: (1) to facilitate the participation of representatives of NGOs or certain individuals at specific NGO/academic conferences relating to defence, arms control and disarmament issues and (2) to establish a publication series for relevant Government-funded research or studies in this field.

Two additional person-years (a financial clerk and a financial/programme administration officer) will be required to manage this expanded programme. The programme officer would be Secretary to the Disarmament

SECRET

Fund Grants and Contribution Committees and be responsible for liaison with other government departments or agencies which have potential funding in this field. The financial clerk would provide the necessary administrative support for this programme. Both positions would also provide assistance to the new verification programme.

Foreign Policy Implications and Priorities

The recent Throne Speech reaffirms the importance the Government attaches to arms control and disarmament policy and indicates the need to encourage public information/participation activities in this field. The actual growth of the Disarmament Fund will have impact both at the national and international level. Domestically, an increase in the Fund at this time would further heighten the Government's profile. The promotion of a balanced discussion of issues will also help to raise the general level of public consciousness and understanding in Canada of the complex issues involved and encourage greater private sector and academic involvement/participation in the discussion of the issues. At the international level, the increase will reaffirm Canadian commitment to the recommendations of the Final Document of the first United Nations Special Session on Disarmament.

Interdepartmental Consultations

The Department of National Defence and the Canadian International Development Agency have been informed of the proposed increase to the Disarmament Fund. Formal interdepartmental meetings are required to determine the role of other government departments and agencies which have provided funding to non-governmental organizations involved in arms control and disarmament issues. This will replace the present informal consultation process regarding contributions between the Department of External Affairs and other government departments and agencies (Departments of National Defence, Secretary of State, Employment & Immigration, CIDA, etc.) and ensure coordination of government efforts to promote a balanced consideration of security issues (defence, arms control and disarmament).

Financial Requirements

The following is a breakdown of the additional funds being sought for the Disarmament Fund (in inflated dollars):

(A) Present					
Disarmament					
Fund	FY83/84	FY84/85	FY85/86	FY86/87	FY87/88
Contributions	180,000	241,500	308,700	327,222	343,583
Contracts	<u>158,000</u>	<u>150,100</u>	<u>142,595</u>	<u>135,465</u>	<u>128,692</u>
Total	338,000	391,600	451,295	562,687	472,275

(B) <u>Disarmament</u>					
<u>Fund (NEW)</u>	FY83/84	FY84/85	FY85/86	FY86/87	FY87/88
Contributions:					
(i) assistance to NGOs	150,000	183,750	220,500	260,466	303,876
(ii) assistance to teaching & research facilities	200,000	236,250	275,625	318,347	364,652
Contracts	180,000	189,000	198,450	208,373	218,792
Grants	50,000	105,000	165,375	231,525	303,876
Operational Budget:					
(i) NGO Conference	20,000	21,000	22,050	23,153	24,311
(ii) publications	50,000	52,500	55,125	57,881	60,775
Total	* 650,000	787,500	937,125	1,099,745	1,276,282
(C) Person Years:					
programme support	-	1	1	1	1
	<u>.25</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	.25	2	2	2	2
(D) Operational Budget:					
Salaries	6,325	72,450	80,000	90,000	100,000
Capital	7,000	7,350	-	-	-
Total	13,325	79,800	80,000	90,000	100,000

Public Information Considerations

The announcement of the increase of the Disarmament Fund early in the next year (late January) will help to focus further attention on the Prime Minister's initiatives to ease East-West tensions. The announcement would re-emphasize Government commitment to public information/participation activities and assistance to teaching and research facilities in Canada and be a concrete example of the redoubled Canadian effort in the arms control and disarmament field.

\* FOOTNOTE

\* IN THIS FISCAL YEAR, THE \$312,000 BEING SOUGHT FOR THE DISARMAMENT FUND INCLUDES THE \$68,000 CARRIED FORWARD BY THE DEPARTMENT FROM THE 1982/83 INCREASE TO THE FUND WHICH WAS APPROVED BY THE POLICY COMMITTEE AT THE JULY 1982 AUCTION.

Security/Sécurité	UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	December 13, 1983
Number/Numéro	FPR-1192

TO/À FILE  
 FROM/DE FPR  
 REFERENCE RÉFÉRENCE  
 SUBJECT SUJET CTV National December 12 -  
 A.J. MacEachen visit to London

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

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CTV: External Affairs Minister, Allan MacEachen, told newsmen in London today that Prime Minister Trudeau's Peace Initiative had been given a distinct boost by NATO Foreign Ministers. MacEachen was on his way home from Brussels after a two-day NATO meeting. Prime Minister Trudeau takes his peace campaign to Washington on Thursday when he will meet with President Reagan.



D. Buckley-Jones  
 Deputy Director  
 Media Relations Division

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

*Mr. Smith*  
*Mr. Goppage* *mf*

TO  
À Under-Secretary of State for  
External Affairs, OTTAWA (IDDZ)

SECURITY  
Sécurité

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM  
De Canadian Ambassador, CARACAS.

DATE December 13, 1983.

REFERENCE  
Référence

NUMBER  
Numéro 166

SUBJECT  
Sujet Prime Minister's Peace Initiative

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA	
MISSION	

ENCLOSURES  
Annexes

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BY OTTAWA

EXTOTT/LSR  
(with attach.)

... You will be interested in the attached article by a leading Venezuelan journalist which appeared in El Diario yesterday. El Diario is one of three Spanish-language daily newspapers in Caracas.

2. Sr. Montiel Cupello telephoned the office a week or so earlier to say that his newspaper had seen quite a lot of wire service traffic on Mr. Trudeau's initiative and wanted to do a background piece. He came to the Embassy and met with our Public Affairs' officer who went over with him the published material that we had available here and provided additional background. The story is a sympathetic but not particularly optimistic treatment of the initiative and of Canada's previous efforts in this field.

3. Ambassador Francisco Paparoni, Director General for International Policy of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, referred to the article in complimentary terms when I met him yesterday during a courtesy call following the presentation of my credentials to President Herrera Friday last. He said that Canada could "count on Venezuela's moral support" in this initiative. This backing, of course, doesn't mean a great deal in practical terms, but at least is an indication of the high regard in which the Prime Minister is held by Ambassador Paparoni and, I am told, by many other Venezuelans.

*[Signature]*  
Ambassador.

Lunes 12 de diciembre de 1983

La tentativa del Primer Ministro de Canadá para evitar la hora nuclear

## Pierre Trudeau está empeñado en una misión mundial de paz

"Debemos reventarnos el alma para conseguir la paz". La frase fue pronunciada en el marco de la reunión cumbre de Williamburg, en mayo pasado. Su autoría corresponde al carismático y muchas veces controversial primer ministro de Canadá: Pierre Elliot Trudeau, el gobernante con más tiempo en el poder (15 años, salvo una breve interrupción entre 1979 y 1980) dentro del universo de los 16 países miembros de la Otan.

Trudeau no se quedó meramente en las palabras y, durante los últimos meses, ha desplegado una intensa actividad a favor de la paz internacional, amenazada por un clima de tensión belicista en ascenso.

En octubre último, el líder de Ottawa realizó una documentada intervención, durante una conferencia para el desarme realizada en su país. A principios de noviembre decidió ir más lejos y emprendió una sorpresiva gira relámpago de cuatro días a través de Alemania Federal, Italia, el Vaticano —encuentro con Juan Pablo II de por medio—, Francia, Bélgica, Holanda y Gran Bretaña. La diplomacia pacifista del dirigente canadiense no se detuvo ahí. A los pocos días arregló maletas una vez más, con destino a Japón y a la India, mientras en Nueva Delhi estaba reunida la Mancomunidad Británica.

A lo anterior se le suma el envío de mensajes a los líderes de Estados Unidos, China y Unión Soviética.


Según Trudeau, sus gestiones pacifistas no han sido otra cosa que una lucha para detener el tiempo, "cuando sólo faltan cinco minutos para que el reloj marque las doce de la noche antes del día fatídico".

### De Suez a 1983

A pesar del aparente "silencio" internacional de Canadá, un país del que a veces se tiene la impresión de que "no existe", Ottawa ha jugado un importante rol en la diplomacia mundial.

Yvon Langlois, primer secretario de la embajada canadiense en Caracas, precisa que Canadá fue el país pionero de las fuerzas de paz internacionales, iniciativa del ex premier Lester Pearson tras la guerra de los seis días, en 1967, entre árabes e israelíes, lo que más tarde le valió el Nobel de la Paz.

Aunque sin demasiadas esperanzas de lograr un acuerdo entre las superpotencias, Trudeau —siguiendo el ejemplo de anteriores estadistas de su país (como Lester Pearson, premio Nobel de la Paz)— viaja por el mundo en procura de una movilización occidental contra el riesgo de una guerra fatídica para la especie.



Primer ministro Trudeau: "En el mismo sendero pacifista que Lester Pearson, y quizás hacia el mismo premio."

Asimismo, el diplomático recuerda que Pearson (en 1956, cuando entonces era ministro de Relaciones Exteriores) intervino en la crisis de Suez como pacificador.

Por lo demás, Canadá mantiene una dinámica presencia en Naciones Unidas, en el Comité para el Desarme y en el diálogo Norte-Sur —donde ejerce la copresidencia—, así como participación en las fuerzas de paz de la ONU en el Líbano y Chipre. Langlois menciona igualmente los esfuerzos para conciliar la perenne enemistad entre Pakistán y la India.

Estos son los precedentes de las recientes giras de Trudeau, las cuales fueron definidas por Paul Majendie, corresponsal en Ottawa de la agencia noticiosa británica *Reuter*, como "la iniciativa diplomática más ambiciosa de Canadá, desde que Lester Pearson intervino en la crisis de Suez".

### Peregrinaje por la paz

En este contexto fue que Pierre Trudeau emprendió lo que ha definido como "un peregrinaje por la paz y el desarme", tendiente a encontrar un nuevo diálogo entre

Estados Unidos y la URSS.

El objetivo europeo de Trudeau consistió en encontrar un consenso entre sus aliados europeos de la Otan para lanzar un plan de paz. Para algunos analistas internacionales, el viaje de Trudeau constituyó una reminiscencia de las actividades de Henry Kissinger en el mismo sentido, durante los años setenta.

No obstante, el diplomático canadiense se apresura a aclarar que, más que una *detente* (que para algunos sectores norteamericanos significó una ventaja militar por parte de los soviéticos) los fines que perseguía el Primer Ministro eran los de un mayor equilibrio entre ambos bandos.

Así, la iniciativa de Ottawa fue acogida en forma favorable pero discreta, en las capitales europeas occidentales.

El canciller belga Leo Tindemans la calificó como "excelente".

