

NOTE: OTHER RELATED FILES TO IH246-2.

- | | |
|---|-----------|
| 1. Terrorists - International..... | IH256-Q-3 |
| 2. Olympics - 1976..... | IH276-1 |
| 3. Black September Group..... | IH295-14 |
| 4. Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA)..... | IH295-17 |
| 5. Irish Nationals (IRA, UDL, etc.)..... | IH295-19 |
| 6. Palestinian Liberation Organization..... | IH295-23 |
| 7. Japanese Red Army..... | IH295-24 |

POLICY FILES

- | | |
|---|----------------|
| 1. Terrorism - General..... | 5189-1 |
| 2. Terrorism - Activity Report..... | 5189-2 |
| 2. Terrorism - Lookouts..... | 5189-3 |
| 3. Terrorism - Hijacking & Airport Incidents - General..... | 5189-4-1 |
| 4. Terrorism - Hijacking & Airport Incidents - Conventions..... | 5189-4-2000045 |
| 5. <i>Hijacking Reports</i> | <i>5189-8</i> |

CRIMES & IRREGULARITIES - PROSECUTIONS

-1 General

5189 - CRIMES & IRREGULARITIES - TERRORISM

-1 Terrorism - General

-2 Terrorism - Activity Reports

-3 Terrorism - Lookouts

-4-1 Terrorism - Hijacking & Airport Incidents - General

-4-2 Terrorism - Hijacking & Airport Incidents - Conventions

-5 Chapter 7.63

-6 Terrorism - Control of Terrorists

5190 - CRIMES & IRREGULARITIES - TRANSPORTATION COMPANIES

-1 General

5195 - CRIMES & IRREGULARITIES - TRAVEL AGENCIES

-1 General

-1-512 Australia & New Zealand

-1-550 France

-1-552 Greece

-1-564 Travel Agencies - Hong Kong

-1-567 Travel Agencies - India

-1-574 Travel Agencies - Israel

-1-575 Italy

-1-611 Travel Agencies - Philippines

-1-622 South America

-1-623 Spain

-1-638 Travel Agencies - Uruguay

5200 - DEATH OF IMMIGRANTS

-1 General

5230 - DEPORTATION - GENERAL SERIES

-1 General

-1-512 Deportation - Australia

-1-520 Deportation - Brazil



Manpower
and Immigration

Main-d'œuvre
et Immigration

(with 1H 246-2)

~~Regional Intelligence Officer,
Dept. of Manpower & Immigration,
Immigration Division,
550 Sherbrooke St. W., Room 704,
MONTREAL 111, Qué~~

First Class
Mail

Objet de la
première classe

Civil Aviation
Security

File

1H 246-2

AD
Rec'd from
G. H. AND. this
date 7/1/76

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Transport Canada Transports Canada

Air Air

RESTRICTED WITH ATTACHMENTS

Your file Votre référence

Our file Notre référence 102-24-6

Ottawa, Ontario,
K1A 0N8,
December 18, 1974.

Mr. A. Butroid,
Special Assistant to Assistant
Deputy Minister, Immigration,
Dept. of Manpower and Immigration,
Bourque Memorial Building,
Room 1002, 305 Rideau Street,
Ottawa, Ontario,
K1A 0J9.

Dear Mr. Butroid:

Forwarded herewith for your information is a copy of the
Minutes of the 6th Meeting of the National Civil Aviation Security
Committee held in Ottawa on November 20, 1974.

Your continued interest and co-operation is appreciated.

Yours truly,

W. M. McLeish,
Director General,
Civil Aeronautics and
National Civil Aviation
Security Co-ordinator.

Encls.

c.c. Mr. H.G. Pollard,
Olympic Co-ordinator.

A MEETING OF
UNE RÉUNION DE/DU

THE NATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY COMMITTEE

WAS HELD ON NOVEMBER 20 1974 . AT 9:30 O'CLOCK ^{P.M.} IN ROOM WELLINGTON
A EU LIEU LE A HEURE M. DANS LA PIÈCE S.

BUILDING. HOLIDAY INN PLACE OTTAWA
ÉDIFICE. LIEU

THOSE IN ATTENDANCE WERE: SEE ATTACHED LIST -- APPENDIX 'A'
ÉTAIENT PRÉSENTS:

CHAIRMAN: NATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY COORDINATOR
PRÉSIDENT: W.M. McLEISH, DIRECTOR GENERAL, CIVIL AERONAUTICS

MEMBERS:
MEMBRES:
Co-Chairman: MR. S.T. GRANT
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY

DATE, TIME AND PLACE OF NEXT MEETING AS REQUIRED
DATE, HEURE ET LIEU DE LA PROCHAINE RÉUNION

WILL MEMBERS BE FURTHER NOTIFIED? YES
LES MEMBRES EN SERONT-ILS NOTIFIÉS À NOUVEAU?

MEETING ADJOURNED AT 1:00 O'CLOCK ^{P.M.}
RÉUNION AJOURNÉE À HEURE M. S.

SECRETARY
SÉCRÉTAIRE

CHAIRMAN
PRÉSIDENT

DATE December 9 19 74

DATE

W.M. McLeish
9 Dec 19 74

AGENDA

NATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY COMMITTEE

NOVEMBER 20, 1974

- 9:30 - 9:45 1. Opening Remarks of the Chairman -- W. M. McLeish
- 9:45 - 10:15 2. Intelligence - Assessment of the Threat
- 10:15 - 10:30 3. Regulations -- Status Report
- 10:30 - 10:50 *Coffee*
- 10:50 - 11:45 4. National Airport Security Program -- Status Report
- 11:45 - 12:15 5. Associate Committee on Aviation Security
- 12:15 - 12:30 6. Flight Operations
- 12:30 - 1:00 7. General Discussion

1. Opening Remarks

Mr. W.M. McLeish, National Civil Aviation Security Co-ordinator opened the meeting by welcoming the delegates and introducing the MOT officials at the head table. Each of the attendees, as per Appendix 'A', later identified himself and the organization he represented.

