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ACCESS TO INFORMATION  
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EXAMINED BY / EXAMINÉ PAR  
DATE M. Bardour  
2007/03/06

DEPARTMENT  
OF  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MINISTÈRE  
DES  
AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TITLE—TITRE:

DISARMEMENT  
MEASURES  
PLANS AND PROPOSALS  
TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION ( INITIATIVES )

DESARMEMENT  
MESURES  
PLANS ET PROPOSITIONS  
TRUDEAU MISSION DE PAIX ( INITIATIVES )

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Retention period—Période de retention:

20Yrs ( 7A-13D ) J



N.A.R.C.

2004

FRC:

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109





Government of Canada  
Gouvernement du Canada

# CLOSED VOLUME VOLUME COMPLET

DATED FROM À COMPTER DU	84-02-28	TO JUSQU'AU	84-03-08
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AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE - À METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER

DO NOT ADD ANY MORE PAPERS - NE PAS AJOUTER DE DOCUMENTS

FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE - POUR CORRESPONDANCE ULTÉRIEURE VOIR

FILE NO. - DOSSIER N°

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace Mission

VOLUME

~~34~~ 35

IDA RBR ZSP  
IDD RLR ZSS  
PUBLICATION ZEP RBP  
IDR  
IDDZ ZSI

SUBJECT/SUJET

WASHINGTON POST

DATE

MAR - 7 1984

## Ruling Coalition Divided

# Dutch Rulers Seek Solution To Dispute Over Cruise Missiles

By Priscilla Painton  
Special to The Washington Post

THE HAGUE—The Dutch government's delaying game on the issue of nuclear missile deployment appears to be played out.

NATO pressure to install its 48 cruise missiles is mounting, and so is domestic pressure to reject them. The main party in the government coalition is split on the issue, as is the Cabinet. A firm decision either way would bring the government down, so Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers is groping for a formula that will pacify the pacifists, assuage the Alliance and mollify his ministers—all by June.

Of the five European countries NATO picked to deploy medium-range nuclear missiles, only the Netherlands has not yet decided to go ahead.

Lubbers' government has postponed the decision three times, hoping that time and the example of the other four allies would weaken popular resistance to the weapons. But instead, public and parliamentary opposition has grown, and NATO is becoming impatient.

To escape this political squeeze, Lubbers is trying to put together a package deal. It would involve deploying fewer missiles than the 48 allotted by NATO, dropping at least two of the Dutch Army's so-called nuclear tasks, and perhaps increasing the country's financial contribution to the Alliance's conventional forces, according to sources close to the government.

Last week, Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek traveled to Washington in an attempt to convince the Reagan administration that NATO should deploy fewer medium-range missiles than its total of 572, with the cuts absorbed by the Netherlands.

"That way," said a Dutch diplomat, "the government would not only be fulfilling its duty as a NATO ally, but also give a signal to the public and to the two superpowers that the Netherlands is one country that takes disarmament seriously."

Meanwhile, U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger is scheduled to fly to The Hague on March 29 to discuss possible compromises with Lubbers and his colleagues.

The balancing act is a critical one for Lubbers' coalition of Liberals and Christian Democrats.

A recent poll ordered by the government has reminded it that much of the antideployment sentiment comes from its own ranks. According to the poll, 63 percent of the Dutch population said it would support a

parliamentary vote against deployment, and 45 percent of the Christian democrats interviewed as well as 34 percent of the Liberals shared this view. Even Mient Jan Faber, the head of the powerful peace movement, said he was surprised by the stubbornness and political range of this resistance to the nuclear weapons even after Belgium, Italy, West Germany and Britain accepted them this fall.

"I'm more confident now than I was last year" that parliament will reject deployment when it comes up for a vote in June, he said.

The issue has split Lubbers' Christian Democratic Appeal party, pitting his own Cabinet ministers against each other and causing some of his supporters in parliament to defect. Foreign Minister van den Broek, a Christian Democrat, favors deployment, while Defense Minister Jacob de Ruiter, also a Christian Democrat, does not, according to sources close to the government.

With 79 of the 150 seats, the coalition has a comfortable majority in parliament. But since the fall, the parliament has seen two Christian Democrats quit the party over deployment and at least eight others denounce it publicly, according to Bert de Vries, the party's parliamentary leader. And he said another "handful" are wavering. This means the crucial votes for deployment might have to come from the far right-wing parties, including the neo-fascist Center Party, a solution the government is said to find politically distasteful.

The stakes are high for NATO as well as for Prime Minister Lubbers. The Alliance wants to present a seamless front in Europe and would view a rejection of deployment as a defeat. For this reason, the United States is amenable to the solution of

fewer missiles if this would guarantee the Netherlands' solidarity with the alliance, according a senior NATO official. Washington will endorse "anything but no deployment at all," he said.

But peace activists in the Netherlands, who wield considerable clout, argue that this amounts to counting how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. Deployment, they say, is more a political than military gesture intended to show the Soviet Union that the United States and its allies are firmly tied in their determination to counter Soviet SS20s. The issue, therefore, is whether to plant any missiles on Dutch soil.

Klaus de Vries, a prominent Labor Party legislator, predicted that the Christian Democrats would ultimately debate deployment in these terms. But Bert de Vries, the parliamentary leader of the Christian Democratic party, said the prospect of fewer nuclear weapons could seduce some members of his faction.

To sweeten the deal, the Dutch government is also considering renouncing at least two of the Army's nuclear responsibilities. The Nike surface-to-air missiles are already scheduled to be replaced by Patriots with nonnuclear warheads. In addition, the Netherlands would remove from its territory NATO's nuclear mines and its Neptune submarine system, according to NATO sources.

The plan, if adopted, is likely to displease NATO. But the coalition is determined to slip out of its political tight spot. Says the Dutch diplomat: "No matter what SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe] decides, it will be announced that a number of nuclear tasks will be dropped."

Lubbers has only four months to come up with a way to sell deployment to the parliament. He has made such a strong public promise to keep the June deadline that Dutch political observers believe he can no longer avoid it.

Says Faber: "The Christian Democrats have realized the decision has to be taken this year because if it's pushed back it will become an election issue" in 1986. So Bert de Vries, the party's parliamentary leader, is among the many Christian Democrats who are hoping the "government will be fairly creative" in the next few months.



Canada

Canada

TO/À • TRANSCRIPT

FROM/DE • FPR

REFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • DPM/SSEA Scrum March 6, 1984 10:15 hrs.  
SUJET • Cruise Testing

Security/Sécurité
UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
March 7, 1984
Number/Numéro
FPR 0250

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

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Q. Mr. MacEachen, are there going to be guidelines in Cabinet for the candidates for the leadership and their conduct over the next few months?

DPM/SSEA: I really don't know, we haven't discussed that yet. It may come up today, but I don't know that kind of guidelines we could establish yet, we have no candidates declared.

Q. But you yourself have said that you would have to make sure the party does not move to the right. It appears that some of the candidates will start to carve our policy positions and therefore some of those policy positions may contradict some of the policies already in place?

DPM/SSEA: I did say in Halifax that I thought it was a good occasion to establish in a debate in discussion, not only by the candidates but others where we were going, what the party stood for and what the goals were and so on and I still think that's a pretty good idea. It would add a lot of interest and be useful in policy formulation that the National Liberation Federation is now doing precisely the same thing, I understand in terms of five policy seminars. I think it is always a rather delicate problem for candidates who are members of the government to campaign and stake out of policy decisions and still supporting existing policy decisions so there is a certain delicacy required but it has happened, we have done it in '68 and it can be done again. There has to be a certain amount of understanding of the situation.

Q. Mr. MacEachen the Federal Court has refused the injunction that the coalition was seeking against the missile tests. Is there any other chance that they might have to stop the test?

DPM/SSEA: I am not aware of any other possibility. They may have others in mind but it is now clear that the court has found that the test of the cruise doesn't present the danger of the damage that was alleged and I think that is a hurdle cleared out of the way.

....2

- 2 -

Q. So the plane is on its way down?

DPM/SSEA: Well, if today were the day then it is I would think. The House has already dealt with this question, last June we had a vote on the cruise and the House overwhelmingly endorsed the test, so now the court has cleared that hurdle and I don't know what remains.

Q. Well, the Supreme Court still has to come out with a ruling, that remains.

DPM/SSEA: Well, we'll just have to wait for that.

Q. You are definitely continuing ahead with that despite the fact that the Supreme Court is deliberating on that right now?

DPM/SSEA: Well, we have not found any basis to believe we ought to terminate our decision or to change it.

Q. Mr. MacEachen why would you not run for the leadership of the Party? You've done it before.

DPM/SSEA: Well, once is enough maybe. It is not my intention to run.

Q. Who do you support? Who are you doing to support?

DPM/SSEA: When the field is completed and when some opportunity is made to evaluate is available to evaluate the situation I might then decide to support a candidate, but I have not made that decision yet.

Q. Mr. Regan's not going to run?

DPM/SSEA: I have no idea.

Q. Well, I understand he is not. That leaves 125 votes out there in Nova Scotia?

DPM/SSEA: Well, if I know anything about the Nova Scotians they will be very very independent in making up their minds and making them up very carefully.

Q. Are you doing to stay in politics after the leadership convention?

DPM/SSEA: Well let me say that I haven't made any decision to leave politics as of now.

Q. Do you think the Prime Minister should also - would he resign his seat and stay out of politics altogether or do you think there might be some movement to have him play another role in the party, perhaps a continuing peace making type role?




- 3 -

DPM/SSEA: Well, I think all that is very conjectural at this stage I haven't discussed with the Prime Minister what he intends to do. I am sure that he will maintain his interest in international affairs, not only for the significant period remaining to him as Prime Minister but beyond that. I haven't had any discussions as to what he might do after he ceases to be Prime Minister.

Q. Are you going to be discussing guidelines?

DPM/SSEA: I don't know.

  
John J. Noble  
Official Spokesman  
and Director  
Press Office

mf

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR6245 07MAR84

T0 EXTOTT IDR

INFO CANMILREPNATO BONN VMBFR LDN WSHDC MOSCO GENEV PRMNY STKHM/  
SCDEL NDHQOTT/DNACPOL/CIS/CORAE/ADMPOL/DIPOL/CPD/DSTRATA

DISTR IFB IDDZ IDA IDRA IDRL RGX RBD CPD IDD

REF YOURTEL IDR0804 05MAR

---MBFR:NEW USA POSITION

PARA 4 OF VMBFR TEL XTDR0088 02MAR HAS PROVIDED USEFUL GUIDANCE  
FOR SEEKING FURTHER CLARIFICATION ON SUBSTANCE OF NEW USA POSN.

2.FOR OUR PART,WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW USA SEE THEIR PROPOSALS  
AFFECTING REQUIREMENTS FOR REDUCTIONS ON EACH SIDE.PRESUMABLY IT  
WOULD REDUCE THEM BUT BY HOW MUCH?ALSO HOW WILL PROPOSALS AFFECT  
DISPUTED DATA CASES AND WESTS EXCEPTIONS REQUIREMENTS?

3.WE WOULD BE ALSO INTERESED TO KNOW HOW USA SEE CONSULTATIONS  
IN SPC(MBFR)DEVELOPING.YOU WILL HAVE NOTED BELGIAN CONCERN ABOUT  
PRESS REPORT TO EFFECT THAT USA WOULD DECIDE FINAL POSN AFTER  
HAVING CONSULTED KEY ALLIES(OURTEL YBGR6232 06MAR).GIVEN  
BELGIUMS VERY ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN MBFR,WE CONSIDER SUCH CONCERN  
LEGITIMATE.SEEN FROM HERE,IT IS REASONABLE TO EXPECT THAT RESULT  
OF REVIEW OF WESTERN POSN WILL BE CLOSE REFLEXION OF USA POSN.  
INDEED WE FORESEE THAT SHOULD ANY OF ALLIES COME UP WITH SUBSTANTIVE  
PROPOSAL TO CHANGE USA STAND,WSHDC WOULD LIKELY USE ARGUMENT THAT  
SUCH PROPOSAL WOULD BE BOUND TO CREATE DIFFICULTY WITHIN ADMIN.

...2



PAGE TWO YBGR6245 CONFD

IN OTHER WORDS,USA ARE UNLIKELY TO HAVE MUCH FLEXIBILITY AND ALLIES WILL THEREFORE HAVE TO LIVE WITH WHATEVER COMES OUT OF WSHDC.SHOULD THIS BE CASE,SOME MAY FEEL THEY ARE(AGAIN)BEING TAKEN FOR GRANTED.

4.ANOTHER CONSIDERATION IS THAT OF TIME-FRAME.DOES WSHDC HAVE DEADLINE IN MIND FOR TABLING OF NEW WESTERN POSN IN VIENN?IF NO/NO,DOES THIS MEAN THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO EXHAUST CONSULTATIVE PROCESS IN SPC/MBFR IN EVENT IT PROVES MORE DIFFICULT THAN ANTICIPATED?IF SO,WHAT TACTIC SHOULD NEGOTIATORS USE IN VIENN IN MEANTIME?

5.FINALLY,IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO KNOW THEIR VIEWS ON WESTERN APPROACH TO BE ADOPTED ON 16MAR BOTH VIS-A-VIS PUBLIC/PRESS AND AT NEGOTIATING TABLE WITH EAST.USA DEL HERE HAS BEEN RATHER VAGUE IF NOT/NOT SILENT ON SUBJ.

CCC/070 071749Z YBGR6245

mf

R E S T R I C T E D

FM BNATO YBGR6243 07MAR84

TO EXTOTT IDA

INFO VMBFR STKHM/SCDEL GENEV PRMNY MDRID LSBON ROME WSAW PRGUE  
ATHNS NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DIPOL/DNACPOL LDN PARIS BPEST MOSCO BONN  
WSHDC COPEN OSLO HAGUE BRU BUCST

DISTR DMF IFB IDD (IDDZ IDR IDRL RCR RSR RBD RBR RGB URR FPR IMU  
REF OURTEL YBGR6237 07MAR

---USA PRESS GUIDANCE:WSAW PACT PROPOSAL TO FREEZE OR REDUCE  
MILITARY EXPENDITURES

QUOTE:

Q:ROMANIA,ON BEHALF OF THE WARSAW PACT,HAS PROPOSED A CONFERENCE ON  
THE NATO AND WARSAW PACT STATES THAT WOULD NEGOTIATE REDUCTION IN  
MILITARY BUDGETS.ANY COMMENT?

A:--WE WILL,OF COURSE,STUDY THE WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL.

--THE WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL IS IRONIC IN THAT THE WARSAW PACT STATES  
HAVE REFUSED EITHER TO PARTICIPATE IN A UN STUDY ON REPORTING OF  
MILITARY BUDGETS OR TO RESPOND CONSTRUCTIVELY TO THE PRESIDENTS  
PROPOSAL IN SEP82 FOR A CONFERENCE ON MILITARY EXPENDITURE REPORTING.

--THE WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL APPEARS TO BE A SOMEWHAT MORE ELABORATE  
VERSION OF IDEAS CONTAINED IN VARIOUS WARSAW PACT PROPOSALS,ADVANCED  
OVER THE LAST TEN YEARS,REGARDING FREEZES OR REDUCTIONS IN MILITARY  
SPENDING.

--GIVEN THE EASTS SECRETIVENESS ABOUT ITS MILITARY SPENDING,THE WEST

...2



PAGE TWO YBGR6243 RESTR

HAS LONG TAKEN THE VIEW THAT THE FIRST STEP MUST BE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A COMMON STANDARD FOR REPORTING ON MILITARY EXPENDITURES.

--AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP SUCH A REPORTING INSTRUMENT HAS BEEN UNDER WAY IN THE UN FOR THE LAST TEN YEARS. THE USA AND ITS NATO ALLIES HAVE BEEN ACTIVE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS SERIES OF STUDIES; THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER WARSAW PACT STATES HAVE REFUSED TO PARTICIPATE. A STANDARD REPORTING INSTRUMENT HAS BEEN DEVELOPED AND REPEATEDLY ENDORSED BY A LARGE MAJORITY OF THE UNGA, BUT NO/NO WARSAW PACT COUNTRY HAS SUBMITTED TO THE UN IN ANY FASHION ITS MILITARY EXPENDITURES.

--IN ADDITION, TO GIVE THIS EFFORT A BOOST, PRESIDENT REAGAN PROPOSED IN THE UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT IN SEP82 THAT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY EXPENDITURE REPORTING BE CONVENED.

--UNFORTUNATELY, THE LATEST WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL MAKES NO/NO REFERENCE TO THE UN EFFORT OR TO THE PRESIDENTS PROPOSAL. IF THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES ARE SERIOUS ABOUT THEIR PROPOSAL, THEY SHOULD PARTICIPATE CONSTRUCTIVELY IN THE UN STUDY OR SUPPORT THE PRESIDENTS INITIATIVE.

--WE HAVE ALSO LONG TAKEN THE VIEW THAT IT IS REDUCTIONS IN MILITARY CAPABILITIES, NOT/NOT MILITARY BUDGETS THEMSELVES, THAT WOULD GENUINELY ENHANCE SECURITY. UNQUOTE

CCC/054 071505Z YBGR6243

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

MF

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR6244 07MAR84

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ IMMED

INFO CANMILREPNATO LDN PARIS BONN HAGUE GENEV VMBFR STKHM/SCDEL  
PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DNACPOL/PPP/DSTRATA  
DISTR DMF IFB IDD IDR IDA RBD CPD

REF CURTEL YBGR6222 02MAR

---NATO CONSULTATIONS ON ASAT AND SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS  
EXCHANGE IN POL CTTEE 06MAR CONFIRMED EARLIER IMPRESSION THAT  
ALLIED PREOCCUPATIONS WITH CDN STRATEGIC VERIFICATION/MOBILITY  
PROPOSALS HAS RECEDED AND THAT PRESSURE FOR FURTHER CONSULTATIONS  
ON THEM AT NATO HQ HAS ALL BUT EVAPORATED. INDEED, PAC CHMN WAS ONLY  
ONE WHO HAS CONTINUED TO ALLUED TO POSSIBILITY. USA REP LIMITED  
INTERVENTION TO RE-STATING STRONG USA OPPOSITION TO CIRCULATING  
PROPOSALS IN CD. HE ALSO MENTIONED, IN GENERAL TERMS, ALTERNATIVE  
ADVANCED BY DOBBINS IN WSHDC THAT PROPOSALS BE ADDRESSED TO LEADERS  
OF USA AND USSR IN EXPECTATION OF WRITTEN REPLY. WE LIMITED COMMENT  
TO OBSERVATION THAT WE WERE CURRENTLY REVIEWING RESULTS OF  
CONSULTATIONS.

2. ON ASAT CONSULTATIONS, USA REP SAID WSHDC WOULD BE UNABLE TO  
PARTICIPATE IN MTG MID-MAR. NETH REP DID NOT/NOT INSIST AND MTG TO  
DISCUSS NETH AND CDN PAPERS HAS TENTATIVELY BEEN SCHEDULED FOR  
11APR.

CCC/054 071618Z YBGR6244



ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER

MF

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM GENEV YTGR1637 07MAR84

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ

INFO WSHDC MOSCO BNATO CANMILREPNATO LDN ROME PARIS BONN VMBFR  
HAGUE PEKIN TOKYO PRMNY NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP/DACPOL/DNACPOL/DSTRATA/  
CIS OSLO COPEN ATHNS WSAW BUCST BPEST ANKRA MDRID LSBON STKHM/SCDEL  
DISTR RGB LSD ETN MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDR RBD ZSI MINE MINT UGB  
IDD RBR RCR RSR RCD RSD CPD ZSP URT URR LCD  
REF MOSCO TEL XYGR0295 05MAR MYTEL YTGR1501 29FEB

---REACTION TO PMS INITIATIVE

FURTHER INDICATIONS OF FAVOURABLE USSR REACTION TO PMS  
INITIATIVE WERE GIVEN YESTERDAY DURING AND IMMED PRIOR TO WORKING  
LUNCHEON I GAVE AT O/R FOR VISITING CDN ACADEMICS. POSITIVE  
COMMENTS WERE ALSO MADE BY CD REPS OF SWEDEN AND INDIA, WHILE  
NONE OF FRENCH, JAPANESE NOR BRAZILIAN REPS COMMENTED DURING  
DISCUSSION ON THIS SUBJECT.

2. DURING INFORMAL EXCHANGE WITH SOME OF ACADEMICS AT O/R IMMED  
PRIOR TO WORKING LUNCHEON USSR DEPUTY REP TO CD, PROKOFIEV STATED  
THAT QUOTE THE USSR LEADERSHIP SUPPORTED PM TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE  
UNQUOTE. HE WENT ON TO REFER TO THE 10 PRINCIPLES OF COMMON GROUND  
ENUNCIATED BY THE PM AND SAID QUOTE WE AGREE WITH THEM UNQUOTE.  
LATER HE ADDED QUALIFICATION QUOTE MORE OR LESS UNQUOTE. DURING LUNCH-  
EON HE REPEATED HIS COMMENTS, THIS TIME REFERRING TO THE PRINCIPLES IN  
CONTEXT OF THEIR INCLUSION IN OUR FEB 21 CD STATEMENT.

...2

PAGE TWO YTGR1637 CONF

2.DURING LUNCHEON DISCUSSION OF THE MEASURE OF SUCCESS  
ACHIEVED BY THE PMS INITIATIVE ON BROAD PURPOSE OF CREATING  
A BETTER POLITICAL CLIMATE FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE EAST-WESTDIALOGUE,  
AMB EKEUS OF SWEDEN AND AMB DUBEY OF INDIA(AS WELL AS PROKOFIEV)  
EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE PMS INITIATIVE.AMB DE LA GORCE OF FRANCE,  
IMAI OF JAPAN AND DE SOUZA OF BRAZIL DID NOT/NOT COMMENT,CONFINING  
THEIR INTERVENTION TO QUESTION OF EFFECTIVENESS OF CD DURING  
SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION

BEESLEY

CCC/221 071150Z YTGR1637

MF

R E S T R I C T E D

FM DELHI WBGR1101 07MAR84

TO EXTOTT IDA

DISTR IDNZ IDAO IDAN

REF YOURTEL IDA0229 16FEB

---INDIRA GANDHI INTERNATIONAL PEACE FOUNDATION

WE HAVE BEEN WAITING FOR LETTER(NOT/NOT YET RECEIVED)MENTIONED  
REFTEL BEFORE REPLYING IN HOPES IT MIGHT SHED SOME LIGHT ON  
QUOTE INDIRA GANDHI INTERNATIONAL PEACE FOUNDATION UNQUOTE OR  
QUOTE INDIRA GANDHI INSTITUTE UNQUOTE.WE HAVE NO/NO INFO AND IN  
CHECKING WITH APPROPRIATE CONTACTS WE HAVE YET TO FIND ANYONE  
WHO HAS HEARD OF INSTITUTION BY EITHER NAME.

2.SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES MENTIONED REFTTEL WAS ESTABLISHED  
MORE THAN 20 YEARS AGO AND CAME UNDER WING OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU  
UNIVERSITY(JNU)AFTER ITS CREATION IN 1969.(JNU OPERATES AT GRADUATE  
LEVEL).SCHOOL OFFERS MA MPHIL,PH D PROGRAMMES.ITS RESEARCH  
PROGRAMMES QUOTE ARE ORIENTED TO CREATE FACILITIES FOR ADVANCED  
STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND AREA STUDIES UNQUOTE.ITS  
CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND ORGANIZATION,ONE OF SEVEN  
CENTRES,LISTS QUOTE DISARMAMENT STUDIES UNQUOTE AS ONE OF THREE  
FIELDS OF STUDY.

3.DOES LETTER PROVIDE ANY CLUES SUCH AS LOCATION WHICH MIGHT  
HELP US TO TRACK DOWN INDIRA GANDHI INSTITUTE?

CCC/068 080523Z WBGR1101

ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER

CDN EYES ONLY  
RESERVE AUX CDNS

mf

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM BONN ZQGR1092 07MAR84

TO EXTOTT(1DDZ

INFO HAGUE BRU OSLO ATHNS MDRID LSBON ANKRA WSHDC BNATO LDN

PARIS ROME PRMNY VMBFR GENEV WSAW PRGUE BPEST BGRAD STKHM/SCDEL

PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDR FPR RBR RBD RBG UGB URR RBRD RBP

RCR RCD

---PM INITIATIVE-SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS

SUMMARY:CONSULTATIONS WITH GERMANS ON SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS

PROVED USEFUL AS THEY SERVED TO ANSWER GERMAN QUESTIONS ON

SUBSTANCE AND HANDLING OF PROPOSALS.FRG WAS PARTICULARLY

INTERESTED IN ICBM MOBILITY PROPOSAL AS THEY SEE IMPLICATIONS FOR

INF WHERE MOBILITY OF WEAPONS CONCERNED IS USEFUL IN HELPING

TO DEFUSE PUBLIC CONCERN.THEY CLEARLY SAW ASAT PROPOSAL AS

HAVING MOST POTENTIAL AND ENCOURAGED US TO CONTINUE TO TRY TO

MOVE USA ON ASAT.

2.REPORT:SMITH AND CLADER MET FOR FOUR HOURS 01MAR(INCLUDING

WORKING LUNCH)WITH FRG ARMS CONTROL OFFICIALS FROM MFA AND MIN

OF DEFENCE,INCLUDING 45 MIN SESSION WITH FRG DISARM AMB FRED

RUTH.LATTER EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH CONSULTATION PROCESS

ON PROPOSALS ON WHICH WE HAD EMBARKED AND NOTED DIFFICULTIES

INHERENT IN ACHIEVING ANYTHING IN CD.MBFR HAD SHOWN HOW HARD

IT WAS TO GET THE USA TO MOVE TOGETHER WITH REST OF ALLIANCE--

...2

000870



PAGE TWO ZQGR1092 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

IT WOULD BE THAT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT IN CD.IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR LEGITIMACY OF ALLIANCE FOR IT TO GO INTO CD WITH COMMON POSITION TO EXTENT POSSIBLE.IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION OF ICBM MOBILITY PROPOSAL RUTH SAID THAT IF IT WERE HIS DECISION HE WOULD PROCEED ONLY IN CLOSEST CONSULTATION WITH USA.HE TENDED TO AGREE WITH USA THAT THIS ISSUE SHOULD NOT/NOT BE DEALT WITH IN CD.SMITH POINTED OUT WE HAD CONSULTED WITH USA FROM LAST NOV BUT RECEIVED LITTLE RESPONSE UNTIL WE MENTIONED TAKING ASAT TO CD.HE ALSO POINTED OUT WE WERE NOT/NOT LOOKING FOR NEGOTIATED TEXT(RUTH SAID HE THOUGH WE WERE)AND REFERRED TO POSSIBILITY OF PUTTING IDEAS IN LETTERS TO USA AND USSR.

3.ON ASAT RUTH SAID IT WOULD BE QUOTE BIG STEP FORWARD UNQUOTE IF WE COULD MOVE USA.IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITH RUTHS OFFICIALS HARTMANN(INF/START/OUTSERSPACE MFA DIV DIRECTOR)SAID FRG WARMLY SUPPORTED BASIC IDEA.RUTH NOTED THAT IN HISTORY OF ARMS CONTROL NEGS ONLY RW HAD BEEN BANNED BEFORE DEVELOPMENT AND IT WAS CLEAR WE HAD TO MOVE INTO AREA OF ANTICIPATORY ARMS CONTROL OR WE WOULD NOT/NOT BE ABLE TO CONTROL TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS. AT SAME TIME RUTH WAS NOT/NOT SURE THAT ACCEPTING CDN PROPOSAL WOULD DETER USA FROM STRATEGIC DEFENCE DEVELOPMENT.HE SUSPECTED THAT USA RESERVATIONS HAD TO DO WITH SDI:HOWEVER HE ALSO HAD IMPRESSION ADELMAN MIGHT BE POSITIVELY DISPOSED TO CDN IDEA.

4.RUTH ALSO ENQUIRED RE STATE OF CDA-GDR EXCHANGE ON ARMS CONTROL.

...3

000871

PAGE THREE ZQGR1092 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

SMITH MENTIONED IDEA WAS DEVELOPING IN DIRECTION OF GENERAL ARMS CONTROL CONSULTATIONS SOMEWHAT ALONG LINES OF FRG-GDR MTGS. (FRG INTEREST IN WHAT WE DO IN THIS AREA WITH GDR IS CLEARLY HIGH AND KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH FRG WOULD NO/NO DOUBT BE OF MUTUAL BENEFIT).

5. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS WITH RUTHS OFFICIALS DETAILS OF PROPOSALS WERE MORE THOROUGHLY EXAMINED. TECHNICAL EXPLANATIONS GIVEN BY CALDER WERE PARTICULARLY USEFUL IN SATISFYING GERMANS QUESTIONS. HARTMANN SAID THEY WERE ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN ICBM MOBILITY PROPOSAL AU THEY WERE CONCERNED OVER POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR INF NEGS. DURING INF STATIONING DEBATE WITH PEACE MOVEMENT IN AUTUMN 1983 ARGUMENT HAD BEEN USED THAT CRUISE AND PII STATIONING INCREASED POSSIBILITY THAT FRG WOULD BE PRIMARY TARGET FOR OTHER SIDE. FORCE OF THIS ARGUMENT HAD BEEN MITIGATED IN PART BY POINTING OUT INF ARMS WERE MOBILE. THUS TO PLACE ICBM MOBILITY LIMITS MIGHT RESULT IN PRESSURE FOR SIMILAR FORMULA FOR INF. SMITH AND CALDER POINTED OUT CDN CONCERNS WERE CLEARLY STRATEGIC. MOREOVER RESPECTIVE GEORGRAPHIC AREAS IN QUESTION WERE DISPARATE (FRG RELATIVELY SMALL)--SOME MOBILITY WAS ACCEPTABLE BUT TOO MUCH COULD CAUSE PROBLEMS. FINALLY, INF WAS BEING BASED IN MANNER THAT FACILITATED VERIFICATION WHEREAS WE WERE CONCERNED ICBM S WOULD NOT/NOT BE.

6. CALDER EXPLAINED THAT SECOND PROPOSAL WAS IN FACT NOT/;NOT SO MUCH VERIFICATION MEASURE AS SUGGESTION FOR CODE OF

PAGE FOUR ZQGR1092 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

BEHAVIOUR FOR TWO SIDES.WE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT SLCM S BEING PLACED ON GENERAL PRUPOSE BOATS.GERMANS AGREED WITH PRINCIPLE THAT ONUS FOR PROOF SHOULD BE ON SIDE PRODUCING THE SYSTEM AND NOTED USA REALLY HAD NO/NO IDEA HOW SLCM S COULD BE VERIFIED.

7.GERMANS APPRECIATED RECEIVING BACKGROUND TO CDN ASAT PROPOSAL. IN RESPONSE THEY SUGGESTED CONSIDERING VARIATIONS ON CDN APPROACH. IT SEEMED CLEAR USA WANTED TO KEEP OPEN OPTION OF ASAT FOR OFFENSIVE PURPOSES.USA ALSO MAINTAINED WHETHER USSR DESTROYED ITS SYSTEM WOULD NOT/NOT BE NOT/NOT VERIFIABLE.HOWEVER IN FRG VIEW TESTING WAS/WAS VERIFIABLE.GERMANS THUS THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE FEASIBLE TO ALLOW EACH SIDE ONE SYSTEM(EXISTING USSR,DEVELOPING USA SYSTEM)AND PLACE COMPLETE BAN ON TESTING.CALDER OBSERVED THAT VARIATIONS ON CDN IDEAS COULD CERTAINLY BE CONSIDERED.HARTMANN NOTED REAL QUESTION WAS LINK USA SAW BETWEEN ASAT AND SDI.SMITH MENTIONED POSSIBILITIES OF GROUND-BASED OR SHUTTLE-BASED LASERS BEING USED AGAINST SATELLITES. 8.SMITH REFERRED TO IDEAS FOR DEVELOPING SATELLITE MONITORING SYSTEM THAT SOME FRENCH FIRMS WERE ALSO INTERESTED IN. HARTMANN SAID GERMANS HAD NOT/NOT BEEN APPROACHED ON THIS IDEA. IN CONCLUSION BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT FURTHER AND EARLY EXAMINATION OF ASAT IDEAS IN BRU WOULD BE USEFUL.

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DISTR RCR DMF RGB IFB IDD IDA IDDZ UGB RBR URR

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---KISSINGER VIEWS ON NATO

FOLLOWING ARTICLE APPEARS IN 05MARCH FINANCIAL TIMES.

2.COMCENTRE PLEASE SEND BY FACSIMILE.

J R SCHRAM/mg

POL & ECON

370

J R SCHRAM

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# The Kissinger recipe

By Ian Davidson

F6/7  
2/3

LAST WEEK, in an extended essay in Time Magazine, Dr Henry Kissinger set out a detailed plan for the rebalancing of the Atlantic Alliance, with the Europeans taking more responsibility for their own defence. At this level, and generally, the idea is anything but new — it goes back several decades — and is indeed becoming a generally fashionable topic of study by analysts and of public pronouncement by the more imaginative European politicians. Yet the Kissinger essay raised a mini-tornado of disapproval from Brussels to Bonn and back again.

This is slightly puzzling. No one can seriously deny that the Alliance faces an accumulation of structural problems, military, financial and political, and only the most complacent would argue that these problems can be dealt with by shuffling them under the carpet. One might imagine that a contribution to the debate by a statesman with as much experience of the international scene as Henry Kissinger would call for deliberate consideration. But no; dismissal has been instant and sweeping, from the German foreign ministry, and from the civilian and military leadership of Nato.

Admittedly, many of the specifics of the Kissinger plan are debatable: some may be inherently misguided; others, if desirable, may be impracticable at least in the current state of Europe's development. But there can be no doubt that he means well; his recipes may or may not be the right ones, but at least his objective is to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance, and to avert a situation in which trans-Atlantic stresses could lead the Americans to career off in the direction of neo-isolationism or global unilateralism.

I suspect that the immediacy of the dismissal of the Kissinger idea has something to do with the fact that he is an American. When President Reagan proposed the development of space-based systems to ward off the danger of nuclear attack, he was widely denounced, both in Europe and in America, for indulging in a dangerous "star wars" fantasy. But when President Mitterrand, a few weeks ago, floated the idea of a European manned station in space to thwart any potential threat, Europe's politicians and strategists remained

absolutely calm, not to say indifferent.

When American spokesmen urge the European allies to step up their spending on conventional defence, to re-examine the entrenched strategy of forward defence, or to invest in hi-tech conventional weapons, as a substitute for tactical nuclear weapons, the Europeans complain that they are being got at. Yet among the French, of all people, it is now becoming acceptable to raise the long-taboo notion that there needs to be a change in the relationship between West Germany and nuclear weapons.

It is Jacques Chirac, no less, the leader of the Gaullist party, who has said that this problem needs to be addressed; how he does not claim to know, but somehow or other, he believes, it must be addressed. And quite recently a French socialist député, writing in Le Monde, argued that, as part of a move towards a more united European defence posture, the Germans should have dual-key control of some of the French nuclear weapons.

As between the two orders of ideas, stronger conventional defence and a re-opening of the German nuclear question, there should be no doubt which ought to be the more explosive in political terms, and which is more pressing in security terms. Yet it is the Americans who are perceived, because of their dominant position in the Alliance, as the trouble-makers; and also, of course, because America today is associated with Reaganism, with all that entails in unpredictability and global activism.

Nevertheless, the Kissinger ideas do deserve serious examination. And they deserve it all the more if it is true, as some suggest, that the good doctor still entertains hopes of returning to high office in Washington, perhaps in his old post of Secretary of State in a second Reagan administration.

Kissinger identifies two broad categories of problems in the alliance: the first military and doctrinal; the second political and economic. The military problem is that Nato's inadequate conventional forces make it predictably dependent on nuclear weapons, or nuclear parity driving the posture of

much of its credibility, and therefore seriously undermines public support for Nato doctrine. The politico-military problem is that, although Europe is much richer than the Soviet Union and potentially as rich as the U.S., it manifestly refuses to equip itself with an adequate conventional defence; yet at the same time it whines at the consequences of its dependence on American nuclear weapons and at the wilfulness of American leadership.

There are mitigating reasons for this undignified European posture, first among which is the special status of Germany. At their own choice, and at the insistence of their neighbours, allies and enemies, the Germans have renounced nuclear weapons; in the nuclear age this makes them ultimately dependent for their security on the nuclear deterrence provided by the American super-power.

Germany's dependence on America has been made even more difficult by the Gaullist

## Many of the specifics of the Kissinger plan are debatable

legacy. Twenty years ago, de Gaulle resisted might and main the American attempts to shift Nato strategy away from the massive nuclear retaliation, in the event of a conventional Soviet attack on Europe, towards what came to be called "flexible response": the U.S. believed this would restore credibility to the nuclear deterrent in Europe; de Gaulle believed it would further undermine it.

For five years his resistance was successful. When it finally failed, he withdrew France from the integrated military structure of Nato, and based French defence policy on the principle of total independence, both nuclear and conventional. Deprived of the French hinterland, geographic, military, logistical and political, the defence of Germany became even more dependent on the American alliance.

The trouble is that this dependency no longer provides reassurance. It may well be true, as most serious analysts claim, that the alliance still provides a secure and stable



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deterrence against a deliberate Soviet attack; if there are holes in the credibility of the nuclear doctrine, yet still a Soviet aggression would face horrific risks. Nevertheless, it is clear, from the controversy in many European countries, that many people do not feel confidence in the security posture.

Kissinger's answer to the problem is that henceforth the Europeans must assume greater responsibility for their own defence. It is idle for the Europeans to retort that they already provide 80 per cent of the ground forces and 80 per cent of the tanks and aircraft. The plain fact is that they spend much less on defence than the Americans, and it is they who are unhappy about the security situation. In any case, Kissinger is not just mouthing the old incantation about defence budgets; he is arguing that it is time the Europeans decided what kind of defence they would be happy with: as a corollary, the post of Supreme Allied Commander in Europe should be transferred from an American to a European general.

His preferred outcome would be that the Europeans would decide they wanted a stronger conventional defence, so as to reduce dependence on nuclear weapons, and would agree to provide it, in conjunction with an American contribution broadly on the present scale. But if the Europeans decided that they were unable to tackle the nuclear dilemma by providing a stronger conventional defence, then in that case the U.S. should act in accordance with a doctrine of nuclear dependence by withdrawing up to half its ground forces.

European responsibility for European security should also extend to arms control, according to Kissinger. The MBFR conventional force negotiations, which reconvene in Vienna next week, and the Eur-missile negotiations which were broken off late last year, are both mainly about European interests; in both of them, therefore, the leading role should be transferred to the Europeans.

It is easy to pick at many of the specifics of the Kissinger plan. The MBFR negotiations, for example, are already handled on the western side on a multilateral Nato basis; and in the case of the Eur-missiles,



Dr Kissinger set out detailed plan

it is hard to envisage the Europeans moving from an influential to a determining role in the control, and therefore the deployment, of nuclear weapons which belong to the U.S., and where any treaty must be ratified in the U.S. Senate. Even in MBFR, to give the Europeans an overtly decisive voice would virtually give them a decision-making power over the deployment of American troops in Europe. The Europeans already play an influential role in both negotiations; it is hard to see how this role could be much enlarged without raising profound constitutional issues in Washington.

Secondly, it is hard to see the advantage to the U.S. of withdrawing half its ground forces from Europe if the Europeans fail to strengthen their conventional defence effort appropriately. If the Americans share Dr Kissinger's doubts about the credibility of Nato's nuclear doctrine, or fear the probable consequences for themselves if it were ever called into play, it may be rational to reconsider the whole of their defence commitment to Europe; it must be much less rational deliberately to engineer a critical weakening of the conventional balance such as might encourage the Russians to try their luck at a purely conventional attack.

Nevertheless, the underlying thrust of the Kissinger thesis is almost incontrovertible. There is no objective reason why European governments should not provide the kind of defence effort, at least in the conventional field, with which they and their electorates would

be comfortable. If they don't like the present situation, whether it comes from dependence on nuclear weapons or from dependence on Reaganism, then they should do something about it. If new strategic thinking and the opportunities provided by hi-tech point towards a shift from nuclear to conventional weapons, by definition that should imply a corresponding shift from dependence on the U.S. to a greater degree of self-reliance.

It will be objected that a greater degree of European self-reliance is inhibited by national sovereignties, national traditions and national politics. In the economic sphere, these are the excuses trundled out to justify the petty protectionisms of national rivalry which have stalled the development of the European Community. In spite of the pressing imperatives of the economic crisis which have called for different attitudes ever since the first oil shock a decade ago. But if Europe's security is at stake, the weasel words will no longer do.

The French seemed to have recognised the nature of the problem: the Germans are wrestling with uncomfortable reality; the British pretend there is no problem, largely because Mrs Thatcher does not really accept that Britain is part of Europe. Henry Kissinger's recipes may be all wrong; but it is a fair bet that, when European Community leaders meet in Paris in June, President Mitterrand will press the debate about European responsibility for European security one step further forward.

**ACTION  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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TO EXTOTT IDDZ

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DISTR RCR IFB IDR IDA IDRA IDRL RGX RBD RCD RSR RSRD CPD IDD  
REF WSHDC TEL UNGR2093 02MAR

---MBFR:NEW USA POSITION;UK VIEWS

FCO DEFENCE DEPT ARE HESITANT TO COMMENT ON NEW USA MBFR PROPOSALS  
WITHOUT CONSIDERABLY FURTHER INFORMATION AND INTERNAL CONSIDERATION  
HERE.THEY DID HOWEVER TELL SMITH/CALDER IN MEETING ON PMS INITIATIVE  
THAT IN THEIR VIEW NEW US IDEAS WERE QUOTE NOT WHAT SHULTZ OR  
ABRAMOWITZ EXPECTED UNQUOTE,AND QUOTE PERHAPS IN WISHFUL THINKING  
WHICH MAY YET BE REALITY UNQUOTE SUGGESTED THAT NEW US APPROACH  
WAS SIMPLY PART OF NATURAL MBFR RHYTHM:AS WESTON SAID,IT IS SEEN  
HERE AS EFFORT TO GAIN TACTICAL ADVANTAGE,AND US SIDE MUST BE  
PREPARED TO FLESH IT OUT WITH TYPE OF DETAILS THAT WILL MEET  
PRESENTATIONAL TERMS.WESTON REPEATED WELL-KNOWN BRITISH POSITION  
ON MBFR,THAT WEST MUST BE PARTICULARLY CAREFUL NOT TO SELL  
BIRTHRIGHT FOR MESS OF POTAGE.NOTHING SHOULD BE GIVEN AWAY WHICH  
IN FACT COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT WESTERN SECURITY IN ORDER TO GAIN  
APPEARANCE OF MOVEMENT.

2.IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATIONS WITH DEFENCE DEPT WE HAVE BEEN TOLD  
...2

KOIT  
RUMMOG A 3186

PAGE TWO XNGR0538 CONFD

THAT BRITISH HAVE TAKEN AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE KNOWN THEIR VIEWS TO US OFFICIALS ENGAGED IN FORMULATING NEW POSITION. WHILE BRITISH HAVE NOT BEEN AS DETAILED IN THEIR RESERVE AS FRG HAVE BEEN IN PUTTING FORWARD THEIR MORE POSITIVE POSITION, QUOTE WE HAVE MADE OUR POINTS TOO UNQUOTE. AS RESULT OF THESE CONSULTATIONS BOTH WITH USA AND, EVIDENTLY, WITH FRG, DEFENCE DEPT OFFICIALS TELL US THAT THEY ARE CONFIDENT THAT DETAILED US PROPOSALS WILL TURN OUT TO BE TO OUR QUOTE MODERATE SATISFACTION UNQUOTE, -A GOOD COMPROMISE BETWEEN BRITISH (AND PENTAGON) CONCERNS ON THE ONE HAND, AND FRG (AND SHULTZ/ABRAMOWITZ) PRESSURES FOR MOVEMENT ON THE OTHER.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM HAGUE YWGR0392 07MAR84

TO EXTOTT IDR IMMED

INFO BONN LDN PARIS BRU BNATO COPEN OSLO MOSCO ROME STKHM/SCDEL  
NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DIPOL/DNACPOL WSHDC PCOOTT/FOWLER PRMNY GENEV  
DISTR RGX IDA IDAN IDRA IDD RBD RCR ZSP ZSI IFB RBR/IDDZ DMF RGB  
RSD RSR URR URD MINA

REF OURTEL YWGR0376 24FEB

---INF:VISIT TO WSHDC BY FM VAN DEN BROEK 28FEB-01MAR

VIGOROUS BUT DISCREET LOBBYING BY USA AMBASSADOR HERE, TWO VISITS  
TO USA OVER PAST FIVE MONTHS BY PM LUBBERS, VISIT LAST WEEK BY FM  
VAN DEN BROEK TO WSHDC WHERE HE WAS RECEIVED AT MOST SENIOR  
LEVELS INCLUDING PRES REAGAN, AND ANNOUNCED VISIT TO HAVE LATER  
THIS MONTH BY DEFENCE SECTY WEINBERGER, ALL ILLUSTRATE HIGH DEGREE  
OF INTEREST IN WSHDC IN DUTCH DECISION OF SITING OF CRUISE  
MISSILES. BOTH SIDES PLAY DOWN IDEA THAT REAGAN ADMIN IS TRYING TO  
BRING PRESSURE ON LUBBERS GOVT. OFFICIAL DUTCH LINE IS THAT VAN  
DEN BROEK VISIT WAS ROUTINE IN CONTEXT OF NORMAL BILATERAL  
CONSULTATIONS AND RECEPTION BY PRES REAGAN PERSONALLY WAS SIMPLY  
GESTURE OF RIENDSHIP. BEHIND SCENES, HOWEVER, THOSE WITH VAN DEN  
BROEK ADMIT THAT INF WAS MAJOR AND EXHAUSTIVE TOPIC OF  
CONVERSATION IN WSHDC. AND IN HAGUE, WHERE IT IS BECOMING  
INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT SIMPLE YES/NO QUESTION OF SITING OF

...2

PAGE TWO YWGR0392 CONF D

CRUISE MISSILES WOULD CAUSE DEFEAT OF GOVT IN PARLIAMENT,  
NEGOTIATIONS ARE GOING ON INTENSIVELY BEHIND THE SCENES TO TRY  
TO FIND ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE PACKAGE.ITS DEFINITION,HOWEVER,  
REMAINS VERY UNCLEAR.

2.REPORT:VOS,DIR OF ATLANTIC COOPERATION AND INTL SECURITY  
DIVISION AT MFA,WHO ACCOMPANIED FM VAN DEN BROEK TO WSHDC SAID  
VISIT TOOK PLACE IN CONTEXT OF NORMAL ROUTINE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS  
BETWEEN NETHS AND USA,BUT CONCEDED THAT IN THIS INSTANCE INF  
ISSUE HAD BEEN MAJOR TOPIC OF DISCUSSION.VAN DEN BROEK MET WITH  
VP BUSH,SECTY OF STATE SHULTZ,ASSISTANT SECTY OF STATE FOR  
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS BURT,DIR OF ACDA ADELMAN,NATL SECURITY ADVISOR  
MACFARLANE,INF NEGOTIATOR PAUL NITZE AND MEMBERS OF HOUSE OF  
REPRESENTATIVE FOREIGN AFFAIRS CTTEE.HE ALSO MET BRIEFLY AND  
UNEXPECTEDLY WITH PRES REAGAN FOR REASONS,VOS CLAIMS,WHICH BORE  
MARK OF FRIENDSHIP AND SHOULD NOT/NOT BE EXAGGERATED.

3.IN COURSE OF MTGS INF ISSUE WAS REVIEWED THOROUGHLY AND  
VARIETY OF SCENARIOS WAS EXAMINED.HOWEVER,VOS WAS EMPHATIC IN  
INSISTING THAT MTGS HAD NOT/NOT BEEN NEGOTIATING SESSIONS.DUTCH  
HAD NOT/NOT BROUGHT TO WSHDC ANY CONCRETE PROPOSALS AND  
AMERICANS HAD NOT/NOT PRESSURED THEM ON ANY COUNTER-PROPOSALS,  
DUTCH SIMPLY FELT THEY NEEDED TO APPRAISE AMERICANS OF  
PREVAILING SITUATION IN NETHS AS THEY SAW IT.APPARENTLY  
AMERICANS UNDERSTOOD THIS AND SHOWED UNDERSTANDING.WSHDC VISIT  
...3



PAGE THREE YWGR0392 CONF

WAS CONSIDERED TO BE USEFUL IN THAT IT ALLOWED EACH SIDE TO EXPOSE CLEARLY POINTS OF VIEW AND PROBLEMS THAT HAD TO BE FACED. VOS SAID CONVERSATIONS WERE RELAXED THROUGHOUT AND VAN DEN BROEK HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED WITH ONE HR TOUR D HORIZON WITH VICE PRES BUSH.