Por otra parte la revista *Maclean's* (la *Time* canadiense) si bien indicó que el Mandatario se había "desempeñado energicamente en su misión", comentó también que, "los anfitriones de Trudeau no dieron indicación de hacer otra cosa que brindarle una audiencia cortés". La prensa europea no prestó mayor atención a la presencia de Trudeau.

Al regresar a Canadá, el Primer ministro esbozó una estrategia pacifista de cinco puntos, resumida así:

1) un encuentro el próximo año entre los cinco poderes nucleares: EE.UU., URSS, China, Francia y Gran Bretaña, para lograr un límite global de los arsenales nucleares;

2) reforzar el tratado de no proliferación nuclear, tanto de los que tienen armas nucleares como de aquellos que no las tienen;

3) aumentar las fuerzas convencionales de Occidente al mismo nivel que el del Pacto de Varsovia, aunque la solución última debe ser reducir las al mínimo posible, por parte de todos;

4) seguir el "plan de asfixia" de los armamentos nucleares propuesto por la ONU en 1978, así como anular las tecnologías que apuntan al diseño de armas exterminadoras más sofisticadas que las actuales. Este punto también contempla prohibir la puesta en funcionamiento de sistemas antisatélites, limitar la movilidad excesiva de misiles antinucleares y lograr que sean eficaces los sistemas de inspección de las reducciones.

(El diplomático canadiense citado señala sobre esto último, que la URSS pone obstáculos en cuanto a la inspección detallada

de sus armamentos, cuando se trata de verificar una reducción);  
5) proponer a los países con armas nucleares la estrategia de Ottawa.

### Paradojas

Pero las buenas intenciones de Trudeau están rodeadas de varias paradojas y contradicciones.

Un diplomático germanofederal, citado anónimamente por *Maclean's*, dijo, al respecto, que "todo el mundo aprecia a un pacificador. La pregunta es si están dispuestos a considerar sus palabras".

Es de observar que el mismo mes en que Trudeau, por un lado, recorrió Bonn, Roma, el Vaticano, París, Bruselas, La Haya, Londres, Tokio y Nueva Delhi, por el otro Estados Unidos, Gran Bretaña, Alemania Federal e Italia comenzaron a instalar los primeros euromisiles nucleares en Europa Occidental.

Entretanto, la URSS respondió retirándose de las respectivas conversaciones en Ginebra y amenazando con desplegar armas atómicas en varios continentes.

Lo que resta alguna autoridad moral a Ottawa, sin embargo, es el visto bueno del gobierno de Trudeau a que la Otan experimente los euromisiles en el congelado territorio norte de Canadá, durante este invierno.

La agencia *Reuters*, por su lado, analiza que "con Washington en desconfianza y Moscú en silencio, Trudeau enfrenta una gigantesca tarea para detener la carrera armamentista, con su cruzada de un 'solo hombre por la paz' alrededor del mundo".

Sin embargo, ya el presidente Ronald Reagan le ha enviado una carta y está previsto un encuentro entre ambos.

Por el momento, la propuesta de Pierre Trudeau sigue en pie. Sus palabras de que "sólo faltan cinco minutos para que el reloj marque las doce de la noche antes del día fatídico" puede que sean sólo una metáfora, pero la verdad es que sólo faltan algunos días para que arribemos al fatal 1984 presagio por George Orwell, al tiempo que el planeta se encuentra en una situación que ha movido al Premier de Canadá a esta ref001791

Gregorio Montiel Cupello

## Mundialito de Tenis Ruah y Mazzotta pasaron a los octavos de final

El venezolano se impuso en un electrizante partido al número tres de Europa, el italiano Máximo Arvinghi. Otro triunfo fue el de la criolla Melissa Mazzotta.



Hoy comienzan los octavos de final.

El venezolano Maurice Ruah, en la categoría de 12 años, superó ayer en un interesante y dramático partido al italiano Máximo Arvinghi, quien es el número tres de Europa en la categoría, en tres sets con scores de 6/3, 4/6 y 6/4. De esta manera Ruah clasificó a los octavos de final del V Campeonato Internacional de Tenis Infantil que tiene lugar en el Altamira Tennis Club, cuyos octavos de final comenzarán hoy.

Por su parte, la campeona mundial la criolla Melissa Mazzotta se impuso sobre la guadalupeña. Florence Moser 6/2 y 6/1. En otros resultados, el criollo Charlie Balayla venció al peruano Luis Corneji 6/3 y 6/1. Otro triunfo, Javier Brandán cayó ante el guatemalteco Fernando Samayola 6/0 y 6/0, en tanto que otro seleccio-

nado nacional, Abraham Levy también ganaba al español Ignacio Martí con parciales de 6/4, 3/6 y 6/4. El criollo Dan Levy no tuvo suerte y fue derrotado por el paraguayo R. Alvarenga 6/1 y 6/3.

El favorito del torneo Jared Palmer, de Estados Unidos, dio cuenta del argentino Martín Stringari 6/1 y 6/0. El estadounidense Friz Visell superó a Dron Guerdel, de Israel, 6/0 y 6/3. Gabriel Gramática, de Argentina, hizo otro tanto con el español José Luis Pérez 6/3 y 6/3. La chiquilla de la República Democrática Hiram Silfa venció a Alfredo Galarraga, de Perú, 5/7, 6/2 y 7/5. Marcos Barboza, de Brasil derrotó al guatemalteco Jacobo Chávez.

Marisol Decarli R.

## Intercontinental de Clubes Gremio se tituló por 2 goles de Renato

El puntero derecho Renato, considerado la máxima esperanza de la nueva promoción de futbolistas brasileños, condujo al Gremio de Porto Alegre a una victoria por 2-1 sobre el Hamburgo, de Alemania Occidental, para que su equipo se titulara ayer campeón intercontinental de clubes.

Renato, puntero derecho, fue el autor de las dos conquistas en un encuentro que se decidió en tiempo extraordinario, luego de un empate 1-1 al finalizar los 90 minutos reglamentarios.

Gremio se clasificó este año campeón de la Copa

Libertadores de América, dejando en el camino a Peñarol, de Uruguay, mientras que el Hamburgo es el campeón europeo tras haber eliminado en mayo al Juventus, de Italia.

Los dos equipos jugaron ante 62.000 espectadores en el estadio nacional de Tokio la Copa Intercontinental, reconocida extraoficialmente como la final del campeonato mundial interclubes.

La victoria hizo del club de Porto Alegre el cuarto equipo latinoamericano que gana esta copa desde que el torneo se trasladó a Tokio en 1980. (UPI).

## El Cuarto Maratón de Caracas tuvo lugar ayer Miguel Hernández se tituló por 2a. vez

El venezolano Miguel Hernández se tituló por segunda vez consecutiva ganador absoluto del cuarto Maratón de Caracas, que tuvo lugar ayer, al parar el cronómetro en 2 horas 22 minutos, mejorando su propio record en la historia de la prueba capitalina. El anterior registro lo agenció Hernández el año pasado con 2.22.28.


La categoría libre, donde ganó Hernández, ubicó en el segundo puesto a José Zapata con 2.23.52. En el tercero, Luis Rudas, con 2.25.48 y a Juan Silva en el cuarto con 2.25.54.

### Las otras categorías

General femenino: Karen McHang, 3.05.07; Adriana Marchena, 3.14.00 (es la primera vez que corre esta distancia); Carmen Padrino, 3.16.59.

Submaster masculino: Juan Chávez, 2.31.10;

Con la concurrencia de mil quinientos participantes se realizó la prueba que anualmente auspicia la Cámara Venezolana de Fabricantes de Cerveza. El campeón mejoró su propia marca que implantó el año pasado.



La prueba cerró el calendario de la Federación Internacional de Atletismo por este año.

Leopoldo Malavé, 2.36.09; Francisco Pescé, 2.44.06; Oscar Rondón, 2.38.11; Rubén Rodríguez, 2.47.21; Master "A" masculino: Miguel Carpio, 2.56.39.

Submaster "A" masculino: Nelson Barre 2.50.47; José Blanc 2.52.16; Miguel Araque 2.56.04.

Submaster "E" masculino: Antonio Bigo 2.49.59; Eduardo Maricelles, 2.50.49; Augusto Domínguez, 2.51.26.

Master "B" masculino: Alberto Darrocha, 2.56.53. Master "C" masculino: Pedro Flores, 3.02.38.

La prueba comenzó en el Zoológico de Caricuao y culminó en Los Próceres con ella se cierra el calendario de la Federación Internacional de Atletismo por este año.

Concurrieron a la maratón mil quinientos corredores y es la única distancia olímpica en este tipo de carreras de fondo que se celebra en el país. La justa auspiciada anualmente por la Cámara Venezolana de Fabricantes de Cerveza.

Marisol Decarli

## El mejor interés...



## ...desde su casa u oficina

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VEA HOY



Circula todos los miércoles  
MARIO  
ALVARO

*file*

Department of External Affairs



Canada

Ministère des Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA, ONTARIO

K1A 0G2

December 13, 1983.

IDDZ-0235

Dr. Douglas A. Ross  
Research Associate, Institute of  
International Relations  
Professor Of Political Science  
University of British Columbia  
2075 Westbrook Mail  
Vancouver, B.C.  
V6T 1W5

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace  
Mission  
4-

Dear Mr. Ross:

Permit me to thank you for your letter of November 20 and your thoughts on US plans and programs related to space-based military technology.

I am not sure that I agree entirely with your views on the matter. While there may be many in the US Administration who strongly favor developments in this field, others in Congress and in the Administration (including, as you note, the President and the Secretary of Defence) are equally committed to arms control policies which would discourage "the militarization of space". Nor do I believe that the obstacles to an ASAT ban are as insurmountable as you suggest. Certainly, the Prime Minister would not have proposed such a ban in the context of his Initiative were he not reasonably confident that it had a chance of success.

Thank you for taking the time to write on this most important question.

*Louis A. Delvoie*

Louis A. Delvoie

Chairman

Task Force Working Group

Dr. Douglas A. Ross,  
Research Associate, Institute of  
International Relations,  
Professor of Political Science,  
University of British Columbia,  
20 November 1983

M. Louis Delvoie,  
Director General,  
Bureau of International Security Affairs,  
Department of External Affairs,  
Pearson Building,  
Ottawa, K1A 0G2

Dear M. Delvoie:

Please find <sup>under separate cover</sup> ~~enclosed~~ a copy of my impressions of the Americas Society conference of Thursday Nov. 17--to which you directed some comments at the CCACD luncheon last Friday. Your concern over the report of that conference by Hal Jones was altogether appropriate. Indeed, I was prompted to write to you by deep misgivings generated both by the nature of the American comments at that meeting and the apparent direction of the current Canadian diplomatic initiative.