The Chairman briefly outlined the areas where progress had been made during the past year and pointed out that the security measures introduced at airports, together with extradition agreements with Cuba, have proven to be effective deterrents against hijacking in North America. He stressed that the air carriers are obliged, in accordance with the new legislation and regulations, to comply with their security programmes as submitted to the Minister. He also made it clear that air carrier personnel concerned with marketing do not have the authority to turn off security screening to facilitate passenger flow to expedite flight departures. An objective for the future is to streamline the screening procedures in order to provide not only an effective system but also one that is economically acceptable by all.

Mr. McLeish indicated the present security posture would be retained as long as international terrorist activities present a threat to civil aviation. The importance of maintaining a total security system to protect against any threat during the Olympics and the other international conferences to be held in 1976 was stressed. Mention was also made that thrust of future efforts would be directed to such areas as employee motivation programmes, intelligence networks, screening facilities and the resolution of problems associated with the operation of small commercial air carriers at our airports.

2. Intelligence - Assessment of the Threat

Sgt. W. Crossley, RCMP Security Service, gave a very interesting briefing on the international terrorist threat to civil aviation. He advised that the analysis of previous incidents revealed there had been no intelligence before a hijacking occurred in most cases. The following points on "Post Incident Responses" were made during his presentation.

- (1) The need for prior planning.
- (2) When an act occurs, co-ordination of the activities of police and various departments involved is essential.
- (3) Maintain a chain of command and need for communication planning.
- (4) Basic missions are:
 - (a) Rescue the Hostages - (minimum goal - maintain status quo, do not permit situation to worsen;
 - (b) Obtain control of situation;
 - (c) Apprehend the terrorists; and
 - (d) Bring to trial.

- 2 -

- (5) While maintaining the status quo, keep lines of communications open, establish who is involved, what are demands and conditions, etc.
- (6) Centralize communications to one liaison point and one person to prevent conflict and confusion.
(At Munich everyone was a spokesman).
- (7) The commission of a terrorist act requires the immediate formation of a command centre where information is reviewed, decisions are made and actions co-ordinated.
- (8) Establish a telephone or radio intercept capability to monitor any communication by terrorist in order to employ counter tactics.
- (9) Use every opportunity for psychological warfare purposes. Put act in proper perspective; that it is a criminal act. Destroy any appeal by terrorists which would inspire others. Present authorities in best light, rescuing hostages.
- (10) Surround terrorist scene to prevent entry or exit and isolate so danger is confined to fixed area. Employ tactical units with proper equipment, i.e. gas, smoke, communication equipment, hand speakers, bull horns, lights and weaponry. Prepare for the unexpected.
- (11) Use every opportunity to separate the hostages from the terrorists. Obtain release of sick, wounded, women and children, if possible. Try to negotiate the exchange of passengers for government officials to ensure the terrorists safety to their final destination.
- (12) Avoid prolongation of the incident due to inability to arrive at a decision. If possible, keep it moving and where change can be made, make it. Continued negotiation is not prolongation and in fact contributes to the terrorists becoming exhausted and accepting terms.
- (13) Try to obtain intelligence continuously. Try to establish the identity of the hijackers, where they are from, any previous record, etc. Attempt to get an expert into the aircraft by devious means in order to peruse the scene.
- (14) When terrorists are on the run, keep them on the run or he will strike back.

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- 3 -

3. Regulations

Mr. T.M. Saunderson, MOT (CARL) outlined the action taken by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to develop international standards and recommended practices on security to safeguard international civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference. These standards and recommended practices, which are known as Annex 17, became effective on August 22, 1974.

It was reported that the Schedule which lists the air carriers to be governed by the Civil Aviation Security Measures Regulations and Order was in the process of being amended to include Great Lakes Air Lines, Time Air and Norcanair.

Mr. Saunderson reported, in addition, that as a result of consultation with ATAC and numerous employee associations involved, agreement has now been reached on the wording of the proposed amendment to the Air Regulations which will require an air carrier to take certain measures when the safety of a specific aircraft or flight is threatened. The proposed new Section 810, formerly drafted as 800, Subsections (5) and (6), was read and attendees were advised that its final approval by Privy Council was expected very soon.

4. National Airport Security Program

Mr. W.P. Stoker, Chief, Airport Policing and Security Division, reported on the status of the National Airport Security Program. Please see Appendix 'B' for details of the presentation.

During the question period, the following points were raised and/or discussed.

- (a) The P.W.A. representative supported the use of x-ray equipment, wherever possible, to inspect carry-on baggage and articles rather than by manual means and recommended additional units be purchased.

Mr. Stoker explained that unit costs were in the order of \$40,000.00 and funds were not initially available to procure units for other than those airports which have high volumes of passenger traffic. However, a program has been developed and approved to provide for the acquisition of additional equipments during the next 5 years.

Mr. Stoker also advised arrangements existed for MOT Telecommunications personnel to repair and maintain the security equipments at airports.

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- (b) The C.P. Air representative asked as to the criteria used by MOT to determine the airports categorized as "major domestic" and the RCMP staffing requirements.

The membership were advised that "volume of traffic" was perhaps the most important consideration for an airport to be designated "major domestic". Some other important factors were (i) type of aircraft serving the airport, and (ii) its location relative to the community served, provincial status, i.e. capital, next point of call en route.

The Chairman advised that because of our international commitments there has been no difficulty in obtaining funds to implement the security program at the international airports. However, it had been difficult to convince Treasury Board officials the same threat existed at our domestic airports and a similar level security is required. The Ministry never intended to stop at the 23 airports now designated as "major domestic", but due to inflation and budgetary constraints we were unable to make any progress. Nevertheless, the Ministry intends to pursue expansion of the program to other appropriate sites.

In respect to an enquiry regarding "RCMP staffing requirements", the membership was informed that MOT makes the final decision but RCMP is consulted.

- (c) The Great Lakes Airlines' representative enquired as to the possibility of developing the ring concourse of Terminal 1 at Toronto International Airport into a sterile area. He indicated the airlines using this terminal had been pressing for the common checkpoint arrangement for some time because of the anticipated savings in security guard costs.