4. VOS REFUTED REPORT APPEARING IN FINANCIAL TIMES OF 02MAR84 TO EFFECT THAT PRES REAGAN WAS NOW WILLING TO ENDORSE A REDUCED NUMBER OF CRUISE MISSILES FOR DEPLOYMENT IN NETHS. VOS ADMITTED POSSIBILITY HAD BEEN ENVISAGED BUT IT WAS ONLY ONE AMONG MANY OTHERS. IT WAS THEREFORE INEXACT TO CONCLUDE THAT IDEA HAD BEEN ENDORSED BY ANYONE AND EVEN LESS SO BY PRES REAGAN. HE ALSO REFUTED COMMENT IN SAME ARTICLE TO EFFECT THAT US DEFENCE SECTY WEINBERGER WOULD VISIT HAGUE 29MAR FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSE TO QUOTE TRY TO RESOLVE UNQUOTE INF ISSUE IN ADVANCE OF JUNE DEADLINE SET BY DUTCH GOVT TO TAKE FINAL DECISION. HE SAID THERE WAS NO/NO DOUBT THAT ISSUE WOULD BE DISCUSSED BUT WEINBERGER WOULD NOT/NOT COME TO THE HAGUE TO QUOTE SOLVE UNQUOTE ISSUE. THINGS WERE NOT/NOT THAT SIMPLE.

5. VOS ADMITTED DUTCH GOVT WAS NOW THINKING MORE IN TERMS OF PACKAGE FORMULA TO BE SUBMITTED TO PARLIAMENT IN JUNE RATHER THAN A YES OR NO/NO TYPE QUESTION. DETAILS OF PACKAGE WERE STILL UNCLEAR AND SITUATION WAS EVOLVING RAPIDLY. THEREFORE IT WAS NOT/NOT PRACTICAL TO GO INTO ANY DETAILS YET. HE COMMENTED,

...4

PAGE FOUR YWGR0392 CONFD

HOWEVER, THAT PRESENT SIX DUTCH NUCLEAR TASKS WOULD BE PART OF ANY PACKAGE IN ONE FORM OR OTHER. HE CONFIRMED WHAT WE HAVE ALREADY REPORTED IN REFTEL THAT A CLEAR-CUT QUESTION OF THE YES OR NO/NO TYPE WOULD PROBABLY PROVOKE NEGATIVE RESPONSE FROM PARLIAMENT. IT WAS BECAUSE GOVT WISHED TO AVOID SUCH AN OUTCOME THAT PACKAGE WHICH COULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO SECOND CHAMBER HAD BECOME NECESSARY. 6. IN LATEST INF POLL PUBLISHED ONLY FEW DAYS AGO, 63/63 PERCENT OF RESPONDENTS DECLARED THEMSELVES AGAINST PROPOSED SITING, 24/24 PERCENT WERE IN FAVOUR AND 13/13 PERCENT HAD NO/NO OPINION. FURTHERMORE, 90/90 PERCENT SAID REDUCTION IN NUMBER OF MISSILES WOULD MAKE NO/NO DIFFERENCE. PARADOXICALLY, HOWEVER, OVER 60/60 PERCENT SAID THEY COULD AGREE WITH GOVT IF IT OPTED IN FAVOUR OF SITING. COMMENTS MADE BY PM LUBBERS AFTER PUBLICATION OF POLL RESULTS INDICATED THAT IT WOULD NOT/NOT BE FOR NETHS TO REDUCE UNILATERALLY NUMBER OF MISSILES. ANY SUCH REDUCTION, IF IDEA WERE TO BE RETAINED, SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED WITHIN NATO AS PART OF A BROADER BASED CUT IN TOTAL NUMBER OF MISSILES TO BE SITED IN EUROPE. AS FOR WEIGHT TO BE ACCORDED TO PUBLIC OPINION AS REFLECTED IN RECENT POLL PM SAID THAT GOVT BORE FINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND IN TAKING ITS DECISION OTHER FACTORS WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AS WELL.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM STKHM/SCDEL SCDL0242 07MAR84

TO EXTOTT IDA

INFO BNATO CANMILREPNATO PRMNY LDN BONN WSHDC BERN PARIS ROME  
VATCN VIENN VMBFR GENEV MOSCO WSAW BGRAD HSNKI ATHNS PCOOTT/FOWLER  
NDHQOTT/CPD/DNACPOL/DSTRATA

BAG BPEST PRGUE BUCST MDRID LSBON HAGUE ANKRA DBLIN DE OTT  
COPEN OSLO BRU DE SKM

DISTR DMF IFB IDAO IDAN IDD IDR IDRL RGB RSR RGX RBD RBR RCD RCR  
RSD ZSI JCX JLA JLO IMU IMD IDDZ

REF OURTEL 0173 21DFEB 0183 22FEB YOUR 260 27FEB

STKHM CONF: CONCEPT OF TREATY ON NON-USE OF FORCE

SUMMARY: IN SUGGESTING THAT WEST SHOULD NOT/NOT REJECT OUT OF HAND  
CONCEPT OF TREATY ON NON-USE OF FORCE OUR FIRST REFTTEL ANALYZED  
SOV MOTIVES IN PROPOSING IT AND SUGGESTED THAT WEST MIGHT TURN IT  
TO ADVANTAGE. THE MOST OBVIOUS WAY MIGHT BE TO HOLD OUT AGREEMENT  
ON SOME FORM OF TREATY AS PRICE FOR ACCEPTANCE OF MOST OR ALL OF  
WESTERN PACKAGE OF CSBMS. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY IS THAT WEST MIGHT  
RETAIN INITIATIVE BY EVENTUALLY COUNTER-PROPOSING NEGOTIATION ON  
METHOD FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN PARALLEL WITH, OR IN  
CONJUNCTION WITH, TREATY ON NON-USE OF FORCE UNDER CCSBMDE. ANALYSIS  
OF ORIGINS OF STKHM CONF AND WESTERN APPROACH TO IT SUGGESTS THAT  
ALLIES DO NOT/NOT REALLY HAVE A POLICY RPT POLICY WITH RESPECT TO  
CONCEPT OF TREATY ON NON-USE OF FORCE. IN PAST IT HAS BEEN ARGUED  
THAT IF ALLIANCE ONCE ADMITTED POSSIBILITY OF SUCH TREATY, MANDATE

PAGE TWO SCDL0242 CONFD

OF CCSBMDE WOULD BEGIN TO UNRAVEL AND FIRST STAGE COULD GO ON  
INDEFINITELY. BUT ON THE OTHER HAND IF WEST CONTINUES TO REFUSE  
TO RESPOND TO THIS QUOTE PROPOSAL UNQUOTE NEGOTIATIONS HERE OVER  
CONCRETE CSBMS MAY NEVER GET UNDERWAY, AN OUTCOME THAT WOULD  
PROBABLY BE MORE IN SOVIET INTERESTS THAN OUR OWN. WHILE THE  
QUESTION OF DEVISING A METHOD FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IS NOT/NOT  
FORESEEN IN MANDATE OF THIS CONF, NEITHER IS THE NEGOTIATING OF  
A TREATY ON NON-USE OF FORCE. IF LATTER IS BEING PRESENTED BY  
RUSSIANS AS A CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURE, FORMER COULD BE  
ADOPTED BY WEST AS ONE TOO. IN FACT, DEVELOPMENT OF METHOD FOR  
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN REGIONAL CONTEXT IS FORESEEN IN UN CHARTER  
WHILE TREATY ON NON-USE OF FORCE IS NOT/NOT LEGAL ASPECTS WOULD  
HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY WEIGHED, BUT ON INITIAL CONSIDERATION THEY  
DO NOT/NOT SEEM TO RULE OUT THIS APPROACH. THUS A WIDER SCENARIO  
MIGHT ENVISAGE WEST CONTINUING TO RESPOND TO PROPOSAL FOR TREATY  
ON NON-USE OF FORCE BY DOUBTING ITS VALIDITY (AS WE ARE NOW DOING)  
BUT SUBSEQUENT (AND BY WAY OF SEEKING WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE THAT  
IS SHAPING UP) COUNTER-PROPOSING PARALLEL NEGOTIATIONS ON DISPUTE  
SETTLEMENT. AT THE VERY LEAST, IF WPO WERE TO REJECT WESTERN PROPOSALS  
IN THIS RECARD, ALLIES WOULD BE IN BETTER POSITION TO CONTINUE  
RESISTING SOVIET INITIATIVE. BUT AT THE MOST (AND THIS IS THE SPIRIT  
IN WHICH THIS IDEA IS BEING DEVELOPED) APPROACH WE HAVE IN MIND  
MIGHT LEAD TO A METHOD FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT DOWN THE LINE AS  
ENVISAGED IN WESTERN QUOTE EVOLUTIVE UNQUOTE OR GRADUALIST APPROACH

...3

PAGE THREE SCDL0242 CONF  
TO CCSBMDE PROCESS.

2. DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSAL: WE AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE PREMATURE,  
AFTER ONLY EIGHT WEEKS AT TABLE, TO BEGIN TO CONSIDER ALTERING  
GRADUALIST APPROACH TOWARDS CCSBMDE THAT WE HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING  
UP UNTIL NOW. IT WOULD BE TOO SOON TO INJECT NOTION OF NON-AGGRESSION  
PACT INTO SEQUENCE INVOLVING TRANSPARENCY, CONSTRAINTS, REDUCTION IN  
CONVENTIONAL FORCES, METHOD FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AND,  
PERHAPS AT END, CHAPEAU IN FORM OF TREATY ON NON-USE OF FORCE.  
HOWEVER, AT SOME POINT, AND POSSIBLY AS SOON AS FORTHCOMING INTER-  
SESSIONAL BREAK, ALLIANCE WILL HAVE TO REASSESS ITS POLICY ON NON-  
USE OF FORCE, IF INDEED WE HAVE ONE, AND RECONSIDER TACTICS IN THIS  
REGARD.

3. DOES ALLIANCE HAVE A POLICY ON CONCEPT OF TREATY ON NON-USE  
OF FORCE? WHEN FRENCH SOUGHT SUPPORT OF ALLIES IN 1979, IN ORDER  
TO NEGOTIATE MANDATE FOR CCSBMDE IN MDRID, THEY EXPLAINED THAT THEY  
WERE PROPOSING TO GIVE SOV UNION A QUOTE PAN-EUROPEAN SECURITY CONF  
UNQUOTE, (IE A FORUM FOR THEM), IN RETURN FOR CONCRETE CSBMS, (IE  
POLITICO-MILITARY SUBSTANCE FOR US). FRENCH WERE CONFIDENT THAT  
RUSSIANS, IN TRYING TO RESTORE THEIR CREDIBILITY AFTER AFGHANISTAN,  
WOULD ACCEPT ZONE OF APPLICATION EXPANDED TO URALS AND WOULD AGREE  
TO PRECISE CRITERIA FOR CONCRETE CSBMS. FRENCH FURTHER SPECULATED  
THAT WEST MIGHT AGREE, AS LEVERAGE, TO CONSIDER TREATY ON NON-USE  
OF FORCE AT END OF CDE PROCESS, IE THE END OF STAGE II, WHEN ARMS  
REDUCTION IN THEORY WILL HAVE BEEN EFFECTED.

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4. FURTHER FRENCH STATED TWO MAJOR OBJECTIVES: (1) TO MAINTAIN POLITICALLY CREDIBLE AND DIPLOMATICALLY USEFUL WESTERN POSTURE IN FACE OF WPO PROPOSAL (ANNOUNCED IN WPO COMMUNIQUE, BUCST 1979) WHICH WERE INTERPRETED BY FRENCH AS AIMED AT TRADING CSBMS FOR DECLARATORY PROPOSALS SUCH AS NON-FIRST USE OF FORCE, AND (2) TO DEAL WITH CSBMS INSIDE PROCESS OF ARMS REDUCTION IN ORDER TO AVOID GIVING ILLUSION THAT THESE MEASURES WERE SUBSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT.

5. AS RECALLED IN OUR REFTEL 0173, NATO ANALYSIS OF PROPOSAL FOR TREATY ON NON-USE OF FORCE CONTAINED IN PRAGUE DECLARATION OF JAN/83 POINTED OUT THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO EXPLORE CONTENTS OF WESTERN COMMITMENTS TO NON-USE OF FORCE IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THERE WAS ROOM FOR PROMOTING POSITIVE AND ACTIVE WESTERN POLICIES IN THIS FIELD. IT SHOULD BE FURTHER RECALLED THAT IN COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT NAC MINISTERIAL MTG JUN/83, ALLIES STATED, IMPLICITLY REPLYING TO PRAGUE DECLARATION, THAT THEY LOOKED QUOTE... TO THE SOVS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF TANGIBLE RESULTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, SINCE THIS WOULD ENHANCE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE. THEY WOULD WELCOME ANY SERIOUS PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE CONFIDENCE AND COOPERATION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST UNQUOTE.

6. IN C-M(83)56 (REVISED) OF 24 OCT 83, QUOTE GENERAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS UNQUOTE ALLIANCE REAFFIRMED NEED TO MAINTAIN INITIATIVE IN ARMS CONTROL PROCESS THROUGH CCSBMDE. AIM WAS TO REDUCE POLITICAL AND MILITARY INSTABILITY CAUSED BY WPO SUPERIORITY IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE BY ADOPTING MEASURES, ENVISAGED IN MANDATE OF

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CCSBMDE, WHICH WOULD REDUCE RISK OF SURPRISE ATTACK AND INTIMIDATION AND ENSURE TRANSPARENCY AND OPENNESS THUS PAVING WAY FOR SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION MEASURES. WHILE IT WAS OBSERVED THAT PROPOSALS OF PURELY DECLARATORY NATURE MIGHT BE OPEN TO CRITICISM ON GROUND OF INCOMPATIBILITY WITH MANDATE, AND THAT CSBMS SHOULD ENTAIL NO/NO APPLICATION INVOLVING MORE ADVANTAGES FOR EAST AND WEST, IT WAS AGREED THAT WPO PROPOSALS SHOULD BE STUDIED ON THEIR MERITS.

7. AT SAME TIME, FOLLOWING PARTICULAR DANGERS WERE IDENTIFIED AMONG WPO OBJECTIVES FOR CCSBMDE: (1) TO FOSTER DISCORD AMONG WEST AS WELL AS BETWEEN WEST AND NNA, (2) TO MAINTAIN PROTRACTED GENERAL DEBATE AT CCSBMDE AS PLATFORM FOR SOV QUOTE PEACE OFFENSIVE UNQUOTE AND QUOTE MILITARY DETENTE UNQUOTE, (3) TO INSTITUTIONALIZE SECURITY DISCUSSIONS AMONG PARTICIPATING STATES AND THUS TO TRY TO GET, THROUGH POLITICAL/LEGAL MEASURES, RECOGNITION OF PERMANENT SOV DROIT DE REGARD OVER WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENCE ARRANGEMENT, (4) TO KEEP CCSBMDE IN BEING AND TO USE IT AS QUOTE SECOND COURT OF APPEAL UNQUOTE IN ORDER TO SUPPLEMENT, AS NECESSARY, SOV OBJECTIVES IN OTHER NEGOTIATING FORUMS.

8. ALL OF THIS SUGGESTS THAT IN FACT THE ALLIANCE DOES NOT/HAVE POLICY ON CONCEPT OF TREATY ON NON-USE OR NON-FIRST USE OF FORCE. WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT FOREGOING COMMENTS ON ORIGINS OF CCSBMDE, AND ALLIANCES CONSIDERATION OF THE INTELLECTURAL BASIS FOR WESTERN POSITION IN STKHM MIGHT BE TAKEN AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR EVENTUAL DISCUSSION IN BRU (AND INDEED BILATERALLY) ON HOW TO DEAL

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WITH TACTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF CONCEPT OF TREATY OF  
NON-USE OF FORCE.

9. IN THE PAST IT HAS BEEN ARGUED THAT SINCE THE PRINCIPLE OF  
NON-USE OF FORCE WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO TRANSLATE INTO REAL, CREDIBLE  
AND VERIFIABLE TERMS, IT WAS NEGATIVE AND ABSTRACT CONCEPT. TO  
ELABORATE IT, OR TO RESTATE IT, RISKED DEROGATING FROM OBLIGATIONS  
EXPRESSED IN MANDATE OF CCSBMDE. INTRODUCTION OF NON-USE OF FORCE  
AS CSBM COULD BE FIRST STEP TOWARDS EUROPEAN QUOTE REGIONALIZATION  
UNQUOTE OF NON-USE OF FORCE AND COULD LEAD TO ESTABLISHMENT OF  
EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM SEPARATE FROM UNITED NATIONS.  
IF ALLIANCE ONCE ADMITTED POSSIBILITY OF CONCLUDING NON-AGGRESSION  
PACT, WHICH RUNS COUNTER TO TERMS OF MANDATE (SO THE ARGUMENT RUNS),  
THEN THE FIRST STAGE OF CCSBMDE WOULD BE LIKELY TO GO ON  
INDEFINITELY DURING WHICH OTHER ELEMENTS MIGHT BE INTRODUCED  
LEADING TO AN INTERMINABLE AND UNMANAGEABLE MORASS.

10. THIS ARGUMENT CAN, OF COURSE, BE TURNED ON ITS HEAD: IF ALLIANCE  
CONTINUES TO DENY POSSIBILITY OF DISCUSSION NON-AGGRESSION PACT,  
THIS FIRST PHASE COULD GO ON INTERMINABLY (IF THE CONF DID NOT/NOT  
IN FACT BREAK UP ENTIRELY). HOW IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, CAN WEST  
RETAIN INITIATIVE IN CCSBMDE IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE ITS SUBSTANTIVE  
AIMS WITHOUT OPENING DOOR TO DISCUSSION OF NON-USE OF FORCE,  
WHETHER AND TO WHAT DEGREE ALLIES WOULD EVER BE ABLE TO AGREE TO  
WHAT RUSSIANS HAVE IN MIND? THE MORE WE DEALY IN RESPONDING  
SUBSTANTIVELY TO WPO, THE LONGER THEY CAN PURSUE THEIR OBJECTIVES

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STICK  
IT  
OUT  
?  
HERE: IE TO FOSTER DISCORD AMONG WEST AND BETWEEN WEST AND NNA  
AND TO PROLONG GENERAL DEBATE FOR SOV PROPAGANDA PURPOSES, WHILE  
KEEPING CCSBMDE IN BEING AS KIND OF COURT OF APPEAL TO SUPPLEMENT  
SOV OBJECTIVES IN OTHER NEGOTIATING FORUMS. MEANWHILE, DESPITE  
FRENCH OPTIMISM THAT IF WEST HOLDS FIRM RUSSIANS WILL GIVE UP  
NON-USE OF FORCE HERE, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THEY WILL BE WILLING  
TO ENTER INTO REAL NEGOTIATIONS OVER WESTERN PACKAGE UNTIL WE ARE  
READY TO DISCUSS THEIR IDEAS. IN OTHER WORDS, WEST WILL LOSE  
TACTICAL INITIATIVE.

11. BUT IF ALLIES HAVE CONTEMPLATED REAFFIRMATION OF PRINCIPLE OF  
NON-USE OF FORCE IN SOME FORM AND AT SOME POINT, HOW LONG WOULD IT  
BE NECESSARY TO HOLD DOOR CLOSED AGAINST ANY DISCUSSION OF THIS  
CONCEPT?

✓  
12. WE SUGGEST THAT ALLIES SHOULD LOOK AT POSSIBILITY OF ADOPTING  
MORE ACTIVE RATHER THAN COMPLETELY DEFENSIVE POSTURE VIS-A-VIS  
CONCEPT OF TREATY ON NON-USE OF FORCE. AIM WOULD BE EITHER TO TURN  
SOV PROPOSAL TO WEST'S ADVANTAGE OR AT LEAST TO NEUTRALIZE IT. AS  
POINTED OUT IN YOUR REFTTEL, WHILE WESTERN PROPOSAL DOES NOT/NOT  
CONTAIN REFERENCE TO NON-USE OF FORCE, THIS SHOULD NOT/NOT BE  
INTERPRETED AS REJECTION ON CONCEPT (WHICH IS EMBODIED IN UN  
CHARTER AND IN NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, AND REPEATED QUOTE REPEATED  
UNQUOTE IN FINAL ACT). WHILE GRADUALIST APPROACH TO CCSBMDE  
ENVISAGES POSSIBLE REAFFIRMATION IN SOME FORM OF NON-USE OF FORCE  
AT END OF LINE, THIS DOES NOT/NOT NECESSARILY MEAN IT CANNOT/NOT  
BE DISCUSSED BEFORE THEN. SIMILARLY, IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT

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NEGOTIATIONS OVER ARRANGEMENTS FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES  
(WHICH MAY WELL PROVE TO BE A MUCH MORE DETAILED AND DIFFICULT AND  
PROTRACTED AND INDEED MEANINGFUL EXERCISE THAN DRAFTING SOME GENERAL  
CLAUSES TO CONSTITUTE THE TEXT OF A TREATY OF NON-USE OF FORCE)  
SHOULD NOT/NOT BE DELAYED UNTIL END OF PROCESS AND RELEGATED TO  
ONE OR SEVERAL CSCE EXPERTS MTGS AT ATHNS OR ELSEWHERE.

13. THUS, WHAT WE CAN ENVISAGE IS THE PARALLEL NEGOTIATION, OPENING  
SOONER RATHER THAN LATER, OF A METHOD FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF  
DISPUTES, ON ONE HAND, AND TREATY ON NON-USE OF FORCE, ON THE OTHER.  
THIS WOULD INITIALLY BE A TACTICAL PLOY INTENDED TO COUNTER SOV  
INSISTENCE ON NEGOTIATING NON-USE OF FORCE IN PARALLEL WITH  
WESTERN CSBMS PACKAGE WITHIN THE BOSOM OF THE STKHM CONF. BUT AS IN  
THE CASE OF ALL GOOD PLOYS, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO LIVE WITH THE  
CONSEQUENCES OF ITS TURNING OUT IN ANOTHER WAY. IN THIS CASE THE  
QUOTE OTHER WAY UNQUOTE COULD BE MUCH MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE  
PURELY TACTICAL ONE, AND COULD LEAD TO VERY VALUABLE SUBSTANTIVE  
RESULTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR PHILOSOPHY OF CCSBMDE PROCESS.

14. FIRST ARGUMENT WE ANTICIPATE AGAINST THIS APPROACH, NOT/NOT  
ONLY FROM WPO BUT ALLIES AS WELL, AND SOME NNA (SWISS HAVE TRIED  
TO CONVINCE THEIR GROUP TO LINK NON-USE OF FORCE TO CONFLICT  
SETTLEMENT BUT AUSTRIANS OBJECT THAT IT WOULD MUDDY WATERS) IS  
THAT NEGOTIATION OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF  
DISPUTES IS NOT/NOT FORESEEN IN MANDATE OF CCSBMDE. NOR/NOR IS  
NEGOTIATION OF TREATY ON NON-USE OF FORCE. MOREOVER, IN SAME WAY

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THAT EAST ARGUES THAT LATTER IS CONFIDENCE-AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURE, WEST COULD INSIT THAT SO IS METHOD OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES A CONFIDENCE-AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURE. IF THIS ISSUE WERE NEGOTIATED UNDER CCSBMDE, RATHER THAN SPORADICALLY AT OCCASIONAL CSCE EXPERTS MTGS, DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE WOULD BE INDUCED AMONG PARTICIPATING STATES SINCE WAY OF RESOLVING THEIR DISPUTES OTHER THAN BY ARMS WOULD BE UNDER SERIOUS CONSIDERATIONS (AND IDEALLY, MIGHT ULTIMATELY BE ACHIEVED).

15. RUSSIANS ALREADY PROVIDED HOOK ON WHICH WEST COULD SEEK TO HANG THIS IDEA WHEN GRINEVSKY SAID ON 16 FEB, THAT HE WOULD WELCOME IDEAS ABOUT POSSIBLE CONTENTS OF TREATY ON NON-USE OF FORCE. ONE SUGGESTION PUT FORWARD BY GRINEVSKY IN THIS REGARD ALREADY TOUCHES ON PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES: QUOTE TO COOPERATE IN ENHANCING THE TASK OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN FULFILLING, PURSUANT TO ITS CHARTER, THE TASK OF SETTLING INNATL DISPUTES AND CONFLICT SITUATIONS UNQUOTE. THUS WESTERN PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE CONFLICT SETTLEMENT UNDER CCSBMDE COULD NOT/NOT BE REJECTED BY EASTERN EUROPEANS AS OUTLANDISH.

16. OBLIGATION TO RESOLVE DISPUTES PEACEFULLY IS EXPRESSED IN UN CHARTER IN WAY WHICH ALLOWS FOR DEVELOPMENT AND ELABORATION, UNLIKE PROVISION ON NON-USE OF FORCE. LATTER IS GENERAL AND, PRACTICALLY SPEAKING, UNIVERSAL. BUT ART. 33 OF UN CHARTER ON PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES ALLOWS FOR NEGOTIATION OF SUBSEQUENT TREATIES OR AGREEMENTS AND SPECIFICALLY MAKES REF TO QUOTE REGIONAL AGENCIES OR ARRANGEMENTS UNQUOTE. IN TERMS OF COMPATIBILITY WITH UN CHARTER,

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THERE IS MORE TO BE SAID FOR DEVELOPING PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AS OPPOSED TO NON-USE OF FORCE.

17. IN FINAL ACT, PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IS GIVEN SPECIAL ATTENTION AS SUBJECT FOR FOLLOW-UP AT EXPERTS MTG. ALTHOUGH THAT MTG, AT MONTREUX, ACHIEVED ONLY MINIMUM AGREEMENT, ITS DISCUSSIONS FORMED BASIS FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF DEVELOPMENT OF ISSUE NOT/NOT ONLY AT ATHNS BUT, IT COULD BE ARGUED, WITHIN CCSBMDE AS WELL, WHICH IS PART OF CSCE PROCESS.

18. WHILE THERE MAY BE TACTICAL ADVANTAGES IN COURSE OF ACTION THAT WE SUGGEST, WHICH COULD ALSO LEAD TO LONG-TERM SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS SOUGHT BY WEST, OTHER CONSIDERATIONS MUST BE WEIGHED CAREFULLY, PARTICULARLY LEGAL ASPECTS. WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO GIVE NON-USE OF FORCE AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES LEGALLY BINDING CHARACTER WHILE RETAINING CONCEPT OF POLITICALLY BINDING CSBMS CALLED FOR IN MANDATE? TRADITIONALLY, IT HAS BEEN ARGUED THAT GIVING ANY ASPECT OF FINAL ACT LEGAL STATUS DIFFERING FROM OTHER ELEMENTS IN IT WOULD UPSET BALANCE BETWEEN BASKETS AND, IN CASE OF SECURITY ASPECTS, THIS COULD LEAD TO SEPARATE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM. BUT IN LONG RUN, IF WEST SEEKS TO PUT INTO PLACE METHOD FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES, THIS LEGAL DIFFERENTIATION AMONG ELEMENTS OF FINAL ACT WOULD HAPPEN ANYWAY. MOREOVER, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT EQUAL AND COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF ALL ASPECTS OF FINAL ACT IS FEASIBLE OR EVEN DESIRABLE; OTHERWISE, NO PART OF FINAL ACT WOULD BE CAPABLE OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENT.

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MAIN QUESTION TO ADDRESS IS WHETHER ALLIES WANT TO GIVE CERTAIN ASPECTS OF FINAL ACT, SUCH AS PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AND NON-USE OF FORCE, PROMINENCE BY EMBODYING THEM IN TREATY FORM. WOULD SUCH LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF PARTS OF FINAL ACT NECESSARILY IMPLY THAT OTHER SECTIONS HAD BEEN DOWN-PLAYED OR IN EFFECT ABANDONED AS CONSEQUENCE?

19. ANOTHER CONSIDERATION IS THAT COMMITMENTS WHICH ARE LEGALLY BINDING USUALLY INCLUDE FORMULATIONS AND PROCEDURES FOR SUBMITTING DISPUTES UNDER THEM TO JURIDICAL OR ARBITRAL DETERMINATION. WHILE THIS IS OF COURSE ANOTHER ARGUMENT IN FAVOUR OF PARALLEL DEVELOPMENT OF NON-USE OF FORCE AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES, IT SEEMS TANTAMOUNT TO EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM. BUT AGAIN, SUCH DEVELOPMENT IS IMPLICIT IN WESTERN GRADUALIST CONCEPT OF CCBSMDE PROCESS WHICH FORESEES ADOPTION OF METHOD OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AND POSSIBLE CHAPEAU ON NON-USE OF FORCE AT END OF LINE.

20. WE WOULD THEREFORE SUGGEST THAT IN REPLYING TO THE SOV PROPOSAL FOR A TREATY ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE, WHICH INEVITABLY WEST MUST DO IF THIS NEGOTIATION IS EVER TO GET UNDER WAY, INITIAL POSTURE OF ALLIES WOULD BE TO CONTINUE REPEATING THAT THERE SEEMS TO BE LITTLE PURPOSE IN REITERATING COMMITMENT IN ART. 2 OF UN CHARTER, WHICH HAS FORCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, OR SECOND PRINCIPLE OF THE FINAL ACT. HOW COULD SUCH TREATY GIVE ADDITIONAL WEIGHT TO RENUNCIATION OF USE OF FORCE OR ADD TO EUROPEAN SECURITY AND STABILITY? RUSSIANS

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✓ SHOULD BE ASKED TO CLARIFY RELATIONSHIP OF PROPOSED TREATY WITH EXISTING OBLIGATIONS UNDER UN CHARTER AND SECURITY SYSTEM ESTABLISHED BY IT. SUBSEQUENTLY, WEST COULD INTRODUCE INTO CCSBMDE QUESTION OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT. FIRST AIM WOULD BE TACTICAL: IN LIKELY EVENT THAT ANY WESTERN PROPOSAL ALONG SUCH LINES WERE REJECTED BY RUSSIANS, ALLIES WOULD BE IN BETTER POSITION TO STALL ON NON-USE OF FORCE, ARGUING THAT IT IS ORGANICALLY LINKED TO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND TWO MUST GO TOGETHER. IN PUBLIC VIEW WEST WOULD BE SEEN TO HAVE RETAINED INITIATIVE IN ESPOUSING POSITION WHICH IS CREDIBLE AND MEANINGFUL. CONVERSELY, SOVIET PUBLIC POSTURE WOULD BE WEAKENED AND THEIR OPPOSITION TO WESTERN POSITION, IE, CONCRETE CSBMS AND METHOD OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES, WOULD BECOME INCREASINGLY UNTENABLE.

21. IN THE EVENT THAT RUSSIANS AGREED TO NEGOTIATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND NON-USE OF FORCE IN TANDEM, EFFECTIVE BRAKE ON SOV AMBITIONS WOULD BE IN PLACE. MEANWHILE, MORE PRESSURE COULD BE PUT ON RUSSIANS TO NEGOTIATE CONCRETE CSBMS FORESEEN IN OUR INTERPRETATION OF MANDATE OF CCSBMDE SINCE THEY WILL BE ANXIOUS TO HAVE SOME RESULTS OUT OF STKHM TO SHOW PROGRESS IN RESTORING QUOTE DETENTE UNQUOTE.

CCC/152 071530Z SCDL0242

Canada

FROM/DE • IDDDZ

SUBJECT • IDDZ Telegrams  
SUJET

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Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
March 6, 1984
Number/Numéro
IDDZ-0218

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Would you please arrange to give the early morning telegram pack to the mail room for delivery to IDDZ in the inter-office messenger run, instead of the present arrangement whereby we pick up the telegrams at the beginning of the morning. Thank you.

*Sheila Connick*  
Task Force Working Group



TO/À L. A. Delvoie

FROM/DE • G. J. Smith

REFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Visit of British MPs  
SUJET

Security/Sécurité
UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
March 6, 1984
Number/Numéro
IDDZ-0217

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

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Mr. Shenstone


Mr. Francis

Mr. Chistoff

Four British MPs (described as "Hot Properties" by our High Commission in London) will be in town next week. They have requested a briefing on "Defence and Disarmament with reference to Canada's commitment to NATO and the results of Prime Minister Trudeau's peace initiative".

2. Given the breadth of the topic and the references to NATO, I have suggested to RCR (Mader) that you would be best placed to brief on this subject, with possible assistance from IDDZ/IDR/IDA as you see fit.

3. The briefing is currently scheduled for ~~your office~~ *C-4 conf. rm.* at 10:00 a.m. on Wednesday, March 14. It is scheduled to run between 30-45 minutes.

  
Gary J. Smith

*Mr. Chistoff & Mr. Francis will join you. (Mr. Francis is doing a briefing with them prior to this.)*



MEMORANDUM

To  
A Office of the Under-Secretary

From  
Do MINA

Reference  
Référence

Security  
Sécurité

UNCLASSIFIED

Date

March 6, 1984

Subject  
Sujet Parliamentary Report - March 6

DPM/SSEA (2)  
MINA (11)  
MINE/Jalbert/  
Laverdure  
MINT/Burbridge/  
MacDonald  
PMO/Fairbairn  
PCO/Fadden/  
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CMR (2) NAX  
DMT PED  
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CGE TID  
CGL UGB  
CGS URD  
CMD XDX  
CML ZEP  
CPD ZSP  
EED ZSS  
EPD IMU  
ETD  
GAD ESD  
GGB TGX  
GMD  
IDD TDD  
IDDZ TED  
IMD UTD  
JCD  
LCD IMC  
LCR

IDR IDA  
RBR IDDZ

### ON THE HILL

The House met at 11:00 to complete debate on this the sixth and final appointed day of the Budget Debate. A vote to approve in general the budgetary policy of the Govt will be held at 5:45.

Yesterday, the Supplementary Estimates (C) 1983-84 were referred to their respective committees. The Speaker ruled that Miss Jewett's motion under S.O.30 that the House debate the testing of cruise missiles on Canadian soil did not satisfy the criteria for emergency debate.

Member Statements of Departmental interest: Jesse Flis spoke of the persecution of Mykola Horbal by Soviet authorities and the MP from Parkdale urged the SSEA to make representations on his behalf.

Q.P. questions of Departmental interest: CRUISE MISSILE TESTING

### SENSE OF THE HOUSE

Once again the Official Opposition, led by their principal Finance Critic, John Crosbie, pilloried the Govt for their economic policies, while the NDP's Pauline Jewett claimed that this Shrove Tuesday was a dark day in Canadian history, following the Federal Court decision to deny the injunction which would have prevented today's testing of the cruise. (see below)

While there are not yet any declared candidates, the impending Liberal leadership race has changed the atmosphere in the House and the Opposition is making great sport out of the perceived candidates. For example, when Ministers Johnston and Roberts responded to questions concerning Govt employment grants, Members on the other side of the corridor supplemented their usual cries of derision with "leader, leader."

The Manitoba language question refuses to die and the PM advised John-Robert Gauthier that the Federal Cabinet was currently considering two options: Constitutional resolution anticipating one from the Manitoba legislature; a submission to the Supreme Court as part of its consideration of the Bilodeau case. The PM suggested Mr. Gauthier might ask him this question in a couple of weeks.


In other debate, Bill Domm complained the oil majors, including Petro Canada, were price fixing; Jim Manly sought the Constitutional entrenchment of Indian self-govt.; and Flora MacDonald complained about the income tax system adversely affecting the poor.

### CRUISE MISSILE TESTING

Pauline Jewett argued that cruise testing made mockery of the claim that Canada was not in the nuclear arms race, and she said its testing had nothing to do with the NATO two-track decision. Responding at some length, the PM said this morning's test was the only one to take place this year and that he hoped progress at the arms limitation talks would make unnecessary future tests. Continuing, he said that if Canada had not obliged its

responsibilities, its credibility with NATO would have been questioned and the Warsaw Pact countries would also have found Canada less credible because Canada's standing depends on its participation in NATO. Regardless, the PM noted that while certain NATO allies were deploying nuclear arms, Canada would no longer have them on its soil after July 1, although the PM admitted that Canada would continue to permit US planes to overfly Canada with nuclear arms and the UK and Germany to test aircraft in Canada, capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The PM dismissed Miss Jewett's argument that the testing of the ALCM was unrelated to the December 1979 two-track decision. Rather, the guidance system is the same in both GLCM and ALCM and the PM opined that the ALCM was probably "the safest form of the triad" because it is the only part of the nuclear deterrent which could be recalled after launch because they are carried by B-52s which could be brought back to their base in case of error. Such was not the case, the PM said, with the submarine-launched or ground-launched ICBMs (the DPM was queried further on this subject following Question Period)

by whom?  
what was said?



D. Colin Robertson  
Departmental Assistant

TO/A • TRANSCRIPT

FROM/DE • FPR

REFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • CBC Radio - Commentary - Cruise testing  
SUJET

Security/Sécurité

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Date March 6, 1984

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WSHDC

CBC: The first test of a cruise missile guidance system in Canada is taking place this morning, despite many protests from all across the country. The comment from the position of one over whose territory the missile will fly, Jim Bentine, editor and publisher of the Cold Lake Grand Centre Sun.

Jim Bentine: As protestors and journalists gather in the small northeastern Alberta towns of Cold Lake and Grand Centre to mark the test of a weapon of destruction none of them will actually see, we must ask what does it all mean? Why is Canada testing the cruise missile? Of course, there is no single answer to such a question, as the dilemma of our Prime Minister well illustrates. On the one hand, he has spent the last few months pleading with the two superpowers to get back to the disarmament bargaining table. On the other hand, his armed forces are today testing a weapon that could only bring the peace that follows death. The problem is that it is impossible to escape the inherent contradictions in all of this. Two bumper stickers which have become big sellers in the Cold Lake region suggest there is more to this issue than meets the eye. One sticker, the one frequently seen on the bumpers of vehicles passing through the gates of the military base, reads "Peace through strength. Test the cruise". The other, seen far less frequently because it reflects an unpopular local stance, reads "Strength through peace. Don't test the cruise". Both messages are more profound than they may seem at first read. The inherent meaning of the peace through strength position is one of deterrence. Those strongly supporting the cruise tests see it as just another expression, and one that is long overdue, of Canada's responsibility to aid the West in maintaining a defense posture that will frighten the Soviets into peace. It's the biblical "an eye for an eye" argument. Meanwhile, the ant-cruisers argue that Canada must turn the other cheek. They say that a world in which the superpowers can already destroy each other thousands of times, the madness must stop somewhere, sometime. The cruise to them represents a dangerous new escalation of the arms race. They are both right and that's why the Canadian people are having so much difficulty with this issue. Opinion polls initially show the majority against the tests, but now they indicate Canadians are generally split on the issue. People in the Cold Lake

-2-

area are an exception to this, of course. They overwhelmingly support the tests, largely because many have a vested interest in a strong Canadian Armed Forces. However, in pursuing the topic with many strong pro-cruisers, I have rarely failed to find doubts. They support the test and indirectly the continuation of the arms race, because until now peace through strength has prevented full scale nuclear war. Until now, and that is the message the small group of protesters will bring to Cold Lakes and Canadians as they march in the snows of northeastern Alberta. It is a message of conscience, fear and doubt. Do we really know peace through strength will work in the future, they are saying. When will someone poke the first eye out, leading to the darkness we all know would soon follow. For commentary, this is Jim Bentine in Cold Lake, Alberta.

CBC: Jim Bentine is editor and publisher of the Cold Lake Grand Centre Sun.

*Joe Noble*



MF

C O N F I D E N T I E L

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--- L'IDEE FRANCAISE D'UNE DEFENSE EUROPEENNE OU LE DILEMNE DE FAUST

PROLOGUE: CIT LE MOMENT EST TELLEMENT BEAU QUE J'AIMERAIS POUVOIR

LE PROLONGER FINCIT. CETTE REPLIQUE DU FAUST DE GOETHE CARICATURE A

PEINE CETTE ETONNANTE AMBIVALENCE QUI MARQUE REFLEXION ACTUELLE DE

FRANCE SUR IDEE D'UNE DEFENSE EUROPEENNE. TERMES DU DILEMNE QUI SEM-

BLE SE POSER SONT D'UNE PART (A) CETTE ASPIRATION DES DIRIGEANTS

FRANCAIS A PROLONGER EUROPE JUSQUE DANS SA SECURITE ET SA DEFENSE

ET, D'AUTRE PART, (B) CETTE INEVITABLE CRAINTE DU CIT NUCLEAIRE

PARTAGE FINCIT AVEC COMME TOILE DE FOND UNE CONSTANTE MEFIANCE A

EGARD D'UNE STABILITE DE LA RFA A ASSURER. A LA BASE DE CETTE

SITUATION RESIDE UN QUESTIONNEMENT SUR DOCTRINE STRATEGIQUE DE LA

FRANCE SANS DOUTE PRINCIPALE RETOMBEE DE CRISE DES EUROMISSILES.

2. ANALYSE: CE TEL DRESSE EN QUELLE SORTE UN BILAN DE NOS RECENTES

RENCONTRES AVEC SPECIALISTES FRANCAIS EN MATIERE D'AFFAIRES

STRATEGIQUES ET DEFENSE (DONT P. LELLOUCHE DE IFRI). IL SE VEUT

AUSSI UNE MISE EN LUMIERE DES INQUIETUDES VEHICULEES PAR PRESSE

FRANCAISE, SURTOUT DEPUIS NOV83, CONCERNANT RAPPORTS FRANCO-ALLEMANDS

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ET QUI TOUTES SONT DIRECTEMENT LIEES A IMPLICATION/ROLE/PLACE DE RFA DANS UNE DEFENSE EUROPEENNE. IL SE VEUT ENFIN UN REFLET DES PRINCIPALES IDEES EMISES LORS DU COLLOQUE DE ACADEMIE DE LA PAIX (23 AU 25FEV) CONSACRE A CES THEMES ET AUQUEL AVONS ASSISTE.

3. (A) LE QUESTIONNEMENT CONCERNANT DOCTRINE STRATEGIQUE DE LA FRANCE.

ATTITUDE DU PRESENT GOUVT SOCIALISTE A ETE MARQUEE DEPUIS MAI 81 PAR UN MELANGE DOSE D'ATLANTISME ET D'EUROPEANISME: ATLANTISME EN TANT QUE ENGAGEMENT DE FRANCE A DEFENSE DE EUROPE AUX COTES DES EUA A ETE AFFIRMEE DE MEME QUE RECONNAISSANCE DE NECESSITE DU PARAPLUIE NUCLEAIRE AMERICAIN SUR EUROPE; EUROPEANISME EN TANT QUE FRANCE S'EST REVELEE PRINCIPALE PROMOTRICE D'UNE PRISE EN MAIN, VOIR D'UNE PARTICIPATION ACCRUE DES EUROPEENS A LEUR PROPRE SECURITE/DEFENSE, PARTICULIEREMENT AU SEIN DE UEO. POSITION PRISE PAR FRANCE TOUT AU LONG DE CRISE DES EUROMISSILES FUT MARQUEE PAR CE DOUBLE TRAIT MAIS QUI EST EGALEMENT REVELATEUR DES APPREHENSIONS QUI ONT ANIME CETTE POSITION.

4. CRISE DES EUROMISSILES A EN FAIT REVELE LES LIMITES DE DOCTRINE STRATEGIQUE FRANCAISE TANT DANS SES PRINCIPES ESSENTIELS (PARTICULIEREMENT AMBIGUITE/INCERTITUDE/INDEPENDANCE/FINALITE DISSUASIVE EXCLUSIVE) QUE DANS REALITE DES FORCES MILITAIRES (NUCLEAIRES) QU'ELLE RECOUVRE ET COMMANDE. EN ENDOSSANT OUVERTEMENT ET SANS

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AMBIGUITE DOUBLE DECISION DE 1979, PRES MITTERRAND REPONDAIT A UNE TRIPLE CRAINTE: (A) CELLE D'UN DECOUPLAGE (TOUJOURS REDOUTE) EUROPE/EUA QUI AURAIT EU POUR CONSEQUENCE DE LIVRER EUROPE A ELLE-MEME POUR SA DEFENSE POUR NE PAS DIRE A G.B. ET FRANCE POUR SA PROTECTION NUCLEAIRE; (B) CELLE D'UNE NEUTRALISATION DE RFA (VOIR DE EUROPE CENTRALE) QUI AURAIT EU POUR CONSEQUENCE NOTAMMENT DE PLACER FRANCE EN PREMIERE LIGNE ET DE COMPROMETTRE STABILITE DE CET AXE FRANCE/RFA ESSENTIEL AU PROJET EUROPEEN; (C) CELLE ENFIN D'UNE CONTAGION DU PACIFISME SUR SON SOL DONT CONSEQUENCE EUT ETE DE RANIMER UN DEBAT SUR DISPOSITIF NUCLEAIRE POURTANT PIECE MAITRESSE DE SA RELATIVE AUTONOMIE EN MATIERE DE DEFENSE (ET POURQUOI PAS D'UNE CERTAINE PART DE SA CREDIBILITE ET SON POIDS POLITIQUE INNAT). POUR PARER A DE TELLES CONSEQUENCES, FRANCE A DU S'EXPOSER/S'EXPOSER EN S'ENGAGEANT NOTAMMENT VIS-A-VIS DE SES PARTENAIRES EUROPEENS EN FAVEUR DU DEPLOIEMENT ALLANT MEME JUSQU'A INTERVENIR DANS DEBAT ELECTORAL ALLEMAND EN JAN83 (MITTERRAND AU BUNDESTAG). MOTIVATION ADDITIONNELLE POUR CE FAIRE A ETE FOURNIE PAR URSS QUI A RECLAME PRISE EN COMPTE DU DISPOSITIF NUCLEAIRE FRANCAIS DANS NEGS FNI. SOMME TOUTE LA FRANCE N'A PU SE CONFINER DANS UNE QUASI NEUTRALITE OU DANS SILENCE QU'AVAIT SOUHAITE GISCARD D'ESTAING A PROPOS DES FORCES FRANCAISES.

5. TOUT SE PASSE POURTANT COMME SI DANS ACTUEL CIT APRES-PERSHING

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FINCIT PRIX A PAYER POUR CETTE EXPOSITION/POUR CETTE NEUTRALITE  
COMRPOMISE MONTRAIT ENFIN LE BOUT DU NEZ. OR COMMENT DEMONTRER A  
RFA ET ALLIANCE UNE SOLIDARITE TANGIBLE TOUT EN PRESERVANT  
INDEPENDANCE ET CARACTERE CIT HEXAGONAL FINCIT DE DISSUASION  
NUCLEAIRE FRANCAISE ET SANS REMETTRE EN CAUSE DOCTRINE STRATEGIQUE  
AINSI QUE CONSENSUS NATL QUI LA SOUTIENT?

6. CETTE QUESTION EST FONDAMENTALE CAR ELLE TRADUIT COMPLEXITE/-  
PROFONDEUR DU DEBAT QUI PREND FORME ACTUELLEMENT EN FRANCE ET  
REVELE NATURE DES ENJEUX VERITABLES A LA FOIS POLITIQUES ET  
STRATEGIQUES. SOULEVER TELLE INTERROGATION REVIENT EN QUEQUE SORTE  
POUR LA FRANCE A DEVOIR PRECISER PRINCIPES D'AMBIGUITE/INCERTITUDE  
DE SA DOCTRINE TOUT EN LES PRESERVANT. TOUTEFOIS, DEUX DECISIONS  
RECENTES FOURNISSENT PREMIERS ELEMENTS DE REPONSE ENVISAGEE PAR  
DIRIGEANTS FRANCAIS A SAVOIR (A) REMPLACEMENT DES MISSILES  
TACTIQUES PLUTON PAR DES HADES D'UNE PORTEE DE 400KM ET  
(B) CREATION D'UNE FORCE D'ACTION RAPIDE (FAR).