The thrust of Canadian and American policies on the military uses of space are quite clearly antagonistic--as exemplified by Canadian frustrations in recent years in promoting an ASAT ban. Just how antagonistic this particular aspect of the Canadian-American relationship could become is necessarily speculative. But I strongly urge that the current Canadian initiative be modified to some extent to accommodate--even if only publicly--some of the broader demands of the most conservative elements of the Washington national security community.

As you indicated last Friday, it seems quite likely that U.S. policy concerning the militarization of space is internally divided and not yet fully resolved. Caution is in order even though the President and Secretary Weinberger did not articulate any overt hostility to the Canadian initiative. Their apparent passivity or indifference may be politically calculated, and may not truly reflect the emerging reality of U.S. space policy. High-level reluctance to take an activist line on space weaponry may stem more from the perceived need to reserve Presidential options prior to the electoral race next year. It is entirely possible--and I think probable--that any expressions of polite interest from the President masked some deeply felt reservations concerning the initiative. There is a substantial accumulated momentum behind the Pentagon's drive towards an ASAT prototype and deployment, and more provocatively, towards some system of Space-Based Ballistic Missile Defence (SBBMD). I have also enclosed a rough draft of a paper on the implications of SBBMD that I presented this past Saturday at York University.

I have some further ideas on how Canadian policy might be adjusted to partially accommodate extremist elements within and outside the U.S. policy process and would be happy to discuss them with you by telephone. Unfortunately, most of them involve increased defence spending. But they are calculated to avoid compromising the basic thrust of the current Trudeau initiative--a mission, as I understand it, which seeks to restore a meaningful dialogue among the nuclear powers and an international political climate conducive to eventual arms control agreements.

In his speech last Thursday, M. Blais spoke of a Canadian willingness to co-operate in Space-Based surveillance systems, but he categorically rejected co-operation in any measures which entailed--to use his words--"the defilement of space." This comment came towards the very end of a conventionally platitudinous luncheon address. There was a very tense (I am tempted to say stunned) silence after the Minister's use of this phrase.

SBBMD and ABM technologies generally have become a top priority to some of the most militant elements of the Administration--as well as to a still thriving if not growing community of extra-governmental anti-communist zealots. Defensive technologies are seen by such people to be the wave of the future, and more importantly, to constitute a dimension of the arms race where the United States enjoys a substantial and perhaps decisive edge over the Soviet Union. Given this perception, demonstrable success on the part of our Prime Minister in promoting an agreement banning SBBMD (or ASAT technologies) may provoke deep hostility--both within and outside the government. With respect to this latter possibility, and particularly in the event that the Prime Minister's initiative begins to gain public momentum, I most strongly urge you to do whatever is possible to enhance the security surrounding the Prime Minister for the duration of his present trip--and even after his return to Ottawa. Extra-governmental extremist elements may feel that their interests are being severely jeopardized (particularly if they begin to feel that Reagan and Weinberger are also beginning to waver on BMD). Until such time as the Canadian initiative is modified to partially placate some of these extremist elements ( I recognize that it may be impossible to mollify them) I would say that extra-ordinary security precautions are very much in order. You may consider present arrangements to be adequate, and perhaps they are--but at the very least I would think that you would be doing the Prime Minister a service if you suggested to him that the gravity of the situation warranted leaving his sons at home. The very fact that Justin is accompanying his father seemed to me to reflect a lack of understanding on the part of both the Prime Minister and his advisers of just how serious and even nasty this whole affair could become.

It is precisely because the space weapons ban has such potential for damaging the President's re-election prospects (the High Frontier scheme could play a major role next year) that the risks are so high. In terms of cultivating a basis for nuclear power agreement this area of discussion clearly holds great, if not the greatest potential. It should be pursued. In the event that the Prime Minister's initiative does begin to gain momentum, please do not underestimate the gravity of the stakes involved--especially the stakes as perceived by extremist elements in U.S. society.

In sum, I hope you will accept these remarks as a seriously concerned but dispassionate comment on the prospects and risks inherent in the Prime Minister's venture. I will send additional comments and policy recommendations as I am able to do so. Unfortunately my end-of-term educational duties are particularly onerous at this point. The very best of luck to your team and to the Prime Minister in this terribly important and timely endeavour.

Yours truly,

Douglas A. Ross

Tel. : Home 604-731-7437  
Off. 604-228-6595

Division Phoned \_\_\_\_\_  
Person \_\_\_\_\_  
Local Time \_\_\_\_\_

*M/S*

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---INITIATIVE DU PM-POSITION FRANCAISE

REPONSE A PREMIERE QUESTION QUE VOUS SOULEVEZ DECOULE DE  
DISTINCTION QUI EST FAITE, D UN POINT DE VUE FRANCAIS, ENTRE  
ANALYSE D UNE SITUATION ET POSITION OU COMPORTEMENT A ADOPTER  
CONSEQUENTEMENT. PRINCIPAUX DIRIGEANTS FRANCAIS, DE MITTERRAND A  
HERNU EN PASSANT PAR CHEYSSON ET MAUROY, SONT EFFECTIVEMENT  
UNANIMES A QUALIFIER SITUATION ACTUELLE DE DIFFICILE ET CRITIQUE,  
DE MEME QU A EXEMPLIFIER CET ETAT DE CHOSES EN FAISANT REFERENCE  
AUX CRISES DE CUBA ET BERLIN. RAPPELONS CEPENDANT QUE ESSENTIEL  
DE ANALYSE FRANCAISE REPOSE SUR DISTINCTION FONDAMENTALE ENTRE  
CAUSES SUPERFICIELLES ET RAISONS PROFONDES. OR, CE QUI IMPORTE  
POUR LA FRANCE, C EST PRECISEMENT DE NE PAS ADOPTER UN COMPORTEMENT  
QUI S ATTACHERAIT AUX SEULES MANIFESTATIONS SUPERFICIELLES DE  
LA CIT CRISE FINCIT.

2. SITUATION ACTUELLE N EST DONC PAS RECENTE ET EN FAIT CORRESPOND  
DEPUIS DERNIERS MOIS A STRATEGIE DE PRESSION EXERCEE PAR URSS  
SUR PAYS EUROPEENS ET OCCIDENTAUX. PACIFISME ET CESSATION DES NEGS

...2

PAGE DEUX WIGR5512 CONFD ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT  
SUR FNI PARTICIPENT NOTAMMENT DE CETTE STRATEGIE QUI VISE A  
PRESSURISER OPINIONS PUBLIQUES ET POLITIQUES OCCIDENTALES, EN  
FAISANT APPEL AU SPECTRE DU DESASTRE NUCLEAIRE ET DE LA PEUR.  
OR, C EST PRECISEMENT A CELA QU IL FAUT ECHAPPER EN EVITANT  
TOUTE DRAMATISATION; D OU, UN SECOND NIVEAU D ANALYSE PORTANT  
SUR RAISONS PROFONDES DE SITUATION ACTUELLE, REMONTANT PLUS  
LOIN DANS LE TEMPS ET FAISANT APPEL A UN INVENTAIRE PLUS GLOBAL  
DES RAPPORTS EST/OUEST.

3. CETTE ANALYSE DEMONTRE QU EN DEPIT DE LA RHETORIQUE, EST ET  
OUEST NE VIVENT PAS EN VASES CLOS ET QU IL Y A MALGRE TOUT UNE  
POURSUITE DES RELATIONS. CELA DIT, FRANCE TEND CEPENDANT A IMPUTER  
A URSS RESPONSABILITE DE S ETRF ELLE-MEME ENFERMEE DANS UNE  
POSITION INSOUTENABLE, PAR AUTO-INTOXICATION, ET QUI,  
PAR EXEMPLE, NE LUI LAISSAIT D AUTRES CHOIX QUE DE SE RETIRER  
DES FNI. POUR LA FRANCE, IL N APPARTIENT PAS A OCCIDENT, PAR LA  
VOIE DE NOUVELLES CONCESSIONS, DE SORTIR URSS DU BOURBIER DANS  
LEQUEL ELLE S EST ELLE-MEME ENFONCEE. DE NOUVELLES CONCESSIONS  
OCCIDENTALES SE FERAIENT AUX DEPENS D UN EQUILIBRE ESSENTIEL  
DES FORCES EN PRESENCE ET QUI SEUL GARANTIT PAIX MONDIALE (NON-  
DEPLOIEMENT DES GLCM/P-II OU PRISE EN COMPTE DU DISPOSITIFS  
FRANCAIS SONT DES EXEMPLES DE CONCESSIONS A RISQUES SUSCEPTIBLES  
DE SORTIR URSS DE SON IMPASSE).

...3

PAGE TROIS WIGR5512 CONFD ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

4.SITUATION ACTUELLE EST MAUVAISE.C EST LA PIRE AUX YEUX DES DIRIGEANTS FRANCAIS DEPUIS CUBA/BERLIN.MAIS LA REACTION QU'ELLE COMMANDE EN EST UNE DE FERMETE QUI NE DOIT PAS ETRE SUGGEREE PAR SES EXPRESSIONS RECENTES ET SUPERFICIELLES QUI PRECISEMENT PORTENT A DRAMATISATION,IE PRECISEMENT EFFET ESCOMPTE PAR URSS. LA GUERRE N EST PAS POUR DEMAIN ET C EST LA PRECISEMENT DEMONSTRATION FAITE PAR ANDREANI,A L'IMAGE DU PRES MITTERRAND, DANS ANALYSE QUE RAPPORTIONS DANS NOTRE TEL 5466.PROPOS TENUS A BRU PAR SEC D ETAT SHULTZ A L'EFFET QUE C'EST MOYENS DE COMMUNICATION ENTRE EUA/URSS NE FAISAIENT NULLEMENT DEFAUT FINCI TENDENT D'AILLEURS A CONFORTER CETTE ANALYSE.

5.CECI NOUS AMENE A CONSTATER QU'IL NE FAUT PAS RESUMER UNE SITUATION A LA QUALIFICATION QU'ON LUI ATTRIBUE.EN CE SENS, DECLARATION DE MITTERRAND DU 16NOV A TELE FRANCAISE ET COMMENTAIRES DU QUAI (ANDREANI) SONT,A NOTRE AVIS,SUR MEME LONGUEUR D ONDES.

6.DEUXIEMEMENT,CONCERNANT RENCONTRE KOHL/MITTERRAND,AVONS REVISE AVEC SOIN TEXTE INTEGRAL TANT DU TOAST DU 24NOV QUE DE CONFERENCE DE PRESSE DU 25NOV.SI REFERENCE EST FAITE A INITIATIVE DU PM CDN,C EST INDENIABLEMENT PAR VOIE D ALLUSIONS INDIRECTES.