Mr. H.E.A. Devitt, the Airport General Manager, was asked to reply and stated the proposed sterile ring concept had been discussed at recent Airport Security Committee meetings and was being actively considered. Lack of space in the main lobby to handle peak period traffic, a construction project in the east-west access and the several openings to the ring which would require closing or control, were cited as the main reasons preventing immediate implementation of this arrangement. He emphasized that congestion would be a serious problem unless the greeters and well-wishers, who were willing to undergo security inspection, were also permitted access to the sterile ring. However, he was prepared to secure the north side of the ring, after the present construction project is completed, to measure the economical impact and effect on congestion if all air carriers serving Terminal 1 agree with the sterile area concept and staffing arrangements.

- 5 -

5. Associate Committee on Aviation Security

Mr. P. de Markham, National Research Council, who is the Secretary of this Committee, gave an interesting report on the research activities undertaken during the past year and some indication of the future areas of research.

6. Flight Operations

Mr. H.R. Finley, MOT, Chief Aviation Safety, stressed the following points during his address on this subject.

- (a) The aviation notice of August 10, 1973, requires an air carrier to include in its Security Manual information relating to the training program given flight crews and flight attendants for handling bomb threats and hijacking incidents while en route.
- (b) Air carriers may use FAA and airline developed programs as training material, as long as they have been approved by MOT.
- (c) Air carriers wishing to modify MOT approved training presentations to better suit their purposes should gain MOT approval if there is any substantial change in content.
- (d) The MOT developed slide/tape presentation entitled "Illicit Explosive Devices in Aircraft", which has been distributed to Canadian air carriers and CALPA for review and comment was not intended as instructional material to make bomb disposal experts of pilots. Rather, it was to make these persons more knowledgeable in order that they might more accurately evaluate the hazard if a desperate situation developed.

Mr. Finley reiterated the guidelines emphasized in the presentation. Leave the device along except (i) when the Captain decides the device should be moved from a high hazard area of the aircraft to a low hazard area. (ii) when the Captain decides he is not in position to land the aircraft before an explosion is likely to happen and action must be taken to neutralize the device as a last resort. The tools and information contained in the Bomb Disposal Kit recommended to be carried aboard aircraft, would enable a captain, who decides to attempt to neutralize the device, to carefully follow the advice of a bomb disposal expert on the ground.

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- 6 -

The CALPA representative also expressed concern that Expedair service introduced a new risk to the security program.

The co-Chairman advised that this matter had recently been discussed at some length with FAA officials who reported that over the five years that the service has been in use in the USA, there have been no difficulties from a security point of view. However, if an alert situation developed in Canada this service would have to be curtailed.

7. General Discussion

Mr. I. Gray, C.P. Air, reported that Mr. J. Skelton, P.W.A. would be replacing him as Chairman of the ATAC Security Sub-Committee.

The co-Chairman, Mr. S.T. Grant, summarized some of the achievements that had taken place during the past year and the areas which would require special emphasis in planning and preparing for the 1976 Olympics. Before adjournment, attendees were invited to pick up copies of the hand-out material. See Appendix 'C'.

ATTENDEES AT THE 6TH NATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY MEETING

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>NAME</u>
ATAC	H. PICKARD L. EDWARDS
AIR CANADA	J. BARCLAY BREDT
AIRTRANSIT	A.J. TONKIN
C.P. AIR	I. GRAY J. STIMSON J. SIMPSON
EASTERN PROVINCIAL AIRWAYS	K. LAWLOR
GREAT LAKES AIRLINES	D. CARRUTHERS
NORDAIR	A. VAN DERMESPEL
NORCANAIR	I. MACLEOD
PACIFIC WESTERN	D.R. JACOX J.P. SKELTON
QUEBECAIR	C. THIBAUT
TRANSAIR	F.C. MCKAY J. FORBES
WARDAIR	B. CORBETT
CALPA	CAPT. F. DEVEAUX
CALDA	S.R. CHAPMAN A. SANDZUIK
CANADIAN LABOUR CONGRESS	FRANK CHAFE
DND	MAJOR V. MCDOUGALL
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS	D. GAGNIER
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT	G. FITZGERALD
MANPOWER AND IMMIGRATION	A. BUTROID H.G. POLLARD
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL	P. MARKHAM
NATIONAL REVENUE	M. GALLUP
POST OFFICE	P. BOISVERT A. TRAYNOR

- 2 -

RCMP

C/SUPT. J.B. GIROUX
INSP. HUGO
SGT. B. CROSSLEY
S/SGT. E. COADY

SOLICITOR GENERAL

R. BOURNE

MOT -- EDMONTON

P.R. JACYK

MOT -- MONCTON

A. KEATING
A. MADDISON
W. FRASER

MOT -- MONTREAL

D. TAILLEFER

MOT -- OTTAWA

W.M. MCLEISH (CHAIRMAN)
S.T. GRANT (CO-CHAIRMAN)
J. COOK
R.H. WILSON
P. BOWES
W.P. STOKER
T. GENEST
R. STUNDEN
S. PLANTE
W. HOUGH
R. NORTH
G. SEMAN
H. FINLEY
C. ROSE
F. WALLACE
B. BARCLAY
P. CARTER
T. SAUNDERSON
G. SKINNER
M. FERGUSON

MOT -- TORONTO

R. HARRIS
G. CASSADY
H. DEVITT
G. COUNTRYMAN

MOT -- VANCOUVER

LLOYD THATE

MOT -- WINNIPEG

G.H. CASS

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STATUS REPORT

NATIONAL AIRPORT SECURITY PROGRAM

Presented to

Sixth Meeting

of

The National Civil Aviation Security Committee

at

Ottawa, Ontario on November 20, 1974

PREPARED BY: Policing & Security
November 1974

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November 1974

NATIONAL AIRPORT SECURITY PROGRAM

ELEMENTS:

1. ESTABLISH (a) National Civil Aviation Security Co-ordinator
(b) National Security Committee
(c) Airport Security Committees
2. AIRPORT PHYSICAL AND STRUCTURAL SECURITY DESIGN CRITERIA
3. IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF PERSONS
4. IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF VEHICLES
5. PURCHASE, INSTALLATION AND OPERATION OF SCREENING DEVICES
6. PROCEDURES FOR UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST CIVIL AVIATION
 - (a) Bomb Search and Disposal
 - (b) Hijacking
7. AIRPORT EMERGENCY PLANS
8. AIRPORT POLICING AND SECURITY STAFFING
9. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

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000061

November 1974

1. ESTABLISHMENT OF:(a) National Civil Aviation Security Co-ordinator

- to co-ordinate all facets of national airport security.

