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Volume 21 From-De 84-01-12 To-À 84-01-16

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28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION
Vol 21

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MGID

TITLE—TITRE:

DISARMEMENT
MEASURES
PLANS AND PROPOSALS
TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION (INITIATIVES)

DESARMEMENT
MESURES
PLANS ET PROPOSITIONS
TRUDEAU MISSION DE PAIX (INITIATIVES)

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M. Baudouin
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DEPARTMENT
OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MINISTÈRE
DES
AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES



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DATED FROM
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84-01-12

TO
JUSQU'AU

84-01-16

AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE - À METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER
DO NOT ADD ANY MORE PAPERS - NE PAS AJOUTER DE DOCUMENTS

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**ACTION
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RECEIVED IN

JAN 16 1984

28-6-1-TRUDEAU

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MISSION

CONFIDENTIAL CDN EYES ONLY

CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS

FM MOSCO XYGR0063 16JAN84

TO EXTOTT/RBD DELIVER BY 161200

STKHM/SCDEL DELIVER BY 161700

INFO WSHDC LDN PARIS BONN ROME HAGUE BRU BNATO PRMNY PEKIN TOKYO

CNBRA WSAW PRGUE BPEST BUCST BGRAD NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP/DGIS

PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RBD RBRD RBP RBT ZSP ZSI IDD IDDZ IDA IDR
FPR

REF YOURTEL RBD0009 14JAN AND RBD0010 14JAN

---PM INITIATIVE:POSSIBLE VISIT TO MOSCO

SUMMARY:ANDROPOV REPLY TO PMS LET CONFIRMS THAT TIMING OF
ANY VISIT TO MOSCO MUST BE LEFT UNDECIDED FOR INDEFINITE
PERIOD.KEY REASONS ARE UNCERTAINTY OF ANDROPOVS HEALTH,COMBINED
WITH SOVIET DESIRE TO RECEIVE PM AT LEVEL AND IN MANNER
COMPARABLE TO OTHERS.OVER-INSISTENT PRESSING BY CDA FOR DECISION
ON TIMING IN COMING FEW WEEKS CLD BE MISCONSTRUED BY SOVS
AS EFFORT TO EMBARRASS THEM.SOVS CONTINUE TO HAVE POSITIVE
INTEREST IN PMS INITIATIVE AND IN HAVING PM VISIT MOSCO TO MEET
WITH ANDROPOV.THEREFORE APPROPRIATE THAT CDN SIDE CONTINUE
IN LOW-KEY WAY TO REGISTER WITH SOV AUTHORITIES PMS CONTINUING
INTEREST IN COMING TO MOSCO AS SOON AS CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT.
AT MTG WITH GROMYKO IN STKHM,DPM/SSEA CLD USEFULLY REGISTER
APPRECIATION FOR ANDROPOVS LATEST CONFIRMATION OF POSITIVE
INTEREST IN PMS INITIATIVE AND READINESS IN PRINCIPLE TO
RECEIVE PM IN MOSCO,EXPRESS UNDERSTANDING RE SOVIET DIFFICULTIES

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PAGE TWO XYGR0063 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

ON TIMING OF VISIT AND GENTLY PROBE SOVIET READINESS TO MAKE FAVOURABLE PUBLIC STATEMENTS RE INITIATIVE.

2. ANDROPOVS REPLY TO PM CONFIRMS STRONG HINTS WE WERE RECEIVING FROM SOVIET OFFICIALS (OURTEL XYGR0046 13JAN-NOTAL) THAT (A) SOV SIDE IS STILL NOT/NOT ABLE TO INDICATE A TIME WHEN ANDROPOV WLD BE ABLE TO RECEIVE PM; AND (B) SOVIETS CONSIDER VISIT BY PM TO MOSCO FOR MTGS WITH LEADERS OTHER THAN ANDROPOV WLD BE INAPPROPRIATE. REASONS FOR THIS SOV POSITION, IN OUR VIEW, RELATE ENTIRELY TO UNCERTAINTY OF ANDROPOVS HEALTH, COMBINED WITH SOV DESIRE TO RECEIVE PM AT LEVEL AND IN MANNER COMPARABLE TO OTHER GOVTS OF MAJOR COUNTRIES. THEY ALSO OF COURSE WISH TO AVOID MAJOR MEDIA EVENT WHICH CLD EMBARRASSINGLY HIGHLIGHT CURRENT GAP IN LEADERSHIP RANKS HERE.

3. LET ALSO EXPLICITLY CONFIRMS GENERALLY POSITIVE SOVIET DISPOSITION TOWARD INTENT OF PMS INITIATIVE (WHILE BEING CAUTIOUSLY NON-COMMITTAL ON SPECIFICS) AND ANDROPOVS ACTIVE INTEREST IN RECEIVING PM IN MOSCO. IN THIS RESPECT WE FAIL TO DISCERN SIMILARITY BETWEEN REACTIONS OF SOVIET OFFICIALDOM AND QUOTE NEGATIVE VIBES UNQUOTE FROM USA OFFICIALS PRIOR TO PMS VISIT TO WSHDC. AT NO/NO POINT HAVE WE EVER RECEIVED NEGATIVE COMMENT FROM SOV OFFICIALS RE PURPOSES AND SUBSTANCE OF PMS INITIATIVE; NOR/NOR HAS ANY SOV OFFICIAL EVER QUESTIONED DESIRABILITY IN PRINCIPLE OF PMS VISITING MOSCO. RESERVATIONS EXPRESSED BY OFFICIALS HAVE RELATED SOLELY TO TIMING OF VISIT, WHICH IN TURN IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO ...3

PAGE THREE XYGR0063 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

AVAILABILITY OF ANDROPOV.

WE SIMILARLY DO NOT/NOT SHARE YOUR PERCEPTION THAT FM INITIATIVE /VISIT WERE QUOTE SLIPPING CONSIDERABLY UNQUOTE IN MOSCO PRIORITIES. SOVIET LEADERSHIP, WE THINK, ATTACHES AS MUCH IMPORTANCE TO PMS INITIATIVE AS THEY EVER HAVE: NO/NO MORE, NO/NO LESS. (WE WOULD, INCIDENTALLY, HESITATE TO ASCRIBE GREAT SIGNIFICANCE TO ABSENCE IN ANDROPOV'S LET OF CERTAIN THEMES OF RECENT EAST-WEST POLEMICS, EG DIRECT CRITICISM OF USA, REFS TO POST-DEPLOYMENT INF SITU. LET STRIKES US AS CONCISELY FUNCTIONAL ONE, CONVEYING GENERALLY RECEPTIVE SOVIET STANCE VIS-A-VIS PMS INITIATIVE, CDA-USSR RELATIONS AND, IN THAT TONTEXT, POSSIBILITIES FOR PMS MTG WITH ANDROPOV.)

4. PMS 05JAN84 LET APPEARS NOT/NOT TO HAVE CAUSED UNDUE IRRITATION AMONG SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND HAS HAD USEFUL FUNCTION OF FORCEFULLY REMINDING SOVIETS OF SERIOUSNESS OF PMS EFFORTS AS WELL AS IMPORTANCE PM ATTACHES TO DIRECT DISCUSSIONS WITH TOP SOVIET LEADERSHIP. DIFFICULTY IS THAT ON QUESTION OF TIMING OF VISIT WE ARE NOW IN LIMBO WHICH MAY BE OF INDEFINITE DURATION. MOREOVER, NOW THAT SOVIET SIDE HAS MADE CRYSTAL CLEAR ITS VIEWS AND SENSITIVITIES ON APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES FOR VISIT, OVER-INSISTENT PRESSING FOR EARLY DECISION ON TIMING COULD ALL TOO EASILY BE MISCONSTRUED AS CDN READINESS TO EMBARRASS SOVIET SIDE IN ITS PRESENT LEADERSHIP BIND. REPEATED PUBLIC REFS TO PMS DESIRE FOR EARLY VISIT TO MOSCO COULD HAVE SIMILAR EFFECT. WHAT TO DO?

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5.DPM/SSEAS STKHM MTG WITH GROMYKO,REFERRED TO IN ANDROPOVS LET,
PROVIDES CONVENIENT OCCASION TO SOUND OUT FURTHER SOVIET THINKING
RE PMS INITIATIVE IN CONTEXT OF PRESENT EAST-WEST SITU.AT MINIMUM
WE SUGGEST DPM/SSEA MIGHT WISH TO REGISTER APPRECIATION FOR GENERALLY
POSITIVE TONE OF ANDROPOVS MOST RECENT LET AND ITS SPECIFIC
REAFFIRMATION OF ANDROPOVS ACTIVE INTEREST IN RECEIVING PM IN MOSCO.
DPM/SSEA COULD ALSO EXPRESS UNDERSTANDING FOR DIFFICULTIES WHICH,
FOR MOMENT,PREVENT A DECISION ON TIMING OF VISIT BY PM.SOVIET SIDE
HAS THUS FAR NEVER/NEVER MADE ANY OFFICIAL PUBLIC STATEMENT ON PMS
INITIATIVE AS SUCH AND IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD PROBABLY BE
RELUCTANT TO GO VERY FAR IN PUBLIC.NEVERTHELESS,IN VIEW OF POSITIVE
TONE OF ANDROPOVS LET AND DEPENDING ON ATMOSPHERE AT MTG,DPM/SSEA
MAY WISH TO PROBE GENTLY EXTENT OF ANY SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO COMMENT
PUBLICLY ON INITIATIVE AND RELATED POSIBILITY OF VISIT.

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RESERVE AUX CDNS

28-6-1- TRUDEAU PEACE
MISSION

24-3-1-CDN

Fasemach

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0035 16JAN84

TO PRMNY

INFO STKHM/SCDEL WSHDC LDN ROME BNATO PARIS BONN VMBFR GENEV

HAGUE BRU TOKYO PEKIN COPEN OSLO MDRID ATHENS PCOOTT/FOWLER

NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDR IDA IMD (IMU RBR RBD FPR (ETN

REF YOURTEL WKGR0059 11JAN

---PM MTG WITH UN SEC GEN

FOLLOWING IS RECORD OF CONVERSATION OF PMS MTG WITH UN SEC GEN IN
NYORK 11JAN.

TEXT BEGINS:QUOTE

MTG BEGAN AT 4 PM AS SCHEDULED.

2.SEC GEN GAVE VERY WARM WELCOME TO PM TRUDEAU AND PRAISED HIS
INITIATIVE.HE INVITED PM TO SPEAK.

3.PM---THERE IS CONSIDERABLE PARALLEL AND COINCIDENCE BETWEEN
VIEWS AND POSITIONS THE TWO OF US HAVE BEEN TAKING.I WAS
DELIGHTED BY YOUR PRE-CHRISTMAS REMARKS ASKING SUPERPOWERS IN
EFFECT AS TO QUOTE WHO GAVE THEM THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE OUR
FATE UNQUOTE.TENSIONS ARE TOO HIGH BETWEEN WARSAW PACT AND
NATO.DIALOGUE IS IMPORTANT AND MUST BE DEVELOPED AT THE
POLITICAL LEVEL.WE MUST AVOID QUOTE NUCLEAR ACCOUNTANCY UNQUOTE.
THERE IS A NEED FOR POLITICAL ACTIONS.THE SITUATION IS TOO
IMPORTANT TO LEAVE TO THE SUPERPOWERS.THE THRUST WE HAVE BEEN

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TAKING IS THE SAME. FOR EXAMPLE, APPROACH I TOOK AT CWLTH MTG IN DELHI HAD BEEN BOTH ON THE NEED TO GET NUCLEAR POWERS TALKING AND NEGOTIATING AND ALSO ON NEED TO STRENGTHEN THE UN. I WOULD BE GLAD TO ANSWER ANY SPECIFIC QUERIES YOU MIGHT HAVE ABOUT WHAT ZHAO OR REAGAN MAY HAVE SAID LATER BUT WOULD FOCUS MY PRESENTATION MAINLY ON THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY AS A RESULT OF MY TRAVELS AND DISCUSSIONS AND ON HOW THE UN MIGHT GET MORE DIRECTLY INVOLVED.

4.PM SAID THAT HE WAS NOW NEARING THE END OF THIS PHASE OF HIS INITIATIVE: QUOTE NEARING THE END UNQUOTE BECAUSE HE WOULD HAVE TO GO TO USSR TOO, IN ORDER PROPERLY TO COMPLETE THE CYCLE. HE HAD WRITTEN TO ANDROPOV FEW DAYS PREVIOUSLY SAYING THAT IF HE COULD NOT/NOT RECEIVE HIM HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO SEE OTHER MEMBERS OF SOVIET LEADERSHIP. HE WAS TRYING TO DO THIS BEFORE THE END OF JAN. HE WASNT SURE WHAT RESPONSE WOULD BE BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SEE THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP BEFORE SUMMING UP WHERE HE WISHED TO GO FROM HERE. IDEALLY HE WOULD LIKE TO ENSURE THAT THE POLITICAL CONTACTS WHICH WOULD BEGIN IN STKHM NEXT WEEK WOULD BE PURSUED. GREATER DIALOGUE WAS REQUIRED AT POLITICAL LEVEL. THERE HAD BEEN SOME ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENTS, INCLUDING THATCHERS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO HUNGARY AND REAGANS DIET SPEECH. THE QUOTE WORDS UNQUOTE BEING USED ARE NOW BETTER. MEGAPHONE DIPLOMACY WAS FADING. NATO BRUSSELS DECLARATION RECOGNIZED THE

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PAGE THREE IDDZ0035 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

OTHER SIDE HAD ITS OWN LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS AND SAID SUPERIORITY SHOULD NOT/NOT BE SOUGHT. IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN WHETHER THESE WERE ONLY WORDS BUT HE THOUGHT THAT AT LEAST ALLIES IN THE WEST WOULD NOT/NOT CONDONE MERE WORDS, WITHOUT ACTIONS.

5.PM REVIEWED BRIEFLY DEVELOPMENTS IN RELATION TO HIS SPECIFIC PROPOSALS. AS FOR THE STKHM CONF, IT HAD BEEN MOVED TO A POLITICAL LEVEL AND THIS WAS GOOD. ON MBFR, THERE HAD BEEN A HELPFUL NATO DECISION TO REVIEW WESTERN POSITION AND WE WERE AWAITING SOME IDEAS AND MOVES FROM FRG. PM REVEALED HE HAD WRITTEN TO CHANCELLOR KOHL THAT VERY MORNING SAYING HE EXPECTED HIM TO MOVE FORWARD. ON THE QUESTION OF FURTHER MEASURES IN THE CONF ON DISARMAMENT IN GENEV, CDA WOULD BE PRESENTING THREE PAPERS IN EARLY FEB, ONE EACH ON ASAT, ON VERIFICATION AND ON MOBILITY OF ICBMS.

6. WITH REGARD TO THE FIVE-POWER CONF IDEA, PM SAID HE HAD RAISED THIS SUBJ WITH EACH OF THE FOUR NUCLEAR POWERS HE HAD VISITED. SUMMARY OF REACTION AMONG THREE NON-SUPERPOWERS TENDED TO BE QUOTE YES, IT WAS A GOOD IDEA BUT NOT/NOT NOW UNQUOTE. THEY DID NOT/NOT WANT WORLD ATTENTION TURNED TOWARD THEIR NUCLEAR ARSENALS BECAUSE BETWEEN THEM THEY ONLY HAD FIVE PERCENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHILE SUPERPOWERS HAD NINETY-FIVE. THEY ASKED WHY PUT HEAT ON US. PM SAID HIS RESPONSE TO THEM WAS THAT THEY HAD RESPONSIBILITIES AS NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES AND OBLIGATIONS AS

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*NPT is not
unconditional. There
is no bargain in its own merits. It should
make it conditional
as 13th world
would center
with focus
on basis
that
bargain
had been
broken
P.*

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BARGAIN UNDER WHICH THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES WOULD ADHERE TO NPT ON BASIS THAT NUCLEAR POWERS WOULD REDUCE NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS AND USE AT LEAST SOME OF THEIR SAVINGS FOR DEVELOPMENT. THIS IDEA HAD NOT/NOT APPEALED TO PMS OWN ADVISERS WHO THOUGHT IT WOULD WEAKEN NPT FURTHER BUT IN EVENT IT HAD HELD NO/NO INTEREST FOR THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES. THIS WHOLE MATTER WAS A WORRYING TREND AND OF REAL CONCERN TO HIM AND SHOULD PRESUMABLY BE ALSO FOR NUCLEAR POWERS. HE HAD NO/NO EASY ANSWER FOR IT BEYOND IDEA OF FIVE-POWER CONF.

8.PM NOTED THAT SECGEN HAD IN HIS FIRST ANNUAL REPORT MENTIONED IDEA OF HIGH-LEVEL MTG OF SC AND HAD MORE RECENTLY DISCUSSED NEGS BETWEEN TWO SUPERPOWERS. WHAT WAS HIS PRESENT THINKING. WAS THERE POSSIBLY A ROLE FOR MILITARY STAFF CTTEE--NOT/NOT SO MUCH TO GET INVOLVED. AS IT HAD BECOME MORIBUND, BUT BECAUSE OF ITS CHARTER BASED RECOGNITION OF RESPONSIBILITY OF FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS. THUS MTG OF MSC COULD BE A SIGNAL THEY WERE TAKING THEIR ROLE SERIOUSLY IN PEACEKEEPING AND INNATL SECURITY FIELDS.

9. SECGEN SAID HE FOULD PMS THOUGHTS VERY INTERESTING AND HAD BEEN FOLLOWING HIS INITIATIVE VERY CLOSELY. HE HAD MET WITH USA AND USSR TOP LEADERS LAST YEAR AND HAD STRESSED THE NEED FOR THEM TO INITIATE DIALOGUE TO RESOLVE NUCLEAR WEAPON RACE. BOTH SOUNDED INTERESTED AND HAD EXPRESSED GOODWILL BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO/NO RESULTS. INDEED THE RHETORIC SINCE THEN HAD MADE THINGS

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MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR DISARMAMENT AND PEACE. IT WAS NOT/NOT ENOUGH FOR THEM TO WISH HIM WELL. IF THREE NON-SUPERPOWERS WANTED SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN ARSENALS OF TWO SUPERPOWERS BEST PLACE TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR WAS AT NEGOTIATING TABLE. HE HAD INFORMED THEM THAT THEY WOULD NOT/NOT HAVE TO COUNT THEIR ARSENALS UNTIL START AGREEMENT HAD BEEN SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDED. UK AND FRENCH HAD BEEN TOLD THAT IN HIS RATIO PROPOSAL THERE WAS EVEN BUILT-IN ROOM FOR MODERNIZATION IN ORDER TO PROVIDE FOR QUOTE SOVEREIGN DEFENCE IN NUCLEAR WAY UNQUOTE. CONCEIVABLY THOSE THREE COULD COME TO TABLE WITHOUT DISCUSSING NUMBER BUT COULD FIRST START WITH OTHER ISSUES SUCH AS CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING. PM THEN SUGGESTED THAT AS THESE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS WERE ALSO THE FIVE MEMBERS OF THE SC, PERHAPS SOME WAY COULD BE FOUND FOR CERTAIN STEPS TO BE TAKEN AT THE UN, TO GET THE FIVE TOGETHER. PERHAPS THEY COULD MEET IN PRIVATE AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL.

7. PM THEN TURNED TO FIFTH POINT IE NON/NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY ASPECTS AND UNDERLINED HIS SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT 1985 NPT REVIEW CONF. AS HE HAD EXPERIENCED AT CWLTH CONF IN DELHI, MANY THIRD WORLD LEADERS WERE ARGUING THAT FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS HAD NOT/NOT LIVED UP TO THEIR SIDE OF THE NPT BARGAIN AND ASKING WHY THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES SHOULD ADHERE TO ONE-SIDED UNFAIR TREATY. PM RECOUNTED HOW AT DELHI HE HAD THROWN OUT NOTION OF A

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WORSE. NEGOTIATING IN PUBLIC WAS UNHELPFUL. NEGS IN HIS PERSPECTIVE SHOULD BE QUIET AND IN PRIVATE MTGS. HE HAD RECENTLY SENT PRIVATE LETS TO REAGAN AND ANDROPOV URGING THEM TO NEGOTIATE BUT HAD NO/NO REPLY AS YET. THE RESULT OF THE PRESENT SITU WAS, HE FEARED, A WEAKENING IN THE WEST BECAUSE OF THE PUBLIC RELATIONS ASPECT. SEC GEN SAID THE BASIC PROBLEM WAS A LACK OF TRUST BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS: HOW DID ONE GENERATE THIS TRUST? SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE. FRENCH AND BRITS HAD TO RECOGNIZE THAT ONE HAD TO HAVE PUBLICS ON BOARD. OF COURSE THE DISARMAMENT CAMPAIGN OF THE UN SHOULD CONTINUE BUT USA NEEDED TO HELP. ITS LANGUAGE HAD NOT/NOT ALWAYS BEEN HELPFUL (IE USA LANGUAGE HAD CONTRIBUTED TO WORSENING PUBLIC FEARS ON THIS MATTER). SEC GEN TOLD PM THAT A VISIT BY HIM TO USSR WAS QUOTE CRUCIAL UNQUOTE. PM WAS A DISTINGUISHED STATESMAN AND EVEN THOUGH A MEMBER OF NATO WAS KNOWN FOR HIS INDEPENDENT AND FAIR VIEWS. PM COULD HELP ENORMOUSLY AS CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION. HE HAD QUOTE ALL OUR MORAL SUPPORT UNQUOTE. HE NEEDED TO CLOSE THE CIRCLE BY VISITING MOSCO.

*de Cuellar
pro-west*

10. SEC GEN, TURNING TO ROLE FOR UN, TICKED OFF POSSIBLE FRAMEWORKS. MOST OBVIOUS WAS SECURITY COUNCIL (SC) AND HERE THE ISSUE WAS HOW TO FORGE A WORKING RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE PERM MEMBERS PARTICULARLY. THEY WERE RUNNING INTO THIS PROBLEM ACROSS THE BOARD INCLUDING FOR EXAMPLE ON LEBANON IN REGARD TO A PULLOUT OF THE ...7

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE. THE PROBLEM REMAINED. ONE NEEDED TO DEVELOP THIS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE USA AND THE USSR ABOVE ALL. IT HAD TO BE A PRIVATE RELATIONSHIP. SECGEN HAD APPEALED TO SHULTZ FEW DAYS AGO TO RAISE THIS MATTER WITH GROMYKO NEXT WEEK IN STKM. ONE NEEDED A RELATIONSHIP WHERE THE TWO SUPERPOWERS WOULD BE ABLE TO OVERLOOK THEIR OWN DIFFERENCES IN THE INTERESTS OF WORKING OUT BROADER SOLUTIONS IN THE SC CONTEXT. THE OTHER POSSIBILITY WAS USING THE MILITARY STAFF CTTEE AS MOOTED BY PM. BUT EXPERIENCE WITH MSC HAD QUOTE NOT/NOT BEEN VERY BRILLIANT UNQUOTE. SECGEN AND HIS COLLEAGUES WERE IN FACT QUITE NEGATIVE ON MSC AND SECGEN ADDED HE FEARED IT MIGHT UNDERMINE THE CONF ON DISARMAMENT IN GENEV. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY IN ADVANCE FOR FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS TO AGREE IT HAD A ROLE TO PLAY. FINALLY RE NPT, SECGEN SAID THIS WAS INDEED VERY IMPORTANT AREA AND THE NUCLEAR POWERS HAD TO SET AN EXAMPLE. AS LONG AS THIS EXAMPLE WAS MISSING OTHER STATES WERE UNLIKELY TO SIGN NPT.

11. MARTENSON (USG DISARMAMENT) EMPHASIZED FOR HIS PART THAT THEIR THINKING WAS INDEED VERY MUCH PARALLEL TO THAT OF CDNS. HE LISTED BASICS OF THEIR APPROACH. THEY FOLLOWED PHILOSOPHY OF NON/^①NON SUPERIORITY AND EQUITY IN^②DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL. EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND USSR WERE AFRAID OF THE PRESENT SITU; THEY WANTED AND WERE READY FOR A SOLUTION. BUT IT HAD TO BE ON A BALANCED BASIS. SECONDLY, HE FULLY AGREED THAT THE NPT WAS IN AN

NPT

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^{NPT} QUOTE EXTREMELY DANGEROUS SITUATION UNQUOTE SHOULD SUPERPOWERS NOT/NOT
GIVE ANY SIGN OF WILLINGNESS TO CONTAIN ARMS RACE. HE THOUGHT
PERHAPS A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN OR SOME SORT OF MORATORIUM FOR
ONE OR TWO YEARS MIGHT HELP, AS AN EXAMPLE. IF NOT/NOT, THERE WOULD
BE REGRESSION ON NPT. THIS POINT HAD TO BE BROUGHT HOME TO NUCLEAR
POWERS. NEXT, HE EMPHASIZED THE PRINCIPLE OF THE LEGITIMATE RIGHT
TO NATL SECURITY BUT STRESSED THAT THIS SHOULD BE ON A LOWER LEVEL.
ANOTHER PRINCIPLE ^{general conclusion} WAS THAT THERE WOULD BE NO/NO WINNER FROM A
NUCLEAR WAR---A POINT WHICH WAS NOW WIDELY ACCEPTED. AGAIN, HE
THOUGHT THAT THE HIGH COST OF ARMAMENT (MORE THAN MILLION DOLLARS
A MINUTE WAS BEING SPENT) MEANT THAT FOR ECONOMIC AND ANTI-
INFLATION REASONS THE POLITICAL PRESSURES WERE GROWING TO DEAL
WITH ARMAMENTS. RE PUBLIC OPINION, THE WORLD DISARMAMENT CAMPAIGN
OF THE UN HAD A CERTAIN ROLE TO PLAY IN DEVELOPING MORE INFORMED
PUBLIC. IT SHOULD COVER ALL COUNTRIES (MARTENSON MENTIONED THEIR
ACTIVITIES PLANNED IN USSR) AND IT SHOULD BE ON A REALISTIC
BASIS. AS FOR MILITARY STAFF CTTEE, MARTENSON POINTED OUT THAT
UNDER ART 26 OF THE CHARTER MSC COULD ONLY ACT ON AN INITIATIVE
FROM THE SC, ON WHICH IT WAS DEPENDENT. *only in
word*

12.PM INTERJECTED THAT IN REGARD TO MSC HE REALIZED WE WOULD
NOT/NOT GET MUCH FROM RETIRED GENERALS. HIS PROPOSAL RATHER WAS
A WAY OF MAKING CLEAR THAT THE FIVE POWERS HAD OBLIGATION FOR
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. THE QUESTION WAS HOW TO REVIVE THAT

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OBLIGATION.PERHAPS THE WAY WAS TO HOLD DISCREET MTGS WITH THE
AMBS OF THE FIVE, FOR EXAMPLE REGARDING THE RISK OF HORIZONTAL
PROLIFERATION.IF NOT/NOT, THERE WILL BE MORE EXAMPLES LIKE
ISREAL BLASTING THE IRAQI REACTOR AND ISRAEL CAN NOT/NOT BE
BLAMED FOR SAYING THAT IS THE ONLY WAY IT HAS TO DEAL WITH THIS
SITUATION.PM SAID HE INTENDED TO PROCEED WITH HIS INITIATIVE
BUT ASKED IF THERE WERE WAYS TO COOPERATE TOGETHER?

13.SECGEN,REVERTING TO PMS SUGGESTION RE FIVE AMBS,AGREED--WE
COULD INITIATE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS OF THE KIND YOU SUGGEST.WE
NEED TO RAISE DISARMAMENT ABOVE IDEOLOGY.WE HAVE TO DO SOMETHING.

14.URGUHART(USG POL)--THE BASIC PROBLEM IS TO GET BACK TO THE
IDEA OF COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY ORIGINALLY BEHIND THE CHARTER
RELATING TO THREATS TO PEACE AND SECURITY,AND APPLY IT TO
DISARMAMENT.THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS DO HAVE A COMMON
RESPONSIBILITY.LINK HAS TO BE MADE BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND THREATS
TO PEACE.

15.SECGEN--WE COULD WORK ON THIS.

16.URGUFART--THE MILITARY(MIL)STAFF CTTEE WOULD ONLY BE REALISTIC
IF THEY(FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS)WANTED AN UMBRELLA BUT THIS REQUIRES
POLITICAL WILL FROM THEM.

17.PM--OUR RHETORIC IS IMPROVING,AT LEAST FROM THE WESTERN SIDE.
IS IT POSSIBLE TO HOPE WE COULD GET BETTER WORDS OUT OF THE USSR
OR IS USSR WAITING UNTIL AFTER USA ELECTION?WHO IS GOING TO GET

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SOVIETS TO LOWER THEIR DECIBELS IF THEY DO NOT/NOT SEE IT IN THEIR INTERESTS? WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES HAVE LESS INFLUENCE ON MOSCO THAN WE HAVE ON WSHDC. PERHAPS THIS REQUIRES CHANGE IN POLICY. EVERYONE AT MOMENT IS BEING MACHO. NOW THAT NATO HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT IT CAN STICK TOGETHER ON DEPLOYMENT AND HAS POLITICAL WILL, ONE CAN START TO CONSIDER SOMETHING LIKE A FREEZE OR MORATORIUM. IT IS TOO SOON TO TAKE THIS TO NATO BUT AT SOME POINT SHOULD WE NOT/NOT MAKE GESTURE?

18. SEC GEN--USSR IS NOT/NOT INTERESTED IN HELPING REAGAN. HIS COLLEAGUES AGREED AND SAID THAT ANY INITIATIVE TO BREAK ICE WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM THE USA, EG THROUGH ONE OF THE ENVISAGED REAGAN STATEMENTS. SEC GEN SAID MORE THAN WORDS WERE NEEDED TO IMPROVE ATMOSPHERE, TRUST WAS REQUIRED. HE REFERRED TO APPROACHES TO HIM FROM ROMANIANS WHO HAD OFFERED THEMSELVES AS BROKERS, AND ASKED WHETHER LDN SIDE WAS AWARE AND INVOLVED IN THEIR EXERCISE.

19. PM SAID ROMANIANS HAD SUGGESTED THAT THEY MEET WITH HIM. QUOTE PROPOSAL IS THERE UNQUOTE. THE ROMANIAN/GREEK IDEA WAS PREMATURE. NATO REALLY HAD TO BEGIN TO DEPLOY. PERHAPS LATER ON IT MIGHT SUIT. MAYBE NOT/NOT EVEN TOO MANY MONTHS FROM NOW. INF DEBATE WAS A POLITICAL ONE, NOT/NOT A MILITARY MATTER. IT DID NOT/NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF USA/EUROPE DECOUPLING. IT WAS NOT/NOT NEEDED FOR REAL DETERRENCE. UNFORTUNATELY IT WAS LIKE POKER PLAYER WHO HAD UPPED ANTE AND NOW WAS CAUGHT IN THE GAME. IF THEY WERE DOING IT AGAIN

...11

PAGE ELEVEN ID020035 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

SOVIETS WOULD NOT/NOT REPLACE SS-4 AND SS-5 BY SS-20. FOR POLITICAL REASONS THEY HAD TO GO FORWARD AND HAD TO BREAK OFF NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS PROBLEM OF FACE. THUS THE ROMANIAN INITIATIVE WAS TOO SOON BUT IT WAS GOOD SOMEONE IN WARSAW PACT WAS DOING THIS.

20. SEC GEN SAID PM HAD SOME SUPPORT FROM UK, FRANCE AND EVEN CHINA BUT HE WONDERED QUOTE WHO DOES CEAUSescu REPRESENT? UNQUOTE. MAYBE CEAUSescu COULD BE CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATIONS BUT HE HAD SOME DOUBTS ABOUT THIS.

*himself
not credible
with Struck*

21. PM--STKHM IS A STEP IN RIGHT DIRECTION--THE POLITICAL LEADERS ARE STARTING TO TALK TO EACH OTHER. WE SHOULD BE PLAYING UP THE POLITICAL ASPECTS TO ENCOURAGE LEADERS TO ACTUALLY TALK SUBSTANCE AND REAL ACTION. PM SAID HE HAD EVEN WONDERED WHETHER THERE WERE SOME ADVANTAGES IN HOLDING THE STKHM MTG AT THE SUMMIT LEVEL. HE HAD HAD A SURPRISINGLY POSITIVE REACTION FROM PM THATCHER AND AT LEAST A NON/NON DISMISSAL FROM REAGAN. THIS IDEA WAS OF COURSE VERY CONF(DQUOTE DONT/DONT TAKE NOTES UNQUOTE)THE IDEA WOULD BE TO GIVE A POLITICAL IMPULSE THROUGH SUCH A MTG AT THE SUMMIT LEVEL; IT WOULD BE AT THE BEGINNING RATHER THAN THE END, AS HAPPENED WITH CSCE FINAL ACT IN HELSINKI IN 1975. IT WAS PARADOX THAT DETENTE WAS COMING TO END JUST WHEN THAT DOCUMENT WAS BEING SIGNED. HE THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY SUPERPOWER SUMMIT COULD BE ARRANGED BEFORE USA ELECTIONS BUT MTG OF TWO IN STKHM IN CONTEXT OF GATHERING OF 35 MIGHT BE MORE MANAGEABLE. BUT WOULD YOU SEC GEN NOT/NOT HAVE MORE ...12

*- Bulgarians?
- guys?*

PAGE TWELVE IDDZ0035 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

LIKELIHOOD OF GETTING THE FIVE TO MEET IN SOME FASHION UNDER
YOUR AUSPICES?

22. MARTENSON (AT SECGENS REQUEST) COMMENTED THAT BASICALLY THE IDEA
WAS GOOD. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET THE FIVE TO TALK. PERHAPS WE CAN
FEEL IT OUT AND GET SOMETHING GOING? IT WOULD PROBABLY BE GOOD IF
IT WERE NOT NOT TOO VISIBLE. THE CONSENT OF THE FIVE WOULD OF
COURSE BE REQUIRED. ONE COULD MAKE A BETTER ASSESSMENT AFTER THE
BEGINNING OF THE STKHM MTG. BUT THE IDEA WAS SOUND AND SHOULD BE
PURSUED. THE DEBATE IN THE FIRST CTTEE THIS YEAR HAD BEEN LOW-
KEY DESPITE THE KAL EPISODE. THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS AND PARTICULARLY
TWO SUPERPOWERS HAD INDEED A COMMON CONCERN OVER THE NPT:
THE PREPCOM WAS COMING UP AS EARLY AS JUN. CONCERN OVER THE NPT
PERHAPS COULD BE USED AS A QUOTE STEPPING STONE UNQUOTE FOR
DIALOGUE BETWEEN THEM.

23. SECGEN THEN STATED HE WAS QUITE PREPARED TO ENTER INTO SUCH
DISCUSSIONS WITH FIVE AMBS ON INDIVIDUAL BASIS IN CONTEXT OF NPT
PROBLEM. HE COULD WARN THEM OF THE ISSUE AND DANGER OF HORIZONTAL
PROLIFERATION AND WOULD PROPOSE TO DO THIS AS SOON AS HE RETURNED
FROM HIS AFRICAN TRIP (IN FEB).

24. CORDOVEZ -- PRESSURE WAS NEEDED ALSO FROM THIRD WORLD.

*particularly m
Soviets*

25. PM -- I TRIED THIS AT THE CWLTH. I HAD TO FIGHT TO GET INCLUDED
IN THE COMMUNIQUE ANY NOTION OF DANGER OF HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION.
GANDHI WOULD NOT/NOT AGREE AND ARGUED VERTICAL PROLIFERATION WAS

...13

*Indian
Pak
Brazil
anti NPT
point*

PAGE THIRTEEN IDDZ0035 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

KEY. NO/NO ONE BOMB IN THIRD WORLD WOULD KILL US ALL

26. CORDOVEZ--BUT THE PROBLEM IS IMPORTANT AND WE SHOULD TRY.

THERE WAS A CHANGE OF ATTITUDE AMONG THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES TOWARD
ACQUIRING MORE ARMAMENTS WHICH NEEDED TO BE COUNTERED. THERE WAS
ALSO THE PROBLEM OF THE DEVELOPED COUNTRY ARMS SALESMEN. THIRD
WORLD LEADERS UNFORTUNATELY DO NOT/NOT SEE A REDUCTION IN ARMS
AS PROBABLY LEADING TO MORE AID.

27. PM REITERATED HIS EFFORTS IN DELHI ON THIS POINT TO STRIKE
QUOTE BARGAIN UNQUOTE BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT--

WITHOUT SUCCESS. IF YOU CONVENED THE FIVE AMBS--WHETHER SEPARATELY
OR TOGETHER--THEY COULD BE MADE AWARE OF THE STRENGTH OF VIEW
IN THIRD WORLD RE NPT. YOU WILL OF COURSE DO WHAT YOU THINK BEST
AND PRESUMABLY IT WOULD BE IN SECRET. YOU DO NOT/NOT EVEN HAVE
TO INFORM ME YOU ARE DOING IT. AT SAME TIME I WILL CONTINUE TO
PUT PUBLIC PRESSURE ON FOR SOME ACTION.

28. SEC GEN SAID HIS IDEA WAS TO SOUND THEM OUT WITH VIEW TO MEETING
UNDER UMBRELLA OF SECURITY COUNCIL. HE WOULD TAKE INITIATIVE IN
FEB. AS FINAL POINT HE NOTED THAT HE WOULD BE IN STKHM FEB 17.

29. MEETING ENDED VERY CORDIALLY AT 1730.

30. SEC GEN HAD WITH HIM URQUHART (USG FOR SPECIAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS),
CORDOVEZ (USG FOR SPECIAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS), MARTENSON (USG FOR
DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS), VIRENDRA DAYAL (CHEF DE CABINET TO SEC GEN),
AND NOTETAKER. CDN SIDE INCLUDED PM, AMB PELLETIER, AXWORTHY (PMO),
FOWLER (PCO), SHENSTONE (IFB), LEE (PRMNY) AND SMITH (IDDZ). UNQUOTE.

CCC/064 170132Z IDDZ0035

*Oh yes it could - bec
it could be the trigger
to kill us all*

*NPT in
Baron*

11 conditional

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
À

The Under Secretary of State for External
Affairs, OTTAWA (UGP)

NO.

DATE
January 16, 1983

QUANTITY
QUANTITÉ

DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION

REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE

1

Article in the Daily News Tribune on December 29, 1983 about "Civility" --
the PM's peace initiative.

DISTR: SCS IDA CGL TDD IDR DMF MING URD URR IDD (IDDZ) PCO/OTT (Fowler)
INFO: WSHDC SFRAN CNGNY

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

RETURN TO / RETOURNER À


Roz Wolfe
Public Affairs Officer
Consulate General
LOS ANGELES

DATE

SIGNATURE

EXT 34/BIL. (REV. 12/70)
7530-21-029-4107

FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR - SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE



Civility needed

2653

Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau has been engaged in a globe-trotting mission trying to get world powers together on arms reduction talks.

The effort is big news in Canada, but it hasn't produced as much reaction elsewhere, particularly in the United States, as Canadians would like.

It also has led to some discourteousness on both sides of the border. A few weeks ago Trudeau referred to a "Pentagon pip-

squeak" who had questioned the prime minister's credibility in Europe.

After Trudeau's recent visit to the White House to promote his ideas, a Canadian news agency quoted U.S. Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger as saying Trudeau's efforts were "akin to pot-induced behavior by an erratic leftist."

A dose of civility would seem to be in order on each side of the border. The cause of peace will not be advanced by name calling.

MR BELVOIR
MR SMITH
MR CANNON

MF

CANADIAN WORLD FEDERALIST

Page 3

P.M. Meets Peace Groups

REPORT ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S
LUNCHEON, MONDAY, JANUARY 16, 1984

This consultation was apparently the third one in a series. On this occasion, about 16 people, some of them officials but most of them representatives of peace groups or strategic studies centres (i.e. non-governmental), met at 10 a.m. in the Langevin Building in Ottawa with Geoffrey Pearson, and at noon went to a luncheon with Prime Minister Trudeau at his official residence at 24 Sussex Drive.

Among the peace groups represented were: Project Ploughshares, Operation Dismantle, World Federalists of Canada, Voice of Women, Student Pugwash Movement, Physicians for Social Responsibility, U.N. Association. At a previous luncheon, Science for Peace and Candis representatives were present.

The 10 a.m. consultation was concerned with the arms control agency or institute (as yet unnamed) proposed in the government's Speech from the Throne at the opening of Parliament a few weeks ago. The questions were: what structure should the agency have (how close to government, how funded, what kind of board, to whom would it report), what functions would it have (research, information dissemination, clearing-house for non-governmental ideas, support of peace studies at universities), what should be the name (include "disarmament" with "arms control"? include "national defence"? "security"? "security alternatives"? "peace"? - Canadian, national, international? - Institute? Agency? Council? Centre?), Finally, what relations should it have with existing institutes and centres - in the Depts. of External Affairs, of National Defence; at universities; and private institutions? (Will it be competitive or helpful to them?)

I have already participated in a previous consultation on this subject with Geoffrey Pearson, held in Toronto at the Canadian Institute of International Affairs on January 11. At that time about 15 people were present, from the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Strategic Studies Program at York University, Science for Peace, Physicians for Social Responsibility.

Some groups expressed concern that the proposed new agency would take over the functions they have been performing and would pre-empt their funds; they were therefore opposed to the formation of the new agency. Some others, myself included, felt that the new agency was meant to perpetuate Trudeau's peace initiative beyond the time when Trudeau and perhaps the Liberal government may no longer be in charge, and thus to institutionalize Canada's official thrust toward peace; we therefore favoured strongly the founding of the new agency, and recommended specific structures, functions, names, and form of relations with our own groups.

My own expressed preference was for a governmental agency which would do some in-house research and also give research grants and contracts to other qualified institutes; the board should consist of both governmental and non-governmental members; functions should include research (mainly on psychological preconditions for tension reduction, since the hardware aspects of disarmament are already well dealt with by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; and also on alternative international security systems, e.g. world government and nonviolence), support of peace studies programs at universities (now starting at University of Toronto, McMaster, and Brock, besides the well-established one at Conrad Grebel College of the University of Waterloo), information dissemination to NGO groups, and information channelling from NGOs to government. One proposed name was International Security Alternatives Council (ISAC).

At the Prime Minister's luncheon, the consultation was on the content of the Peace Initiative itself. What further particular proposals and policies should be added to those which Trudeau

had advocated already? We took our turn around the table to speak for about 5 minutes each, and Trudeau commented after the first half had spoken and again after the second half.

Many of us started by congratulating him on launching the Peace Initiative, and then went on to say how it could be broadened or supplemented. Some people expressed opposition to cruise missile testing. (G. Pearson commented privately afterwards "You have lost that one. Go on from there.") Jim Stark of Operation Dismantle mentioned that Costa Rica will propose the World Disarmament Referendum at the United Nations next September, and he invited Canada to cosponsor or at least promise to carry out the vote with the next federal election. Trudeau was still skeptical that the O.D.'s simple question is very meaningful - everyone would vote for it, and so what? (This has been the government's attitude all along.) Among other proposals were: Middlepower initiatives, especially the Peacemakers Association of Nations; Canada Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, International Satellite Monitoring Agency, Inspection by the People (for disarmament verification), a Big-Power Non-Intervention Treaty (not to intervene even if asked by government).

Trudeau felt that Canada is already a foremost world peace-keeper; that what matters is what the superpowers and other nuclear-weapons-states can be induced to do; and that an important agreement to press for is conventional arms reductions in Europe, because balance at lower levels would then be possible, and NATO could safely give up its nuclear first-use policy, required all this time because of NATO conventional weapons inferiority in Europe.

I feel that the government is open to suggestions and listening; how many will be implemented remains to be seen, though we should not expect too much too soon. It is good that they are consulting with us early in the process, before attitudes have hardened and decisions have been finalized. Too often in the past we could only react to whatever government policy had already been formulated, and wish we'd had earlier input. This input has now been provided; we shall see how effective it has been. Most of us did not have much time to prepare. In my case, for example, I received the invitation by phone call on Friday for the meeting the following Monday. For the Jan. 11 consultation, too, warning time was only 3 days.

Perhaps we may hope that, as the new agency is formed, the government's contact with the peace NGOs could become more regular and routine. We would learn what proposals have a chance and not be too wild in our dreams (at least in public), while the government would get used to thinking in terms of long-range goals or worldwide peace and security, and not just react to the crises of today.

Hanna Newcombe

Canadian fishery faces choppy seas in Europe

By Paulette Roberge

LONDON

THE WORLD'S number one exporter of seafood cannot afford to be complacent: in its trade with Europe, the Canadian fishing industry is still in choppy waters, whipped up by exchange rates, quality expectations and a campaign to boycott its products.

The boycott is being urged nationwide in Britain, where it is linked to the continuing European push to end seal hunting. The International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW), a prime mover in the movement that led the European Community (EC) nations to ban imports of baby seal pelts last October, is flooding nearly five million British homes with pleas to stop buying Canadian fish products.

IFAW claims these come from the same fishermen who kill seals, and it is asking householders to pressure major supermarket chains to discontinue stocking the products.

So far, only the Tesco chain has responded with a request to its supplier to source elsewhere, while the other chains have taken the line that they won't get involved in a moral issue.

Officials at the Canadian High Commission here are telling importers and supermarket executives that no baby seals were hunted last year or this year, and that IFAW's claims are inaccurate. Generally, however, the Canadians are playing it low key, hoping to avoid publicizing the issue even more.

Accord

The boycott campaign comes just when Canada and the EC have entered into a second long-term fisheries accord. It's still too early to assess the agreement's effectiveness, although Canadian officials are optimistic that it will improve the fishing industry's prospects in Europe. In fact, the agreement replaces an earlier deal, which sank after two years of often acrimonious fighting over its terms and provisions.

The new agreement spells out the tonnage of five popular fish products Canada can sell to the EC each year for the next four years at specific and favorable tariff duties. In return for guaranteed access to EC markets at low tariffs, the Canadian government grants licenses to EC member-states to fish within Canada's 200-mile offshore zone.

This agreement replaces an earlier deal, launched in late 1981, which sank after two years of often acrimonious fighting over its terms and provisions. Early on, it became

apparent that a number of conditions had not been addressed in explicit enough terms.

It is hoped that the problems have now been thrashed out, and that there won't be a return to the situation where low fish sales led Ottawa to delay granting of fishing licenses. "We're all very optimistic that it will work because both sides understand each other better," says Robin Higham, fisheries counsellor at the Canadian mission to the EC in Brussels.

In addition, the EC has recently formulated its own common fisheries policy, and this has at least helped clarify the situation. It sets out fish quotas for each country, and assigns a percentage of access to Canadian waters for each member state. West Germany and France have the biggest shares, with Italy in third place because of its requirements for squid.

However, the Canada-EC agreement only guarantees access to the market, not sales. The individual countries are under no obligation to buy at the tariffs set out. Although importers will be anxious to exploit the tariffs, they will also be concerned with price and quality. It is in these areas that Canada, which exports about \$300 million in fish products to the EC annually, still faces serious challenges.

Says David Tobin of the Department of Fisheries & Oceans in Ottawa: "The currency exchange problem makes it difficult to export and compete with the Europeans on the European market." Prices have had to be reduced to compensate for the unfavorable links between the Canadian and European currencies.

Another serious hurdle for the industry is the quality of its product, which importers argue compares unfavorably with that of Scandinavian competitors.

Dirk Alberts, fisheries marketing officer at the Canadian mission in Hamburg, says the recurring complaint from importers is that Canadians need to make huge improvements to satisfy the standards of European consumers. Poor quality is perceived to result from the handling and the processing of the catch.

The issue of quality was discussed at length in the Kirby Task Force on Atlantic Fisheries in late 1982. It concluded that quality is necessary to maintain economic vitality in the industry, and recommended that bleeding, gutting and icing the fish at sea should be made mandatory.

"Although Canadian processors would like to serve the higher-priced and quality-sensitive markets, the lower average quality of fish landed at the dock and the inadequate attention to quality in the processing plants holds them back," the task force concluded.

Japan's trade shift has implications here

MAJOR STRUCTURAL changes in the Japanese economy after two oil price hikes in the 1970s, together with forecasts of a lower rate of economic growth, will fracture the complementary relationship between Japanese economic and Australian resource development.

That's the main conclusion of a recent government report, *Energy Induced Changes to the Structure of Trade*, showing how Japanese import demand is shifting away from traditional commodities, including energy raw materials. Canada's economic relations with Japan echo Australia's, and the report has interesting implications for our own situation.

Since the Japanese market will no longer provide a basis for further expansion of capacity in Australian mineral and agricultural industries, export activity is about to enter a third phase. The first phase, which lasted until the mid 1970s and was based on raw materials exports, coincided with the rapid expansion of heavy industry in Japan. The second phase featured a rapid increase in Japanese demand for energy products, especially coal.

In that first phase, Japan's share of Australian exports grew to more than 30%, compared with about 12% at the start of the 1960s. However, it's dropped to about 27% in the past two years. Australia's share of the Japanese import market fell to about 5% from 8% in 1970.

Just how the profile of Australia's export trade with Japan will develop now isn't clear. The report does not suggest which particular products can take advantage of new opportunities in Japan, but does talk of strong demand expected for imports of intermediate goods and nondurables such as leisure-related goods and services.

Even though traditional exports will wane, the report argues that there are strong grounds for focusing Australian exports more sharply toward the Japanese market rather than shifting to alternatives such as the U.S.

Japan is a market where consumption patterns are still forming, so there is the potential to supply emerging requirements. Moreover, growth of personal incomes is substantial, and equality of income distribution ensures the capacity of personal consumption will increase, too. There will be new opportunities for investment, and technology will be created as adjustments to Japan's industrial structure continues.

Though it was not part of the report's coverage, other countries in Asia are cited as possible outlets for the traditional commodities Australia used to supply to Japan. South Korea (Australia's fourth largest export market) and China (sixth largest) are two of them. However, since Australia enjoys a big trade surplus with both countries, it may have to offer greater concessions on imports to win larger access to their markets.

— Barry Critchley, Sydney

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO The Canadian Embassy
À Moscow, USSR

NO. IDDZ-0038 DATE Jan.16,84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
	<p>REF OURTEL IDDZ0009</p> <p>ORIGINAL LETTER FROM PM TRUDEAU TO PRESIDENT YURI ANDROPOV FOR TRANSMISSION.</p> <p>John McNee Task Force Working Group</p>	
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION	<p>26 janvier/84</p> <p>DATE</p>	<p>RETURN TO / RETOURNER À</p> <p>IDDZ/OTTAWA</p> <p>SIGNATURE</p>



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

REFERRED BY THE OFFICE
OF THE SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS, MINISTER'S
REGISTRY - LETTERS

TRANSMIS PAR LE CABINET
DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT
AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES
DOSSIERS DU MINISTÈRE -
LETTRES

5-2723

To/À
AU

1DDZ

☒ FOR INFORMATION AND ANY NECESSARY ACTION
POUR EXAMEN ET SUITE À DONNER, S'IL Y A LIEU

☐ THIS LETTER HAS BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED
ON A ACCUSÉ RÉCEPTION DE CETTE LETTRE

☐ BY TELEPHONE/PAR TÉLÉPHONE

☐ BY LETTER (Copy attached)/PAR LETTRE (Copie-jointe)

REMARKS/REMARQUES

Signature

84-02-08

Date 00051

January 16, 1984

Dear Mr. Trudeau:

We, the undersigned members and adherents of Newtonbrook United Church in Willowdale, Ontario, wish to express our support and extend our thanks for your ongoing peace initiative. We pray that other world leaders will join with you in your search for peace.

We encourage you to continue your efforts and ask that our government speak, act and vote in a manner consistent with the Canadian people's wish for world peace.

We join with our church leaders in urging the Canadian government to become an independent voice of clarity and restraint in the present climate of increasing world tension.

As members of a community of faith, concerned with human life in the global village and stewardship of the earth's resources, we pray for the success of your initiative.

We, too, are anxious to do our part and would appreciate any suggestions you may have as to what we might do to further the cause of peace.

Jan Miller

Gary Porter

Don Gunning

Angus Holm

Peggy Jornton

Marquise Taylor

B Thompson

Robert McElhinney

Edlyn Hare

Barbara Trivett

Betty Appleby

22 BOWERBANK, Willowdale
4244 28

64 Bowerbank Dr Willowdale
4244 129

182 Sadding Ave Willowdale

36 Clayhall Cres. North York

600 Yonge St Willowdale
4244 184

11 Robson Pl Willowdale

177 Patricia Ave. Willowdale

8 Michigan Dr. Willowdale

55 Lorne Ave Willowdale

257 Parkview Ave Willowdale

469 Cummer Ave. Willowdale

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Sandra McKee
Heather Oswald
Pauline & Bill Phillips
Hazel Griffiths
Velma McGregor
Myra Paul
Josephine Cowie
Anja Gallus
Pauline Graham
Jean Wright
Donna Moron

Burke St Wdale - M4M 1V1
16 Lloydminster Cres. Willowdale.
M2M 2R8
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Thornhill Ont. L3T 4P3
489 Cummer Ave, Willowdale, Ont.
69 Beaverbrook St
34 Rosborough Ave.
4918 Bathurst St #510
Willowdale, Ont.
29 Rosasco Drive
Toronto, M4A 1R2
1 Spence St, Thornhill
69 Lloydminster
Willowdale

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Hazel Weston 23 Revere Dr. Willowdale

Shelley Wright

Hazel Kitto

38 Revere Dr, Willowdale

Lesley Collins 28 Weyburn Rd. Willowdale

Lesley Collins

Jean MacLeod 59 Bowerbank Dr. Willowdale

Peter Holm

Carol Marilyn Blum 195 Commercial Dr. Willowdale

Helen R. Cox

Edward L. Scott

Keith Sakaguchi

Eleanor & Joe Wilson

Susan Bennett

Lois & Bill Henning

James Brown

Shirley Joy

Cindy Benson

John J. May

R. L. McMillan

D. H. Beattie

Betty Thompson

Craig Macleod

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Karol McElhinney

Mary Hume

Thomas Chapman

Drew Miller

Elvira Marshall

Dorothy W. Bonfield

Ellen Lowcock

Margaret Milne

Sharon

Elizabeth Jones

Sheila Schutt

Marilyn Wilson

David & Eileen Frainger

Paul Anderson

Barbara Ayres

AD C

Thelma Anderson

Carol Scott

Kelly Payne

Kim Vrensen

Anne Burch

Jim Graham

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<u>Heather Burch</u>	<u>Ron Jewett</u>
<u>Pamela Uensen</u>	<u>Christine Jewett</u>
<u>Luth M. Geo</u>	<u>Eyle Miller</u>
<u>Alan E Thompson</u>	<u>Arthur L. Miller</u>
<u>John E. Br</u>	
<u>Wendy Burch</u>	
<u>Joanna M. Elhinney</u>	
<u>CAS Casey Payne</u>	
<u></u>	
<u>Effie M. Smith</u>	
<u>Bertha E. Cole</u>	

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W. Eric Nelson

Paul Wesley

Muriel & Bill Tupling

Christina & James

Ken Taylor

Pat Taylor

Helen Tonkin

Barbara Fawcett

Catherine Fawcett

FEB 6 1984
FEV



IAN S MILLER
22 BOWERBANK DR
WILLOWDALE ONT
M2M 1Z8

ONTARIO FAST

I II 1984

NO 3 SHIFT
MIP 414

How Allan J. MacEACHEN...
Minister of State for External Affairs
House of Commons
Ottawa.

CANADA
POSTAGE PAID
POST PAYÉ



16-0187

Reçu in TRAN - Reçu par TRAN		REQUEST FOR TRANSLATION	DEMANDE DE TRADUCTION	1. CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
2. From (Work-Unit) - De (Unité de travail) IDDZ (Task Force on PM INITIATIVE)		3. Address - Adresse L.B. PEARSON C-5		
4. Authorizing Officer - Agent responsable Dr. K. Calder		5. Title or rank - Titre ou rang Adviser fm DND		
6. Tel. No. - N° de tél. 995-5912		7. Signature <i>[Signature]</i>		

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT TO BE TRANSLATED - DESCRIPTION DU DOCUMENT À TRADUIRE

8. Title or Subject - Titre ou sujet FIVE POWER CONFERENCE		9. Number of pages - Nbre de pages -4-	
10. Type - Nature <input type="checkbox"/> report rapport <input type="checkbox"/> publication <input type="checkbox"/> directive <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> work instrument instrument de travail <input type="checkbox"/> correspondence correspondance <input type="checkbox"/> other autre		11. Destination - Diffusion <input type="checkbox"/> Outside the Public Service, and/or À l'extérieur de la fonction publique, et/ou <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Within the Public Service À l'intérieur de la fonction publique	
12. Source Language - Langue de départ English		13. Target Language - Langue d'arrivée French	
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16. Date submitted Date d'envoi Y-A M D-J 198 4 0 1 1 6		17. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Call for pick-up Appeler pour porteur		18. <input type="checkbox"/> Return to point of origin (Box 3) Retourner à l'expéditeur (Case 3)	
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25. Observations or special requests - Observations ou demandes spéciales					

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8. **Box 23.** Consult the Annex to Memorandum RRE 14 of March 1, 1983 which explains the working of the priority system that took effect on 1983:04:01.

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8. **Case 23.** On trouvera à l'Annexe de la note RRE 14 du 1^{er} mars 1983 des explications sur le mécanisme des priorités qui prend effet le 19 83-04-01.



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K. Calder/sc

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SIG *G.J. Smith*
G.J. Smith

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MEASURE II

I Proposal

An Agreement that States must Demonstrate and Ensure the Verifiability of New Strategic Weapons Systems.

II Background/Rationale

1. A central concern of arms control negotiations has always been the verifiability of provisions in the resulting agreements. Such verification is deemed necessary in order to ensure compliance, thereby enhancing mutual confidence, and preventing clandestine measures intended to circumvent treaty provisions.
2. Hitherto, verification means have resided primarily in so-called National Technical Means (NTMs). These include satellites, reconnaissance aircraft, radar facilities, etc. It has generally been felt that the types of technologies and the manner in which they have been restricted by past arms control agreements have been such as to allow for adequate verification utilizing NTMs. This is reflected in the absence of the requirement for on-site verification provisions in past strategic arms control agreements, and the provisions contained therein which oblige the participants to refrain from measures designed to interfere with the operation of NTMs.
3. Verification, however, is likely to become increasingly difficult as new strategic technologies are developed and deployed. Weapons developed without adequate attention to verifiability may make arms control negotiations increasingly difficult, may increase distrust as to treaty adherence, and may thereby act to decrease overall deterrence stability.
4. There are essentially two approaches to dealing with this problem. The first, on-site verification, has become increasingly relevant to ongoing arms control negotiations and the technologies they seek to limit. Such measures may, however, be inadequate, or difficult to

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negotiate to the mutual satisfaction of the parties concerned. Therefore, the second approach to verification, that secured through National Technical Means, may therefore require strengthening. Were measures agreed to and undertaken to ensure the verifiability of weapons to be deployed, through National Technical Means, the requirement for on-site or co-operative verification may be somewhat alleviated.

5. In this connection, it may be desirable to alter existing provisions concerning verification by National Technical Means. Thus far, it has simply been required that there be non-interference in the operation of NTMS, together with provisions designed to preclude concealment measures which are intended to impede verification by NTMS. Enhanced verifiability by NTMS may be secured if the party deploying a given weapon system is required to demonstrate that the system is indeed verifiable by NTMS. If the deploying party is unwilling or unable to do so to the satisfaction of others, the deploying party would be required to suggest other verification provisions which would ensure verifiability. Were these acceptable to the non-deploying party, such other verification provisions as agreed to would immediately become reciprocal for both parties in terms of similar weapons systems.
6. The net effect of such provisions would be such as to ensure that strategic weapons systems are designed and deployed so as to be verifiable by NTMs, or by NTMs and a combination of other verification techniques.

III Evaluation

(a) Stability

As explained earlier⁴, the enhancement of confidence in the adherence of the parties to arms control agreements is highly stabilizing. Verifiability is necessary for such mutual confidence. Given the potential development of new strategic weapons technologies which are difficult to verify by NTMs, the effect of this

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proposal would be such as to increase the incentives to design weapons systems which were verifiable by NTMS. Were systems designed which were not verifiable by NTMS, there would be a requirement to agree to additional reciprocal on-site or co-operative measures. This would enhance deterrence stability through encouraging the verifiability of weapons systems, particularly of those new systems which were allowed by an arms control agreement, but whose characteristics would be such as to hamper verification.

(b) Negotiability

Although parties to arms control negotiations have displayed varying degrees of concern as to the question and methods of verification, all states share a general interest in maintaining adequate verification capabilities. This commonality of interest is likely to increase as new technologies are developed which would greatly impede the verification task. Given the reciprocal nature of this proposal, the parties to arms control negotiations should regard this measure as roughly equal in its effects.

V Details of Proposal

The precise nature and wording of the proposal should be left up to the parties concerned. Discussions as to verifiability and verification mechanisms should take place in a verification body which would serve as an adjunct to the Standing Consultative Commission created by the SALT I and SALT II agreements.



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SIG

G.J. Smith

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MEASURE III

I Proposal:

An Agreement to Restrict the Mobility of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).

II Background/Rationale

1. At the centre of a stable deterrence system is the maintenance by both sides of a secure capacity for retaliation. If both sides maintain such a capability, neither will attack first, out of fear that such action could trigger a devastating response. On the other hand, a capability to engage in a disarming first strike against the nuclear forces of one's opponent would be destabilizing. Such a capability could generate fears of attack in a crisis, perhaps inducing the opponent to strike first in order to avoid being disarmed. Pressures to develop an equivalent capability could be created; the prospects for meaningful arms control would be seriously eroded. The confidence of states in their ability to retaliate, and therefore to deter, would be seriously eroded and the stability of the deterrence system as a whole would suffer.
2. In recent years concern has developed that such instabilities may be developing in the strategic balance. Trends in ICBM force characteristics (numbers, accuracy, destructive power, etc.) have led many to conclude that ICBM forces may be increasingly vulnerable to a disarming strike. Indeed, it is on the basis of such conclusions that radical reductions are being sought in ICBM assets at the START negotiations, and that planning is underway to move to less vulnerable basing modes for ICBM forces.
3. Of course these concerns over vulnerability apply primarily to one element of the triad of nuclear forces; bomber and submarine forces are not, at this time, considered to be vulnerable. What is troubling is the possibility that the most reliable, capable and hitherto secure forces may be threatened. Although the logic of this concern is open to debate, given the

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invulnerability of other elements of strategic forces, states nevertheless attach significance to the ICBM vulnerability issue, and are modernizing their forces partly as a consequence of this concern. In addition, problems at arms control talks have resulted from demands for reductions in ICBM capability.

4. In response to this issue, the development of mobile ICBM systems has begun. In general terms, such moves help to defuse the vulnerability question, and enhance the prospect for stable deterrence. Greater success in arms control negotiations may be expected as both sides would have reduced incentives - and capabilities - in the counterforce area.
5. It is possible, however, that a move towards mobility may be destabilizing because of the consequent difficulty this would pose in verifying by so-called National Technical Means (NTMs) (Satellites, radars, etc.). If this were allowed to transpire, arms control could become difficult to negotiate, and fears of "breakout" (unauthorized sudden increases in forces) could produce pressures for larger forces and generate considerable instability in the deterrence system.
6. It will be necessary and desirable, therefore, to preclude such developments through adequate verification procedures and force deployment patterns. On-site inspection and remote sensing may provide for some assurances in this regard, but are unlikely to be in and of themselves adequate. Perhaps more promising is the possibility of prior agreement to configuring mobile ICBM forces in such a manner that verification by National Technical Means (NTMs) is possible.
7. Some possible elements of this proposal are presented in Section IV, but details should be left up to the powers to negotiate. These details relate to as yet undetermined, but critical, factors such as mobile ICBM force size, and the characteristics of the missiles themselves.

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III Evaluation

(a) Stability

As explained earlier, to the extent that mobile ICBMs are deployed, the stability of deterrence may be bolstered as there would be reduced first strike fears and incentives. If these deployments were accompanied by adequate verification procedures resulting from various agreed restrictions on ICBM mobility and deployment, arms control agreements legitimizing this shift in strategic forces in more stabilizing directions would become easier to secure. In addition, fears of unauthorized deployments would be reduced, if not eliminated.

(b) Negotiability

As noted earlier, there is likely to be a general move in the direction of mobile ICBMs. All states are likely to be in favour of measures designed to enhance the verifiability of such deployments, particularly if such measures would reduce the requirement for intrusive verification procedures.

IV Details of Proposal

Although the precise nature and wording of the proposal should be left up to the negotiating parties, the following represent considerations which should be taken into account in constructing this proposal.

i) Designated Areas of Deployment

The parties would agree to deploy mobile ICBMs only in certain fixed locales to be identified by agreement. Systems located outside these areas would be considered a violation of the agreement.

ii) Size and Nature of Deployment Area

In order to assist in verification, the size of the deployment area at the locales

identified in (i) above would have to be identified. These areas, in turn, should be distinguishable from surrounding territory, ideally by man-made barrier. In addition, designated entry and exit points for missiles being deployed or removed for repair or testing should be agreed to.

iii) Frequency of Movement

In addition to the above measures, it may be desirable to limit the frequency of movement of the missiles in order to assist satellite verification. Movement frequency would be established to enhance verifiability without thereby increasing vulnerability.

iv) Missile Storage

It may be desirable to establish guidelines for the storage of replacement and surplus missiles in order to enhance confidence that missile reload/refires are not being clandestinely deployed.