7. ETATS MAJORS FRANCAIS SE GARDENT BIEN DE RECONNAITRE DANS  
CREATION D'UNE FAR UNE QUELCONQUE MODIFICATION DE SON OPTION  
STRATEGIQUE. AU PLUS S'AGIT-IL (OFFICIELLEMENT) DE MODERNISER ET  
D'ACCROITRE PUISSANCE D'UN CORPS D'ARMEE DESTINE A PROTEGER  
INTERETS VITAUX DE LA FRANCE MAIS SANS POUR AUTANT EN PRECISER  
DAVANTAGE ZONE EFFECTIVE D'APPLICATION OU CONDITIONS SPECIFIQUES

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D'ENTREE EN JEU. OBSERVATEURS PLUS CRITIQUES SOULIGNENT POUR LEUR PART, QUE PAR CREATION D'UNE FAR LA FRANCE (A) SE DONNE CERTES LES MOYENS DE DEFENDRE SON SANCTUAIRE (ET SES INTERETS VITAUX) BIEN AU-DELA DE SES FRONTIERES (B) MAIS AUSSI DE S'ASSOCIER A UNE RIPOSTE DE OTAN EN CAS DE CONFLIT CONVENTIONNEL LIMITE (Y COMPRIS SUR FRONT HORS EUROPE CENTRALE) (C) ET DE RASSURER RFA EN CONTRIBUANT PLEINEMENT A SA SECURITE (I.E. EN FOURNISSANT GARANTIE QUE FRANCE POURRAIT EFFECTIVEMENT INTERVENIR CIT BIEN A L'AVANT FINCIT). DOTATION DU MISSILE HADES SOULEVE PROBLEMATIQUE DE MEME NATURE PUISQUE CONSEQUENCE PREMIERE EN EST DE MENAGER TERRITOIRE ALLEMAND EN FAISANT PORTER CONFLIT AUX FRONTIERES ORIENTALES DE CETTE DERNIERE.

8. PAR CES DEUX DECISIONS FRANCE TENTE DE REpondre A CETTE CONTRADICTION DU CIT COMMENT FINCIT PARTICIPER A DEFENSE/SECURITE DE EUROPE (ET SURTOUT DE RFA) ET PRESERVER INDEPENDANCE (NEUTRALITE) DE SA DISSUASION NUCLEAIRE. COMME LE SOULIGNE LELLOUCHE, IL S'AGIT POUR DIRIGEANTS FRANCAIS DE CIT FAIRE QQUE CHOSE POUR LES ALLEMANDS FINCIT SANS ROMPRE CONSENSUS NATL SUR IDEES CLEFS DE POLITIQUE FRANCAISE DE DEFENSE QUE SONT INDEPENDANCE/AMBIGUITE/ INCERTITUDE. SOLUTION PRECONISEE SEMBLE DONC AVOIR COUPE LA POIRE EN DEUX EN MAINTENANT AMBIGUITE. ELLE VISE A DONNER A FRANCE MOYENS D'UN ENGAGEMENT DE FORCES CONVENTIONNELLES MAIS CLAIREMENT

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DEMARQUEES/DECOUPLEES DES MOYENS NUCLEAIRES TACTIQUES EGALEMENT  
MODERNISES ET D'UNE PLUS GRANDE PORTEE.

9. JUSQU'A PRESENT VOCATION CLAIREMENT HEXAGONALE DE POLITIQUE DE  
DEFENSE DE FRANCE (SURTOUT NUCLEAIRE) A ENROBE SA DOCTRINE  
STRATEGIQUE D'UNE RELATIVE QUIETUDE. MAIS TANT EXPOSITION POLITIQUE  
ADOPTEE LORS CRISE DES EUROMISSILES QUE CES DEUX DECISIONS RECENTES  
POURRAIENT BIEN RANIMER DEBAT NATIONAL ENTRE ATLANTISME/EUROPEANIS-  
ME. PARTIS DE DROITE, DONT M. CHIRAC, CRAIGNENT UNE CIT DERIVE  
ATLANTISTE FINCIT. CETTE CRAINTE DECOULE NOTAMMENT DE ASSOCIATION  
DU PRES MITTERRAND A DECLARATION DE WILLIAMSBURG. C'EST POURQUOI  
DROITE FRANCAISE SEMBLE S'ORIENTER VERS UN EUROPEANISME ACCENTUE  
SURTOUT SI ON EN JUGE PAR RECENTES DECLARATIONS DE M. CHIRAC,  
NOTAMMENT EN RFA, QUI ENVISAGERAIT CREATION D'UNE FORCE NUCLEAIRE  
EUROPEENNE AVEC PARTICIPATION ALLEMANDE TELLE PERSPECTIVE EST  
PARTAGEE PAR GISCARD D ESTAIN AUTRE PART, ON RETROUVE  
COMMUNISTES FRANCAIS FAVORABLES A PRISE EN COMPTE DU DISPOSITIF  
NUCLEAIRE FRANCAIS A GENEVE MAIS FAROUCHEMENT NATIONALISTES QUANT  
A JUSTIFICATION ET FINALITES DE TELS MOYENS.

10. MAIS A LA BASE DU COMPORTEMENT FRANCAIS RESIDE UNE DOUBLE  
MEFIANCE A SAVOIR A EGARD DES EUA ET DE RFA, SURTOUT, DANS CE CAS,  
A LUMIERE DE EVOLUTION POLITIQUE INTERIEURE RECENTE.

11. (B) LA QUESTION ALLEMANDE.

SI MEFIANCE A EGARD DES EUA PEUT SE RESUMER FACILEMENT PAR UN DOUTE

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QUANT A ENGAGEMENT AMERICAIN EN CAS DE CONFLIT LIMITE EN EUROPE, PROBLEME ALLEMAND EST PLUS COMPLEXE. POUR CONCLURE RAPIDEMENT SUR EUA, PRECISONS QUE CE QUE REDOUTE FRANCE (OUTRE DECOUPLAGE VOIR MEME RETRAIT AMERICAIN DE EUROPE) C'EST QUE AMERICAINS N'AIENT DEJA AMORCE UNE CERTAINE FORME DE DESENGAGEMENT. D'ABORD, UN DESENGAGEMENT ECONOMIQUE AUQUEL SE SUPERPOSE DESENGAGEMENT MILITAIRE SOUS LA PRESSION NOTAMMENT D'UN NECESSAIRE REDEPLOIEMENT DE SES FORCES EN RAISON DU CONFLIT EN AMERIQUE CENTRALE QUI MENACE EUA A SES FRONTIERES. PROJET DE STATION ORBITALE AMERICAINE EST EGALEMENT PREOCCUPANT PUISQU'INDICATIF D'UN CHANGEMENT STRATEGIQUE IMPORTANT DU FAIT DE JUXTAPOSITION DE DISSUASION/PROTECTION. SI CETTE CRAINTE EST REELLE EN FRANCE SANS DOUTE APPELLE-T-ELLE QUE REPONSE COMME CELLE D'UN GEN AMERICAIN LORS COLLOQUE DE ACADEMIE DE LA PAIX A L'EFFET CIT QUE EUA N'ONT PAS MAINTENU EN EUROPE PENDANT QUARANTE ANS 350,000 HOMMES POUR NE PAS REAGIR EN CAS DE CONFLIT MEME LIMITE FINCIT QUE CE SOIT AU NORD DE NORVEGE OU A L'EST DE TURQUIE. EN FAIT, FRANCE POSE DANS CE CAS DES DOUTES QU'ELLE NE POSE PAS SUR ELLE-MEME ALORS QUE TELLE INCERTITUDE CONSTITUE PRECISEMENT FACTEUR CLEF DE SA PROPRE STRATEGIE ET DE SON ENGAGEMENT A DEFENSE DE EUROPE.

12. REVENANT A QUESTION ALLEMANDE, QUE CRAINT LA FRANCE? ELLE CRAINT (A) ADOPTION D'UNE POSITION NEUTRALISTE (B) QUE REUNIFICATION ...8

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AVEC RDA NE SOIT PROJET TOUJOURS VIVANT (C) ET UNE MONTEE DE INDEPENDANCE NATLE. CES CRAINTES SONT REELLES ET NE SAURAIENT ETRE MINIMISEES MEME AU RISQUE DE N'Y RECONNAITRE QU'UN DEBAT FRANCO-FRANCAIS.

13. CERTES REUNIFICATION DES DEUX ALLEMAGNE EST-ELLE TOUJOURS INSCRITE COMME OBJECTIF DANS CONSTITUTION DE RFA. MAIS HOMMES POLITIQUES ALLEMANDS ONT POSE BLOCAGES A TELLE EVENTUALITE PRINCIPALEMENT EN ADHERANT A OTAN ET UEO, SANS PARLER DE CEUX QUI VONT DE SOI AU PLAN IDEOLOGIQUE ET ECONOMIQUE.

14. CERTES, MONTEE DU SENTIMENT D'INDEPENDANCE NATIONALE EST AUSSI UNE POSSIBILITE. S'IL Y A CHEZ DIRIGEANTS ALLEMANDS ACTUELS UNE CERTAINE CIT DISPONIBILITE FINCIT A L'EUROPE, FORCE EST DE RECONNAITRE QUE IDEE EUROPEENNE A SOUFFERT AU COURS DES DERNIERES ANNEES CERTAINES DECEPTIONS EN RFA, NOTAMMENT ECHECS DU SOMMET DE STUTTGART ET DU PLAN GENSHER. D'AILLEURS, PRESSE ALLEMANDE SE MONTRE DE PLUS EN PLUS CRITIQUE VIS-A-VIS DE CEE N'Y RECONNAISSANT QU'UNE LOURDE ADDITION DONT ELLE FAIT LES FRAIS. PLUS IMPORTANT, JEUNES GENERATIONS N'ONT PLUS CE COMPLEXE OU CETTE CIT MAUVAISE CONSCIENCE FINCIT DU PASSE PAS PLUS QU'ELLES N'ONT DE CIT RAISONS SENTIMENTALES FINCIT DE FAIRE L'EUROPE.

15. ENFIN, MOUVEMENT DE LA PAIX EN RFA A CREE UN CERTAIN TRAUMATISME EN FRANCE ET DE VIVES APPREHENSIONS. SI VOTE DU BUNDESTAG

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DE NOV83 ETAIT SANS EQUIVOQUE, DIRIGEANTS FRANCAIS ONT CRAINT UNE DESTABILISATION DE RFA OU PIRE SA NEUTRALISATION POSSIBLE.

APPREHENSIONS ACTUELLES SE FONDENT SUR CONSTAT DE CETTE ALLIANCE EN GESTATION ENTRE SPD/VERTS. SANS DOUTE PEUT-ELLE S'EXPLIQUER EN TANT QUE COMPORTEMENT (POUR SPD) D'UN PARTI D'OPPOSITION A RECHERCHE D'UNE BASE ELECTORALE OU COMME L'EXPLIQUAIT FERDINAND KINSKY (DG CENTRE INNTAL DE FORMATION EUROPEENNE), D'UN PARTI (SPD) QUI TENTE DE S'ASSURER QUE GOUVT MINORITAIRE QU'IL EST SUSCEPTIBLE DE COMPOSER SOIT ACCEPTABLE AUX VERTS LE MOMENT VENU.

16. SANS DOUTE DESSEIN POLITIQUE DE RFA ACTUELLE VA-T-IL DAVANTAGE DANS SENS D'UN ATLANTISME RENFORCE MAIS PAR UNE AUTONOMIE ACCRUE DE EUROPE AU SEIN DE OTAN. CECI POSE D'EMBLEE PROBLEME DU NUCLEAIRE I.E. DU NUCLEAIRE PARTAGE.

17. (C) L'IDEE FRANCAISE D'UNE DEFENSE EUROPEENNE.

COMME NOUS L'AVONS DECRIT PRECEDEMMENT, ATTITUDE RECENTE DE FRANCE VISAIT (A) A SE MONTRER SOLIDAIRE DE ALLIANCE ET (B) A RASSURER RFA EN REPONSE A CETTE DOUBLE MEFIANCE A ENDROIT EUA/RFA. BIEN SUR FRANCE A ADOPTE DES MESURES EN CE SENS MEME AU RISQUE DE SOULEVER DES INTERROGATIONS A PROPOS DE SA DOCTRINE STRATEGIQUE. MAIS DE SON EXPOSITION POLITIQUE DEUX CONSEQUENCES PRINCIPALES EMERGENT.

(A) D'ABORD, VIS-A-VIS DES NEGS FNI/START, FRANCE A EN QUELQUE SORTE PRIS PARTIE DANS UN CIT DEBAT QUI NE LA CONCERNAIT PAS FINCIT.

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SA NEUTRALITE EST ENTACHEE. C'EST POURQUOI IDEE QU'UN JOUR OU L'AUTRE PRISE EN COMPTE DE SON DISPOSITIF NUCLEAIRE DEVRA INTERVENIR PREND DE PLUS EN PLUS D'IMPORTANCE A TOUT LE MOINS PEUT-ON AUJOURD'HUI POSER LA QUESTION MEME SI REPONSE OFFICIELLE NOUS EST DEJA CONNUE. (B) ENSUITE, IL APPARAIT EVIDENT QUE RENFORCEMENT DE SA CAPACITE D'INTERVENTION ET D'AGIR CONCRETEMENT AU PLAN DE SECURITE DE EUROPE NE SAURAIT SE RESUMER A CREATION D'UNE FAR. LES CONTRADICTIONS INHERENTES A SA DOCTRINE ET MISES EN LUMIERE PAR DISCOURS FRANCAIS LORS CRISE DES EUROMISSILES, DOIVENT ETRE APLANIES PAR D'AUTRES INITIATIVES.

18. IDEE D'UNE DEFENSE EUROPEENNE EST DE CETTE NATURE MEME SI A CERTAINS EGARDS ELLE NE MANQUE PAS D'ETRE PERCUE, DANS UNE PERSPECTIVE CRITIQUE, COMME UN EXUTOIRE POLITIQUE POUR UN QUESTIONNEMENT A EVITER SUR SA DOCTRINE STRATEGIQUE. OR, IDEE D'UNE COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DE DEFENSE S'INSCRIT SUR FOND D'ECHECS. QU'IL SUFFISE DE RAPPELER ECHECS DE CED EN 54/AUTO-LIMITATION DECIDEE PAR CONSEIL DES MINS DE UEO EN 57 DES ATTRIBUTIONS DE ORGANISME QUI DEVENAIT UNE SUBSIDIAIRE DE OTAN/ ECHEC DU PLAN FOUCHET/ ECHEC DE FORCE MULTILATERALE 63-64/ RETRAIT FRANCAIS DU COMMANDEMENT INTEGRE DE OTAN EN 66. S'IL IMPORTE PEU D'IDENTIFIER RESPONSABILITE DE CES ECHECS, FORCE EST TOUTEFOIS DE CONSTATER QU'A CHAQUE OCCASION FRANCE ETAIT INEVITABLEMENT AU COEUR DE CES DEBATS ET QU'ESSENTIEL-

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LEMENT PROBLEME DE COOP MILITAIRE EUROPEENNE TENAIT EN DEUX POINTS  
(A) LE NUCLEAIRE PARTAGE (B) ROLE DE RFA.

19. DEPUIS AUTOMNE 81, FRANCE A CLAIREMENT INDIQUE SA VOLONTE DE  
REDYNAMISER UEO EN TANT QUE TRAITE REVISE DE BRUXELLES FOURNIT  
DEJA ASSISE JURIDIQUE NECESSAIRE AU DEVELOPPEMENT D'UNE CONCERTATION  
CIT POLITIQUE FINCIT ACCURE, FAUTE D'UNE PRESOMPTION FAVORABLE SIMI-  
LAIRE A COURT TERME AU NIVEAU DE COMMUNAUTE. COMME LE SOULIGNAIT  
CERTAINS INTERVENANTS LORS COLLOQUE DE ACADEMIE DE LA PAIX, UEO A  
MERITE DE NE PAS COMPRENDRE CERTAINS FAUTEURS DE TROUBLE TELLE CIT  
LA GRECE FINCIT. AUTRE GESTE SIGNIFICATIF CONCERNE REACTIVATION DE  
DISPOSITION DE ACCORD FRANCO-ALLEMAND DE63 PORTANT SUR COOPERATION  
MILITAIRE ET DISCUSSIONS POLITIQUES A CET EFFET. A DATE, S'IL EST  
CLAIR QU'UN DIALOGUE FRANCO-ALLEMAND A ETE RANIME, INTENTIONS  
FRANCAISES EN CE FAISANT SEMBLANT SE CONCENTRER SUR DEVELOPPEMENT  
D'UNE COOP EN MATIERE DE PRODUCTION D'ARMEMENTS. PARTAGE DU  
NUCLEAIRE AVEC RFA EST CIT EXCLU FINCIT POUR DIRIGEANTS FRANCAIS  
ACTUELS. OR IL EST CLAIR QUE RFA NE SAURAIT (SELON KINSKY) PAYER  
ADDITION DE MODERNISATION DU DISPOSITIF NUCLEAIRE FRANCAIS SANS  
QUE N'INTERVIENNE OCTROI D'UNE PART DE RESPONSABILITE CORRESPONDAN-  
TE DANS DECISION D'EMPLOI. IL VA SANS DIRE QUE D'EVIDENCE, DANS  
CE SCENARIO EXTREME, CONSEQUENCES STRATEGIQUES SONT OU SERAIENT  
CONSIDERABLES POUR LA FRANCE.

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20. EN FAIT DESSEIN FRANCAIS SEMBLE AVEC CONSTANCE ETRE DE VOULOIR VERITABLEMENT ANCRER RFA A EUROPE. SI UEO APPARAÎT COMME UN MODE CIT JURIDIQUE FINCIT DE POURSUIVRE TEL VISEE, PREOCCUPATION EXPRIMEE PAR PRES MITTERRAND A LA HAYE D'ASSOCIER EUROPE AU PROJET DE STATION SPATIALE AMERICAINE EST AUSSI DU MEME ORDRE. LE SPATIAL EVITE DE POSER QUESTION DU NUCLEAIRE. S'IL N'EST PAS POSSIBLE DE PARTAGER NUCLEAIRE AVEC RFA (TANT VIS-A-VIS DE RFA ELLE-MEME QUE DE URSS), LE SPATIAL PEUT L'ETRE. AVANTAGE EN EST D'ASSOCIER RFA A REVOLUTION STRATEGIQUE QU IMPLIQUE PROJET AMERICAIN, NE SERAIT-CE QUE SOUS COUVERT D'UNE PARTICIPATION TECHNOLOGIQUE ET MEME FINANCIERE A CIT PROTECTION FINCIT DE EUROPE. PLUS ENCORE, IL S'AGIT AUSSI D'ASSURER QUE EUROPE CONTRIBUE A NOUVELLE GENERATION D'ARMEMENTS QUE FRANCE NE PEUT A ELLE SEULE PRODUIRE ET QUI RISQUE DE RENDRE OBSOLETE SON DISPOSITIF NUCLEAIRE ACTUEL. SOMME TOUTE, IL S'AGIT BIEN LA D'UNE IDEE/D'UN DESSEIN A GARDER EN MEMOIRE POUR L'HEURE.

21. CONCLUSION: QUE RETENIR DE CE QUI PRECEDE? (A) D'ABORD QUE ATTACHEMENT FRANCAIS A IDEE D'UNE DEFENSE EUROPEENNE ET EMPHASE DONT ELLE FAIT OBJET NE PEUVENT S'EXPLIQUER PAR SEUL IDEAL D'UNE EUROPE PROLONGEE JUSQUE DANS SA SECURITE. OUTRE INEVITABLES INTERETS ECONOMIQUES ET TECHNOLOGIQUES, PRESENTES MOTIVATIONS FRANCAISES DECOULENT AUSSI D'UN SOUCI LEGITIME DE PRESERVER ET VALORISER

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SA DOCTRINE STRATEGIQUE. (B) AU PLAN POLITIQUE, IDEE D'UNE DEFENSE EUROPEENNE VISE A PRESERVER STABILITE DE RFA, A L'ANCER DAVANTAGE A EUROPE, A S'EN MONTRER SOLIDAIRE, JUSQU'A SA DEFENSE, EN OUVRANT PERSPECTIVE DE L'ASSOCIER AU DIALOGUE POLITIQUE EN LA MATIERE ET POURQUOI PAS A SA PROTECTION. LA OU LE BAS RISQUE DE BLESSER, C'EST SANS DOUTE DANS LE FAIT QU'EN METTANT ACCENT SUR REVITALISATION DE UEO, FRANCE EVITE POUR L'INSTANT, PAR UNE TELLE IDEE, DIFFICILE QUESTION DU NUCLEAIRE PARTAGE AVEC RFA D'AUTANT QUE DECISION PRISE AVEC CREATION DE LA FAR A UN IMPACT SURTOUT DANS L'ORDRE DU CONVENTIONNEL. (C) AU PLAN STRATEGIQUE, IDEE D'UNE DEFENSE EUROPEENNE VISE MOINS A PREPARER LES LENDEMAINS D'UN EVENTUEL DECOUPLAGE EUA/EUROPE (TOUJOURS PREOCCUPANT POUR FRANCE) QU'A RAFFERMIR ROLE DE EUROPE AU SEIN D'UNE ALLIANCE ATLANTIQUE AINSI RENFORCEE. UNE EUROPE FORTE EST PERCUE COMME MEILLEURE CONTRIBUTION A ATLANTISME TOUT COMME A L'EUROPE ELLE-MEME. CE FAISANT TOUTEFOIS, LA FRANCE TENTE D'EVITER DE DEVOIR PRECISER SON PROPRE ENGAGEMENT SI CE N'EST DANS L'ORDRE DU CONVENTIONNEL DE MEME QU'A EVADER INTERROGATIONS SUR SES MOYENS NUCLEAIRES. LE DECOUPLAGE CONVENTIONNEL/NUCLEAIRE EST AINSI MAINTENU. (D) ENFIN, ET IL S'AGIT LA D'UNE DIMENSION IMPORTANTE, DIRIGEANTS FRANCAIS TENTENT D'EVITER UNE MISE EN QUESTION INTERIEURE ENTRE TENDANCES ATLANTISTE/EUROPEANISTE. CE QU'IL CONVIENT PLUTOT DE POSER CE SONT BASES DE ...14

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CE QUI POURRAIT SUSCITER UN ELEMENT ADDITIONNEL DE RENFORCEMENT DU CONCENSUS NATIONAL DEJA EXISTANT. PROMOUVOIR UNE EUROPE PLUS FORTE CADRE BIEN AVEC UNE TELLE PREOCCUPATION.

22. CIT LE MOMENT EST TELLEMENT BEAU QUE J'AIMERAIS POUVOIR LE PROLONGER FINCIT. MAIS, CE FAISANT, FAUST SAVAIT QUE LA SANCTION EN SERAIT DE CONFIER SON AME A MEPHISTO. SI L'ENJEU DE CETTE IDEE D'UNE DEFENSE EUROPEENNE N'APPELLE PEUT-ETRE PAS UN DEVOUEMENT AUSSI DRAMATIQUE FORCE EST DE RECONNAITRE QU'IL S'INSCRIT SUR UN FOND SINON DE CONTRADICTIONS A TOUT LE MOINS D'INTERROGATIONS. AVONS TENTE ICI D'EN SOULEVER QQUES UNES EN FAISANT ETAT DE CE QUI NOUS APPARAIT POUR L'HEURE PLUS IMPORTANT DEVELOPPEMENT INTERVENU DEPUIS AVENEMENT DU REGIME SOCIALISTE EN MATIERE DE POLITIQUE DE DEFENSE ET EN REGARD DE PERCEPTION FRANCAISE DE EUROPE. IL Y A CERTES LA UN CHOIX POLITIQUE IMPORTANT ET SANS DOUTE AUSSI UN PARI ESSENTIEL SUR L'ALLEMAGNE.

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---TIMES SERIES ON NATO

FOLLOWING IS SIXTH ARTICLE IN TIMES SERIES ON NATO, APPEARING  
IN TIMES OF 06MAR.

2.COMCENTRE PLS SEND BY FACSIMILE.

*J R Schram*  
J R SCHRAM/mg

POL & ECON

370

*J R Schram*  
J R SCHRAM





As the Atlantic alliance celebrates its thirty-fifth anniversary, it is particularly appropriate to rededicate ourselves to the great task we set

for ourselves in 1949. The more closely the nations of the alliance can work together, the better we will be able to preserve peace and stability, and the better it will be for people everywhere.

The values that bind Nato together are not abstract concepts. Individual liberty, the rule of law, and respect for dignity of the individual are priceless and real. They have been handed down to us at enormous sacrifice of blood and treasure. They are the cement of the alliance and we can never take them for granted. And it is the success of democracy, not the military power of the totalitarians, that will shape the rest of this century.

The world has changed a great deal since the representatives of 12 states met in Washington, on April 4, 1949, to sign the treaty establishing the alliance. But the underlying unity and purposes of the Atlantic community have not changed.

The founding members of Nato pledged to safeguard the "freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples" and to consider an armed attack against any one of them an attack against them all. Having just experienced the most devastating conflict in history, alliance leaders knew first hand the dangers of war, and the requirement for unity to deter it.


But they had more than sound historical understanding. They had remarkable foresight. The structure of Atlantic cooperation which they built has ensured the longest period of European peace, stability and progress in history.

The challenges which the Atlantic alliance confronts today are no less difficult. If we face them with the same determination, creativity, and sense of responsibility we have shown in the past, the future will be secure. If we are to achieve true peace, we must work for it.

The bedrock of our alliance is our unshakable commitment to ensure our security through collective self-defence. There is no alternative but to maintain a credible deterrent military posture and political solidarity. The continuing growth of Soviet military power will require a sustained effort by all of us to reduce disparities in the military balance, to broaden our cooperations to make the necessary investments to keep the peace.

Nato is not solely a military alliance. We also seek to improve the well-being of our people. Sustained economic growth will be the key. In this regard, we need to resist protectionism while we expand our cooperation in the fields of science and technology. We have long recognized that developments beyond the treaty area are relevant to our own well-being.

Building a constructive relationship with the world beyond the treaty area will require great energy and wisdom. We need to work



together in addressing the human, social, political and economic conditions which create the instability on which radicalism and Soviet interventionism feeds. This does not mean expanding the treaty area. But it does mean working closer together in sharing the burdens and solving the problems.

Since its creation, Nato has always had to address the question of how best to deter Soviet attack. The future will be no different. And we have agreed on the outline of the answer: defence and dialogue. There is no evidence that future Soviet behaviour will be anything but a serious threat to our security and to those principles on which a humane international system must be based. The answer for the future will still be defence and dialogue, a policy of reasonable strength combined with the commitment to search for ways to reduce the risk of conflict. Our challenge is to follow a policy of realism, strong enough to protect our interests but flexible enough to spare no effort in finding a fair way to reduce the levels of arms.

## A candle of freedom we must preserve

Sometimes, even in the free countries, we forget the richness of our most precious possession: freedom and human rights. People who live in tyranny, however, can see freedom much more clearly. It shines like a candle in the dark. It is our responsibility to speak out and to work hard for the dignity of mankind, to improve human rights, and to hold governments accountable for their behaviour. This challenge has no limits.

The experience of the past 35 years has prepared the nations of the Atlantic community to overcome these challenges. As long as we stand together we will remain secure. We have not learned rote formulas to be applied to all situations whether they fit or not. What we have learned is that the alliance is truly durable. While we cannot take our partnership for granted, we can be certain that patience, cooperation, and hard work will pay off. Any undertaking will ultimately be judged by the challenges it accepts and by those it overcomes. We have accepted a worthy challenge and

## In the sixth of our series marking 35 years of Nato, President Ronald Reagan calls for continued resolution in resisting the Soviet threat and declares there can be no limit in challenging breaches of human rights

overcome many of them over the years. There is no reason to doubt the future.

This continuing vitality is nowhere more evident than in the deepening of alliance consultations on the question of nuclear arms control and maintenance of the alliance's nuclear deterrent. The 1979 INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) decision, taken in response to the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles threatening Western Europe, is a shining example of the alliance's traditional approach to western security—the dual foundation of defence and dialogue.

Nato has implemented both tracks of that decision, despite unprecedented political and military threats from the Soviet Union. Nato was responsible for the initiation of the Geneva arms control talks, which the Soviet Union at first resisted. It was through consultations within Nato that our arms control positions were developed. And it has been the unity and determination of Nato which has made possible the actions needed to maintain our nuclear forces in Europe.

Contrary to popular assertions, the alliance is reducing rather than increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons. The alliance agreed that as INF weapons were introduced, existing weapons would be removed on a one-for-one basis.

In addition, however, last autumn Nato decided to reduce the Nato nuclear stockpile by an additional 1,400 weapons. Together with the 1,000 warheads removed three years ago these unilateral reductions will bring the number of weapons withdrawn since 1979 to 2,400. The overall Nato stockpile will be reduced by one third.

The INF experience is an extremely important lesson for the future. It shows the ability of democratic governments to work together. Despite the stress, even with governmental changes in all of the countries directly involved, we will have been able to maintain a coherent policy. Contrary to the pessimism of many critics, dictators, ship, do not have an inherent advantage when dealing with free people. When governments remain open, people will respond in the best interests of freedom and peace.

The US will continue to work with our allies to ensure deterrence

at the lowest possible level of nuclear weapons, and to strengthen the capability of conventional forces to deter conflict and lessen the likelihood of war.

As we work to ensure a credible military posture, we are also creating the basis from which to seek more stable and productive East-West relations. On January 16 I underscored my personal commitment to building a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union, on the basis of realism, strength, and dialogue.

The United States is prepared to pursue the dialogue with the Soviet Union in all areas of our relations, from arms control to regional issues, from human rights to bilateral concerns. While I cannot predict the intentions of the Soviet Union, I firmly believe that it is in the interest of both sides that arms control negotiations go forward in all areas which had been under discussion.

The East-West dialogue must also embrace the full range of issues contained in the Helsinki Final Act. If it does not, we cannot expect to strengthen mutual confidence and understanding. In our bilateral dealings with the Soviet Union, and in the multilateral channels of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the nations of the Atlantic community will continue to pursue improvements in the rights of the individual, in greater communication and access, and in meaningful dialogue on the wide range of issues affecting the people of the continent.

## From isolationism to awareness

The United States did not come easily to the Atlantic alliance. Independence and continental isolation has been a long tradition. As President Washington put it: "Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have no or a very remote relation." That may have been true two centuries ago, but that view was swept away in the violence of two world wars. It became clear that there was no sensible alternative to an active policy of collective security if the democratic nations of the West were to survive.

So long as the sense of common heritage and interests remains vigorous in the West, and so long as the world remains the dangerous and challenging place that it is today, then the Atlantic Alliance must be strong and vibrant. On the occasion of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, President Truman stated: "If there is anything certain today, if there is anything inevitable in the future, it is the will of the people of the world for freedom and for peace." I share President Truman's optimism.

© Times Newspapers Limited, 1984

A full collection of articles in this series will be published in book form in cooperation with the Georgetown Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington.

F 2/6  
3/3



External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

TRANSMITTAL SLIP - NOTE D'ENVOI

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -  
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

*After signature on return of M. Delvoie  
make copy for Larry, IDD, IDA, IDR*

*Done*

30

*File  
28-6-1-  
 Trudeau*

TO/A DMF (through IFB)  
FROM/DE IDDZ  
SUBJECT/SUJET Centre for Defence and Arms Control

Security	
Sécurité	CONFIDENTIAL
File	
Dossier	28-6-1- TRUDEAU
Date	March 5, 1984

ATTACHMENT  
PIÈCE JOINTE Memorandum to the Deputy Prime Minister and  
Secretary of State for External Affairs (IDDZ-0215)

DISTRIBUTION	RECORD OF CONSULTATION (Names/Divisions) RAPPORT DE CONSULTATION (Noms des individus/Directions)	ACTION/SUITE À DONNER
MINA (3) MINT (2) MINE Parl Sec USS DMT DMF FPR CPD CMRR (2)		The attached memorandum is for your signature, if you agree.
IDD IDA IDR		REQUIRED BY/DEMANDÉ POUR  L. A. Delvoie Chairman Task Force Working Group Prime Minister's Task Force on East-West Relations and International Security

TO BE RETAINED WITH FILE COPY - A CONSERVER AVEC L'EXEMPLAIRE DESTINÉ AU DOSSIER

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M. FILE  
DIARY

L. A. Delvoie  
Task Force Working Group  
5-5912

CONFIDENTIAL

March 5, 1984

IDDZ-0215

IDD  
IDA  
IDR

Memorandum for:  
The Deputy Prime Minister and  
Secretary of State for External Affairs

28-6-1-TRUDEAU	
	9

c.c. Minister for International Trade  
c.c. Minister for External Relations

SUBJECT: Centre for Defence and Arms Control

In the attached letter to the Prime Minister, you outlined some of your thinking on the creation and mandate of the Centre for Defence and Arms Control announced in the Speech from the Throne. There remain a number of outstanding questions and issues on which I would welcome your views as we pursue our discussions with the PCO and DND on this subject. These include:

- Should the Centre be created by ministerial decision or by legislation?
- Should the Centre have a right to provide policy advice to the Minister and/or the Government?
- Should the Centre have an obligation to provide policy advice to the Minister and/or the Government on request?
- What should be the Centre's relationship to the Department of External Affairs? to the Department of National Defence?
- Should the Centre have a board of governors or should its director report direct to the Minister? (We understand that the PCO has, on its own initiative, approached Bill Barton to ask him whether he would be willing to serve as Chairman of the board of governors of the Centre.)
- Should the Centre be given responsibility for administering that portion of the Disarmament Fund which is earmarked for public information and education, and which is now administered by the Department? (This represents approximately two-thirds of the Fund, as opposed to one-third which is used to contract for research in support of departmental operations and policy formulation.)

...2

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

- What should be the name of the organization (e.g. Centre for Defence and Arms Control, Canadian Council on International Security, Institute for Peace and Security)?

(sgd.)

Michael Shenstone  
Assistant Deputy Minister  
Political and International  
Security Affairs

(sgd.)

de Montigny Marchand



External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
CABINET DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

ACTION REQUEST/FICHE DE SERVICE

Lloyd Francis MP			No. A 06059
Subject: Lets fr. Municipalities re res on peace initiatives			Action div./Dir. responsable IDD
Letter dated/Lettre en date du 84-03-05	Date rec'd in MINA Date de réception à MINA 84-03-08	Date sent to div. Date d'envoi à la dir. 84-03-08	Info. division(s)/Direction(s) informée(s)
Action to be completed and white slip returned to MINA by L'action doit être complétée et la feuille blanche retournée à MINA par			84-03-16
Comments/Commentaires			

ACTION REQUIRED/ACTION REQUISE	FOR DIV. USE/POUR L'UTILISATION DE LA DIR.
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for signature of SSEA Réponse pour la signature du SEAE	Date received/Date reçu Mar. 8/84
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for the signature of Réponse pour la signature de	Action officer/Agent responsable A Després
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply by Division Réponse de la direction to note & file ??	Disposition Answered Apr 5/84
<input type="checkbox"/> For information and any necessary action Pour l'examen et suite à donner, s'il y a lieu	Date
For MINA use/Pour utilisation de MINA	


ALL TRANSFERS TO BE REPORTED TO MINA  
REGISTRY  
LE REGISTRE DE MINA DOIT ÊTRE AVISÉ DE  
TOUT CHANGEMENT

5-1047

A-06059

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES  
HOUSE OF COMMONS  
CANADA

LE PRÉSIDENT  
THE SPEAKER



O T T A W A  
March 5, 1984

The Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, P.C., M.P.  
Deputy Prime Minister and  
Secretary of State for External Affairs  
Room 209-S, Centre Block  
House of Commons  
O T T A W A

Dear Colleague:

For your information, I am sending you, herewith,  
copy of the resolutions supporting federal peace initiatives  
received from:-


- Regional Municipality of Niagara, Ontario
- Corporation of the County of Northumberland, Ontario
- County of Huron, Ontario
- Corporation of the County of Essex, Ontario
- Corporation of the City of Nanticoke, Ontario

Yours sincerely,

Lloyd Francis


Lloyd Francis

Enclosures



OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY  
PRIME MINISTER  
MAR 6 1984  
CABINET DU VICE-  
PREMIER MINISTRE





## OFFICE OF THE CLERK

The Regional Municipality of Niagara  
2201 St. David's Road, P.O. Box 1042  
Thorold, Ontario L2V 4T7  
Telephone: (416) 685-1571

FEB 17 9 25 AM '83  
February 13, 1984

Our Ref: F 2-84

SPEAKER'S OFFICE  
LA PRESIDENCE

Mr. J.A. Brezina, Clerk  
The City of Stoney Creek  
777 Highway No. 8  
Box 9940  
Stoney Creek, Ontario  
L8G 4N9

Dear Mr. Brezina:

Re: Resolution No. 23-6  
City of Stoney Creek

At its meeting of February 2, 1984, the Council of the Regional Municipality of Niagara endorsed your Council's resolution on nuclear disarmament, supporting all initiatives by our Federal Parliament and the Prime Minister promoting peace among the superpowers and all nations.

By copy of this letter, we are notifying the Speaker of the House of Commons of our endorsement of this resolution.

Yours very truly,

W.J. Dawson  
Regional Clerk

WJD:sr

Encl.

cc: Speaker of the House of Commons ✓

THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF NIAGARA

Finance Committee

January 25, 1984

F 2-84

Council Session February 2, 1984 No 3-84

Moved by Councillor Mann

Seconded by Councillor Cummings

That Regional Council endorse the resolution of the  
City of Stoney Creek on nuclear disarmament, supporting  
all initiatives by our Federal Parliament and the  
Prime Minister promoting peace among the superpowers  
and all nations.

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY

CLERK, Regional Municipality of Niagara

000926

THE CORPORATION OF THE  
**COUNTY OF NORTHUMBERLAND**

PETER A. CRAMP, A.M.C.T.  
CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER



860 WILLIAM STREET  
COBOURG, ONTARIO  
K9A 3A9  
TELEPHONE (416) 372-5322

FEB 23 9 15 AM '83

OFFICE OF COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR  
SPEAKER'S OFFICE  
LA PRESIDENCE

February 13 1984

~~Mr. J. A. Brezina, A.M.C.T.,~~  
Clerk, City of Stoney Creek,  
777 Highway No. 8, Box 9940,  
Stoney Creek, Ontario, L8G 4N9.

Dear Sir:

re: Resolution---initiatives by the Federal Parliament  
and the Prime Minister for promoting peace among  
the super powers and all nations

Please be advised at County Session held on February 8, 1984,  
Council resolved that the resolution passed by your Council on  
December 13, 1983, concerning the above be endorsed.

yours truly,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "P. Hay".

P. Hay,  
Deputy-Clerk-Treasurer.

mam---ph

c.c. Speaker of the House of Commons

COUNTY OF HURON

BILL G. HANLY, A.M.C.T.  
CLERK-TREASURER AND ADMINISTRATOR  
WILLIAM R. ALCOCK, C.A., A.M.C.T.  
DEPUTY CLERK-TREASURER



FEB 13 9 11 AM '83

TELEPHONE 524-8394  
AREA CODE 519

COURT HOUSE SQUARE  
GODERICH, ONTARIO  
N7A 1M2

February 2, 1984

SPEAKER'S OFFICE  
LA PRESIDENCE

Mr. J. A. Brezna, City Clerk

City of Stoney Creek

Box 9940

STONEY CREEK, Ontario

L8G 4N9

Re: Resolution re nuclear disarmament

Your communication dated January 9, 1984 was  
presented to our February 2, 1984 session of County Council.

Action was taken by our Council as indicated below:

Huron County Council concurred with the resolution.

Yours very truly,

  
Clerk-Treasurer &  
Administrator.

BGH:MAS

c.c. Speaker, House of Commons,  
Ottawa, Ont.

c.c. Murray Cardiff, MP  
Huron-Bruce



# The City of Stoney Creek

777 Highway No. 8, Box 9940, Stoney Creek, Ontario L8G 4N9 — Tel. 643-1261

January 9, 1984

County of Huron  
RECEIVED

JAN 10 1984

Clerk-Treasurer

TO THE CLERK OF THE MUNICIPALITY

Dear Sir or Madam:

The attached resolution was passed by the Council of the City of Stoney Creek at its meeting held Tuesday, December 13, 1983.

Would you please present this resolution to your Council for endorsement and if endorsed, notify the Speaker of the House of Commons.

It would be appreciated, if you could also send me a copy of your Council's decision.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "J. A. Brezina".

J. A. Brezina, A.M.C.T.  
City Clerk

JAB/jr  
encl.

# THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF STONEY CREEK

RESOLUTION NO. 23-6

SESSION: DECEMBER 13, 1983

MOVED BY Councillor DiIanni

SECONDED BY Councillor Santarelli

WHEREAS nuclear disarmament is an issue of paramount importance affecting the lives of every resident in our municipality, let it be known that the City of Stoney Creek supports all initiatives by our Federal Parliament and the Prime Minister promoting peace among the superpowers and all nations, that this motion be circulated to all municipalities in Ontario with a population of over 15,000 people for support, and that a copy of the resolution be sent to the Speaker of the House of Commons.

Carried.

William L. Sears, Mayor



# Corporation of the County of Essex

Office of the Administrative Assistant

Lee A. Recchia  
Administrative Assistant

February 3, 1984

FEB 7 12 13 PM '83

SPEAKER'S OFFICE  
LA PRESIDENCE

Mr. J. A. Brezina, A.M.C.T.  
City Clerk  
City of Stoney Creek  
Box 9940, 777 Highway No. 8  
Stoney Creek, Ontario  
L8G 4N9

Dear Mr. Brezina:

Re: Your Council's resolution concerning nuclear disarmament

Your resolution was discussed by the Essex County Council at a meeting held on February 1, 1984 and the following action was taken:

- a) filed \_\_\_\_\_
- b) endorsed XX
- c) not supported \_\_\_\_\_
- d) other \_\_\_\_\_

Yours truly,

Lee Recchia  
Administrative Assistant

LR:db

c.c. Speaker of the House of Commons ✓

230 MA STREET

PORT DOVER, ONTARIO

NOA 1N0

FEB 1 9 25 AM '83



DAVID M. KILPATRICK A.M.C.T.

(519) 583-0890

SPECIAL NOTICE  
LA PRÉSIDENCE

THE CITY OF NANTICOKE  
February 1, 1984.

Our file: DK-84-36 F&A

Mr. J. A. Brezina, A.M.C.T.  
City Clerk  
The City of Stoney Creek  
Box 9940  
Stoney Creek, Ont.  
L8G 4N9

~~Mr. Brezina~~

This letter is to advise that your resolution regarding nuclear disarmament and the promotion of peace among nations has been considered and the following recommendation passed:

"That the City of Stoney Creek's resolution regarding nuclear disarmament and the promotion of peace among nations be supported."

Yours truly,

David M. Kilpatrick, A.M.C.T.  
City Clerk

DMK/ws

p.c. Mr. Lloyd Francis M.P., Speaker of the House

Encl.





Photocopied January 25, 1984 COUNCIL RECORD

# The City of Stoney Creek

777 Highway No. 8, Box 9940, Stoney Creek, Ontario L8G 4N9 — Tel. 643-1261

January 9, 1984

TO THE CLERK OF THE MUNICIPALITY

Dear Sir or Madam:

The attached resolution was passed by the Council of the City of Stoney Creek at its meeting held Tuesday, December 13, 1983.


Would you please present this resolution to your Council for endorsement and if endorsed, notify the Speaker of the House of Commons.

It would be appreciated, if you could also send me a copy of your Council's decision.

J. A. Brezina, A.M.C.T.  
City Clerk

JAB/jr  
encl.

COUNTY OF OXFORD  
TREASURER'S OFFICE



REFER TO

COMMITTEE .....

COUNCIL .....

DEPARTMENT .....

OTHER .....



# THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF STONEY CREEK

RESOLUTION NO. 23-6

SESSION: DECEMBER 13, 1983

MOVED BY Councillor Dilanni

SECONDED BY Councillor Santarelli

WHEREAS nuclear disarmament is an issue of paramount importance affecting the lives of every resident in our municipality, let it be known that the City of Stoney Creek supports all initiatives by our Federal Parliament and the Prime Minister promoting peace among the superpowers and all nations, that this motion be circulated to all municipalities in Ontario with a population of over 15,000 people for support, and that a copy of the resolution be sent to the Speaker of the House of Commons.

Carried.

William L. Sears, Mayor

Mr. Bennett ⑧

Mr. Smith

+ Task Force file

March 1/84

28-6-1

(Trudeau)

Pierre Trudeau and the Diplomacy of Peace

by

John Kirton

ACC	REF	DATE
FILE		DOSSIER
28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE		
Mission		

John Kirton is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto and the co-author, with David Dewitt, of Canada as a Principal Power, (Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 1983)

Prime Minister Trudeau's recently concluded peace initiative has quite properly dominated the attention of those Canadians anxious to assess their country's capacities in the international realm, its current stature in world affairs and the personal contribution made by their departing leader to Canadian foreign policy as a whole. The initiative on east-west relations and international security, begun in September of 1983 and formally ended five months later, displayed Canada's ability, at a time of pressing domestic difficulty, to make an unprecedented, sustained, investment of its most valuable political resources in the international issue of overriding significance. For the first time in the post-1950 era the initiative demonstrated Canada's standing as an effective principal in the rarified realm of those with an ongoing responsibility for ensuring a secure world order. And in doing so it confirmed Pierre Trudeau's mastery of the art of combining his personal intellectual skills and international reputation with the formidable diplomatic and national assets of the country he has led for sixteen years.

Yet many Canadians, burdened by a conception of their country as a distinctly secondary international power and by an enduring suspicion of Prime Minister Trudeau, remain profoundly skeptical of these accomplishments and the entire peace initiative itself. Their critique, while often indirect, is certainly comprehensive. It extends from the very motives for the initiative, through its method of preparation, substantive basis and diplomatic execution, to its ultimate impact on events abroad. In the realm of motivation, the Prime Minister is charged with a sporadic interest in foreign policy questions of this sort, a desire to sustain his prime ministership, party or historical reputation, an interest in playing to the disarmament instincts of publics at home and abroad, and a wish to publicly distance Canada from the United States or to affect the latter's internal political debates. In regard to

preparation, the criticisms centre on his reliance on an official task force and selected American intellectuals, rather than the rich talent in the Canadian diplomatic establishment, functional and technical reaches of the civil service, and the university community beyond. From this elite process allegedly flowed unspecific, unoriginal proposals which ignored the real causes of East-West tension and arms control stalemate, which inspired a diplomatically unprepared, unilateral set of public and philosophic summit-level discussions punctuated by personal outbursts, and which aimed at fellow middle powers or at securing for Canada the role of interlocutor between the two superpowers. Thus, the critics conclude, the initiative was not taken seriously abroad, received little concrete support from key powers, and was readily rejected while other states moved at their own pace to produced the real improvement in the East-West climate that the first few months of 1984 have seen.

While many of these immediate individual criticisms will readily recede as evidence about the initiative becomes available, they are collectively sustained by the logic built upon two false premises. The first assumes the Prime Minister's motives for the initiative to be essentially personal, and thus easily discovers an elitist process generating public rhetoric which had no concrete, durable effect. More importantly, the second premise rests on the conviction that a small or middle power Canada was obviously overreaching its influence in trying to intrude into the select great power club of East-West relations in their nuclear dimension. It is thus inevitable that the Prime Minister's real motives lay elsewhere, that ephemeral rhetoric from political managers is all that could have resulted, and that the Prime Minister ought to have confined himself to the prescribed middle power modus operandi of seeking small gains in those select functional areas where

Canada's technical and legal skills provided some credentials.

### Motivation

The first premise and its ensuing logic is easily dispelled by looking at the evidence regarding the Prime Minister's motivation. Pierre Trudeau is no latecomer to the ranks of those worried about nuclear dilemmas on the global scale. His legacy begins with his passionate anti-nuclear involvement in the debate over Canadian military commitments in the early 1960's, and continues after 1968 with his success in denuclearizing Canada's military roles, his leadership in the international non-proliferation movement from 1974 onward, and his subsequent strengthening of the arms control voice in External Affairs and at the United Nations Special Sessions on Disarmament. More recently, one can point to his speech at Notre Dame in May of 1982, his successful initiative at the Williamsburg Summit of May 1983 in securing a seven-power commitment to "devote [the summiteers] full political resources to reducing the threat of war", and his genuine intellectual and moral dilemmas over Canada's cruise missile decision.