7.PRES FRANCAIS A D'ABORD CONFIRME,DANS SA CONFERENCE DE PRESSE,

...4

PAGE QUATRE WIGR5512 CONFD ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT  
SURTOUT DIFFERENCE DE CONCEPTION CONCERNANT FUROMISSILES  
AVEC SON HOMOLOGUE ALLEMAND. COLLEGUES DE BONN RECONNAITRONT  
SANS DOUTE AVEC NOUS QUE CECI DECOULE ESSENTIELLEMENT D UNE  
DIFFERENCE QUANT AUX ENJEUX RESPECTIFS EN CAUSE. SI SS-20  
CONSTITUENT MENACE IMMEDIATE POUR RFA, DISPOSITIF NUCLEAIRE  
FRANCAIS, VOIR MEME SA POLITIQUE DE DEFENSE DU TERRITOIRE NTL,  
L EST TOUT AUTANT PUISQUE DANS LE CAS OU FRONTIERES FRANCAISES  
SERAIENT MENACEES, LEUR DEFENSE NE S EFFECTUERA  
PAS SUR SON TERRITOIRE. OR FORCE NUCLEAIRE FRANCAISE EST D ABORD  
UN DISPOSITIF REpondant A SES PROPRES FINS ET NON A CELLES DE  
OTAN OU DE RFA.

8. C EST SANS DOUTE CE POURQUOI PRES FRANCAIS A INDIQUE DANS SA  
CONFERENCE DE PRESSE CIT JE N ENTENDS PAS ME SUBSTITUER AUX  
DIVERSES AUTORITES POLITIQUES DES PAYS AMIS. JE NE LEUR DONNE  
PAS DE CONSEILS. J EXPRIME MA CONVICTON. JE NE SUIS PAS PLUS PRES  
DU CHANCELIER KOHL OU DE MME THATCHER QUE DE M. UNTEL OU DE MME  
UNTEL. J AI AU NOM DE LA FRANCE A EXAMINER DES PROBLEMES QUI NOUS  
UNISSENT A LA RFA. JE SUIS D ABORD PROCHE DE MES PROPRES  
CONVICTIONS, SI JE PUIS DIRE. FINCIT.

9. CONCERNANT ROLE EVENTUEL DE MEDIATION ENTRE EST/OUEST, PRES  
FRANCAIS A REpondU A CETTE MEME CONFERENCE DE PRESSE: CIT JE N AI  
JAMAIS PROPOSE MA MEDIATION FINCIT. QUANT AUX CIT INITIATIVES QUE  
...5

PAGE CINQ WIGR5512 CONFD ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

POURRAIENT PRENDRE LA FRANCE POUR PERMETTRE AUX NEGOCIATIONS DE REPENDRE SANS VOULOIR ALLER PLUS VITE QUE LA MUSIQUE, EST-CE QUE L'ORCHESTRE VA JOUER PRESTO OU MODERATO FINCIT, PRES A REPONDU CIT L'ESSENTIEL EST QU'IL NE SE TROMPE PAS D'INSTRUMENT FINCIT. SUR CDE, PRES A AJOUTE CIT SANS AUCUN DOUTE C'EST UN DES BONS MOYENS FINCIT.

10. REVENANT AU TOAST, AVONS NETTE IMPRESSION QUE DIVERGENCE A LAQUELLE S'EST ATTACHE PRES FRANCAIS, CONCERNAIT ENGAGEMENT ACCRU DE LA FRANCE A DEFENSE DE RFA. RECONNAITREZ ICI CETTE CONSTANTE DE POSITION FRANCAISE QUI N'ENTEND PAS SE SUBSTITUER AU PARAPLUIE NUCLEAIRE AMERICAIN ET ACCROITRE PORTEE DE SA DISSUASION AU CONTINENT EUROPEEN. POLITIQUE EUROPEENNE DE DEFENSE PASSE PAR UNE VOLONTE POLITIQUE TOUJOURS A REALISER, MAIS AUSSI ET PEUT-ETRE, DANS UN PREMIER TEMPS, PAR UNE COLLABORATION ACCRUE EN TERME DE PRODUCTION CONJOINTE DE MATERIEL MILITAIRE. BREF, N'AVONS PAS RETROUVE DANS CE TOAST EXPRESSION DE PREOCCUPATIONS PERTINENTES A INITIATIVE DU PM.

11. TROISIEMEMENT, CONCERNANT CONFERENCE DES CINQ PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES, VOYONS DIFFICILEMENT A PRIME ABORD QUELLE POURRAIT ETRE APPROCHE, MEME DERIVEE, QU'AURAIT PU EVOQUER MITTERAND A BONN EN RAISON DE FERMETE DES CONDITIONS PREALABLES A SA PARTICIPATION QUI ONT DEJA ETE POSEES ET REITEREES. RAPPELLERONS

...6

PAGE SIX WIGR5512 CONFD ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

A CE CHAPITRE CRAINTE SOULIGNEE PAR ANDREANI A PROPOS DE FORMULE CDNNE ACTUELLE A SAVOIR QUE CES MEMES CONDITIONS, POSEES PAR FRANCE POUR SA PARTICIPATION, NE DEVIENNENT, DANS SITUATION ACTUELLE, ET MEME SI ELLE S ASSOCIAIT A UNE TELLE RENCONTRE, L OBJET MEME DUNE CONFERENCE DES CINQ NUCLEAIRES. DES PAS DOIVENT DONC ETRE ACCOMPLIS AU PREALABLE ET DES REDUCTIONS OU ECARTS DIMINUES SENSIBLEMENT SANS QU IL NE SOIT POUR AUTANT QUESTION DE PROPORTIONS PRECISES. S IL DEVAIT Y AVOIR UNE FORMULE ACCEPTABLE A LA FRANCE, FORMULE NE SAURAIT ETRE PREJUDICIABLE A EXISTENCE DE FORCE NUCLEAIRE FRANCAISE ET LA PLACER SUR MEME PIED QUE CELLES DES FUA/URSS DANS LA MESURE OU RAPPORT ACTUEL DEMESURE PERSISTE. CECI, VOUS LE COMPRENDREZ, LAISSE PEU DE PLACE POUR DES SOLUTIONS MEDIANES.

12. QUE LE PRES MITTERRAND AIT EN POCHE DES CIT INITIATIVES FINCIT CELA N A RIEN D ETONNANT ET CONSTITUAIT D AILLEURS CONCLUSION ET IMPRESSION FINALE DE NOTRE TEL 5327 17NOV. QUANT A FORME DE CES INITIATIVES, ELLE DEVRA SE SITUER A L INTERIEUR DE MARGE DE MANOEUVRE QUI EST SIENNE ET QUE DECRIVIONS DANS NOTRE TEL 5487 07DEC. NOTRE PRINCIPALE HYPOTHESE A CE STADE-CI, ET MEME SI PRES A REFUSE D ANTICIPER UN ROLE DE MEDIATION, SERAIT DANS LE SENS DE FAVORISER UNE REPRISE DU DIALOGUE FUA/URSS DANS CADRE DES NEGS DE GENEV. COMMENT? CELA RESTE A DEFINIR ET ...?

PAGE SEPT WIGR5512 CONF D ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT  
SOMMES ASSURES QUE NOS INTERLOCUTEURS SERONT PEU BAVARDS A  
CE PROPOS POUR MENAGER IMPACT ET CREDIBILITE DE TOUTE  
INITIATIVE.MAIS CONSTATONS QU A CET EGARD,FRANCE N A RIEN A  
Y PERDRE D AUTANT QU ELLE S EST MONTREE CONSTAMMENT  
INTRANSIGEANTE SUR NON PRISE EN COMPTE DE SON DISPOSITIF NUCLEAIRE  
ET QU IL S AGIRAIT D UNE REPRISE DE NEGS BILATERALES DONT ELLE  
N EST PAS PARTIE.CELA EST MESSAGE CLAIR DES DERNIERS MOIS TANT A  
MOSCO QU A WSHDC.PAR AILLEURS,CONSTATONS EGALEMENT QUE DANS  
ANALYSE FRANCAISE AMELIORATION DES RELATIONS EST/OUEST N EST  
PAS EXCLUSIVEMENT DEPENDANTE DE DISCUSSIONS DE NATURE STRATEGIQUE  
ET MILITAIRE.DANS SON ANALYSE,POURSUITE DE RELATIONS CULTURELLES/  
SCIENTIFIQUES/TECHNIQUES/COMMERCIALES SONT PRECISEMENT CE QUI,  
A CE JOUR,PERMET D AFFIRMER QU UN CERTAIN DIALOGUE CONTINU DE  
MEME QUE DE FOURNIR DES AIRES DE DETENTE ET DE RAPPROCHEMENT  
POSSIBLE.CETTE SECONDE VOIE/APPROCHE,VOUS LE COMPRENDREZ,REPOND  
A CETTE TRADITIONNELLE GLOBALISATION DE POLITIQUE EXTERIEURE  
FRANCAISE.DE MEME QUA CETTE ESSENTIELLE MISE EN PERSPECTIVE DES  
RAPPORTS.

13.CONSTATONS ENFIN QUE PROPOS RECUEILLIS PAR MIN BUSSIERE A  
BAIRS,AUPRES DU PM MAUROY,CONSTITUENT MEILLEURE SYNTHESE QUE  
PUISSIONS FAIRE POUR L HEURE DE POSITION FRANCAISE CONCERNANT  
INITIATIVE DU PM.A NOTRE AVIS,SI LA POSITION FRANCAISE EST  
PRUDENTE,ELLE EST NEANMOINS POSITIVE ET ATTENTIVE.IL IMPORTE

...8

PAGE HUIT WIGR5512 CONFD ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT  
TOUTEFOIS DE GARDER EN MEMOIRE CE QUE FRANCE PEUT ET NE PEUT  
PAS FAIRE, FORT DES CONTRAINTES ET PRINCIPES QUI SONT SIENS.  
CET INTERET ET CETTE ATTENTION PARTICULIERE PORTEE A INITIATIVE  
CDNE NOUS APPARAISSENT POUR L HEURE DES RESULTATS EMINEMMENT  
PRECIEUX QUIL NE FAUDRAIT PAS MINIMISER FAUTF DUN APPUI PLUS  
EXPLICITE.

CCC/074 131548Z WIGR5512

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

MF  
RD

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE BONN ZQGR4134 13DEC83

A EXTOTT (IDDZ

INFO PARIS PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/PPP BNATO LDN BRU WSHDC

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDR IDA RCR

REF VOTRETEL IDDZ0269 09DEC NOSTELS ZQGR4119 02DEC ZQGR4017 29NOV

---INITIATIVE DU PM-VUES ALLEMANDES

AVONS REVU COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE KOHL-MITTERAND 25NOV83 ET

CONTACTE AGENCE DE PRESSE MAIS N AVONS DECOUVERT AUCUNE

ANALOGIE A INITIATIVE PM.TEL QU INDIQUE DANS NOTRETEL 4017

DU 29NOV, IL Y EUT APPEL A RFLANCE DU DIALOGUE EST-OUEST AVEC

ENGAGEMENT PERSONNEL KOHL ET MITTERAND MAIS AUCUNME REFERENCE

A CONF DES 5 PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES NE FUT FAITE.