MESSAGE

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---PRES REAGANS SPEECH:LET TO PM AND ANALYSIS

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2.TEXT OF LET AS FOLLOWS.QUOTE.

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3.TEXT OF ANALYSIS OF SPEECH AS FOLLOWS.QUOTE.

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SIG G.J. Smith

DEAR PIERRE

AS YOU AND I DISCUSSED LAST MONTH, THERE IS NO MORE IMPORTANT SUBJECT WITH WHICH AN AMERICAN PRESIDENT DEALS THAN THE UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IN THE WAKE OF THE KOREAN AIR LINES TRAGEDY AND MOSCOW'S UNFORTUNATE DECISION TO SUSPEND THE MAJOR ARMS NEGOTIATIONS OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION HAVE ENTERED AN ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT PERIOD. FOR THIS REASON, I HAVE DECIDED TO PRESENT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND TO GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLICS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD A COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT OF MY APPROACH TO THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP AND MY HOPES FOR THE FUTURE.

IN MY ADDRESS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE ON JANUARY 16, I WILL REAFFIRM THE READINESS OF THE UNITED STATES TO PURSUE A CONSTRUCTIVE AND REALISTIC DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AIMED AT BUILDING A MORE POSITIVE AND STABLE LONG TERM RELATIONSHIP. I WILL AS WELL CALL UPON THE SOVIETS TO MAKE A COMPARABLE AND SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE. WHILE I WILL NOT BE ANNOUNCING SPECIFIC NEW INITIATIVES, I WILL SET FORTH A FRAMEWORK FOR OUR FUTURE DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION MAKING CLEAR MY SINCERE DESIRE TO IMPROVE EAST WEST RELATIONS.

BECAUSE OF THE SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE I ATTACH TO MY STATEMENT I WANT TO SHARE THE TEXT WITH YOU BEFOREHAND. I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE THAT IT MEETS OUR COMMON OBJECTIVES BY SETTING A POSITIVE TONE BOTH FOR THE OPENING OF THE CDE MEETING IN STOCKHOLM AND FOR GEORGE SHULTZ'S MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO.

WITH BEST WISHES.

RON

"B"

CONFIDENTIAL

January 16, 1984

IDDZ-0036

~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (through R. R. Fowler)~~

President Reagan's Televised Address
on USA-Soviet Relations, January 16

In his most comprehensive statement on the Administration's approach to the USSR on the eve of the Stockholm Conference and the Shultz/Gromyko meeting on Wednesday, January 18, President Reagan outlined "a policy of credible deterrence, peaceful competition, and constructive cooperation".

He reaffirms the USA's readiness to pursue a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union. His point of departure is the conviction that in 1984 the United States is "in its strongest position in years to establish a realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union".

Rejecting the view that the present situation is especially dangerous, he points to America's deterrence (which had been strengthened in his Administration) as having made the world safer. But deterrence is not enough: dialogue is also needed to build a constructive working relationship.

The speech contains no new proposals but presents a framework for USA/USSR relations. Reagan proposes that the USA and USSR make a major effort in three areas:

- (1) to reduce the threat and use of force in solving international disputes.
- (2) to reduce the vast arms stockpiles (especially nuclear arms).
- (3) to establish a better working relationship with each other.

The USA approach will be based on "realism, strength and dialogue". He mentions problems: e.g. Soviet role in the Middle East, human rights, and Soviet compliance with international covenants; but stresses that the USA does not threaten the Soviet Union, even if it does not like its political system, and restates his dream "of eliminating the risks of nuclear war".

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He concludes by citing Kennedy: "Let us not be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved."

Our preliminary assessment is that, although the speech does not go as far as we would have liked - it stresses the need for American military strength and highlights the Soviet responsibility for problems in the bilateral relationship, it expresses surprise that the Soviets take offence at his criticism of their system - it is a long step forward in moderating rhetoric and stressing dialogue as the way to improving East-West relations.

If questioned in the House, you might say that:

1. We welcome and are encouraged by the President's statement, which signals to the Soviet Union on the eve of the Stockholm Conference and the Shultz/Gromyko meeting that the USA wants to improve East-West relations and work for a constructive, long-term relationship with the Soviet Union.
2. The President's approach is very largely along the lines of the initiative. It is an indication that the trend in East-West relations is improving and that the initiative has borne fruit.
3. It gives the Stockholm meeting a political impetus at the outset, as we had hoped.


Gary J. Smith
Task Force Working Group

cc: PMO/Axworthy

PCO/Osbaldeston

DND/Anderson

DEA/MINA/USS/DMF/IFB/IDR



MESSAGE

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WORKING PAPER OUTLINING MEASURES FOR RESTRAINING
STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY

SUBJECT

This paper outlines three measures designed to enhance strategic stability through placing restraints on military technologies and bolstering the capacity of arms control agreements to manage the strategic nuclear relationship.

BACKGROUND

These proposals, and their associated papers, elaborate on ideas advanced by the Prime Minister of Canada on November 13, 1983. They are designed to place realistic limits on new strategic weaponry, the development and deployment of which would render arms control negotiations more difficult, and would act to destabilize the global nuclear balance.

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Historically, arms control negotiations have failed to limit satisfactorily or preclude the deployment of particular strategic weapons technologies whose characteristics have been such as to cause the stability of deterrence to erode. Such deployments have, in turn, encouraged the deployment of countervailing systems, and have rendered the task of future arms control negotiations far more difficult.

By addressing weapons systems yet to be developed or deployed, and by proposing the upgrading of existing verification provisions, it is intended that dangerous new avenues of the arms competition be shut off before the cycle of weapons development and deployment begins. It is thereby hoped that the strategic relationship between the nuclear powers will be restricted to more stabilizing technologies and deployments, and that the task of arms control will be made more manageable.

These proposals are designed to maximize negotiability and stability. Taken together, or singly (as listed below and described in Annexes 1 - 3), they would contribute to the stability of the nuclear balance and the progress of arms control:

- an agreement to ban the testing and deployment of high-altitude Anti-Satellite systems

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- an agreement that states must demonstrate and ensure the verifiability of new strategic weapons systems
- an agreement to restrict the mobility of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).

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MEASURE I

I Proposal: An Agreement to Ban the Testing and
Deployment of High-Altitude
Anti-Satellite Systems (ASATs)

II Background/Rationale

1. There is an increasing reliance on satellite systems for various strategic purposes; these include the verification of arms control agreements, intelligence gathering, meteorology, early warning, and strategic communications and navigation. This reliance is likely to increase in the future as the capabilities represented by space-based systems are exploited.
2. In general terms, the use of satellites for passive military purposes is stabilizing. Although satellites may provide data and command and control capabilities useful for the initiation of conflict, the stabilizing functions of satellite technology override these concerns. Satellites are critical to the stability of deterrence and the progress of arms control. By providing warning, intelligence information, and secure command and control capabilities, satellites reduce the dangers of surprise attack and decrease incentives to adopt destabilising 'launch-on-warning' postures. In addition, by assuring more resilient control over retaliatory forces, the credibility of deterrence is enhanced.
3. In terms of arms control, the ability of satellites to verify compliance with existing agreements (so-called National Technical Means (NTMs)) has proven critical to the negotiation of arms control measures. Other methods of verification, including on-site inspection, have proven difficult to negotiate, and do not in and of themselves represent adequate verification provisions.
4. In this connection, the ongoing development of anti-satellite capabilities is dangerous from the point of view of deterrence stability and

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prejudicial to the future success of arms control. One operational ASAT capability already exists, while other systems are approaching the testing and deployment stages.

5. As currently designed, however, these systems are only able to operate against satellites in low orbit. These satellites are primarily used for reconnaissance and meteorology. More critical satellites used for strategic command, control and navigation reside at higher altitudes. The most destabilising development in ASAT technology would, therefore, be the development of ASAT systems which were capable of operating at these higher altitudes.
6. It would seem, therefore, that an important step in negotiating an arms control regime for ASAT systems would be to ban the testing and deployment of systems capable of high altitude operation. This agreement would be valuable in its own right and might, in addition, be seen as a crucial first step towards an overall ASAT ban. By addressing systems yet to be developed, but whose development would be even more serious than current programs, negotiability may be enhanced.

III Evaluation

(a) Stability

The majority of the most critical command and control and navigation satellites are currently placed in higher altitudes. If ASATs capable of destroying these satellites were banned, the stability of deterrence would be enhanced. Moreover, by creating a sanctuary for satellite deployment at these altitudes, there would be an incentive to move satellites increasingly into higher orbits, where possible. In addition, it should be noted that low altitude satellites, though important for arms control verification, are not generally considered to be as critical to the stable functioning of deterrence. Should an ASAT ban at higher altitudes be negotiable, and prove enduring, sufficient confidence may be created to ban or restrict other systems.

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(b) Negotiability

Currently deployed ASAT systems, or those under advanced development, are designed to provide matching low-altitude capabilities, to serve as a mutual deterrent against use and possibly as bargaining chips in future ASAT negotiations. They also seem intended to provide a military capability against low altitude satellites used to support general purpose forces.

No state has yet developed a high altitude ASAT capability. The reliance on high altitude satellites for critical command, control and communications systems is likely, however, to increase. The creation of a sanctuary at higher altitudes would preserve these satellites from potential destruction, thereby enhancing deterrence, and would foreclose a costly area of defence expenditure. These potential effects of a high altitude ASAT ban would be in the interests of all states concerned.

IV Details of Proposal

Although the precise nature and wording of the agreement should be left up to the negotiating parties, the following represent considerations which should be taken into account in constructing this proposal.

...6

- (i) The ban should be on both deployment and testing. This arises from the fact that some systems may be difficult to distinguish from others in terms of their high-altitude capability. However, no party would contemplate deployment and use of a high altitude system without testing. Such testing, moreover, could be detected using ground and space-based systems.
- (ii) A ban on development is unlikely to be successful. States may insist on maintaining an active R and D program to avoid unanticipated developments and deployment by the other side. Moreover,

- 4 -

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a ban on development would be difficult, if not impossible, to verify, even with more intrusive methods of inspection.

- (iii) The definition of 'testing' would have to be carefully worked out. It is possible, for example, to test an ASAT system without exploding the destructive mechanism. This may, therefore, require limitations on the proximity of satellites to each other and other measures such as limits on the testing of crucial ASAT components.
- (iv) ASATs can be deployed in a variety of basing modes. To secure agreement, a ban on land, sea, air and space-based systems would be the most advantageous.
- (v) All destructive mechanisms should be precluded including high explosives, nuclear weapons, lasers, particle beams, and direct kinetic kill.
- (vi) The altitude limit should be established at the maximum operational altitude of existing and developing systems. This would have to be resolved through negotiation.
- (vii) A mechanism such as a Standing Consultative Commission is likely to be necessary to provide a forum for information exchange and to deal with compliance issues.
- (viii) All states should be encouraged to join this agreement.
- (ix) Verification arrangements would be difficult to agree upon given the existence of many devices with a marginal ASAT capability and the dynamic state of ASAT technology. Nevertheless, given the high value placed on high altitude satellites, negotiations should lead to an adequate verification regime.



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

16 JAN 84 20 08 12

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FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0038 16JAN84

TO/À

TO STKHM/SCDEL

INFO

DISTR

DELVOIE DE SMITH

REF

From

---CONSULTATIONS IN LDN ON ACD AT UN AND CD

SUBJ/SUJ

WITH PM S MOSCO TRIP HAVING BEEN PUSHED OFF INTO INDETERMINABLE
FUTURE, WAY NOW SEEMS CLEAR FOR ME TO ATTEND SUBJ CONF IN LDN 26JAN.
SKINNER AND KERGIN WILL ALSO ATTEND, AS WILL SCHRAM OF HICOM.
2. I HAVE BEEN WONDERING WHETHER IT MIGHT NOT/NOT MAKE SENSE TO
UTILIZE THIS OCCASION FOR INDEPTH BRIEFING OF BRIT OFFICIALS ON PM S
INITIATIVE AND IN PARTICULAR TO GO OVER GROUND OF THEIR RESERVA-
TIONS, PARTICULARLY ON ISSUES SUCH AS FIVE-POWER. WE COULD ALSO EVEN
CONSIDER LEAVING WITH THEM REVISED FIVE-POWER PAPER. IF YOU THINK
THIS IS GOOD IDEA, I WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST THAT THERE WOULD BE MERIT
IN HAVING CALDER COME ALONG FOR HIS EXPERTISE. HE COULD SIT IN ON
26JAN MTG AND WE COULD SCHEDULE BILATERAL WITH BRITS FOR 27JAN.
COST WOULD BE BORNE ON INITIATIVE BUDGET.
3. GRATEFUL YOUR VIEWS.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

G. J. Smith/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

G. J. Smith



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

6 JAN 84 18 56 12	
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Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ **C O N F I D E N T I A L** CDN EYES-ONLY

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0037 16JAN84
TO/À TO STKHM/SCDEL DELIVER BY 170800
INFO
DISTR DELVOIE DE SMITH
REF FROM our REF RBD TELS 0009 AND 0010 14JAN
SUBJ/SUJ ---PM INITIATIVE:FURTHER STEPS

COPIED BELOW IS TEXT OF MEMO SENT TO PM THIS AM COMMENTING ON
ANDROPOV LETTER AND OFFERING UP SOME PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON
POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS IN VIEW OF DELAY IN MOSCO VISIT.PM HAS CALLED
FOR SHORT MTG TOMORROW(TUESDAY) AT 1200 HRS.TO REVIEW SITUATION.
GRATEFUL YOU PROVIDE US BY 170800 WITH ANY VIEWS DPM/SSEA OR YOU
MIGHT HAVE ON FUTURE STEPS.

2.TEXT BEGINS.

(COMCENTRE: PLEASE COPY ATTACHED)

TEXT ENDS.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG <u>G.J.Smith/sc</u>	IDDZ	5-5912	SIG <u>G.J.Smith</u>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CANADIAN EYES ONLY~~

January 16, 1984

IDBZ-0033

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (through R. R. Fowler)

Your Initiative: Letter from President Andropov

Attached is the text of President Andropov's response to your letter of January 5 concerning your visit to Moscow. It was handed over to us late on Saturday afternoon, January 14, without comment by the Soviet Ambassador.

The initial Task Force and East European Bureau analysis of the letter can be summarized as follows:

- i) If Gromyko's message to Geoffrey Pearson in mid-November about your visit was "wait", Andropov's message is in effect to "wait harder". Andropov says he is hopeful that it will be possible "in the not-too-distant future" to return to the issue of finding mutually acceptable dates for such a meeting. Our interpretation of the Russian words chosen in this particular expression (other words such as imminent could have been used) suggests that it may be as much as or even more than six weeks before we hear from them again, and then only to return to discussing dates, not necessarily agreeing to them. In effect, the letter says don't call us, we'll call you.
- ii) The letter makes it clear that Andropov will be the one to receive you in due course, not any grouping or "collective" of other Soviet leaders in the Politburo. This also suggests that the option mentioned by Mr. Osbaldeston at Friday's meeting, of inviting other Soviet leaders to Canada, is unlikely to be positively received.
- iii) The thematic generality of the message is notably free of direct criticism either of the USA by name or of INF deployment. Nor is there a repetition of the insistence by Andropov that status quo ante deployment must be reinstated before the Soviets

- 2 -

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CANADIAN EYES ONLY

can return to the table. This strikes us, along with such collateral as the recent article in the Soviet press indirectly criticizing the Soviet pilot and ground crew which shot down the KAL aircraft, the presence of Gromyko in Stockholm, and Andropov's January 12 public comment to a French peace group that "not a single chance should be missed", as indicating cautious semblance of marginal moderation in the Soviet approach to East-West security and dialogue, at least for Canadian and European consumption. A hard line will undoubtedly remain dominant at Stockholm but there are at least a few soft straws in the wind. In terms of your visit, we are inclined therefore to give less weight to hesitations occasioned by a Soviet policy review, or to Soviet uncertainty of whether receiving you would somehow assist Reagan's reelection, and much more weight to the health of Andropov and Soviet determination to show no sign of regency or indeed transition.

- iv) The risk of irritating the Soviets by your January 5 letter was fully recognized at the time and deemed to be tolerable. We were indeed forcing the Soviet hand and of course they wished we would not. Nevertheless, we remain concerned that for a complex of reasons your initiative and visit were slipping in Moscow's priorities and that a letter direct to Andropov was the only way (a) to remain consistent with our own logic and with your timetable, (b) to ensure high-level attention to your visit with the option of hosts other than Andropov, and (c) to gain a clear understanding of the various factors behind the delay of your visit.

Where do we go from here?

The delay in securing dates for Moscow has obvious implications for the logical flow of your initiative in that the USSR remains the missing element in your desire to see the leaders of all five nuclear powers. It also has implications for your planned speech in the House in early February. Mr. MacEachen will be speaking with Mr. Gromyko this Thursday in Stockholm and may obtain some further clarification of Soviet thinking. (We have suggested that

- 3 -

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he might hint to Gromyko that there would be value in Gromyko making some public indication of firm Soviet intention to receive you in Moscow plus a general statement of support for your initiative along the lines of the first paragraph of Andropov's letter.) In the interim, the following are some of our preliminary thoughts on possible options that you might wish to consider as next steps:

- (a) Complete the current elements of the initiative (Zhao visit, meetings with New York editorial board, Senators Mathias and Glenn and visit here of Romanian Foreign Minister February 7-8) and then wait for the Soviet invitation without giving your speech. The major disadvantage of this course of action is that we have no firm idea of how long the wait will be. This could result in a lengthy hiatus and loss of momentum.
- (b) Finish up the remaining elements on the agenda, make the speech, and conclude the initiative on the theme that much has been accomplished and that "peace is always unfinished business". The positive side of this is that it provides you with a fixed timetable for winding up your personal involvement in the initiative. The negative side is the missing element of Moscow, the fifth nuclear power and other major player in East-West relations.
- (c) Visit Stockholm and Geneva respectively to see Prime Minister Palme, drop in on the Stockholm Conference, and in Geneva to speak to the three suffocation proposals at the Conference on Disarmament. This would keep up the process side of your initiative with a substantive overlay. On the other hand, Mr. MacEachen will already have covered the Stockholm dimension and the agenda for Geneva is not really sufficient to justify Prime Ministerial attendance.
- (d) Visit Eastern Europe: possibly Berlin, Prague, Bucharest. Such a visit would keep the initiative moving and would entail more dialogue with the East. (Mrs. Thatcher and Prime Minister Craxi will shortly be visiting Eastern Europe.) It might also keep some slight pressure on the Soviets to respond as soon as possible on dates. On the

- 4 -


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CANADIAN EYES ONLY

negative side, Eastern Europe is obviously second best and, apart from the Romanians, they are unlikely to be able to say much beyond reflecting Moscow's current propaganda line and attempting to focus on bilateral issues.

We will be examining these various options in greater detail in the next few days but would welcome an indication of your current thinking.

As for the press line on the Andropov letter, we would propose that you take the high road and simply say that Andropov has expressed support for your initiative, reaffirmed his intention to receive you in person, and hopes soon to be in a position to discuss dates. Do you agree?

We will be forwarding to you on Wednesday of this week an analysis of a strategic freeze and INF moratorium.


Gary J. Smith
Task Force Working Group

cc: PMO/Axworthy
PCO/Osbaldeston
DND/Anderson
DEA/MINA/USS/DME/IFB/IDR/RBD/RBR

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January 16, 1984

IDDZ-0036

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (through R. R. Fowler)

President Reagan's Televised Address
on USA-Soviet Relations, January 16

In his most comprehensive statement on the Administration's approach to the USSR on the eve of the Stockholm Conference and the Shultz/Gromyko meeting on Wednesday, January 18, President Reagan outlined "a policy of credible deterrence, peaceful competition, and constructive cooperation".

He reaffirms the USA's readiness to pursue a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union. His point of departure is the conviction that in 1984 the United States is "in its strongest position in years to establish a realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union".

Rejecting the view that the present situation is especially dangerous, he points to America's deterrence (which had been strengthened in his Administration) as having made the world safer. But deterrence is not enough: dialogue is also needed to build a constructive working relationship.

The speech contains no new proposals but presents a framework for USA/USSR relations. Reagan proposes that the USA and USSR make a major effort in three areas:

- (1) to reduce the threat and use of force in solving international disputes.
- (2) to reduce the vast arms stockpiles (especially nuclear arms).
- (3) to establish a better working relationship with each other.

The USA approach will be based on "realism, strength and dialogue". He mentions problems: e.g. Soviet role in the Middle East, human rights, and Soviet compliance with international covenants; but stresses that the USA does not threaten the Soviet Union, even if it does not like its political system, and restates his dream "of eliminating the risks of nuclear war".

- 2 -


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He concludes by citing Kennedy: "Let us not be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved."

Our preliminary assessment is that, although the speech does not go as far as we would have liked - it stresses the need for American military strength and highlights the Soviet responsibility for problems in the bilateral relationship, it expresses surprise that the Soviets take offence at his criticism of their system - it is a long step forward in moderating rhetoric and stressing dialogue as the way to improving East-West relations.

If questioned in the House, you might say that:

1. We welcome and are encouraged by the President's statement, which signals to the Soviet Union on the eve of the Stockholm Conference and the Shultz/Gromyko meeting that the USA wants to improve East-West relations and work for a constructive, long-term relationship with the Soviet Union.
2. The President's approach is very largely along the lines of the initiative. It is an indication that the trend in East-West relations is improving and that the initiative has borne fruit.
3. It gives the Stockholm meeting a political impetus at the outset, as we had hoped.



Gary J. Smith
Task Force Working Group

cc: PMO/Axworthy

PCO/Osbaldeston

DND/Anderson

DEA/MINA/USS/DMF/IFB/IDR

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External Affairs
Canada
Affaires extérieures
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MESSAGE

FILE/Dossier

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COMMUNICATIONS

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UNCLASSIFIED

CANADIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

WSHDC PA274 16JAN84

PMO/LANGILL DC OTT

IDDZ UGP FPR

ATTACHED, AS DISCUSSED, ARE QUESTIONS FOR THE WRITTEN
INTERVIEW WITH PM FROM MORGAN STRONG OF MCNAUGHT
SYNDICATE. THEY ARE RELATED TO PEACE INITIATIVE
AND I THEREFORE TOLD HIM HE COULD EXPECT HIS
WRITTEN ANSWERS WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS.

2. STRONG IS A NEW COLUMNIST FOR THE SYNDICATE AND
HIS COLUMNS ARE DISTRIBUTED TO 1500 DAILIES, INCLUDING
MOST OF THE MAJORS. GIVEN THE CONTINUING INTEREST
OUTSIDE WASHINGTON IN THE INITIATIVE, I FEEL THIS IS
AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY TO REASSERT THE PM AND
CANADA'S PRIORITIES IN THE PEACE AND SECURITY FIELD.
PLEASE LET ME KNOW IF THERE ARE ANY PROBLEMS.

DRAFT/PROJET

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APProuvé

SIG

GOSSAGE

public affairs

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GOSSAGE

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MCNAUGHT

MCNAUGHT SYNDICATE 537 STEAMBOAT ROAD, GREENWICH, CONN. 06830 - (203) 661-4970 (800) 243-3313

Mr. Patrick Gossage
Canadian Embassy
1771 N. St.
Washington, D. C. 20036


Dear Sir;

In regard to our prior conversation. I would like to submit several questions for consideration by Prime Minister Trudeau.

1. What precipitated your peace initiative.
2. What has been the response and what success has there been.
3. There has been rather limited endorsement from President Reagan. The Soviet Union has yet to set a date for meetings. Does this not limit any potential for success.
4. The S.T.A.R.T. and I.N.P. negotiations have been suspended. How might your effort contribute toward resumption.
5. You have suggested that the political structure engage the issue directly, rather than the bureaucrats. How might this be accomplished and to what advantage.
6. What has been the response to your suggestion of a summit conference of nuclear nations.
7. How have the N.A.T.O. member nations responded.
8. Have we in your view reached a critical point in regard to the potential of nuclear conflict.
9. Could you outline your proposals in regard to reduction of nuclear weaponry.
10. Your efforts will and have required a great deal of your time. Do you intend to devote at some point you full attention to the effort.

I hope the above meet with your approval.

Sincerely,


Morgan Strong

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR0062 16JAN84

TO EXTOTT UDDZ DELIVER BY 160900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP , *photo/AXUSAPAS/concern*

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RBG RBD RBR IDR IDA

---PM INITIATIVE; MOSCO VISIT

GRATEFUL IMMED PRESS GUIDANCE ON HANDLING PMS LET AND
ANDROPOV REPLY. I HAVE HAD ENQUIRY FROM CBC REP LAZOWSKY WHICH
SUGGESTS HE MAY KNOW OF EXISTENCE OF THIS EXCHANGE. WHAT, IF
ANYTHING, ARE YOU SAYING TO PRESS YOUR END?

ROBERTS

CCC/044 161000Z XYGR0062

0034
Del by 161800

*We are stonewalling (i.e. saying nothing has yet been
heard from Russians) until we hear further from
pm on reception of press line recommended para 8 on
tel RSD 0010 Jan 14/80.*

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ 12 10
~~CONFIDENTIAL - CDN EYES ONLY~~

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDZ0035 16JAN84
TO/À TO PRMNY
INFO
DISTR INFO STKHM/SCDEL WSHDC LDN ROME BNATO PARIS BONN VMBFR GENEV HAGUE
REF BRU TOKYO PEKIN COPEN OSLO MDRID ATHNS PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHOTT/ADMPOL
SUBJ/SUJ /CPP
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDR IDA IMU RBR RBD FPR ETN IMD IMU
REF YOURTEL WKGR0059 11JAN
---PM MTG WITH UN SEC GEN
FOLLOWING IS RECORD OF CONVERSATION OF PMS MTG WITH UN SEC GEN IN
NYORK 11JAN.
2.TEXT BEGINS.
(COMCENTRE: PLEASE COPY ATTACHED)
TEXT ENDS.

17 JAN 84 01 32Z

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG G. J. Smith/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG G. J. Smith

PM MTG WITH UN SEC GEN-PEACE INITIATIVE

quote:

MTG BEGAN AT 4 PM AS SCHEDULED.

2. SEC GEN GAVE VERY WARM WELCOME TO PM TRUDEAU AND PRAISED HIS INITIATIVE. HE INVITED PM TO SPEAK.

3. PM--THERE IS CONSIDERABLE PARALLEL AND COINCIDENCE BETWEEN VIEWS AND POSITIONS THE TWO OF US HAVE BEEN TAKING. I WAS DELIGHTED BY YOUR PRE-CHRISTMAS REMARKS ASKING SUPERPOWERS IN EFFECT AS TO QUOTE WHO GAVE THEM THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE OUR ~~FATE~~ ~~DATE~~ UNQUOTE. TENSIONS ARE TOO HIGH BETWEEN WARSAW PACT AND NATO. DIALOGUE IS IMPORTANT AND MUST BE DEVELOPED AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL. WE MUST AVOID QUOTE NUCLEAR ACCOUNTANCY UNQUOTE. THERE IS A NEED FOR POLITICAL ACTIONS. THE SITUATION IS TOO IMPORTANT TO LEAVE TO THE SUPERPOWERS. THE THRUST WE HAVE BEEN TAKING IS THE SAME. FOR EXAMPLE, APPROACH I TOOK AT CWLTH MTG IN DELHI HAD BEEN BOTH ON THE NEED TO GET NUCLEAR POWERS TALKING AND NEGOTIATING AND ALSO ON NEED TO STRENGTHEN THE UN. I WOULD BE GLAD TO ANSWER ANY SPECIFIC QUERIES YOU MIGHT HAVE ABOUT WHAT ZHAO OR REAGAN MAY HAVE SAID LATER BUT WOULD FOCUS MY PRESENTATION MAINLY ON THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY AS A RESULT OF MY TRAVELS AND DISCUSSIONS AND ON HOW THE UN MIGHT GET MORE DIRECTLY INVOLVED.

4. PM SAID THAT HE WAS NOW NEARING THE END OF THIS PHASE OF HIS INITIATIVE: QUOTE NEARING THE END UNQUOTE BECAUSE HE WOULD HAVE TO GO TO USSR TOO, IN ORDER PROPERLY TO COMPLETE THE CYCLE. HE HAD WRITTEN TO ANDROPOV FEW DAYS PREVIOUSLY SAYING THAT IF HE COULD NOT/NOT RECEIVE HIM HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO SEE OTHER MEMBERS OF SOVIET LEADERSHIP. HE WAS TRYING TO DO THIS BEFORE THE END OF JAN. HE WASN'T SURE WHAT RESPONSE WOULD BE BUT IT WAS

- 2 -

IMPORTANT TO SEE THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP BEFORE SUMMING UP WHERE HE WISHED TO GO FROM HERE. IDEALLY HE WOULD LIKE TO ENSURE THAT THE POLITICAL CONTACTS WHICH WOULD BEGIN IN STKHM NEXT WEEK WOULD BE PURSUED. GREATER DIALOGUE WAS REQUIRED AT POLITICAL LEVEL. THERE HAD BEEN SOME ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENTS, INCLUDING THATCHER S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO HUNGARY AND REAGAN S DIET SPEECH. THE QUOTE WORDS UNQUOTE BEING USED ARE NOW BETTER. MEGAPHONE DIPLOMACY WAS FADING. NATO BRUSSELS DECLARATION RECOGNIZED THE OTHER SIDE HAD ITS OWN LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS AND SAID SUPERIORITY SHOULD NOT/NOT BE SOUGHT. IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN WHETHER THESE WERE ONLY WORDS BUT HE THOUGHT THAT AT LEAST ALLIES IN THE WEST WOULD NOT/NOT CONDONE MERE WORDS, WITHOUT ACTIONS.

5. PM REVIEWED BRIEFLY DEVELOPMENTS IN RELATION TO HIS SPECIFIC PROPOSALS. AS FOR THE STKHM CONF, IT HAD BEEN MOVED TO A POLITICAL LEVEL AND THIS WAS GOOD. ON MBFR, THERE HAD BEEN A HELPFUL NATO DECISION TO REVIEW WESTERN POSITION AND WE WERE AWAITING SOME IDEAS AND MOVES FROM FRG. PM REVEALED HE HAD WRITTEN TO CHANCELLOR KOHL THAT VERY MORNING SAYING HE EXPECTED HIM TO MOVE FORWARD. ON THE QUESTION OF FURTHER MEASURES IN THE CONF ON DISARMAMENT IN GENEV, CDA WOULD BE PRESENTING THREE PAPERS IN EARLY FEB, ONE EACH ON ASAT, ON VERIFICATION AND ON MOBILITY OF ICBMS.

6. WITH REGARD TO THE FIVE-POWER CONF IDEA, PM SAID HE HAD RAISED THIS SUBJ WITH EACH OF THE FOUR NUCLEAR POWERS HE HAD VISITED. SUMMARY OF REACTION AMONG THREE NON-SUPERPOWERS TENDED TO BE QUOTE YES, IT WAS A GOOD IDEA BUT NOT/NOT NOW UNQUOTE. THEY DID NOT/NOT WANT WORLD ATTENTION TURNED TOWARD THEIR NUCLEAR ARSENALS BECAUSE BETWEEN THEM THEY ONLY HAD FIVE PERCENT OF

- 3 -

NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHILE SUPERPOWERS HAD NINTY-FIVE.THEY ASKED WHY PUT HEAT ON US.PM SAID HIS RESPONSE TO THEM WAS THAT THEY HAD RESPONSIBILITIES AS NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES AND OBLIGATIONS AS MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR DISARMAMENT AND PEACE.IT WAS NOT/NOT ENOUGH FOR THEM TO WISH HIM WELL.IF THREE NON-SUPERPOWERS WANTED SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN ARSENALS OF TWO SUPERPOWERS BEST PLACE TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR WAS AT NEGOTIATING TABLE.HE HAD INFORMED THEM THAT THEY WOULD NOT/NOT HAVE TO COUNT THEIR ARSENALS UNTIL START AGMT HAD BEEN SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDED.UK AND FRENCH HAD BEEN TOLD THAT IN HIS RATIO PROPOSAL THERE WAS EVEN BUILT-IN ROOM FOR MODERNIZATION IN ORDER TO PROVIDE FOR QUOTE SOVEREIGN DEFENCE IN NUCLEAR WAY UNQUOTE.CONCEIVABLY THOSE THREE COULD COME TO TABLE WITHOUT DISCUSSING NUMBER BUT COULD FIRST START WITH OTHER ISSUES SUCH AS CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING.PM THEN SUGGESTED THAT AS THESE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS WERE ALSO THE FIVE MEMBERS OF THE SC,PERHAPS SOME WAY COULD BE FOUND FOR CERTAIN STEPS TO BE TAKEN AT THE UN,TO GET THE FIVE TOGETHER.PERHAPS THEY COULD MEET IN PRIVATE AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL.

7.PM THEN TURNED TO FIFTH POINT IE NON/NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY ASPECTS AND UNDERLINED HIS SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT 1985 NPT REVIEW CONF.AS HE HAD EXPERIENCED AT CWLTH CONF IN DELHI,MANY THIRD WORLD LEADERS WERE ARGUING THAT FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS HAD NOT/NOT LIVED UP TO THEIR SIDE OF THE NPT BARGAIN AND ASKING WHY THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES SHOULD ADHERE TO ONE-SIDED UNFAIR TREATY.PM RECOUNTED HOW AT DELHI HE HAD THROWN OUT NOTION OF A BARGAIN UNDER WHICH THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES WOULD ADHERE TO NPT ON BASIS THAT NUCLEAR POWERS WOULD REDUCE NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS

- 4 -

AND USE AT LEAST SOME OF THEIR SAVINGS FOR DEVELOPMENT. THIS IDEA HAD NOT/NOT APPEALED TO PM S OWN ADVISERS WHO THOUGHT IT WOULD WEAKEN NPT FURTHER BUT IN EVENT IT HAD HELD NO/NO INTEREST FOR THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES. THIS WHOLE MATTER WAS A WORRYING TREND AND OF REAL CONCERN TO HIM AND SHOULD PRESUMABLY BE ALSO FOR NUCLEAR POWERS. HE HAD NO/NO EASY ANSWER FOR IT BEYOND IDEA OF FIVE-POWER CONF.

8. PM NOTED THAT SEC GEN HAD IN HIS FIRST ANNUAL REPORT MENTIONED IDEA OF HIGH-LEVEL MTG OF SC AND HAD MORE RECENTLY DISCUSSED NEGS BETWEEN TWO SUPERPOWERS. WHAT WAS HIS PRESENT THINKING. WAS THERE POSSIBLY A ROLE FOR MILITARY STAFF CTTEE--NOT/NOT SO MUCH TO GET INVOLVED, AS IT HAD BECOME MORIBUND, BUT BECAUSE OF ITS CHARTER BASED RECOGNITION OF RESPONSIBILITY OF FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS. THUS MTG OF MSC COULD BE A SIGNAL THEY WERE TAKING THEIR ROLE SERIOUSLY IN PEACEKEEPING AND INNATL SECURITY FIELDS.

9. SEC GEN SAID HE FOUND PM S THOUGHTS VERY INTERESTING AND HAD BEEN FOLLOWING HIS INITIATIVE VERY CLOSELY. HE HAD MET WITH USA AND USSR TOP LEADERS LAST YEAR AND HAD STRESSED THE NEED FOR THEM TO INITIATE DIALOGUE TO RESOLVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS RACE. BOTH SOUNDED INTERESTED AND HAD EXPRESSED GOODWILL BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO/NO RESULTS. INDEED THE RHETORIC SINCE THEN HAD MADE THINGS WORSE. NEGOTIATING IN PUBLIC WAS UNHELPFUL. NEGS IN HIS PERSPECTIVE SHOULD BE QUIET AND IN PRIVATE MTGS. HE HAD RECENTLY SENT PRIVATE LETS TO REAGAN AND ANDROPOV URGING THEM TO NEGOTIATE BUT HAD NO/NO REPLY AS YET. THE RESULT OF THE PRESENT SITU WAS, HE FEARED, A WEAKENING IN THE WEST BECAUSE OF THE PUBLIC RELATIONS ASPECT. SEC GEN SAID THE BASIC PROBLEM WAS A LACK OF TRUST BETWEEN THE

- 5 -

TWO SUPERPOWERS:HOW DID ONE GENERATE THIS TRUST?SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE.FRENCH AND BRITS HAD TO RECOGNIZE THAT ONE HAD TO HAVE PUBLICS ON BOARD.OF COURSE THE DISARMAMENT CAMPAIGN OF THE UN SHOULD CONTINUE BUT USA NEEDED TO HELP.ITS LANGUAGE HAD NOT/NOT ALWAYS BEEN HELPFUL(IE USA LANGUAGE HAD CONTRIBUTED TO WORSENING PUBLIC FEARS ON THIS MATTER).SECGEN TOLD PM THAT A VISIT BY HIM TO USSR WAS QUOTE CRUCIAL UNQUOTE.PM WAS A DISTINGUISHED STATESMAN AND EVEN THOUGH A MEMBER OF NATO WAS KNOWN FOR HIS INDEPENDENT AND FAIR VIEWS.PM COULD HELP ENORMOUSLY AS CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION.HE HAD QUOTE ALL OUR MORAL SUPPORT UNQUOTE.HE NEEDED TO CLOSE THE CIRCLE BY VISITING MOSCO.

10.SECGEN,TURNING TO ROLE FOR UN,TICKED OFF POSSIBLE FRAMEWORKS.MOST OBVIOUS WAS SECURITY COUNCIL(SC) AND HERE THE ISSUE WAS HOW TO FORGE A WORKING RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE PERM MEMBERS PARTICULARLY.THEY WERE RUNNING INTO THIS PROBLEM ACROSS THE BOARD INCLUDING FOR EXAMPLE ON LEBANON IN REGARD TO A PULLOUT OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE.THE PROBLEM REMAINED.ONE NEEDED TO DEVELOP THIS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE USA AND THE USSR ABOVE ALL.IT HAD TO BE A PRIVATE RELATIONSHIP.SECGEN HAD APPEALED TO SHULTZ FEW DAYS AGO TO RAISE THIS MATTER WITH GROMYKO NEXT WEEK IN STKHM.ONE NEEDED A RELATIONSHIP WHERE THE TWO SUPERPOWERS WOULD BE ABLE TO OVERLOOK THEIR OWN DIFFERENCES IN THE INTERESTS OF WORKING OUT BROADER SOLUTIONS IN THE SC CONTEXT.THE OTHER POSSIBILITY WAS USING THE MILITARY STAFF CTTEE AS MOOTED BY PM.BUT EXPERIENCE WITH MSC HAD QUOTE NOT/NOT BEEN VERY BRILLIANT UNQUOTE.SECGEN AND HIS COLLEAGUES WERE IN FACT QUITE NEGATIVE ON MSC AND SECGEN ADDED HE FEARED IT MIGHT UNDERMINE THE CONF

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ON DISARMAMENT IN GENEV. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY IN ADVANCE FOR FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS TO AGREE IT HAD A ROLE TO PLAY. FINALLY RE NPT, SECGEN SAID THIS WAS INDEED VERY IMPORTANT AREA AND THE NUCLEAR POWERS HAD TO SET AN EXAMPLE. AS LONG AS THIS EXAMPLE WAS MISSING OTHER STATES WERE UNLIKELY TO SIGN NPT.

11. MARTENSON (USG DISARMAMENT) EMPHASIZED FOR HIS PART THAT THEIR THINKING WAS INDEED VERY MUCH PARALLEL TO THAT OF CDNS. HE LISTED BASICS OF THEIR APPROACH. THEY FOLLOWED PHILOSOPHY OF NON/NON SUPERIORITY AND EQUITY IN DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL. EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND USSR WERE AFRAID OF THE PRESENT SITU; THEY WANTED AND WERE READY FOR A SOLUTION. BUT IT HAD TO BE ON A BALANCED BASIS. SECONDLY, HE FULLY AGREED THAT THE NPT WAS IN AN QUOTE EXTREMELY DANGEROUS SITU UNQUOTE SHOULD SUPERPOWERS NOT/NOT GIVE ANY SIGN OF WILLINGNESS TO CONTAIN ARMS RACE. HE THOUGHT PERHAPS A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN OR SOME SORT OF MORATORIUM FOR ONE OR TWO YEARS MIGHT HELP, AS AN EXAMPLE. IF NOT/NOT, THERE WOULD BE REGRESSION ON NPT. THIS POINT HAD TO BE BROUGHT HOME TO NUCLEAR POWERS. NEXT, HE EMPHASIZED THE PRINCIPLE OF THE LEGITIMATE RIGHT TO NATL SECURITY BUT STRESSED THAT THIS SHOULD BE ON A LOWER LEVEL. ANOTHER PRINCIPLE WAS THAT THERE WOULD BE NO/NO WINNER FROM A NUCLEAR WAR--A POINT WHICH WAS NOW WIDELY ACCEPTED. AGAIN, HE THOUGHT THAT THE HIGH COST OF ARMAMENT (MORE THAN MILLION DOLLARS A MINUTE WAS BEING SPENT) MEANT THAT FOR ECONOMIC AND ANTI-INFLATION REASONS THE POLITICAL PRESSURES WERE GROWING TO DEAL WITH ARMAMENTS. RE PUBLIC OPINION, THE WORLD DISARMAMENT CAMPAIGN OF THE UN HAD A CERTAIN ROLE TO PLAY IN DEVELOPING MORE INFORMED PUBLIC. IT SHOULD COVER ALL COUNTRIES (MARTENSON MENTIONED THEIR

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ACTIVITIES PLANNED IN USSR) AND IT SHOULD BE ON A REALISTIC BASIS. AS FOR MILITARY STAFF CTTEE, MARTENSON POINTED OUT THAT UNDER ART 26 OF THE CHARTER MSC COULD ONLY ACT ON AN INITIATIVE FROM THE SC, ON WHICH IT WAS DEPENDENT.

12. PM INTERJECTED THAT IN REGARD TO MSC HE REALIZED WE WOULD NOT/NOT GET MUCH FROM RETIRED GENERALS. HIS PROPOSAL RATHER WAS A WAY OF MAKING CLEAR THAT THE FIVE POWERS HAD OBLIGATION FOR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. THE QUESTION WAS HOW TO REVIVE THAT OBLIGATION. PERHAPS THE WAY WAS TO HOLD DISCREET MTGS WITH THE AMBS OF THE FIVE, FOR EXAMPLE REGARDING THE RISK OF HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION. IF NOT/NOT, THERE WILL BE MORE EXAMPLES LIKE ISRAEL BLASTING THE IRAQI REACTOR AND ISRAEL CAN NOT/NOT BE BLAMED FOR SAYING THAT IS THE ONLY WAY IT HAS TO DEAL WITH THIS SITUATION. PM SAID HE INTENDED TO PROCEED WITH HIS INITIATIVE BUT ASKED IF THERE WERE WAYS TO COOPERATE TOGETHER?

13. SEC GEN, REVERTING TO PMS SUGGESTION RE FIVE AMBS, AGREED--WE COULD INITIATE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS OF THE KIND YOU SUGGEST. WE NEED TO RAISE DISARMAMENT ABOVE IDEOLOGY. WE HAVE TO DO SOMETHING.

14. URQUHART (USG POL)--THE BASIC PROBLEM IS TO GET BACK TO THE IDEA OF COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY ORIGINALLY BEHIND THE CHARTER RELATING TO THREATS TO PEACE AND SECURITY, AND APPLY IT TO DISARMAMENT. THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS DO HAVE A COMMON RESPONSIBILITY. LINK HAS TO BE MADE BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND THREATS TO PEACE.

15. SEC GEN--WE COULD WORK ON THIS.

16. URQUHART--THE MILITARY (MIL) STAFF CTTEE WOULD ONLY BE REALISTIC IF THEY (FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS) WANTED AN UMBRELLA BUT THIS REQUIRES POLITICAL WILL FROM THEM.

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17.PM--OUR RHETORIC IS IMPROVING,AT LEAST FROM THE WESTERN SIDE.

IS IT POSSIBLE TO HOPE WE COULD GET BETTER WORDS OUT OF THE USSR
OR IS USSR WAITING UNTIL AFTER USA ELECTION?WHO IS GOING TO GET

SOVIETS TO LOWER THEIR DECIBELS IF THEY DO NOT/NOT SEE IT IN THEIR
INTERESTS?WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES HAVE LESS INFLUENCE ON MOSCO THAN
WE HAVE ON WSHDC.PERHAPS THIS REQUIRES CHANGE IN POLICY.EVERYONE
AT MOMENT IS BEING MACHO.NOW THAT NATO HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT IT
CAN STICK TOGETHER ON DEPLOYMENT AND HAS POLITICAL WILL,ONE CAN
START TO CONSIDER SOMETHING LIKE A FREEZE OR MORATORIUM.IT IS TOO
SOON TO TAKE THIS TO NATO BUT AT SOME POINT SHOULD WE NOT/NOT
MAKE GESTURE?

18.SECGEN--USSR IS NOT/NOT INTERESTED IN HELPING REAGAN.HIS
COLLEAGUES AGREED AND SAID THAT ANY INITIATIVE TO BREAK ICE WOULD
HAVE TO COME FROM THE USA,EG THROUGH ONE OF THE ENVISAGED REAGAN
STATEMENTS.SECGEN SAID MORE THAN WORDS WERE NEEDED TO IMPROVE
ATMOSPHERE,TRUST WAS REQUIRED.HE REFERRED TO APPROACHES TO HIM
FROM ROMANIANS WHO HAD OFFERED THEMSELVES AS BROKERS,AND ASKED
WHETHER CDN SIDE WAS AWARE AND INVOLVED IN THEIR EXERCISE.

19.PM SAID ROMANIANS HAD SUGGESTED THAT THEY MEET WITH ^{Himx} ~~RE~~.QUOTE
PROPOSAL IS THERE UNQUOTE.THE ROMANIAN/GREEK IDEA WAS PREMATURE.
NATO REALLY HAD TO BEGIN TO DEPLOY.PERHAPS LATER ON IT MIGHT SUIT.
MAYBE NOT/NOT EVEN TOO MANY MONTHS FROM NOW.INF DEBATE WAS A
POLITICAL ONE,NOT/NOT A MILITARY MATTER.IT DID NOT/NOT SOLVE THE
PROBLEM OF USA/EUROPE DECOUPLING.IT WAS NOT/NOT NEEDED FOR REAL
DETERRENCE.UNFORTUNATELY IT WAS LIKE POKER PLAYER WHO HAD UPPE
ANTE AND NOW WAS CAUGHT IN THE GAME.IF THEY WERE DOING IT AGAIN
SOVIETS WOULD NOT/NOT REPLACE SS-4 AND SS-5 BY SS-20.FOR POLITICAL

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REASONS THEY HAD TO GO FORWARD AND ~~BE~~^{HAD} TO BREAK OFF NEGOTIATIONS.
IT WAS PROBLEM OF FACE. THUS THE ROMANIAN INITIATIVE WAS TOO SOON
BUT IT WAS GOOD SOMEONE IN WARSAW PACT WAS DOING THIS.

20. SEC GEN SAID PM HAD SOME SUPPORT FROM UK, FRANCE AND EVEN CHINA
BUT HE WONDERED QUOTE WHO DOES CEAUSESCU REPRESENT? UNQUOTE. MAYBE
CEAUSESCU COULD BE CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATIONS BUT HE HAD SOME
DOUBTS ABOUT THIS.

21. PM--STKHM IS A STEP IN RIGHT DIRECTION--THE POLITICAL LEADERS
ARE STARTING TO TALK TO EACH OTHER. WE SHOULD BE PLAYING UP THE
POLITICAL ASPECTS TO ENCOURAGE LEADERS TO ACTUALLY TALK SUBSTANCE
AND REAL ACTION. PM SAID HE HAD EVEN WONDERED WHETHER THERE WERE
SOME ADVANTAGES IN HOLDING THE STKHM MTG AT THE SUMMIT LEVEL. HE
HAD HAD A SURPRISINGLY POSITIVE REACTION FROM PM THATCHER AND AT
LEAST A NON/NON DISMISSAL FROM REAGAN. THIS IDEA WAS OF COURSE VERY
CONFIDENTIAL (QUOTE DONT/DONT TAKE NOTES UNQUOTE) THE IDEA WOULD BE TO
GIVE A POLITICAL IMPULSE THROUGH SUCH A MTG AT THE SUMMIT LEVEL;
IT WOULD BE AT THE BEGINNING RATHER THAN THE END, AS HAPPENED WITH
CSCE FINAL ACT IN HELSINKI IN 1975. IT WAS PARADOX THAT DETENTE
WAS COMING TO END JUST WHEN THAT DOCUMENT WAS BEING SIGNED. HE
THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY SUPERPOWER SUMMIT COULD BE ARRANGED BEFORE USA
ELECTIONS BUT MTG OF TWO IN STKHM IN CONTEXT OF GATHERING OF 35
MIGHT BE MORE MANAGEABLE. BUT WOULD YOU SEC GEN NOT/NOT HAVE MORE
LIKELIHOOD OF GETTING THE FIVE TO MEET IN SOME FASHION UNDER
YOUR AUSPICES?

22. MARTENSON (AT SEC GEN'S REQUEST) COMMENTED THAT BASICALLY THE IDEA
WAS GOOD. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET THE FIVE TO TALK. PERHAPS WE CAN
FEEL IT OUT AND GET SOMETHING GOING? IT WOULD PROBABLY BE GOOD IF
IT WERE NOT/NOT TOO VISIBLE. THE CONSENT OF THE FIVE WOULD OF

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COURSE BE REQUIRED. ONE COULD MAKE A BETTER ASSESSMENT AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE STKHM MTG. BUT THE IDEA WAS SOUND AND SHOULD BE PURSUED. THE DEBATE IN THE FIRST CTTEE THIS YEAR HAD BEEN LOW-KEY DESPITE THE KAL EPISODE. THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS AND PARTICULARLY TWO SUPERPOWERS HAD INDEED A COMMON CONCERN OVER THE NPT: THE PREPCOM WAS COMING UP AS EARLY AS JUN. CONCERN OVER THE NPT PERHAPS COULD BE USED AS A QUOTE STEPPING STONE UNQUOTE FOR DIALOGUE BETWEEN THEM.

23. SEC GEN THEN STATED HE WAS QUITE PREPARED TO ENTER INTO SUCH DISCUSSIONS WITH FIVE AMBS ON INDIVIDUAL BASIS IN CONTEXT OF NPT PROBLEM. HE COULD WARN THEM OF THE ISSUE AND DANGER OF HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION AND WOULD PROPOSE TO DO THIS AS SOON AS HE RETURNED FROM HIS AFRICAN TRIP (IN FEB).

24. CORDOVEZ--PRESSURE WAS NEEDED ALSO FROM THIRD WORLD.

25. PM--I TRIED THIS AT THE CWLTH. I HAD TO FIGHT TO GET INCLUDED IN THE COMMUNIQUE ANY NOTION OF DANGER OF HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION. GANDHI WOULD NOT/NOT AGREE AND ARGUED VERTICAL PROLIFERATION WAS KEY. NO/NO ONE BOMB IN THIRD WORLD WOULD KILL US ALL.

26. CORDOVEZ--BUT THE PROBLEM IS IMPORTANT AND WE SHOULD TRY. THERE WAS A CHANGE OF ATTITUDE AMONG THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES TOWARD ACQUIRING MORE ARMAMENTS WHICH NEEDED TO BE COUNTERED. THERE WAS ALSO THE PROBLEM OF THE DEVELOPED COUNTRY ARMS SALESMEN. THIRD WORLD LEADERS UNFORTUNATELY DO NOT/NOT SEE A REDUCTION IN ARMS AS PROBABLY LEADING TO MORE AID.

27. PM REITERATED HIS EFFORTS IN DELHI ON THIS POINT TO STRIKE QUOTE BARGAIN UNQUOTE BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT--WITHOUT SUCCESS. IF YOU CONVENED THE FIVE AMBS--WHETHER SEPARATELY OR TOGETHER--THEY COULD BE MADE AWARE OF THE STRENGTH OF VIEW

- 11--

IN THIRD WORLD RE NPT.YOU WILL OF COURSE DO WHAT YOU THINK BEST
AND PRESUMABLY IT WOULD BE IN SECRET.YOU DO NOT/NOT EVEN HAVE
TO INFORM ME YOU ARE DOING IT.AT SAME TIME I WILL CONTINUE TO
PUT PUBLIC PRESSURE ON FOR SOME ACTION.

28.SECGEN SAID HIS IDEA WAS TO SOUND THEM OUT WITH VIEW TO MEETING
UNDER UMBRELLA OF SECURITY COUNCIL.HE WOULD TAKE INITIATIVE IN
FEB.AS FINAL POINT HE NOTED THAT HE WOULD BE IN STKHM FEB17.

29.MTG ENDED VERY CORDIALLY AT 1730.

30.SECGEN HAD WITH HIM URQUHART(USG FOR SPECIAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS),
CORDOVEZ(USG FOR SPECIAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS),MARTENSON(USG FOR
DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS),VIRENDRA DAYAL(CHEF DE CABINET TO SECGEN),
AND NOTETAKER.CDN SIDE INCLUDED PM,AMB PELLETIER,AXWORTHY(PMO),
FOWLER(PCO),SHENSTONE(IFB),LEE(PRMNY) AND SMITH(IDDZ). *UNQUOTE*



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

16 JAN 84 12 6 362 10

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0034 16JAN84

TO/À TO MOSCO DELIVER-BY-170800

INFO INFO PC00TT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP PM00TT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN

REF DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RBG RBD RBR IDR IDA

SUBJ/SUJ REF YOURTEL XYGR 0062 16 JAN

---PM INITIATIVE:MOSCO VISIT

WE ARE STONEWALLING (I.E.SAYING NOTHING HAS YET BEEN HEARD FROM
RUSSIANS) UNTIL WE HEAR-FURTHER FROM PM ON ACCEPTANCE OF PRESS LINE
RECOMMENDED PARA8 OURTEL RBD0010 JAN14.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG G.J. Smith/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG G.J. Smith

CONFIDENTIAL
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

January 16, 1984

IDDZ-0033

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (through R. R. Fowler)

Your Initiative: Letter from President Andropov

Attached is the text of President Andropov's response to your letter of January 5 concerning your visit to Moscow. It was handed over to us late on Saturday afternoon, January 14, without comment by the Soviet Ambassador.

The initial Task Force and East European Bureau analysis of the letter can be summarized as follows:

- i) If Gromyko's message to Geoffrey Pearson in mid-November about your visit was "wait", Andropov's message is in effect to "wait harder". Andropov says he is hopeful that it will be possible "in the not-too-distant future" to return to the issue of finding mutually acceptable dates for such a meeting. Our interpretation of the Russian words chosen in this particular expression (other words such as imminent could have been used) suggests that it may be as much as or even more than six weeks before we hear from them again, and then only to return to discussing dates, not necessarily agreeing to them. In effect, the letter says don't call us, we'll call you.
- ii) The letter makes it clear that Andropov will be the one to receive you in due course, not any grouping or "collective" of other Soviet leaders in the Politburo. This also suggests that the option mentioned by Mr. Osbaldeston at Friday's meeting, of inviting other Soviet leaders to Canada, is unlikely to be positively received.
- iii) The thematic generality of the message is notably free of direct criticism either of the USA by name or of INF deployment. Nor is there a repetition of the insistence by Andropov that status quo ante deployment must be reinstated before the Soviets

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can return to the table. This strikes us, along with such collateral as the recent article in the Soviet press indirectly criticizing the Soviet pilot and ground crew which shot down the KAL aircraft, the presence of Gromyko in Stockholm, and Andropov's January 12 public comment to a French peace group that "not a single chance should be missed", as indicating cautious semblance of marginal moderation in the Soviet approach to East-West security and dialogue, at least for Canadian and European consumption. A hard line will undoubtedly remain dominant at Stockholm but there are at least a few soft straws in the wind. In terms of your visit, we are inclined therefore to give less weight to hesitations occasioned by a Soviet policy review, or to Soviet uncertainty of whether receiving you would somehow assist Reagan's reelection, and much more weight to the health of Andropov and Soviet determination to show no sign of regency or indeed transition.

- iv) The risk of irritating the Soviets by your January 5 letter was fully recognized at the time and deemed to be tolerable. We were indeed forcing the Soviet hand and of course they wished we would not. Nevertheless, we remain concerned that for a complex of reasons your initiative and visit were slipping in Moscow's priorities and that a letter direct to Andropov was the only way (a) to remain consistent with our own logic and with your timetable, (b) to ensure high-level attention to your visit with the option of hosts other than Andropov, and (c) to gain a clear understanding of the various factors behind the delay of your visit.

Where do we go from here?

The delay in securing dates for Moscow has obvious implications for the logical flow of your initiative in that the USSR remains the missing element in your desire to see the leaders of all five nuclear powers. It also has implications for your planned speech in the House in early February. Mr. MacEachen will be speaking with Mr. Gromyko this Thursday in Stockholm and may obtain some further clarification of Soviet thinking. (We have suggested that

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he might hint to Gromyko that there would be value in Gromyko making some public indication of firm Soviet intention to receive you in Moscow plus a general statement of support for your initiative along the lines of the first paragraph of Andropov's letter.) In the interim, the following are some of our preliminary thoughts on possible options that you might wish to consider as next steps:

- (a) Complete the current elements of the initiative (Zhao visit, meetings with New York editorial board, Senators Mathias and Glenn and visit here of Romanian Foreign Minister February 7-8) and then wait for the Soviet invitation without giving your speech. The major disadvantage of this course of action is that we have no firm idea of how long the wait will be. This could result in a lengthy hiatus and loss of momentum.
- (b) Finish up the remaining elements on the agenda, make the speech, and conclude the initiative on the theme that much has been accomplished and that "peace is always unfinished business". The positive side of this is that it provides you with a fixed timetable for winding up your personal involvement in the initiative. The negative side is the missing element of Moscow, the fifth nuclear power and other major player in East-West relations.
- (c) Visit Stockholm and Geneva respectively to see Prime Minister Palme, drop in on the Stockholm Conference, and in Geneva to speak to the three suffocation proposals at the Conference on Disarmament. This would keep up the process side of your initiative with a substantive overlay. On the other hand, Mr. MacEachen will already have covered the Stockholm dimension and the agenda for Geneva is not really sufficient to justify Prime Ministerial attendance.
- (d) Visit Eastern Europe: possibly Berlin, Prague, Bucharest. Such a visit would keep the initiative moving and would entail more dialogue with the East. (Mrs. Thatcher and Prime Minister Craxi will shortly be visiting Eastern Europe.) It might also keep some slight pressure on the Soviets to respond as soon as possible on dates. On the

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
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negative side, Eastern Europe is obviously second best and, apart from the Romanians, they are unlikely to be able to say much beyond reflecting Moscow's current propaganda line and attempting to focus on bilateral issues.

We will be examining these various options in greater detail in the next few days but would welcome an indication of your current thinking.

As for the press line on the Andropov letter, we would propose that you take the high road and simply say that Andropov has expressed support for your initiative, reaffirmed his intention to receive you in person, and hopes soon to be in a position to discuss dates. Do you agree?

We will be forwarding to you on Wednesday of this week an analysis of a strategic freeze and INF moratorium.


Gary J. Smith
Task Force Working Group

cc: PMO/Axworthy

PCO/Osbaldeston

DND/Anderson

DEA/MINA/USS/DMF/IFB/IDR/RBD/RBR

Unofficial translation

The Right Honourable
Pierre E. Trudeau,
Prime Minister of Canada,
Ottawa, Canada

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Thank you for the good wishes you have expressed in your message of January 5, 1984.

We completely understand your concerns about the dangerous situation in the world today. We share and appreciate your interest in the relaxation of tensions, in maintaining and consolidating peace. This can be achieved only through joint efforts of those who are really searching for ways to transfer international relations to the tracks of normal and productive development. The Soviet leadership, as well as you are, is acting in this particular direction.

I am convinced that the Soviet-Canadian dialogue on these issues must be continued and deepened - it will bring about nothing but advantage. The earliest opportunity for this will arise during the meeting between Mr. A. Gromyko and Secretary of State for External Affairs Mr. A. MacEachen in Stockholm.

I hope that the two of us will also have an opportunity to meet and exchange opinions as to what else the Soviet Union and Canada could do, together or in a parallel way, to eliminate the threat of nuclear war hanging over the world, to curb the arms race and to improve the international situation in general. I am hopeful that will be possible in the not too distant future to return to the issue of finding mutually acceptable dates for such a meeting of which we will inform you additionally.

In conclusion I would like to express my best wishes to you, Mr. Prime Minister, for the new year of 1984.

Sincerely yours,

January 14, 1984

00057
Y. ANDROPOV 0

Господину Пьеру Э.Трюдо,
Премьер-министру Канады,
Оттава, Канада

Уважаемый господин Премьер-министр,

Благодарю Вас за добрые пожелания, которые выражены в Вашем послании от 5 января.

Нам глубоко понятна Ваша обеспокоенность опасной обстановкой, которая создалась сейчас в мире. Мы разделяем и ценим проявляемую Вами заинтересованность в ослаблении напряженности, в сохранении и упрочении мира. Добиться этого можно только совместными усилиями всех, кто действительно стремится к поискам путей к переводу международных отношений на рельсы нормального и плодотворного развития. Советское руководство, как и Вы, действует именно в этом направлении.

Убежден, что советско-канадский диалог по этим вопросам следует продолжать и углублять - это принесет только пользу. Ближайшая такая возможность представится при встрече А.А.Громыко с министром иностранных дел Канады А.Маккензом в Стокгольме.

Надеюсь, что и нам лично удастся встретиться и обменяться мнениями о том, что еще могли бы предпринять Советский Союз и Канада, совместно или параллельно, для устранения нависшей над миром угрозы ядерной войны, для обуздания гонки вооружений и общего оздоровления международной обстановки. К вопросу о взаимоприемлемом сроке такой встречи можно будет вернуться, надеюсь, в недалеком будущем, о чем мы сообщим дополнительно.

Заканчиваю выражением наилучших пожеланий Вам, г-н Премьер-министр, на наступивший 1984 год.

С уважением

Ю.АНДРОПОВ

14 января 1984 года

MASTER

FILE

Jan. 16

DEAR PIERRE

AS YOU AND I DISCUSSED LAST MONTH. THERE IS NO MORE IMPORTANT SUBJECT WITH WHICH AN AMERICAN PRESIDENT DEALS THAN THE UNITED STATES' RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IN THE WAKE OF THE KOREAN AIR LINES TRAGEDY AND MOSCOW'S UNFORTUNATE DECISION TO SUSPEND THE MAJOR ARMS NEGOTIATIONS OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION HAVE ENTERED AN ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT PERIOD. FOR THIS REASON, I HAVE DECIDED TO PRESENT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND TO GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLICS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD A COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT OF MY APPROACH TO THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP AND MY HOPES FOR THE FUTURE.

IN MY ADDRESS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE ON JANUARY 16, I WILL REAFFIRM THE READINESS OF THE UNITED STATES TO PURSUE A CONSTRUCTIVE AND REALISTIC DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AIMED AT BUILDING A MORE POSITIVE AND STABLE LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP. I WILL, AS WELL, CALL UPON THE SOVIETS TO MAKE A COMPARABLE AND SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE. WHILE I WILL NOT BE ANNOUNCING SPECIFIC NEW INITIATIVES, I WILL SET FORTH A FRAMEWORK FOR OUR FUTURE DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION, MAKING CLEAR MY SINCERE DESIRE TO IMPROVE EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

BECAUSE OF THE SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE I ATTACH TO MY STATEMENT I WANT TO SHARE THE TEXT WITH YOU BEFOREHAND. I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE THAT IT MEETS OUR COMMON OBJECTIVES BY SETTING A POSITIVE TONE BOTH FOR THE OPENING OF THE CDE MEETING IN STOCKHOLM AND FOR GEORGE SHULTZ'S MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO.

WITH BEST WISHES.

RON

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
JANUARY 16, 1984

- DURING THESE FIRST DAYS OF 1984, I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU -- AND THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD -- MY THOUGHTS ON A SUBJECT OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE -- RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

- TOMORROW, THE UNITED STATES WILL JOIN THE SOVIET UNION AND 33 OTHER NATIONS AT A EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE IN STOCKHOLM. THE CONFERENCE WILL SEARCH FOR PRACTICAL AND MEANINGFUL WAYS TO INCREASE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND PRESERVE PEACE. WE WILL BE IN STOCKHOLM WITH THE HEARTFELT WISHES OF OUR PEOPLE FOR GENUINE PROGRESS.