(b) National Security Committee

Membership: Government - MOT, Justice, Solicitor
General, External Affairs,
Manpower & Immigration, Post
Office, RCMP and DND.

Airlines - Air Canada, CPAir, Pacific
Western, Nordair, Quebecair,
Wardair, Transair and Eastern
Provincial.

Unions and
Associations - CALPA, CATCA, CALEA, CALFAA,
CALDA, CLC, IAMAW and ATAC.

MOT Employee
Unions - PIPS and PSAC.

(c) Airport Security Committees - A.O. 78

Membership: Airport authority, local law enforcement
authorities, rescue and fire fighting
services, airlines, air traffic services,
cargo operators, postal services, customs,
health & immigration, general aviation,
ground services, and other airport tenants.

Status:

(a) Mr. W.M. McLeish, Director General, Civil Aeronautics was
appointed National Civil Aviation Security Co-ordinator.

Mr. S.T. Grant, Executive Officer, Civil Aviation Security
was appointed as alternate Civil Aviation Security Co-
ordinator.

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Restricted

November 1974

- 2 -

A National Civil Aviation Security Co-ordinator's Operations Room has been established in MOT Headquarters. Designated officials of the Ministry, RCMP and Department of External Affairs report to the Operations Room when a civil aviation alert is declared. This provides multi-disciplined support and interdepartmental/agency coordination of activities related to the incident. The Operations Room is equipped with extensive communication capabilities designed to facilitate rapid dissemination of information and/or directions as required.

Emergency telephones have been installed in the Air Traffic Control Towers at 32 International and Domestic Airports to ensure an immediately available conference line capability for observer use between the airport and the Operations Room.

Emergency co-ordinating centres are being established at all International and Domestic Airports to provide a focal point for the co-ordination of local activity related to any emergency situation at the airport.

- (b) The National Security Committee has met with the National Civil Aviation Security Co-ordinator on five (5) occasions since its formation in 1970. Meeting number six (6) is to be held in November 1974.
- (c) Airport Security Committees are established and have been active at the nine (9) International Airports as well as a number of major Domestic Airports. Terms of Reference related to these Committees have been distributed. The objective is to extend the formation of these Committees to all airports under MOT jurisdiction.

Copies of Minutes of Airport Security Committee meetings are received by Ottawa, enabling prompt advice and assistance on outstanding problems.

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Restricted

000063

Restricted

November 1974

- 3 -

2. MODIFICATION AND DESIGN OF EXISTING AND FUTURE FACILITIES TO
MAXIMIZE PHYSICAL AND STRUCTURAL SECURITY FEATURES:

Policy: A.O. 50

The design authority shall incorporate security features in the design, alteration and construction of airports and airport buildings for the purpose of protecting facilities and zones against unlawful criminal acts and the prevention of unauthorized access by persons or vehicles to non-public areas.

- (a) Detailed physical security surveys - International Airports.
- (b) Summary Report and Recommendations.
- (c) Implementation.
- (d) Detailed physical security surveys - Major Domestic Airports.
- (e) Summary Report and Recommendations.
- (f) Implementation.
- (g) Security systems.

Status:

- (a) Field studies were undertaken at nine (9) International Airports to evaluate and identify additional physical security requirements.
- (b) Detailed reports were prepared for each airport which formed the basis for capital expenditure estimates presented and approved by Treasury Board for the erection of perimeter barriers at the International Airports.
- (c) With the exception of Gander, Halifax, Winnipeg and Vancouver Airports, perimeter security barriers (fencing) have been completed at International Airports. Gander, Halifax and Winnipeg have submitted operational plans to complete their fencing programs. Vancouver has minimal gaps in their security barrier yet to be completed. All International Airports are utilizing guardhouses to control vehicle access to the airside.

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Restricted

000064

Restricted

November 1974

- 4 -

- (d) Field studies were undertaken at twenty-three (23) Major Domestic Airports to evaluate and identify additional physical security requirements.
- (e) Detailed reports were prepared for each airport which formed the basis for capital expenditure estimates presented and approved by Treasury Board for the erection of perimeter barriers at Major Domestic Airports.
- (f) Anticipated completion date for installation of security barriers is mid 1975.
- (g) A key-card access control system has been evaluated and is cost-effective where manpower is reduced.

Master Security Specifications (M.S.S.) have been developed and are stored in DKF Master Specification IBM 360 computer.

A committee composed of MOT representatives has been formed at Ottawa to co-ordinate referred comments and resolve conflicts or uncertainties in the Standard and Master Specifications. Representatives named to date:

KSP - A.B. McIntosh
KFM - L.M.E. Hawkins
KFB - E.J. Gray

KMD - N.H. Burren
CAX - J. Cook
ATS - W.R. Lane
TAC - G. Seman

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Restricted

000065

Restricted

November 1974

- 5 -

3. IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF ALL PERSONS SEEKING
ACCESS TO AND PERMITTED ON THE AIRSIDE OF AIRPORTS
OR IN RESTRICTED AREAS:

Policy: A.O. 71

Personal identification measures are to be established by Airport Managers to control access by persons into restricted areas. The identification measures employed shall be according to need.

Status:

The above policy provides flexibility of methods to achieve the desired control at all MOT operated airports.

Identification measures could include identification cards, access lists or personal recognition.

Equipment for manufacturing colour coded identification cards is being used at all International Airports and will be extended to other airports as the need arises.

The Airport Traffic Regulations (amended Airport Vehicle Control Regulations) provide enforcement authority to control access to restricted areas of airports.

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Restricted

Restricted

November 1974

- 6 -

4. IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF VEHICLES SEEKING ACCESS
TO AND PERMITTED ON THE AIRSIDE OF AIRPORTS OR IN
RESTRICTED AREAS:

Policy: A.O. 45

All vehicles, for which authority is requested to operate on restricted areas of airports shall be equipped with standard identification markings prescribed by the Ministry before such authority can be given.