In deciding whether to undertake his initiative Pierre Trudeau wrestled with the question of whether he could do most as a retired leader or active prime minister supported by the full resources of his state, and it appears that he delayed his retirement until his initiative was largely completed. Were his intended audiences the publics at home or abroad, the easy popular solution would have been a refusal to assist the U.S. in testing air-launched cruise missiles in Canada, and, armed with such moral superiority, a public crusade abroad echoing the precepts already voiced by such purists as Mr. Palme of Sweden and Mr. Papandreou of Greece. Instead he chose the far more demanding challenge of embarking on an initiative, with both public and private dimensions, that remained faithful to, and could thus effectively

mobilize, Canada's position as a major, fully committed member of the Western alliance. Indeed it was probably this serious preoccupation with moving major states abroad that left him an easy prey at times for the temptations of his political staffers anxious to convert his diplomatic successes abroad into partisan and personal advantage at home.

### Preparation

Thus the Prime Minister sought a serious initiative that would have immediate effects on the dangerous political climate prevailing in the international system which threatened to choke the prospects for civilized relations between its major members on both sides of the east-west divide. The preparation for such an initiative demanded the mobilization of skilled diplomatic professionals who could rapidly produce a series of meaningful proposals which stood some chance of arresting the upward spiral of megaphone diplomacy, dying dialogue and hardening suspicions abroad. The result was a task force consisting primarily of those officials, at all levels, from External Affairs and National Defence, who could combine diplomatic and arms control expertise with an iconoclastic penchant for new ideas and who could, above all, generate a broad set of creative and workable options within ten days. In devising these options, the Task Force canvassed a wide array of alternatives, including the possibilities of fostering real peaceful settlement of disputes in peripheral regions of east-west confrontation. The Task Force drew on ideas from within the bowels of the bureaucracy, from the Prime Minister himself and from its own brainstorming sessions, to generate an extensive amount of options and recommendations for prime ministerial and ministerial consideration.

In choosing among these options subsequently at Meach Lake, the Prime Minister was assisted by several of Canada's most experienced ambassadors

recalled from the key capitals abroad. During and after these deliberations, the Prime Minister was open to proposals and advice, and received them, from a vast variety of individuals, ranging from Ivan Head, through senior academics who had proven to be of value in matters of high security policy in the past, to General Rogers of NATO. While the pet proposals of many outsiders did not survive scrutiny to remain on the Prime Minister's final list, it is clear that one does not get real and rapid movement from Moscow and Washington by conducting elaborate exercises in domestic participatory diplomacy of 1968-70 vintage.

#### Substance

What emerged from this process was a well crafted and balanced set of proposals capable of generating movement on a wide variety of fronts and thereby fuelling the Prime Minister's central purpose of engendering political dialogue. At the centre was a conference of the world's five nuclear weapons powers to discuss limits on (and later, reductions in) their nuclear arsenals, to consider common crisis management and confidence building measures, and possibly to deal with any of the other proposals on the Prime Minister's list. Related to the five power conference was a general proposal for strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, primarily by securing additional signatories from major third world states before the treaty's review in 1985. A third proposal took advantage of the more immediate diplomatic schedule to urge both east and west to attend the Stockholm conference on European security at the foreign ministerial level. A fourth proposal sought a new effort to obtain a Western plan, that the Soviets could respond to positively, for conventional mutual and balanced force reductions (MFBR) in Europe. And the fifth was a triad of nuclear arms control measures dealing with the mobility of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, the verifiability



of such weapons and a preemptive ban on the development of anti-satellite (A-Sat) weapons<sup>capable of</sup> in high altitude orbits.

All of these proposals individually met the Task Force's stringent requirements: proposals of a Prime Ministerial magnitude that were original as government proposals, negotiable, strongly based in substance, and capable of an generating rapid movement. In addition, all centred on areas where Canada had a seat at the negotiating table or demonstrated expertise and which simultaneously avoided the private negotiating preserves of the two super-powers, while bearing directly on the central arms control issues of interest everywhere. Taken together the package that emerged offered proposals relating to both immediate and longer term developments, in the nuclear, conventional, and future technology spheres. It was a comprehensive set of proposals well-designed to probe all areas where east-west dialogue and cooperation might be possible.

#### Execution

Equally well conceived was the process of execution. The Prime Minister began knowing that other principal powers within the alliance, notably Italy and Germany (with whom Canada soon came to act in tandem) shared similar concerns but were unable to take the lead themselves. Thus, after private consultation with Washington, he tested the waters at the summit level in all major capitals in Western Europe, and a few other European capitals which had responded spontaneously to Canadian leadership on the issue. While the Prime Minister had demonstrated the seriousness of his intentions to all by going public in his Guelph speech of October 1983, it was only after these private summit discussions in Europe that he unveiled his set of specific proposals in his Montreal speech of November 13th. He then ventured to enlist support from the major powers of the South. While he stumbled with his

nonproliferation proposal at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in India, Japan and China each provided encouragement in their own way.

The third stage of the summit sequence centered on the superpowers themselves. In Washington a well advised Prime Minister wisely avoided the temptation to plunge into technical foreign policy details with President Reagan and instead spoke philosophically about how the United States could best communicate its peaceful intentions to its Western friends and to the other side. President Reagan's responsiveness left Prime Minister Trudeau well prepared to inspire comparable reactions from the east when he was finally able to visit Moscow. Throughout this exhausting and protracted schedule, the Prime Minister's patience on occasion snapped, most importantly in the lost opportunity at the Commonwealth summit. But his public outbursts, about third-rate Pentagon pipsqueaks and the flexible response doctrine, while unnecessary, at least invited President Reagan to show himself to be a man of peace as well as a commander-in-chief, and showed the Europeans, in both west and east, that he understood their private concerns and was sufficiently serious to speak his mind.

#### Impact

Although quick judgements can be deceptive, it is even now clear that the Prime Minister's efforts accomplished a great deal. Certainly it was taken seriously, as Canada's standing, the Prime Minister's reputation and the substance of his initiative secured for him an unprecedented invitation to visit Deng Xioping of China within seven days on two days notice, as well as immediate invitations on request to visit three East European capitals, an unusual meeting for his emissaries with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, and, under difficult conditions, a rare meeting with a well-briefed and seriously interested Konstantin Chernenko himself. Indeed, no world leader could refuse

to see him. And even when he faltered, as in India, the weight of Canada's reputation and its proposals ensured that the momentum was sustained.

Moreover, in most of these capitals he was given not only goodwill, but enough of substance to continue the quest. The Europeans applauded the Stockholm suggestion, the Germans acted in tandem on MFBR, and on the novel and far reaching five power conference, the non-nuclear states of the Summit Seven signed on at an early stage. Even the Indians were somewhat sympathetic if on condition that they be the sixth power at the meeting.

It is equally clear that such concrete support produced real results, and that Canada's initiative contributed in many, and made the critical difference in a few, important respects. Canada's voice supplemented that of the Europeans in helping to convince the United States Secretary of State Shultz to go to Stockholm, where his meeting with Soviet foreign minister Gromyko dispelled the rancour of their previous encounter and began the resumption of American-Soviet dialogue at the political level. Canada's request for a forthcoming Western proposal on MBFR, issued after a similar West German request had been rejected by the U.S., helped reopen a debate in Washington, and led to the NATO overture which moved the resumed East-West dialogue into substantive discussions of arms control. And within hours of Prime Minister Trudeau's seminar on effective communication with President Reagan, the latter's rhetoric about the "evil empire" receded and the tone of American pronouncements acquired a moderate mainspring. While other forces and actors mattered, and others were quick to claim credit, the Prime Minister's immediate objectives of breaking the ominous rhythm of crisis and megaphone diplomacy, of restoring effective East-West communication at the political level, and of allowing a shared framework of assumptions to be recreated across the East-West divide, were all secured.

More durable accomplishments may yet be registered. Canada's functionally based A-Sat proposal is regarded by the Western Alliance, and by some in the U.S. Congress, as the best such approach and proposal on the table. Canada's willingness to engage in exhaustive consultations with its allies on this proposal is a promising sign of future results. Even the ambitious five power proposal is there for others to build upon. The United States has signalled its willingness to participate if the other four did so, the Chinese have moderated their initial rejection, the British and French have privately recognized talks embracing their nuclear systems to be inevitable at some point, and the Soviets as yet have not refused outright. Given the long period of gestation required for successful arms control measures in the past, it is possible that Canada's five power concepts may yet reach fruition in some form and Forum.

By virtue of its very comprehensiveness, and its quest for serious, short term results, the Prime Minister's peace initiative did, of course, leave some lost opportunities and unexplored possibilities in its wake. The failure to devise and deliver a sophisticated non-proliferation initiative was a particularly poignant failure for the world's first nuclear weapons-capable state to renounce the bomb. And from the Williamsburg declaration onward, there was a disconcerting tendency for the Prime Minister to put key proposals on the public table, before exhausting their potential in private diplomacy or ensuring that other principal powers were ready to continue the quest. Yet the ultimate critique is that Canadian leaders and publics were too slow and too impatient to realize what their country was capable of in the East-West realm. It is not that Canada irresponsibly tried too much, for too long, to no lasting effect.



External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
CABINET DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES  
**ACTION REQUEST/FICHE DE SERVICE**

Lloyd Francis MP			No. <b>A 06058</b>
Subject Sujet <b>Lets re peace initiatives fr. various municipalities</b>			Action div./Dir. responsable <b>IDD</b>
Letter dated/Lettre en date du <b>84-03-05</b>	Date rec'd in MINA Date de réception à MINA <b>84-03-08</b>	Date sent to div. Date d'envoi à la dir. <b>84-03-08</b>	Info. division(s)/Direction(s) informée(s)
Action to be completed and white slip returned to MINA by L'action doit être complétée et la feuille blanche retournée à MINA par			<b>84-03-16</b>
Comments/Commentaires			

ACTION REQUIRED/ACTION REQUISE	FOR DIV. USE/POUR L'UTILISATION DE LA DIR.
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for signature of SSEA Réponse pour la signature du SEAE	Date received/Date reçu <b>Mar. 8/84</b>
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for the signature of Réponse pour la signature de	Action officer/Agent responsable <b>AA Despres</b>
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply by Division Réponse de la direction <b>to note &amp; file ??</b>	Disposition <b>Answered Apr 5/84</b>
<input type="checkbox"/> For information and any necessary action Pour l'examen et suite à donner, s'il y a lieu	Date
For MINA use/Pour utilisation de MINA	

ALL TRANSFERS TO BE REPORTED TO MINA  
REGISTRY  
LE REGISTRE DE MINA DOIT ÊTRE AVISÉ DE  
TOUT CHANGEMENT

**5-1047**

A-06058



CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES  
HOUSE OF COMMONS  
CANADA

28-6-1- TRUDEAU PEACE INITIATIVES	

LE PRÉSIDENT  
THE SPEAKER

O T T A W A  
March 5, 1984

The Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, P.C., M.P.  
Deputy Prime Minister and  
Secretary of State for External Affairs  
Room 209-S, Centre Block  
House of Commons  
O T T A W A

Dear Colleague:

For your information, I am sending you copy of the many resolutions supporting federal peace initiatives received from:-

- Corporation of the City of Burlington, Ontario
- Township of Georgina, Region of York, Ontario
- Township of Kingston, Ontario
- Corporation of the City of Toronto, Ontario
- Regional Municipality of Durham, Ontario
- County of Oxford, Ontario
- City of Owen Sound, Ontario
- Corporation of the City of St. Catharines, Ontario
- City of York, Ontario
- City of Sarnia, Ontario
- City of Orillia, Ontario
- City of Guelph, Ontario
- Corporation of the Town of Oakville, Ontario


I also enclose copy of respective letters of acknowledgment for the above.

Yours sincerely,

Lloyd Francis

Lloyd Francis

Enclosures



OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY  
PRIME MINISTER  
MAR 6 1984  
CABINET DU VICE-  
PREMIER MINISTRE

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES  
HOUSE OF COMMONS  
CANADA

LE PRÉSIDENT  
THE SPEAKER

O T T A W A

Ms. Helen MacRae, M.P.A.  
City Clerk and  
Director of Administrative Services  
Corporation of the City of Burlington  
P.O. Box 5013  
Burlington, Ontario  
L7R 3Z6

Dear Ms. MacRae:

Thank you for your letter of February 16, 1984, to the effect that the Council of the Corporation of the City of Burlington, at its meeting held on February 13, 1984, adopted a resolution in support of peace initiatives.

I am pleased to send copy of your letter to the attention of our Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, P.C., M.P.

Yours sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY  
Lloyd Francis, M.P.

Lloyd Francis

MAR 5 1984





# The Corporation of the City of Burlington

**City Hall:**  
426 Brant Street, Burlington, Ontario, Canada  
**Mailing Address:**  
P.O. Box 5013, Burlington, Ontario, Canada L7R 3Z6

**Telephone:**

**File No.:** 335-7697  
38.21

FEB 20 9 51 AM '83

SPECIAL DELIVERY  
LA RESIDENCE

February 16, 1984

The Honourable Lloyd Francis,  
Speaker of the House of Commons,  
Parliament Buildings,  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0A6

Dear Sir:

Please be advised that the Council of the Corporation of the City of Burlington at its regular meeting held on Monday, February 13, 1984 enacted the following Motion in support of the initiative by the Federal Parliament in promoting peace:

"RESOLVED THAT the City of Burlington supports all initiatives by our Federal Parliament, the Prime Minister, and the spokespeople of each party in Parliament in promoting peace among the superpowers and all nations;

and that a copy of this resolution be sent to the Speaker of the House of Commons, the Prime Minister, and the Leaders of the Progressive Conservative and New Democratic Parties."

This is for your information.

Yours truly,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Helen MacRae".

Helen MacRae, M.P.A.  
CITY CLERK AND DIRECTOR OF  
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

MC/lm  
1109a

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES  
HOUSE OF COMMONS  
CANADA

LE PRÉSIDENT  
THE SPEAKER

O T T A W A

Mr. Larry R. Simpson, A.M.C.T. (A)  
Deputy Clerk  
Township of Georgina  
Region of York  
Keswick, Ontario  
L4P 3E9

Dear Mr. Simpson:

Thank you for your letter of February 13, 1984, to the effect that the Council of the Township of Georgina, at its meeting held on February 9, 1984, adopted a resolution supporting peace initiatives.

I am pleased to send copy of your letter to the attention of our Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, P.C., M.P.


Yours sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY  
Lloyd Francis, M.P.

Lloyd Francis

MAR 5 1984

TOWNSHIP OF GEORGINA



REGION OF YORK

CIVIC CENTRE

FEB 20 9 52 AM '83

KESWICK ONTARIO L4P 3E9

FILE NO. ....

1984 02 13

SPEAKER'S OFFICE  
LA PRESIDENCE

The Honourable Cyril L. Francis  
Speaker of the House of Commons  
Parliament Buildings  
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0A6

Honourable Sir:

I advise that the Council of the Township of Georgina at a meeting held on February 9th, 1984 passed a resolution supporting the initiatives by our Federal Parliament to promote peace among the superpowers and all nations.

A copy of the complete resolution has been enclosed for your reference in this matter.

Yours truly

Larry R. Simpson, A.M.C.T. (A)  
Deputy Clerk

LRS/mg  
Encl.

cc -- J.A. Brezina, A.M.C.T.  
Clerk  
City of Stoney Creek

KESWICK - 416-476-4301 - PEPPERLAW - 705-437-2210

000951



THE CORPORATION OF THE TOWNSHIP OF GEORGINA

IN

C-84-52

THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF YORK

Moved by Ken Smockum

Seconded by Gordon Boothby Date February 9th 19 84

BE IT RESOLVED THAT

WHEREAS nuclear disarmament is an issue of paramount importance  
effecting the lives of every resident in our Municipality, let  
it be known that The Corporation of the Township of Georgina  
supports the initiatives by our Federal parliament to promote  
peace among the superpowers and all nations, and that a copy of  
this resolution be sent to the Speaker of the House of Commons.

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY

*Larry R. Simpson*  
LARRY R. SIMPSON

DEPUTY CLERK

TOWNSHIP OF GEORGINA

Mayor John S. Rogers

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES  
HOUSE OF COMMONS  
CANADA

LE PRÉSIDENT  
THE SPEAKER

O T T A W A

Mr. D.A. Gordon, A.M.C.T., C.M.C.-  
Clerk  
Township of Kingston  
Postal Bag 3400  
Kingston, Ontario  
K7L 4Z4

Dear Mr. Gordon:

*Thank you for your letter of February 14, 1984, to the effect that the Kingston Township Council, at their meeting held on February 7, 1984, adopted the Resolution of the Corporation of the City of Stoney Creek on peace initiatives.*

*I am sending copy of your letter to the attention of our Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, P.C., M.P.*

*Yours sincerely,*

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY  
**Lloyd Francis, M.P.**

*Lloyd Francis*

**MAR 5 1984**

Office of the Clerk  
D.A. GORDON, A.M.C.T.



POSTAL BAG 3400  
KINGSTON, ONTARIO  
K7L 4Z4  
TEL: (613) 384-1770

FEB 21 9 24 AM '83 Township of Kingston

SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LA PRÉSIDENCE

February 14, 1984

The Honourable Lloyd Francis, P.C., M.P.  
Speaker of the House of Commons  
House of Commons  
OTTAWA, Ontario  
K1V 1A0

Dear Sir:

Re: Stoney Creek 23-6 December 13, 1983

Kingston Township Council considered the above noted Resolution at their February 07 Council Meeting, and passed the following Resolution:

"That Council supports the Resolution of the Corporation of the City of Stoney Creek supporting the efforts of the Government of Canada to promote peace among all nations and that the Clerk be authorized to send a copy of this Resolution to A.M.O., our M.P., M.P.P., the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the House of Commons."

Yours very truly,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "D.A. Gordon", written over a horizontal line.

D.A. Gordon, A.M.C.T., C.M.C.  
Clerk

DAG/d

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES  
HOUSE OF COMMONS  
CANADA

LE PRÉSIDENT  
THE SPEAKER

O T T A W A

Mr. R.V. Henderson  
City Clerk  
City Hall  
Toronto, Ontario  
M5H 2N2

Dear Mr. Henderson:

*Thank you for your letter of February 2, 1984, to the effect that the Council of the Corporation of the City of Toronto, at its meeting held on January 23/27, 1984, endorsed the resolution of the City of Stoney Creek supporting peace initiatives.*

*I am sending copy of your letter to the attention of our Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, P.C., M.P.*

*Yours sincerely,*

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

**Lloyd Francis, M.P.**

*Lloyd Francis*

**MAR 5 1984**



## Department of the City Clerk

City Hall, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5H 2N2

FEB 10 10 53 AM '83

Roy V. Henderson / City Clerk

A.R.N. Woadden / Deputy City Clerk

SP. LA. INQUIRY  
ICE

February 2, 1984

The Honourable Lloyd Francis,  
Speaker of the House,  
House of Commons,  
Ottawa, Ontario.

Dear Mr. Speaker:

At its meeting held on January 23 and 27, 1984, the Council of the Corporation of the City of Toronto gave consideration to the following Resolution of the City of Stoney Creek:

"WHEREAS Nuclear disarmament is an issue of paramount importance affecting the lives of every resident in our municipality, let it be known that the City of Stoney Creek supports all initiatives by our Federal Parliament and the Prime Minister promoting peace among the superpowers and all nations, that this motion be circulated to all municipalities in Ontario with a population of over 15,000 people for support, and that a copy of the resolution be sent to the Speaker of the House of Commons."

As requested by the City of Stoney Creek, I advise that Toronto City Council endorsed this Resolution insofar as it relates to the present peace initiatives.

Yours truly,

*Roy V. Henderson*  
City Clerk.

pc/sp  
DET

c.c. City Clerk, City of Stoney Creek





CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES  
HOUSE OF COMMONS  
CANADA

LE PRÉSIDENT  
THE SPEAKER

O T T A W A

Mr. C.W. Lundy, A.M.C.T.  
Regional Clerk  
605 Rossland Road East  
P.O. Box 623  
Whitby, Ontario  
L1N 6A3

Dear Mr. Lundy:

Thank you for your letter of February 8, 1984, to the effect that the Council of the Regional Municipality of Durham, at its meeting held on February 1, 1984, endorsed the resolution of the City of Stoney Creek supporting peace initiatives.

I am sending copy of your letter to the attention of our Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, P.C., M.P.

Yours sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY  
Lloyd Francis, M.P.

Lloyd Francis

MAR 5 1984



The Regional  
Municipality  
of Durham

Clerks Department

605 Rossland Road East  
P.O. Box 623,  
Whitby, Ontario  
Canada, L1N 6A3  
(416) 668-7711

C.W. LUNDY, A.M.C.T.  
Regional Clerk

February 8, 1984

FEB 13 2 24 PM '83

SP. IN. OFFICE  
LA PRESIDENCE

The Honourable Lloyd Francis  
Speaker of the House  
House of Commons  
OTTAWA, Ontario  
K1A 0A6

Resolution of the City of Stoney Creek

Honourable Sir, the following resolution of the City of Stoney Creek was endorsed by the Council of the Regional Municipality of Durham on February 1, 1984:

"WHEREAS nuclear disarmament is an issue of paramount importance affecting the lives of every resident in our municipality, let it be known that the City of Stoney Creek supports all initiatives by our Federal Parliament and the Prime Minister promoting peace among the superpowers and all nations, that this motion be circulated to all municipalities in Ontario with a population of over 15,000 people for support, and that a copy of the resolution be sent to the Speaker of the House of Commons."

C. W. Lundy, A.M.C.T.  
Regional Clerk

CWL:ns

cc: Mr. J. A. Brezina, City Clerk, City of Stoney Creek

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES  
HOUSE OF COMMONS  
CANADA

LE PRÉSIDENT  
THE SPEAKER

O T T A W A

Mr. J. Harold Walls  
County Clerk  
P.O. Box 397  
Court House  
Woodstock, Ontario  
N4S 7Y3

Dear Mr. Walls:

*Thank you for your letter of January 31, 1984, in which you inform us that the Oxford County Council, at its meeting held on January 25, 1984, endorsed the resolution from the Corporation of the City of Stoney Creek supporting peace initiatives.*

*I am sending copy of your letter to the attention of our Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, P.C., M.P.*

*Yours sincerely,*

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY  
**Lloyd Francis, M.P.**

*Lloyd Francis*

**MAR 5 1984**

J. ALLS, A.M.C.T., C.M.C.  
Clerk

H. C. DAY, A.M.C.T.  
Treasurer



COUNTY OF OXFORD

P.O. Box 397  
Court House  
Woodstock, Ontario  
N4S 7Y3  
Phone: (519) 539-5688

FEB 6 2 30 PM '83

January 31, 1984

SPEAKER'S OFFICE  
LA PRESIDENCE

The Honourable Lloyd Francis,  
Speaker of the House of Commons,  
Room 220 N.,  
House of Commons,  
Ottawa, Ontario.  
K1A 0A6

Dear Sir:

Oxford County Council, at its Meeting held on January 25, 1984, endorsed the Resolution from The Corporation of the City of Stoney Creek, supporting all initiatives by our Federal Parliament and the Prime Minister to promote peace among the superpowers and all nations.

A copy of the correspondence is enclosed.

Yours very truly,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "J. Harold Walls".

J. Harold Walls  
County Clerk

bjt  
Encl.

**THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF STONEY CREEK**

**RESOLUTION NO. 23-6**

**SESSION: DECEMBER 13, 1983**

**MOVED BY Councillor DiIanni**

**SECONDED BY Councillor Santarelli**

**WHEREAS nuclear disarmament is an issue of paramount importance affecting the lives of every resident in our municipality, let it be known that the City of Stoney Creek supports all initiatives by our Federal Parliament and the Prime Minister promoting peace among the superpowers and all nations, that this motion be circulated to all municipalities in Ontario with a population of over 15,000 people for support, and that a copy of the resolution be sent to the Speaker of the House of Commons.**

**Carried.**

**William L. Sears, Mayor**

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES  
HOUSE OF COMMONS  
CANADA

LE PRÉSIDENT  
THE SPEAKER

O T T A W A

Mr. Glen Henry  
Deputy City Clerk  
City Hall  
808 Second Avenue East  
Owen Sound, Ontario  
N4K 2H4

Dear Mr. Henry:

Thank you for your letter of February 3, 1984, in which you inform us that your City Council, at its meeting held on January 30, 1984, adopted the resolution of the Corporation of the City of Stoney Creek supporting peace initiatives.

I am pleased to send copy of your letter to the attention of our Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, P.C., M.P.

Yours sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY  
Lloyd Francis, M.P.

Lloyd Francis

MAR 5 1984

CLERK'S DEPARTMENT



CITY HALL  
808 SECOND AVENUE EAST  
OWEN SOUND, ONTARIO N4K 2H4  
TELEPHONE 1-519-376-1440

FEB 9 11 46 AM '83 *City of Owen Sound*

SPEAKER'S OFFICE  
LA PRESIDENCE

February 3, 1984.

Mr. Lloyd Francis, M.P.,  
Speaker of the House of Commons,  
House of Commons,  
Ottawa, Ontario. K1A 0A6.


Dear Sir:

At a meeting of City Council held on Monday evening January 30th,  
1984 the following resolution was adopted:

"THAT the Council of the Corporation of the City of Owen Sound  
hereby endorses the following resolution passed by the Corpora-  
tion of the City of Stoney Creek on December 13, 1984, namely:

'WHEREAS nuclear disarmament is an issue of paramount  
importance affecting the lives of every resident in our  
municipality, let it be known that the City of Stoney  
Creek supports all initiatives by our Federal Parliament  
and the Prime Minister promoting peace among the super-  
powers and all nations, that this motion be circulated  
to all municipalities in Ontario with a population of  
over 15,000 people for support, and that a copy of the  
resolution be sent to the Speaker of the House of  
Commons.' "

Yours truly,

  
Glen Henry,  
Deputy City Clerk.

GH/rem

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES  
HOUSE OF COMMONS  
CANADA

LE PRÉSIDENT  
THE SPEAKER

O T T A W A

Mr. Rod Hollick, A.M.C.T.  
City Clerk  
City Hall  
P.O. Box 3012  
St. Catharines, Ontario  
L2R 7C2

Dear Mr. Hollick:

Thank you for your letter of February 7, 1984, in which you inform us that the Council of the Corporation of the City of St. Catharines, at its meeting held on February 6, 1984, endorsed the resolution from the City of Stoney Creek supporting peace initiatives.

I am sending copy of your letter and of the resolution to the attention of our Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, P.C., M.P.

Yours sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY  
Lloyd Francis, M.P.

Lloyd Francis


MAR 5 1984



# CITY OF ST. CATHARINES

BOX 3012  
ST. CATHARINES, ONTARIO L2R 7C2  
PHONE (416) 688-5600

T. R. HOLLICK  
CITY CLERK



February 7th 1984

FEB 9 11 45 AM '83

ST. CATHARINES OFFICE  
LA PRÉSIDENCE

The Honourable Lloyd Francis  
Speaker of the House  
House of Commons  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0A6

Mr. Speaker:

Re: Resolution from the City of Stoney Creek Supporting  
Nuclear Disarmament and Peace Among All Nations  
Our File No. 35.11.2

Please be advised that the Council of the Corporation of the City of St. Catharines at its regular meeting of February 6th 1984, endorsed the above-noted resolution from the City of Stoney Creek.

For your complete information in this regard, I am attaching a copy of the correspondence received from that municipality.

Rod Hollick, A.M.C.T.  
City Clerk

KV/bt  
attachment

cc Mr. J. Reid, M.P.  
Mr. G. Parent, M.P.



# The City of Stoney Creek

777 Highway No. 8, Box 9940, Stoney Creek, Ontario L8G 4N9 — Tel. 643-1261

January 9, 1984

TO THE CLERK OF THE MUNICIPALITY

Dear Sir or Madam:

The attached resolution was passed by the Council of the City of Stoney Creek at its meeting held Tuesday, December 13, 1983.

Would you please present this resolution to your Council for endorsement and if endorsed, notify the Speaker of the House of Commons.

It would be appreciated, if you could also send me a copy of your Council's decision.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "J. A. Brezina".

J. A. Brezina, A.M.C.T.  
City Clerk

JAB/jr  
encl.



**THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF STONEY CREEK**

**RESOLUTION NO. 23-6**

**SESSION: DECEMBER 13, 1983**

**MOVED BY Councillor DiIanni**

**SECONDED BY Councillor Santarelli**

**WHEREAS nuclear disarmament is an issue of paramount importance affecting the lives of every resident in our municipality, let it be known that the City of Stoney Creek supports all initiatives by our Federal Parliament and the Prime Minister promoting peace among the superpowers and all nations, that this motion be circulated to all municipalities in Ontario with a population of over 15,000 people for support, and that a copy of the resolution be sent to the Speaker of the House of Commons.**

**Carried.**

**William L. Sears, Mayor**

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES  
HOUSE OF COMMONS  
CANADA

LE PRÉSIDENT  
THE SPEAKER

O T T A W A

Mr. Ron W. Maurice  
Deputy City Clerk  
2700 Eglinton Avenue West  
Toronto, Ontario  
M6M 1V1

Dear Mr. Maurice:

Thank you for your letter of February 2, 1984, to the effect that the Council of the City of York, at its meeting held on January 23, 1984, endorsed the resolution from the City of Stoney Creek (as amended in your letter) supporting peace initiatives.

I am sending copy of your letter to the attention of our Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, P.C., M.P.

Yours sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY  
Lloyd Francis, M.P.

Lloyd Francis

MAR 5 1984



# THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF YORK

2700 Eglinton Avenue West, Toronto, Ontario M6M 1V1 (416) 653-2700

FEB 9 11 44 AM '83

February 2, 1984.

SPEAKER'S OFFICE  
RESIDENCE

The Honourable Lloyd Francis,  
Speaker of the House of Commons,  
Room 233S,  
Centre Block,  
House of Commons,  
Ottawa, Ontario,  
K1A 0A6

Dear Sir:

Re: Resolution With Respect  
to Nuclear Disarmament

The Council of the City of York, at its meeting held on January 23, 1984, considered a communication from the City of Stoney Creek forwarding a resolution with respect to the above subject, a copy of which is attached for your information.

Please be advised that Council amended this resolution by deleting the word "all" from the third line thereof, and endorsed the resolution, as amended.

Yours very truly

  
RON W. MAURICE,  
Deputy City Clerk.

RWM:hg.



Council  
Jan. 23, 1984,  
Item F-15.

# The City of Stoney Creek

777 Highway No. 8, Box 9940, Stoney Creek, Ontario L8G 4N9 - Tel. 643-1261

RECEIVED

January 9, 1984

JAN 15

CITY OF YORK  
CLERK'S DEPARTMENT

TO THE CLERK OF THE MUNICIPALITY

Dear Sir or Madam:

The attached resolution was passed by the Council of the City of Stoney Creek at its meeting held Tuesday, December 13, 1983.

Would you please present this resolution to your Council for endorsement and if endorsed, notify the Speaker of the House of Commons.

It would be appreciated, if you could also send me a copy of your Council's decision.

J. A. Brezina, A.M.C.T.  
City Clerk

JAB/jr  
encl.

Please see over/-



000970

**THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF STONEY CREEK**

RESOLUTION NO. 23-6

SESSION: DECEMBER 13, 1983

MOVED BY Councillor DiIanni

SECONDED BY Councillor Santarelli

WHEREAS nuclear disarmament is an issue of paramount importance affecting the lives of every resident in our municipality, let it be known that the City of Stoney Creek supports all initiatives by our Federal Parliament and the Prime Minister promoting peace among the superpowers and all nations, that this motion be circulated to all municipalities in Ontario with a population of over 15,000 people for support, and that a copy of the resolution be sent to the Speaker of the House of Commons.

Carried.

William L. Sears, Mayor

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES  
HOUSE OF COMMONS  
CANADA

LE PRÉSIDENT  
THE SPEAKER

O T T A W A

Ms. Ann Tuplin  
City Clerk  
City Hall  
Sarnia, Ontario  
N7T 7N2

Dear Ms. Tuplin:

Thank you for your letter of February 1, 1984, in which you inform us that the Sarnia City Council, at its meeting held on January 30, 1984, adopted the resolution by which it endorsed the resolution of the City of Stoney Creek supporting peace initiatives.

I am sending copy of your letter and of the resolution to the attention of our Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, P.C., M.P.

Yours sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY  
Lloyd Francis, M.P.

Lloyd Francis

MAR 5 1984





CITY OF SARNIA  
ONTARIO, CANADA

(519) 332-0330  
CITY HALL  
ONTARIO, CANADA  
N7T 7N2

February 1, 1984  
CITY OF SARNIA  
CITY CLERK

The Speaker of the House of Commons  
Parliament Buildings  
Ottawa, Ontario

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Sarnia City Council, at its meeting held on January 30, 1984, considered the attached resolution from the City of Stoney Creek regarding nuclear disarmament, at which time the following resolution was adopted:

"THAT Sarnia City Council endorse the resolution of the City of Stoney Creek supporting the Federal Government and Prime Minister regarding Nuclear Disarmament."

Your support in this matter would be appreciated.

Yours truly,

*Ann Tuplin*  
Ann Tuplin  
City Clerk

/kj

cc: The Hon. J. Bud Cullen, M.P.  
J.C. Robertson  
J.A. Brezina, City Clerk  
City of Stoney Creek



D.

JAN 30 1984

As. 2/84

## The City of Stoney Creek

RECEIVED Highway No. 8, Box 9940, Stoney Creek, Ontario L8G 4N9 - Tel. 643\*1261  
CITY CLERK, SARNIA

S-5  
JAN 13 10 21 AM '84

January 9, 1984

TO THE CLERK OF THE MUNICIPALITY

Dear Sir or Madam:

The attached resolution was passed by the Council of the City of Stoney Creek at its meeting held Tuesday, December 13, 1983.

Would you please present this resolution to your Council for endorsement and if endorsed, notify the Speaker of the House of Commons.

It would be appreciated, if you could also send me a copy of your Council's decision.

J. A. Brezina, A.M.C.T.  
City Clerk

JAB/jr  
encl.

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES  
HOUSE OF COMMONS  
CANADA

LE PRÉSIDENT  
THE SPEAKER

O T T A W A

Mr. Ronald J. Ellett  
Deputy Clerk  
City of Orillia  
Box 340  
Orillia, Ontario  
L3V 6J1

Dear Mr. Ellett:

*Thank you for your letter of February 1, 1984, in which you inform us that the City of Orillia, at its meeting held on January 30, 1984, supported the resolution adopted by the Corporation of the City of Stoney Creek on peace initiatives.*

*I am sending copy of your letter and of the resolution to the attention of our Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, P.C., M.P.*

*Yours sincerely,*

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

**Lloyd Francis, M.P.**

**MAR 5 1984**

*Lloyd Francis*



## City of Orillia

BOX 340—ORILLIA, ONTARIO  
L3V 6J1  
(705) 325-1311

OFFICE  
OF THE  
CLERK—ADMINISTRATOR

2 21 PM '83

SPECIAL OFFICE  
LA PRESIDENCE

February 1, 1984.

The Honourable Lloyd Francis,  
Speaker,  
House of Commons,  
OTTAWA, Ontario.  
K1A 0A6

Dear Sir:


Re: Peace Initiatives of Parliament

Attached is a copy of a resolution adopted by the Council  
of the Corporation of the City of Orillia, at its meeting  
held on January 30, 1984.

Yours truly,

Ronald J. Ellett,  
Deputy Clerk.

/sc  
Encl.



CITY OF ORILLIA

THAT this Council endorse the resolution of the City of Stoney Creek supporting the peace initiatives of Parliament and the Prime Minister, and that copies of this resolution and the City of Stoney Creek resolution be sent to the following:

The Speaker of the House of Commons

Mr. Doug Lewis, M.P.

THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF STONEY CREEK

RESOLUTION NO. 23-6

SESSION: DECEMBER 13, 1983

MOVED BY Councillor DiIanni

SECONDED BY Councillor Santarelli

WHEREAS nuclear disarmament is an issue of paramount importance affecting the lives of every resident in our municipality, let it be known that the City of Stoney Creek supports all initiatives by our Federal Parliament and the Prime Minister promoting peace among the superpowers and all nations, that this motion be circulated to all municipalities in Ontario with a population of over 15,000 people for support, and that a copy of the resolution be sent to the Speaker of the House of Commons.

Carried.

William L. Sears, Mayor

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES  
HOUSE OF COMMONS  
CANADA

LE PRÉSIDENT  
THE SPEAKER

O T T A W A

Mr. W.G. Hall  
City Clerk  
City Hall  
59 Garden Street  
Guelph, Ontario  
N1H 3A1

Dear Mr. Hall:

Thank you for your letter of February 9, 1984,  
to the effect that the Guelph City Council, at its meeting held  
on February 6, 1984, endorsed the resolution of the City of  
Stoney Creek supporting peace initiatives.

I am pleased to send copy of your letter to the  
attention of our Secretary of State for External Affairs, the  
Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, P.C., M.P.

Yours sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

Lloyd Francis, M.P.

Lloyd Francis

MAR 5 1984



# Guelph

ONTARIO • CANADA

CITY HALL (519) 822-1260  
59 CARDEN ST. N1H 3A1

FEB 14 9 15 AM '83

SPEAKER'S OFFICE  
LA PRESIDENCE

February 9th, 1984.

Our File No:

Honourable Lloyd Francis,  
Speaker of the House of Commons,  
House of Commons,  
OTTAWA, Ontario.  
K1A 0A6

Dear Sir:

At a meeting of the Guelph City Council, held Monday, February 6th, 1984,  
the following resolution was passed:

"THAT Council endorse the resolution of the City of Stoney  
Creek supporting all initiatives by our Federal Parliament and  
the Prime Minister promoting peace among the superpowers and  
all nations."

Yours truly,

W.-G. Hall,  
City Clerk.

WGH:ms

cc. Mr. J.A. Brezna,  
Dr. J. Schroder,  
Mr. M.R. Sather.



CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES  
HOUSE OF COMMONS  
CANADA

LE PRÉSIDENT  
THE SPEAKER

O T T A W A

Ms. Cathie L. Best  
Deputy Clerk  
The Corporation of the Town of Oakville  
P.O. Box 310  
Oakville, Ontario  
L6J 5A6

Dear Ms. Best:

Thank you for your letter of January 24, 1984,  
to which was attached copy of the resolution passed by the  
City of Stoney Creek on peace initiatives, which was supported  
by the Council of the Town of Oakville on January 23, 1984.

I am sending copy of your letter and of the  
resolution to the attention of our Secretary of State for  
External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, P.C., M.P.

Yours sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY  
Lloyd Francis, M.P.

Lloyd Francis

MAR 5 1984



# THE CORPORATION OF THE TOWN OF OAKVILLE

TELEPHONE 845-6601

P.O. BOX 310  
L6J 5A6

FEB 20 9 51 AM '83

January 24, 1984

SPEAKER'S OFFICE  
LA PRÉSIDENCE

The Honourable Lloyd Francis  
Speaker of the House of Commons  
Queen's Park  
Toronto, Ontario

Re: Resolution - City of Stoney Creek

Dear Sir:

Please be advised that the attached resolution passed by the City of Stoney Creek was supported by the Council of the Town of Oakville on January 23, 1984.

Respectfully submitted,

Cathie L. Best  
Deputy Clerk

CLB:bu

cc: J.A. Brezna  
City Clerk  
Stoney Creek

**THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF STONEY CREEK**

**RESOLUTION NO. 23-6**

**SESSION: DECEMBER 13, 1983**

**MOVED BY Councillor DiIanni**

**SECONDED BY Councillor Santarelli**

**WHEREAS nuclear disarmament is an issue of paramount importance affecting the lives of every resident in our municipality, let it be known that the City of Stoney Creek supports all initiatives by our Federal Parliament and the Prime Minister promoting peace among the superpowers and all nations, that this motion be circulated to all municipalities in Ontario with a population of over 15,000 people for support, and that a copy of the resolution be sent to the Speaker of the House of Commons.**

**Carried.**

**William L. Sears, Mayor**

OFFICE OF  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



CABINET DU  
SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

MEMORANDUM

1DDZ-C4

To  
A Office of the Under-Secretary

From  
De MINA

Security  
Sécurité

UNCLASSIFIED

Reference  
Référence

Date March 5, 1984

Subject  
Sujet Parliamentary Report - March 5

DPM/SSEA (2)  
MINA (11)  
MINE/Jalbert/  
Laverdure  
MINT/Burbridge/  
MacDonald  
PMO/Fairbairn  
PCO/Fadden/  
Elcock/  
Mitchell

ON THE HILL

The House met at 11:00 after a one-week recess. Before debate recommenced on the Budget motion, Brian Mulroney, Yvon Pinard, Bill Yurko, Ian Waddell and Chuck Cook spoke briefly in tribute to the accomplishments of Conservative Member John Kushner (Calgary East) who died last week. (There are now four seats vacant in the House - 2 Liberal, 2 Conservative).

Member Statements of Departmental interest:  
Stan Darling complained that the Govt was doing little to reduce Canada's tourism deficit.

Q.P. questions of Departmental interest: CRUISE  
TESTING; ACID RAIN.

SENSE OF THE HOUSE

The atmosphere in the House was strange. It had only been a week since the House recessed for its mid-winter break, but, as the saying goes, "in politics, a week is a long time." And so it was that Members honoured the Prime Minister, who, on another wintry day five days ago, announced, for the second time, that he was going to resign. Memories of that day (Nov 21/79) and the events which followed, were made much of by the various speakers. Brian Mulroney, who spoke first, declared that he would be prudent, mindful that the last there were eulogies, they were premature. Therefore, he said, he would make his in instalments and he would become progressively more fulsome as the date of the leadership contest approached. Cognizant of the predictions of political pundits, he said that the leadership succession appeared to be very much of a contest and would remain so until March 16 (the significance of this date - when John Turner has said he will announce his intentions, earned the predictable roars from the gallery). The Opposition Leader, with an Irishman's sense of language, waxed eloquent about the PM's accomplishments and his 16-year leadership of the Liberal Party, which he, like Lord Birkenhead, likened to a Noah's Ark, "full of all kinds of beasts wandering all over." Speaking in French, the Quebecer said that PM's most significant accomplishment had probably been in the area of Quebec-Cda relations and his efforts to ensure a bilingual Canada in which Francophones were welcome.

Ian Deans regretted that his leader had been unable to return from British Columbia in time for the tributes but said that he had read the debates from the last time goodbyes were said to the PM and hoped that "I say nothing that will prompt you to reconsider your decision." After noting the transformation which the PM had gone through: from flower-child in the sixties to gunslinger in the seventies and finally new father of Confederation in the eighties, Mr. Deans said the PM would be most remembered for his "burning commitment to a Quebec within Canada." The NDP House Leader concluded, humorously, by drawing the PM's attention to several job advertisements for which the PM would be suitable.

Beginning "as I was saying on Nov 21, 1979, before I was so rudely interrupted," former PM Clark said that while he did not agree with the PM's vision of Canada, he fully appreciated his efforts to provide Canadians of French origin with a place in Canada.

USS MCB  
CMR (2) NAX  
DMT PED  
DMF PPD  
CCB PSD  
CCBR RBD  
SFB RCD  
TFB RGB  
IFB RGX  
EFB RSD  
LGB SCD  
PGB SCS  
SCI  
FPR SCH  
ACB SFP  
ADA SIC  
APD SID  
APZ SIM  
CCBM SIO  
CCBA SIS  
CGD TAD  
CGE TID  
CGL UGB  
CGS URD  
CMD XDX  
CML ZEP  
CPD ZSP  
EED ZSS  
EPD IMU  
ETD  
GAD ESD  
GGB TGX  
GMD  
IDD TDD  
IDDZ TED  
IMD UTD  
JCD  
LCD IMC  
LCR

GMR IDDZ  
IDA URE  
IDR

Speaking as his seat-mate, friend and colleague, the DPM reminisced about the PM's many accomplishments, saying that the MP from Mount Royal had dominated political life of Canada all during his public career" and he had no peer in the House of Commons in his ability to "carry the argument." Saying that the PM had made a good decision for himself and the Liberal Party, the DPM provided that he was a little saddened by it and that he had worked with the PM for sixteen years. The DPM then reminded the House of his prescience, when, on the occasion of the PM's last tribute, he had said "It has been my view since the last election that the right hon. member for Mount Royal (Mr. Trudeau) could continue to lead our party and could succeed in returning this party to office in the future." Providing an historical perspective, Stanley Knowles said that by the time the PM resigned in June, he would have served 15 years and 5 months, more than any other PM but MacKenzie King and two months longer than Wilfred Laurier. The Dean of the House concluded that he had known six of Canada's 16 PMs and that he would place the PM, who had once flirted with his own party, in the top three alongside Louis St. Laurent and Lester Pearson. David Berger spoke as one of the new generation of members and he was then followed by Bill Yurko, who provided the funniest tribute of the afternoon. The independent member compared the PM to a cowboy who had left his hoofprints all over the nation...lassoed strays...burned his bilingual brand - an EF with multi-cultural bar on the herd...ridden many horses - some nags...only once did he get bucked off. He didn't quit long, but dusted himself off and rode again...now he rides again into the sunset...as westerners say - adios." With the exception of a few Conservatives, all members stood in recognition of the PM who subsequently replied that this was one of the few occasions on which he found himself without words. The PM thanked members for their tributes.

Question Period began with John Crosbie in an allusion to the tribute, telling the PM to "get along little doggie" and then launching into an assault on the Govt's economic policy. This is International Women's Week and the NDP made constant reference to it in their questioning to the Ministry on Cruise testing (see below), the role of women in the public service.

#### CRUISE TESTING

Pauline Jewett called on the DPM to not test the cruise missile tomorrow and to appoint a woman as Disarmament Ambassador or to the Task Force on Peace. The DPM suggested this was a "tall order that we abrogate our agreement with the US on less than 24-hours notice." The DPM declared the Govt believed the cruise testing was an important contribution and that there was not reason to suspend the agreement with the Americans. He said he would consider the suggestions regarding the concerns of women and the arms race and that he would welcome her suggestions for Disarmament Ambassador.

#### ACID RAIN

Minister Caccia advised John Fraser that it would not be useful to prejudge the outcome of his proposed talks with the Provincial Ministers of the Environment regarding an Acid Rain strategy towards the US.

#### Mrs. ABBADA AND THE SYRIAN JEWS

The DPM told Jake Murta that he is aware of the concerns regarding the murder of Mrs. Lillian Abbada and the plight of Syrian Jews. The DPM said the Govt takes the steps which it thinks would be effective in dealing with the situation and that "we have to be sure the steps we will take will be helpful rather than hurtful." The DPM promised to "inform himself about recent representations and relay this information."