- WE LIVE IN A TIME OF CHALLENGES TO PEACE, BUT ALSO OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACE. THROUGH TIMES OF DIFFICULTY AND FRUSTRATION, AMERICA'S HIGHEST ASPIRATION HAS NEVER WAVERED: WE HAVE, AND WILL CONTINUE TO STRUGGLE FOR A LASTING PEACE THAT ENHANCES DIGNITY FOR MEN AND WOMEN EVERYWHERE. I BELIEVE 1984 FINDS THE UNITED STATES IN ITS STRONGEST POSITION IN YEARS TO ESTABLISH A CONSTRUCTIVE AND REALISTIC WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

- WE HAVE COME A LONG WAY SINCE THE DECADE OF THE SEVENTIES -- YEARS WHEN THE UNITED STATES SEEMED FILLED WITH SELF-DOUBT AND NEGLECTED ITS DEFENSE, WHILE THE SOVIET UNION INCREASED ITS MILITARY MIGHT AND SOUGHT TO EXPAND ITS INFLUENCE BY ARMED FORCE AND THREATS. OVER THE LAST TEN YEARS, THE SOVIETS DEVOTED TWICE AS MUCH OF THEIR GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT TO MILITARY EXPENDITURES AS THE UNITED STATES, PRODUCED SIX TIMES AS MANY ICBM'S, FOUR TIMES AS MANY TANKS, AND TWICE AS MANY COMBAT AIRCRAFT. AND THEY BEGAN DEPLOYING THE SS-20 INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILE AT A TIME WHEN THE UNITED STATES HAD NO COMPARABLE WEAPON.

STRENGTH

JAB

- HISTORY TEACHES THAT WARS BEGIN WHEN GOVERNMENTS RELIEVE THE PRICE OF AGGRESSION IS CHEAP. TO KEEP THE PEACE, WE AND OUR ALLIES MUST BE STRONG ENOUGH TO CONVINCE ANY POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR THAT WAR COULD BRING NO BENEFIT, ONLY DISASTER. SO WHEN WE NEGLECTED OUR DEFENSES, THE RISKS OF SERIOUS CONFRONTATION GREW.

Tough

- THREE YEARS AGO WE EMBRACED A MANDATE FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO CHANGE COURSE, AND WE HAVE. WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THE CONGRESS, WE HALTED AMERICA'S DECLINE. OUR ECONOMY IS NOW IN THE MIDST OF THE BEST RECOVERY SINCE THE SIXTIES. OUR DEFENSES ARE BEING REBUILT. OUR ALLIANCES ARE SOLID AND OUR COMMITMENT TO DEFEND OUR VALUES HAS NEVER BEEN MORE CLEAR.

- AMERICA'S RECOVERY MAY HAVE TAKEN SOVIET LEADERS BY SURPRISE. THEY MAY HAVE COUNTED ON US TO KEEP WEAKENING

OURSELVES. THEY HAVE BEEN SAYING FOR YEARS THAT OUR
DEFENSE WAS INEVITABLE. THEY SAID IT SO OFTEN THEY
PROBABLY STARTED BELIEVING IT. IF SO, I THINK THEY CAN
SEE NOW THEY WERE WRONG.

JAB

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- THIS MAY BE THE REASON WE'VE BEEN HEARING SUCH
STRIDENT RHETORIC FROM THE KREMLIN RECENTLY. THESE HARSH
WORDS HAVE LED SOME TO SPEAK OF HEIGHTENED UNCERTAINTY
AND AN INCREASED DANGER OF CONFLICT. THIS IS
UNDERSTANDABLE, BUT PROFOUNDLY MISTAKEN. LOOK BEYOND THE
WORDS, AND ONE FACT STANDS OUT: AMERICA'S DETERRENCE IS
MORE CREDIBLE AND IT IS MAKING THE WORLD A SAFER PLACE;
SAFER BECAUSE NOW THERE IS LESS DANGER THAT THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP WILL UNDERESTIMATE OUR STRENGTH OR QUESTION

// SHOT AT
US AND
OTHERS

OUR RESOLVE.

- YES, WE ARE SAFER NOW. BUT TO SAY THAT OUR RESTORED
DETERRENCE HAS MADE THE WORLD SAFER IS NOT TO SAY THAT IT
IS SAFE ENOUGH. WE ARE WITNESSING TRAGIC CONFLICTS IN
MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD. NUCLEAR ARSENALS ARE FAR TOO
HIGH. AND OUR WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION
IS NOT WHAT IT MUST BE. THESE ARE CONDITIONS WHICH MUST
BE ADDRESSED AND IMPROVED.

- DETERRENCE IS ESSENTIAL TO PRESERVE PEACE AND PROTECT
OUR WAY OF LIFE, BUT DETERRENCE IS NOT THE BEGINNING AND
END OF OUR POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION. WE MUST AND
WILL ENGAGE THE SOVIETS IN A DIALOGUE AS SERIOUS AND
CONSTRUCTIVE AS POSSIBLE, A DIALOGUE THAT WILL SERVE TO
PROMOTE PEACE IN THE TROUBLED REGIONS OF THE WORLD,
REDUCE THE LEVEL OF ARMS, AND BUILD A CONSTRUCTIVE
WORKING RELATIONSHIP.

- NEITHER WE NOR THE SOVIET UNION CAN WISH AWAY THE
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR TWO SOCIETIES AND OUR
PHILOSOPHIES. BUT WE SHOULD ALWAYS REMEMBER THAT WE DO
HAVE COMMON INTERESTS. AND THE FOREMOST AMONG THEM IS TO
AVOID WAR AND REDUCE THE LEVEL OF ARMS. THERE IS NO
RATIONAL ALTERNATIVE BUT TO STEER A COURSE WHICH I WOULD
CALL CREDIBLE DETERRENCE AND PEACEFUL COMPETITION; AND IF
WE DO SO, WE MIGHT FIND AREAS IN WHICH WE COULD ENGAGE IN
CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION.

- OUR STRENGTH AND VISION OF PROGRESS PROVIDE THE BASIS
FOR DEMONSTRATING, WITH EQUAL CONVICTION, OUR COMMITMENT
TO STAY SECURE AND TO FIND PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS
THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. THAT IS WHY 1984 IS A YEAR OF
OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACE.

- BUT IF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE TO RISE TO THE CHALLENGES FACING US AND SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACE, WE MUST DO MORE TO FIND AREAS OF MUTUAL INTEREST AND THEN BUILD ON THEM. I PROPOSE THAT OUR GOVERNMENTS MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT TO SEE IF WE CAN MAKE PROGRESS IN THREE BROAD PROBLEM AREAS.

- FIRST, WE NEED TO FIND WAYS TO REDUCE -- AND EVENTUALLY TO ELIMINATE -- THE THREAT AND USE OF FORCE IN SOLVING INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES.

- THE WORLD HAS WITNESSED MORE THAN 100 MAJOR CONFLICTS SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAR II ALONE. TODAY, THERE ARE ARMED CONFLICTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AFGHANISTAN, SOUTHEAST ASIA, CENTRAL AMERICA, AND AFRICA. IN OTHER REGIONS, INDEPENDENT NATIONS ARE CONFRONTED BY HEAVILY ARMED NEIGHBORS SEEKING TO DOMINATE BY THREATENING ATTACK OR SUBVERSION.

- MOST OF THESE CONFLICTS HAVE THEIR ORIGINS IN LOCAL PROBLEMS, BUT MANY HAVE BEEN EXPLOITED BY THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS SURROGATES -- AND, OF COURSE, AFGHANISTAN HAS SUFFERED AN OUTRIGHT SOVIET INVASION. FUELING REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND EXPORTING VIOLENCE ONLY EXACERBATE LOCAL TENSIONS, INCREASE SUFFERING, AND MAKE SOLUTIONS TO REAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS MORE DIFFICULT. FURTHER, SUCH ACTIVITY CARRIES WITH IT THE RISK OF LARGER CONFRONTATIONS.

- WOULD IT NOT BE BETTER AND SAFER IF WE COULD WORK TOGETHER TO ASSIST PEOPLE IN AREAS OF CONFLICT IN FINDING PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO THEIR PROBLEMS? THAT SHOULD BE OUR MUTUAL GOAL. BUT WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THE GAP IN AMERICAN AND SOVIET PERCEPTIONS AND POLICY IS SO GREAT THAT OUR IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE MUST BE MORE MODEST. AS A FIRST STEP, OUR GOVERNMENTS SHOULD JOINTLY EXAMINE CONCRETE ACTIONS WE BOTH CAN TAKE TO REDUCE THE RISK OF U.S.-SOVIET CONFRONTATION IN THESE AREAS. AND IF WE SUCCEED, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO MOVE BEYOND THIS IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE.

WHAT ?

- OUR SECOND TASK SHOULD BE TO FIND WAYS TO REDUCE THE VAST STOCKPILES OF ARMAMENTS IN THE WORLD.

- IT IS TRAGIC TO SEE THE WORLD'S DEVELOPING NATIONS SPENDING MORE THAN \$150 BILLION A YEAR ON ARMED FORCES -- SOME 20 PERCENT OF THEIR NATIONAL BUDGETS. WE MUST FIND WAYS TO REVERSE THE VICIOUS CYCLE OF THREAT AND RESPONSE WHICH DRIVES ARMS RACES EVERYWHERE IT OCCURS.

- WITH REGARD TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE SIMPLE TRUTH IS, AMERICAN'S TOTAL NUCLEAR STOCKPILE HAS DECLINED. TODAY, WE HAVE FAR FEWER NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAN WE HAD 20 YEARS AGO. AND IN TERMS OF ITS TOTAL DESTRUCTIVE POWER, OUR NUCLEAR STOCKPILE IS AT THE LOWEST LEVEL IN 25 YEARS.

- JUST 3 MONTHS AGO, WE AND OUR ALLIES AGREED TO WITHDRAW 1,400 NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM WESTERN EUROPE. THIS

COMES AFTER THE REMOVAL OF A THOUSAND NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM EUROPE 3 YEARS AGO. EVEN IF ALL OUR PLANNED I' IMMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES HAVE TO BE DEPLOYED IN EUROPE OVER THE NEXT 5 YEARS -- AND WE HOPE THIS WILL NOT BE NECESSARY -- WE WILL HAVE ELIMINATED FIVE EXISTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR EACH NEW WEAPON DEPLOYED. ///

- BUT THIS IS NOT ENOUGH. WE MUST ACCELERATE OUR EFFORTS TO REACH AGREEMENTS THAT WILL GREATLY REDUCE NUCLEAR ARSENALS, PROVIDE GREATER STABILITY, AND BUILD CONFIDENCE.

- OUR THIRD TASK IS TO ESTABLISH A BETTER WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH EACH OTHER, ONE MARKED BY GREATER COOPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING.

- COOPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING ARE BUILT ON DEEDS, NOT WORDS. COMPLYING WITH AGREEMENTS HELPS; VIOLATING THEM HURTS. RESPECTING THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS POLISTERS THE RELATIONSHIP; DENYING THESE RIGHTS HARMS IT. EXPANDING CONTACTS ACROSS BORDERS AND PERMITTING A FREE INTERCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND IDEAS INCREASE CONFIDENCE; SEALING OFF ONE'S PEOPLE FROM THE REST OF THE WORLD REDUCES IT. PEACEFUL TRADE HELPS, WHILE ORGANIZED-THEFT OF INDUSTRIAL SECRETS CERTAINLY HURTS.

-
- ALL
- NEGATIVE
- TELLING
OFF JOW

- COOPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING ARE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT TO ARMS CONTROL. IN RECENT YEARS, WE HAVE HAD SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENTS AND TREATIES. COMPLIANCE IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE WE-SEEK TRULY EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL. HOWEVER, THERE HAS BEEN MOUNTING EVIDENCE THAT PROVISIONS OF AGREEMENTS HAVE-BEEN VIOLATED AND THAT ADVANTAGE HAS BEEN TAKEN OF AMBIGUITIES IN OUR AGREEMENTS.

LINKAGE

- IN RESPONSE TO A CONGRESSIONAL REQUEST, A REPORT ON THIS WILL BE SUBMITTED IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. IT IS CLEAR THAT WE CANNOT SIMPLY ASSUME THAT AGREEMENTS NEGOTIATED WILL BE FULFILLED. WE MUST TAKE THE SOVIET COMPLIANCE RECORD INTO ACCOUNT, BOTH IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR DEFENSE PROGRAM AND IN OUR APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL. IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, WE WILL WORK TO REMOVE THE OBSTACLES WHICH THREATEN TO UNDERMINE EXISTING AGREEMENTS AND THE BROADER ARMS CONTROL PROCESS.

JOWS AT
FAULT.

- THE EXAMPLES I HAVE CITED ILLUSTRATE WHY OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT WHAT IT SHOULD BE. WE HAVE A LONG WAY TO GO, BUT WE ARE DETERMINED TO TRY AND TRY AGAIN. WE MAY HAVE TO START IN SMALL WAYS, BUT START WE MUST.

- IN WORKING ON THESE TASKS, OUR APPROACH IS BASED ON THREE GUIDING PRINCIPLES: REALISM, STRENGTH, AND DIALOGUE.

- REALISM MEANS WE MUST START WITH A CLEAR-EYED UNDERSTANDING OF THE WORLD WE LIVE IN. WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT WE ARE IN A LONG-TERM COMPETITION WITH A GOVERNMENT THAT DOES NOT SHARE OUR NOTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES AT HOME AND PEACEFUL CHANGE ABROAD. WE MUST BE FRANK IN ACKNOWLEDGING OUR DIFFERENCES AND UNAFAID TO PROMOTE OUR VALUES.

- STRENGTH IS ESSENTIAL TO NEGOTIATE SUCCESSFULLY AND PROTECT OUR INTERESTS. IF WE ARE WEAK, WE CAN DO NEITHER. STRENGTH IS MORE THAN MILITARY POWER. ECONOMIC STRENGTH IS CRUCIAL AND AMERICA'S ECONOMY IS LEADING THE WORLD INTO RECOVERY. EQUALLY IMPORTANT IS OUR STRENGTH OF SPIRIT, AND UNITY AMONG OUR PEOPLE AT HOME AND WITH OUR ALLIES ABROAD. WE ARE STRONGER IN ALL THESE AREAS THAN WE WERE 3 YEARS AGO.

- OUR STRENGTH IS NECESSARY TO DETER WAR AND TO FACILITATE NEGOTIATED SOLUTIONS. SOVIET LEADERS KNOW IT MAKES SENSE TO COMPROMISE ONLY IF THEY CAN GET SOMETHING IN RETURN. AMERICA CAN NOW OFFER SOMETHING IN RETURN.

- STRENGTH AND DIALOGUE GO HAND-IN-HAND. WE ARE DETERMINED TO DEAL WITH OUR DIFFERENCES PEACEFULLY, THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEMS THAT DIVIDE US, AND TO WORK FOR PRACTICAL, FAIR SOLUTIONS ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL COMPROMISE. WE WILL NEVER RETREAT FROM NEGOTIATIONS.

- I HAVE OPENLY EXPRESSED MY VIEW OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM. I DON'T KNOW WHY THIS SHOULD COME AS A SURPRISE TO SOVIET LEADERS, WHO HAVE NEVER SHIED FROM EXPRESSING THEIR VIEW OF OUR SYSTEM. BUT THIS DOES NOT MEAN WE CAN'T DEAL WITH EACH OTHER. WE DON'T REFUSE TO TALK WHEN THE SOVIETS CALL US "IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS" AND WORSE, OR BECAUSE THEY CLING TO THE FANTASY OF A COMMUNIST TRIUMPH OVER DEMOCRACY. THE FACT THAT NEITHER OF US LIKES THE OTHER'S SYSTEM IS NO REASON TO REFUSE TO TALK. LIVING IN THIS NUCLEAR AGE MAKES IT IMPERATIVE THAT WE DO TALK.

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- OUR COMMITMENT TO DIALOGUE IS FIRM AND UNSHAKABLE. BUT WE INSIST THAT OUR NEGOTIATIONS DEAL WITH REAL PROBLEMS, NOT ATMOSPHERICS.

- IN OUR APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS, REDUCING THE RISK OF WAR -- AND ESPECIALLY NUCLEAR WAR -- IS PRIORITY NUMBER ONE. A NUCLEAR CONFLICT COULD WELL BE MANKIND'S LAST. THAT IS WHY I PROPOSED, OVER 2 YEARS AGO, THE "ZERO OPTION" FOR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES. OUR AIM WAS AND CONTINUES TO BE TO ELIMINATE AN ENTIRE CLASS OF NUCLEAR ARMS.

- INDEED, I SUPPORT A ZERO OPTION FOR ALL NUCLEAR ARMS. AS I HAVE SAID BEFORE, MY DREAM IS TO SEE THE DAY

WHEN NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL BE BANISHED FROM THE FACE OF
THE EARTH.

- LAST MONTH, THE SOVIET DEFENSE MINISTER STATED THAT
HIS COUNTRY WOULD DO EVERYTHING TO AVERT THE THREAT OF WAR. ✓
THESE ARE ENCOURAGING WORDS. BUT NOW IS THE TIME
TO MOVE FROM WORDS TO DEEDS.

- THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL EXISTS;
THE SOVIET LEADERS SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IT. WE HAVE
PROPOSED A SET OF INITIATIVES THAT WOULD REDUCE
SUBSTANTIALLY NUCLEAR ARSENALS AND REDUCE THE RISK OF
NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION.

- THE WORLD REGRETS -- CERTAINLY WE DO -- THAT THE
SOVIET UNION BROKE OFF NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE
NUCLEAR FORCES, AND HAS NOT SET A DATE FOR THE RESUMPTION
OF THE TALKS ON STRATEGIC ARMS AND ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES
IN EUROPE. OUR NEGOTIATORS ARE READY TO RETURN TO THE
NEGOTIATING TABLE TO WORK TOWARD AGREEMENTS IN INF,
START, AND MBFR. WE WILL NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH.
WHENEVER THE SOVIET UNION IS READY TO DO LIKEWISE, WE
WILL MEET THEM HALFWAY.

- WE SEEK TO REDUCE NUCLEAR ARSENALS, AND TO REDUCE THE
CHANCES FOR DANGEROUS MISUNDERSTANDING AND
MISCALCULATION. SO WE HAVE PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS FOR
WHAT WE CALL "CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES." THEY COVER

A WIDE RANGE OF ACTIVITIES. IN THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS,
WE HAVE PROPOSED TO EXCHANGE ADVANCE NOTIFICATIONS OF
MISSILE TESTS AND MAJOR MILITARY EXERCISES. FOLLOWING UP
ON CONGRESSIONAL SUGGESTIONS, WE ALSO PROPOSED A NUMBER
OF WAYS TO IMPROVE DIRECT CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION.

// LAST WEEK, WE HAD PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS
HERE IN WASHINGTON ON IMPROVING COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING
THE "HOTLINE."

- THESE BILATERAL PROPOSALS WILL BE BROADENED AT THE
CONFERENCE IN STOCKHOLM. WE ARE WORKING WITH OUR ALLIES
TO DEVELOP PRACTICAL, MEANINGFUL WAYS TO REDUCE THE
UNCERTAINTY AND POTENTIAL FOR MISINTERPRETATION
SURROUNDING MILITARY ACTIVITIES, AND TO DIMINISH THE
RISKS OF SURPRISE ATTACK.

- ARMS CONTROL HAS LONG BEEN THE MOST VISIBLE AREA OF U.S.-SOVIET DIALOGUE. BUT A DURABLE PEACE ALSO REQUIRES US TO DEFUSE TENSIONS AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS.

R- TAKE THE MIDDLE EAST AS AN EXAMPLE. EVERYONE'S INTERESTS WOULD BE SERVED BY STABILITY IN THE REGION AND OUR EFFORTS ARE DIRECTED TOWARD THAT GOAL. THE SOVIETS COULD HELP REDUCE TENSIONS THERE INSTEAD OF INTRODUCING SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS INTO THE AREA. THIS WOULD CERTAINLY HELP US TO DEAL MORE POSITIVELY WITH OTHER ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP.

- ANOTHER MAJOR PROBLEM IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION IS HUMAN RIGHTS. SOVIET PRACTICES IN THIS AREA, AS MUCH AS ANY OTHER ISSUE, HAVE CREATED THE MISTRUST AND ILL WILL THAT HANGS OVER OUR RELATIONSHIP.

- MORAL CONSIDERATIONS ALONE COMPEL US TO EXPRESS OUR DEEP CONCERN OVER PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE IN THE SOVIET UNION AND OVER THE VIRTUAL HALT IN THE EMIGRATION OF JEWS, ARMENIANS, AND OTHERS WHO WISH TO JOIN THEIR FAMILIES ABROAD.

- OUR REQUEST IS SIMPLE AND STRAIGHTFORWARD: THAT THE SOVIET UNION LIVE UP TO THE OBLIGATIONS IT HAS FREELY ASSUMED UNDER INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS -- IN PARTICULAR, ITS COMMITMENTS UNDER THE HELSINKI ACCORDS. EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT GREATER RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO PROGRESS IN OTHER AREAS OF THE SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP.

- CONFLICTS OF INTEREST BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE REAL. BUT WE CAN AND MUST KEEP THE PEACE BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS AND MAKE IT A FETTER AND MORE PEACEFUL WORLD FOR ALL MANKIND.

- OUR POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION, A POLICY OF CREDIBLE DETERRENCE, PEACEFUL COMPETITION, AND CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION, WILL SERVE OUR TWO NATIONS AND PEOPLE EVERYWHERE. IT IS A POLICY NOT JUST FOR THIS YEAR, BUT FOR THE LONG TERM. IT IS A CHALLENGE FOR AMERICANS. IT IS ALSO A CHALLENGE FOR THE SOVIETS. IF THEY CANNOT MEET US HALFWAY, WE WILL BE PREPARED TO PROTECT OUR INTERESTS, AND THOSE OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES. BUT WE WANT MORE THAN DETERRENCE; WE SEEK GENUINE COOPERATION; WE SEEK PROGRESS FOR PEACE.

- COOPERATION BEGINS WITH COMMUNICATION. WE SEEK SUCH COMMUNICATION. AS I HAVE SAID, WE WILL STAY AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLES IN GENEVA AND VIENNA. FURTHERMORE, SECRETARY SHULTZ WILL BE MEETING THIS WEEK WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO IN STOCKHOLM. THIS MEETING SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY OTHERS, SO THAT HIGH-LEVEL CONSULTATIONS BECOME A REGULAR AND NORMAL COMPONENT OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.

- OUR CHALLENGE IS PEACEFUL. IT WILL BRING OUT THE BEST IN US. IT ALSO CALLS FOR THE BEST FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

✓
- WE DO NOT THREATEN THE SOVIET UNION. FREEDOM POSES A THREAT, IT IS THE LANGUAGE OF PROGRESS. WE PROVED THIS 35 YEARS AGO WHEN WE HAD A MONOPOLY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND COULD HAVE TRIED TO DOMINATE THE WORLD. BE WE DIDN'T. INSTEAD WE USED OUR POWER TO WRITE A NEW CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF MANKIND. WE HELPED REBUILD WAR-RAVAGED ECONOMIES IN EUROPE AND THE FAR EAST, INCLUDING THOSE OF NATIONS WHO HAD BEEN OUR ENEMIES. INDEED, THOSE FORMER ENEMIES ARE NOW NUMBERED AMONG OUR STAUNCFEST FRIENDS.

- WE CAN'T PREDICT HOW THE SOVIET LEADERS WILL RESPOND TO OUR CHALLENGE. BUT THE PEOPLE OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES SHARE WITH ALL MANKIND THE DREAM OF ELIMINATING THE RISKS OF NUCLEAR WAR. IT IS NOT AN IMPOSSIBLE DREAM, BECAUSE ELIMINATING THESE RISKS IS SO CLEARLY A VITAL INTEREST FOR ALL OF US. OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE NEVER FOUGHT EACH OTHER; THERE IS NO REASON WE EVER SHOULD. INDEED, WE FOUGHT COMMON ENEMIES IN WORLD WAR II. TODAY OUR COMMON ENEMIES ARE POVERTY, DISEASE AND, ABOVE ALL, WAR.

- MORE THAN 20 YEARS AGO, PRESIDENT KENNEDY DEFINED AN APPROACH THAT IS AS VALID TODAY AS WHEN HE ANNOUNCED IT:

|| - "SO, LET US NOT BE BLIND TO OUR DIFFERENCES," HE SAID, "BUT LET US ALSO DIRECT ATTENTION TO OUR COMMON INTERESTS AND TO THE MEANS BY WHICH THOSE DIFFERENCES CAN BE RESOLVED."

Kennedy

- WELL, THOSE DIFFERENCES ARE DIFFERENCES IN GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE AND PHILOSOPHY. THE COMMON INTERESTS HAVE TO DO WITH THE THINGS OF EVERYDAY LIFE FOR PEOPLE EVERYWHERE.

- SUPPOSE, FOR A MOMENT, IVAN AND ANYA FOUND THEMSELVES IN A WAITING ROOM, OR SHARING A SHELTER FROM THE RAIN WITH JIM AND SALLY, AND THERE WAS NO LANGUAGE BARRIER TO KEEP THEM FROM GETTING ACQUAINTED. WOULD THEY DEBATE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEIR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS? OR, WOULD THEY FIND THEMSELVES COMPARING NOTES ABOUT THEIR CHILDREN, AND WHAT EACH OTHER DID FOR A LIVING?

- BEFORE THEY PARTED COMPANY THEY WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TOUCHED ON AMBITIONS, HOBBIES, WHAT THEY WANTED FOR THEIR CHILDREN AND THE PROBLEMS OF MAKING ENDS MEET. AND AS THEY WENT THEIR SEPARATE WAYS, ANYA WOULD BE SAYING TO IVAN, "WASN'T SHE NICE, SHE ALSO TEACHES MUSIC." JIM WOULD BE TELLING SALLY WHAT IVAN DID OR DIDN'T LIKE ABOUT

HIS POSS. THEY MIGHT EVEN HAVE DECIDED THAT THEY WERE
ALL GOING TO GET TOGETHER FOR DINNER SOME EVENING SOON.

- ABOVE ALL, THEY WOULD HAVE PROVEN THAT PEOPLE DON'T
MAKE WARS. PEOPLE WANT TO RAISE THEIR CHILDREN IN A
WORLD WITHOUT FEAR, AND WITHOUT WAR. THEY WANT TO HAVE
SOME OF THE GOOD THINGS OVER AND ABOVE BARE SUBSISTENCE
THAT MAKE LIFE WORTH LIVING. THEY WANT TO WORK AT SOME
CRAFT, TRADE, OR PROFESSION THAT GIVES THEM SATISFACTION
AND A SENSE OF WORTH. THEIR COMMON INTERESTS CROSS ALL
BORDERS.

- IF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WANTS PEACE, THEN THERE WILL
BE PEACE. TOGETHER WE CAN STRENGTHEN PEACE, REDUCE -THE --
LEVEL OF ARMS, AND KNOW IN DOING SO WE HAVE HELPED -
FULFILL THE HOPES AND DREAMS OF THOSE WE REPRESENT AND
INDEED OF PEOPLE EVERYWHERE. LET US BEGIN NOW.



TO/À

MEMORANDUM TO:
IDDZ

FROM/DE •

URR

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •
SUJET

President Reagan's Speech to US/USSR
Relations, January 16, 1984.

MAJOR FILE

Security/Sécurité UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date Jan. 16/84
Number/Numéro URR-0024

Mr. Smith
Not much news here.
[Signature]

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

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The objective of President Reagan's "tone" speech - which did not break any new ground on specifics was to modify his bellicose image and rhetoric by:

- (a) signalling to a domestic audience the opening of the President's campaign as a peace candidate by attempting to deal with Democratic allegations about the lack of arms control talks;
- (b) emphasizing the Administration's accomplishments that the Americans own build-up and economic recovery had now made the United States stronger and more effective in dealing with the Soviet Union resulting in a safer world;
- (c) highlighting that the President is committed to practical dialogue with the Soviets in order to alleviate criticism in Europe on the eve of the Stockholm Conference that his Administration had been too truculent and inflexible in resolving arms control differences with the Soviet Union.

Synopsis

The speech represents a strong reiteration of the President's desire for peace. It is candid in criticizing the USSR and in recognizing fundamental differences between the USA and the USSR; but it also points to common interests -- avoidance of war, arms reduction -- and notes that basic philosophical and political differences should not prevent the two superpowers from dealing with each other.

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UNCLASSIFIED

The speech lays down three aims: (i) finding ways to reduce the threat and use of force internationally; (ii) arms reductions; and (iii) better US/USSR bilateral relations. To these ends, the President highlighted three principles: (i) realism -- a candid recognition of inescapable differences combined with ongoing competition and mutual criticism; (ii) strength -- military and economic -- to assure effective deterrence; (iii) but also the need for "serious, constructive" dialogue to contain and resolve international tensions. While preserving peace and reducing arms are the priorities, the President also looks to a further stage of possible constructive bilateral US/USSR cooperation.

The speech signals to the USSR a pragmatic desire to seek solutions to international political tensions as well as flexibility in seeking accords to reverse the arms race. It puts emphasis on renewing arms control discussions and confidence-building measures. It calls on the USSR to respond with concrete actions -- deeds rather than words.

The speech makes clear that there has been no change in the President's deeply held views on the repugnance of Soviet values nor in his intention to continue to criticize these but it is an attempt to engage the Soviets in an effective dialogue to deal with over-riding priorities of peace and arms control. It attempts to improve the climate and prospects for discussions.

State Department Views:

In briefing our Embassy in Washington, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Palmer made three points: (i) the speech is the most comprehensive statement of President Reagan's policy toward the USSR and his first speech to deal exclusively with USA/USSR relations; (ii) the timing, on the eve of the Shultz/Gromyko meeting in Stockholm, is crucial and it is an important signal to the USSR in response to its publicly and privately expressed concern on US rhetoric; and (iii) the speech responds to the expressed concern of US allies on the state of East-West relations and the accompanying rhetoric.

Palmer drew attention to the President's words that "1984 finds the U.S. in its strongest position in years to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with the USSR", and to the quote from President Kennedy's 1963 American University speech, "Let us also direct attention to common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved". This quote he claimed was specifically chosen by Reagan to signal a desire for change to the Soviets and is important symbolically since the Kennedy speech was seen in both the US and USSR as a turning point in US/USSR relations.

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Palmer cautioned against excessive optimism on these relations, however, since there remain several obstacles to any real breakthrough. He also noted the President's linkage of realism with dialogue. While Palmer suggested that Reagan's future rhetoric might be scaled down from the "focus of evil" level, he would still speak candidly and critically about the USSR. There would not be a return to the rhetoric of detente. But the President was signalling a desire to be active in seeking US/USSR agreements.

Palmer noted the deliberate listing and order of priorities as set down by the President: reducing use of force internationally; reducing arsenals; improving bilateral relations.

Palmer said recent US/USSR talks on improving the "hotline" went extremely well. He was also positive on other potential examples of cooperation as well as recent US/USSR contacts which included discussion of reducing unhelpful rhetoric.

Palmer also emphasized the President's contention that U.S. deterrent power had made the world safer, strident rhetoric notwithstanding.

Palmer did not presage novel US arms control proposals to encourage the USSR to renew negotiations but said Shultz would have enough flexibility in his meeting with Gromyko to demonstrate clearly US willingness to read arms accords.

Palmer admitted that coincidence of the President's speech with the forthcoming report to Congress on Soviet violation of previous accords was not ideal but the President had decided personally to bring out the compliance issue, as he did in his speech, rather than to have it emerge later to close the door the speech was designed to open.

The US expects the USSR to criticize the U.S. arms control compliance record in response to the U.S. report and to respond publicly to the speech by calling for concrete U.S. actions to match US words as the President has done with the USSR.

Conclusion

The speech delivered superbly by the President who once again has shown that he can exploit the television medium more effectively than any President since John Kennedy marks a definite improvement in the tone of the Administration's approach to the USSR. The President has signalled a willingness to seek accommodation on key problems of peace and security notwithstanding and without altering his fundamental negative

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assessments of Soviet behaviour or his basic attachment to the principle underlying his approach to dealing with the USSR: deterrence through strength. In our view his remarks respond effectively to domestic concerns about the atmosphere of East-West relations and place the onus for a reply on the USSR without, however, offering anything concrete to entice the Soviets to engage in the dialogue called for by the President.

The official Soviet reaction will predictably be dismissive and critical. However whether the President's statement will be enough in itself to elicit a positive diplomatic response and more flexible approach to existing problems from the Soviets, including the resumption of arms control Talks, is difficult to assess. Matching deeds to words remains a problem for both sides. But the speech does provide an opening to Moscow which they may be encouraged to test, especially if another Reagan term seems a likely prospect. The Shultz-Gromyko meeting and other near-term official US/USSR contacts will be important in determining how the USSR will respond.

In any event, the speech accords with the thrust of the Prime Minister's initiative particularly as presented to President Reagan and could be cited in discussions he might have with the Soviet leaders to try to encourage them to now make a similar step in altering the trend line of East-West relations.



M.G. von Nostitz
Director
U.S. General Relations Division

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WSHDC UNGR1050 16JAN84

TO EXTOTT URR

INFO ATNTA BOSTN BFALO CHCGO CLVND DALAS DTROT LNGLS MNPLS NRLNS
CNGNY PHILA SFRAN SEATL PCOOTT/FOWLER BNATO STKHM/SCDEL
DISTR IIDDZ IDR IDA UGB

REF OURTELS UNGR1049 16JAN;UNGR1004 04JAN

---JOHN GLENN

OUR REFTELS DEALT WITH CANDIDACY OF WALTER MONDALE AND DEMOCRATIC
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION PROCESS.THIS TEL ASSESSES JOHN GLENN'S
CAMPAIGN AND POLICY PROPOSALS.

2.WALTER MONDALE'S CLOSEST CHALLENGER FOR NOMINATION IS JOHN GLENN,
OHIO'S SENIOR SENATOR.A FORMER WORLD WAR II AND KOREAN WAR FIGHTER
PILOT HERO,HE BECAME ASTRONAUT(FIRST AMERICAN TO ORBIT EARTH)AS
SERVING MILITARY OFFICER.IN 1962 HE BEGAN CAREER AS BUSINESS EXECU-
TIVE(ROYAL CROWN COLA;QUESTOR CORP;HOLIDAY INN FRANCHISE).GLENN WAS
FIRST ELECTED TO SENATE IN 1974 FOLLOWING EARLIER TRIES IN 1964 AND
1970(FORMER RACE ABANDONED AFTER HE INJURED HIMSELF).HE HAS BEEN
CAMPAIGNING FOR PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION SINCE APRIL OF LAST YEAR.

3.GLENN'S NATIONAL PROMINENCE STILL OWES MORE TO HIS CAREER AS AN
ASTRONAUT THAN TO HIS SENATE SERVICE.WHILE AN EFFECTIVE AND SERIOUS
LEGISLATOR,HE HAS NOT/NOT BEEN AN ESPECIALLY HIGH PROFILE SENATOR
FROM STANDPOINT OF PUBLIC IMPACT.HE SERVES ON TWO SENATE CTTEES
(FOREIGN RELS AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS)WHERE HE HAS PURSUED HIS KEY

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INTERESTS IN ARMS CONTROL AND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION. HE HAS NOT/NOT BEEN PARTICULARLY NOTED FOR MAJOR DOMESTIC POLICY INITIATIVES. HE IS PROBABLY MOST REMEMBERED IN SENATE FOR HIS OPPOSITION TO SALT II TREATY WHICH HE OPPOSED AS NOT/NOT BEING SUBJ TO ADEQUATE VERIFICATION (A CONTENTION BASED ON TECHNICAL DEFICIENCIES WHICH HE NOW CONSIDERS TO HAVE BEEN OVERCOME). HIS EXPERTISE ON SUBJ OF NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION IS UNPARALLELED IN SENATE. HE WAS ONE OF MAJOR ARCHITECTS OF 1978 NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ACT AND HAS CONSISTENTLY SOUGHT TO BLOCK FOREIGN AID TO COUNTRIES NOT/NOT COMPLYING WITH NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS. HE HAS BEEN CRITICAL OF ADMIN HAWKS AND SEEMED PARTICULARLY TO ENJOY BAITING HAIG IN HIS APPEARANCES BEFORE SENATE CTTEE.

4. ON OTHER ISSUES GLENN HAS BEEN MIDDLE OF ROAD DEMOCRAT AND ACTUALLY MORE LIBERAL THAN HIS OPPONENTS TRY TO MAKE OUT (ON BASIS OF HIS SUPPORT FOR ASPECTS OF REAGAN'S INITIAL ECONOMIC POLICY THRUSTS). IN FACT MAJOR LIBERAL ORGANIZATIONS HERE GIVE HIM FAIRLY GOOD RATINGS HE HAS VOTED AGAINST BANNING ABORTION AND AGAINST SCHOOL PRAYER AND HAS BEEN GENERALLY SUPPORTIVE OF TRADITIONAL DEMOCRATIC SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES. HE IS IDEALISTIC, ASSOCIATED WITH VIRTUES OF SMALL-TOWN AMERICA. HE IS SOMETHING OF A LONER AND IS NOT/NOT A GOOD ORGANIZER OR MANAGER. HIS TASTES ARE SIMPLE AND ABSTEMIOUS AND HE IS ABSOLUTELY HONEST.

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5.HIS CAMPAIGN FOR PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION BEGAN WITH HIGH EXPECTATIONS.WITH ESTABLISHED NAME RECOGNITION,HERO STATUS AND PERCEPTION OF HIM AS IDEAL REP.OF TRADITIONAL AMERICAN VALUES AND AS ONLY CANDIDATE WITH A MOVIE IT WAS CONSIDERED THAT HE WLD MAKE ENORMOUS IMPACT ON DEMOCRATIC RACE.HE WAS AND PROBABLY REMAINS MOST FEARED OF DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES BY WHITE HOUSE BECAUSE HE CAN EFFECTIVELY COMPETE FOR THE CENTRE.MANY DEMOCRATIC PROS AGREE HIS NATIONAL THEMATIC APPEAL WLD MAKE HIM THE BEST CANDIDATE PARTY CLD FIELD AGAINST REAGAN. HE HAS USUALLY DONE BETTER THAN MONDALE IN TRIAL HEAT POLLS AGAINST REAGAN BUT LATER HE HAS BEEN SLIPPING PRECIPITOUSLY IN POLLS VERSUS MONDALE.IT IS NOW COMMONPLACE TO ASSUME THAT MONDALE HAS DEMOCRATIC RACE ALMOST WRAPPED UP BUT THERE IS QUITE A WAY TO GO YET.

6.GLENN'S CAMPAIGN HAS SUFFERED FROM NUMBER OF PROBLEMS.HE HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY LESS SUCCESSFUL THAN MONDALE IN GENERATING FUNDS FOR HIS RACE WHICH RECENTLY LED TO STAFF LAY OFFS IN CAMPAIGN TEAM.HIS COTERIE OF CHIEF ADVISORS HAS BEEN RECYCLED IN RESPONSE TO HIS POOR SHOWING AND HE CONTINUES TO SUFFER FROM ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS IN KEY STATES.EVEN QUOTE RIGHT STUFF UNQUOTE HAS BEEN A BOX OFFICE DISAPPOINTMENT.HIS STRATEGY IN CAMPAIGN HAS ALSO BEEN FAULTED FOR NOT/NOT BEING GEARED TO BEST RELATE TO NOMINATION PROCESS AND DEMOCRATIC PARTY ACTIVISTS WHO ARE EXPECTED TO BE KEY PLAYERS THERE.IN FACT GLENN SIMPLY DID NOT/NOT HAVE KIND OF LONG ESTABLISHED LINKAGES WITH PARTY WITH MONDALE HAS MANAGED TO DEVELOP IN HIS YEARS OF SERVICE AS SENATOR AND VICE-PRES.NOR HAS HE BEEN ABLE TO STIMULATE MUCH IN WAY OF CHARISMATIC APPEAL TO PUBLIC AT LARGE.

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7. AS THINGS NOW STAND GLENNS EFFORTS ARE DIRECTED TO APPEALING BEYOND PARTY ACTIVISTS IN ATTEMPT TO BRING LESS ACTIVIST DEMOCRATS INTO NOMINATION PRIMARIES AND CAUCUSES. NEW MEDIA BLITZ TO BE LAUNCHED THIS MONTH IN NEW HAMPSHIRE AND IOWA IS KEY ELEMENT OF THIS STRATEGY. GLENNS ORGANIZERS ADMIT THAT MONEY IS VERY TIGHT AND THAT THEY CAN MAKE NO/NO MISTAKES FROM NOW ON. THEIR HOPE IS THAT GLENN WILL BE ABLE TO ESTABLISH HIMSELF INITIALLY AS STRONG AND CLEAR NUMBER TWO IN EARLY EVENTS AND THEN GO ON TO DEVELOP GROUNDSWELL SUPPORT IN LATER CAUCUSES AND PRIMARIES. THEY THUS HOPE THAT JESSE JACKSON IN PARTICULAR WILL DRAW BLACK DEMOCRATIC VOTE FROM MONDALE (ESPECIALLY IN SOUTH) GIVING GLENN BETTER OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAL TO MORE MIDDLE OF ROAD WHITE DEMOCRATS WHO ARE NOT/TAKEN BY MONDALES QUOTE SPECIAL INTERESTS UNQUOTE CAMPAIGN.

8. IN HIS CAMPAIGN GLENN HAS FOCUSED ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES IN KEEPING WITH HIS PAST INTEREST IN SUBJ. HE HAS ARTICULATED DETAILED FIVE POINT PLAN ON THAT FRONT CALLING FOR (IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER): ARMS FREEZE; WORKING TO REDUCE EXISTING NUCLEAR ARMS LEVELS; ENFORCEMENT OF NON-PROLIFERATION LAWS; DRAWING OTHER NUCLEAR STATES INTO DIALOGUE; EXPANDING ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS BEYOND NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

9. SECOND MAIN PLANK IS HANDLING OF ECONOMY AND DEFICIT. WHILE HE HAS RESISTED CLIMBING ON INDUSTRIAL POLICY BANDWAGON BEING PROMOTED BY DEMOCRATS THIS YEAR, HE HAS PROPOSED NUMBER OF SPECIFIC MEASURES TO REDUCE DEFICIT INCLUDING 10 PERCENT TAX SURCHARGE AND REDUCTIONS

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IN MILITARY SPENDING(CUTTING MX,RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE AND OTHER ITEMS)ALTHOUGH NOT/NOT WHOLESALE CUTBACK.HE HAS ALSO COME OUT IN SUPPORT OF CURBING ACID RAIN HERE AND HAS INDICATED HIS INTENTION TO INTRODUCE SENATE BILL THIS YR.(A PRETTY GUTSY STAND FOR SOMEONE FROM ONE OF MAIN POLLUTION SOURCE STATES).ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES HE IS ONLY DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE STILL SUPPORTING PRESENCE OF MARINES IN BEIRUT ALTHOUGH IN LONGER TERM HE ARGUES FOR REVITALIZATION OF CAMP DAVID PROCESS.HE OPPOSES ADMIN ON ASPECTS OF POLICY ON CENTRAL AMERICA.HE SUPPORTS MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO EL SALVADOR ALTHOUGH IN CONJUNCTION WITH CURBING DEATH SQUADS AND IS AGAINST SUPPORT FOR CONTRAS IN NICARAGUA ARGUING THAT THIS IS CONTRARY TO USAS OAS OBLIGATIONS.

10.GLENNS EFFORTS IN NEXT TWO MONTHS WILL BE MAKE OR BREAK PROPOSITION FOR HIM(AS FOR MOST OTHERS IN RACE)GIVEN NOMINATION RULES. HE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY CONTINUE TO BANG AWAY AT MONDALE AS CAPTIVE OF SO MANY SPECIAL INTERESTS THAT HE WLD BE INCAPABLE OF SAYING NO/NO TO ANYONE IF ELECTED.THIS TACK TOGETHER WITH MEDIA MESSAGE PORTRAYING GLENN AS EFFECTIVE AND BROADLY EXPERIENCED POLITICAL FIGURE WITH BUSINESS,MILITARY AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND WILL BE MAJOR THRUSTS OF HIS DRIVE WHICH WILL HOPEFULLY KEEP HIM IN RACE BEYOND EARLY EVENTS.

11.SHLD HE FAIL,HIS ROLE IN USA POLITICS WILL NOT/NOT END SINCE HE WLD REMAIN INFLUENTIAL USA SENATOR PARTICULARLY IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

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MASTER FILE

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Division Phoned _____
Person _____
Local Time _____

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR1048 16JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ URR PCOOTT/FOWLER FLASH

INFO MOSCO BNATO LDN ROME PARIS BONN VMBFR HAGUE BRU PEKIN TOKYO
PRMNY CANMILREPNATO NDHQOTT/ADMPOOL/CPP/DACPOL/DNACPOL/DSTRATA/CIS
GENEV OSLO COPEN ATHNA PRMNY/BEESELEY
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDR RBD ZSI UGB IDD MINE MINT RBR RCR
RSR RCD RSD CPD ZSP URT URE LCD LSD

---PRES REAGANS SPEECH

WE WERE BRIEFED THIS AM BY DEP ASST SEC PALMER ON PRES REAGANS SPEECH
WHICH WILL BE DELIVERED AT 1000 AM. PALMER SAID SPEECH WAS IMPORTANT
FOR THREE REASONS: (A) IT IS THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT OF PRES
REAGANS POLICY TO THE USSR AND IS HIS FIRST SPEECH DEALING EXCLUS-
IVELY WITH USA/USSR RELS; (B) TIMING OF SPEECH COMES AT CRUCIAL STAGE
IN US/USSR RELS; ON THE EVE OF IMPORTANT WEDNESDAY MTG WITH SHULTZ
AND GROMYKO. IT CONTAINS AN IMPORTANT SIGNAL TO THE USSR WHICH HAS
EXPRESSED BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY CONCERN WITH USA RHETORIC;
(C) THE SPEECH CONSTITUTES A RESPONSE TO USA ALLIES WHO HAVE BEEN
EXPRESSING CONCERN ABOUT THE STATE OF EAST/WEST RELS AND THE RHETORIC
THAT HAS GONE WITH IT.

2. PALMER SAID THAT THE KEY NOTE SENTENCES OF THE SPEECH (WHICH HAS
BEEN FAXED TO IDDZ/URR AND PCOOTT) ARE FIRST QUOTE I BELIEVE 1984
FINDS THE UNITED STATES IN ITS STRONGEST POSITION IN YEARS TO
ESTABLISH A CONSTRUCTIVE AND REALISTIC WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH

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THE SOVIET UNION UNQUOTE AND SECOND THE QUOTATION AT THE END OF THE SPEECH FROM PRES KENNEDY WHICH SAYS QUOTE SO LET US NOT/NOT BE BLIND TO OUR DIFFERENCES, BUT LET US ALSO DIRECT ATTENTION TO OUR COMMON INTERESTS AND TO THE MEANS BY WHICH THOSE DIFFERENCES CAN BE RESOLVED UNQUOTE. PALMER SAID THIS QUOTE WAS SPECIFICALLY CHOSEN BY REAGAN TO SIGNAL A DESIRE FOR CHANGE TO THE SOVS. THIS QUOTATION FROM KENNEDY'S SPEECH AT AMERICAN UNIVERSITY HAS IN THE PAST BEEN SEEN AS A TURNING POINT IN USA/USSR RELS NOT/NOT ONLY BY AMERICAN EXPERTS BUT BY SOV EXPERTS. ITS SYMBOLIC VALUE IS THEREFORE VERY IMPORTANT AND IT IS NO/NO ACCIDENT THAT THIS WAS CHOSEN AS THE THEME OF THE SPEECH.

3. IN PRESENTING THE SPEECH PALMER SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE TOOK NOTE OF THE CAUTIONS THE SPEECH CONTAINED. DESPITE REAGAN'S REALISTIC RELATIONSHIP WE SHLD NOT/NOT BE TOO OPTIMISTIC. THERE ARE SEVERAL REASONS WHY THIS MAY NOT/NOT BE A YEAR OF MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH. AND PALMER POINTED TO PARAGRAPH ON PAGE 4 OF SPEECH IN WHICH PRES REAGAN BRINGS TOGETHER REALISM AND DIALOGUE. THIS IS THE PARAGRAPH THAT BEGINS QUOTE I HAVE OPENLY EXPRESSED MY VIEW OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM... UNQUOTE. PALMER SAID WE SHLD TAKE THIS TO MEAN WHILE PRES WILL NOT/NOT IN FUTURE USE PHRASES LIKE QUOTE FOCUS ON EQUAL UNQUOTE HE WILL NEVERTHELESS CONTINUE TO SPEAK CANDIDLY ABOUT THE SOV UNION. WE SHLD NOT/NOT EXPECT A RETURN TO DETENTIST RHETORIC. SPEECHES WILL

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REMAIN CANDID, FOCUSING EVEN AS THIS ONE DOES ON SOV ARMS BUILDUPS, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND FAILURE TO ADHERE TO ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS RATHER THAN ON VAGUE STATEMENTS OF COOPERATION. PALMER SAID PRES HAS NOT CHANGED HIS VIEW OF USSR. WITH THIS SPEECH HE IS SIGNALING DESIRE TO BE ACTIVE IN SEEKING AGREEMENT.

4. PALMER ALSO DREW ATTENTION TO THREE PRIORITY AREAS OF COOPERATION THAT PRES HAD LISTED. PALMER POINTED OUT THAT ORDER OF PRIORITY IS NOT/NOT ACCIDENTAL AND REFLECTS PRESIDENTS CONCERNS. FIRST AREA IS QUOTE TO FIND WAYS TO REDUCE--AND EVENTUALLY TO ELIMINATE--THE THREAT AND USE OF FORCE IN SOLVING INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES UNQUOTE. THE SECOND AREA IS QUOTE TO FIND WAYS TO REDUCE THE VAST STOCKPILE OF ARMAMENTS IN THE WORLD UNQUOTE AND THE THIRD IS FOR USA AND USSR TO ESTABLISH A BETTER WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH EACH OTHER, ON MARKED BY GREATER COOPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING UNQUOTE.

5. AS POSSIBLE EVIDENCE FOR OPTIMISM PALMER SAID THAT THE HOTLINE TALKS LAST WEEK BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WENT EXTREMELY WELL. THESE TALKS DO NOT/NOT CONSTITUTE A BREAKTHROUGH BUT NEVERTHELESS IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT THE TALKS WENT SMOOTHLY. SIMILARLY THE SOVS LAST WEEK INDICATED THAT THEY WERE READY TO GO AHEAD ON USA/USSR MARITIME BOUNDARY TALKS. PALMER ALSO SAID THAT GROMYKO MAY BE INDICATING SOMETHING ELSE IN THE AREA OF CO-OP AT THE MTG WITH SHULTZ IN STKM. WHEN QUESTIONED FURTHER HE DECLINED TO ELABORATE SAYING ONLY THAT SOVS HAD IN CONFIDENCE GIVING USA SOME HINTS. PALMER ALSO SAID THAT ...4

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RECENT MONTHS HAVE SEEN INCREASED DIALOGUE ON ISSUES SUCH AS THE MIDDLE EAST. HE SAID THAT HARTMAN HAD MET SEVERAL TIMES WITH SENIOR SOV OFFICIALS INCLUDING GROMYKO. DOBRYNIN HAD ALSO MET WITH SHULTZ AND AMERICAN OFFICIALS MORE RECENTLY AMONG THE MAJOR SUBJS FOR DISCUSSION WAS THE IMPORTANCE OF LESSENING THE AMOUNT OF UNHELPFUL RHETORIC.

6. PALMER ALSO PUT CONSIDERABLE EMPHASIS ON PARA THAT READS QUOTE THIS MAY BE THE REASON WEVE BEEN HEARING SUCH STRIDENT RHETORIC FROM THE KREMLIN RECENTLY. THESE HARSH WORDS HAVE LFD SOME TO SPEAK OF HEIGHTENED UNCERTAINTY AND AN INCREASED DANGER OF CONFLICT. THIS IS UNDERSTANDABLE, BUT PROFOUNDLY MISTAKEN. LOOK BEYOND THE WORDS, AND ONE FACT STANDS OUT: AMERICAS DETERRENCE IS MORE CREDIBLE AND IT IS MAKING THE WORLD A SAFER PLACE; SAFER NOW BECAUSE THERE IS LESS DANGER THAT THE SOV LEADERSHIP WILL UNDERESTIMATE OUR STRENGTH OR QUESTION OUR RESOLVE UNQUOTE. PALMER SAID THAT PRES REAGAN FIRMLY BELIEVES THIS AND BELIEVES THAT WE ARE MOVING AWAY FROM WAR.

AMERICAN DETERMINATION SHOWN OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS HAS CONVINCED THE SOV UNION THAT IT WLD BE A MISTAKE TO ASSUME THE USA IS NOT/NOT DETERMINED TO STAND UP TO THE SOV UNION. AT ANOTHER POINT IN THE BRIEFING PALMER SEEMED TO CONTRADICT THIS VIEW BY SAYING THAT THE USA DID NOT/NOT KNOW HOW THE SHULTZ/GROMYKO MTG WLD GO BECAUSE GROMYKO CAN BE VERY DIFFICULT EVEN AT THE BEST OF TIMES AND THESE QUOTE CERTAINLY ARE NOT/NOT GOOD TIMES UNQUOTE.

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7. PALMER WAS ASKED IF THE USA WLD DO ANYTHING TO QUOTE HELP UNQUOTE THE SOVS COME BACK TO THE ARMS CONTROL TALKS. HE SAID THAT THE USA WILL NOT/NOT BE PUTTING FORWARD ANY BLINDINGLY NEW IDEAS. HOWEVER THE MANDATE SEC SHULTZ IS TAKING WITH HIM TO STKHM HAS ENOUGH FLEXIBILITY IN IT TO CLFARLY ILLUSTRATE TO THE SOVS AMERICAN WILLINGNESS TO REACH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. PALMER SAID THAT IF THE DISCUSSIONS ARE POSITIVE IN TONE SHULTZ WILL BE FAR MORE INCLINED TO USE THIS FLEXIBILITY. PALMER SAID THAT THE STATEMENT IN THE SPEECH QUOTE WHENEVER THE SOV UNION IS READY TO DO LIKEWISE WE WILL MEET THEM HALFWAY UNQUOTE IS INTENDED ALSO TO BE A SIGNAL OF FLEXIBILITY.

8. PALMER ADMITTED THAT THE COINCIDENCE OF THE SPEECH WITH THE USA REPORT TO CONGRESS ON COMPLIANCE TENDED TO UNDERCUT SOMEWHAT THE THRUST OF THE PRESIDENTS SPEECH. HOWEVER THE PRES PERSONALLY HAD DECIDED THAT IT WAS BETTER TO BRING OUT THE COMPLIANCE ISSUE QUESTION IN ADVANCE OF THE SPEECH RATHER THAN TO DO SO LATER FOR DOING SO LATER WLD HAVE THE EFFECT OF SLAMMING SHUT A DOOR THAT HAD JUST BEEN OPENED. USA EXPECTS THAT SOVS WILL NOW ACCUSE THE USA OF ARMS CONTROL VIOLATION TOO.

9. PALMER SAID THE USA EXPECTS THE INITIAL SOV REACTION AT LEAST IN PUBLIC TO THE SPEECH WILL BE THAT SPEECH IS NOT/NOT A SUBSTANTIVE MOVE AND THAT USA WILL HAVE TO FOLLOW-UP ITS WORDS WITH ACTION. HE SAID THAT IN USA VIEW THE SOVS HAVE STILL NOT/NOT DETERMINED

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HOW THEY WANT TO MOVE IN THEIR RELS WITH USA IN THE NEXT YR. WE NOTED THAT THE SOVS HAD ALREADY CHARACTERIZED THIS SPEECH AS A QUOTE PSEUDO-PEACEFUL TIRADE UNQUOTE AND WONDERED ON WHAT BASIS THEY HAD DONE SO. PALMER SAID THAT DOBRYNIN HAD BEEN BRIEFED ON THE SPEECH ON SATURDAY, AND THAT SOV CORRESPONDENT HAD ATTENDED THE PRESS BACKGROUNDER DONE BY NSC ADVISER MCFARLANE ON SATURDAY. WHEN WE RAISED OUR EYEBROWS AT THE LATE BRIEFING OF THE ALLIES PALMER SAID THAT BRIEFING OF THE ALLIES HAD BEEN DELAYED UNTIL A FINAL TEXT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED. HE SAID THAT THE C NCLUDING SECTION FOR EXAMPLE HAD BEEN ADDED ONLY YESTERDAY BY THE PRES PERSONALLY.

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External Affairs Canada
Affaires extérieures Canada

ACTION MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

WDC 010/18
NOTE A DOMINION COMMUNICATIONS
Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	UNCLASSIFIED - FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION	12	10
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TO/A	TO EXTOTE/IDDZ/CALDER		
INFO			
DISTR	—NUCLEAR FREEZE AND ARMS CONTROL - 27 PAGES		
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DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG		288	SIG <i>R.J. LYSYSHYN/th</i>

EXT 010 : (22/2)

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ARMS CONTROL VS. THE FREEZE

by ---

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**CONFERENCE ON THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
FREEZE AND ARMS CONTROL**

**Cambridge, Massachusetts
January 13-15, 1983**

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Over the past year, the nuclear freeze movement has brought to the forefront of public discussion a deceptively attractive, simple solution to the arms race -- freeze it! Calling for an absolute prohibition on the production, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, advocates argue that a freeze can truly bring about a halt in the arms race and reduce the dangers of nuclear war.

The nuclear freeze has been as popular as it is simple. But is it really a plausible path to meaningful arms control, or is it a distraction that makes genuine arms control far more difficult to achieve?

There has been much debate on this question, and surely there is more to come. However, a serious review of the issue forces the conclusion that the nuclear freeze proposal has such serious drawbacks as to make it unsuitable as the basis for meaningful arms control.

The Freeze as Sentiment

The rapid growth of the nuclear freeze movement is a phenomenon which cannot be fully explained. However, it is clear that a number of factors were instrumental in boosting the visibility and the political clout of the freeze movement, and they all have a common element -- fear. The fear of nuclear war has once again spawned a movement of concerned men, women and children who demand that we avoid Armageddon.

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The roots of the freeze movement go as far back as we care to look, but its more recent impetus has come from the increased attention to defense issues and the undeniable growth in the Soviet threat. The 1980 election in large part turned on the question of defense, and the Reagan Administration has made the rebuilding of US defenses a central element of its program.

The continuing public focus on threats to US security and the huge defense expenditures necessary to meet those threats have helped to create a backlash or an aversion to matters related to defense. This aversion has been particularly strong with respect to our nuclear arsenal where a major modernization of our nuclear forces has served to rekindle strong anti-nuclear sentiment. Anxieties were ~~exacerbated~~ even further by several statements by Reagan Administration officials concerning nuclear weapons and nuclear war, and since then some politicians have sought to exploit anti-nuclear sentiment for ballot-box gains, and authors and publishers have cashed in as well.

The fear and anxiety that is so much a part of the nuclear freeze movement is, of course, understandable. There has been dangerous developments in the nuclear balance in recent years, and a nuclear war would most certainly be unimaginably horrible. But it takes more than fear to prevent nuclear war. It takes a dual strategy of deterrence and arms control.

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The very foundation of peace in the nuclear age has been America's strategy of deterrence. Since the earliest days of our possession of nuclear weapons, the United States has sought to prevent war by discouraging aggression against the United States and its allies. By threatening any aggressor with the certainty of unacceptable levels of destruction an uneasy peace has been maintained. The history of the twentieth century makes it sadly clear that peaceful intentions and good motives alone never stop aggressors. Military strength does, and the strategy of deterrence has been highly successful in protecting America's security since the end of World War II.

But America has pursued a dual policy since the end of World War II. In addition to maintaining strong military forces for deterrence, we have also vigorously pursued arms control as a complement to our policy of deterrence.

Thus while anxiety over the threat of nuclear war is well warranted, we cannot let fear dictate our response. The proven course of deterrence and arms control is the best means of preventing nuclear war and preserving the peace. A nuclear freeze would be harmful to deterrence and to meaningful arms control and thus a freeze should be rejected.

The Flaws of the Freeze

The arguments against the nuclear freeze proposal are many and would apply to most, if not all, of the various freeze formulae that have been proposed. The most popular freeze proposal, and the one which has earned the nuclear

freeze label, is the Congressional Resolution introduced by ⁶/₃₀ Senators Kennedy and Hatfield and its companion measure introduced in the House of Representatives. This resolution calls for an immediate mutual and verifiable freeze on production, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. This proposal is surely well intentioned, but it will not help accomplish effective arms control. In fact, if a freeze were to be implemented, it would endanger American security and the security of our allies.

The first, and probably the strongest, argument against the nuclear freeze proposal is that a freeze would preserve the current high level of nuclear forces and would thus preserve an unequal and unstable strategic balance.

The experts have hotly debated the exact status of the strategic balance for years, but there is no debate that the balance has shifted dramatically in recent years in favor of the Soviet Union. There is debate over whether parity still exists, but there is little opposition to the view that present trends cannot continue without directly harming the security interests of the United States.

As a result of a massive 15-year military buildup, the Soviet Union has now surged ahead of the United States in every static measure of strategic power except one -- total strategic warheads. In missile throw-weight, missile warheads, ICBMs, SLBMs and even strategic bombers, the Soviet Union has gained the advantage; and qualitatively the Soviet Union has caught up as well.

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In addition to numerical advantages, the average age of Soviet strategic weapons and their delivery systems has come down considerably while the average age of US systems has gone up. According to US Department of Defense figures, 77 percent of Soviet systems are less than five-years-old while 77 percent of US systems are in excess of 15 years of age.

Thus, if a freeze were implemented, the United States would be frozen with aging systems with no opportunity to modernize those forces to ensure a strong and credible deterrent.

Our current strategic weapon systems will also become increasingly vulnerable over time, and a vulnerable deterrent is an invitation to catastrophe. The vulnerability of our land-based missile force is already a matter of major concern. While the freeze would lock us into these and other current systems, the freeze would not prevent advances in conventional air defenses or anti-submarine warfare that could threaten the remaining two elements of our strategic triad. But a freeze would prevent the production of the Stealth bomber and other advances that could counter steadily improving Soviet air defenses. Similarly, the freeze would prevent the production of new Trident submarine and other efforts to stay ahead of advances in anti-submarine warfare.

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In short, a nuclear freeze would weaken deterrence over time and thus make nuclear war more rather than less likely. 8/27

The present nuclear balance in Europe is also one which should not be frozen in its present state. A freeze now would give the Soviet Union an overwhelming nuclear advantage in intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe to the detriment of our own and our allies' security.

A second important argument that flows from the first is that by freezing at today's high and unequal levels, a nuclear freeze would undercut our START and INF negotiations and make the prospects for actual arms reduction^s less likely. ✓

The United States is currently engaged in two separate negotiations with the Soviet Union seeking nuclear arms reduction^s. In those negotiations, the United States has put forward dramatic reductions proposals: in START, the US is calling for one-third reductions in ballistic missile warheads, and a cut in the number of deployed missiles to about one-half the current US levels. In the INF negotiations, the US has proposed the elimination of a whole category of intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The Soviet Union has responded with counterproposals that also envisage arms reduction^s. While the Soviet proposals have not been acceptable to the United States, it is important to note that the principal of reductions has been accepted.

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This is quite significant, especially in view of the fact that the recent SALT II negotiations produced a draft treaty which would have allowed both sides to almost double their nuclear warhead inventory within the terms of the agreement.

Thus, in a very real sense we have already moved far beyond a freeze, and we should not waste the months and years it would take to negotiate the terms of a verifiable nuclear freeze if, in fact, that were possible. Supporters of a freeze may believe that a freeze agreement could be easily arrived at, but experience has shown that any meaningful agreement would require agreed definitions, counting rules and other details which would unavoidably complicate the implementation of the conceptually simple nuclear freeze proposal.

Aside from the complexities of implementing a freeze, US agreement to a freeze would destroy Soviet incentives for accepting an arms reduction agreement. A freeze at today's force levels would preserve the Soviet Union in a position of relative advantage. The Soviets thus would have every incentive to prolong a freeze and avoid coming to an agreement on arms reductions to lower but equal levels.

Unless the United States and its allies demonstrate their will to take the actions necessary to restore the nuclear balance, the Soviets will have little incentive to agree to reductions in their own forces. Indeed, the Soviet Union initially refused our offers to negotiate on

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INF systems while they deployed several hundred [new] SS-20 missile systems. They agreed to come to the negotiating table only when it became clear that we and our NATO allies were determined to take steps to counter those SS-20 deployments unless an arms control agreement were reached. A unilateral US withdrawal from the allied "dual track" decision of 1979, which has consistently been endorsed by all NATO governments, would also cause serious doubt on American leadership of NATO and our readiness to fulfill our commitments to the defense of Europe.

Similarly, the freeze would leave the US with a vulnerable land-based missile system, an aging and less credible bomber force, and a submarine fleet which faces block obsolescence in the 1990s. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, would have an arsenal of newer, heavier ICBMs, newer ballistic missile-firing submarines and over 250 modern Backfire bombers built during the 1970s. Under these circumstances, there would be little reason for the Soviet Union to agree to reductions.

A third important argument against the nuclear freeze is that it is just not verifiable in many important respects. Simply prefacing a freeze proposal with an incantation that it must be mutual and verifiable just doesn't make it so.

As proposed, a freeze would cover production, testing and deployment of strategic nuclear weapons. However, of

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those three categories, only deployment is verifiable with ¹¹/₂₂ high confidence, and there are exceptions to that. Verifying a ban on nuclear testing would be extremely difficult, and the possibility of surreptitious testing at lower-yield levels would be significant. With respect to production of nuclear weapons, however, the task of verifying a freeze becomes unmanageable. Even with on-site inspection, the possibility of detecting the production of nuclear weapons would be low.