Objective:

Develop a means to readily identify authorized vehicles and isolate unauthorized vehicles on the airside.

Status:

The policy and accompanying standards are currently under review to determine the most acceptable approach to meeting the objective.

The Airport Traffic Regulations (amended Airport Vehicle Control Regulations) provide enforcement authority to control vehicles on restricted areas of airports.

It is intended that the Vehicle Identification program be implemented when a reasonable degree of completion of security barriers and controlled access points has been reached to permit the checking of vehicles entering the airside of airports.

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Restricted

000067

Restricted

November 1974

- 7 -

5. PURCHASE, INSTALLATION AND
OPERATION OF DEVICES TO SCREEN:

- (a) Passengers and Carry-on Baggage.
- (b) Checked Baggage.
- (c) Cargo.
- (d) Mail.

Policy: A.O. 48

Detection devices may be provided at all Canadian International Airports for use by the airlines to prevent or deter the carriage aboard aircraft of any sabotage device or weapon in carry-on baggage or on the passenger's person.

Status:

The above policy statement is being amended to relate the provision of equipment to air carriers' security programs.

Purchase and Installation -

Three hundred and seventy-five (375) hand-held metal detectors have been distributed by MOT to all airports where scheduled air carriers provide service. This distribution fulfilled the Ministry's obligation to provide a metal detection capability at all airports to enable air carriers to screen all boarding passengers.

Fifty-eight (58) walk-thru metal detectors have been purchased and installed at Airports. Regions have been asked to re-examine their requirements using the "Guide for Passenger and Carry-on Baggage Screening" as a working document. Additional information will provide the basis for further procurement of detection equipment.

Ten (10) low level X-ray devices have been installed at International Airports to examine carry-on baggage. Additional information from Regions will provide the basis for further procurement.

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Restricted

000068

Restricted

November 1974

- 8 -

Operation

An amendment to the Aeronautics Act was passed on July 27, 1973 to provide legislative authority for security measures to be taken at airports.

The necessary means of implementing the security measures provided by the Act are contained in the Civil Aviation Security Measures Regulations and the Civil Aviation Security Measures Order.

All Canadian air carriers listed in the schedule of the Regulations are participating in the passenger screening program. Private security agencies have been contracted by the air carriers to operate the metal detection equipment.

The Ministry has developed a training package to ensure maximum use is being made of the devices. Delivery of this package to Regions is complete. Arrangements have also been made for Telecommunications Branch staff to test and evaluate detection devices and to provide maintenance assistance.

Items B and D are included in the program of Research and Development.

Item C - Cargo Screening

A program to evaluate the usefulness of dogs in the detection of explosives has been completed. Explosives detection dogs and handlers are presently located at Montreal, Toronto, Gander, Winnipeg, Edmonton and Vancouver International Airports. These teams have proven useful in the search of baggage and cargo carried aboard bomb-threatened aircraft.

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Restricted

000069

Restricted

November 1974

- 9 -

6. DEVELOPING, IMPLEMENTING AND MAINTAINING NATIONALLY
ACCEPTED PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH UNLAWFUL ACTS
AGAINST CIVIL AVIATION INCLUDING:

- unscheduled landing of an unlawfully seized aircraft.
- implementing bomb search and disposal procedures.

Status:

A Planning Guide for the development of airport emergency procedures to deal with hijacking, bomb threats and bomb disposal has been distributed to all Regions and airports.

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Restricted

000070

Restricted

November 1974

- 10 -

7. DEVELOPING AND MAINTAINING "EMERGENCY PLANS"
BASED ON A NATIONALLY ACCEPTED FORMAT:

The plan must provide for all airport emergencies.

Examples:

- Emergency Crash on Airport
- Emergency Crash off Airport
- Emergency Stand-by
- Structural Fires
- Emergency Bomb Threat
- Hijacking
- Armed Attack
- Sabotage
- Radiation Hazard
- Disasters
- Others

Objective:

To develop a guide for use at all MOT Airports.

Status:

A guideline has been produced and distributed to all Regions and Airports.

. . . /11

Restricted

000071

November 1974

- 11 -

8. POLICING AND SECURITY STAFF:

MOT Headquarters, Region and Airport Staff.

RCMP Security Guard Service at International and Domestic Airports.

Status:

1. MOT staffing is almost completed. Twenty-eight of the thirty-two security officers authorized for Airports and Construction Branch have been appointed.
2. MOT staffing summarized:

HQ OTTAWA

9 positions - two vacant

<u>Region HQ</u>	<u>2 each</u>	<u>Airports</u>	
Atlantic	- staffed	Gander	1 - staffed
Quebec	- two vacant	Halifax	1 - staffed
Ontario	- staffed	Montreal	2 - staffed
Central	- staffed	Ottawa	1 - staffed
Western	- staffed	Toronto	2 - staffed
Pacific	- staffed	Winnipeg	1 - staffed
		Calgary	1 - staffed
		Edmonton	1 - staffed
		Vancouver	1 - staffed

3. The RCMP have established a Security Guard Service composed of constables specially recruited and trained for airports commanded and supervised by experienced officers and NCOs.
4. The Special Constables have the powers of a peace officer, wear the regular uniform of the RCMP and carry firearms. They receive an intensive nine (9) week training course oriented to airport security duties. The constables have not been tasked with passenger and baggage security screening, other than to provide the necessary police presence.
5. The RCMP Security Guard Service duties at airports include:

. . . /12

November 1974

- 12 -

Law enforcement
Traffic control
Security guarding & patrolling
Crowd control
Police presence at passenger
security screening points

6. The RCMP replace Canadian Corps of Commissionaire personnel who are now being phased out of security duties at airports staffed by the Security Guard Service.
7. RCMP establishment and strengths.