2.AVONS AUSSI REPRIS CONTACT AVEC NOS INTERLOCUTEURS TANT

AU MAI QU A CHANCELLERIE AFIN DE VERIFIER SI INITIATIVE DU PM

FUT EFFECTIVEMENT DISCUTEE ENTRE KOHL ET MITTERAND.MAE

NOUS RECONFIRME DE NE PAS AVOIS RECU INFO A CET EFFET.

VERIFICATION FAITE,NEUER,DIRECTEUR EUROPE A CHANCELLERIE,

QUI A COUVERT PERSONNELLEMENT 42E CONSULTATIONS FRANCI-ALLEMANDES

ET QUI A ACCOMPAGNE KOHL A ATHENES(SOMMET CEE),NOUS A DIT QU SA

CONNAISSANCE IL N Y A PAS/PAS EU DISCUSSION DIRECTE D INITIATVE

PM TRUDEAU NI A BONN NI A ATHENES NEUER A VERIFIE SES DOSSIFRS

A NOTRE DEMANDE MAIS N A RETROUVE AUCUNE ALLUSION A TELLE DISCUSSION.

3.A NOTRE AVIS,POSITION DE RFA TELLE QUE DECRITE DANS

...2

PAGE DEUX ZQGR4134 CONFD

NOTRETEL 4119 02DEC DEMEURE VALABLE. IL Y A CEPENDANT  
LIEU D AJOUTER DEVELOPPEMENT RECENT SUR SCENE PUBLIQUE:  
DANS DISCOURS IMPORTANT 12DEC DEVANT TOUTES LES GRANDES  
PERSONNALITES DE CDU (CONSIDERE COMME MINI-CONVENTION DE CDU), KOHL  
A DIT CIT IDEF D UNE CONFERENCE DES 5/5 PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES EST  
DIGNE DE CONSIDERATION A PM TRUDEAU. KOHL DANS SES DISCOURSE RECENTS  
SUR RELATIONS EST-OUEST MAINTIENT SON APPEL A URSS POUR REPRISE  
DIALOGUE ET CELA DANS TOUS LES FORA POSSIBLES (ING, START, MBFR,  
CONF DE STOCKHOLM ET SOMMET REAGAN-ANDSOPOW). PERCEVONS APPUI  
PUBLIC DE KOHL A CONFERENCE DES 5/5 PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES, DANS  
CONTEXTE D UNE ALTERNATIVE ADDITIONNELLE VISANT UNE REPRISE  
DIALOGUE EST-OUEST. (VOUS FERONS TENIR TRADUCTION D EXTRAIT  
D DISCOURSE 12DEC83).

CCC/005 141038Z ZQGR4134

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE BUCST UYGR3123 13DEC83

A EXTOTT RBR

INFO LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU  
HAGUE WSHDC MOSCO BNATO GENEV WSAW BPEST PRGUE BGRAD STKHM VIENN  
PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CIS/ADMPOL/CPD/DGIS PRMNY VMBFR  
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RBD FPR IDD IDR IDA IDDZ RBRD  
IDX ZSP ZSI

REF NOTRETEL UYGR3105 07DEC

---VISITE BERLINGUER:CEAUSESCU ET TRUDEAU

ENRICO BERLINGUER, SECRETAIRE GENERAL DU PARTI COMMUNISTE ITALIEN  
A VISITE BUCST DU 9 AU 12DEC. IL SEST ENTRETENU AVEC CEAUSESCU DE  
DIVERSES QUESTIONS (RAPPORTS ENTRE PARTIS, CONFLITS REGIONAUX,  
CRISE ECONOMIQUE ET FINANCIERE, TAUX D INTERETS, ETC) MAIS  
PRINCIPALEMENT DE TENSION EN EUROPE SUITE A LA CRISE SUSCITEE PAR  
DEPLOIEMENT DES MISSILES NUCLEAIRES A MOYENNE PORTEE. AMBASSADEUR  
D ITALIE, QUI A RENCONTRE BERLINGUER APRES CONCLUSION DES ENTRETIENS  
AVEC PRESIDENT MA DIT QUE CE DERNIER AVAIT FAIT UN ELOGE APPUYE DU  
PM TRUDEAU A BERLINGUER. NON SEULEMENT PLUSIEURS ELEMENTS D  
INITIATIVE DU PM CORRESPONDRAIENT D ASSEZ PRES A SES PROPRES VUES  
MAIS IL JUGAIT AUSSI QUE PM TRUDEAU ETAIT UN CIT HOMME RAISONNABLE  
FINCIT ET CIT QUI AVAIT LE SENS DES RESPONSABILITES FINCIT ET  
QUE CE QUIL TENTAIT DEVAIT ETRE TENTE. CEAUSESCU A AUSSI CONFIE  
QUE SELON LUI, URSS NE REVIENDRAIT PAS A LA TABLE DES NEGOCIATIONS

...2

PAGE DEUX UYGR3123 CONFD

SANS UN GESTE SIGNIFICATIF DE L OCCIDENT.

2. QUANT AU RESTE DE LA DISCUSSION (ZONE DENUCLEARISEE DES BALKANS  
CORRESPONDANT A UNE BANDE AUSSI DENUCLEARISEE EN EUROPE CENTRALE  
ET EFFORTS QUE TOUTES LES FORCES DEMOCRATIQUES EN MOUVEMENTS EN  
FAVEUR DE LA PAIX DEVAIENT INTENSIFIER) ELLE NE CONTENAIT QUE  
DES VUES QUI VOUS SONT DEJA CONNUES.

CCC/181 131130Z UYGR3123

*Action*

④

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR3024 13DEC83

TO EXTOTT UGB URR IDDZ PCOOTT/FOWLER DELIVFR BY 140830

INFO MOSCO BNATO ROME LDN BONN PARIS NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/CPH HAGUE

PMOOTT/AXWORTHY BRU PEKIN PRMNY CNGNY TOKYO DELHI

DISTR MINA USS DMF IDR IDA RGB IFB RBD RBR RCR

---PMS VISIT 15DEC:DEPARTURE STATEMENT

DEPARTURE STATEMENT SHOULD BE BRIEF.WE NEED TO EXCHANGE OUR DRAFT,  
OR AT LEAST BE ABLE TO MENTION BASIC POINTS WHICH WOULD BE MADE,  
WITH MEDAS 14DEC.HE WILL LET US KNOW WHAT WHITE HOUSE PROPOSES  
REAGAN SAY.WE REALIZE PM MAY CHOOSE TO MAKE POINTS DIFFERENTLY OR  
INDEED MAKE DIFFERENT POINTS IN LIGHT OF DISCUSSION WITH REAGAN  
ITSELF BUT BEGGING THIS EVENTUALITY FOR TIME BEING,WE WOULD PROPOSE  
AS STARTING POINT SOMETHING GENERAL ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

A)I HAVE HAD A VERY PRODUCTIVE MTG WITH THE PRESIDENT AND HAVE  
RENEWED AGAIN MY SENSE OF HIS DEEP COMMITMENT TO REDUCING WORLD  
TENSION.

B)THE DISCUSSIONS I HAVE HAD WITH MANY WORLD LEADERS HAVE SHOWN TO  
ME THAT WE ARE ALL COMMITTED TO THAT GOAL.

C)I MAY BE GOING TO THE SOVIET UNION AT SOME POINT AND I WILL BE  
ABLE TO TELL THEM OF MY FINDINGS.I WILL NOT/NOT BE GOING THERE WITH  
ANY MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN WHO CAN SEND HIS OWN MESSAGES BUT  
I WOULD BE GOING IN SUPPORT OF THE GOAL OF BETTER COMMUNICATION AND  
UNDERSTANDING WHICH WE ALL SHARE.

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR3024 CONFD

D)I HAVE NOT/NOT RAISED ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSALS WITH THE PRESIDENT  
THOUGH I HAVE MENTIONED SOME IDEAS FOR HIS FUTURE CONSIDERATION  
AND WE WILL BE ABLE TO FOLLOW UP ON SOME OF THESE.

2.YOU CAN NO DOUBT DO MUCH BETTER.GRATEFUL RESPONSE ASAP.

CCC/059 132322Z UNGR3024

FIRST DRAFT  
MF

MWEE  
D R A F T  
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTURE STATEMENT

1. I have had a very productive meeting with the President.
2. <sup>both</sup> We share a deep concern at the prevailing state of world tensions and over the dangers of nuclear weapons. We both want ~~to reduce~~ global tensions and the risks of nuclear war.  
<sup>to explore all means of reducing</sup>
3. I have told the President of my recent consultations with other world leaders who share my concerns and largely support the central purpose of my initiative.
4. I may visit Moscow in upcoming months. I would not be bearing a message from the President, rather my aim would be to open another line of communication to the Soviet leadership and assure them again of the West's deep desire for peace.