Thus inadequate verification alone is a sufficient argument against the nuclear freeze as proposed.

The Freeze Ignore Deterrence

There are other arguments against the nuclear freeze, but they are mostly subsidiary to those mentioned here. However, there is one additional criticism of the freeze that needs to be made. The freeze proposal ignores deterrence. It assumes that deterrence is stable and easily maintained no matter what the strategic nuclear balance sheet looks like. It assumes that the vulnerability and looming obsolescence of US strategic systems will not affect the viability of deterrence. In short, it assumes that the concept of minimum deterrence is valid -- that so long as the United States retains the capacity to destroy a few Soviet cities then deterrence will prevail.

Implications of a Nuclear Freeze

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March 9, 1983



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is a statement by Richard R. Burt, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, before the Subcommittees on Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems of the House Committee on Armed Services, March 9, 1983.

I particularly welcome the opportunity to testify before this committee on the subject of a possible freeze on the U.S. nuclear arsenal. I welcome it for several reasons:

- Because this is an issue of such fundamental importance to the security of the United States;
- Because of its impact on our allies; and
- Ultimately, because of its importance to the maintenance of peace.

The prevention of nuclear war is the highest priority of this Administration. It must be the highest priority of any administration in the nuclear age. All of us know what nuclear war would mean for our country and the world. As the President himself has repeatedly said, in such a war there can be no winners.

No one has a monopoly on the desire to avoid a nuclear catastrophe. We recognize that nuclear freeze proposals issue from a profound concern about the danger of nuclear war; we fully share that concern. We also know that those proposals are supported by many who are deeply committed to rapid and significant progress in arms control. We, too, share that commitment.

The debate here is not over ends; it is about means. It is not a debate be-

tween those with good and those with malevolent intentions. The issue is how to translate the good intentions of those who desire effective arms control into actions which will achieve that end.

I believe the proposals for a freeze on the U.S. nuclear arsenal—however well intentioned they are and however attractive they may seem—would not achieve their stated purpose. On the contrary, I am convinced that they would diminish our national security and ultimately increase, not reduce, the danger of war.

- A freeze would encourage, rather than discourage, threatening Soviet behavior.
- It would hinder, rather than help, our efforts to achieve effective arms control.
- And it would weaken, rather than strengthen, the Atlantic alliance which is the cornerstone of our own security.

Implications for Our Relations With the Soviet Union

The effective management of our relations with the Soviet Union is essential to the preservation of peace and stability in the world. Toward that end, our policy toward the Soviet Union must be based on consistency, resolve, and national and allied unity. We cannot successfully manage this vital relationship—we cannot moderate Soviet international conduct—on the basis of gestures which would only be interpreted as signs of weakness and division.

• Unilateral U.S. restraint during the 1970s, which was tantamount to a freeze on our part, did not produce Soviet restraint. On the contrary, the Soviet Union implemented expansionist policies in far regions of the world and carried out the most intensive conventional and nuclear military buildup in peacetime history.

The changes in the military balance—or as the Soviets would say, the correlation of forces—which resulted from our respective policies during the 1970s mean that even a mutual freeze under present circumstances would only legitimize the existing Soviet nuclear advantage with uncertain and potentially dangerous political and military consequences.

The Soviet Union has itself frequently advanced proposals for freezing forces, so as to conserve the military advantages it has acquired and avoid having to undertake significant reductions in arms control negotiations.

A freeze would undermine the relative capability of our nuclear deterrent vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and, as a result, the credibility of our strategy of deterrence, which has successfully preserved the peace for over three decades. Moreover, as you know, it would not be verifiable.

The Soviet leadership's assessment of our resolve is every bit as important to the effectiveness of deterrence as is the Soviet calculation of our military capability. But even a nonbinding freeze would raise the most fundamental questions about our will to deter aggression and, if necessary, repel it with force.

Implications for Arms Control

Many proponents of a freeze maintain that it could be an effective first step toward arms control. In fact, I fear that it would have just the opposite effect. As you know, we are engaged in a variety of arms control endeavors.

In START (strategic arms limitation talks), we are seeking deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons, whose existence inspires such justified concern, and we are focusing our efforts on the most destabilizing systems, namely land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles.

In INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces), we have proposed the elimination of an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons—an unprecedented offer in the history of nuclear arms control. The President has at the same time made clear that this is not a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Ambassador Nitze [Paul H. Nitze, head of the INF negotiations] has been authorized to explore any

possible solutions which would take four fundamental principles into account.

- Any agreement must provide for equal levels between the United States and the Soviet Union.
- As a corollary, no agreement should include the independent national deterrents of France and Great Britain.
- An agreement should not have the effect of transferring the threat from Europe to Asia.
- And any agreement must provide for effective verification.

These are not only eminently fair and reasonable conditions. They are absolutely vital to serious and effective arms control. It remains for the Soviet Union to decide whether it will negotiate on the basis of them.

We are also seeking significant reductions of military manpower in Europe in the MBFR [mutual and balanced force reductions] negotiations, as well as a total verifiable ban on chemical weapons, which we are pursuing in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

In all of these negotiations we are pursuing the same goal: arms control agreements which will enhance peace and stability not by just placing a ceiling on the arms race but by actually producing verifiable, militarily significant reductions in armaments.

The principal obstacle to progress in all these arms control endeavors so far has been Soviet reluctance to agree to significant reductions and/or to a verification regime which would guarantee compliance.

Whether the Soviet Union will change its position in this regard is difficult to predict. But it is certain that it will not if it has no incentive to do so. A freeze would, in effect, reward the Soviet Union for its arms buildup.

The Soviets have agreed to real arms control only when it has been in their interest to do so. You will recall the major debate over the ABM [antiballistic missile] system. Only when the Congress—by one vote—authorized the government to proceed with the ABM did the Soviet Union have the incentive to enter into negotiations on and eventually agree to the ABM Treaty.

Prior to NATO's 1979 dual-track INF decision, the Soviet Union was unwilling to consider control on the SS-20 missiles. It was only after that decision was taken and after the Soviets were finally convinced, on the basis of U.S. and allied preparations, that we were fully committed to implementing the 1979 decision did they agree to negotiations.

We must ask ourselves whether the Soviet Union would be in Geneva today

negotiating over these systems if we had not moved ahead with preparations for counterdeployments of U.S. longer range INF missiles. Similarly, the prospect of U.S. strategic modernization continues to be a vital element in ensuring serious START negotiations.

With your permission I would like briefly to read to you the views of Ambassadors Nitze and Rowny [Edward L. Rowny, special representative for arms control and disarmament negotiations] on the freeze question:

• Ambassador Nitze reports that, "... the passage [of a freeze resolution] would seriously undermine our ability to negotiate an equitable agreement. ... Continuation of NATO preparations for deployment of U.S. longer-range INF missiles in Europe and the prospect of that deployment are the strongest incentives the Soviets have to negotiate seriously. ... Were the development and deployment of U.S. longer-range INF missiles to be deferred, we would have virtually no bargaining leverage with the Soviets. They would have every reason to draw out the negotiations indefinitely without results."

• Ambassador Rowny, for his part, advises that "negotiations on reducing strategic arms would be made immensely more difficult, if not impossible, by passage of a freeze resolution. ... The Soviets would have no incentive to negotiate."

We should not delude ourselves. A mutual freeze would be every bit as difficult to negotiate as arms reductions themselves—indeed, such a complete ban on production, development, and deployment of new systems could prove even more complicated than our current complex and difficult arms talks.

Moreover, a freeze would be a step backward. In START both sides have accepted the concept of reductions; in INF the Soviets have moved away from rigid insistence on the maintenance of current SS-20 force levels. Why should we throw away the opportunity to achieve real reductions in the talks which are now under way in exchange for the uncertain and potentially dangerous alternative of a freeze?

Implications for Relations With Our Allies

The U.S. strategic deterrent is fundamental to the effectiveness—even the survival—of NATO.

• Militarily, our nuclear forces are the capstone of NATO's deterrent and the linchpin of our strategy of flexible response. They are the ultimate link between European security and our own, as the only forces which ultimately can deter the Soviets from using, or

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threatening to use, their own nuclear potential or massive conventional forces.

Politically and psychologically, our strategic deterrent and the presence of U.S. troops in Europe symbolize our commitment to the defense of Europe and our conviction that the security of Western Europe and our own security are, indeed, indivisible.

A freeze would undermine our capacity to defend Europe, and it would inspire doubts among European leaders and publics about our resolve to do so. As such, it would have the most deleterious effect on the underpinnings of the alliance.

It is significant that no major allied government, all of which support arms control in principle but are deeply concerned about Soviet nuclear modernization and the current nuclear balance, has spoken out in favor of a freeze. Indeed, they have all repeatedly rejected Europe-wide freeze proposals offered by the Soviet Union. By destroying the deployment track of the NATO two-track decision, a freeze would cut the ground out from under these European leaders who have steadfastly held to implementation of that decision.

call into question the will and ability of the United States to exercise its leadership in a manner which protects the interests of all.

Conclusion

To sum up, I believe that the consequences of a freeze resolution would be the opposite of those its proponents hope to achieve.

- It would encourage irresponsible, rather than restrained, Soviet conduct.

- It would threaten stability by preventing reestablishment of the strategic balance, rather than strengthening that balance.

- It would cripple, rather than advance, our arms control initiatives:

- It would weaken, not strengthen, the Atlantic alliance upon which our own security so heavily depends.

- It would heighten the risk of war, rather than strengthen the peace.

mind in the course of your deliberations. We share with you the same objectives of preventing war and securing the peace and the same commitment to effective arms control as an essential means to that end. We believe the President's program—the most comprehensive arms control program ever set out by any American administration—is the best way of fully achieving this objective. □

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* AS. 15.

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MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF A NUCLEAR FREEZE

A Nuclear Freeze Today Would:

- **Codify Soviet Advantages**
- **Increase the Vulnerability of our Forces**
- **Derail Real Opportunities for Arms Control**

**In Short, a Freeze would Undercut Both Deterrence and
Negotiations.**

16/27
**FREEZE WOULD BE DANGEROUS FOR
MILITARY BALANCE AND IMPEDE
ARMS CONTROL**

A Freeze would:

- **Reward the Soviet Union for Massive Buildup and Penalize American Restraint**
- **Codify Dangerous Soviet Advantages**
- **Prevent Replacement of Aging and Vulnerable U.S. Systems**
- **Prevent Safety and Security Improvements to U.S. Systems**
- **Prevent NATO Force Modernization and Undercut NATO Deterrence**
- **Setback Real Arms Control**
- **Undermine U.S. Leadership of NATO Alliance**

12/2

A FREEZE AT CURRENT LEVELS WOULD REWARD THE USSR FOR A MILITARY BUILDUP AND PENALIZE THE U.S. FOR RESTRAINT

USSR

- In the Last 15 Years, 60 SSBNs Deployed in 5 New or Improved Classes
- Since Salt I, About 1/2 of SLBMs Replaced with 3 New SLBM Types; A New SLBM Type is being Tested
- Since Salt I, Over Half of ICBMs Replaced with 10 Variants of 3 New ICBMs
- Since Salt I, Over 200 Backfire Bombers with Inherent Intercontinental Range Deployed

US

- Now Deploying Trident Submarines, the First SSBNs Built Since 1967
- 1 New Type of SLBM Introduced Since Salt I
- Minuteman III Modified, But no New Types of ICBMs Deployed Since 1970, Before Salt I
- No New Intercontinental Bomber in Over 20 Years

Since Salt I was Signed, the USSR has Spent the Equivalent of \$140 Billion More than the U.S. on Strategic Forces

19/27

A FREEZE WOULD LOCK IN EXISTING SOVIET-ADVANTAGES

	<u>USSR</u>		<u>US</u>
◦ Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles	-2,704	to	1,944
◦ Ballistic Missile Warheads	-7,500	to	7,200
◦ Prompt Hard Target Kill Potential	-Over 2:1		
◦ Ballistic Missile Throw-Weight (Million Pounds)	-11.2	to	4.5
◦ LRINF Missiles (SS-4, SS-5 SS-20 VS Pershing II and GLCM)	-600	to	0

19/77

AGING AMERICAN STRATEGIC FORCES CANNOT MAINTAIN DETERRENCE INDEFINITELY

SSBNs/SLBMs

- Most American SSBNs Face Block Obsolescence In Early 1990s
- Trident Submarine and Missiles Necessary to Increase SSBN Operating Areas and Hence Survivability of Submarines
- SLCMs to Provide a Strategic Reserve
- Large, Vigorous Soviet Anti-Submarine Warfare Program Would be Largely Unaffected by Freeze

ICBMs

- Minuteman is Vulnerable and is Incapable of Attacking Sufficient Soviet Hard Targets to Maintain Deterrence

BOMBERS

- B-52s are Old and Increasingly Vulnerable to Soviet Defenses
- Upgrades of Massive Soviet Air Defense System Unaffected by Freeze
 - 5,000 Radars
 - 2,500 Interceptors
 - 10,000 SAMs
- ALCM Needed as Standoff Weapon
- B-1B Needed to Escape Destruction on Ground and to Penetrate Soviet Defenses

7/2

MAJOR UNITED STATES MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS STOPPED BY A FREEZE

Current Number of Systems

◦ Strategic Nuclear Systems

- M-X Missile 0
- Trident SSBN 2 on Sea Trials
- Trident I (C-4) SLBM 240
- Trident II (D-5) SLBM 0
- B-1B Bomber 0
- Advanced Technology Bomber ("STEALTH") 0
- Air Launched Cruise Missiles 7 Aircraft 84 ALCMs
- Sea Launched Cruise Missiles 0

◦ Intermediate Range Nuclear Missiles

- Pershing II Missile 0
- Ground Launched Cruise Missiles 0

7/77

A Freeze Would Prevent Replacement of Obsolescent Launchers of American Strategic Weapons*

- 22% of Weapons are on ICBMs. Of These, 23% are on ICBMs Over 15 Years Old; None on ICBMs Less Than 5 Years Old
- 50% of Weapons are on Submarines. Of These, 92% are on Submarines 15-20 Years Old
- 28% of Weapons are on Bombers, Which Average About 20 Years Old
- Only 4% of Total Weapons are on Launchers Less Than 5 Years Old; 77% are on Launchers 15 Years or Older

Soviet Weapons are on Modern Launchers

- 72% of Soviet Weapons are on ICBMs. Of These, 85% are on ICBMs Less Than 5 Years Old, and 97% are on ICBMs Less Than 10 Years Old
- 20% of Soviet Weapons are on Submarines. Of These, 99% are on Submarines That are Less Than 10 Years Old
- 8% of Soviet Weapons are on Bombers. Of These, 55% are on Backfires, Which Average Less Than 5 Years Old
- Fully 77% of Total Soviet Weapons are on Launchers Less Than 5 Years Old; 94% are on Launchers Less Than 10 Years Old

As a Result of Its Massive Buildup of Strategic Forces, the Already Tremendous Soviet Advantage Would Increase Under a Freeze. Modern, Powerful, and Survivable Soviet Forces Would be Effective for Many Years, While a Large Portion of American Forces Would Become Ineffective Due to Obsolescence and Soviet Defensive Measures

* Weapons are Defined as Warheads on Missiles or Bombs

2/2
2/2

NUCLEAR FREEZE WOULD UNDERCUT DETERRENCE OF CONVENTIONAL WAR.

- Soviet Military Doctrine Envisions Use of Massive Military Force in Surprise Attack to Crush NATO Within Days
- Soviets have Overwhelming Conventional Superiority
- Nuclear Forces are Essential Component of NATO Deterrent
 - Without Capable NATO Nuclear Forces, Soviets Might Be Tempted to Use Their Conventional Forces Against NATO
- A Freeze Would Accept the Current Soviet Advantage in Longer-Range Intermediate Range Missiles of 600 to 0
 - Deployment of Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles is Necessary, Absent Arms Control, to Restore Nuclear Balance and Deter Attack

7/2
7/7

NUCLEAR FREEZE—A SEDUCTIVE SLOGAN BUT BAD ARMS CONTROL

Unrealistic

- Massively Complicated to Negotiate
- Many Areas Could Improve and Expand (E.G. ASW, Air Defense, BMD)

Unverifiable by NTM*

- Much R&E Undetectable, Even With Inspections
- Potential for Massive Breakout

Accepts Inequalities

- Undermines Principle that Arms Control Agreements Must be Balanced and Stabilizing

Undermines Current Negotiations

- Would Endorse Soviet Position that Balance Exists
- Codifies Soviet Advantages, Thus Removing Soviet Incentive to Reduce
- Derails Start and INF Negotiations on Reductions Already Underway

Politically Useful to USSR

- Prospect of "Imminent" Freeze Would Reduce U.S. Support for Needed U.S. Defense Programs
- Soviet Leaders Could Pose as Peaceful While Pursuing Military Objectives During Protracted Negotiations

*NTM Refers to National Technical Means of Verification, Such as Satellite Monitoring

2/2

FREEZE NOT VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS (NTM)

- Requires Extensive Negotiation to Reach Agreement on Effective Measures
- Monitoring Production and Deployments of Smaller Nuclear Weapons Requires Measures Beyond National Technical Means
- Some Aspects of a Freeze Could not be Verified Even with Measures Beyond NTM, E.G. Low Yield Nuclear Weapon Tests
- Soviet Subsystems Necessary for Insuring Reliability and for Preparing for Breakout Could be Tested without Detection

5/2
7/7

FREEZING THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

- **A Freeze would Prohibit Nuclear Testing, Hence would Prevent Important Improvements in Nuclear Weapon Safety and Security that are Designed into Warheads**
 - **Insensitive High Explosives to Prevent Accidental Detonation**
 - **Integral Permissive Action Links (Pal) to Prevent Unauthorized or Accidental Detonation**

26/2
2/7

A FREEZE WOULD UNDERMINE AMERICAN LEADERSHIP OF NATO

- The Dual-Track Decision to Deploy Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles to Counterbalance Soviet SS-20s and to Seek to Negotiate US-Soviet Arms Reductions was an Alliance Decision
- An American Decision to Negotiate on a Freeze would Repudiate that Decision
- NATO Leaders Oppose the Freeze Because it would Block NATO INF Modernization While Permitting Soviet Union to its SS-20s and Other Nuclear Forces

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SUPPORT OF FREEZE IS BASED ON MISUNDERSTANDING

The Facts Are:

- **American Defense Spending has been Relatively Level Over the Past 20 Years, While Domestic Spending has Increased by 3 Times**
- **U.S. Strategic Forces are a Small Part of Our Defense Budget and Cost Less Now Than in the 60's**
- **The Soviet Union has Spent and is Spending Far More on Military Forces Than the United States**
- **U.S Nuclear Stockpile has Declined Significantly in Numbers and Total Megatonnage Since Mid 60's**
- **U.S. has Fewer Nuclear Missiles and Bombers Than in the 60's**
- **Modernization of U.S. Strategic Forces is Long Overdue**
- **Programs Must be Funded Now to Have an Effective Defense into the 21st Century**

ML

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MESSAGE

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

FOR RELEASE AT 10:00 A.M. EST
MONDAY, JANUARY 16, 1984

TEXT OF AN ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT

The East Room

January 16, 1984

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JAN 16 1984
11:00 A 37102

During these first days of 1984, I would like to share with you -- and the people of the world -- my thoughts on a subject of great importance to the cause of peace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Tomorrow, the United States will join the Soviet Union and 33 other nations at a European disarmament conference in Stockholm. The conference will search for practical and meaningful ways to increase European security and preserve peace. We will be in Stockholm with the heartfelt wishes of our people for genuine progress.

We live in a time of challenges to peace, but also of opportunities for peace. Through times of difficulty and frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We have and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that enhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984 finds the United States in its strongest position in years to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union.

We have come a long way since the decade of the seventies -- years when the United States seemed filled with self-doubt and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence by armed force and threats. Over the last 10 years, the Soviets devoted twice as much of their gross national product to military expenditures as the United States, produced six times as many ICBM's, four times as many tanks, and twice as many combat aircraft. And they began deploying the SS-20 intermediate-range missile at a time when the United States had no comparable weapon.

History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our allies must be strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. So when we neglected our defenses, the risks of serious confrontation grew.

Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American people to change course, and we have. With the support of the American people and the Congress, we halted America's decline. Our economy is now in the midst of the best recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt. Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear.

America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was inevitable. They said it so often they probably started believing it. If so, I think they can see now they were wrong.

This may be the reason we've been hearing such strident rhetoric from the Kremlin recently. These harsh words have led some to

-more-

3/7

speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look beyond the words, and one fact stands out: America's deterrence is more credible and it is making the world a safer place; safer because now there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will underestimate our strength or question our resolve.

Yes, we are safer now. But to say that our restored deterrence has made the world safer is not to say that it is safe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These are conditions which must be addressed and improved.

Deterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our way of life, but deterrence is not the beginning and end of our policy toward the Soviet Union. We must and will engage the Soviets in a dialogue as serious and constructive as possible, a dialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions of the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive working relationship.

Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies and our philosophies. But we should always remember that we do have common interests. And the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms. There is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would call credible deterrence and peaceful competition; and if we do so, we might find areas in which we could engage in constructive cooperation.

Our strength and vision of progress provide the basis for demonstrating, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through negotiations. That is why 1984 is a year of opportunities for peace.

But if the United States and the Soviet Union are to rise to the challenges facing us and seize the opportunities for peace, we must do more to find areas of mutual interest and then build on them. I propose that our governments make a major effort to see if we can make progress in three broad problem areas.

First, we need to find ways to reduce -- and eventually to eliminate -- the threat and use of force in solving international disputes.

The world has witnessed more than 100 major conflicts since the end of World War II alone. Today, there are armed conflicts in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their origins in local problems, but many have been exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and exporting violence only exacerbate local tensions, increase suffering, and make solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult. Further, such activity carries with it the risk of larger confrontations.

Would it not be better and safer if we could work together to assist people in areas of conflict in finding peaceful solutions to their problems? That should be our mutual goal. But we must recognize that the gap in American and Soviet perceptions and policy is so great that our immediate objective must be more modest. As a first step, our governments should jointly examine concrete actions we both can take to reduce the risk of

- 3 -

U.S.-Soviet confrontation in these areas. And if we succeed, we should be able to move beyond this immediate objective. 4/7

Our second task should be to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world.

It is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending more than \$150 billion a year on armed forces -- some 20 percent of their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious cycle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere it occurs.

With regard to nuclear weapons, the simple truth is, America's total nuclear stockpile has declined. Today, we have far fewer nuclear weapons than we had 20 years ago. And in terms of its total destructive power, our nuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years.

Just 3 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw 1,400 nuclear weapons from Western Europe. This comes after the removal of a thousand nuclear weapons from Europe 3 years ago. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next 5 years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- we will have eliminated five existing nuclear weapons for each new weapon deployed.

But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to reach agreements that will greatly reduce nuclear arsenals, provide greater stability, and build confidence.

Our third task is to establish a better working relationship with each other, one marked by greater cooperation and understanding.

Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts. Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

Cooperation and understanding are especially important to arms control. In recent years, we have had serious concerns about Soviet compliance with agreements and treaties. Compliance is important because we seek truly effective arms control. However, there has been mounting evidence that provisions of agreements have been violated and that advantage has been taken of ambiguities in our agreements.

In response to a congressional request, a report on this will be submitted in the next few days. It is clear that we cannot simply assume that agreements negotiated will be fulfilled. We must take the Soviet compliance record into account, both in the development of our defense program and in our approach to arms control. In our discussions with the Soviet Union, we will work to remove the obstacles which threaten to undermine existing agreements and the broader arms control process.

The examples I have cited illustrate why our relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it should be. We have a long way to go, but we are determined to try and try again. We may have to start in small ways, but start we must.

In working on these tasks, our approach is based on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.

Realism means we must start with a clear-eyed understanding of the world we live in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a government that does not share our

-more-

000627

notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to promote our values.

Strength is essential to negotiate successfully and protect our interests. If we are weak, we can do neither. Strength is more than military power. Economic strength is crucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery. Equally important is our strength of spirit, and unity among our people at home and with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than we were 3 years ago.

Our strength is necessary to deter war and to facilitate negotiated solutions. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise only if they can get something in return. America can now offer something in return.

Strength and dialogue go hand-in-hand. We are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, through negotiations. We are prepared to discuss the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations.

I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. I don't know why this should come as a surprise to Soviet leaders, who have never shied from expressing their view of our system. But this does not mean we can't deal with each other. We don't refuse to talk when the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors" and worse, or because they cling to the fantasy of a communist triumph over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we do talk.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakable. But we insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not atmospherics.

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war -- and especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. A nuclear conflict could well be mankind's last. That is why I proposed, over 2 years ago, the "zero option" for intermediate-range missiles. Our aim was and continues to be to eliminate an entire class of nuclear arms.

Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.

Last month, the Soviet defense minister stated that his country would do everything to avert the threat of war. These are encouraging words. But now is the time to move from words to deeds.

The opportunity for progress in arms control exists; the Soviet leaders should take advantage of it. We have proposed a set of initiatives that would reduce substantially nuclear arsenals and reduce the risk of nuclear confrontation.

The world regrets -- certainly we do -- that the Soviet Union broke off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has not set a date for the resumption of the talks on strategic arms and on conventional forces in Europe. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table to work toward agreements in INF, START, and MBFR. We will negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we will meet them halfway.

We seek to reduce nuclear arsenals, and to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation. So we have put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva

negotiations, we have proposed to exchange advance notification of missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on congressional suggestions, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct channels of communication. Last week, we had productive discussions with the Soviets here in Washington on improving communications, including the "Hotline."

These bilateral proposals will be broadened at the conference in Stockholm. We are working with our allies to develop practical, meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risk of surprise attack.

Arms control has long been the most visible area of U.S.-Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires both of us to defuse tensions and regional conflicts.

Take the Middle East as an example. Everyone's interests would be served by stability in the region, and our efforts are directed toward that goal. The Soviets could help reduce tensions there instead of introducing sophisticated weapons into the area. This would certainly help us to deal more positively with other aspects of our relationship.

Another major problem in our relationship with the Soviet Union is human rights. Soviet practices in this area, as much as any other issue, have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union and over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others who wish to join their families abroad.

Our request is simple and straightforward: that the Soviet Union live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

Our policy toward the Soviet Union, a policy of credible deterrence, peaceful competition, and constructive cooperation, will serve our two nations and people everywhere. It is a policy not just for this year, but for the long term. It is a challenge for Americans. It is also a challenge for the Soviets. If they cannot meet us halfway, we will be prepared to protect our interests, and those of our friends and allies. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation; we seek progress for peace.

Cooperation begins with communication. We seek such communication. As I have said, we will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz will be meeting this week with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union.

We do not threaten the Soviet Union. Freedom poses no threat, it is the language of progress. We proved this 35 years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, and could have tried to

7/7

dominate the world. But we didn't. Instead we used our power to write a new chapter in the history of mankind. We helped rebuild war-ravaged economies in Europe and the Far East, including those of nations who had been our enemies. Indeed, those former enemies are now numbered among our staunchest friends.

We can't predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge. But the people of our two countries share with all mankind the dream of eliminating the risk of nuclear war. It is not an impossible dream, because eliminating these risks is so clearly a vital interest for all of us. Our two countries have never fought each other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we fought common enemies in World War II. Today our common enemies are poverty, disease and, above all, war.

More than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an approach that is as valid today as when he announced it: "So, let us not be blind to our differences," he said, "but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved."

Well, those differences are differences in governmental structure and philosophy. The common interests have to do with the things of everyday life for people everywhere.

Suppose, for a moment, Ivan and Anya found themselves in a waiting room, or sharing a shelter from the rain with Jim and Sally, and there was no language barrier to keep them from getting acquainted. Would they debate the differences between their respective governments? Or, would they find themselves comparing notes about their children, and what each other did for a living?

Before they parted company they would probably have touched on ambitions, hobbies, what they wanted for their children and the problems of making ends meet. And as they went their separate ways, Anya would be saying to Ivan, "Wasn't she nice, she also ~~loves music~~." Jim would be telling Sally what Ivan did or didn't like about his boss. They might even have decided that they were all going to get together for dinner some evening soon.

Above all, they would have proven that people don't make wars. People want to raise their children in a world without fear, and without war. They want to have some of the good things over and above bare subsistence that make life worth living. They want to work at some craft, trade, or profession that gives them satisfaction and a sense of worth. Their common interests cross all borders.

If the Soviet government wants peace, then there will be peace. Together we can strengthen peace, reduce the level of arms, and know in doing so we have helped fulfill the hopes and dreams of those we represent and indeed of people everywhere. Let us begin now.

* * *

73
Affaires extérieures
Canada
Fin 000001/7

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

FACSIMILE

TOR/TDO
COMMUNICATIONS

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

UNCLASSIFIED

CANADIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

WSHDC PA274 16JAN84

BH PMO/LANGILL DC OTT

FIDDZ UGP FPR

MF

ATTACHED, AS DISCUSSED, ARE QUESTIONS FOR THE WRITTEN
INTERVIEW WITH PM FROM MORGAN STRONG OF MCNAUGHT
SYNDICATE. THEY ARE RELATED TO PEACE INITIATIVE
AND I THEREFORE TOLD HIM HE COULD EXPECT HIS
WRITTEN ANSWERS WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS.

2. STRONG IS A NEW COLUMNIST FOR THE SYNDICATE AND
HIS COLUMNS ARE DISTRIBUTED TO 1500 DAILIES, INCLUDING
MOST OF THE MAJORS. GIVEN THE CONTINUING INTEREST
OUTSIDE WASHINGTON IN THE INITIATIVE, I FEEL THIS IS
AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY TO REASSERT THE PM AND
CANADA'S PRIORITIES IN THE PEACE AND SECURITY FIELD.
PLEASE LET ME KNOW IF THERE ARE ANY PROBLEMS.

DRAFTER/AUTOGRAF

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

P. GOSSAGE

public affairs

X207

P. GOSSAGE

00063

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2/2.

MENNAUGHT

MENNAUGHT SYNDICATE 537 STEAMBOAT ROAD, GREENWICH, CONN. 06830 - (203) 661-4970 (800) 243-3313

Mr. Patrick Gossage
Canadian Embassy
1771 N. St.
Washington, D. C. 20036


Dear Sir;

In regard to our prior conversation. I would like to submit several questions for consideration by Prime Minister Trudeau.

1. What precipitated your peace initiative.
2. What has been the response and what success has there been.
3. There has been rather limited endorsement from President Reagan. The Soviet Union has yet to set a date for meetings. Does this not limit any potential for success.
4. The S.T.A.R.T. and I.N.F. negotiations have been suspended. How might your effort contribute toward resumption.
5. You have suggested that the political structure engage the issue directly, rather than the bureaucrats. How might this be accomplished and to what advantage.
6. What has been the response to your suggestion of a summit conference of nuclear nations.
7. How have the N.A.T.O. member nations responded.
8. Have we in your view reached a critical point in regard to the potential of nuclear conflict.
9. Could you outline your proposals in regard to reduction of nuclear weaponry.
10. Your efforts will and have required a great deal of your time. Do you intend to devote at some point you full attention to the effort.

I hope the above meet with your approval.

Sincerely,


Morgan Strong

External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

ACT 100

FILE

1/9

WDC 009/16

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

FACSIMILE

TOR/TOD
COMMUNICATIONS

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

JAN 18 10 49 '84

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

UNCLASSIFIED

CANADIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

FM/DE

WASHDC PA272 16JAN84

TO/A

IDDZ/SMITH ONLY

INFO

DISTH

REF

SUBJ/SUJ

DRAFT TELEX TO POSTS - PM INITIATIVE: MEDIA GUIDANCE

COMCENTRE: PLEASE FAX ATTACHED

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APProuvé

SIG

P. GOSSAGE/AM PUBLIC AFFAIRS

X207

SIG

P. GOSSAGE

2/9

FAX TO IDDZ/SMITH ONLY

DRAFT TELEX TO POSTS - FM INITIATIVE: MEDIA GUIDANCE

NOTE TO SMITH - I HAVE SUGGESTED GUIDANCE ON MOSCOW
ON PAGE 3, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT LATEST DEVELOPMENTS.
I WILL LEAVE IT TO YOU TO MAKE OTHER ADJUSTMENTS,
AND WOULD YOU PLEASE EXPEDITE THE FINAL VERSION TO
POSTS, WITH PRIORITY TO THE US.

TEXT FOLLOWS:

AS EVIDENCE MOUNTS OF GROWING INTERNATIONAL AND EVEN
ADMINISTRATION SUPPORT FOR REDUCING TENSIONS AND SEEKING
NEW MEANS OF DIALOGUING WITH THE SOVIETS, THE FMS AND CANADA'S
ROLE IN THIS PROCESS SHOULD BE STRESSED WITH MEDIA AND OTHER
CONTACTS. AS THE FMS PHASE OF INTENSE PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT
OF NECESSITY WINDS DOWN, WE MUST MAINTAIN CREDIBILITY OF
CONTINUING CANADIAN INVOLVEMENT IN PEACE AND SECURITY
ISSUES, AND ENSURE THAT COLUMNISTS AND EDITORIALISTS,
AS WELL AS NGO STRATEGIC STUDIES COMMUNITY IS FULLY INFORMED
OF CANADIAN ROLE AND POSITIONS. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF
HOPEFULLY MOST USEABLE WITH SUCH CONTACTS.

1. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INITIATIVE. ON JANUARY 11 THE

PM MET FOR ONE HOUR AND A HALF WITH JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN IN NEW YORK. THIS AGAINST EARLY SUPPORT FROM THE SEC GEN AND OFFER TO PROVIDE QUOTE BACKUP IN ANY USEFUL WAY UNQUOTE TO INITIATIVE. IN ADDITION, PMO ANNOUNCED LAST WEEK THAT THE PMS SUFFOCATION MEASURES (BAN TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF ANTI SATELLITE SYSTEMS, RESTRICTIONS ON EXCESSIVE MOBILITY OF ICBMS AND FUTURE STRATEGIC SYSTEMS TO BE VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS) WOULD BE TARIED IN GENEVA IN FEBRUARY AT THE UN CONFERENCE ON DISARMEMENT. . PMS PARTICULAR PURPOSE WAS TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF MOVING THE FIVE POWER IDEA INTO THE UNITED NATIONS. HE STRESSED THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FIVE UNDER THE CHARTER TO SETTLE DISPUTES BY PEACEFUL MEANS IN THE PURSUIT OF PEACE AND SECURITY. THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS HAVE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES TO INITIATE ACTIONS AS WELL AS THE RIGHT TO VETO. THE PM SUGGESTED THE SEC GEN APPROACH THE FIVE AT THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL, BUT PM UNDERLINED THAT QUOTE IF THAT WERE TO HAPPEN, I COULD ONLY SEE IT HAPPENING VERY SECRETLY AND PRIVATELY UNQUOTE. HOWEVER, FIVE POWER IDEA IS STILL VERY MUCH ON CANADIAN AGENDA, PERHAPS AS PM NOTED IN MODIFIED FORM, NOT ATTACKING REDUCTIONS IMMEDIATELY BUT BEGINNING WITH CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES AS EXAMPLE. UN IS POSSIBLE FORUM TO FURTHER EXPLORE IDEA SINCE FIVE ARE ALREADY PERMANENT MEMBERS OF SECURITY COUNCIL.

4/9

3.

2. MOSCOW. THE APPROACH TO THE KREMLIN FOR AN EARLY DATE TO DISCUSS THE INITIATIVE WITH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP MAY NOT SUCCEED, THE RUSSIANS REMAINING DETERMINED TO HAVE THE PM SEE ANDROPOV WHEN HE IS AVAILABLE. THIS COULD DELAY THE FINAL VISIT OF THE MISSION FOR SOME TIME. THE PM HAS SAID THAT THE INITIATIVE IS NOT COMPLETE UNTIL HE HAS SEEN THE OTHER SUPER POWER, AND WE ARE SIMPLY AT PRESENT IN A HOLD POSITION. YOU WILL RECEIVE FURTHER GUIDANCE THIS WEEK ON THIS MATTER. HOWEVER, GROWING EVIDENCE OF WILLINGNESS OF ALLIANCE AND US ADMINISTRATION TO EASE RHETORIC, SEEK INVENTIVE WAYS TO REDUCE TENSIONS (CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES TO BE PROPOSED IN STOCKHOLM), PROVIDE PM WITH AGENDA FOR MEETING WITH SOVIET LEADERSHIP. BOTTOM LINE IS THAT EVEN IF ANDROPOV CONDITION AND PRESIDENTS NERVOUSNESS ABOUT SUMMITRY DO NOT AUGER WELL FOR EARLY SUPERPOWER SUMMIT, CANADIAN INTENTION IS TO CONTINUE TO TRY AND MULTIPLY HIGH LEVEL POLITICAL CONTACTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND TO USE OUR SOMEWHAT PRIVILEGED LINES OF COMMUNICATION WITH MOSCOW TO CREATE BETTER CONDITIONS FOR WASHINGTON MOSCOW POLITICAL DIALOGUE.

3. EVALUATION OF THE INITIATIVE SO FAR. ONE OF THE PMS MAJOR OBJECTIVES, THE POLITICIZATION OF THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS HAS BEGUN. WHILE STILL BEING RECEIVED WITH SOME SKEPTICISM BY

4.

THE MEDIA, THERE ARE SIGNS THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION IS OPEN FOR A THAW (SHULTZ PRESS CONFERENCE LAST WEEK, PRESIDENT SPEECH MONDAY, WILLINGNESS TO MEET GROMYKO IN STOCKHOLM AND TO APPROACH MEETING IN CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT, REAGAN REGRETS IN TIME INTERVIEW RE EVIL EMPIRE QUOTE, STATE DEPARTMENT PROMOTING ALLIANCE CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES TO BE TABLED AT STOCKHOLM - NYT FRONT PAGE SUNDAY). CLEARLY THIS IS NOT DIRECT RESULT OF PM MEETING, BUT AT LEAST VERY MUCH IN DIRECTION OF TRUDEAU PITCH TO PRESIDENT AS OUTLINED BELOW. IN ADDITION, TONE AND SUBSTANCE OF NATO DECLARATION LAST MONTH REFLECT GREATLY INCREASED POLITICAL WILL BEING PUT INTO DISARMAMENT PROCESS. PM QUOTE THE STATEMENTS IN BRUSSELS ARE A DEFINITE CHANGING OF THE TREND LINE, WHICH WAS AWAY FROM DIALOGUE, WHICH WAS TOWARDS MEGAPHONE DIPLOMACY, WHICH WAS TOWARD HANDING THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER TO THE NUCLEAR ACCOUNTANTS UNQUOTE FROM INTERVIEW WASHINGTON DEC. 15. THE SOVIETS ARE NOW ON THE DEFENSIVE RATHER THAN NATO.

4. RESULTS OF WASHINGTON MEETING. WASHINGTON VISIT WAS NOT A BREAKTHROUGH, NOR INTENDED TO BE. MUCH ATTENTION HAS BEEN PAID TO FACT THAT PRESIDENT DID NOT EMBRACE FIVE POWER IDEA, WHEN PM DID NOT SEEK SPECIFIC ENDORSEMENT. POSITIVE TONE AND SUCCESS OF PMS TACTIC WITH REAGAN NEEDS EMPHASIS. REAGAN SHOWED CONSIDERABLE CONCERN ABOUT HIS WARLIKE IMAGE IN US AND ABROAD, AND THE PM TALKED TO THE PRESIDENT ABOUT THIS AS POLITICIAN TO POLITICIAN. THE PMS CONTENTION THAT

5.

5/1
19

THE QUOTE SIGNAL UNQUOTE THAT THE US WANTED DIALOGUE,
SAW A NUCLEAR WAR AS UNWINNABLE, AND HAD CLEARLY PEACEFUL
INTENTIONS WAS NOT GETTING THROUGH WAS ACCEPTED BY
PRESIDENT. PM QUOTE THIS IS WHAT I WAS TELLING THE
PRESIDENT...MAKE SURE THAT YOUR MESSAGES, IF THEY ARE
SINCERE, AND I BELIEVE THEY ARE, AND IF YOU ARE A MAN OF
PEACE, AND I CANNOT BELIEVE ANYBODY LEADING THE US WOULD
WANT WAR, MAKE THAT AS CLEAR NOW THAT YOU HAVE MADE THE
MESSAGE OF THE STRONG MAN CLEAR. NEGOTIATE FROM STRENGTH
UNQUOTE FROM WASHDC INTERVIEW DEC.15. PM WENT ON TO
SAY THAT HE DID NOT ACCEPT THAT ADMINISTRATIONS TONE HAD
BEEN SAME ALL ALONG. HE USED NEW FLEXIBILITY IN INF AND
START, WILLINGNESS UP UPGRADE STOCKHOLM, AND DIET SPEECH
AS INDICATIONS THAT IN PAST FEW MONTHS LANGUAGE IS NEW AND
ENCOURAGING.

IF PEACE AND DISARMAMENT ISSUE MORE ENTHUSIASTICALLY
EMBRACED BY ADMINISTRATION, DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES STARTING
TO RUSH IN WITH PROPOSALS OF THEIR OWN, ALL OF WHICH
PROMISES TO KEEP FUNDAMENTALS OF CANADIAN INITIATIVE ON US
POLITICAL AGENDA DURING ELECTION YEAR.

IN ADDITION, MONDALE IS PROPOSING ANNUAL SUMMITRY, AND
GLENN, ALTHOUGH ENDORSING FREEZE, PROPOSES INVOLVING OTHER
NUCLEAR POWERS AND NON-PROLIFERATION FOCUS AS WELL. HE HAS
WRITTEN TO PM SUGGESTING THEY MEET AND PM IS LOOKING FOR DATE.

78/9

5. FIVE POWER. THE PM HAS SAID IN THE HOUSE THAT THE IDEA HAS BEEN ACCEPTED BY ALL THE LEADERS HE HAS SEEN IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER. IT REMAINS OF IMPORTANCE BECAUSE ANY EFFORTS TO PREVENT FURTHER NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION WOULD NOT SUCCEED UNLESS NON NUCLEAR STATES SAW THE FIVE TAKING STEPS TO REDUCE THEIR OWN STOCKPILES. TRUDEAU SPOKE TO THIS ISSUE AFTER HIS NY MEETING QUOTE THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS HAVE A GREAT RESPONSIBILITY TO BEGIN REDUCING THEIR NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS, BUT PARALLEL WITH THAT, I FEEL THERE IS GREAT DANGER IN HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION AND THAT IF NUCLEAR WEAPONRY BEGINS TO SPREAD TO AN INCREASING NUMBER OF COUNTRIES, THE WORLD WILL BE EVEN MORE UNSAFE THAN IT IS NOW. UNQUOTE. BUT, DISAPPOINTED BY THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCES UNWILLINGNESS TO STRONGLY ENDORSE NON PROLIFERATION, HE SAID QUOTE I THINK IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT MANY OF THE NON ALIGNED LEADERS SAY, UNTIL THE SUPER POWERS HAVE BEGUN REDUCING, DONT TALK TO US ABOUT NOT ACQUIRING UNQUOTE. IMPORTANT THEREFORE TO EMPHIZE CONNECTION IN CANADIAN APPROACH TO DISARMAMENT BETWEEN HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL PROLIFERATION. AS TO FIVE POWER IDEA PER SE, POSITIVE REACTIONS WERE GAINED FROM MITTERAND, (ALTHOUGH CHEYSSON SUBSEQUENTLY HAS REAFFIRMED MORE CLASSIC FRENCH POSITION), CRAXI OF ITALY WHO IS ENTHUSIASTIC AS IS NAKASONE OF JAPAN, AND KOHL OF FRG. NEITHER SOVIETS NOR AMERICANS HAVE SPECIFICALLY REJECTED PROPOSAL, NOR HAVE CHINESE.

8/9

THE RUSSIANS HAVE AGREED TO THE IDEA IN THE PAST. IN HIS WASHINGTON INTERVIEW HE SAID HE HAD TOLD THE NON SUPERPOWERS THAT SINCE THEY SUPPORT POLITICAL DIALOGUE IN OTHER FIELDS WHY DONT THEY PRESSURE REAGAN AND ANDROPOV TO TAKE LEADERSHIP IN LAUNCHING PREPARATIONS FOR A CONFERENCE. PM QUOTE THE FIVE POWER PROPOSAL IS ONE TECHNIQUE AMONG MANY TO GET BOTH SIDES TO RENEW THE DIALOGUE. BUT WHEN I SUCCEEDED IN GETTING OUR SIDE TO RENEW THE DEALOGUE IN STOCKHOLM, I THINK I HAVE ACHIEVED MUCH MORE IMMEDIATELY THAN WHAT, HOPEFULLY, WE WILL ACHIEVE ONE DAY FOR THE FIVE POWER DIALOGUE UNQUOTE. FIVE POWER IS AN IDEA WHOSE TIME WILL COME, PERHAPS NOT IN THE FORM ENVISAGED ORIGINALLY IN THE MONTREAL SPEECH. SHOULD NOT, THEREFORE BE DEFENSIVE ABOUT THIS PART OF THE INITIATIVE. A DYNAMIC HAS BEEN SET IN PLAY, AND WILL UNDOUBTEDLY LAST BEYOND THIS PHASE OF THE INITIATIVE.

6. THE FUTURE. THE HIGH PROFILE STAGE OF THE INITIATIVE WILL WIND DOWN FOLLOWING THE RESOLUTION OF THE MOSCOW STEP AND A LIKELY WINDUP SPEECH IN CANADA NOW FORESEEN SOMETIME IN FEBRUARY. INTERLOCUTORS MUST NOT BE LEFT TO THINK THAT CANADA'S INTEREST IN CRITICAL ISSUES OF PEACE AND SECURITY WILL THEN ATROPHY. IT IS UNLIKELY SEARCH FOR NEW SOLUTIONS TO EAST WEST TENSIONS WILL DISAPPEAR AS CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY PREOCCUPATION. COULD BE SURMISED THAT NATION HAS REFOUND A ROLE IN WHICH IT IS COMFORTABLE AND WHICH HAS SOLID ROOTS BACK TO PEARSON, ETC. EXPERTISE AND CREDIBILITY BUILT UP FOR INTENSE PERIOD OF INITIATIVE WILL NOT BE LOST, AND EVERY LIKELIHOOD THIS WILL

B.

9/9

CONTINUE TO PRODUCE INITIATIVES IN OTHER FORA. IN ADDITION, MUCH THOUGHT BEING GIVEN TO FORM AND STRUCTURE OF DISARMAMENT CENTRE ANNOUNCED IN SPEECH FROM THRONE. FINALLY, THERE IS CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE THAT RENEWED CANADIAN ROLE IN THESE ISSUES HAS CONSIDERABLE BIPARTISAN BACKING.

7. PLEASE ENSURE THIS GUIDANCE SHARED WITH PAOS.

MASTER FILE

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BUCST UYGR0123 16JAN84

TO EXTOTT RBR DELIVER BY 161100

INFO BNATO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CIS/ADMPOL/PPP/DGIS

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR RBD FPR IDD IDR

IDA ~~IDDZ~~ RBRD ZSP RBP ZSS CMR XDV RBT

REF YOURTEL RBR0050 10JAN

---VISIT OF FM STEFAN ANDREI

WAS INFORMED 16JAN BY MME GROZA THAT STEFAN ANDREI WILL LEAVE HUCST
05FEB FOR PARIS THEN FLY TO NYORK AND ON 06FEB WILL GO FROM NYORK
TO OTT ON PILGRIM FLT NBR39 LEAVING NYORK 1940 AND ARRIVING OTT 2130.
STEFAN ANDREI IS PLANNING TO LEAVE CDA IN AFTERNOON OF 09FEB FOR
WSHDC. HE IS MTG WITH SECTY STATE SCHULTZ ON 10FEB.

2. DEL WILL INCLUDE DIR AD INTERIM OF DIRECTORATE FIVE (WESTERN
HEMISPHERE) ION BESTELIU AND DEPUTY DIR MIRCEA RACEANU, PLUS ANOTHER
COUNSELLOR YET TO BE CHOSEN FROM MIN CABINET OR FROM MFT, PLUS ONE
BODY GUARD. AMB RODEAN WILL OF COURSE BE INCLUDED IN DEL.

3. STEFAN ANDREI SPEAKS FLUENT FRENCH BUT DOES NOT/NOT SPEAK ENGLISH
AS WELL. HE OFTEN USES INTERPRETERS WHEN INTERLOCUTOR SPEAKS ENGLISH.
BESTELIU AND RACEANU SPEAK FLUENT ENGLISH (RACEANU IS USUAL ENGLISH
INTERPRETER IN RESTR MTGS WITH ANDREI). THEY BOTH UNDERSTAND FRENCH
BUT DO NOT/NOT SPEAK IT VERY WELL.

4. AS YOU KNOW, STEFAN ANDREI HAS A VERY HEAVY SCHEDULE. REGARDING
OFFICIAL VISITS, YOU MIGHT BE INTERESTED TO KNOW THAT IN FIRST MONTHS

...2

PAGE TWO UYGR0123 CONFD

OF 1984 HE IS SUPPOSED TO GO TO SPAIN ON 23FEB(ROM AUTHORITIES WOULD LIKE KING OF SPAIN TO PAY OFFICIAL VISIT TO ROMANIA EXCLUSIVELY WHILE SPANIARDS WOULD LIKE TO ORGANIZE TOUR OF WHOLE AREA(YUGO,CZECH,ETC). STEFAN ANDREI WILL ALSO GO TO FRG SOON.VISIT WHICH WAS DUE TO TAKE PLACE LAST WEEK HAS BEEN POSTPONED BECAUSE OF FM GLNSCHERS ACCIDENT. STEFAN ANDREI IS ALSO SUPPOSED TO GO TO JPN,TURKEY AND FRANCE(IN APR). GROMYKO IS EXPECTED IN BUCST AT END OF MONTH AND FOREIGN MIN OF THE NETHERLANDS IS ALSO DUE TO COME SOON.

CCC/181 161300Z UYGR0123

**CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

MASTER FILE

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM EXTOTT RBD0011 16JAN83

TO MOSCO STKHM DELIVER BY 160900

WSHDC LBN PARIS BONN ROME HAGUE BRU BNATO PRMNY PEKIN TOKYO CNBRA

WSAW PRGUE BPEST BUCST BGRAD NDHQOTTADMPOL/CPD/DGIS PCOOTT/FOWLER

PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RBR REP RBT ZSP ZSI IDD IDDZ IDA IDR FPR

REF OURTEL RBD0010 14JAN

---LET FROM ANDROPOV:INITIAL ANALYSIS AND COMMENT

IN FIRST PARA REFTTEL PLEASE ADD FOLLOWING PHRASE AFTER ...ANDROPOVS

LET OF QUOTE 14JAN IN RESPONSE TO PMS MESSAGE OF UNQUOTE 05JAN AS

FOLLOWS.

CCC/099 161601Z RBD0011

MASTER FILE

R E S T R I C T E D

FM STKHM/SCDEL SCDL0005 15JAN84

TO EXTOTT FPR DELIVER BY 160900

DISTR LIDDZ TRAN IDA IDR DMF IFB

---DPM/SSEA SPEECH TO CCSBMDE

GRATEFUL YOU ARRANGE TRANSLATION OF FOLLOWING DRAFT TEXT OF
DPM/SSEA STATEMENT TO CCSBMDE AND TRANSMIT IT TO US FOR
DEL BY 170900. TRANSLATION SHOULD BE DONE ON WORD PROCESSOR AS
THERE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE FURTHER MODIFICATIONS.

2. TO FACILITATE SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE IN OTT, RECOMMEND THAT ENG
TEXT ALSO BE PUT ON WORD PROCESSOR. WE WILL TELEX TEXT AS
DELIVERED FOR DEL BY 180900.

3. QUOTE WE ARE MTG HERE IN STKHM AT A TIME WHEN THE DIALOGUE ON
SECURITY IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS HAS BEEN REDUCED TO A SERIES OF
DISCORDANT PRONOUNCEMENTS. CRITICALLY IMPORTANT NEGOTIATIONS
ON WHICH GREAT HOPES HAD BEEN FIXED HAVE BEEN BROKEN OFF, SUSPENDED
OR INTERRUPTED.

CONCRETE RESULTS SEEM MORE REMOTE, MORE UNATTAINABLE, THAN EVER.

AND AT THE SAME TIME THE ACRIMONIOUS RHETORIC OF DISTRUST
CONTINUES UNABATED AND INTENSIFIED.

REAL DIALOGUE HAS VIRTUALLY DISAPPEARED.

NEVER HAS A CONFERENCE BEEN MORE URGENTLY REQUIRED THAN THIS ONE.

AND NEVER HAVE EXPECTATIONS-AND HOPES-BEEN GREATER FOR A
SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME

...2

PAGE TWO SCDL0005 RESTR

TO SURVEY THE CONDITION OF THE WORLD TODAY IS NOT/NOT A HAPPY TASK.

WHICHEVER WAY WE TURN,SUSPICION,DISTRUST,AND TENSIONS CRISS-CROSS OUR PERSPECTIVES IN A FRIGHTENING MANNER.

AND AS TENSIONS MOUNT,SO DOES THE SHARPNESS OF THE RHETORIC WHICH SEEMS,SO DEPRESSINGLY,TO HAVE REPLACED THE FORTH-RIGHT DIALOGUE BY WHICH NATIONS HAVE CUSTOMARILY COMMUNICATED THEIR HOPES AND FEARS TO EACH OTHER.

WE HAVE COME ALMOST TO A HALT IN OUR EFFORTS TO FIND MORE CIVILIZED WAYS OF LIVING WITH EACH OTHER AND TALKING TO EACH OTHER.

SINCE WE LAST MET IN MADRID,THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF DEVELOPMENTS WHICH HAVE MADE UNDERSTANDING AND ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST MORE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE,IN PARTICULAR, THE DECISION OF THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES TO SUSPEND THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE MAJOR EAST-WEST ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIAITONS IS MOST REGRETTABLE.WE EXPRESS THIS REGRET,NOT/NOT IN THE SPIRIT OF RECRIMINATION,BUT BECAUSE WE ARE CONVINCED THAT SUSTAINED DIALOGUE AND THE CONSTRUCTIVE PURSUIT OF EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS OFFER THE BEST WAY TO AVERT THE RISKS OF ARMED CONFLICT.

WE IN THE WEST DEMAND RESPECT FOR OUR LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS AND ARE DETERMINED TO ENSURE OUR SECURITY ON THE BASIS OF A BALANCE OF FOURCES AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL.BY THE SAME TOKEN,HOWEVER, WE ASSERT OUR RESPECT FOR THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL

...3

I E THREE SCDL0005 RESTR
OTHER COUNTRIES.

IT IS IN THIS SPIRIT OF MUTUAL INTEREST AND MUTUAL RESPECT
THAT WE CALL FOR THE RESUMPTION OF EAST-WEST ARMS CONTROL
NEGOTIATIONS AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT.FOR OUR PART,
WE ARE READY AND WILLING TO BEGIN AGAIN NOW.

IN THE WORDS OF THE DECLARATION ISSUED IN BRUSSELS LAST MONTH
BY THE NATIONS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE:
QUOTE WE URGE THE COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT TO SEIZE THE
OPPORTUNITIES WE OFFER FOR A BALANCED AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP
AND FOR GENUINE DETENTE.UNQUOTE

IT IS THE FEAR,AND THE MISTRUST AND THE INSECURITY THAT HAVE BEEN
BUILDING UP IN RECENT YEARS THAT HAVE BEEN THE DRIVING FORCE
BEHIND THIS CONFERENCE.

PERSISTENT AND INDEED ESCALATING DOUBTS ABOUT WHAT ONE SIDE OR
THE OTHER INTENDS TO DO WITH ITS ARMS,WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY A
POLITICAL ISSUE,CONSTITUTE THE MOST LIKELY BASIS FOR THE OUTBREAK
OF CONVENTIONAL WAR,WHICH IN TURN COULD TRIGGER A NUCLEAR WAR.

CANADA APPROACHES THE QUESTION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS IN EUROPE
FROM THE PREMISE THAT A MORE STABLE BALANCE OF FORCES MUST BE
ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE TWO ALLIANCES AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE
LEVEL,IF THE DANGER OF CONFLICT IS TO BE LESSENERD,BUT HOW CAN
WE ASSURE STATES THAT THEIR SECURITY CAN BE MAINTAINED WITHOUT
INCREASING MILITARY POTENTIALS TO THE DANGEROUS LEVELS WE ARE
WITNESSING TODAY,ESPECIALLY IN CENTRAL EUROPE.WE NEED TO DEVELOP
MECHANISMS WHICH WILL LEAD TO GREATER OPENNESS IN MILITARY AFFAIRS
AMONG THE PARTICIPATING STATES.

UNLIKE PREVIOUS ARMS NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HAVE ENCOUNTERED

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PAGE FOUR SCDL0005 RESTR

DIFFICULTIES IN TRYING TO STRIKE NUMERICAL BALANCES ON THE BASIS OF WHAT EACH SIDE CAN DO, OUR JOB HERE IS TO FIND WAYS OF REASSURING EACH OTHER ABOUT WHAT WE INTEND TO DO, AND MORE IMPORTANT, WHAT WE INTEND NOT/NOT TO DO.

THIS IS THE ONLY WAY THAT WE CAN BREAK THE SPIRAL WHICH IMPELS STATES TO REDRESS PERCEIVED MILITARY IMBALANCES, PROMPTING THEIR ADVERSARIES IN TURN TO TAKE COUNTERMEASURES RESULTING IN EVER GREATER AND INCREASINGLY UNSTABLE LEVELS OF ARMS.

THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA, CONCERNED BY THE WIDENING GAP BETWEEN MILITARY STRATEGY AND POLITICAL PURPOSE, HAS UNDERTAKEN A PERSONAL INITIATIVE TO ENCOURAGE THE REESTABLISHMENT OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND CONFIDENCE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. THE LEADERS WITH WHOM HE HAS MET TO DATE HAVE AGREED THAT THERE EXISTS A PRESSING NEED TO PROVIDE THAT JOLT OF POLITICAL ENERGY REQUIRED TO IMPROVE THE CLIMATE AND BASIS FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS.

THIS CONFERENCE OFFERS AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESTORE POLITICAL IMPULSE TO ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE BECAUSE IT LINKS MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING. FOR THIS REASON, OUR WORK MUST BE AMBITIOUS IN SCOPE, IT MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL OF THE FACTORS WHICH ARE PRESENT IN THE CURRENT IMBALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND WHICH COULD LEAD TO SURPRISE ATTACK OR POLITICAL INTIMIDATION THROUGH THE USE OF FORCE.

THIS CONFERENCE OFFERS AN OPPORTUNITY TO CONTRIBUTE IN A UNIQUE

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I E FIVE SCDL0005 RESTR

AND PIONEERING WAY TO DEVISING EFFECTIVE MEANS AND MEASURES BY WHICH ACTUAL ARMS REDUCTIONS CAN BE IMPLEMENTED WITHOUT DIMINISHING THE SENSE OF SECURITY ON WHICH THIS PROCESS MUST REST.

WE WILL NOT/NOT DISCOVER CONFIDENCE BY ACCIDENT,WE MUST WORK AT IT,WE MUST CREATE IT,AND THE PROCESS IS LIKELY TO BE SLOW AND LABORIOUS.

THIS IS WHY THIS CONFERENCE IS SO ESSENTIAL.

AND THAT IS WHY IT SHOULD EMBARK ON CONSTRUCTIVE BUSINESS FROM THE VERY OUTSET.EFFORTS MUST BEGIN RIGHT NOW ON THE TASK OF TRANSLATING THE NOTION OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING INTO SUSTAINABLE MEASURES AND POLICIES.

IT WOULD BE EASY FOR US TO USE THE OPPORTUNITY NOW AFFORDED US TO MAKE WONDERFUL SPEECHES.

BUT WE HAVE NO/NO TIME-OUR SPECIFIC TASKS ARE TOO IMPERATIVE TO ALLOW US TO INDULGE THIS LUXURY.

IT WOULD BE EASY TO PRESENT A SERIES OF CAREFUL AND DETAILED ANALYSES OF THE BALANCE OR IMBALANCE OF ARMS,CONVENTIONAL OR OTHERWISE.

BUT DO WE REALLY NEED TO DO SO?IS THE PRESENTATION OF CONFLICTING DATA AND DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS OF WHAT IT MEANS-ARE THESE THE PURPOSES THAT HAVE BROUGHT US TOGETHER?

AND ABOVE ALL,IT WOULD BE EASY FOR US TO ENGAGE IN RHETORIC:
IN DECLAMATION
IN DENUNCIATION

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PAGE SIX SCDL0005 RESTR
IN RECRIMINATION

IT IS EASY TO MAKE ACCUSATORY SPEECHES-ESPECIALLY IN TIMES OF
STRESS AND DANGER.IT IS MUCH LESS EASY TO DECIDE TO SET ALL THAT
ASIDE AND TO MAKE AN UNEMOTIONAL,WORKMANLIKE BEGINNING ON THE
SLOW AND DETAILED TASK OF FINDING WAYS TO REVERSE A DOWNWARD
TRENDLINE IN INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE.

OF INFLAMED DEBATE AND OF RECRIMINATION WE HAVE ALL,SURELY,HAD
ENOUGH.

EARLY ON IN OUR MEETING HERE IN STOCKHOLM I APPEAL FOR A DIFFERENT
APPROACH TO PREVAIL:

DETAILED

SPECIFIC

SERIOUS

URGENT

LET US NOT/NOT WASTE TIME BELABOURING EACH OTHER WITH THE MANY
UNRESLOVED GRIEVANCES WE CAN ALL LIST AND RECITE WITHOUT MUCH
TROUBLE.

OF COURSE THESE ISSUES EXIST AND OF COURSE THEY MUST BE RECOGNIZED
AND DEALT WITH.

BUT ARE WE PREPARED TO ALLOW THEM TO OBSCURE THE POSSIBILITIES
FOR PROGRESS INHERENT IN THE MANDATE WE HAVE GIVEN OURSELVES FOR
THE ENDEAVOUR ON WHICH WE ARE EMBARKING?

I HOPE NOT/NOT,AND I KNOW THAT MY HOPE IS SHARED BY MILLIONS OF
PEOPLE AROUND THE WORLD.

WE HAVE COME HERE TO NEGOTIATE.

...?

THE SEVEN SCDL0005 RESTR

TO PRESENT AND DISCUSS PROPOSITIONS.

AND TO REACH AGREEMENT ON SPECIFIC MEASURES WHICH WILL
CONTRIBUTE TO CONFIDENCE, STABILITY AND SECURITY.

WE, IN THE GROUP OF NATIONS REFERRED TO AS THE WEST, HAVE OUR
CONCEPTION OF THE TYPE OF MEASURE ON WHICH WE CAN BUILD, WE WILL
PRESENT A PACKAGE OF IDEAS WHICH, IF ACCEPTED, WOULD BE A LONG
STEP FORWARD, CREATING A NEW BASIS ON WHICH TO APPROACH ARMS
REDUCTION.

WE WILL PROPOSE MEASURES WHICH ENVISAGE MORE OPENNESS ABOUT
BASIC MILITARY INFORMATION, EARLIER NOTICE OF A WIDER RANGE OF
MILITARY ACTIVITIES, MANDATORY RATHER THAN VOLUNTARY EXCHANGES OF
OBSERVERS AT IMPORTANT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, AND WAYS TO VERIFY ANY
AGREEMENTS REACHED. THESE MEASURES WOULD PROMOTE ASSURANCE THAT
THE ROUTINE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN EUROPE
ARE NOT/NOT THREATENING, AND WOULD MAKE UNUSUAL PREPARATION FOR
HOSTILITIES MORE DIFFICULT TO CONCEAL. THEY WILL ALSO TREAT A
PRACTICAL PROBLEM WHICH ARISES FROM THE PRESENT LIMITED MUTUAL
CONFIDENCE: THAT IS, HOW TO DEAL WITH EMERGENCIES OR ACCIDENTS
WHICH COULD SPARK CRISES IN EUROPE.

WE HAVE EVERY EXPECTATION THAT OTHERS AT THIS CONFERENCE,
INDIVIDUALLY AND COLLECTIVELY, WILL BRING FORWARD THEIR OWN IDEAS.

I AM SURE THAT SOME WILL BE MORE INTERESTING THAN OTHERS.

I AM SURE THAT WE WILL BE URGED TO CONSIDER MEASURES THAT WOULD
BE MORE DECLARATORY THAN SPECIFIC-AND I AM EQUALLY SURE THAT WE
WILL, ALL OF US, BE VIGILANT ABOUT IDEAS THAT, BY SUGGESTING SLICK

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PAGE EIGHT SCDL0005 RESTR

AND EASY AND APPARENT SOLUTIONS TO AGONIZINGLY DIFFICULT PROBLEMS,
COULD LEAD US INTO A FALSE AND DANGEROUS SENSE OF SECURITY.

BUT THAT DISCUSSION IS STILL TO COME.

FOR THE MOMENT LET ME IMPRESS ON THIS GATHERING THE SENSE OF
URGENCY WHICH MUST ATTACH TO OUR WORK.

