

FILE NO. 20-1-2-DOM
Vol. 1 Closed
See Vol. 2

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ACTION COPY

Handwritten notes:
copy to Mr. Petcher
Mr. Langley
Ecuadorian Mr. Barber
Mr. Hamon
Mr. Leveau

20-1-2-DOM
33

FM SDOMINGO JUL30/65 CONFD
TO COMCENTRE OTT 206 IMMED
REF YOURTEL SVC1500 JUL23 AND MYTEL185 JUL20
DOMINICANREPUBLIC

HEREWITH REPETITION REQUESTED QUOTE

6. THIRDLY POSSIBLY OWING TO PRESENT MARKET VOLUME OF FISH
EVERY FOOD OR FISH IMPORTER IS TRYING TO ARRANGE DELIVERY
OF SALT FISH FROM CDA OR OTHER COUNTRIES. HOWEVER IN THIS
CLIMATE SALT FISH IS QUICKLY PERISHING AND REFRIGERATING
IS VERY SCARCE. UNQUOTE

Latin American
/M. Gauvin/aw
3.8.65

AND QUOTE

8. SANPEDRO DEMACORIS IS 60 MILES FROM SDOMINGO AND
WITHOUT OAS HELP THERE WILL BE CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY IN
FINDING TRANSPORT TO MOVE FISH FROM DOCKS TO RECIPIENTS IN
COUNTRYSIDE. FACILITIES THERE WHICH I HAVE SEEN ARE VERY
LTD IT IS SEASONAL PORT FOR LOADING SUGAR AND MOLASSES. UNQUOTE

LB

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TO
À

Economic Division,
ATTENTION: Mr. Barker.

SECURITY
Sécurité

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM
De

Latin American Division

DATE

July 29, 1965.

REFERENCE
Référence

Santo Domingo Telegram No. 185 of July 20.

NUMBER
Numéro

SUBJECT
Sujet

Our Embassy's Views on the Proposed Gift of
Salt Fish to the Dominican Republic.

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA	
20-1-2-DOM	
MISSION	33

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

DISTRIBUTION
Mr. Ritchie

Although we have some reservations about certain obscure parts of the lengthy argumentation in the telegram under reference, we are inclined to think that some of the negative factors mentioned tip the scales against the desirability of our providing salt fish for the Dominican Republic. Especially significant is the observation that such a gift could antagonize the regular importers of Canadian fish and harm the future market. (In this connection, we note from Santo Domingo's telegram No. 198 that normal commercial shipments of Canadian fish are currently taking place.) Moreover, because of the unwillingness of the persons in the zone held by the forces under Caamaño to accept supplies from the hands of the OAS, difficulties might arise, if we used this channel, in ensuring that the Canadian donation was distributed in an equitable manner. There also seems to be some danger that the donation might find its way into the hands of profiteers or commercial middlemen. Finally, we attach significance to the considerable amount of doubt now raised by the Embassy concerning the extent of the need for this food.

2. We have very serious hesitations about the feasibility of the alternative methods of distributing the fish suggested by the Embassy, which would impose an impossible drain on the administrative resources of this tiny mission. Reference to a counterpart funds arrangement seems to go well beyond anything which we would wish to contemplate for the Dominican Republic at this time. On the other hand, I think it would be a departure from our normal emergency relief practice to turn the supplies over to a strictly denominational organization.

A. J. PICK
Latin American Division.

X 219/11

FM SDOMINGO JUL15/65 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 180 IMMED
REF MYTEL 174 JUL14 AND 175 JUL15
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

20-1-2-Don
36

20-Don-1-4

I CALLED ON DOCTOR GODOY TODAY. HE IMPRESSED ME AS HAVING GREAT CHARM UNUSUAL PERSUASIVENESS AND KEEN INTELLECT ALL FORTIFIED BY DETERMINATION. HIS OUTLOOK TOWARD LOCAL PROBLEM INDICATED SENSE OF MODERATION LIBERAL ATTITUDE AND WILLINGNESS TO PRESS OBJECTIVE OF CONSTITUTIONIST MODERATES WHEN THEY SERVED NATIONAL INTEREST AS A WHOLE.

2. IN CONVERSATION I MENTIONED KEEN INTEREST OF MINISTER IN LATIN-AMERICA THAT HE FOLLOWED CLOSELY DEVELOPMENTS HERE AND WAS DEEPLY SYMPATHETIC TO PRESENT PLIGHT OF DOMINICAN PEOPLE. I ADDED I WAS SURE MINISTER WOULD WISH ME TO EXPRESS HIS EARNEST HOPE WOUNDS OF CONFLICT WOULD BE QUICKLY HEALED. I ALSO EXPRESSED APPRECIATION THAT BOTH SIDES AND PARTICULARLY CONSTITUTIONISTS DOWNTOWN HAD TO DATE PROTECTED OUR CHANCERY AND CDN COMMERCIAL PREMISES UNDER DIFFICULT CONDITIONS. I ADDED MY PERSONAL THOUGHT IT WAS COURAGEOUS OF DOCTOR GODOY TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY TO ACT AS PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT AND WISHED HIM LUCK.

3. IN REPLY HE SAID IF DOMINICANS THEMSELVES WERE NOT RPT NOT WILLING TO UNDERTAKE THESE TASKS HOW COULD THEY EXPECT OTHERS TO HELP. HE SEEMED CONFIDENT HE COULD GET OTHERS TO SERVE WITH HIM AND BRING ABOUT DEVELOPMENT OF NORMAL DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL LIFE.


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PAGE TWO 180

HE MENTIONED BARRERA HAD NOT RPT NOT YET ACCEPTED BUT WAS FLYING
HERE AND HE HOPED TO HAVE HIM ACCEPT AFTER ARRIVAL. HE SAID I MIGHT
HAVE OBSERVED EVEN UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES HOW MUCH SYMPATHY
THERE WAS FOR CDA IN THIS COUNTRY TO WHICH I COULD INDEED AGREE.
HE MENTIONED HOW DIFFICULT HIS TASK WOULD BE IN MONTHS TO COME BUT
SHOWED OPTIMISM HE WOULD SUCCEED.

4. PLEASANTRIES EXCHANGED DO NOT RPT NOT IMPLY RECOGNITION ANY
GOVT HERE FOR GODOY DOES NOT RPT NOT YET HAVE ANY LOCAL STATUS
NOR DO I. MOREOVER ALL DISCUSSION WAS IN CLEAR CONTEXT THAT HE IS
ONLY AGREED CANDIDATE AT PRESENT FOR PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT AND
NOTHING MORE

HAMPSON



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X L 15/6

20-1-2-DOH
36

Aug 20-DOH-1-4

FM SDOMINGO JUN 11/65 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY
TO EXTERNAL 131 IMMED

INFO TT WDC PERMISNY DE OTT
TALK WITH AMBASSADOR BUNKER.

I SAW AMBASSADOR BUNKER THIS AFTERNOON. I HAD PREVIOUSLY LEFT AT HIS OFFICE TEXT OF MR MARTINS STATEMENT MAY 28 IN HOUSE OF COMMONS. BUNKER EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR CDN GOVTS UNDERSTANDING OF USA POLICIES IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND APOLOGIZED FOR NOT RPT NOT HAVING BEEN ABLE TO RECEIVE ME SOONER.

2. I STATED MOTIVE BEHIND OUR REOPENING OF CHANCERY HAD BEEN MISUNDERSTOOD IN CERTAIN QUARTERS HERE AND GAVE REASONS FOR OUR INITIATIVE. I MENTIONED NEED TO DO SOMETHING TO PREVENT MODERATES ON CAAMANOS SIDE FROM DESPAIRING AND TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO ACT WITH RESPONSIBILITY. I REFERRED TO TIMING OF OUR INITIATIVE WHICH TOOK PLACE WHEN CEASEFIRE WAS PRECARIOUS AND WHEN SPIRITS WERE EXACERBATED AFTER IMBERTS TROOPS OCCUPATION OF CITY NORTH CORRIDOR. BUNKER THOUGHT OUR INITIATIVE UNFORTUNATE SINCE HE HAD GOOD EVIDENCE THAT MODERATES NO RPT NO LONGER HAD ANY INFLUENCE. HE STATED CAAMANO WAS NOT RPT NOT A FREE AGENT AND COMMUNIST THREAT WAS REAL. I COMMENTED COMMUNISM WAS ALWAYS A DANGER ESPECIALLY IF WE FAILED TO FIND EARLY SOLUTION. I SAID I HAD DISCUSSED COMMUNIST DANGER WITH CAAMANO. HIS ANSWER HAD BEEN THAT ASSAM WOULD BE OUTLAWED IN ACCORDANCE WITH 1963 CONSTITUTION AND THOSE ACTIVE COMMUNISTS JAILED. BUNKER SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED MATTER WITH GUZMAN BUT COULD NOT RPT NOT OBTAIN FROM HIM SUFFICIENT GUARANTEE. HE SAID COMMUNISM COULD BE DEALT WITH BY CONSTITUTIONAL

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MEANS IN USA OR CDA BUT NOT RPT NOT IN LATINAMERICA QUOTE TO PREVENT COMMUNISM HERE IS OUR MAIN PURPOSE.WE HAVE NEVER CONCEALED THAT THIS WAS OUR MAIN OBJECTIVE UNQUOTE .

3.BUNKER THEN STATED OAS THREE MAN COMMISSION WAS STILL AT EXPLORATORY STAGE.THEY HAD SPOKEN TO THE CONTENDING PARTIES,TO LATIN AMERICAN AMBASSADORS HERE,TO BUSINESS PROFESSIONAL AND STUDENTS GROUPS IN SDOMINGO AS WELL AS IN SANTIAGO.THE CONTENDING PARTIES WERE BOTH INFLEXIBLE.CAAMANO INSISTED ON 1963 CONSTITUTION,RECOGNITION OF ELECTED CONGRESS,FORMATION OF GOVT OF DEMOCRATIC PERSONALITIES,RETURN OF ARMED FORCES UNDER CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL,IMMED WITHDRAWAL OF INTER AMERICAN FORCE AND WAS PREPARED TO STEP DOWN BEFORE GUZMAN.IMBERT GROUP WAS IN FAVOUR OF ENLARGING GOVT TO INCLUDE NON POLITICAL FIGURES BUT INSIST ON CARRYING ON AS GOVT UNTIL ELECTION COULD TAKE PLACE UNDER OAS CONTROL.BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL GROUP WERE AFRAID OF COMMUNIST IF COUNTRY RETURNED TO BOSCH TYPE GOVT. STUDENTS AND LABOUR GROUP FAVOURED RETURN TO 1963 CONSTITUTION. WHEN BUNKER ASKED WHAT POINT 1963 CONSTITUTION THEY INSISTED ON, THEY MENTIONED HUMAN RIGHTS,GUARANTEEE OF FREE SPEECH AND ASSOCIATION AND SOCIAL REFORM.BUNKER HAD REPLIED THESE WERE ALL GOAL OF ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS.HE SAID THERE WERE ALL SORTS OF CONSTITUTIONS,USA CONSTITUTION WAS SHORT,BRITS HAD NONE AND (THESE?)DOMINICANS WERE REGARDING A SEVEN MONTHS CONSTITUTION AS IF IT COULD NOT RPT NOT BE CHANGED OR AMENDED .

4.WHEN I ASKED BUNKER IF HE COULD SEE AN EARLY SOLUTION HE REPLIED

...3'.....'

PAGE THREE 131

NEGOTIATIONS STAGE HAD NOT RPT NOT YET BEGUN. HE TOLD CAAMANOS SIDE WHICH APPEARED IMPATIENT THAT HE HAD NEVER EXPERIENCED QUICK NEGOTIATIONS IN EITHER BUSINESS OR DIPLOMACY: IN WEST IRIAN NEGOTIATIONS WERE EXPECTED TO LAST TEN DAYS, THEY TOOK SIX MONTHS; IN PANAMA IT HAD BEEN THE SAME. HERE PARTIES WERE INCENSED AND RIGID. SITUATION WAS CONFUSED AND INTRICATE. HE COULD NOT RPT NOT SEE HOW A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION COULD BE FOUND QUICKLY. OAS THREE MAN COMMISSION HAD INDIAN DEL HERE WITH A MANDATE TO FIND A SOLUTION AND WOULD REMAIN HERE SO LONG AS A SOLUTION IS NOT RPT NOT FOUND.

5. I SAID I THOUGHT THE LONGER IT TOOK THE MORE DIFFICULT IT WOULD BECOME TO FIND A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION WITH SUFFICIENT GUARANTEES. I POINTED OUT WHEN I FIRST MET CAAMANO ON MAY 12 HE HELD NO RPT NO GRUDGE AGAINST PRESIDENT JOHNSON OR USA PEOPLE. HOWEVER SINCE IMBERTS TROOPS ATTACKS OF CITY NORTH CORRIDOR I HAD NOTICED A GROWING ANTI-AMERICANISM ON CAAMANOS SIDE. BUNKER DID NOT RPT NOT REACT. HIS GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS CAAMANO IS ONE OF SCEPTICISM IF NOT RPT NOT CONTEMPT.

6. IT IS EVIDENT THERE IS NO RPT NO FEELING OF URGENCY ON THE PART OF BUNKER TO FIND SOLUTION. THE DIALOGUE IS LIKELY TO BE ALLOWED TO GO ON UNTIL CAAMANO SIDE LOSE PATIENCE AND DISCREDITS ITSELF THROUGH SOME MAJOR ERROR. THE EXTREMISTS ARE BOUND TO HAVE A LARGER SAY AND THIS MAY BE USED TO JUSTIFY EARLY ASSESSMENT THAT COMMUNIST DOMINATED INSURRECTIONIST MOVEMENT.

7. ACCORDING TO MAYOBRE BUNKER HAS FULL POWER FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON

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PAGE FOUR 131

TO DEVISE A FORMULA AND THREE MAN OAS COMMISSION IS NOTHING MORE THAN
A FRONT FOR A NEW USA ATTEMPT TO FIND A SOLUTION SATISFACTORY TO USA.
BUNKER IS 71 YEARS OLD. HE IS A FINE GENTLEMAN WITH A GRACIOUS
MANNER. BECAUSE OF HIS BACKGROUND OF BIG BUSINESS AND HIGH LEVEL
DIPLOMACY HE IS OVERLY DISTURBED BY NOISE OF YOUNG REVOLUTIONARIES
WITH GUNS ON CAAMANOS SIDE AND IS INCLINED TO DISCARD THEM AS A
BUNCH OF THUGS. FURTHERMORE THE GROWING ANTI-AMERICANISM DISPLAYED
BY CAAMANOS RADIO AND PRESS DOES NOT RPT NOT HELP HIM TO UNDERSTAND
THAT BEHIND THIS APPARENTLY UNDISCIPLINED AND AGGRESSIVE MOB THERE
ARE A PEOPLE WHO WANT A CHANGE OF THEIR OWN CHOICE AND NOT RPT NOT
ONE DICTATED BY USA. WHETHER WE LIKE IT OR NOT RPT NOT WE WILL HAVE
TO ADJUST TO DESIRES OF LATINAMERICAN PEOPLE FOR SELF-DETERMINATION
GAUVIN*****

Fm - S Domingo

MAY 10

ACTION COPY

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EXTERNAL OTTAWA CANADA

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OPIMMED

FOLLOWING FOR HAMMON FREDDY OFFERED INTERVIEW FOR ME
WITH CHARLIE TELL ME SOONEST WHAT YOU THINK

GAUVIN

END OF TELEX?"

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EXTERNAL OTT

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20-1-2-DDM X L
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PST27 MAY6 POLICY STATEMENT DISTRIBUTION
LDN WASHDC NY BOGOTA BAIRE CARACAS GUATEMALA HAVANA LIMA MVIDEO
PORTPRINCE QUITO RIO SJOSE SANTIAGO SDOMINGO IMMED
TT MCOW IMMED DE LDN
TT MEXICO IMMED DE WASHDC
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

THERE FOLLOWS A SELECTION ORGANIZED BY TOPICS OF MOST RELEVANT TEXTS OF ANSWERS MADE RECENTLY IN HOUSE OF COMMONS BY PRIME MINISTER OF CDA ON ORDERS OF DAY CONCERNING ASPECTS OF SITUATION IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. DATE OF EACH STATEMENT IS INDICATED IN BRACKETS:

A. CDN POSITION ONEVENTS IN DR. QUOTE WE HOPE THAT PEACE, SECURITY AND STABILITY WILL SOON BE RETURNED TO THAT COUNTRY (THE DR) UNDER A GOVT OF ITS OWN CHOOSING UNQUOTE (MAY5).

B. COMMUNICATIONS WITH USA. QUOTE THE GOVT HAS BEEN IN TOUCH THROUGH ITS EMB IN WASHDC WITH USA GOVT WITH REGARD TO TRAGIC DEVELOPMENTS IN DR; IT HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED THAT USA GOVT HAS INTERVENED IN DR FOR PROTECTION OF ITS OWN CITIZENS AS WELL AS THOSE OF OTHER COUNTRIES. IT IS RECOGNIZED ALSO MR SPEAKER THAT EVIDENCE HAS BEEN STATED TO EXIST INDICATING INTERVENTION IN DR WITH A VIEW TO BRINGING ABOUT A CASTRO-TYPE GOVT IN THAT ISLAND. I AM NOT RPT NOT ABLE TO ASSESS SIGNIFICANCE OF THAT EVIDENCE AT PRESENT TIME. I DO REALIZE THAT, AS PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAS ALREADY STATED, RESPONSIBILITY FOR RESTORATION OF STABILITY AND SECURITY IN THAT UNHAPPY COUNTRY, APART FROM RESPONSIBILITY WHICH ATTACHES TO ITS OWN PEOPLE, IS IN HANDS OF OAS, AND THAT ORGANIZATION HAS AT PRESENT A CTTEE OF FIVE IN DR UNQUOTE (MAY3).

QUOTE WE HAVE MADE NO RPT NO REPRESENTATIONS TO USA WITH RESPECT TO POSITION OF EX-PRESIDENT BOSCH IN THIS MATTER OR WHAT SHOULD BE HIS POSITION IN DEVELOPMENTS AS THEY OCCUR WITHIN DR. NATURALLY- AND I DO NOT RPT NOT THINK IT IS NECESSARY FOR US TO TELL USA GOVT THIS-WE HOPE THAT ANY POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH ARE MADE FOR RESTORATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY TO ISLAND WILL BE MADE BY AND FOR PEOPLE OF DR UNQUOTE (MAY4).

C. POSSIBLE COMMUNIST INVOLVEMENT IN EVENTS IN DR. QUOTE IN SO FAR AS INTERVENTION IN REBELLION BY ELEMENTS THAT ARE ATTEMPTING TO BRING ABOUT A COMMUNIST TAKE OVER IS CONCERNED, WE HAVE NOT RPT NOT RECEIVED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FROM USA AUTHORITIES-AND WE ARE IN TOUCH WITH THEM ON THIS MATTER-TO JUSTIFY ANY CONCLUSION ON OUR PART AT THIS TIME UNQUOTE (MAY3).

QUOTE WE ARE ATTEMPTING, NATURALLY, TO GET ALL INFO WE CAN IN REGARD TO THIS SITUATION, BUT I HAVE VERY LITTLE TO ADD TO WHAT I SAID YESTERDAY, THOUGH ADDITIONAL INFO AND REPORTS HAVE REACHED US SINCE THEN. AS I EMPHASIZED YESTERDAY, THESE ARE NOT RPT NOT CONCLUSIVE CONCERNING DEGREE OF COMMUNIST INVOLVEMENT IN FIGHTING IN SDOMINGO. HOWEVER, A NUMBER OF COMMUNISTS ARE INVOLVED WITH INSURGENTS TO BEST OF OUR INFO, AND SOME HAD RECEIVED GUERRILLA TRAINING IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES INCLUDING, I HAVE NO RPT NO DOUBT, CUBA. AT SAME TIME, I SHOULD LIKE TO MAKE IT VERY CLEAR THAT WE DO NOT RPT NOT AT PRESENT TIME HAVE INFO WHICH WOULD ENABLE US TO ARRIVE AT A DEFINITE CONCLUSION CONCERNING DIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF COMMUNIST COUNTRIES IN DR REBELLION. HOWEVER, WE ARE IN CLOSE CONSULTATION THROUGH DIPLO CHANNELS WITH ALL SOURCES OF INFO AVAILABLE TO US, INCLUDING OUR OWN EMB THERE, CONCERNING DEVELOPMENTS IN DR AND ARE STRIVING TO GET AS COMPLETE AN ACCOUNT AS POSSIBLE UNQUOTE (MAY4).

D. ACTIVITIES OF OAS. QUOTE SO FAR AS OAS IS CONCERNED, WE HAVE

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PAGE TWO PST27

BEEN FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS OF THAT BODY, OF WHICH WE ARE NOT RPT N
NOT A MEMBER, AND WE VIEW WITH INTEREST AND CONCERN STEPS THEY HAVE
TAKEN.... IN SENDING A CTEE TO SDOMINGO WITH A VIEW TO BRINGING
ABOUT A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND A RESUMPTION OF PEACE UNQUOTE
(MAY3).

E. PROTECTION OF CDNS IN DR. QUOTE USA HAS MADE ITS EVACUATION
FACILITIES AVAILABLE TO CDNS AND NATIONALS OF OTHER COUNTRIES,
AND I THINK WE SHOULD BE VERY GRATEFUL FOR SERVICES OF USA IN THIS
REGARD UNQUOTE (MAY3).

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

[Handwritten signature]

OUTGOING MESSAGE

FM: EXTERNAL	DATE	FILE	SECURITY
	MAY 10/65	20-1-2-DOM 33	UNCLASS 47
TO: SANTO DOMINGO	NUMBER		PRECEDENCE
	XL-100		OPIMM
INFO:			

Ref.:

Subject: **INTERVIEW WITH CHARLIE.**

FOLLOWING FOR GAUVIN. WE HAVE NO RPT NO OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED INTERVIEW WITH CHARLIE.

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION

NO STANDARD

ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	APPROVED BY
SIG NAME T.C. HAMMOND/bm	LATIN AMERICAN	2-2480	SIG NAME A.J. PICK

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(DUPLICATE)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Security: Confidential.....

No:.....69.....

FROM:
The Canadian Embassy
Caracas, Venezuela

Date:.....February 23, 1965.....

Reference:.....

Enclosures?.....

Subject:.....
Presentation of Credentials in the
Dominican Republic

Air or Surface Mail: Courier.....

Post File No 22-9-1 and 22.9-1-1.....

Ottawa File No. 210-1-R-DOM
20-DOM-1-1
10

Feb
LCR

References

Mrs. Rankin and I arrived in Santo Domingo by air Monday, February 1. We were met at the airport by the Ambassador in charge of Protocol, Dr. José Francisco Nadal Rincón and Mr. and Mrs. Kenneth Noble, Mr. and Mrs. P. Creighton and Mr. J. W. Culhane of our Embassy. On Tuesday, February 2, I was received by the Under-Secretary of Exterior Relations, Dr. Pedro Pablo Cabral Bermúdez and handed to him copies of my letters of credence and letter of recall of my predecessor. I spent about a half hour with the Under-Secretary who is relatively new in his position and who seemed unprepared or unwilling to discuss Canadian - Dominican Republic relations except in generalities.

Internal Circulation

2. As you may know the government of the Dominican Republic refuse to discuss a date for presentation of credentials until the Ambassador is actually in Santo Domingo and hence I was pleased that an appointment for this purpose was quickly fixed for Tuesday, February 9. On February 8, the hour for presentation the following day was changed from 9.00 A.M. to 12.00 noon. A white suit was required for the ceremony. I had attempted to buy a white suit in New York, Caracas and San Juan, Puerto Rico without success. I noted from our files that my predecessor had encountered the same problem and had been granted an exemption by Protocol to permit him to appear in a dark summer weight suit and had presumed the same dispensation would be granted me. On the contrary, the Ambassador in charge of Protocol and the Under-Secretary of Exterior Relations made it clear that a white suit was the required dress. As a result I appeared in a suit borrowed from Mr. Noble and which passed inspection despite some differences in builds. The suit might have been described by a society editor as "loose fitting".

Distribution to Posts

3. Accompanied by Mr. Noble and Mr. Creighton, I was picked up at the El Embajador Hotel at 11.45 A.M. by the Chief of Protocol and First Lieutenant José Ramón Mejía Dominguez of the Dominican National Army and whisked in a Chrysler Imperial limousine, with two motorcycles fore and two motorcycles aft, to the National Palace. In the courtyard in the front of the imposing Palace was drawn up a batallion of the Presidential Guard, which presented arms and the National Guard band which played the Dominican National Anthem. Escorted by the Chief of Protocol, I then entered the Palace and was guided to the Salón de Embajadores where at the far end of this magnificent room were waiting the President of the Triumvirate, Dr. Donald J. Reid Cabral, the other "half" of the Triumvirate, Dr. Ramón Cáceres Troncoso, and Dr. Pedro Pablo Cabral Bermúdez, the Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs. On reaching the entrance, we bowed and then

Confidential

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proceeded to about six paces in front of the President, bowing again. I then stepped forward and addressing the President briefly expressed my pleasure in having the opportunity of handing to him my letters and of wishing to take every opportunity to maintain and extend the good relations between our two countries. The President accepted the letters and then invited me to introduce the Embassy staff. This done, Mr. Noble and Mr. Creighton were led by the Chief of Protocol to chairs at the right hand side of the salon while the President invited me to sit beside him.

4. Dr. Reid Cabral is a most impressive young man in his early forties. His father's Scottish origins are evident in his physical makeup - reddish, sandy hair, very white skin and penetrating blue eyes. While short in stature, he appears wiry and in good health. As you probably know, Donald Reid Cabral is the son of William Reid now retired Superintendent of the Royal Bank of Canada in the Caribbean area; his mother, the former Señorita Cabral, a Dominican by birth, is of Portuguese origin. I met the parents at a reception my wife and I gave on Thursday, February 11.

5. Although Donald Reid Cabral speaks good English, our ten or twelve minutes of conversation was all in Spanish. I told him that we might well be cousins as my maternal grandmother had been a Reid. He laughed and leaned over to me and said: "You'd better be careful claiming Reid cousins in the Dominican Republic. There are a good number of them here that are very black." Turning to more serious things, the President of the Triumvirate described the very difficult economic situation prevailing in the Dominican Republic - although he was optimistic as he always is that their problems would be resolved. Meanwhile he said additional credits were essential and hoped that Canada might be in a position to help. I told him that I knew that the two Canadian banks, the Royal Bank of Canada and the Bank of Nova Scotia had joined in a consortium with the two American banks some months ago to loan his government something in the neighbourhood of \$28 million and that additional credits had been obtained from the IMF. The drastic drop of sugar prices just before my arrival, the President said, had created a new and serious situation for his country considering the great dependency on this crop. I told him that I had just learned that in recent weeks Canada had made a reasonably good sized purchase of sugar from the Dominican Republic and this apparently was news to him and he expressed his pleasure. He turned then to the great need for the Republic to develop new sources of foreign exchange exports and asked if I knew if Falconbridge Nickel intended proceeding rapidly with their concession in the Dominican Republic. I told him that I had had an hour's conversation with Mr. Cox and that he had expressed satisfaction with their pilot plant operations and left me with the impression that the Ferro-Nickel deposits might soon be exploited more fully. I mentioned to the President the \$10 million contributed by Canada to the Inter-American Bank for soft loans to Latin America. He commended most warmly this Canadian initiative.

6. I asked the President if he thought political developments had moved ahead sufficiently to meet the September first election date - but he avoided a direct answer and merely replied that his problems were many and varied. He said that before taking action on obvious problems he was accused of being under the thumb of vested interests (including the military, I presume) and that when he did take action, he was just as promptly accused by the same people as being dictatorial.

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7. The President ended the interview with a warm expression of goodwill towards Canada and with much hand shaking all around, my colleagues and I withdrew making the same reverences as we did when we entered.

8. On reaching the front steps of the Palace, the Battalion of the Presidential Guard again presented arms and the band put forth with a vigorous rendition of "O Canada". From the time of our arrival until our departure press photographers, television and newsreel cameramen were buzzing about us.

9. In accordance with tradition the Chief of Protocol and the Military Aide joined us, our wives and the Canadian members of the Embassy staff for champagne in our hotel suite.

10. From 2.30 P.M. on Tuesday, February 9 till 5.30 P.M. on Thursday, February 11 my wife and I managed to call on all twenty Ambassadors and their wives, resident in Santo Domingo. Thursday evening we held a reception in the Hotel El Embajador for approximately 120 guests from the diplomatic corps, government, leaders of the business community and Canadians resident in Santo Domingo.

11. During the week prior to presentation of credentials, I devoted most of my time to the affairs of the Embassy but also managed to call on the Foreign Office and on the Managers of the Royal Bank of Canada, the Bank of Nova Scotia, Falconbridge Nickel and the Confederation Life Association. We also attended a dinner given by the British Ambassador and Mrs. Lockhart and a luncheon given by the United States Ambassador and Mrs. Bennett.

12. On two occasions I had an opportunity of speaking to the Chief of Protocol about notes submitted by our Embassy some weeks or months ago to which we had received no reply. Embassy Note No. 198 of November 16 had asked for permission for our Canadian-based non-diplomatic staff to import an automobile on first arrival. The lack of a car was causing particular hardship to our recently arrived married clerk, Mr. J. W. Culhane. Within twenty-four hours of my raising the matter with Dr. Nadal, he telephoned the Embassy to advise that permission for Mr. Culhane to import a car had been granted. I also raised the question of our Note No. 74 of April 14, 1964, concerning our desire to conclude an agreement concerning the establishment of amateur radio operators between the two countries. The need for such an agreement arises particularly in the operations of Canadian missionaries in various locations throughout the Dominican Republic. Dr. Nadal promised to investigate and advise the Embassy as soon as possible.

13. It would be presumptuous of me to comment in any details on the political and economic situation in the Dominican Republic, except to say that based on my calls both on the business community and on the diplomatic corps, things are rather hectic in both sectors. Donald Reid Cabral is generally admired as a dedicated and honest citizen attempting to do his best under extremely difficult circumstances. He endorses his salary cheque each month to a home for children. Several commented that he had also shown a political shrewdness in recent months which was unsuspected when he first took office. Several of his recent acts in bucking the hierarchy of the armed forces and the police have been described as courageous and accomplished with finesse. Most observers have

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felt that the lack of cohesion in any of the political parties made elections scheduled for September 1 of this year most unlikely. Most felt that Donald Reid Cabral is now politically ambitious and that he is likely to run for the presidency himself but without aligning himself with any party. With both Bosch and Balaguer unable to return to the country or take part in the elections, most felt Donald Reid Cabral was the best bet to win if the elections are held and if of course the military continue to support him.

14. The American Ambassador, W. Tapley Bennett, while generally admiring the President of the Triumvirate deplored his lack of administrative ability and was scathing about the lack of skilled administrators to support him.

15. The Israeli Ambassador, Mr. Barón, a keen and experienced observer of Latin American affairs for many years (for twelve years he conducted the Israeli - Latin American information programme from New York, has travelled extensively throughout the area, and has written several books in Spanish) is long on Donald Reid Cabral. Barón thinks the elections will be held September 1 and believes at this stage that Donald Reid Cabral will be elected President.

16. Obviously the young President of the Triumvirate is walking a tight rope. Many are amazed that he has not fallen long before this and each day that he survives enhances his reputation. If he does have presidential aspirations, he faces some criticism from Dominicans on the grounds that he is not really a Dominican himself - despite the fact that he was born in the country.

17. Dr. Ramón Cáceres Troncoso at present the only other member of the Triumvirate is only referred to with a smile. He apparently is completely dominated by Donald Reid Cabral.

18. As mentioned before, the economy is close to bankruptcy. Sugar prices have fallen to less than two and a half cents a pound on the world market and the American quota for the first period of 1965 was considerably lower than anticipated. At the same time the huge Dominican sugar co-operative, with its greatly inflated payrolls and generally poor business practices, is operating on the basis of producing sugar at a cost of about six cents a pound. When I asked one businessman how the country could possibly survive under these circumstances, he told me of his friend who runs a large retail store. This friend claims he loses \$100. a day each day his store is opened. When queried on how he survived the merchant replied that fortunately he was closed on Sunday.

19. Nevertheless the Dominican Republic is an Article 8 country under the IMF and still maintaining convertibility. Despite the recent requirement for a deposit of forty per cent of the value of imported goods to be held in escrow by the Central Bank for about four months, there is no shortage of luxury imports. On the face of it it seems ridiculous that when the country is meeting its overseas obligations by borrowing, import licencing and exchange control regulations are not imposed.

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Confidential

- 5 -

20. I learned while I was in Santo Domingo that the two Canadian banks - the Royal Bank of Canada and the Bank of Nova Scotia had just been fined by the government for permitting their reserves to drop below the requirements of the banking law. The Royal Bank had been fined \$208,000 with more to come and the Bank of Nova Scotia \$40,000. with a great deal more to come. Briefly the Banks claimed the large loans referred to earlier plus a system of discounting paper lodged to cover the forty per cent escrow deposits on imports had indeed brought their reserves below the legal levels. The two Managers felt, however, that there was some injustice in being fined when they had made almost obligatory loans to support the government in the first place. (I was told that the President of the Triumvirate was annoyed at the fines which were imposed without his knowledge but too late for him to intervene without appearing to countermand the law.) The American AID - including the \$10. million loan signed during the time I was in the country - would seem to be the sole financial prop maintaining the government in power at this time. One cartoonist pictured the American government giving aid with one hand and casting aside Dominican sugar with the other. The American Ambassador said that no doubt the United States would continue to support the government while he hoped their advice on economic matters would be accepted and lead to a more permanent solution.

21. A variety of press clippings is enclosed covering my two weeks' stay in the Dominican Republic. In addition, there was television and newsreel coverage of our arrival and the presentation of credentials ceremony.

Bruce Rankin

Bruce Rankin
Ambassador

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

OUTGOING MESSAGE

FM: EXTERNAL	DATE	FILE	SECURITY
	JAN 28/65	20-1-2-DOM	CONF
TO: CARACAS	NUMBER		PRECEDENCE
	XL-30		OPIMM
INFO:	<i>file</i> <i>JCN</i>		

Ref.: OUR TEL XL-18 OF JAN 20.
Subject: VISIT TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

DESPITE THE REPORTS FROM SANTO DOMINGO OF UNSETTLED POLITICAL CONDITIONS AND CABINET AND OTHER CHANGES, WHICH COULD POSSIBLY DELAY APPOINTMENT TO PRESENT CREDENTIALS, WE ARE INCLINED TO THINK THAT YOU SHOULD STILL TRY TO GET TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC SOMETIME IN EARLY FEB. HOWEVER, WE HAVE NO RPT NO OBJECTION IF YOU SHOULD WISH TO DELAY DEPARTURE FOR ABOUT A WEEK TO ALLOW THINGS TO SETTLE. DATE OF YOUR RETURN TO CARACAS MAY NOW BE MORE FLEXIBLE SINCE WE HAVE JUST BEEN ADVISED DEFINITELY THAT THE VISIT OF MINISTER SHARP TO SOUTH AMERICA HAS BEEN POSTPONED. PLEASE TREAT THIS INFO AS CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL YOU ARE OFFICIALLY ADVISED OF EXPLANATIONS WHICH CAN BE GIVEN TO VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES.

2. PLEASE RECONFIRM YOUR TRAVEL PLANS TO US.

LOCAL **Personnel Operations (done in Div.)** NO STANDARD DISTRIBUTION

ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	APPROVED BY
SIG..... T.C.HAMPOND/bm NAME.....	LATIN AMERICAN	2-2480	A.J.PICK SIG..... A.J.PICK NAME.....

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

FILE

OUTGOING MESSAGE

FM: EXTERNAL	DATE	FILE	SECURITY
	JAN 20/65	20-1-2-DCM	UNCLASS
TO: CARACAS	NUMBER	PRECEDENCE	
		XL-18	PRIORITY
INFO:	<i>file</i> <i>JCN</i>		

Ref: YOUR TEL 65 JAN 18

Subject: VISIT TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

YOUR PLANS TO VISIT SANTO DOMINGO FOR PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS BEGINNING JAN 30 ARE APPROVED. PLANNED RETURN BY ABOUT FEB 15 SEEMS QUITE SATISFACTORY SINCE THE VISIT MENTIONED IN OUR TEL XL-164 OF DEC 22 HAS BEEN POSTPONED INDEFINITELY.

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIV. (done in Div) NO STANDARD
 (MR. HARDY)

ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	APPROVED BY
SIG..... NAME... G. HAMMOND/lcm.....	LATIN AMERICAN	2-2480	M. G. PICK SIG..... NAME... A. J. PICK.....

20-1-2-DOM

(original on 20-DOM-1-4)

SANTODOMINGO 85 1/50 CANADIANGHR 27 645P

URGENT

ETAT EXTERNAL OTTAWA

OPIMMEDIATE 12 REID CARBRAE HAS QUOTE TEMPORARILY UNQUOTE ASSUMED

POSITION OF SECSTATE ARMED FORCES REPLACING MAJGEN VINAS ROMAN

NOW APPOINTED TO INTERAMERICAN DEFENCE BOARD WASHDC STOP TRIUMVIR

CACERES TRONCOSO QUOTE TEMPORARILY UNQUOTE SECSTATE EXTERNAL

RELATIONS STOP ALL REPT ALL POSITION OF SUBSECRETARY ABOLISHED STOP

SERVICES CHIEFS

ZND BRIG GEN WESSIN Y WESSIN HAVE VOICED SUPPORT

OF CHANGES STOP RANKIN EXPECTS TO ARRIVE MONDAY WE ARE INFORMING

HIM OF THIS SHUFFLE IN THE EVENT HE MAY WISH TO CHANGE HIS PLANS

DOMCAN

file
JCH

J VVVV

J.S.

ACTION COPY

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OTT
806P EST

Hammond Xh
M. [unclear]
Xh

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20-6-9-SHARP
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CP TEL OTT
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EXTERNAL OTT

WAA3/CPT OTA099 NMT240 TAM28 VIA CANADIAN
CARACAS 65 18 1715 CTF 3RD TXT
ETAT *re. by Mr. [unclear]*

EXTERNAL OTTAWA/CANADA

ETAT PRIORITY NU IN VIEW OF YOURTEL XL14 JAN 14 PRESUME
OTHER VISIT CANCELLED OR INDEFINITELY POSTPONED PROPOSE
THEREFORE TO VISIT SANTO DOMINGO TO PRESENT CREDENTIALS

LEAVING CARACAS JANUARY 30 UNFORTUNATELY APPOINTMENT NOT REPEAT NOT
POSSIBLE UNTIL AFTER ARRIVAL DOMREP HENCE UNABLE TO SAY
DEFINITELY WHEN CAN RETURN CARACAS BUT HOPE NOT REPEAT NOT LATER
THAN FEBRUARY FIFTEEN YOUR APPROVAL PLEASE

RANKIN

*my tel XL166 of Dec 22
sig went on for to say:
"It is not now planned
that proposed mission will
take place early in January"*

yes

file
JCX

(CO) 708P EXXX 808P EST

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ACTION COPY

XL

20-1-2-00M

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WAA003 RAA048-E RAG008 HCE205-ACRA1061/CA3920

CARACAS 34/30 (29) 1740P

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LT
EXTERNAL OTTAWACANADA
ETATPRIORITY NO26 REFYOURTEL XL18 JAN20 IN VIEW OF OTHER
COMMITMENTS HERE LAST HALF FEBRUARY AND ROY DEPARTURE MIDMARCH
PROPOSE TO PROCEED SANTO DOMINGO TOMORROW AS PLANNED RANKING

VVVVV

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20-1-2-DOM

De

*file
JCN*

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ETAT EXTERNAL OTTAWA

OPIIMMEDIATE 13 REFOURTEL 12 JAN 27/64 CABINET SHUFFLE
REFTTEL STATEMENT QUOTE ALL POSITIONS OF SUBSEC ABOLISHED UNQUOTE
SHOULD HAVE READ ALL POSITIONS OF SUBSEC OF ARMED FORCES
ABOLISHED

DOMCAN

(B

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

(DUPLICATE)

NUMBERED LETTER

To: The Canadian Embassy,
Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.

From: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference:

Subject: National Day Message - February 27.

Security: UNCLASSIFIED

No.: B-

Date: January 19, 1965.

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No.:

Ottawa File No. <u>20-1-2-114</u> 22-13-1-1	
<u>2</u>	<u>/</u>

References

Would you please transmit the following
His Excellency
message from the Governor-General to the Triumvirate
of the Dominican Republic, to be delivered on
February 27, 1965:

Government
House

Begins:

On the occasion of the anniversary of the
independence of the Dominican Republic, I wish to
express to you, on behalf of the people of Canada
and in my name, our best wishes for the happiness
and prosperity of the people of your country.

Internal
Circulation

Georges-P. Vanier,
Governor-General of Canada.

Ends.

Latin Am. Div.

Distribution
to Posts

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

s.19(1)

ACCESS SECTION / SECTION DE L'ACCES

DOCUMENT REMOVED FROM FILE / DOCUMENT RETIRE DU DOSSIER

RG 25 Acc 80-81/022 ^{Box} Vol 4 File/Dossier 201-2-DOM. Pt. 1

Description of document/Description du document

Letter to Alfred Pickford from Bruce Rankin

No. of Pages/Nbre de pages 1

Date 5/12/64

Access to Information Act/Reason for Removal

Loi sur l'accès à l'information/Retrait en vertu de

Exemption/Exception 19(1)

Review Officer/Agent(e) d'examen K. Brown/DRAIT - JH

2

ACCESS SECTION / SECTION DE L'ACCES

DOCUMENT REMOVED FROM FILE / DOCUMENT RETIRE DU DOSSIER

RG 25 Acc 80-81/022 ^{Box} Vol 4 File/Dossier 20-1-2-DOM. Pt. 1

Description of document/Description du document

Letter to Bruce Rankin from Alfred
Ricks

No. of Pages/Nbre de pages 2

Date 30/10/64

Access to Information Act/Reason for Removal

Loi sur l'accès à l'information/Retrait en vertu de

Exemption/Exception 19(1)

Review Officer/Agent(e) d'examen K. Brown/DFAIT - lb

20-1-2-DOM

CANADIAN EMBASSY



AMBASSADE DU CANADA

*Mobile
absent from
late October
until Dec 15.*

Apartado del Este 11452,
Caracas, Venezuela,
October 27, 1964

*file
L.H.H.*

*Rec'd.
Oct 30/64*

Dear Alfred,

Since presenting my credentials here September 16, I have managed practically all my official calls and have had the majority of return visits. In addition to the diplomatic corps, I called also on the Foreign Minister, the Minister of Development and the Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons - but suspended other calls on Cabinet members because, as you know, a new Cabinet is to be formed any day now. Also I have managed to get my nose into a fair bit of work - and am enjoying it.

I am wondering now about plans to present credentials in Santo Domingo and on this would appreciate your advice. I personally am in no hurry to go to the Dominican Republic but a long delay between agrément and presentation of credentials may not be appreciated at the receiving end. I wrote Ken Noble asking if he had any suggested target date and have now a reply which translated and otherwise interpreted seems to suggest that some time prior to independence day, February 27 would suit him best.

I see the triumverate have announced elections for next September which if successful might produce yet another government and the need for another visit to Santo Domingo.

You may have some definite views on when and whether I should present credentials in Santo Domingo and I would appreciate very much hearing from you in this regard. Incidentally Ray Roy has had his post extended here until about March 1965. I would, of course, prefer making my trip to Santo Domingo while he is still here.

Mr. A. J. Pick,
Latin American Division,
Department of External Affairs,
Ottawa

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- 2 -

Please give my best regards to Patsy. I remember well the pleasant supper with you both, my last in Canada.

Sincerely,



~~Bruce Rankin~~
~~Ambassador~~


Files: 1607-40 Vol 19
261-40 Vol 2
234~~5~~⁷-40 Vol 7
1476-40 Vol 2
6397-40 Vol 8
11719-40 Vol 2
2345-40 Vol 3
20-DOM-1-4
20-DOM-22-5
20-DOM-14
20-1-2-DOM
20-HOND-1-4
20-HOND-14 Vol 1
20-BRA-1-4
20-BRA-14
20-1-2-BRA

Latin American/A.J. Pick/ah

CONFIDENTIAL

June 8, 1964

Relations with New Governments
in Latin America



The following is a summary of each of the seven military coups that have taken place in Latin America since the beginning of 1962 and the official Canadian reaction to them.