Location	Establishment <u>74/75</u>	Strength <u>31 Oct. 74</u>
HQ Ottawa	5	4
Gander	27	26
Halifax	29	24
Montreal	109	68
Ottawa	42	33
Toronto	132	135
Winnipeg	39	37
Calgary	45	44
Edmonton	39	37
Vancouver	57	59
St. Johns, Nfld.	8	5
Moncton	8	8
Saint John, N.B.	8	6
Sydney	7	7
Fredericton	7	7
Goose Bay	12	11
Quebec	18	18
Sept Iles	8	7
Mont Joli	7	6
Windsor	10	9
London	8	8
Sault Ste. Marie	7	6
North Bay	7	6
Regina	13	13
Saskatoon	10	9
Thunder Bay	10	9

November 1974

- 13 -

Whitehorse	7	7
Penticton	7	7
Victoria	10	9
Prince George	7	6
*Hamilton	10	0
*Sudbury	7	0
*Edmonton Industrial	14	0
Dog Handlers	6	6
Stolport Montreal	8	See Note
Stolport Ottawa	7	See Note
	—	—
TOTALS	755	637

NOTE: Stolport Montreal manned by MIA (8)
 Stolport Ottawa manned by "A" Division (6)

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Restricted

November 1974

- 14 -

9. ENSURING THAT AN ADEQUATE PROGRAM OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IS INITIATED AND MAINTAINED TO SUPPORT THE OBJECTIVES AND GOALS OF THE AIRPORT SECURITY PROGRAM:

Status:

An Associate Committee on Aviation Security has been established under the auspices of the National Research Council and is active in research efforts to develop, among other things, an infallible explosives detector.

A.TAC/KSP Team is actively considering the relative merits of various detection devices to ensure that we embody the latest technological advances in the MOT statements of requirements and techniques.

A program to evaluate the usefulness of dogs in the detection of explosives has been launched. Explosives detection dogs are presently located at Montreal, Vancouver, Edmonton, Winnipeg, Gander and Toronto International Airports.

A feasibility study is underway relating to the development of aircraft isolation areas and an emergency search shelter for processing flights known or suspected to be carrying bombs, bomb disposal equipment and techniques.

Frequent contact is maintained with the Federal Aviation Agency and Department of Transportation in the U.S.A. to exchange information on aviation security matters.

Restricted

000075

6TH MEETING

NATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY COMMITTEE

HAND-OUT MATERIAL

1. Civil Aviation Security Measures Regulations
2. Civil Aviation Security Measures Order
3. Airport Traffic Regulations
4. Status Report - National Airport Security Program
5. National Civil Aviation Security Alert Levels
6. Draft -- Amended Section 800 of the Air Regulations
7. Ministry of Transport Safety Specifications for Passenger Baggage X-Ray Equipment.
8. Aviation Notice - Recommended Procedures for the Carriage of Firearms Aboard Canadian Registered Aircraft
9. Aviation Notice - Recommended Procedures for Escorting Prisoners Aboard Air Carrier Aircraft

Restricted

STATUS REPORT

NATIONAL AIRPORT SECURITY PROGRAM

Presented to

Sixth Meeting

of

The National Civil Aviation Security Committee

at

Ottawa, Ontario on November 20, 1974

PREPARED BY: Policing & Security
November 1974

Restricted

Restricted

November 1974

NATIONAL AIRPORT SECURITY PROGRAM

ELEMENTS:

1. ESTABLISH (a) National Civil Aviation Security Co-ordinator
(b) National Security Committee
(c) Airport Security Committees
2. AIRPORT PHYSICAL AND STRUCTURAL SECURITY DESIGN CRITERIA
3. IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF PERSONS
4. IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF VEHICLES
5. PURCHASE, INSTALLATION AND OPERATION OF SCREENING DEVICES
6. PROCEDURES FOR UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST CIVIL AVIATION
 - (a) Bomb Search and Disposal
 - (b) Hijacking
7. AIRPORT EMERGENCY PLANS
8. AIRPORT POLICING AND SECURITY STAFFING
9. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Restricted

000078

Restricted

November 1974

I. ESTABLISHMENT OF:

(a) National Civil Aviation Security Co-ordinator

- to co-ordinate all facets of national airport security.

(b) National Security Committee

Membership: Government - MOT, Justice, Solicitor
General, External Affairs,
Manpower & Immigration, Post
Office, RCMP and DND.

Airlines - Air Canada, CPAir, Pacific
Western, Nordair, Quebecair,
Wardair, Transair and Eastern
Provincial.

Unions and
Associations - CALPA, CATCA, CALEA, CALFAA,
CALDA, CLC, IAMAW and ATAC.

MOT Employee
Unions - PIPS and PSAC.

(c) Airport Security Committees - A.O. 78

Membership: Airport authority, local law enforcement
authorities, rescue and fire fighting
services, airlines, air traffic services,
cargo operators, postal services, customs,
health & immigration, general aviation,
ground services, and other airport tenants.

Status:

(a) Mr. W.M. McLeish, Director General, Civil Aeronautics was
appointed National Civil Aviation Security Co-ordinator.

Mr. S.T. Grant, Executive Officer, Civil Aviation Security
was appointed as alternate Civil Aviation Security Co-
ordinator.

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Restricted

000079

Restricted

November 1974

- 2 -

A National Civil Aviation Security Co-ordinator's Operations Room has been established in MOT Headquarters. Designated officials of the Ministry, RCMP and Department of External Affairs report to the Operations Room when a civil aviation alert is declared. This provides multi-disciplined support and interdepartmental/agency coordination of activities related to the incident. The Operations Room is equipped with extensive communication capabilities designed to facilitate rapid dissemination of information and/or directions as required.

Emergency telephones have been installed in the Air Traffic Control Towers at 32 International and Domestic Airports to ensure an immediately available conference line capability for observer use between the airport and the Operations Room.

Emergency co-ordinating centres are being established at all International and Domestic Airports to provide a focal point for the co-ordination of local activity related to any emergency situation at the airport.

- (b) The National Security Committee has met with the National Civil Aviation Security Co-ordinator on five (5) occasions since its formation in 1970. Meeting number six (6) is to be held in November 1974.
- (c) Airport Security Committees are established and have been active at the nine (9) International Airports as well as a number of major Domestic Airports. Terms of Reference related to these Committees have been distributed. The objective is to extend the formation of these Committees to all airports under MOT jurisdiction.

Copies of Minutes of Airport Security Committee meetings are received by Ottawa, enabling prompt advice and assistance on outstanding problems.