THE PRESENCE HERE THIS WEEK OF SO MANY DISTINGUISHED FOREIGN
MINISTERS UNDERLINES THE IMPORTANCE WHICH PARTICIPATING STATES
ATTACH TO THIS CONFERENCE, AND TO THE OPPORTUNITY WHICH IT OFFERS
FOR A NEW BEGINNING IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS, BUT, IF THIS CONFERENCE
IS TO FULFILL OUR EXPECTATIONS, WE AS FOREIGN MINISTERS CANNOT/NOT
CONFINE OUR INVOLVEMENT IN IT TO BEING PRESENT AT ITS LAUNCHING.
WE MUST UNDERTAKE TO KEEP THE PROGRESS OF THE CONFERENCE UNDER
CLOSE REVIEW, SO THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO INTERVENE AT THE POLITICAL
LEVEL WHENEVER THIS MAY APPEAR NECESSARY TO ENSURE FORWARD MOVEMENT.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN EDIFICE OF MUTUALLY REINFORCING MILITARY
AND POLITICAL CONFIDENCE IS AN URGENT NECESSITY, AND ONE WHICH WILL
REQUIRE THE CONSTANT APPLICATION OF POLITICAL WILL.

LET US, AS MINISTERS, COMMIT OURSELVES HERE AND NOW TO INVESTING
THIS ENTERPRISE WITH A SENSE OF POLITICAL DIRECTION AND URGENCY,
AND IF IT PROVES DESIRABLE FOR US TO RETURN TO THIS FORUM TO
RE-INSPIRE AND MAINTAIN THAT MOMENTUM, IS THERE ANY AMONG US WHO
WOULD NOT/NOT COME BACK, WHO WOULD ASSIGN A HIGHER PRIORITY TO
OTHER ENGAGEMENTS?

LET US BEGIN TO NEGOTIATE.

LET US CONCENTRATE ON THE REALISTIC GOALS DEFINED BY THE MANDATE

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PAGE NINE SCDL0005 RESTR

FOR THIS CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING-AND NOT/NOT ON THE
ENORMITY OF SOME OF THE GAPS THAT MUST ULTIMATELY BE FACED IN
OUR SEARCH FOR A LESS DANGEROUS WORLD.

A LESS DANGEROUS WORLD:I AM CONVINCED THAT THAT IS WHAT WE ALL
WANT-REGARDLESS OF OUR POLITICAL SYSTEM,OUR GEOGRAPHICAL SIZE,
OUR ARMED MIGHT.

WE ARE ALL IN THIS TOGETHER,SUPERPOWER AND MINI-STATE.WE MOVE
FORWARD TOGETHER,OR WE SINK BACK INTO GREATER AND GREATER
DANGER.

I COME BACK AGAIN AND AGAIN TO URGENCY OF OUR CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
TASK.

NEVER HAVE IMAGINATION AND DETERMINATION BEEN MORE URGENTLY
CALLED FOR.

THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA COMMITS ITSELF NOW,AS IT HAS DONE IN
THE PAST,TO RESPONDING UNSTINTINGLY TO THIS CHALLENGE.

AS WE STRIKE OUT ALONG THIS NEW PATH,THIS ROAD THAT BEGINS IN
STOCKHOLM,WE DECLARE SOLEMNLY THAT WE WILL SPARE NO/NO EFFORT
IN OUR COMMON SEARCH FOR PEACE-AND FOR THE SENSE OF CONFIDENCE
THAT UNDERPINS SECURITY.

LET US SEE WHETHER WE CAN,TOGETHER,BUILD CONFIDENCE,AND RESTORE
A CIVILIZED POLITICAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN US.

BECAUSE WE MUST.UNQUOTE
CCC/152 160600Z SCDL0005

MESSAGE

FILE DOSSIER

SECURITY SÉCURITÉ CONFIDENTIAL CAN EYES ONLY

0010
ORIG. NO.
No D'ORIG.

JAN 14/83
DATE

15 JAN 84 01 52Z

DEPT MIN. PLACE LIEU

28-6	1-TRUDEAU	PEACE
PRECEDENCE		MISSION
		44

Fm de

EXTORT/RBD

To d

MUSCO STKHM (DELIVER BY 151000)

Info

WHAC, LON, PARIS, BONN, ROME, HAGUE, BRU, BNATO, PRMNY,
PEKIN, TOKYO, CNBRA, WSAW, PRAQUE, BREIT, BUCST, BGRAD,

Distr

Ref

NDHQTT/ADMPOL/CPP/DGIS PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN
MINA USS DME IFB RGB ABD RBRD RBP RBT ZSP ZSI IDD IDPZ
OUR TEL RBD 009 JAN 14/84 FPR IDA IDR

Sub./suj

LET FROM ANDROPOV: INITIAL ANALYSIS AND COMMENT

INITIAL RBD/IDPZ ANALYSIS AND COMMENT
14 JAN IN RESPONSE TO PM'S MESSAGE OF
OF ANDROPOV LET OF 5 JAN AS FOLLOWS.

2.) IF GROMYKOS MESSAGE TO PM'S EMISSARIES
IN MID-NOV ABOUT VISIT TO MOSCOW BY PM

TRUDEAU WAS ^{QUOTE} "WAIT ^{UNQUOTE} ANDROPOV MESSAGE IS

^{QUOTE} "WAIT HARDER ^{UNQUOTE} ANDROPOV SAYS HE IS HOPEFUL

THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE "IN THE NOT TOO

DISTANT FUTURE" TO RETURN TO THE ISSUE OF

FINDING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE DATES FOR SUCH

A MEETING. OUR READING OF RUSSIAN WORDS

CHOSEN IN THIS EXPRESSION SUGGESTS THAT IT MAY BE

DRAFTER DA TEL

DIVISION DIRECTOR

TELEPHONE

PH/GS/mm

[Signature]

PAGE NO. 2 ORIG. NO./N° D'ORIG. 010 SECURITY/SÉCURITÉ CONF CAN EYES ONLY

AS MUCH AS OR EVEN MORE THAN SIX WEEKS BEFORE WE HEAR FROM THEM AGAIN AND THEN ONLY TO RETURN TO DISCUSSING DATES NOT NECESSARILY AGREEING TO THEM.

3.) SECOND MESSAGE WHICH COMES THROUGH CLEARLY IN LETTER IS THAT ANDROPOV WILL BE ONE TO RECEIVE PM, NOT ANY GROUPING OR QUOTE COLLECTIVE UNQUOTE OF OTHER SOVIET LEADERS IN POLITBURO. THIS ALSO SUGGESTS THAT OPTION OF INVITING LEADING SOVIETS, OTHER THAN ANDROPOV, TO CPA WLD NOT BE POSITIVELY RECEIVED.

4.) THEMATIC GENERALITY OF MESSAGE IS NOTABLY FREE OF DIRECT CRITICISM EITHER OF USA BY NAME OR OF INF DEPLOYMENT. NOR IS THERE REPETITION OF INSISTENCE BY ANDROPOV TO PM THAT STATUS QUO ANTE DEPLOYMENT MUST BE REINSTITATED BEFORE SOVIETS CAN RETURN TO TABLE. THIS STRIKES US, ALONG WITH SUCH COLLATERAL AS ARTICLE ON KAL

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INCIDENT, PRESENCE OF GROMYKO IN STKHLN, AND
ANDROPOV ^{JAN 12} QUOTE NOT A SINGLE CHANCE SHOULD BE
MISSED UNQUOTE TO FRENCH PEACE ~~INTEREST~~ GROUP, AS
INDICATING CAUTIOUS SEMBLANCE OF MARGINAL MODERATION
IN SOVIET APPROACH TO EAST-WEST SECURITY AND
DIALOGUE; AT LEAST FOR CDN AND EUROPEAN
CONSUMPTION. HARD LINE WILL UNDOUBTEFULLY REMAIN
DOMINANT AT STKHLN BUT THERE ARE AT LEAST FEW
SOFT STRAWS IN WIND. RE 1 PM VISIT WE ARE
THEREFORE INCLINED TO GIVE LESS WEIGHT TO
HESITATIONS OCCASIONED BY SOVIET POLICY REVIEW,
OR TO SOVIET UNCERTAINTY WHETHER RECEIVING PM
WOULD SOMEHOW ASSIST REAGANS, REFLECTION, AND
MUCH MORE WEIGHT TO HEALTH OF ANDROPOV
AND SOVIET DETERMINATION TO SHOW NO SIGN
OF REGREY OR INDEED TRANSITION.

5.) IMPLICATIONS FOR DPM/SSIA MTG WITH GROMYKO -
RECOMMEND DPM/SSIA EXPRESS OUR DISAPPOINTMENT ALONG
WITH CONTINUING CDN UNDERSTANDING FOR SOU

PAGE NO. 4 ORIG. NO. / NO D'ORIG. 010 SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ CONF CAN ICYES ONLY

PREDICAMENT. HE MIGHT ALSO IMPLY RECOGNITION OF GROMYKO'S APPARENT PRE-EMINENCE IN SOV FOREIGN POLICY AND SAY WE HOPE TO HAVE GOOD NEWS SOON. WE ARE ALSO CONSIDERING WHETHER GROMYKO MIGHT NOT BE ASKED TO MAKE ~~SOME~~ PUBLIC INDICATION, PERHAPS TO CAN PRESS AT STKHM, OF FIRM SOV INTENTION TO RECEIVE PM IN MOSCO PLUS GENERAL STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR PM INITIATIVE ALONG LINES OF FIRST PARA ^DANDROPOV LETTER. GRATEFUL VIEWS OF DPM/SSEA.

~~3~~ AND ANY COMMENTS EMB MOSCO.

6) DELAY IN VISIT TO MOSCO HAS OBVIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR LOGICAL FLOW OF PM'S INITIATIVE IN THAT USSR REMAINS MISSING ELEMENT IN PM'S DESIRE TO SEE LEADERS OF ALL FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS. WHETHER WE NOW GO ON QUOTE HOLD UNQUOTE AND WAIT FOR MOSCO OR ENTERTAIN OTHER OPTIONS WILL ~~BE~~ HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED.

7) AS FINAL POINT OF ASSESSMENT WOULD NOTE THAT RISK OF IRRITATING SOVS BY 5 JAN PM LET TO ANDROPOV WAS FULLY RECOGNIZED AT TIME AND DEEMED TO BE TOLERABLE. WE ARE INDEED FORCING SOV HAND AND OF COURSE THEY WISH WE WOULD NOT. REACTION BY

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SOME SOV OFFICIALS IS CURIOUSLY SIMILAR TO NEGATIVE VIBES FROM USA OFFICIALS PRIOR TO PM VISIT TO WSHDC, WITH ADDED DIMENSION IN MOSCO OF PM VISIT SEEN AS UNPREDICTABLE ELEMENT IN SOV LEADERSHIP CHEMISTRY. NONETHELESS WE REMAIN CONVINCED THAT PM INITIATIVE AND VISIT WERE, FOR COMPLEX OF REASONS, SLIPPING CONSIDERABLY IN MOSCO PRIORITIES AND THAT LET DIRECT TO ANDROPOV WAS ONLY WAY (A) TO REMAIN CONSISTENT WITH OUR OWN LOGIC AND WITH PM'S TIMETABLE, (B) TO ENSURE HIGH LEVEL ATTENTION TO PM VISIT WITH OPTION OF HOSTS OTHER THAN ANDROPOV AND (C) TO GAIN CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF VARIOUS FACTORS BEHIND DELAY OF VISIT.

8] PRESS LINE - OUR RECOMMENDATION RE RESPONSIVE PRESS LINE WILL BE THAT WE TAKE HIGH ROAD AND SIMPLY SAY THAT ANDROPOV EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR PM INITIATIVE, REAFFIRMED HIS INTENTION TO RECEIVE PM IN PERSON AND HOPES SOON TO BE IN POSITION TO DISCUSS DATES.

9. ALL ADDRESSEES MUST PROTECT FACT THAT LET HAS BEEN RECEIVED AND ITS CONTENTS UNTIL WE HAVE GUIDANCE FROM PM AND DPM/SSBA.

MESSAGE

FILE DOSSIER

SECURITY SÉCURITÉ CONFIDENTIAL CDM EYES ONLY

15 JAN 84 01 52Z

A-7

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION

Fm de DEPT MIN. PLACE LIEU ORIG. NO. DATE PRECEDENCE
EYTOTT / RBD 009 14 JAN 151000
To: MOSCO STKHLM (DELBY 160900)
Info WSHDC, LON, PARIS, BONN, ROME, HAGUE, BRU, BNATO
Distr PRMNY, PEKIN, TOKYO, CNBRA, WSAW, PRGUE, BPEST, BUCST
Ref BGRAD, NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP/DGIS, PCOOTT/FOWLER, PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN
Sub 'subj MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RBD RBRD RBP RBT, ZSP, ZSI
IDD IDDZ IDA IDR, FPR

DURTEL RBR 0056 11 JAN

PM INITIATIVE - LET FROM ANDROPOV

1. IN LATE AFTERNOON ~~14~~ 14 JAN, ~~R~~ SOU
AMB RODIONOV CALLED ON RBD ~~TO DELIVER~~ AND IDDZ/SMITH

PRE QUOTE ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW TO
CONVY TO PM MESSAGE FROM ANDROPOV
UNQUOTE. AMB COULD ADD NOTHING TO CONTENTS
OF MESSAGE.

2. REACTING TO MESSAGE, RBD ASSURED
RODIONOV OF CONTINUED CDN UNDERSTANDING
FOR SOU CIRCUMSTANCES BUT ADDED NOTE OF
DISAPPOINTMENT THAT IT IS STILL NOT POSSIBLE
TO ARRANGE VISIT. HE REMINDED AMB THAT JUST
AS WE EXTEND OUR FULL UNDERSTANDING, WE ASK

DIRECTOR SIGNATURE

DIVISION DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVAL SIGNATURE

SIG

SIG

PAGE NO. 2 ORIG. NO. N° D'ORIG. 009 SECURITY/SÉCURITÉ CONFIDENTIAL CDN EYES ONLY

THAT SOUS UNDERSTAND OUR SITUATION AND PM'S WISHES

3. AMB COULD ONLY RESPOND QUOTE YOU KNOW REASON WHY WE CANNOT FIX SPECIFIC DATES BUT I HOPE DATES WILL BE SETTLED

SHORTLY UNQUOTE

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF TEXT
4. ~~TEXT~~ AS FOLLOWS QUOTE DEAR . . .

. . . . Y ANDROPOV UNQUOTE .

5. ANALYSIS AND COMMENT IN SEPARATE TEL INCLUDING IMPLICATIONS FOR DPM/SSEA MTG WITH GROMYKO 19 JAN. MORE PARA 9 THAT TEL RE PROTECTION THIS INFO.

The Right Honourable
Pierre E. Trudeau,
Prime Minister of Canada,
Ottawa, Canada

QUOTE Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Thank you for the good wishes you have expressed in
your message of January 5, 1984.

We completely understand your concerns about the
dangerous situation in the world today. We share and
appreciate your interest in the relaxation of tensions,
in maintaining and consolidating peace. This can be achieved
only through joint efforts of those who ^{ARE} really searching
for ways to transfer international relations to the tracks
of normal and productive development. The Soviet leadership,
^{IN THE SAME WAY AS} as well as you are, is acting in this particular direction.

I am convinced that the Soviet-Canadian dialogue on
these issues must be continued and deepened - it will bring
about nothing but advantage. The earliest opportunity for
this will arise during the meeting between Mr. A. Gromyko and
Secretary of State for External Affairs Mr. A. MacEachen in
Stockholm.

I hope that the two of us will also have an opportunity
to meet and exchange opinions as to what else the Soviet
Union and Canada could do, together or in a parallel way, to
eliminate the threat of nuclear war hanging over the world,
to curb the arms race and to improve the international
situation in general. I am hopeful that ^{it} will be possible
in the not too distant future to return to the issue of
finding mutually acceptable dates for such a meeting, of which
we will inform you ^{additionally}.

In conclusion I would like to express my best wishes to
you, Mr. Prime Minister, for the new year of 1984.

Sincerely yours,

January 14, 1984

Y. ANDROPOV UNQUOTE

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

DELIVER 0/R

CALLER. Dr. Kelder

*Smith: We can send papers but,
I suggest, only simultaneously
with CD circulation. Right in*

Agree 2 KK.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PRMNY WKGR0083 13JAN84

TO EXTOTT **LDDZ** DELIVER BY 160900

INFO WSHDC LDN ROME BNATO PARIS BONN VMBFR GENEV HAGUE BRU STKHM
TOKYO PEKIN COPEN OSLO MDRID ATHNS PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CFP
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDR IDA IMU IMD RBR RBD FPR
REF OURTEL WKGR0059 11JAN

RETURN TO	GENEV HAGUE BRU STKHM
REMOVED BY	DISCO FOUR - ETR
ACC	REF DATE
FILE	DOSSIER
28-6-1-Trudeau Peace Mission	

---PM INITIATIVE:MTG WITH UN SECGEN-FOLLOW-UP

IN FOLLOW-UP TO PM MTG WITH UN SECGEN, JAN11, LEE AND KERGIN MET
WITH THREE SENIOR UN PARTICIPANTS (URQUHART, MARTENSON AND DAYAL)
TO SEEK THEIR REACTIONS AND LEARN OF POSSIBLE FUTURE UN ACTION.
ALL CONVEYED SECGEN POSITIVE IMPRESSIONS REGARDING 1 1/2 HR MTG
AND EXPRESSED IN VARYING DEGREES OF PRECISION, CERTAIN THOUGHTS
SECGEN HAS IN MIND REGARDING FUTURE ACTION.

2. USG URQUHART WAS VOCALLY MOST ENTHUSIASTIC AND INDICATED PEREZ
DE CUELLAR HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED WITH PM PRESENTATION.
URQUHART STATED THAT THERE QUOTE WAS NO/NO SUBSTITUTE FOR ACTION
BEING TAKEN BY CONTEMPORARY LEADERSHIP UNQUOTE AS OPPOSED TO
EFFORTS BY FORMER STATESMEN SUCH AS BRANDT, WALDHEIM
AND PALME (PALME IN HIS PREVIOUS CAPACITY) WHO HAVE LESS CURRENT
INFLUENCE. HE SAID SECGEN WAS MOST ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT PMS IDEA
AND INTENDED TO ACT ON IT.

3. PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD ASKED URQUHART TO PRODUCE SOME IDEAS WHICH
MIGHT SUPPORT PM INITIATIVE. URQUHART WILL ATTEND ROME MTG OF

...2

PAGE TWO WKGR0083 CONF

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INTENDS TO DRAFT PAPER

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WIRES UNQUOTE. HE INTENDS TO STRESS THEME THAT FIVE SC PERMANENT
MEMBERS HAVE SPECIAL AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTENANCE
OF INNATL SECURITY (QUOTE CONDOMINIUM UNQUOTE APPROACH) WHICH INCLUDES
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CUSTOMARY WESTERN PRAGMATISM. AS EXAMPLE, HE NOTED THAT USA UNWILLING-
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THEREBY PREVENTING MNF WITHDRAWAL AS IMPORTANT STEP IN SETTLEMENT.

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BROADER QUESTION OF FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS RESPONSIBILITY
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STKHM CONF

PAGE THREE WKGR0083 CONFD

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// CALDER
TO
NOTE.

7. WE WILL CONTINUE TO STAY IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THESE THREE OFFICIALS, PARTICULARLY URQUHART, IN ORDER TO MONITOR ANY DEVELOPMENTS ARISING FROM PM SUGGESTIONS TO UN SEC GEN.

CCC/119 140226Z WKGR0083



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉC O N F I D E N T I A L

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0026 13JAN84

TO/À

TO COPEN

INFO

DISTR

INFO BNATO BRU HAGUE OSLO ROME PARIS BONN WSHDC PRMNY LDN MDRID

REF

ANKRA ATHNS MOSCO VMBFR STKHM PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CP

SUBJ/SUJ

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDR IDA RBR RSD RSR RCR

---PM INITIATIVE:LET FROM DANISH PM

DANISH AMB HANDED OVER ON JAN12 TEXT OF FOLLOWING LET FROM DANISH
PM SCHLUETER WHICH IS IN RESPONSE TO PM TRUDEAU'S LET OF 18 NOV.

2.TEXT BEGINS.

(COMCENTRE: PLEASE COPY ATTACHED)

TEXT ENDS.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG G.J. Smith/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG J.L.A. Delvoie

ROYAL DANISH EMBASSY

copy

File No. 105.I.1/2

No. 1

The Embassy of Denmark presents its compliments to the Department of External Affairs and has the honour to convey to the Department the following message, which the Prime Minister of Denmark has sent to the Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada:

"My dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter dated 18 November, 1983 in which you elaborate on various aspects of your initiative to improve the presently strained East-West relationship. I am grateful to be given this opportunity to present the Danish government's views on the concrete proposals contained in your most recent message.

In the shorter term you suggest that all NATO members be represented at the inaugural meeting of the CDE in Stockholm on 17 January, 1984 at a high political level. I share with you the satisfaction that the NATO council meeting in Brussels 8-9 December revealed full agreement among the allies that their foreign ministers should attend the opening. This decision can be considered yet another token of the importance that we all attach to the imminent restoration and subsequent intensification of the high level political dialogue between East and West in general, and to the favourable and substantial outcome of the CDE in particular.

././.

Department of External Affairs,
Ottawa

- 2 -

In this connection I also welcome the ministers' decision that a thorough appraisal of East-West relations be undertaken with a view to achieving a more constructive East-West dialogue. This step, in my view, is fully in tune with the aims of your initiative and could, no doubt, further efforts to establish a more stable East-West relationship.

I have also studied your proposals to reinvigorate the MBFR negotiations. As I stated in my letter of 16 November, 1983, the Danish government is prepared to consider favourably any concrete steps aimed at promoting the achievement of this goal. Such steps seem even more needed now that the Eastern side has chosen to desist from setting a date for the resumption of the Vienna negotiations after the present recess.

It is not least against this background that the Danish government shares the view of a number of NATO members that now is the time for undertaking a review of the Western negotiating positions in order to re-define our strategies at the MBFR negotiating table and to resume as soon as possible substantial negotiations in Vienna. This approach could also result in a more active posture on the part of the West and in your words, Mr. Prime Minister, would demonstrate to the East and to our own publics our desire to make meaningful progress in the arms control field.

I will be awaiting the outcome of your further contemplations on the elements of your initiative with interest.

Yours sincerely,


(signed)

Poul Schlüter"

The Embassy has been advised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen that the letter, signed by Prime Minister Poul Schlüter on January 5, 1984, has been sent by special courier to this Embassy. As soon as it is received in Ottawa, the message will be brought to the Department of External Affairs for delivery to the Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada.

The Embassy of Denmark avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of External Affairs the assurances of its highest consideration.

Ottawa, January 10, 1984.



MISSION

00066
8

PAGE TWO IDDZ0028 UNCLAS

EFFORT TO CONTROL CONVENTIONAL ARMS AS WELL AS NUCLEAR.

WITH REGARD TO INVOLVING OTHER NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES, MY OWN SPECIFIC PROPOSAL, WHICH I STATED PUBLICLY IN OCTOBER, WOULD BE TO INITIATE IMMEDIATELY AN ANNUAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES CONFERENCE AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL. I ALSO AGREE WITH YOUR SUGGESTION THAT SUCH EFFORTS AIM AT A BAN ON ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS, A CATEGORY OF NEW AND DESTABILIZING WEAPONRY WE MUST DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO DISCOURAGE.

MR PRIME MINISTER, YOU HAVE MY RESPECT AND ADMIRATION FOR SPEAKING OUT BOLDLY ON THIS TOPIC OF ULTIMATE CONCERN TO MANKINDS FUTURE. IF YOUR SCHEDULE ALLOWS, I WOULD DEEPLY APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH YOU TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS IN DETAIL. PLEASE ACCEPT MY WISHES FOR HEALTH AND HAPPINESS IN THE NEW YEAR. PERSONAL REGARDS, SINCERELY, (SIGNED) JOHN GLENN, UNITED STATES SENATOR.

TEXT ENDS.

UUU/145 140107Z IDDZ0028

*See copy not sent
to HLO
of 2nd copy*

20-CDA-9-PM
20-1-1-1

A-7

*28-6-1-TRUDEAU
PEACE MISSION*

D I F F U S I O N R E S T R I E N T E

DE PRMNY WKGR0082 13JAN84

A EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO WSHDC CNGNY LDN ROME PARIS BONN TOKYO GENEV

HAGUE MOSCO STKHM PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/COLEMAN

DISTR MINA FPR USS DMF IFB IDR IDA IMU RBR RDB SCS

REF NOTRETEL WKGR0059 11JAN

---CONF DE PRESSE DU PM A NEW YORK

CONF DE PRESSE QUI A SUIVIR RENCONTRE DU PM AVEC SEC GEN DE L ONU
11JAN A ATTIRE ASSISTANCE ELEVEE ET DIVERSIFIEE. EN EFFET, PLUS DE
70 REPRESENTANTS DES MEDIA DE QUELQUE 14 PAYS ONT COUVERT

EVENEMENTS. DESIRONS ATTIRER ATTENTION NOTAMMENT SUR PRESENCE DE:

(A) TELEVISION: CBC-RADIO-CDA, GLOBAL TV, TVA, CTV, CNN(US), NBC(US),
ABC(US), ADN(RFA). (IL SEMBLE QUE DU COTE AMERICAIN, SEUL CNN AIT
UTILISE MATERIEL);

(B) AGENCES DE PRESSE: CP, UPI, AFP, TASS, INTERPRESS SERVICE, REUTERS,
AP, PANAFRICAN PRESS AGENCY, GERMAN PRESS AGENCY, KUWAIT NEWS AG,
KYODO NEWS SERVICE;

(C) PRESSE ECRITE: KEYSTONE PRESS AGENCY, NEWSWEEK, NEW YORK TIMES,
TIME MAGAZINE, GLOBE AND MAIL, MONTREAL GAZETTE, MACLEANS, SOUTHAM
NEWS, TORONTO STAR, EXCELSIOR(MEXICO), TORONTO SUN;

(D) RADIO: RADIO-CDA, CBC, RADIO-CDA INNTL, RADIO-FRANCE INTL, BBC,
HUNGARIAN RADIO AND TV, RKO(US), NBC, STANDARD BROADCASTING.

...2

PAGE DEUX WKGR0082 RESTR

2. PAR AILLEURS, COLLEGUES DE 12 MISSIONS (TCHECO, AUSTRALIE,
DANEMARK, NORVEGE, SWEDE, FINLANDE, RFA, FRANCE, TURQUIE, JAPON,
SINGAPOUR, PAYS-BAS) NOUS ONT APPROCHES SPECIFIQUEMENT POUR
RECEVOIR CIT DEBRIEFING FINCIT SUR RENCONTRE.

CCC/119 132348Z WKGR0082

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3 - This is a copy of
sent copy.*

ACC	522247	840223
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24-3-1-CDA		

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PRMNY WKGR0083 13JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 160900

*28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE
MISSION*

INFO WSHDC LDN ROME BNATO PARIS BONN VMBFR GENEV HAGUE BRU STKHM
TOKYO PEKIN COPEN OSLO MDRID ATHNS PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDR IDA IMU IMD RBR RBD FPR
REF OURTEL WKGR0059 11JAN

---PM INITIATIVE:MTG WITH UN SECGEN-FOLLOW-UP

IN FOLLOW-UP TO PM MTG WITH UN SECGEN, JAN11, LEE AND KERGIN MET
WITH THREE SENIOR UN PARTICIPANTS (URQUHART, MARTENSON AND DAYAL)
TO SEEK THEIR REACTIONS AND LEARN OF POSSIBLE FUTURE UN ACTION.
ALL CONVEYED SECGEN POSITIVE IMPRESSIONS REGARDING 1 1/2 HR MTG
AND EXPRESSED IN VARYING DEGREES OF PRECISION, CERTAIN THOUGHTS
SECGEN HAS IN MIND REGARDING FUTURE ACTION.

2. USG URQUHART WAS VOCALLY MOST ENTHUSIASTIC AND INDICATED PEREZ
DE CUELLAR HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED WITH PM PRESENTATION.
URQUHART STATED THAT THERE QUOTE WAS NO/NO SUBSTITUTE FOR ACTION
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STKHM CONF

PAGE THREE WKGR0083 CONFD

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CCC/119 140226Z WKGR0083

CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS

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C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

TO EXTOTT RBP DELIVER BY 160900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR RBD RBR (IDDZ FPR

REF YOURTEL RBP0058 13JAN;OURTEL XYGR0039 11JAN

---VISIT OF SOV JOURNALIST

BEFORE WE APPROACH AFANASIEV AS SUGGESTED PARA 3 REFTEL WE WISH TO CONFIRM WITH YOU FIRST THAT VISIT OF AFANASIEV OR A JOURNALIST IS STILL AS RELEVANT IN LIGHT OF COMMENTS WE HAD FROM SECOND EUROPEAN DEPT ON 13JAN(NOT/NOT REPORTED BEFORE REFTEL)AND IN VIEW OF SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS REPEATED IN TELS RBD009 AND 0010 14JAN(ANDROPOVS REPLY).

2.AFANASIEV TYPE VISIT WAS INFORMALLY RAISED WITH SUKHODREV AT LUNCHEON 13JAN.HIS REACTION WAS BOTH IMMEDIATELY AND CONFIDENTLY NEGATIVE-NO/NO QUICK IN AND OUT VISIT TO INTERVIEW PM.HE UNDERSTOOD CDN WISH WAS FOR VISIT BY EMINENT SOVIET JOURNALIST WHO WLD INTERVIEW PM,HAVE ACCESS TO MEDIA, MAYBE APPEAR ON TV HIMSELF,TRAVEL IN CDA AND ALL AT CDN EXPENSE.HE PERSONALLY WAS WORKING ON POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE. HOWEVER SINCE SUKHODREV NOW IN STKHM WITH GROMYKO,CANNOT/NOT EXPECT EARLY RESULTS FROM HIS END.

3.DURING LUNCH LAST FRI,SUKHODREV ALSO RECONFIRMED ABSOLUTE IMPOSSIBILITY FOR BOVIN TO VISIT CDA IN COMING WEEKS.

CCC/144 161130Z XYGR0060

CONFIDENTIAL

January 13, 1984

mf

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

c.c. Mr. Osbaldeston

Initiative - Meeting, 9:30 a.m., Friday January 13

If you agree, the following people will attend the meeting tomorrow morning: Mr. MacEachen, Messrs Osbaldeston, Axworthy, Marchand, Fowler, Delvoie, Archdeacon, Smith and Calder.

You may wish to open the meeting by asking Louis Delvoie to give you an update on events since the last meeting, including Moscow's reaction to your most recent letter.

The next item could be Mr. MacEachen's views on the prospects for the Stockholm conference (his speech is attached). His meeting with Mr. Gromyko is scheduled for Thursday January 19 at 3:00 p.m.; by that time, we should have a reply to your letter to Mr. Andropov, so Mr. MacEachen should be able to convey your response, if necessary, directly to Mr. Gromyko.

You will recall that it had been suggested that Mr. MacEachen might invite his colleagues to La Sapinière in the Spring to discuss, among other things, a Western response to the East's MBFR proposal of last Spring. He agreed to do so, but the preliminary reaction from NATO Ambassadors was negative, and Mr. MacEachen's officials now recommend that he should not invite Foreign Ministers to meet in Canada.

The next item could be Senator John Glenn's request to meet you. There now (Mr. MacEachen withdrew his objection yesterday evening) seems to be agreement in External Affairs that you should meet him in Ottawa. We believe that if you agree to meet him, the effect on your initiative would be highly positive. If you were also to agree to invite Republican Senator Mathias to lunch in the near future, (he very much wants to meet you) that should diminish any perception, however ill-founded, that you were in some way taking sides in the American election.

CONFIDENTIAL


- 2 -

As you know, John Glenn entirely supports the specifics of your Initiative. However, he goes further - he supports a nuclear freeze. Since there will be intense media interest at the time of his visit, and because Canadian Peace Groups would discard all their reservations about your initiative if you were to support a freeze (I quote Jim Stark), you may wish to discuss tomorrow the pros and cons of moving some way in that direction.

Until now, the main objection to a total freeze has been the fact that it would stop deployment of the Euromissiles with all the consequences for NATO solidarity etc. of which you are fully aware. However, because Euromissile deployment will continue for the next five years, and NATO solidarity has already been displayed quite convincingly, a total freeze might soon be an option worth serious consideration. On the other hand, the Reagan administration and some NATO allies strongly oppose the idea. You could, therefore, go part of the way towards the "total freeze" position by publicly supporting a freeze on the further development or deployment of destabilizing strategic nuclear systems. This would have the advantage of aiming specifically at the MX missile and its Russian equivalents which are acknowledged to be highly destabilizing. Such a freeze would not prejudice the development of Midgetman single warhead missiles nor, indeed, of cruise missiles which, while posing verification problems, are not vulnerable, are not seen as first-strike weapons, and can, therefore, be seen as stabilizing. Also, it would allow continued deployment of Cruise and Pershing II intermediate weapons in Europe.

In case you wish to follow this suggested agenda the items are listed in point form on the following page.

Please find attached a retyped letter for your signature to Mr. Andropov, and an interesting article from the Washington Post.



R.R.F.

Archdeacon

PROPOSED AGENDA

1. Status report on Initiative - Louis Delvoie
2. Stockholm - Mr. MacEachen
3. John Glenn Meeting
- Invite Senator Mathius?
4. Partial Nuclear Freeze - Pros and Cons
(Last opportunity to hear Mr. MacEachen's
views if you meet Senator Glenn in the very
near future).

CONFIDENTIAL

January 11, 1984


IDDZ-0022

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (through R.R. Fowler)

Initiative: Letter to Andropov

Attached for your signature is a letter to Andropov in which the typographical error contained in the text submitted to you previously has been corrected.

I very much regret that we did not catch the error before the letter was sent to you.



L. A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

O T T A W A, K1A 0A2

January 5, 1983

Dear Mr. President,

As we enter 1984, I have renewed confidence that the political will exists to repair lines of communication between East and West and to begin to build a more constructive relationship. I was pleased to receive support for this endeavour in your reply to my message of early November.

I have completed consultations with a large number of Western and Third World leaders. Without exception, I have received vigorous encouragement for my undertaking to reduce tensions and promote productive dialogue. I am pleased to note that Mr. Gromyko will be going to Stockholm and that he will have an opportunity to meet Western foreign ministers. I know that the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. MacEachen, looks forward to an opportunity to meet Mr. Gromyko privately to exchange views on a number of topical bilateral and international questions.

I remain firmly committed to the importance of deepening the dialogue with you and your colleagues in the Soviet leadership. In that regard, I fully understand that it has not yet been possible to fix a firm date for me to take up your personal invitation to visit Moscow. In planning the course of my initiative for the weeks ahead I still hope it will be possible to visit Moscow before the end of January. If, however, you believe that this would impose unduly on your personal agenda, I want you to know that I am prepared to meet in Moscow in that time period with those of your colleagues whom you might personally designate.

.../2

His Excellency Yuri Andropov
President of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet
Moscow, USSR

- 2 -

Last November, my emissary outlined to Mr. Gromyko and other senior officials some of my ideas on positive steps to improve the level of East-West understanding. I would like to elaborate on the results of my consultations with other leaders thus far, and gain first-hand the assessment of the Soviet leadership of the international situation and the Soviet approach to the political challenges which face us all.

Mr. President, may I extend to you my sincere personal wishes for a happy and successful new year and my prayers for an early and full recovery.

Yours sincerely,

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR0021 06JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 060900

INFO PCOTTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPF

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RBD RBR IDR IDA

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0009 05JAN

---PM INITIATIVE:VISIT TO MOSCO

SUMMARY:AMB THIS AM DELIVERED TO SUSLOV,HEAD,SECOND EUROPEAN DEPT, TEXT OT PM LET TO ANDROPOV.SUSLOV UNDERTOOK TO HAVE LET TRANSMITTED ASAP TO ITS DESTINATION.HIS OFF-CUFF COMMENTS PROVIDED LITTLE GROUNDS FOR OPTIMISM THAT THERE WILL BE EARLY SOVIET DECISION RE TIMING FOR POSSIBLE PM VISIT TO MOSCO,REGARDLESS OF WHETHER HE WERE TO BE RECEIVED BY ANDROPOV OR BY DESIGNATED COLLEAGUES.

2.PROMPTNESS WITH WHICH AMB WAS RECEIVED BY SUSLOV(LESS THAN TWO HOURS NOTICE),AND CARE WITH WHICH HE STUDIED UNOFFICIAL EMB TRANSLATION OF TEXT,REFLECT SOVIET INTEREST IN APPEARING TO TAKE POSITIVE INTEREST IN PMS INITIATIVE.HOWEVER,SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSAL FOR JAN VISIT(AMB EXPLAINED PREFERRED TIME PERIODS ORALLY)WHETHER ANDROPOV AVAIL OR NOT/NOT CLEARLY PUT SUSLOV IN QUANDARY AS TO HOOW TO RESPOND.RESULT WAS MUCH HEDGING,INCLUDING ALLUSIONS TO FACTORS OF TENUOUS RELEVANCE.SUSLOV RECALLED GROMYKO STATEMENTS TO PEARSON TO EFFECT THAT TIMING OF ANY VISIT MUST BE LEFT OPEN FOR TIME BEING AND STATED FIRMLY THAT QUOTE THIS SITUATION HAS NOT/NOT CHANGED UNQUOTE.HE FURTHER NOTED THAT GROMYKO WLD BE GOING TO STKHM,

...2

PAGE TWO XYGR0021 CONF

NECESSITATING STRENUOUS AND TIME-CONSUMING PREPARATIONS, AND THAT ASSESSING RESULTS OF STKHM MTGS WLD ALSO REQUIRE TIME. MOST IMPORTANT THING, HE SAID, WAS THAT ANY MTG BETWEEN PM TRUDEAU AND QUOTE SOVIET LEADERS UNQUOTE BE A SUCCESS. HE UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY LET PROMPTLY TO ADDRESSEE.

3. SUSLOVS GENERALLY UNFORTHCOMING REMARKS SHLD NOT/NOT, WE THINK, BE CONSTRUED AS REFLECTING NEGATIVE SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD PMS INITIATIVE ITSELF. IN PRESENT SITUATION, NORMAL CAUTION OF SOV OFFICIALS IS REINFORCED BY PROBLEM OF CURRENT ANDROPOV INCAPACITY TO PARTICIPATE IN PUBLIC EVENTS AND IMPORTANT RELATED POLICY ISSUE OF HOW TO PRESENT THIS SITUATION TO WORLD. SENIOR SOV OFFICIALS CELARLY HAVE NO/NO IDEA WHEN THIS AWKWARD SITUATION MIGHT BE RESOLVED. HOW TO DEAL WITH IT IS CERTAINLY MATTER TO BE DECIDED BY TIGHT CIRCLE OF PARTY LEADERS. LATTER, WHILE WISHING TO AVOID APPEARING INDECISIVE OR UNRESPONSIVE TO INITIATIVE WHICH HAS BEEN WIDELY LAUDED BY OTHER HEADS OF GOVT (BOTH EAST AND WEST) MAY AT SAME TIME NOT/NOT WELCOME PROSPECT OF VISIT WHICH, BECAUSE OF INEVITABLY HIGH MEDIA COVERAGE, CLD HAVE EFFECT OF HIGHLIGHTING EMBARRASSING LEADERSHIP GAP HERE AND CONSEQUENT ASSYMETRY IN RECEPTION OF CDN PM. RELECTANCE TO TAKE EARLY DECISION ON TIMING OF VISIT MAY ALSO BE REINFORCED BY UNCERTAINTIES ON HOW MINISTERIAL MTGS IN STKHM (ESP. SCHULZ-GROMYKO MTG) MAY AFFECT EAST-WEST ATMOSPHERE IN COMING WEEKS.

CCC/144 061230Z XYGR0021

CONFIDENTIAL


January 12, 1983

IDDZ-0023

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

Initiative: Stockholm Conference

As requested, we attach for your information
a draft of Mr. MacEachen's statement to the opening
session of the Stockholm Conference.


L.A. Delvoje
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

CDE SPEECH

We are meeting here in Stockholm at a time when the dialogue on security in East-West relations has been reduced to a series of discordant pronouncements. Critically important negotiations on which great hopes had been fixed have been broken off, suspended or interrupted.

Concrete results seem more remote, more unattainable, than ever.

And at the same time the acrimonious rhetoric of distrust continues unabated and intensified.

Real dialogue has virtually disappeared.

Never has a Conference been more urgently required than this one.

And never have expectations - and hopes - been greater for a successful outcome.

To survey the condition of the world today is not a happy task.

Whichever way we turn, suspicion, distrust, and tensions criss-cross our perspectives in a frightening manner. And as tensions mount so does the sharpness of the rhetoric which seems, so depressingly, to have replaced the forthright dialogue by which nations have customarily communicated their hopes and fears to each other.

- 2 -

We have come almost to a halt in our efforts to find more civilized ways of living with each other and talking to each other.

It is the fear, and the mistrust and the insecurity that have been building up in recent years - right across the globe, but nowhere more alarmingly than in Europe among the participating States - it is these dangerously corrosive attitudes that have been the driving force behind this Conference.

Persistent and indeed escalating doubts about what one side or the other intends to with its arms, which is essentially a political issue, constitutes the most likely basis for the outbreak of conventional war, which in turn, could trigger a nuclear war.

Canada approaches the question of conventional arms in Europe from the premise that a more stable balance of forces must be established between the two Alliances at the lowest possible level, if the danger of conflict is to be lessened. But how can we assure states that their security can be maintained without increasing military potentials to the dangerous levels we are witnessing today especially in Central Europe. We need to develop mechanisms which will lead to greater openness in military affairs among the participating states.

Unlike previous arms negotiations which have encountered difficulties in trying to strike numerical balances on the basis of what each side can do, our job here is to find ways of reassuring each other about what we intend to do, and more important, what we intend not to do.

This is the only way that we can break the spiral which impells states to redress perceived military imbalances, prompting their adversaries in turn to take countermeasures resulting in ever greater and increasingly unstable levels of arms.

The Prime Minister of Canada, concerned by the widening gap between military strategy and political purpose, has undertaken a personal initiative to encourage the re-establishment of political dialogue and confidence at the highest level between East and West. The leaders with whom he has met to date have agreed that there exists a pressing need to provide that jolt of political energy required to improve the climate and basis for the achievement of arms control agreements.

- 4 -

This Conference offers an opportunity to restore political impulse to arms control in Europe because it links that military and political confidence building. For this reason, our work must be ambitious in scope. It must take into account all of the factors which are present in the current imbalance of conventional arms and which could lead to surprise attack or political intimidation through the use of force.

This Conference offers an opportunity to contribute in a unique and pioneering way to devising effective means and measures by which actual arms reductions can be implemented without diminishing the sense of security on which this process must rest.

We will not discover confidence by accident. We must work at it. We must create it. And the process is likely to be slow and laborious.

That is why this Conference is so essential.

And that is why it should embark on constructive business from the very outset. Efforts must begin right now on the task of translating the notion of confidence building into sustainable measures and policies.

- 5 -

It would be easy for us to use the opportunity now afforded us to make wonderful speeches.

But we have no time - our specific tasks are too imperative to allow us to indulge this luxury.

It would be easy to present a series of careful and detailed analyses of the balance or imbalance of arms conventional or otherwise.

But do we really need to do so? Is the presentation of conflicting data and differing interpretations of which it means - are these the purposes that have brought us together.

And above all, it would be easy for us to engage in rhetoric:

In declamation

In denunciation

In recrimination.

It is easy to make accursatory speeches - especially in times of stress and danger. It is much less easy to decide to set all that aside and to make an unemotional, workmanlike beginning on the slow and detailed task of finding ways to reverse a downward trendline in international dialogue.

- 6 -

Of inflamed debate and of recrimination we have all,
surely, had enough.

Early on in our meeting here in Stockholm I appeal for a
different approach to prevail.

Detailed
Specific
Serious
Urgent.

Let us not waste time belabouring each other with the
many unresolved grievances we can all list and recite without much
trouble.

Of course these issues exist and of course they must be
recognized and dealt with.

But are we prepared to allow them to obscure the
possibilities for progress inherent in the mandate we have given
ourselves for the endeavour on which we are embarking.

I hope not. And I know that my hope is shared by
millions of people around the world.

We have come here to negotiate.

- 7 -

To present and discuss propositions.

And to reach agreement on specific measures which will contribute to confidence, stability and security.

We, in the group of nations referred to as the West, have our conception of the type of measure on which we can build. We will present a package of ideas which if accepted would be a long step forward creating a new basis on which to approach arms reductions.

We will propose measures which envisage more openness about basic military information, earlier notice of a wider range of military activities, mandatory rather than voluntary exchanges of observers at important military activities and ways to verify any agreements reached. These measures would promote assurance that the routine military activities of other participants in Europe are not threatening, and would make unusual preparation for hostilities more difficult to conceal. They will also treat a practical problem which arises from the present limited mutual confidence: that is, how to deal with emergencies or accidents which could spark crises in Europe.

- 8 -

We have every expectation that others at this Conference, individually and collectively, will bring forward their own ideas.

I am sure that some will be more interesting than others.

I am sure that we will be urged to consider measures that would be more declaratory than specific - and I am equally sure that we will, all of us, be vigilant about ideas that by suggesting slick and easy and apparent solutions to agonizingly difficult problems could lead us into a false and dangerous sense of security.

But that discussion is still to come.

For the moment let me impress on this gathering the sense of urgency which must attach to our work.

Let us, as Ministers, commit ourselves here and now to investing this enterprise with a sense of political direction and urgency. And if it proves desirable for us to return to this forum to re-inspire and maintain that momentum, is there any among us who would not come back, who would assign a higher priority to other engagements.

- 9 -

Let us begin to negotiate.

Let us concentrate on the realistic goals defined by the mandate for this Conference on Confidence-Building- and not on the enormity of some of the gaps that must ultimately be faced in our search for a less dangerous world.

A less dangerous world:

I am convinced that that is what we all want - regardless of our political system, our geographical size, our armed might.

We are all in this together. Superpower and mini-state. We move forward together, or we sink back into greater and greater danger.

I come back again and again to the urgency of our confidence-building task.

Never have imagination and determination been more urgently called for.

The Government of Canada commits itself now, as it has done in the past to responding unstintingly to this challenge.

- 10 -

As we strike out along this new path, this road that begins in Stockholm, we declare solemnly that we will spare no effort in our common search for peace - and for the sense of confidence that underpins security.

Let us see whether we can, together, build confidence, and restore a civilized political dialogue between us.

Because we must.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

Subject
Sujet

Date

7 January 1982

Publication

Washington Post

Reagan to Seek To Ease Tension With the Soviets

By Michael Getler
and Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writers

President Reagan is expected to make a major speech soon on U.S. Soviet relations that administration officials say is meant to send a positive signal to the Kremlin and entice it back into a dialogue that might lead to a more constructive relationship.

The presidential speech is expected to come before Jan. 18, when Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko are scheduled to meet in Stockholm at the opening of a 35-nation East-West conference on reducing the risks of war in Europe.

Officials here said the speech is meant to try to set a positive tone for that meeting, which is the first such encounter since last September, when the Soviet downing of a Korean jetliner produced a harsh clash in public and private between the two top diplomats.

Since then, the Soviets also have suspended all three sets of arms control negotiations that were in progress and relations have remained strained.

Administration officials, in interviews yesterday, said that a great deal of thought has been going into the state of relations with Moscow recently and that several tactics are being considered on how both to maintain pressure on Moscow, especially to return to the arms talks, yet remove obstacles that may be in the way of getting the relationship back to more normal status.

One element is the expected presidential speech, which administration officials described as a sign that Reagan was willing to deal with the

Soviets, was serious about improving the relationship and would like to speed up that process. Officials said the speech has been under discussion between Reagan and Shultz since last summer, and was once considered for delivery in mid-December.

Delivering the speech so close to the Shultz-Gromyko meeting could leave the impression it is a maneuver to place the Soviets on the defense, officials said. But they insisted that this was not the case.

The basic thrust of the speech is expected to be a call for serious and practical dialogue, despite wide differences, on grounds that the world is too dangerous to let the situation fester. Domestically, such a speech would position Reagan politically as an advocate of dialogue when Democrats are criticizing him for contributing to the dangerous tension.

The publicized meeting yesterday in the White House between Reagan and Ambassador James Goodby, chief of the U.S. delegation to the Stockholm conference, is another element.

Other elements, officials suggested, involve the likelihood that the administration will refrain from some of the harsh statements it has directed at the Soviets in the past.

Reagan already gave some indication of this when he was asked, in a Time magazine interview this week, whether he would again call the Soviets the "focus of evil" as he did in an earlier speech.

"No, I would not say things like that again," he answered, "even after some of the things that have been done recently."

The administration also may refrain from making optimistic public statements, as they did in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of arms talks, about how the Soviets are likely to come back quickly to those talks because that may only make it more difficult for the Soviets to return.

Officials acknowledge that they have no idea whether Moscow would believe a new and more positive Reagan pitch on improving relations or whether the Soviet leadership is in a position to respond favorably even if inclined to do so because of the uncertain health and status of President Yuri V. Andropov.

By the same token, there is no indication that the White House at the moment has any plans to make substantive shifts in negotiating positions at the stalled Geneva talks on strategic and medium-range nuclear missiles.

Earlier this week Gromyko sharply criticized Reagan administration policies in what appeared to be a conscious effort to dampen any expectations that his meeting with Shultz was apt to lead to better relations.

Officials said January also "should be an interesting month" in U.S.-Soviet relations because, along with the effort to appear more forthcoming, it is likely that a White House report detailing alleged Soviet violations of past arms agreements will be sent to Congress.

Officials say this presents a challenge to the White House, which feels it must be straightforward about its concerns, yet would like to do so without destroying the prospects for future arms control. Some top officials believe it is possible to reconcile these seemingly incompatible goals.

They suggested that if the report is presented soon, at a time when no negotiations are under way, there is a better chance that it can be absorbed and reflected upon carefully by the public without necessarily jeopardizing future talks.

They also said that while it is highly unlikely that Moscow will ever admit to wrongdoing, official publication of the complaints could deter Moscow from future actions skirting agreements.

Although a main complaint of the White House is said to focus on a new Soviet radar that may be a violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, officials said the administration has no intention of renouncing that treaty.

- sent to URR for possible inclusion in
a speech by MND 20/1/84 San Diego
DRAFT

13.1.84

Yet it is not enough to concentrate on military hardware and capabilities. One of the basic emphases of Prime Minister Trudeau's current initiative on East-West relations and international security is to reassert the importance of the consideration of the aims and intentions that govern the use of arms. This is essential as a way to reduce the threat of nuclear war.

I would like to conclude by mentioning several aspects of the situation in Europe, the most heavily armed region of the earth, where East and West stand toe to toe.

We should first remind ourselves that NATO has been a bulwark against war in Europe and must continue to be the guarantee of peace on the continent. But because there is an imbalance in conventional forces in Europe - the Warsaw Pact conventional forces heavily outweigh those of NATO - there is a risk that nuclear weapons would be brought into action at an early stage of any conflict. That is why we say that the nuclear threshold in Europe is too low.

Canada is committed to raising that threshold. The solution is to establish a more reasonable balance of conventional forces on either side. The simplest way to achieve this would be

- 2 -

to increase NATO's conventional forces in Europe, but the more sensible approach would be for both sides to reduce their conventional forces to mutually agreed levels. Canada is urging NATO allies to follow this path and to give fresh impetus to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks in Vienna which have been proceeding very slowly over the past ten years.

This week the Stockholm conference on increasing military and political confidence in Europe gets underway. There Western foreign ministers, including my colleague Allan MacEachen and Secretary Shultz, are meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and other Eastern ministers.

This is exactly the sort of political dialogue that is necessary if we are to re-establish East-West relations on a constructive, long-term basis. It is in the common interests of East and West, and of the superpowers especially, to find ways together to guarantee their mutual security.

The Stockholm conference will not achieve any dramatic breakthroughs, but it aims to reduce the risks of war in Europe. It is critical that we devote ourselves to that goal.

- 3 -

In the nuclear age peace cannot be separated from security. A strong and resolute defence is essential to maintain our security. At the same time, political leaders must devote their efforts to ensuring that armed conflict does not break out.

PLEASE RETURN TO IDDZ AFTER SIGNATURE

MINA (2)
CMR
FPR
PCO (Mr. J. Caron)
FILE
DIARY

OTTAWA, ONTARIO

K1A 0G2

JAN 13 1984

Mr. Charles Turner, M.P.
(London East)
House of Commons
Room 355-S
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0A6

Dear Mr. Turner:

I would like to thank you for your letter of November 29 conveying correspondence from Gary Price of London who has expressed such warm support for the Prime Minister's Peace Initiative.

It is in part in response to the concern of citizens such as Mr. Price that the Prime Minister has undertaken his efforts towards enhancing the East-West dialogue.

Thank you for writing to me on this matter.

Yours sincerely,

Original Signed by
Original signed per
ALLAN J. MacEACHEN

Allan J. MacEachen

JAN 6 1984
A04342
10DD



nal Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CABINET DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

ACTION REQUEST/FICHE DE SERVICE

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

From

Charles Turner MP

No.
NO

A 04342

Subject
Sujet

Gary Price re PM's peace efforts etc.

Action div./Dir. responsable

1DD2

Letter dated/Lettre en date du

83-11-29

Date rec'd in MINA

Date de réception à MINA

Date sent to div.

Date d'envoi à la dir. 2

Info. division(s)/Direction(s) informée(s)

Action to be completed and white slip returned to MINA by
L'action doit être complétée et la feuille blanche retournée à MINA par

83-12-12

Comments/Commentaires

ACTION REQUIRED/ACTION REQUISE

- ☐ Reply for signature of SSEA
Réponse pour la signature du SEAE
- ☐ Reply for the signature of
Réponse pour la signature de
- ☐ Reply by Division
Réponse de la direction
- ☒ For information and any necessary action
Pour l'examen et suite à donner, s'il y a lieu

ALL TRANSFERS TO BE REPORTED TO MINA
REGISTRY

LE REGISTRE DE MINA DOIT ÊTRE AVISÉ DE
TOUT CHANGEMENT

5-1047

FOR DIV. USE/POUR L'UTILISATION DE LA DIR.

Date received/Date reçu

December 18

Action officer/Agent responsable

J. Caron

Disposition

Reply prepared 4/1/84

Date

4/84


For MINA use/Pour utilisation de MINA

TRANSMITTAL SLIP - NOTE D'ENVOI

TO/À DPM/SSEA
FROM/DE IDDZ
SUBJECT/SUJET PM's initiative.

Security Sécurité	UNCLASSIFIED
File Dossier	
Date	January 4, 1983.

ATTACHMENT
PIÈCE JOINTE

DISTRIBUTION	RECORD OF CONSULTATION (Names/Divisions) RAPPORT DE CONSULTATION (Noms des individus/Directions)	ACTION/SUITE À DONNER
MTNA(2), CMK FPR PCO/Caron		<p>For your signature please if you agree.</p> <p> L.A. Delvoie Chairman Task Force Working Group</p> <p>REQUIRED BY/DEMANDÉ POUR</p>

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EXT 401



HOUSE OF COMMONS
CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES
CANADA

CHIEF GOVERNMENT WHIP
WHIP EN CHEF DU GOUVERNEMENT

A-04342

OTTAWA, Ontario
K1A 0A6

29 November 1983

Honourable Allan MacEachen, P.C., M.P.
Secretary of State for External Affairs
House of Commons

My Dear Mr. Minister:

Re: Gary Price
2-506 Piccadilly Street
London, Ontario
N5Y 3G5

Attached please find copy of a letter from the above-named constituent and attachment to The London Free Press wholeheartedly supportive of Prime Minister's peace efforts.

I thought you would find his comments regarding the nuclear arms build-up of interest.

Kindest personal regards,

CHARLES TURNER, M.P.
(London East)

Attachment

Gary Price
506 Piccadilly Street, #2
London, Ontario
NSY 3G5

① of 3 pages

November 23, 1983

Mr. Charles Turner
Room 355S
House of Commons
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0A6

Dear Sir:

I am enclosing a copy of a letter I have recently sent to the London Free Press for the Letters to the Editor Section. I whole heartedly support Prime Minister Trudeau's efforts to achieve world stability by finding some common ground between East and West. The nuclear arms build-up is escalating to a frightening level, and the only sane solution to this problem is through a nuclear freeze and move in the direction of mutually verified nuclear disarmament. I wish the Prime Minister the best of luck and trust that these sentiments will be passed on through the appropriate channels.

Yours truly,



Gary Price

Gary Price
506 Picadilly Street, #2
London, Ontario
N5Y 3G5

(2)

November 23, 1983

London Free Press
Letter to the Editor
369 York Street
P.O. Box 2280
London, Ontario
N6A 4G1

Dear Sir:

My motivations for writing today have been fuelled by anger. It infuriates me that a select and very powerful few, may control the destiny of the rest of the world. These few must be made aware of how the majority of us feel, and what we think of the nuclear arms build-up and the dangers that accompany the same. I am not so naive as to think there is a simple solution to the problem. I realize that there are always two sides to each issue, and that the issue of nuclear arms is no exception. It is only with a realistic perception of both the anti-nuclear, and the pro-nuclear sides, that we can attack the issue in a way that will prove productive. It is the issue of nuclear arms we must attack, for they are the real enemy, not the Soviets as many would have us believe. I am sure that the average Soviet is just as terrified of a nuclear holocaust as the average citizen in our Western culture. Nuclear arms make up the real enemy to be feared, for they threaten all of mankind, both East and West. This is the central issue that we must not loose sight of, for it is too easy to get caught up in our blinded and one sided perceptions that prevent us from dealing with the problem in a productive way.

It is with this in mind, that I support Pierre Trudeau in his efforts to obtain a sense of world stability. If he can act as a catalyst to this end, then I fail to see how anyone can criticize him for it, regardless of what they think of him as a politician or a man. Setting aside President Reagan's paranoia of a Red Tidal Flood that he fears will engulf us all, and his reactive behaviour to such illusions, or retaliatory actions from either side which could light the fuse, it is probably ignorance, miscalculation or misinterpretation of the other sides intent that is most likely to start us on the road to devastation.

.../2

3


For these reasons, I would greatly appreciate a mediator who is respected by both East and West, and has the intelligence and ability to help both find some common ground. Canada certainly has a right to speak out and be heard given what is at stake, and who better in the political world could represent us and fulfill the above-mentioned qualifications than our own Prime Minister. His efforts at this time should be applauded. When no one else is doing anything really tangible and concrete, he has taken the initiative in a humanitarian move that can only benefit us all. I truly believe that he will introduce an element of sanity at a time when it has never been needed more.

I find it hard to see how anyone can disagree with a nuclear freeze and a move in the direction of mutually verified nuclear disarmament, even if only in principle, and yet I know there are people who do. I am not advocating dropping our defenses, for I know that militarily this would be foolish and would not accomplish the desired goal of stability. Are we not going in the wrong direction however with a continued arms build-up, and no real or serious efforts at compromise? Communication between East and West must be promoted if we are to see the world survive as we know it today. Without restored stability, both sides can only lose from the possible resulting consequences. We should join together and refocus our sights in an effort to gain control over our nuclear arms, rather than attempting to gain control over each other.

Yours truly,

Gary Price

5





TO/À IDDZ
FROM/DE IDA

MF

Mr. Calder
Could we have
a word pls

REFERENCE • Telegram IDA0060 of January 16¹², 1984 and
RÉFÉRENCE memorandum RBR0006 of January 4, 1984.
SUBJECT • Soviet Proposal for a Joint Nuclear Non-
SUJET Proliferation Declaration

Security/Sécurité	CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	28-7-5-1
Date	January 13, 1984
Number/Numéro	IDA-0066

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

W/attach

ETN
RBR
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RBD

Attached is the telegram reporting on our talk with Soviet Embassy Second Secretary Goussarov on this subject. The text of the ideas which the Russians are suggesting for a joint nuclear non-proliferation declaration is included in the telegram. You will note our initial comments to Mr. Goussarov about such a declaration. We should be grateful to know whether the Prime Minister will wish to have any joint declaration issued during his visit to Moscow or whether he would prefer simply a reference to non-proliferation in a joint communiqué (which we assume will be unavoidable). Whatever the decision, do you wish us to prepare a text in consultation with others involved in this question?

O.A. Chistoff

O.A. Chistoff,
Acting Director,
Arms Control & Disarmament Division

Canada Canada

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

28-4-6 28-7-5-1

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
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SECURITY/SECURITE	CONFIDENTIAL	12	10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDA0060 12JAN84		
TO/A	TO MOSCOW		
NFO	INFO LDN WSHDC BONN PARIS ROME OSLO COPEN BRU ANKRA ATHNS CANMIL-		
DISTR	REP NATO BNATO CNBRA VIAEA NDHQOTT/DNACPOL/DSTRATA		
REF			
SUBJ/SUJ	DISTR IFB IDDZ IDD IDR IDAO IDAN RBR ETN		
	---SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR JOINT NPT DECLARATION		
	IN FOLLOW UP TO SEVERAL RECENT DISCUSSIONS ON SAME SUBJECT, SOVIET		
	EMB REP 11JAN PROVIDED UNOFFICIAL PAPER LISTING ITEMS WHICH COULD BE		
	INCLUDED IN JOINT SOVIET/CDN DECLARATION ON NON-PROLIFERATION OF		
	NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR FORM PART OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE COVERING RANGE OF		
	SUBJECTS WHICH COULD BE ISSUED DURING PMS VISIT TO MOSCOW. SIMILAR		
	DECLARATION HAD BEEN SUGGESTED IN 1977 FOR SSEA JAMIESON'S PLANNED		
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	2. PAPER WAS DESCRIBED VARIOUSLY AS PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS OF WHAT		
	HAD BEEN SUGGESTED IN 1977 (ITEM 8 DOES NOT/FIT THIS DESCRIP-		
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	WAS PUT IN CONTEXT OF PMS PEACE INITIATIVE AND HIS INTEREST IN		
	STRENGTHENING NPT. SOVIETS WERE TO HOPE TO GIVE PMS PEACE INITIATIVE		
	MORE CONCRETE RESULTS THAN QUOTE GODSPEED UNQUOTE AND PROPOSED DEC-		

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

M.R. GRINIUS/
O.A. CHISTOFF/PEC

IDA

2-5039

SIG

O.A. CHISTOFF

00070

8

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PAGE TWO IDA0060 CONF

12

10

LARATION WOULD BE ONE SUCH MEASURE. SOVIET EMB REP LEFT IT ENTIRELY TO CDN SIDE WHETHER PROPOSAL SHOULD BE PURSUED.

3. TE IDA UNDERTOOK TO DISCUSS IDEA WITH OTHERS AND SIMPLY NOTED DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PLANNED VISIT IN 1978 WHICH FELL WITHIN BILATERAL CONTEXT AND PMS CURRENT PROPOSED VISIT WHICH WOULD FOCUS PRIMARILY ON PEACE INITIATIVE. WHETHER BILATERAL DECLARATION WOULD BE APPROPRIATE IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED, PARTICULARLY AS SUCH BILATERAL DECLARATIONS OR COMMUNIQUE WERE NOT ISSUED DURING PMS VISITS TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN HIS PEACE EFFORTS.

4. DESPITE REPEATED CLAIM THAT IDEA IS ONLY SOVIET WORKING LEVEL SUGGESTION, WE ARE SKEPTICAL ABOUT HOW QUOTE UNOFFICIAL UNQUOTE PROPOSAL IS. SOVIET INTENTIONS (OTHER THAN THEIR LOVE OF DECLARATORY STATEMENT) ARE NOT CLEAR BUT ARE NO DOUBT INFLUENCED BY NEED TO SHOW SOME PROGRESS IN RUN-UP TO 1985 NPT REVCONF.

5. WE SHALL BE GIVING IDEA MORE THOUGHT IN ORDER TO PROVIDE CONSIDERED REPLY. IN MEANTIME, WE BELIEVE PROPOSED ITEMS ONE AND THREE IN PARTICULAR COULD POSE PROBLEMS.

6. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SOVIET UNOFFICIAL PAPER:


(Comcentre please copy attached)

Joint Soviet-Canadian Declaration on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons

This document could in our opinion:

- 1) Give a political assessment of the danger of the present international situation; —
- 2) State the intent of the two sides to work towards its improvement; ✓
- 3) Emphasize the threat of spreading nuclear arms in the world; —
- 4) Renew the commitment of the two sides to the NPT; ✓
- 5) Urge the increased role of International Atomic Energy Agency in the control of peaceful use of nuclear materials; ✓
- 6) Appeal to other countries to join the NPT; ✓
- 7) Renew the commitment of the sides to observe the NPT in all their activities; ✓
- 8) Consultations on a bilateral basis in the preparation for the 1985 Review Conference. ✓

DELEGATION DE LA FRANCE
AU CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD



28-7-5	
48	6

DECLARATION FRANCO-SOVIETIQUE SUR LA
NON-PROLIFERATION DES ARMES NUCLEAIRES

(Rambouillet, le 22 juin 1977 - Texte intégral)

La République française et l'Union des Républiques Socialistes Soviétiques, conscientes de la responsabilité qu'elles assument en tant que puissances nucléaires et désireuses d'éviter les dangers qui découlent de la dissémination des armes nucléaires, réaffirment leur commune volonté de déployer tous leurs efforts tendant à éviter la prolifération de ces armes.