I Argentina (March - April 1962)

President Frondizi was deposed by the military forces on March 29 and the President of the Senate, Jose Maria Guido, assumed the presidency on March 30. A note was received from the Foreign Minister telling our Embassy of this on the same date, but it did not expressly request recognition. Our Ambassador recommended recognition on April 4, and in stronger terms on April 9 and 13. On April 9 the British Ambassador was given discretion as from April 10 to acknowledge this circular note and thus continue in normal relations, and he did so on April 10. The British did not give publicity to this action but said that the news department would confirm, in answer to press enquiries, that the British Government was in normal relations with the new government. On April 18 (the day after Canada had acted in Buenos Aires) the United States Embassy took similar action and the State Department issued a release saying that the American acknowledgement meant that relations were continuing with the Argentine government.

The Canadian Position

The Minister agreed with a memorandum of April 6 that the Guido regime might be recognized "after the United States and, say, Brazil and Mexico" had done so. Having noted from Buenos Aires telegrams the growing number of countries that had extended recognition, the Minister indicated on April 14 that he thought the time had come for Canada to act, and he requested that instructions be drafted with a covering memorandum which he could show to the Prime Minister. Thus, on April 16 a further memorandum was sent to the Minister, pointing out that some 36 countries had acted, though the United States had not then reached a decision, and that there was much to be said for Canada not being among the last countries represented in Buenos Aires to recognize the new regime. A telegram for Buenos Aires was speedily cleared and was sent off on the night of the same day. There is no indication that the Minister consulted the Prime Minister. No publicity was given in Ottawa to this action.

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The mission was asked to confirm when it delivered its note but failed to let us know. Indeed, when we were concerned about the possibility of a parliamentary question, we asked the mission on April 25 to let us know the date of their note. In their reply they still did not do so but simply said that the text had gone forward in their most recent bag, which in fact did not come in until April 30. Only then did we know that the mission's note was dated April 17. (As indicated above, the United States suddenly took action the day after Canada. Brazil did not act until May 3.)

Files 1607-40, Vol. 19
261-40, Vol. 2

II Peru (July - August 1962)

On July 18, 1962, there was a straight military take-over from the constitutional president of Peru because of the dissatisfaction of the armed forces with the results of the election of June 10. The United States official reaction was very hostile. The same day a note was sent to the diplomatic missions in Lima justifying the action and indicating the wish to continue friendly relations. The arrested president's term of office ended on July 28. Immediately thereafter most European NATO countries recognized the military junta. The British acted on July 30 and announced their action the following day.

The Canadian Position

A memorandum was sent to the Minister on July 27 recommending against early recognition and suggesting that although it might not be possible to wait for the United States, we should delay until after recognition had been granted by the British and some of the main Latin American countries. On August 1, just before the Minister was to leave for Vancouver for two weeks, a further memorandum was sent to him recommending that he agree to a formula, similar to the instructions given by the Vatican to the Nuncio in Lima, that Canadian recognition be extended when two important states of the hemisphere had done so, it being thought that Argentina and Chile might be the first to move. The Minister reacted unfavourably to the proposed formula, particularly the mention of Argentina with its own regime dominated by the military, but he did authorize a telegram to Washington designed to sound out the United States authorities without indicating that Canadian recognition was either imminent or was likely to be long delayed. He wished to be kept informed about this after his departure on the morning of August 2.

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On the afternoon of August 3, the Prime Minister, on seeing the telegram to Washington, gave instructions that recognition be extended without delay. A telegram to Lima was signed on Saturday morning, August 4, but because of a mistake in the Comcentre, it was not actually sent off to Lima until Tuesday, August 7 (the Monday being a civic holiday), and the mission took action the same day. At the request of the Prime Minister, the Press Gallery was informed of the Canadian act of recognition the following day. (Mexico acted on August 6, the Vatican August 7 immediately after Canada, Argentina on August 8, Chile August 10, Brazil August 15 and the United States on August 17.)

Files 2347-40, Vol. 7
1476-40, Vol. 2

III Guatemala (March - April, 1963)

On March 30, 1963, the constitutional President of Guatemala, whose regime had been rather corrupt and erratic, was overthrown by a military coup. The motive was partly to forestall the probable election the following November of a presidential candidate to whom the armed forces were very hostile. The following day the new regime was installed with the senior colonel as Chief of Government. On April 1, a circular note was sent to missions with a justification for the military take-over, in which the new Foreign Minister affirmed the intention to maintain the traditional ties of friendship between the Government of the people of Guatemala and the country in question. The United States, although not hostile, was in no hurry to recognize the new regime. They wished to consult with Latin American Governments, especially those of Central America. The British proposed to follow the United States in recognizing, provided that the U.S. action was not unduly delayed. In fact, Britain acted on April 10. This followed, among others, three Central American countries: El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, who acted on April 8. Peru immediately followed, then Mexico on April 11, then France and the United States on April 17.

Canadian Position

The Canadian position was complicated by our election on April 8 and the subsequent change of Government. A memorandum was written for the Minister on April 9 suggesting that since some of the Central American countries, including two of its immediate neighbours, had accepted the new Guatemalan Government, and since two European countries of standing, Britain

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and Switzerland, had also made this decision the time was opportune for Canada to indicate its recognition. On April 11, Mr. Green indicated that this question should be submitted to the Cabinet. A second memorandum was prepared on April 22, the day the new Government was sworn in, for the new Minister, recommending recognition and pointing out that in view of the action taken by other American states and the principal NATO countries, Canada was perhaps running a little late. On April 23, Mr. Martin asked that the matter be submitted to the Prime Minister and this was done in a memorandum of April 24, which went forward the following day. On April 26, the Prime Minister agreed and a telegram went to our Chargé that day. Indeed, because the matter had become urgent locally, he was so informed by telephone and was able to call on the Foreign Minister that day and to add that Canadian action had been delayed because of the change of Government here.

Files 6397-40, Vol. 8
11719-40, Vol. 2

IV Ecuador (July - August, 1963)

On July 11, 1963, a Military Junta seized power and sent the highly incompetent President into exile. This military take-over was sympathetically regarded by the United States. On July 12 a Minister temporarily in charge of the Foreign Ministry sent a circular note with a long justification for the coup and expressed the wish to maintain and strengthen the relations existing with the country in question. There was early recognition by the Vatican. The British Ambassador requested instructions from London, authorizing him to grant recognition as soon as the United States did, but it turned out the United States wished to wait until some significant Latin American countries had acted. With advance instructions, the British Ambassador was able to acknowledge the circular note on July 22 and most of the Western European missions acted about the same time. Chile and Argentina, followed by Paraguay and Uruguay, recognized on July 30, and the United States on July 31 with a simultaneous press release from the State Department.

Canadian Position

Our position in Quito was complicated at the time of the military coup by the illness of our Chargé d'Affaires, the only officer, who was about to hand over to his successor. Langille was favourable to recognition as early as July 12. A memorandum was sent to the Minister on July 25 with a memorandum for the Prime Minister, which Mr. Martin signed on July 26.

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These took the general line that we ought not to be hasty about recognition, but might extend it about the same time as the United States. The Prime Minister authorized a telegram to Washington, which accompanied the memorandum and went out on July 29. This simply said that, provided a number of Latin American countries had recognized, we would probably do likewise the following week, particularly if the United States did so at that time. A further memorandum was sent to the Minister on August 1, which was moved quickly because we were already running behind the United States. Mr. Martin signed a telegram to Quito, which went out that day, authorizing recognition of the Military Junta. The mission was able to act on the afternoon of August 2. No publicity was given to this and there was no press interest in Canada. (Incidentally, Brazil appears to have acted at the same time as Canada.)

File 2345-40, Vol. 3

V Dominican Republic (September - December 1963)

On September 25, 1963, a military coup overthrew the elected president of the Dominican Republic. A note explaining this action was sent to the missions in Santo Domingo on the same day, and a second note concerning the installation of a Civil Triumvirate on September 27. The United States reacted very unfavourably and went so far as to request the British to withhold their recognition as long as possible. Spain extended recognition as early as October 12 along with Portugal. The British acted on October 30, with no public announcement, followed the next day by Germany, France and Italy and a few days later by Japan, Belgium and the Netherlands. Western Hemisphere countries were slower to act. Argentina was the first important one to move, on December 11, then the United States on December 14 and fairly quickly thereafter Chile, Peru and Brazil. (The Vatican and Uruguay did not act until February 27, 1964, the anniversary of Dominican independence.)

Canadian Position

The Chargé D'Affaires, when presented with the first note of September 25 by messenger, read and returned it immediately, saying that he was awaiting instructions. (It was not necessary for him to do this, but there were no serious consequences.) He took delivery of the second note on September 27. In a memorandum of October 3, it was recommended to the Minister that action concerning Canadian recognition be postponed until it became clearer that political conditions had reached some stability and until the intentions of a number of Western European and particularly Latin American countries were known. It was suggested that while we need not await the United States before taking action, we should consult with them on our thinking on the problem. As anticipated, the Minister was asked a question in the House about Canada's relations with the Dominican Republic.

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A further interim report was sent to the Minister on December 12, just prior to his departure for Europe, pointing out that while the Western European countries had recognized the new government, no major Latin American countries had done so. On the following day, December 13, we were told that Argentina had recognized the new regime on December 11. Then it was learned without forewarning that the United States was about to recognize. It seemed probable that a number of the countries of the Hemisphere would do likewise, so a telegram was sent to the Minister in Paris on December 13, asking authority to recognize. In his reply of December 14 the Minister agreed there was no reason to delay recognition any longer. He asked that the Prime Minister be informed of the action being taken, and in fact, the Prime Minister was asked to clear the telegram of instructions to Santo Domingo, which went out on December 14. Because of complicated personnel changes, the mission had to be asked by telegram on December 16 to confirm the date of its note.

Files 20-DOM-1-4
20-DOM-22-5
20-DOM-14
20-1-2-DOM ✓

VI Honduras (October - December 1963)

On October 3, 1963, the armed forces overthrew the outgoing constitutional president to prevent the probable election of his proposed successor on the following October 13. Two notes were sent to the accredited diplomatic missions, one on October 9 giving the reasons for the coup and expressing the desire to continue cordial relations with the country concerned, and a second on October 11, listing the members of the new Cabinet. The United States was in no hurry to extend recognition. Neighbouring Guatemala, also under military rule, recognized the new regime on October 6, followed soon by Spain and Nationalist China. The other two neighbours, El Salvador and Nicaragua, acted on October 23. Britain extended recognition on October 30, without publicity. Argentina acted on December 13 and the United States on December 14, simultaneously with their recognition of the new regime in the Dominican Republic. The usual release was issued by the State Department. Brazil followed on December 18.

Canadian Position

In an early report, our Ambassador to Honduras, who is resident of course in Costa Rica, recommended that we withhold recognition long enough to indicate our disapproval of "such contempt for constitutionality and democracy". In a first memorandum to the Minister on October 23, we recommended that there be no early action, partly because there was no resident mission suffering embarrassment and because direct Canadian national interests were limited. It was proposed to raise the matter with him again when recognition had been extended by some of the more important Latin American countries or United States recognition was likely. The Minister indicated his agreement with this on October 28.

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In a further memorandum of December 17, it was recommended that the time for Canadian action had come, partly because of the United States decision on December 14, of which we had really no advance notification. A telegram of instructions was signed by the Minister on December 21, sent out on Monday, December 23, and acted on by the mission the following day.

Files 20-HOND-1-4
20-HOND-14, Vol. 1

VII Brazil (April 1964)

On April 1, 1964, there was a military uprising against President Goulart, and the next day the Congress declared the office of president vacant and named the President of the Chamber of Deputies, Ranieri Mazzilli, to exercise the office as interim president. A note was written to the diplomatic missions by the Chief of Protocol that day informing them of this change. Without awaiting any such formal advice, and indeed within hours of the action of the Brazilian Congress, the United States President sent a warm and congratulatory message to Mazzilli. Less than two weeks previously Mr. Mann, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, had told a closed meeting in Washington that there would be a change in United States policy on the recognition of regimes that came to power by military coups and that it was proposed to favour a realistic policy of treating with new regimes regardless of how they came to power, provided only they have effective control over their national territories. We were told by the State Department that the Johnson message was not to be regarded as an act of recognition since the position was taken that there was a continuity of the regime in Brazil, with respect for the constitutional process, and thus recognition was not called for. The British took the position that a formal act of recognition was not required and on April 7 authorized their Embassy to acknowledge the circular note of April 2 as an indication that diplomatic relations were being continued. A new president, General Castello Branco, was elected on April 11 and was inaugurated on April 15. In this case, it is not possible to list fully the dates on which action was taken by other governments on the changes in Brazil, as there were different interpretations of what had happened constitutionally and disagreement whether formal acts of recognition were called for. By April 20 it appeared that the only countries that had not recognized or given some indication of the continuation of relations were Mexico, Cuba, Uruguay, Paraguay and Haiti. Uruguay reached a decision on April 24 to acknowledge the note and indicate the continuation of relations.

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CONFIDENTIAL

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Canadian Position

A background memorandum on the crisis in Brazil was quickly drafted and sent to the Minister on April 3 and returned on April 6. A second memorandum for the Minister was prepared on April 8, dealing with the question of relations with the new regime, with a proposed telegram for Rio with instructions for a note to indicate the continuation of relations. This, unfortunately, was somewhat delayed in reaching the Minister and he did not sign the telegram until late on Friday, April 10. In order to have it sent and received on the Saturday, that morning it was marked EMERGENCY and dispatched. On the memorandum, the Acting Under-Secretary had suggested to the Minister that he might wish to mention the matter to the Prime Minister, and Mr. Martin did this. Mr. Martin also agreed that no publicity should be given to the action proposed, but that if a question were asked in the House, the reply should be that we had indicated our intention to continue diplomatic relations with the Brazilian Government.

As several days went by without a telegram from our Embassy, it was asked to let us know the date of its note to the Brazilian Foreign Ministry. The mission explained that as the telegram was not received until April 11 and as our note was really directed towards the election of Mazzilli (rather than Castello Branco, who was elected on the 11th), the third person note was back-dated to April 10 and delivered to the Foreign Ministry on Monday, April 13.

Files 20-BRA-1-4
20-BRA-14
20-1-2-BRA

cc: D.L. (2)
European
Latin American
Legal
Press & Liaison
Protocol

R.C.M.P.
Washington
San José
Santo Domingo
Bonn
Hamburg.

Consular Div. / WPMcLeod / CJWebster /
mab

20-1-2-DOM

Ottawa, May 6, 1964.

file
FEV

Director of Immigration,
Department of Citizenship and Immigration,
Ottawa.

The Embassy of the Dominican Republic in Ottawa has informed us by Note that Mr. Pablo Silva, formerly Consul of that country in Hamburg, Germany, has absconded from his post, and has purloined cash in the amount of eight or nine thousand dollars. Mr. Pablo Silva has been informed that he is no longer entitled to diplomatic immunity.

The Embassy reports that Mr. Silva has obtained entry visas to the U.S.A. and Costa Rica to which it is believed, he proposes to travel. It is also thought that he may try to enter Canada.

The foregoing information is forwarded to you in the event that Mr. Pablo Silva may have already entered Canada, or may try to do so in the future. We should be grateful if you would let us have any information concerning the movements or other activities of Mr. Silva which might come to your attention.

H. F. CLARK

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

D.L.(2)/D.D. MacKinnon/lb

20-1-2-DM

file
[Handwritten signature]

CONFIDENTIAL

Your File:
D 981-11-1-22-1

Our File: 2/216 (D.L.(2) Sp.R.)

April 22, 1964.

The Commissioner,
Royal Canadian Mounted Police,
O t t a w a.

Attention: Directorate of Security and Intelligence

I refer to your letter of March 25, 1964 concerning the possible entry into Canada of Joaquin BALAGUER, former President of the Dominican Government, and Rhadames TRUJILLO, son of the late Generalissimo Trujillo.

Any possible entry to Canada by undesirables such as these two men to plan or carry out political plots connected with their hopes of returning to power in the Dominican Republic would be an unwelcome abuse of the privilege of visiting Canada. We understand that the Dominican Government is presently seeking the extradition from Spain of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, Jr., Rhadames' brother, to stand trial for crimes with which he is charged while a member of his father's corrupt and dictatorial regime. Although Rhadames' own record is also extremely bloody and he is little more than a political gangster, we are not certain that he is currently wanted on any specific charges in the Dominican Republic. Balaguer's reputation as a Trujillo puppet is somewhat unsavoury but lacks some of the gangster overtones of the two Trujillo brothers.

If information should be available indicating when and how Balaguer or Trujillo might travel to Canada, we would agree with any steps that might be taken at the port-of-entry with the cooperation of Immigration authorities to prevent their entry into Canada. Rhadames has been in exile for two years or more and it is possible that he might not be in possession of a valid travel document as required for his entry to Canada. Moreover, in view of our knowledge of these persons' political plans, it would seem to us reasonable to deny them entry on the grounds that they were clearly not bona fide tourists or visitors and thus not eligible to be granted entry to Canada under Section 7(1)(c) or any other specific classes of eligible non-immigrants under Section 7 of the Immigration Act.

A copy of this letter is being sent to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration.

J. J. MCCARDLE

cc: Immigration Branch
Latin American Division

Defence Liaison (2) Division

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

000042

L. THE AMERICAN/TUHammond/Mel

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Defence Liaison (2) Division

CONFIDENTIAL

April 7, 1964

Latin American Division

Your memorandum of April 2, 1964

20-1-2-DOM

Dominican Republic - Balaguer and Trujillo

Any possible entry to Canada by undesirable persons such as Joaquin Balaguer and Rhadames Trujillo to plan or carry out political plots connected with their hopes of returning to power in the Dominican Republic would be an unwelcome abuse of the privilege of visiting Canada. We understand that the Dominican Government is presently seeking the extradition from Spain of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, Jr., the brother of Rhadames, to stand trial for crimes with which he is charged while a member of his father's corrupt and dictatorial regime in the Dominican Republic. Although Rhadames' own record is also extremely bloody and he is little more than a political gangster, we are not certain that he is currently wanted on any specific charges in the Dominican Republic. Balaguer's reputation as a Trujillo puppet is somewhat unenviable but lacks some of the gangster overtones of the two Trujillo brothers.

2. If information should be available indicating when and how Balaguer or Trujillo might travel to Canada, we would agree with any steps that might be taken at the port-of-entry with the cooperation of Immigration authorities to prevent the arrival in Canada of these two persons. Rhadames has been in exile for two years or more and there is some possibility that he may not be in possession of a valid travel document as required for his entry to Canada. Moreover, in view of our knowledge of these persons' political plans, it would seem to us reasonable to deny them entry on the grounds that they were clearly not bona-fide tourists or visitors and thus not eligible to be granted entry to Canada under Section 7(1)(c) or any other specific classes of eligible non-immigrants under Section 7 of the Immigration Act. Will an approach be made to the Immigration Department to determine whether they believe that appropriate action could be taken to prevent these two persons

Consular

Latin American Division

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

000043

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM D.L.(2)/C.F.W. Hooper/ib

TO: LATIN AMERICAN DIVISION

Security CONFIDENTIAL

Date April 2, 1964.

FROM: Defence Liaison (2) Division

File No.
2/216 (DL(2) Sp.R.)
20-1-2-DM

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: Dominican Republic - Balaguer and Trujillo

*file
JWH*

Information has been received that Joaquin Balaguer, former President of the Dominican Republic now living in exile in the United States, and Rhadames Trujillo, son of the late Generalissimo Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, may travel to Canada in the near future for a meeting looking toward the eventual return to power in the Dominican Republic of Balaguer.

2. We should appreciate any comments which you may care to make concerning this report.

W. Hooper
Defence Liaison (2) Division

CIRCULATION

Consular

c. Latin American Div. Economic/W.K. Wardroper/sjb/mm

20-1-2-DOM

*Mr. Pick to see
to file
A*

CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, March 12, 1964

The Deputy Minister,
Department of Trade and Commerce,
Ottawa.

I refer to your enquiry about the possibility of approval being given for the sale of nitroguanidine to the Dominican Armed Forces.

As you know, political conditions in the Dominican Republic have been disturbed for some time. Moreover, in November, 1963 we were informed by the United States that their shipments of military equipment to the Dominican Republic had been suspended. No word of reinstatement of such shipments has been received.

In view of the nature of the present regime, which ousted the moderate government of President Bosch, and the unsettled situation in the Dominican Republic, we think that Canadian Industries Ltd. should be discouraged at this time from seeking sales in that country.

Jord!

This would have been stronger if it had been pointed out that the CSSEA had agreed that CILC be discouraged in this.

J. R. MCKINNEY

per Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

c.c. P & LS
Latin American Division

CONFIDENTIAL

20-1-2-DDM	
13	✓
MARCH 11, 1964	

ECONOMIC DIVISION

Proposed Export of Nitroguanidine
to the Dominican Republic

The Minister has indicated his agreement with the recommendation in the memorandum which is returned to you herewith.

file
LJC


M.N. BOW

Economic Development Division

O/SSEA
O/USSEA
O/PM
P & LS
Latin American Division

20-1-2-DOM	
File 37-22-1-DOM	
13	✓

File



MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

Confidential

March 4, 1964

Proposed Export of Nitroguanidine
to the Dominican Republic

*marked to see
file
gc 21*

Canadian Industries Limited have informed the Department of Trade and Commerce that there are prospects for selling 25 tons of nitroguanidine explosive to the Ministry of Defence of the Dominican Republic. The nature of this explosive, as well as its destination to a military agency in the Dominican Republic, indicates that it would probably be used for military purposes.

2. We have always maintained very strict controls on the export of military items to the Dominican Republic and have sold them virtually nothing of a military nature in recent years. The present regime there is unstable and does not inspire confidence. In the circumstances, I recommend that you decline to concur in an export licence covering nitroguanidine at this time.

(SIGNED) A. E. RITCHIE

N. A. R.

File - 20-1-2-DOM

File
CONFIDENTIAL

Economic Division

February 17, 1964

Latin American Division

Your memorandum of February 6, 1964

Sale of Nitroguanidine (Picrite) for the Dominican Armed Forces

We have reservations about the desirability of the export from Canada of nitroguanidine for the Dominican Armed Forces. We understand from you that this explosive is normally used in the manufacture of ammunition. Given the extremely unsettled political conditions prevailing in the Dominican Republic, we doubt whether a major purpose for such ammunition is likely to be normal recreational hunting. It would, in our view, be quite unrealistic to treat this as an export of material for sporting ammunition.

2. Canada has in the past tended to take a particularly cautious attitude towards applications for the export of weapons, ammunition and military supplies to highly volatile areas of the Caribbean such as the Dominican Republic. Your memorandum contains no information concerning the size or value of the possible order in question. However, we are inclined to think that, assuming the order is small and the Canadian export interest is thus not involved to any important degree, on balance it would be the most prudent course for Canada to pass up this sales opportunity. It must be borne in mind that it was the senior officers of the Dominican Armed Forces who, only a few months ago, overthrew in a military coup d'état the moderate, constitutional government of President Juan Bosch, with which Canada had diplomatic relations, and imposed a completely non-representative, civilian junta as the Government of the Dominican Republic. In keeping with the pattern throughout the Hemisphere, Canada delayed recognizing this new government for a considerable period. We believe that there is no desirability from the Canadian point of view of becoming a supplier of military items for self-seeking and politically irresponsible elements as hostile to the emergence of democratic forms of government as the Dominican Armed Forces have recently proved themselves to be.

A. J. BECK

Latin American Division

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO: Latin American Division
FROM: Economic Division
REFERENCE:
SUBJECT: Sale of Nitroguanidine (Picrite) for Dominican Armed Forces

Security CONFID.

Date Feb. 6, 1964

File No.	
20-1-2-DOM	
19	file

JC H

The Commercial Counsellor in Santo Domingo has enquired of the Canadian Commercial Corporation whether an application for the export of nitroguanidine to the Dominican Armed Forces would be approved.

2. In late October the United States Embassy reported that an embargo on arms shipments to Dominica had been reimposed and expressed the hope that Canada would take similar action. Subsequently, our Charge d'Affaires in Santo Domingo suggested that the United States' recognition of the Dominican Government would probably lead to resumption of weapons deliveries.

3. The United States authorities have not so far told us that they have lifted their arms embargo. If we were to ask them they would probably now say they no longer expected us to halt Canadian arms shipments.

4. We should be grateful for your views regarding the export of nitroguanidine to the Dominican Republic.

[Signature]
Economic Division.

CIRCULATION
Ext. 326 (6/56)

file
diary
circulation

CONFIDENTIAL

20-1-2-DOM

Ottawa, de
January 29, 1964.

Dear Yvon,

Your letter of January 15 raised a timely and useful question concerning the nature and the tone of our present relations with the Triumvirate in the Dominican Republic and the desirability of a visit by you to Santo Domingo in the near future.

During the short life of the constitutional government of President Juan Bosch, we were conscious of the desirability of taking advantage of whatever opportunity existed at that time to make the Canadian presence felt in Santa Domingo. Indeed, we were anxious, in so far as it was feasible, to lend encouragement to a new government that seemed to betoken some salutary, albeit fragile, progress in the political evolution of the Dominican Republic. It was with these considerations in mind that authorization was granted for certain consular assistance to be extended by our Embassy in Havana to Dominican nationals in Cuba (see our letter XL-6 of Jan. 16, 1964 to Santo Domingo) and for the Canadian representative in Moscow to sign the nuclear test-ban treaty on behalf of the Dominican Republic. Moreover, one of our main reasons for suggesting to you last June that you visit Santo Domingo to present your credentials at the earliest convenient date in the summer was this desire to demonstrate our interest in the political development of the re nascent Dominican Republic. We also wished to compensate for the fact that during the period prior to Mr. Noble's appointment, the post of chargé d'affaires in Santo Domingo was being filled by a relatively junior officer. In this connection your August visit and your comments on the outlook for the Bosch Government were particularly valuable.

J.C.L.Y. Beaulne, Esq.,
Ambassador,
The Canadian Embassy,
CARACAS, Venezuela.

However, in the drastically changed political circumstances following the coup d'état and the installation in power of a non-representative civil junta by the military, it is beginning to appear that, at least for the present time, our relations with the Government of the Dominican Republic, which were resumed only after a considerable delay in keeping with the Hemispheric pattern, might best be carried on "in a minor key". As you have pointed out, political conditions are still extremely muddy, and may become even muddier in view of the uncertainties surrounding the schedule of frequent staggered elections and the shadowy intentions of the Dominican officer corps. Moreover, there is at the present juncture no special Canadian interest that can best be served by an early visit to Santo Domingo; certainly, there are no subjects on which representations in person at the Ambassadorial level seem necessary.

Accordingly, at this initial stage of a period of uncertainty, I consider that plans for a future visit to the Dominican Republic should be postponed indefinitely. We can, of course, have another careful look at this problem some six months from now, when it may be possible to see whether the Triumvirate has begun to find its feet, or whether the military rug will by then have been snatched from under it.

With best wishes,

A. J. PICK

A. J. Pick



AMBASSADE D'HAÏTI
OTTAWA, CANADA

AIDE - MEMOIRE

Le Gouvernement de la République d'Haïti a l'honneur de solliciter un visa de touriste (aller-retour) en faveur de Monsieur Luis Lorenzo Colon, ressortissant de la République Dominicaine.

Monsieur Luis Lorenzo Colon qui réside actuellement en Haïti, était chef de police dans le Gouvernement de l'ex-Président Trujillo.

L'Ambassade d'Haïti est prête à transmettre au Gouvernement haïtien toute demande d'information que le Ministère de la Citoyenneté et de l'Immigration voudra bien lui présenter.

Ottawa, le 13 janvier 1964.



We have received a copy of the cable you sent to Port-au-Prince as a result of our telephone call, requesting our Embassy there to take no action on any application received on behalf of Mr. Colon and to refer full particulars to Ottawa. ✓

We do not propose to take any action on this matter unless we receive an application on behalf of Mr. Colon. || *[Handwritten signature]*

Copy of this letter is being sent to the R.C.M.P.

[Handwritten signature]
G.E. White,
for Director of Immigration.

cc. Latin American

RECEIVED BY MAIL

20-1-2-DOM

DIVISION DE L'IMMIGRATION

IMMIGRATION BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF CREST AND IMMIGRATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
Ottawa, Ontario.

TO:	<i>Miss Badley</i>
	JAN 23 1964
	REGISTRY

OUR FILE NO. R. 2-22381

OTTAWA, 4, January 21, 1964.

25-9-1-DOM	
8	

Attention: Miss Badley, Consular Division.

This will confirm information given to you orally regarding the interest expressed by the Haitian Government in a proposed visit to Canada of Mr. Luis Lorenzo Colon, former Chief of Police in the Trujillo Government and now a resident of Haiti.

Mr. Musset Pierre-Jerome, the Charge d'Affaires for Haiti visited our office on January 10, 1964, to inquire about our requirements for visiting privileges as they would apply to Mr. Colon. He stated his Government had requested him to look into this matter. He did not state the purpose nor the length of the proposed visit. Mr. Pierre-Jerome wished to know whether the fact that we had experienced some difficulties with General Espaillet of the Dominican Republic, might prejudice an application on behalf of Mr. Colon. He was given a brief description of the non-immigrant requirements and was told that applications for admission are considered on their own individual merits. He then asked what the chances were of an application on behalf of Mr. Colon being approved and was told that an opinion could not be expressed for lack of information.

It was suggested to Mr. Pierre-Jerome that his Government should get in touch with our Embassy in Port-au-Prince where they would be provided with the appropriate instructions. Mr. Pierre-Jerome was also told he should write the Department if he wished more information regarding this particular matter.

good! *

Mr. Pierre-Jerome returned to the Department on January 13, and, on behalf of his Government, submitted a written request for a tourist enc. visa on behalf of Mr. Colon. A copy of his request is enclosed. He was told the information available was insufficient and it was suggested that he have Mr. Colon get in touch with the Canadian Embassy in Port-au-Prince.

... 2

** This would be a more correct procedure, than that of delivering an aide-memoire to Dept & Swiss.*

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Ref. file 20-1-2-DOM

20-1-2-DOM

FM: Santo Domingo	DATE	FILE	SECURITY
	DECEMBER 16, 1963	10-1-5-1	CONFID
TO: External Ottawa	NUMBER	PRECEDENCE	COMCENTRE USE ONLY
	132	DEFERRED	
INFO: Caracas Havana Washington		BY BAG	

Mr. McGeer

*file
LJE*

*Answered
Jan 16/64
Our letter
KL-6*

Ref.: Our Telegram 96 of September 30, 1963
Subject: Consular Activities in Cuba on Behalf of the Dominican Government.

Should matter be raised again by the Dominican Government, I would appreciate your authorization to offer Canadian cooperation in assisting the Dominicans in Cuba to return to the Dominican Republic given previous conditions that list of names be provided in advance and if necessary that individuals make their own travel arrangements.

2. Regarding Dominican Air Force pilot, I recommend consideration this matter be left until Dominicans make a specific new request for our assistance.

Leith

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION

ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	APPROVED BY
SIG. NAME: J. Clark Leith			SIG. NAME: Clark Leith

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(FILE COPY)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO:.....The Canadian Embassy,.....
SANTO DOMINGO, Dominican Republic

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
 EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference:..Your deferred telegram No: 132 of..
 December 16, 1963.

~~Subject~~.....
 Subject:..Consular Activities in Cuba.....
on behalf of the Dominican Republic

Security:..CONFIDENTIAL.....
 No:.....XL-6.....
 Date:.....January 16, 1964.....
 Enclosures:.....
 Air or Surface Mail:.....
 Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.	
20-1-2-DOM.	

References

As you will be aware, we originally granted authorization for certain Canadian consular assistance on behalf of the Dominican Republic to be extended by our Embassy in Havana to Dominican nationals in Cuba, subjects to the approval of the Cuban authorities. The decision to attempt to be of assistance was taken in part on the basis of the cordial relations prevailing between Canada and the constitutional government of President Bosch, as well as our desire to lend assistance and encouragement to a democratically-based government that seemed to imply some salutary progress in the political evolution of the Dominican Republic.

2. In the perhaps somewhat unlikely event that the Foreign Ministry should ever raise this matter again, we should feel obliged to reconsider the desirability of Canadian assistance in the light of the drastically changed circumstances which now prevail. Indeed, because of the present Dominican government's very different standing in the Hemisphere, we would be somewhat embarrassed by any move on the part of the Triumvirate to seek special courtesies from Canada at this time.

3. Accordingly, we wish you to be particularly careful to avoid giving the Dominican authorities any encouragement whatsoever to take up again the question of possible Canadian consular assistance on their behalf in Cuba.

Under-Secretary of State
 for External Affairs

Internal
Circulation

Consular Division

Distribution
to Posts

Caracas
Havana
Washington

20-1-2-DOM
291

CANADIAN EMBASSY



AMBASSADE DU CANADA

*File
please*

Apartado del Este 11452,
Caracas, Venezuela,
January 15, 1964.

Confidential

*Rec'd
[Signature]*

Dear Alfred:

Now that Mr. Noble is established as Chargé d'Affaires in the Dominican Republic, he suggested to me that I should pay a visit to Santo Domingo. I should appreciate instructions and briefing in this regard.

My short visit to Santo Domingo last August was very successful, in my opinion, and despite my misgivings and the premonitions I expressed about President Bosch's ability to carry on, I had hopes that it would be possible to make Canadian presence felt in the Dominican Republic. This is why I suggested that I should make regular visits and keep in close touch with the development of Canadian initiatives. At this time, the situation seems so confused and the information I receive so contradictory that I feel quite unable to propose a course of action.

A good friend of mine, Dr. Luis Aquiles Mejia, (who spent most of his life as an exile in Caracas and was Dominican Ambassador to Venezuela under the Council of State until President Bosch replaced him last Spring with Dr. Maximo Ares) flew yesterday to Santo Domingo. I understand that he has accepted the post of Foreign Minister under the Triumvirate. I told you that Dr. Maximo Ares had left a couple of months ago

Mr. A.J. Pick,
Latin American Division,
Department of External Affairs,
Langevin Block,
O t t a w a

.../2

Confidential


- 2 -

to re-organize the P.R.D. I have not seen him since and I presume that he is still in the Dominican Republic. I suppose that these two former envoys to Venezuela will now be bitter adversaries, although they seemed to get on well in Caracas.

I do not know what policy the Canadian Government has decided to follow towards the Dominican Republic until elections take place. I should be grateful if you could let me know what role I am expected to play in the circumstances.

Please accept my best regards.

Yours sincerely,



Yvon Beaulne,
Ambassador.

000058

NUMBERED LETTER

To: The Canadian Embassy,
SANTO DOMINGO, Dominican Republic.

From: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference: Your letter 269 of December 17, 1963.

Subject: Nuclear Test Ban Treaty -
Dominican Republic

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No.: XL5

Date: January 15, 1964

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No.:

Ottawa File No.	
20-1-2- 201 DOM.	
200042	

References

We have noted that when you delivered your Notes 218 and 219 of December 17, 1963 to the Foreign Ministry you thought it opportune to mention the fact that the Dominican Republic had not yet ratified the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. We also noted that you had offered, in the final paragraph of your First Person Note No. 218, to transmit the Dominican Instrument of Ratification to Moscow "when said ratification by the Government of the Dominican Republic has been completed."

2. We suppose that you took these initiatives on the assumption that Canada had already ratified the Treaty. However, the Canadian Instruments of Ratification have not yet been deposited, nor has a date yet been fixed for their deposit (although we expect this to be decided within the next week or so).

3. Under the circumstances, you will no doubt appreciate that your hints to the Dominican Foreign Ministry concerning ratification of the Treaty - while doubtless offered with the best of intentions - were not only premature but actually unwise in the absence of specific instructions from Ottawa to encourage the Dominican authorities to take early action on ratification.

4. While we do not expect that your oral and written remarks will have any serious repercussions, we would ask you to exercise due caution in future when transmitting factual information concerning the Treaty to the Dominican Foreign Ministry.

A. J. PICK

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Internal
Circulation

Disarmament

Distribution
to Posts

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

OUTGOING MESSAGE

FM: EXTERNAL	DATE	FILE	SECURITY
	JAN 10/64	83-8-2-DOM 20-1-2-DOM	RESTD
TO: SANTO DOMINGO	NUMBER		PRECEDENCE
	C-33		PRIORITY
INFO:	<i>file</i> <i>JCX</i>		

Ref.: URTEL JAN 9
Subject: COURTESY VISAS

COURTESY VISA FOR MATOS CONCEPCION AND ANY SIMILAR
FUTURE REQUEST CANNOT RPT NOT BE AUTHORIZED. PROCEDURES
OUTLINED IN OURTEL C2301 OCT 16 ARE TO BE APPLIED

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION NO STANDARD

LOCAL DONE BY DIV: LATIN AMERICAN DIV
PROTOCOL

ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	APPROVED BY
SIG..... NAME..... H CURRIE/EB	CONSUL R		J. WEBSTER SIG..... NAME..... R. CHAPUT

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Cooperatives
Workers in the
Subject Dominican Republic

DEC 21 1963

OTTAWA JOURNAL

Date Publication

Dominicans Find Trust at Premium

By CARMAN CUMMING

SANTO DOMINGO, Dominican Republic (CP) — During the 30-year dictatorship of Rafael Trujillo, Dominicans say, one in every three men worked for the government. Of the other two, one wanted to work for the government and the other was an informer.

Facetious or not, the saying points up one of the main problems Dominicans have faced in the 2½ years since Trujillo was assassinated. They find it hard to trust each other.

This in turn has meant a special kind of problem for Ignatius Larusic, a 38-year-old Canadian, who came here in mid-1962 to help revive the fledgling co-operative movement that almost expired in Trujillo's last years.

"There's a tremendous lack of confidence in neighbors here," Larusic says. "Everyone is afraid the others are going to take advantage of him. It runs through the whole fabric of national life."

There is even an expression for it: "La ley del embudo—the law of the funnel." Roughly, it means the big guy gets the big end of the funnel and the little guy gets the little end.

Larusic, a lean and hard-driving organizer, has been working to build up trust in small groups so they can get ready to move on to bigger things. Sometimes it's a simple and tough problem of finding one man that the others will trust to look after their money.

CO-OP BACKGROUND

A native of Cape North, N.S., Larusic was brought up on co-operatives and attended St. Francis Xavier University in Antigonish, birthplace of the movement.

After graduation he worked with Cape Breton fishing co-ops and also spent four years with the federal government. He came here as a volunteer when the Dominican Federation of Co-operatives, trying to re-establish after Trujillo's death, asked help from the Cody International Institute at St. Francis Xavier.

In the Dominican Republic, he has worked to get co-ops back in the field, put books back in order, develop educational programs.

His approach is direct, but he retains a careful sensitivity on the role of the outsider in helping to organize the movement.

Basically, he thinks, the co-ops will have to grow by themselves; in their own way. Outsiders can help them over only the toughest hurdles.

"Anything that affects the living and thinking of the people can't be brought in ready-made."

This is particularly true, he says, since the main problems are not economic or social but moral.

MORALITY NEEDED

"Until there is some basic morality in the Dominican economy and politics, real development is mythical."

Moral overtones mingle with practical instruction when Larusic speaks to one of the dozen or so groups—mostly credit co-ops—that he is working with.

He warns them that Dominicans have a tendency to gamble and that a co-op is not a get-rich-quick scheme, but only a means of accomplishing more in a group than could be achieved singly.

His small audience, sometimes joined by a stray dog or chicken, listens attentively and nods agreement.

At the end of the meeting Larusic goes over the books with the executive and helps straighten out entanglements.

But sometimes he finds it better to let the executive make mistakes and learn the hard way.

"In the long run, only Dominicans are going to make an impression here," he says. "Foreigners are not going to make any impact."

Refs
- Sent to Domingo
- Caracas
Done Feb 13/64
of file
R.J.C.H.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

OUTGOING MESSAGE

DATE	FILE	SECURITY
DEC 31/63	37-22-1-DOM 20-1-2-DOM	CONFID

FM: EXTERNAL OTTAWA

TO: LONDON	NUMBER	PRECEDENCE
	E-2306	PRIORITY

INFO: TANDC OTT JIB

*Multiple see
file
JCY*

Ref.: YOUR TEL 3478 DEC 18
 Subject: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

WE DO NOT KNOW OF ANY INQUIRY FROM THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC FOR PURCHASE OF CDN SABRE AIRCRAFT. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOME CONFUSION MAY HAVE ARISEN FROM NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN CANADAIR AND COLOMBIA CONCERNING PROPOSED SALE OF SABRE JETS TO THAT COUNTRY.

[Handwritten signature]
for.

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION	DDP L.A. Division	} Done	NO STD
ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	APPROVED BY
SIG... N. Haffey/mj	Economic	25640	SIG... O.G. Stoner

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(DUPLICATE)

DESPATCH

TO:.....The Canadian Embassy,.....
Santo Domingo, D.R......

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
 EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference: Your letters 174 of August 29, 1963.
and 270 of December 17, 1963.

Subject:.....
AMATEUR RADIO AGREEMENT.....
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.....

Security:.....
 No:..... E-1.....
 Date:... January 6, 1964.....
 Enclosures:..... One.....
 Air or Surface Mail:..... Air.....
 Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.	
<u>20-1-2-DOM</u>	
<u>41-8-9</u>	
	<i>file</i>

file
RJT

References

DOT

We would agree with your recommendation that the proposed Amateur Radio Agreement with the Dominican Republic might now be reconsidered following the recognition of the new Dominican Government by Canada.

2. We have considered the Note from the Dominican Foreign Ministry attached to your letter No. 174 of August 29, 1963 and find it acceptable. Accordingly, you may wish to ascertain if the Dominican authorities are still interested in such an agreement and, if so, advise us so that we may proceed to obtain an Order-in-Council authorizing Mr. K. F. Noble to conclude the agreement by way of an exchange of Notes.

3. Attached for your information is a copy of the Amateur Radio Agreement between Canada and Venezuela in which the text of the Notes appears in French, English and Spanish.

Internal Circulation

Latin American Div.

J. R. MCKINNEY,

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Distribution to Posts

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

OUTGOING MESSAGE

DATE	FILE	SECURITY
<i>Dec 21/63</i>	20-1-2-307 cc. <i>LOUIS</i>	UNCLAS
	20-1-2-307	

FM:

TO: HIS EXCELLENCY DR. DONALD REID CARRAL
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

NUMBER

PRECEDENCE

B-104

PRIORITY

INFO: SANTO DOMINGO.

Ref.:

Subject:

EXCELLENCY,

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO INFORM YOU THAT THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT HAS APPOINTED MR. KENNETH FREDERIC NORRIS AS CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AD INTERIM OF THE CANADIAN EMBASSY IN SANTO DOMINGO.

IN COMMENDING HIM TO YOU I ASK YOU TO AFFORD HIM EVERY FACILITY AND ASSISTANCE IN THE FULFILMENT OF HIS DUTIES.

ACCEPT, EXCELLENCY, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

PAUL MARTIN
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OF CANADA.

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION NO STD.

Minister's Office
cc. O/USNA
Latin American Div.
Personnel Div.
T & C - done in Protocol.

ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	APPROVED BY
SIG..... <i>R.F.</i> NAME..... <i>R. Farland/D</i>	Protocol	2-6136	SIG..... NAME..... PAUL MARTIN

Economic/J. R. McKinney/pa

JIB
L.A. Div. ←

20-1-2-DM

[Handwritten signatures and initials]

*W. Hammond
to be on return
copy*

[Handwritten signature]
file
[Handwritten initials]

Confidential

December 20, 1963.

The Deputy Minister,
Department of Trade and Commerce,
Ottawa.

Attn: Mr. E. C. Thorne

The Deputy Minister,
Department of Defence Production,
Ottawa.