  
D. Colin Robertson  
Departmental Assistant



External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

MGTC/DRAFTING/Access to Information Act -  
MGTC/DRAFTING/Loi sur l'accès à l'information

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

# MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY  
SÉCURITÉ

**C O N F I D E N T I A L**

6 MAR 84 00 272

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FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0216 05MAR84

TO/À

TO BNATO **DELIVER BY 060900**

INFO

DISTR

INFO CANMILREPNATO LDN PARIS BONN HAGUE GENEV VMBFR STKHM/SCDEL

REF

PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DNACPOL/CPD/DSTRATA

SUBJ/SUJ

DISTR DMF IFB IDD IDR IDA RBD CPD

REF YOURTEL YBGR6222 02MAR

---NATO CONSULTATION ON ASAT AND SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS

~~WE CURRENTLY ARE INFORMING PM OF RESULTS OF OUR~~

~~AS DISCUSSED ORALLY WITH BRUSON, OUR GENERAL PREFERENCE IS FOR NATO~~

~~CONSULTATIONS IN WEHDC AND EUROPE AND SEEKING FURTHER~~

~~EXPERTS CONSULTATION ON ASAT TO TAKE PLACE AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE~~

~~GUIDANCE FROM HIM ON DISPOSITION OF ASAT PROPOSALS AS~~

~~MOMENT. HAVING SAID THAT, HOWEVER, WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE WOULD BE~~

~~WELL AS 2 STRATEGIC PROPOSALS DEALING WITH MOBILITY AND~~

~~VALUE IN FIRST HAVING HAD OPPORTUNITY TO SEE NATURE OF RESPONSE ON~~

~~VERIFICATION. UNTIL RESPONSE RECEIVED WE ARE NOT/NOT ABLE YET~~

~~ASAT THAT USA GOVT IS OBLIGED TO MAKE TO CONGRESS BY END OF MARCH.~~

~~TO MAKE FIRM COMMITMENT TO EITHER WANT DATE SUCCESSFUL~~

~~IF OUR GUESS IS RIGHT, USA ITSELF WILL PROBABLY WAIT TO DELAY NATO~~

~~WILL ADVISE ASAP.~~

~~CONSULTATION UNTIL AFTER SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.~~

~~2. WE CAN THEREFORE AGREE TO DELAYING EXPERTS CONSULTATION UNTIL~~

~~EARLY APRIL AND HAVING IT TACKED ON TO SEMI-ANNUAL DISARMAMENT~~

~~EXPERTS MTG PROVIDED IT IS CAST AS SEPARATE MTG AND GIVEN ENTIRE~~

~~DAY TO ITSELF ON 11 APR. IT WOULD BE OUR DESIRE TO HAVE DISCUSSION~~

~~FOCUS ON (A) BROADLY BASED DUTCH PAPER DEALING WITH OUTER SPACE AND~~

~~ARMS CONTROL (B) CDN PAPER RELATED TO HIGH-ALTITUDE ASAT BAN TOGETHER~~

~~WITH ANY DOCUMENTATION USA MIGHT WISH TO CIRCULATE RELATIVE TO ITS~~

~~SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.~~

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG Gary J. Smith

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG J.L.A. Delvoie

000986

OFFICE  
THE  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CABINET  
DU  
SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT  
AUX  
AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TO/A: IDDZ/Delvoie  
FROM/DE: MINA/Dudon

Date 14/03/84

REFERENCE/RÉFÉRENCE: IDDZ-0215

SUBJECT/SUJET: Minister's decision/Décision du Ministre

Seen by the DPM/SSEA.



External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

# TRANSMITTAL SLIP - NOTE D'ENVOI


TO/À DMF (through IFB)

FROM/DE IDDZ

SUBJECT/SUJET Centre for Defence and Arms  
Control

Security
Sécurité <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>
File
Dossier
Date March 5, 1984

ATTACHMENT  
PIÈCE JOINTE Memorandum to the Deputy Prime Minister and  
Secretary of State for External Affairs (IDDZ-0215)

DISTRIBUTION	RECORD OF CONSULTATION (Names/Divisions) RAPPORT DE CONSULTATION (Noms des individus/Directions)	ACTION/SUITE À DONNER
<u>MINA (3)</u> MINT (2) MINE Parl Sec USS DMT DMF FPR CPD CMRR (2)		The attached memorandum is for your signature, if you agree.
IDD IDA IDR		REQUIRED BY/DEMANDÉ POUR   L. A. Delvoie Chairman Task Force Working Group Prime Minister's Task Force on East-West Relations and International Security

0344

TO BE RETAINED WITH FILE COPY - A CONSERVER AVEC L'EXEMPLAIRE DESTINÉ AU DOSS 000988



MINA (3)  
MINT (2)  
MINE  
Parl c  
USS  
DMT  
DMF  
FPR  
CPD  
CMRR (2)

M. FLE  
DIARY

PLSE RETURN TO IDDZ AFTER SIGNATURE

L. A. Delvoie  
Task Force Working Group  
5-5912

CONFIDENTIAL

March 5, 1984

IDDZ-0215

IDD  
IDA  
IDR

Memorandum for:  
The Deputy Prime Minister and  
Secretary of State for External Affairs

c.c. Minister for International Trade  
c.c. Minister for External Relations

SUBJECT: Centre for Defence and Arms Control

In the attached letter to the Prime Minister, you outlined some of your thinking on the creation and mandate of the Centre for Defence and Arms Control announced in the Speech from the Throne. There remain a number of outstanding questions and issues on which I would welcome your views as we pursue our discussions with the PCO and DND on this subject. These include:

- Should the Centre be created by ministerial decision or by legislation?
- Should the Centre have a right to provide policy advice to the Minister and/or the Government?
- Should the Centre have an obligation to provide policy advice to the Minister and/or the Government on request?
- What should be the Centre's relationship to the Department of External Affairs? to the Department of National Defence?
- Should the Centre have a board of governors or should its director report direct to the Minister? (We understand that the PCO has, on its own initiative, approached Bill Barton to ask him whether he would be willing to serve as Chairman of the board of governors of the Centre.)
- Should the Centre be given responsibility for administering that portion of the Disarmament Fund which is earmarked for public information and education, and which is now administered by the Department? (This represents approximately two-thirds of the Fund, as opposed to one-third which is used to contract for research in support of departmental operations and policy formulation.)

...2

5.3.14(05)

000989

0544

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

- What should be the name of the organization (e.g. Centre for Defence and Arms Control, Canadian Council on International Security, Institute for Peace and Security)?

(sgd.)

Michael Shenstone  
Assistant Deputy Minister  
Political and International  
Security Affairs

Original Signed by  
de MONTIGNY MARCHAND  
de Montigny Marchand

External Affairs Canada  
Affaires extérieures Canada

TRANSMITTAL SLIP - NOTE D'ENVOI

TO/À DMF (through IFB)  
FROM/DE IDDZ  
SUBJECT/SUJET Centre for Defence and Arms  
Control

Security Sécurité	CONFIDENTIAL
File Dossier	
Date	March 5, 1984

ATTACHMENT  
PIÈCE JOINTE Memorandum to the Deputy Prime Minister and  
Secretary of State for External Affairs (IDDZ-0215)

DISTRIBUTION	RECORD OF CONSULTATION (Names/Divisions) RAPPORT DE CONSULTATION (Noms des individus/Directions)	ACTION/SUITE À DONNER
MINA (3) MINT (2) MINE Parl Sec USS DMT DMF FPR CPD CMRR (2)		The attached memorandum is for your signature, if you agree.
IDD IDA IDR		REQUIRED BY/DEMANDÉ POUR  L. A. Delvoie Chairman Task Force Working Group Prime Minister's Task Force on East-West Relations and International Security

TO BE RETAINED WITH FILE COPY - A CONSERVER AVEC L'EXEMPLAIRE DESTINÉ AU DOSSIER

EXT 401

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

R E S T R I C T E D

FM BNATO YBGR6225 05MAR84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 050900

REF OURTEL YBGR6222 02MAR

---CONSULTATIONS AT NATO ON SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS

NEXT POL CTTEE MTG IS TUES, 06MAR, NOT/NOT MAR05 AS STATED

REFTEL.

CCC/070 051115Z YBGR6225

MF  
WTF

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDR0804 05MAR84

TO WSHDC DELIVER BY 060930

INFO BONN VMBFR LDN BNATO CANMILREPNATO MOSCO GENEV PRMNY STKHM

NDHQOTT/DNACPOL/CID/CORAE/ADMPOL/DIPOL/CPD/DSTRATA

DISTR IFB IDDZ IDA IDRA IDRL RGX RBD CPD IDD

REF YOURTEL UNGR2093 02MAR

---MBFR:NEW USA POSITION

GRATEFUL YOU REPORT ON USA MBFR PROPOSALS.

2.WE WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO CONSULT WITH USA OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR MBFR.OUR FIRST PURPOSE WOULD BE TO FIND OUT MORE ABOUT USA POSITION AND HOW IT CAME ABOUT.THIS WILL BE USEFUL IN ASSISTING US TO DEVELOP OUR OWN POSITION IN ADVANCE OF DISCUSSIONS IN NATO.

3.IF TIMING IS ACCEPTABLE FROM YOUR POINT OF VIEW AND THAT OF USA OFFICIALS CONCERNED CDN TEAM COMPOSED OF A DESPRES,DEPUTY DIRECTOR DIR AND LCOL SEVERANCE,DNACPOL,COULD BE IN WSHDC MON 12MAR FOR CONSULTATIONS.

4.FOR BONN:IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF WE COULD HAVE ACCOUNT OF RECENT RUTH MTGS IN WSHDC.

5.FOR LDN:GRATEFUL TO KNOW EXTENT TO WHICH UK HAS BEEN CONSULTED ON NEW USA POSITION.

6.FOR BNATO AND MBFR:PLEASE INFORM US OF ANY POINTS YOU FEEL IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE TO RAISE IN WSHDC FROM YOUR PERSPECTIVE,KEEPING IN MIND THAT PURPOSE OF VISIT IS TO GAIN FURTHER INSIGHT INTO USA POSITION AND INTENTIONS.

CCC/240 052327Z IDR0804

000993

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

Division Phoned \_\_\_\_\_  
Person \_\_\_\_\_  
Local Time noon 10

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM LDN XNGR0504 05MAR84

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ \_\_\_\_\_ DELIVER BY 050900

INFO BNATO DELIVER BY 051200

WSHDC CANMILREPNATO BRU MOSCO BONN ROME VMBFR GENEV PARIS OSLO

COPEN ATHNS STKHM/SC DEL PCOOTT/FOWLER/AXWORTHY

NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DNACPOL/DACPOL/CPD/DSTRATA/CIS

DISTR IDD IFB MINA MINE MINT USS DMF IDA RBR RCR RSR RED RCD RSD

CPD ZSI ZSP UGB URR IDR RGB

REF BNATO TEL YBGR6209 28FEB

---PM INITIATIVE:IDDZ/BRITISH CONSULTATIONS 02MAR

SUMMARY:SMITH/CALDER TALKS WITH FCO DEFENCE AND ARMS CONTROL

OFFICIALS WERE JUST WHAT PROVERBIAL DOCTOR ORDERED:MALAISE WHICH

WAS INCREASINGLY AFFLICTING OFFICIAL LEVEL PERCEPTIONS OF CDN

INITIATIVE HAS BEEN REVERSED;TEMPERATURES DROPPED WITHIN MINUTES

OF DIAGNOSIS GETTING UNDER WAY,AND BY MIDDLE OF TWO-HOUR

CONSULTATIVE SESSION(ASSISTED BY OBVIOUSLY RELAXED DISCUSSIONS

OVER LUNCH)WHAT EARLIER SEEMED ALMOST HOPELESSLY DOWNWARD TREND-

LINE HAD BEEN GIVEN DISTINCTLY UPWARD TILT.CDN TEAM COULD LEAVE

LDN WELL SATISFIED AT BRITISH SENSE OF REASSURANCE,-AND IF COURSE

OF CONSULTATIONS CONTINUES,MOST DREADED FCO FEARS WILL PROVE

LARGELY ILLUSORY.BOTH OFFICIALS AND MINISTERS HERE WILL

NECESSARILY STILL HAVE SOME WORRIES(EG OVER LONGER TERM IMPLICATIONS

...2

PAGE TWO XNGR0504 CONF D

OF FIVE POWER PROPOSALS FOR THEIR DETERRENT; OVER HANDLING OF ASAT PROPOSALS SO AS TO ENCOURAGE RATHER THAN HARDEN USA RECEPTIVENESS; OVER SUBSTANCE AND TACTICS OF STRATEGIC PROPOSALS, PARTICULARLY CDN COMMITMENT TO TAKE THEM INTO CD), BUT FCO HAS BEEN VISIBLY REASSURED BY CDN INTENTION INITIALLY TO FOCUS FIVE POWER CONCEPT IN UN, AND TO ENSURE FULL IF SPEEDY DISCUSSION OF OTHER PROPOSALS WITHIN ALLIANCE. PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT, SMITH AND CALDER WORKED HARD AND EFFECTIVELY TO RE-ESTABLISH TRADITIONAL CLOSE SENSE OF BILATERAL RAPPORT AND CONSULTATION ON DEFENCE AND ARMS CONTROL QUESTIONS, AND ON CDN INITIATIVE AS IT CONTINUES TO EVOLVE.

2. REPORT: AS WE HAD EXPECTED, SMITH/CALDER MEETING WITH FCO AND MOD OFFICIALS BEGAN WITH DEFENCE DEPT HEAD WESTON DETERMINED TO TAKE OFFENSIVE ALONG LINES OF UK QUOTE QUESTIONS UNQUOTE WHICH WERE TO HAVE BEEN RAISED 28 FEB IN BRUSSELS. THROUGH RATHER DEFT AND CONTROLLED PROCESS OF BALANCED GIVE AND TAKE, SMITH AND CALDER WERE ABLE VISIBLY TO REASSURE WESTON ON HIS IMMEDIATE PROCEDURAL CONCERNS. MEETING THUS QUICKLY MOVED ON TO BECOME RELAXED YET BUSINESSLIKE EXCHANGE ON SUBSTANCE AND TACTICS OF SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS AND FIVE POWER CONFERENCE CONCEPT. BOTH WESTON AND ARMS CONTROL DEPT HEAD MICHAEL PAKENHAM CLEARLY FOUND TALKS AND SUBSEQUENT LUNCH REASSURING AS TO PAST, AND USEFUL, EVEN ENCOURAGING, FOR FUTURE.

...3

PAGE THREE XNGR0504 CONF

3. SMITHS BROAD REVIEW OF INITIATIVE IMPLEMENTATION FOCUSED ON ITS GENESIS IN PM TRUDEAU'S PERSONAL CONCERN ABOUT POST-KAL/INF EAST/WEST RELATIONS AS REFLECTED IN GUELPH SPEECH. IN THIS CONTEXT, CDN ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS ARE DIRECT RECOGNITION OF OUR COMMITMENT ON ONE HAND TO NATO AND DOUBLE-TRACK DECISION, AND ON OTHER TO PRINCIPLE THAT WEST COULD NOT SIMPLY TALK ON POLITICAL LEVEL ABOUT REVERSING EAST/WEST TRENDLINE WITHOUT DOING SOMETHING SPECIFIC ABOUT IT. NEED TO LINK HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL PROLIFERATION WAS SEEN AS ESPECIALLY PRESSING, AND WAS A MAJOR CDN CONCERN IN FORMULATING FIVE POWER CONCEPT. CDN EFFORTS AT DISCUSSION WITH BRITISH PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN SECRETARY HAD RECEIVED RATHER QUOTE CHOPPED UNQUOTE RESPONSE, BUT OTHER REACTIONS HAD CONVINCED PM TRUDEAU THAT ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS SHOULD BE PRESSED AHEAD. IN ANY CASE, FIVE POWER PROPOSAL HAD NEVER BEEN INTENDED TO PREVENT UK MODERNIZATION OR TO OTHERWISE IMPINGE ON UK DETERRENT BEFORE CONCLUSION OF START NEGOTIATIONS.

4. FOR HIS PART, WESTON REITERATED HIS QUOTE CHAGRIN UNQUOTE THAT CDA HAD CARRIED PROPOSALS (ESPECIALLY FIVE POWER CONCEPT) WHICH HE SAW AS TOUCHING DIRECTLY ON UK INTERESTS, TO EASTERN EUROPE AND THIRD WORLD. HE SAID THAT EVEN IF FIVE POWER PROPOSAL WERE NOW TO FOCUS ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND CRISIS CONTROL, CDA SHOULD FIRST DISCUSS WITH UK AND USA BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS THEY MAY ALREADY

...4



PAGE FOUR XNGR0504 CONF

HAVE IN PLACE TO DEAL WITH THESE ASPECTS. IN REPLY, SMITH/CALDER WERE ABLE LARGELY TO DISPELL FEELING THAT UK HAD INTENTIONALLY BEEN QUOTE BUMPED UNQUOTE, AS WESTON PUT IT. IDDZ PROPOSAL JUST RECEIVED HERE FOR BILATERAL POLMIL TALKS EARLY APRIL WAS HELPFUL IN REASSURING UK OF CONTINUING CDN COMMITMENT TO CONSULTATIVE PROCESS, AND WAS CLEARLY WELCOMED BY BOTH WESTON AND PAKENHAM. STILL-SHARP UK CONCERNS ABOUT FIVE POWER PROPOSAL HAVE THUS BEEN RELIEVED AT LEAST INSOFAR AS SMITH SUGGESTED FOCUS FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION MAY HAVE SHIFTED TO UN SEC GEN FOR HIM TO ACT ON IN LEAD UP TO NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE.

5. UK SIDE REPEATED THEIR SUBSTANTIVE SYMPATHY WITH CDN ASAT OBJECTIVES, VOLUNTEERING THAT CDN PROPOSALS ARE QUOTE RELEVANT TO ALL OF US UNQUOTE, THAT CDN PAPER HAS GOOD IDEAS, AND THAT ON OUTER SPACE IN GENERAL, CDA AND UK ARE OBVIOUSLY CLOSE. TO QUOTE WESTON: SPACE CRIES OUT FOR TREATMENT WHICH WOULD ALLOW ARMS CONTROL TO HAVE ITS RIGHTFUL PART UNQUOTE. WHILE UK HAS NOT YET PUT TOGETHER OFFICIAL REACTION TO SDI, AS CALDER/WESTON EXCHANGE REVEALED, CDA AND UK HAVE WORRIES WHICH USA BRIEFING SESSIONS IN FEBRUARY DID NOT DISPELL-EG OVER IMPLICATIONS FOR RISK SHARING, ALLIANCE STRATEGY, AND TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY. BUT DESPITE BROAD AGREEMENT ON SUBSTANCE, UK REMAINS CONVINCED THAT PUSHING ASAT PROPOSAL AHEAD NOW IN CD WILL WASTE GOOD CONCEPT BEFORE ITS TIME.

...5

PAGE FIVE XNGR0504 CONF

IMMEDIATE RESULT WILL BE TO RE-EMPHASIZE IN CD SOVIET OUTER SPACE TREATY PROPOSAL, AND IN USA, HARDENING OF OPPOSITION TO ANY MOVEMENT ON OUTER SPACE ARMS CONTROL. QUOTE TO PUT CDN PROPOSAL INTO CD NOW WOULD MAKE IT BOTH AS IMPORTANT AND AS IRRELEVANT AS, FOR INSTANCE, CDB UNQUOTE.

6. PAKENHAM SAID OBJECTIVE SHOULD RATHER BE TO MAKE IT AS EASY AS POSSIBLE FOR USA. MARCH 06 POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETING MAY CLARIFY BOTH USA PERCEPTIONS AND QUESTION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT CDN OR CDN/DUTCH PAPER WILL BE CONSIDERED BY, EG NATO DEFENCE EXPERTS: IN MEANTIME, AS SMITH POINTED OUT, QUESTION FOR CDA WILL REMAIN ONE OF JUDGEMENT ON HOW BEST TO ENCOURAGE THE USA TO BE AS FORTHCOMING AS POSSIBLE. WHILE WE HAVE SOME FLEXIBILITY AS TO PROCEDURE, WE MAY WANT AT SOME STAGE TO SLIDE OUR PAPER INTO THE CD OUTER SPACE WORKING GROUP ONCE IT GETS GOING. IN MEANTIME, WE LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM USA WHERE ASAT AND SDI FIT INTO ARMS CONTROL ENDEAVOURS.

7. CALDER GAVE GENERAL OVERVIEW OF CDN THINKING ON TWO STRATEGIC PROPOSALS. UK SHOWED INTEREST IN HIS ARGUMENT THAT MOBILITY PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE EFFECT NOT SO MUCH AS OF RESTRICTING USA AS OF IMPOSING ON SOVIETS THOSE CONSTRAINTS UNDER WHICH USA MUST ALREADY OPERATE AS RESULT OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL REALITIES. WESTON AND PAKENHAM WERE VISIBLY RELIEVED TO LEARN THAT PROPOSALS ...6

PAGE SIX XNGR0504 CONF D

WERE INTENDED PRIMARILY AS CONCEPTS FOR INCLUSION IN STRATEGIC NEGOTIATIONS, AND NOT NECESSARILY AS SEPARATE AGREEMENTS IN THEMSELVES AND THAT IT HAD NEVER BEEN CANADIAN THOUGHT THAT WE WOULD BE IN POSITION IN SOME WAY TO NEGOTIATE THESE OURSELVES. QUOTE IF CDN STRATEGIC PROPOSALS ARE SIMPLY TO BE TRANSLATED INTO MESSAGE TO SUPERPOWERS THEN YOU WOULD FIND SOME MEASURE OF AGREEMENT HERE UNQUOTE.

8. THEY WERE EQUALLY HAPPY TO HEAR THAT ALL THREE PROPOSALS WILL BE DISCUSSED QUOTE EXHAUSTIVELY BUT NOT EXHAUSTINGLY UNQUOTE IN NATO BEFORE THEY ARE BROUGHT TO WIDER PUBLIC IN CD CONTEXT OR, AS NOW SEEMS LIKELY, THROUGH PMS LETTERS TO USA, ALLIED AND EASTERN HEADS OF GOVT. CONSENSUS DEVELOPED THAT THOUGH NATO REVIEW MUST BE COMPLETED WITHIN REASONABLE TIME FRAME, IT COULD INCLUDE EXAMINATION WITHIN HLG, WHICH ALREADY HAS MANDATE TO REVIEW OF OUTER SPACE AND TRADE-OFF BETWEEN TRANSPARANCY AND SURVIVABILITY. BRITISH DIFFERENCES ON EACH OF THESE PROPOSALS- PARTICULARLY STRATEGIC PROPOSALS- REMAIN, AND WILL BE BROUGHT UP AGAIN IN NATO CONTEXT. IN MEANTIME, WESTON SUGGESTED QUOTE WHY NOT PUT CDN IDEAS TO BED IN HIGH LEVEL GROUP IN WAY MORE LIKELY TO INCREASE FERTILITY THAN TO DAMAGE THEM THROUGH PREMATURE EXPOSURE IN CD UNQUOTE. SMITH TOLD WESTON THAT CDNS WOULD NOT BE QUOTE DISINCLINED UNQUOTE TO HIGH LEVEL GROUP DISCUSSIONS IF ...7

PAGE SEVEN XNGR0504 CONFD

SOMEONE WERE TO MAKE THIS SUGGESTION. AT SAME TIME, WE SEEM NOW TO BE MOVING TO SITUATION WHERE TWO STRATEGIC PROPOSALS WILL THEMSELVES BE GIVEN TO USA AND SOVIETS THROUGH LETTER TO HEADS OF GOVT, OR IN GENEVA.

9. DESPITE THESE VERY WELCOME ASSURANCES, WESTON AND PAKENHAM STILL REMAIN UNEASY AT PROSPECT OF HAVING SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS INTRODUCED IN CD AT ANY STAGE, -WHETHER ASAT IN RELATIVELY NEAR FUTURE, OR STRATEGIC PROPOSALS AT ALL. THEY ARE ALSO STILL WARY THAT FIVE POWER PROPOSAL MAY RESURFACE, EG AT LDN SUMMIT, IN FORM WHICH WILL ENCOURAGE BOTH INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURE FOR INCLUSION OF BRITISH DETERRENT PREMATURELY IN NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS. THEY ASKED ABOUT FUTURE OF GENERAL CDN INITIATIVE, AND ABOUT CDN INTENTIONS CONCERNING QUOTE DECALNUE UNQUOTE: SMITH TOLD THEM DECALOGUE WOULD MOST CERTAINLY APPEAR IN LETTERS WHICH PM TRUDEAU HAD INDICATED HE INTENDED TO WRITE TO SOVIETS, USA AND PERHAPS OTHER HEADS OF GOVT. ABOVE ALL, THEY ARE ANXIOUS TO BE INCLUDED BOTH BILATERALLY AND THROUGH NATO, IN FULL CONSULTATION PROCESS AS INITIATIVE FURTHER UNFOLDS. THEY WERE VISIBLY REASSURED TO KNOW THAT THIS WAS INDEED CDN INTENTION.

CCC/083 051203Z XNGR0504

MF

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WSAW UMGR0429 05MAR84

TO PCOOTT/FOWLER DELIVER BY 051200

INFO EXTOTT RED

DISTR RBR LIDDZ XDV

REF OURTEL UMGR012 07FEB(NOTAL)

---LETTERS OF THANKS/PMS VISIT TO GDR

AMB TRAVELLING TO GDR THUR 08MAR TO ATTEND LEIPZIG FAIR.EXPECTED  
HONECKER VISIT TO CDN STAND WOULD PRESENT IDEAL OPPORTUNITY FOR  
AMB TO DELIVER PMS WORDS OF THANKS.(PROPOSED TEXT WAS FORWARDED TO  
YOU IN REFTEL).WE SHOULD THEREFORE BE GRATEFUL IF TIME PERMITTING  
YOU COULD APPROVE TEXT OR ALTERNATIVELY PROVIDE AMENDED TEXT BY  
070900.SIGNED LETTER COULD OF COURSE BE FORWARDED AT LATER DATE.

UUU/235 051415Z UMGR0429

MP  
WFF

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR0292 05MAR84

TO EXTOTT RBR

INFO BH MSSTOTT/BERLINGUET/MACDOWALL NRCOTT/GINGRAS DE OTT  
DISTR MINA DMF EFB ETD ETS RGB RBD RBT RBRD/IDDZ RBP ZSP IFT  
ZSI ZSS

REF YOURTEL RBR0396 28FEB

---MSG TO GORBACHEV FROM MIN SANDT JOHNSTON

CAL ON VICE FORMIN RYZHOV TO DELIVER LET FROM SANDT MIN  
JOHNSTON TO GORBACHEV TOOK PLACE 05MAR(AS PROPOSED BY  
SUSLOV/MFA IN OURTEL XYGR0240 20FEB AND AGREED IN YOURTEL  
RBR0396 28FEB(NOTAL).IN HANDING OVER LETS AND ATTACHMENT  
GREY RECALLED NATURE OF GORBACHEV/JOHNSTON EXCHANGE IN AUG83  
(GORBACHEV REGRETTE LACK OF MOVEMENT ON SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL  
EXCHANGES AND JOHNSTON PROMISED TO PROVIDE DETAIL ON CDN  
COMPLAINTS)AND NOTED THAT FORMIN GROMYKO HAD MENTIONED ARCTIC  
AS EXAMPLE OF SOVIET INTEREST IN HIS EXCHANGE WITH DPM/SSEA  
ON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP IN STKHM IN JAN84.LET IT  
WAS EXPLAINED SHOULD BE SEEN AS CONSISTENT WITH PMS INITIATIVE  
AND WISH TO PROVIDE POLITICAL IMPETUS FROM TOP TO OVERCOME  
DIFFERENCES AND AS A REFLECTION OF HIGH LEVEL CDN INTEREST IN  
PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT OF FUTURE EXCHANGES.IN ADDITION LET  
SHOULD BE SEEN IN LIGHT OF CDN COMMITMENT TO PROMOTE DIALOGUE  
ON SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS.

2.TAKING ADVANTAGE OF FLOW OF CONVERSATION GREY TOOK OPPORTUNITY  
TO REFER TO INCREASED ACTIVITY ON PART OF BOTH EMBS AND AMBS  
SINCE THEY TOOK UP THEIR NEW ASSIGNMENTS AND HOPED THAT EACH

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PAGE TWO XYGR0292 CONFD

FOREIGN MINISTRY WOULD CONTINUE TO FACILITATE ACCESS TO SENIOR LEADERSHIP AND OFFICIALS OF RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES. WE UNDERSTOOD DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN SEEING GORBACHEV AT THIS TIME BUT ASSUMED AMBASSADORIAL ACCESS TO LEADERSHIP (OTHER THAN FORMIN) COULD OCCUR FROM TIME TO TIME, REFLECTING SOME DEGREE OF RECIPROCITY AND EXTENT OF SUPPORT EXTRAFF PROVIDED SOVIET AMB IN OTT. RYZHOV TOOK UP THIS POINT ONLY OBLIQUELY AND LATER AS WE LEFT ROOM, SAYING THAT SUSLOV, WHO WAS PRESENT THROUGHOUT WAS ALWAYS AVAILABLE TO RECEIVE US (PRESUMABLY TO DISCUSS OUR ACCESS REQUIREMENTS).

3. RYZHOV SEEMED TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO EXPLANATION OF BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF LET AND PROLONGED MTG CONSIDERABLY TO DISCUSS BILATERAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL. HE WAS PLEASED WITH POLITICAL ATTN GIVEN OUR RELATIONSHIP IN CDA, LIKED IDEA OF GIVING IT POLITICAL IMPETUS AND CITED GORBACHEV VISIT AND RECENT VISIT BY PM AS VERY IMPORTANT IN THIS CONTEXT. THEY VERY MUCH APPRECIATED VISIT OF PM TRUDEAU.

4. HOWEVER RYZHOV ALSO HAD TO MENTION AREAS WHERE OPPORTUNITIES WERE NOT/NOT BEING SIZED OR PURSUED WITH VIGOUR. HE WISHED TO ESCHEW COMPARISONS OF WHO WAS MORE ACTIVE BUT SOVIETS WOULD WELCOME AND SUPPORT EVERY SIGN OF INTEREST FROM US TO PROMOTE BILATERAL DEVELOPMENTS. OF THE VARIOUS QUESTIONS ON HIS MIND AND ONE BROACHED BY GORBACHEV LAST YEAR, THERE WAS SOVIET

...3

PAGE THREE XYGR0292 CONFD

DISAPPOINTMENT WITH SLUGGISHNESS AND LACK OF ENTHUSIASM OF  
CDN BUSINESSMAN IN BUYING SOVIET EQPT AND MACHINERAY.(HE HAD  
IN MIND POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET ENGINES IN CDN TRACTORS AND AS  
IN CASE OF SUSHKOV/HANCOCK EXCHANGE RYZHOVS BRIEF MAY HAVE BEEN  
OUT OF DATE.)BUT RYZHOV REFERRED TO AMB PEARSONS AND PM TRUDEAUS  
VISITS AS EXAMPLES OF WHAT COULD BE DONE TO DEVELOP POLITICAL  
CONTACTS THAT MIGHT CREATE FORWARD MOVEMENT IN COMMERCIAL FIELD.

5.AT THIS POINT SUSLOV INTERVENED TO SAY THAT MFA WAS STILL  
WAITING TO HEAR FROM CDNS ON TIMING FOR NEXT ROUND OF POLITICAL  
CONSULTATIONS.RYZHOV THEN CITED FRG-USSR AND FRANCE-USSR AS  
EXAMPLES OF GOOD COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH EACH APPROACHING  
THIRTY BILLION ROUBLES A YEAR.HE ALSO AGREED THAT ARCTIC WAS OF  
GREAT INTEREST TO BOTH USSR AND CDA AND LOOKED FORWARD TO WHAT  
HE CALLED JOINT AS WELL AS PARALLEL ACTIVITIES.IN GENERAL  
RESPONSE TO SOVIET POINTS RYZHOV AND SUSLOV WERE ASSURED

THAT AMB ROBERTS AND CDN EMB WOULD CONTINUE TO BE ACTIVE IN  
PROMOTING ALL APSECTS OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS TO ACHIEVE  
MUTUAL BENEFITS.

CCC/144 051430Z XYGR0292



c.c. EA/CMR/Johnston

IDDZ/J.McNee/5-5912

Ref. PMO No: 4048 150

DRAFT

OTTAWA K1A 0A2

March 4, 1984.

Dear King,

Thank you very much for your reflections on my February 9th speech in the House and on the course of my initiative.

You are entirely right to lay stress on the fact that the most serious international problems, including those of the nuclear threat, affect all nations. Although the most immediate dangers lie along the razor's edge of East-West relations, I would agree that we cannot simply confine ourselves to an East-West perspective.

Your proposal for an international co-operative effort to help the world's children is certainly consistent with my argument that we must seek out areas of agreement and common interest between both sides. I will give it some thought. In setting out the elements of this initiative I have had to choose amongst many compelling ideas; in the end, I have not laid great stress on how continued spending on armaments by both the developed and developing worlds represents a misallocation of resources on a global scale, but that, clearly, is one of the most distressing aspects of the current situation.

Again, many thanks for your letter.

Mr. King Gordon  
984 Fairlawn Avenue  
Ottawa K2A 3S5

001005



Government of Canada  
Privy Council Office

Gouvernement du Canada  
Bureau du Conseil privé

Ottawa, Canada  
K1A 0A3

Date: 21 February 1984...

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. R. Francis (IDD).....  
Director General, International.....  
Security and Arms Control Bureau

Letter to the Prime Minister from:

KING GORDON

PMO Ref. No: 4049...150.....


We have arranged with the Under Secretary's office that the Department's services can be drawn upon in preparing replies to letters which the Prime Minister has received on foreign affairs.

I would be grateful if you could prepare a draft reply to the attached letter and return it to me directly by 5 March 1984 with a copy to CMR/Johnston. It should be prepared as if for the Prime Minister's signature, although I would also welcome your advice on alternative ways of dealing with the matter, if appropriate.

If you have any questions, please call me at 5-6073.

Maurice D. Archdeacon  
Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat

c.c. PMO/Correspondence (Nicole Fournier)  
PCO/Judy Cameron  
EA/CMR/Ted Johnston



**PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE - BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVÉ**

**CONTROL FORM - PRIME MINISTER'S CORRESPONDENCE**

**FORMULAIRE DE CONTRÔLE - CORRESPONDANCE DU PREMIER MINISTRE**

TO/A: Mr. Fowler

CC: Messrs. Osbaldeston, Darling, Clark (our file)

RE: LETTER FROM/LETTRE DE:  
King Gordon

DATE:  
February 12, 1984

SUBJECT/SUJET:  
Peace Initiatives

CORRESPONDENCE NO/NO DE LA CORRESPONDANCE:  
4048 150

Judy Cameron

DATE: February 20, 1984

☐ REPLY PREPARED FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S SIGNATURE.  
RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DU PREMIER MINISTRE.

☐ REPLY PREPARED FOR MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN'S SIGNATURE AND FORWARDED THROUGH JUDY CAMERON.  
RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DE MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN, TRANSMISE PAR JUDY CAMERON.

☐ REFERRED TO ANOTHER MINISTER THROUGH JUDY CAMERON TO MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN.  
RÉFÉRÉ À UN MINISTRE PAR JUDY CAMERON À MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN.

☐ NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. COPY RETAINED IN PCO FOR INFORMATION AND ORIGINAL RETURNED TO JUDY CAMERON.  
AUCUNE RÉPONSE NÉCESSAIRE. UNE COPIE EST CONSERVÉE AU BCP À TITRE D'INFORMATION. L'ORIGINAL RETOURNE À JUDY CAMERON.

ADDITIONAL REMARKS/OBSERVATIONS ADDITIONNELLES:

4048 150

REC'D. / REÇU

FEB 20 1984

Coordination

984 Fairlawn Avenue  
Ottawa K2A 3S5  
February 12 1984

Dear Pierre,

I was greatly impressed by your report on your peace initiative and on the urgently critical situation to which it was addressed. A further study of the text confirmed my original judgment and, as you might expect, inspired certain opinions on where you might effectively have gone further in your analysis and advocacy. I hope you won't mind my sharing some of these opinions with you.

To begin with, I considered your opening sentences to be much more than introductory rhetoric. The nuclear threat is of paramount concern to all of mankind - regardless of age, sex, culture, nationality, ideology. If we do not bring it under rational control, the lives of our children and children's children are in acute peril. A nuclear war would make no distinction "between right and wrong, between rich and poor, between east and west, north and south."

It follows, then, that it is the imperative concern of all of us in the global community.

You established very early in your speech the unusability of the nuclear weapon and in the course of your argument assigned the "experts," the "high priests of nuclear strategy" to their proper place. This important conclusion was examined in some detail by Harlan Cleveland in his article of January 18 in the Christian Science Monitor. The relevance of this fact to the theory of deterrence is obvious but apparently is not yet evident to the strategic experts and their star-wars technologists. It appears that one central purpose of your mission was to encourage the assertion of political control over the official guardians of security, particularly on the part of the super-powers.

Your "decatalogue" is a useful elaboration of the areas of common interest on which agreement should and could be reached.

The role of NATO and Canada's role in NATO were, I felt, unduly stressed although your point that NATO is a political and not just a military alliance needs being brought into the open. And through this emphasis you were able to show its use in dialogue between east and west, the achievement of a measure of detente and normal political, cultural and economic relations, as well as the usefulness of free discussion among the NATO partners. What concerns me is that NATO, seen in a confrontational relationship with the Warsaw Pact, seems to accept the fact of a permanently divided world whereas there is a common concern shared by people in the north and south, east and west, that we establish a secure world community, responding to the actualities of the modern world.

ORIGINAL TO R. Fowler  
ORIGINAL ENVOYE *ax please see*  
C.C. PMO FILE *PM's note on*  
C.C. DOSSIERS CPM *encl. 001008*

These thoughts directed me back to an analysis of the contemporary world and its problems which you developed so convincingly in your Mansion House speech in London almost exactly nine years ago. Significantly, that speech fell midway in the decade between Lester Pearson's global review, Partners in Development, and Willy Brandt's North-South: A Program for Survival. Three passages struck me a particularly relevant today:

"We have at this moment in time an opportunity to recognize and arrest the inertia which threatens to plunge all too many societies into a vast labyrinth of confusion and despair. The first step in that process is acceptance of two facts: the inter-relationship of all countries, and the interaction of all phenomena. ~~The acceptance, in brief, of what each of the world's cultures has been proclaiming for centuries - that we are all brothers.~~"

"We are one on this earth. Each has the power to injure all the others. Each of us must assume the responsibility that that implies. And each must understand that the nature of that injury is not ephemeral and it is not transient. It can be real and it can be permanent. Cooperation is no longer simply advantageous: in order to survive it is an absolute necessity."

"Not a Shakespeare nor a Wordsworth nor a Kipling could translate into stirring words the requirements for commodity price stabilization or nuclear non-proliferation. Yet these struggles are the essence of life on this planet today. They are not struggles that can be confined to a law court or a battlefield or House of Commons: they require institutions and regimes of immense dimensions and novel attributes; they call - in the final analysis - for world-wide co-operation, for they demand that we struggle not against other human beings but with other human beings. They demand a common cause of humanity."

In your speech in Parliament, you laid important stress on the necessity of establishing meaningful dialogue between the super-powers that would lead to agreement along the lines set forth in your decalogue and guarantee some security against the threat of nuclear holocaust. And you stressed the common concern of all states, in fact, of all of mankind in the attainment of such security. But what you brought out in your Mansion House speech was the commonality, the inter-relation of problems facing our international community - food and nutrition the environment, health, energy as well as the threat of nuclear disaster. And the ongoing struggle to solve these problems which concern us all calls for "world-wide cooperation."

If we seek global security we must go beyond an effort to build a bridge over a permanent chasm dividing east from west. And there are a good many indications that we are moving in that necessary direction. As Willy Brandt wrote in the Introduction to his Report: "We see signs of a new awareness that mankind is becoming a single community."


On your present trip to Moscow you will almost certainly have the opportunity of continuing your peace initiative. You will be speaking with Soviet and other world leaders of the necessity for common action to reduce tension and promote detente along the lines you laid down in the Commons. Why not raise the challenge of a great new combined effort to mobilize the resources of the world community to solve at least one of the major problems that affect the lives of millions of our fellow human beings?

I think of the challenge portrayed so vividly by James Grant of UNICEF in his report on The State of the World's Children: 1982-83. He brings out the sombre fact that 40,000 children die each day - nearly 15 million each year - mainly through lack of food and the absence of primary health care which could be made available through existing resources. If we were to apply the human, scientific and economic resources equivalent to one one-hundredth of what the world is spending on armaments to this purpose, we could reduce that appalling number by one-half by the end of the century.

This is a realistic appraisal. The infrastructure is already in place. A process is already in being that involves world-wide participation of non-governmental organizations, ministries of health and agriculture in developing countries, bi-lateral cooperation programs and international specialized agencies. Given global dimensions, such a program would achieve dramatic results which would enhance world stability and security. But above all, it would bring together in a cooperative effort a wide range of the world's people and nations that would go far beyond easing tension through inspiring what you have described as "a common cause of humanity."

You will, I know, not consider that I am proposing an alternative approach to your peace initiative but rather an amplification of a cooperative endeavor that goes beyond bridging the chasm that now exists. Among other things it will open up the possibilities of new combined middle-power efforts by east and west within the context of global needs and open up the possibilities of active Commonwealth participation in keeping with the Goa Declaration. And it would find solid backing from the Canadian people.

All good wishes

  
King Gordon

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

*Lfr. Calder O/R*  
*Mr. Smith O/R*

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission (M/F)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR6222 02MAR84

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ IMMED

INFO CANMILREPNATO LDN PARIS BONN HAGUE GENEV VMBFR STKHM/SCDEL  
PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY NDHQOTT/ADM POL/DNACPOL/CPP/DSTRATA  
DISTR DMF IFB IDD IDR IDA RBD CPD

REF OURTEL YBGR6209 28FEB

---CONSULTATION AT NATO ON SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS

FOLLOW-UP ON OUTCOME OF FEB28 BRIEFING BY SMITH AND CALDER  
TO POL CTTEE(PAC)MORE OR LESS CONFIRMS EARLIER IMPRESSION  
THAT,AS FAR AS MOST ALLIES ARE CONCERNED,CONSULTATION AT  
NATO HQ ON SUBSTANCE OF TWO STRATEGIC VERIFICATION/MOBILITY  
PROPOSALS HAS PROBABLY BEEN EXHAUSTED.THIS IS NO/NO DOUBT IN  
PART CONSEQUENCE OF CALDERS MASTERFUL EXPOSITION AND DEFENCE  
OF PROPOSALS.EXCEPTIONS ARE,NOT/NOT SURPRISINGLY USA AND  
UK.USA COLLEAGUE,HOWARD PERLOW,TOLD US HE DID NOT/NOT  
RECEIVE REPORT OF SMITH/CALDER DISCUSSIONS IN WSHDC PREVIOUS  
WEEK UNTIL AFTER PAC MTG.ALTHOUGH IT DID NOT/NOT DIFFER  
SIGNIFICANTLY FROM CDN ACCOUNT OF EXCHANGES,THERE WERE  
DIFFERENCES IN EMPHASIS AND UNDERSTANDING.PERLOW SAID HE  
WOULD BE COMING BACK ON THESE AT NEXT PAC MTG,MAR05.HE AS  
YET HAD NO/NO INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING FURTHER CONSULTATIONS  
BUT THOUGHT WSHDC WOULD LIKELY BE PUSHING FOR EXPERTS MTG AT

...2

CONFIDENTIAL  
27 MAR 1982

PAGE TWO YBGR6222 CONFD

NATO TO DISCUSS ALL THREE PROPOSALS. WE ARE AWARE FROM OTHER SOURCES THAT USA DEL WAS DISAPPOINTED AND SOMEWHAT ANNOYED AT RELATIVELY RESTRAINED LINE TAKEN BY UK REP, IN PARTICULAR THAT HE CHOSE TO CIRCULATE QUESTIONS RATHER THAN PUTTING THEM TO BRIEFING TEAM DIRECTLY.

2. INABILITY OF USA TO SUSTAIN EARLIER CRITICISM OF PROPOSALS AND OUR OFFER OF FURTHER CONSULTATIONS HAS EFFECTIVELY ASSUAGED PREOCCUPATIONS OF NON-NUCLEAR PARTNERS. FURTHERMORE, BY SETTING IN MOTION LONG-BLOCKED NATO CONSULTATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL IMPLICATIONS OF ASAT DEVELOPMENT, WE HAVE WON GRATITUDE OF NUMBER OF ALLIES. AT SAME TIME, WE CONTINUE RECEIVING EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN RE ALLIANCE UNITY AND DESIRABILITY OF AVOIDING NEEDLESS EXASPERATION OF PARTICULAR NATL SENSITIVITIES.

3. AS TO TASK AT HAND, WE HAVE LEARNED THAT DUTCH WILL, AT NEXT PAC MTG 05MAR, BE PUSHING HARD FOR EXPERTS MTG WEEK OF MAR 19 ON ASAT. THEY HAVE STRONG SUPPORT OF FRG AND BELGIUM. ALTERNATIVE IS FRENCH PROPOSAL TO TACK EXCHANGE ON ASAT ON TO END OF APR9-10 DISARMAMENT EXPERTS MTG. THIS IS USA PREFERENCE. NETH IS VERY STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THIS BUT MIGHT BE BROUGHT AROUND WERE IT CAST AS SEPARATE MTG AND GIVEN ENTIRE DAY TO ITSELF (IE, APR11). NETH DEL SEES ADVANTAGE IN DELAYING MTG IF IT MEANS USA WILL BE BETTER PREPARED. EITHER WAY, WE CAN PROBABLY EXPECT USA WILL WANT AT SAME TIME TO ADDRESS OTHER TWO CDN PAPERS. WE

...3



PAGE THREE YBGR6222 CONFD

HAVE BEEN TAKING LINE THAT WHILE WE WOULD NOT/NOT OPPOSE THIS,  
THREE PROPOSALS DO NOT/NOT CONSTITUTE PACKAGE AS SUCH AND THAT WE  
SAW SOME MERIT IN TREATING PAPERS ON VERIFICATION/MOBILITY OF  
STRATEGIC SYSTEMS DIFFERENTLY.

4.GRATEFUL ANY FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS BY 050900.

CCC/298 021700Z YBGR6222

Canadian Centre  
for Arms Control  
and  
Disarmament

Centre canadien  
pour le contrôle  
des armements  
et le désarmement

275 Slater Street, Fifth Floor,  
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1P 5H9 613-230-7755

MF  
March 2, 1984

Mr. Louis A. Delvoie  
Director General  
International Security and Arms Control Bureau  
Department of External Affairs  
125 Sussex Drive  
Ottawa, Ontario

(same letter  
received by  
Gary Smith)

9/3/84

sc

Dear Mr. Delvoie:

This letter is in reference to two articles written by Michael McDowell which appeared in the Globe and Mail on February 29 and March 2. Both articles misconstrued the comments I made to McDowell to a degree that some clarification seems warranted.

With regard to the first article, entitled 'Arms Control Group Fears Ottawa Rival', a few points should be made. First, McDowell approached me for a piece about the Centre - that the Throne Speech institute was featured in the story was unanticipated and unfortunate. Second, the article vastly exaggerated (i.e. use of the word 'fear') our concern about the possible areas of overlap between the two organizations and the shortage of research talent. Those are problems of which we are all aware and which we will work out in time. Finally, no one connected with the Centre made the comment about officials failing to inform the Prime Minister about it. McDowell has told me he got this view from someone else.

With regard to McDowell's second article, entitled 'Setback Expected for Peace Plan', my comments were once again misconstrued, selectively reported, and taken out of context.

In particular, I was referring to the aspect of the initiative contained in Mr. Trudeau's personal efforts to interject a measure of political energy into international arms control efforts. In his February 9 speech to the House, Mr. Trudeau himself stated that his involvement would be declining.

As such, there was no suggestion in what I told McDowell that the specific proposals of the initiative would be dropped or pursued less vigorously by External Affairs or National Defence as a result of Mr. Trudeau's resignation. The proposals are, after all, Government policy.


...2/

...2/

Both of McDowell's articles reflect the typical journalistic practice of taking comments out of context in order to generate 'news'. That he has done this with this interview is, to say the least, a matter of real regret on my part.

I hope that this letter serves the purpose of clarification.

Sincerely yours,



John M. Lamb  
Executive Director

CPD 11 RBR TIR 1 RBP  
IDD ZEP CGS EER

SUBJECT/SUJET 12

GLOBE AND MAIL

PUBLICATION  
IFB  
JLO

ZSI URR

MF

DATE

MAR 2 1984

# Setback expected for peace plan

By MICHAEL McDOWELL

Pierre Trudeau's peace initiative is unlikely to progress in any significant way now that the Prime Minister has announced his resignation, some arms control and defence specialists said yesterday.

Although Mr. Trudeau can carry on a personal crusade for increased dialogue between Washington and Moscow, they said his international influence will have diminished greatly.

"He loses most of his clout (abroad) if he's not Prime Minister," said Gerald Wright, president of the Atlantic Council of Canada, a support group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. However, "he could do a certain amount to educate public opinion in Canada and stimulate interest (in arms control)."

Mr. Wright said he was not at all confident the Government would continue stressing arms control and security issues with the energy of recent months: "One of the unfortunate aspects of the Trudeau years is that the attention to (arms control) has been so sporadic."