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Restricted

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Restricted

November 1974

- 3 -

2. MODIFICATION AND DESIGN OF EXISTING AND FUTURE FACILITIES TO
MAXIMIZE PHYSICAL AND STRUCTURAL SECURITY FEATURES:

Policy: A.O. 50

The design authority shall incorporate security features in the design, alteration and construction of airports and airport buildings for the purpose of protecting facilities and zones against unlawful criminal acts and the prevention of unauthorized access by persons or vehicles to non-public areas.

- (a) Detailed physical security surveys - International Airports.
- (b) Summary Report and Recommendations.
- (c) Implementation.
- (d) Detailed physical security surveys - Major Domestic Airports.
- (e) Summary Report and Recommendations.
- (f) Implementation.
- (g) Security systems.

Status:

- (a) Field studies were undertaken at nine (9) International Airports to evaluate and identify additional physical security requirements.
- (b) Detailed reports were prepared for each airport which formed the basis for capital expenditure estimates presented and approved by Treasury Board for the erection of perimeter barriers at the International Airports.
- (c) With the exception of Gander, Halifax, Winnipeg and Vancouver Airports, perimeter security barriers (fencing) have been completed at International Airports. Gander, Halifax and Winnipeg have submitted operational plans to complete their fencing programs. Vancouver has minimal gaps in their security barrier yet to be completed. All International Airports are utilizing guardhouses to control vehicle access to the airside.

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Restricted

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Restricted

November 1974

- 4 -

- (d) Field studies were undertaken at twenty-three (23) Major Domestic Airports to evaluate and identify additional physical security requirements.
- (e) Detailed reports were prepared for each airport which formed the basis for capital expenditure estimates presented and approved by Treasury Board for the erection of perimeter barriers at Major Domestic Airports.
- (f) Anticipated completion date for installation of security barriers is mid 1975.
- (g) A key-card access control system has been evaluated and is cost-effective where manpower is reduced.

Master Security Specifications (M.S.S.) have been developed and are stored in DKF Master Specification IBM 360 computer.

A committee composed of MOT representatives has been formed at Ottawa to co-ordinate referred comments and resolve conflicts or uncertainties in the Standard and Master Specifications. Representatives named to date:

KSP - A.B. McIntosh	KMD - N.H. Burren
KFM - L.M.E. Hawkins	CAX - J. Cook
KFB - E.J. Gray	ATS - W.R. Lane
	TAC - G. Seman

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Restricted

000082

Restricted

November 1974

- 5 -

3. IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF ALL PERSONS SEEKING
ACCESS TO AND PERMITTED ON THE AIRSIDE OF AIRPORTS
OR IN RESTRICTED AREAS:

Policy: A.O. 71

Personal identification measures are to be established by Airport Managers to control access by persons into restricted areas. The identification measures employed shall be according to need.

Status:

The above policy provides flexibility of methods to achieve the desired control at all MOT operated airports.

Identification measures could include identification cards, access lists or personal recognition.

Equipment for manufacturing colour coded identification cards is being used at all International Airports and will be extended to other airports as the need arises.

The Airport Traffic Regulations (amended Airport Vehicle Control Regulations) provide enforcement authority to control access to restricted areas of airports.

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Restricted

Restricted

November 1974

- 6 -

4. IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF VEHICLES SEEKING ACCESS TO AND PERMITTED ON THE AIRSIDE OF AIRPORTS OR IN RESTRICTED AREAS:

Policy: A.O. 45

All vehicles, for which authority is requested to operate on restricted areas of airports shall be equipped with standard identification markings prescribed by the Ministry before such authority can be given.

Objective:

Develop a means to readily identify authorized vehicles and isolate unauthorized vehicles on the airside.

Status:

The policy and accompanying standards are currently under review to determine the most acceptable approach to meeting the objective.

The Airport Traffic Regulations (amended Airport Vehicle Control Regulations) provide enforcement authority to control vehicles on restricted areas of airports.

It is intended that the Vehicle Identification program be implemented when a reasonable degree of completion of security barriers and controlled access points has been reached to permit the checking of vehicles entering the airside of airports.

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Restricted

Restricted

November 1974

- 7 -

5. PURCHASE, INSTALLATION AND
OPERATION OF DEVICES TO SCREEN:

- (a) Passengers and Carry-on Baggage.
- (b) Checked Baggage.
- (c) Cargo.
- (d) Mail.

Policy: A.O. 48

Detection devices may be provided at all Canadian International Airports for use by the airlines to prevent or deter the carriage aboard aircraft of any sabotage device or weapon in carry-on baggage or on the passenger's person.

Status:

The above policy statement is being amended to relate the provision of equipment to air carriers' security programs.

Purchase and Installation -

Three hundred and seventy-five (375) hand-held metal detectors have been distributed by MOT to all airports where scheduled air carriers provide service. This distribution fulfilled the Ministry's obligation to provide a metal detection capability at all airports to enable air carriers to screen all boarding passengers.

Fifty-eight (58) walk-thru metal detectors have been purchased and installed at Airports. Regions have been asked to re-examine their requirements using the "Guide for Passenger and Carry-on Baggage Screening" as a working document. Additional information will provide the basis for further procurement of detection equipment.

Ten (10) low level X-ray devices have been installed at International Airports to examine carry-on baggage. Additional information from Regions will provide the basis for further procurement.

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Restricted

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Restricted

November 1974

- 8 -

Operation

An amendment to the Aeronautics Act was passed on July 27, 1973 to provide legislative authority for security measures to be taken at airports.

The necessary means of implementing the security measures provided by the Act are contained in the Civil Aviation Security Measures Regulations and the Civil Aviation Security Measures Order.

All Canadian air carriers listed in the schedule of the Regulations are participating in the passenger screening program. Private security agencies have been contracted by the air carriers to operate the metal detection equipment.

The Ministry has developed a training package to ensure maximum use is being made of the devices. Delivery of this package to Regions is complete. Arrangements have also been made for Telecommunications Branch staff to test and evaluate detection devices and to provide maintenance assistance.

Items B and D are included in the program of Research and Development.