Attn: Mr. R. M. Trites

Reported Negotiations for Sale of
Canadian Sabre Aircraft to the
Dominican Republic

We attach a copy of a self-explanatory telegram of December 18 from Canada House, London, querying a report that the Dominican Republic has been negotiating with Canada for the purchase of Canadian sabre aircraft. We assure that this report is unfounded and that it may have arisen from confusion with Canadair's negotiations with Colombia, but we would welcome any comment you might wish to offer. From this Department's standpoint, it would seem most unlikely that Canadian export permits could be issued for a transaction involving the sale of sabre aircraft to the present regime in the Dominican Republic.

J. R. MCKINNEY

[Handwritten initials]

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

FM LDN DEC18/63 CONFID
TO EXTERNAL 3478 PRIORITY
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

SLATER, AMERICAN DEPT FO, TOLD US TODAY THAT BEFORE FALL OF BOSCH REGIME HAWKER SIDDELY, WITH FO ENCOURAGEMENT, HAD BEEN ENDEAVOURING TO SELL HUNTER AIRCRAFT TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC WITH FAIR PROSPECT OF SUCCESS. INDEED GRANTING OF EXPORT LICENCES HAD BEEN APPROVED. AFTER FALL OF BOSCH REGIME FO HAD ASKED HAWKER TO DESIST AND HAWKER HAD DONE SO. SLATER EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS FIRM BRIT POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA TO WORK FOR SUCCESS OF ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS AND CERTAINLY NOT RPT NOT TO HELP GOVT THAT HAD COME INTO POWER IN MANNER FOLLOWED BY NEW REGIME IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

2. VERY RECENTLY HAWKER HAD TOLD FO THAT THEY HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT DOMINICANS WERE NEGOTIATING FOR PURCHASE OF CDN SABRE AIRCRAFT.

SLATER ASKED US IF WE COULD THROW ANY LIGHT ON THIS MATTER. WE SIMPLY UNDERTOOK TO REPORT AND ENQUIRE.

Protocol/R. Ferland/B

cc. Minister's Office
O/USSEA
→ Latin American Division
Personnel Division.

file: 22-9/DM/SDO-2
cc: 10315-40

December 18, 1963.

20-1-2-DOM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

Appointment of Chargé d'Affaires ad
interim in Santo Domingo, Dominican
Republic.

*File
JCN*

[Handwritten signatures and initials on the left margin]

Following the Canadian Government's recognition of the Dominican Government it is proposed, with the concurrence of the Department of Trade and Commerce, to appoint Mr. Kenneth Frederic Noble of the Department of Trade and Commerce as Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in Santo Domingo. Attached, for your information, are biographical notes on Mr. Noble.

2. In such instances, the accepted practice calls for a communication from Foreign Minister to Foreign Minister.

3. Accordingly, I attach for your signature a telegram to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Dominican Republic appointing Mr. Kenneth Frederic Noble as Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in Santo Domingo. Mr. Noble has not yet taken over his functions. The signed telegram will be held until we are advised that he is in Santo Domingo.

H.A.R.

Kenneth Frederic NOBLE

Born: Vancouver, B.C.; April 9, 1908.

Family: Married Jessie Elizabeth MacPhail; two sons, one daughter.

Education: King George V High School, Vancouver;
University of British Columbia, B.A. 1928;
University of California, post-graduate work 1929-1930.

Resided at: Vancouver.

Previous Career:

1928-29, 1928-30 Teaching Fellowship, University of California.

Associated with J.F. Noble of Vancouver.

1930-31 Real estate and insurance.

1931-32 Dominion Bureau of Statistics.

Personal Notes:

Member of University of California Chapter of Hon. Economic Fraternity.

1946 Justice of the Peace (Hong Kong).

1953 Coronation Medal.

Career with the Department:

1932 Appointed Junior Trade Commissioner March 9.

1933 Posted to Hong Kong as Assistant Trade Commissioner September 14.

1937 Transferred to Singapore as Assistant Trade Commissioner February 23.

1942 Transferred to Sydney as Assistant Trade Commissioner February 25.

1943 Canadian Shipping Board Representative, Australia.

1943-46 Special Representative in Australia for Canadian Association of
Life Assurance Companies

1945 Promoted to Trade Commissioner.

1947 Transferred to Hong Kong as Trade Commissioner February 12.

1951 Transferred to Cape Town as Trade Commissioner January 10.

1953 Transferred to Johannesburg as Trade Commissioner December 18.

1958-63 Transferred to Vancouver as Western Representative, Department
of Trade and Commerce November 1.

① Note.

Action copy has
gone to Economic
Div where act div.

20-1-2-DCM.

20-1-2-DCM


149
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7071

FM LDN DEC18/63 CONFID
TO EXTERNAL 3478 PRIORITY
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

SLATER, AMERICAN DEPT FO, TOLD US TODAY THAT BEFORE FALL OF BOSCH
REGIME HAWKER SIDDELY, WITH FO ENCOURAGEMENT, HAD BEEN ENDEAVOURING
TO SELL HUNTER AIRCRAFT TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC WITH FAIR PROSPECT
OF SUCCESS. INDEED GRANTING OF EXPORT LICENCES HAD BEEN APPROVED.
AFTER FALL OF BOSCH REGIME FO HAD ASKED HAWKER TO DESIST AND HAWKER
HAD DONE SO. SLATER EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS FIRM BRIT POLICY IN LATIN
AMERICA TO WORK FOR SUCCESS OF ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS AND CERTAINLY
NOT RPT NOT TO HELP GOVT THAT HAD COME INTO POWER IN MANNER
FOLLOWED BY NEW REGIME IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

2. VERY RECENTLY HAWKER HAD TOLD FO THAT THEY HAD REASON TO BELIEVE
THAT DOMINICANS WERE NEGOTIATING FOR PURCHASE OF CDN SABRE AIRCRAFT.

SLATER ASKED US IF WE COULD THROW ANY LIGHT ON THIS MATTER. WE
SIMPLY UNDERTOOK TO REPORT AND ENQUIRE.



20-1-2-00M
~~SECRET~~
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f 19

ACTION COPY

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EXTERNAL OTT

CPT WAA10 RAA160-E RAK144 ACRA412/DGNYX259 26 AAC

SANTODOMINGO 18 1120A

ETAT EXTERNAL

OTTAWA

133 REFYRTEL XL194 DECEMBER 16 SEE OUR TEL 131 DECEMBER 16

NO RPT NO WORD YET FROM NOBLE HOWEVER ANTICIPATED BY WEEKEND

DOMCAN

(BF) 1129A

CP TEL OTT

\$

EXTERNAL OTT

U

EMBAJADA DE LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA
OTTAWA

No. 507 (Continua).

El proceso electoral organizado según se ha indicado, requiere que los Partidos Políticos sometan a la consideración de la ciudadanía, para su difusión, conocimiento y estudio, los ante-proyectos de constitución que sustenten, con antelación a la celebración de las elecciones.


La Embajada de la República Dominicana hace provecho de la oportunidad para reiterar al Departamento de Re-laciones Exteriores del Canadá los sentimientos de su más alta consideración.



2 de Diciembre de 1963,

O T T A W A .





TO: *Mr. Jannet*
DEC 16 1963

20-1-2-DOM
DOM
20-7-14
ap/sk

OTT035CPT WAA13 BAA 72-E RAG203 ACRA71/DGNYX54 17/16 CANADIANGHR VIA

SANTODOMINGO 16 117P

ETAT EXTERNAL

OTTAWA

131 REFYRTEL XL193 DECEMBER FOURTEEN / NOTE DELIVERED TO FOREIGN MINISTER THIS MORNING

Dec 16
DOMCAN

20-DOM-14
see
crossed with
our tel
XC 194 of
Dec 16.6
(page 1)
file
JH

(BF) 135P

CP TEL OTT

\$

EXTERNAL OTT

VVVVV

Department of the Secretary of State
Secrétariat d'Etat

Foreign Languages - Langues étrangères

Translation Bureau
Bureau des traductions

20-1-2-DM
~~20-DM-1~~
20 02

Our No. 1430 Your No. External Affairs.

Notre no. spanish Votre no.

C. K.

J 22
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.. 1

Embassy of the Dominican Republic
Ottawa.
Number 507 .

The Embassy of the Dominican Republic attentively greets Canada's Department of External Affairs and has the honour to advise that the Civil Triumvirate, which governs the Dominican Republic, has voted, on November 26, 1963, Bill (law) number 68, through which the dates have been set for the elections that are to be held for the various elective officials who will guide the destinies of the Country. In this respect, between the first of September and the thirtieth of November, 1964¹⁹⁶⁴; a census will be taken of the persons that are to have a vote in the elections and elections held for the Mayors of the Boroughs. The elections for municipal officials (aldermen and trustees) will be held on January 15th, 1965. On the first of March 1965, elections will be held to make up the members of the Assembly for the revision of the Constitution. The members of the National Congress are to be ^{elected} held on the 24th of June, 1965. Finally, on the 15th of July, 1965, elections will be held for the President and the Vice President of the Republic. The winning candidates will assume authority on the 16th of August, 1965.

It has been formally requested that the Organization of American States send a technico-practical commission that would make recommendations for the preparation and organizing of the election proceedings in a democratic manner that would restore constitutionality, that would assure the regional support of this international organization and that would guarantee the stability of the government to be elected.

The electoral process organized as has been indicated, requires that the Political Parties submit to the consideration of the citizens, for their knowledge and study, the draft plans of the constitution that they advocate, in advance of the holding of the elections.

Pal

.. / 2

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
REGISTRY

DEC 11 11 02 AM '63

[Faint, mostly illegible text, likely a teletype or typed message, containing several paragraphs of communication.]

Department of the Secretary of State
Secrétariat d'Etat

Foreign Languages - Langues étrangères

Translation Bureau
Bureau des traductions

Our No. 1430 Your No.
Notre no. spanish Votre no.
C. K.

.. 2

The Embassy of the Dominican Republic takes this opportunity of reiterating the sentiments of the highest consideration for Canada's Department of External Affairs.

(initials not clear)

seal of the Embassy of
the Dominican Republic
Canada

December 2, 1963,
O T T A W A .

(translator's note : Sheet 1 , Line 9 , appears to contain an error, as the year should really be 1964. However, it is year 1965 that is written in the original note, per sheet 1, line 9 also.)

20-1-2-DOM

EMBAJADA DE LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA

OTTAWA

No. 507.

File
[Handwritten signature]

La Embajada de la República Dominicana saluda muy atentamente al Departamento de Relaciones Exteriores del Canadá y tiene el honor de informar que el Triunvirato Civil que gobierna la República Dominicana ha votado, en fecha 26 de Noviembre de 1963, la Ley No. 68, mediante la cual han sido organizadas y se han fijado las fechas de las elecciones que serán celebradas para elegir los distintos funcionarios electivos -- que han de regir los destinos del País. Al efecto, entre el primero de Septiembre y treinta de Noviembre de 1964 se hará un empadronamiento de las personas que votarán en las elecciones y se elegirán los ^{e local reeves} Alcades Pedáneos; el 15 de Enero de 1965 se hará la elección de los funcionarios municipales (síndicos y regidores); el primero de Marzo de 1965 se efectuarán las -- elecciones para integrar los miembros de la Asamblea Revisora de la Constitución; el 24 de Junio de 1965 serán electos los -- miembros del Congreso Nacional y, finalmente, el 15 de Julio de 1965 se celebrarán las elecciones para elegir el Presidente y el Vice-Presidente de la República. Los candidatos triunfantes asumirán el poder el 16 de Agosto de 1965.

Se ha solicitado formalmente a la Organización de Estados Americanos el envío de una comisión técnico-práctica -- que formule recomendaciones para preparar y organizar en forma democrática el proceso eleccionario por el cual se va restau-- rar la constitucionalidad, asegure el respaldo regional de ese organismo internacional y garantice la estabilidad del gobierno que resulte electo.

#126

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

T.C. Hammond

Subject Canadian Priests In Dominican Republic

Date December 16, 1963 Publication The Gazette

20-1-2-DOM

file
707

Canadian Priests In Dominican Republic

YAMASA, Dominican Republic. — In the high country of the south-central Dominican Republic, Rev. James Walsh sets out for Mass clad in a starched white surplice, in a jeep, with two sky rockets under his arm.

The sky rockets, serving in lieu of church bells, are typical of the way half a hundred Canadian priests have adapted to life in the Dominican Republic.

When Father James arrives at the country chapel, after bouncing over a pasture field, three boys jump down from the back of the jeep. They touch off the rockets and watch with satisfaction as two puffs of smoke high in the mountain sky signal to the parishioners.

Then Father James, a native of Toronto, who has spent most of his 25 years as a priest in the Dominican Republic, smiles tolerantly and goes inside the wooden chapel.

Three hours later, after confessions and Mass, the chapel is surrounded by scores of Dominicans who

By CARMAN CUMMING

linger to gossip, relax and chew stalks of sugar cane.

Father James — or Father Santiago as he is known here — climbs back into the jeep, shoes all but six or eight parishioners out of the back and moves on.

With one other Canadian priest, Father James serves a parish of 40,000 souls in the hills north of Santo Domingo.

His colleague is Rev. Lionel Walsh, a Newfoundlander, and no relation.

Most of their work is covered by jeep, but sometimes they have to resort to mules, travelling tricky mountain trails into the hinterland.

Their headquarters, St. Joseph's Mission of the Scarborough Order, is in Yamasa, a neat town of 2,000.

Near the church, six sisters of the Grey Nuns of Pembroke, Ont., operate a public school and high school along with a clinic.

Three other Canadian girls — two nurses and a secretary — also arrived recently to help

with the clinic, which serves some 300 patients a day.

The size of the mission creates some odd problems for the Canadian priests.

Father Santiago says he once performed 180 baptisms in one day — but he hastens to add that this really isn't many. Some priests have gone as high as 800.

Mass marriages are also common as the church works hard to stabilize the erratic Dominican family life.

But the interests of the Canadian priests go well beyond the morals of the community.

Father Santiago proudly takes a visitor to see the local co-operative, where he inspects a bin of cocoa beans and comments worriedly that the campesinos are still bringing them in too wet.

The next stop is a farm on the outskirts of town, to inspect a number of pigs brought in for breeding purposes by the peace corps.

Other foreigners here say the impact of the Canadian priests has been far out of proportion to their numbers.

L A Div

20-1-2-DOM

*file
JLV*

PRIORITY PG118 PRESS GUIDANCE DISTRIBUTION DEC16/63

RECOGNITION OF DOMINICAN GOVT

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF TEL XL193 DEC14 TO SDOMINGO QUOTE THIS IS
YOUR AUTHORITY TO ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF DOMINICAN FOREIGN SECRETA-
RYS NOTE NO.17667 SEP27 THUS RECOGNIZING THE TRIUMVIRATE AS THE
GOVT OF DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.YOU SHOULD DELIVER YOUR NOTE JUST AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE.UNQUOTE.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

OUTGOING MESSAGE

28

FM: EXTERNAL	DATE	FILE	SECURITY
	DEC 14 1963	20-1-2-DEM.	UNCLASS
TO: SANTO DOMINGO		NUMBER	PRECEDENCE
		XL 193	OPIMMEDIATE
INFO: WASHINGTON			OPIMMEDIATE
MATO PARIS (FOR SSEA)			PRIORITY
CARACAS		Dec 14/63	OPIMMEDIATE

65/32

Ref.:

Subject: RECOGNITION OF THE DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT

THIS IS YOUR AUTHORITY TO ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE DOMINICAN FOREIGN SECRETARY'S NOTE NO. 17667 OF SEPT 27 (A COPY OF WHICH WAS ATTACHED TO YOUR LETTER 209 OF SEPT 30) THUS RECOGNIZING THE TRIUMVIRATE AS THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. YOU SHOULD DELIVER YOUR NOTE JUST AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

*PG distribution
(to all posts)*

*Refs
Legal
Protocol
Consular
Passport Office
Press & Liaison
J.C. (Mr. Tubaku)*

*done
41*

*done
Dec 14/63*

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION STANDARD CC: Legal Div (Done in L. A. Div)

ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	APPROVED BY
SIG... <i>J.C.</i> NAME... TCHammond	Latin American	22480	APPROVED BY SIG... <i>K.B. BARSON</i> NAME...

FM EXTERNAL OTT DEC14/63

TO SDOMINGO XL193 OPIMMED

INFO WASHDC OPIMMED NATOPARIS(FOR SSEA)PRIORITY

RECOGNITION OF DOMINICAN GOVT

THIS IS YOUR AUTHORITY TO ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF DOMINICAN
FOREIGN SECRETARYS NOTE NO.17667 SEP27(A COPY OF WHICH WAS ATTACHED
TO YOURLET 209 SEP30)THUS RECOGNIZING THE TRIMVIRATE AS THE GOVT
OF DOMINICANREPUBLIC.YOU SHOULD DELIVER YOUR NOTE JUST AS SOON
AS POSSIBLE.



416 XL

To: *Mr. Hamman*
1963

20-1-2-007.
~~20-1-2-007~~
del

seen
cap

FM NATOPARIS DEC14/63 CONFID

TO EXTERNAL 2775 OPIMMED

INFO WASHDC

REF YOURTEL XL192 DEC13

RECOGNITION OF THE DOMINICAN GOVT

I AGREE THAT THERE IS NOW NO RPT NO REASON TO DELAY LONGER
RECOGNITION OF THE DOMINICAN GOVT AND YOU MAY INSTRUCT THE
MISSION IN SDOMINGO TO DELIVER AN APPROPRIATE NOTE. THE PRIME
MINISTER SHOULD BE INFORMED OF THE ACTION BEING TAKEN AND A
COPY OF THE REFTEL SHOWN TO HIM

MARTIN

Ref
Caracas
Santa
domingo
(by bag)

done
Dec 14
ST

file
JL

second copy not returned by Duty Officer
Concentra/4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Return to
Te Hammond
R. A. New

OUTGOING MESSAGE *65*

FM: EXTERNAL	DATE	FILE	SECURITY
	DEC 13 1963	20-1-2-DOM	CONFID.
TO: NATO PARIS	NUMBER	PRECEDENCE	
	XL 192	OPIIMMEDIATE	
INFO: WASHINGTON			OPIIMMEDIATE

Ref.:

Subject: RECOGNITION OF THE DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT FOLLOWING FOR THE MINISTER:

Refs Caracas Santo Domingo by boy done J. A.

IN A MEMORANDUM OF OCTOBER 3 WE RECOMMENDED TO YOU THAT CANADIAN RECOGNITION OF THE NEW DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT MIGHT BEST BE POSTPONED UNTIL A NUMBER OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AND THE MORE IMPORTANT LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES HAD EXTENDED RECOGNITION. BRITAIN, FRANCE, BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS RECOGNIZED, THE NEW GOVERNMENT SEVERAL WEEKS AGO, AND ARGENTINA DID SO ON DECEMBER 11. A NUMBER OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, EXCEPT MEXICO, VENEZUELA AND COSTA RICA, WHICH ARE NOT REPEAT NOT LIKELY TO ACT SOON, WILL PROBABLY FOLLOW THE ARGENTINE EXAMPLE VERY SHORTLY. WE LEARNED IN A CABLE FROM OUR EMBASSY IN SANTO DOMINGO OF TODAY'S DATE THAT THE UNITED STATES CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN SANTO DOMINGO HAS ~~NOT~~ RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO RECOGNIZE THE DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT TOMORROW, DECEMBER 14. THIS HAS NOW BEEN CONFIRMED BY EMBWASH.

2. THERE WOULD, THEREFORE, NO/LONGER SEEM TO BE REASON FOR DELAY IN RECOGNIZING THE NEW GOVERNMENT, SINCE IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT A NUMBER OF MAJOR COUNTRIES HAVE ALREADY DONE SO OR ARE PREPARED TO DO SO. SUCH RECOGNITION WOULD BE IN KEEPING WITH THE GENERAL CANADIAN POLICY OF RECOGNIZING AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME DE FACTO REGIMES WHEN THEY ARE IN EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF A COUNTRY.

3. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO LEARN ~~AS~~ AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHETHER YOU AGREE THAT RECOGNITION BE EXTENDED IMMEDIATELY.

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION STANDARD CC: Legal Div (Done in L.A. Div)
T. + C Mr Fletcher

ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	APPROVED BY
<i>Te Hammond/McL</i>	Latin American	22480	M. CADIEUX
SIG.....			SIG.....
NAME.....			NAME.....


20-1-2-DOM

FM EXTERNAL OTT DEC13/63 CONFD
TO NATOPARIS XL192 OPIMMED
INFO WASHDC OPIMMED
RECOGNITION OF THE DOMINICAN GOVT
FOLLOWING FOR THE MINISTER

file
JcW

IN A MEMO OF OCT3 WE RECOMMENDED TO YOU THAT CDN RECOGNITION OF THE NEW DOMINICAN GOVT MIGHT BEST BE POSTPONED UNTIL A NUMBER OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AND THE MORE IMPORTANT LATINAMERICAN COUNTRIES HAD EXTENDED RECOGNITION. BRITAIN, FRANCE, BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS RECOGNIZED THE NEW GOVT SEVERAL WEEKS AGO, AND ARGENTINA DID SO ON DEC11. A NUMBER OF LATINAMERICAN COUNTRIES, EXCEPT MEXICO, VENEZUELA AND COSTARICA, WHICH ARE NOT RPT NOT LIKELY TO ACT SOON, WILL PROBABLY FOLLOW THE ARGENTINE EXAMPLE VERY SHORTLY. WE LEARNED IN A CABLE FROM OUR EMB IN SDOMINGO OF TODAYS DATE THAT THE USA CHAGE DAFFAIRES IN SDOMINGO HAS RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO RECOGNIZE THE DOMINICAN GOVT TOMORROW, DEC14. THIS HAS NOW BEEN CONFIRMED BY EMBWASH.

2. THERE WOULD, THEREFORE, NO RPT NO LONGER SEEM TO BE REASON FOR DELAY IN RECOGNIZING THE NEW GOVT, SINCE IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT A NUMBER OF MAJOR COUNTRIES HAVE ALREADY DONE SO OR ARE PREPARED TO DO SO. SUCH RECOGNITION WOULD BE IN KEEPING WITH THE GENERAL CDN POLICY OF RECOGNIZING AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME DE FACTO REGIMES WHEN THEY ARE IN EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THE ADMIN OF A COUNTRY.
3. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO LEARN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHETHER YOU AGREE THAT RECOGNITION BE EXTENDED IMMEDIATELY.



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
Top Secret
DEC 13 1963
XL

FM WASHDC DEC13/63 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 4122 OPIMMED
INFO LDN NATOPARIS(FOR MINISTER)
TT SDOMINGO CARACAS DE OTT
REF OURTEL 3935 DEC2 AND TELECON PICK-ROBINSON DEC13
USA RECOGNITION OF DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HONDURAS
THIS WILL CONFIRM THAT USA PLANS TO ANNOUNCE RECOGNITION OF
DR AND ALSO HONDURAS AT 12 NOON TOMORROW DEC14. IN GIVING US THIS INFO
TODAY CROCKETT DIR OFFICE OF CARIBBEAN AND MEXICAN AFFAIRS APOLOG-
IZED FOR HAVING OVERLOOKED NOTIFYING US PREVIOUSLY IN WASHDC OF
THIS DECISION. HE SAID THAT USA ADMIN HAD BEEN MOVING GRADUALLY
IN DIRECTION OF RECOGNITION BEFORE PRES KENNEDYS DEATH WHICH HAD
OF COURSE INTERRUPTED HIGH LEVEL ACTION. ANNOUNCEMENT OF NOV26
BY DR OF SCHEDULE OF ELECTIONS HAD BEEN A HELPFUL DEVELOPMENT
FACILITATING RENEWED ATTENTION TO RECOGNITION PROBLEM. EXACT TIMING
ON WHICH DECISION WAS TAKEN IS UNKNOWN TO US BUT OUR IMPRESSION IS
THAT IT PROBABLY DATES FROM EARLY THIS WEEK PERHAPS DEC9 OR 10.
2. IMPLICATION OF CROCKETTS REMARKS WAS THAT DECISION TO RECOGNIZE
DR AND HONDURAS DID NOT RPT NOT REFLECT CHANGE IN USA PHILOSOPHY
ON RECOGNITION BUT WAS RATHER END PRODUCT OF PROCESS ALREADY BEGUN
UNDER KENNEDY ADMIN. WHILE THIS MAY WELL BE TRUE WE SHOULD NOT RPT
NOT BE SURPRISED AS TIME GOES ON TO SEE TENDENCY FOR JOHNSON ADMIN
TO BE SOMEWHAT LESS CONCERNED ABOUT CONSIDERATIONS OF POLITICAL
REFORM AND CONSTITUTIONALITY AND READIER TO SUPPORT REGIMES IN
EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF NATIONAL TERRITORY AND DECLARING THEMSELVES
FRIENDLY TO USA.***

seen
copy

Feb
1964

Refs
Caracas
Santo Domingo
(by boy)
done
dec 14



ACTION COPY

414

<i>XL</i>	To: <i>Mr. Hammond</i>
	DEC 11 1963

XL

FM SDOMINGO DEC 13/63 CONFD
 TO EXTERNAL 130 OPIMMED
 INFO TT WASHDC CARACAS DE OTT
 USA RECOGNITION
 AMERICAN CHARGE DAFFAIRES INFORMED LATE LAST NIGHT
 OF HIS INSTRUCTIONS RECOGNIZING GOVT SAT DEC 14

<i>20-1-2-DOM</i>
<i>DOIM-14</i>
<i>19</i> <i>19</i>

feh

LEITH

Commonwealth Div.

D.L.(2)

Latin American Division

Pass and Liaison Div

U.S. Division

Santo Domingo Caracas

Consular/APHIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

20-1-2-DOM

Ottawa, December 12, 1963

Photo File No. 60-40

*file
JEX*

The Deputy Minister,
Department of Citizenship and Immigration,
Ottawa.

RE: Deportation of Dominican Citizens

We are forwarding for your information and any action which you may consider necessary a copy of letter No. 245 of November 22, 1963, and its two enclosures, from the Canadian Embassy Santo Domingo, D.R.

In accordance with previous practice, we shall continue to telephone promptly to your Admissions Division any information regarding prospective deportees which we may receive as suggested in paragraph 5 of the attached letter.

...

ROGER CHARLTON

Under Secretary of State
for External Affairs

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy,
Santo Domingo, D.R.

Reference:

Subject: Deportation of Dominican Citizens

Security: Restricted

No: 245

Date: November 22, 1963

Enclosures: TWO

Air or Surface Mail: Courier

Post File No: 10-1-1

Ottawa File No.	
60-40	
8	47

Mr. Donald

References

It was reported in the November 17 edition of Listin Dieric that the Martinique authorities had announced they would no longer permit exiled Dominicans to land on their territory. The article also stated that the Puerto Rican authorities had unofficially adopted the same attitude, thus effectively closing off the "principal" routes and destinations for Dominican deportees except that via Kingston, Toronto and Montreal, to Paris. A clipping and an office translation of the pertinent section of this article are attached.

Copy out 60-AW-1-40

2. We have confirmed with the French Embassy that exiled Dominicans are no longer being allowed to land on French overseas territories. The French Chargé d'Affaires, s.i., stated that approximately twenty Dominican deportees had so far been allowed into France. He hinted, however, that future applications by such persons for entry to France would be turned down.

3. We have been told by an American consular officer that Dominicans exiled by the new government "have a pretty good chance of being accepted" by the United States authorities if they possess valid American visas. However, our informant stated that no visas were being issued to facilitate the deportation of any person.

4. The British Embassy has informed us that they have advised the Jamaican authorities that the granting of Jamaican visas to Dominican deportees could lead to a rather uncomfortable situation. As a case in point, the British First Secretary mentioned that a Jamaican visa had been authorized for Dr. MEJIA Ricart on the understanding that this worthy would enter Mexico via Jamaica. MEJIA Ricart is still in Jamaica: it is not certain whether he has been refused an entry permit by the Mexicans or whether he has yet made application for one. In any event, Mr. Campbell thought that "a few more weeks of MEJIA" and Jamaica's doors would be closed too.

5. When that happens, there will be little danger of any of these political undesirables ending up in Canada. However, in the meantime, we have unofficially asked for, and received, assurances from the French and British Embassies, and from Pan American Airways, that they will inform us of prospective Dominican deportees transiting Canada.

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

Caracas

November 17, 1963

LISTIN DIARIO

It was made known yesterday that the authorities of the island of Martinique have declared that they will not accept on their territory any person with deportee status.

The Martinique route for transporting those deported by the Dominican Government is considered "closed".

It was indicated that the only route "open" is to Kingston, Jamaica; Toronto and Montreal, Canada, and Paris, France.

The first deportations of citizens made by the government installed by virtue of September twenty-fifth's coup d'état were effected by way of Martinique.

The two principal destinations until today were Paris, France and San Juan, Puerto Rico.

It is said that Dr. Mario Mejía Ricart and Señor Luis Rissi, two of the latest deportees to Paris, have remained in Kingston. It was asserted that they do not wish to continue the trip.

There was news yesterday that the Puerto Rican authorities had adopted the same attitude as that of Martinique with respect to Dominican deportees, but this was not confirmed.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Subject.....

Date November 17, 1963 Publication.....

Latin Daily

Martinica:

No Aceptará Deportados

Las autoridades de la isla de Martinica declararon que no aceptarían en su territorio a ninguna persona en calidad de deportado, según se supo ayer.

La vía de Martinica para transportar a los deportados por el gobierno dominicano se considera "cerrada".

Se indicó que la única vía "abierta" es la de Kingston, Jamaica; Toronto y Montreal en Canadá y París Francia.

Las primeras deportaciones de ciudadanos hechas por el gobierno instalado a raíz del golpe de Es-

tado del 25 de septiembre se realizaron vía Martinica.

Los dos principales sitios de destino hasta ahora son París, Francia y San Juan, Puerto Rico.

Se dijo que el doctor Marcelo Mejía Ricart y el señor Luis Rissi, dos de los últimos deportados hacia París permanecen en Kingston. Se negaron a continuar el viaje según se afirmó.

Se tuvo noticias ayer de que las autoridades portorriqueñas adoptarán la misma actitud que las de

Para el País

Martinica con respecto a los deportados dominicanos, pero no se confirmó.

Aunque los dominicanos deportados parten en diversas líneas aéreas, en la mayoría de los casos las reservaciones y billetes son de la Compañía Dominicana de Aviación según se dijo.

El número de dominicanos y extranjeros que no pueden obtener pasajes para el país rebasa los ochenta.

Los nombres de esas personas han sido suministrados paulatinamente a las líneas aéreas y marítimas radicadas en el territorio nacional por la dirección general de Migración.

Claudio Torres el corresponsal del LISTINDIARIO, que fue deportado el pasado martes presumiblemente hacia París salió de aquí en un jet de la Pan American, pero su pasaje era de la CDA, según se informó.

Después que Torres salió del país no se ha vuelto a saber de él.



415
XL

To the President
DEC 12 1963

XL

20-1-2-DOM
~~20-DEA-14~~
19 19

FM SDOMINGO DEC 12 '63 CONF CDN EYES ONLY
TO EXTERNAL UNN²⁹ OPIMMED
INFO TT WASHDC CARACAS DE OTT
USA RECOGNITION

USA CHARGE DAFFAIRES CONFIDENTIALLY EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL FEELINGS
TODAY THAT USA WOULD RECOGNIZE DOMINICAN GOVT SHORTLY. SEVERAL
REASONS BEHIND FEELING BUT BASICALLY AMERICANS EVIDENTLY PREPARED
TO RECOGNIZE HONDURAS SHORTLY AND FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE DOMINICAN
GOVT AT LEAST SIMULTANEOUSLY WOULD PLACE AMERICANS IN UNTENABLE
POSITION HERE EG APPEARING TO SUPPORT LEFT WING (GUERILLAS?).
2. APPEAR THAT OTHER HEMISPHERE COUNTRIES INCLUDING BRAZIL AND
COLOMBIA WILL RECOGNIZE WITHIN DAY OR TWO HOWEVER NO RPT NO CON-
FIRMATION OF THIS

file

LEITH



#13

REPRODUCTION COPY

To: *[Handwritten signature]*
X DEC 15 1983
[Handwritten initials]

[Handwritten signature] XL

20-1-2-DOM

~~20-DOM-14~~
19 19

FM SDOMINGO DEC 12/63 CONFID

TO EXTERNAL 128 OPIMMED

INFO TT CARACAS DE OTT

RECOGNITION

ARGENTINA RECOGNIZED YESTERDAY.

2. REPEATING MY RECOMMENDATIONS PARA 8 MY TEL 125 NOV 19,

PARTICULARLY RECOGNITION BEFORE USA

CA 20-DOM-14

*Repeated info Wash DC
Openly Dec 13/63
JLX*

[Handwritten signature]

LEITH


FBIS '5 OFFICIAL USE ONLY

LIMA AFP IN SPANISH 2005 11 DEC 63 P

(TEXT) BUENOS AIRES--ACCORDING TO AN ANNOUNCEMENT MADE TO
NEWSMEN BY FOREIGN MINISTER MIGUEL ZABALA ORTIZ, THE ARGENTINE
GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED TO RECOGNIZE THE GOVERNMENTS OF HONDURAS
AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

11 DEC 1035P MLH/DP

Handwritten:
W. B. ...
Hammer ...
LA



To: Mr. Hamm
DEC 3 1963

XL 411

20-1-2-DOM
~~20-DOM-14~~
all in

(cc 20-DOM-14)

FM WASHDC DEC2/63 CONFD

TO EXTERNAL 3935 PRIORITY

INFO BAG CARACAS SDOMINGO DE OTT

REF YOURTEL XL185 NOV29 AND SDOMINGO TEL125 NOV19

USA RECOGNITION OF DOMINICAN GOVT

ACCORDING TO SOWASH (DESK OFFICER IN STATE DEPT) USA POSITION ON RECOGNITION HAS NOT RPT NOT CHANGED SINCE OUR TELS 3502 OCT28 AND 3568 NOV1. USA OFFICIALS ARE HOWEVER STUDYING NOV27 ANNOUNCEMENT OF DOMINICAN REP TO OAS CONCERNING DOMINICAN AUTHORITIES PLAN TO HOLD ELECTIONS STARTING WITH RURAL SHERIFFS MID64 AND BUILDING UP TO PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN JUL65. SOWASH INDICATED USA GOVT WOULD SEEK MORE INFO ON ELECTION COMMITMENT OF DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AUTHORITIES BEFORE DECIDING ON RECOGNITION. HE VENTURED PERSONAL COMMENT THAT IN VIEW OF PAST DOMINICAN EXPERIENCE WITH DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES, SPREAD OF ONE AND ONE HALF YEARS BETWEEN SHERIFF AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS MIGHT LEAD TO PERIOD OF CONSIDERABLE INSTABILITY AND JEOPARDIZE SUCCESS OF LATTER. ON THE OTHER HAND, DECISION TO HOLD PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN JUL65 IS IN LINE WITH DOMINICAN REPUBLIC PROMISE OF LAST SUMMER TO RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVT WITHIN TWO YEARS.
2. WE HOPE TO CONSULT SOWASH AGAIN SHORTLY AND REPORT ON PROGRESS.

file
JCS

Refs
all
LA
posts
(if any)
(del)
JH

LA

UNCLASSIFIED

20-1-2-DOM

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

UNCLASSIFIED 16 NOVEMBER 1963
FROM SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICA
TO HIS EXCELLENCY K. J. HOLYOAKE, MINISTER OF EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS, WELLINGTON

File
JCH

Permit me the honour to salute Your Excellency and take this opportunity to declare that the Civil Triumvirate Government of Dominica has maintained respect for and has continued to guarantee the fundamental rights of the people in accordance with Article 8 of the 1962 Constitution. It has reaffirmed and maintained the principal provisions of Article 5 of the Charter of the Organisation of American States and the Declaration of the IX Inter-American Conference at Bogota, has clearly maintained liberty and justice and has fulfilled its international obligations, and has democratically limited the powers conferred on it to a definite period during which it will respect civil liberties, national and international institutions and will ultimately hold free elections, open to all political parties.

With the complete support of the Dominican people the Government takes this opportunity officially to request your good office so that your illustrious Government will recognise the Triumvirate Government, thus maintaining the unbreakable links of friendship which happily have always united our peoples and Governments. By furthering the complete access to the community of free nations of the world which Dominican dignity deserves you would help Dominica to a full recovery.

I reiterate in the name of the friendly peoples of the Western World, the unconditional "amity" (word unclear) of the Dominican people.

(Signed) Donald J. Reid Cabral
Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Dominica

(Q.19687)

Prime Minister
Secretary of External Affairs

Received: 19 November 1963 2130Z

UNCLASSIFIED

000095

20-1-2-DOM

SEEN BY THE MINISTER

RESTRICTED

December 12, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

Correspondence Concerning Canadian Recognition
of the Present Dominican Government

*file
JEN*

Attached for your signature, if you agree, is a reply to the letter from Mr. Robert A. Carr, a Canadian businessman residing in the Dominican Republic who suggests that Canada should now recognize the new government in that country. While we do not consider that any useful purpose would be served by engaging in debate with Mr. Carr concerning the arguments put forward in his letter, we should perhaps not let pass unchallenged the implication he makes that the Canadian position is due primarily to United States "influence", since in fact we have received no representations from the United States on this subject.

2. In our Memorandum of October 3 we recommended that Canadian recognition of the de facto government of the Dominican Republic, which was installed in power following a military coup d'état on September 25, 1963, should be postponed until a number of Western European and major Latin American countries had extended recognition. While the first condition has been met now that Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands have recognized the new government, to date no major Latin American country has done so. (As far as we are aware, the only Latin American countries to have recognized are Paraguay, Honduras and Guatemala.)

3. We are closely following developments in connection with the possible recognition of the Dominican Triumvirate, and will submit to you a further memorandum just as soon as it appears appropriate to take action in this matter. In the meantime, for your background information we are attaching copies of an exchange of telegrams with our Embassy in Washington on this subject.

2

N.A.R.
N. A. R.

*Letter signed by SSEA
12.12.63, mailed*

b

12.12.59(05)

MINISTERS OFFICE
DEC 12 1963
- 2228 -

FM EXTERNAL NOV29/63 CONFD

TO WASHDC XL185 PRIORITY

INFO BAG CARACAS SDOMINGO DE OTT

SDOMINGO TEL 125 NOV19

RECOGNITION OF THE DOMINICAN GOVT

WE HAVE RPTD TO YOU SDOMINGOS REFTEL INDICATING THE INITIATION OF LOCAL PRESSURES FOR CDN RECOGNITION ON THE PART OF DOMINICAN FOREIGN MINISTER ACTING IN CONCERT WITH CERTAIN CDN BUSINESS INTERESTS IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

2. THE DE FACTO GOVT OF DOMINICAN REPUBLIC HAS SO FAR SHOWN NO RPT NO DISPOSITION TO MAKE ANY SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSIONS LEADING TO AN EARLY RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONALITY OR REP INSTITUTIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS OPEN TO DOUBT WHETHER FURTHER DELAY ON THE PART OF MAJOR HEMISPHERE COUNTRIES IN RECOGNIZING THE PRESENT GOVT IMPOSED BY THE MILITARY IS LIKELY TO LEAD TO ANY IMPROVEMENT IN POLITICAL SITUATION IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

3. IN VIEW OF FACTORS NOTED IN PRECEDING PARAS, WE ARE BEGINNING TO GIVE CONSIDERATION TO QUESTION OF TIMING OF CDN RECOGNITION OF PRESENT DOMINICAN GOVT AND WHETHER FURTHER DELAY IS DESIRABLE. AS YOU WILL HAVE NOTED FROM YOUR COPY OF OUR MEMO TO MINISTER OCT3, WE HAVE NOT RPT NOT OURSELVES BEEN DISPOSED TO RECOGNIZE UNTIL A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF BOTH WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES HAVE DONE SO. WHILE THIS CONDITION APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN MET WITH REGARD TO FORMER GROUP, WE DO NOT RPT NOT KNOW OF ANY MAJOR LATINAMERICAN COUNTRY WHICH HAS ACTED SO FAR. DOMINICAN FOREIGN MINISTERS SUGGESTION THAT RECOGNITION BY CDA MIGHT SPEARHEAD SIMILAR MOVEMENT BY ARGENTINA, CHILE, PERU AND BRAZIL IS PRECISELY THE KIND OF ROLE WHICH WE WOULD WISH TO AVOID IF POSSIBLE. ON OTHER HAND THE LONGER CDN RECOGNITION IS DELAYED THE MORE INCONSISTENT OUR POSITION WOULD BEGIN TO APPEAR ALONGSIDE OUR EXISTING RECOGNITION OF SEVERAL EQUALLY OR MORE UN-

PAGE TWO XL185.

DEMOCRATIC REGIMES IN LATINAMERICA AS WELL AS ELSEWHERE AND WITH OUR GENERAL POLICY OF RECOGNIZING AT APPROPRIATE TIME DE FACTO REGIMES WHEY THEY ARE IN EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF A COUNTRY. DOMINICAN TRIUMVIRATE DOES, IN FACT, SEEM TO HAVE COUNTRY UNDER EFFECTIVE ADMIN.

4. WE SHOULD THEREFORE BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD, IN ADDITION TO BRINGING STATE DEPT UP TO DATE REGARDING OUR OWN THINKING ON THIS PROBLEM, ASCERTAIN WHETHER USA POSITION HAS UNDERGONE ANY DEVELOPMENT SINCE THAT SET OUT IN PARA 2 YOURTEL 3502 OCT28.

XL

FM WASHDC DEC2/63 CONFID

T EXTERNAL 3935 PRIORITY

INFO BAG CARACAS SDOMINGO DE OTT

REF YOURTEL XL185 NOV29 AND SDOMINGO TEL125 NOV19

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2. WE HOPE TO CONSULT SOWASH AGAIN SHORTLY AND REPORT ON PROGRESS.

LATIN AMERICAN/TCHammond/McL

cc: O/SSEA
O/UBSEA
O/PM
Press & Liaison

Legal Div
Santo Domingo

Return to RA Carr
20-1-2-DOM

Ottawa, Canada
December 12, 1963

Dear Mr. Carr,

I am writing to acknowledge receipt of your recent letter outlining the reasons for which you feel that the Canadian Government should recognize the present de facto government of the Dominican Republic.

I should like to thank you for your consideration in bringing your views on this subject to my personal attention and to inform you that I have passed your letter to the appropriate officers of my Department, where it has been very carefully noted.

I should perhaps also take this opportunity to inform you that Canada has not received any representations from the United States in connection with the question of recognition of the de facto Dominican government. It would therefore be wrong to suggest that, as your letter might be taken to imply, United States "influence" was a significant reason for the present Canadian position regarding the Dominican Republic. In this regard I would direct your attention to the fact that no major Latin American country has so far recognized the Triumvirate which was installed in power following the military coup d'état on September 25.

In conclusion, I should like to assure you that we are closely studying this question to ensure that

Robert A. Carr, Esq.
P. O. Box 50
Santo Domingo
Dominican Republic

. . . 2

2.

the position adopted by the Canadian Government is in keeping both with the interests of Canada in the context of our Latin American relations and with our general policy concerning diplomatic recognition.

Yours sincerely,

PAUL MARTIN

SEEN BY THE MINISTER

R. A. CARR & CO., C. POR A.

IMPORTERS AND COMMISSION AGENTS
No. 80 ISABEL LA CATOLICA STREET
SANTO DOMINGO
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

CABLE ADDRESS:
"CARCO"

POSTAL ADDRESS:
P. O. BOX 50

TELEPHONES { 9-1145
9-1146

20-1-2-DOM

November 21, 1963

The Honourable Paul Martin
Secretary of State for External Affairs
Ottawa
CANADA

Sir;

I am a Canadian businessman, many years a resident in this country. I am concerned about the Canadian Government's failure to extend diplomatic recognition to the new civil government which was installed here on September 26th. This Government is comprised of well-known persons of prestige, without personal political ambitions, who are decidedly pro-West and anti-Communist. They are dedicated to the social and economic advancement of their people and they have the decided backing of a large majority of the populace. Diplomatic recognition by Canada would have a favourable moral effect and make their difficult task a little less arduous.

I lived here under Trujillo's despotic regime, which enjoyed diplomatic relations with Canada. I lived here under the "Counsel of State" Government which was also recognized by Canada, and which came to power in exactly the same manner as today's Government (through a coup d'état). Later came the "democratically" elected Bosch Government which, in addition to being decidedly leftist and anti-foreigner, was notoriously inept and was rapidly leading the country down the path to economic ruin. This Government also enjoyed diplomatic relations with Canada.