"The present initiative was hatched almost overnight. It did not come out of long years of hard thought and expertise. On Trudeau's part, it never had a completely true ring. There were long periods when he had never given any attention to the subject at all."

If Ottawa is to persuade people it is taking the issue seriously, it must recruit more officials for arms control work, provide more funds for research and pay greater attention to the subject in the Cabinet and Parliament, Mr. Wright added.

Retired Canadian Admiral Robert Falls said Mr. Trudeau may still have international prestige, but he will now be seen primarily as

"an intellectual and an elder statesman."

"I would like to think that the things he set in train will go on," Admiral Falls said.

Mr. Trudeau can take some credit for injecting common sense into the nuclear debate and helping to reduce the rhetoric involved, said the admiral, a former chairman of NATO's military committee and a director of the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament.

John Lamb, executive director of the Ottawa-based CCACD, agreed that Mr. Trudeau's departure placed a question mark over the peace initiative.

"You have to look at who is carrying the ball inside the Govern-

ment, and External Affairs is probably not going to. Defence certainly won't. If there is any chance of anyone carrying the ball, it would have to be the Prime Minister's Office."

Robert Spencer, director of the Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto, said he believed Mr. Trudeau's role in the Canadian peace initiative was at an end.

"Obviously, he does not speak or travel or have the entrees that an active Prime Minister gets, (but) lots of people are involved in debating arms control issues who have no official post. The woods are full of them if he wants to invest the time and energy there."

Canada

IDA/S.O.I.E.Y.A.M./0-1082/pec/dj

TO/A The Disarmament Fund Grants & Contributions  
Committee

FROM/DE • IDA

REFERENCE • Memorandum IDA-0100 of January 24, 1984  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Disarmament Fund Class Contributions  
SUJET Committee Meeting - March 2, 1984

Security/Sécurité
CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
5-1-3-IDA
Date
March 2, 1984
Number/Numéro
IDA-0284

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

The following applications for financial assistance  
are submitted for consideration by the Committee:

1. Peace Education Network

Peace Education Network is involved in providing  
access to background information for teachers and community  
leaders. It is seeking a grant, primarily to cover operating  
expenses, including salaries, for one year.

Although the request includes letters of support  
from Mark Madoff, Assistant Professor, Department of  
Literature and Philosophy, Royal Roads Military College and  
Dr. Douglas A. Ross Institute of International Relations,  
UBC, the submitted examples of PEN's work are quite subjec-  
tive. There are regional considerations to be taken into  
account. A contribution of \$2600 for the purchase of books  
and periodicals might be considered.

Total Budget \$57,000  
Request 57,000  
Recommendation 2,600

.../2

2. Peace Research Institute-DUNDAS (PRI-D)

PRI-D has been working for many years producing two journals, Peace Research Reviews (PRR) and Peace Research Abstracts Journal (PRAJ). The latter is a particularly useful publication which provides synopses of publications on various aspects of peace research (including strategic studies). In 1982, Dr. MacGuigan, then SSEA wrote to PRI-D that a grant would be considered when funds became available.

A grant of \$15,000 would be an acknowledgement by this Department of the dedication and hard work of the Newcombes, and previously, of the Canadian Peace Research Institute in the field of Peace Research. A grant at this juncture, when the peace studies and strategic studies streams are converging, could be very timely. Consideration might be given to seeking a standing annual grant of \$10,000 to PRI-D for its abstract journal.

Total Budget	77,193
Request	70,000
Recommendation FY 1983/84	15,000

G *ok*

3. Pax Humanum: INPAX - International Peace Jamboree, Ottawa, 1-9 September 1984

A small group of Ottawa university students are organizing an international peace jamboree which will bring together youth from Canada and other countries to promote "global peace-building". The programme is divided into four major streams: Dialogue; Skills Development; Cultural Events and Activities; and Beyond INPAX. The organizers hope that INPAX will also stimulate the planning of peace-related activities for International Youth Year and International Peace Year.

This ambitious project has merit. The organizers appear to have had extensive and thorough consultations with experts representing the full spectrum of views on ACD issues. A contribution for the amount requested could be considered, provided that there is Departmental consensus on the feasibility of this project. More information is required on the actual programme and organization of this activity to ensure that contributions criterion are met.

Total Budget	1,167,388
Request	40,000
Recommendation	

4. Voice of Women: Attend Women's International League for Peace and Freedom Conference 6-8 March, Geneva.

Women's International League for Peace and Freedom is organizing a conference for women to discuss and plan the "effective participation" of women in the World Disarmament Campaign. The Conference is meant to provide opportunities to network, to learn about disarmament activities in the UN and to learn about the work of the Committee on Disarmament (CD). Voice of Women, which has been invited to participate in the conference is seeking financial assistance to partially defray the travel expenses of Mrs. Marion Kerans.

Ms. Barlow of the PMO who forward this request to the Fund indicated that Mrs. Kerans is a respected representative of the women's movement in Canada. Financial support to enable her to attend the Conference would be a means of endorsing women's, albeit advocacy oriented, participation in the discussion of Arms Control and Disarmament issues.

Total Budget	\$2158.50
Request	800.00
Recommendation	500.00

OK

Part rather than conf

5. Voice of Women: International Women's Conference "The Urgency for True Security: Women's Alternatives for Negotiating Peace".

Voice of Women is trying to organize a national women's coalition to organize an international conference "to explore creative, peaceful and non-violent solutions to the threat of global violence". It will also attempt to "bring into international focus the perspective and negotiating skills of women.

Depending on the coalition established and the degree of balance in their programme a contribution of \$50,000 (the maximum given to an organization to date) might eventually be considered with funding to be provided in stages.

Total Budget	\$266,589
Request	266,589
Recommendation	
FY 1984-85	?

.../4

6. United Nations Association in Canada: Briefing Papers

UNAC is expanding its excellent briefing papers series. Six of the next ten papers to be issued will be devoted to international security issues: Peacekeeping; Horizontal Proliferation; Biological Weapons; Chemical Weapons; Arms Control Fora; and Third World Countries and the Arms Race. UNAC intends to distribute the papers without charge to high schools, community colleges and universities. All the ACD papers are to be ready by Disarmament Week.

While we have funded speakers programmes in the past for Disarmament Week, we have been disappointed with the printed material issued during that period by many NGO's. Support for this UNAC project should ensure that objective information material will be available.

Total Budget	\$80,600	
Request	37,000	
Recommendation		
FY83/84	15,000	G
FY84/85	17,931.50	Contribution
FY84/85	4,000.00	G

JK

7. United Nations Association in Canada/Canadian Student Pugwash: International Security and Outer Space Programme

Further to the Committee's decisions of March 4, 1983 and September 1, 1983 approving a total contribution of \$40,000, UNAC/CSP has submitted their interim accounting to date and their request for the remaining \$10,000.

The programme is doing well. It has not attracted the wide audiences or business support originally hoped for in March 1983. It has nevertheless gained substantial media coverage and stimulated corporate interest.

Total Budget	\$81,786.96
Total Request	40,000.00
Approved	
(in principle)	40,000.00
Contributed	30,000.00
Substantiated	
Request	10,000.00
Recommendation	10,000.00

JK



8. Ad Hoc Committee to support the Canadian Third Track for Peace

The group formed by Dr. Laxer is seeking \$2500 per month for one year to finance publication of a monthly newsletter which would reflect the informational-educational output of a resource education centre for voluntary organizations. Science for Peace, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Psychologists for Social Responsibility, among others would make use of the Centre. The group is also seeking \$10,000 to support a conference being organized at Simon Fraser University. *Does it exist?*

Total Budget	\$40,000
Request	40,000
Recommendation	

9. York University: Conference - "Deterrence in the 1980's April 26-27, 1984"

The York University Research Programme in Strategic Studies is organizing a conference on "Deterrence in the 80's". The conference will focus on the political strategic environment and deterrence; the strategy of deterrence; strategic deterrence and the Superpowers; NATO and deterrence; deterrence and new technology; arms limitation and deterrence; and, the future of deterrence, with a view to analysing the extent to which deterrence can and should remain the key component of American and western security. The conference will also attempt to ascertain whether the changes which have occurred, and are occurring, in terms of deterrence strategy are in Canada's security interests.

The conference is thought provoking and will contribute to the general discussion of international security issues.

Total Budget	\$26,230.17
Request	22,122.00
Recommendation	10,000.00

*OK for*  
*originally 10,000?*

Canadian Disarmament Information Service: Peace Calendar

CANDIS is seeking a grant of \$16,940 to cover its operating costs for the next two months. On June 8, 1983 a contribution of \$3,000 was made to CANDIS in recognition of the utility of the Peace Calendar's coverage of NGO disarmament activities in Canada. CANDIS has consolidated its position as a network contact for disarmament groups.

Total Budget	\$56,670
Request	16,940
Recommendation	15,000 G

*multiplication  
of clearing hours  
e.g. Labor*

11. Disarmament Times

The Disarmament Times is seeking a grant of \$5000 to sustain its operations. At the June 8, 1983 meeting a similar request was considered. While there was merit in providing financial assistance to the Disarmament Times, the Committee considered the request to be outside the criteria for contributions as the funding was intended for administrative items including salaries. There is greater flexibility with the recently authorized Disarmament Fund Grants.

Total Budget	\$50,000
Request	5,000
Recommendation	5,000 G

*what is it?*

*OK*

12. Canadian Student Pugwash/Defence, Arms Control and Social Responsibility: A Directory to Information Sources

Canadian Student Pugwash financial assistance to prepare a directory to provide "comprehensive information on research institutes in Canada and abroad, educational programs, activities of Canadian researchers, and important journals and reference works relevant to the field." It will also contain information about governmental and non-governmental organizations in Canada and an introductory bibliography.

Canadian Student Pugwash has an excellent reputation for organizing objective conferences. Should they apply the same balanced approach to a Directory it could be a very useful reference document for general public use. Maximum assistance should be accorded this project.

Total Budget	\$7770.20
Request	7770.20
Recommendation	3000.00

*OK*

*what about  
govt centre?*

13. C.I.I.A.: Monograph and Workshop on International Security and the Peace Movement.

Messrs. Kim Killeen and Michael Pearson are seeking financial assistance for the preparation of a monograph on Canadian security policy and the peace movement and the organization of a workshop involving members of the "peace activist" community, officials, Members of Parliament and academics (somewhat like the composition of the Consultative Group). The monograph will try to describe and analyse the various positions (or perceived positions) in Canada on international security issues. The workshop is intended to promote a dialogue between the various participants.

An analysis of the perceptions and/or misperceptions of the various groups involved in the international security debate, should stimulate further discussion on this subject. Much will depend, however, on the analysis of the authors. An initial contribution for the researchers travel and a further \$1500 next fiscal year for expenses and part of the publication costs, (provided the publication is balanced), might be considered.

The workshop, which we could consider a mini-Consultative Group meeting, could be beneficial and fully funded.

Total Budget	26,100
Request	17,000
Recommendation FY 1983-84	1,000
FY 1984-85	13,500

*What sequence?  
where via vis  
GG*

*+3000*

14. Peace Research Institute - Dundas: Technological Modernization

PRI-D wishes to purchase equipment to modernize its operations (IBM wordprocessor) and to make back issues of the Peace Research Abstracts Journal (PRAJ) computer accessible. Part of the funding requested is for the salary of a technician and for consultations with Peace research colleagues in West Germany who have been computerizing PRAJ Reference Numbers and the codes assigned to Abstracts.

In view of the utility of the abstracts to the research work of this Division, assistance to this organization for modernization/computerization would be money well spent.

Total Budget	\$50,086.20
Request	50,086.20
Recommendation	38,000.00
FY84/85	8,000.00

*Govt Centre?*

*OR*

15. Interfaith Programme for Public Awareness of Nuclear Issues

The Interfaith Programme intends to hold "hearings" to consider the "serious moral issues related to Canadian nuclear policies which warrant further public review." The "Hearings" are intended to "use the concepts of responsible stewardship, justice, sustainability, and participation as measures of the moral acceptability of Canada's current nuclear policies and activities."

There is insufficient information to consider this request. Moreover, Energy, Mines, and Resources has requested that no commitments be made until there has been an inter-Departmental meeting on "Hearings". ?

Total Budget	\$86,745
Request	10,580
Recommendation	deferred

16 Educating for Peace: Conference

Educating for Peace is seeking funds to defer expenses involved with their conference on Educating for Peace. ?

Patrick Watson is the keynote speaker. The Conference is intended to provide "practical classroom help to teachers" who are dealing with nuclear/arms race issues. Joe Beckett will participate in the workshop Canada: The Arms Race and the Search for Peace.

In light of the participation of Joe Beckett and John Lamb a contribution may be in order. The group has also submitted a printed version of their resource guide for teachers (they sought a \$500 contribution). They still wish financial support for their booklet.

Total Budget	\$1500
Request	1500
Recommendation	<u>\$00</u>

OR

17 Peace Research Institute - Dundas: Inter-University Conference on Peace Studies, Brock University, May 11-13, 1984

PRI-D, Science for Peace, World Federalists of Canada, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Canadian Peace Research and Education Association and Brock University have joined together to sponsor the conference which is meant to promote a dialogue and a balanced approach for discussion of peace education among representatives from the university programmes in strategic studies and arms control, peace educators and peace researchers.

The Conference organizers have tried to assemble balanced panels of speakers. John Sigler, Doug Roche and Ted Olson are confirmed participants. Ron Purver is being approached. Ron Cleminson is interested in participating. The Conference has the potential to promote a better dialogue on questions of peace and security.

Total Budget	\$10,000
Request	4,000
Recommendation	<u>4,000</u>

OR

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2093 02MAR84

TO EXTOTT) IDDZ

INFO VMBFR BNATO CANMILREPNATO BONN LDN MOSCO GENEV PRMNY  
STKHM NDHQOTT/DNACPOL/CID/CORAE/ADMPOL/DIPOL/CPD/DSTRATA  
DISTR IFB IDR IDA IDRA IDRL RGX RBD RCD RCR RSR RSRD CPD IDD  
---VMBFR:NEW USA POSITION

WE WERE ASKED TO CALL ON STATE DEPT(HAWES).HAWES SAID THAT WE  
HAD BEEN ASKED TO CALL SO THAT USA CLD FORMALLY INFORM US THAT  
THE REVIEW THAT THEY HAD UNDERTAKEN OF THEIR VBFR POSITION IS  
NOW OVER AND THAT USA HAS REACHED A NEW POSITION.IT IS THE USA  
VIEW THAT THE WEST MUST DO SOMETHING TO ANSWER WHAT THE SOVS  
HAVE DONE AND THAT WE SHLD PUT SOMETHING DOWN DURING THIS NEXT  
SESSION WHICH IS LIKELY TO BE A SHORT ONE.HAWES SAID THAT USA  
HAD DECIDED TO NARROW THE FOCUS OF THE DATA DISPUTE TO COMBAT  
AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES.THIS WLD ALLOW FOR RESLN OF THE DATA  
QUESTION BUT WLD MAINTAIN THE EMPHASIS ON THOSE TROOPS WHOSE  
MILITARY RELEVANCE IS HIGHEST.THE USA HAS DECIDED AT THE SAME  
TIME HOWEVER THAT THERE MUST BE A RESLN OF THE DATA QUESTION  
BEFORE WE MOVE TO REDUCTIONS.THE USA IS NOT/NOT PREPARED TO  
REDUCE FIRST.HAWES ALSO PROVIDED SOME FURTHER INFO ON THE CONCEPT  
OF A QUOTE BAND UNQUOTE WITHIN WHICH SOME DISCREPANCY WLD BE  
ALLOWED.HE WAS RELUCTANT TO TALK MUCH ABOUT THIS SAYING USA WAS  
STILL POLISHING DETAILS.HE SAID THE BANK WLD BE ESTABLISHED ON

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR2093 CONFD

THE BASIS OF(A)CATEGORY OF TROOPS CONCERNED AND(B)CONFIDENCE IN OUR VERIFICATION CAPABILITY FOR THAT PARTICULAR CATEGORY. BAND WLD NOT/NOT APPLY TO THE AGGREGATE OF TROOPS.HAWES PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING ILLUSTRATION OF HOW THE USA WLD ENVISAGE THE BAND WLD WORK.WHAT IS NOTEWORTHY IS THAT IT WLD APPEAR THE USA INTENDS TO APPLY THE BAND CONCEPT IN FAIRLY MINUTE DETAIL.HAWES SAID FOR EXAMPLE THAT IF THROUGH OUR VERIFICATION CAPABILITY WE DETERMINED THAT BULGARIAN RADIO OPERATORS NUMBERED 2,400 PLUS OR MINUS 100 AND IF THE EAST CLAIMED THAT THERE WERE 2,302 UNDER THE QUOTE BAND UNQUOTE SYSTEM WE WLD CONSIDER THERE TO HAVE BEEN AGREEMENT.HAWES SAID IT WILL UNDOUBTEDLY TAKE SOME TIME TO WORK OUT BETWEEN THE EAST AND THE WEST AGREEMENT ON THE DEFINITION OF THESE CATEGORIES.

2.IN RESPONSE TO OUR QUESTION HAWES SAID THAT THE DECISION TO FOCUS ON COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES FOR SOLVING THE DATA PROBLEM DID NOT/NOT MEAN THAT AT THE END OF THE PROCESS THE USA WAS WILLING TO AGREE THAT WE WLD COMPLETELY IGNORE REAR SERVICES.THESE ARE BEING LEFT FOR LATER IN THE PROCESS.PARITY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST IS STILL THE USA GOAL.

3.HAWES SUMMARIZED THE USA POSITION BY SAYING THAT WHILE THE USA HAS SAID THAT IT WILL NOT/NOT AGREE TO REDUCTIONS BEFORE AGREEMENT ON DATA THEY HAVE RESOLVED TO CRACK THROUGH THE DATA PROBLEM BY QUOTE IMAGINATIVE TECHNICAL APPROACHES UNQUOTE.

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR2093 CONF

WE SAID THAT IT APPEARED TO US THAT WE WERE AGAIN FACED WITH A NUCLEAR ACCOUNTANTS APPROACH TO THE NEGS AND THAT THE USA POSITION DID NOT/NOT ON FIRST GLANCE APPEAR TO PROVIDE THE KIND OF POLITICAL MOTIVATION WE HOPED TO INJECT INTO THE MBFR PROCESS. HAWES AGREED THIS WAS AN ACCURATE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE USA PROPOSAL BUT SAID THAT THE USA HAD LOOKED AT THE DATA PROBLEM AND HAD DECIDED IT WAS STRATEGICALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO TRY AND MAKE AN END RUN AROUND THE ISSUE. THEY BELIEVE THAT WE CAN CUT THROUGH IT WITH A TECHNICAL APPROACH SUCH AS THIS.

4. HAWES SAID THAT USA WAS DISCUSSING NEW POSITION FIRST WITH THE QUOTE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS UNQUOTE BUT SAID HE HOPED THAT IN ABOUT A WEEK THEY WLD HAVE ELABORATED THE PROPOSAL WELL ENOUGH TO BE ABLE TO UNDERTAKE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS IN A MORE FORMAL MANNER BOTH WITH DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND THEY HOPED WITH CDA. WE INDICATED (AS WE HAVE IN THE PAST) THAT WE WLD BE MOST INTERESTED IN SUCH CONSULTATION. PLS ADVISE IF YOU WLD BE PREPARED TO SEND A TEAM DOWN TO WSHDC NEXT WEEK OR EARLY THE WEEK AFTER FOR SUCH CONSULTATION IF IT PROVES IMPOSSIBLE FOR USA TEAM TO TRAVEL TO CDA.

5. PARAS 1 TO 4 INCLUSIVE CONTAIN INFO RECEIVED IN CONFIDENCE FROM STATE DEPT.

CCC/241 022154Z UNGR2093



## PERS MNGT GESTION DU PERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L PERS MGMT NO/NO OTHER DIST IN OTT  
FM GENEV YTGR1542 02MAR84

TO EXTOTT ACB

DISTR ACBX IMD JCD IDDZ/DELVOIE DMT

---ORDER OF CANADA INVESTITURE

AS YOU KNOW, ORDER OF CANADA INVESTITURES WILL TAKE PLACE  
IN OTT ON APR 11. GOVT HOUSE HAS EXPLAINED THAT TRAVEL COSTS  
UP TO ONE RETURN ECONOMY FARE VICTORIA-OTTAWA WILL BE PAID  
(AMOUNTING TO CHF 1430-CDN DLRS 830). AS SPECIAL EXCEPTION TO  
NORMAL PRACTICE OF ONE GUEST PER RECIPIENT, BOTH MY MOTHER (WHO LIVES  
IN VICTORIA) AND MY WIFE RUTH, ARE INVITED (AS RESULT OF HELPFUL  
INTERVENTION BY JACQUES NOISEUX, BASED ON GOTLIEB PRECEDENT).  
2. IT IS EMBARRASSING TO BE RAISING QUESTION OF TRAVEL COSTS  
SO SOON AFTER MOST HELPFUL ACTION BY DEPT ON NOV 30 PUBLIC  
SERVICE AWARD CEREMONIES. AS IN THAT CASE, OF COURSE, I WOULD  
CARRY OUT CONSULTATIONS IN OTT BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE DEPT  
(WHICH PROVED MOST USEFUL IN NOV-DEC TRIP) HENCE INFO ADDRESSEES  
OF THIS TEL.

3. IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE COSTS I HAVE ENQUIRED ABOUT APEX FARES  
AND HAVE BEEN ADVISED AS FOLLOWS:

CHEAPEST APEX FARE IS LONDON-MONTREAL-RETURN CHF810

CHEAPEST CHARTER FLIGHT IS GENEVA-LONDON-RETURN CHF240

TOTAL APPROX COST FOR MRS BEESLEY CHF1055

...2

PAGE TWO YTGR1542 CONFD PERS MGMT

4.SINCE I MAY HAVE TO GO TO BRU(ALONG WITH OTHER DISARMAMENT  
AMBASSADORS HERE)FOR DISARMAMENT CONSULTATIONS EN ROUTE TO OTT,  
THE TOTAL COST FOR MY FARE IN SUCH EVENT WOULD BE:

GENEV-BRU-MTL-OTT-GENEV TOTAL APPROX COST FOR ME:CHF1783

(NORMAL ECONOMY AIR FARE GENEV-BRU-OTT-GENEV WOULD BE CHF2991)

5.GRATEFUL TO LEARN WHETHER DEPT WILL ABSORB TRAVEL COSTS FOR  
MYSELF AND MRS BEESLEY OVER AND ABOVE THOSE PAID BY GOVT HOUSE  
(ON ASSUMPTION THAT I WILL PAY FOR RETURN FARE VICTORIA-OTT-VICTORIA  
FOR MY MOTHER)

BEESLEY

CCC/221 021729Z YTGR1542

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM GENEV YTGR1528 2MAR84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO BNATO WSHDC CANMILREPNATO BRU MOSCO LDN BONN ROME VMBFR PARIS  
OSLO COPEN ATHNS STKHM/SCDEL PCOOTT/FOWLER/AXWORTHY NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/  
DNACPOL/DACPOL/CP/STRATA/CIS

DISTR IDD IFB MINA MINE MINT USS DMF IDA RBR RCR RSR RBO RCO RSO CPD  
ZSI ZSP UGB URR IDR RGB

REF BNATO TEL YBGR6209 28FEB

---CONSULTATIONS ON SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS:IDDZ BRIEFING OF POL CTTEE  
28FEB

FOR THE RECORD,FOLLOWING ARE SUMMARY NOTES OF TALKING POINTS RAISED  
DURING REF CONSULTATIONS THUR,28FEB(PARA 2 REFTTEL REFERS):QUOTE

IN THE CDN BRIEFING OF THE POLITICAL CTTEE,A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS  
WERE RAISED CONCERNING WHETHER THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT WAS THE  
QUOTE APPROPRIATE FORUM UNQUOTE TO PRESENT THE THREE CDN PAPERS(ON  
PROHIBITION OF HIGH ALTITUDE ASAT SYSTEMS,ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS  
VERIFICATION AND ON RESTRICTING MOBILITY OF ICBM SYSTEMS RESPECTIVELY).

THERE WAS ALSO SOME QUESTION ABOUT THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN TABLING  
AND CIRCULATING THESE PAPERS.NOTES OF OUR RESPONSE ARE AS FOLLOWS:  
1)QUOTE TABLING UNQUOTE VERSUS QUOTE CIRCULATING UNQUOTE:WE INDICATED  
THAT WHILE IT WAS INDEED THE CDN INTENTION TO PRESENT THE CDN PAPERS  
AT THE CD IN DUE COURSE,THIS WOULD BE AFTER EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION IN  
NATO;THE PAPERS WOULD HOWEVER BE BROUGHT TO THE CD,AND THE QUESTION

...2

PAGE TWO YTGR1528 CONFD

OF MEANS WAS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION AND CONSULTATION. IN THE MEANTIME, OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE TERMS QUOTE TABLING UNQUOTE AND QUOTE CIRCULATING UNQUOTE WAS AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE TABLING UNQUOTE: QUOTE TABLING UNQUOTE IS THE PROCESSED BY WHICH A DOCU, EITHER IN THE FORM OF A NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL OR BACKGROUND PAPER, IS PRESENTED TO THE CD, USUALLY BEING INTRODUCED BY A STATEMENT. THE DOCUS IN QUESTION ARE GIVEN A CD NUMBER, AND THE SECRETARIAT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR PROCESSING AND DISTRIBUTION IN ALL OFFICIAL LANGUAGES. QUOTE TABLING UNQUOTE CAN TAKE PLACE EITHER IN PLENARY SESSION (WHERE IT IS GIVEN A CD NUMBER BY THE SECRETARIAT) OR IN ONE OF THE WORKING GROUPS (WHERE IT IS GIVEN A WP NUMBER). QUOTE CIRCULATING UNQUOTE: QUOTE CIRCULATING UNQUOTE IS A GENERIC DESCRIPTION, INDICATING, IN BROAD TERMS, ANY METHOD USED TO PASS DOCUS TO OTHER PARTICIPANTS (NUMBER UNSPECIFIED) OF THE CD NOT/NOT INVOLVING THE FORMAL PROCESS OF GOING THROUGH THE SECRETARIAT. AMONG THE OPTIONS ENCOMPASSED BY THIS TERM COULD BE, FOR EXAMPLE, LETS TO DELS, OR ANY OTHER INFO DEVICE DEEMED APPROPRIATE.

2) CD AS AN QUOTE APPROPRIATE UNQUOTE INSTITUTION: THE USA DEL MADE THE POINT THAT SINCE THE CD WAS A PURELY NEGOTIATING FORUM, IT WAS INAPPROPRIATE AS A PLACE TO PRESENT THE DOCUS WE HAD IN MIND. OUR RESPONSE WAS AS FOLLOWS:

CD AS A NEGOTIATING FORUM: BOTH PRECEDENT AND THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE CD ALLOW FOR EXCHANGES OF VIEWS IN PROCEEDINGS OTHER THAN

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THOSE IMPLIED IN ACTUAL ENGAGEMENTS IN NEGOTIATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE MANDATE OF THE NTB WORKING GROUP LAST YEAR DID NOT/NOT CALL FOR NEGOTIATIONS, BUT FOCUSSED ON EXPLORING IN-DEPTH ISSUES RELATED TO VERIFYING AN NTB REGIME BY SEISMIC MEANS. SIMILARLY, QUOTE CONCENTRATED DISCUSSIONS UNQUOTE HAVE BEEN HELD ON THE ISSUE OF THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR, OUTSIDE THE WORKING GROUP CONTEXT, AND IT WAS UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED BY ALL PARTIES THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS WOULD NOT/NOT NECESSARILY LEAD TO NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SUBJ.

MEANING OF THE QUOTE QUOTE APPROPRIATE UNQUOTE: THE USA DELEGATE ASSERTED THAT THE CD DID NOT/NOT HAVE THE MANDATE TO DEAL WITH THE SUBJ MATTER OF THE CDN PAPERS. WE REPLIED THAT THE TERM QUOTE APPROPRIATE UNQUOTE HAS IN FACT TWO MEANINGS, THE LEGAL, OR INSTITUTIONAL MEANING (IE WHETHER OR NOT/NOT THE CD IS BY ITSELF EMPOWERED TO ADDRESS ISSUES CONTAINED IN THE CDN PAPERS), AND THE POLITICAL MEANING (IE WHETHER OR NOT/NOT CONTENT OF THE CDN PAPERS MAKE THEM POLITICALLY DESIRABLE TO PRESENT TO THE CD AT THIS TIME: QUOTE APPROPRIATE UNQUOTE IN THE LEGAL/INSTITUTIONAL SENSE:

BY THE AGENDA OF THE 1984 SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD/433), ADOPTED 17 FEB 84, THE QUOTE STANDING AGENDA UNQUOTE (THE SO-CALLED DECALOGUE) WAS REAFFIRMED AS THE BASIS OF THE MANDATE OF THE CD. ITEMS OF THE DECALOGUE RELEVANT TO THE CDN PROPOSALS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ALL ASPECTS UNQUOTE. (AGENDA ITEM I)

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QUOTE COLLATERAL MEASURES,CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES;EFFECTIVE  
VERIFICATION METHODS IN RELATION TO APPROPRIATE DISARMAMENT  
MEASURES,ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES CONCERNED UNQUOTE.(AGENDA ITEM  
IX)

THE 1984 AGENDA(AS OPPOSED TO THE STANDING AGENDA,(CITED ABOVE)  
MOREOVER LISTS THE FOLLOWING ITEMS RELEVANT TO THE CDN PAPERS:

- CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT.
- PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE.

THESE AGENDA ITEMS ARE ACCORDINGLY REFLECTED IN THE PROGRAM OF WORK  
OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT.

QUOTE APPROPRIATE UNQUOTE IN THE POLITICAL SENSE:

THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS ITSELF WAS IN FACT THE MEANS BY WHICH WE  
HAVE CHOSEN TO DETERMINE THE POLITICAL/STRATEGIC APPROPRIATENESS OF  
BRINGING THE CDN PROPOSED TO THE CD.FURTHER CONSULTATIONS IN NATO  
WILL TAKE PLACE,AND WE WERE PLEASED TO HEAR THAT COLLEAGUES WOULD  
LIKE ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE CDN PAPERS,PERHAPS WITH  
THE PRESENCE OF EXPERTS,AT A LATER STAGE THIS SPRING.

AS A RESULT OF THIS PRESENTATION,THE USA DELEGATE ALLOWED THAT IN  
LEGAL TERMS THE CD DID HAVE THE MANDATE TO ADDRESS THE CDN PROPOSALS.  
HE MAINTAINED,HOWEVER,THE USA POSITION THAT FOR POLITICAL/STRATEGIC  
REASONS,IT WAS INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE CDN DOCUS TO BE CIRCULATED IN  
THE CD BECAUSE:

- STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND NEGOTIATIONS APPERTAINING THERETO WERE

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BEST DEALT WITH ON A BILATERAL(IE USA/USSR)BASIS;AND  
-THE CDN PROPOSAL ON OUTER SPACE WOULD THREATEN TO EXPOSE PUBLICLY  
DIFFERENCES OF VIEW WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.THE AMERICAN DELEGATE DID  
HOWEVER SAY THAT THE USA WAS IN BROAD AGREEMENT WITH THE THRUST OF  
CDN PROPOSALS ON MOBILITY AND VERIFIABILITY ALTHOUGH HE MAINTAINED  
THAT USA STILL HAD PROBLEMS WITH TIMING AND FORUM.THE OUTER SPACE  
PROPOSAL WAS HOWEVER SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT SINCE IT HAD IMPLICATIONS  
BEYOND THE PURELY BILATERAL CONTEXT,AND THE USA WAS READY TO ENGAGE  
IN INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS IN NATO ON THE CDN PROPOSAL ON OUTER  
SPACE AT A DATE TO BE AGREED.UNQUOTE.

CCC/198 021545Z YTGR1528

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

READDRESSED FM LDN 02MAR84 TO EXTOTT IDR IDDZ IDA  
FM LDN XNGR0492 02MAR84

TO EXTOTT RCM DELIVER 020900

INFO BRU ATHNS ROME PARIS POECD BONN DUBLN HAGUE COPEN LSBON  
MDRID BREEC FINOTT/IER PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR RSR RCR RCT RST RCD RGB TAD EFB EPD EED EER EPT DMT DMF  
SFB URB IFB IMP ZEP

REF BREEC TEL YCGR0356 08FEB

---EUROPEAN COMMUNITY:BILATERAL DIPLOMACY:BRITISH PERSPECTIVES  
SUMMARY:GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL WAS HERE 28FEB;ITALIAN PRESIDENT  
PERTINI VISITED LDN LAST WEEK;DUTCH PRIME MINISTER LUBBERS WILL  
BE HERE TODAY;AND PRESIDENT MITTERRAND WILL COME 05MAR.ESSENTIAL  
FOCUS IN ALL THESE VISITS(EVEN LARGELY CEREMONIAL CALL BY  
PERS PERTINI),IS EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,AND ALL ARE APPRECIATED HERE  
AS PART OF INTENSE PATTERN OF BILATERAL CONTACTS SET IN MOTION  
BY FRENCH PRESIDENCY.OF FOUR VISITS,IT IS NO/NO SECRET HERE THAT  
THOSE OF CHANCELLOR KOHL AND PRES MITTERRAND ARE REGARDED AS OF  
MOST SIGNIFICANCE;OFFICIALS MAY PLAY DOWN SUGGESTIONS OF FRG/  
FRENCH/UK QUOTE AXIS UNQUOTE,BUT THEY ARE PRIVATELY CONCERNED AT  
POSSIBILITY OF FRENCH/GERMAN QUOTE DEAL UNQUOTE,AND WANT TO  
ENSURE UK IS PART OF ANY DISCUSSIONS ABOUT COMPROMISE PROPOSALS.  
QUOTE THREE CAPITALS MOVING IN PARALLEL ON COMMUNITY PROBLEMS MAY  
NOT/NOT GUARANTEE SUCCESS,BUT IF WE MOVE AGAINST EACH OTHER,IT WILL  
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GUARANTEE MAJOR FAILURE UNQUOTE.WHILE NO ONE HERE IS WILLING TO BE OVERLY OPTIMISTIC,(AS CHANCELLOR KOHL SAID TO PRESS,QUOTE WE HAVE NOT/NOT YET REACHED TOP OF MOUNTAIN UNQUOTE),FEELING IS THAT SUBSTANTIAL COMPROMISES COULD BE ACHIEVED IF CURRENT MOMENTUM AND POLITICAL WILL CONTINUE INTO MARCH SUMMIT.AND EVEN IF BROAD AGREEMENT IS NOT/NOT ACHIEVED THERE,GGROUNDWORK WILL HAVE BEEN LAID FOR ESSENTIAL COMPROMISE BY COUNCIL MTG IN JUNE.

2.REPORT:CHANCELLOR KOHLS TALKS WITH PM THATCHER ARE CHARACTERIZED BY FCO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY DEPTS HAVING BEEN GOOD,IF GENERAL.THERE WAS BROAD AGREEMENT ON NEED FOR BUDGETARY CONTROL,AND OBVIOUS APPRECIATION ON BOTH SIDES THAT REPEAT OF ATHENS SUMMIT IN MARCH WOULD BE DISASTROUS.NONETHELESS UK GAVE LITTLE GROUND ON ITS INSISTENCE THAT INCREASE IN OWN RESOURCES BE ACCOMPANIED BY EXPENDITURE CONTROL AND AGREEMENT TO BUDGET REBATE SOLUTION.FCO OFFICIALS SHUS SUGGEST THAT THERE IS STILL PLENTY OF ROOM FOR MARCH DISCUSSIONS TO FALL SHORT.ON OTHER HAND,THEY TAKE ENCOURAGEMENT FROM EXPECTATION THAT ATMOSPHERE AMONGST LEADERS IN MARCH IS BETTER THAN AT ATHENS;THEY RECOGNISE FRENCH DETERMINATION TO GET SOMETHING OUT OF MARCH MTG,AND ARE MOTIVATED BY REALISATION THAT FAILURE TO REACH BROAD AGREEMENT BY JUNE WOULD BE QUOTE SERIUS CATASTROPHE UNQUOTE.

3.IN SOME CONTRAST, LAST WEEKS PERTINI VISIT,WHILE GREAT PERSONAL

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PAGE THREE XNGR0492 CONF

SUCCESS(PERTINI WAS DESCRIBED IN BRITISH PRESS AS EUROPE'S BEST LOVED HEAD OF STATE), WAS CEREMONIAL IN CHARACTER:TALKS ON COMMUNITY AND OTHER MATTERS ARE DESCRIBED AS HAVING BEEN QUOTE DESULTORY UNQUOTE,AND OFFICIALS HERE CONTINUE TO TALK OF ITALY MORE AS PART OF PROBLEM THAN OF SOLUTION.

4.BOTH PERTINI AND KOHL VISITS INCLUDED REVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL QUESTIONS,AND PARTICULARLY OF MILK PRODUCTION.COMMUNITY AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS ARE IN BRITISH EYES TYPIFIED BY DIFFICULTIES OVER MILK:WHILE THERE IS INCREASING GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT SUPER LEVY IS INEVITABLE,SPECIFIC PRACTICAL PROBLEMS(AS IN ALL COMMUNITY QUESTIONS)WILL CONTINUE TO INHIBIT EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY DE-ACTION; APART FROM QUESTION OF WHERE TO SET LIMIT(EG 97 MILLION TONS,AS UK WOULD LIKE, - OR AT HIGHER LEVEL WITH AGREEMENT TO WORK DOWN GRADUALLY?)BRITISH CLAIM THEY FIND IRISH ARGUMENT FOR EXEMPTION ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT TO ADMIT,BOTH BECAUSE THEY FEEL ONCE ONE EXCEPTION IS MADE AGREEMENT WILL BECOME LITTLE BETTER THAN SIEVE,AND BECAUSE THEY SEE DIFFICULTY IN DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN CONDITIONS NORTHERN IRELAND AND EIRE.THEY REGARD ITALIAN ARGUMENT AS IMPLYING A RIGHT TO SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN MILK PRODUCTION AS NOTHING LESS THAN QUOTE SPURIOUS UNQUOTE,AND VIEW GREEK CONTENTIONS SIMILARLY.HAVING SAID THAT,THEY PRIVATELY RECOGNISE,ALBEIT GRUDGINGLY,THAT OTHERS ARE COMING TO HOLD SIMILAR VIEWS ABOUT UK INTRANSIGENCE OVER

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BUDGET REBATE.

5. BOTH CHANCELLOR KOHL AND PM THATCHER ARE CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF MEDITERRANEAN PRODUCTS MOVING INTO SURPLUS; THEY SHARE CONVICTION THAT AS ENLARGEMENT PLANNING PROCEEDS, SOUTHERN EUROPEAN PRODUCTS MUST BE TREATED ESSENTIALLY IN SAME MANNER AS NORTHERN PRODUCE. ON OTHER HAND, BOTH LEADERS REAFFIRMED COMMITMENT TO TARGET DATES FOR PORTUGUESE AND SPANISH ACCESSION.

6. ON OWN RESOURCES, WHILE BRITISH EXPECT PROBLEMS TO EXTEND BEYOND MARCH SUMMIT, THERE SEEMS INCREASING CONVERGENCE AMONGST UK, FRENCH AND FRG ON AMOUNT NEEDED, AND PM THATCHER DISCUSSED WITH KOHL POSSIBILITY OF EVENTUAL UNDERSTANDING BASED ON 1.4 PERCENT.

(OFFICIALS SAY THEY WOULD BE SURPRISED IF ANY FIGURE HIGHER THAN 1.4 (IE COMMISSION CALL FOR 2 PERCENT) WOULD EVEN BE CONSIDERED HERE). THE POINT IS HOWEVER THAT UK WILL NOT/NOT AGREE EVEN TO LOWER FIGURE UNLESS THERE ARE CORRESPONDING CONCESSIONS IN OTHER AREAS OF BRITISH CONCERN.

7. BUDGETARY IMBALANCE QUESTION REMAINS STILL MORE DIFFICULT, AND PM THATCHER WAS UNAMBIGUOUS IN TELLING KOHL THAT UK WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST ON SOMETHING THEY CAN ACCEPT. LEADERS EVIDENTLY DISCUSSED NET CONTRIBUTION OF 500 M ECUS PER YEAR. OFFICIALS HERE THINK THEY HAVE QUOTE GOT THE FRENCH OFF IDEA OF FIVE-YEAR TIME - LIMITED REBATE UNQUOTE; BUT BRITISH WILL NOT/NOT AGREE TO ANY CONCEPT WHICH

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PAGE FIVE XNGR0492 CONF D

IS NOT/NOT BASED ON REBATE CONTINUING AS LONG AS PROBLEM LASTS,-  
OR AT LEAST AS LONG AS ANY NEW OWN RESOURCES AGREEMENT CONTINUES.  
TO GO SOME DISTANCE IN MEETING FRENCH CONCERNS,BRITISH ARE PREPARED  
TO AGREE TO SOOE SYSTEM OF REVIEW-BUT ONLY IF CHANGES DO NOT/NOT  
TAKE PLACE WITHOUT UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT TO TERMINATE,RATHER THAN  
POSITIVE DECISION TO CONTINUE.

8.ON EXTERNAL TRADE ISSUES,BOTH.FRG AND UK HAVE IMPRESSION THAT  
OILS AND FATS ISSUE IS QUOTE DEAD UNQUOTE.ON OTHER HAND,THEY  
REMAIN CONCERNED OVER CEREAL SUBSTITUTE QUESTION,AND ARE QUOTE  
UNIMPRESSED UNQUOTE BY COMMISSION PROPOSALS.DESPITE CONTINUING  
FEAR HERE THAT UNILATERAL EUROPEAN ACTION RUNS CLEAR RISK OF USA  
RETALIATION,BRITISH HAVE AGREED TO REVIEW COMMISSION MANDATE  
FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH USA,-PROVIDED THIS GOES HAND IN HAND WITH  
CAP REFORM WHICH COULD AT ONCE BE REALISTICALLY PORTRAYED TO  
USA AS HELPFUL,AND YET GIVE FRENCH FAVOURABLE OUTCOME ON CEREAL  
SUBSTITUTES TO OFFER THEIR FARMERS IN RETURN FOR UNPOPULAR CAP-  
RELATED SACRIFICES.

9.ON GERMAN PROPOSALS FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY COOPERATION,BRITISH  
LISTENED RATHER THAN SPOKE:CHANCELLOR KOHLS PRESENTATION WAS  
APPARENTLY VERY GENERAL,ARGUING THAT EUROPE SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTING  
MEASURES(FOR MOST PART UNDEFINIED)WHICH WOULD STRENGTHEN EUROPEAN  
SIDE OF DEFENCE PILLAR IN ORDER TO BALANCE USA COMMITMENT WHICH WAS

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ITSELF RECEDING INTO PACIFIC.UK RESPONSE WAS QUOTE CAUTIOUS UNQUOTE, REFLECTING OVERRIDING CONCERN HERE NOT/NOT TO DAMAGE NATO ALLIANCE.UK MINISTERS AND OFFICIALS RECOGNISE THAT THIS CONCERN IS SHARED BY FRG, AND BRITISH ARE PREPARED TO BE PRAGMATIC ON FURTHER DISCUSSION OF SECURITY ISSUES IN COMMUNITY CONTEXT. (THEY AGREE THAT SECURITY IS APPROPRIATE SUBJECT FOR COMMUNITY POLITICAL COOPERATION, BUT NOTE THAT USEFUL LIMITS OF DISCUSSION IN EUROPEAN CONTEXT ARE ALWAYS DEFINED BY PRESENCE OF NON-NATO MEMBERS). PM THATCHER GAVE NO/NO FIRM COMMITMENT ON KOHLS SECURITY IDEAS, NOR ON WHETHER WEU IS APPROPRIATE FORUM TO TAKE THEM UP. DISCUSSION HERE IS DESCRIBED AS QUOTE WAITING FOR PROBLEM TO EMERGE BEFORE IDENTIFYING RESPONSE UNQUOTE.

10. KOHL AND THATCHER BRIEFLY DISCUSSED POLITICAL COOPERATION AND EAST/WEST RELATIONS. THEY AGREED THAT MARCH SUMMIT SHOULD PRODUCE BROAD DISCUSSION OF POLITICAL ISSUES, AND SHOULD RESULT IN POLITICAL DECLARATION WHICH WOULD RIGHT DISARRAY APPARENT EVEN ON POLITICAL ISSUES AT ATHENS SUMMIT. KOHL AND THATCHER COMPARED NOTES ON EAST/WEST POLICY; TWO LEADERS SHARED CONCLUSIONS FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH CHERNENKO, AND PM THATCHER RELATED HER EXPERIENCES IN HUNGARY TO FRG CHANCELLOR WHO IS EVIDENTLY PLANNING TRIP THERE HIMSELF.

CCC/102 021746Z XNGR0492



PAGE TWO YWGR0382 CONFD

RECEIVED A 31-03

ORGANIZATIONS, DUTCH AT MFA. CONVERSATION WAS RELAXED THROUGHOUT MTG

AND DUTCH SHOWED<sup>08</sup> KEEN INTEREST ON LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OF PMS

INITIATIVE, PARTICULARLY HIS VISIT TO THREE EASTERN EUROPEAN

COUNTRIES AND TO MOSCO ON OCCASION OF ANDROPOVS FUNERAL. SMITH AND

CALDER REVIEWED VISITS BRIEFLY BY MAKING USUAL POINTS. DUTCH WERE

PARTICULARLY INTERESTED TO KNOW WHAT MARGIN OF MANOEUVRE, IN OUR

VIEW, COUNTRIES SUCH AS CZECHOSLOVAKIA, ROMANIA AND GDR POSSESSED

IN RELATION TO USSR WHEN IT CAME TO CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS EASING OF

INTL TENSION. DUTCH WERE ALSO INTERESTED IN CDN IMPRESSIONS OF NEW

SECTY GEN CHERNENKO AND WHETHER IN HIS MTG WITH HIM, PM TRUDEAU

COULD DETECT ANY INDICATION OF WISHING TO RESUME TALKS WITH

AMERICANS PARTICULARLY ON INF AND START. ON FIRST QUESTION SMITH

AND CALDER INDICATED THAT IF POSSIBILITIES OF INDEPENDENT

INITIATIVES FROM USSR WERE SMALL, ESPECIALLY FOR A COUNTRY SUCH AS

CZECHOSLOVAKIA, (WHICH WIJNAENDTS IS VISITING SHORTLY) THEY WERE

NEVERTHELESS REAL AND SHOULD NOT/NOT BE OVERLOOKED ENTIRELY. ON

SECOND QUESTION THEY SAID CHERNENKO SEEMED TO BE RECEPTIVE TO

POSSIBILITY OF EASING TENSION AND SPOKE OF NECESSITY OF EQUAL

SECURITY.

3. ON THREE CDN SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS, DUTCH REITERATED THEIR VIEW

THAT CD WAS USEFUL FORUM FOR SOME ISSUES, BUT THEY HAD RESERVATIONS

ABOUT PRESENTATION OF CDN PACKAGE TO IT. THEY HAD, HOWEVER, HAD REPORT

OF PREVIOUS DAYS DISCUSSIONS IN NATO PC AND WERE AT LEAST PARTIALLY

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PAGE THREE YWGR0382 CONFD

REASSURED.DUTCH FOCUSSED PRIMARILY ON ASAT ISSUE AND OFFERED NO/NO COMMENTS ON VERIFICATION AND ICBM MOBILITY PROPOSALS.IN COMPARING CDN AND DUTCH ASAT PROPOSALS IT WAS RECOGNIZED THAT THERE WAS LITTLE SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEM ALTHOUGH TACTICS SEEMED TO DIFFER.BECAUSE DUTCH PROPOSAL WAS MORE COMPREHENSIVE THAN CDN ONE,DUTCH QUERIED WHETHER IT WAS SOUND TACTICAL MOVE FOR CDA TO OPEN BID BY WHAT THEY CONSIDERED TO BE LIMITED PROPOSAL.SMITH AND CALDER RECOGNIZED ASAT ISSUE NEED TO BE DISCUSSED FURTHER AND THEREFORE WELCOMED IDEA OF NATO EXPERT MTG GROUP TO REVIEW WHOLE ISSUE.IT WAS NOT/NOT CLEAR,HOWEVER,WHETHER EXPERTS WOULD EXAMINE OVERALL ASAT ISSUE ON BASIS OF BOTH PROPOSALS OR MOSTLY ON DUTCH PAPER.DUTCH SEEMED TO THINK DECISION HAD BEEN THAT EXPERTS SHOULD FOCUS PRIMARILY ON DUTCH PAPER AND THIS WILL NEED TO BE CLARIFIED.