MF

ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR3023 13DEC83

TO EXTOTT UIDDZ UGB PCOOTT/FOWLER DELIVER BY 140900

INFO MOSCO BNATO ROME LDN BONN PARIS NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/CPP

PMOOTT/AXWORTHY

DISTR MINA USS DMF IDR IDZ RGB IFB RBD RBR RCR URR

---PMS VISIT 15DEC

NEW DEVELOPMENTS AND QUESTIONS IN PROGRAM AS FOLLOWS:

- ✓ A) ON ARRIVAL AT ANDREWS PM WILL BE MET BY SELWA ROOSEVELT, CHIEF OF PROTOCOL, AMB ROBINSON, JAMES MEDAS. ✓ B) MTG AT WHITE HOUSE WILL END AT 1150 PM. TRUDEAU AND PRES REAGAN WILL EXIT VIA DIPLOMATIC ENTRANCE. THEY WILL MAKE SHORT DEPARTURE STATEMENTS TO PRESS. THESE STATEMENTS WILL BE COORDINATED. WE ASSUME THIS MEANS SHOWING EACH OTHER TEXTS IN ADVANCE. WILL ADVISE FURTHER. ✓ C) STATE DEPT LUNCH LIST AS FOLLOWS: SHULTZ, DEP SECTY KENNETH DAM, NSC ADVISOR EUD MACFARLANE, UNDER SEC LARRY EAGLEBURGER, UNDER SEC ALLAN WALLIS, AMB ROBINSON, NSC EX SEC ROBERT KIMMIT, ASST SEC BURT, DEPTY ASST SEC MEDAS. D) WE HAVE INFORMED STATE DEPT THAT AT PRESENT CDN PLACES ARE PM, DPM/SSEA, AXWORTHY, FOWLER, <sup>SMITH</sup>JOHNSON, BURNEY, DELVOIE PLUS AMB AND POLITICAL MINISTER AT EMB. E) HAVE ARRANGED THE VISIT TO CORCORAN. PRESS CAN BE KEPT AWAY FROM PM WHILE HE VIEWS EXHIBIT. PLSE CONFIRM
- 2 | PM WISHES TO DO THIS. WE REITERATE THAT THIS EXHIBIT HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS THE MOST IMPORTANT EXHIBIT OF MERICAN ART EVER PUT TOGETHER. ✓ F) IN VIEW OF CONGRESSIONAL RECESS, SFNATE FOR RELS CTTF

...2

NO 1020  
DATE A 3102  
DORNER

PAGE TWO UNGR3023 CONF D

AND SEN MATHIAS WERE UNSUCCESSFUL IN PUTTING TOGETHER A SUFFICIENTLY  
LARGE AND EFFECTIVE GROUP OF SENATORS THAT WLD JUSTIFY TRIP TO HILL.  
WE THEREFORE PROPOSE FOLLOWING TWO MTGS INSTFAD:

1500: AT OFFICIAL RESIDENCE MTG WITH SUCH SENIOR JOURNALISTS AND  
EDITORS AS: HEDRICK SMITH, NY TIMES; LESLIE GELB, NY TIMES;

DON OBERDORFER, WASH POST; MEG GREENFIELD, WASH POST; LARRY BARRETT OR  
STROBE TALBOT, TIME; MEL ELFIN OR JOHN WALCOTT, NEWSWEEK; KAREN ELIOT  
HOUSE, WALL STREET JOURNAL.

1630: MTG AT HOTEL WITH DEFENCE AND ARMS CONTROL EXPERTS PM HAS MET  
BEFORE: ROBERT MCNAMARA, BILL HYLAND, HELMUT SONNENFELDT, BRENT SCOWCROFT,  
JAMES SCHLESINGER. WE WLD INVITE SEN MATHIAS. ABOVE LISTS ARE PROPOSED  
INVITEES. WHILE WE EXPECT TO DRAW WELL, ACUTAL ATTENDANCE WILL DEPEND  
ON AVAILABILITY AND OTHER COMMITMENTS OF THESE PEOPLE.

2. IF WE ARE TO PUT THESE EVENTS TOGETHER WE REQUIRE YOUR CONFIRMATION  
THAT WE SHLD GO AHEAD ASAP TOMORROW AM.

G) VP BUSH HAS ASKED IN PM CLD COME TO HIS RESIDENCE FOR SHORT TALK  
BEFORE DINNER. THIS WLD BE AT 1845. GRATEFUL YOU CONFIRM PM IS  
AGREEABLE TO THIS. PM AND VP WLD LEAVE FOR ALIBI CLUB TOGETHER AT  
1915. PLSE CONFIRM PM AGREES.

3. WE SHALL DO SEPARATE TEL WEDNESDAY AM ON DPM/SSEA PROGRAMME BUT  
WE ASSUME DPM/SSEA WILL WANT TO CONSIDER PARTICIPATING IN MTGS AT  
1500 (IF PRESS CONF AT VISTA FINISHED) AND 1630 ABOVE (IF PM AUTHOR-  
IZES EVENT AT ALL.)

CCC/059 132322Z UNGR3023

1515  
1545  
MATHIAS

1545  
1700  
JOURNALISTS

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

MF  
E

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR3022 13DEC83

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ UGB URR PCOOTT/FOWLER DELIVER BY 140830

INFO PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN

---PM INITIATIVE:BRIEFING FOR WASH MEDIA

GOTLIEB HOSTED BREAKFAST THIS MORNING FOR 20 WASH JOURNALISTS WHO WILL BE COVERING PM VISIT.FOLLOWING AMBS INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ON GENESIS AND PROCESS OF INITIATIVE TO DATE,WIDE RANGE OF QUESTIONS WHICH WENT ON FOR NEARLY HOUR REVEALED FOLLOWING NEGATIVE FEATURES.

A)IN EVIDENT SEARCH FOR PROVOCATIVE NEWS STORY,WSH PRESS CORPS IS ANXIOUS TO TRY TO PLAY TRUDEAU APPROACH TO RELNS WITH EAST AGAINST REAGAN RHETORIC AND SABRE RATTLING;

B)MEDIA HERE BARELY AWARE OF CONSTRUCTIVE TENOR OF NAC MINISTERIAL DECLARATION OR OF CDN ROLE IN ITS CONSTRUCTION;

C)OUR UNWILLINGNESS TO BECOME INVOLVED IN SPECIFICS OF START OR INF NEEDED TO BE EMPHASIZED AS DID PMS DETERMINATION NOT TO BE HONEST BROKER OR MESSAGE CARRIER BETWEEN TWO SUPER POWERS;

D)USA PRESS CONTINUES TO FEEL THAT QUOTE CHEMISTRY UNQUOTE BETWEEN PM AND PRESS IS NOT GOOD;

E)THERE IS EXPECTATION ADMIN WILL SIMPLY DENY USA-USSR RELNS ARE WITHOUT WORKING CHANNELS OR ARE IN DANGEROUS OR VOLATILE STATE;

F)SOME MEDIA PRESENT HAVE IMPRESSION THAT PM IS BACKING AWAY FROM SPECIFIC PROPOSALS OF INITIATIVE AND BECOMING INCREASINGLY PHILOSOPHICAL IN APPROACH TO HIS MISSION;

...2

REMER  
A 3102

PAGE TWO UNGR3022 CONFD

2. WE DEALT WITH ABOVE POINTS. WE WILL HAVE TO AWAIT ADVANCE STORIES TO SEE HOW WE SUCCEEDED BUT IT WAS EVIDENT THAT THE PURPOSE OF PMS MISSION AS ITNERNATL NEWS STORY WILL NEED CONCRETE CLARIFICATION. WE EMPHASIZED SUCCESSFULLY NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUE AND CRISIS MGMT, NOT IN CONTEXT OF FIVE-POWER MTG BUT AS THEMES PM HAD BEEN PURSUING WHERE THERE WAS CLEARLY A MUTUALITY OF INTEREST BETWEEN THE USA AND SOVIET UNION. THIS WAS WELL RECD BY MEDIA PRESENT. ON FIVE-POWER IDEA, WE NOTED THAT WE HAD HAD NO CLEAR RESPONSE TO IDEA FROM ADMIN AS YET. CLEARLY THIS IDEA REMAINS THE MOST UNDERSTANDABLE AND CONCRETE ASPECT OF THE INITIATIVE FOR USA, AS WELL AS CDN PRESS.

3. WE WERE STRUCK BY NEED TO COMMUNICATE PMS PERSONAL COMMITMENT AND PHILOSOPHY FACING INCREASED DANGER OF NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION, BUT ALSO BY DIFFICULTY AT BEING ADEQUATE SPOKESMAN FOR DYNAMICS HE BRINGS TO HIS MISSION. WE FEEL STRONGLY THAT THE MORE OPPORTUNITY THE PM HIMSELF HAS TO GET THIS DIMENSION OF HIS MISSION ACROSS TO MEDIA, THE MORE POSITIVELY IT WILL BE RECD AND COMMUNICATED TO WIDER AMERICAN PUBLIC, WHICH IS NECESSARY FOR SUCCESS OF HIS MISSION ON EVERY LEVEL.

CCC/059 132321Z UNGR3022

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

*MF*  
*nd*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR3020 13DEC83

TO EXTOTT UGB LIDDZ URR PCOOTT/FOWLER DELIVER BY 140900  
INFO MOSCO BNATO ROME LDN BONN PARIS HAGUE BRU PEKIN PRMNY CNGNY  
TOKYO DELHI NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/CPD PMOOTT/AXWORTHY  
DISTR MINA USS DMF IDR IDA RGB IFB RBD RBR RCR

---VIP BUSH

OURTEL UNGR0964 16MAR REMAINS VALID WITH ONE CHANGE IN EMPHASIS.  
IF REAGAN DID NOT/NOT RUN IN 84,BUSH CANDIDACY TO SUCCEED HIM WOULD  
BE MORE ACCEPTABLE TODAY THAN IT WOULD HAVE BEEN LAST SPRING,PAR-  
TICULARLY IF ACCOMPANIED BY CONSERVATIVE VICE-PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE  
SUCH AS LAXALT.BUSH HAS CERTAINLY EARNED CONFIDENCE OF REAGAN AND  
CLD WELL HAVE HIS ENDORSEMENT.HE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY REMAIN AS VP IN  
MORE LIKELY EVENTUALITY OF REAGAN RUNNING AGAIN.

2.HIS DIPLOMATIC ROLE HAS BROADENED SOMEWHAT SINCE LAST SPRING AS  
WELL.WE ARE SENDING SEPARATELY ACCOUNT OF HIS RECENT TRAVEL IN  
SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA.

CCC/059 132149Z UNGR3020

ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER

Division Phoned	
Person	
Local Time	

*Handwritten initials/signature*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR3019 13DEC83

TO EXTOTT UGB LIDDZ PCOOTT/FOWLER F L A S H  
 INFO MOSCO BNATO ROME LDN BONN PARIS HAGUE BRU PEKIN PRMNY CNGNY  
 TOKYO DELHI NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/CPD PMOOTT/AXWORTHY  
 DISTR MINA USS DMF IDR IDA RGB IFB RBD RBR RCR URR

---THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY:PRIORITIES

SUMMARY:THIS IS AN ELECTION YEAR.OVERWHELMING PRIORITY FOR REAGAN IS  
 THEREFORE COMMUNICATION:TO SHOW HIS PRESIDENCY HAS BEEN A SUCCESS  
 AND TO ENSURE THAT REST OF YEAR IS SUCCESSFUL.FOREIGN POLICY IS  
 CENTRAL TO THESE EFFORTS AND SPECIFICALLY THE RELATIONSHIP WITH  
 USSR,AND ARMS CONTROL.