It is interesting to note that the Counsel of State, under pressure from Washington, held early elections against their better judgement. As you no doubt are aware, this later proved to be a mistake. Notwithstanding this the U.S. Government is again insisting on early elections as a condition for recognition.

It seems ironic to me that Canada does not see fit now to extend recognition to a pro-West, anti-Communist Government which meets all the international requirements for recognition, thereby denying them the moral support implied by such action.

In recent days there is a persistent rumour to the effect that Canada

SECRETARY'S OFFICE
JMC
NOV 26 1963

SEEN BY THE MINISTER

-2-

has been withholding diplomatic recognition because of pressure from the U.S. Government which is also bringing pressure to bear on South American nations to maintain a similar attitude. Their efforts in this regard failed completely as far as Great Britain and the other Western European Governments are concerned.

In closing, at the risk of being presumptuous, I would urge you to recognize the new Dominican Government promptly, thereby reaffirming Canada's traditional friendship towards the Dominican Republic and, at the same time, dispelling the obviously erroneous impression that Canada's attitude in this case, is influenced by the United States.

Very truly yours,



Robert A. Carr

Return to L. A. New

cc: O/SSEA
O/USSEA
O/PM
Press & Liaison

File 20-1-2-DOM

Legal Div.
Santo Domingo

ANDRÉ COUVRETTE

RESTRICTED

December 12, 1963

Div. Diary
Diary
Spare
File

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

Correspondence Concerning Canadian Recognition
of the Present Dominican Government

*Signed
JST A
1/24
d/ sent
Dec. 17/63*

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2

N. A. ROBERTSON

N. A. R.



To: Mr. Hamm
DEC 6 1963

420

20-1-2-007
~~21-0011-14~~
20-1-2-007

ACTION

20-HOND-14
20-0011-14

FM MEXICO DEC6/63 RESTD

TO EXTERNAL 193

RECOGNITION OF DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HONDURAS

WE LEARNED TODAY AT FO THAT MEXICO WILL NOT RPT NOT SEND BACK HER

DIPLO STAFF TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HONDURAS. IN BOTH COUNTRIES SHE

WILL ASK FOREIGN GOVT TO REPRESENT HER INTERESTS WITH THE EXCEPTION

OF CONSULAR MATTERS WHICH WILL BE IN CHARGE OF JUNIOR MEXICAN

OFFICIALS.

Repeated info to
Caracas, Santo Domingo
& Wash Dec 6
JCN

20-1-2-DM

26

MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

SANTO DOMINGO DOMESTIC SERVICE IN SPANISH 1000 27 NOV 63 E

(TEXT) DURING A LONG MEETING OF POLITICAL LEADERS OF THE COALITION WHICH SUPPORTS THE GOVERNMENT WITH THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL ELECTION BOARD AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, IT WAS AGREED THAT FIVE ELECTIONS WILL BE HELD AS PRELIMINARY STEPS TOWARD A RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONALITY. AT THE MEETING AT THE NATIONAL PALACE IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT THE TRIUMVIATE WILL TRANSFER THE REINS OF GOVERNMENT ON 16 AUGUST 1965 TO THE GOVERNMENT

Handwritten initials: JF

WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY BE ELECTED.

IT WAS LEARNED THAT THE FIRST ELECTIONS TO SELECT DISTRICT OFFICIALS WILL BE HELD BETWEEN 1 SEPTEMBER AND 30 NOVEMBER 1964. THESE ELECTIONS WILL ALSO SERVE FOR THE REGISTRATION OF THE VOTERS WHO WILL TAKE PART IN ENSUING ELECTIONS. ON 15 JANUARY 1965 MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS WILL BE HELD. ON 1 MARCH 1965 MEMBERS OF THE ASSEMBLY WHICH WILL REVISE THE CONSTITUTION WILL BE ELECTED, AND ON 29 JUNE DEPUTIES AND SENATORS TO THE NATIONAL CONGRESS WILL BE ELECTED. FINALLY, ON 15 JULY 1965, THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC WILL BE ELECTED.

Handwritten initials: HA

27 NOV 1050A RWS/DS

DOMINICAN ALLY

SANTO DOMINGO DOMESTIC SERVICE IN SPANISH 1000 25 NOV 63 F

(EXCERPTS) DOMINICAN TRIUMVIRATE MEMBER DR. RAMON TAPIA ESPINAL SAID YESTERDAY THAT THERE IS NO LEGAL OBSTACLE TO THE ENTRY INTO THE COUNTRY OF FORMER DOMINICAN PRESIDENTS JUAN BOSCH AND JOAQUIN BALAGUER. DR. TAPIA ESPINAL MADE THIS STATEMENT TO NEWSMEN AT THE NATIONAL PALACE AT ABOUT 1000 HOURS LOCAL TIME YESTERDAY. REFERRING SPECIFICALLY TO DR. BALAGUER, HE STATED THAT THE LATTER S PARTICIPATION IN THE COMING ELECTION WOULD DEPEND ENTIRELY ON THE ELECTION BOARD.

TAPIA ESPINAL REITERATED THE GOVERNMENT S INTENTION TO MAKE POSSIBLE A RAPID RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONALY AND HE GAVE ASSURANCES THAT CONSITUENT ELECTIONS WILL TAKE PLACE ON 12 DECEMBER 1964. HE ADDED THAT MUNICIPAL AND STATE ELECTIONS WILL BE HELD AFTERWARD.

DR. TAPIA ESPINAL STATED IN CONCLUSION THAT THE TRIUMVIRATE DOES NOT FOR THE PRESENT CONTEMPLATE ANY CHANGE IN ITS FOREIGN POLICY.

25 NOV 106P REB/BG

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Please return
file copy to
J.C. Hammond
L.A. div

DATE	NOV 28	FILE	SECURITY
	1963		

FM: EXTERNAL

TO: WASHINGTON

NUMBER

XL 185

PRECEDENCE

PRIORITY

(SIGNED) A. E. BITCHIE

INFO: ~~CARACAS~~ ~~SDOMINGO~~ (BY BAG)

Refs
all LA first
(by bag)
(see 6)
J.C.

Ref.: SDOMINGO TEL 125 OF NOV 19

Subject: RECOGNITION OF THE DOMINICAN GOVT.

WE HAVE REPEATED TO YOU SDOMINGO'S REFTEL INDICATING THE INITIATION OF LOCAL PRESSURES FOR CDN RECOGNITION ON THE PART OF THE DOMINICAN FOREIGN MINISTER ACTING IN CONCERT WITH CERTAIN CDN BUSINESS INTERESTS IN THE DR. (HOWEVER, WITH REGARD TO THE LATTER, NO REPEAT NO REPRESENTATIONS HAVE YET BEEN RECEIVED FROM SENIOR EXECUTIVES IN CANADA OF CDN FIRMS OPERATING IN THE DR.)

2. THE DE FACTO GOVT OF THE DR HAS SO FAR SHOWN NO DISPOSITION TO MAKE ANY SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSIONS LEADING TO AN EARLY RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONALITY OR REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS OPEN TO DOUBT WHETHER FURTHER DELAY ON THE PART OF MAJOR HEMISPHERE COUNTRIES IN RECOGNIZING THE PRESENT GOVT IMPOSED BY THE MILITARY IS LIKELY TO LEAD TO ANY IMPROVEMENT IN THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE DR.

3. IN VIEW OF THE FACTORS NOTED IN THE PRECEDING PARAS, WE ARE BEGINNING TO GIVE CONSIDERATION TO THE QUESTION OF THE TIMING OF CDN RECOGNITION OF THE PRESENT DOMINICAN GOVT AND WHETHER FURTHER DELAY IS DESIRABLE. AS YOU WILL HAVE NOTED FROM YOUR COPY OF OUR MEMO TO THE MINISTER OF OCT 3, WE HAVE NOT REPEAT NOT OURSELVES BEEN DISPOSED TO

LOCAL STANDARD DISTRIBUTION

ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	APPROVED BY
SIG.....TCHammond/McL..... NAME.....	LATIN AMERICAN DIV.	22480	SIG.....(SIGNED) A. E. BITCHIE..... NAME.....

2.

RECOGNIZE UNTIL A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF BOTH WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES HAVE DONE SO. WHILE THIS CONDITION APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN MET WITH REGARD TO THE FORMER GROUP, WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT KNOW OF ANY MAJOR LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY WHICH HAS ACTED SO FAR. THE DOMINICAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S SUGGESTION THAT RECOGNITION BY CANADA MIGHT SPEARHEAD A SIMILAR MOVEMENT BY ARGENTINA, CHILE, PERU AND BRAZIL IS PRECISELY THE KIND OF ROLE WHICH WE WOULD WISH TO AVOID IF POSSIBLE. ON THE OTHER HAND THE LONGER CDN RECOGNITION IS DELAYED, THE MORE INCONSISTENT OUR POSITION WOULD BEGIN TO APPEAR ALONGSIDE OUR EXISTING RECOGNITION OF SEVERAL EQUALLY OR MORE UNDEMOCRATIC REGIMES IN LATIN AMERICA AS WELL AS ELSEWHERE AND WITH OUR GENERAL POLICY OF RECOGNIZING AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME DE FACTO REGIMES WHEN THEY ARE IN EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF A COUNTRY. THE DOMINICAN TRIUMVIRATE DOES, IN FACT, SEEM TO HAVE THE COUNTRY UNDER EFFECTIVE ADMINISTRATION.

4. WE SHOULD THEREFORE BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD, IN ADDITION TO BRINGING THE STATE DEPARTMENT UP TO DATE REGARDING OUR OWN THINKING ON THIS PROBLEM, ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE USA POSITION HAS UNDERGONE ANY DEVELOPMENT SINCE THAT SET OUT IN PARA 2 OF YOURTEL 3502 OF OCT 28.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

OUTGOING MESSAGE

FM: EXTERNAL	DATE	FILE	SECURITY
	NOV 28 1963	20-1-2-DOM	CONFIDENTIAL
TO: WASHINGTON	NUMBER		PRECEDENCE
	XL 185		PRIORITY
INFO: CARACAS SDOMINGO (BY BAG)			

Ref.: **SDOMINGO TEL 125 OF NOV 19**
RECOGNITION OF THE DOMINICAN GOVT.

Subject: WE HAVE REPEATED TO YOU SDOMINGO'S REFTEL INDICATING THE INITIATION OF LOCAL PRESSURES FOR ~~CDN~~ RECOGNITION ON THE PART OF THE DOM NICAN FOREIGN MINISTER ACTING IN CONCERT WITH CERTAIN CDN BUSINESS INTERESTS IN THE DR. HOWEVER, WITH REGARD TO THE LATTE , NO REPEAT NO REPRESENTATIONS HAVE YET BEEN RECEIVED FROM SENIOR EXECUTIVES IN CANADA OF CDN FIRMS OPERATING IN THE DR.

2. THE DE FACTO GOVT OF THE DR HAS SO FAR SHOWN NO DISPOSITION TO MAKE ANY SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSIONS LEADING TO AN EARLY RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONALITY OR REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS OPEN TO DOUBT WHETHER FURTHER DELAY ON THE PART OF MAJOR HEMISPHERE COUNTRIES IN RECOGNIZING THE PRESENT GOVT IMPOSED BY THE MILITARY IS LIKELY TO LEAD TO ANY IMPROVEMENT IN THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE DR.

3. IN VIEW OF THE FACTORS NOTED IN THE PRECEDING PARAS, WE ARE BEGINNING TO GIVE CONSIDERATION TO THE QUESTION OF THE TIMING OF CDN RECOGNITION OF THE PRESENT DOMINICAN GOVT AND WHETHER FURTHER DELAY IS DESIRABLE. AS YOU WILL HAVE NOTED FROM YOUR COPY OF OUR MEMO TO THE MINISTER OF OCT 3, WEHAVE NOT REPEAT NOT OURSELVES BEEN DISPOSED TO

LOCAL STANDARD
 DISTRIBUTION

ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	APPROVED BY
SIG..... TCHammond/MoL..... NAME.....	LATIN AMERICAN DIV.	22480	SIG..... NAME.....

2.

RECOGNIZE UNTIL A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF BOTH WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES HAVE DONE SO. WHILE THIS CONDITION APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN MET WITH REGARD TO THE FORMER GROUP, WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT KNOW OF ANY MAJOR LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY WHICH HAS ACTED SO FAR. THE DOMINICAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S SUGGESTION THAT RECOGNITION BY CANADA MIGHT SPEARHEAD A SIMILAR MOVEMENT BY ARGENTINA, CHILE, PERU AND BRAZIL IS PRECISELY THE KIND OF ROLE WHICH WE WOULD WISH TO AVOID IF POSSIBLE. ON THE OTHER HAND THE LONGER CDN RECOGNITION IS DELAYED, THE MORE INCONSISTENT OUR POSITION WOULD BEGIN TO APPEAR ALONGSIDE OUR EXISTING RECOGNITION OF SEVERAL EQUALLY OR MORE UNDEMOCRATIC REGIMES IN LATIN AMERICA AS WELL AS ELSEWHERE AND WITH OUR GENERAL POLICY OF RECOGNIZING AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME DE FACTO REGIMES WHEN THEY ARE IN EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF A COUNTRY. THE DOMINICAN TRIUMVIRATE DOES, IN FACT, SEEM TO HAVE THE COUNTRY UNDER EFFECTIVE ADMINISTRATION.

4. WE SHOULD THEREFORE BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD, IN ADDITION TO BRINGING THE STATE DEPARTMENT UP TO DATE REGARDING OUR OWN THINKING ON THIS PROBLEM, ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE USA POSITION HAS UNDERGONE ANY DEVELOPMENT SINCE THAT SET OUT IN PARA 2 OF YOURTEL 3502 OF OCT 28.

FM EXTERNAL NOV29/63 CONFD

TO WASHDC XL185 PRIORITY

INFO BAG CARACAS SDOMINGO DE OTT

SDOMINGO TEL 125 NOV19

RECOGNITION OF THE DOMINICAN GOVT

WE HAVE RPTD TO YOU SDOMINGOS REFTEL INDICATING THE INITIATION OF LOCAL PRESSURES FOR CDN RECOGNITION ON THE PART OF DOMINICAN FOREIGN MINISTER ACTING IN CONCERT WITH CERTAIN CDN BUSINESS INTERESTS IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

2. THE DE FACTO GOVT OF DOMINICAN REPUBLIC HAS SO FAR SHOWN NO RPT NO DISPOSITION TO MAKE ANY SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSIONS LEADING TO AN EARLY RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONALITY OR REP INSTITUTIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS OPEN TO DOUBT WHETHER FURTHER DELAY ON THE PART OF MAJOR HEMISPHERE COUNTRIES IN RECOGNIZING THE PRESENT GOVT IMPOSED BY THE MILITARY IS LIKELY TO LEAD TO ANY IMPROVEMENT IN POLITICAL SITUATION IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

3. IN VIEW OF FACTORS NOTED IN PRECEDING PARAS, WE ARE BEGINNING TO GIVE CONSIDERATION TO QUESTION OF TIMING OF CDN RECOGNITION OF PRESENT DOMINICAN GOVT AND WHETHER FURTHER DELAY IS DESIRABLE. AS YOU WILL HAVE NOTED FROM YOUR COPY OF OUR MEMO TO MINISTER OCT3, WE HAVE NOT RPT NOT OURSELVES BEEN DISPOSED TO RECOGNIZE UNTIL A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF BOTH WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES HAVE DONE SO. WHILE THIS CONDITION APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN MET WITH REGARD TO FORMER GROUP, WE DO NOT RPT NOT KNOW OF ANY MAJOR LATINAMERICAN COUNTRY WHICH HAS ACTED SO FAR. DOMINICAN FOREIGN MINISTERS SUGGESTION THAT RECOGNITION BY CDA MIGHT SPEARHEAD SIMILAR MOVEMENT BY ARGENTINA, CHILE, PERU AND BRAZIL IS PRECISELY THE KIND OF ROLE WHICH WE WOULD WISH TO AVOID IF POSSIBLE. ON OTHER HAND THE LONGER CDN RECOGNITION IS DELAYED THE MORE INCONSISTENT OUR POSITION WOULD BEGIN TO APPEAR ALONGSIDE OUR EXISTING RECOGNITION OF SEVERAL EQUALLY OR MORE UN-

PAGE TWO XL185

DEMOCRATIC REGIMES IN LATINAMERICA AS WELL AS ELSEWHERE AND WITH OUR GENERAL POLICY OF RECOGNIZING AT APPROPRIATE TIME DE FACTO REGIMES WHEN THEY ARE IN EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF A COUNTRY. DOMINICAN TRIUMVIRATE DOES, IN FACT, SEEM TO HAVE COUNTRY UNDER EFFECTIVE ADMIN.

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File 20 1 2 001

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

T.C. Hammond

Subject The mysterious Latin who's in the Don jail

cc. to Santa Domingo

Date November 25, 1963

Publication Toronto Daily Star

RON HAGGART

The mysterious Latin who's in the Don jail

OF ALL THE Latin American dictators who have trod across the stage, pillaging their homelands, filling their own pockets and murdering their enemies, none was more incredible than Rafael Trujillo.

He ruled the Dominican Republic for 31 years and was said to have a personal fortune of half a billion dollars and an income of \$36 million a year when, on May 30, 1961, he was ambushed and killed on his way back to the capital city of Ciudad Trujillo from his daily visit to his aged mother.

Traditionally, Canada has stayed out of the intrigues of Latin America (although at least one Canadian company, the Ozama, fell into Trujillo's maw while he was acquiring 12 of his country's 16 sugar mills). Canada is the only country in the Western Hemisphere which does not belong to the Organization of American States; a carved chair for Canada's delegate is still in a basement storeroom in the OAS building in Washington.

Can he stay in Canada?

Today, however, Canada is very much involved in Latin America intrigue. That involvement concerns a 41-year-old major-general of Trujillo's forces named Arturo Rafael Espailat whom "The Benefactor" appointed as secretary of security in 1957 and who, in the words of an exiled member of the Dominican congress became "one of the toughest Trujillo henchmen."

Today, Maj-Gen. Arturo Espailat is in a cell in the Don jail in downtown Toronto waiting to find out for the second time whether Canada will let him in. He has been in Canada before; he lived for 10 months in a fashionable Ottawa apartment house. His wife and his three children are still there but Espailat himself was deported on a technicality as the result of a decision by the Supreme Court of Canada last month. Now he is back, seeking refuge in the one country of the Western Hemisphere which has never cared very much about Latin American politics.

As chief of security for Trujillo, Maj-Gen. Espailat directed a force of some 5,000 policemen and spies, yet this was only one of seven security forces with which Trujillo kept himself in power in a country of fewer than 3,000,000 persons.

The man for whom Espailat worked ruled by terror and personal deification. One factory in the Dominican Republic turned out nothing but busts of The Benefactor; hospitals bore the legend "Trujillo Cures Us." Trujillo owned 25 cars and 30 houses and one of his 20-odd farms spread through several provinces. He and his family were the largest landowners in the country.

In July of 1957, after Espailat's appointment as chief of security, several members of the Jehovah's Witness sect were rounded up, beaten in jail, and expelled from the country, but this was only the most routine of the tales which surround the powerful man who now sits in the Don jail awaiting an immigration hearing on Wednesday.

The U.S. State Department has for six years been trying to get Maj-Gen. Espailat into American jurisdiction so that the U.S. police can question him about one of the most bizarre episodes in Trujillo's reign of terror. So far, Espailat has managed to avoid falling into American hands. He has hopped around between the islands of Caribbean, and Canada.

The particular case in which the U.S. authorities have an especial interest is the mysterious disappearance on the streets of New York city of Dr. Jesus de Galindez, who was a lecturer at Columbia university and who had worked for Trujillo in the Dominican Republic from 1939 to 1946 where, along with other government service he taught Trujillo's son in the school of diplomatic law.

(This was Rafael Trujillo, Jr., whom his father made a colonel at 3 and a general at 6.)

An enemy vanished

But Jesus de Galindez became an enemy of Trujillo, and fled to the U.S. where he worked on a massive treatise called *The Era of Trujillo*, for which the history department of Columbia awarded him his PhD in absentia.

On March 12, 1956, Jesus de Galindez stepped into a subway station in Manhattan and was never seen alive again.

On the same night that De Galindez disappeared from the streets of Manhattan, several people have said that they saw an unconscious man loaded into an airplane at an airport on Long Island. The plane's pilot was an American named Gerry Murphy who was employed by the Dominican airline. The next day the plane refuelled at West Palm Beach, Fla., and the man who filled the extra gasoline tanks that had been installed in the plane, said he also saw an unconscious man in the passenger compartment.

Copies of De Galindez's massive expose of the Trujillo regime were not found in his apartment, and it was saved for publication only by the fact that he had given a copy in Spanish to a Chilean friend for safekeeping.

Associates of the American pilot have said that Murphy met Maj-Gen. Espailat in Florida before the disappearance of De Galindez. Two witnesses have also said in court that Murphy met Espailat in New Jersey six days before the mysterious disappearance of De Galindez.

More than a year after the disappearance of De Galindez, an official note from the U.S. government said that the name of Arturo Espailat kept cropping up repeatedly in American investigations of the case and it asked that the Dominican government waive Espailat's diplomatic immunity so that he could be available for "the usual and lawful procedures in matters of investigation and trial."

Espailat himself has said he could not have been involved because he did not arrive as consul-general in New York until seven weeks after the disappearance of De Galindez.

Many mysterious deaths

He left the U.S. two days after the note was delivered. When he was safely back in the Dominican Republic he was promoted to major-general, appointed secretary of state and, somewhat later, put in charge of Dominican security forces. After he was back, the Dominican government refused the American request that he waive his immunity to face questioning in the De Galindez case.

Few other people are still alive to tell what happened to Dr. Jesus de Galindez, one of the most articulate and talented of Trujillo's foes. The American pilot, Gerry Murphy, was murdered on a mountain road outside Ciudad Trujillo and his body fell into a bay full of sharks feeding from slaughterhouse offal.

Murphy's co-pilot, Octavio Antonio de la Maza, was said by Dominican authorities to have committed suicide in jail after writing a confession to Murphy's murder.

Perhaps the only man in the world who knows the real story, for others, too, have died along the way, is Maj-Gen. Arturo Espailat, who sits today in the Don jail in downtown Toronto.

Consular Div./J.A. Donald/ab

LA
OS

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO: FILE - 10-83-1-40

1-11-C-2 ✓

FROM: Consular Division

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: Arturo Espaillet

1-11-C-2
35

Unclassified
Security
Date November 22, 1963

File No. 10-83-1
1-11-C02
20-1-3-DOM

Handwritten signatures and initials

On November 21 Mr. White of Immigration called up to say that he had received information to the effect that Espaillet was on board a TCA aircraft en route to Toronto where he was expected to land late that afternoon. Plans had been laid on for his reception. On November 22 Mr. Dagg phoned to confirm that Espaillet had indeed landed in Toronto. Espaillet argued that he had merely entered Canada in transit to France and Immigration was in two minds whether to escort him to Montreal and put him on the plane for that country or to hold him in Toronto. Eventually Espaillet admitted that he had no intention of proceeding to France and that his statement was merely a ruse to allow his entry in Canada. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, on being consulted, decided he should be detained and that Espaillet's wife, who had been expecting his arrival in Canada, should be informed that he was being held in the Don jail in Toronto. She said that she would inform Espaillet's lawyer.

2. A new Immigration deportation inquiry has been ordered under Sections 5(t) and 38 of the Immigration Act. Immigration officers say that before his second deportation can be effected another long legal battle may ensue.

J. A. DONALD

J.A. D.

P.S. - Mr. Warshof has been informed of this development by phone. He feels the matter is of concern now only to the Immigration authorities and the item on Espaillet can be removed from the Minister's handbook - see our memo to O/SSEA of November 19.

CIRCULATION

Latin American Division ✓

O.L. (2) Div.

c.c. DDP
WASHINGTON
L.A. Div ←
Santo Domingo

20-1-2-DOM

file
JLX

CONFIDENTIAL

OTTAWA, November 21, 1963.

The Deputy Minister,
Department of Trade and Commerce,
Ottawa.

The Director,
Joint Intelligence Bureau,
Department of National Defence,
Ottawa.

United States Embargo on Arms Shipment
to the Dominican Republic

On October 23rd, an Officer of the United States Embassy called on this Department and left with us a Memorandum (copy attached) relating to a U.S. decision to reimpose an embargo on the shipment of arms to the Dominican Republic. As you will note, the United States Government, after expressing its appreciation for the co-operation shown by Canada in restricting arms shipments to the Dominican Republic in 1960-62, has asked for Canadian co-operation again until such time as the situation in the Dominican Republic is clarified.

We pointed out to the United States Embassy representative that Canadian policy with respect to arms shipments to the Caribbean area was not at variance with the reimposition of an embargo by the United States. We further explained that Canada had consistently refused to authorize the export of significant quantities of arms to sensitive areas in the Caribbean and that as far as could be determined at the moment, this would continue to be the Canadian policy.

J. R. MCKINNEY

JR
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

000118

CONFIDENTIAL

October 22, 1963

MEMORANDUM

The present de facto regime of the Dominican Republic has not yet taken the steps toward representative, constitutional government which would permit the normalization of its relations with the Government of the United States. Remnants of the Bosch administration have designated a provisional president and the support they command, together with the fervor with which they repudiate the coup, is apparently great enough that a peaceful resolution does not yet appear likely.

The United States Government has therefore reimposed its earlier embargo on arms shipments to the Dominican Republic. The United States Government wishes to express its gratitude to the Government of Canada for its cooperation in restricting arms shipments during the critical 1960-62 period and express the hope that in the present situation Canada will take action similar to ours until such time as the situation in the Dominican Republic is clarified.

CONFIDENTIAL

PLEASE RETRANSMIT TEL NO. 125 PHONOGRAM RELAY DATE NOV 19
FROM SP. COMM. CO. WFA WASTAC Q. R. W. R. I. T. A.

AUTHORIZING OFFICER Command
DIVISION LA PIN
PHONE NO.

RECEIVED BY [Signature] (CONCENTRE)

(THIS FORM IS TO BE COMPLETED IN DUPLICATE -
RETURN ONE COPY TO AUTHORIZING OFFICER)

XL

ACTION COPY

AMENDED COPY

20-1-2-DOM

FM SDOMINGO NOV 19/63 CONF
TO EXTERNAL 125 OPIMMED

Mr. Manning

20-1-2-DOM
20-1-2-DOM

INFO TT CARACAS DE OTT
RECOGNITION

Inf. T.T. Wash. DC Priority

f.9

YESTERDAY MANAGERS ROYAL AND SCOTIA BANKS, PHONE COMPANY AND LOCAL
CDN BUSINESSMAN ASKED FOREIGN MINISTER AND MYSELF FOR COCKTAILS.
FOLLOWING POINT RAISED IN CORDIAL TWO-HOUR CHAT.

2. FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED ALL TRADITIONAL PREREQUISITES FOR
RECOGNITION HAD BEEN MET AND ASKED WHY CDA WHICH HE SAID
NORMALLY FOLLOWS THE EUROPEAN TRADITION (EG CDN RECOGNITION OF
CUBA) HAS NOT RPT NOT YET RECOGNIZED. FURTHER, HE SUGGESTED
LACK OF CDN RECOGNITION WAS PROBABLY DUE TO USA PRESSURE. IN
REPLY, I NOTED ALTHOUGH I HAVE NOT RPT NOT BEEN INFORMED WHY
RECOGNITION WAS BEING DELAYED CDA HAS RECENTLY BEEN TAKING
A GREATER INTEREST IN HER OWN HEMISPHERE. IN THIS CONTEXT I
EXPRESSED PERSONAL OPINION CDA WAS PROBABLY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT
ATTITUDE OF HEMISPHERE AS A WHOLE AND NOT RPT NOT SIMPLY THE
INEVITABLE.

file
JLX

Refs
plan
Jrc
ECIC

all 4 pros
file
done
BT

3. IN ~~EXT~~ ^{LENGTHY} MONOLOGUE ON INTERNAL SITUATION FOREIGN MINISTER
STATED HE AND TRIUMVIRATE HAD NOT RPT NOT PROMOTED COUP BUT
ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY ONLY ON CONDITION MILITARY WOULD NOT
RPT NOT EXERCISE INFLUENCE. PRESENT GOVT HE SAID MUST SUCCEED
AS ONLY ALTERNATIVES ARE MILITARY OR COMMUNIST DICTATORSHIPS.
BECAUSE OF CRITICAL ROLE OF GOVT IN LEADING COUNTRY TO DEMOCRACY
FOREIGN MINISTER FELT GOVT SHOULD HAVE MORAL BACKING OF ALL
FRIENDLY NATIONS. HE FELT CDN RECOGNITION SIGNIFICANT AS OTHER
IMPORTANT HEMISPHERE NATIONS WOULD FOLLOW CDN LEAD QUICKLY
PARTICULARLY ARGENTINA CHILE PERU AND BRAZIL.

4. ELECTION SCHEDULE EMBODYING TRANSFER IN TWO YEARS WILL BE
FOLLOWED WITH POSSIBLY A FEW CHANGES AND GOVT WILL ACCEPT ALL

PAGE TWO 125

OAS RECOMMENDATIONS ON HANDLING ELECTION. THE PRD HE SAID SHOULD TAKE PART BUT PERSONALLY DOUBTED THAT FOURTEEN JUN WOULD BE ALLOWED.


5. IN DISCUSSING HEMISPHERE PROBLEM OF COUPS FOREIGN MINISTER MAINTAINED DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CASE DIFFERENT AS BOSCH GOVT MISINTERPRETED DEMOCRATIC ELECTORAL MANDATE.

6. FOREIGN MINISTER CONCLUDED REITERATING HIS HOPE THAT CDA WOULD RECOGNIZE SHORTLY.

7. AFTER FOREIGN MINISTER LEFT CDN INTERESTS REPRESENTED AGREED WITH FOREIGN MINISTERS DESIRE FOR EARLY CDN RECOGNITION NOTING FAVOURABLE CLIMATE FOR THEIR OPERATION WITH ALTERNATIVE UNDESIRABLE AND THEREFORE PRESENT GOVT SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED. NONE INDICATED HE HAD FELT ANY DISCRIMINATION DUE TO LACK OF CDN RECOGNITION BUT I SENSED ALL FELT DELAY MIGHT RAISE DIFFICULTIES IN OPERATIONS. LATTER POINT ALSO HINTED AT IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH FALCONBRIDGE.

8. AS GOVT NOW EVIDENTLY FIRMLY IN CONTROL WITH LITTLE PROSPECT OF VOLUNTARY CHANGES AND NO RPT NO VISIBLE ALTERNATIVE IN SIGHT I SEE LITTLE GAIN LENGTHY DELAY IN RECOGNITION. I ALSO FEEL THAT IT WOULD BE WISE TO RECOGNIZE BEFORE USA BUT WOULD PREFER THAT WE NOT RPT NOT BE FIRST IMPORTANT HEMISPHERE COUNTRY TO RECOGNIZE AS WE WOULD THUS APPEAR TO TRIGGER HEMISPHERIC RECOGNITION

LEITH



ACTION COPY

FM SDOMINGO NOV19/63 CONFID
TO EXTERNAL 125 OPIMMED
INFO TT CARACAS DE OTT
RECOGNITION

TO: *Mr. Adams*
NOV 20 1963
REGISTRY

Yk
20-1-2-DOM
20-1-2-14
19 19

YESTERDAY MANAGER ROYAL AND SCOTIA BANK, PHONE COMPANY AND LOCAL
CDN BUSINESSMAN ASKED FOREIGN MINISTER AND MYSELF FOR COCKTAILS.
FOLLOWING POINT RAISED IN CORDIAL TWO HOUR CHAT.

2. FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED ALL TRADITIONAL PREREQUISITES FOR
RECOGNITION HAD BEEN MET AND ASKED WHY CDA WHICH HE SAID
NORMALLY FOLLOWS THE EUROPEAN TRADITION (EG CDN RECOGNITION OF
CUBA) HAS NOT RPT NOT YET BEEN RECOGNIZED. FURTHER, HE SUGGESTED
LACK OF CDN RECOGNITION WAS PROBABLY DUE TO USA PRESSURE. IN
REPLY, I NOTED ALTHOUGH I HAVE NOT RPT NOT BEEN INFORMED WHY
RECOGNITION WAS BEING DELAYED CDA HAS RECENTLY BEEN TAKING
enormous
ERRONEOUSLY GREATER INTEREST IN HER OWN HEMISPHERE. IN THIS
CONTEXT I EXPRESSED PERSONAL OPINION CDA WAS PROBABLY TAKING
INTO ACCOUNT ATTITUDE OF HEMISPHERE AS A WHOLE AND NOT RPT NOT
AS IS SIMPLY THE INEVITABLE.

3. IN BRIT GOVTS MONOLOGUE ON INTERNAL SITUATION FOREIGN
MINISTER STATED HE AND TRIUMVIRATE HAD NOT RPT NOT PROMOTED
COUP BUT ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY ONLY ON CONDITION MILITARY
WOULD NOT RPT NOT EXERCISE INTERROGATING. PRESENT GOVT HE SAID
MUST SUCCEED AS ONLY ALTERNATIVES ARE MILITARY OR COMMUNIST
DICTATORSHIP. BECAUSE (GRP CRPT) THAT GOVT IN LEADING COUNTRY TO
DEMOCRACY FOREIGN MINISTER FELT GOVT SHOULD HAVE MORAL BACKING
OF ALL FRIENDLY NATIONS. HE FELT CDN RECOGNITION SIGNIFICANT AS
OTHER IMPORTANT HEMISPHERE NATIONS WOULD FOLLOW CDN LEAD
QUICKLY *There* IS ARGENTINA, CHILE, PERU AND BRAZIL.

4. ELECTION SCHEDULE POWER TRANSFERRED IN TWO YEARS WILL BE
FOLLOWED WITH POSSIBLY A FEW CHANGES AND GOVT WILL ACCEPT ALL

PAGE TWO 125

OAS RECOMMENDATIONS ON HANDLING ELECTION. THE PRD HE SAID SHOULD TAKE PART BUT PERSONALLY DOUBTED THAT FOURTEEN JUN WOULD BE ALLOWED.

5. IN DISCUSSING HEMISPHERE PROBLEM OF COUPS FOREIGN MINISTER MAINTAINED DOMICIAN REPUBLIC CASE DIFFERENT AS BOSCH GOVT MISINTERPRETED DEMOCRATIC ELECTORAL MANDATE.

6. FOREIGN MINISTER CONCLUDED REITERATING HIS HOPE THAT CDA WOULD RECOGNIZE SHORTLY.

7. AFTER FOREIGN MINISTER (GRP CRPT) CDN INTEREST^S REPRESENTED AGREED WITH FOREIGN MINISTERS DESIRE FOR EARLY CDN RECOGNITION NOTING FAVOURABLE CLIMATE FOR THEIR OPERATION WITH ALTERNATIVE UNDESIRABLE AND THEREFORE PRESENT GOVT SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED. NONE INDICATED HE HAD FELT ANY DISCRIMINATION DUE TO LACK OF CDN RECOGNITION BUT I SENSED ALL FELT DELAY MIGHT RAISE DIFFICULTIES IN OPERATIONS. LATTER POINT ALSO HINTED (GRP CRPT) IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH FALCONBRIDGE.

8. AS GOVT NOW EVIDENTLY FIRMLY IN CONTROL WITH LITTLE PROSPECT OF VOLUNTARY CHANGES AND NO RPT NOT VISIBLE ALTERNATIVE IN SIGHT. I SEE LITTLE GAIN LENGTHY DELAY IN RECOGNITION. I ALSO FEEL THAT IT WOULD BE WISE TO RECOGNIZE BEFORE USA BUT WOULD PREFER THAT WE NOT RPT NOT BE FIRST IMPORTANT HEMISPHERE COUNTRY TO RECOGNIZE AS WE WOULD THUS APPEAR TO TRIGGER HEMISPHERIC RECOGNITION

LEITH

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

f, 0

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Security: Unclassified

No: 242

Date: November 19, 1963

Enclosures: two

FROM: The Canadian Embassy,
Santo Domingo, D.R.

Air or Surface Mail: Courier

11-1-2-1

Post File No: 10-1-1

Reference:

Subject: Recognition of New Government

To: Mr. [Handwritten Name]
NOV 27 1963

Ottawa File No.
20-1-2-DOM
~~20-DOM-14~~

References

Enclosed are Note No. SAA 20497 from the Secretariat of State for External Relations, and an office translation of a précis of the Note, found on pages 14 through 16. Although it is dated November 8, 1963, we did not receive this communication until November 13.

2. The Note purports to show why the best interests of the Dominican people were served when the Armed Forces, in an "expression of ... democratic vocation", overthrew the government of Juan Bosch. In addition, one paragraph is devoted to the statement that the new government has effectively fulfilled the prerequisites "necessary for recognition and continuity of international relations".

3. We have not acknowledged this Note.

file
JCH

Paul Gaglianone
for The Embassy

Internal
Circulation

Pol.

Distribution
to Posts

NOV 27 1963
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Secretaría de Estado de Relaciones Exteriores

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La Secretaría de Estado de Relaciones Exteriores presenta sus cumplimientos a las misiones diplomáticas y solicita su atención al texto que seguidamente se transcribe, con ruegos de trasladarlo al conocimiento de sus respectivos gobiernos.

El Triunvirato investido con las funciones de gobierno en la República Dominicana, como consecuencia de los acontecimientos del pasado 25 de septiembre, está consciente y reconoce la contribución de simpatía y apoyo moral que el pueblo dominicano ha recibido de los pueblos y naciones amigas, especialmente de las hermanas naciones americanas, en su lucha por instaurar un gobierno democrático y representativo que, a la vez que responda a su mejor tradición institucional, recoja las inaplazables conquistas de reforma social y desarrollo económico que imperativamente reclama la realidad presente del pueblo dominicano.

Por tener conciencia de esas circunstancias, y así reconocerlo, el Gobierno dominicano se siente comprometido a llevar a conocimiento de los gobiernos y pueblos amigos la exposición objetiva y las ponderaciones adecuadas de los antecedentes y la situación actual de la República Dominicana, en interés de una equitativa comprensión de la verdad.

El 20 de diciembre de 1962 la historia del civismo en la República Dominicana registró un acontecimiento extraordinario



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nario. En ese día el pueblo dominicano ejerció, con absoluta libertad y ejemplar pulcritud, por tercera vez en sus 118 años de vida independiente, el derecho a elegir sus gobernantes.

Sobre el telón de fondo de la oprobiosa tiranía de los Trujillo, renacieron en esa forma en la República Dominicana la constitucionalidad y el estado de derecho, verdaderos milagros que fueron motivo de justificado asombro para propios y extraños.

Este fenómeno desusado de la realización de un edificante ejercicio del requisito fundamental de la democracia por un pueblo que había estado aherrojado durante décadas por una feroz tiranía y que, consecuentemente, carecía de la experiencia y madurez al parecer indispensables para que ello fuera posible, se explica por la vocación sin desmayos demostrada por el pueblo dominicano hacia los ideales democráticos, humanitarios y cristianos que han constituido la fibra íntima de su proceso de evolución histórica, pese a las más crueles vicisitudes y frustraciones.

A esa vocación democrática, sobrepuesta a la inexperience y a numerosos otros factores adversos, se debió sustancialmente la realización ordenada y límpida del acto comicial del 20 de diciembre de 1962. Bajo la tiranía de los Trujillo tal vocación había subsistido y adquirió caracteres a-



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gudos en una aspiración unanime de suplantarse los métodos del desamparo jurídico, de la persecución y el terror, por la convivencia respetuosa de la ley, capaz de garantizar la seguridad de todos y de abrir el camino hacia la solidaridad constructiva que permitiera la solución de los ingentes problemas sociales y económicos. Por tener en cuenta esta realidad inobjetable, en la cual era participe la inmensa mayoría del pueblo dominicano, pudo el Consejo de Estado conducir al país a la culminación del proceso electoral, no obstante que a las dificultades derivadas de las condiciones internas no tardaron en sumarse, con su habitual virulencia, los perturbadores influjos foráneos provenientes de uno de los bandos de la pugna de intereses e ideologías que conmueve hoy al mundo.

La victoria electoral que obtuvo en los comicios de diciembre el profesor Juan Bosch parecía destinada a colmar las aspiraciones del pueblo dominicano. Junto al respaldo popular traducido por las urnas todo indicaba que el nuevo gobierno dispondría de apoyo generalizado de los sectores independientes y aún partidaristas. Además, en lo externo existía una disposición sumamente favorable, tanto oficial como privada, para prestar ayuda en las tareas de fomento y desarrollo de los recursos nacionales.

Las notas de escepticismo que eran oponibles a esta perspectiva optimista no parecían tener fundamento ni vi-



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gor para entorpecer o impedir la cristalización de la misma. Sin embargo, con la ventaja de analizar hechos a posteriori, cabe fijar la atención en los antecedentes inmediatos del profesor Bosch y su régimen para entender el acelerado deterioro de lo que figuraba como un franqueamiento fecundo hacia la estabilidad institucional en la República Dominicana.

El señor Bosch llevó adelante su campaña electoral haciendo uso constante y sistemático de las ideas de diferenciación de clases sin omitir incursiones hasta en la zona de los prejuicios raciales. Para quien conozca la historia de Santo Domingo, y la textura social y étnica de su conglomerado, nada más ajeno a la índole del pueblo dominicano, tal como lo ha forjado su evolución histórica, que la introducción de semejantes ideas en el desenvolvimiento de la beligerancia política. La esperanza de que ello fuera solamente un recurso transitorio de movilización de voluntades, que el sentido de responsabilidad del estadista se encargaría luego de atemperar, se veía alentada por el hecho de que concomitantemente el señor Bosch rehuía acentuar el divisionismo partidarista, con lo cual tocaba una de las cuerdas sensibles de las aspiraciones generales, esto es, la del concierto y la armonización de todos los ciudadanos de buena voluntad.

Lamentablemente, no obstante, la atadura del señor Bosch a los conceptos de las contradicciones de clase es



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taban sumamente arraigadas según todos los indicios. Si el pueblo dominicano hubiera dispuesto de una sensibilidad política avézada y en capacidad para discernir las matizaciones de las corrientes ideológicas de la época probablemente lo habría advertido así. Era muy significativo el juicio que le merecía al señor Bosch el proceso histórico dominicano, según lo expone en su libro "Trujillo, causas de una tiranía sin ejemplo", basado en una adaptación arbitraria y sin fundamento, y hasta cierto punto también ingenua, de la tesis marxista de la división y la lucha de clases. Lo arbitrario de la adaptación salta a ojos vistas frente a una sociedad que, como la dominicana, resulta en muchos aspectos rudimentaria y carente de desarrollo y por tanto fundamentalmente divorciada de las concepciones que inspiró el industrialismo capitalista del siglo XIX.

Esta desorientada supeditación ideológica estaba destinada a colocar el ejercicio del poder por el señor Bosch, de inmediato, en agudo conflicto con la manera de pensar, los sentimientos, usos y costumbres del pueblo dominicano, los cuales propenden hacia la solidaridad igualitaria y la recíproca compenetración de todos sus componentes en aras de un común destino de inconfundible acento democrático.

Síntoma alarmante de la predisposición del señor Bosch en este sentido quedaron al desnudo cuando, ya en cali-



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dad de Presidente electo, a su regreso de Estados Unidos y Europa, pronunció un discurso de extensión inusitada ante la radio y la televisión en el cual vertió amenazas enconos de clase y partidistas como tónica de la acción de gobierno que se proponía emprender. Tan desafortunada fué esta intervención del señor Bosch que su pésimo efecto sobre nacionales y extranjeros le obligó a variar de inflexión en el pronunciamiento que hizo al juramentarse como Presidente de la República sin que ello, como lo iban a demostrar los hechos, alcanzara a introducir alteración en actos determinantes de su gestión gubernativa.