A cette fin, elles estiment qu'une large coopération internationale est nécessaire particulièrement au sein de l'A.I.E.A. dont le système d'inspection, en contrôlant le respect effectif des engagements pris en matière de non-prolifération, constitue un moyen important et efficace pour atteindre cet objectif. Elles sont prêtes à contribuer à l'amélioration de ces contrôles.

La France et l'U.R.S.S. reconnaissent que l'accès aux usages pacifiques de l'énergie nucléaire représente pour un nombre croissant de pays un moyen important de leur développement économique. Elles veilleront de leur côté,

chacune en ce qui la concerne, à ce que leur coopération avec des pays tiers dans le domaine de l'industrie nucléaire présente toutes les garanties nécessaires pour empêcher la prolifération. Dans cette perspective, elles rappellent qu'elles se sont prononcées en faveur d'une limitation des transferts de matières nucléaires propres à fabriquer des armes nucléaires ou autres dispositifs nucléaires explosifs et d'installations et technologies susceptibles de produire ces matières.

Les deux parties appliqueront leur politique d'exportations de matières nucléaires, équipements et technologie en respectant leurs engagements internationaux dans ce domaine et en se fondant sur les objectifs de la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires. Elles sont disposées, chacune en ce qui la concerne, à renforcer les dispositions et garanties appropriées dans le domaine des équipements, des matières et des technologies. Elles continueront à contribuer activement à la concertation sur les principes généraux relatifs aux exportations nucléaires.

Elles se félicitent de la coopération qui s'est instaurée entre elles dans le domaine de la technologie nucléaire.

La France et l'U.R.S.S. attachent une grande importance à la protection physique des matières nucléaires afin d'éviter tout usage ou maniement non autorisé. Elles se prononcent en faveur de l'élaboration d'une convention internationale à ce sujet.

Elles poursuivront leurs consultations sur l'ensemble de ces questions./.



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY SÉCURITÉ	C O N F I D E N T I A L	14 JAN 84 01 06Z	12	10
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FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0032 13JAN84

TO/À TO PARIS

INFO INFO BNATO LDN BONN ROME BNATO VMBFR PRMNY GENEV MOSCO BRU HAGUE

DISTR MDRID LSBON OSLO ATHNS ANKRA TOKYO PEKIN STKHM/DELVOIE

REF PCOOTT/FOWLER NDNOTT/ADMPOL/CPD

SUBJ/SUJ DISTR MINA USS DMF RCR IDR IDA RCD RBR

---PM INITIATIVE:LET FROM PRES MITTERRAND

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LET FROM PRES MITTERRAND IN RESPONSE TO



PM TRUDEAU S LET OF 18NOV.WHILE TEXT IS DATED DEC 23 IT WAS ONLY

HANDED OVER TO PROTOCOL DIV ON 11JAN.GRATEFUL YOUR ANALYSES OF LET,

PARTICULARLY REF TO FIVE POWER CONFERENCE.

2.TEXT AS FOLLOWS:

(COMCENTRE PLS COPY ATTACHED LET QUOTE TO UNQUOTE)

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG  G. SMITH	IDDZ	5-5912	SIG  G. SMITH

LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE

PARIS, le 23 décembre 1983

90071

Monsieur le Premier Ministre,

Je vous remercie de votre lettre du 18 novembre par laquelle vous me faites part des conclusions que vous avez retirées de vos récents entretiens en Europe.

Votre souci d'agir en sorte que soit évitée une nouvelle dégradation des relations Est-Ouest est également le mien, et celui du gouvernement français.

En 1984, notre tâche consistera à utiliser toutes les occasions de contacts, à commencer par la conférence de Stockholm sur le désarmement en Europe, pour favoriser la reprise d'un dialogue politique effectif entre l'Union Soviétique et les Etats-Unis. Nous devrions également agir en faveur de la reprise des négociations sur les armements américains et soviétiques de portée intermédiaire en Europe.

D'une façon plus générale, la France encourage naturellement tout effort de réduction des armements. J'ai précisé récemment devant l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies à quelles conditions mon pays pourrait envisager de participer à un tel processus et nous

Son Excellence
Monsieur Pierre Elliott TRUDEAU
Premier Ministre du Canada
O T T A W A

.../...

avons eu l'occasion, lors de votre passage à Paris, de nous en entretenir directement.

La première condition est, vous le savez, que soit considérablement réduite la disparité actuelle entre les arsenaux des deux grandes puissances nucléaires et l'armement des trois autres puissances nucléaires. La seconde est que ne soient pas développés les systèmes défensifs qui ruineraient la dissuasion. La troisième est que soient réduits les déséquilibres conventionnels et conjurée la menace chimique.

Le rappel de ces conditions logiques n'empêche en rien, au contraire, de réfléchir à la meilleure façon de ralentir, puis de stopper la course aux armements et d'avancer, comme vous le faites des propositions en ce sens.

Je suis très désireux de poursuivre avec vous nos contacts et notre dialogue sur ces questions. Toute occasion de progresser dans ce sens doit être saisie. C'est pourquoi, en vous rappelant les positions de la France, je souhaite le meilleur effet à vos initiatives et vous prie de croire, Monsieur le Premier Ministre, à l'assurance de ma très haute considération et de mon

très
bien cordial souvenir

Francis Mitterrand
Francis MITTERRAND

UNQUOTE



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

MESSAGE
FAC SIMILE

Fib

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

12	10

SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ **C O N F I D E N T I A L**

14 JAN 84 01:06Z

FM/DE **FM EXTOTT IDDZ0031 13JAN84**
TO/A **TO PRGNY**
INFO
DISTR **REF MCNEE/KERGIN TELCON 13JAN**
REF **---PM INITIATIVE: LET TO PM FROM HARTENSON**
SUBJ/SUJ **(CONCENTRE: PEEASE FAX ATTACHED TEXT)**

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

J. MCNEE

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

G. SMITH

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

POSTAL ADDRESS—ADRESSE POSTALE UNITED NATIONS, N.Y. 10017
CABLE ADDRESS—ADRESSE TELEGRAPHIQUE UNATIONS NEWYORK

REFERENCE:

16 December 1983


Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I have read the text of the speeches you delivered on 27 October at the University of Guelph and on 13 November in Montreal with deep interest and admiration. It happens that the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs is planning to publish early in 1984 a special issue of its quarterly journal Disarmament centering on the theme of The Future of Disarmament, in which a number of well-known public figures from all parts of the world, including present or former Government officials, scientists and recognized authorities on various aspects of the subject will contribute a brief statement of their views on the outlook for disarmament or arms limitation in the 1980s, and what might be done at the present juncture to improve that outlook.

It seemed to us that it might be appropriate to your own concerns, as well as a valuable contribution to the international community's consideration of this pressing question, if we could lead this issue off with an article by you presenting your current thinking on the subject and perhaps amplifying or following up the ideas you presented in your recent speeches. If you should find yourself in a position to write such an article we would be most honoured and pleased to print it.

I should perhaps add that in order to meet our deadline for the Spring 1984 issue of Disarmament we would need to receive the article by the end of January 1984, or close to that date.

Please accept, Mr. Prime Minister, the assurances of my highest consideration.


Jan Mårtenson
Under-Secretary-General
Department for Disarmament Affairs

H.E. Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau

TO/A RBR
FROM/DE • IDDZ

REFERENCE • Your memo January 9, 1984.
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Brief for the Romanian Foreign Minister's
SUJET visit.


Security/Sécurité	CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	January 13, 1984
Number/Numéro	IDDZ-0030

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

-1-
DISTRIBUTION

Attached, as requested, is a brief on the Prime Minister's initiative for the briefing book for the Romanian Foreign Minister's visit.

2. Given that there are likely to be important developments in the initiative between now and the visit and the DPM/SSEA's intimate involvement with the initiative, we suggest that you could include in the scenario brief one sentence along these lines - "You might review the current status of the Prime Minister's initiative."


L.A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

CONFIDENTIAL

Originator : J.A. McNee
Division : IDDZ
Telephone No.: 995-5912

PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE

ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

ISSUE

The purpose of this brief is to discuss the current status of the Prime Minister's initiative.

BACKGROUND

The Prime Minister's central purpose is to try to stop and reverse the worsening trend in East-West relations, and thus reduce international tensions and risks of confrontation. His chief proposal addresses the need to restore confidence and re-establish high-level political dialogue between East and West, and particularly between the two superpowers. The PM is interested in seeing if by opening lines of communication to Moscow more propitious conditions can be created for political dialogue between Moscow and Washington.

The initiative involves a number of specific proposals - (a) a conference of the five nuclear weapon states to limit strategic nuclear arsenals (b) a concerted political effort to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime (c) a substantive Western response to the Eastern proposals on MBFR and a meeting at the Foreign Minister level in Vienna (d) the inauguration of the Stockholm CDE Meeting at senior political level. *

Also related to the initiative, but not pursued personally by the PM with other governments, are proposals for (a) a ban on the testing and deployment of high altitude anti-satellite systems (b) a requirement that future strategic systems be verifiable by National Technical Means and (c) restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs.

REACTIONS

The reactions of other governments may be roughly summarized as follows:

- 2 -

European allies have given encouraging support. The Western Europeans share his analysis of the dangerous state of East-West relations and the need for the re-establishment of political dialogue.

The French were generally supportive, with reservations as to timing. Their statements on the five power conference have been contradictory, but generally reserved. The Germans were positive and generally supportive (and have subsequently endorsed the five power conference idea). The British were generally supportive of the broad purpose, but have reservations about specific proposals (especially the five power conference). The Dutch and Belgians reacted very positively, with some reservations as to timing (they think such an initiative may be most needed in the spring of 1984 once INF deployment has taken place). The Italians were generally supportive and have publicly endorsed the idea of a five power conference. (Also, there have been very positive and fully supportive written responses from the Danes and Norwegians and a very positive reactions from the Spaniards and Turks. The Greeks generally support the initiative, but disagree with NATO's INF deployment.)

PM Nakasone of Japan was very receptive and fully supportive when the PM visited Tokyo on November 19.

Commonwealth Heads of Government specifically endorsed PM Trudeau's initiative in the Goa Declaration on International Security.

The Chinese are mildly supportive of the broad political purpose, but do not support the call for a five power conference or the NPT. They argue that the first priority is concentrating pressure on the superpowers to reduce their arms.

The Soviets are interested, but cautious and non-committal. They claim to have had sad experiences with high-level contact with the US, hence they were "reserved" about the idea of the higher level of contact the better. While they appreciated the PM's view on the importance of discussions of intentions and goals, they claimed that Washington, in deploying new missiles was acting on a different basis. They were non-committal on a five power conference and reserved judgement on the question of political level representation at CDE and MBFR.

The USA has assured the Prime Minister of its support for the broad political objectives he is pursuing in East-West relations, while laying most of the blame for the current state of those relations on Soviet attitudes and actions. The USA administration has reservations about most of the specific arms control measures put forward by the Prime Minister.

- 3 -

U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar has commended and encouraged the Prime Minister's efforts.

RESULTS

The degree of support which the Prime Minister has garnered for the main purposes of his initiative is of itself a positive result insofar as it may have a beneficial effect on the climate of East-West relations. The decisions taken at the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels in early December were particularly significant in furthering the purposes of the initiative:

- (a) an undertaking by NATO foreign ministers to attend the opening of the CDE in Stockholm (Canadian delegation in the lead);
- (b) an undertaking to review NATO negotiating position in the MBFR negotiations (Canadian delegation in the lead);
- (c) the "Brussels declaration" which places heavy emphasis on genuine détente and dialogue in East-West relations (an FRG initiative, actively supported by the Canadian delegation);
- (d) a mandate given the permanent NATO Council to review the current state of East-West relations and to report to the next NATO ministerial meeting on what actions might be taken to improve them.

CANADIAN POSITION

The Prime Minister will be pursuing his initiative with President Ceausescu in Bucharest February 1-2.

ROMANIAN POSITION

Romanian Vice-Foreign Minister Dolgu welcomed the Prime Minister's initiative during his visit to Ottawa December, 1983. The Romanians agree on the primary importance of the need to restore East-West dialogue; the main objective of the Romanians' compromise proposals on INF is to contribute to the resumption of such a dialogue. While both the Prime Minister's and the Romanian initiatives share the same ultimate goal, the Romanians are concentrating on the INF question, while we are trying to work around it (see other briefs for an outline of the Romanian initiative).



281/114/256
FILE/DOSSIER

MESSAGE

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Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ C O N F I D E N T I A L 13 JAN 84 22 072 12 10

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0029 13JAN84

TO/À TO STKHM DELIVER BY 140900 IMMED

INFO INFO WSHDC LDN BONN MOSCO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR DISTR MINA USS DMF IDA RCR RBR URR



REF REF SMITH/DELWORTH TELECON 13JAN

---STKHM CONF:PARLIAMENTARY DEL:BILATERALS

AS DISCUSSED REFTELECON YOU SHOULD INFORM NATO AND N/NA DELS OF NAMES OF CDN PARLIAMENTARY DEL WHO WILL BE ACCOMPANYING DPM/SSEA IN STKHM(HON JOE CLARK,PAUL MCCRAE AND PAULINE JEWETT).PM HAS INDICATED THAT IN DOING SO YOU SHOULD MENTION THAT THEIR INCLUSION IN CDN DEL IS REFLECTION OF CDN ~~NON~~ ^{ACH TO} PARTISAN APPROVAL ~~OF~~ FOREIGN POLICY AND ALL-PARTY SUPPORT FOR PEACE INITIATIVE.

2.MR CLARK SPECIFICALLY HAS ASKED TO SEE FOLLOWING IN STKHM: PM PALME AND FOREIGN MINISTERS SHULTZ,GROMYKO,GENSCHER AND HOWE. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD APPROACH LOCAL DELS IN STKHM ACCORDINGLY. OUR UNDERSTANDING IS THAT MR CLARK WILL ARRIVE JAN16 AND DEPART SOMETIME JAN20 THEREBY PROVIDING TIMEFRAME OF JAN17-18-19 FOR POSSIBLE MTGS.

3.FYI:WE HAVE LEARNED THAT CLARK S ASSISTANT,PEGGY MASON,ALSO WILL BE CONTACTING LOCAL EMBS ABOUT APPTS.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG  G.J. Smith sc	IDDZ	5-5912	SIG  G.J. Smith



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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14 JAN 84

01 072

SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

UNCLASSIFIED

12

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FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0028 13JAN84

TO/À

TO BNATO

INFO

DISTR

INFO WSHDC BRU HAGUE BONN ROME LDN PARIS **GENEV** YPRMNY ANKRA ATHNS VMBFR

REF

MOSCO STKHM MDRID LSBON OSLO COPEN PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP

SUBJ/SUJ

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB URR UGB IDR IDA RCR RBR FPR

---PM INITIATIVE:LET FROM SENATOR GLENN

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LET FROM SENATOR JOHN GLENN TO PM TRUDEAU **DATED JAN 3**

WHICH WAS RELEASED TO PRESS TODAY. ~~DATES FOR MTG WITH SENATOR GLENN~~
~~ARE UNDER REVISION.~~

2.TEXT BEGINS.

(COMCENTRE: PLEASE COPY ATTACHED)

TEXT ENDS.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

G.J.Smith/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

G.J.Smith



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	UNCLASSIFIED	12	10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDDZ0027 13JAN84		
TO/À	TO WSHDC LDN ROME BNATO PARIS BONN VMBFR GENEV HAGUE BRU STKHM TOKYO		
INFO	PEKIN COPEN OSLO MDRID ATHNS <i>MOSCO PERMANY</i>		
DISTR	INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CP		
REF	DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDR IDA RBR RBD FPR <i>imu</i>		
SUBJ/SUJ	REF PRMNY TEL WKGR0059 11JAN		
	---PM INITIATIVE:PM MTG WITH UN SEC GEN		
	FLWG IS TEXT OF STATEMENT 11JAN <i>ISSUED</i> BY PRESS SECTION OF U.N. AFTER PM		
	MTG WITH SEC GEN QUOTE		
	SECRETARY-GENERAL,JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR MET TODAY WITH THE		
	PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA,PIERRE TRUDEAU.IN AN HOUR-AND-A-HALF		
	CONVERSATION,THEY REVIEWED THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND SPECIFI-		
	CALLY DISCUSSED VARIOUS WAYS OF REDUCING TENSIONS,IN PARTICULAR IN		
	THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO MAJOR POWERS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE		
	ALLIANCES.IN THIS CONTEXT,THE PRIME MINISTER INFORMED THE SECRETARY-		
	GENERAL OF HIS PEACE INITIATIVES AND THE REACTIONS TO THEM FROM THE		
	WORLD LEADERS THAT HE HAD CONTACTED SO FAR.		
	THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WELCOMED THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS		
	WITH THE PRIME MINISTER,ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE CURRENT TENSE		
	INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.HE BELIEVED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER S IDEAS		
	COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE LESSENING OF TENSIONS AND LEAD TO THE		
	IMPROVEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS		
	...2		

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG <i>[Signature]</i> McNEE	IDDZ	5-5912	SIG <i>[Signature]</i> G. SMITH

Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
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PAGE TWO. IDDZ0027 UNCLAS

PARTICULARLY INTERESTED TO LEARN MORE OF THE PRIME MINISTER S PRO-
POSAL FOR A POSSIBLE FIVE-POWER MEETING, SINCE HE IS OF THE VIEW
THAT THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAVE A SPECIAL
RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE CHARTER.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE PRIME MINISTER ALSO DISCUSSED THE
FORTHCOMING NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY REVIEW CONFERENCE, AND THE NEED
TO STRENGTHEN THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME. THEY HAVE AGREED TO KEEP
IN TOUCH REGARDING FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE
PRIME MINISTER S INITIATIVES. UNQUOTE.



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0026 13JAN84

TO/À

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INFO BNATO BRU HAGUE OSLO ROME PARIS BONN WSHDC PRMHY LDN HDRID

REF

ANKRA ATHNS MOSCO VMBFR STKHH PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADMPOI/CPP

SUBJ/SUJ

DISTR HINA USS DHF IFB IDR IDA RBR RSD RSR RCR

---PM INITIATIVE:LET FROM DANISH PM

DANISH AMB HANDED OVER ON JAN12 TEXT OF FOLLOWING LET FROM DANISH

PM OCHLUETER WHICH IS IN RESPONSE TO PM TRUDEAU LET OF 18NOV.

2.TEXT BEGINS.

(CONCENTRE: PLEASE COPY ATTACHED)

TEXT ENDS.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG G.J.Smith/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG L.A.Delvoie

MESSAGE PREPARATION

- 1) Use OCR element and set typewriter for 10 pitch. Observe right margin marked "10". If typewriter capable of 12 pitch only, ensure that right margin, marked "12", is observed.
- 2) Use full capitals and double line feed at all times.
- 3) Security Classification: "UNCLASSIFIED" is to be typed without spacing between letters. All other classifications are to have one space between the letters, e.g. C O N F I D E N T I A L
- 4) Use only one space between words in the address portion of the message, e.g.
TO LDN PARIS IMMED WSHDC
DISTR PUA APO APR MFP
- 5) Subject line is indicated by three dashes in front of the subject, e.g. --- REVISED FSDS
- 6) First paragraph is neither numbered nor indented. All subsequent paragraphs are numbered. Do not use space between the paragraph number and the first letter of the text, e.g. 3. THE POST...
- 7) Do not use space before or after punctuation marks, e.g. WILL ARRIVE BERNE, 15 JUN. THE etc.
- 8) Use only the following punctuation: period, comma, semi-colon, colon, dash, oblique stroke, brackets and question mark.
- 9) Following signs must be spelled out: \$ (DOLLARS), % (PERCENT), # (NUMBER), " (QUOTE), and " (UNQUOTE). In English the apostrophe is omitted to form a single word, while in French the apostrophe is replaced by a space.
- 10) Always repeat negatives NO and NOT as NO/NO and NOT/NOT. DO NOT/NOT underline.
- 11) End of page of multi-page messages is identified on a separate line, at left margin with only three periods and the number of the following page, e.g.
...2
- 12) Do not use punctuation at the end of the message when there is a signature.

PRÉPARATION DES MESSAGES

- 1) Employer le LOC et régler la machine au pas "10". Placer la marge droite à "10". Si vous avez une machine de pas "12", placer la marge droite à "12".
- 2) Toujours utiliser les majuscules et le double interligne.
- 3) La cote de sécurité "NONCLASSIFIÉ" doit être dactylographiée sans espace entre les lettres. Toutes les autres doivent l'être avec un espace, par exemple: C O N F I D E N T I E L
- 4) Pour l'adresse, utiliser seulement un espace entre chaque mot, par exemple:
A LDN PARIS IMMED WSHDC
DISTR PUA APO APR MFP
- 5) Faire précéder le sujet de trois tirets, par exemple: ---DSE REVISÉES
- 6) Le premier paragraphe n'est jamais numéroté et commence à la marge. Tous les paragraphes suivants sont numérotés. Ne pas laisser d'espace entre le numéro du paragraphe et la première lettre du texte, par exemple: 3. LA MISSION...
- 7) Ne pas laisser d'espace avant ou après les signes de ponctuation, par exemple: ARRIVERAI À BERNE, 15 JUN. LE etc.
- 8) Utiliser seulement les signes de ponctuation suivants: point, virgule, point virgule, deux points, tiret, barre oblique, parenthèses et point d'interrogation.
- 9) Les signes suivants doivent être dactylographiés en toutes lettres: \$ (DOLLARS), % (POUR CENT), # (NUMÉRO), " (CITATION) et " (FIN DE CITATION). En anglais, omettre l'apostrophe et ajouter la terminaison au mot pour en faire un seul mot. En français remplacer l'apostrophe par un espace.
- 10) Répéter toujours les négatifs NO et NOT comme ceci: NO/NO NOT/NOT (en français les négatifs ne sont pas répétés).
- 11) Sur les messages comportant plus d'une page, indiquer sur une ligne séparée, à la marge à gauche, le numéro de la page suivante en le faisant précéder de trois points seulement, par exemple:
...2
- 12) Ne pas mettre de ponctuation à la fin du message quant il comporte une signature.

ROYAL DANISH EMBASSY

copy

File No. 105.I.1/2

No. 1

The Embassy of Denmark presents its compliments to the Department of External Affairs and has the honour to convey to the Department the following message, which the Prime Minister of Denmark has sent to the Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada:

"My dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter dated 18 November, 1983 in which you elaborate on various aspects of your initiative to improve the presently strained East-West relationship. I am grateful to be given this opportunity to present the Danish government's views on the concrete proposals contained in your most recent message.

In the shorter term you suggest that all NATO members be represented at the inaugural meeting of the CDE in Stockholm on 17 January, 1984 at a high political level. I share with you the satisfaction that the NATO council meeting in Brussels 8-9 December revealed full agreement among the allies that their foreign ministers should attend the opening. This decision can be considered yet another token of the importance that we all attach to the imminent restoration and subsequent intensification of the high level political dialogue between East and West in general, and to the favourable and substantial outcome of the CDE in particular.

././.

Department of External Affairs,
Ottawa

- 2 -

In this connection I also welcome the ministers' decision that a thorough appraisal of East-West relations be undertaken with a view to achieving a more constructive East-West dialogue. This step, in my view, is fully in tune with the aims of your initiative and could, no doubt, further efforts to establish a more stable East-West relationship.

I have also studied your proposals to reinvigorate the MBFR negotiations. As I stated in my letter of 16 November, 1983, the Danish government is prepared to consider favourably any concrete steps aimed at promoting the achievement of this goal. Such steps seem even more needed now that the Eastern side has chosen to desist from setting a date for the resumption of the Vienna negotiations after the present recess.

It is not least against this background that the Danish government shares the view of a number of NATO members that now is the time for undertaking a review of the Western negotiating positions in order to re-define our strategies at the MBFR negotiating table and to resume as soon as possible substantial negotiations in Vienna. This approach could also result in a more active posture on the part of the West and in your words, Mr. Prime Minister, would demonstrate to the East and to our own publics our desire to make meaningful progress in the arms control field.

I will be awaiting the outcome of your further contemplations on the elements of your initiative with interest.

Yours sincerely,


(signed)

Poul Schlüter"

The Embassy has been advised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen that the letter, signed by Prime Minister Poul Schlüter on January 5, 1984, has been sent by special courier to this Embassy. As soon as it is received in Ottawa, the message will be brought to the Department of External Affairs for delivery to the Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada.

The Embassy of Denmark avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of External Affairs the assurances of its highest consideration.

Ottawa, January 10, 1984.



MASTER
FILE

R E S T R I C T E D

FM BNATO YBGR8008 13JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDR

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER WSHDC

DISTR(IEDZ

---GEORGETOWN CENTER CONFERENCE ON FUTURE OF NATO

OTT ADDRESSEES WILL BE RECEIVING BY BAG OF 13JAN TEXTS OF STATEMENTS MADE AT THIS CONF BY TINDEMANS AND KISSIN ER.TEXT TO BE DELIVERED TONIGHT BY HELMUT SCHMIDT WILL FOLLOW.

2.TINDEMANS SPEECH IS WORTH READING FOR ADDITIONAL LIGHT IT SHEDS ON HIS PROPOSAL FOR STUDY OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.KISSINGERS SPEECH IS WORTH READING FOR WHAT HE SAYS ABOUT FIRST-USE AND INF, AND FOR HIS PROPOSALS ON HOW TO CONDUCT DIALOGUE WITH SOVIET UNION IN COMING MONTHS.HIS SPEECH WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE WIDELY REPORTED IN INNATL PRESS.I WOULD BE SURPRISED IF IT WERE NOT/NOT SEEN, AMONG OTHER THINGS,AS AN ATTEMPT TO STAKE A CLAIM TO BE NAMED AS SECRETARY OF STATE IN SECOND REAGAN ADMIN,AND PERHAPS EVEN BEFORE USA ELECTIONS,AS AMBASSADOR ON SPECIAL MISSION CHARGED WITH SOUNDING SOVIET UNION ON POSSIBILITIES OF RENEWING SUPER-POWER DIALOGUE.IN REPLYING TO QUESTION FROM MICHAEL PALLISER,KISSINGER ALLOWED THAT,IF ALLIANCE DECIDED TO APPROACH USSR ON COLLECTIVE BASIS,THEN SPECIAL ENVOY HE SUGGESTED SHOULD BE APPOINTED MIGHT PREFERABLY BE EUROPEAN.CONCEPT AS OUTLINED IN HIS SPEECH,HOWEVER,REFERS RATHER TO POSSIBILITY THAT ENVOY WOULD BE AN AMERICAN SPEAKING FOR USA GOVT.

// TAB
2.

CCC/298 131720Z YBGR8008

FASE FURCO

McNOR

TO

MASTER FILE

CDN EYES ONLY

RESERVE AUX CDNS

C O N F I D E N T I E L ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

DE PARIS WIGR3109 13JAN84

A EXTOTT RCR LIVRAISON 131300

INFO BONN STKHM WSHDC BNATO

DISTR RGB RBR RCR IDR IDA IDD DMF

---VISITE UNIVERSITAIRES FRANCAIS AU CDA-RENCONTRE AVEC SOPPELSA

LORS D UDEUNFR OERPOUR GUPE D UNIVERSITAIRES FRANCAIS

QUI ENTREPNDMTOUS PEU VISITE AU CDA, AVONS RENCONTRE

M. JACQUES SOPPELSA, PRES. DE UNIV PARIS I (SORBONNE) ET DIRECTEUR

DE INSTITUT NATL DES ETUDES SUPERIEURES DE DEFENSE ET DES ARMEMENTS.

2. SOPPELSA NOUS A INDIQUE AVOIR PARTICIPE IL Y A QUELQUES JOURS A

BONN A DES ECHANGES AVEC BRANDT ET EGON BAHR DANS CADRE DES CONSULTA-

TIONS MENSUELLES PS FRANCAIS/SPD. TELS ECHANGES LUI APPARAISSENT

IMPORTANTS CAR REA, SA STABILITE ET SES OPTIONS, CONSTITUENT

PROBLEME STRATEGIQUE NUMERO UN DES ANNEES A VENIR POUR SECURITE

EUROPEENNE. CELA DIT SOPPELSA A RECONNU QUE ECHANGES AC SPD ONT

PAS ETE FACILES SUR CES QUESTIONS. PS CONSIDERE QUE INSTALLATION DES

CRUISE/PII AMERICAINS EST DES PLUS NECESSAIRES ALORS QUE SPD, POURTANT

INITIALEMENT FAVORABLE, A DEPUIS DERNIERS MOIS ADOPTE UNE ATTITUDE

CIT PAS TRES RESPONSABLE FINCIT MAIS SANS DOUTE CARACTERISTIQUE DES

LOUVOIEMENTS NORMAUX D UN PARTI D OPPOSITION.

3. ELEMENT IMPORTANT, SOPPELSA A INDIQUE QU A LA DEMANDE DU PREMIER

SECRETAIRE DU PS (JOSPIN), IL AVAIT ETE CHARGE DE CREER UN GROUPE DE

...2

PAGE DEUX WIGR3109 CONFD ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

TRAVAIL INCLUANT NOTAMMENT HUNTZINGER RESP DES AFFAIRES INNTALES
AU PS.BUT DE CE GROUPE SERAIT D IDENTIFIER POSSIBILITES/AVENUEFS
POUR APPROFONDIR CONSULTATION AVEC ALLEMANDS EN FONCTION D UNE
COOP MILITAIRE EUROPEENNE ACCRUE.COMME LE SAVEZ,DEVELOPPEMENT
D UNE TELLE COOP EUROPEENNE COTIE LME FOAMENTAL MAINTES
FOIS EVOQUE PAR DIRIGEANTS FNCAIS RE DERNIER SOMMET FRANCO-
ALLEMAND/INTERVEIODU MIN HERNU A UEO ETC.POUR LA FRAE^{NK} IL
S AGIT LA D UNE FACON DE RENFORCER COOP EUROPEENNE BIEN SUR MAIS
SURTOUT D INSCRIRE DANS LE CONCRET UNE VOLONTE COMMUNE DE PRISE
EN MAINS PAR EUROPEENS DE LEUR SECURITE/DEFENSE ET SUSCEPTIBLE DE
GENERER VOLONTE PLUS FERME AU PLAN POLITIQUE DANS CES DOMAINES.

4.D UN POINT DE VUE FRANCAIS ET SOPPELSA LE CONFIRME,IL NE FAIT
AUCUN DOUTE QUE TOUTE AGRESSION SUR RFA CONSTITUERAIT UN CIT CASUS
BELLI FINCIT ENTRAINANT LA FRANCE.SELON LUI,ON NE SAURAIT COMPTER
INDEFINIMENT SUR FUA ET BIEN QUE LEUR PRESENCE SOIT TOUJOURS
ESSENTIELLE/VITALE IL IMPORTE D ORES ET DEJA DE PREPARER UNE RFLEVE
ET DE SE Doter DES MOYENS DE LE FAIRE.

5.INDICATION QUI NE MANQUE PAS D INTERET,SOPPELSA NOUS A SIGNALE
QUE HAUTES AUTORITES FRANCAISES SONT A METTRE AU POINT UNE CIT
INITIATIVE FINCIT EN MATIERE DE DESARMEMENT QUI DEPASSERAIT DANS
SA FORMULATION ET SA PORTEE CADRE DE CDE.ETAT D AVANCEMENT DE
CETTE INITIATIVE SERAIT TRES AVANCEE AU POINT OU SOPPELSA PRESUMAIT
...3

PAGE TROIS WIGR3109 CONFD ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

QU ELLE AURAIT DU ETRE LANCEE AVANT OUVERTURE DE CDE.SOPPELSA
N A PAS VOULU COMMENTER DAVANTAGE MALGRE QU IL NOUS AIT CIT MIS
LA PUCE A L OREILLE FINCIT.

6.VENANT DE SOPPELSA QUI EST A LA FOIS PROCHE DU PS ET GOUVT FT
QUI A CAPACITE D INFLUENCER VUES OFFICIELLES,AVONS TOUT LIEU
CONSIDER COMME PERTINENTE IDEE D UNE TELLE PROPOSITION POUR
NOT PART,FORCE NOUS EST DE ^(CONSTATER, MEME SI) COTAR, MEME EN DEMEURONS POUR
L HEURE A DES SPECULATIO^{NS},QUE INITIATIVE FRANCAISE,SI ELLE SE
SITUE DANS CONTEXTE DU DESARMEMENT,POURRAIT BIEN EGALEMENT S ETENDRE
PLUS GLOBALEMENT AU DOMAINE DES RELATIONS EST/OUEST.VOUS
SOUVIENDREZ QUE DANS SON INTERVENTION TELEVISEE DU 16NOV.PRES
MITTERRAND AVAIT INDIQUE EN SUBSTANCE QUE LE MOMENT VENU IL NE
MENAGERAIT AUCUN EFFORT POUR PARVENIR A UNE AMELIORATION DES
RELATIONS EST/OUEST TOUT EN EXCLUANT EVENTUEL ROLE DE MEDIATION
^{AIT}RE EUA/URSS.AU RISQUE DE POUSSER PLUS AVANT SPECULATION
POUVONS PENSER QUE FRANCE A PEUT-ETRE DEFINI UNE FORMULE QUI TOUT
EN NE COMPROMETTANT PAS SES PROPRES POSITIONS ET EVITANT ROLE DE
MEDIATION DANS DES NEGS AUXQUELLES ELLE N EST PAS PARTIF,SERAIT
DE NATURE A GENERER UNE AMELIORATION DES RAPPORTS EST/OUEST.SI
TFL ETAIT LE CAS,IL VA DE SOI QUE IDEE D UNE INITIATIVE FRANCAISE
EST IMPORTANTE EU EGARD A INITIATIVE DU PM CDN.IL Y A CEPENDANT
FORT A PARIER QUE CETTE IDEE NE CIRCULE POUR L HEURE QUE DANS DES
CERCLES TRES RESTREINT SI CELA DEVAIT SE CONFIRMER.

7.SOULEVENS DANS TEL SUIVANT POSSIBILITE QUE POURSUIVIEZ A OTT
DIALOGUE AVEC SOPPELSA.

MP

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BGRAD ZLGR3082 13JAN84

TO EXTOTT RBR

INFO STKHM/SCDEL DELHI

DISTR MINA FPR DMF RGB RSD RSR RBD RBR IDDZ IDR IDAO IDAN

REF YOURTELS IDA0048 10JAN IDA0051 12JAN

---STKHM CONF:BILATERALS

INVITATION PASSED TO MFA PROTOCOL ON RECEIPT. MOJSOVS ACCEPTANCE
OF INTATION RECEIVED AT SAME MOMENT WE INFORMED MFA OF CANCELLATION.
MFA UNDERSTOOD CIRCS BUT CLEARLY FELT MOJSOV MIGHT SEEK BILATFRAL
INSTEAD. ON BASIS PARA2 YOURTEL0051 WE THEREFORE SAID THAT IT MIGHT
BE BEST TO LEAVE ANY PROPOSAL MOJSOV MIGHT HAVE UNTIL DELS GET TO
STKHM.

2. HEAD CDN SECTION MFA TELLS US THAT CONCEPTS ELABORATED IN PMS
INITIATIVE CLOSELY PARALLEL YUGO VIEWS, AND THAT MOJSOV HAS TAKEN
PERSONAL INTEREST. HE SAID CHOGM GOA DECLARATION HAD PARTICULAR
IMPACT HERE BECAUSE IT WAS ENUNCIATED AND ESPOUSED Y MRS GANDHI,
WHO IS ALSO CHAIRMAN OF NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT. HENCE WE SUSPECT THERE
MIGHT BE INTEREST IN WORKING FOR SIMILAR STATEMENT IN THAT FORUM.

CCC/096 131330Z ZLGR3082

CORRECTED COPY
EXEMPLAIRE CORRIGE

MATTER FILE

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CORRECTED COPY

FM OSLO WGGR3056 13JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDR DELIVER BY 131100

INFO BRU LDN PARIS WSHDC BONN COPEN HAGUE MDRID LSBON ROME ATHNS

ANKRA BNATO CANMILREPNATO STKHM/SCDEL VMBFR PCOOTT/FOWLER/ARCHDEACON

NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD/DIPOL/DNACPOL/ORAE

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDD IDDZ RGB UGB URR RCE RBR CPD FRP IDRL

REF YOURTEL IDR0151 12JAN

---TINDEMANS INITIATIVE:HARMEL REVIEW:NORWAY

FOLLOWING OUR BRIEFING OF LIAN DIRECTOR OF MFA NATO DIV,WHO WILL
ACCOMPANY FOREIGN MIN STRAY TO STKHM ON JAN16,HE UNDERTOOK TO REPORT
YOUR VIEWS TO STRAY IN QUOTE MOST POSITIVE MANNER UNQUOTE.HF

INDICATED THAT THERE WAS MERIT IN YOUR CONCEPT THAT NATO I/S COULD
REDUCE REVIEW TO LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR WHICH WHILE QUOTE SAFF
UNQUOTE MAY NOT/NOT MEET INTENT OF MINS WHO COMMISSIONED WORK.

2.WHILE LIAN WILL ACT AS DESCRIBED WE REALIZE MATTER WILL BE MATTER
OF DISCUSSION WITH MFA POLDIR RAVNE AND PARTICULARLY WITH NORWEGIAN
PERMREP IN BRU.REGARDLFSS BELIEVE STRAY WILL PROBABLY WANT TO TOUCH
BASE WITH DPM/SSEA ON ISSUE AND WILL LIKELY DO SO IN HELPFUL MANNER.

SOME SMALL DETAIL MAY BE REQUESTED IE WHAT IS MEANT PRECISELY BY

QUOTE HIGH LEVEL OFFICIAL INVOLVEMENT UNQUOTE?FOR EXAMPLE WOULD CDA
SEND DMF?ALSO WHAT MECHANICS DO WE HAVE IN MIND RE SECRTARIAT FOR
QUOTE SELECT GROUP OF NATO PERMREPS UNQUOTE.THESE WERE IMMEDIATE
QUESTIONS WE WERE UNABLE TO ANSWER.

CCC/061 131452Z WGGR3056

MASTER

FILE

Division Phoned _____
Person SC
Local Time 1500

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

UNCLASSIFIED

FM LDN XNFC1503 13JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 130900

INFO WSHDC PRMNY ROME BNATO PARIS BONN VMBFR GENEV HAGUE
BRU STKHM TOKYO PEKIN COPEN OSLO MDRID ATHNS PCOOTT/FOWLER
NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/PPP

DISTR RCR MINA USS DMF IFB IDR IDA IMU RBR RBD FPR SCS

REF PRMNY TEL WKGR0059 11JAN

---PM MEETING WITH UN SEC GEN

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ARTICLE IN LONDON TIMES FRIDAY 13JAN
BY TIMES NY CORRESPONDENT PYSARIWSKI QUOTE TRUDEAUS NUCLEAR PLEA
TO UN UNQUOTE.

QUOTE AS PART OF AN EFFORT TO RENEW DISCUSSION ON DISARMAMENT,
MR PIERRE TRUDEAU, THE CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER, HAS PROPOSED
THAT THE UNITED NATIONS BE USED AS A FORUM FOR TALKS AMONG ALL
FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS WHO ALSO HAPPEN TO BE THE PERMANENT
MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

HE BROUGHT UP THE POSSIBILITY AFTER A MEETING ON WEDNESDAY
WITH SENOR JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR, THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL,
WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW TO HAVE UNEQUIVOCALLY COME OUT IN SUPPORT
OF MR TRUDEAUS DISARMAMENT INITIATIVE. OF THE FIVE NUCLEAR
POWERS, ONLY CHINA HAS EXPRESSED AN INTEREST.

MR TRUDEAU TOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE THAT WHILE THE UNITED STATES

...2

PAGE TWO XNGR1503 UNCLAS

AND THE SOVIET UNION, AS THE TWO MAIN NUCLEAR POWERS, SHOULDERS THE MAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARMS CONTROL AND REDUCTION, THE OTHER THREE COUNTRIES, INCLUDING BRITAIN AND FRANCE, MUST ALSO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS. QUOTE I AM NOT PREPARED, NOR SHOULD THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD BE PREPARED, TO LET THE OTHER THREE OFF THE HOOK UNQUOTE, HE SAID.

UUU/083 131153Z XNFC1503

MAYOR FILE

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR1047 13JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDR

INFO BRU LDN PARIS BONN OSLO COPEN HAGUE MDRID LSBON ROME ATHNS

ANKRA BNATO CANMILREPNATO NDHQOTT/ADM POL/ CPP/ DIPOL/ DNACPOL/ ORAE

STKHM/SCDEL VMBFR PCOOTT/FOWLER/ARCHDEACON

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDD IDDZ RGB UGB URR RCR RSR RBR CPD FPR

IDRL IDA

---COMPLIANCE ISSUES:PRESS BRIEFING

UNIDENTIFIED STATE DEPT OFFICIAL(IDENTIFIED TO EMB AS RICK BURT)

HAS BRIEFED USA PRESS ON REPORT TO CONGRESS OF SOV ARMS CONTROL

COMPLIANCE.BURT BRIEFING WHICH WILL PROBABLY BE CARRIED IN MAJOR

PRESS TOMORROW APPEARED TO FOCUS ON 3 ISSUES:THE RADAR-UNIT THAT

MAY BE PART OF AN ABM SYSTEM,THE SECOND ICBM AND ENCODED TELEMETRY.

2.BURT TOLD PRESS THAT AN UNCLASSIFIED VERSION OF THE REPORT TO

CONGRESS WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE IN DUE COURSE.

CCC/231 132300Z UNGR1047

MAJOR FILE

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR1045 13JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDR

INFO BRU LDN PARIS BONN OSLO COPEN HAGUE MDRID LSBON ROME ATHNS
ANKRA BNATO CANMILREPNATO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP/DIPOL/DNACPOL/ORAE
STKHM/SCDEL VMBVR PCOOTT/FOWLER/ARCHDEACON

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDD IDDZ RGB UGB URR RCR RSR RBR CPD FPR
IDRL IDA

REF YOURTELS IDR0149 AND IDR0151 12JAN

---TINDEMANS INITIATIVE:HARMEL REVIEW

DISCUSSED HARMEL REVIEW WITH JOHN HAWES, DIR OF DIVISION IN STATE
RESPONSIBLE FOR NATO. HAWES SAID THAT USA AGREES THAT REVIEW MUST
BE CARRIED OUT WITH THE ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT OF HIGH LEVEL REPS FROM
CAPITALS. TO THIS END HE AGREED THAT USSR/EASTERN EUROPE EXPERTS
MTG WLD HAVE TO BE INVOLVED AND SAID THAT USA ENVISAGED HIGH LEVEL
MTG PROBABLY AT POLITICAL DIR LEVEL IN APRIL. USA ALSO BELIEVES THAT
PAPER MUST BE AS FORWARD LOOKING AS POSSIBLE AND TO BE EFFECTIVE
IT MUST BE CONCISE AND INCLUDE POSITIVE PRACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS.

2. HOWEVER USA IS CONCERNED THAT AT THIS STAGE THE ALLIANCE IS
NOT/NOT PREPARED TO LOOK FORWARD WITH CONFIDENCE AND THAT THEREFORE
ANY ATTEMPT TO LAUNCH IMMEDIATELY INTO THE FORWARD LOOKING ASPECTS
OF THE FINAL PAPER WLD END UP REFLECTING NOT/NOT THE SERIOUS
THOUGHT OF THE ALLIANCE BUT RATHER CURRENT ALLIANCE ANXIETIES.

3. HAWES ALSO SAID THAT IT IS THE USA VIEW THAT THE FORWARD LOOKING

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR1045 CONF D

WORK CANNOT/NOT BE DONE WITHOUT A GOOD HARD LOOK AT THE 1978 AND 1983 STUDIES. THIS HARD LOOK SHLD EMPHASIZE THE KEY FINDINGS IN THOSE STUDIES, LOOK AT EVENTS SINCE THEM AND THUS PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR THE FORWARD LOOK. THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL FOR AN OUTLINE WHICH HAWES AGREED WAS NOT/NOT AT ALL FORWARD LOOKING WAS INTENDED AS THE BASIS FOR WHAT HAWES DESCRIBED AS THE QUOTE ONE INCH OF PAPER THAT WILL BE UNDERNEATH THE REAL PROPOSALS UNQUOTE. HAWES EMPHASIZED THAT IT IS NOT/NOT THE USA INTENTION TO DO THOSE STUDIES OVER AGAIN. THEY CAN BE RECAPITULATED.

4. IN SUM THE USA DOES NOT/NOT WANT A 15 PAGE ESSAY THAT DOES NOT/NOT CONTRIBUTE MUCH THINKING BUT ONLY REFLECTS CURRENT ANXIETIES. IN THE USA VIEW THE RECAPITULATION WORK CAN BE DONE NOW AND THE USA HAS NO/NO PROBLEM WITH IT BEING DONE BY THE I/S. THE FORWARD LOOKING PART SHLD BE DONE WHEN THE ALLIANCE IS IN A POSITION TO LOOK FORWARD WITH CONFIDENCE.

5. WE NOTED THAT HAWES COMMENTS REFLECTED A FAIRLY CONSISTENT THEME THAT WE HAVE NOTICED IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH USA ARMS CONTROL OFFICIALS IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS AND THAT WHAT I BOILS DOWN TO IS THAT THE USA DOES NOT/NOT WANT AT THIS TIME TO BE PUT IN A POSITION WHERE IT IS BEING PRESSURED BY ITS ALLIES TO COME UP WITH NEW INITIATIVES FOR DEALING WITH THE USSR. WE SAID THAT IT SEEMS TO US FOR THE PRESENT THE USA IS SIMPLY TRYING TO BUY TIME AND IT APPEARED THAT USA WLD RATHER HAVE NATO, FOR THE PRESENT, INVOLVED IN A MARKING

PAGE THREE UNGR1045 CONFD

TIME EXERCISE RATHER THAN PRESSING FORWARD TOO QUICKLY WITH
INITIATIVES FOR DEALING WITH THE SOV UNION. HAWES SAID THAT
PUTTING IT THAT WAY WAS UNCHARITABLE BUT NOT/NOT INACCURATE.

CCC/231 132300Z UNGR1045

21 7

External Affairs / Affaires extérieures
Canada

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Winc 010/13

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

Y00/Y00
CONFIDENTIAL IS

SECURITY
CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED - FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

JAN 13 12 14 '04

FROM

FM HUSCO POL0761 12JAN03

CANADIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

TO

TO EX10FT/120Z/CALDER

INFO

DATE

---NUCLEAR FREEZE RESOLUTION - 6 PAGES

REF

REMARKS

MF

ORIGINAL AS IS

ORIGINAL AS IS

Section V
AMENDMENTS

This section summarizes the amendments that will be offered to H.R. 13, the Nuclear Freeze Resolution, and provides pro and con arguments on the major amendments.

2/12
Sen. Brandford will offer an amendment in the nature of a substitute (the text of H.R. Res. 4) which calls for reductions in the nuclear weapons of the United States and Soviet Union, and expressed the full support of Congress for the two ongoing arms control negotiations in Geneva.

Specifically, the substitute urges the United States and Soviet Union to work toward achieving a freeze on strategic nuclear forces at equal and substantially reduced levels, and to negotiate effective verification measures. The resolution also urges both powers to negotiate "confidence building measures" which are likely to reduce the risk of accidental war, and to concentrate special attention on reducing destabilizing weapons.

Arguments for the Brandford Substitute/Against the Freezing Resolution --
Supporters of the Brandford substitute argue that a nuclear freeze, as provided in the freezing resolution, could lead the United States into a position of military disadvantage and vulnerability and would frustrate negotiations to achieve nuclear arms reductions. A freeze would reward the Soviet Union for the massive military build-up in recent years, and would prevent the long overdue reduction of U.S. nuclear forces. The U.S. would not be able to match the Soviet advantage in land-based ICBMs, or to counter the 600 Soviet intermediate range nuclear missiles targeted against Europe. The freeze will undermine ongoing arms control negotiations and make significant arms control more difficult because the Soviet Union would have little incentive to agree to reductions if they could freeze the existing military situation. Moreover, the major effort required to negotiate a freeze would divert the U.S. from current negotiations to substantially reduce the number of nuclear weapons.

A freeze on testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons would involve elements that cannot be verified, with the result that there would be considerable doubt that the Soviet Union would abide by the freeze in all its aspects.

A freeze would also undermine U.S. leadership of the NATO alliance, since it would amount to a unilateral withdrawal from the NATO agreement for deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in December 1983.

The Republican substitute, by calling first for a substantial reduction in nuclear weapons, will demonstrate to the Soviet Union the firm commitment of the Congress and the American people to the President's NATO proposals. The substitute encourages the U.S. and Soviet Union to substantially reduce nuclear arms and eliminates the concern of the American people for nuclear arms reductions consistent with their security needs.

3/6

Arguments Against the Broomfield Substitute/For the Committee Resolution
Opponents of the Republican Substitute, who support the committee resolution, argue that there is now a rough parity in the overall nuclear balance between the United States and Soviet Union. Imposing a freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons will prevent a continued build-up of destabilizing weapons that would only add to the threat of nuclear war. A freeze on testing would lower confidence in the reliability of existing weapons on both sides, with the result that neither side would have confidence in their ability to launch a successful first strike.

The committee resolution instructs the START negotiators to decide "when and how" to achieve a mutual freeze. Thus, there will be sufficient flexibility to institute the freeze in such a way as to insure that the Soviets have an incentive to negotiate reductions. Moreover, the resolution specifically states that it does not preclude the U.S. from taking advantage of other arms control agreements, in order to avoid disrupting ongoing negotiations.

A freeze on testing and deployment can be easily verified by technical means available to both countries. Indeed, it is easier to monitor a freeze than an agreement like START since any activity detected would constitute a violation. Production is harder to verify, but our monitoring of Soviet production plants in the past has been good enough to predict every new ICBM before it began its tests.

Although there are imbalances favoring the Soviets in land-based medium-range missiles in Europe, the U.S. and NATO combined forces provide sufficient deterrence to a Soviet attack. The resolution provides that any agreement achieved at the START negotiations must be consistent with existing U.S. commitments to NATO defense.

The Broomfield substitute is a prescription for no arms control at all. By accepting only the goal of freezing weapons at "equal and substantially reduced levels," the Republican substitute proscribes years of negotiations while the arms race continues. In addition, it makes no improvement on the committee resolution's provisions for verification, reductions, or special attention to destabilizing weapons.

Reps. Levitas and Porter may offer an amendment in the nature of a substitute calling on the United States and Soviet Union to adhere to the principle of a guaranteed strategic "build-down" of nuclear forces, under which each nation would eliminate two nuclear warheads for each newly-deployed nuclear warhead.

Arguments For the Amendment -- Supporters of the amendment argue that replacement of vulnerable nuclear systems with more survivable ones will enhance nuclear stability by improving the deterrent capability of the nuclear forces of both the United States and the Soviet Union. The two-for-one build-down proposal will allow the U.S. and the Soviets to modernize their strategic nuclear forces while achieving meaningful reductions in the total number of nuclear warheads. This net reduction in weapons, coupled with the deployment of more reliable and survivable systems, will enhance nuclear stability and thus reduce the likelihood of nuclear war. The build-down is also compatible with current arms control negotiations which are already attempting to reduce the number of nuclear warheads.

Public
Information
Series

Arms Control and the Nuclear Freeze Proposal

4/6



April 1982

United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs

This publication has been prepared to respond to many of the questions and suggestions we have received about the proposal for a nuclear freeze.

In recent months, a proposal for a U.S.-Soviet nuclear weapons freeze has attracted widespread attention. A resolution supporting such a freeze has been submitted to Congress, and versions have been placed on the November ballot in several states. While the wording of different versions varies, and some call for eventual reductions in arms levels, the basic idea is this:

The President should immediately propose that the United States and the Soviet Union adopt a mutual freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons and missiles and new aircraft designed primarily to deliver nuclear weapons, subject to strict verification.

The U.S. Government recognizes that the proposal represents the best of intentions: to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war and encourage more rapid progress in a critical and exceptionally complex area of arms control. We all share these objectives. But, after carefully reviewing the proposal, we have concluded that a freeze at existing nuclear levels would have adverse implications for international security and stability and would frustrate attempts to achieve the goal on which we all agree: the negotiation of substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides.

What Kind of Arms Control Agreements Do We Seek?

Four principles underlie the U.S. approach to arms control. We seek agreements that:

- Produce significant reductions in the arsenals of both sides;
- Result in equal levels of arms on both sides, since an unequal agreement, like an unequal balance of forces, can encourage coercion or aggression;
- Are verifiable, because when our national security is at stake, agreements cannot be based upon trust alone; and
- Enhance U.S. and allied security and reduce the risk of war, because arms control is not an end in itself but an important means toward securing peace and international stability.

These four principles were highlighted by the President in his speech of November 18, 1981. They are the foundation for the U.S. position in the current Geneva negotiations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). They also form the basis for our approach to strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union, negotiations we will call START—Strategic Arms Reduction Talks.

5/6

What Are the Drawbacks of a Freeze Proposal?

While the Administration shares the genuine and deeply felt convictions that have given rise to the freeze proposal, we believe the proposal does not constitute sound defense or effective arms control policy, and thus we cannot support the freeze itself. A freeze would be dangerous to security, stability, and the cause of peace for the following reasons:

- A freeze at existing levels would lock the United States and our allies into a position of military disadvantage and vulnerability. The freeze would prevent us from correcting existing dangerous deficiencies in our nuclear forces caused by the sustained Soviet buildup. The substantial improvements in the Soviet force of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), for example, have given the Soviet Union the means to destroy a large part of our ICBM force. In addition, there are about 600 Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles capable of striking our NATO allies. These missiles are not offset by any comparable U.S. systems. In this case, a freeze would prevent us from restoring the balance.

- A freeze is not good enough. We do not want to cap deployments at current levels; we want significant reductions in the nuclear arms of both sides, reductions that will lead to a stable military balance. The United States has already offered a bold new arms control initiative at the negotiations in Geneva on land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles. We proposed a "zero option" under which the United States would cancel the planned deployment of Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles in exchange for the elimination of comparable Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Our objective in negotiating strategic arms control agreements is also to achieve significant reductions.

- A freeze would make significant arms control more difficult. The Soviets would have little incentive to agree to reductions in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms if they knew they could simply freeze the existing military situation. This has already been demonstrated in the area of intermediate-range forces, where the U.S.S.R., initially refused our offers to negotiate while steadily deploying some 300 SS-20 missile systems. The Soviets agreed to come to the negotiating table only when it became clear that we and our NATO allies were determined to take steps to counter those SS-20 deployments.

- A freeze would cast serious doubt on American leadership of the NATO alliance. In 1979, in the face of continuing Soviet deployments, the members of the alliance agreed to begin deployment in 1983 of U.S. Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles and to seek a U.S.-U.S.S.R. arms control agreement to reduce intermediate-range nuclear forces. A freeze now would, in effect, be a unilateral decision by the United States to withdraw from this joint allied undertaking.

- A freeze on all testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons would include important elements that cannot be verified. The practical result is that the United States would live up to a freeze in all its aspects, while there would be considerable doubt that the Soviets would also live up to it. We simply cannot afford to base our national security on trust of the Soviets.

A Freeze and the Soviet Buildup

During the past decade, the Soviet Union has mounted a sustained buildup across the entire range of its nuclear forces. Soviet modernization efforts have far outstripped ours, particularly in the development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles, which now pose a major threat to a large part of our land-based ICBM force. In the last 10 years, the Soviets introduced an unprecedented array of new strategic weapons into their arsenals, including the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs, the Typhoon and Delta submarines and several new types of submarine-launched missiles, and the Backfire bomber. During this same period, the United States exercised restraint and only introduced the Trident missile and submarine and the cruise missile.

This trend has been harmful to the security interests of the United States and its allies and to global stability. It is not just a question of numbers. As their military capability has grown, the Soviets have increasingly resorted to the use of military force directly, or through proxies such as Cuba, to intervene in areas farther and farther from their borders. The increased assertiveness of Soviet behavior—the invasion of Afghanistan, pressure on Poland, support for insurgency in Central America—reflects growing Soviet confidence in their military capabilities.

ICBMs. Since 1972, the Soviets have developed and deployed at least 10 different variants of three new types of ICBMs. In the same period, the United States deployed no new types of ICBMs and only one variant of the existing Minuteman. In 1988, we plan to begin deployment of the MX, the first new U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile in 16 years.

Sea-Based Forces. The commissioning of the first U.S. Trident submarine in 1982 marked the end of a 16-year period during which the United States did not build any new ballistic missile-firing submarines. In this same period, the U.S.S.R. added over 80 missile-firing submarines in four new or improved classes. The Soviets are now deploying two new types of missile submarines—the Typhoon and the Delta III—while we are building only the Trident.

Bombers. When the first B-1 bomber becomes operational in 1986, it will have been nearly a quarter of a century since the last U.S. heavy bomber was produced. In contrast, the Soviets have produced more than 250 modern Backfire bombers that have inherent intercontinental capabilities. The Soviets also have improved their large air defense system designed to counter our bomber force. A freeze would not constrain these Soviet air defenses.

The following chart compares the introduction of new strategic weapons by the United States and the U.S.S.R. and shows the momentum of the Soviet buildup over the last decade. As the chart shows, the Soviets introduced twelve new or improved nuclear weapons systems, while the United States only introduced three, and they upgraded or expanded every area of their nuclear arsenal.


Moreover, in most significant measures used to judge strategic forces—total number of systems, total number of ballistic missiles, total destructive potential—the Soviets now surpass the United States. Soon they could equal and surpass us in number of warheads, the one area where the United States has traditionally had an advantage.

The President entered office with a mandate to correct these trends. The modernization program he announced in October 1981 is designed to restore the strategic balance and prevent nuclear war. In so doing, it will give the Soviet Union a strong incentive to negotiate with us to achieve genuine arms reductions.

Conclusion

The Reagan Administration is committed to equitable and verifiable arms control aimed at substantial reductions in military forces. While the freeze proposal reflects the desire of people everywhere to reduce the threat of nuclear war, it would not promote reductions, equality, or verifiability. Rather, it would accomplish the opposite. A freeze at existing levels would lock in existing nuclear inequalities while making further progress in arms control difficult, if not impossible. For these reasons, our goal in arms control must be the negotiation of substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides. We can do better than a freeze.

Introduction of Strategic Weapons by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. 1972-1982



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MESSAGE

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JOHN H. GLENN, JR.

test ban treaty. Glenn, who did everything in his power to obstruct ratification of the SALT II Treaty back in 1979 (on verification grounds), is now a strong SALT II supporter. He has even gone so far as to offer an amendment to bar defense programs which violate SALT limits.

*Born July 18, 1921 in Cambridge, Ohio; attended Muskingum College undergraduate; served in Marine Corps from 1942-1965 and as a NASA astronaut from 1959-1964; first American to orbit the Earth; Vice President and President of Royal Crown Cola; Senate service since 1974.

3/3

JOHN GLENN

Nuclear Weapons Freeze - Sponsored Kennedy-Hatfield in 1983; voted for it in 1982 in committee.

MX Missile - Voted against MX funding 3 out of 4 times. Prefers small MX deployed trucks on superhighways.

B-1 Bomber - Voted for the B-1 Bomber. The B-1 engines are made in Ohio.

SALT II Treaty - Voted against SALT II in Foreign Relations Committee and played an obstructionist role. Presently supports SALT II.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty - Sponsor of Kennedy-Mathias resolution in 1983.

Warnke Nomination - Voted for Warnke.

Chemical Weapons - Voted for nerve gas production.

Neutron Bomb - Voted for neutron bombs in 1977.

Nuclear Aircraft Carriers - Voted for funding for nuclear aircraft carriers in 1982.

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External Affairs
Canada

Affaires étrangères
Canada

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR ARTICLE JAN13/84
"EUROMISSILES AS BARCAINING CHIPS? THINK AGAIN!"

COMCENTRE: PLS COPY ATTACHED

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Public Affairs

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OPINION

Euromissiles as bargaining chips? Think again!

By Jane Sharp

Now that American cruise and Pershing II missiles have been deployed in Europe and the Soviets have walked out of the Geneva INF talks — no wonder it seems a good time to ask why our legislators and NATO leaders have been so glibly to the Reagan Administration arguments for weapons systems as bargaining chips in arms control negotiations. There is little evidence that these "bargaining chips" can fulfill any of the missions for which they are touted. They do not:

- Cause recalcitrant adversaries to negotiate.
- Soften the adversary's negotiating position.
- End up being cashed in in exchange for weapons systems on the other side.
- Or facilitate the conclusion of arms control agreements not negotiable otherwise.

Evidence from arms control experiences with the Soviet Union overwhelmingly suggests that US weapons systems required to beef up bargaining strength will:

- Delay the start of bargaining by the other side.
- Toughen the adversary's negotiating stance.
- Remain as part of the permanent arsenal.
- Ensure that an agreement will be at higher force levels than would otherwise have been possible.

It is worth examining the INF case, where the worst damage might yet be averted. NATO's "double decision" in December 1979 to deploy and limit medium-range US missiles in Western Europe was rationalized on two grounds: to reassure the allies of the American security guarantee, and to provide incentive for the Soviet Union to negotiate limits on SS-20 missiles.

Polarization within the US and the new low to which confidence in American leadership and allegiance to NATO have fallen, in the five European countries which have accepted the new missiles, testify to the fallacy of

the first argument. But what effect has the double decision had on Soviet willingness to negotiate, and on Soviet bargaining tactics?

There was no Soviet reluctance to negotiate limits on the SS-20 in the late 1970s. During the negotiation of SALT II, both sides agreed that in the expected Salt III talks they would deal with limits on US medium range, nuclear-capable, aircraft and cruise missiles, and on the USSR's SS-20 missile and Backfire bomber. In May, 1978, Leonid Brezhnev traveled to Bonn to assure West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt that SS-20 limits would be on the SALT III agenda.

As NATO debated possible hardware responses to the SS-20 through 1978 and 1979, Soviet and East European leaders grew visibly alarmed. In an obvious effort to preempt a NATO deployment decision, in October 1979 Brezhnev offered — on condition no new medium-range NATO systems were deployed — to reduce the deployment of Soviet medium-range missiles and begin negotiations immediately on this category of weapons. At the time fewer than 100 SS-20 missiles were targeted on Western Europe.

The US could have cashed in cruises and Pershings right then, but NATO's collective leadership lumbered on to its double decision. The deployment package was tempered with an offer to include the new systems in SALT III limits and a promise to remove one old warhead for each new cruise and Pershing II warhead deployed.

Nevertheless, the Soviets denounced the package, claiming all basis for their earlier offer had been undermined by such coercive tactics. Chancellor Schmidt eventually persuaded Brezhnev to change his mind and bilateral talks were begun in October 1980 but suspended when President Carter lost his reelection bid, not to be resumed by the Reagan administration until late 1981. The effect of the double decision was to delay serious ne-

gotiations for over two years, while the Soviets more than doubled the SS-20 threat to Western Europe.

At the Geneva talks on medium-range missiles, the Soviets first offered to reduce their SS-20s targeted on Europe to no more than the number of NATO missiles targeted on the Soviet Union, i.e., from 243 to 162. More recently the Soviets offered to reduce the SS-20s targeted on Western Europe to 140. These are concessions of sorts and justify an intensified diplomatic effort on our part in Geneva.

The point, however, is that the Soviets' best offer since the double decision is not as good a bargain as they offered in October 1979. Thus, the bargaining chips, true to form, delayed the start of serious negotiations and toughened the Soviet position. If all cruise and Pershings are deployed, they surely will generate Soviet counter-measures, leading either to a breakdown in the INF talks and no agreement at all, or one which merely codifies the new systems on both sides.

Badly needed at this juncture are mature NATO leaders who can move to achieve an interim INF agreement based on the *status quo ante* of October 1979. A multilateral START negotiation should then set ceilings on the strategic forces of all five nuclear powers as suggested recently by Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. This would meet NATO's goal of limiting the Soviet threat to Western Europe, the Japanese and Chinese concern about Soviet missiles targeted on Asia, and the Soviet goal of limiting other countries' forward-based nuclear weapons around its perimeter.

This kind of agreement could most easily be negotiated under a general nuclear moratorium. Such an effort would do much to restore West European confidence in the US and rekindle hope in the arms control process.

Ms. Sharp is a resident scholar in the Peace program at Cornell University.