2.REPORT:WE SHOULD ASSUME THAT REAGAN IS RUNNING AGAIN.THERE IS CASE  
 TO BE MADE THAT AT END OF JANUARY HE WILL DECIDE NOT/NOT TO RUN ON  
 DUAL GROUNDS OF SUCCESS THAT IN HIS VIEW HE HAS A)SUCCEEDED IN  
 IMPROVING USA SECURITY AND RE-ESTABLISHING USA SELF-RESPECT AND RES-  
 PECT FOR USA ABROAD;B)REVERSED TRENDS IN ROLE PLAYED BY GOVT IN OVER-  
 REGULATED USA SOCIETY AND PERMITTED PRODUCTIVE FORCES IN SOCIETY TO  
 RE-ASSERT THEIR EFFECTIVENESS;C)REDUCED SHARPLY INFLATION.THESE  
 ACHIEVEMENTS PERMIT HIM TO BELIEVE HE HAS ACCOMPLISHED WHAT HE SET  
 OUT TO DO.AT AGE 74 AND WITH A COUPLE OF THREATS TO HIS LIFE IN THE  
 BACKGROUND,THERE IS A REAL QUESTION IF HE WANTS THE PRESSURE-COOKED  
 OFFICE FOR ANOTHER FOUR YEARS,PARTICULARLY IF HE HAS TO FACE A DEMO-  
 CRATIC SENATE.IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HIS WIFE SEES IT THIS WAY.

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR3019 CONFIDENTIAL

3. IN ANY CASE, THIS SUCCESSFUL EVALUATION IS CERTAINLY VIEW HE HAS OF HIS TIME IN OFFICE. WEIGHT OF OPINION IS THAT HE WILL RUN AGAIN. BUT EVEN IF HE DID NOT/NOT, HE WLD HAVE JUST AS MUCH REASON TO COMMUNICATE THIS VIEW OF THE RECENT PAST AND ITS SUCCESSFUL COMMUNICATION THEREFORE HAS TO STAND AS A KEY PRIORITY FOR REAGAN.

4. JUST AS IMPORTANT AS RECORD OF RECENT PAST IS PROGNOSIS FOR NEXT YR. RIGHT NOW REAGAN IS DOING WELL IN POLLS. BUT HE HAS BEEN LUCKY. OFTEN DRAMATIC UNPREDICTABILITY IS WHAT HAS MARKED 4TH YR OF PREVIOUS RECENT PRESIDENCIES SINCE KENNEDY. REAGAN WILL NEED TO MAKE HIS 4TH YR AS SURPRISE-FREE AS POSSIBLE. HE CAN PROBABLY PREDICT AN EXPANDING ECONOMY AND WHILE HUGE DEFICITS ARE CONTROVERSIAL, DOMESTIC SCENE IS REASONABLY PREDICTABLE (INCLUDING CHARGES ADMIN POLICIES ARE UNFAIR). BUT FOREIGN AFFAIRS ARE CRUCIALLY UNPREDICTABLE. USA POSITION IS OVER-EXPOSED IN MIDDLE EAST, TO BE SURE, AND POSSIBLY ALSO IN LATIN AMERICA. WHILE IN END REAGAN MAY ALSO FIND HE NEEDS POSITIVE READ-OUTS ON USA-USSR RELS, THIS REALIZATION HAS NOT/NOT YET TAKEN HOLD IN WHITE HOUSE. INSTEAD CONVICTION IS THAT USA HAS SHOWN STRENGTH AND DETERMINATION AND IS NOW IN POSITION THAT WHILE USA IS WILLING TO TALK SOVS MUST COME TO USA. FROM THS POINT OF VIEW WESTERN UNITY IS VITAL TO REAGAN.

5. THE MAIN POLITICAL CONTEXT IS THE SO-CALLED GENDER GAP. HE CANNOT/NOT COUNT ON WINNING THE NEXT ELECTION WITH WOMEN BEING AS DECISIVELY AGAINST HIM. THEIR MARGIN (ABOUT 58-42) IS REINFORCED BY THAT OF MINORITIES AND WORKERS IN KEY INDUSTRIAL STATES SO AS TO MAKE

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR3019 CONF D

HIS NATIONAL POSITION IN ELECTORAL COLLEGE TERMS VULNERABLE. GENDER GAP IS NOT/NOT DUE PRIMARILY TO WOMENS ISSUES BUT IS ESSENTIALLY FUNCTION OF WAR AND PEACE, OF SENSITIVITY TO CHARGES OF TRIGGER-HAPPINESS. REAGAN WILL BENEFIT POLITICALLY FROM ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WITH USSR, OR AT LEAST SOME VISIBLE PROGRESS. A BETTER CLIMATE OF RELS WITH USSR WLD ALSO HELP.

6. IN THIS SENSE, PMS EFFORTS SHLD BE WELCOME. BUT IN SENSE SUCH EFFORTS WLD BE SEEN AS IMPLICITLY CRITICAL OF REAGAN THEY WLD NOT/NOT BE.

7. REAGAN IS WALKING A DUAL LINE. ON ONE HAND, HE HAS AROUSED AMERICAN PATRIOTISM, AND PART OF THAT ELECTORATE IS DEEPLY AFFECTED. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE HAS AROUSED ANXIETY, AFFECTING ANOTHER PART OF THE ELECTORATE. HE NEEDS TO BRING THESE TWO IMPULSES CLOSER TOGETHER. THAT IS HIS BIGGEST PRIORITY. IT IS WHAT THE PMS INITIATIVE IS ADDRESSING. IT IS WHY WE HAVE TO BE SO CAREFUL IF PM IS TO SUCCEED. THERE IS UNDERLYING BUT UNSPOKEN POLITICAL CONCERN PMS INITIATIVE IS FORCING TIMING AND CONTENT OF KEY POLITICAL ISSUE FOR REAGAN.

8. BEST LINE TO TAKE WITH REAGAN IS THAT OF PARA 11 OURTEL UNGR3003.

A) YOU (REAGAN) HAVE SUCCEEDED IN SENDING SIGNAL TO USSR OF STRENGTH OF USA DETERMINATION TO STRENGTHEN ITS DEFENCE AND SECURITY AND TO TAKE STEPS INCLUDING USE OF FORCE TO DEFEND USA INTERESTS; B) YOU HAVE SUCCEEDED IN SENDING SIGNALS TO USSR OF WESTERN RESOLVE AND UNITY IN THE SAME DIRECTION; C) YOU HAVE NOT/NOT SUCCEEDED HOWEVER

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR3019 CONF D

IN SENDING A SIGNAL TO USSR THAT ADMIN IS SERIOUSLY COMMITTED TO PEACEFUL RELS WITH THE SOV UNION WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF USA INTERESTS. PM TRUDEAU ACCEPTS WITHOUT QUESTION REAGANS DEEP SINCERE COMMITMENT TO PEACE. WHETHER SIGNAL HAS BEEN SENT IN EFFECTIVE MANNER IS NOT/NOT FOR CDA TO JUDGE; FACT IS THAT BASED ON OUR INTELLIGENCE IN MOSCO THE SIGNAL APPEARS NOT/NOT TO HAVE BEEN RECEIVED. SOVS SEEM CONFUSED AND UNCERTAIN ABOUT USA INTENTIONS.

9. ABOVE ALL, WE SHLD RECOGNIZE REAGAN STRENGTH POLITICALLY IS IN HIS ABILITY TO COMMUNICATE HIS OWN TOTALLY POSITIVE AND CONFIDENT VIEWS. HIS ADMIN HAS STYLE OF WORKING WHICH FEEDS THESE VIEWS. STRESS OF PM TRUDEAU PRESENTATION SHLD BE DIRECTED TO CONVINCING REAGAN THAT PMS EFFORTS WILL HELP TO MAKE HIS VIEWS REALITY RATHER THAN PUTTING REAGAN AND HIS VIEWS ON THE DEFENSIVE.

CCC/059 132037Z UNGR3019

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDA1412 13DEC83

TO TOKYO

INFO BONN LDN PARIS WSHDC BNATO

DISTR PPR IDDZ IDAO IDAN

REF YOURTEL UIGR3150 13DEC(NOTAL)

- . ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT VERIFICATION PROGRAMME

PROGRAMME ANNOUNCED BY DPM/SSEA ON OCT 20 1983, IS NATURAL FOLLOW-

ON TO INITIAL MODEST BASIC RESEARCH PROJECT BETWEEN NATIONAL

DEFENCE (ORAE) AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (IDA) BEGUN IN 1979. PROJECT

RESULTED IN NUMBER OF PUBLICATIONS WITH WHICH JAPANESE WILL BE

FAMILIAR THROUGH MEMBERSHIP ON COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (CD) IN

GENEVA. FIRST TWO DOCU, COMPENDIUM OF ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION

PROPOSALS AND QUANTIFICATION WORKING PAPER, WERE TABLED IN CD IN

1980. CONCEPTUAL WORKING PAPER ON ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION WAS

TABLED WITH INTRODUCTORY BRIEFING IN GENEVA IN WHICH JAPANESE

AMBASSADOR (OKAWA) TOOK PART. UPDATED COMPENDIUM WAS SUBMITTED TO

CD IN FEB 1982. ANNOUNCED PROGRAMME WHICH ALLOCATES ADDITIONAL

RESOURCES, PERSONNEL AS WELL AS FINANCIAL IS DESIGNED TO UNDERTAKE

BROADER PROGRAMME OF RESEARCH. IT WILL PROVIDE FUNDING TO EXPAND

PARTICIPATION BY UNIVERSITIES AND OTHER RESEARCH GROUPS AS WELL AS

BY PRIVATE INDUSTRY. FOR EXAMPLE ON ACADEMIC SIDE RESTRICTED

INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON ACV VERIFICATION, WITH SMALL WORKSHOPS

...2

(NDHQ/OSTRATA?)

Carry  
down in  
OSTRATA.

PAGE TWO IDA1412 CONF

ON CW AND IN OUTER SPACE WAS HOSTED BY CARLETON UNIVERSITY AND FUNDED BY EXTERNAL AFFAIRS IN JUN 1983 AND WAS JUDGED INNOVATIVE AND SUCCESSFUL(WILL FORWARD COPY OF PROCEEDINGS EXPECTED TO BE PUBLISHED BY CARLETON THIS MONTH).

2. VERIFICATION PROGRAMME IS TO BE FUNDED INITIALLY AT DOLLARS ONE MILLION WITH ANNUAL INCREASES. RESEARCH-GOVERNMENT, ACADEMIC AND COMMERCIAL-WILL FOCUS ON DEFINING CONCEPT, ROLE AND TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR VERIFICATION IN TERMS OF ACD ISSUES OF PRIMARY CONCERN TO CANADA. THESE INCLUDE CJ, CTB AND OUTER SPACE. IT HAS BEEN CANADIAN CONTENTION THAT VERIFICATION HAS COMMON APPLICATION TO SPECTRUM OF ACD NEGOTIATION. THEREFORE WHILE CANADIAN RESEARCH WILL FOCUS ON ISSUES OF PRIMARY CANADIAN CONCERN, IT WILL NOT BE LIMITED TO THEM.