En efecto, una serie de actuaciones del regimen del ex-Presidente Bosch demuestra la veracidad de este aserto. En primer término, la Constitución preparada por su Partido, y que solamente se dió a conocer después de asumir el mando, contenía además de lamentables confusiones, contradicciones evidentes y una sistematización sumamente defectuosa, factores que en diversas formas alteraban o destruían numero aspectos del ordenamiento jurídico de la nación, el pala dino desconocimiento de principios y normas intrínsecas al e jercicio efectivo de la democracia, tales como la libertad de enseñanza y el derecho a la propiedad privada. La primera esencial para la formación del ciudadano según los dictados de la propia conciencia, y el segundo fundamental al ejerci-



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cio de las prerrogativas de la persona humana porque, si en los regimenes democráticos cabe limitarlo y hacerlo útil a los intereses colectivos, no es menos cierto que en gran medida constituye uno de los basamentos de la libertad individual. La marejada de repudio público a que dicho proyecto de Constitución dió lugar obligó al régimen del señor Bosch a modificar sus pretensiones en algunos de los puntos principales, pero pronto otras iniciativas del Poder Ejecutivo demostrarían que ellas continuaban gravitando sobre las convicciones y el sosiego del pueblo dominicano.

Baste aludir a dos de las más sobresalientes de esas iniciativas, las cuales por sus vastos alcances sobre el mecanismo socioeconómico son valederas para denotar, dentro de una síntesis como la presente, lo justificado de la expectante zozobra de la sociedad dominicana ante las intenciones de su gobierno y el natural sentimiento de frustración que ello fué concitando paulatinamente y que de manera fatal habría de conducir a la rebeldía.

Se hace referencia a la Ley de Confiscaciones que, tras una maniobra petitoria preparada con todos los requisitos de las llamadas asambleas de "democracia directa" del castrismo, a incitación del Presidente Bosch, fué aprobada por la Cámara de Diputados en una única y súbita sesión. Dicha Ley consagraba con amplitud sin tasa y con un procedimiento viciado la pena de confiscación de bienes, proscrita invariablemente por la tradición constitucional dominicana y que, después



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de la caída de la tiranía de los Trujillo, hubo de adoptarse aunque con precisas limitaciones para enfrentar el enorme problema de la acumulación de bienes en manos del tirano, sus familiares y asociados. La Ley de Confiscaciones del Gobierno de Bosch, en cambio, constituía a las Cámaras Legislativas, compuestas abrumadoramente por los miembros del partido en el poder, en verdaderos tribunales populares con veredictos sin apelación, invadiendo en tal virtud el Poder Legislativo la jurisdicción del Poder Judicial y haciendo extensivos prácticamente a todos los ciudadanos los procesos de confiscación de bienes sin las garantías previstas por los procedimientos judiciales. La protesta popular fué de carácter unánime con la sola excepción del partido del señor Bosch y el estridente apoyo de los grupos de extrema izquierda. Y si el señor Bosch y su régimen se vieron obligados a ceder una vez más no fué ciertamente porque hubieran abandonado los al parecer irresistibles impulsos que proyectaban su acción gubernamental hacia una positiva y radical vulneración de elementales garantías de la personalidad humana.

De manera simultánea con la Ley de Confiscaciones las Cámaras Legislativas tomaron bajo consideración, también a iniciativa del depuesto Presidente, una Ley de Plusvalía que, desbordando sin contemplaciones las finalidades de una equitativa retribución del Fisco, tal como ocurre en las legislaciones de esa índole de los países democráticos, representaba en



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realidad una nueva prueba del aparente propósito gubernamental de reducir en materia económica a los ciudadanos dominicanos a la dependencia absoluta del Estado.

La atención se fatigaría con muchos otros testimonios de la misma catadura, advirtiéndose que tanto los citados como los dejados de mencionar se encuentran documentados copiosamente en la prensa dominicana correspondiente a los meses de gobierno del señor Bosch. Lo que interesa subrayar, sin embargo, es que tan desacertadas providencias, cuya calificación más moderada no puede ser otra que la de desorientadas y carentes de planificación acorde con las auténticas aspiraciones del pueblo dominicano, fueron causa de un clima de inseguridad y desasosiego fácilmente comprensibles, reflejado en la paralización de las actividades económicas, en la retractación de los capitales nacionales y extranjeros, en el incremento de los factores de escepticismo propicios a la anarquía y la improductividad, precipitando todo ello a la economía dominicana en una curva descendente que estaba lejos de compaginarse con la impostergable exigencia de movilizar de manera solidaria todos sus renglones para una acción agresiva y eficaz contra la penuria desoladora del pueblo dominicano.

Similares efectos inusitados y desconcertantes producía la conducción de la política exterior de la República por el señor Bosch. Desde los propios actos de su juramenta-



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ción el nuevo Presidente impuso criterios y procedimientos que transgredieron usos universalmente aceptados y lesionaron sin motivo la sensibilidad de naciones amigas. Frecuentemente dejó traslucir su menosprecio a las instituciones interamericanas y cuando, a causa del conflicto con la vecina República de Haití, se vió constreñido a aceptar la jurisdicción de la Organización de Estados Americanos, no se privó de dejar constancia en acciones y declaraciones públicas del concepto que la misma le merecía, abocando al país a complicaciones internacionales de incalculables consecuencias. Finalmente quedó demostrado cómo su régimen utilizaba las diferencias con Haití para fines de política interna sin que le preocupara lo más mínimo que con ello no solamente exponía a graves riesgos la seguridad del pueblo dominicano sino que también introducía adicionales factores de intranquilidad y desasosiego en el ambiente nacional.

Pero el aspecto más ominoso de la situación creada en esa forma era el terreno fértil que la misma ofrecía a las prédicas extremistas, sobre todo cuando la autoridad gubernamental no se recataba en contemporizar con ellas, y muchas veces en colaborar con las actividades de sus personeros, granjeándoles facilidades para el adoctrinamiento, violando en su favor la autonomía universitaria, designando a muchos de ellos para puestos claves en las instituciones económicas,



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técnicas y culturales, y permitiendo que fuera cada vez más intenso el comercio con las consignas e instrucciones provenientes de Cuba, llegando hasta a permitir el tráfico de viajeros hacia y desde Cuba, como en el caso, entre otros, de la nutrida representación dominicana que asistió a la última conmemoración del 26 de julio en dicho país.

Este juego peligroso, que concediendo amplio margen favorable a las intenciones del ex-Presidente Bosch, podría admitirse a lo más como un intento de servirse de los extremistas sin participar en sus convicciones, fué a su vez aprovechado por aquellos, duchos en la técnica política, para sus propios y privativos fines. La prensa dominicana documenta igualmente este gravísimo aspecto de las crecientes preocupaciones del pueblo dominicano. Entrar en sus detalles sería también pecado imperdonable de prolijidad innecesaria cuando, por otra parte, las escasas declaraciones del ex-Presidente Bosch sobre el tema, pero sobre todo sus persistentes omisiones, no obstante la cada vez más aguda perentoriedad de una definición categórica, permiten configurar una actitud de creciente e inexplicable desentendimiento y justificación.

En efecto, si a principios de su gobierno el señor Bosch en una oportunidad aislada y con una breve frase, calificó con duros términos el comunismo, mantuvo luego un



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prolongado silencio durante el cual el hecho de cada día era el incremento extraordinario de las actividades de los seguidores del marxismo leninismo. Los reclamos de los partidos políticos y de las instituciones calificadas sobre esa situación, así como el general consenso de la opinión pública, fueron desoidos por el señor Bosch, quien si no eludía el tema pretendía que fueran los denunciantes quienes adoptaran las medidas que correspondían a su propia responsabilidad de acuerdo con la ley. Finalmente se negó a atender al reclamo de las instituciones castrenses, las cuales acudieron a él en su calidad de Comandante en Jefe, heridas por la difamación que pretendía dividir las con el visible propósito de desintegrarlas. Cuando entonces no pudo evitar una respuesta se limitó a proclamar "que él no había regresado al país a perseguir a nadie" como si el cumplimiento de la ley pudiera calificarse de persecución. Pero el criterio que impulsaba al señor Bosch a seguir tales normas de conducta, ante un peligro cada vez más evidente, se ilustra con el pronunciamiento que hizo en Guadalupe, acabando de abandonar el país después de su deposición, cuando significó que "este movimiento no está llamado a una lucha para lograr el comunismo sino para lograr la libertad."

Los riesgos que encaraba para la existencia misma de la República Dominicana este aspecto de la política del gobierno del señor Bosch se hacen manifiestos en toda su grave-



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dad si, entre otros elementos de juicio, tenemos en cuenta la zona geográfica en que está situada la nación, zona que es de primordial importancia para el Continente y el Mundo Libre y que determina para la República Dominicana una ubicación que la hace particularmente accesible a la penetración procedente de Cuba. El régimen que impera en esa isla no se ha cuidado de disimular sus actividades subversivas contra las instituciones democráticas de los pueblos latinoamericanos y pasiva y activamente se ha constituido en un eficaz canalizador de las tendencias similares en América. Si se tiene en cuenta la proximidad de Cuba, si se suman las equívocas actuaciones del régimen de Bosch y sus no menos graves omisiones, así como el delicado proceso de mejoramiento social y económico que debe cumplirse en Santo Domingo, hay que convenir en que los factores internos y externos se conjuraban para predisponer de manera fatal hacia un desenlace en que por lo menos se reproducirían los angustiosos problemas de orden público que actualmente confronta el pueblo hermano de Venezuela, aunque en honor a la verdad deba señalarse que la semejanza hubiera distado de ser exacta, pues mientras en Venezuela un gobierno percatado de sus responsabilidades se ha enfrentado de manera decidida a la subversión que utiliza el desorden, la anarquía y el crimen, en Santo Domingo se asistía al espectáculo sorprendente de un gobernante que no sólo rehuía de manera sistemática el deber



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mandato recibido, en el breve lapso de varios meses, mediante insistentes tentativas para vulnerar principios esenciales del sistema democrático, comenzando por dar a conocer, sólo después de hacerse cargo del gobierno, una Constitución que por su índole antidemocrática mereció el repudio unánime de la opinión pública con excepción de los partidos de ideología marxista;

3o. Que la situación geográfica de la República Dominicana, por su vecindad a Cuba, y también la situación interna, por sus graves problemas sociales y económicos, eran incompatibles con una política de fondo demagógico, notoria por su ineptitud y que tendía a las diferencias y luchas de clase, que toleraba y con frecuencia colaboraba con actividades subversivas de la extrema izquierda, sin definir jamás una clara postura de defensa de las instituciones democráticas, no obstante los perentorios reclamos en ese sentido, causas concurrentes a crear una situación de inminente peligrosidad para la existencia misma de la República Dominicana.

La acción de las Fuerzas Armadas el 25 de septiembre pasado, pues, adquiere así carácter radicalmente divorciado de las asonadas e insubordinaciones movidas por la ambición de poder del elemento militar contra el gobierno civil. No constituye tampoco un acto contradictorio de los comicios del 20 de diciembre si éstos se entienden como base de un orden institucional sustancialmente democrático tal como el que aspira a conquistar el pueblo dominicano. Por el contrario, el acontecimiento del 25 de septiembre concurre a complementar la autenticidad del suceso comicial del 20 de diciembre de 1962 como expresiones ambas de una misma vocación democrática.

La manera como se ha definido la situación que existe al presente en la República Dominicana confirma tan-



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de preservar las instituciones bajo las cuales había recibido el mandato que ejercía, sino que también tomaba la iniciativa para obliterar los principios sobre los cuales dichas instituciones se sustentaban.

No es difícil comprender, a la luz de esta densa perspectiva dibujada en el breve lapso de siete meses, cómo la frustración y la sospecha ganaron el ánimo de la mayoría del pueblo dominicano, hasta configurar con acusados relieves de similitud la siniestra imagen de la páfida emboscada que redujo al infortunado pueblo cubano al trágico cautiverio que hoy lo aflige.

Si lo que le faltó al depuesto Presidente Bosch fué solamente comprensión para esta lógica consecuencia de su política, ya que reiteradamente niega tener convicciones o simpatías comunistas, ello podría ser una explicación de sus errores, pero ni le exime de responsabilidad ni mucho menos tal circunstancia hubiera evitado que se concretaran los inminentes peligros que había suscitado.

Al resumirse la exposición anterior queden establecidas patentemente las siguientes conclusiones:

1o. Que el acto comicial del 20 de diciembre tuvo ante todo el significado de una ostensible demostración del pueblo de la República Dominicana para cristalizar sus aspiraciones en un régimen civil, democrático y representativo;

2o. Que el ejercicio del poder por el señor Bosch y por su régimen desnaturalizó repetidas veces la índole del



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to la sinceridad de sus móviles como su entrañable vinculación a la gran mayoría del pueblo dominicano. En efecto, los militares hicieron entrega del poder al elemento civil, libremente escogidos por la mayoría de los partidos políticos democráticos, y la conducta comprensiva y ordenada que ha observado la casi totalidad de la población ha permitido que se establezca el nuevo gobierno sin derramarse una sola gota de sangre.

El proceso no ha sido en modo alguno el resultado de una componenda política ni es ficticio. Clara y terminantemente han hecho constar los partidos políticos y las personalidades representativas que han aceptado las responsabilidades del gobierno que no admitirán la interferencia militar en la conducción de las tareas del régimen civil. Por otra parte, el retorno a la normalidad institucional es propósito indeclinable del nuevo gobierno, a obtenerse en el menor plazo posible y bajo absolutas garantías.

Tales circunstancias han hecho fácil para el nuevo régimen ofrecer los requisitos exigibles para el reconocimiento y la continuidad de las relaciones internacionales, basadas, de acuerdo con las normas de uso en la materia, en el mantenimiento del orden interno, en la autolimitación de su mandato y en la capacidad para el cumplimiento de los compromisos internacionales.



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La Secretaría de Estado de Relaciones Exteriores hace provecho de la oportunidad para reiterar a las Misiones Diplomáticas los sentimientos de su consideración más distinguida.

Santo Domingo, R. D.,
8 de noviembre de 1963.

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a stylized 'S' followed by a long, thin vertical stroke.

To abridge the preceding arguments, the following conclusions are clearly established:

1. That the elections of December 20 demonstrated completely the significance of an apparent demonstration of the people of the Dominican Republic to crystallize their aspirations in a civil, democratic and representative regime;

2. That the exercise of power by Sr. Bosch and by his regime repeatedly misinterpreted the mandate received; in the brief span of a few months, by means of persistent attempts to destroy principles essential to the democratic system, he began making known, but only after dominating the government, a constitution which by its anti-democratic outlook merited unanimous repudiation by public opinion, with the exception of the political parties with Marxist ideology;

3. That the geographical situation of the Dominican Republic, by reason of its proximity to Cuba, and also its internal situation, by reason of its grave social and economic problems, were incompatible with policies which were basically demagogic, notorious for ineptness and which emphasized class differences and class struggles, which frequently were in collaboration with subversive activities of the extreme left, without ever defining a clear posture in defence of democratic institutions, even when President Bosch was asked many times to do so and which concurrently created a situation of imminent peril for the very existence of the Dominican Republic.

The action taken by the armed forces last September 25, therefore, acquires in this manner a character radically divorced from the accusations that their actions were motivated by the military's ambition for power in

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opposition to the civil government. Nor does it constitute an act contradictory to the elections of December 20 if these are understood as the base of a substantially democratic institutional order such as that which the Dominican people desire. On the contrary, the events of September 25 helped to perfect the authenticity of the elections of December 20, 1962, both of which were expressions of an identical democratic vocation.

The manner in which the present Dominican situation has defined itself confirms the sincerity of the military's motives as much as their affectionate identification with the great majority of the Dominican people. In effect, the military has delivered power to the civilians, freely chosen by the majority of the democratic political parties, and the comprehensive and orderly conduct which almost all the population observed, has enabled the new government to establish itself without the spilling of a single drop of blood.

The process hasn't been in any way the consequence of a political arrangement nor is it fictitious. Clearly and conclusively all political parties and representative personalities who have accepted the responsibilities of government have made known that they will not allow military interference in the conduct of the civil regime's tasks. On the other hand, the return to constitutional normality in the least possible time and under absolute guarantees is the firm resolve of the new government.

Such a state of affairs has made it easy for the new regime to offer the requirements necessary for recognition and continuity of international relations, based in accord with the standards of use in this matter, in the maintenance of internal order, the self-limitation of its mandate and in the capacity for the fulfilment of international obligations.

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- 2 -

opposition to the civil government. Nor does it constitute an act contradictory to the elections of December 20 if these are understood as the base of a substantially democratic institutional order such as that which the Dominican people desire. On the contrary, the events of September 25 helped to perfect the authenticity of the elections of December 20, 1962, both of which were expressions of an identical democratic vocation.

The manner in which the present Dominican situation has defined itself confirms the sincerity of the military's motives as much as their affectionate identification with the great majority of the Dominican people. In effect, the military has delivered power to the civilians, freely chosen by the majority of the democratic political parties, and the comprehensive and orderly conduct which almost all the population observed, has enabled the new government to establish itself without the spilling of a single drop of blood.

The process hasn't been in any way the consequence of a political arrangement nor is it fictitious. Clearly and conclusively all political parties and representative personalities who have accepted the responsibilities of government have made known that they will not allow military interference in the conduct of the civil regime's tasks. On the other hand, the return to constitutional normality in the least possible time and under absolute guarantees is the firm resolve of the new government.

Such a state of affairs has made it easy for the new regime to offer the requirements necessary for recognition and continuity of international relations, based in accord with the standards of use in this matter, in the maintenance of internal order, the self-limitation of its mandate and in the capacity for the fulfilment of international obligations.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(DUPLICATE)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy,
Santo Domingo, D.R.

Reference:.....

Subject: Recognition of New Government

Security:.....Unclassified.....

No:.....242.....

Date:.....November 19, 1963.....

Enclosures:.....two.....

Air or Surface Mail:.....Courier.....

Post File No:.....11-1-2-1
10-1-1.....

Ottawa File No.	

References

-- Enclosed are Note No. SAA 20497 from the Secretariat of State for External Relations, and an office translation of a précis of the Note, found on pages 14 through 16. Although it is dated November 8, 1963, we did not receive this communication until November 13.

2. The Note purports to show why the best interests of the Dominican people were served when the Armed Forces, in an "expression of ... democratic vocation", overthrew the government of Juan Bosch. In addition, one paragraph is devoted to the statement that the new government has effectively fulfilled the prerequisites "necessary for recognition and continuity of international relations".

3. We have not acknowledged this Note.

Paul Coughton
for The Embassy

Internal
Circulation

Distribution
to Posts

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

OUTGOING MESSAGE

(original 20-001-14)



FM: Santo Domingo	DATE	FILE	SECURITY	
	NOVEMBER 7, 1963	20-1-2-001	Unclass.	
TO: External Ottawa	NUMBER	PRECEDENCE	COMCENTRE USE ONLY	
	124	DEFERRED		
INFO: Caracas by air mail				

fh
LRD

Ref.: My Tel 123 of November 5, 1963

Subject:

The Belgian Government recognized the Triumvirate on
 November 6.

Leith

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION			
ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	APPROVED BY
SIG..... NAME..... J. Clark Leith.....			SIG..... NAME..... J. Clark Leith.....

AMENDED COPY

FM SDOMINGO NOV19/63 CONFID
TO EXTERNAL 125 OPIMMED
INFO TT CARACAS DE OTT
RECOGNITION

YESTERDAY MANAGERS ROYAL AND SCOTIA BANKS, PHONE COMPANY AND LOCAL
CDN BUSINESSMAN ASKED FOREIGN MINISTER AND MYSELF FOR COCKTAILS.
FOLLOWING POINT RAISED IN CORDIAL TWO HOUR CHAT.

2. FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED ALL TRADITIONAL PREREQUISITES FOR
RECOGNITION HAD BEEN MET AND ASKED WHY CDA WHICH HE SAID
NORMALLY FOLLOWS THE EUROPEAN TRADITION (EG CDN RECOGNITION OF
CUBA) HAS NOT RPT NOT YET RECOGNIZED. FURTHER, HE SUGGESTED
LACK OF CDN RECOGNITION WAS PROBABLY DUE TO USA PRESSURE. IN
REPLY, I NOTED ALTHOUGH I HAVE NOT RPT NOT BEEN INFORMED WHY
RECOGNITION WAS BEING DELAYED CDA HAS RECENTLY BEEN TAKING
A GREATER INTEREST IN HER OWN HEMISPHERE. IN THIS CONTEXT I
EXPRESSED PERSONAL OPINION CDA WAS PROBABLY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT
ATTITUDE OF HEMISPHERE AS A WHOLE AND NOT RPT NOT SIMPLY THE
INEVITABLE.

3. IN LENGTHY MONOLOGUE ON INTERNAL SITUATION FOREIGN MINISTER
STATED HE AND TRIUMVIRATE HAD NOT RPT NOT PROMOTED COUP BUT
ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY ONLY ON CONDITION MILITARY WOULD NOT
RPT NOT EXERCISE INFLUENCE. PRESENT GOVT HE SAID MUST SUCCEED
AS ONLY ALTERNATIVES ARE MILITARY OR COMMUNIST DICTATORSHIPS.
BECAUSE OF CRITICAL ROLE OF GOVT IN LEADING COUNTRY TO DEMOCRACY
FOREIGN MINISTER FELT GOVT SHOULD HAVE MORAL BACKING OF ALL
FRIENDLY NATIONS. HE FELT CDN RECOGNITION SIGNIFICANT AS OTHER
IMPORTANT HEMISPHERE NATIONS WOULD FOLLOW CDN LEAD QUICKLY
PARTICULARLY ARGENTINA CHILE PERU AND BRAZIL.

4. ELECTION SCHEDULE EMBODYING TRANSFER IN TWO YEARS WILL BE
FOLLOWED WITH POSSIBLY A FEW CHANGES AND GOVT WILL ACCEPT ALL

PAGE TWO 125

OAS RECOMMENDATIONS ON HANDLING ELECTION. THE PRD HE SAID SHOULD TAKE PART BUT PERSONALLY DOUBTED THAT FOURTEEN JUN WOULD BE ALLOWED.

5. IN DISCUSSING HEMISPHERE PROBLEM OF COUPS FOREIGN MINISTER MAINTAINED DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CASE DIFFERENT AS BOSCH GOVT MISINTERPRETED DEMOCRATIC ELECTORAL MANDATE.

6. FOREIGN MINISTER CONCLUDED REITERATING HIS HOPE THAT CDA WOULD RECOGNIZE SHORTLY.

7. AFTER FOREIGN MINISTER LEFT CDN INTERESTS REPRESENTED AGREED WITH FOREIGN MINISTERS DESIRE FOR EARLY CDN RECOGNITION NOTING FAVOURABLE CLIMATE FOR THEIR OPERATION WITH ALTERNATIVE UNDESIRABLE AND THEREFORE PRESENT GOVT SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED. NONE INDICATED HE HAD FELT ANY DISCRIMINATION DUE TO LACK OF CDN RECOGNITION BUT I SENSED ALL FELT DELAY MIGHT RAISE DIFFICULTIES IN OPERATIONS. LATTER POINT ALSO HINTED AT IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH FALCONBRIDGE.

8. AS GOVT NOW EVIDENTLY FIRMLY IN CONTROL WITH LITTLE PROSPECT OF VOLUNTARY CHANGES AND NO RPT NO VISIBLE ALTERNATIVE IN SIGHT I SEE LITTLE GAIN LENGTHY DELAY IN RECOGNITION. I ALSO FEEL THAT IT WOULD BE WISE TO RECOGNIZE BEFORE USA BUT WOULD PREFER THAT WE NOT RPT NOT BE FIRST IMPORTANT HEMISPHERE COUNTRY TO RECOGNIZE AS WE WOULD THUS APPEAR TO TRIGGER HEMISPHERIC RECOGNITION

LEITH

NNNN

(Original on 20-00M-17)

MV

FM SDOMINGO NOV5/63 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 123 OPIMMED
INFO TT CARACAS DE OTT
REF MYTEL 122 OCT31
RECOGNITION

20-1-2-00M

file
JCH

JAPAN HAS RECOGNIZED. BELGIAN AMBASSADOR INFORMS THEY AND DUTCH
WILL RECOGNIZE SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN COORDINATING ARRANGEMENTS ARE
MADE. PARAGUAY, NOT RPT NOT REPRESENTED HERE HAS RECOGNIZED.

2. INTERNAL SITUATION.

SCHOOLS REMAIN CLOSED. MTGS BANNED. FEW DEMONSTRATIONS SINCE LAST
TEL. NO RPT. NO PUBLIC REACTION TO EUROPEAN RECOGNITION. GOVT
REACTION LIMITED TO EXPRESSION OF PLEASURE WITH EUROPEAN RECOGNITION.

3. COUNTER COUP PLOT DISCOVERED OCT31 OF LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE.

DISTINCT POSSIBILITY THAT GOVT DELIBERATELY DISTORTED PLOT TO
GAIN BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SUPPORT. ONLY OFFICIAL VERSION OF
PLOT RELEASED AND THOSE ACCUSED HAVE NOT RPT NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO
MAKE STATEMENT TO PRESS.

4. USA CONVERSATIONS WITH GOVT REFERRED TO BY PRESIDENT

KENNEDY LAST WEEK ARE SIMPLY OCCASIONAL MTGS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
AND HAVE NOT RPT NOT PRODUCED ANY HOPE OF EARLY RECOGNITION BY

USA

LEITH

NNNN
OTT072
BW48
PP OTT
DE WDC
P 012207Z

20-1-2-DOM

*file
T-71
X4*

*seen
[signature]*

FM WASHDC NOV1/63 UNCLAS
TO EXTERNAL 3568 PRIORITY
AIRMAIL SDOMINGO
PRESIDENT KENNEDYS PRESS CONFERENCE OCT31-RECOGNITION OF DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC

ASKED ABOUT POSSIBLE RESUMPTION OF FULL DIPLO RELATIONS WITH
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, PRESIDENT KENNEDY SAID QUOTE:
THERE HAVE BEEN CONVERSATIONS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC TO SEE WHAT
ASSURANCES CAN BE GIVEN REGARDING THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRATIC
RULE, CONSTITUTIONAL RULE IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. WE HAVE A CHARGE
DAFFAIRES THERE, AND QUITE OBVIOUSLY WE ARE INTERESTED IN THAT
RESTORATION. THOSE ASSURANCES ARE OF FREE ELECTIONS, AND SO WE ARE
CONTINUING TO CARRY OUT THESE DISCUSSIONS, ALTHOUGH
ACTUALLY THEY ARE RELATIVELY INFORMAL, AND THEY REAP NO RPT NO
HARVEST AS YET. BUT THAT WOULD BE OUR POLICY TO ATTEMPT TO SEE IF
WE CAN RESUME RELATIONS WITH THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC UNDER
ASSURANCES OF A RESTORATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVT. AS YET WEVE
HAD NO RPT NO SUCCESS. UNQUOTE.

20-1-2-DOM

(original 20-Dom-14) XL
file
JA

FM SDOMINGO OCT31/63 CONF
TO EXTERNAL 120 OPIMMED
INFO TT CARACAS DE OTT
RECOGNITION

FRENCH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES INFORMS HAS RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO
RECOGNIZE GOVT TODAY. BELGIUM AND ITALIAN AMBASSADORS HAVE NOT
RPT NOT YET RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS BUT EACH ANTICIPATE RECOGNITION
SHORTLY

LEITH

20-1-2-DOM
del

ryw 20-DOM-17

FM SDOMINGO OCT31/63 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 120 OPIIMED
INFO TT CARACAS DE OTT
RECOGNITION

FRENCH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES INFORMS HAS RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO
RECOGNIZE GOVT TODAY. BELGIUM AND ITALIAN AMBASSADORS HAVE NOT
RPT NOT YET RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS BUT EACH ANTICIPATE RECOGNITION
SHORTLY

LEITH

20-1-2-DOM

ACTION COPY

XL

file
[initials]

[signature]

FM SDOMINGO OCT31/63 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 122 OPIMMED
INFO TT CARACAS DE OTT
INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

GOVT DECREE TODAY SUSPENDS THE RIGHT TO PUBLIC MTGS AND ASSOCIA-
TIONS FOR THIRTY DAYS. MOVE EVIDENTLY TO DEAL WITH SEVERAL PLANNED
PRD MTGS AND BRIEF QUOTE MICRO MTG UNQUOTE ORGANIZED FOURTEENTH
JUN. YESTERDAY GOVT REVISED PENAL CODE ESTABLISHING HEAVY PENALTIES
FOR TERRORISM EVIDENTLY PROMPTED BY EXPLOSION OF THREE BOMBS IN
THE CAPITAL MON, HOWEVER NO RPT NO DAMAGE CAUSED.

2. RECOGNITION.

ITALY RECOGNIZED TODAY (REF MYTEL 120 OCT31). BELGIUM ONLY EUROPEAN
COUNTRY REPRESENTED HERE WAITING INSTRUCTIONS. *th?* ?

3. UNDERSTAND THE LATIN SITUATION AS FOLLOWS. CHILEAN CHARGE
DAFFAIRES LEAVING BUT NO RPT NO ANNOUNCEMENT MADE. BRAZIL LIKELY
TO RECOGNIZE SHORTLY. COLOMBIA AND PANAMA WILL LIKELY DELAY. ARGENT-
INA EVIDENTLY UNCERTAIN.

4. JAPAN STILL AWAITING INSTRUCTIONS.

5. INFO HERE INDICATES USA POSITION REMAINS FIRM DESPITE CONTINUING
IMPASSE

LEITH

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(DUPLICATE)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy,
Mexico City.

Reference: Our letter No. 517, Oct. 4, 1963, Para. 6.

Subject: OAS Action on Military Coups - Mexican
Attitude.

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: 554

Date: October 31, 1963

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air (Courier)

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.	
20-1-2-DOM	
21	-

file
JGH

References

Mr. Ritchie
Mr. Pick
Mr. Hammond ←
Comm. Dist.
NDC (through
P & L)
D.L.(2)
Washington
NATO Paris
L.A. Posts
CCOS

& file
J.A. Dougan
Nov. 18/63

Internal
Circulation

We noted in the letter under reference that despite the Mexican Government's close adherence to the Estrada Doctrine dealing with changes of government in other countries whereby "Mexico makes no decision in the sense of granting recognition because it considers that this is an insulting practice impinging on the sovereignty of other nations ... but limits itself to maintaining or withdrawing when it thinks appropriate its diplomatic representatives", Mexican reactions to the overthrow of ex-President Bosch of the Dominican Republic, and later in the case of Honduras, were clear evidence of disapproval which in effect did pass judgment on what had taken place.

2. As you know the Estrada Doctrine, promulgated in 1930, was a direct result of Mexican experience during the preceding two decades when changes of government resulting from Mexico's Revolution led to the withholding of recognition of some of these governments by other powers, particularly the United States. It was primarily, therefore, a political response to outside pressure; Mexican efforts to obtain the support of other governments for the Doctrine as the expression of a valid principle of international law have not been successful. Now, as a result of the military takeovers in the Dominican Republic and Honduras and Mexico's implicit disapproval of these takeovers, the Doctrine is coming under attack in Mexico itself.

Bases of Attack

3. Questions have been raised, for example, as to the difference between the normal diplomatic practice of breaking relations and Mexico's recent actions; it has been said that whatever the intent of the Estrada Doctrine these actions are tantamount to an expression of disapproval and, therefore, of intervention (as conceived by the Doctrine) in the internal affairs of other countries. The Government has also been accused by extreme Left opinion of using the Doctrine as an excuse for lack of any clear policy so that it can wait to see what the United States is going to do. Others have called for bringing the Doctrine up-to-date in the context of the Pan American system and have drawn attention to Clause (d) of Article 5 of the Charter of the OAS which affirms the "effective exercise of representative democracy" as a principle of the Charter. Finally, as noted in the letter under reference, there is some discrepancy between the Estrada Doctrine and the doctrine of self-determination, to which Mexico also attaches great importance.

Distribution
to Posts

Position of Government

4. In public, at least, Foreign Minister Tello has said that the Estrada Doctrine continues to govern Mexican policy and that there is no reason to change it. The Mexican Government will continue to study each case that occurs in the light of the Doctrine and will conduct itself accordingly. When asked about Mexico's policy towards the present Government of Spain, which she has never recognized, Señor Tello replies that Mexico continues to maintain relations with the Spanish Republican Government because its overthrow was obtained through the intervention of foreign powers.

5. Nevertheless there have been signs that the Government is concerned about the current application of the Estrada Doctrine and its relation to the wider question of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States. In our letter No. 536 of October 18 reporting the visit of President Tito to Mexico we referred to the suggestion put forward by President López Mateos that the States members of the United Nations should subscribe to an international agreement ratifying the principle of non-intervention and presumably spelling out what it means. Both President Tito and the head of the Mexican delegation to the General Assembly have since put this idea before the Assembly but, so far as we know, without carrying it any further. The Foreign Ministry tells us that the Mexican delegation will probably submit a resolution on the subject if and when the delegation finds there is sufficient support amongst other delegations for the proposal. The resolution would probably not go into the substance of such a treaty but would propose some procedure for its drafting. Our informant suggested that the treaty might embody a commitment similar to that expressed in Article 15 of the OAS Charter, though worded more loosely. Article 15 reads as follows:

"No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements."

He emphasized that this project was not to be confused with, and was separate from, the proposal already made by one or two governments -- President Tito referred to it while he was in Mexico -- to codify in some form the principles of international co-existence.

Attitude Toward Possible OAS Action

6. It also appears that Mexico would not object to the OAS giving consideration to ways and means of discouraging coups d'état, despite reluctance to transgress the principle of non-intervention. Foreign Minister Tello told me this week during a casual meeting at the airport that in his view none of the existing rules of the OAS provided for collective action to prevent or discourage coups d'état and that it would be necessary to draw up such a rule before any action could be taken. However, he thought the proper place to do this was at the Inter-American Conference which has been suggested for Quito during the second half of March next and not at a Meeting of Consultation as proposed by Venezuela and Costa Rica.

7. Officials have told us that, although opposed to hasty action, Mexico would nevertheless go along with a Meeting of Consultation if there was a majority in favour. They are inclined to doubt, however, that such a majority exists, despite assurances they have just received from the Foreign Minister of Venezuela who was here on October 28 and saw President López Mateos. The Mexicans have heard that the Americans are also lukewarm about a Meeting of Consultation unless the major Latin American countries are in favour and there is some prospect of constructive agreement.

- 3 -

8. Our informant at the Ministry speculated further that, if and when it comes to the point of drawing up new policies, two possible lines of action might be considered. The first would be to agree that recognition of unconstitutional governments would not take place without prior consultation, on the understanding that the results of such consultation need not commit governments to any particular decision. Secondly, there might be some agreement to pursue this consultation to the point of considering non-military sanctions against unconstitutional governments. Our informant admitted that such measures could be described as "interventionist" but at the same time he thought that some action would probably have to be taken to discourage military takeovers.

(Sgd.) W.A. Irwin
Ambassador.



NDOL

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PP WDC

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P 281529Z

Mr. W. Agnew
1. DEPT. OF
INDUSTRY

*To see
A. M. JCN*

*o
He
how E*

f-30

FM TANDC OTT OCT28/63 UNCLAS

TO TT TANDC MEXICO TC6500 PRIORITY DE WDC

INFO EXTERNAL TANDC SDOMINGO (LEITH)

CLARK FOR NOBLE FM FLETCHER

REF NOBLES TC33 OCT23

DUTY IN PUERTO RICO

YOUR TRAVEL PLANS TO PUERTO RICO ARE APPROVED. DEPT HAS DEPOSITED TRAVEL ADVANCE SPECIFIED AS REQUESTED.

2. PLEASE ADVISE LODGING PLACE SANJUAN EARLIEST RPTG SDOMINGO.

3. ASSUME YOU HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO REQUEST OF LEITH SUGGESTIONS AND BACKGROUND DATA APPROPRIATE TO YOUR PERIOD OF TEMPORARY DUTY IN SANJUAN.

4. FOR LEIGH NOBLES DEPARTURE MEXICO CITY OCT30 FOR KINGSTON JAMAICA WHERE HE WILL CHANGE PLANES FOR PUERTO RICO ARRIVING SANJUAN 1300 HOURS OCT31.

20-1-2-DOM
~~99999~~ 40
65

*file
71*

20-1-2-DOM

*file
J*

PHONOGRAM RELAY
PLEASE RETRANSMIT TEL NO. *SPONING 6* UNN DATE *OCT 29*

FROM.....TO *W.A.S.H.D.C.*

AUTHORIZING OFFICER *H. Hammond*

DIVISION *L.A. DIV*

PHONE NO.....

RECEIVED BY *[Signature]*
(CONCENTRE)

(THIS FORM IS TO BE COMPLETED IN-DUPLICATE-
RETURN ONE COPY TO AUTHORIZING OFFICER)

File on
JAN

20-1-2-DOM

(Original on 20-DOM-19)
DUM
20-CUBA-1-4

XL

FM SDOMINGO OCT29/63 CONFID CDN EYES ONLY

TO EXTERNAL UNN OPIMMED

INFO IT CARACAS DE OTT

[Reputed to Wash DC]

BRIT AMBASSADOR INFORMED THIS MORNING HE HAS RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO ACKNOWLEDGE FOREIGN MINISTRY NOTE TOMORROW THUS RECOGNIZING NEW GOVT. NO RPT NO PUBLICITY OF RECOGNITION WILL BE MADE.

2. INTERNAL SITUATION STILL A POLITICAL IMPASSE WITH LITTLE PROSPECT OF MAJOR CHANGE IN GOVT MAKE UP IN NEAR FUTURE. SPORADIC STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS CONTINUE ALMOST DAILY, HOWEVER POLICE EFFECTIVELY MAINTAINING CONTROL

LEITH

XL

Original 20 DOM-14

FM WASHDC OCT28/63 CONF
TO EXTERNAL 3502 PRIORITY
INFO BAG SDOMINGO CARACAS DE OTT
REF OURTEL 3361 OCT16
RECOGNITION OF DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

file 20-1-2-DOM
JH

SOWASH, DESK OFFICER FOR DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AFFAIRS, TOLD US OCT28 THAT THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES HAD EXTENDED FORMAL RECOGNITION TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC TRIUMVIRATE--SPAIN PORTUGAL NATIONALIST CHINA AND HONDURAS. HE THOUGHT IN ADDITION THAT GUATEMALA HAD JUST RECOGNIZED THE NEW DOMINICAN REPUBLIC REGIME OR WAS ABOUT TO DO SO.

2. AS FAR AS RECOGNITION BY USA WAS CONCERNED, SOWASH SAID THAT THE SITUATION REMAINED AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, IT THAT UNDER EXISTING CONDITIONS NORMALIZATION OF DIPLO RELATIONS WAS NOT RPT NOT POSSIBLE. SOME SORT OF A MOVE TOWARDS QUOTE CONSTITUTIONALITY UNQUOTE WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE BY THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AUTHORITIES BEFORE USA CAN CONSIDER RESUMPTION OF DIPLO AND AID TIES.

3. IN THIS CONTEXT WE MENTIONED TO SOWASH THE SUBSTANCE IN CARACAS TEL 58 OF OCT18 WHICH HE FOUND OF GREAT INTEREST. SOWASH HAD NO RPT NO INFO HOWEVER TO SUBSTANTIATE ARES OPTIMISM THAT THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC MILITARY FAVOURED A QUICK REPLACEMENT OF THE TRIUMVIRATE BY A GOVT WHICH COULD CLAIM A MORE CONSTITUTIONAL CHARACTER. IN FACT SOWASH DOUBTED THAT ANY REP OF THE PRD SUCH AS ARES COULD BE SUCCESSFUL IN NEGOTIATING WITH THE MILITARY TOWARDS ESTABLISHING A MORE QUOTE DEOMOCRATIC UNQUOTE FORM OF GOVT.

Economic Division

CONFIDENTIAL

October 23, 1963

Latin American Division

20-1-2-DOM

United States Embargo on Arms Shipments to the
Dominican Republic and Request for Canadian Cooperation

On the afternoon of October 22, Mr. C. A. Kiselyak, Second Secretary of the United States Embassy, called on the desk officer to leave a U.S. Memorandum indicating that the United States had reimposed an embargo on the shipment of arms to the Dominican Republic and expressing the hope that in the present circumstances Canada would take similar action until such time as the situation in the Dominican Republic was clarified. Copies of the Memorandum are attached.

2. In accepting the Memorandum, we commented that the course of action suggested in it was not in fact at variance with the continuing practice of the Canadian Government over the past several years of refusing authorization for the export of arms to sensitive areas of the Caribbean, including the Dominican Republic.

3. In response to our enquiry, Mr. Kiselyak indicated that he did not have any reason to suppose that U.S. authorities intended to make an announcement concerning their embargo. Nevertheless, he could not rule out the possibility of some public statement referring to it. Furthermore, it may be assumed that other states in the Americas and perhaps in Western Europe are being approached in the same way and this might conceivably come to light. We take it you may, therefore, wish to have the Minister prepared for a possible question in the House of Commons concerning the Canadian policy in this respect.

AJ PICK
Latin American DivisionMr. Ritchie
Mr. Bow
SANTO DOMINGO

CONFIDENTIAL

October 22, 1963

MEMORANDUM

The present de facto regime of the Dominican Republic has not yet taken the steps toward representative, constitutional government which would permit the normalization of its relations with the Government of the United States. Remnants of the Bosch administration have designated a provisional president and the support they command, together with the fervor with which they repudiate the coup, is apparently great enough that a peaceful resolution does not yet appear likely.

The United States Government has therefore reimposed its earlier embargo on arms shipments to the Dominican Republic. The United States Government wishes to express its gratitude to the Government of Canada for its cooperation in restricting arms shipments during the critical 1960-62 period and expresses the hope that in the present situation Canada will take action similar to ours until such time as the situation in the Dominican Republic is clarified.

CONFIDENTIAL

20-1-2-DOM

(original 20-DOM-14)

file
JH

XL

FM SDOMINGO OCT 30 /63 CONF
TO EXTERNAL OTT UNN OPIMMED
INFO TT CARACAS DE OTT
RECOGNITION.

WEST GERMAN CHARGE DAFFAIRS INFORMS HE HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO
RECOGNIZE GOVT TOMORROW

LEITH

(L)

Mr. Hammond
L.A.

ACTION COPY

E. Cur

TO: *Mr. Whitpress*
OCT 31 1963
REGISTRY

201-2-DOM
101 | *10*

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~~9803-14-40~~
65 | 165

file
JCN

FM SDOMINGO OCT30/63 SECRET
TO EXTERNAL 358 PRIORITY
INFO TANDC OTT
REF YOURTEL TC6500 OCT28
PLAN TO TRAVEL TO SANJUAN FOR LOCAL LONG WEEKEND LEAVING
NOV1 RETURNING NOV3. WILL CONTACT NOBLE THERE PROVIDE BACKGROUND
AND TRADE ENQUIRIES

LEITH''''

*- Is Care aware
of this
- No objections*

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du	/

Reçu 20-DOM-17

FM SDOMINGO OCT30/65 CONF
TO EXTERNAL OTT UNN OPIMMED
INFO TT CARACAS DE OTT
RECOGNITION.

WEST GERMAN CHARGE DAFFAIRS INFORMS HE HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO
RECOGNIZE GOVT TOMORROW

LEITH

20-1-2-201
20 | 09 | file



Apartado 1393,
Santo Domingo,
Dominican Republic.

October 24, 1963. *Rec'd, OCT 28*
M. Hayward

What is this about
and?

Dear Mr. Pick:

In the last paragraph of your telegram XL145 of October 11th you solicited my comments on the matter. For the moment I would prefer to defer those comments until after we have recognized the government and I have had an opportunity to discuss the pros and cons with Mr. Noble. However, should you wish to have my preliminary comments before that time, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Yours sincerely,

J. Clark Leith
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

he - about
question for
Mr. Beach,
primarily
of the
deal
acceleration
Concess-
Santo Domingo



Mr. A. Pick,
Chief, Latin American Division,
Dept. of External Affairs,
Ottawa.

CONFIDENTIAL



ACTION REQUEST

TO **LATIN AMERICAN DIV.** | DATE **OCT 25/63**

LOCATION

FROM **O/SSEA/M. N. ROWE** | RE FILE NO.