MASTER FILE

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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---MBFR:REVIEW OF WESTERN POSITION

JUDGING FROM RECENT ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS CONCERNING CDN OFFER TO
HOST MIN MTG IT NOW APPEARS THAT THERE IS DISTRESSINGLY LITTLE
ENTHUSIASM FOR PRESSING AHEAD TO HAVE EARLY CONCLUSION OF MBFR
REVIEW MANDATED BY MINS.NEVERTHELESS WE SHALL CONTINUE TO ATTEMPT
TO IMPRESS UPON OUR ALLIES NEED TO MOVE FORWARD.WE FULLY RECOGNIZE
THAT SOVIET UNION,NOT/NOT WEST,IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SUSPENSION,BUT WE
MUST BE ABLE TO REASSURE OUR PUBLIC THAT WE ARE SERIOUSLY EXPLORING
POSSIBILITIES OF MOVEMENT CONTAINED IN EASTS FEB AND JUN PROPOSALS.
2.WE RECOGNIZE THAT ONLY REALISTIC CDN ROLE IN MBFR MAY BE THAT OF
QUOTE FACILITATOR UNQUOTE.ALTHOUGH WE HAVE TAKEN LEAD IN PRESSING
FOR AHG RECOMMENDATION FOR REVIEW OF NATO POSITION TO BE UNDERTAKEN
IN LIGHT OF EASTERN MOVEMENT LAST YEAR,AND WE INTEND TO CONTINUE
PRESSING FOR EARLY COMPLETION OF THIS MANDATE,WE RECOGNIZE REVIEW
CAN ONLY PROGRESS ON BASIS OF PREAGREED FRG/USA POSITION.BILATER-
ALLY AND THROUGH NATO,WE SHALL CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO FORMU-
LATE THEIR VIEWS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.ONCE THEY HAVE DONE SO,WE
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PAGE TWO IDR0176 CONFD

INTEND TO TAKE FULL PART IN SPC DELIBERATIONS. IF THEY DECIDE AGAINST SUBSTANTIAL WESTERN MOVE WE SHALL HAVE TO CONSIDER WHETHER INITIATIVE ON PART OF CDA OR ANY OTHER LESSER PARTICIPANT WOULD HAVE ANY PROSPECT OF SUCCESS.

3. OUR OFFER TO HOST LA SAPINIERE TYPE MTG, WHICH WILL BE KEPT ON BACK BURNER TO BE BROUGHT OUT AGAIN AT MORE PROPITIOUS MOMENT, IS EXAMPLE OF KIND OF ROLE WE CAN USEFULLY PLAY TO ENCOURAGE MOVEMENT ON WESTERN SIDE.

4. WHEN SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS EVENTUALLY BEGIN ON MBFR WE WILL DO OUR UTMOST TO PROVIDE YOU WITH FULL AND DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS.

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---SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS:USA BRIEFING TO
COUNCIL

WITHOUT HAVING SEEN FULL TEXT OF DOBBINS PRESENTATION AND IN ABSENCE
OF KEY EXPERT IN OTT WF CAN ONLY PROVIDE FOLLOWING GENERAL COMMENTS
FOR POSSIBLE DISCUSSION IN STKHM ON 16JAN.WE NOTE SOME DIFFERENCES
OF APPROACH IN DOBBINS PRESENTATION WHICH WAS MORE EVEN KEELER THAN
COMMENTS MADE BY ACDA PRES ADELMAN TO OUR AMB IN WSHDC.

2.ONE THREAD WHICH RUNS THROUGH EACH EXAMPLE PRESENTED BY DOBBINS
IS THAT IN MOST CASES THERE IS NO/NO CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE FROM
INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE TO PROVE NON-COMPLIANCE BUT ONLY ENOUGH TO
RAISE SUSPICION OF NON-COMPLIANCE.THUS WE GATHER SOVIET ACTIONS MAY
NOT/NOT HAVE ACTUALLY CHANGED FROM WHAT THEY WERE DOING EARLIER.IT
IS NOT/NOT POSSIBLE TO DRAW CONCLUSION THAT EXAMPLES ILLUSTRATE
RESULTS OF RECENT SOVIET DECISION NOT/NOT TO COMPLY WITH MAIN

...2

PAGE TWO IDR0174 SECRET

PROVISIONS OF AGREEMENTS OR THAT MOSCOWS ATTITUDE TOWARDS COMPLIANCE HAS CHANGED. CONTRARY CONCLUSION COULD BE DRAWN THAT PRESENTATION ILLUSTRATES THAT UNDER REAGAN STANDARDS OF ADHERENCE AND VERIFICATION HAVE BEEN RAISED, PARTICULARLY IN RELATION TO SALT TREATIES. WHAT WAS ACCEPTABLE UNDER CARTER IN TERMS OF COMPLIANCE HAS GRADUALLY BECOME UNACCEPTABLE.

3. MOST CLEAR CUT CASE, ALTHOUGH IT DOES NOT/NOT RELATE TO LEGAL TREATY OBLIGATION, IS PROBABLY VIOLATION OF CSCE NOTIFICATION COMMITMENT WHERE ZAPAD MILITARY EXERCISE IS CONCERNED. IT IS CASE OF VIOLATION OF POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS UNDER HSNKI FINAL ACT.

4. CONCERNING KRASNOYARSK RADAR AND ABM TREATY YOU MAY WISH TO CHECK FOLLOWING: APPARENTLY THERE WILL BE VIOLATION WHEN IT BECOMES OPERATIONAL. UNTIL THEN INSTALLATION MAY NOT/NOT CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION, EVEN IF IT HAS CHARACTERISTICS CITED.

5. TELEMETRY AND SALT II. SOVIET ACTION RE ENCRYPTION RESULTS FROM EXPLOITATION OF LOOPHOLE IN AGREEMENT WHICH STATES SOMEWHAT VAGUE OBLIGATIONS OF SIDES NOT/NOT TO IMPEDE VERIFICATION THROUGH NATL TECHNICAL MEANS. IT IS LARGELY A QUESTION OF INTERPRETATION. ALTHOUGH SOVIETS ARE NO/NO DOUBT VIOLATING SPIRIT THEY MAY NOT/NOT BE IN VIOLATION OF LETTER OF AGREEMENT.

6. SS16 AND SALT II. WE ARE NOT/NOT CLEAR ABOUT NATURE OF PROBLEM. WE ASSUME SOVIET NON-COMPLIANCE WOULD BE RELATED TO FACT THAT MISSILES/LAUNCHERS SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMANTLED UNDER SALT II AND NOT/NOT TO

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PAGE THREE IDR0174 SECRET

FACT THAT FOLLOW-ON MISSILE MAY HAVE BEEN TESTED IN FORM OF SSX-25.

7.TTBT.IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO DEFEND CASE FOR NON-COMPLIANCE UNTIL MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES ARE REFINED.IT IS PRESENTLY QUESTION OF WORST CASE ESTIMATE.

8.WE AGREE WITH POINT MADE BY CDN REPRESENTATIVE AND OTHERS AT 11JAN SCG THAT MAKING SUSPICIONS PUBLIC WOULD TEND TO ATTRACT ACCUSATION THAT USA IS ONLY PREPARING GROUND FOR ITS OWN NON-COMPLIANCE(E.G. STAR WARS TECHNOLOGY APPLICATION TO BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE).

9.AS SECRET REPORT TO CONGRESS IS BOUND TO BE LEAKED AT LEAST IN PART FOR WHATEVER REASONS,WE SHARE NORWEGIAN CONCERN THAT MAKING PUBLIC USA REPORT ON SOVIET NON-COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON ALREADY STORMY ARMS CONTROL CLIMATE.IF SUBJECT RAISED WITH WESTERN MINISTERS IN STKHM WE SHOULD USE OCCASION TO STRESS THAT WE WOULD NOT/NOT WISH TO SEE INCOMPLETE INFO ABOUT NON-COMPLIANCE USED TO DAMAGE EAST-WEST CLIMATE AND INCREASE TENSION,POINTING AS CDN REP DID AT SCG MTG,TO CDN EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE BETTER EAST-WEST ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH NEGOTIATIONS SUCH AS INF,START AND MBFR SHOULD BE RESUMED AND CONDUCTED,NOT/NOT TO MENTION NEW FORUM OPENING IN STKHM.

10.FOR DELVOIE:WSHDC REPORTS THAT BURT IS NOT/NOT PLANNING QUOTE EVENT UNQUOTE IN ORDER TO PRESENT BRIEFING TO HIS COLLEAGUES ON SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH ACD AGREEMENTS,BUT WILL LOOK FOR OCCASION TO

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PAGE FOUR IDR0174 SECRET

SPEAK ON ISSUE(POSSIBLY MON EVENING) AND WILL OF COURSE BE AVAILABLE
FOR DISCUSSION/QUESTIONS. SECTY SHULTZ IS PLANNING TO INCLUDE
REMARKS ON SOVIET COMPLIANCE IN HIS PRESENTATION AT MON DINNER AND
WILL BE PREPARED TO ANSWER QUESTIONS.

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MASTER FILE

D I F F U S I O N R E S T R E I N T E

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---CONF DE STKHM:VUES DU MAE BELG TINDEMANS

SOMMAIRE:A LA VEILLE DE LA CONF DE STKHM, LE MAE TINDEMANS A ACCORDE
ENTREVUE AU JOURNAL CIT LA CITE FINCIT. IL SE MONTRE TOUJOURS TRES
PRES DES IDEES ET OBJECTIFS DE L INITIATIVE TRUDEAU. IL SOULIGNE L
IMPORTANCE DE POURSUIVRE UN DIALOGUE AVEC LES PAYS DE L EST ET D
ETABLIR UNE CONFIANCE RECIPROQUE. TINDEMANS RENCONTRERA SON
HOMOLOGUE SOVIETIQUE PENDANT LA DITE CONF. IL ESPEQE VISITER LA
YUGOSLAVIE PRO CHAINEMENT.

2. RAPPORT: PENDANT LA VISITE DU PM TRUDEAU EN NOV83, TINDEMANS S EST
MONTRE POSITIF A L EGARD DES OBJECTIFS ET STRATEGIES DE L
INITIATIVE TRUDEAU. DANS INTERVIEW ACCORDE A CIT LA CITE FINCIT,
TINDEMANS, EN PRECISANT QUELQUES POINTS ESSENTIELS DE LA POLITIQUE
QUE LES PAYS OCCIDENTAUX DEVRAIENT POUR SUIVRE A LA CONF DE STKHM,
MONTRE TOUJOURS UNE PERCEPTION SEMBLABLE A CELLE DE TRUDEAU
CONCERNANT L ANALYSE DE LA SITUATION DES RELATIONS ES/OUEST ET LES
STRATEGIES QUI PEUVENT LES AMELIORER. TINDEMANS A DIT QUE LE BUT
PRINCIPAL A LA CONF DOIT ETRE DE CREER UN CLIMAT OU UN DIALOGUE

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PAGE DEUX ZVGR0119 RESTR

EST/OUEST PEUT SE POURSUIVRE. IL A AUSSI NOTE QU'IL N'Y A PAS DE
RELATION ENTRE LA DECISION DE L'OTAN D'IMPLANter LES EUROMISSILES
ET LA CONF DE STKHM, CETTE DERNIERE AYANT ETE DECIDEE AVANT LA
PREMIERE. DONC C'EST NOUS DEVONS ABSOLUMENT NOUS EN TENIR AU MANDAT
QUI A ETE DECIDE A MADRID FINCIT. QUANT AU RESULTATS POSSIBLES A
STKHM, IL A DECONSEILLE TROP D'OPTIMISME, CAR TROP D'ESPOIR
AMENERAIT LA DECEPTION. A CET EGARD IL A NOTE QUE MADRID, QU'IL
ESTIME AVOIR ETE UN SUCCES, DEVAIT FAIRE FACE AUX PROBLEMES
TRES COMPLEXES, ET QUE L'ATMOSPHERE TENDUE ET LE CONTEXTE DIFFICILE
A CE MOMENT NE SIGNIFIE PAS QUE STKHM NE PUISSE REUSSIR.

3. TINDEMANS A MIS L'ACCENT SUR L'IMPORTANCE DE POURSUIVRE LA
RECHERCHE DE MOYENS D'ETABLIR LA CONFIANCE ET LE DIALOGUE
POLITIQUE AFIN D'AMELIORER L'ATMOSPHERE DES RELATIONS EST/OUEST,
UNE POSITION QUI REJOINT BIEN UN DES THEMES MAJEURS DE L'INITIATIVE
TRUDEAU. TINDEMANS AFFIRME QUE LA DANGEREUSE COURSE AUX ARMEMENTS
D'AUJOURD'HUI EST LE RESULTAT DES TENSIONS POLITIQUES ET QUE SI
ON POUVAIT REDUIRE CES TENSIONS PAR UN DIALOGUE ENTRE LES PAYS
DE L'EST ET DE L'OUEST, ON POURRAIT CREER UNE SITUATION QUI
PERMETTRAIT LE CONTROLE DES ARMEMENTS. IL A AUSSI NOTE QUE LA
MEFIANCE ACTUELLE DANS LES RELATIONS EST/OUEST EST TRES DANGEREUSE
CAR ELLE AMENE SUSPICIONS, ACCUSATIONS ET ENFIN MAUVAISES EVALUATIONS

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PAGE TROIS ZVGR0119 RESTR

DES INTENTIONS DES AUTRES PAYS. PAR CONSEQUENT, LA TRANSPARENCE DES POSITIONS PRISES PAR CHACUN DES COTES EST ESSENTIELLE SI L ON VEUT AMELIORER LE DIALOGUE ET LE PROCESSUS DE DESARMEMENT. CONCERNANT CIT L INITIATIVE TINDEMANS FINCIT, LE MIN A REITERE SON OPINION BIEN CONNUE A SAVOIR QUE LES PAYS OCCIDENTAUX, APRES AVOIR DEMONTRE LEUR FERMETE DANS LE DOMAINE DE DEFENCE (PAR L INSTALLATION DES CRUISES ET DES PERSHING), DOIVENT MAINTENANT DEMONTRER LEUR DESIR DE POUR SUIVRE LE DIALOGUE, CONFORMEMENT AU SENS DU RAPPORT HARMEL.

4. TINDEMANS A AUSSI REAFFIRME L APPUI DE SON GOUV POUR L IMPLANTATION DES EUROMISSILES, NE LAISSANT AUCUN DOUTE SUR L IMPORTANCE POUR L OUEST DE LA FERMETE ET DE LA CREDIBILITE. IL A RAPPELE QUE DANS SES ENTRETIENS AVEC LES REPRESENTANTS DE L EST, DEPUIS LA DECISION CIT DOUBLE VOIE FINCIT DE L OTAN. EN 1979, IL LEUR A MENTIONNE A PLUSIEURS REPRISES DE NE PAS S ILLUSIONNER QUANT A L IMPLANTATION DES MISSILES S IL N Y AVAIT PAS DE RESULTATS POSITIFS A GENEV. IL ESTIME QUE MOSCO A FAIT UNE MAUVAISE EVALUATION EN CROYANT QUE LES DEMOCRATIES EUROPEENNES NE POURRAIENT PAS LE FAIRE. PAR EXEMPLE, SI LES PAYS OCCIDENTAUX ONT ACCEPTE, L AUTOMNE DERNIER UN MORATOIRE D IMPLANTATION EN ECHANGE D UN DEMANTELEMENT PARTIEL DES SS-20, IL N Y AURAIT PLUS EU DE CREDIBILITE POUR L OUEST, CE QUI EST LE PLUS IMPORTANT DU POINT DE VUE POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE. LA CREDIBILITE NE PEUT ETRE ETABLIE QU AVEC DES EFFORTS A LONG TERME ET PAR UNE

...4

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DIPLOMATIE DESCRETE.

5.TINDEMANS CROIT DONC QUE STKHM PEUT DONNER LIEU A D AUTRES
INITIATIVES ET AIDER A ETABLIR UNE CONFIANCE RECIPROQUE.COMME
ACTION POSITIVE DU COTE BELGE,TINDEMANS RENCONTRERA GROMYKO
PENDANT LA CONF DE STKHM.CETTE RENCONTRE REMPLACERA CELLE
QUI AVAIT ETE ANNULEE L AUTOMNE DERNIER A NYORK POUR DFS
RAISONS QU IL N EST PAS NECESSAIRE DE REDIRE,ET CELLE
QUI ETAIT PREVUE POUR FEV A BRU MAIS QU ON A DECIDE D AVANCER
LA DATE.ON PREVOIT EGALEMENT UNE VISITE EN YUGOSLAVIE.IL SE
PEUT QU IL Y AIT D AUTRES INITIATIVES A VENIR DES BELGES.

CCC/126 131307Z ZVGR0119

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

MASTER FILE

D I F F U S I O N R E S T R I E N T E

DE PRMNY WKGR0082 13JAN84

A EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO WSHDC CNGNY LDN ROME PARIS BONN TOKYO GENEV

HAGUE MOSCO STKHM PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/COLEMAN

DISTR MINA FPR USS DMF IFB IDR IDA IMU RBR RDB SCS

REF NOTRETEL WKGR0059 11JAN

---CONF DE PRESSE DU PM A NEW YORK

CONF DE PRESSE QUI A SUIVIR RENCONTRE DU PM AVEC SEC GEN DE L ONU

11JAN A ATTIRE ASSISTANCE ELEVEE ET DIVERSIFIEE. EN EFFET, PLUS DE

70 REPRESENTANTS DES MEDIA DE QUELQUE 14 PAYS ONT COUVERT

EVENEMENTS. DESIRONS ATTIRER ATTENTION NOTAMMENT SUR PRESENCE DE:

(A) TELEVISION: CBC-RADIO-CDA, GLOBAL TV, TVA, CTV, CNN(US), NBC(US),

ABC(US), ADN(RFA). (IL SEMBLE QUE DU COTE AMERICAIN, SEUL CNN AIT

UTILISE MATERIEL);

(B) AGENCES DE PRESSE: CP, UPI, AFP, TASS, INTERPRESS SERVICE, REUTERS,

AP, PANAFRICAN PRESS AGENCY, GERMAN PRESS AGENCY, KUWAIT NEWS AG,

KYODO NEWS SERVICE;

(C) PRESSE ECRITE: KEYSTONE PRESS AGENCY, NEWSWEEK, NEW YORK TIMES,

TIME MAGAZINE, GLOBE AND MAIL, MONTREAL GAZETTE, MACLEANS, SOUTHAM

NEWS, TORONTO STAR, EXCELSIOR(MEXICO), TORONTO SUN;

(D) RADIO: RADIO-CDA, CBC, RADIO-CDA INNTL, RADIO-FRANCE INTL, BBC,

HUNGARIAN RADIO AND TV, RKO(US), NBC, STANDARD BROADCASTING.

...2

SECRET

PAGE DEUX WKGR0082 RESTR

2. PAR AILLEURS, COLLEGUES DE 12 MISSIONS (TCHECO, AUSTRALIE,
DANEMARK, NORVEGE, SWEDE, FINLANDE, RFA, FRANCE, TURQUIE, JAPON,
SINGAPOUR, PAYS-BAS) NOUS ONT APPROCHES SPECIFIQUEMENT POUR
RECEVOIR CIT DEBRIEFING FINCIT SUR RENCONTRE.

CCC/119 132348Z WKGR0082

MF

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDA0064 13JAN84

TO LDN

INFO PRMNY GENEV PARIS BONN ROME WSHDC BNATO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CP

DISTR DMF IFB IDD IDR CIDDZ IDAO IDAN IMU IMD

REF OURLET IDA1477 30DEC

---CONSULTATIONS ON ACD AT UN AND CD

DPM/SSEA HAS APPROVED DELEGATION CONSISTING OF FOLLOWING: GJ SMITH,
DIRECTOR IDA (OR SUBSTITUTE DEPENDING ON REQUIREMENTS OF PM INITIA-
TIVE); GR SKINNER, COUNSELLOR PERMISGENEV; MF KERGIN, COUNSELLOR PERMISNY.
(SUBSTITUTE FOR SMITH WOULD LIKELY BE OA CHISTOFF, ACTING DIRECTOR
IDA).

2. GRATEFUL THAT YOU CAN MAKE SCHRAM AVAILABLE AT THESE TALKS AS WELL.
BRIT HICOM WERE INFORMED EARLY ON OF OUR INTEREST IN HAVING SOMEONE
FROM MISSION ATTEND. THERE IS POSSIBILITY THAT INVITATIONS TO MIN
LUCE LUNCH WILL BE LIMITED TO THREE PER DEL.

3. YOU SHOULD INFORM FCO OF ABOVE. FOR OUR PLANNING PURPOSES, YOU
MIGHT ALSO ASK WHETHER OTHER DELS HAVE QUERIED SHORTNESS OF MEETING.
AMBITIOUS AGENDA SUGGESTS IT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE TO COVER ALL ITEMS
AS FULLY AS ONE MIGHT WISH IN ONE DAY.

4. PLEASE RESERVE THREE SWB FOR NIGHTS JAN25 AND 26 AND ADVISE
LOCATION. CODING FOR TRAVEL/ACCOMM IS 014-183-183-000-0920/0901.

CCC/121 132311Z IDA0064

DIAMBER FILE

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT RBP0058 13JAN84

TO MOSCO DELIVER BY 160900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR RBD RBR UDDZ FPR

REF YOURTEL 0039 11JAN

---VISIT OF SOVIET JOURNALIST

ALTERNATIVE CANDIDATES PROPOSED BY ARBATOV DO NOT/NOT SEEM SUITABLE BUT YOUR SUGGESTION THAT WE MIGHT CONSIDER INVITATION TO AFANASIEV FOR SOLE PURPOSE OF INTERVIEWING PM IN ORDER TO KEEP FOCUS ON INITIATIVE STRIKES US AS GOOD IDEA.WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT INTERVIEW NOT/NOT BE TELEVISED, HOWEVER, IN ORDER NOT/NOT TO FORECLOSE ON POSSIBILITY THAT PM MIGHT LATER APPEAR ON SOVIET TV. 2.WE SPOKE TO COLEMAN IN PMO REGARDING AFANASIEV PROPOSAL.REACTION TO IDEA WAS POSITIVE BUT PMS SCHEDULE FOR JANUARY IS EXTREMELY FULL AND IT IS PROBABLE THAT AN AFANASIEV INTERVIEW COULD ONLY BE ARRANGED IN JANUARY IF PM TRAVELS TO MOSCOW THIS MONTH.PROSPECTS FOR INTERVIEW IN FEBRUARY ARE BETTER BUT TIMING OF MOSCOW VISIT WOULD BE OVERRIDING FACTOR.PMO ALSO ADVISED THAT GIVEN PMS VERY HEAVY SCHEDULE IN JANUARY SOME DELICACY IS INVOLVED IN ASSURING EQUITABLE ACCESS TO PM BY CDN MEDIA AND THIS FACTOR WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BEFORE MAKING ANY DEFINITE DECISION TO GO AHEAD WITH AFANASIEV INTERVIEW.

...2

PAGE TWO RBP0058 CONF

3. PMO ASKED THAT WE PROVIDE THEM WITH AS MANY BACKGROUND AND BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS AS POSSIBLE ON AFANASIEV. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD SUPPLY AND WE WILL PURSUE MATTER FURTHER. WOULD WELCOME ANY FURTHER IDEAS YOU MIGHT HAVE ON POSSIBLE PROGRAM FOR AFANASIEV.

4. GRATEFUL YOU PROCEED TO SOUND OUT AVAILABILITY OF AFANASIEV FOR VISIT IN PERIOD 23JAN-15FEB WITH EYE ON SOV RESPONSE TO PM PROMISED YOURTEL XYGR0046.

5. PLSE ENSURE THAT YOUR TELS ARE COPIED TO INFO AND DISTR ADDRESSEES COVERED IN OURS.

CCC/202 132252Z RBP0058

122

118
action
(original taken
by En. Delmeste Stahm)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR0046 13JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 131000

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADM POL/CPP

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RBD RBR IDR IDA

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0009 05JAN,OURTEL XYGR0021 06JAN

---PM INITIATIVE:VISIT TO MOSCOW

AT LUNCH TODAY WITH SUSLOV AND OTHER MEMBERS OF SECOND EURO-
PEAN DEPT WE WERE INFORMED THAT REPLY TO PMS LETTER TO

ANDROPOV HAS ALREADY BEEN DRAFTED AND CLD BE APPROVED MOMENTARILY.

IF NOT/NOT DISPATCHED TODAY IT SHLD BE WITHIN SEVERAL DAYS AND

IN ANY EVENT BEFORE MTG BETWEEN DPM/SSEA AND FOREIGN MINISTER

GROMYKO.IN MEANTIME,MESSAGE CONTINUED TO BE:QUOTE WAIT UNQUOTE

BECAUSE PROBLEM CONTINUES TO BE ONE OF QUOTE TIMING UNQUOTE.

OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT SOVIETS CONTINUE TO HAVE DIFFICULTIES IN
DECIDING HOW TO RESPOND IN AWKWARD AND EMBARRASING SITUATION

AND LOOK TO STKHM MTG NEXT WEEK AS POSSIBLE WAY OF EASING

THEIR DELEMMA.THIS VIEW IS REINFORCED BY COMMENTS MADE BY

BOTH SUSLOV AND SUKHODREV TO THE EFFECT THAT PROPOSAL IN PMS
LETTER THAT HE MIGHT BE RECEIVED BY SOMEONE DESIGNATED BY

ANDROPOV WAS QUOTE A BAD MISTAKE UNQUOTE.SOVS EMPHASIZED

THAT AFTER ANDROPOV HIMSELF,ONLY GROMYKO SPEAKS AUTHORITATIVELY

ON SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS.WE TOOK THIS TO MEAN NOT/NOT

...2

PAGE TWO XYGR0046 CONFD

THAT PM SHOULD COME AND BE RECEIVED BY GROMYKO, BUT THAT GROMYKOS
MSG QUOTE WAIT UNQUOTE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED DEFINITIVE.

SUKHODREV TOLD US THAT HE WOULD BE INTERPRETER IN STOCKHOLM FOR
GROMYKO MTGS WITH DPM/SSEA, SCHULTZ AND HOWE.

CCC/044 131410Z XYGR0046

~~NEO~~

Muster File

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM ROME WTGR0011 13JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDR DELIVER BY 130900

INFO BNATO C NMILREPNATO VMBFR WSHDC LDN PARIS BONN BRU COPEN

ATHNS HAGUE OSLO LSBON MDRID ANKRA NDHQOTT/CPP/DNACPOL

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD IDDZ IDRA IDRL IDA

REF YOURTEL IDR0054 05JAN BNATO TEL YBGR3001 10JAN

---MBFR:CDN PROPOSAL

ACCORDING TO FRANCESCHI, DEPUTY DIRGEN FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND
DANOVI, DIRECTOR OF DIV DEALING WITH NATO AFFAIRS AT FARNESINA,
ITALIAN POSITION ON CDN PROPOSAL TO CONVENE A MTG OF NATO FOREIGN
MINISTERS AT LA SAPINIERE IS NOT/NOT MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM
THAT OF OUR OTHER ALLIES.

2. WE EMPHASIZED THAT OBJECTIVE OF MTG WOULD BE TO CONSIDER
CONCLUSIONS OF MBFR REVIEW IN BROADER CONTEXT OF NATO APPROACH TO
WHOLE QUESTION OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AS AN ESSENTIAL
ELEMENT IN WESTERN SECURITY EQUATION. FRANCESCHI AND DANOVI,
WHO COULD NOT/NOT RECEIVE US BEFORE LAST NIGHT, DID NOT/NOT REJECT
CDN PROPOSAL OUT-OF-HAND BUT TENDED RATHER TO ARGUE THAT IT WAS
PREMATURE. IN SPITE OF UNANIMOUS DECISION OF NAC MINISTERIAL MTG TO
CONDUCT MBFR REVIEW, THERE EXISTED SIGNIFICANT DIVERGENCIES AMONGST
ALLIES AS TO DIRECTION WHICH IT SHOULD TAKE AND EVEN MORE SO AS
TO CONCLUSIONS WHICH IT WOULD LIKELY REACH. ONCE REVIEW HAD
CLARIFIED HIGHLY TECHNICAL AND EXTREMELY COMPLEX ISSUE OF MBFR,

...2

PAGE TWO WTGR0011 CONFD

REDUCED IT TO ITS FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS, AND ELABORATED POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS FOR BENEFIT OF MINISTERS, CONSIDERATION COULD REALISTICALLY BE GIVEN TO CONVENING OF A SPECIAL MINISTERIAL MTG, EITHER AS WAY OF GIVING IMPULSE TO, OR OF PREPARING FOR, RESUMPTION OF VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. TO PROVIDE FOR A MINISTERIAL MTG AT THIS STAGE WOULD BE TO LEAP INTO UNKNOWN, WITH ALL RISKS INVOLVED.

3. WE COULD NOT/NOT REPLY WITH ANY ASSURANCE TO OUR INTERLOCUTORS QUESTION ON WHETHER DPM/SSEA WOULD WISH TO RAISE CDN PROPOSAL ON MBFR WITH HIS NATO COLLEAGUES AT STKH.

CCC/191 131151Z WTGR0011



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE

MISS/OTN

12 JAN 84 20 58Z 10

~~20-1-1~~
7 11

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ C O N F I D E N T I E L

FM/DE DE EXTOTT RCR0048 12JAN84

TO/À A BONN/HOP LIVRAISON POUR 130900

INFO INFO PC00TT/FOWLER BNATO VMBFR WSHDC MOSCO PARIS LDN ROME

REF DISTR USS DMF RCD RGB IFB IDDZ IDR IDA

SUBJ/SUJ ---LETTRE DU PM AU CHANCELIER

CI-BAS, TEXTE DE LETTRE DATEE 11JAN. ORIGINAL SUIT PAR VALISE
NO 6 QUITTANT OTT 13JAN. VOUS SAURIONS GRE TRANSMETTRE TEXTE
VENDREDI 13 A CHANCELIER EN AVISANT QU ORIGINAL SUIVRA SOUS
PEU. VOUS NOTEREZ AU DERNIER PARA MENTION D UN PRESENT AU
CHANCELIER: SCULPTURE VOUS SERA ACHEMINEE VIA DND A CAUSE DE
SON VOLUME.

CIT

2. COMCENTRE PRIERE COPIER TEXTE D ANNEXE A. FINCIT.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG F. NADEAU/PP

RCR

6-8782

SIG LOUISE FRECHETTE



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

OTTAWA, K1A 0A2


January 11, 1984

CIT

MY DEAR HELMUT,
My Dear Helmut,

Since you kindly received me in Bonn in early November, I have had a variety of further discussions with world leaders concerning the perilous state of relations between East and West and particularly the superpowers. I am pleased to report that these consultations have gone well. There is no doubt that the level of concern is high and it is clear that most leaders are indeed anxious to apply the necessary political will to ease current tensions.

The NATO Ministerial meeting in early December was certainly a landmark, largely due to the FRG inspired declaration which Canada was pleased to heartily support. I hope next week's opening in Stockholm of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe will be similarly successful. At a minimum, it will provide a forum for further high level meetings between leaders from the East and West. On the MBFR front, we are looking forward to the proposals which your Government has undertaken to bring forward in NATO. As you are aware, on the basis of what we now know of these proposals, they too will receive our full support.



Herr Helmut Kohl
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
Bonn

-2-

From our last meeting, you know I had hoped to conclude my series of high level meetings with visits to Washington and Moscow. I had a good meeting with Ronald Reagan on December 15 and was impressed by his determination to change the rhetoric and see US/Soviet relations improve. Unfortunately, we have not yet been able to determine whether President Andropov will be able to receive me in Moscow in the near future although I am exploring the possibility of seeing other senior Soviet leaders.

At your generous dinner in Bonn on November 10, you demonstrated an interest in primitive art and we discussed briefly Canadian Eskimo carving. I am sending with this letter a soapstone sculpture by Tyara of Cape Dorset entitled "Sedna and Walrus" as well as an explanation of the Eskimo legend which inspired this particular piece. I hope you will be pleased to add this example of Canadian native art to your collection.

Yours sincerely,

with friendly regards
WITH FRIENDLY REGARD,

Pierre

PIERRE

FINCIT

UNCLASSIFIED

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

JAN 12 9 03 PM '83

NYK

005/12

NUMBER

0022

DATE

12

JAN 84

PAGES

2

FROM: PERMANENT MISSION NEW YORK

TO: EXTOTT IDDZ

DELIVER BY 130900

INFO: PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/COLEMAN

DISTR: IMU FPR

REFERENCE:

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION

SUBJECT: SECGEN MTGS WITH CDN PM: UN PRESS RELEASE

ACC	322102	RE	DATE
FILE	20-CDA-9-PM	DOSSIER	
24-3-1-CDA			

cp/ M GERVAIS

RELEASING OFFICER

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- Destroy
- Doc Centre
- Circulation File

United Nations Press Release

Department of Public Information
Press Section
United Nations, New York

2/2



SG/SM/3513
11 January 1984

SECRETARY-GENERAL MEETS WITH CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER

The following statement was made this evening by the Spokesman for the Secretary-General:

Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar met today with the Prime Minister of Canada, Pierre Trudeau. In an hour-and-a-half conversation, they reviewed the international situation and specifically discussed various ways of reducing tensions, in particular in the relationship between the two major Powers and their respective alliances. In this context, the Prime Minister informed the Secretary-General of his peace initiatives and the reactions to them from the world leaders that he had contacted so far.

The Secretary-General welcomed the opportunity to exchange views with the Prime Minister, especially in view of the current tense international situation. He believed that the Prime Minister's ideas could contribute to the lessening of tensions and lead to the improvement of international relations. The Secretary-General was particularly interested to learn more of the Prime Minister's proposal for a possible five-Power meeting, since he is of the view that the permanent members of the Security Council have a special responsibility under the Charter.

The Secretary-General and the Prime Minister also discussed the forthcoming Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, and the need to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. They have agreed to keep in touch regarding further developments in connection with the Prime Minister's initiatives.

* * * * *



IDDZ/J.

McNee, 55012/15

MB

TO/A RSR
FROM/DE • IDDZ

REFERENCE • Your memo of January 10, McNee/Weybrecht
RÉFÉRENCE telcon, January 12.

SUBJECT •
SUJET Visit of DPM/SSEA to Turkey

Security/Sécurité	CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	January 12, 1983
Number/Numéro	IDDZ-0025

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

-1-
DISTRIBUTION

... Attached, as requested, is a background brief on the Prime Minister's initiative for the briefing book for the DPM/SSEA's visit to Turkey.

2. As we mentioned in reftelcon, in the scenario brief you might simply include a sentence - "You might review the current status of the Prime Minister's initiative."

L.A. Delvoie
L.A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE

ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

ISSUE

The purpose of this brief is to discuss the current status of the Prime Minister's initiative.

BACKGROUND

The Prime Minister's central purpose is to try to stop and reverse the worsening trend in East-West relations, and thus reduce international tensions and risks of confrontation. His chief proposal addresses the need to restore confidence and re-establish high-level political dialogue between East and West, and particularly between the two superpowers. The PM is interested in seeing if by opening lines of communication to Moscow more propitious conditions can be created for political dialogue between Moscow and Washington.

The initiative involves a number of specific proposals - (a) a conference of the five nuclear weapon states to limit strategic nuclear arsenals (b) a concerted political effort to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime (c) a substantive Western response to the Eastern proposals on MBFR and a meeting at the Foreign Minister level in Vienna (d) the inauguration of the Stockholm CDE Meeting at senior political level.

Also related to the initiative, but not pursued personally by the PM with other governments, are proposals for (a) a ban on the testing and deployment of high altitude anti-satellite systems (b) a requirement that future strategic systems be verifiable by National Technical Means and (c) restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs.

REACTIONS

The reactions of other governments may be roughly summarized as follows:

European allies have given encouraging support. The Western Europeans share his analysis of the dangerous state of East-West relations and the need for the re-establishment of political dialogue.

- 2 -

The French were generally supportive, with reservations as to timing. Their statements on the five power conference have been contradictory, but generally reserved. The Germans were positive and generally supportive (and have subsequently endorsed the five power conference idea). The British were generally supportive of the broad purpose, but have reservations about specific proposals (especially the five power conference). The Dutch and Belgians reacted very positively, with some reservations as to timing (they think such an initiative may be most needed in the spring of 1984 once INF deployment has taken place). The Italians were generally supportive and have publicly endorsed the idea of a five power conference. (Also, there have been very positive and fully supportive written responses from the Danes and Norwegians and a very positive reactions from the Spaniards and Turks. The Greeks generally support the initiative, but disagree with NATO's INF deployment.)

PM Nakasone of Japan was very receptive and fully supportive when the PM visited Tokyo on November 19.

Commonwealth Heads of Government specifically endorsed PM Trudeau's initiative in the Goa Declaration on International Security.

The Chinese are mildly supportive of the broad political purpose, but do not support the call for a five power conference or the NPT. They argue that the first priority is concentrating pressure on the superpowers to reduce their arms.

The Soviets are interested, but cautious and non-committal. They claim to have had sad experiences with high-level contact with the US, hence they were "reserved" about the idea of the higher level of contact the better. While they appreciated the PM's view on the importance of discussions of intentions and goals, they claimed that Washington, in deploying new missiles was acting on a different basis. They were non-committal on a five power conference and reserved judgement on the question of political level representation at CDE and MBFR.

The USA has assured the Prime Minister of its support for the broad political objectives he is pursuing in East-West relations, while laying most of the blame for the current state of those relations on Soviet attitudes and actions. The USA administration has reservations about most of the specific arms control measures put forward by the Prime Minister.

- 3 -

U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar has commended and encouraged the Prime Minister's efforts.

RESULTS

The degree of support which the Prime Minister has garnered for the main purposes of his initiative is of itself a positive result insofar as it may have a beneficial effect on the climate of East-West relations. The decisions taken at the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels in early December were particularly significant in furthering the purposes of the initiative:

- (a) an undertaking by NATO foreign ministers to attend the opening of the CDE in Stockholm (Canadian delegation in the lead);
- (b) an undertaking to review NATO negotiating position in the MBFR negotiations (Canadian delegation in the lead);
- (c) the "Brussels declaration" which places heavy emphasis on genuine détente and dialogue in East-West relations (an FRG initiative, actively supported by the Canadian delegation);
- (d) a mandate given the permanent NATO Council to review the current state of East-West relations and to report to the next NATO ministerial meeting on what actions might be taken to improve them.

TURKISH POSITION

The Turkish government supports the Prime Minister's prescription and commends his initiative as "courageous" and based on "solid logic". They signal the lack of a full USA/USSR dialogue as a particularly negative feature of the current situation and think that the timing of the initiative is right given prevailing tensions between the superpowers.

While they do not expect immediate results from the initiative, they have expressed admiration for it and think it could contribute to détente.

TO/A See Distribution List

FROM/DE • RSR

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Visit of DPM/SSEA to Turkey
SUJET

Mr. McNair
Done for action pls
[Signature]

Security/Sécurité	CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	January 10, 1984
Number/Numéro	RSR-0013

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

1

DISTRIBUTION

Further to our meeting of January 6,
... I have attached a revised list of subjects for
which we have requested briefing material
and talking points.

2. I would be grateful if you would
ensure that we receive the briefs by the end
of day January 16. Briefs should be typed
in the standard format and, if at all possible,
confined to no more than two pages.

Julie Loranger

Julie Loranger
Director
European Northern and
Southern Tier Countries
Relations Division

BRIEFS FOR VISIT OF DPM/SSEA TO TURKEY

<u>BACKGROUND BRIEFS</u>	<u>RESPONSIBLE DIVISION</u>
1. Fact sheet	RSR
2. Turkey Historical Review	RSR
3. Turkey - Domestic political and Economic Situation	RSR/Post
4. Turkey-Foreign Policy	RSR/Post
5. Turkey-Canada Relations	RSR/Post
6. Biographies	Post
 <u>MULTILATERAL ISSUES</u>	
A) <u>East-West Relations</u>	
7. General Overview	RBR
8. Prime Minister Trudeau's peace initiative	IDDZ
9. Security Issues: Stockholm Conference Arms Control and Disarmament	IDR-IDA
10. USSR Internal Situation (Soviet Leadership)	RBR
B) <u>Middle-East Situation</u>	
11. Lebanon	GMR
12. Iran-Iraq War	GMR
13. Arab-Israeli Dispute	GMR
14. PLO	GMR
C) <u>Other Multilateral Issues</u>	
15. Cyprus	RSR/IDR
16. Turkey Relations with NATO	
17. Turkey Relations with Western Europe	RSR/RCM/RCR
18. Turkey Relations with Islamic Countries	RSR/Post
19. Human Rights	RSR/IMU

- 2 -

D) Multilateral Issues

20. Briefing as prepared for the Davos Symposium EER

BILATERAL ISSUES

21. Illegal Visitor Movement from Turkey SIM
22. Commercial Relations RST
23. ECD Financing in Turkey RST/TDO/EDC
24. Nuclear Cooperation ETN
25. CANDU Nuclear Reactor ETN
26. De Havilland Buffalo Aircraft Co-production TDO/RST
27. Military Assistance IDR
28. Armenian Terrorism in Canada ZSE
29. Turkish Consular Representation in Canada XDX/ZSS/RSR
30. Property for Turkish Embassy in Canada MRC/XDX

DISTRIBUTION LIST

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ANKRA

CONFIDENTIAL


January 12, 1983

IDDZ-0023

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

Initiative: Stockholm Conference

As requested, we attach for your information
a draft of Mr. MacEachen's statement to the opening
session of the Stockholm Conference.


L.A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

CDE SPEECH

We are meeting here in Stockholm at a time when the dialogue on security in East-West relations has been reduced to a series of discordant pronouncements. Critically important negotiations on which great hopes had been fixed have been broken off, suspended or interrupted.

Concrete results seem more remote, more unattainable, than ever.

And at the same time the acrimonious rhetoric of distrust continues unabated and intensified.

Real dialogue has virtually disappeared.

Never has a Conference been more urgently required than this one.

And never have expectations - and hopes - been greater for a successful outcome.

To survey the condition of the world today is not a happy task.

Whichever way we turn, suspicion, distrust, and tensions criss-cross our perspectives in a frightening manner. And as tensions mount so does the sharpness of the rhetoric which seems, so depressingly, to have replaced the forthright dialogue by which nations have customarily communicated their hopes and fears to each other.

- 2 -

We have come almost to a halt in our efforts to find more civilized ways of living with each other and talking to each other.

It is the fear, and the mistrust and the insecurity that have been building up in recent years - right across the globe, but nowhere more alarmingly than in Europe among the participating States - it is these dangerously corrosive attitudes that have been the driving force behind this Conference.

Persistent and indeed escalating doubts about what one side or the other intends to with its arms, which is essentially a political issue, constitutes the most likely basis for the outbreak of conventional war, which in turn, could trigger a nuclear war.

Canada approaches the question of conventional arms in Europe from the premise that a more stable balance of forces must be established between the two Alliances at the lowest possible level, if the danger of conflict is to be lessened. But how can we assure states that their security can be maintained without increasing military potentials to the dangerous levels we are witnessing today especially in Central Europe. We need to develop mechanisms which will lead to greater openness in military affairs among the participating states.

Unlike previous arms negotiations which have encountered difficulties in trying to strike numerical balances on the basis of what each side can do, our job here is to find ways of reassuring each other about what we intend to do, and more important, what we intend not to do.

This is the only way that we can break the spiral which impells states to redress perceived military imbalances, prompting their adversaries in turn to take countermeasures resulting in ever greater and increasingly unstable levels of arms.

The Prime Minister of Canada, concerned by the widening gap between military strategy and political purpose, has undertaken a personal initiative to encourage the re-establishment of political dialogue and confidence at the highest level between East and West. The leaders with whom he has met to date have agreed that there exists a pressing need to provide that jolt of political energy required to improve the climate and basis for the achievement of arms control agreements.

- 4 -

This Conference offers an opportunity to restore political impulse to arms control in Europe because it links that military and political confidence building. For this reason, our work must be ambitious in scope. It must take into account all of the factors which are present in the current imbalance of conventional arms and which could lead to surprise attack or political intimidation through the use of force.

This Conference offers an opportunity to contribute in a unique and pioneering way to devising effective means and measures by which actual arms reductions can be implemented without diminishing the sense of security on which this process must rest.

We will not discover confidence by accident. We must work at it. We must create it. And the process is likely to be slow and laborious.

That is why this Conference is so essential.

And that is why it should embark on constructive business from the very outset. Efforts must begin right now on the task of translating the notion of confidence building into sustainable measures and policies.

- 5 -

It would be easy for us to use the opportunity now afforded us to make wonderful speeches.

But we have no time - our specific tasks are too imperative to allow us to indulge this luxury.

It would be easy to present a series of careful and detailed analyses of the balance or imbalance of arms conventional or otherwise.

But do we really need to do so? Is the presentation of conflicting data and differing interpretations of which it means - are these the purposes that have brought us together.

And above all, it would be easy for us to engage in rhetoric:

In declamation

In denunciation

In recrimination.

It is easy to make accusatory speeches - especially in times of stress and danger. It is much less easy to decide to set all that aside and to make an unemotional, workmanlike beginning on the slow and detailed task of finding ways to reverse a downward trendline in international dialogue.

- 6 -

Of inflamed debate and of recrimination we have all, surely, had enough.

Early on in our meeting here in Stockholm I appeal for a different approach to prevail.

Detailed

Specific

Serious

Urgent.

Let us not waste time belabouring each other with the many unresolved grievances we can all list and recite without much trouble.

Of course these issues exist and of course they must be recognized and dealt with.

But are we prepared to allow them to obscure the possibilities for progress inherent in the mandate we have given ourselves for the endeavour on which we are embarking.

I hope not. And I know that my hope is shared by millions of people around the world.

We have come here to negotiate.

- 7 -

To present and discuss propositions.

And to reach agreement on specific measures which will contribute to confidence, stability and security.

We, in the group of nations referred to as the West, have our conception of the type of measure on which we can build. We will present a package of ideas which if accepted would be a long step forward creating a new basis on which to approach arms reductions.

We will propose measures which envisage more openness about basic military information, earlier notice of a wider range of military activities, mandatory rather than voluntary exchanges of observers at important military activities and ways to verify any agreements reached. These measures would promote assurance that the routine military activities of other participants in Europe are not threatening, and would make unusual preparation for hostilities more difficult to conceal. They will also treat a practical problem which arises from the present limited mutual confidence: that is, how to deal with emergencies or accidents which could spark crises in Europe.

- 8 -

We have every expectation that others at this Conference, individually and collectively, will bring forward their own ideas.

I am sure that some will be more interesting than others.

I am sure that we will be urged to consider measures that would be more declaratory than specific - and I am equally sure that we will, all of us, be vigilant about ideas that by suggesting slick and easy and apparent solutions to agonizingly difficult problems could lead us into a false and dangerous sense of security.

But that discussion is still to come.

For the moment let me impress on this gathering the sense of urgency which must attach to our work.

Let us, as Ministers, commit ourselves here and now to investing this enterprise with a sense of political direction and urgency. And if it proves desirable for us to return to this forum to re-inspire and maintain that momentum, is there any among us who would not come back, who would assign a higher priority to other engagements.

- 9 -

Let us begin to negotiate.

Let us concentrate on the realistic goals defined by the mandate for this Conference on Confidence-Building- and not on the enormity of some of the gaps that must ultimately be faced in our search for a less dangerous world.

A less dangerous world:

I am convinced that that is what we all want - regardless of our political system, our geographical size, our armed might.

We are all in this together. Superpower and mini-state. We move forward together, or we sink back into greater and greater danger.

I come back again and again to the urgency of our confidence-building task.

Never have imagination and determination been more urgently called for.

The Government of Canada commits itself now, as it has done in the past to responding unstintingly to this challenge.

- 10 -

As we strike out along this new path, this road that begins in Stockholm, we declare solemnly that we will spare no effort in our common search for peace - and for the sense of confidence that underpins security.

Let us see whether we can, together, build confidence, and restore a civilized political dialogue between us.

Because we must.

MAJOR FILE

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR1041 12JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDR

INFO BNATO CANMILREPNATO BRU MOSCO LDN BONN ROME VMBFR GENEV PARIS
HAGUE OSLO COPEN ATHNS MDRID/CSCE PRMNY/BEESELEY PCOOTT/FOWLER/
AXWORTHY NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DACPOL/DNACPOL/DPP/DSTRATA/CIS

DISTR IDD IFB MINA MINE MINT USS DMF IDA RBR RCR RSR RBD RCD RSD
CPD ZSI ZSP URR URT URE LCD LSD IDDZ

---INF:KVITSINSKY VIEWS

WE ARE FAXING TO YOU TEXT OF NYORK TIMES ARTICLE BY USSR INF
NEGOTIATOR KVITSINSKY THAT IS DESCRIBED AS THE QUOTE AN ABRIDGED
VERSION OF HIS FIRST DETAILED PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
UNQUOTE.THERE IS LITTLE NEW IN KVITSINSKYS ARTICLE.HE ARGUES SOV
UNION WAS PREPARED TO EFFECT LARGE SCALE MEANINGFUL ARMS CUTS WHILE
THE USA WAS STUBBORNLY PROCEEDING WITH DEPLOYMENT AND WAS NOT/NOT
PREPARED TO REDUCE ITS ARMS.THE USA WAS CALLING FOR UNILATERAL SOV
DISARMAMENT.KVITSINSKY SPECIFICALLY ATTACKS THE ROLE OF USA
NEGOTIATOR NITZE SAYING FIRST THAT NITZE DISTORTED THE WALK IN THE
WOODS DEAL FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES.KVITSINSKY CLAIMS HE NEVER
INDICATED TO NITZE THAT THE WALK IN THE WOODS FORMULA PROPOSED BY
NITZE WLD BE ACCEPTABLE TO HIM OR SOV SIDE.ACCORDING TO KVITSINSKY
NITZES GOAL IN LEAKING NEWS OF THE WALK IN THE WOODS WAS TO CREATE
AN ILLUSION OF POSSIBLE PROGRESS.

2.KVITSINSKYS SECOND COMPLAINT ABOUT NITZE INVOLVES THE NOV WALK IN

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR1041 CONF

BOTANICAL GARDENS AND THE ARGUMENT OVER WHO OFFERED THE PROPOSAL DISCUSSED THERE. KVITSINSKY SAYS THAT IT WAS AT ALL TIMES AN AMERICAN POSITION. KVITSINSKY CALLS ATTRIBUTING THE PROPOSAL TO THE SOV UNION A QUOTE DISHONOURABLE ACT UNQUOTE.

3. KVITSINSKY ARTICLE CONCLUDES WITH CONTENTION THAT USA NEGOTIATION TACTICS WERE INTENDED TO GAIN AN EDGE FOR THE USA IN THE NUCLEAR EQUATION. IN THE END WHAT HAS HAPPENED IS THAT SECURITY OF BOTH SOV UNION AND WEST HAVE BEEN FURTHER ENDANGERED. KVITSINSKY LISTS SOV COUNTERMEASURES AS BEING: (A) LIFTING OF MORATORIUM ON SS20 DEPLOYMENT IN THE EUROPEAN PART OF SOV UNION; (B) DEPLOYMENT OF SOV TACTICAL MISSILES IN EASTERN EUROPE; AND (C) ADDITIONAL DEPLOYMENT OF SOV WEAPONS ON THE HIGH SEAS ADJACENT TO THE AMERICAN COAST LINE.

CCC/231 122126Z UNGR1041

master FILE

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR1038 12JAN84

TO EXTOTT RBR

INFO MOSCO BNATO LDN ROME PARIS BONN VMBFR HAGUE BRU PEKIN

TOKYO PRMNY PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADMPOLE/CPP

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDR IDDZ RBD URR ZSI UGB

---USA/USSR RELS: PRES REAGAN'S SPEECH

WHITE HOUSE HAS ANNOUNCED THAT PRES REAGAN WILL GIVE HIS ANTICIPATED SPEECH ON EAST/WEST RELS MONDAY AM 16JAN. PRESS REPORTS ARE THAT IT WILL BE CONCILIATORY IN TONE. COMMENTATORS ARE, HOWEVER, FOCUSSED ON FACT THAT PRES IS GOING AHEAD WITH PAPER ON COMPLIANCE ISSUES AT SAME TIME. THIS THEY ARGUE WILL UNDERCUT CREDIBILITY OF REAGAN'S APPROACH.

2. ONE COLUMNIST POINTS OUT THAT BY ACTING AT SAME TIME ON COMPLIANCE AND SPEAKING IN MODERATE TONES REAGAN RISKS OFFENDING BOTH LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES. ON OTHER HAND BY ACTING THIS WAY PRES IS DEFENDING HIMSELF AGAINST ATTACKS FROM BOTH FACTIONS.

3. IN ARGUING THIS WAY OBSERVERS MAY BE OVERESTIMATING HOW WELL, IN EVEN THE BEST OF CIRCUMSTANCES, PRESIDENTS CHANGED TACTICS WILL BE ACCEPTED AS INDICATING A MEANINGFUL CHANGE OF POLICY. CHANGED TACTICS ARE UNLIKELY TO RECEIVE AN IMMEDIATE RESPONSE FROM ANY OF THE GROUPS WHO THE NEW APPROACH IS EXPECTED TO AFFECT: THE SOVS, THE ALLIES AND THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE. ONLY A LONG TERM MODIFICATION OF THE PRESIDENTS BEHAVIOUR WILL OVERCOME THEIR SCEPTISM. HOWEVER, WE HAVE

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR1038 CONFD

ALL ARGUED THAT THE RHETORIC IS AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE POLICY. THUS IN MODIFYING HIS RHETORIC PRES MAY INDEED BE SIGNALLING A POSITIVE CHANGE OF POLICY, IN EXACTLY THE DIRECTION PM HAS URGED HIM TO TAKE.

4. IT IS, THEREFORE, IN OUR AND THE ALLIES INTEREST TO ENCOURAGE ANY POSITIVE MODIFICATION IN REAGANS APPROACH. IF CHANGE IN REAGANS TONE IS AS SIGNIFICANT AS WE HAVE BEEN LEAD TO BELIEVE (BURT TOLD AMB HIS FIRST DRAFT WAS VERY POSITIVE) PM MAY WISH TO MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT WELCOMING THIS CHANGE AND EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENTS NEW APPROACH AND/OR WRITE TO THE PRES IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SPEECH WHICH WE ASSUME WILL BE TELEVISED MONDAY AM.

5. WE WILL TRY TO OBTAIN AN ADVANCE COPY OF THE TEXT, BUT PAST EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT THESE ARE USUALLY NOT/NOT AVAILABLE BECAUSE THEY ARE REVISED UP TO THE LAST MOMENT BY WHITE HOUSE SPEECH WRITERS. HOWEVER WE ARE TOLD THAT LETS WILL BE SENT TO PM AND DPM/SSEA (WE ASSUME FROM PRES AND SEC STATE RESPECTIVELY) IN ADVANCE OF THE SPEECH AND THAT DPM/SSEA LET WILL PROVIDE OUTLINE OF MAIN THRUST OF SPEECH.

CCC/241 122046Z UNGR1038

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RD *Done*
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BONN ZQGR1008 12JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDR DELIVER BY 121200

INFO BNATO CANMILREPNATO BRU VMBFR WSHDC LDN PARIS ROME ATHNS
HAGUE

DISTR MINA DMF IFB UDDZ IDRA IDRL IDA

---MBFR-CDN PROPOSAL

MFA HAS PROVIDED US WITH FOLLOWING REACTION TO CDN PROPOSAL.

IT RUNS CLOSELY ALONG LINES OF TAYLORS REPORT ON PERMREPS
LUNCH 10JAN(BNATOTEL YBGR8001 10JAN)BUT ALSO CONTAINS SOME
ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.

2.GERMANS AGREE MBFR NEEDS TO HAVE QUOTE SOME LIFE BREATHED
INTO IT UNQUOTE AND THUS SUPPORT GENERAL CDN OBJECTIVE.
WHAT THEY QUESTION IS PROPOSAL OF DEVOTING INFORMAL MIN MTG
TO ARMS CONTROL ISSUES(CONCERNTRATING ON MBFR)AT TIME WE
SUGGEST.THERE WERE TWO REASONS FOR THIS.FIRST WAS THAT
GIVEN BY AMB BEHREND(S>IDR0066 06JAN)AND AT BNATO,IE GYRICH-
TYPE MTGS SHOULD BE FREE-WHEELING,INFORMAL,AGENDALESS OCCASIONS
WHEN MINS ARE NOT/NOT BURDENED WITH TASK OF TAKING SPECIFIC
DECISIONS.

3.ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT/NOT SEEN IT REPORTED ELSEWHERE,
SECOND EASON WAS IN FACT MORE STRONGLY UNDERLINED BY MFA
THAN WAS FIRST.THIS WAS THAT CDN PROPOSAL WOULD LIKELY
HAVE EFFECT OF SHIFTING TO MINISTERIAL LEVEL WORK THAT
EXPERTS/OFFICIALS SHOULD HAVE BEEN DOING.CONTACT LIKENED
POTENTIAL SITUATION TO EVERGREEN COMMUNITY WHERE QUOTE MINS

...2

PAGE TWO ZQGR1008 CONFD

NOW GET TOGETHER TO COUNT CHICKENS UNQUOTE.FRG VIEW IS THAT AGREEMENT ON WESTERN RESPONSE TO EASTERN PROPOSALS CAN AND SHOULD BE HAMMERED OUT AT OFFICIAL LEVEL AND NOT/NOT BY MINS.QUOTE WE NEED TO DO OUR HOMEWORK UNQUOTE BEFORE PULLING IN MINS UNQUOTE CONTACT DID NOT/NOT SEE THAT MIN MTG WOULD BE USEFUL IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON WESTERN RESPONSE.IT WOULD HOWEVER POSSIBLY BE USEFUL IF QUOTE POLITICAL BANG UNQUOTE WERE NECESSARY TO GIVE EAST SIGNAL.WE ARE READY AND EAGER TO TALK IN EFFORT TO GET EAST BACK TO NEGOTIATING TABLE IN VIENNA.THERE WAS NO/NO POINT IN SENDING SUCH SINGNAL YET,AS WE WERE NOT/NOT YET READY.

4.ON THIS LAST POINT CONTACT NOTED THAT FRG WAS RWORKING ITS DATA/VERIFICATION PROPOSAL AND WAS CURRENTLY PUSHING IT QUOTE BILATERALLY UNQUOTE.HE SAID THAT SOME INDICATION TO THIS EFFECT WOULD BE GIVEN AT SCG 4TG(MON 16JAN).

5.COMMENT:FRG HAS ALWAYS BEEN PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TO WSHDC VIEWS/POSITIONS ON MBFR(UNDERSTANDABLE GIVEN SIZE OF USAS TROOP PRESENCE IN FRG AND),HAS ALWAYS PREFERRED TO CLEAR THINGS BILATERALLY WITH WSHDC,AND TO LESSER EXTENT WITH LDN BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH ANY PROPOSALS.THAT IS NOT/NOT TO SAY FRG IS ANY LESS CONCERNED ABOUT BREATHING LIFE INTO MBFR THAN WE ARE-THEY SIMPLY DISAGREE ON TACTICS TO BE USED TO GET OUR FRIENDS TO GO ALONG.IT MAY BE THAT THEY FEEL MIN MTG OF TYPE WE PROPOSE COULD ISOLATE USA AND THUS BE COUNTER PRODUCTIVE.IN ANY EVENT IT WOULD APPEAR THAT,FRG FEELS MBFR-

...3

PAGE THREE ZQGR1008 CONFD

RELATED EFFORTS, IN NEAR TERM, SHOULD BE CONCENTRATED ON
OBTAINING ALLIANCE AGREEMENT TO THEIR NEW VERIFICATION
PROPOSAL, AND THAT THIS CAN BEST AND MOST QUICKLY BE PURSUED
THROUGH BILATERAL APPROACHES.

CCC/242 121530Z ZQGR1008

External Affairs
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Affaires extérieures
Canada

MASTER FILE

ACTION MESSAGE
SUITE A DONNER

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TO EXTOTT/IDDZ/URR

INFO

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MATHIAS MTG WITH TRUDEAU - 3 PAGES

REF

CORRESPONDENCE WITH MATHIAS RE POSSIBLE MTG WITH PM TRUDEAU. GRATEFUL YOUR ADVICE.

SUBJ/SUJ

43

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APProuvé

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R.J. LYSYSHYN/th



CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR.
UNITED STATES SENATE

2/3


December 23, 1983

Dear Ambassador:

Many thanks for the courtesy of your letter of December 21st. I, too, am sorry that we were unable to arrange a meeting with Prime Minister Trudeau, but I look forward to hearing from you further about a meeting in Ottawa.

Again with appreciation and best wishes for a happy holiday season,

Sincerely,


Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.

His Excellency
Allan Gotlieb
The Ambassador of Canada
1746 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

File 115-111111-111111

3/3

Canadian Embassy



Ambassade du Canada

1746 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036

December 21, 1983

BY HAND

Dear Senator Mathias,

I write to you with two purposes.

The first is to thank you and your staff for your efforts in attempting to arrange a meeting between Prime Minister Trudeau, yourself and your Senate colleagues. It is unfortunate that circumstances were such as to prevent this from occurring. Secondly, I regret that, as it turned out, it was impossible to go ahead with your planned meeting with Prime Minister Trudeau on December 15. Unhappily, last minute changes in his program precluded this. I should add that I would be more than pleased to brief you on the Prime Minister's visit and his overall initiative. If you are interested your office might undertake to arrange a mutually convenient time for us.

Finally, as I mentioned to you, I notified the Prime Minister's office about the idea of your visiting him in Ottawa in January or soon after. I am sure that we will be able to arrange something in the new year. In the interim please accept my best wishes for the holiday season and the coming New Year.

Yours sincerely,

Allan Gotlieb
Ambassador

The Honourable Charles McC. Mathias,
Senate Russell Office Building,
Room 387,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Canada
WFO 603/13
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ACTION MESSAGE
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'Mission' to U.S.!

By Alan Emory

Times Washington Correspondent

WASHINGTON — Canada's prime minister arrives in Washington today on a mission of crisis management and communications.

The official word is that Pierre Elliott Trudeau will try to sell President Reagan on the idea of improving the political dialogue among the world's powers and, thereby, to lower the risk of nuclear war.

The skeptics wonder whether he is trying to win himself a Nobel Peace Prize, as another Canadian prime minister, Lester B. Pearson, did with his Middle East program in 1957, and to boost the standing of Mr. Trudeau's Liberal Party in Canada, where it now badly trails the Conservatives in public opinion polls.

Canadian officials say that Mr. Trudeau will not assume the role of "go-between or honest broker," that he is not on a crusade or making a "big pitch."

On the other hand, Mr. Trudeau does believe that political leaders must take personal responsibility for easing international tensions. As one who has met with more than

40 world leaders recently, all of whom have ideas for peace, he is in a good position to communicate these ideas to President Reagan in their hour-long meeting at the White House.

Also, Mr. Trudeau, unlike some of the leaders with whom he has met, is still in office, and, as one diplomat put it Tuesday, "that is the time to have terrific ideas."

Mr. Trudeau, insiders say, will not try to advise President Reagan to cool his sometimes-bellacose rhetoric on the Soviets and is coming as an "ally and friend," not as an adversary.

What the Prime Minister would like to take away with him is a promise from President Reagan to attend a five-power conference on reducing nuclear arms and halting the spread of nuclear weapon capability.

"We would very much like to have an indication he would participate," Canadian Ambassador Allan E. Gottlieb told a breakfast meeting with correspondents here.

The United States has not rejected the five-power talk idea, but it has not embraced it, either.

Canadian diplomats characterize the Trudeau visit almost as much in terms of what the Prime Minister is not trying to do as in terms of what he hopes to accomplish.

He is not, they say, trying to interpose himself between the United States and the Soviet Union, though some cynics maintain that is exactly what he is seeking; not trying to suggest any crack in the unity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, not trying to propose methods of nuclear disarmament.

Instead, his goal is to



—UPI Telephoto

Pierre Elliot Trudeau

stress the "real risk" in today's world, the danger of war by accident and of the escalation of third-world conflicts.

Mr. Trudeau has visited the leaders of Western Europe and of the Commonwealth nations, and he has been to China. Some diplomatic circles believe the Soviets said they wanted to wait to see him until after the Canadian leader had been to Washington, but Canadians say they have no evidence of that and Mr. Trudeau does have an invitation to Moscow in hand.

Mr. Trudeau sees his mission as a kind of "third rail," after missile deployment and disarmament talks, mirroring a widespread public fear of nuclear war. It is the latest move in a series that included efforts at an earlier United Nations disarmament conference, a speech at Notre Dame University about 18 months ago and the Williamsburg summit this past spring.

Mr. Trudeau feels there is a growing sense the West must send a signal Moscow it is willing to talk, and that the two superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, have a "heavy obligation," as one observer put it, to start creating an international atmosphere favorable to peace.

Ambassador Gottlieb said Canada recognized Mr. Reagan as a leader who had been "very firm and strong," but there was "no dispute he is a man of peace."

The ambassador rejects reports that the President and the Prime Minister did not get along personally and says the meetings he has attended between the two have reflected a "good rapport" and the reported strains are "totally mythological."

While today's meeting is expected to relegate specifics to a back seat in deference to general goals, Mr. Trudeau is on record as favoring "suffocating" the arms race by barring new areas of competition, such as high-altitude anti-satellite weapons, and feeling that stopping the spread of nuclear weapons might be helped by linking the effort to development aid and security guarantees.

If the superpowers themselves cut back on nuclear weapons, Mr. Trudeau feels, that will improve the chance of halting their proliferation around the globe.