4.WITH REGARD TO MBFR DUTCH INDICATED AGAIN NECESSITY TO MOVE FORWARD AND SAID THEY WERE GLAD AMERICANS SEEMED NOW TO BE TAKING STEP IN RIGHT DIRECTION.APPARENTLY DUTCH HAD BEEN TIPPED OFF APPROX THREE DAYS EARLIER,ON PERSONAL BASIS,OF AMERICAN MOVE.DUTCH DID NOT/NOT OFFER ANY CLUE ON SOURCE OF INFO,BUT ONE CAN ASSUME THAT IN VIEW OF UNRESOLVED FINF ISSUE IN NETHS AND PRESENT VISIT OF FM VAN DEN BROEK TO WSHDC TO DISCUSS MATTER,AMERICANS WISHED TO MAKE SOME SORT OF GESTURE TOWARDS NETHS.

5.BELIEVE MTG WAS EXTREMELY USEFUL,PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF DUTCH INITIATIVE ON ASAT.ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SOME DIFFERENCES IN APPROACH,

...4




PAGE FOUR YWGR0382 CONF

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THEREFORE WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT CONTACTS BE MAINTAINED IN  
BOTH CAPITALS AND IN NATO ON THIS ISSUE.

CCC/155 011146Z YWGR0382

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**



C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2091 01MAR84

TO EXTOTT UDDZ DELIVER BY 020300

INFO BNATO CANMILREPNATO BRU MOSCO LDN BONN ROME VMBFR GENEV PARIS  
HAGUE OSLO COPEN ATHNS STKHM/SCDEL PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY  
NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DACPOL/DNACPOL/CPD/DSTRATA/CIS

DISTR IDD IFB MINA MINE MINT USS DMF IDA RBR RCR RSR RBD RCD RSD  
CPD ZSI ZSP UGB URR IDR RGB

REF OURTELS UNGR2072 24FEB, UNGR2077 28FEB

---PMS INITIATIVE: CIRCULATION OF CDN PROPOSALS IN CD

WE HAVE RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM JAMES DOBBINS, DEP ASST SEC, BUREAU  
OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, STATE DEPT. DOBBINS MET WITH IDDZ TASK FORCE  
WHILE THEY WERE HERE. YOU WILL RECALL THAT DOBBINS THEN INDICATED  
TO US THAT WHILE HE CLD NOT/NOT SPEAK WITH FULL AUTHORITY THAT HE  
EXPECTED THAT IF WE WERE TO WRITE TO USA AND SOVS FORMALLY SUGGESTING  
THE TWO SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS (ON VERIFICATION AND MOBILITY) WE WLD  
PROBABLY GET A POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM USA WHICH WE CLD THEN ANNOUNCE  
PUBLICLY (SEE PARA 10 OF OURTEL UNGR2072 24FEB). PURPOSE OF DOBBINS  
CALL TODAY WAS TO SAY THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS IDEA WITH HIS  
SUPERIORS AND WAS CALLING TO CONFIRM THAT USA WLD INDEED CONSIDER  
THIS ROUTE TO BE AN APPROPRIATE MEANS OF CIRCULATING OUR SUFFOCATION  
PROPOSALS AND THAT WE WLD RECEIVE A POSITIVE RESPONSE. DOBBINS  
SPECIFICALLY ASKED THAT THIS VIEW BE CONVEYED TO OTT.

CCC/059 012259Z UNGR2091

Secrétariat  
d'État

Secretary  
of State

*Mr. Smith*  
*Dr. Polder*  
(JMF)

OTTAWA K1A 0A3  
March 1, 1984

MAR 1  
COPY TO

MEMORANDUM TO:

Mr. Geoffrey Pearson  
Brig. Gen. M. Archdeacon  
✓ Mr. Gaby Warren

FROM:

G.T. Rayner

IFB  
MINA / PUPPET  
RBR  
IDA  
IDR  
ADD 2  
SLO / MIDOURTIN  
IN / MIDOURTIN  
ON RETURN  
+ ORIGINAL TO  
IMJ / CARRIER  
RICHARDSON  
TO SEE  
ON  
RETURN  
*gwr*

SUBJECT:

Colloquium on Human Rights and Peace

I am pleased to attach, for your immediate information, a copy of the letter dated March 1st from the Colloquium chairman to the Prime Minister. The letter was delivered to the Prime Minister's office today.

*G.T. Rayner*  
G.T. Rayner

Attach.

Canada

# DALHOUSIE LAW SCHOOL



March 1, 1984

The Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, P.C., Q.C., M.P.  
Prime Minister of Canada  
Room 309-S  
House of Commons  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0A6

Dear Mr. Trudeau:

I am writing on a matter which I know is of deep concern to you, namely the threat of nuclear war and the role that Canada can play in promoting "a global partnership for peace." Many Canadians share your concern and have followed recent events which have attempted to address the current rise in international tensions. Your personal peace initiative has drawn both international interest and support and, indeed, has injected fresh political energies into the high task of easing the strains pervading East-West relations.

On the national level the Speech from the Throne (December 7, 1983) referred to the creation of a publicly funded centre to gather, collate and digest the high volume of information now available on defence and arms control issues. Your subsequent remarks in the House of Commons on February 9, 1984 indicated that the government intends to create a defence and arms control institute. This proposal was discussed at a recent Colloquium on Human Rights and Peace which took place on February 10-11, 1984 in Ottawa. Sponsored by the Canadian Human Rights Foundation with the assistance of the Department of the Secretary of State, the Colloquium brought together some of Canada's foremost experts:

- to explore the relationship between human rights and peace;
- to analyse some of the national and international political structures required to promote greater interdependence between human rights and peace;
- to examine opportunities open to Canada and Canadians to contribute to the development of human rights and peace; and

- to consider what is now being done in Canada and abroad by way of study, research and education of human rights and peace, and to determine whether the Canadian capacity for such study and research should be strengthened through the creation of a national body of internationally recognized expertise.

The Colloquium was, therefore, a very timely event with particular relevance to the government's intention to establish a centre or institute on defence and arms control. There was a clear consensus that there are other dimensions to the study of peace, such as its relationship to human rights and conflict resolution, in addition to defence and arms control. While security, defence and disarmament are clearly central to the debate, they doubtless would be strengthened by the addition of a positive perspective such as the promotion of, and adherence to, human rights as an inducement towards a global consciousness on the need for peace. Indeed, Canada's credibility, internationally, is undoubtedly stronger in the realm of human rights and conciliation than it is in terms of defence security and arms control. The inclusion of these other dimensions within the mandate would enhance the value both nationally and internationally of the proposed centre or institute. I have, accordingly, been asked as chairman of the Colloquium to bring to your attention some of the more significant views put forth at the Colloquium in the interests of influencing the mandate of the proposed institute. (A comprehensive report on the proceedings will be available within the next couple of months).

There was a general acceptance among Colloquium delegates that human rights are more than a question relating to politics and international relations. It was felt that there is, and must continue to be, an objective moral imperative which can contribute in a substantive way to the pursuit of a true and enduring peace.

While peace will not come automatically with enhanced respect for human rights, there is a temptation, in the pursuit of peace, to ignore human rights violations. Several speakers at the Colloquium contended that the world could not enjoy a lasting peace without respect for human rights. Peace without human rights would be a hollow peace as in the long run, one cannot expect those regimes which are repressive and violent at home to be peaceful abroad. ✓ //

With reference to Canada, many at the Colloquium felt that there is a great challenge to be met in providing Canadians with the information they will need to participate intelligently in the public debate on issues relating to arms control, conflict resolution, human rights and the maintenance of world peace. A survey of existing Canadian research on peace and human rights undertaken by a member of the Colloquium demonstrated that the

country is lacking a coherent strategy and that what is needed is a coordinated, sustained response on this pressing issue. It was thought that such a response should be based on a multi-disciplinary approach whose primary objective it would be to inform the Canadian public, scholars and governments on all factors relative to the quest for peace. It was the hope of the Colloquium that the proposed institute on defence and arms control could assume this challenge and incorporate within its mandate what was felt to be the inextricable relationship between human rights and peace. So emphatic was the Colloquium view of the importance of combining the human rights dimensions of peace to those of defence and arms control, that it was recommended that should this not be possible through the new institute, one or more non-government organizations or universities might wish to explore the possibility of having such study and education undertaken by an existing or new Canadian peace research organization. Clearly, it would be preferable to avoid a proliferation of research bodies.

In closing, may I summarize the most salient points to emerge from the Colloquium as follows:


1. there was general agreement that there is an often overlooked but close relationship between peace and human rights. The exact nature of this relationship and how one affects the other, is not clear and deserves further thought and research;
2. it is essential that the world develop effective mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts which endanger both peace and human rights, either by better use of, or, the re-shaping of existing structures, or by the creation of new ones;
3. regardless of the mechanisms used, conflict resolution depends on the public will of the States, and that public will can come about through the education of their populations on the importance of peace and human rights. Education and the dissemination of information on the domestic and international levels are essential ingredients in the movement towards peace and human rights;
4. Canada has a role to play on the international level in this vital debate by its fortunate history and political position in the world. It is apparent, however, that we are not currently prepared as a country for the task. The issues are much broader than arms control and disarmament and certainly wider than defence strategies, important as these factors may be. Canada needs a

coordinated and sustained internationally accepted  
programme of study, scholarship, research, publication  
and promotion of peace including its relationship to  
human rights and conflict resolution which should not be  
merely a collateral aspect of strategic planning.

I trust, Prime Minister, you will find these comments  
and observations of some use. For your ready reference I am  
attaching a copy of the Colloquium agenda together with a list of  
participants. Given the nature of the subject, I am also sending  
a copy of this letter and attachments to each of Mr. Brian  
Mulroney and Mr. Edward Broadbent.

I look forward to hearing from you at your convenience  
on this most vital matter.

Yours sincerely,



Ronald St. John Macdonald, Q.C.  
Professor of International Law

MF

Program for G. Smith and K. Calder

BONN, March 1

---

09:30 Discussion in Embassy with Ambassador and  
Karsgaard as required.

10:30 Meeting with Foreign and Defense Ministry  
Dr. Ruth's Office  
Altebundeskanzleramt

Participants

German

Dr. Fred Ruth, FRG Disarmament Ambassador  
Dr. Hartmann, MFA Director INF, START Division  
Dr. Schmidt, MFA D/Director, INF, START Division  
Lt. Col. Heise, Ministry of Defence,  
Arms Control Division

Canadian

Ambassador McPhail  
G. Smith  
Dr. K. Calder  
D. Karsgaard

11:00 Meeting continues with above participants minus  
Ambassadors Ruth and McPhail

12:45 Lunch at Weinrestaurant "Zur Lese"

German

Dr. Hartmann  
Dr. Schmidt  
Lt. Col. Heise  
Dr. Buerstedde (MFA, MBFR Division - Director)

Canadian

Mr. Smith  
Dr. Calder  
Mr. Karsgaard





IDR/Brian Herman/2-5457/bh

TO/À ☒ IDDZ RBR IDR/Després IDA

FROM/DE • IDR

REFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •  
SUJET • Visit of NATO Secretary General-Designate  
Lord Carrington: Briefing Material

Security/Sécurité
CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
March 1, 1984
Number/Numéro
IDR-0759

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

IFB


File  
Diary  
Circ  
W/F

Lord Carrington is now scheduled to visit Ottawa for informal consultations March 22-23, 1984, during which time he will be meeting with the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and the Minister of National Defence.

2. We will not, on this occasion, be assembling a lengthy briefing book. Rather, we will prepare a detailed scenario/overview brief, with talking points, for use by Mr. Trudeau, Mr. MacEachen and Mr. Blais. We would ask you to submit a contribution to this brief on the issues with which you are concerned (with talking points):

- (1) IDDZ - the Prime Minister's initiative;
- (2) RBR - East/West relations and the Soviet leadership change;
- (3) IDR - Arms control issues (INF, START, and MBFR);
- (4) IDA - Stockholm Conference

3. The Department of National Defence will be asked to submit a contribution on Alliance defence questions and Canada's military contribution to NATO. We would be grateful for your input no later than Monday, March 12, 1984, in order that we may prepare a consolidated brief, consult all concerned on its substance and tone, and forward it in sufficient time to the Prime Minister, Mr. MacEachen and Mr. Blais.

  
J.R. Francis  
Director  
Defence Relations Division

LUNCHEON AT THE RESIDENCE OF THE AMBASSADOR  
OF CANADA ON THE OCCASION OF THE VISIT OF  
MEMBERS OF PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU'S TASK FORCE

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 29, 1984 AT 13:00

---

Mr. J. Wijnaendts	Ambassador at Large Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mrs. A.E. de Bijl Nachenius	Head of Political Affairs Desk Atlantic Cooperation and International Security Direction Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. J.W. Scheffers	Head of Non Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament Section International Organizations Direction Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Gary J. Smith	Director Arms Control and Disarmament Division Department of External Affairs Ottawa
Dr. Kenneth J. Calder	Director Strategic Analysis Department of National Defence Ottawa
Mr. Franco Pillarella	Counsellor Canadian Embassy
HOST	Mr. L.A.H. Smith Ambassador of Canada



External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY  
SÉCURITÉ

UNCLASSIFIED

1 MAR 84 23 42 Z

12

10

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0214 01MAR84

TO/À

TO BAIRS

INFO

DISTR

INFO PC00TT/FOWLER

REF

DISTR CPD LSR

SUBJ/SUJ

REF OURTEL IDDZ0210 29FEB; YRTEL 0263 29FEB

---PM INITIATIVE: PARAGUAYAN INTEREST

PRESUME REFTELS CROSSED.OUR REFTEL AND ESPECIALLY PM S 9FEB HOUSE  
OF COMMONS SPEECH SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT FOR YOU TO DRAW ON TO BRIEF  
PARAGUAYANS.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

J. MCNEE

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE

001055



*file*

TO/À MGIM MGTC MGIK

FROM/DE • IDDZ

REFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Prime Minister's Task Force on East-West  
SUJET Relations and International Security -  
Move to C-4

Security/Sécurité
UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
March 1, 1984
Number/Numéro
IDDZ-0212

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

IFB

IDR

IDA

This is to advise that IDDZ (the above Task Force)  
will be moving from C-5 to C-4, Room 140 on March 2 (tomorrow).  
Telephone number remains the same (5-5912).

*L. A. Delvoie*  
L. A. Delvoie  
Chairman  
Task Force Working Group

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

S E C R E T

FM GENEV YTGR1510 01MAR84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO BNATO CANMILREPNATO BRU MOSCO LDN BONN ROME VMBFR PARIS HAGUE  
OSLO COPEN ATHNS STKHM/SCDEL PCOOTT/FOWLER/AXWORTHY NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/  
DACPOL/PPP/DSTRATA/CIS

DISTR IDD IFB MINA MINE MINT USS DMF IDA RBR RCR RSR RBD RCD RSD

CPD ZSI ZSP UGB URR IDR RGB

REF WSHDC UNGR2077 28FEB

---PMS INITIATIVE:CIRCULATION OF ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS AT CD AND  
USA REACTION

MOST GRATEFUL FOR USEFUL AND TIMELY CONTRIBUTION BY WSHDC TO QUESTION  
OF TECHNIQUE TO MOST EFFECTIVELY HANDLE CDN ARMS CONTROL  
PROPOSALS. IN ADDITION TO SENSITIVITIES IN CDA/USA AND INTRA-  
ALLIANCE RELATIONS WHICH ARE, OF COURSE MAJOR CONSIDERATION, THERE IS  
SITUATION ON GROUND IN CD, ITS FOLKLORE AND MODUS OPERANDI OF THIS  
BODY. WE ARE ASSUMING THAT IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER QUOTE CIRCULATION  
UNQUOTE OF EITHER SOME OR ALL OF PAPERS WILL TAKE PLACE; IN SUCH  
EVENT IT IS INDEED DESIRABLE THAT HOWEVER PRESENTED IT BE CLEARLY  
SPELLED OUT WHAT PURPOSE WHICH PAPERS ARE INTENDED TO SERVE. RECENT  
DEVELOPMENTS (EG IN NATO-SEE BNATO TEL YBGR6209 OF 28FEB) SUGGEST  
THAT PROCESS OF ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS MAY ALLOW SOMEWHAT MORE  
FLEXIBILITY, PARTICULARLY ON PART OF USA/UK, THAN MIGHT BE

...2

RENNOD A 27102  
ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER

PAGE TWO YTGR1510 SECRET

PREVIOUSLY APPARENT. THIS SAID, HOWEVER, MUCH WILL DEPEND ON ACTUAL  
MODUS VIVENDI BY WHICH CDN PAPERS ARE BROUGHT FORWARD.

2. WE INTEND TO SUGGEST IN SEPARATE TEL POSSIBLE OPTIONS AVAILABLE  
FOR INTRODUCING PAPERS TO CD, KEYED TO CIRCUMSTANCES AS THEY ARE  
NOW EVOLVING.

CCC/198 021600Z YTGR1510

*action*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM HAGUE YWGR0382 01MAR84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 010900

INFO BONN/SMITH/CALDER DELIVER BY 011500 CANMILREPNATO BRU LDN  
MOSCO BONN ROME VMBFR GENEV PARIS OSLO COPEN ATHNS STKHM/SCDE PRMNY  
PCOOTT/FOWLER WSHDC NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DNACPOL/DIPOL/CPD/CSTRATA/CIS  
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDAO IDAN IDR SCS

REF OURTEL YWGR0371 22FEB

---PM INITIATIVE:CONSULTATIONS WITH DUTCH DURING VISIT SMIT/CALDER  
SUMMARY:DISCUSSIONS WITH DUTCH COVERED TWO BROAD AREAS.FIRST WAS  
GENERAL REVIEW OF PMS INITIATIVE AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST/  
WEST RELNS.SECOND WAS CDN SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS,PARTICULARLY  
INITIATIVE ON ASAT,ITS COMPARABILITY TO DUTCH PROPOSAL SUBMITTED  
TO NATO(WHERE SIMILARITIES NOTED)AND PROCEDURES FOR PURSUING(WHERE  
DUTCH CONTINUE TO HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT USE OF CD,BUT WELCOME  
INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS IN NATO).QUESTIONING SHOWED ONGOING HIGH  
LEVEL OF DUTCH INTEREST IN PMS INITIATIVE.DISCUSSION WAS CONDUCTED  
IN RELAXED ATMOSPHERE AND DUTCH WERE VERY APPRECIATIVE OF GESTURE  
OF CONSULTING WITH THEM.

2.REPORT:SMITH AND CALDER MET OVER LUNCH AT AMBS RESIDENCE WITH  
ROVING AMB WIJNAENDTS;DE BIJL NACHENIUS-HEAD OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS  
DESK IN ATLANTIC COOPERATION AND INTL SECURITY DIV,AND WITH SCHEFFER  
-HEAD OF NON-NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT SECTION IN INTL

...2

PAGE TWO YWGR0382 CONFD

ORGANIZATIONS DIV AT MFA. CONVERSATION WAS RELAXED THROUGHOUT MTG AND DUTCH SHOWED KEEN INTEREST ON LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OF PMS INITIATIVE, PARTICULARLY HIS VISIT TO THREE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND TO MOSCO ON OCCASION OF ANDROPOVS FUNERAL. SMITH AND CALDER REVIEWED VISITS BRIEFLY BY MAKING USUAL POINTS. DUTCH WERE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED TO KNOW WHAT MARGIN OF MANOEUVRE, IN OUR VIEW, COUNTRIES SUCH AS CZECHOSLOVAKIA, ROMANIA AND GDR POSSESSED IN RELATION TO USSR WHEN IT CAME TO CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS EASING OF INTL TENSION. DUTCH WERE ALSO INTERESTED IN CDN IMPRESSIONS OF NEW SECTY GEN CHERNENKO AND WHETHER IN HIS MTG WITH HIM, PM TRUDEAU COULD DETECT ANY INDICATION OF WISHING TO RESUME TALKS WITH AMERICANS PARTICULARLY ON INF AND START. ON FIRST QUESTION SMITH AND CALDER INDICATED THAT IF POSSIBILITIES OF INDEPENDENT INITIATIVES FROM USSR WERE SMALL, ESPECIALLY FOR A COUNTRY SUCH AS CZECHOSLOVAKIA, (WHICH WIJNAENDTS IS VISITING SHORTLY) THEY WERE NEVERTHELESS REAL AND SHOULD NOT/NOT BE OVERLOOKED ENTIRELY. ON SECOND QUESTION THEY SAID CHERNENKO SEEMED TO BE RECEPTIVE TO POSSIBILITY OF EASING TENSION AND SPOKE OF NECESSITY OF EQUAL SECURITY.

3. ON THREE CDN SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS, DUTCH REITERATED THEIR VIEW THAT CD WAS USEFUL FORUM FOR SOME ISSUES, BUT THEY HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT PRESENTATION OF CDN PACKAGE TO IT. THEY HAD, HOWEVER, HAD REPORT OF PREVIOUS DAYS DISCUSSIONS IN NATO PC AND WERE AT LEAST PARTIALLY ...3



PAGE THREE YWGR0382 CONFD

REASSURED.DUTCH FOCUSSED PRIMARILY ON ASAT ISSUE AND OFFERED NO/NO COMMENTS ON VERIFICATION AND ICBM MOBILITY PROPOSALS.IN COMPARING CDN AND DUTCH ASAT PROPOSALS IT WAS RECOGNIZED THAT THERE WAS LITTLE SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEM ALTHOUGH TACTICS SEEMED TO DIFFER.BECAUSE DUTCH PROPOSAL WAS MORE COMPREHENSIVE THAN CDN ONE,DUTCH QUERIED WHETHER IT WAS SOUND TACTICAL MOVE FOR CDA TO OPEN BID BY WHAT THEY CONSIDERED TO BE LIMITED PROPOSAL.SMITH AND CALDER RECOGNIZED ASAT ISSUE NEED TO BE DISCUSSED FURTHER AND THEREFORE WELCOMED IDEA OF NATO EXPERT MTG GROUP TO REVIEW WHOLE ISSUE.IT WAS NOT/NOT CLEAR,HOWEVER,WHETHER EXPERTS WOULD EXAMINE OVERALL ASAT ISSUE ON BASIS OF BOTH PROPOSALS OR MOSTLY ON DUTCH PAPER.DUTCH SEEMED TO THINK DECISION HAD BEEN THAT EXPERTS SHOULD FOCUS PRIMARILY ON DUTCH PAPER AND THIS WILL NEED TO BE CLARIFIED.

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CCC/155 011146Z YWGR0382

1-1EO

MF

R E S T R I C T E D

FM PCOOTT PC00229 01MAR84

TO LDN/LAPOINTE

INFO BNATO EXTOTT MINA DMF IDDZ IFB USS RGB

PMOOTT/JOHNSON/COLEMAN

FROM FOWLER

---CBC QUOTE THE JOURNAL UNQUOTE INTERVIEW WITH CARRINGTON, 02FEB  
PRIME MINISTER RETURNED FROM TRIP TO CSSR, DAVOS, GDR AND ROMANIA  
LATE THUR, 02FEB. AT 22:00 HRS THAT EVENING, CBCS EXTREMELY  
INFLUENTIAL QUOTE THE JOURNAL UNQUOTE SCREENED AN INTERVIEW  
BETWEEN ANCHOR PERSON BARBARA FRUM AND LORD CARRINGTON ON CDA  
AND NATO WHICH FOCUSED ON FRUMS INTERPRETATION OF THE INTENT  
AND THRUST OF PM TRUDEAUS REMARKS AT THE DAVOS SYMPOSIUM 28JAN.  
2. THE INTERPRETATION SHE ASCRIBED TO TRUDEAUS REMARKS IN HER  
QUESTIONING OF CARRINGTON WAS DISTORTED AND ILL INFORMED. FOR  
INSTANCE, FRUM SAID TO CARRINGTON QUOTE... (TRUDEAU) SEEMS TO  
BELIEVE THAT IF HE HELPED WAKE UP THE WESTERN EUROPEANS--THE  
WEST GERMANS, THE DUTCH, THE BRITISH--THAT NO/NO AMERICAN PRESIDENT  
WOULD EVER RISK NUCLEAR WAR TO PREVENT THE OVERRUNNING OF  
EUROPE, AND HE SAYS AS A GOOD NATO MEMBER HES PROVIDED A USEFUL  
SERVICE UNQUOTE. AND LATER SHE ASKED QUOTE HOW HAVE WESTERN  
EUROPEANS REACTED TO HIS SUGGESTION THAT THEY SHOULDNT/SHOULDNT  
RELY ON ANY FUTURE AMERICAN PRESIDENT? UNQUOTE AND STILL LATER  
STATED QUOTE... THE MSG THAT IS COMING THROUGH HERE IS THAT

...2

PAGE TWO PC00229 RESTR

SOMEHOW WE SHOULD NOT/NOT BELIEVE THAT THE USA SEES THE DEFENCE OF HAMBURG THE WAY IT SEES THE DEFENCE OF BOSTON; THAT THE USA NO/NO LONGER WILL THINK THAT THE DEFENCE OF EUROPE IS WORTH WORLD WAR THREE UNQUOTE.

3. IN THE FACE OF SUCH QUESTIONING CARRINGTON HANDLED HIMSELF BRILLIANTLY; REFUSING TO CRITICIZE EVEN OBLIQUELY THE PM, THE CDN GOVT OR CDAS CONTRIBUTION TO NATO.

4. WHAT THE PM DID SAY IN DAVOS IS QUOTE... THE QUESTION THAT IS BEING INCREASINGLY ASKED IS: YES, BUT WILL THE USA PRESIDENT REALLY ORDER A USE OF AN ATOMIC WEAPON, EVEN IN EUROPE, IF HE KNOWS IT IS GOING TO RESULT IN WORLD WAR III? I DON'T KNOW THE ANSWER OF THE PRESIDENT, BUT I GUESS ONE CAN SPECULATE AS TO WHETHER HE WOULD WANT TO START WORLD WAR III THROUGH INF ANYMORE THAN HE WOULD THROUGH START WEAPONS UNQUOTE. IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT THESE REMARKS WERE MADE IN THE CONTEXT OF AN INFORMAL SEMINAR THE PURPOSE OF WHICH WAS TO DISCUSS EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND CURRENT STRATEGIES. TRUDEAU NEVER SUGGESTED THAT THE USA OR THE USA PRESIDENT SHOULD/SHOULD OR INDEED WOULD/ WOULD NEVER DEFEND EUROPE WITH ITS STRATEGIC DETERRENT; RATHER HE ALLOWED THAT IT WAS (AS KISSINGER HAD SUGGESTED IN NATO IN 1979 AND MACNAMARA HAS BEEN SUGGESTING IN A VARIETY OF WAYS MORE RECENTLY) A LEGITIMATE QUESTION - A QUESTION WHICH VIRTUALLY EVERY SERIOUS INNATL ANALYST (WITH OR WITHOUT REVIEWING THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN ...3

PAGE THREE PC00229 RESTR

INVOLVEMENT IN WORLD WARS 1 AND II) HAVE ALSO ASKED. TRUDEAU WAS SUGGESTING THAT SUCH QUESTIONS DESERVED TO BE STUDIED AND CONSIDERED IN THE FORMULATION OF ALLIANCE STRATEGY; THAT INDEED THE STRENGTH OF THE NATO ALLIANCE WAS ITS ABILITY TO ASK SUCH QUESTIONS OPENLY AND SEE THEM DEBATED WITHIN OUR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS.

5. CARRINGTON WILL VISIT OTT 22 AND 23 MAR. WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD ARRANGE TO BRING THE TRANSCRIPT OF BOTH MR TRUDEAU'S REMARKS AT DAVOS AND THE JOURNAL INTERVIEW TO CARRINGTON'S ATTN BEFORE THAT TIME. (TRANSCRIPTS WILL BE FORWARDED BY BAG LEAVING OTT 01 MAR.)

6. THIS RATHER GROSS DISTORTION OF TRUDEAU'S REMARKS AND INTENT HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO THE ATTN OF QUOTE THE JOURNAL UNQUOTE EDITORIAL COUNSEL AND TO BARBARA FRUM, AND THEIR ANSWER HAS BEEN DELAYED UNTIL TODAY. THE LATTER WAS PREPARED TO CONCEDE THAT SHE MIGHT HAVE BEEN REMISS IN INTERPRETING THE PM SO CATEGORICALLY BUT SHE AND HER PRODUCERS NOTED NO/NO QUOTE RETRACTION MECHANISM UNQUOTE EXISTS IN THEIR PROGRAM FORMAT AND OFFERED NO/NO FURTHER PUBLIC RECOURSE. WE WOULD NOT/NOT WANT TO LEAVE CARRINGTON WITH THE IMPRESSIONS SUGGESTED BY FRUM.

CCC/204 011630Z PC00229

R030

R CZBZOTWYDYL

889

AM-TRUDEAU-PEACE: 0524

By GLENN SOMERVILLE

OTTAWA (CP) - PIERRE TRUDEAU'S FUTURE IS ANYONE'S GUESS; AND HIS PERSONAL PEACE INITIATIVE, WHICH OCCUPIED SO MUCH OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S TIME OVER THE PAST FOUR MONTHS, NOW SEEMS TO BE OVER.

IN THE END, IT MAY BE SEEN AS ONLY ANOTHER OF TRUDEAU'S SHORT-LIVED PERSONAL INTERESTS, LIKE HIS PREVIOUS PASSION FOR PROMOTING A NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE BETWEEN RICH AND POOR NATIONS.

"WE HAVEN'T BEEN TOLD TO DISBAND OR ANYTHING," SAID LOUIS DELVOIE, A MEMBER OF THE SMALL GROUP PULLED TOGETHER LATE LAST YEAR TO RUN THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT EFFORT. BUT NEITHER WOULD HE SPECULATE ABOUT ITS FUTURE, IF IT HAS ONE.

FOR NOW, DELVOIE ADDED, THE GROUP WILL CONCENTRATE ON "FOLLOW-UP THINGS, USING DIPLOMATIC AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANNELS" TO PURSUE PROPOSALS TRUDEAU MADE OR RECEIVED DURING HIS TRAVELS TO PARIS, THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS, ROME, BONN, LONDON, ZURICH, TOKYO, DACCA, NEW DELHI, PEKING, WASHINGTON, NEW YORK, PRAGUE, EAST BERLIN, BUCHAREST AND - FINALLY - IN MOSCOW ON FEB. 15.

IN RETROSPECT, HOWEVER, THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH TO THE COMMONS ON FEB. 9, AFTER RETURNING FROM A VISIT BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA, EAST GERMANY AND ROMANIA, PROBABLY SPELLED THE END OF HIS PERSONAL EFFORT.

HE SAID THEN HIS INVOLVEMENT WOULD BE "LESS INTENSIVE" IN FUTURE, AND HE TOOK CREDIT FOR A RISING PUBLIC PERCEPTION ABOUT THE RISKS OF NUCLEAR WAR.

## \* WRAPPED IT UP \*

"I THINK HE PRETTY WELL WRAPPED IT UP IN HIS COMMONS SPEECH," REMARKED NEW BRUNSWICK PREMIER RICHARD HATFIELD, WHO MET TRUDEAU WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON. THE IDEA THAT TRUDEAU MADE PEOPLE "OTHER THAN THOSE IN THE TWO SUPERPOWER NATIONS MORE SENSITIVE TO THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSIDERING ARMS CONTROL" WAS THE ESSENCE OF THE PEACE INITIATIVE, AND THAT'S BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, HATFIELD SUGGESTED.

IN THEIR HALF-HOUR MEETING, ONLY A FEW HOURS AFTER TRUDEAU'S RESIGNATION BECAME PUBLIC, THE ONLY FUTURE TOPIC DISCUSSED WAS NEXT WEEK'S CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE ON NATIVE RIGHTS.

IF HE HAD TO GUESS, HATFIELD SAID, "PROBABLY THERE IS NOTHING AT ALL UNDER CONSIDERATION" IMMEDIATELY FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

IT WAS ONLY AFTER A WALK IN A BLOWING GALE THAT PILED SNOW IN OTTAWA STREETS TUESDAY NIGHT - PLUS SOME JUDO PRACTICE - THAT THE 64-YEAR-OLD TRUDEAU FINALLY DECIDED TO CALL IT QUITS AFTER 16 YEARS.

IONA CAMPAGNOLO, THE LIBERAL PARTY PRESIDENT IN CHARGE OF RUNNING THE CONVENTION IN JUNE TO PICK TRUDEAU'S SUCCESSOR, SAID SHE HADN'T DISCUSSED WHAT HE MAY DO NOW, BUT SHE ASSUMES "MUCH OF HIS TIME WILL BE SPENT WITH HIS SONS." JUSTIN IS 12 NOW, SACHA 10 AND MICHEL 8 YEARS OLD.

HE WILL PROBABLY GO TO MONTREAL, WHERE HE HAS A QUARTER-MILLION-DOLLAR ART DECO-STYLE HOUSE, AFTER THE SCHOOL YEAR ENDS, SAID CAMPAGNOLO.

TRUDEAU WAS ONCE REGULARLY TOUTED FOR A SENIOR POST IN THE UNITED NATIONS, BUT MUCH OF THAT SPECULATION HAS DIED AWAY. AFTER A MEETING EARLIER THIS YEAR WITH TRUDEAU IN NEW YORK, UN SECRETARY GENERAL JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR SPOKE WARMLY OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S DISARMAMENT EFFORTS BUT ANOTHER CANDIDATE HAS SINCE BEEN NAMED TO THE PERMANENT UN POST.

THAT LEAVES AVAILABLE TO HIRE IN "ONE ONE HEALTHY" AS EX-PRIME MINISTER, WHO TRAVELLED WITH EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE,

cc: WSHDC

IDA/5/6

Department of External Affairs



Canada

Ministère des Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA, Canada  
K1A OG2

February 29, 1984

Mr. Gordon Thompson  
Consulting Scientist  
Union of Concerned Scientists  
26 Church Street  
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02238  
U. S. A.

Dear Mr. Thompson:

I have been asked to thank you for your letter of February 8, 1984 to Prime Minister Trudeau and for your views on Proliferation Reform.

As you are aware, the Prime Minister has focussed on strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty as one of our urgent objectives and has impressed this on both nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. As we approach next year's review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Prime Minister has expressed a determination to press both sides to keep the NPT bargain. The basis of that bargain was that the nuclear powers would reduce their armaments in return for the non-nuclear powers not building their own, and that both would cooperate in sharing the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Your own views, which support the Prime Minister's NPT objectives, were very much appreciated.

Yours sincerely,

L. A. Delvoie  
Chairman  
Task Force Working Group

c.c. PMO/Correspondence (Nicole Fournier)  
PCO/Judy Cameron  
EA/CMR/Ted Johnston

Ref. PMO No. 4048 173



Government of Canada  
Privy Council Office

Gouvernement du Canada  
Bureau du Conseil privé

Ottawa, Canada  
K1A 0A3

Date: 21 February 1984

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. R. Francis (I.D.D.)  
Director General, International  
Security and Arms Control Bureau

Letter to the Prime Minister from:

GORDON THOMPSON

PMO Ref. No: H049...173.....


We have arranged with the Under Secretary's office that the Department's services can be drawn upon in preparing replies to letters which the Prime Minister has received on foreign affairs.

I would be grateful if you could arrange for a reply (within seven working days) to the attached letter for signature at the appropriate level within the Department of External Affairs and with copies to PMO/Correspondence (Nicole Fournier) and External Affairs/CMR/Johnston. I would also welcome your advice on alternative ways of dealing with the matter, if appropriate.

If you have any questions, please call me at 5-6073.

Maurice D. Archdeacon  
Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat

c.c. PMO/Correspondence (Nicole Fournier)  
PCO/Judy Cameron  
EA/CMR/Ted Johnston



Canada

001068



**PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE - BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVÉ**

**CONTROL FORM - PRIME MINISTER'S CORRESPONDENCE**

**FORMULAIRE DE CONTRÔLE - CORRESPONDANCE DU PREMIER MINISTRE**

TO/A:

Mr. Fowler

CC:

Messrs. Osbaldeston, Darling, Clark (our file)

RE: LETTER FROM/LETTRE DE:

Gordon Thompson

DATE:

February 8, 1984

SUBJECT/SUJET:

Peace Mission

CORRESPONDENCE NO/NO DE LA CORRESPONDANCE:

4048 173

Judy Cameron

DATE: February 20, 1984

☐

REPLY PREPARED FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S SIGNATURE.  
RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DU PREMIER MINISTRE.

☐

REPLY PREPARED FOR MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN'S SIGNATURE AND FORWARDED THROUGH JUDY CAMERON.  
RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DE MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN, TRANSMISE PAR JUDY CAMERON.

☐

REFERRED TO ANOTHER MINISTER THROUGH JUDY CAMERON TO MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN.  
RÉFÉRÉ À UN MINISTRE PAR JUDY CAMERON À MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN.

☐

NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. COPY RETAINED IN PCO FOR INFORMATION AND ORIGINAL RETURNED TO JUDY CAMERON.  
AUCUNE RÉPONSE NÉCESSAIRE. UNE COPIE EST CONSERVÉE AU BCP À TITRE D'INFORMATION. L'ORIGINAL RETOURNE À JUDY CAMERON.

ADDITIONAL REMARKS/OBSERVATIONS ADDITIONNELLES:

REC'D. / RE J

FEB 20 1984

Coordination

4048 173

# UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS

26 Church Street • Cambridge, Massachusetts 02238 • (617) 547-5552

February 8, 1984

Pierre Elliott Trudeau  
Prime Minister  
Parliament Hall, 3rd Floor  
Center Block  
Ottawa, Canada  
K1P 5PZ


Dear Prime Minister Trudeau:

The enclosed op-ed piece relates to your current arms control initiative, which (as you must know) is arousing much interest worldwide.

I will soon be publishing further pieces on the concept of Proliferation Reform, which is close to your concept. It seems to me that the 1985 NPT Review Conference will a good forum at which to articulate These ideas.

Thank you for your attention.

Sincerely,



Gordon Thompson  
Consulting Scientist

GT/nj

Enclosure

ORIGINAL TO R. Fuchs (22)  
ORIGINAL ENVOYE A  
C.C. PMO FILE  
C.C. DOSSIERS CPM

# A new route to arms control

By Gordon Thompson

Shortly before Christmas, it was reported that Lawrence Eagleburger, the United States' under-secretary of state for political affairs, had told a private meeting that Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's peace initiative was "akin to pot-induced behavior by an erratic leftist." A State Department spokesman later expressed regret for the report.

How did Prime Minister Trudeau earn this insult? In a time of heightening international tension, with U.S.-Soviet nuclear and conventional arms negotiations stalled, Trudeau had the temerity to suggest that the superpowers need help in controlling their arms race.

Trudeau's plan has four elements. First, he suggests a conference of the five nuclear powers to negotiate global limits on nuclear weapons. Second, he proposes strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to curb the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries. Third, he urges renewed negotiations on conventional forces in Europe. Finally, he suggests agreements to suffocate the development of destabilizing weapons technologies.

Trudeau introduced his plan in October with a speech in Ontario. He then visited his European counterparts, including Margaret Thatcher and Francois Mitterrand, before attending a late-November meeting of Commonwealth heads of state in India and then going on to Peking. The Commonwealth, which in the past has looked more like a social club than a cell of antinuclear firebrands, broadly endorsed the Trudeau effort. In mid-December, Trudeau took his proposal to President Reagan.

In taking this initiative, the Canadian prime minister is expressing the growing frustration of non-superpowers over the U.S.-Soviet arms race. Trudeau wants to bring a "third force" into action to overcome the inertia of superpower confrontation. An important part of this scheme is the linking of "vertical" and "horizontal" proliferation.

Horizontal proliferation is the spread of nuclear arms to non-nuclear countries; the vertical variety is the build-up of nuclear arms by any nation in the five-member nuclear club. The link between the two was accepted in the 1968 NPT, which was supposed to stop both kinds of proliferation. Yet we expect Pakistan, Argentina, South Africa, India, Israel and others to forgo bomb-building while the superpowers neglect their NPT pledge to end the arms race.

A fresh approach, involving "proliferation reform," would return attention to the vertical-horizon-

tal link and improve prospects for certain U.S.-Soviet arms control treaties. Such reform ideas, not specifically articulated by Trudeau but gaining stock among analysts, may be crystallized as follows:

- A. ● Nuclear nations should achieve significant progress on arms control.
- B. ● Nuclear nations should accept the same restraints on their civilian nuclear sectors as non-nuclear nations do, and separate their civilian and military nuclear activities.
- C. ● Such restraints, applied uniformly to all countries, should be confirmed through rigorous inspection by a revitalized International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the much-beleaguered United Nations body that administers the NPT.

Reform of this kind would have two salutary effects. It would help to curb horizontal proliferation by making the current nonproliferation regime both more equitable and more effective. Proliferation reform also would create new opportunities for treaty verification.

For example, stopping production of the material necessary for bomb-making would require on-site inspection. The IAEA is now negotiating with the Soviets on limited inspection measures for their civilian nuclear operations. By stopping the transfer of nuclear materials from civilian to military uses, expanded measures of this kind would represent a major victory for arms control. The vital principle of on-site verification would be established.

Trudeau's "third force" initiative is attractive because it presents a new route to arms control. To date, agreement between the superpowers has relied completely on their mutual efforts. Now, the rest of the world may be ready to press its own agenda, perhaps as a result of the new awareness of the global consequences of nuclear war.

It must be acknowledged, moreover, that the "third force" has leverage. First, there is the moral imperative, which must not be underrated. Second, there is a bargaining lever: non-nuclear nations demanding arms control in exchange for their own restraint from nuclear weapons—a tough-minded, *quid pro quo* renegotiation of the NPT's vertical-horizontal link.

In addition, the economic power, resource wealth and strategic geography of many potential "third force" countries could allow stronger pressure to be applied against the nuclear club if a new sense of disarmament urgency took hold.

So it may be that the Trudeau initiative—especially significant given Canada's place in NATO and the industrial world—is the start of something big: an angry group of non-superpowers demanding their right to a world free from U.S.-Soviet brinkmanship.

VERY SLOW  
NOT LIKELY

B must  
be achieved  
first.

Will not be  
accepted  
by NWS

?

Gordon Thompson is a consulting scientist to the  
"Union of Concerned Scientists."

February 17, 1984.

Mr. Gordon Thompson,  
Union of Concerned Scientists,  
26 Church Street,  
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02238  
U.S.A.

Dear Mr. Thompson:

On behalf of the Prime Minister, I acknowledge your letter of February 8.

Please be assured that it and the enclosed newspaper clipping will be brought to Mr. Trudeau's attention.

Yours sincerely,

Original Signed by  
Original signé par

Marie-Andrée Pastien,  
Correspondence Director.

Original to: E. Fowler

MAB/sv20

4048 173



MESSAGE

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Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
29 FEB 81 10 26Z 12 10

SECURITY SÉCURITÉ	<u>C O N F I D E N T I A L</u>
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FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDDZ0210 29FEB84
TO/À	TO ALL POSTS
INFO	
DISTR	DISTR GENERAL
REF	---SITREP ON PM INITIATIVE ON PEACE AND SECURITY
SUBJ/SUJ	THIS TEL IS PRIMARILY INTENDED TO PROVIDE INFO ON THIS SUBJ TO POSTS OUTSIDE EUROPE/NORTH AMERICA AREA WHICH HAVE NOT/NOT BEEN INVOLVED WITH PM INITIATIVE ON ONGOING BASIS.  2.MOST AUTHORITATIVE EXPOSITION OF WHERE INITIATIVE NOW STANDS IS TO BE FOUND IN PM STATEMENT TO HOUSE OF COMMONS FEB09, WHICH WAS BAGGED TO ALL POSTS FEB10. POSTS SHOULD USE THIS STATEMENT AS PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF INFO IN THEIR CONTACTS WITH HOST GOVTS AND LOCAL MEDIA. POSTS MAY ALSO DRAW AS APPROPRIATE ON OURTEL IDDZ0144 10FEB WHICH PROVIDED ALL POSTS WITH SUMMARY OF HOF C INTERVENTIONS BY PM, OPPOSITION LEADER MULRONEY AND NDP LEADER BROADBENT. (MEDIA GUIDANCE PROVIDED TO 35 POSTS MOST DIRECTLY CONCERNED IN OURTEL IDDZ0140 OF FEB09 REMAINS VALID.)  3.AS INDICATED IN PM STATEMENT, THE PROPOSALS WHICH HE LAUNCHED IN COURSE OF HIS INITIATIVE ARE TO BE ACTIVELY PURSUED THROUGH DIPLO CHANNELS AND/OR IN APPROPRIATE INNATL ORGANIZATIONS. PM DOES NOT/NOT AT PRESENT ENVISAGE ANY FURTHER TRAVEL ABROAD IN PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVES OF HIS INITIATIVE.  4.FOR YOUR BACKGROUND INFO ONLY, WE REPRODUCE BELOW TEXT OF SUMMARY REVIEW OF INITIATIVE WHICH WE FORWARDED TO PM ON FEB07. (THIS DOCU ...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG L.A.Delvoie/sc	IDDZ	5-5912	 SIG L.A.Delvoie



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PAGE TWO IDDZ0210 CONFD

12

10

OBVIOUSLY DOES NOT/NOT TAKE ACCOUNT OF PM MTG WITH GENERAL SECTY  
CHERNENKO, WHICH WE ASSESS AS HAVING BEEN POSITIVE EVENT IN TERMS OF  
PURPOSES OF PM INITIATIVE.)

5.TEXT BEGINS.QUOTE:

(COMCENTRE: PLEASE COPY ATTACHED)

UNQUOTE.TEXT ENDS.

11  
The purpose of this memorandum is to review very briefly the impact which your peace initiative has had. It is an updated version of the memorandum we forwarded to you on December 19, 1983.

On the broad front of East-West relations, the following balance sheet roughly weighs events since you launched your initiative in early October.

Plus

- Generally positive reactions of foreign governments and media to the political aspects of your speeches, messages and visits abroad.
- The Goa Declaration issued by the Commonwealth Heads of Government.
- President Reagan's speech to the Japanese Diet.
- The Brussels Declaration issued by NATO Foreign Ministers.
- The NATO decision to undertake a review of East-West relations and to devise means to improve them.
- Forward movement within NATO on MBFR.
- The opening of the Stockholm Conference at Foreign Minister level and the numerous high level East-West contacts to which this gave rise (including the Shultz-Gromyko meeting).
- The undertaking of the UN Secretary General to envisage discussions with the representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council on nuclear arms limitations.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

- The tone of President Reagan's speech on USA - Soviet relations, and of his State of the Union message.
- The contribution to East-West dialogue of your talks with the leaders of three Eastern European countries.

Minus

- The USA invasion of Grenada.
- USSR withdrawal from the INF and START negotiations.
- Increasing uncertainty regarding the USSR leadership.
- The Reagan Administration's proposals for a 17% increase in the USA defence budget (including the start of research on a Ballistic Missile Defence system).
- Increased direct USA involvement in the Lebanon/Syria/Israel conflict.
- The start of a new round in the public debate between the USA and USSR on non-compliance with the provisions of arms control agreements.

On balance, therefore, it would seem that while a number of factors have contributed to the further deterioration of East-West relations, some positive steps have been taken to try to improve the climate surrounding those relations, especially in the realm of direct contacts and declaratory policy, i.e. there has been some shift away from "megaphone diplomacy" in favour of dialogue.

On the specific proposals which you advanced as part of your initiative, the results are mixed. The proposal to launch the Stockholm Conference at senior political level has been successfully implemented. Some progress has been made within the alliance on the MBFR front. The idea of a five power conference has been endorsed by a number of important countries, including the FRG and Italy, and may be pursued by Secretary General de Cuellar; it has, however, been greeted with reservations or pre-conditions by the five governments most directly concerned. Virtually no headway has been made on the question of horizontal nuclear proliferation. Reactions received so far to the three suffocation measures have been either negative or guarded, but it will not be possible to assess the prospects of these proposals until discussion papers on them are circulated at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva within the next few



CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

weeks. These measures, as well as some of your other specific proposals, will continue to be pursued by Canada through diplomatic channels and within the international institutions most directly concerned.