FOR:

- ACTION
- APPROVAL
- COMMENTS
- DRAFT REPLY
- INFORMATION
- INVESTIGATE AND REPORT
- INVESTIGATION
- MAKE.....COPIES
- MORE DETAILS
- NOTE AND FILE

- NOTE & FORWARD
- NOTE & RETURN
- P.A. ON FILE
- REPLY DIRECTLY
- REPLY, PLEASE
- SEE ME, PLEASE
- SIGNATURE
- TRANSLATION
- YOUR REQUEST

PREPARE MEMO TO:.....

REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF:.....

REMARKS US EMBARGO ON ARMS SHIPMENTS TO
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND REQUEST FOR CDN
COOPERATION

Memo Oct.23 to Economic Div. from L.A.Div

BEEN BY THE MINISTER

000171

LATIN AMERICAN/TCHammond/MCL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Oct 24/63

MEMORANDUM

TO: Economic Division

Security CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: Latin American Division

Date: October 23, 1963

REFERENCE:

File No.	
20-1-2-DOM	

SUBJECT: United States Embargo on Arms Shipments to the Dominican Republic and Request for Canadian Cooperation

File
JFH

On the afternoon of October 22, Mr. C. A. Kiselyak, Second Secretary of the United States Embassy, called on the desk officer to leave a U.S. Memorandum indicating that the United States had reimposed an embargo on the shipment of arms to the Dominican Republic and expressing the hope that in the present circumstances Canada would take similar action until such time as the situation in the Dominican Republic was clarified. Copies of the Memorandum are attached.

2. In accepting the Memorandum, we commented that the course of action suggested in it was not in fact at variance with the continuing practice of the Canadian Government over the past several years of refusing authorization for the export of arms to sensitive areas of the Caribbean, including the Dominican Republic.

3. In response to our enquiry, Mr. Kiselyak indicated that he did not have any reason to suppose that U.S. authorities intended to make an announcement concerning their embargo. Nevertheless, he could not rule out the possibility of some public statement referring to it. Furthermore, it may be assumed that other states in the Americas and perhaps in Western Europe are being approached in the same way and this might conceivably come to light. We take it you may, therefore, wish to have the Minister prepared for a possible question in the House of Commons concerning the Canadian policy in this respect.

R M N.J. PICK

Latin American Division

CIRCULATION

Mr. Ritchie
[Signature]

CONFIDENTIAL

October 22, 1963

MEMORANDUM

The present de facto regime of the Dominican Republic has not yet taken the steps toward representative, constitutional government which would permit the normalization of its relations with the Government of the United States. Remnants of the Bosch administration have designated a provisional president and the support they command, together with the fervor with which they repudiate the coup, is apparently great enough that a peaceful resolution does not yet appear likely.

The United States Government has therefore reimposed its earlier embargo on arms shipments to the Dominican Republic. The United States Government wishes to express its gratitude to the Government of Canada for its cooperation in restricting arms shipments during the critical 1960-62 period and expresses the hope that in the present situation Canada will take action similar to ours until such time as the situation in the Dominican Republic is clarified.

P. M. 3

20-1-2-DUM
ae | ds

Rec'd 20-DUM-1-7

FM CARACAS OCT18/63 RESTD
TO EXTERNAL 58 OPIMMED
INFO TT SDOMINGO DE OTT
DOMINICAN PROSPECTS

FORMER DOMINICAN AMBASSADOR TO VENEZUELA MAXIMO ARES IS LEAVING TODAY FOR SDOMINGO AT THE REQUEST OF PRD OF WHICH HE IS THIRD MOST IMPORTANT LEADER TO SUGGEST WAY OUT OF PRESENT IMPASSE. ARES WAS VICE PRESIDENT OF COMMISSION CHARGED WITH REVISING CONSTITUTION PROCLAIMED APR/63 AND DECLARED INVALID AFTER RECENT COUP DETAT. HE TOLD ME THAT UNDER ARTICLE 132 SENATE CHAIRMAN CASA NOVAS SHOULD OCCUPY PRESIDENCY PROVISIONALLY AND SUMMON NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WITHIN TWO WEEKS TO ELECT SUCCESSOR TO BOSCH FOR REMAINDER OF TERM. UNDER ARTICLE 125 ASSEMBLY MUST ELECT NEW PRESIDENT FROM MAJORITY PARTY. HE CLAIMED THAT BOSCH UNACCEPTABLE TO MILITARY, DID NOT RPT NOT INTEND TO RETURN, AGREED WITH THIS PLAN AND WAS WILLING TO RESIGN IN ORDER TO FACILITATE SOLUTION.

2. ARES SAID THAT ON SEP24 BOSCH HAD MET WITH CABINET MEMBERS CHAIRMEN OF SENATE AND CHAMBER DEPUTIES. HE ADVISED THEM THAT ARMY PRESSURE HAD BECOME UNBEARABLE AND REQUESTED NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BE CALLED IN EXTRAORDINARY EMERGENCY SESSION AT WHICH HE WOULD ANNOUNCE HIS RESIGNATION AFTER EXPOSING INTRIGUES PRIVATELY SUGAR AND OIL INTERESTS, ALLIED OPPOSITION TO SECTORS AND MILITARY LEADERS. THIS RESIGNATION WOULD HAVE BEEN REJECTED BY NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND BOSCH WOULD HAVE EMERGED WITH STRONGER HAND TO CARRY OUT HIS PROJECT OF REFORM. ACCORDING TO ARES THIS PLAN WAS LEAKED TO OPPOSITION WHO PERSUADED GENERALS TO OVERTHROW BOSCH BEFORE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY COULD MEET.

3. ARES EXPECTED FAVOURABLE RECEPTION. HE ASSURES ME THAT MILITARY HAVE ALREADY SENT HIM INDICATIONS THROUGH FAMILY AND BUSINESS RELATIONS THAT THEY FAVOUR QUICK REPLACEMENT OF PRESENT IMPOTENT TRIUMVIRATE BY GOVT BASED ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONTINUITY ACCEPTABLE BOTH TO DOMINICAN PEOPLE AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES. HE STATES SOCIAL

...2

PAGE TWO 58

CHRISTIANS SUPPORT OF THIS PLAN AND HOPES OTHER OPPOSITION GROUPS
CAN BE CONVINCED IT OFFERS A DECENT AND RESPECTABLE ALTERNATIVE
IMPENDING ECONOMIC RECESSIONS AND POLITICAL CHAOS. ARES IMPLIED
HE WAS ENCOURAGED BY VENEZUELAN AND AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP

BEAULNE

Lati American/T.C.Hammond/mr

References:

c.c. 20-4-OAS-13	
20-1-2-DOM	
Mr. Dougan	
Mr. Pick	

20

Rec'd 20-10-M-1-48

C-20-4-OAS-13

FM WASHDC OCT17/63 UNCLAS
 TO EXTERNAL 3388 PRIORITY
 INFO AIRMAIL SDOMINGO CARACAS
 SITUATION IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

A SPECIAL SESSION OF OAS COUNCIL WAS CALLED OCT15 AT REQUEST OF DOMINICAN REPUBLIC REP WHO WANTED TO REPORT QUOTE A DELICATE SITUATION UNQUOTE EXISTING IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AS A RESULT OF UNDUE PRESSURE EXERTED BY QUOTE A MEMBER GOVT UNQUOTE IN SUPPORT OF QUOTE THE SO CALLED PRINCIPLE OF SUCCESSION OF POWER UNQUOTE. A MOTION BY THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC REP TO HOLD THE MTG BEHIND CLOSED DOORS WAS DEFEATED AFTER AN INTERVENTION BY THE VENEZUELAN REP AGAINST SECRECY IN THIS CASE.

2. ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS GOVT THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC REP READ A COMMUNIQUE, THE CONTENTS OF WHICH HAD BEEN PASSED ON THE SAME DAY TO THE ADDRESSEE MR SPENCER KING, THE USA CHARGE IN SDOMINGO BY THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AUTHORITIES. THE COMMUNIQUE READ IN

PART AS FOLLOWS: (OUR TRANSLATION FROM SPANISH): QUOTE THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC GOVT COONSIDERS AS UNWARRANTED THE SUGGESTION WHICH IN THE NAME OF YOUR GOVT YOU MADE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON THAT THE REINS OF POWER SHOULD BE HANDED TO MR JUAN CASASNOVAS GARRIDO. THIS CONSTITUTES AN UNPRECEDENTED INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF A SOVEREIGN NATION... IT IS CONTRARY TO ALL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW THAT A GOVT, WHOSE CONTROL OVER THE COUNTRY IS ABSOLUTE AND IS PEACEFULLY EXERTED, AND WHICH HAS DEMONSTRATED ITS INDISPUTABLE ABILITY TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC ORDER, SHOULD DIVEST ITSELF OF POWER IN FAVOUR OF AN OBSCURE INDIVIDUAL WHO DOES NOT RPT NOT ENJOY ANY INFLUENCE IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE STATE UNQUOTE. THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC REP WENT ON TO STATE HIS REGRET OVER THE EXCESSIVE ZEAL OF A QUOTE, CONFUSED UNQUOTE CIVIL SERVANT WHO HAD PROBABLY GONE FURTHER THAN REQUIRED BY HIS INSTRUCTIONS. HE CONCLUDED BY EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT THE INCIDENT WAS CLOSED AND SAID THAT THE DOMINICANS FOR THIER PART

PAGE TWO 3388

WERE PREPARED TO FORGET IT.

3. USA REP RESPONDED AT SOME LENGTH STATING INTER ALIA THAT HE WAS SURPRISED QUOTE THAT THE REGIME WHICH HAD ASSUMED POWER IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC HAS SEEN FIT TO SEEK THIS MTG AND TO HAVE ITS REP MAKE THE STATEMENTS TO WHICH WE HAVE JUST LISTENED... ON BEHALF OF THE GOVT OF USA I DECLARE... THAT THE USA HAS NOT RPT NOT AND IS NOT RPT NOT INTERFERING IN ANY WAY IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THAT TROUBLED AND UNHAPPY COUNTRY. IN VIEW OF THE DISTORTED AND INACCURATE VERSION WHICH HAS JUST BEEN GIVEN OF THE TALKS HELD YESTERDAY BETWEEN THE USA CHARGE IN SDOMINGO AND MEMBERS OF THE DE FACTO GOVT I SHOULD LIKE TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT, AND IN DOING SO, SHOULD LIKE TO REJECT MOST EMPHATICALLY A MOST ENERGETICALLY THE PROTEST WHICH HAS JUST BEEN MADE... IN ORDER THAT NO RPT NO AMBIGUITY COULD EXIST IN THE MINDS OF THE AUTHORITIES IN SDOMINGO CONCERNING THIS MATTER UNQUOTE (THE RESUMPTION OF DIPLO AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH USA) QUOTE THE USA CHARGE, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE DEPT OF STATE, HELD INFORMAL TALKS YESTERDAY WITH MEMBERS OF THE DE FACTO GOVT. HE MADE CLEAR THAT USA POLICY REMAINS AS STATED ON OCT4 BY THE SEC OF STATE... OUR CHARGE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT ACTIONS TAKEN BY USA GOVT FOR THE REMOVAL OF ITS PERSONNEL ARE CONTINUING. HE THEN ENQUIRED WHAT PLANS THE TRIUMVIRATE HAD ON RETURNING TO CONSTITUTIONALITY. HE WAS INFORMED OF PLANS ANNOUNCED FOR THE HOLDING OF SOME ELECTIONS FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY TO TAKE PLACE SOME FOURTEEN MONTHS FROM NOW. OUR CHARGE REPLIED THAT THIS WOULD NOT RPT NOT PERMIT THE PROMPT RESTORATION OF OUR RELATIONS AND THE CLOSE COLLABORATION WE DESIRED. OUR CHARGE WAS THEN SPECIFICALLY ASKED WHAT ALTERNATIVE HE COULD PROPOSE. IT WAS IN THIS CONTEXT AND IN RESPONDING TO THIS REQUEST THAT THE CHARGE CALLED ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT USA GOVT HAD RECEIVED A REQUEST FROM JUAN CASASNOVAS GARRIDO TO RECOGNIZE HIM AS THE PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC ON THE BASIS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND OF A DECISION TAKEN BY A QUORUM OF THE DOMINICAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WHICH MET ON DOMINICAN SOIL

PAGE THREE 3388

OCT10. MAY I MAKE CLEAR AT THIS POINT THAT USA GOVT HAS MADE NO RPT NO ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OR REPLY TO THAT REQUEST. OUR CHARGE MADE IT CLEAR THAT USA WAS NEITHER INSISTING NOR SUGGESTING ANY ONE SOLUTION BUT WAS SEEKING TO ASCERTAIN THE PLANS OF THE DE FACTO GOVT TOWARD THE RETURN OF CONSTITUTIONALITY AND TO ASCERTAIN THEIR VIEWS TOWARDS THE DESIGNATION OF CASASNOVAS UNQUOTE.

4. THE INFO IN THE FOREGOING IS BASED ON AN CAS DOCU DATED OCT15.

Consular Div. J.A. Donald/ab

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO: Latin American Division

Security CONFIDENTIAL

Date October 16, 1963

FROM: Consular Division

File No.	20-1-2-001
	20-1-2-001

Do Oct 17/63

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: Arturo Espaillat

- Refer cc. to Santo Domingo
- Mr. [unclear] to see on return
file
J.C.V.

We are informed by Immigration that, following the failure before the Supreme Court of Canada of his appeal against an order of deportation, Arturo Espaillat was permitted by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration to take voluntary departure from Canada. He actually did so on October 9 flying by way of Toronto and Kingston, Jamaica, to Santo Domingo. On arrival in the Dominican Republic he was refused admittance (Immigration's words were "he was told he was not welcome there") and put on the first available flight to Martinique, where, as far as is known, he remains.

2. No action has so far been taken by the Immigration authorities against Espaillat's wife and children. Immigration intend to review the situation after Espaillat has had sufficient time to settle down somewhere. It is assumed that they are still in Canada (as you know the two boys were attending Ashbury) but this does not seem to have been checked very thoroughly by Immigration. Should Mrs. Espaillat remain here indefinitely with a view, later on, of applying for her husband's admission as an immigrant, Immigration would not regard favourably any such proposal.

[Signature]
 Consular Division

CIRCULATION
 Mr. Wershof

LATIN AMERICAN/TCHammond/McL

20-1-2-DOM

DRAFT

CONFIDENTIAL

Suggested Insert for EAO Memorandum to October 7, 1963
the Minister Covering Submission to
Cabinet Concerning Emergency Aid for Tobago

Although Hurricane Flora has caused extensive damage in other countries of the Caribbean area, including Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Cuba, it is the view of the Department of External Affairs that the present relations of these countries with Canada as well as with other American countries are not such as to warrant Canadian relief assistance to them at this time.

Canada's relations with the Dominican Republic are in a state of suspense following the overthrow of the constitutional government of President Juan Bosch, as a result of a military coup on September 25. Although Canada, of course, has relations with Cuba, emergency relief from Canada to that country would not appear to be desirable, partly because of its possible adverse effect on Canada's relations with the United States and with other Latin American countries. Similarly, in the case of Haiti, because of the dictatorial nature of the régime of President Duvalier, any Canadian assistance would be politically embarrassing and run the risk of misinterpretation

Approved by
Mr. Puck Oct 7
JK

Mr. Martin

*This did not reach me in time on Friday
but you may wish to use it to answer the
question by Mr. Boutin (Dorchester) which
you took as notice*

U.

CONFIDENTIAL

October 3, 1963

File 20-1-2-DOM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

Coup d'Etat in the Dominican Republic

*file
G.J.H.*

It is possible that you may be asked a question on the Orders of the Day in the House of Commons concerning the recent coup d'état in the Dominican Republic and the nature of Canada's present relations with that country. Accordingly, there is attached a suggested reply, along very general lines, which you may wish to use, if it is required.

2. Early on the morning of September 25, the constitutional Government of the Dominican Republic, headed by the democratically-elected President Juan Bosch, was overthrown as a result of a bloodless coup d'état led by the Chief of the General Staff, the service and police chiefs and a group of senior military officers. The main reason advanced by the military for this action was the allegation that it was necessary in order to prevent Communism from destroying the country. In order to establish what they termed "a rightist state", the military officers arrested and eventually deported Sr. Bosch, nullified the present Dominican Constitution, dissolved the Congress and called upon a select group of leading members of six right-wing parties, none of whom enjoys any sizeable popular support, to choose a government. These political figures, with the backing of the military, have appointed a Triumvirate consisting of three predictably conservative civilians, who are not connected with any of the Dominican political parties, to form the executive of a new government. Cabinet portfolios are being shared out among the several extreme right-wing political figures. The Triumvirate is to rule for a two-year period and a political truce of at least one year amongst political parties has been declared. Only a vague reference has so far been made to the holding of general elections before the end of this two-year period. Several hundred persons, presumably Leftists, Communists and supporters of Sr. Bosch, appear to have been arrested. There have been no indications of popular outbursts either in protest against or in support of the coup.

3. Failing any specific promise of democratic elections in the near future, the replacement of Sr. Bosch, who was generally regarded as a liberal, if somewhat ineffectual, leftist, by the three-man junta, who have no popular mandate whatsoever, is a grave blow to the hopes of establishing on a firm basis a

MINISTERS OFFICE
OCT 4 1963
2567

TO THE HONOURABLE MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT
FROM THE SECRETARY OF DEFENCE
SUBJECT: [Illegible]

[Extremely faint and illegible typed text, likely the main body of a letter or report.]

[Faint text at the bottom of the page, possibly a signature block or footer.]


2.

representative system in the Dominican Republic, which had only recently emerged from over 30 years of brutal dictatorship under Trujillo. During its short seven months of authority, President Bosch's government had been faced with hostility from both the extreme Left, including Communists and Castroist elements, and the far Right, including reactionary military officers in close alliance with wealthy oligarchic elements and several would-be strongmen in the officer corps.

4. At this time there is no indication of any disposition on the part of leading Latin American countries to move quickly to recognize the new government. The United States, Mexico, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Honduras and Bolivia have broken off diplomatic relations. The United States has also stopped aid payments under the Alliance for Progress. While we expect that in the not too distant future some Western European countries and some smaller, more conservative Latin American countries may recognize the new government, it is likely that some time will elapse before a considerable number of Latin American countries, or the United States, will do so.

5. It has been the general policy of Canadian Governments to recognize at the appropriate time de facto regimes when they are in effective control of the administration of a country. Canada has in recent months recognized Latin American governments which have come to power as a result of military coups in Argentina, Peru, Guatemala and Ecuador. However, since we know of no country which has as yet formally recognized the new Dominican Government, I recommend that action concerning possible Canadian recognition be postponed until it becomes clearer whether political conditions have reached some stability in the Dominican Republic and until the intentions of a number of West European and particularly Latin American countries are known. A further memorandum would be submitted to you at that time. In this way, Canadian recognition could be timed to take place at about the same time as that of a significant number of important countries, thus reducing the danger of appearing to make haste to recognize a thoroughly undemocratic and unconstitutional regime.

6. It must be anticipated that the United States may not extend recognition at least in the immediate future. While we need not ourselves wait for the United States before taking action, may we keep the United States informed of our thinking on this problem and in particular of our disposition to delay recognition until a sizeable number of West European and Latin American countries have done so?


N.A.R.

POSSIBLE QUESTION

Will the Secretary of State for External Affairs comment on the recent developments in the Dominican Republic and the nature of Canada's present relations with that country?

SUGGESTED ANSWER

The constitutional government of the Dominican Republic, which was headed by the democratically-elected President Juan Bosch and with which Canada had diplomatic relations, was overthrown as a result of a coup d'état carried out by Dominican military officers on the morning of September 25. Naturally, this development has affected the state of our relations, as well as those of many other nations, with the Dominican Republic. However, the personnel of the Canadian Embassy in Santo Domingo are still at their post and we shall continue to watch carefully the situation in the Dominican Republic so as to be able to determine what our policy should be.

SEEN BY THE MINISTER

20-1-2-DOM

Question

L'autre jour le député de Dorchester m'a posé la question suivante: Le ministre pourrait-il informer la Chambre de l'attitude que le gouvernement canadien entend prendre vis-à-vis les récents événements survenus en République Dominicaine?

Réponse

La réponse est que comme tout le monde sait le Gouvernement de la République Dominicaine, élu de façon démocratique, et dirigé par le président Juan Bosch, a été renversé par un coup d'état militaire le 25 septembre dernier. Le Canada avait des relations diplomatiques avec le Gouvernement constitutionnel du président Bosch et naturellement le coup d'état n'a pas manqué d'affecter ces relations. Cependant, le personnel de notre Ambassade à Saint Domingue demeure à son poste et nous continuons de porter une vive attention aux événements en République Dominicaine pour voir quel en sera l'effet sur nos relations avec ce pays.

file
JCH

(2)

Mr. Hammy
Mr. [unclear]

~~E~~
XL

FM TANDC OTT OCT21/63 CONF
TO TT TANDC MEX IC6337 OPIMMED DE WASHDC
INFO TT TANDC SDOMINGO DE OTT
EXTERNAL (LATINAMERICAN)

20-1-2	DOM
210	50

CLARK FM FLETCHER

PLEASE ADVISE NOBLE THAT UPON COMPLETION OF VACATION LEAVE MEX HE IS TO PROCEED BY AIR TO SAN JUAN PUERTO RICO AND REMAIN THERE UNTIL WE ADVISE HIM TO PROCEED TO SDOMINGO.

File
[unclear]

2. SINCE PUERTO RICO IS PART OF HIS TRADE TERRITORY HE WILL BE IN POST TRAVEL STATUS AND MAY THEREFORE CLAIM LIVING EXPENSES. HE MAY ALSO CLAIM HIS WIFE'S EXPENSES SUBJECT TO FINAL APPROVAL BY TB ALTHOUGH WE ANTICIPATE NO RPT NO DIFFICULTY IN THIS LATTER RESPECT IN VIEW OF CIRCUMSTANCES.

3. NOBLE SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO FIND ACCOMMODATION OF THE APARTMENT HOTEL TYPE LESS EXPENSIVE THAN NORMAL HOTEL ACCOMMODATION SINCE WE DO NOT RPT NOT KNOW HOW LONG HE MAY BE THERE AND EXPENSES MUST BE KEPT AS REASONABLE AS POSSIBLE.

4. AFTER ARRIVAL SAN JUAN, NOBLE SHOULD CONTACT LEITH VIA COPY OF THIS MSG WE ARE REQUESTING LEITH TO THEN SEND NOBLE SOME TRADE ENQUIRIES AND OTHER MATTER WHICH NOBLE MIGHT USEFULLY LOOK INTO IN PUERTO RICO.

5. UPON HIS ARRIVAL SAN JUAN, NOBLE SHOULD CONTACT US BY TEL AND GIVE US CONTACT ADDRESS.



CTION REQUEST

TO LATIN AMERICAN DIV. DATE OCT 30/63

LOCATION

FROM O/SSEA/M. N. BOW RE FILE NO.

FOR:

- ACTION
- APPROVAL
- COMMENTS
- DRAFT REPLY
- INFORMATION
- INVESTIGATE AND REPORT
- INVESTIGATION
- MAKE.....COPIES
- MORE DETAILS
- NOTE AND FILE

- NOTE & FORWARD
- NOTE & RETURN
- P.A. ON FILE
- REPLY DIRECTLY
- REPLY, PLEASE
- SEE ME, PLEASE
- SIGNATURE
- TRANSLATION
- YOUR REQUEST

PREPARE MEMO TO:.....

REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF:.....

REMARKS QUESTION IN HOUSE: DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC - Attached question was not
 answered in the House of Commons
 because the Member concerned did not
 pursue it.

000187

Latin American/T.C.Hammond/mr

References: 28-DOM-1-4
20-1-2-DOM ←
Trade and Commerce
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff

original on 20-DOM-16

FM SDOMINGO OCT21/63 CONFD

TO EXTERNAL 112 OPIMMED

INFO TT CARACAS DE OTT

VARIOUS PROPOSALS RECENTLY ADVANCED FOR MODIFICATION OF PRESENT GOVT HAVE FOUND LITTLE ACCEPTANCE SUCCEEDING ONLY IN POLARIZING FORCES.

2. CLANDESTINE PROCLAMATION BY NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (REF MYLET 223 OCT14) BACKED BY PRSC AND 14TH JUN BUT REVIEW QUALIFIED SUPPORT WITH DEMANDS FOR VARIOUS SOCIALIST REFORMS AND PUNISHMENT OF MILITARY. AMERICAN INVOLVMENT (WASHDC TEL OCT17) DELIBERATELY MIS-CONSTRUED BY GOVT RESULTING IN UNIFORM OBJECTION OF QUOTE INTER-FERENCE UNQUOTE BY ALL FACTIONS.

3. SANCHEZ FORMER EDUCATION MINISTER PROPOSAL INVOLVING CONSTITUENT ELECTION DEC 63 REJECTED BY ALL FACTIONS INCLUDING PRD.

4. REPORTED TRIUMVIRATE PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE PRD AND PRSC IN GOVT BUT EXCLUDE 14TH JUN AND PROPOSING (GP CORRUPT) BARRERAS (EARLY?) MEMBER OF COUNCIL (GP CORRUPT) AS PRESIDENT ANGERED SUPPORTING PARTIES. FOLLOWING HEATED MTG WITH SUPPORTING PARTIES TRIUMVIRATE REPORTEDLY AGREED TO CONSULT FORMER ON FUTURE IMPORTANT MATTERS. PRD AND PRSC REAFFIRMED TO QUOTE CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTION UNQUOTE.

5. FEELING REMAINS IN POLITICALLY AWARE CIRCLES THAT SOME CHANGES MUST BE MADE BUT BECOMING INCREASINGLY EVIDENT THAT NO RPT NO FACTION IS PREPARED TO REDUCE DEMANDS SUFFICIENTLY TO PERMIT GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE SOLUTION

LEITH

file 20-1-2-DOM

*Original on
20-DOM-1-4*

FX CARACAS OCT18/63 RESTD
TO EXTERNAL 58 OPIMMED
INFO TT SDOMINGO DE OTT
DOMINICAN PROSPECTS

*INFO: WASH DC OPIMM
JLX*

JLX

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BEAULNE

Latin American/T.C.Hammond/mr

References: c.c. 20-4-OAS-13
20-1-2-DOM ←
Mr. Dougan
Mr. Pick

FM WASHDC OCT17/53 UNCLAS
TO EXTERNAL 3388 PRIORITY
INFO AIRMAIL SDOMINGO CARACAS
SITUATION IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

[Revised on 20-007-14]

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PAGE TWO 3388

WERE PREPARED TO FORGET IT.

3. USA REP RESPONDED AT SOME LENGTH STATING INTER ALIA THAT HE WAS SURPRISED QUOTE THAT THE REGIME WHICH HAD ASSUMED POWER IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC HAS SEEN FIT TO SEEK THIS MTG AND TO HAVE ITS REP MAKE THE STATEMENTS TO WHICH WE HAVE JUST LISTENED... ON BEHALF OF THE GOVT OF USA I DECLARE... THAT THE USA HAS NOT RPT NOT AND IS NOT RPT NOT INTERFERING IN ANY WAY IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THAT TROUBLED AND UNHAPPY COUNTRY. IN VIEW OF THE DISTORTED AND INACCURATE VERSION WHICH HAS JUST BEEN GIVEN OF THE TALKS HELD YESTERDAY BETWEEN THE USA CHARGE IN SDOMINGO AND MEMBERS OF THE DE FACTO GOVT I SHOULD LIKE TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT, AND IN DOING SO, SHOULD LIKE TO REJECT MOST EMPHATICALLY A MOST ENERGETICALLY THE PROTEST WHICH HAS JUST BEEN MADE... IN ORDER THAT NO RPT NO AMBIGUITY COULD EXIST IN THE MINDS OF THE AUTHORITIES IN SDOMINGO CONCERNING THIS MATTER UNQUOTE (THE RESUMPTION OF DIPLO AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH USA) QUOTE THE USA CHARGE, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE DEPT OF STATE, HELD INFORMAL TALKS YESTERDAY WITH MEMBERS OF THE DE FACTO GOVT. HE MADE CLEAR THAT USA POLICY REMAINS AS STATED ON OCT 4 BY THE SEC OF STATE... OUR CHARGE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT ACTIONS TAKEN BY USA GOVT FOR THE REMOVAL OF ITS PERSONNEL ARE CONTINUING. HE THEN ENQUIRED WHAT PLANS THE TRIUMVIRATE HAD ON RETURNING TO CONSTITUTIONALITY. HE WAS INFORMED OF PLANS ANNOUNCED FOR THE HOLDING OF SOME ELECTIONS FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY TO TAKE PLACE SOME FOURTEEN MONTHS FROM NOW. OUR CHARGE REPLIED THAT THIS WOULD NOT RPT NOT PERMIT THE PROMPT RESTORATION OF OUR RELATIONS AND THE CLOSE COLLABORATION WE DESIRED. OUR CHARGE WAS THEN SPECIFICALLY ASKED WHAT ALTERNATIVE HE COULD PROPOSE. IT WAS IN THIS CONTEXT AND IN RESPONDING TO THIS REQUEST THAT THE CHARGE CALLED ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT USA GOVT HAD RECEIVED A REQUEST FROM JUAN CASASNOVAS GARRIDO TO RECOGNIZE HIM AS THE PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC ON THE BASIS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND OF A DECISION TAKEN BY A QUORUM OF THE DOMINICAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WHICH MET ON DOMINICAN SOIL

PAGE THREE 3388

OCT10. MAY I MAKE CLEAR AT THIS POINT THAT USA GOVT HAS MADE NO
RPT NO ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OR REPLY TO THAT REQUEST. OUR CHARGE
MADE IT CLEAR THAT USA WAS NEITHER INSISTING NOR SUGGESTING
ANY ONE SOLUTION BUT WAS SEEKING TO ASCERTAIN THE PLANS OF THE
DE FACTO GOVT TOWARD THE RETURN OF CONSTITUTIONALITY AND TO ASCERTAIN
THEIR VIEWS TOWARDS THE DESIGNATION OF CASASNOVAS INQUOTE.
4. THE INFO IN THE FOREGOING IS BASED ON AN CAS DOCU DATED
OCT15.

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FM SDOMINGO OCT 18/63 CONFID CDN EYES ONLY
TO EXTERNAL 108 OPIIMED
INFO TT CARACAS DE OTT
RECOGNITION

To: Mr. [Handwritten Name]
OCT 21 1963

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20-DUM-14
20 00

BRIT AMBASSADOR INFORMED MTG WED BRIT, FRENCH, GERMAN, ITALIAN. ee 20. DON 1-4
MISSION CHIEFS DISCUSSED RECOGNITION AGREEING (A) GOVT FULLY
IN POWER (B) MILITARY APPARENTLY NOT RPT NOT INTERFERING WITH
GOVT (C) DELAY WOULD ENCOURAGE SOME ELEMENTS OF MILITARY OR
LEFT TO ACT TO DETRIMENT OF PRESENT GOVT WHICH MISSION CHIEFS
CONSIDER ACCEPTABLE. THEY THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THEIR COUNTRIES
RECOGNIZE SIMULTANEOUSLY IN A FEW DAYS POSSIBLY NEXT WEEK. EUROPEANS
EVIDENTLY FEEL AMERICAN PRESSURES WILL NOT RPT NOT SPEED
RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVT SO MUST ACCEPT DE FACTO
SITUATION.

file
[Handwritten initials]

2. AMERICANS HERE EVIDENTLY NOT RPT NOT AWARE OF EUROPEAN RECOMMEN-
DATION.
3. AS NO RPT NO DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY HAS YET RECOGNIZED, SUCH A MOVE
WOULD PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR GOVT. HOWEVER,
I DO NOT RPT NOT FEEL EUROPEAN RECOGNITION WOULD
SIGNIFICANTLY INFLUENCE INTERNAL EVENTS AS GOVTS MAJOR CONCERN
APPEARS TO BE LOSS OF USA AND LATIN ACCEPTANCE. AMERICANS
APPEAR FIRM IN DEMANDING SOME CHANGES IN PLANS WHILE LATIN
EVIDENTLY WAITING FOREIGN MINISTERS CONSULTATIONS. LEFTIST
LEADERS PARTICULARLY FOURTEENTH, JUN ANXIOUS TO AVOID VIOLENCE
NOW BUT ONE LEADER TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT UNLESS CONSTITUTIONAL
SOLUTION FOUND WITHIN FEW WEEKS VIOLENCE UNAVOIDABLE.

...2

PAGE TWO 108

4. I DO NOT RPT NOT FEEL WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE UNTIL LATER AS IT WOULD
BE USEFUL TO GAUGE INTERNAL REACTION OF EUROPEAN RECOGNITION.
FURTHER IT WOULD SERVE NO RPT NO USEFUL PURPOSE TO UNDERMINE
AMERICAN POSITION. FINALLY STATE OF SIEGE
CONTINUES

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LT EXTERNAL

OTTAWA

NO107 PUBLISHED REPORTS HONDURAS PORTUGAL RECOGNIZED GOVERNMENT
HOWEVER DUE NO RPT NO RESIDENT DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION CANNOT
CONFIRM

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

OUTGOING MESSAGE

*Please return
 file copy, after
 transmission, to
 J.C. Hammond
 G.A. Kler*

FM: EXTERNAL	DATE	FILE	SECURITY
	OCT 15 63	20-1-2- DOM	CONFID
TO: SANTO DOMINGO	NUMBER	PRECEDENCE	
	XL 146	PRIORITY	
INFO:			

Ref.: YOURTEL 99 OF OCT 8

Subject: EMBASSY ADMINISTRATION PRIOR TO RECOGNITION OF NEW GOVERNMENT

THERE IS NO REPEAT NO OBJECTION IN THE PERIOD PRIOR TO RECOGNITION OF THE NEW DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT TO YOUR HAVING MINOR AND ROUTINE DEALINGS FOR THE NORMAL CONDUCT OF THE MISSION'S BUSINESS WITH DOMINICAN AGENCIES SUCH AS CUSTOMS, POLICE, IMMIGRATION, ETC. PROVIDING THEY ARE OF ^A ~~THE~~ CONSULAR OR ADMINISTRATIVE NATURE AND DO NOT REPEAT NOT INVOLVE FORMAL COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY.

2. SOCIAL CONTACTS WITH DOMINICAN OFFICIALS ~~SHOULD~~ BE AVOIDED EXCEPT ON A STRICTLY INFORMAL BASIS.

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION NO STANDARD

CC: Protocol
 Legal
 Consular (done in Division)

ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	APPROVED BY
<i>J.C. Hammond</i>	Latin Amer	22480	J.A. DOUGAN
SIG.....			SIG.....
NAME.....			NAME.....

J.W. legal

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FM SDOMINGO OCT8/63 RESTD
TO EXTERNAL 99

REF YOURTEL XL136 SEP25 PARA1
CUSTOMS CLEARANCE

SEVEN ITEMS INCLUDING NOBLES PERSONAL EFFECTS PRESENTLY IN CUSTOMS.
NORMAL PROCEDURE OF SOLICITING EXONERATION THROUGH FOREIGN MINISTRY
PRESENTLY IMPOSSIBLE. STANDARD ALTERNATIVE METHOD AVAILABLE INVOLVES
DIRECT REQUEST TO CUSTOMS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF GOODS PENDING EXONER-
ATION. AMERICANS USING THIS METHOD. APPRECIATE YOUR ADVICE.

20-1-2-DOM

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~~ACTION COPY~~

[Original on 20-DOM-17]

FM WASHDC OCT16/63 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 3361 PRIORITY
INFO LDN

file

RECOGNITION OF DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

AT A RECEPTION LAST NIGHT A FIRST SEC AT BRIT EMB TOLD US THAT STATE
DEPT OFFICIALS HAD FORMALLY EXPRESSED HOPE THAT UK AUTHORITIES WOULD
DELAY RECOGNITION OF DOMINICAN REPUBLIC REGIME AS LONG AS POSSIBLE
AND WOULD CONSULT WITH USA BEFORE TAKING DECISION. OUR INFORMANT
ALSO SAID THAT TO HIS KNOWLEDGE ONLY SPAIN HAD THUS FAR RECOGNIZED
THE NEW GOVT IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

20-1-2-DOM

FM EXTERNAL OTT OCT11/63 CONFD

TO CARACAS XL145 PRIORITY

SDOMINGO PRIORITY

INFO IT MEXICO(FOR NOBLE THROUGH CLARK)PRIORITY DE WDC

TANDC OTT(FLETCHER)

REF SDOMINGO TEL 98 OCT2 AND CARACAS TEL 54 OCT4

CDN REPRESENTATION IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

FOR YOUR OWN INFO WE DO NOT RPT NOT EXPECT THAT WE SHALL BE ABLE TO REACH A DECISION REGARDING RECOGNITION OF THE NEW DOMINICAN GOVT FOR SOME TIME IN VIEW OF THE ABSENCE OF ANY INDICATION THAT A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF IMPORTANT COUNTRIES ARE DISPOSED TO RECOGNIZE IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND THE APPARENT UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT PRESENT DE FACTO GOVTS PROSPECTS.

2.WE ARE CONSCIOUS THAT THE ARRIVAL OF NOBLE COULD BE SOMEWHAT EMBARRASSING,BECAUSE OF HIS RELATIVELY SENIOR RANK,WHETHER IT TAKES PLACE BEFORE OR AFTER ANY EVENTUAL CDN RECOGNITION. HOWEVER ON BALANCE WE ARE INCLINED TO PREFER THAT NOBLE ARRIVE ONLY AFTER FORMAL RECOGNITION BY CDA RATHER THAN BEFORE.ACCORDINGLY HE IS BEING INSTRUCTED BY TANDC NOT RPT NOT TO PROCEED TO SDOMINGO UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

3.AT THE SAME TIME ALL PLANS FOR MR.BEAULNE TO VISIT SDOMINGO SHOULD BE POSTPONED INDEFINITELY.BECAUSE OF THE UNCERTAINTIES INVOLVED IN THE PRESENT DUAL ACCREDITATION OF OUR AMBASSADOR IN CARACAS TO SDOMINGO WE WOULD PREFER AT THIS TIME IN THE LIGHT OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC NOT RPT NOT TO EMPHASIZE THIS ACCREDITATION.ACCORDINGLY IF A NEW GOVT IS EVENTUALLY RECOGNIZED AND NOBLE SUBSEQUENTLY ARRIVES,WE WOULD PREFER THAT HIS APPOINTMENT AS CHARGE BE MADE BY A PRO FORMA COMMUNICATION FROM OTT RATHER THAN A NOTE SIGNED BY MR.BEAULNE.

4.IN THIS CONNECTION WE SHOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING IN DUE COURSE COMMENTS ON THE LONGER-TERM QUESTION OF THE DESIRABILITY OF MAINTAINING THE DUAL ACCREDITATION TO SDOMINGO IN THE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH HAVE ARISEN,INCLUDING THE TENSION BETWEEN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND VENEZUELA.

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ACTION COPY

M. Hammel

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cc 20-DOM-14
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T
FM SDOMINGO OCT14/63 RESTD
TO EXTERNAL 105 PRIORITY
INFO BAG CARACAS
SPAIN RECOGNIZES

SPANISH AMBASSADOR VISITED FOREIGN MINISTRY AFTERNOON OCT12 TO
INFORM THE SPANISH RECOGNITION.

*file
JCS*

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Please return file copy to J.C. Hammond L.A. Levy



FM: EXTERNAL	DATE	FILE	SECURITY
	OCT 11 1963	20-1-2-DOM	CONFID
TO: CARACAS AND SANTO DOMINGO	67/17	NUMBER	PRECEDENCE
		XL 145	PRIORITY
INFO: MEXICO (FOR NOBLE THROUGH CLARK)			PRIORITY
TANPC (FLETCHER)			

Ref: SANTO DOMINGO TEL 98 OF OCT 2 AND CARACAS TEL 54 OF OCT 4

Subject: CANADIAN REPRESENTATION IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT EXPECT THAT WE SHALL BE ABLE TO REACH A DECISION REGARDING RECOGNITION OF THE NEW DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT FOR SOME TIME IN VIEW OF THE ABSENCE OF ANY INDICATION THAT A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF IMPORTANT COUNTRIES ARE DISPOSED TO RECOGNIZE IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND THE APPARENT UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT PRESENT DE FACTO GOVERNMENT'S FUTURE PROSPECTS.

2. WE ARE CONSCIOUS THAT THE ARRIVAL OF NOBLE COULD BE SOMEWHAT EMBARRASSING, BECAUSE OF HIS RELATIVELY SENIOR RANK, WHETHER IT TAKES PLACE BEFORE OR AFTER ANY EVENTUAL CANADIAN RECOGNITION. HOWEVER ON BALANCE WE ARE INCLINED TO PREFER THAT NOBLE ARRIVE ONLY AFTER FORMAL RECOGNITION BY CANADA RATHER THAN BEFORE. ACCORDINGLY HE IS BEING INSTRUCTED BY T&C NOT REPEAT NOT TO PROCEED TO SANTO DOMINGO UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

3. AT THE SAME TIME ALL PLANS FOR MR BEAULNE TO VISIT SANTO DOMINGO SHOULD BE POSTPONED INDEFINITELY. BECAUSE OF THE UNCERTAINTIES INVOLVED IN THE PRESENT DUAL ACCREDITATION OF OUR AMBASSADOR IN CARACAS TO SANTO DOMINGO WE WOULD PREFER AT THIS TIME IN THE LIGHT OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC NOT REPEAT NOT TO EMPHASIZE THIS ACCREDITATION. ACCORDINGLY IF A NEW GOVERNMENT IS EVENTUALLY RECOGNIZED AND NOBLE

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION STANDARD T&C MR. FLETCHER PROTOCOL DIV. PERSONNEL DIV.

ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	APPROVED BY
SIG NAME TCHammond/McL	Latin American	22480	SIG (SIGNED) A.E. RITCHIE

MADE IN CANADA

SUBSEQUENTLY ARRIVES, WE WOULD PREFER THAT HIS APPOINTMENT AS CHARGE BE MADE BY A PRO FORMA COMMUNICATION FROM OTTAWA RATHER THAN A NOTE SIGNED BY MR. BEAULNE.

4. IN THIS CONNECTION WE SHOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING IN DUE COURSE COMMENTS ON THE LONGER-TERM QUESTION OF THE DESIRABILITY OF MAINTAINING THE DUAL ACCREDITATION TO SANTO DOMINGO IN THE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH HAVE ARISEN, INCLUDING THE TENSION BETWEEN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND VENEZUELA.

MADE IN CANADA

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(DUPLICATE)

CC 20-1-2-DOM

NUMBERED LETTER

**TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.**

FROM: The Canadian Embassy,
Lima, Peru

Reference:.....

Subject: Military Coup in Dominican Republic
and Honduras

Security: UNCLASSIFIED

No: 517

Date: October 10, 1963

Enclosures:.....

Air or Surface Mail:.....

Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No. 20-1-2-DOM	
20-BOE-1-4	
26	26

References

Mr. Pick
Mr. Dougan
Mr. West
Santo Domingo
Caracas
San Jose
Washington
cc.20-1-2-DOM

& File
Latin American
T.C. Hammond
Oct. 21/63

The Bolivian Foreign Minister, Dr. Fellman, announced on October 3 that in accordance with his Government's policy not to recognize Governments which overthrow legally constituted democratic Governments, relations between Bolivia and Honduras have been suspended. Relations with the Dominican Republic have similarly been suspended.

2. The Minister also announced that Bolivia supported the Venezuelan proposal to hold a special meeting of Foreign Ministers to consider what action should be taken to defend democratic governments in the Americas. The increased frequency with which legally elected democratic governments are being overthrown must be a cause for concern to all countries of the hemisphere and a special conference such as proposed by Venezuela would be consistent with the spirit of the obligations members of the O.A.S. undertook when signing the Bogota Charter.

3. The following day both Houses of the Bolivian Congress passed a resolution supporting the President's decision not to recognize "Governments which by coming to power by force of arms seriously endanger the democratic system".