3. WE WELCOME SHARING EXPERTISE WITH LIKEMINDED COUNTRIES AND INTERPLAY WHERE SUCH IS POSSIBLE. FOR MANY, NATO CONNECTION PROVIDES SIMPLE CONNECTION; WITH JAPAN CD MAY PERHAPS BE MOST LIKELY VENUE. SHOULD CARLETON CST 1984 SYMPOSIUM WE WILL KEEP JAPAN IN MIND. WE WOULD OF COURSE BE INTERESTED IN JAPANESE RESEARCH PLANS IF SUCH HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED.

CCC/165 140235Z IDA1412

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDA1410 13DEC83

TO GENEV/BEESELY

DISTR MINA USS DMF IDDZ IDAO IDAN

REF YOURTEL YTGR8246 13DEC

---ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT CONSULTATIONS

INFO PASSED TO OFFICE OF RT HON JOE CLARK.THEY CONFIRMED THEY  
HAD TRIED TO REACH YOU YESTERDAY.

CCC/105 140235Z IDA1410

MF

TELEGRAM RETRANSMIT FORM

CONCENTRE:

Please repeat telegram number ULGR0264

FROM VIENN DATED 13DEC83

Classification CONFIDENTIAL (copy attached)

Action TO \_\_\_\_\_

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR \_\_\_\_\_

*L. A. Delvoie*  
L.A. Delvoie

Authorizing Officer

IDDZ      5-5912      Dec.13/83  
Division      Phone      Date

NOTE: It is the responsibility of the authorizing officer to  
attach a copy of telegram to be repeated to this form.

*Sheila*  
*pls have this*  
*repeated to*  
*PCOBBT/Fawler*  
*AD*  
*Done*  
*13/12/83*  
*se*

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM VIENN ULGR0264 13DEC83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO LDN BONN ANKRA COPEN OSLO HAGUE WSHDC TOKYO PEKIN PRMNY COSCO  
DELHI BNATO CNGNY

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB RGB RSD RCD IDD IDR IDA FPR

---PMS PEACE INITIATIVE--AUSTRIAN VIEWS

DURING COURTESY CALL ON DR FRIEDRICH BAUER, DEPUTY SEC GEN OF MFA,  
PETER HANCOCK (ATTENDING EAST EUROPEAN COMMERCIAL COUNSELLORS CONF  
IN VIENNA) TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW NUMBER OF EAST/WEST QUESTIONS  
WITH AUSTRIANS, INCLUDING PROSPECTS FOR DISARMAMENT AND PMS PEACE  
INITIATIVE. BAUER TOLD US IN CONFIDENCE THAT FM LANC FAVOURS MAKING  
ORAL STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF PMS EFFORTS TO BRING THE SUPER POWERS  
TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. WHEN AND WHERE SUCH EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT  
IS TO BE MADE, BAUER COULD NOT/NOT TELL US, BUT IT WAS CLEARLY IN THE  
OFFING. HANCOCK IN TURN THANKED THE AUSTRIANS AND SAID ANY SUPPORT  
WOULD BE MOST WELCOMED BY THE PM, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF  
DIFFICULTIES EXPERIENCED IN BRINGING THE BIG FIVE TOGETHER.

2. BAUER FELT THAT IT WAS EXREMELY IMPORTANT FOR A SENIOR STATESMAN  
TO KEEP QUOTE THE CANDLE BURNING UNQUOTE, HOWEVER FAINT THE LIGHT  
MAY BE. IN THE END WHAT MATTERED, BAUER SAID, WAS TO BRING THE AMERICANS  
AND THE SOVIETS TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE IN ONE FORM OR ANTOHER.  
WHETHER OTHERS WISHED TO PARTICIPATE IN PROCESS WAS OF SFCONDARY  
IMPORTANCE. THE ONLY PROBLEM WITH PM TRUDEAU, BAUER FURTHER DECLARED,

...2

PAGE TWO ULGR0264 CONFID

WAS THAT HE SUFFERED CREDIBILITY WITH SOVIETS, HAVING ALLOWED  
THE AMERICANS TO TEST CRUISE MISSILES ON CDN SOIL. HANCOCK  
REMINDS THE AUSTRIANS THAT CDA WAS NOT/NOT A NEUTRAL STATE AND HAD  
CERTAIN OBLIGATIONS TO FULFILL AS NATO MEMBER; SOME WITH CONSIDERABLE  
PUBLIC AGONY AT THAT.

CCC/060 131215Z ULGR0264

MF

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FEX-3502  
(212) 246-7424

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Facsimile  
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ACTION  
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Our file/no. dossier:  
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NYC 034

NO. GRPA 56 DATE 13 Dec. 83

PAGES 3  
(incl. cover)  
(y compris la page couverture)

FROM: Canadian Consulate General  
DU : Consulat général du Canada  
NEW YORK

SECTION: GRPA  
Mr./Ms. \_\_\_\_\_  
M./Mad. Amos Donohue

TO : Mr./Ms. \_\_\_\_\_  
A : M./Mad. \_\_\_\_\_

Department: \_\_\_\_\_  
Service : Extott / IDDZ

Phone : \_\_\_\_\_  
Téléphone : \_\_\_\_\_

Subject : Article of the "Australian"  
Objet : Sydney daily, Dec. 5, 1983

# Trudeau plays political Russian roulette with nuclear doomsday

CANADA'S Prime Minister for almost 20 years, Mr Pierre Trudeau, a leader in the mould of international statesman, chose last week to launch his most ambitious drive yet to turn world public opinion into an electoral draw-card.

Charismatic though he may seem as he moves easily among his fellow heads of state, Mr Trudeau, who lost power briefly some four years ago to the rival Liberal Party (as in Australia, a conservative-leaning group), is again facing political defeat.

Standing against him in elections that must be held next year is a formidable opponent — former business leader — Brian Mulroney, perhaps the first Canadian political figure to emerge as a serious challenger to the Trudeau charisma.

Canadians know how well Mr Trudeau has made his presence felt on the global stage: he attends the right conferences, and his ideas on economics are aimed at creating a bridge between developed and developing nations. However, at home his economic policies of nationalisation have driven the country to the brink of economic ruin.

Pierre Trudeau is more than a global visionary with a well-publicised penchant for pretty women — he has shifted ground gradually during his time in power and now espouses concerted action for world development.

And he has also launched a world-wide campaign to support the nuclear disarmament movement. Last week in the Canadian capital, Ottawa, he said that he would give himself a couple of months to see how the venture progressed.

This latest campaign began last month in Montreal, the centre of Quebec, where Mr Trudeau may be politically vulnerable next year.

There he told a nationwide audience that the number one priority for every Canadian was the threat of nuclear war.

There was a time when the Canadian leader's views on nuclear strategy were merely a reflection of the White House stance. But now Mr Trudeau is distinctly at odds with the Reagan administration, al-

Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau has been globe-trotting since CHOGM in the cause of world peace — or is it in the cause of improving his image in time for the election he faces next year? NICHOLAS ROTHWELL reports from New York. **WOLFA**

age by consummate diplomacy to hide their differences.

As a one-man campaigner against the spread of nuclear weapons, Mr Trudeau has taken on the task at seemingly a most unpropitious time: the "nuclear club" of nations capable of making bombs is said to be growing, while talks on arms reductions in Europe broke down two weeks ago.

This has led some of the more cynical observers of the chequered career of Mr Trudeau to consider his "anti-nuclear gamble" a last-gasp effort to regain his stature with Canadians, to recoup the damage done by his economic policies, and to win another term in power.

The reality, however, aides close to Mr Trudeau insist, is somewhat different: the Prime Minister, who is an active observer of the world scene, was quick to see the significance of the peace movements that have emerged over the past two years in Western nations.

## Move attracts much criticism

But while there were lots of protests, these were being led mainly by non-government bodies such as United Nations groups, trade unions and coalitions of activists. Few if any government leaders were willing to speak out against the growth of the nuclear arsenals.

It was this, rather than political pressures, that encouraged Mr Trudeau to launch his campaign — some say a quixotic venture, some an inspired drive for peace. But he has also been well aware that the poll ratings for his own government trail the Mulroney opposition by record levels.

As part of his campaign, Mr Trudeau has proposed a series of conferences and initiatives, stressing contacts between world leaders, in a bid to lessen the use of force in the settlement of international

disputes and to stem the tide of deaths caused by more than 130 conflicts since the end of World War II, which have claimed 35 million lives.

Mr Trudeau's two-fold basic argument is that the international machinery to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons is breaking down, and that with \$6000 million a year being spent around the world on weaponry, it is inevitable that aggression will become the method of settling disputes.

He wants a group of Commonwealth leaders, including himself and the Australian Prime Minister, Mr Hawke, to visit the White House for talks this coming year, and he views the forthcoming NATO foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels as the next crucial step in testing the progress of his campaign.

The Trudeau initiative is designed to help work out a replacement for the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, which is up for review next year.

Mr Trudeau's vision of Canada includes a broad view of the Pacific rim, which gives the country a privileged relationship with Japan, China, Asia and Australia and New Zealand.

This move by Mr Trudeau to seek global answers for a worldwide problem has met with some cynicism from European and US critics, aware that his Utopian-sounding goals are being aired just as relations between the US and Moscow are reaching a new low in Europe.

Mr Trudeau has called for the five known nuclear powers — the US, the Soviet Union, France, China and Great Britain — to reduce armaments, as well as proposing a ban on Star Wars anti-satellite systems.

When NATO ministers meet on December 8, Canada's External Affairs Minister, Mr Allan MacEachen, will canvas his opposite numbers, seeking definite replies to a set of 15 questions Mr Trudeau sent to the NATO leaders after a recent European trip.

While Mr Trudeau has de-

clared himself available at any time from the middle of this month for talks with either the Soviet or the US President, he says it would be preferable for him to meet the Russians first, "so that I could catch up on my knowledge of them rather than see President Reagan yet once again."

So far the international success of Mr Trudeau's tour has been considerable — but there have been no specific commitments of support for his key proposal, the idea of a five-nation nuclear conference.

But on the domestic front nuclear crisis does not loom so heavily as the economic crunch; highly regionalised

BURROUGHS DEX 3500

P. 3

Canada is going through a period of political upheaval, with union problems almost bringing the entire public service of British Columbia out on strike.

Further, Mr Trudeau's image, compared with the dynamic new contender, Mr Mulroney, is slipping badly.

Mr Mulroney has not long entered parliament, but already his presence has begun to revitalise an opposition accustomed only to setbacks and defeats.

Mr Mulroney is certain to campaign by stressing the disastrous costs of Mr Trudeau's national economic policy.

Despite the globe-trotting, the moral fervor and the glamor of the Trudeau campaign, it may well be that economics, not the dangers of nuclear war, will dictate the outcome of the Canadian elections next year.



Mr Trudeau . . . "Best I should catch up on my knowledge of the Russians"

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THE AUSTRALIAN

FEATURE PAGE

5-12-81

REF-N.R.