MASTER FILE

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDR0151 12JAN84

TO BRU LDN PARIS WSHDC BONN OSLO COPEN HAGUE MDRID LSBON ROME ATHNS
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DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDD IDDZ RGB UGB URR RCR RSR RBR CPD FRP IDRL
REF OURTEL 0148 12JAN

---TINDEMANS INITIATIVE:HARMEL REVIEW

YOU WILL BE AWARE FROM RECENT EXCHANGES THAT CDN VIEW ON PROCEDURAL
APPROACH TO HARMEL REVIEW EXERCISE DIFFERS FROM THAT ENDORSED BY
NATO SEC GEN AND OTHER ALLIES AS EXPRESSED IN RECENT DISCUSSIONS IN
NATO COUNCIL. ESSENTIALLY, WE BELIEVE THAT MORE INNOVATIVE METHOD IS
CALLED FOR BEYOND USING ONLY CUSTOMARY NATO CTTEE MACHINERY AND
DEPENDING ON NATO INNATL STAFF TO SYNTHESIZE NATL INPUTS. DPM/SSFA
HAS ENDORSED THIS APPROACH AND, GIVEN TENOR OF DISCUSSIONS IN BRU, WE
FEEL THAT MAKING OUR VIEWS KNOWN IN CAPITALS IS STEP NOW WARRANTED.
DRAWING ON REFTTEL, WE WOULD ASK YOU TO RAISE MATTER WITH HOST AUTHOR-
ITIES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE UPON RECEIPT THIS TEL (IN EVENT ISSUE MAY
ARISE DURING MTG IN STKHM OF NATO FORMING ATTENDING STKHM CONFERENCE
ON SECURITY/CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE).
2. WE ARE ADVOCATING HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN HARMEL REVIEW
EXERCISE AND ASKING ALLIES TO ENSURE THAT EFFORTS NOW BEING INITIATED
DO NOT/NOT BECOME BOGGED DOWN. WE BELIEVE THIS CAN BEST BE
ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH ONGOING INVOLVEMENT OF BOTH SR OFFICIALS IN

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PAGE TWO IDR0151 CONF

NATO CAPITALS AND NATO PERMREPS THEMSELVES. WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT CONSENSUS SEEMS THUS FAR TO BE IN FAVOUR OF NATO SENIOR POLITICAL CTTEE(SPC) HANDLING BULK OF BASIC WORK IN BRU, WE ALSO FEEL THAT THERE ARE OPTIONS OPEN TO SUPPLEMENT SPC WORK AND ENSURE REVIEW EXERCISE INCLUDES FRESH IDEAS AND WIDE-RANGING CONCLUSIONS: (A) MANDATING SELECT GRP OF NATO PERMREPS THEMSELVES TO DRAFT FRAMEWORK OF STUDY RATHER THAN LEAVING TASK TO NATO SECT; (B) CONVOKING EARLY FEB MTG OF COUNCIL, REINFORCED BY SR REPS FROM CAPITALS, TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON INITIATING STUDY; (C) HOLDING ANOTHER SUCH MTG IN MAR TO REVIEW PROGRESS PRIOR TO DRAFTING OF CONCISE REPORT TO NATO FORMINS AT THEIR MTG IN WSHDC - CURRENTLY SCHEDULED FOR 29-31 MAY.

3. WE BELIEVE THAT REVIEW ITSELF SHOULD BE FORWARD LOOKING AND BUILD UPON, RATHER THAN REPEAT, MUCH OF ANALYSIS OF EAST/WEST RELNS CONTAINED IN STUDIES ON THIS SUBJ CONDUCTED BY NATO IN 1978 AND 1983. ALLIES SHOULD, AS ORIGINAL 1967 HARMEL REPORT DID, CONCENTRATE ON QUOTE PRACTICAL TASKS UNQUOTE AND WHAT SHOULD BE ALLIANCE APPROACH TO EAST/WEST DIALOGUE AND DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTRUCTIVE EAST/WEST RELNS.

4. YOU MAY WISH TO INDICATE THAT WE ARE PROVIDING OUR VIEWS AS SUPPLEMENT TO ONGOING DISCUSSIONS IN NATO/BRU AND IN LIGHT OF POSSIBILITY THAT NATO MINS MAY WISH TO DISCUSS THIS AT STKHM.

5. FOR BONN: IN CONVEYING THESE VIEWS YOU MAY INFORM FRG AUTHORITIES

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PAGE THREE IDR0151 CONFD

THAT WE LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING CLOSELY WITH THEM ON THIS SUBJ AND
THAT,ON BASIS OF INITIAL EXAMINATION,WE BELIEVE THAT THEIR
SUGGESTED STUDY FRAMEWORK(BNATO TEL YBGR2008 12JAN) IS IN
DIRECTION OF OUR OWN THINKING.

CCC/202 122327Z IDR0151

MASTER FILE

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDR0148 12JAN84

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LSBON ANKRA STKHM/SCDEL ROME ATHNS

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDD IDDZ RGB UGB URR RCR RSR RBR CPD IDRL IDA
REF OURTEL 0059 06JAN YOURTELS YBGR2006 11JAN 2008,2009 12JAN

---TINDEMANS INITIATIVE:HARMEL REVIEW

INFO ADDRESSEE POSTS TAKE NOTE CONTENTS THIS TEL FOR BACKGROUND
PURPOSES.

WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT REVIEW EXERCISE IS SUFFICIENTLY
IMPORTANT TO WARRANT FOLLOW-UP OUTSIDE OF CUSTOMARY NATO MACHINERY
AND WE ARE NOT/NOT YET CONVINCED THAT DISCUSSIONS TO DATE REFLECT
IN-DEPTH CONSIDERATION IN CAPITALS OF POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES.TO THIS
END,WE INTEND MAKING OUR VIEWS KNOWN IN NATO CAPITALS AND SEPARATE
TEL WILL FOLLOW TO POSTS CONCERNED ASKING THEM TO RAISE MATTER
WITH HOST AUTHORITIES.WE WILL ALSO BE BRIEFING DPM/SSEA ON MATTER
WITH SUGGESTION THAT,CIRCUMSTANCES PERMITTING,HE RAISE SUBJ WITH HIS
NATO COLLEAGUES IN STKHM.

2.IN MAKING OUR VIEWS KNOWN IN NATO CAPITALS WE WILL OF COURSE TAKE
ACCOUNT OF PERMREPS DISCUSSION IN BRU.WE WILL SIMPLY WISH TO INDICATE
THAT,IN CDN VIEW,THERE ARE ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES WHICH MAY NOT/NOT
HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED SUFFICIENTLY AND WHICH,IF ADOPTED,COULD LEAD

...2

PAGE TWO IDR0148 CONFD

TO FRESHER IDEAS AND PERSPECTIVES, WHICH IS WHAT WE CONSIDER MINS AGREED TO AT THEIR MTG IN BRU. WE WILL ALSO NOTE THAT IT SEEMS GENERAL CONSENSUS FAVOURS BULK OF WORK BEING UNDERTAKEN IN NATO SENIOR POLITICAL CTTEE(SPC). THAT CONSENSUS NOTWITHSTANDING, WE WILL ADVOCATE THAT SELECT GRP OF PERMREPS BE MANDATED TO PREPARE FRAMEWORK OUTLINE PRIOR TO 25JAN. WE DO NOT/NOT WISH TO SEE THAT OUTLINE LEFT IN HANDS OF I/S TO DEVELOP. ONE OF PROBLEMS WE HAVE WITH CUSTOMARY APPROACH IS EXACTLY WHAT IS NOW HAPPENING. THOSE WITH VIEWS ARE OFFERING PAPERS ON OUTLINE FOR STUDY WHICH WILL BE DIGESTED BY I/S AND PROBABLY REGURGITATED IN THE FORM OF LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR FRAMEWORK. THERE WILL FOLLOW DEBATE ON CONTENTS OF FRAMEWORK WHICH WILL PROBABLY LEAD TO COMPROMISE AND WATERING-DOWN. FOR EXAMPLE, WE NOTE FROM YOURTELS YBGR 2008 AND 2009 THAT USA AND FRG ARE TAKING QUITE DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO EXERCISE AND RECONCILING THE TWO, NO/NO DOUBT WITH INPUTS FROM OTHERS, WILL NOT/NOT IN OUR VIEW BE CONDUCIVE TO SETTING THE TONE FOR KIND OF EFFECTIVE REVIEW WE HAVE IN MIND.

3. COMBINED WITH APPROACH SUGGESTING MORE DIRECT EARLY AND ONGOING INVOLVEMENT OF PERMREPS, WE WILL ALSO SUGGEST THAT THERE BE SPECIAL MTG IN BRU, PERHAPS IN EARLY FEB, OF HIGH-LEVEL REPS FROM CAPITALS TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON LAUNCHING OF STUDY. THIS WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER SUCH MTG TO CONSIDER PROGRESS IN MAR (AS NOTED IN YOURTEL 2009, PARA 06) PERHAPS IN CONJUNCTION WITH PLANNED EXPERTS MTG ON

...3

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PAGE THREE IDR0148 CONF

USSR/EASTERN EUROPE.OUR IDEAS,IN EFFECT,ARE ATTEMPT BOTH TO PURSUE INNOVATIVE APPROACH AND DEAL WITH WHAT APPEARS TO BE GENERAL FEELING THAT SPC SHOULD HANDLE WORK IN BRU.

4.AS TO CONTENT OF STUDY FRAMEWORK,WE CONTINUE TO BE INTERESTED IN REACTIONS OF DANNENBRING TO THOUGHTS CONTAINED OURTEL 4905 22DEC83.WE WOULD ASK THAT YOU ALSO CIRCULATE CDN VIEWS AS CONTAINED PARAS TWO/TWO TO EIGHT/EIGHT OF THAT TEL TO OTHERS IN MANNER OF BOTH FRG AND USA NOTES,EMPHASIZING THAT WHILE THESE VIEWS WERE PROFERRED PRIOR TO RECENT PERMREPS DISCUSSIONS OF 10-11JAN,WE THOUGHT OTHERS MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN HAVING THEM.

5.WE HAVE DIFFICULTY IN RECONCILING BOTH FRG AND USA SUGGESTIONS FOR FRAMEWORK WITH IDEA OF SHORT,CONCISE STUDY OF LENGTH NO/NO GREATER THAN ORIGINAL HARMEL REPORT.WHAT TROUBLES US IS THAT THESE FRAMEWORKS ARE FAR TOO DETAILED.THEY MAY WELL LEAD TO EXTENSIVE NATL INPUTS WHICH WILL SIMPLY BE QUOTE BOILED DOWN UNQUOTE AND IN PROCESS ANY NEW IDEAS COULD BE WELL REDUCED TO FORM OF OBSCURITY.THIS IS NOT /NOT DESIRABLE.SOMEHOW THESE LENGTHY VIEWS WILL HAVE TO BE COMPRESSED INTO MANAGEABLE PROPORTIONS(WHICH AGAIN WE DO NOT/NOT THINK CAN BE DONE EFFECTIVELY THROUGH NEGS AMONG ALL SPC MEMBERS). IF WE HAD TO COMMENT ON APPROACHES,WE WOULD BY FAR FAVOUR IDEAS OFFERED BY FRG.THEY ARE ORIENTED TOWARDS QUOTE PRACTICAL TASKS UNQUOTE AND AWAY FROM ANALYSIS WHICH ALREADY EXISTS.BY CONTRAST, USA PAPER FOCUSES TOO MUCH ON PAST AND CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS

PAGE FOUR IDR0148 CONFD

AND DOES NOT/NOT FOCUS ENOUGH ON ALLIANCE APPROACH TO EAST/WEST
DIALOGUE AND WHAT WEST SHOULD BE DOING IN YEARS AHEAD. INSTEAD, IT
SEEMS TO DWELL ON DEVELOPMENTS IN USSR/EASTERN EUROPE AND THEIR
EFFECTS ON NATO, WHICH IS NOT/NOT APPROACH WE WOULD SUPPORT.

6. WE NOTE FROM YOUR REPORTS THAT YOU HAVE SIGNALLED TO YOUR
COLLEAGUES THAT CDN APPROACH CONTRASTS WITH METHODS AS OUTLINED
BY SECGEN AND GENERALLY ADOPTED. YOU MAY WISH TO INFORMALLY LET THEM
KNOW THAT APPROACHES ARE BEING MADE IN CAPITALS.

CCC/202 122328Z IDR0148

MAJOR FILES

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDR0127 12JAN84

TO BNATO VMBFR DELIVER BY 130900

INFO CANMILREPNATO WSHDC LDN PARIS BONN ROME BRU ATHNS HAGUE OS
LSBON MDRID ANKRA STKHM COPEN PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/PPP/DNACPOL
DISTR MINA DMF IFB DDZ IDA

REF OURTEL IDR0054 05JAN YOURTEL YBGR3001 10JAN

---MBFR:CDN PROPOSAL

GIVEN GENERALLY NEGATIVE REACTION TO PROPOSAL TO HOST AN INFORMAL
MIN MTG ON MBFR AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL MATTERS WE HAVE RECOMMENDED
DPM/SSEA NOT/NOT TO EXTEND THIS INVITATION FORMALLY AT STKHM B
MENTION IN BILATERALS THAT HE REMAINS PREPARED TO HOST MTG IN CDA
SHOULD THERE BE CONSENSUS AT LATER DATE SUCH MTG WOULD BE BENFFI
SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS IN BNATO AND CAPITALS TO OBTAIN NATL REACTION
IN RECORD TIME GREATLY APPRECIATED.

CCC/202 122327Z IDR0127

1/2

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(212) 246-7424UNCLASSIFIED
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FILE

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TRANSMISSION

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ACTION
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Our file/no. dossier:

NYC

27

NO. GRPA - 79 DATE 12 JANUARY 1984

PAGES TWO
(incl. cover)
(y compris la page
couverture)FROM: Canadian Consulate General
DU : Consulat général du Canada
NEW YORKSECTION: General Relations & Public
Mr./Ms. Affairs
M./Mad. Weatherup

TO : Mr./Ms.

A : M./Mad.

Department:

Service : EXTOTT: IDDZ

Phone :

Téléphone :

Subject : NEW YORK TIMES "TRUDEAU IN AN ARMS PLEA AT U.N."
Objet :

12 January 1984 (A6)

ORIGINAL AS IS

2/2

ORIGINAL AS IS

NYT

12/1/84

(A6)

Trudeau in an Arms Plea at U.N.

Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., Jan. 11 — Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau of Canada proposed today that the five nuclear powers use the United Nations as a forum for talks on reducing nuclear weapons.

He raised the possibility in the course of an hour-and-a-half meeting this afternoon with Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar in which the main topic was the Canadian leader's two-month-old effort to encourage renewed discussion on disarmament.

"I think the two major nuclear powers have the main responsibility,"

Mr. Trudeau said at a news conference after the meeting. "But I am not prepared, nor should the nations of the world be prepared, to let the other three off the hook, as it were. They are nuclear powers; they have responsibility by virtue of their standing as permanent members of the Security Council."

The nuclear powers are the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China.

DO NOT FORGET THE NEEDIEST

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MASTER

FILE

*Text sent to all
initiation posts*

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM PRMNY WKGR0067 12JAN84

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ/SMITH

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

REF OURTEL WKGR0059 11JAN

---PM MTG WITH UN SEC GEN-PEACE INITIATIVE

AS DISCUSSED, FOLLOWING IS ROUGH TRANSCRIPTION OF NOTES BY MISSION
REP AT JAN11 MTG. EDITING ON BASIS YOUR OWN NOTES AND RECOLLECTIONS,
AND ANY DISTR THEREAFTER, ARE IN YOUR HANDS.

2. BEGINS: MTG BEGAN AT 4 PM AS SCHEDULED.

3. SEC GEN GAVE VERY WARM WELCOME TO ^{PM} TRUDEAU AND PRAISED HIS
INITIATIVE. HE INVITED PM TO SPEAK.

4. PM--THERE IS CONSIDERABLE PARALLEL BETWEEN VIEWS AND POSITIONS THE
I WAS DELIGHTED BY YOUR PRE-CHRISTMAS REMARKS ASKING WHO SUPERPOWERS IN EFFECT
TWO OF US HAVE BEEN TAKING TENSIONS ARE TOO HIGH, DIALOGUE IS IMPORTANT
AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL
AND MUST BE DEVELOPED. WE MUST AVOID QUOTE NUCLEAR ACCOUNTANCY UNQUOTE.
(THE SITUATION IS TOO IMPORTANT TO THE SUPERPOWERS)
THERE IS A NEED FOR POLITICAL (POL) ACTIONS, BUT THE THRUST WE HAVE BEEN
I TOOK
TAKING IS THE SAME. FOR EXAMPLE TRUDEAU'S APPROACH AT COMWEL MTG IN
DELHI HAD BEEN BOTH ON THE NEED TO GET NUCLEAR POWERS TALKING AND
NEGOTIATING AND ALSO ON NEED TO STRENGTHEN THE UN. ^I HE WOULD BE GLAD
AND TO ANSWER SPECIFIC QUERIES ^{you must have about what ZHAO OR REAGAN MAY HAVE SAID} LATER BUT WOULD FOCUS ^{my} IN HIS PRESENTATION
MAINLY ON THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY AS A RESULT OF HIS TRAVELS AND
DISCUSSIONS. *AND ON HOW THIS UN MIGHT GET MORE DIRECTLY INVOLVED.*

5. PM SAID THAT HE WAS NOW NEARING THE END OF THIS PHASE OF HIS
INITIATIVE

EXERCISE: QUOTE NEARING THE END UNQUOTE BECAUSE HE WOULD HAVE TO GO

...2

ASKED WHY PUT HEAT ON US. PM SAID HIS RESPONSE TO THEM WAS THAT HIS RESPONSIBILITIES AS NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES AND OBLIGATIONS AS MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR DISARMAMENT AND PEACE. IT WAS NOT KNOWN FOR THEM TO WISH HIM WELL. IF THOSE NON-SUPERPOWERS UNITED SIGNIFICANT RESOLUTIONS IN ASSISTANCE OF THE SUPERPOWERS BEST PLACE TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR WAS AT NEGOTIATING TABLE. HE INFORMED THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO COUNT THEIR ARSENALS UNTIL STAFF AGENT HAD BEEN SUCCESSFULLY CONVINCED UK AND FRANCE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT IN HIS PRESSION THERE WAS KUDRY BUILT IN ARM FOR MODERNIZATION IN ORDER TO PROVIDE FOR SOVEREIGN DEFENSE IN NUCLEAR WAY. CONSEQUENTLY THOSE THREE CAME TO TABLE WITHOUT DISCUSSING NUMBER BUT CLO. FIRST START WITH BEHOLD ISSUES SUCH AS CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING.

ANDROPOV FEW DAYS BEFORE PRESENTLY HE HAD WRITTEN TO SAYING THAT IF HE CLO NOT ASSURE HIM HE WLD BE PREPARED TO SEE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP

PAGE TWO WKGR0067 CONF D CDN EYES ONLY

TO USSR TOO, IN ORDER PROPERLY TO COMPLETE THE CYCLE. HE WAS TRYING TO DO THIS BEFORE THE END OF JAN. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SEE THE USSR.

BEFORE SUMMING UP WHERE HE WOULD GO FROM HERE.

HE WISHED TO ENSURE THAT THE POL CONTACTS WHICH WLD BE PUT IN TRAIN IN STKHM NEXT WEEK WERE INDEED PURSUED. THERE HAD BEEN SOME ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENTS. THE QUOTE WORDS UNQUOTE BEING USED ARE

IDEALLY HE WLD LIKE

WLD BE GREATER DIALOGUE WAS REQUIRED AT POLITICAL LEVEL INCLUDING THAT FOR A VISIT TO HUNGARY AND RECENT DIET SPEECH

NATO BRUSSELS DECLARATION RECOGNIZED THIS OTHER STATE HAD ITS OWN LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS AND NOW BETTER. MEGAPHONE DIPLOMACY WAS FADING. IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN WHETHER THESE WERE ONLY WORDS BUT HE THOUGHT THAT AT LEAST ALLIES IN THE WEST WLD NOT/NOT CONDONE MERE WORDS, WITHOUT ACTIONS.

SAYING UNPARALLELITY SHD NOT BE SUBJECT

6. PM REVIEWED BRIEFLY DEVS IN RELATION TO HIS SEVERAL PROPOSALS.

SPECIFIC SEVERAL

AS FOR THE STKHM CONF, IT HAD BEEN MOVED TO A POL LEVEL AND THIS WAS GOOD. ON MBFR, THERE HAD BEEN A HELPFUL NATO DECLARATION AND THEY WERE

DESIRING TO REVIEW NATO POSITION

PM REVEALED HE HAD WRITTEN TO CHANCELLOR KOHL THAT VERY MORNING SAYING HE EXPECTED HIM TO MOVE FORWARD. AWAITING SOME IDEAS AND MOVES FROM FRG. ON THE QUESTION OF FURTHER

MEASURES IN THE CONF ON DISARMAMENT IN GENEV, CDA WLD BE PRESENTING THREE PAPERS, ONE EACH ON ASAT, ON VERIFICATION AND ON MOBILITY OF ICMBS.

IN EARLY FEB

7. WITH REGARD TO THE FIVE POWER CONF IDEA, PM SAID HE RAISED THE SUBJECT MATTER WITH EACH OF THE FOUR NUCLEAR POWERS HE HAD VISITED. REACTION

AMONG SUMMARY OF THEIR

THREE NON-SUPERPOWERS

IT WAS A GOOD IDEA

THEY DIDN'T WANT WORDS WITH THOSE

TENDED TO BE QUOTE YES BUT NOT/NOT NOW UNQUOTE. AMONG THE THREE NON-SUPERPOWERS, PM GAVE BRIEF ACCT OF HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THOSE

THOSE NUCLEAR ARSENALS BECAUSE BETWEEN THEM THEY ONLY HAD FIVE PERCENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHILE NON-SUPERPOWERS.

THREE AND HOW HE HAD ENDEAVOURED TO REASSURE THEM ON VARIOUS POINTS OF CONCERN. PM SUGGESTED THAT AS THESE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS WERE ALSO

CERTAIN

THE FIVE MEMBERS OF THE SC, PERHAPS SOME WAY CLO BE FOUND FOR THE STEPS TO BE TAKEN AT THE UN, TO GET THE FIVE TOGETHER. PERHAPS THEY CLO MEET

IN PRIVATE AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL.

PAGE THREE WKGR0067 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

8.PM THEN TURNED TO FIFTH POINT IE NON/NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

ASPECTS AND UNDERLINED HIS SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT ^{ABOUT} RISKS AT 1985 NPT

REVIEW CONF. ^{AS HE HAD ~~SAID~~ AT COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE IN DELHI, MANY THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES WERE} ~~THERE WAS SIGNIFICANT THIRD WORLD PRESSURE~~ ARGUING

^{FILE} THAT NUCLEAR POWERS HAD NOT/NOT LIVED UP TO THEIR SIDE OF THE

NPT BARGAIN AND ASKING WHY THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES SHLD ADHERE TO

ONE-SIDED UNFAIR TREATY. PM RECOUNTED HOW AT DELHI ~~COMWEL~~ MTG HE

HAD THROWN OUT NOTION OF A BARGAIN UNDER WHICH THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

WLD ADHERE TO NPT ON BASIS THAT NUCLEAR POWERS WLD REDUCE NUCLEAR

ARMAMENTS AND USE AT LEAST SOME OF THEIR SAVINGS FOR DEVT. THIS IDEA

HAD NOT/NOT APPEALED TO PM'S OWN ADVISERS ^{WAS THOUGHT IT WLD WEAKEN NPT FURTHER BUT IN ~~THE~~} AND ~~IN THE~~ EVENT HAD HELD

NO/NO INTEREST FOR THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES. THIS WHOLE MATTER WAS A ^{WORRYING TEND}

^{ADD OF} REAL ~~WORRY~~ ^{CONCERN TO HIM AND SHD PRESUMABLY BE ALSO FOR NUCLEAR POWERS. HE HAD NO EASY} FOR PM AND SHLD PRESUMABLY BE ALSO FOR NUCLEAR POWERS.

^{ANSWER FOR IT BEYOND IDEA OF FIVE POWER CONFERENCE.}

9.PM NOTED THAT SEC GEN HAD IN HIS FIRST ANNUAL REPORT MENTIONED IDEA

OF HIGH-LEVEL MTG OF SC AND HAD MORE RECENTLY DISCUSSED NEGS BETWEEN

TWO SUPERPOWERS. WHAT WAS HIS PRESENT THINKING. WAS THERE POSSIBLY A

ROLE FOR MILITARY STAFF CTTEE--NOT/NOT SO MUCH TO GET INVOLVED, AS IT

HAD BECOME MORIBUND, BUT BECAUSE OF ITS CHARTER BASED RECOGNITION OF

RESPONSIBILITY OF FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS. THUS MTG OF MSC CLD BE A

SIGNAL THEY WERE TAKING THEIR ROLE SERIOUSLY ^{IN PERSPECTIVE AND INTERVENTION} ^{FOUND PM'S THINKING VERY INTERESTING AND BEEN FOLLOWING HIS INITIATIVES VERY CLOSELY. HE} ^{SECURITY} ^{FILED}

10. SEC GEN SAID HE HAD MET WITH USA AND USSR TOP LEADERS LAST YEAR

AND HAD STRESSED THE NEED ^{FROM TO INITIATE} ^{TO RESOLVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS RACE} FOR DIALOGUE. ~~THEY AGREED IN DISCUSSION.~~ ^{BOTH SUGGESTED}

^{INTERESTED AND HAD REPRODUCED GOOD WILL.} BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO/NO RESULTS. INDEED THE RHETORIC SINCE THEN HAD

MADE THINGS WORSE. NEGOTIATING IN PUBLIC WAS UNHELPFUL. NEGS IN HIS

PAGE FOUR WKGR0067 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

PERSPECTIVE SHLD BE QUIET AND IN PRIVATE MTGS. HE HAD RECENTLY SENT PRIVATE LETS TO REAGAN AND ANDROPOV UR3ING THEM TO NEGOTIATE BUT HAD NO/NO REPLY AS YET. THE RESULT OF THE PRESENT SITU WAS, HE FEARED, A WEAKENING IN THE WEST BECAUSE OF THE PUBLIC RELATIONS ASPECT. SEC GEN SAID THE BASIC PROBLEM WAS A LACK OF TRUST BETWEEN THE TWO SUPER-POWERS: HOW DID ONE GENERATE THIS TRUST? SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE. FRENCH AND BRITS HAD TO RECOGNIZE THAT ONE HAD TO HAVE PUBLICS ON BOARD. OF COURSE THE DISARMAMENT CAMPAIGN OF THE UN SHLD CONTINUE BUT USA NEEDED TO HELP. ITS LANGUAGE HAD NOT/NOT ALWAYS BEEN HELPFUL (IE USA LANGUAGE HAD CONTRIBUTED TO WORSENING PUBLIC FEARS ON THIS MATTER). SEC GEN TOLD PM THAT A VISIT BY HIM TO USSR WAS QUOTE CRUCIAL

UNQUOTE. PM ~~HAD A PARTICULAR STATUS AND STANDING~~. HE HAD QUOTE ALL OUR MORAL SUPPORT UNQUOTE. HE NEEDED TO CLOSE THE CIRCLE.

11. SEC GEN, TURNING TO ROLE FOR UN, TICKED OFF POSSIBLE FRAMEWORKS. MOST OBVIOUS WAS ^{SECURITY COUNCIL} (SC) AND HERE THE ISSUE WAS HOW TO FORGE A WORKING

RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE PERM MEMBERS PARTICULARLY. THEY WERE RUNNING INTO THIS PROBLEM ACROSS THE BOARD INCLUDING FOR EXAMPLE ON LEBANON IN REGARD TO A PULLOUT. ^{OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE} THE PROBLEM REMAINED. ONE NEEDED TO DEVELOP

THIS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE USA AND THE USSR ABOVE ALL. IT HAD TO BE A PRIVATE RELATIONSHIP. SEC GEN HAD APPEALED TO ^{FEW DAYS AGO} SHULTZ TO RAISE THE MATTER WITH GROMYKO NEXT WEEK IN STKM. ONE NEEDED A RELATIONSHIP WHERE THE TWO SUPERPOWERS WLD BE ABLE TO OVERLOOK THEIR OWN DIFFERENCES IN THE INTERESTS OF WORKING OUT BROADER SOLUTIONS IN THE SC

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PAGE FIVE WKGR0067 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

CONTEXT. THE OTHER POSSIBILITY WAS USING THE MILITARY STAFF CTTEE AS
MOOTED BY PM. BUT EXPERIENCE WITH MSC HAD QUOTE NOT/NOT BEEN ^{VERY} BRILLIANT
UNQUOTE. SEC GEN AND HIS COLLEAGUES WERE IN FACT QUITE NEGATIVE ON

MSC AND SEC GEN ADDED HE FEARED IT MIGHT UNDERMINE THE CONF ON DIS-
ARMAMENT IN GENEV. ^{IT WLD BE NECESSARY IN ADVANCE FOR 5 PERMANENT MEMBERS TO AGREE IT HAD ^{ANY} RIGHT TO PLAY.} FINALLY RE NPT, SEC GEN SAID THIS WAS INDEED VERY

IMPORTANT AREA AND THE NUCLEAR POWERS HAD TO SET AN ^{AND} EXAMPLE. ^{AS LONG AS THIS}
^{EXAMPLE WAS MISSING OTHER STATES WERE UNLIKELY TO SIGN NPT.} 12. MARTENSON (USG DISARMAMENT) EMPHASIZED FOR HIS PART THAT THEIR

THINKING WAS INDEED VERY MUCH PARALLEL TO THAT OF CDNS. HE LISTED
BASICS OF THEIR APPROACH. THEY FOLLOWED PHILOSOPHY OF NON/NON

SUPERIORITY AND EQUITY IN DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL. EAST EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES ^{AND USSR} WERE AFRAID OF THE PRESENT SITU; THEY WANTED ^{AND WERE READY FOR} A SOLUTION.

BUT IT HAD TO BE ON A BALANCED BASIS. SECONDLY, HE FULLY AGREED THAT
THE NPT WAS IN AN ^{AND EXTREMELY} DANGEROUS SITU. ^{UNQUOTE SHD UNDERSTAND NOT CLOS ANY SIGN OF ^{ANOTHER} WILLINGNESS} HE THOUGHT PERHAPS A COMPRE-
^{TO COMMIT}

HENSIVE TEST BAN OR SOME SORT OF MORATORIUM MIGHT HELP ^{FOR ONE OR TWO YEARS} FOR A WHILE
^{AS AN EXAMPLE}
^{IF NOT MORE WLD BE REGRESSION OF NPT, THIS POINT HAD TO BE BROUGHT HOME TO NUCLEAR POWERS}
~~TO DELAY FALLING AWAY FROM THE NPT BUT IT MIGHT ONLY BE TEMPORARY.~~

NEXT, HE EMPHASIZED THE PRINCIPLE OF THE LEGITIMATE RIGHT TO NATL
SECURITY BUT STRESSED THAT THIS SHLD BE ON A LOWER LEVEL. ANOTHER
PRINCIPLE WAS THAT THERE WLD BE NO/NO WINNER FROM A NUCLEAR WAR--
A POINT WHICH WAS NOW WIDELY ACCEPTED. AGAIN, HE THOUGHT THAT THE HIGH
COST OF ~~NUCLEAR~~ ^(MORE THAN MILLION DOLLARS A MINUTE WAS BEING SPENT) ARMAMENT MEANT THAT FOR ECONOMIC AND ANTI-INFLATION
REASONS THE POL PRESSURES WERE GROWING TO DEAL WITH ARMAMENTS. RE

PUBLIC OPINION, THE WORLD DISARMAMENT CAMPAIGN OF THE UN HAD A CERTAIN
^{IN DEVELOPING MORE INFORMED PUBLIC} ROLE TO PLAY. IT SHLD COVER ALL COUNTRIES (MARTENSON MENTIONED THEIR

...6

AT MOMENT IS BEING MAJOR NOW THAT NATO HAS DISMANTLED
AND HAS POLITICAL WILL
CAN STICK TOGETHER ~~ONE~~ DEPLOYMENT. ONE CAN START TO CONSIDER SOMETHING.
WKS PROBLEMS OR MORATORIUM. ITS TOO SOON TO TAKE THIS TO NATO BUT AT
SOME POINT SHAN'T WE MAKE COUNTER? ~~PERHAPS IN AN COORDINATE JUNE~~
~~AMBS CAN SIT DOWN PROGRESS X~~

PAGE SIX WKGR0067 CONF D CDN EYES ONLY

ACTIVITIES PLANNED IN USSR) AND IT SHLD BE ON A REALISTIC BASIS. AS FOR
MILITARY STAFF CTTEE, MARTENSON POINTED OUT THAT UNDER ART 26 OF THE
CHARTER, MSC ^{COULD ONLY} ~~WOULD~~ ACT ON AN INITIATIVE FROM THE SC, ^{ON} ~~IT~~ IT WAS
DEPENDENT.

^{HE REALIZED WE WOULDN'T GET MUCH FROM RETIRED GENERALS X}
13.PM INTERJECTED THAT IN REGARD TO MSC HIS PROPOSAL WAS A WAY OF
MAKING CLEAR THAT THE FIVE POWERS HAD OBLIGATION FOR ^{RATHER} ~~DISARMAMENT~~. THE
QUESTION WAS HOW TO REVIVE THAT OBLIGATION. PERHAPS THE WAY WAS TO

HOLD DISCREET MTGS WITH THE AMBS OF THE FIVE, FOR EXAMPLE REGARDING
IF NOT THOSE WILL BE MORE EXAMPLES LIKE ISRAEL BLASTING THE IRAQI REACTOR AND ISRAEL CAN'T BE

THE RISK OF HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION. ^{ASKED IF} ~~WE~~ INTEND TO PROCEED WITH ~~MY~~
INITIATIVES BUT ARE THERE WAYS ^{PM SAYS HIS} ~~THAT WE CLD~~ COOPERATE TOGETHER?

14. SEC GEN, REVERTING TO PMS SUGGESTION RE FIVE AMBS, AGREED-WE CLD
INITIATE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS OF THE KIND YOU SUGGEST. WE NEED TO
RAISE DISARMAMENT ABOVE IDEOLOGY. WE HAVE TO DO SOMETHING.

15. URQUHART (USG POL)-THE BASIC PROBLEM IS TO GET BACK TO THE IDEA OF
COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY ^{RELATING TO THREATS TO PEACE AND SECURITY} ORIGINALLY BEHIND THE CHARTER AND APPLY

IT TO DISARMAMENT ~~AND IN NATL SECURITY MATTERS~~. ^{THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS DO}
16. SEC GEN-WE CLD ^{DO WORK ON THIS X} ~~MAKE THIS LINK~~. ^{HAVE A COMMON RESPONSIBILITY. LINK}
^{HAS TO BE MADE BETWEEN DISARMAMENT}
^{AND THREATS TO PEACE.}

17. URQUHART-THE MILITARY (MIL) STAFF CTTEE WLD ONLY BE REALISTIC IF

THEY (THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS) WANTED AN UMBRELLA ^{FROM THEM} BUT THIS REQUIRES POLITICS WILL

18. PM-OUR RHETORIC IS IMPROVING, AT LEAST FROM THE WESTERN SIDE. ^N ~~WAS~~

IT POSSIBLE TO HOPE WE CLD GET BETTER WORDS OUT OF THE USSR OR ^{IS} ~~WAS~~

^{WHO IS GOING TO GET SOLD TO LOWER THEIR DELIBERS IF THEY DON'T SEE IT IN THEIR INTERESTS? WARSAW}
USSR WAITING UNTIL AFTER USA ELECTION? ~~AT SOME POINT WE WLD HAVE TO~~

~~THINK OF MAKING SOME SORT OF GESTURE EG AMBS SITTING DOWN TOGETHER.~~

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^{INFLUENCE}
~~PART COUNTRIES HAVE LESS INFLUENCE ON~~ ^{MUSCO THAN WE HAVE ON}
~~USSR. PERHAPS THIS REQUIRES CHANGE IN POLICY.~~ E.000823

BLAMED FOR
SAYING THAT
IS THE ONLY
WAY IT
HAS TO
DEAL WITH
THIS
SITUATION.

PAGE SEVEN WKGR0067 CONF D CDN EYES ONLY

19. SEC GEN-USSR IS NOT/NOT INTERESTED IN HELPING REAGAN. HIS

COLLEAGUES AGREED AND SAID THAT ANY INITIATIVE TO BREAK ICE WLD

HAVE TO COME FROM THE USA EG THRU ONE OF THE ENVISAGED REAGAN

STATEMENTS. SEC GEN REFERRED TO APPROACHES TO HIM FM ROMANIANS AND

ASKED WHETHER CDN SIEE WAS AWARE AND INVOLVED IN THEIR EXERCISE.

20. PM SAID ROMANIANS HAD SUGGESTED THAT THEY MEET WITH PM. QUOTE

PROPOSAL IS THERE UNQUOTE. THE ROMANIAN/GREEK IDEA WAS PREMATURE. NATO REALLY

PERHAPS LATER ON IT MIGHT SUIT. MAYBE NOT/NOT EVEN TOO MANY MONTHS

FROM NOW. INF DEBATE WAS A POL ONE, NOT/NOT A MIL MATTER. IT DID NOT/

NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF USA/EUROPE DECOUPLING. UNFORTUNATELY IT WAS

LIKE POKER PLAYER WHO HAD UPped ANTE AND NOW WAS STUCK. ONE HAD TO

DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF FACE. THUS THE ROMANIAN INITIATIVE WAS TOO

SOON BUT IT WAS A MOVE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

21. SEC GEN-TRUDEAU HAD SOME SUPPORT ~~EG~~ FROM THE OTHER THREE NUCLEAR

POWERS. QUOTE BUT WHO DOES CEAUSESCU REPRESENT? UNQUOTE. MAYBE CEAUSESCU CWD BT

22. PM-STKHM IS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION-THE POL LEADERS ARE

STARTING TO TALK TO EACH OTHER. WE SHLD BE PLAYING UP THE POL ASPECTS

TO ENCOURAGE LEADERS TO ACTUALLY TALK SUBSTANCE. PM SAID HE HAD EVEN

WONDERED WHETHER THERE WERE SOME ADVANTAGE IN HOLDING THE STKHM MTG

AT THE SUMMIT LEVEL. HE HAD HAD A MODERATELY POSITIVE REACTION FROM

PM THATCHER AND AT LEAST A NON/NON DISMISSAL FROM REAGAN. THIS IDEA

WAS OF COURSE VERY CONF D (QUOTE DONT/DONT TAKE NOTES UNQUOTE) THE IDEA

WLD BE TO GIVE A POL IMPULSE KTHRU SUCH A MTG AT THE SUMMIT LEVEL;

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PAGE EIGHT WKGR0067 CONF CDN EYES ONLY
IT WLD BE AT THE BEGINNING RATHER THAN THE END. BUT WLD YOU SEC GEN
NOT/NOT HAVE MORE LIKELIHOOD OF GETTING THE FIVE TO MEET IN SOME
FASHION UNDER YOUR AUSPICES?

23. MARTENSON (AT SEC GEN'S REQUEST) COMMENTED THAT BASICALLY THE IDEA
WAS GOOD. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET THE FIVE TO TALK. PERHAPS WE CAN FEEL
IT OUT? ONE CLD MAKE A BETTER ASSESSMENT AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE
STKHM MTG. BUT THE IDEA WAS SOUND AND SHLD BE PURSUED. THE DEBATE IN
THE FIRST CTTEE THIS YEAR HAD BEEN LOW KEY DESPITE THE KAL EPISODE.
THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS HAD INDEED A COMMON CONCERN OVER THE NPT:

THE PREPCOM WAS COMING UP AS EARLY AS JUN. CONSIDER OVER THE NPT
PERHAPS CLD BE USED AS A "STEPPING STONE" FOR DIALOGUE BETWEEN THEM.

24. SEC GEN THEN STATED HE WAS PREPARED TO ENTER INTO SUCH DISCUSSIONS
WITH FIVE AMBS ON INDIVIDUAL BASIS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NPT PROBLEM.
HE CLD WARN THEM OF THE ISSUE AND WLD PROPOSE TO DO THIS AFTER HE
RETURNED FROM HIS AFRICAN TRIP (IN FEB) X

25. CORDOVEZ - PRESSURE WAS NEEDED ALSO FROM THE THIRD WORLD.

26. PM - I TRIED THIS AT THE COMWEL. I HAD TO FIGHT TO GET INCLUDED IN

THE COMMUNIQUE ANY NOTION OF HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION. CANADI WLDNIT ALLOW AND
ARMED VERICAL PROLIFERATION WAS KEY. NO ONE BOMB IN THIRD WORLD WLD KILL US ALL.

27. CORDOVEZ - BUT THE PROBLEM IS IMPORTANT AND WE SHLD TRY. THERE WAS
A CHANGE OF ATTITUDE AMONG THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES WHICH NEEDED TO BE
COUNTERED. THERE WAS ALSO THE PROBLEM OF THE DEVELOPED COUNTRY ARMS
SALESMEN. THE THIRD WORLD LEADERS UNFORTUNATELY DO NOT/NOT SEE A
REDUCTION IN ARMS AS PROBABLY LEADING TO MORE AID.

28. PM REITERATES HIS EFFORTS IN DELHI ON THIS POINT TO STRIKE THE

PAGE NINE WKGR0067 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
QUOTE BARGAIN UNQUOTE--WITHOUT SUCCESS. IF YOU CONVENED THE FIVE
AMBS--WHETHER SEPARATELY OR TOGETHER--THEY CLD BE MADE AWARE OF THE
STRENGTH OF VIEW IN THIRD WORLD RE NPT. YOU WILL OF COURSE DO WHAT
you don't even have to inform me your doing it x
YOU THINK BEST AND PRESUMABLY IT WLD BE IN SECRET. AT SAME TIME I
WILL CONTINUE TO PUT PUBLIC PRESSURE ON FOR SOME ACTION.

WITH VIEW TO MEETING UNDER UMBRELLA OF SECURITY COUNCIL X
29. SEC GEN SAID HIS IDEA WAS TO SOUND THEM OUT. HE WLD TAKE INITIATIVE
AS FINAL POINT HE
IN FEB. ~~NOTING~~ THAT HE WLD BE IN STKHM FEB17.

30. MTG ENDED VERY CORDIALLY AT 1730.

ENDS.

CCC/119 122313Z WKGR0067

31: SEC GEN HAS WITH HIM : - - - - -
*IN ADDITION TO CAN STAFF INCLUDED: PM, AMB PELLETIER, AXWORTHY (PMU),
FOWLER (PCO), SHENSTONE (IFB), LEE (PERMANY) AND SMITH (IAZ).*

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDA0060 12JAN84

TO MOSCO

INFO LDN WSHDC BONN PARIS ROME OSLO COPEN BRU ANKRA ATHNS BNATO
CANMILREPNATO CNBRA VIAEA NDHQOTT/DNACPOL/DSTRATA PCOOTT/FOWLER
DISTR IFB LIDDDZ IDD IDR IDAO IDAN RBR ETN

---SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR JOINT NPT DECLARATION

IN FOLLOW UP TO SEVERAL RECENT DISCUSSIONS ON SAME SUBJECT, SOVIET
EMB REP 11JAN PROVIDED UNOFFICIAL PAPER LISTING ITEMS WHICH COULD BE
INCLUDED IN JOINT SOVIET/CDN DECLARATION ON NON-PROLIFERATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR FORM PART OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE COVERING RANGE OF
SUBJECTS WHICH COULD BE ISSUED DURING PMS VISIT TO MOSCOW. SIMILAR
DECLARATION HAD BEEN SUGGESTED IN 1977 FOR SSEA JAMIESONS PLANNED
VISIT TO MOSCOW IN 1978 WHICH WAS CANCELLED.

2. PAPER WAS DESCRIBED VARIOUSLY AS PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS OF WHAT
HAD BEEN SUGGESTED IN 1977 (ITEM 8 DOES NOT/FIT THIS DESCRIPTION)
AND IDEA WHICH HAD ORIGINATED WITH QUOTE MIDDLE-LEVEL UNQUOTE
SOVIET MFA OFFICIALS AND SOVIET EMBASSY. SOVIET REP EMPHASIZED
DELICACY OF SOVIET POSITION IN VIEW OF 1977 FAILURE. IT WAS THEREFORE
PRESENTED AS JUST AN IDEA FOR CONSIDERATION BY CDN SIDE. PROPOSAL
WAS PUT IN CONTEXT OF PMS PEACE INITIATIVE AND HIS INTEREST IN
STRENGTHENING NPT. SOVIETS HOPED TO GIVE PMS PEACE INITIATIVE
MORE CONCRETE RESULTS THAN QUOTE GODSPEED UNQUOTE AND PROPOSED

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DECLARATION WOULD BE ONE SUCH MEASURE. SOVIET EMB REP LHM IT
ENTIRELY TO CDN SIDE WHETHER PROPOSAL SHOULD BE PURSUED.

3. IDA UNDERTOOK TO DISCUSS IDEA WITH OTHERS AND SIMPLY NOTED
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PLANNED VISIT IN 1978 WHICH FELL WITHIN BILATERAL
CONTEXT AND PMS CURRENT PROPOSED VISIT WHICH WOULD FOCUS PRIMARILY
ON PEACE INITIATIVE. WHETHER BILATERAL DECLARATION WOULD BE APPRO-
PRIATE IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED, PARTICULARLY
AS SUCH BILATERAL DECLARATIONS OR COMMUNIQUE WERE NOT ISSUED
DURING PMS VISITS TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN HIS PEACE EFFORTS.

4. DESPITE REPEATED CLAIM THAT IDEA IS ONLY SOVIET WORKING LEVEL
SUGGESTION, WE ARE SKEPTICAL ABOUT HOW QUOTE UNOFFICIAL UNQUOTE
PROPOSAL IS. SOVIET INTENTIONS (OTHER THAN THEIR LOVE OF DECLARATORY
STATEMENTS) ARE NOT CLEAR BUT ARE NO DOUBT INFLUENCED BY NEED TO SHOW
SOME PROGRESS IN RUN-UP TO 1985 NPT REVCONF.

5. WE SHALL BE GIVING IDEA MORE THOUGHT IN ORDER TO PROVIDE CONSIDER-
ED REPLY. IN MEANTIME, WE BELIEVE PROPOSED ITEMS ONE AND THREE IN
PARTICULAR COULD POSE PROBLEMS.

6. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SOVIET UNOFFICIAL PAPER:

QUOTE JOINT SOVIET-CANADIAN DECLARATION ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THIS DOCUMENT COULD IN OUR OPINION:

- 1) GIVE A POLITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE DANGER OF THE PRESENT
INTERNATIONAL SITUATION;
- 2) STATE THE INTENT OF THE TWO SIDES TO WORK TOWARDS ITS IMPROVEMENT;
- 3) EMPHASIZE THE THREAT OF SPREADING NUCLEAR ARMS IN THE WORLD;
- 4) RENEW THE COMMITMENT OF THE TWO SIDES TO THE NPT;
- 5) URGE THE INCREASED ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
IN THE CONTROL OF PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS;
- 6) APPEAL TO OTHER COUNTRIES TO JOIN THE NPT;
- 7) RENEW THE COMMITMENT OF THE SIDES TO OBSERVE THE NPT IN ALL THEIR
ACTIVITIES;
- 8) CONSULTATIONS ON A BILATERAL BASIS IN THE PREPARATION FOR THE
1985 REVIEW CONFERENCE. UNQUOTE.

Refcc to PCO/Trade
Done
12/1/84
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM STKHM UDGR0055 12JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDA DELIVER BY 121200

INFO CANMILREPNATO LDN PARIS BONN ROME WSHDC OSLO COPEN ANKRA

VMBFR NDHQOTT/DNACPOL/DSTRATA

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---STKHM CONFIERENCE:SOME PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS

TWO DAYS OF MTGS IN BRU EARLIER THIS WEEK PROVIDED AN INTERESTING CURTAIN RAISER ON STKHM NEGOTIATIONS.

2.TAKEN TOGETHER,THFSE SESSIONS WERE HIGHLIGHTED BY TWO BROAD AND POSITIVE COMMITMENTS WHICH AUGUR WELL FOR THE FUTURE.

3.DISCUSSIONS AT HOD LEVEL AND AGAIN AT REINFORCED COUNCIL MTG MADE POSSIBLE A USEFUL REAFFIRMATION,AS A FOLLOW-UP TO DECISION REGARDING MINISTERIAL PARTICIPATION,OF PURPOSES OF STKHM CONFERECE AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPORTANCE IN TOTAL EAST-WEST SCHEME OF THINGS AT THE MOMENT.AGAINST BACKGROUND OF LONG-STANDING US COOLNESS TO STKHM CONFERENCE(AND MOST RECENTLY WSHDCS REPORT ON CONVERSATION WITH GOODBY)IT WAS ENCOURAGING TO HEAR WELL-ARTICULATED EXPRESSIOUS OF FIRM SUPPORT FOR CONFERENCE AS WELL AS PROFESSIONS OF STRONG BELIEF IN WHAT WEST MIGHT BE ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH WITH DELIBERATE AND SUSTAINED SHOW OF ALLIANCE UNITY.TONE AND CONTEXT OF US INTERVENTIONS WERE PARTICULARLY INTERESTING IN THIS CONNECTION: AMERICANS MAY STILL NOT/NOT BE CONVINCED THAT EUROPEAN SECURITY CAN BE NEGOTIATED IN A 35 MEMBER FORUM BUT THEY SHOWED NO/NO SIGN OF THEIR DOUBTS ON THIS BROAD POLICY OBJECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS IN BRU.(THEIR RESERVATIONS ON SPECIFIC MEASURES WITHIN THE WESTERN

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PAGE TWO UDGR0055 CONF

PACKAGE ARE A DIFFERENT MATTER).ON THE WHOLE THE PREVAILING ATMOSPHERE WAS STRONGLY POSITIVE.

4.SECOND MAJOR COMMITMENT WAS IN REALM OF STRATEGY;AT CDN INSTISTENCE IT WAS AGREED THAT THE WESTERN POSITION SHOULD BE PRESENTED EARLY ON IN STKHM CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS IN ORDER TO RETAIN INITIATIVE AND A MEASURE OF CONTROL OVER CONFERENCE MOMENTUM.IT WAS GENERALLY AGREED THAT PACKAGE OF MEASURES SHOULD BE READY BY OPENING OF CONFERENCE SO THAT MINISTERS COULD REFER TO THE WESTERN APPROACH TO CSBMS IN THEIR OPENING STATEMENTS AND THEIR BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS,AND THAT THE PACKAGE ITSELF SHOULD BE TABLED AT A VERYEARLY SESSION FOLLOWING OPENING MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS.IN THIS WAY WEST WOULD HOPE TO PROVIDE AN UNDERLYING PHILOSOPHY FOR CONFERENCES WORK(AND BY SO DOING DIVERT THE INEVITABLE PROPAGANDA THRUSTS OF THE EASTERN EUROPEANS)AS WELL AS A CONCRET FRAMEWORK INTO WHCIH OTHER PROPOSALS MIGHT BE FITTED(RATHER THAN FINDING OURSELVES WORKING THE OTHER WAY ROUND).

5.AT THE SAME TIME AND ON THE DOWNSIDE,MUCH IN EVIDENCE WERE THE USUAL ALLIANCE INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES.SOMEDAY WE,COLLECTIVELY,WILL COME TO APPRECIATE THAT WE SPEND FAR TOO MUCH TIME NEGOTIATING AMONGST OURSELVES ON PRECISE FORMULATIONS THAT FALL AWAY QUICKLY WHFN THE REAL ENCOUNTER BEGINS,AND FAR TOO LITTLE DIVISING STRATEGIES TO COUNTER THE OTHER SIDES OBJECTIVES.IN NATO DISCUSSIONS ONE HAS THE FEELING SOMETIMES THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY IS TO ACHIEVE A CAREFULLY WORDED AND DELICATELY BALANCED STATEMENT OF ALLIANCE

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QUOTE DEMANDS UNQUOTE AS IF WE COULD RUN THE WHOLE NEGOTIATION ON OUR OWN TERMS AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH FINELY SCRIPTED SCENARIO EMERGING FROM BRU. FOR THE FUTURE I BELIEVE WE SHOULD MAKE A CONCERTED ATTEMPT TO HAVE ALLIANCE CONSULTATION FOCUS ALMOST MORE ON THE OTHER SIDES DEMANDS THAN ON PRODUCING A PERFECTLY TUNED VERSION OF OUR OWN.

6. WE LEFT BRU WITHOUT PUTTING WESTERN PACKAGE OF CSBM PROPOSALS INTO FINAL FORM, AN ACHIEVEMENT WHICH WILL OBVIOUSLY BE NECESSARY IF WE ARE TO RETAIN A MEASURE OF CONFERENCE INITIATIVE AND CONTROL AS WE HAVE ALL AGREED WOULD BE OUR WISEST STRATEGY. IT IS TO BE HOPED THAT THESE DIFFICULTIES HAVE BEEN RESOLVED IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS, BUT AS WE LEFT BRU STILL OUTSTANDING WERE TURKISH DIFFICULTIES WITH LEVEL OF FORCE STRENGTH AT WHICH OBLIGATION TO NOTIFY WOULD BECOME OPERATIONAL, THE FRENCH DIFFICULTIES WITH THE NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS TO BE ALLOWED ANNUALLY, AND US PROBLEMS WITH RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE AND WHETHER POSSIBLE MOVEMENTS OF RDF THROUGH EUROPE EN ROUTE TO SOMEWHERE ELSE WOULD REQUIRE PRIOR NOTIFICATION TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES (INCLUDING OF COURSE THE SOVIET UNION). ALTHOUGH THERE WERE STRONG EXPRESSIONS OF SATISFACTION AT WAY IN WHICH ALLIANCE CONSULTATION HAD WORKED AT HSNKI PREPARATORY MTG, AND EXPECTATIONS VOICED THAT THIS WOULD CONTINUE IN STKHM, WE STILL HAVE SOME WAY TO GO ENSURING THAT THE SUBSTANCE OF THESE CONSULTATIONS IS MORE SHARPLY HONED AND IN A MORE TIMELY FASHION.

7. WITH REGARD TO THE PROBLEM INHERENT IN CSCE AS TO WHETHER THE
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THE REAL CENTRE OF GRAVITY IN FORMULATING WESTERN POSITIONS SHOULD BE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE OR THE COMMUNITY, I SENSE A CERTAIN DISSATISFACTION IN SOME QUARTERS THAT THE SO-CALLED EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION MECHANISM WAS VIRTUALLY OUT OF BUSINESS IN HSNKI, AND THAT ACCORDINGLY THERE MAY BE A MOVE TO REASSERT A DISTINCTLY EUROPEAN DIMENSION AT STKHM. (FRENCH RATHER THAN GREEK PRESIDENCY FOR FIRST SIX MONTHS OF STKHM CONFERENCE WILL OBJVIOUSLY MAKE A DIFFERENCE). THUS THE 10 HAVE ARRANGED A CONSULTATION CAUCUS FOR MON JAN16, TO PROCEED FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTERS NATO SESSION THAT EVENING. FRENCH APPROACH TO DISAGGRIGATION OF WESTERN CSBM PACKAGE (SE MYTEL WBGR6020 10JAN FROM BRU) IS CLEARLY A MANIFESTATION OF DESIRE TO MAXIMIZE LOOSER AND MULTIFOCAL NATURE OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS WHICH IS ABOUT TO BEGIN HERE, WHILE ACCEPTING THE BASIS OF ALLIANCE UNITY. IT WILL BE INTERESTING TO SEE HOW THE BALANCE OF POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS DEVELOPS AS BETWEEN THE ALLIANCE CAUCUS AND THE COMMUNITY CAUCUS HERE, BUT FOR THE MOMENT I AM WELL SATISFIED WITH STRONG EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR INTEGRITY OF ALLIANCE PACKAGE FROM NETHERLANDS, UK, NORWAY AND USA IN PARTICULAR.

8. FINALLY, THERE WAS A FEELING AMONG MANY AT BRU MTGS THAT CONTRARY TO EARLIER EXPECTATIONS SOVIET PERFORMANCE AT SKTHM MIGHT TURN OUT TO BE MORE MATTER-OF-FACT AND WORKMANLIKE, AND LESS POLEMICAL THAT SPECULATION ON THIS POINT HAS BEEN SUGGESTING FOR THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. SOME ARE NOW WONDERING WHETHER SOVIETS, HAVING

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FAILED IN A MASSIVE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN TO INFLUENCE EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION, WILL NOW EXERCISE A DIPLOMATIC OPTION AND PRESENT AN IMAGE OF WORKING HARD FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS. I HOPE THAT THIS ASSESSMENT IS CORRECT, AND CERTAINLY ROBERTS RECENT CONVERSATION WITH GRINIEVSKI POINTS IN THIS DIRECTION, BUT I WOULD BE SURPRISED IF GROMYKO AND OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS COULD LET THIS OCCASION PASS WITHOUT SAYING SOME PRETTY HARSH THINGS. THE LITMUS TEST WILL BE WHETHER, IF THEY START OUT ON THIS HARSH NOTE, THEY CONTINUE IT INSTEAD OF MOVING QUICKLY AND ELIBERATELY AND TO A MORE SERIOUS DIPLOMATIC OPTION. LET US DO OUR BEST TO HELP AND ENCOURAGE THEM IN THIS LATTER DIRECTION

DELWORTH

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MASTER FILE

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE EXTOTT RCR0048 12JAN84

A BONN/HOP LIVRAISON 130900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER BNATO VMBFR WSHDC MOSCO PARIS LDN ROME

DISTR USS DMF RCD RGB IFB IDDZ IDR IDA

---LETTRE DU PM AU CHANCELIER

CI-BAS, TEXTE DE LETTRE DATEE 11JAN. ORIGINAL SUIT PAR VALISE
NO 6 QUITTANT OTT 13JAN. VOUS SAURIONS GRE TRANSMETTRE TEXTE
VENDREDI 13 A CHANCELIER EN AVISANT QU ORIGINAL SUIVRA SOUS
PEU. VOUS NOTEREZ AU DERNIER PARA MENTION D UN PRESENT AU
CHANCELIER: SCULPTURE VOUS SEREA ACHEMINEE VIA DND A CAUSE DE
SON VOLUME.

2.CIT

MY DEAR HELMUT,

SINCE YOU KINDLY RECEIVED ME IN BONN IN EARLY NOVEMBER, I HAVE HAD A
VARIETY OF FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH WORLD LEADERS CONCERNING THE
PERILOUS STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND PARTICULARLY
THE SUPERPOWERS. I AM PLEASED TO REPORT THAT THESE CONSULTATIONS HAVE
GONE WELL. THERE IS NO/NO DOUBT THAT THE LEVEL OF CONCERN IS HIGH AND
IT IS CLEAR THAT MOST LEADERS ARE MOST ANXIOUS TO APPLY THE NECESSARY
POLITICAL WILL TO EASE CURRENT TENSIONS.

THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING IN EARLY DECEMBER WAS CERTAINLY A
LANDMARK, LARGELY DUE TO THE FRG INSPIRED DECLARATION WHICH CANADA WAS
PLEASED TO HEARTILY SUPPORT. I HOPE NEXT WEEKS OPENING IN STOCKHOLM OF

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PAGE TWO RCR0048 CONF

THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE WILL BE SIMILARLY SUCCESSFUL.
AT A MINIMUM, IT WILL PROVIDE A FORUM FOR FURTHER HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS
BETWEEN LEADERS FROM THE EAST AND WEST. ON THE MBFR FRONT, WE ARE
LOOKING FORWARD TO THE PROPOSALS WHICH YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS UNDERTAKEN
TO BRING FORWARD IN NATO. AS YOU ARE AWARE, ON THE BASIS OF WHAT WE NOW
KNOW OF THESE PROPOSALS, THEY TOO WILL RECEIVE OUR FULL SUPPORT.

FROM OUR LAST MEETING, YOU KNOW I HAD HOPED TO CONCLUDE MY SERIES OF
HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS WITH VISITS TO WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW. I HAD A GOOD
MEETING WITH RONALD REAGAN ON DECEMBER 15 AND WAS IMPRESSED BY HIS
DETERMINATION TO CHANGE THE RHETORIC AND SEE US/SOVIET RELATIONS
IMPROVE. UNFORTUNATELY, WE HAVE NOT/NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO DETERMINE
WHETHER PRESIDENT ANDROPOV WILL BE ABLE TO RECEIVE ME IN MOSCOW IN
THE NEAR FUTURE ALTHOUGH I AM EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF SEEING
OTHER SENIOR SOVIET LEADERS.

AT YOUR GENEROUS DINNER IN BONN ON NOVEMBER 10, YOU DEMONSTRATED AN
INTEREST IN PRIMITIVE ART AND WE DISCUSSED BRIEFLY CANADIAN ESKIMO
CARVING. I AM SENDING WITH THIS LETTER A SOAPSTONE SCULPTURE BY TYARA
OF CAPE DORSET ENTITLED QUOTE SEDNA AND WALRUS UNQUOTE AS WELL AS AN
EXPLANATION OF THE ESKIMO LEGEND WHICH INSPIRED THIS PARTICULAR PIECE.
I HOPE YOU WILL BE PLEASED TO ADD THIS EXAMPLE OF CANADIAN NATIVE ART
TO YOUR COLLECTION.

YOURS SINCERELY,

WITH FRIENDLY REGARD,

PIERRE

FINCIT.

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ACTION
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FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

JAN 12 9 03 PM '83

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FROM: PERMANENT MISSION NEW YORK

TO: EXTOTT LIDDZ

DELIVER BY 130900

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DISTR: IMU FPR

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SUBJECT: SEC GEN MTGS WITH CDN PM: UN PRESS RELEASE

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United Nations Press Release

Department of Public Information
Press Section
United Nations, New York

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SG/SM/3513
11 January 1984

SECRETARY-GENERAL MEETS WITH CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER

The following statement was made this evening by the Spokesman for the Secretary-General:

Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar met today with the Prime Minister of Canada, Pierre Trudeau. In an hour-and-a-half conversation, they reviewed the international situation and specifically discussed various ways of reducing tensions, in particular in the relationship between the two major Powers and their respective alliances. In this context, the Prime Minister informed the Secretary-General of his peace initiatives and the reactions to them from the world leaders that he had contacted so far.

The Secretary-General welcomed the opportunity to exchange views with the Prime Minister, especially in view of the current tense international situation. He believed that the Prime Minister's ideas could contribute to the lessening of tensions and lead to the improvement of international relations. The Secretary-General was particularly interested to learn more of the Prime Minister's proposal for a possible five-Power meeting, since he is of the view that the permanent members of the Security Council have a special responsibility under the Charter.

The Secretary-General and the Prime Minister also discussed the forthcoming Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, and the need to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. They have agreed to keep in touch regarding further developments in connection with the Prime Minister's initiatives.

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FROM: PERMANENT MISSION NEW YORK

TO: LIDDZ deliver by 1300 JAN 12

INFO:

DISTR: 1MV/Paddington, 1DA

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: PM Visit to ON Sec Gen

Article by Kaufman NYT 12/1

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THE NEW YORK TIMES, W.

Trudeau Due at U.N.; Hopeful on Peace Plan

By MICHAEL T. KAUFMAN

Special to The New York Times

OTTAWA, Jan. 10 — Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau will visit New York Wednesday for talks at the United Nations on his two-month-old effort to stimulate renewed discussions on disarmament encouraged by responses from nations such as China and individuals such as Senator John Glenn, according to aides.

At a meeting scheduled for Wednesday with Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Mr. Trudeau plans to present arguments for convening a meeting of nuclear nations within the

context of the United Nations, his aides said. He will also submit technical papers discussing proposals to ban high-altitude antisatellite systems and to oppose the introduction of delivery systems that could not be verified by nuclear adversaries.

Official reaction in Washington has been reserved, with President Reagan limiting his backing for Mr. Trudeau's crusade to wishes of "Godspeed," and there is uncertainty in Moscow on setting a date for a visit by the Canadian Prime Minister. But Gary Smith, the head of a special Canadian task force on the peace initiative, said in an inter-

view that the Trudeau proposal is nonetheless improving the "atmosphere" and yielding tangible results.

Mr. Smith pointed to recent actions by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as evidence that the "tone is changing" following the Canadian initiative.

Stockholm Meeting Cited

Specifically, he listed the decision by NATO countries to send their foreign ministers to next week's Stockholm conference on East-West relations, where Secretary of State George P. Schultz is scheduled to meet with An-

EDNESDAY, JANUARY 11, 1984

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drei A. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister.

The other steps, he said, included the decisions made at the NATO meeting in Brussels in December to review both the issue of relations between East and West and the NATO position on a mutual balance of force reduction, with particular regard to the way conventional force levels might determine nuclear strategies.

Mr. Smith said the adoption by NATO of a West German resolution establishing the objective of military parity with the Russians rather than military supremacy was another recent decision in harmony with the Trudeau initiative.

These steps, he said, were at least partly the consequences of the first two

points of the peace plan calling for renewed and widened talks on arms reduction.

There have been other responses that are much more direct reactions to the plan, which also included a call for a summit conference of nuclear powers, curbs on the spread of nuclear weapons and a ban on high-altitude antisatellite weapons.

For example, Canadian diplomats are openly delighted that Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang of China will reportedly support the initiative when he addresses Canada's Parliament next week.

Similarly, they praise the publication of Mr. Trudeau's Nov. 7 speech outlining the plan in the influential American journal *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*.

They note that Fidel Castro, the Cuban leader, has endorsed the thrust of the proposals, that the Italian Parliament endorsed them and that John Glenn has sent Mr. Trudeau a letter expressing his interest in the disarmament effort, thus in part confirming the Prime Minister's stated hope that the search for disarmament solutions not be left entirely to bureaucrats but be taken up by politicians.

The Trudeau proposals, Mr. Smith said, are in large measure attempts "to raise international consciousness and find ways to restore a measure of trust between the superpowers."

REMEMBER THE NUKEBOM?

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