(Sgd.) Freeman M. Tovell
The Embassy

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to Posts**

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

OUTGOING MESSAGE

20-1-2-DOTT

		DATE	FILE	SECURITY
FM:	Santo Domingo	OCTOBER 10, 1963	cc. ^{IO-1-1} Master <i>20-1-2-DOTT</i>	RSTD
		NUMBER	PRECEDENCE	COMCENTRE USE ONLY
TO:	External Ottawa	102	DEFERRED TELEGRAM	
INFO:	Caracas by bag			

Handwritten stamp:
To: *M. J. Hamm*
OCT 17 1963

Handwritten signature:
Leith

Ref.:
Subject: Nationalist China Recognizes

Chinese Nationalist reception tonight attended by Tavares, acting Foreign Minister and other Foreign Ministry officials. Evidently Nationalist China has recognized government but chose this method to make it known (ref my tel 100 of October 8).

2. Eight countries attended to avoid offending Chinese but none did little more than shake hands with government officials present.

Leith

Handwritten: pol

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SIG. NAME..... J. Clark Leith			SIG. NAME..... <i>J. Clark Leith</i>

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

OUTGOING MESSAGE

FM: Santo Domingo	DATE	FILE		SECURITY	
	OCTOBER 10, 1963	10-1-1 cc. Master		RSTD	
TO: External Ottawa	NUMBER	PRECEDENCE		COMCENTRE USE ONLY	
	102	DEFERRED TELEGRAM			
INFO: Caracas by bag					

Ref.:
Subject: **Nationalist China Recognizes**

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is not to be
used

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FM WASHDC OCT11/63 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 3297 PRIORITY
REF OURTEL 3269 OCT10

RECOGNITION OF DR AND HONDURAS REGIMES

SOWASH, OFFICER IN CHARGE DR AFFAIRS, TOLD US OCT11 THAT USA POSITION VIS-A-VIS RECOGNITION OF DR REGIME REMAINED AS SUMMARIZED IN RUSKS STATEMENT(OUR REFTEL) IE THAT EXISTING CONDITIONS IN DR LEFT NO RPT NO OPPORTUNITY FOR NORMALIZATION OF DIPLO RELATIONS. ROWELL, DESK OFFICER FOR HONDURAN AFFAIRS, CONFIRMED THAT THE SITUATION WAS IDENTICAL WITH REGARD TO RECOGNITION OF HONDURAN REGIME.

2. SOWASH MENTIONED THAT EVENTUAL RECOGNITION BY USA OF DR AND HONDURAS REGIMES WOULD NOT RPT NOT NECESSARILY BE TIMED TO TAKE PLACE SIMULTANEOUSLY SINCE CONDITIONS OBTAINING IN THE TWO COUNTRIES MAY BE DIFFERENT.

FM WASHDC OCT7/63 UNCLAS

TO EXTERNAL 3226 PRIORITY

INFO LDN EMBPARIS NATOPARIS PERMISNY PRIORITY

BAG HAVANA DE OTT

AIRMAIL ALL LATINAMERICAN MISSIONS

USA POLICY TOWARDS LATINAMERICA

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY EDWIN MARTIN, ASST SEC OF STATE FOR INTERAMERICAN AFFAIRS, WRITTEN FOR THE NY HERALD TRIBUNE AND REPRODUCED IN WASHDC POST FOR OCT6: TEXT BEGINS QUOTE BY TRADITION AND CONVICTION AS WELL AS A MATTER OF POLICY, USA OPPOSES THE OVERTHROW OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND POPULAR DEMOCRATIC GOVTS ANYWHERE.

THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE IN LATINAMERICA, WITH WHOSE PEOPLE WE HAVE SUCH CLOSE HISTORICAL TIES AND WHOSE ASPIRATIONS FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM WE SUPPORT WHOLEHEARTEDLY. MOREOVER, UNDER THE CHARTER OF PUNTA DEL ESTE, THE PEOPLE OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE HAVE BOUND THEMSELVES IN A JOINT EFFORT FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT- THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS- WITHIN A FRAMEWORK OF FREE AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS.

THE DEVIATIONS FROM THESE PRINCIPLES WHICH WE HAVE OBSERVED IN THE TWO YEARS SINCE PUNTA DEL ESTE HAVE CAUSED SOME TO QUESTION THE VALIDITY OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER AND SOME IMPATIENT CYNICS TO IGNORE THE PROGRESS WHICH HAS BEEN MADE.

BOTH THE IMPATIENT IDEALISTS AND THE DEFEATIST CYNICS IGNORE THE REALITIES OF RISING NATIONALISM; THE ANXIETIES CAUSED BY SOCIAL REVOLUTION; THE CHALLENGE POSED BY THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS TO OLD VALUE SYSTEMS; THE THREAT TO THE ESTABLISHED ORDER BROUGHT ON BY THE NEW, AND FINALLY THE STRAIN WHICH RAPID SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE PLACES ON FRAGILE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.

IN SHORT, THERE IS A TEMPTATION TO MEASURE CURRENT EVENTS NOT RPT NOT AGAINST HISTORICAL REALITY AND SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS, BUT AGAINST SOMEWHAT THEORETICAL NOTIONS OF THE MANNER IN WHICH MEN SHOULD AND DO OPERATE IN A COMPLEX WORLD.

WE ALL HAVE RESPECT FOR MOTHERHOOD AND ABHOR SIN. WE MAY OBSERVE, HOWEVER, THAT WHILE MOTHERHOOD HAS PROSPERED, SO HAS SIN. IN AN

PAGE TWO 3226

INCREASINGLY NATIONALISTIC WORLD OF FOREIGN STATES, A USA FROWN, DOES NOT RPT NOT DETER OTHERS FROM COMMITTING WHAT WE CONSIDER TO BE POLITICAL SINS. AND AS WE ARE PRETTY NATIONALISTIC OURSELVES AND RIGHTFULLY PROUD OF OUR GREAT SUCCESSES, WE SOMETIMES FIND THIS FACT FRUSTRATING.

OUR TASK HAS ONLY BEGUN WHEN WE HAVE STATED OUR POSITION. THE REAL ISSUE IS HOW, UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF THE PRESENT DAY WORLD, WE CAN ASSIST THE PEOPLES OF OTHER SOVEREIGN NATIONS TO DEVELOP STABLE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND HELP THEM STRENGTHEN THEIR BELIEFS IN THESE INSTITUTIONS SO AS TO MAKE THEM EFFECTIVE AGAINST BRUTE FORCE.

IN LATINAMERICA THERE ARE VERY FEW WHO WOULD ARGUE AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE FOR VIOLENT OVERTHROW OF INSTITUTIONAL REGIMES. MOST OF THOSE WHO SUPPORT OR ACCEPT COUPS D ETAT WOULD SIMPLY MAINTAIN THAT THEIR PARTICULAR CASE WAS SURROUNDED BY UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES. THIS IS QUOTE YES, BUT UNQUOTE ARGUMENT.

GENUINE CONCERN WITH AN OVERTURN OF THE ESTABLISHED ORDER, FEAR OF LEFT-WING EXTREMISM, FRUSTRATION WITH INCOMPETENCE IN AN AREA OF GREAT AND RISING EXPECTATIONS AND A SHEER DESIRE FOR POWER ARE ALL FORMIDABLE OBSTACLES TO STABLE, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVT- ESPECIALLY IN COUNTRIES WHERE THE TRADITIONAL METHOD OF TRANSFERRING POLITICAL POWER HAS BEEN BY REVOLUTION OR COUP D ETAT. IN MOST OF LATINAMERICA THERE IS SO LITTLE EXPERIENCE WITH THE BENEFITS OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY THAT THERE IS AN INSUFFICIENT BODY OF OPINION, CIVIL OR MILITARY, WHICH HAS ANY REASON TO KNOW ITS VALUE AND HENCE DEFEND IT.

NO RPT NO TWO COUNTRIES ARE ALIKE, BUT IN GENERAL WE FEEL THAT IN ORDER TO ENLARGE THEIR EXPERIENCE OF LEGITIMACY, AND THUS THEIR RESPECT FOR IT, WE MUST STRENGTHEN IN EACH SOCIETY THE POWER OF THE EDUCATED MIDDLE CLASS WITH A STAKE IN THE COUNTRY, AND

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PAGE THREE 3226

HENCE IN PEACE AND ORDER AND DEMOCRACY FOR ALL THE PEOPLE. THIS IS IN FACT WHAT THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS IS ALL ABOUT-IT IS AS MUCH A SOCIO-POLITICAL REVOLUTION AS IT IS AN ECONOMIC ONE.

AS SOCIETIES COME TO HAVE MORE RESPECT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CIVILIAN GOVTS WITH WIDE POPULAR SUPPORT, THESE GOVTS WILL NO RPT NO LONGER BE EASY TARGETS FOR MILITARY COUPS. BUT TO TIP THE BALANCE EVEN MORE IN FAVOR OF ESTABLISHED CIVILIAN GOVTS, WE ALSO MUST ASSIST THE MILITARY TO ASSUME THE MORE CONSTRUCTIVE PEACETIME ROLE OF MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY AND WORKING ON CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS. THE LATTER ARE ESPECIALLY VALUABLE IN IDENTIFYING THEM WITH THE PROBLEMS AND GOALS OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION.

EVEN IN USA WE ARGUE ABOUT THE AREAS OF NATIONAL POLICY IN WHICH THE MILITARY HAVE A RIGHTFUL VOICE. IN LATINAMERICA WE CAN NOT RPT NOT AIM TO REDUCE THEM TO IMPOTENCE IN THE NATIONAL LIFE- RATHER IT IS A PROBLEM OF ACCEPTANCE OF A MISSION IN SUPPORT OF LEGITIMATE GOVTS AGAINST SUBVERSION FROM EXTREMISTS OF BOTH RIGHT AND LEFT, WHOSE THREAT OF FORCE MUST BE MET BY FORCE. THERE MUST BE MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN THE FORMULATION OF SOME NATIONAL POLICIES; THEY CAN NOT RPT NOT BE EXCLUDED ALTOGETHER.

I SHOULD NOT RPT NOT WISH THIS EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR THE MILITARY TO ACQUIRE A NEW AND SOMEWHAT MORE LIMITED ROLE IN POLITICAL LIFE TO BE READ AS A DOWNGRADING OF THE REAL CONTRIBUTION THEY HAVE MADE TO POLITICAL FREEDOM AND STABILITY IN MANY COUNTRIES. PERON IN ARGENTINA, PEREZ JIMENEZ IN VENEZUELA AND ROJAS PINILLA IN COLOMBIA WERE ALL MILITARY DICTATORS WHO WERE THROWN OUT WITH THE HELP OF THEIR OWN MILITARY IN THE 1950S. AND THE TWO WORST DICTATORS TODAY IN LATINAMERICA, IT SHOULD BE NOTED, ARE NOT RPT NOT MILITARY MEN AND WERE ABLE TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR POWER BY REDUCING THE REGULAR MILITARY FORCES TO IMPOTENCE. NOR ARE THE MILITARY UNIVERSAL SUPPORTERS OF THOSE WHO OPPOSE CHANGE AS REPRESENTED BY THE PROGRAMS OF THE ALLIANCE. GOVTS

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PAGE FOUR 3226

CONTROLLED BY THE MILITARY HAVE OVERSEEN THE ELECTION TO POWER THIS YEAR IN ARGENTINA AND PERU OF TWO OF THE MOST PROGRESSIVE REGIMES EITHER COUNTRY HAS EVER HAD. THIS YEAR IN ECUADOR AND GUATEMALA, MILITARY REGIMES HAVE ANNOUNCED REFORM PROGRAMS OF SUBSTANTIAL IMPORTANCE.

NEVERTHELESS, THE FUNDAMENTAL FACTS REMAIN-MILITARY COUPS THWART THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE, DESTROY POLITICAL STABILITY AND THE GROWTH OF THE TRADITION OF RESPECT FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND NURTURE COMMUNIST OPPOSITION TO THEIR TYRANNY. MOREOVER THE MILITARY OFTEN SHOW LITTLE CAPACITY FOR EFFECTIVE GOVT, WHICH IS A POLITICAL RATHER THAN MILITARY JOB.

APART FROM OUR AND THE ALLIANCES VIGOROUS LONG-TERM EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE THE POLITICAL VACUUMS ON THE CIVILIAN SIDE WHICH INVITE MILITARY ACTION, AS WELL AS OUR EFFORTS TO TRAIN THE MILITARY IN THEIR MOST VALUABLE ROLE, WHAT CAN THE USA DO IN THE CASE OF SPECIFIC THREATS OR COUPS WHICH NEVERTHELESS COME?

UNLESS THERE IS INTERVENTION FROM OUTSIDE THE HEMISPHERE BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST CONSPIRACY, THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE INVOLVING THE PROBABILITY OF USA SOLDIERS KILLING THE CITIZENS OF ANOTHER COUNTRY IS NOT RPT NOT TO BE ORDERED LIGHTLY.

NOR CAN WE, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, CREATE EFFECTIVE DEMOCRACY BY KEEPING A MAN IN OFFICE THROUGH USE OF ECONOMIC PRESSURE OR EVEN MILITARY FORCE WHEN HIS OWN PEOPLE ARE NOT RPT NOT WILLING TO FIGHT TO DEFEND HIM. A DEMOCRACY DEPENDENT ON OUTSIDE PHYSICAL SUPPORT OF THIS KIND IS A HOLLOW SHELL WHICH HAS NO RPT NO FUTURE. THE PEOPLE HAD BETTER START ALL OVER AGAIN. MOREOVER, ONCE OUTSIDE MILITARY SUPPORT IS USED IT MAY PROVE HARD TO WITHDRAW. WE HAVE SEEN IN THIS CENTURY-IN HAITI, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND NICARAGUA- HOW POLITICALLY UNPRODUCTIVE MILITARY OCCUPATIONS ARE, EVEN WHEN CARRIED OUT WITH THE BEST OF INTENTIONS.

WE MUST USE OUR LEVERAGE TO KEEP THESE NEW REGIMES AS LIBERAL

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AND CONSIDERATE OF THE WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE AS POSSIBLE. IN ADDITION, WE MUST SUPPORT AND STRENGTHEN THE CIVILIAN COMPONENTS AGAINST MILITARY INFLUENCE AND PRESS FOR NEW ELECTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SO THAT THESE COUNTRIES ONCE AGAIN MAY EXPERIENCE THE BENEFITS OF DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY. DEPENDING UPON THE CIRCUMSTANCES, OUR LEVERAGE IS SOMETIMES GREAT, SOMETIMES SMALL. ONE SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY USA AND ALLIANCE POLICIES I HAVE DESCRIBED. THEY ARE ACCOMPLISHMENTS THAT HAVE TRULY ENHANCED THE LONG-TERM PROSPECTS OF THE ALLIANCE.

IN ARGENTINA, THE MILITARY WALKED UP THE HILL A NUMBER OF TIMES TO LOOK AT THE GREEN PASTURES OF FULL MILITARY CONTROL AND THE POWER AND PREREQUISITES THAT WOULD GO WITH IT. EACH TIME A COMBINATION OF WISER HEADS IN THE MILITARY, ALONG WITH MORE AND MORE CONFIDENT CIVILIAN LEADERS WHO WERE STRONGLY BUTTRESSED BY USA DIPLO SUPPORT AND AID PROGRAMS, TURNED THEM BACK. THE ELECTIONS WERE HELD ON SCHEDULE.

IN PERU, THE ONE-YEAR RULE OF THE JUNTA WAS ABOUT THE MOST RESPECTFUL OF CIVIL LIBERTIES, MOST PROGRESSIVE IN ITS POLICIES, AND QUICKEST TO GIVE UP ITS POWER PEACEFULLY IN THE HISTORY OF LATINAMERICAN MILITARY REGIMES. HERE AGAIN THE STRONG STAND TAKEN BY USA PRIOR TO RECOGNITION HELPED TO SECURE PUBLIC COMMITMENTS ON, AND FOLLOW-THROUGH FROM, THE JUNTA TO PURSUE LIBERAL POLICIES - LIBERAL OF COURSE ONLY FOR A MILITARY DICTATORSHIP.

A SIMILAR STORY CAN BE TOLD OF THE ECUADORIAN JUNTA, WHICH IS GOVERNING THROUGH AN ABLE AND REP CIVILIAN CABINET AND GENERALLY WITHOUT REPRESSION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES.

IN EVERY CASE MENTIONED THERE HAS BEEN A NOVEL AND NOTABLE ABSENCE OF REPRISALS AGAINST THE LEADERS OF THE OUSTED REGIMES. THE FIRING SQUADS OR PRISON GUARDS, SO CHARACTERISTIC OF EARLIER POLITICAL UPHEAVALS IN LATINAMERICA, HAVE BEEN ESCHEWED. THIS

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RESTRAINT CAN BE CREDITED TO THE PROGRESS LATINAMERICA HAS BEEN MAKING UNDER THE ALLIANCE AND TO USA INFLUENCE BROUGHT TO BEAR THROUGH ALL THE MEANS OPEN TO US, TO PRODUCE MODERATION AND A PROMPT RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL AND DEMOCRATIC REGIMES.

I FEAR THERE ARE SOME WHO WILL ACCUSE ME OF HAVING WRITTEN AN APOLOGIA FOR COUPS. I HAVE NOT RPT NOT. THEY ARE TO BE FOUGHT WITH ALL THE MEANS WE HAVE AVAILABLE. RATHER I WOULD PROTEST THAT I AM URGING THE REJECTION OF THE THESIS OF THE FRENCH PHILOSOPHERS THAT DEMOCRACY CAN BE LEGISLATED-ESTABLISHED BY CONSTITUTIONAL FIAT.

I AM INSISTING ON THE ANGLO-SAXON NOTION THAT DEMOCRACY IS A LIVING THING WHICH MUST HAVE TIME AND SOIL AND SUNLIGHT IN WHICH TO GROW. WE MUST DO ALL WE CAN TO CREATE THESE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS, AND WE CAN DO AND HAVE DONE MUCH.

BUT WE CAN NOT RPT NOT SIMPLY CREATE THE PLANT AND GIVE IT TO THEM; IT MUST SPRING FROM SEEDS PLANTED IN INDIGENOUS SOIL. NQUOTE TEXT ENDS.

in American/T.C.Hammond/mr

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FM WASHDC OCT4/63 CONF D
TO EXTERNAL 3205 PRIORITY
INFO BAG CARACAS SDOMINGO FM OTT
REF OURTET 3105 SEP25

EVENTS IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

ON OCT4 WE SPOKE TO SOWASH, OFFICER IN CHARGE OD DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AFFAIRS AT STATE DEPT. THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF SOWASH'S COMMENTS ON RECENT EVENTS IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

2. THE CONTENTION OF THE MILITARY THAT COUP WAS INEVITABLE LEST COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES SPREAD DANGEROUSLY IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC WAS PROBABLY SINCERE ALTHOUGH NOT RPT NOT NECESSARILY WELL FOUNDED. WHILE IT WAS TRUE THAT BOSCH DID NOT RPT NOT TAKE FIRM MEASURES AGAINST EXTREME LEFTISTS HIS GOVT HAD SEEMED TO MAINTAIN REASONABLE CONTROL OVER SITUATION. BUT COMMUNISM WAS A VERY EMOTIONAL ISSUE IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND IT WAS NOT RPT NOT TOO SURPRISING AS A RESULT THAT MILITARY GOT ALARMED TO EXTENT THEY CLAIMED. IT WAS NOT RPT NOT IMPOSSIBLE ALSO THAT TAKEOVER HAD SERVED TO CLOAK SOME INDIVIDUAL AMBITIONS. IN THIS CONTEXT IT WAS OF INTEREST TO NOTE, THAT MOST, IF NOT RPT NOT ALL, OF THE COMMUNISTS OR LEFTISTS ARRESTED AFTER THE COUP HAD SINCE BEEN RELEASED WHILE OTHERS HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY OR GO INTO HIDING. SO FAR THERE DID NOT RPT NOT SEEM TO BE ANY INDICATION THAT THE NEW JUNTA WOULD TAKE FIRMER STEPS TO ERADICATE COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN THE COUNTRY. ON THE OTHER HAND THE MILITARY HAVE STATED PUBLICLY THAT THEY WANTED NO RPT NO DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY IN GOVT. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES WAS ONE LED TO SPECULATE THAT THERE WAS/PROBABLY AN ELEMENT OF BOTH PERSONAL AMBITION AND GENUINE CONCERN OVER COMMUNISM THAT LED TO THE COUP.

3. A PROVISIONAL GOVT CONSISTING OF A THREEMAN CIVILIAN JUNTA AND OF A CABINET CHOSEN FROM MEMBERS OF SIX OPPOSITION PARTIES HAD BEEN INSTALLED TO RULE THE COUNTRY. THE JUNTA MEMBERS WERE SAID NOT RPT NOT TO BE MEMBERS OF ANY PARTY BUT THEY ARE KNOWN TO BE CLOSE

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TO THE UCN. THEY ARE (A) SANTOS, A CONSERVATIVE WHO IS GIVEN CREDIT FOR THE SUCCESSFUL ORGANIZATION AND HOLDING OF THE DEC ELECTIONS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT HE WAS PRESIDENT OF THE CENTRAL ELECTORAL JUNTA WHICH EXISTED AFTER THE ASSASSINATION OF TRUJILLO; (B) ^{TAVARES} ~~TAPIA~~, A YALE EDUCATED BUSINESSMAN WHO WAS SEC OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE; AND (C) ^{TAPIA} TAVARES, A LAW PARTNER OF BONELLIS FIRM WHO HELD TWO DIFFERENT PORTFOLIOS IN COUNCIL OF STATE. AS FOR CABINET MINISTERS THEY WERE CHOSEN MAINLY FROM THE UCN AND THE PRC PARTIES. IT WAS TOO EARLY TO MAKE A SOUND ASSESSMENT OF THE TEAM BUT IT COULD BE DESCRIBED GENERALLY AS BEING QUOTE CONSERVATIVE UNQUOTE. THE PROVISIONAL GOVT HAS DISSOLVED CONGRESS AND SUSPENDED THE BOSCH CONSTITUTION OF 1963. IT REINSTATED THE 1955 CONSTITUTION AS AMENDED A NUMBER OF TIMES SINCE AND, IN PARTICULAR, IN 1962 BY THE COUNCIL OF STATE. FROM A LEGAL STANDPOINT THERE WERE SOME DOUBTS AS TO HOW THIS CONSTITUTION WOULD WORK IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

4. THE JUNTA AS REPORTEDLY ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY THAT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS WOULD BE HELD IN TWO YEARS TIME ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE LET IT BE KNOWN IN A LESS OFFICIAL MANNER THAT EIGHTEEN MONTHS OR EVEN LESS WAS THE OBJECTIVE. THEY ARE EXTREMELY ANXIOUS TO GET RECOGNITION SO THAT AID, ESPECIALLY FROM USA, CAN BE RESUMED AND CLAIM THAT THE ALTERNATIVE IS EITHER BANKRUPTCY OR A COMMUNIST TAKEOVER.

5. USA OFFICIALS DEPLORED THE COUP FOR ITS POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GOVTS IN LATINAMERICA GENERALLY WHICH MAY PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF CASTROISM; FOR ITS ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS; AND, PARTICULARLY, BECAUSE OF USA CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC SINCE TRUJILLOS ASSASSINATION. THE QUESTION OF RECOGNITION WAS BEING CONSIDERED ACTIVELY AT HIGHEST ADMIN LEVELS AND IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE AT THIS STAGE TO SAY WHAT THE ULTIMATE DECISION WOULD BE NOR TO FORESEE ITS TIMING. THIS WAS AFFECTED BY A NUMBER OF ACTORS INCLUDING THE MILITARY COUP IN HONDURAS OCT3

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PAGE THREE 3205

AND THE JOINT COSTA RICA-VENEZUELA REQUEST, CONSIDERED AT OAS SPECIAL MTG YESTERDAY, THAT A MTG OF OAS FOREIGN MINISTERS BE CALLED TO CONSIDER WHAT CORRECTIVE MEASURES, PREVENTIVE AND REMEDIAL, SHOULD BE TAKEN IN DEALING WITH SITUATIONS INVOLVING INTERVENTION BY MILITARY. SOME CONGRESSIONAL (EG SENATOR GRUENING) AND PRESS CIRCLES WERE URGING USA ADMIN TO TAKE FIRREST MEASURES TO ISOLATE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND EVEN TO REINSTAL BOSCH BY FORCE IF NECESSARY; THIS WAS QUOTE LOOSE TALK UNQUOTE AS STATE DEPT HAD TO TAKE A MORE QUOTE REALISTIC UNQUOTE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM IN VIEW OF LATINAMERICAN SENSITIVITY TO QUOTE INTERVENTION UNQUOTE IN ANY FORM. AS FAR AS WAS KNOWN NO LATINAMERICAN COUNTRY HAD YET RECOGNIZED THE NEW REGIME. WE SHALL FOLLOW UP.

6. THE SITUATION IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC WAS CALM EXCEPT FOR A FEW DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE JUNTA A CERTAIN DEGREE OF APATHY SEEMED TO PREVAIL.

FM WASHDC OCT7/63 CONFD

TO EXTERNAL 3230 PRIORITY

INFO LDN EMBPARIS NATOPARIS PERMISNY PRIORITY

BAG ALL LATINAMERICAN MISSIONS DE OTT

REF OURTEL3226 OCT7

EDWIN MARTINS STATEMENT ON USA POLICY VIS-A-VIS LATINAMERICA
ACCORDING TO TOPPING, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INTERAMERICAN
REGIONAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS, EDWIN MARTINS STATEMENT GIVEN IN
REFTEL WAS DRAFTED AT HIGHEST LEVELS OF USA ADMIN AND CLEARED BY
WHITEHOUSE. THE STATEMENT WAS BEING GIVEN WIDE DISSEMINATION IN
LATINAMERICA THROUGH USA MISSIONS. TOPPING CONFIDED THAT IN HIS
ESTIMATION THE SOMEWHAT UNUSUAL CHANNEL USED FOR RELEASING THIS
QUOTE IMPORTANT UNQUOTE STATEMENT RESULTED FROM A DESIRE IN ADMIN
CIRCLES TO AMORTISE THE IMPACT THE STATEMENT MAY HAVE ON USA
PUBLIC GENERALLY AND PARTICULARLY ON THE POSITION OF MOSCOSO,
USA COORDINATOR FOR THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS, WHO IS REPORTED
TO HAVE REACTED QUITE STRONGLY AND EMOTIONALLY TO THE MILITARY
COUPS IN THE DOMINICANREPUBLIC AND HONDURAS IN EXTEMPORANEOUS
COMMENTS.

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FM SDOMINGO OCT8/63 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL OTT UNN OPIMMED
INFO TT CARACAS DE OTT
EXCHANGE SITUATION

USA DEFINITELY WITHDRAWING AID ON WEEKEND, RIGHTIST MTG SUN WITH ATTENDANCE CONSIDERABLY SHORT OF EXPECTATION, STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS YESTERDAY THROUGH THIS MORNING AT UNIVERSITY, STATE OF SEIGE FOR CAPITAL DISTRICT DECLARED LAST NIGHT, SMALL DEMONSTRATION OF WOMENS MARCH QUICKLY BROKE UP TRIGGERING POLICE EFFORTS TO SUBDUE CENTRAL DOWNTOWN AREA WITH TEARGAS TODAY AND RENEWED ARRESTS HAVE COLLECTIVELY CHANGED MOOD IN CAPITAL. MANY WHO PASSIVELY ACCEPTED COUP AND RESULT OF CIVIL GOVT AS LESSER OF TWO EVILS NOW CONCERNED OVER SITUATION. HARDER POLICE LINE REMINISCENT OF LATTERS BALAGUER DAYS IS ONLY CAUSE OF RESENTMENT. ALTHOUGHT WITH FULL MILITARY SUPPORT GOVT REMAINS FIRMLY IN POWER, SHOULD DEVELOPMENTS CONTINUE IN PRESENT DIRECTION IT WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR IT TO ACCOMPLISH POSITIVE PROGRAMME AND WITHOUT SOME MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS BY THOSE BASES IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR GOVT TO RETAIN POWER WITHOUT SOME MAJOR CHANGE IN POLICY OR MAKE UP OF EXTERNAL RECOGNITION. TO MY KNOWLEDGE NO RPT NO COUNTRY REPRESENTED HERE HAS YET RECOGNIZED NEW GOVT ALTHOUGH NATIONALIST CHINA MAY HAVE DONE SO WHILE NOT RPT NOT ADMITTING IT.

LEITH

FM WASHDC OCT7/63 CONFD

TO EXTERNAL 3230 PRIORITY

INFO LDN EMBPARIS NATOPARIS PERMISNY PRIORITY

BAG ALL LATINAMERICAN MISSIONS DE OTT

REF OURTEL3226 OCT7

EDWIN MARTINS STATEMENT ON USA POLICY VIS-A-VIS LATINAMERICA ACCORDING TO TOPPING, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INTERAMERICAN REGIONAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS, EDWIN MARTINS STATEMENT GIVEN IN REFTEL WAS DRAFTED AT HIGHEST LEVELS OF USA ADMIN AND CLEARED BY WHITEHOUSE. THE STATEMENT WAS BEING GIVEN WIDE DISSEMINATION IN LATINAMERICA THROUGH USA MISSIONS. TOPPING CONFIDED THAT IN HIS ESTIMATION THE SOMEWHAT UNUSUAL CHANNEL USED FOR RELEASING THIS QUOTE IMPORTANT UNQUOTE STATEMENT RESULTED FROM A DESIRE IN ADMIN CIRCLES TO AMORTISE THE IMPACT THE STATEMENT MAY HAVE ON USA PUBLIC GENERALLY AND PARTICULARLY ON THE POSITION OF MOSCOSO, USA COORDINATOR FOR THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS, WHO IS REPORTED TO HAVE REACTED QUITE STRONGLY AND EMOTIONALLY TO THE MILITARY COUPS IN THE DOMINICANREPUBLIC AND HONDURAS IN EXTEMPORANEOUS COMMENTS. ?

~~Latin American~~/T.C.Hammond/mr

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All L.A. Posts
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff

FM WASHDC OCT10/63 UNCLAS

TO EXTERNAL 3269 PRIORITY

INFO LDN NATOPARIS EMBPARIS PERMISNY

AIRMAIL SDOMINGO CARACAS SANJOSE

MILITARY COUPS IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HONDURAS-- USA POLICY

THE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AN ORAL STATEMENT WHICH SEC RUSK MADE

TO A PRESS BRIEFING FRI OCT4 ON THIS MATTER. THE STATEMENT WAS

PASSED ON TO US OVER THE PHONE BY THE STATE DEPT AT OUR REQUEST.

QUOTE WE VIEW THE RECENT MILITARY COUPS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

AND HONDURAS WITH THE UTMOST GRAVITY. THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE

OF RE AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVT ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN

THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS. STABLE AND EFFECTIVE GOVT RESPONSIVE TO

POPULAR WILL IS A CRITICAL FACTOR IN THE ATTAINMENT OF SOCIAL

AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS. UNDER EXISTING CONDITIONS IN THE DOMINICAN

REPUBLIC AND HONDURAS THERE IS NO RPT NO OPPORTUNITY FOR EFFECTIVE

COLLABORATION BY USA UNDER THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS OR FOR NORMA-

LIZATION OF DIPLO RELATIONS. ACCORDINGLY WE HAVE STOPPED ALL ECONO-

MIC AND MILITARY AID TO THESE COUNTRIES AND HAVE COMMENCED ORDERLY

REASSIGNMENT OF PERSONNEL INVOLVED. UNQUOTE

FM WASHDC OCT10/63 UNCLAS

TO EXTERNAL 3270 PRIORITY

INFO LDN NATOPARIS EMBPARIS PERMISNY

AIRMAIL CARACAS SDOMINGO SANJOSE

PRESIDENTIAL NEWS CONFERENCE OCT9--MILITARY COUPS IN LATINAMERICA

THE PRESIDENT WAS ASKED WHETHER EDWIN MARTINS RECENT STATEMENT ON LATIN AMERICA (OURTEL 3226 OCT7) HAD BEEN CLEARED WITH HIM AND IF SO, WHETHER IT REPRESENTED A REVERSAL OF USA POLICY ON DICTATORSHIPS IN LATINAMERICA. THE PRESIDENT REPLIED QUOTE NO RPT NO UNQUOTE TO THE FIRST PART OF THE QUESTION, ADDING THAT HE HAD BEEN INFORMED GENERALLY OF WHAT MARTIN WAS TO SAY. THE PRESIDENT STATED THAT QUOTE MR MARTIN WAS MERELY ATTEMPTING TO EXPLAIN SOME OF THE PROBLEMS IN LATINAMERICA--WHY COUPS TAKE PLACE AND WHAT PROBLEM THEY PRESENT US WITH UNQUOTE. MR KENNEDY WENT ON TO COMMENT THAT USA POLICY, VIS-A-VIS LATIN AMERICAN DICTATORSHIPS WAS NOT RPT NOT REVERSED AND HE EXPLAINED THAT IN THE CASE OF THE RECENT COUPS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HONDURAS QUOTE WE MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT WE ARE OPPOSED TO AN INTERRUPTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM BY A MILITARY COUP, NOT RPT NOT ONLY BECAUSE WE ARE ALL COMMITTED UNDER THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS TO DEMOCRATIC GOVT... BUT ALSO BECAUSE... DICTATORSHIPS ARE THE SEED BEDS FROM WHICH... COMMUNISM ULTIMATELY SPRINGS UP. UNQUOTE IT WAS FOR THESE REASONS THAT USA BROKE OFF RELATIONS WITH THESE TWO COUNTRIES. COUPS WERE SELF DEFEATING AND DEFEATING FOR THE HEMISPHERE AND USA WAS USING ITS INFLUENCE JOINTLY WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE HEMISPHERE QUOTE IN THOSE AREAS WHERE COUPS HAVE TAKEN PLACE TO PROVIDE FOR AN ORDERLY RESTORATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES. UNQUOTE

2. IN REPLY TO A FURTHER QUESTION, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT USA NATIONAL POLICY TOWARDS COUPS WAS DESCRIBED WITH THE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HONDURAS QUOTE OF OUR AMBASSADORS, OUR AIDES,

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AND OUR MILITARY ASSISTANTS AND ALL THE REST. UNQUOTE RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES IN THOSE TWO COUNTRIES WAS USA OBJECTIVE AND QUOTE WE ARE WORKING WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS OF OAS SO THAT TOGETHER WE CAN BRING ABOUT A RETURN TO ORDER IN THOSE COUNTRIES AND A RETURN TO PEACEFUL PROCEDURES UNQUOTE.

3. ASKED LATER WHETHER HE WAS SATISFIED THAT USA DID ALL IT COULD SHORT OF THE USE OF FORCE TO PREVENT THE COUPS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HONDURAS, MR KENNEDY REPLIED THAT HE WAS. HE WENT ON TO STATE THAT THE QUOTE IDEA THAT WE OUGHT TO SEND USA MARINES INTO HONDURAS... IS A VERY SERIOUS MISTAKE. THAT IS NOT RPT NOT THE WAY IN MY OPINION AND I THINK THAT MR MARTIN WAS ATTEMPTING TO EXPLAIN THAT, THAT IS NOT RPT NOT THE WAY FOR DEMOCRACY TO FLOURISH. SO I THINK WE DID THE BEST WE COULD. IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO ALWAYS DO BETTER BUT WE DID THE BEST WE COULD AND ARE GOING TO CONTINUE TO DO SO. UNQUOTE.

Latin America/J. A. Dougan/af

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Mr. Ritchie
L.A. Div.
D.L. (2)
Into Paris
London
Paris Embassy
611 L.A. Posts
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff

FM WASHDC OCT11/63 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 3289 PRIORITY
REF OURTEL 3270 OCT10

USA POLICY VIS-A-VIS COUPS IN LATINAMERICA

SINCE THE RECENT MILITARY COUPS IN DR AND HONDURAS THERE HAS BEEN SPORADIC SPECULATION IN THE PRESS THAT A QUOTE HARD UNQUOTE POSITION TOWARDS REGIMES ARISING FROM COUPS DETAT HAD DEVELOPED IN WHITE HOUSE CIRCLES AS OPPOSED TO A QUOTE SOFT UNQUOTE APPROACH PROMOTED AT CERTAIN STATE DEPT LEVELS. WE MADE MENTION OF SUCH COMMENTS IN THE PRESS WHEN WE SPOKE TO SOWASH THE DR DESK OFFICER(OUR TEL 3205 OCT4)WHO DISCARDED THEM AS BEING QUOTE LOOSE TALK UNQUOTE. NEVERTHELESS IT IS OF INTEREST TO NOTE THAT THE PRESIDENT IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE OCT9 (OUR TEL 3270 OCT10) EMPHASIZED HIS ADMIN'S FIRM OPPOSITION TO COUPS AS IF TO DISSIPATE DOUBTS WHICH EDWIN MARTIN'S STATEMENT(OURTEL 3226 OCT7) MAY HAVE LEFT IN THE MINDS OF SOME PEOPLE THAT USA WAS NOT RPT NOT AFTER ALL SO ADAMANTLY AGAINST MILITARY TAKEOVERS. THE PRESIDENT SAID INTER ALIA THAT QUOTE MR MARTIN WAS MERELY ATTEMPTING TO EXPLAIN SOME OF THE PROBLEMS IN LATINAMERICA-WHY COUPS TAKE PLACE AND WHAT PROBLEMS THEY PRESENT US WITH UNQUOTE. 2. THIS APPARENT DIFFERENCE OF APPROACH LED SEN WAYNE MORSE(D-OREGON) TO CHARGE THAT QUOTE THE ADMIN IS PLAYING WITH DISASTER IN TRYING TO TRAVEL DOWN THESE TWO DIVERGENT ROADS AT THE SAME TIME UNQUOTE. THE SENATOR ACCORDING TO NYTIMES OCT11 THOUGHT THAT PRES KENNEDY QUOTE IS SEEKING TO PUT AN UMBRELLA OVER THE POLICY CONFLICT UNQUOTE BETWEEN MARTIN'S VIEW QUOTE THAT SOME COUPS ARE ACCEPTABLE UNQUOTE AND THE QUOTE ASSUMPTION OF THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS THAT IT IS DESIGNED TO PROMOTE CONSTITUTIONAL GOVT UNQUOTE. 3. IT IS DIFFICULT OF COURSE TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THERE IN FACT EXISTS A DIVERGENCE OF VIEW BETWEEN THE STATE DEPT TOP OFFICIAL ON LATINAMERICA AND THE WHITE HOUSE AS TO THE DEGREE OF FIRMNESS WHICH USA SHOULD APPLY IN ITS DEALINGS WITH MILITARY COUPS AND REGIMES. HOWEVER IT MAY BE OF SOME SIGNIFICANCE THAT THE PRESIDENT AT HIS NEWS CONFERENCE THOUGHT IT APPROPRIATE TO REITERATE HIS ADMIN'S FIRM OPPOSITION TO TAKEOVERS. °

Latin America J.A. Dugan/af

Reference

Mr. Ritchie
L.A. Div.
D.I. (2)
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L.A. Div.
Paris Embassy
All L.A. Posts
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff

FM WASHDC OCT11/63 CONFID
TO EXTERNAL 3289 PRIORITY
REF OURTEL 3270 OCT10

USA POLICY VIS-A-VIS COUPS IN LATINAMERICA

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FM WASHDC OCT15/63 CONF D

TO EXTERNAL 3340 PRIORITY

USA ATTITUDE TOWARD MILITARY COUPS IN LATIN AMERICA

FROM REMARKS MADE OCT14 BY SULLIVAN, HARRIMAN'S SPECIAL ASST,

IT IS CLEAR THAT STATE DEPT IS EMBARRASSED BY CONSEQUENCES OF ED

MARTINS STATEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT, PUBLISHED IN NY HERALD TRIBUNE

AND OTHER NEWSPAPERS TEN DAYS AGO. AS SULLIVAN EXPLAINED IT,

MARTINS STATEMENT HAD BEEN INTENDED AS A MEANS OF EXPLAINING

SOME OF THE BACKGROUND FACTORS INVOLVED IN MILITARY COUPS AND IN

THIS WAY DEMONSTRATING THAT IT WAS NOT RPT NOT ALWAYS POSSIBLE OR

ADVISABLE FOR USA TO REFUSE ALL AID TO OR CONTACT WITH RESULTANT

REGIMES. WE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT MARTINS STATEMENT MIGHT HAVE

BEEN DRAFTED PRIOR TO MILITARY TAKEOVERS IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

AND HONDURAS AND THAT ITS PUBLICATION SO SOON AFTER THESE EVENTS

MAY HAVE BEEN AN UNFORTUNATE COINCIDENCE. IN ANY EVENT, SULLIVAN

WAS AT PAINS TO DOWNGRADE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STATEMENT IN

RELATION TO STATEMENTS BY RUSK (OCT4) AND THE PRESIDENT (OCT9)

AS REFLECTING CONTINUING USA DISAPPROVAL OF MILITARY TAKEOVERS.

2. IN THE CASE OF BOTH THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HONDURAS, SULLIVAN SAID THERE WAS NO RPT NO DISPOSITION WHATEVER TO LOOK SYMPATHETICALLY

AT THE CLAIMS OF THE NEW REGIMES TO RECOGNITION OR THE RESUMPTION OF AID. THERE WOULD BE PUBLIC PRESSURE FOR EARLY RECOGNITION SHOULD

THERE BE AN UNWELCOME CHANGE OF REGIME IN A LARGE AND IMPORTANT

COUNTRY SUCH AS BRAZIL SINCE IT WOULD BE ARGUED THAT USA COULD

NOT RPT NOT AFFORD TO ISOLATE ITSELF FROM THE GOVT IN POWER IN

SUCH A STATE. BUT THE SAME ARGUMENT DID NOT RPT NOT APPLY IN THE

MUCH LESS SIGNIFICANT CASES OF DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HONDURAS

WHICH WOULD HAVE TO TAKE THE CONSEQUENCES UNLESS STEPS WERE TAKEN

TO RETURN TO MORE ACCEPTABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES.

3. WITH REGARD TO USA REPRESENTATION AT THE SAO PAULO CONFERENCE

(OURTEL 3324 OCT14) SULLIVAN INDICATED THAT HARRIMAN'S APPOINTMENT

HAD BEEN A RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED BY THE ADMIN

PAGE TWO 3340

TO THIS MIG AND TO THE OPPORTUNITY IT WOULD PROVIDE FOR A
RESPECTED SENIOR MEMBER OF THE ADMIN TO ASSESS AT FIRST HAND
POLITICAL TRENDS IN BRAZIL AND MORE GENERALLY IN LATIN AMERICA.
CIA AND STATE DEPT ARE NOT RPT NOT UNNATURALLY LOOKING WITH
APPREHENSION AT CURRENT ESTIMATES OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL POSITION
IN BRAZIL IN PREPARATION FOR HARRIMANS VISIT.

To:
 XL SEP 27 1963

ACTION COPY

DOM.
20-1-2-~~63~~
see by

XL file
J.H.
Ref: (by by)
e Santo Domingo
Cruces

FM HAVANA SEP26/63 RESTD
TO EXTERNAL 227
REF YOURLET XL193 SEP19

CONSULAR ACTIVITIES ON BEHALF DOMINICAN GOVT

IN VIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC ACTION ON REFLET
BEING DEFERRED PENDING YOUR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.

Agreed
JH

2. IN ABSENCE OF APPROVAL FOR PROJECT TO FACILITATE EXIT OF DOMINICANS
FROM CUBA THIS MATTER HAS NOT RPT NOT OF COURSE BEEN DISCUSSED
FURTHER WITH CUBANS SINCE REPORTED ON IN OURTEL 171 AUG16.

25932-40 ✓

Ph. West

EMBAJADA DE LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA
OTTAWA

20-12-Don

To: *[Handwritten]*
OCT 8 1963
No. 435

TO:
OCT 14 1963
REGISTRY

[Handwritten signature]

La Embajada de la República Dominicana saluda muy atentamente al Departamento de Relaciones Exteriores del Canadá y tiene a bien participarle que el Doctor Donald J. Reid Cabral ha sido designado Secretario de Estado de Relaciones Exteriores de la República Dominicana, por el Triunvirato Civil que gobierna al País.

*Notice of
appt. of Dr.
to Sec. of State
of Dom. Rep.*

La Embajada de la República Dominicana hace provecho de la oportunidad para reiterar al Departamento de Relaciones Exteriores del Canadá los sentimientos de su más alta consideración.

[Handwritten signature]

lro. de Octubre de 1963,
O T T A W A.