In short, if the objective was to make a breach in the climate of distrust and to take a first step or two in the long process required to reverse the ongoing deterioration in East-West relations, your initiative has already contributed, directly and indirectly, to the achievement of some highly positive results."



External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

*file*

IDR/A.A.Després/2-6205/r1

TO/À           IDDZ

FROM/DE   •   IDR

REFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT   •   MBFR: New USA Position  
SUJET

Security/Sécurité
CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
February 29, 1984
Number/Numéro
IDR-0749

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

1

DISTRIBUTION

Attached, as discussed, is a memorandum to  
the Prime Minister for your signature.

*fu* *R.S. Leaman*  
Defence Relations Division

CONFIDENTIAL

February 29, 1984

IDDZ - 0211

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (through R.R. Fowler)

MBFR: New USA Position

Ambassador Gotlieb was briefed on February 28 by Director Adelman of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) concerning the recent decision by President Reagan to be more flexible on the question of data in the MBFR negotiations in response to the Eastern move in the negotiations last year. The Eastern move, you will recall, proposed in essence a trade-off between data and verification.

Differences of view within the Alliance and in the US administration on the principle of making substantive concessions to the East in response to their latest proposals have delayed the review process within NATO and the internal negotiation of NATO's counterproposals. It is expected that the new USA position which we assume will be discussed during the forthcoming Kohl visit to Washington will form the basis of a set of draft proposals to be tabled as a German initiative for discussion in NATO by mid-March. It is hoped these proposals would result in a Western move at the negotiating table during the Round which begins March 16.

The new USA position would involve more flexibility on data by dropping insistence on a full agreement on the number of all Eastern forces in the area concerned before reductions (there is no disagreement on the number of Western forces), in exchange for Eastern acceptance of more stringent verification measures. The Alliance would concentrate instead in the first instance on counting combat and combat support troops, and would allow a band of discrepancy to exist the size of which still needs to be determined. This would presumably take care of some of the differences in figures between sides on total Eastern troop size. It would also take into account the East's claim related to the fact that many paramilitary functions on the Western side are performed by civilians, while uniformed personnel perform the same functions in Eastern Europe. However, it would, among other things, require agreement on a new set of definitions of what is combat or combat support personnel which is bound to be a slow and arduous process, not only between East and West but also internally within the Alliance. Full agreement on the number of all uniformed personnel would still be required but only later on after full verification procedures are in place.

.../2

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

The new position approved by the White House is less ambitious than the German package discussed with you in Bonn last November and with FRG Ambassador Ruth in Ottawa in December. It would, however, be close to a common denominator which would be negotiable within NATO. It should at least allow the current NATO review of MBFR to move more quickly toward the adoption of a set of Alliance proposals which we hope will result in some progress in the talks. In our view, proposals based on the position explained by Adelman have little chance of unblocking the talks by themselves but could be made sufficiently interesting to test Eastern good faith in MBFR.

For our part, we will concentrate on working out the best possible package which can be steered through NATO in sufficient time for tabling in Vienna during the Round of talks which begins March 16. With the assistance of the new verification unit being established in External Affairs and in consultation with Allies, we will at the same time work at delineating which verification aspects of the resulting revised Western position could benefit from in depth and detailed study by Canada.



L. A. Delvoie,  
Chairman,  
Task Force Working Group.

cc: PCO/Osbaldeston  
PMO/Axworthy  
DND/Anderson  
/CPP  
/DNACPOL  
/DSTRATA  
EA/MINA/USS/DMF/IFB/IDD/IDR/IDA

MF

LUNCHEON AT THE RESIDENCE OF THE AMBASSADOR  
OF CANADA ON THE OCCASION OF THE VISIT OF  
MEMBERS OF PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU'S TASK FORCE

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 29, 1984 AT 13:00

---

Mr. H. Wijnaendts	Ambassador at Large Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mrs. A.E. de Bijl Nachenius	Head of Political Affairs Desk Atlantic Cooperation and International Security Direction Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. J.W. Scheffers	Head of Non Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament Section International Organizations Direction Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Gary J. Smith	Director Arms Control and Disarmament Division Department of External Affairs Ottawa
Dr. Kenneth J. Calder	Director Strategic Analysis Department of National Defence Ottawa
Mr. Franco Pillarella	Counsellor Canadian Embassy
HOST	Mr. L.A.H. Smith Ambassador of Canada

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2086 29FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO BNATO CANMILREPNATO BRU MOSCO LDN BONN ROME VMBFR GENEV PARIS  
HAGUE OSLO COPEN ATHNS STKHM/SCDEL PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/  
DACPOL/DNACPOL/CPP/DSTRATA/CIS

DISTR IDD IFB MINA MINE MINT USS DMF IDA RBR RCR RSR RBD RCD RSD

CPD ZSI ZSP UGB URR IDR RGB

REF OURTEL UNGR2072 24FEB

---PMS INITIATIVE:CONSULTATIONS WITH USA

DURING BRIEFING TEAMS CONVERSATIONS WITH VARIOUS AMERICAN TEAMS  
(SEE REFTE)SEVERAL POINTS WERE MADE TO US ABOUT SOME OF THE  
LIMITATIONS OF CDAS THREE SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS.THESE ARE OUTLINED  
BELOW.NO/NO ATTEMPT IS MADE TO MAKE THESE POINT CONSISTENT EITHER  
WITH ONE ANOTHER(THEY CAME FROM DIFFERENT PEOPLE IN DIFFERENT MTGS.)  
OR TO MAKE THEM CONSISTENT WITH GENERAL OVERALL VIEW OF USA ADMIN  
WHICH IS THAT USA AGREES QUOTE IN PRINCIPLE UNQUOTE WITH OUR  
PROPOSALS ON VERIFICATION AND ON LIMITING MOBILITY BUT IT DISAGREES  
FUNDAMENTALLY ON GROUNDS OF SUBSTANCE WITH OUR ASAT PROPOSAL.INSTEAD  
THEY ARE PRESENTED AS FACTORS WE SHLD CONSIDER IN DEVELOPING OUR  
PROPOSALS.

2.ASATS:WHILE THE USA AGREES THAT OVERALL SPACE ACTIVITIES  
CONTRIBUTE TO STABILIZING THE ARMS BALANCE IT DOES NOT/NOT LOGICALLY

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PAGE TWO UNGR2086 CONFD

FOLLOW THAT SATELLITES SHLD OPERATE IN A SANCTURAY. AN ANALOGY WAS MADE TO STRATEGIC AIRCRAFT. THE POINT WAS MADE TO US THAT SAYING YOU ARE IN FAVOUR OF BANNING ASATS IS THE SAME THING AS SAYING THAT THERE ARE NO/NO ACTIVITIES LIKELY TO TAKE PLACE IN SPACE WHICH YOU WLD WANT TO DEFEND YOURSELF AGAINST. THE CDN ASAT PROPOSAL DOES A WEAK JOB ON VERIFICATION. ITS SCOPE IS TOO NARROW. (AS NOTED IN REFTTEL ONE INTERLOCUTOR SAID WE SHLD NOT/NOT PUT PROPOSAL FORWARD UNTIL WE CLD SUGGEST A VERIFICATION REGIME). AN ASAT BAN IS SOMETHING YOU CAN FINALLY VERIFY ONLY IF YOU CAN DETECT AN OUT AND OUT VIOLATION IE AN ATTACK ON ONE OF YOUR SATELLITES. BUT FAILURE OF A SATELLITE CANNOT/NOT BE AUTOMATICALLY ATTRIBUTED TO AN ASAT. OTHER THINGS CAN AFFECT SATELLITES. THEREFORE EVEN A GROSS VIOLATION CANNOT/NOT BE FULLY VERIFIED. TESTING ASATS IS EVEN MORE UNVERIFIABLE. THE ONLY REASON THE USA IS AWARE THAT THE SOVS HAVE AN ASAT CAPABILITY IS BECAUSE THE SOVS DID NOT/NOT ENCRYPT THE SIGNALS FROM EITHER THE TARGET OR THEIR INTERCEPTOR DURING THEIR TESTS. THE USA IS NOT/NOT SURE WHY THEY DID NOT/NOT ENCRYPT BUT THE POINT IS THAT IF EITHER OR BOTH THE TARGET OR THE INTERCEPTION HAD BEEN ENCRYPTED THE USA WLD NOT/NOT KNOW OF THE SOV ASAT CAPABILITY. YOU CANNOT/NOT BAN ENCRYPTION AS TOO MUCH DATA OF A SECURE NATURE NOW COMES DOWN FROM SPACE. THIS DATA IS NECESSARY FOR NATL SECURITY ON BOTH SIDES. 3. ANOTHER PROBLEM WITH ASAT BAN IS THE QUESTION OF DEFINITION. FIRST ...3

PAGE THREE UNGR2086 CONFD

OF ALL SURVIVABILITY MEASURE ON SATELLITES(IE THE ABILITY OF ONE SATELLITE TO DEFEND ITSELF FROM AN ATTACK)LOOK LIKE ASAT CAPABILITY AS WELL.ALSO SEVERAL OTHER THINGS CAN LOOK LIKE AN ASAT.ONE PARTICULAR ITEM MENTIONED IS THE USA SPACE SHUTTLE.DURING THE USA/USSR ASAT TALKS WHICH TOOK PLACE IN THE LATE 70S THE USSR SPECIFICALLY TRIED TO INTERFERE WITH THE USA SHUTTLE PROGRAM ON THE BASIS THAT THE SHUTTLE WAS AN ASAT.

4.ONE OF THE PROBLEMS THE USA WLD HAVE ABOUT TALKING ABOUT ASAT IN THE CD IS THAT IN ORDER FOR THE DISCUSSION TO BE MEANINGFUL A LOT OF INFO WLD HAVE TO BE MADE AVAILABLE RE THE NATURE OF USA SPACE SYSTEMS.UNDERSTANDABLY THE USA IS RELUCTANT TO DO THIS.THE USA IS IN THE PROCESS OF AN EXTENSIVE EVALUATION OF THE POTENTIAL FOR ASAT TREATY.THEY HOPE TO GO TO CONGRESS SOMETIME SOON WITH RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS CONGRESS HAS PUT TO THE ADMIN.IN CONCLUSION TO THIS PAPER THE USA HOPES TO BE ABLE TO MAKE A GENERAL STATEMENT OF ITS POLICY ON ARMS CONTROL IN SPACE.SHORTLY AFTER THAT THEY HOPE TO BE ABLE TO CONSULT IN DETAIL WITH THE ALLIES ON WHAT THEY HAVE IN MIND.FRAMEWORK OF CURRENT USA REVIEW INCLUDES LOOKING AT(1)TOTAL BANS,(2)PARTIAL BAN IE ALLOWING ONE SPECIFIC KIND OF SYSTEM AND(3) CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES.ALL OF THE ABOVE SUFFER FROM THE PROBLEMS OF VERIFIABILITY,QUESTIONS ABOUT DESIRABILITY AND DEFINITION.CURRENT THINKING AS ABOVE ARGUMENTS POINT OUT IS AGAINST

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PAGE FOUR UNGR2086 CONF

BANS BUT PERHAPS SOMETHING CAN BE DONE ON CBMS.

5.USA FINDS ASAT FIELD TO BE PARTICULARLY TRICKY ONE TO DISCUSS AT THIS TIME.PRESSURES FROM ALLIES TO NEGOTIATE ON ASAT IS MORE UNWELCOME BECAUSE OF A SIMILAR GREAT DESIRE IN CONGRESS TO MOVE FORWARD ON AN ASAT BAN.TO THE EXTENT CONGRESS PERCEIVES THE ALLIES ARE UNHAPPY WITH USA POSITION IT WILL HARDEN THEIR OWN POSITION AND MAY SERIOUSLY AFFECT USA FUNDING FOR ITS OWN ASAT.

6.ONE COMMENTATOR SUGGESTED THAT LIMITED ASAT SUGGESTION SUCH AS WE HAVE PROPOSED OR AN ASAT BAN THAT IS LIMITED IN TIME ENDS UP BEING THE WORST OF BOTH WORLDS.ADVOCATES OF ASAT ARE AGAINST IT AND ADVOCATES OF A STRATEGIC DEFENCE INITIATIVE ATTACK IT.

7.LIMITS OF MOBILITY OF ICBMS:ALL OUR INTERLOCUTORS AGREED THAT OUR MOBILITY PROPOSAL WAS NOT/NOT CONTRARY TO THE SCOWCROFT COMMISSION REPORT.SOME SAID HOWEVER THAT IT VIOLATED THE SPIRIT OF THE SCOWCROFT REPORT WHICH ARGUED THAT MOBILE MISSILES ARE A GOOD THING. INTERLOCUTORS AGREED THAT IN THE LONG RUN LIMITING MOBILITY IS A WAY OF IMPOSING ON THE SOV UNION THE KIND OF LIMITATIONS THAT EXIST IN PRACTICE FOR THE USA.THE USA SIMPLY CANNOT/NOT HAVE ITS ICBMS FULLY MOBILE.THE USA IS EVALUATING A SIMILAR PROPOSAL TO WHAT WE HAVE PUT FORWARD.THE CONSTRAINTS PUT ON MOBILITY HOWEVER CANNOT/NOT BE TOO GREAT.THE THEORY OF DETERRENCE DEPENDS ON AN OBSERVABLE THREAT AND THAT THREAT HAS TO BE SEEN TO BE SURVIVABLE.IT WLD THEREFORE BE DANGEROUS TO AGREE ON AN AREA OF LIMITATION THAT

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ENDANGERS SURVIVABILITY AND DOES NOT/NOT REALLY ENHANCE VERIFICATION. SUCH AN AGREEMENT CLD BE MISLEADING. IN THE USA VIEW IT IS ALSO INAPPROPRIATE TO SET GUIDELINES BEFORE YOU KNOW TO WHAT SYSTEM THEY WILL BE APPLIED. IF A GUIDELINE IS SET THAT THEN PROVES IMPRACTICABLE THIS MAY WELL ENCOURAGE CHEATING WHICH WLD DO MORE POLITICAL DAMAGE THAN NOT/NOT HAVING AN AGREEMENT TO START WITH.

8. VERIFIABILITY OF NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS: AGAIN USA WAS IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH CONCEPT. INTERLOCUTORS SAID THAT TO SOME EXTENT WHAT WE ARE PROPOSING IS ALREADY AGREED TO IN SALT II IN A GENERAL WAY. ONE OF THE PROBLEMS USA HAS WITH THE PROPOSAL IS THAT IT IS BASICALLY DECLARATORY IN NATURE. PROPOSAL IS BASICALLY A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLE. IF AN ATTEMPT WERE TO BE MADE TO TURN PROPOSAL INTO AN AGREEMENT THE USA WLD NOT/NOT SIGN AN AGREEMENT THAT SPECIFIED ONLY WHAT YOU SHLD VERIFY AND DID NOT/NOT FULLY SAY HOW IT IS TO BE ACHIEVED.

9. ONE OF THE PROBLEMS WITH A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLE IS THAT IS HAS CONSEQUENCES IN THE WEST BUT NOT/NO IN THE EAST. DECLARATIONS SUCH AS THIS HAVE NO/NO REAL BENEFITS BUT THERE IS A COST. ONE COMMENTATOR FROM DOD WENT SO FAR AS TO SUGGEST THAT CDA WAS NAIVE TO BELIEVE USSR WLD NOT/NOT EXPLOIT SUCH AN AGREEMENT. PROPOSAL IS NOT/NOT FACTORING IN PAST EXPERIENCE IN HIS VIEW. THE OBJECTIVE OF VERIFICATION IS NOT/NOT TO CATCH THE USSR IN VIOLATION OF AN

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AGREEMENT BUT TO PREVENT VIOLATION.THEREFORE AS SYSTEMS CHANGE DEMANDS ON VERIFICATION CHANGE.

10.ANOTHER PROBLEM WITH VERIFICATION AS IT APPLIES TO NEW SYSTEMS IS THAT YOU HAVE TO CONSIDER NOT/NOT JUST HOW THE USA GOVT CAN CONVINCE ITSELF THAT SOV UNION IS ADHERING TO AGREEMENTS BUT HOW IT CAN CONVINCE OTHERS OF THIS.MUCH PRESENT INFO PARICULARLY INFO AVAILABLE FROM NTMS IS NOT/NOT RELEASABLE PUBLICLY AND IF YOU CANNOT/NOT RELEASE INFO PUBLICLY HOW DO YOU ENFORCE AN AGREEMENT. WHAT IS REALLY NECESSARY IN THIS AREA OF ARMS CONTROL ARE IDEAS THAT ALLOW YOU TO PRODUCE PUBLIC EVIDENCE OF COMPLIANCE OR FAILURE TO COMPLY.IN THIS REGARD THE USA FINDS IT MUCH MORE PRODUCTIVE TO TALK ABOUT OPERATIONALLY DEPLOYED SYSTEMS THAN TO TALK IN A THEORETICAL WAY ABOUT FUTURE SYSTEMS.IF WE WANT TO LOOK FORWARD TO MORE GENERAL PROPOSAL ON FUTURE SYSTEMS WHAT MIGHT BE MORE USEFUL IS A BAN ON ENCRYPTION OF TELEMETRY.

11.ANOTHER PROBLEM IS THAT SHLD SUCH AN AGREEMENT GO INTO PLACE WITHOUT MORE SPECIFIC PROVISIONS FOR HOW VERIFICATION WLD BE ACHIEVED THE SOV UNION CLD SIMPLY CLAIM THAT THEY CANNOT/NOT VERIFY A CERTAIN AMERICAN SYSTEM.WE DO NOT/NOT KNOW WHAT EXACTLY SOV VERIFICATION CAPABILITY IS FROM NTMS AND IT WLD THEREFORE BE DIFFICULT TO CONTRADICT THEIR CLAIM.NTM IS ALSO EXTREMELY LIMITED AS A MEAN OF VERIFYING REFIRE OR MISSILE THROWWEIGHT.

12.PARAS1 TO 11 INCLUSIVE CONTAIN INFO RECEIVED IN CONFIDENCE FROM DOD,ACDA AND STATE DEPT.

CCC/230 021340Z UNGR2086

Division Phoned \_\_\_\_\_

Person \_\_\_\_\_

Local Time \_\_\_\_\_

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

MF  
D

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR0268 29FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 291200

INFO VMBFR BNATO CANMILREPNATO BONN LDN MOSCO GENEV PRMNY STKHM

NDHQOTT/DNACPOL/CID/COREA/ADMPOL/DIPOL/CPD/DSTRATA

DISTR IFB IDR IDA IDRA IDRL RGX RBD RCD RCR RSR RSRD CPD IDD

REF OURTEL UNGR2078 28FEB

---MBFR:NEW USA POSITION

WE SHOULD ADD FOLLOWING TO REPORT OF ACDA BRIEFING.ADELMAN

BRIEFED US AT OUR URGING.STATE HAS NOT/NOT BEEN AS FORTHCOMING.

WE HAVE NO/NO IDEA WHETHER AND WHEN USA IS BRIEFING OTHERS;HENCE

INFO AND INDEED FACT THERE WAS SUCH A BRIEFING SHOULD BE PROTECTED.

GOTLIEB SAID CDN AUTHORITIES WOULD BE PLEASED TO LEARN OF THESE

INDICATIONS OF NEW USA FLEXIBILITY.HE ASKED FOR BILATERAL

CONSULTATIONS WITH CDA.

CCC/230 291643Z UNGR0268

MF

UNCLAS TO Brief?

MR DELVOIE

Should we send our undoss. brief?

DM

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BAIRS ZYGR0263 29FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 011000

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR CPD LSR

---PMS PEACE INITIATIVE:PARAGUAYAN INTEREST

AMB EXPECTS TO BE MEETING WITH PARAGUAYAN PRES STROESSNER DURING  
HIS VISIT TO ASUNCION MAR 6-8 GIVEN PUBLICITY ABOUT MR TRUDEAUS  
TRAVELS AND PRESIDENTS PERSONAL INTEREST IN EAST/WEST MATTERS,  
GRATEFUL IF WE COULD RECEIVE BRIEF(UNCLAS)RESUME OF PMS DISCUSSIONS,  
TRAVELS AND SUMMING UP OF SUCCESS ACHIEVED.WE ALREADY HAVE HERE TEL  
IDDZ0144 OF 10FEB84 AND LET SCS-M-0233 OF 25JAN84 BUT TWO PAGE  
OVERALL RESUME WOULD BE HIGHLY USEFUL AND DEEPLY APPRECIATED BY  
PARAGUAYANS.TEXT WOULD OF COURSE BE TRANSLATED INTO SPANISH HERE.  
UUU/028 011144Z ZYGR0263

summary of 9 Feb HJ C debate

T.O'Brady  
03

Pr's NYTimes  
Interview  
Trans



Government  
of Canada

Gouvernement  
du Canada

IDD

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# news release

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Date FEBRUARY 28, 1984

84/31

For release

## AGREEMENT ON REFUELLING FOR AEROFLOT FLIGHTS AT GANDER

The Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, and the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Transport, today announced that the Government of Canada has agreed to sign the Memorandum of Understanding negotiated with the Soviet Union in 1983 to provide for refuelling facilities at Gander Airport for Aeroflot transit flights.

The Memorandum also provides for specific transfer arrangements for crews of Soviet fishing vessels being repaired at the CN Dockyard in St. John's.

"Significant economic benefits to Newfoundland will be generated by this agreement", Mr. MacEachen said. Local contractors are expected to build and manage all aspects of Aeroflot refuelling facilities and to provide catering and technical services to the airline.

"More than 100 jobs will be created at Gander Airport when the refuelling facilities are in place", Mr. Axworthy said, "and there will be another 100 jobs in St. John's at the dockyard".

- 30 -

ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER

Mr. Smith 9/12 30  
Mr. Calder 9/12

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR6209 28FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 290900

HAGUE/SMITH DELIVER BY 291100

INFO WSHDC CANMILREPNATO BRU MOSCO LDN BONN ROME VMBFR GENEV PARIS  
OSLO COPEN ATHNS STKHM/SCDEL PCOOTT/FOWLER/AXWORTHY

NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DNACPOL/DACPOL/CPD/DSTRATA/CIS

DISTR IDD IFB MINA MINE MINT USS DMF IDA RBR RCR RSR RBO RCO RSO

CPD ZSI ZSP UGB URR IDR RGB

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0208 27FEB(NOTAL)

---CONSULTATIONS ON SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS:IDDZ BRIEFING OF POL

CTTEE 28FEB

SUMMARY:ONE AND HALF HOUR SESSION SMITH,CALDER AND GENEV/SKINNER  
HAD WITH POL CTTEE WENT VERY WELL,ATMOSPHERE BEING RELAXED  
THROUGHOUT.THIS WAS DUE TO GREAT EXTENT TO FACT THAT UK REP CHOSE  
NOT/NOT TO REPEAT PERFORMANCE PUT UP BY HIS COLLEAGUE ON SPC WHERE  
RBD/HANCOCK HAD GIVEN BRIEFING ON PMS VISIT TO EASTERN EUR TWO  
WEEKS AGO.IN FACT HE DID NOT/NOT RAISE QUESTIONS AS PER REFTL  
INDICATING HE WOULD CIRCULATE THEM.CDN INTENTION OF EXHAUSTIVE  
CONSULTATIVE PROCESS IN NATO WAS OBVIOUSLY WELL RECEIVED ALTHOUGH  
POINT WAS MADE FORCEFULLY THAT CDA DID NOT/NOT THINK IN TERMS OF  
YEARS.THERE WAS GENERAL SUPPORT FOR DUTCH AND NORWEGIAN SUGGESTION  
FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION ON ASAT IN PARTICULAR AND PLANS ARE NOW FOR  
REINFORCED MTG OF CTTEE ON SUBJ EITHER IN MAR OR APR.

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PAGE TWO YBGR6209 CONFD

2.REPORT.SMITH INTRODUCED BRIEFING BY EXPLAINING WHERE 3 PROPOSALS FITTED INTO PMS INITIATIVE.HE OBSERVED THAT WHILE THESE WERE SECONDARY TO OVERALL POLITICAL OBJECTIVES,THEY NONETHELESS REPRESENTED OUTGROWTH OF STRATEGY OF SUFFOCATION ELABORATED BY PM AT UNSSOD IN 1978.HE NOTED ASAT WAS SERIOUS ISSUE GIVEN DESTABILIZING EFFECT DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH SYSTEMS CAN HAVE.ON VERIFICATION AND ICBM MOBILITY PROPOSALS,HE STRESSED THAT THESE WERE STRATEGIC THOUGHTS CONSISTENT WITH SCOWCROFT REPORT AND THAT CDA HAD NO/NO INTENTION TO NEGOTIATE THESE.HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT OUR IDEAS WOULD FIND THEIR PLACE IN DISCUSSION AS WELL AS NETHS PAPER ON OUTER SPACE WHICH WAS ALSO WORTHY OF COMMENTS.FINALLY,HE STRESSED OUR DESIRE TO EXHAUST CONSULTATIVE PROCESS IN NATO ALTHOUGH HE MADE IT CLEAR LATER IN DISCUSSION THAT WE DID NOT/NOT MEAN YEARS.

3.GENERALLY SPEAKING,USA REP STAYED OFF SUBSTANCE.WHILE HE CAME TO AGREE THAT CD WAS NOT/NOT NECESSARILY INAPPROPRIATE PLACE TO DISCUSS ASAT(THANKS TO SKINNERS EXPERT EXPOSE ON DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TABLING AND CIRCULATING),AND ALTHOUGH NOBODY PICKED UP HIS EARLIER ARGUMENT THAT IT WAS,HE URGED NOT/NOT TO CIRCULATE PAPER IN GENEV AS IT WOULD MAKE ALLIED UNITY VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE.HE REITERATED POINT ABOUT PROBLEMS ARISING FROM CIRCULATION OF PAPERS ON VERIFICATION AND ICBM MOBILITY AS SUCH MOVE WAS BOUND TO HIGHLY POLITICIZE ISSUES.IN RESPONSE,IT WAS INDICATED THAT WHILE ALLIES UNITY WAS IMPORTANT IT WAS ANOTHER MATTER TO DETERMINE HOW THIS COULD BE ACHIEVED.IN CASE ...3



PAGE THREE YBGR6209 CONF D

OF ASAT IN PARTICULAR, IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS OF CONCERN TO ALL AND THAT IT WAS THEREFORE INCUMBENT UPON USA TO PROVIDE FURTHER INDICATION AS TO WHERE ARMS CONTROL FITS WITH ASAT.

4. UK REP WHO HAD BEEN CONVINCED EVENING BEFORE TO DEFER QUESTIONS UNTIL TEAM REACHES LDN 02MAR, WELCOMED PLEDGE TO EXHAUST CONSULTATIVE PROCESS IN NATO BEFORE IDEAS WERE PUT FORWARD IN GENEV. HE HOWEVER SUGGESTED THAT OWN QUESTIONS WHICH HE NEVERTHELESS INTENDED TO CIRCULATE SERVE AS BASIS FOR ON-GOING CONSULTATIONS. HE HOWEVER URGED CARE IN HANDLING ASAT PROPOSAL SO AS NOT/NOT TO OFFER SOVIETS TACTICAL OPPORTUNITY TO PICK UP IDEAS.

5. FRG REP REMAINED SILENT THROUGHOUT (THIS IS UNDERSTANDABLE SINCE TEAM WILL BE VISITING BONN 01MAR). IN REFERRING TO CONSULTATIONS HELD EARLIER IN PARIS, FRENCH REP EXPRESSED DESIRE FOR IN-DEPTH DISCUSSION ON ASAT IN PARTICULAR. IN THIS VEIN, HE SUGGESTED SUCH DISCUSSIONS COULD TAKE PLACE RIGHT AFTER DISARMAMENT EXPERT MTG HELD EARLY APR. THIS WAS SUPPORTED BY USA REP. DUTCH REP, ALONG WITH ITALIAN AND BELGIAN, WERE MORE INTERESTED IN CONSULTATIVE PROCESS AND SUGGESTED THAT REINFORCED MTG OF POL CTTEE BE HELD AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE, PREFERABLY WEEK OF 19MAR TO FOCUS IN PARTICULAR ON ASAT. PICKING UP ON FRENCH REPS PROPOSAL, HE OBSERVED THAT GIVEN SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CDN PROPOSALS, DISARMAMENT EXPERTS MIGHT NOT/NOT BE MOST SUITABLE CANDIDATES BECAUSE OF THEIR UN ORIENTATION. FOR HIS PART, NORWEGIAN REP WAS GENERALLY POSITIVE AND SPOKE EXACTLY ALONG

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PAGE FOUR YBGR6209 CONFID

LINES OF NOTE HE HAD GIVEN US EARLIER (OURTEL YBGR6113 01FEB).

6. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? JUDGING FROM ALLIES COMMENTS, IT WOULD APPEAR ATTN IS SHIFTING LARGELY TO ASAT AND AWAY FROM OUR STRATEGIC VERIFICATION/MOBILITY PROPOSALS. THIS PROBABLY REFLECTS DECISION OF MOST ALLIES TO LEAVE RUNNING ON LATTER TO THREE NUCLEAR PARTNERS. WE SHALL BE SEEKING FROM COLLEAGUES CONFIRMATION OF THIS IMPRESSION IN COURSE OF NEXT FEW DAYS. THERE IS, HOWEVER, VERY REAL POSSIBILITY THAT USA, SINCE IT IS VIRTUALLY ISOLATED ON ISSUE MAY, IN ORDER TO CHECK THIS TREND, PUSH FOR FURTHER CONSULTATIONS AT NATO ON ENTIRE CDN PACKAGE. THIS TACTIC WAS USED BY PAC CHAIRMAN CELLA WHO IS USA NATIONAL, AT CONCLUSION OF REGULAR PAC MTG ALTHOUGH WITHOUT OSTENSIBLE SUCCESS.

CCC/054 290943Z YBGR6209

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

MF  
ED

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2078 28FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO VMBFR BNATO CANMILREPNATO BONN LDN MOSCO GENEV PRMNY

STKHM NDHQOTT/DNACPOL/CID/CORAE/ADMPOL/DIPOL/CPD/DSTRATA

DISTR IFB IDR IDA IDRA IDRL RGX RBD RCD RCR RSR RSRD CPD IDD

---MBFR:NEW USA POSITION

ACDA DIR ADELMAN TODAY BRIEFED GOTLIEB ON NEW USA MBFR POSITION.  
POINTS MADE ARE AS FOLLOWS:(I)PRES REAGAN HAS DECIDED ON A POLICY  
OF FLEXIBILITY ON THE DATA QUESTION IN THAT USA WILL NO/NO LONGER  
INSIST ON A FULL AGREEMENT ON DATA BEFORE REDUCTIONS.INSTEAD USA  
WILL PROPOSE A BAND WITHIN WHICH THERE IS AGREEMENT.THE USA HAS  
NOT/NOT YET DETERMINED HOW WIDE THIS BAND WITHIN WHICH A DISCREPANCY  
CAN EXIST WILL BE OR WHETHER DISCREPANCY ALLOWED WILL BE IN  
PERCENTAGE TERMS OR NUMERICAL.IN TIME THE USA WILL INSIST ON FULL  
AGREEMENT ON DATA BUT ONLY AFTER FULL VERIFICATION PROCEDURES  
ARE IN PLACE.THE BAND WITHIN WHICH THERE CAN BE DISCREPANCY IS  
THEREFORE AN INTERIM MEASURE.(II)USA WILL AGREE TO CHANGE UNIT OF  
ACCOUNT FROM SIMPLY COUNTING TROOPS TO COUNTING COMBAT TROOPS AND  
COMBAT SUPPORT TROOPS ONLY.USA HAS NOT/NOT YET DEVELOPED FULL  
DEFINITIONS FOR THESE CATEGORIES.(III)THESE CONCESSIONS WLD BE IN  
EXCHANGE FOR SOV AGREEMENT ON ENHANCED VERIFICATION PACKAGE.THIS  
PACKAGE WILL INCLUDE SPECIFIC VERIFICATION PROPOSALS SUCH AS  
AGREED ENTRY-EXIT POINTS AS WELL AS ASSOCIATED MEASURES(CBMS)

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PAGE TWO UNGR2078 CONF

THAT ARE INTENDED BOTH TO ENHANCE VERIFICATION AND WILL ALSO BUILD CONFIDENCE IN THEMSELVES. MEASURES WHILE LIMITED IN SCOPE ARE BASICALLY CONSISTENT WITH STKHM CONFERENCE MEASURES.

2. IN DESCRIBING PROPOSALS ADELMAN SAID INTENTION WAS TO REMOVE A PROBLEM WHILE IMPROVING VERIFICATION POSSIBILITIES. IT AIMS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF HOW AND WHAT YOU COUNT AND AT THE SAME TIME PROVIDES SOV A FACE-SAVING WAY TO AGREE TO A RESOLUTION. USA SAID THAT THEY DO NOT/NOT BELIEVE THAT SIMPLY CHANGING WHAT YOU ARE COUNTING WILL SOLVE THE DISCREPANCY PROBLEM BUT THEY HOPE THAT TAKEN WITH THE PROPOSAL FOR A BAND OF ACCEPTABLE VARIATION THIS WILL ALLOW FOR FORWARD MOVEMENT.

3. USA EXPECTS TO PUT PROPOSAL TO ALLIANCE IN BRUSSELS IN MID-MARCH WITH HOPE OF PUTTING IT TO EAST SHORTLY AFTER. USA REALIZES IT WILL NOT/NOT BE POSSIBLE TO MEET 17MAR RESUMPTION OF MBFR BUT HOPES TO BE AS CLOSE TO THAT DATE AS POSSIBLE.

4. OTHER CONTACTS TELL US THAT THIS POSITION WAS CAREFULLY BROKERED WITHIN ADMIN AND PROVIDES SOMETHING FOR EVERYONE. SALIENT POINT IS THAT EVEN AT FIRST GLANCE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS ARE EVIDENT. SETTING OF THE BAND IS FIRST PROBLEM. TOO NARROW A BAND MAY LEAVE US NO/NO CLOSER TO A SOLUTION. SECOND PROBLEM IS QUESTION OF DEFINITION OF TROOPS TO BE COUNTED. WE SUSPECT THAT GETTING USA TO RESOLVE THESE QUESTIONS WITHIN ADMIN WILL NOT/NOT BE MUCH EASIER THAN GETTING IT TO DEVELOP THIS POSITION. THOSE WHO FEEL MBFR IS A FLAWED NEGOTIATION

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PAGE THREE UNGR2078 CONF

STILL HAVE A GOOD SHOT A HOLDING IT UP.ON OTHER HAND THIS CHANGE  
DOES PROVIDE FOR FLEXIBILITY IF WEST WANTS TO USE IT.DETERMINATE  
IN THIS REGARD MAY WELL BE SOV PERFORMANCE ON VERIFICATION QUESTION.

CCC/241 282244Z UNGR2078

IDDZ

UNCLASSIFIED

FM GENEV YTGR1450 28FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDA

INFO BNAOT WSHDC WSAW BONN MOSCO BUCST PRGUE LDN STKHM/SECDEL PARIS  
VIENN VMBFR PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR RBR RBD IDR IDD

---CD:GDR STATEMENT-PMS INITIATIVE

IN AN OTHERWISE UNREMARKABLE STATEMENT IN PLENARY ON 28FEB,AMB  
ROSE OF GDR CALLED FOR A QUOTE A BROAD COALITION OF REASON AND  
COMMON SENSE UNQUOTE IN CONSIDERING CONCRETE MEASURES TO AVERT A  
NUCLEAR INFERNO.REFERRING TO THE NEED FOR A REVERSAL OF QUOTE THE  
NEGATIVE TRENDS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION UNQUOTE AND  
REITERATING GDRS WILLINGNESS QUOTE TO CONSIDER THE LEGITIMATE  
INTERESTS OF ALL SIDES IN HONEST NEGOTIATIONS...AND TO BE OPENMINDED  
TO ALL USEFUL IDEAS NO/NO MATTER FROM WHICH SIDE THEY MAY COME  
UNQUOTE,AMB ROSE DECLARED QUOTE THE GDR SUPPORTED ON THE OCCASION  
OF PM TRUDEAUS RECENT VISIT HIS PROPOSALS TO REDUCE THE DANGER OF  
NUCLEAR WAR UNQUOTE.

UUU/221 281640Z YTGR1450

MF

R E S T R I C T E D

FM EXTOTT IFB0054 28FEB84

TO BPEST

DISTR RBD IDDZ

REF YOURTEL ZWGR0271 24FEB

---EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND PMS PEACE INITIATIVE:HUNG VIEWS

GRATEFUL YOU INCLUDE IFB AND IDDZ IN DISTRIBUTION OF SIGNIFICANT  
MESSAGES ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND PMS PEACE INITIATIVE SUCH AS  
YOUR VERY INTERESTING REFTTEL.

CCC/277 282105Z IFB0054

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

*Mr. Smith* *OR*

*28-6-1- Trudeau Peace Mission*

S E C R E T

FM WSHDC UNGR2077 28FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO BNATO CANMILREPNATO BRU MOSCO LDN BONN ROME VMBFR GENEV

PARIS HAGUE OSLO COPEN ATHNS STKHM/SCDEL PCOOTT/FOWLER/AXWORTHY

NMDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DACPOL/DNACPOL/CPD/DSTRATA/CIS

DISTR IDD IFB MINA MINE MINT USS DMF IDA RBR RCR RSR RBD RCD RSD

CPD ZSI ZSP UGB URR IDR RGB

REF OURTEL UNGR2072 24FEB

---PMS INITIATIVE:CIRCULATION OF ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS AT CD  
AND USA REACTION

SUMMARY:USA OBJECTION TO OUR USE OF CD AS LOCALE FOR OBTAINING  
INNATL CONSIDERATION FOR ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS THEY CONSIDER  
MISPLACED IN THAT FORUM IS FIRM AND IS ROOTED IN SOME FUNDAMENTAL  
ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE PURSUIT OF USA INTERESTS AND THE CONDUCT  
OF INNATL AFFAIRS.IN ORDER TO(A)ADVANCE THE SUBSTANCE OF CDN  
PROPOSALS;(B)AVOID RISK OF REDUCING POTENTIAL FOR INFLUENCING USA  
POSITIONS;AND(C)AVOID RISK OF MAKING USA LESS FORTHCOMING IN  
RESPONDING TO OUR REQUEST FOR INFO AND CONSULTATION,WE SHLD TRY  
TO ADAPT CDN PURPOSES TO FACT OF USA OBJECTIONS TO USE OF CD FORUM.  
ONE ALTERNATIVE APPROACH WLD BE TO(A)WRITE TO LEADERS OF USA AND  
USSR ABOUT PROPOSALS IN CONTEXT OF QUOTE PRINCIPLES UNQUOTE  
LETTERS;(B)DISCUSS SUBSTANCE OF PROPOSALS IN NAC;(C)MENTION IN  
STATEMENT IN CD ON OTHER MATTERS THAT CDA IS ALSO STUDYING SUBSTANCE  
...2



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OF THESE ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS WHICH PRINCIPALLY CONCERN USA AND USSR;AND(D)MAKE AVAILABLE STRICTLY ON INFO BASIS SUMMARY OF POINTS MADE IN THESE LETS OR INCLUDE SUMMARY OF POINTS IN CDN STATEMENT IN CD WHICH CLD THEN BE CIRCULATED TO MEMBERS.

2.REPORT:THERE ARE THREE FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTIES OF FOREIGN POLICY OF REAGAN ADMIN WHICH OUR PROPOSALS RUB AGAINST:THE PRIMACY IN USA POLICY OF EAST-WEST RELNS;THE GREAT NEED IN THIS CONTEXT TO PROTECT THE STRATEGIC BALANCE;THE NEED TO ENSURE REAL AMERICAN INTERESTS ARE NOT/NOT HOSTAGE TO WHAT ARE PERCEIVED AS ADVERSARY MULTILATERAL (IE THIRD WORLD)FORUMS.THESE ARE ELEMENTS OF WHAT USA PRACTITIONERS CONSIDER THE NEW REALISM IN USA FOREIGN POLICY.THERE ARE UNILATERALIST IMPULSES IN THIS VIEW BUT THESE ARE AT PRESENT MORE OR LESS DISCIPLINED WITHIN NATO CONSULTATIVE CONTEXT.

3.AS YOU KNOW,THEME OF QUOTE STRAINS WITHIN NATO ALLIANCE UNQUOTE IS RECEIVING HEIGHTENED ATTN AROUND HERE,AS REFLECTED IN KISSINGER ARTICLE IN TIME THIS WEEK WHOSE PROPOSAL TO REDUCE UNILATERALLY HALF OF USA LAND FORCES IN EUROPE IF SOME BASIC USA POSITIONS ARE UNSATISFIED WILL MEET WITH CONSIDERABLE PRIVATE SATISFACTION IN ADMIN.PERTINENCE OF THIS THEME TO OUR PURPOSES IS THAT NERVES ARE PROBABLY MORE RAW ON SUBJ OF EFFECTIVE NATO CONSULTATIONS THAN THEY MIGHT BE OTHERWISE.

4.BUT USA RESISTANCE TO IDEA OF USING CD FOR SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL NEGS GOES BACK A LONG WAY.WE SHLD RECALL THAT KENNEDY ADMIN HELD

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UP APPROVAL OF CHARLES RITCHIES CREDENTIALS BECAUSE OF THEIR  
OBJECTION TO CDA INTRODUCING IN CD PREDECESSOR FORUM A PROPOSAL  
TO BAN WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN OUTER SPACE, PROPOSAL WHICH  
SAME ADMIN ACTUALLY ENDORSED IN SUBSTANCE NOT/NOT LONG AFTERWARD.  
SINCE THEN, USA DISENCHANTMENT WITH UTILITY OF VIRTUALLY ALL  
MULTILATERAL POLITICAL FORUMS HAS BECOME ALMOST UNOFFICIAL ACT  
OF FAITH. NOTION THAT MEMBERS OF CD WLD USEFULLY ADDRESS SUBSTANTIVE  
PROPERTIES OF ISSUES AS CENTRAL TO USA CAPABILITY FOR NUCLEAR  
DETERRENCE AS MOBILITY AND VERIFIABILITY OF STRATEGIC FORCES  
OFFENDS USA, AND THEY ASSUME, USSR AS WELL, IF CD ADDRESSES ONLY  
PRESENTATIONAL OR RHETORICAL ASPECTS OF ISSUE, USA EXPERIENCE IS  
THAT EXERCISE WILL BE EXPLOITED AND MADE TO WORK TO USA DISADVANTAGE.  
5. THESE ARE BASIC ATTITUDES WHICH HAVE CONDITIONED USA OVER-REACTION  
TO OUR PROPOSED USE OF CD AS LOCALE FOR MULTILATERAL CIRCULATION OF  
THESE PROPOSALS. OBVIOUSLY, WE DISAGREE WITH SOME BASIC ASPECTS OF  
USA VIEWPOINT, AND WE HAVE DONE SO IN CONSULTATION WITH THEM.  
6. THESE ATTITUDES ARE SEPARATE FROM USA ASSESSMENT OF SUBSTANCE OF  
THREE CDN PROPOSALS. INDEED, AS REFTTEL INDICATES, USA OFFICIALS SUGGEST  
THEY ARE IN BROAD AGMT WITH THRUST OF CDN PROPOSALS ON MOBILITY AND  
VERIFIABILITY, THOUGH WE WLD NOT/NOT WANT TO PLACE TOO MUCH EMPHASIS  
ON THAT ASSERTION SINCE WHOLE OBJECT OF VERIFICATION IS SO INTER-  
RELATED WITH SO MANY OTHER POLITICAL, TECHNOLOGICAL AND MILITARY  
CONSIDERATIONS THAT ITS DISCUSSION AS PRINCIPLE IS ALMOST WITHOUT  
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SIGNIFICANCE FROM USA POINT OF VIEW. ASAT PROPOSAL REVEALS CLEAR SUBSTANTIVE DISAGREEMENT ON SUBSTANCE BUT LESS OF A HOSTILITY TO LEGITIMACY OF REFERRAL OF ISSUE TO CD EVEN IF THERE IS HOSTILITY TO POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DOING SO.

7. WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE US? WE CLD TELL USA THAT THEY ARE OVER-REACTING AND SIMPLY GO AHEAD AS UNOBTRUSIVELY AS POSSIBLE TO CIRCULATE SUCH PROPOSALS AT CD. WE DOUBT THIS WOULD CAUSE MUCH OF CONSEQUENCE TO HAPPEN TO AFRICAN INTERESTS ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. HOWEVER, OFFICIALS HERE WOULD BE MORE MISTRUSTFUL OF CDN ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN IN PMS NAME IN ARMS CONTROL FIELD AS RESULT. THIS IN TURN CLD RISK MAKING USA LESS FORTHCOMING IN RESPONDING TO OUR REQUESTS FOR INFO AND CONSULTATION. WE SHALL END UP BEING POSSIBLY CORRECT BUT PROBABLY WITH DIMINISHED INFLUENCE.

8. THERE MAY BE A SLIGHTLY MODIFIED APPROACH WHICH CLD BETTER SUIT OUR OVERALL PURPOSES.

9. INSTEAD OF CIRCULATING THESE PROPOSALS DIRECTLY TO PARTICIPANTS IN CD WHICH FROM USA POINT OF VIEW HAS AN ACTION-ORIENTED SIGNIFICANCE, WE CLD DIRECT OUR ACTION AT THE TWO SUPER POWERS THEMSELVES. PM CLD WRITE TO REAGAN AND CHERNENKO SETTING OUT THE SUBSTANCE OF HIS PROPOSALS FOR THEIR CONSIDERATION, EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER SUBSTANTIVE CONSULTATION ON THEM IN NATO. LETS WLD HAVE TO DIFFERENTIATE OUR RELNSHIPS TO THE TWO ADDRESSEES IN WAY WHICH REFLECTS OUR PARTICIPATION IN NATO. THEY CLD BE THE SAME LETS WHICH

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TAKE UP THE TEN PRINCIPLES DESCRIBED IN SPEECH TO HOC FEB9.

10. CD REFERENCE CLD CONSIST OF INDICATING, IN A STATEMENT ADDRESSED IN PART TO OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, THAT CDA HAS SO WRITTEN THE USA AND USSR ON THESE ISSUES, TWO AT LEAST OF WHICH CONCERN PRINCIPALLY THE STRATEGIC RELNSHIP BETWEEN THESE TWO COUNTRIES AS A NEGOTIATING ISSUE AND THE THIRD OF WHICH IS POSSIBLY OF MORE GENERAL EVENTUAL NEGOTIATING SIGNIFICANCE. FOR INFO PURPOSES, CDN DEL CLD THEN MAKE AVAILABLE TO OTHER CD DELS SUMMARY OF POINTS MADE IN TWO LETS. ALTERNATIVELY, CDN STATEMENT CLD CONTAIN, BY WAY OF INFO, A MORE DETAILED SUMMARY OF POINTS AND CDN STATEMENT CLD THEN BE CIRCULATED.

11. THIS WLD BE TECHNIQUE WHICH DEFERS TO STRENGTH OF USA PERCEPTIONS ON POINTS THEY CONSIDER OF BASIC IMPORTANCE TO THEIR INTERESTS WHILE CARRYING THROUGH WITH OUR INTENTION TO OFFER FOR CONSIDERATION SOME PROPOSALS OF SUBSTANCE IN EAST-WEST RELNS AND ARMS CONTROL. IT RECOGNIZES CD DOES NOT/NOT NEGOTIATE USA-USSR STRATEGIC ISSUES. IT ALSO TAKES INTO ACCOUNT FACT THAT PROPOSALS WERE NOT/NOT INTENDED AS ENDS IN THEMSELVES FROM CDN POLICY POINT OF VIEW BUT WERE MEANT AS ILLUSTRATIONS OF SORT OF SUBSTANTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS CDA CLD MAKE TO INNATL DISCUSSION IN SUPPORT OF PM PEACE INITIATIVE ON POLITICAL LEVEL.

GOTLIEB

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