B LA

*No act is appropriate
during present period
of suspended cabinet
Oct 10/63*

[Handwritten mark]

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
REGISTRY

OCT 2 4 20 PM '63

NO ENCLOSURES

EMBAJADA DE LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA

OTTAWA

To: Mr. Jammy
OCT 9 1963

20-1-2-Dom

No. 431.

*File
JAM*

La Embajada de la República Dominicana saluda muy atentamente al Departamento de Relaciones Exteriores del Canadá en ocasión de participarle que, de acuerdo con comunicación suministrada por la Cancillería Dominicana, en fecha de ayer, 26 de Septiembre de 1963, por selección de los dirigentes de los Partidos Políticos Democráticos, ha quedado constituida, por el término de dos años, una Junta de Gobierno Provisional, en forma de Triunvirato Civil, la cual está integrada por el Licenciado Manuel Emilio de los Santos, Doctor Ramon Tapia Espinal, Ingeniero Manuel Enrique Tavarez Espailat.

Según se expresa en la referida comunicación, al término de los dos años de mandato de esta Junta Provisional, se celebrarán elecciones generales.

La Embajada de la República Dominicana hace provecho de la oportunidad para reiterar al Departamento de Relaciones Exteriores del Canadá los sentimientos de su más alta consideración.

JAM

No acct appropriate during suspended relations

Oct 9/63

JLV

27 de Septiembre de 1963,
O T T A W A, O N T A R I O.

B XL



a change in the Gov't of the Rep. they have formed a Civil Triunvirate.

NO ENCLOSURES

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
REGISTRY

SEP 31 2 19 PM '63

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
REGISTRY

OCT 8 4 33 PM '63

EMBAJADA DE LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA
OTTAWA

20-1-2-Dor

No. 426.

To: *Mr Hammond*
OCT 1 1963
XL

File
File

seen
[Signature]

La Embajada de la República Dominicana saluda muy atentamente al Departamento de Relaciones Exteriores del Canadá y tiene a bien informar a esa Cancillería, que de acuerdo a las informaciones oficiales procedentes de la República, los Altos Comandos Militares y de la Policía Nacional emitieron un comunicado en el cual expresan que el Gobierno del Presidente Juan Bosch había sido depuesto en la mañana del 25 de Septiembre por los integrantes de dichos Comandos y que en breve plazo se procedería a constituir un gobierno provisional presidido por un ciudadano apolítico. Como medida preliminar, el comunismo ha sido declarado fuera de ley, las Cámaras Legislativas han sido disueltas y se ha puesto en vigor la Constitución de Septiembre de 1962.

Agrega el Comunicado, que serán respetados los compromisos internacionales que la República ha asumido, en especial los acordados en la Décima Conferencia de Caracas y en la Octava Reunión de Punta del Este; que serán garantizados los derechos humanos, tanto civiles como políticos, la propiedad privada y la libre empresa, y agrega que el País está en perfecta calma y tranquilidad.

La Embajada de la República Dominicana hace provecho de la oportunidad para reiterar al Departamento de Relaciones Exteriores del Canadá los sentimientos de su más alta consideración.

26 de Septiembre de 1963,
O T T A W A .

Note:
not for acknt
being suspended
relat

Oct 2/63

JLH
LA de



Pal

NO ENCLOSURES

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
REGISTRY

SEP 30 3 12 PM '63

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

J-11

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy.....

Santo Domingo, D.R.....

Reference: Our Letter 207 of September 28.....

Subject: Note from the Secretaria de Estado
de Relaciones Exteriores.....

Security: Unclassified

No: 209

Date: September 30, 1963

Enclosures: / one

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No: 10-1-1

Ottawa File No.	
20-1-2-DOM	
20-DOM-22-5	

References

I am enclosing a copy of a note received by registered mail today from the Secretario de Estado de Relaciones Exteriores, Donal J. Reid Cabral.

~~c-20-1-1-3~~

*file
JEX
Oct 10/63*

*To: Mr. Jamm
OCT 8 1963*

*J. Clark Leth
Chargé d'affaires a.i.*

Internal Circulation

POL

Distribution to Posts
Caracas

EXC 185V (RSA 8/25)

Office Code
to Bosses
Description

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
REGISTRY

OCT 4 2 50 PM '63

Circulation
Instructions

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
REGISTERED MAIL FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE
I AM ENCLOSING A COPY OF A NOTE RECEIVED FROM

References

.....
.....
Subject:
References:
.....
FROM:
.....

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA
TO THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR

Office File No.

Post File No.: 10-1-1
Title of Subject Matter: ...
Enclosures: one
Date: September 30, 1963
No.: 512
Security: Restricted

NUMBERED LETTER

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

DVP- 17667

Santo Domingo, D.N.,
27 de Septiembre de 1963.

Señor Encargado de Negocios:

Tengo a honra participar a Vuestra Señoría que, en cumplimiento del compromiso contraído por los Altos Comandos de las Fuerzas Armadas mediante su Manifiesto del día 25 del mes en curso al pueblo dominicano, una vez depuesto el Gobierno del ciudadano Juan Bosch, quedó constituido formalmente en el día de ayer, en arreglo con la selección llevada a cabo por los dirigentes de los partidos políticos democráticos, un Gobierno provisional formado por un Triunvirato civil, amparado en las más altas normas de la Moral y de la Justicia.

Dicho Triunvirato, cuyo mandato será válido por un período de dos años, al término del cual se celebrarán elecciones generales, está presidido por el ciudadano Licenciado Emilio de los Santos, e integrado además por los ciudadanos Doctor Ramón Tapia

A Su Señoría

Señor James Clark Leith,

Encargado de Negocios a.i. del Canadá,

C I U D A D.-

- 2 -

Espinal e Ingeniero Manuel Tavárez Espaillet.

Son los propósitos del actual Gobierno, dotar al país de un régimen civil provisional fundamentado básicamente en principios anticomunistas que de inmediato ha puesto en vigor, establecer la normalidad constitucional y respetar y mantener todos los compromisos internacionales en los cuales ha intervenido la República Dominicana y, por último, garantizar al pueblo dominicano el más cabal respeto de los Derechos Humanos, el derecho de propiedad y la libre empresa.

Hago provecho de la oportunidad, para renovar a Vuestra Señoría las seguridades de mi distinguida consideración.

NR/a.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(DUPLICATE)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM:
The Canadian Embassy,

Reference:
Santo Domingo, D.R.

Subject:
Our Letter 207 of September 28

.....
Note from the Secretaria de Estado
de Relaciones Exteriores
.....

Security: Unclassified.....

No: 209.....

Date: September 30, 1963.....

Enclosures: one.....

Air or Surface Mail: Air.....

Post File No: ... 10-1-1.....

Ottawa File No.	

References

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I am enclosing a copy of a note received by
registered mail today from the Secretario de Estado de
Relaciones Exteriores, Donal J. Reid Cabral.

J. Clark
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

Internal
Circulation

Distribution
to Posts

Caracas

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(DUPLICATE)

NUMBERED LETTER

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Security:.....

No:..... 207.....

Date:..... September 28, 1963.....

Enclosures:.....

Air or Surface Mail:..... Courier.....

Post File No:..... 10-1-1.....

FROM:
The Canadian Embassy,

SANTO DOMINGO, Dominican Republic.

Reference:..... Para 6 of our Telegram #90 of Sept.25/63.....

Subject:..... RECOGNITION OF NEW GOVERNMENT.....

Ottawa File No.
20-1-2-D011

References

The latest information I have available is that no country has yet officially recognized the new government. Brazil, however, acknowledged the note announcing the military coup, but I was told they did not consider this recognition of the new government itself. They are presently awaiting instructions on whether or not to answer a note announcing the formation of the Triumvirate.

2. The Venezuelan Ambassador is presently terminating his personal affairs and will be leaving within the next few days. The American Ambassador had originally planned to leave either today or tomorrow, but my latest information is that they are still considering the matter.* The Mexican Ambassador has received instructions to withdraw all diplomatic personnel. As soon as he can terminate his affairs he will be leaving. According to today's press, Costa Rica, which has not had a diplomatic representative here since President Bosch's inauguration, and Bolivia, which is represented by an Ambassador, will break relations. Also, according to the press, it appears likely that El Salvador will break relations.

3. I understand that the remaining countries are presently awaiting instructions.

4. For your information the following countries presently have resident diplomatic representatives in Santo Domingo. Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Belgium, China, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, France, Germany, Great Britain, Holy See, Italy, Japan, Mexico, El Salvador, Panama, Spain, the U.S.A. and Venezuela.

5. I am enclosing a copy of a note received from the Dean of the Consular Corps which quotes a note received from the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores on September 25 announcing the coup. As I recall, this was the type of note which was delivered to my residence, which I read and returned. I will also be enclosing a copy of a note received today from the Foreign Ministry announcing the installation of the new government if this arrives in time. (Other missions have received it). Presumably should we wish to recognize this government it would be this latter note which you would wish me to acknowledge.

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

Caracas

J. Clark Gault
Charge d'Affaires, a.i.

6 p.m. The American Amb. has just left

HONORABLE CUERPO CONSULAR

Republica Dominicana

Santo Domingo, D.N.
Septiembre 25, 1963

A los Honorables señores miembros del
Cuerpo Consular en la Republica Dominicana.

Distinguidos Colegas:

Pláceme copiar a continuación, para su información y gobierno, texto de la comunicación No. DH-17529 de la fecha de hoy, de la Secretaria de Estado de Relaciones Exteriores:

"La Secretaria de Estado de Relaciones Exteriores tiene a bien llevar a conocimiento del Honorable Señor Decano del Cuerpo Consular y por su digno conducto a todos los demás miembros de dicho Cuerpo, que, de acuerdo con el Manifiesto expedido en esta fecha por los Comandos de las Fuerzas Armadas de la Nación y por las razones expuestas en el mismo, el gobierno que presidía el ciudadano Juan Bosch ha sido depuesto y disueltas las Camaras Legislativas, y que, asimismo, se ha declarado en vigor la Constitución del 17 de Septiembre de 1962.

Igualmente la Secretaria de Estado de Relaciones Exteriores tiene a bien informar al Honorable Señor Decano del Cuerpo Consular y demás miembros de dicho Cuerpo, que los Comandos de las Fuerzas Armadas de la Nación han asumido transitoriamente las funciones de Gobierno, hasta tanto se constituye un Gobierno provisional de carácter esencialmente civil y de unidad nacional, que tendrá como fundamental encargo la convocatoria a elecciones libres, a fin de establecer cuanto antes la normalidad constitucional.

Finalmente, la Secretaria de Estado de Relaciones Exteriores le informa que el orden público del país se encuentra completamente asegurado por la autoridad constituida y que los compromisos internacionales válidamente contraídos por el Estado serán escrupulosamente cumplidos y respetados.

La Secretaria de Estado de Relaciones Exteriores aprovecha la oportunidad para reiterar al Honorable Señor Decano del Cuerpo Consular y demás miembros de dicho Cuerpo las seguridades de su más distinguida consideración." (al final figuran las iniciales del Sub-Secretario Sr. Efraim Herrera Soler).

Saludo a Uds, muy cordialmente,

T.N.A. Broberg
Cónsul General de Dinamarca
Decano

ACTION COPY

XL

To: Mr. Hamm
OCT 7 1963

20-1-2-DOM
~~20-DOM-1-4~~
by dr

FM CARACAS OCT4/63 CONF
TO EXTERNAL 54 OPIMMED
INFO SDOMINGO

REF YOURTEL 98 OCT2

JS

file
JA 78

SOLICITED COMMENT ON NOBLES ARRIVAL
BETANCOURT FEARS USA RECOGNITION OF MILITARY REGIMES IN SDOMINGO
AND HONDURAS ON EVE OF GENERAL ELECTION IN VENEZUELA
MIGHT ENDANGER HIS POSITION AND ENCOURAGE RESTIVE ELEMENTS AMONG
ARMED FORCES. IN CIRCUMSTANCES IT WOULD(BE?)PREFERABLE FOR ME
NOT RPT. NOT TO APPEAR IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC BEFORE NEXT JAN.

2. MY NOTE APPOINTING NOBLE AS CHARGE DAFFAIRES WOULD AMOUNT TO
RECOGNITION. EFFECT MIGHT BE REDUCED IF HE IS REGARDED MERELY AS
REPLACEMENT FOR LEITH WHOSE IMMINENT DEPARTURE COULD BE ANNOUNCED
AT THE SAME TIME

BEAULNE

K.A. Dwo

20-1-2-DOM

Question

L'autre jour le député de Dorchester m'a posé la question suivante: Le ministre pourrait-il informer la Chambre de l'attitude que le gouvernement canadien entend prendre vis-à-vis les récents événements survenus en République Dominicaine?

*File
LJC*

Réponse

La réponse est que comme tout le monde sait le Gouvernement de la République Dominicaine, élu de façon démocratique, et dirigé par le président Juan Bosch, a été renversé par un coup d'état militaire le 25 septembre dernier. Le Canada avait des relations diplomatiques avec le Gouvernement constitutionnel du président Bosch et naturellement le coup d'état n'a pas manqué d'affecter ces relations. Cependant, le personnel de notre Ambassade à Saint Domingue demeure à son poste et nous continuons de porter une vive attention aux événements en République Dominicaine pour voir quel en sera l'effet sur nos relations avec ce pays.

*Text not given
in House yet
JLW
Oct 11/68*

O/SSEA
cc: O/USSEA
Mr. Bow
Parliamentary Secty.
Mr. Dier

Press & Liaison Div.
Legal Div.
Protocol Div.

LATIN AMERICAN/TCHammond/McL

*Please return
file copy to
J.L. Hammond
- A. Div.*

Santo Domingo
Caracas
Washington

CONFIDENTIAL

October 3, 1963

File 20-1-2-DOM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

Coup d'Etat in the Dominican Republic

It is possible that you may be asked a question on the Orders of the Day in the House of Commons concerning the recent coup d'état in the Dominican Republic and the nature of Canada's present relations with that country. Accordingly, there is attached a suggested reply, along very general lines, which you may wish to use, if it is required.

2. Early on the morning of September 25, the constitutional Government of the Dominican Republic, headed by the democratically-elected President Juan Bosch, was overthrown as a result of a bloodless coup d'état led by the Chief of the General Staff, the service and police chiefs and a group of senior military officers. The main reason advanced by the military for this action was the allegation that it was necessary in order to prevent Communism from destroying the country. In order to establish what they termed "a rightist state", the military officers arrested and eventually deported Sr. Bosch, nullified the present Dominican Constitution, dissolved the Congress and called upon a select group of leading members of six right-wing parties, none of whom enjoys any sizeable popular support, to choose a government. These political figures, with the backing of the military, have appointed a Triumvirate consisting of three predictably conservative civilians, who are not connected with any of the Dominican political parties, to form the executive of a new government. Cabinet portfolios are being shared out among the several extreme right-wing political figures. The Triumvirate is to rule for a two-year period and a political truce of at least one year amongst political parties has been declared. Only a vague reference has so far been made to the holding of general elections before the end of this two-year period. Several hundred persons, presumably Leftists, Communists and supporters of Sr. Bosch, appear to have been arrested. There have been no indications of popular outbursts either in protest against or in support of the coup.

3. Failing any specific promise of democratic elections in the near future, the replacement of Sr. Bosch, who was generally regarded as a liberal, if somewhat ineffectual, leftist, by the three-man junta, who have no popular mandate whatsoever, is a grave blow to the hopes of establishing on a firm basis a

2.

representative system in the Dominican Republic, which had only recently emerged from over 30 years of brutal dictatorship under Trujillo. During its short seven months of authority, President Bosch's government had been faced with hostility from both the extreme Left, including Communists and Castrolist elements, and the far Right, including reactionary military officers in close alliance with wealthy oligarchic elements and several would-be strongmen in the officer corps.

4. At this time there is no indication of any disposition on the part of leading Latin American countries to move quickly to recognize the new government. The United States, Mexico, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Honduras and Bolivia have broken off diplomatic relations. The United States has also stopped aid payments under the Alliance for Progress. While we expect that in the not too distant future some Western European countries and some smaller, more conservative Latin American countries may recognize the new government, it is likely that some time will elapse before a considerable number of Latin American countries, or the United States, will do so.

5. It has been the general policy of Canadian Government to recognize at the appropriate time de facto regimes when they are in effective control of the administration of a country. Canada has in recent months recognized Latin American governments which have come to power as a result of military coups in Argentina, Peru, Guatemala and Ecuador. However, since we know of no country which has as yet formally recognized the new Dominican Government, I recommend that action concerning possible Canadian recognition be postponed until it becomes clearer whether political conditions have reached some stability in the Dominican Republic and until the intentions of a number of West European and particularly Latin American countries are known. A further memorandum would be submitted to you at that time. In this way, Canadian recognition could be timed to take place at about the same time as that of a significant number of important countries, thus reducing the danger of appearing to make haste to recognize a thoroughly undemocratic and unconstitutional regime.

6. It must be anticipated that the United States may not extend recognition at least in the immediate future. While we need not ourselves wait for the United States before taking action, may we keep the United States informed of our thinking on this problem and in particular of our disposition to delay recognition until a sizeable number of West European and Latin American countries have done so?

M. A. ROBERTSON
N.A.R.

POSSIBLE QUESTION

Will the Secretary of State for External Affairs comment on the recent developments in the Dominican Republic and the nature of Canada's present relations with that country?

SUGGESTED ANSWER

The constitutional government of the Dominican Republic, which was headed by the democratically-elected President Juan Bosch and with which Canada had diplomatic relations, was overthrown as a result of a coup d'état carried out by Dominican military officers on the morning of September 25. Naturally, this development has affected the state of our relations, as well as those of many other nations, with the Dominican Republic. However, the personnel of the Canadian Embassy in Santo Domingo are still at their post and we shall continue to watch carefully the situation in the Dominican Republic so as to be able to determine what our policy should be.

20-1-2-DOM
~~20-DOM~~
sp | sp

ACTION COPY

To: Mr. Hammer
OCT 3 1963

FM SDOMINGO OCT2/63 CONF
TO EXTERNAL 98

INFO TT TANDC OTT (FLETCHER) CARACAS FM OTT
NOBLES ARRIVAL

PLANNED ARRIVAL OF NOBLE OCT24 RAISES QUESTION OF OUR RELATIONS
WITH NEW GOVT.

2. IF CDA RECOGNIZES BEFORE NOBLE ARRIVES FEEL BEAULNE SHOULD NOT
RPT NOT VISIT AS PLANNED. THEREFORE RECOMMEND BEAULNE SEND ME UN-
DATED NOTE ADDRESSED TO DONALD J REID CABRAL, SECRETARIO DE ESTADO
DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES APPOINTING NOBLE CHARGE D AFFAIRES.

3. HOWEVER IF IT APPEARS NOBLE TO ARRIVE BEFORE CDN RECOGNITION
WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ADVICE PROCEDURE TO FOLLOW.

4. MISSION ALSO FACTOR. IMMEDIATE COMMERCIAL PROSPECTS DO NOT RPT
NOT APPEAR DIMINISHED AT MOMENT BY COUP EXCEPT POSSIBLE HESITANCE
BY CDN FIRMS. FEEL WE SHOULD TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF PRIVATE COMMER-
CIAL POTENTIAL. HOWEVER STRENGTHENING OF MISSION THIS TIME LIKELY
BE TAKEN BY RECOGNITION CONSCIOUS DOMINICANS AS FRIENDLY GESTURE
TOWARDS PRESENT GOVT. HAVING HAD FOR SOME TIME TO ALLAY DOMINICAN
CRITICISM OF MISSION LEVEL WE EMPHASIZED TO PREVIOUS GOVT BEAULNE
AND NOBLES APPOINTMENTS AS INDICATION OF INCREASED CDN INTEREST
AND SYMPATHY WITH DEMOCRATIC GOVT. IF YOU CONSIDER THIS FACTOR
IMPORTANT, ON NOBLES ARRIVAL IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO ANNOUNCE MY
PLANNED DEPARTURE IN DEC OR JAN. ALTHOUGH DUE TO CDN WEATHER I
WOULD HAVE PREFERRED DELAY MY DEPARTURE BEYOND SCHEDULED MID FEB,
I AM PREPARED TO FOLLOW YOUR WISHES IN MATTER. FEEL BY NEW YEAR
CREIGHTON WILL HAVE ENTIRELY ADEQUATE LOCAL CONTACTS AND SPANISH
TO HANDLE POLITICAL WORK. COPY TO BEAULNE FOR COMMENT

*File
best*

LEITH



To: Mr. Hamner
SEP 30 1963

20-1-2-DUM
sp sp

XL

file
JL

FM SDOMINGO SEP30/63 CONFID

TO EXTERNAL 96 OPIMMED

INFO HAVANA WASHDC DE OTT

RECOMMEND WE SUSPEND ALL MEASURE OF COOPERATION WITH DOMINICAN
GOVT(BY?)CDN EMB HAVANA UNTIL QUESTION DISPUTING RECOGNITION OF
NEW DOMINICAN GOVT RESOLVED

LEITH

Agreed
JL

20-1-2 DOM
44 44
AMBASSADE DU CANADA

file
JRX

CANADIAN EMBASSY



Apartado 1393,
Santo Domingo,
Dominican Republic.

Confidential

September 28, 1963

Mr. A.J. Pick,
Head of Latin-American Division,
Department of External Affairs,
Ottawa, Ontario.

Dear Mr. Pick:

You will find a few items in today's bag which I hope will be of interest to you, but unfortunately there is just not enough time to intelligently discuss all the items which I would like to. However, for the moment I will raise these questions with you, in the hope that I will be able to discuss them in further detail before the next bag.

The reasons for Bosch's downfall are many and varied, and the actual incident was simply the trigger. I hope to be able to analyse these various reasons for the next bag.

Public reaction to the coup, as I indicated earlier in the week in a telegram, is mixed. It will take a few more days for people to make up their minds about the new government, although of course the left wing already has. On Thursday night I was speaking with one of the 14th of June members in hiding and he told me that "if you stay here long enough you will see a revolution." In discussing the general situation, and some of the bombs were going off at the time, he said "it is a time bomb", but I am not clear whether he was referring to a specific bomb that had just gone off or the general situation of the country. It appears to me quite unlikely that the 14th of June will be allowed to work in the open, although de las Santos has already said that they will be free to do so. How effective the 14th of June and possibly some elements of the PRD will be in organizing terrorism remains to be seen.

cc. Mr. Y. Beaulne,
Caracas.

- 2 -

Oct 20 is the indicated date
[Signature]

(Saltelli) ✓
You may wish to get in touch with Mr. Noble in Mexico City ~~as~~ the question of recognition can't be solved before his scheduled arrival. You may also wish to consider whether or not it would be politic to have the Mission appear to be strengthened immediately following our recognition of the government.

Finally, there is the question of Ambassador Beaulne's visits to Santo Domingo. With Venezuela withdrawing its representation here, relations between the two countries may not be the best. For this reason you may wish to discuss with Mr. Beaulne the advisability of his visiting here in the near future.

There are probably a number of items which I have not covered, and if you feel that there are some aspects on which you would like me to report, please do not hesitate to let me know.

With very best personal regards to yourself and Tom Hammond.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

J. Clark Leith,
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

P.S. I also hope to find out what I can about the sources of power in the new govt. I certainly doubt at the moment that the Trinitate will be free of military interference. I also doubt that Vinas Roman is actually the strongest man in the military at the moment.

[Signature]

20-1-2-DOM



70.14
Apartado del Este 11452,
Caracas, Venezuela,
September 25, 1963.


Dear Alfred:

The overthrow of President Bosch this morning changes the circumstances in which I hoped to visit Santo Domingo next month. I had felt that it would be appropriate for me to be present when Mr. Noble arrived, in order to introduce him to government authorities and foreign diplomats. At the same time, I wished to emphasize by frequent trips the interest and support of the Canadian government. It might be preferable now to wait until the dust settles.

I should be grateful for your advice on this matter. I have already expressed my misgivings to Clark Leith, who will probably communicate with you.

Please accept my best personal regards.

Yours sincerely,


Yvon Béaulne,
Ambassador.

Mr. A.J. Pick,
Latin American Division,
Department of External Affairs,
Langevin Block,
O t t a w a.

J. J. [Signature]
October 4, 1963

TELEPHONE CALL FROM OFFICE OF MR. FLETCHER, T&C

file 20-1-2-007

TEXT OF TELEGRAM TO MR. CLARK, COMMERCIAL COUNSELLOR, MEXICO

J. J.

PLEASE CONVEY FOLLOWING MESSAGE BY APPROPRIATE MEANS TO K. F. NOBLE AT SALTILLO. QUOTE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS HAS INDICATED THAT THERE MAY WELL BE A DELAY OF INDETERMINATE DURATION BEFORE THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA RECOGNIZES THE PRESENT AUTHORITIES IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, WHICH HAVE COME TO POWER THROUGH A COUP D'ETAT. ACCORDINGLY THERE MAY HAVE TO BE A CORRESPONDING DELAY IN YOUR ARRIVAL IN SANTO DOMINGO. WE WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED. YOU SHOULD CONTINUE WITH YOUR PLANS FOR LEAVE FROM OCTOBER 12 TO 20 INCLUSIVE BUT KEEP IN TOUCH WITH CLARK WHO WILL BE OUR CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION WITH YOU UNQUOTE.

PLEASE CONFIRM THAT THE MESSAGE HAS BEEN RECEIVED BY NOBLE.

REPLY OF OCTOBER 3 FROM MR. CLARK, MEXICO

NOBLE RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE BY TELEPHONE THIS MORNING. PRESENTLY PLANS DEPART SALTILLO OCTOBER 12 FOR MEXICO CITY HOLIDAY UNTIL OCTOBER 20.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO: Protocol Division
FROM: Consular Division
REFERENCE: Santo Domingo's Letter No. 190 of September 16
SUBJECT: GRANTING OF COURTESY VISAS.

Security UNCLASSIFIED

Date September 25, 1962

File No.	10-11-1-10	
	20-1-2	DOM

file
JCS

Attached is a self-explanatory letter from our Embassy in Santo Domingo concerning the issuance of courtesy visas.

2. While we see merits in the recommendation made by the Embassy, we should be grateful if you would let us have your comments before we consult Immigration authorities (should it be decided not to issue courtesy visas). You will want to bear in mind that non-immigrant procedures imply in this case the presentation of evidence from the university or other institution accepting Dominican students, together with the passing of thorough medical examinations for those students coming for one year or more.

CIRCULATION
L.A. Div. ✓
D.L. (2)

This I believe will have to be held up pending a clarification of the situation in the D.R.

[Signature]
Consular Division.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, Santo Domingo, D.R.

Reference:

Subject: Granting of Courtesy Visas

Security: Unclassified

No: 190

Date: September 16, 1963

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No: 10-1-7

Ottawa File No.	

References

The Government of President Bosch has continued a scholarship plan instituted by the former régime, a plan whereby certain persons who, it is thought, could benefit from study abroad but could not on their own afford such study, are given postings to Dominican Embassies or Consulates located in "university" cities. For the duration of their posting, the diplomatic duties of these persons can hardly be described as onerous; in actual fact the recipients of the awards granted under this plan are, and remain, students first and employees of their Foreign Service second.

2. Nevertheless, a special passport is issued to each appointee and a Third Person Note is sent to the Mission of the country to which he has been accredited, requesting that he be granted a visa "corresponding" to his passport. A "corresponding" visa for the holder of a special passport is, in the unwritten interpretation of the Dominican Ministry of Foreign Relations, a courtesy visa.

3. The names of the most recent recipients of the awards granted under el Plan de Becas para Estudios en el Exterior have just been announced. One of these persons, Dr. Eliot Martes Fernández Pérez, has been appointed "Auxiliar" at the Dominican Consulate General in Montreal. It is Dr. Fernández Pérez' intention to take up a Resident Staff Appointment at the Montreal Children's Hospital. The Ministry of Foreign Relations has granted Dr. Fernández Pérez a special passport and has requested that a courtesy visa be issued thereon.

4. In the past, in response to similar requests, this Mission has granted courtesy visas, presumably by authority of Section 358 b. 7 of the Consular Instructions. (It should be noted that formerly the Dominican authorities made no distinction between "regular" new appointees to their diplomatic service, and the "special" appointments made under el Plan de becas).

5. This scholarship scheme is laudable in that it provides for certain people badly-needed educational facilities otherwise unavailable to them. However, recent discussions with the Ministry of Foreign Relations concerning to whom and under what conditions diplomatic and courtesy visas may be granted by this Embassy have led us to wonder whether undue advantage may be taken of the privilege of

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

- 2 -

issuing courtesy visas to newly created members of the Dominican Foreign Service. It is therefore our opinion that Dr. Fernández Pérez, and all future becadistas, should be required to submit to ordinary non-immigrant procedures and should be granted ordinary non-immigrant visas.

6. We should be grateful for your comments on Dr. Fernández Pérez' case in particular, and in general, on the visa policy to be followed with respect to similar cases.

[Handwritten Signature]
The Embassy

CAK - DOM REPUBLIC REMAINS

Ottawa,

September 20, 1963.

20-1-2 - DOM
27 -

*File
just*

Yesterday, September 19, The Canadian Chargé

d'affaires in Moscow sent the following telegram to His Excellency Hector Garcia Godoy, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Dominican Republic:

"I have the honour to report that in accordance with your instructions I signed today at 1600 hours Russian and English language copies of Nuclear Test Ban Treaty on behalf of the Dominican Republic. Signed Albert Frederick Hart, Chargé d'affaires, a.i., of Canada, Moscow."

At the signing ceremony Mr. Hart made a brief statement in which he said he was happy and honoured to sign the Test Ban Treaty on behalf of the Dominican Republic. He also paid tribute to the adherence of the Dominican Republic to the Treaty.



LONDON 710

TO EXTERNAL OPIMMEDIATE
INFO TT SANTO DOMINGO FM OTT

I HAVE TODAY SENT EN CLAIR TEL TO HIS EXCELLENCY HECTOR
GARCIA GODOY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC TEXT BEGINS ~~SEPTEMBER 19~~ // I HAVE THE HONOUR
TO REPORT THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR INSTRUCTIONS I
SIGNED TODAY AT 1600 HOURS RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH LANGUAGE
COPIES OF NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY ON BEHALF OF THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC SIGNED ALBERT FREDERICK HART
CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF CANADA MOSCOW // ENDS,
2. AT THE SIGNING CEREMONY I MADE BRIEF
STATEMENT IN WHICH I SAID I WAS HAPPY AND HONOURED
TO SIGN ON BEHALF OF DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND IN WHICH
I PAID TRIBUTE TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC'S ADHERENCE
TO THE TREATY
HART CANAD MOSCOW

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(FILE COPY)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO:.....The Canadian Embassy.....
Havana, Cuba.....

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
 EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference: Santo Domingo Letter No. 187 of
 September 9, 1963

Subject:.....
Dominican Pilot in Cuba.....

Security:....CONFIDENTIAL.....

No:.....XL-192.....

Date:.....September 19, 1963.....

Enclosures:....One.....

Air or Surface Mail:....Air.....

Post File No.: ~~20-1-2-Cuba~~.....

Ottawa File No.	
20-1-2	DOM Cuba

References

It would be in order for you to attempt to look into the matter of the possible imprisonment in Cuba of the Dominican Air Force Pilot, Major Luis Alberto Martinez Rincon, which is discussed in Santo Domingo's letter under reference. A copy of this letter is attached for your convenience.

2. In making enquiries, in the form which you consider most appropriate, of the Cuban Foreign Ministry to elicit any information they are prepared to supply concerning the whereabouts of Major Martinez, you should explain that while Canada has not, of course, undertaken to act formally on behalf of the Dominican Republic in Cuba, a specific request for our assistance in making this enquiry concerning the welfare of a Dominican citizen has been received from the Dominican Government, which has no protecting power in Havana.

3. We should be grateful to learn in due course whether this query meets with Cuban cooperation and whether any information is provided.

Internal Circulation

A. J. PICK

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Distribution to Posts

Santo Domingo
Caracas

(without attachment)

20-1-2-DOM

Mr. Hammond
(on return file)

What a mess!
It seems tel 96 did leave
@ home - possibly
relayed in N.Y.C! ?

FM SDOMINGO SEP11/63 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 79 OPIMMED
REF YOURTEL N124 SEP11
NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
WE HAVE NOT RPT NOT RECEIVED YOURTEL N96 AUG30 GRATEFUL FOR COPY
SOONEST.

- 2. FOREIGN MINISTER SENT FULL POWER TO AMBASSADOR SMITH SEP10.
- 3. FOREIGN MINISTRY INFORMED THIS MORNING HART NOW CHARGE DAFFAIRES.
WOULD APPRECIATE INFO HOW LONG HART HOLDS POSITION. UPON RECEIPT
OF THIS INFO/5 GRS CORRUPT. SDOMINGO HAS BEEN ASKED FOR REPET-
ITION/FULL POWER.
- 4. REPEAT TEL N96 ON NEW CODE PAGE. → This report has been done

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

OUTGOING MESSAGE

DATE	FILE	SECURITY
SEPT 10/68	20-1-2-DOM 20-9-2	CONFID

FM: **EXTERNAL**

TO: **SANTO DOMINGO**

NUMBER	PRECEDENCE
N-124	OP IMMEDIATE ROSS CAMPBELL

INFO: **MOSCOW**

*Mr. Holmstedt
see on return
COP*

Ref.: **YOURTEL 78 OF SEPT 5**

Subject: **NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY**

HAS FULL POWER FOR "CDN AMBASSADOR" ALREADY BEEN
 DESPATCHED TO OUR EMBASSY MOSCOW? WE ASSUME YOU HAVE GIVEN DOMINICANS
 INFO CONTAINED IN OURTEL N96 OF AUG 30 AND THAT THEY ARE AWARE THAT
 DOCUMENT AUTHORIZING SIGNATURE ON BEHALF OF DOMINICAN REPUBLIC SHOULD
 BEAR NAME OF CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ALBERT FREDERICK HART AND NOT THAT
 PAST
 OP/AMBASSADOR ARNOLD SMITH. PLEASE REPORT PRESENT STATUS OF THIS
 MATTER TO EXTERNAL INFO MOSCOW.

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION NO STANDARD Disarmament Div. 10 c.

Legal Div.
 Latin American Div. ✓
 (refs done in div.)

ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	APPROVED BY
SIG..... NAME... K.D. McIlraith/JL	Disarmament	2-5039	ROSS CAMPBELL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

J-2

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, Santo Domingo, D.R.

Reference: Our Telegram 78 of September 5, 1963

Subject: Dominican Pilot in Cuba

Security: Confidential

No: 187

Date: September 9, 1963

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Courier

Post File No: 10-1-3

To: Mr. Hamner
18 SEP 18 1963

Ottawa File No.
20-1-2-DOM
20-1-2-CUBA
56 80

References

Done
Letter to Havana (with cc of Caracas)
cc Santo Domingo
File
HCX
Sept 19/63

During our conversation with the new Foreign Minister, Dr. García Godoy, he raised the question of a Dominican pilot who disappeared with his P51 aircraft last summer. The Foreign Minister showed us a brief note dated August 28, 1963 written by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. The note stated simply that Major Luis Alberto Martínez Rincón, of the Fuerza Aérea Dominicana, who disappeared with his P51 aircraft while flying to Miami on August 25, 1962, is now in prison in Cuba. The note requested the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to do anything in its power to repatriate the pilot. This is all the information the Foreign Minister had available and he did not know from where the Air Force had obtained its information.

2. The Foreign Minister asked if our Embassy in Havana could locate the pilot, adding that anything we could do would be deeply appreciated by the Dominican Government. I replied that his request would be passed on to Ottawa for consideration.

3. As I recall, at the time the aircraft disappeared there was considerable local publicity. The Dominican Government and Air Force felt that the plane had gone down in Haiti and the Government's request to search for the plane was rejected by the Haitian authorities. A search subsequently carried out by the Haitians did not locate the plane nor was the United States Military Mission in Haiti able to uncover any clues as to its whereabouts.

4. Following the discussion with the Foreign Minister, I raised this subject informally with the Chief of the United States Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) here in Santo Domingo. He arrived in Santo Domingo shortly before this incident took place and recalls it rather vividly. He said that from their information the plane was one of four flying to Miami for repairs and that the pilot in question left the group somewhere between here and Cuba and was never seen again. The other pilots made no effort to follow him. The American was not sure whether this was an indication of incompetence or collusion on the part of the other pilots. He went on to say that the American Air Force and Navy made a thorough search for the aircraft and although there was always the chance that the plane went down leaving no trace, he considers it highly unlikely that this was the case. At that time they concluded that the pilot had deliberately flown to Cuba although they had no information about his political leanings.

Internal Circulation

70L


Distribution to Posts

Havana
Caracas

- 2 -

5. As a further gesture of friendly cooperation with the Dominican Government I feel that it would be useful to have our Embassy in Havana investigate this matter on their behalf.

6. I would appreciate your advice on the reply I should make to the Foreign Minister concerning this matter.


Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

File

Personnel Division.

Restricted

September 9, 1963.

Latin American Division.

20-1-2-DUM	
22	✓

Visit to Santo Domingo of Canadian Ambassador.

The attached telegram (No. 51 of September 5) from Caracas concerns the arrival in Santo Domingo of Mr. Kenneth Noble of the Commercial Service, who is to be resident Chargé d'Affaires.

2. Mr. Beaulne was in Santo Domingo at the end of July, for the first time, in order to present his credentials. We agree that it would be suitable for him to return to introduce Mr. Noble. The more status we can give to Mr. Noble - in the eyes of the Dominicans - the less pressure we are likely to be under in order to send a resident Ambassador to the Dominican Republic.

3. As we do not have the exact date for Mr. Noble's arrival, would you please answer the telegram, sending this information - that is, if you agree with us that Beaulne should be on hand to launch Noble in a suitable way.

A. J. PICK

Latin American Division.

To: Mr. Hamm
XL SEP 9 1963

J-3

20-1-2-DOM

cc 202 + 19 7E

ACTION COPY

Refer to Disarm (lib 3) + 19 7E
T & C (Latin American Div) (etc 2)
Done M. R.
Sept. 11/63
XL

FM SDOMINGO SEP 5/63 CONFID

TO EXTERNAL 78

INFO BAG CARACAS

INTERVIEW WITH NEW FOREIGN MINISTER DR HECTOR ^{GARCIA} ALKETA GODOY CACERES

SWORN IN AUG 30 RECEIVED MEMBERS OF EACH MISSION IN SEPARATE

INTERVIEWS THIS WEEK. FOLLOWING ITEMS AMONG SUBJECTS WE DISCUSSED

(1) EXIT DOMINICANS FROM CUBA; RPTD REQUESTS FOR NAMES ADDRESSES

TRAVEL PARTICULARS OF TEN DOMINICAN CITIZENS CONCERNED. WAS INFORMED

THEY ARE PRESENTLY ~~SHIFTING~~ ^{He?} NAMES OF SEVERAL DOZEN MANY WHOM MARRIED

CUBANS. WE PROMISED TO LIST TEN SHORTLY. (2) DOMINICAN-CDN TRADE; RPTD

SUGGESTIONS AND OFFERS OF ASSISTANCE MADE PREVIOUSLY TO MINISTER

OF COMMERCE THAT DOMINICANS SEND TRADE MISSION TO CDA. GODOY

EXPRESSED INTEREST AND ALSO ASKED FOR DETAILS OF CDN TRADE

SERVICE AS HE HOPED TO STRENGTHEN COMMERCIAL WORK OF DOMINICAN

EMB (3) NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY; WAS INFORMED PRESIDENT SIGNED

FULL POWER DECREE FOR CDN AMBASSADOR MOSCOW YESTERDAY.

(see airtel Aug 30. no N 96)

Form Hamman
XL SE?

XL J.1

ACTION COPY

FM HAVANA SEP4/63 CONF
TO EXTERNAL 199 OPIMMED
INFO TT WASHDC PRIORITY-FM OTT
REF YOURTEL XL97 AUG19 WASHDC TEL 2720 AUG27
EXIT OF DOMINICANS FROM CUBA

20-1-2-00M
~~55-32-40~~
20-1-2-00M
56 26

FROM LOCAT KLM MANAGER, REDEKER, WE HAVE OBTAINED SOME
ADDITIONAL INFO BEARING ON THIS QUESTION.

Mr. Peoff
to file
return
to me

2. ACCORDING TO REDEKER INITIATIVE FOR LARGE REPATRIATION MOVE
REFERRED TO IN WASHDC REFTEL AND WHICH HE STATES INVOLVES SOME
180 DOMINICAN RESIDENTS OF CUBA CAME FROM GROUP OF LOCAL DOMINICANS.
WITH BLESSING OF CUBAN AUTHORITIES THEY APPARENTLY FORMED CTTEE
TO MAKE REPATRIATION ARRANGEMENTS. GROUP THEN GOT IN TOUCH WITH
DOMINICAN CONSUL IN MIAMI, RELATIVE OF ONE MEMBER OF CTTEE, WHO IN
TURN REFERRED MATTER TO DOMINICAN EMB IN WASHDC. SUBSEQUENTLY
CLEARANCE WAS GRANTED BY SDOMINGO AND APPROACH MADE TO KLM FOR
CHARTER FLIGHTS.

file
F
70

3. REDEKERS OPINION OF CTTEE WAS THAT IT CONTAINED BOTH FIDELISTA
COMMUNISTS AND DOMINICANS INTERESTED SOLELY IN REPATRIATING FELLOW
CITIZENS. AT FIRST ARRANGEMENTS APPEARED TO BE GOING AHEAD
SATISFACTORILY WITH CUBAN IMMIG AUTHORITY. RECENTLY HOWEVER
SOME DIFFICULTIES HAD ARISEN. WHILE REDEKER HAS NOT RPT NOT BEEN
GIVEN CLEAR INDICATION OF NATURE OF DIFFICULTIES FROM CTTEE OR
CUBANS, HE GAINED IMPRESSION FROM ONE MEMBER OF CTTEE THAT
POLITICAL COMPLICATIONS HAD DEVELOPED. THERE WAS INFERENCE THAT
CUBANS NOW WISHED TO ADD SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS TO REPATRIATION LIST
WHOSE CLAIM TO DOMINICAN CITIZENSHIP WAS QUESTIONABLE.

N.B.

4. WE ARE NOT RPT NOT IN POSITION OF COURSE TO KNOW WHETHER
DOMINICANS ON WHOSE BEHALF DOMINICAN REPUBLIC ORIGINALLY
APPROACHED US ARE INCLUDED ON ABOVE REPATRIATION LIST BUT
PRESUMABLY THIS WILL BECOME EVIDENT WHEN LISTS ARE COMPARED IN
OTT AND WASHDC. IN ANY EVENT IT WOULD SEEM DESIRABLE

PAGE TWO 199

TO SECURE AS FULL DETAILS POSSIBLE FROM DOMINICANS ON OUR
POTENTIAL GROUP OF REPATRIATES.

and from West as well. 1/1
71

XL SEP 2 1983
To: Mr. Hemmery

ACTION COPY

J 46

L-A

20-1-2-DOM

5532-40
4)
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OTT016PT WAA20 RAA101-E RAG172 ACRA54/DGNYX32 17 AAC

SANTODOMINGODR 2 1202P

EXTERNAL

OTTAWA

76 REFYRTEL XL122 AUGUST R THIRTY WILL SEE NEW FOREIGN MINISTER

GARCIA GODOY THIS WEEK

DOMCAN

file
J.E.H.

XXØRMEØXX

20-1-2-DOM	

FM EXTERNAL OTT AUG30/63 RESTD

TO SDOMINGO N96 OPIMMED.

INFO MOSCOW PRIORITY

REF YOURTEL 76 AUG21

NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

YOU SHOULD INFORM DOMINICAN AUTHORITIES THAT ARNOLD SMITH LEFT
MOSCOW TODAY ON PERM POSTING TO OTT AND THAT OUR EMB WILL BE
HEADED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ALBERT FREDERICK HART UNTIL NEW AMBASSADOR
TAKES OVER TOWARDS END OF YEAR.

2. WE WOULD OF COURSE AGREE TO HART SIGNING TEST BAN TREATY ON
BEHALF OF DOMINICAN REPUBLIC IF THAT SHOULD BE THE DESIRE OF
DOMINICAN GOVT.

ROBERTSON°