Item C - Cargo Screening

A program to evaluate the usefulness of dogs in the detection of explosives has been completed. Explosives detection dogs and handlers are presently located at Montreal, Toronto, Gander, Winnipeg, Edmonton and Vancouver International Airports. These teams have proven useful in the search of baggage and cargo carried aboard bomb-threatened aircraft.

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Restricted

000086

Restricted

November 1974

- 9 -

6. DEVELOPING, IMPLEMENTING AND MAINTAINING NATIONALLY
ACCEPTED PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH UNLAWFUL ACTS
AGAINST CIVIL AVIATION INCLUDING:

- unscheduled landing of an unlawfully seized aircraft.
- implementing bomb search and disposal procedures.

Status:

A Planning Guide for the development of airport emergency procedures to deal with hijacking, bomb threats and bomb disposal has been distributed to all Regions and airports.

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Restricted

000087

Restricted

November 1974

- 10 -

7. DEVELOPING AND MAINTAINING "EMERGENCY PLANS"
BASED ON A NATIONALLY ACCEPTED FORMAT:

The plan must provide for all airport emergencies.

Examples:

- Emergency Crash on Airport
- Emergency Crash off Airport
- Emergency Stand-by
- Structural Fires
- Emergency Bomb Threat
- Hijacking
- Armed Attack
- Sabotage
- Radiation Hazard
- Disasters
- Others

Objective:

To develop a guide for use at all MOT Airports.

Status:

A guideline has been produced and distributed to
all Regions and Airports.

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Restricted

000088

Restricted

November 1974

- 11 -

8. POLICING AND SECURITY STAFF:

MOT Headquarters, Region and Airport Staff.

RCMP Security Guard Service at International and Domestic Airports.

Status:

1. MOT staffing is almost completed. Twenty-eight of the thirty-two security officers authorized for Airports and Construction Branch have been appointed.
2. MOT staffing summarized:

HQ OTTAWA

9 positions - two vacant

<u>Region HQ</u>	<u>2 each</u>	<u>Airports</u>	
Atlantic	- staffed	Gander	1 - staffed
Quebec	- two vacant	Halifax	1 - staffed
Ontario	- staffed	Montreal	2 - staffed
Central	- staffed	Ottawa	1 - staffed
Western	- staffed	Toronto	2 - staffed
Pacific	- staffed	Winnipeg	1 - staffed
		Calgary	1 - staffed
		Edmonton	1 - staffed
		Vancouver	1 - staffed

3. The RCMP have established a Security Guard Service composed of constables specially recruited and trained for airports commanded and supervised by experienced officers and NCOs.
4. The Special Constables have the powers of a peace officer, wear the regular uniform of the RCMP and carry firearms. They receive an intensive nine (9) week training course oriented to airport security duties. The constables have not been tasked with passenger and baggage security screening, other than to provide the necessary police presence.
5. The RCMP Security Guard Service duties at airports include:

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Restricted

000089

Restricted

November 1974

- 12 -

Law enforcement
 Traffic control
 Security guarding & patrolling
 Crowd control
 Police presence at passenger
 security screening points

6. The RCMP replace Canadian Corps of Commissionaire personnel who are now being phased out of security duties at airports staffed by the Security Guard Service.
7. RCMP establishment and strengths.

Location	Establishment <u>74/75</u>	Strength <u>31 Oct. 74</u>
HQ Ottawa	5	4
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Calgary	45	44
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Moncton	8	8
Saint John, N.B.	8	6
Sydney	7	7
Fredericton	7	7
Goose Bay	12	11
Quebec	18	18
Sept Iles	8	7
Mont Joli	7	6
Windsor	10	9
London	8	8
Sault Ste. Marie	7	6
North Bay	7	6
Regina	13	13
Saskatoon	10	9
Thunder Bay	10	9

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Restricted

November 1974

- 13 -

Whitehorse	7	7
Penticton	7	7
Victoria	10	9
Prince George	7	6
*Hamilton	10	0
*Sudbury	7	0
*Edmonton Industrial	14	0
Dog Handlers	6	6
Stolport Montreal	8	See Note
Stolport Ottawa	7	See Note
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TOTALS	755	637

NOTE: Stolport Montreal manned by MIA (8)
Stolport Ottawa manned by "A" Division (6)

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Restricted

November 1974

- 14 -

9. ENSURING THAT AN ADEQUATE PROGRAM OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IS INITIATED AND MAINTAINED TO SUPPORT THE OBJECTIVES AND GOALS OF THE AIRPORT SECURITY PROGRAM:

Status:

An Associate Committee on Aviation Security has been established under the auspices of the National Research Council and is active in research efforts to develop, among other things, an infallible explosives detector.

A TAC/KSP Team is actively considering the relative merits of various detection devices to ensure that we embody the latest technological advances in the MOT statements of requirements and techniques.

A program to evaluate the usefulness of dogs in the detection of explosives has been launched. Explosives detection dogs are presently located at Montreal, Vancouver, Edmonton, Winnipeg, Gander and Toronto International Airports.

A feasibility study is underway relating to the development of aircraft isolation areas and an emergency search shelter for processing flights known or suspected to be carrying bombs, bomb disposal equipment and techniques.

Frequent contact is maintained with the Federal Aviation Agency and Department of Transportation in the U.S.A. to exchange information on aviation security matters.

Restricted

000092

Restricted

November 1974

NATIONAL AIRPORT SECURITY PROGRAM

ELEMENTS:

1. ESTABLISH (a) National Civil Aviation Security Co-ordinator
(b) National Security Committee
(c) Airport Security Committees
2. AIRPORT PHYSICAL AND STRUCTURAL SECURITY DESIGN CRITERIA
3. IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF PERSONS
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5. PURCHASE, INSTALLATION AND OPERATION OF SCREENING DEVICES
6. PROCEDURES FOR UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST CIVIL AVIATION
 - (a) Bomb Search and Disposal
 - (b) Hijacking
7. AIRPORT EMERGENCY PLANS
8. AIRPORT POLICING AND SECURITY STAFFING
9. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Restricted

000093

Restricted

November 1974

1. ESTABLISHMENT OF:

(a) National Civil Aviation Security Co-ordinator

- to co-ordinate all facets of national airport security.

(b) National Security Committee

Membership: Government - MOT, Justice, Solicitor
General, External Affairs,
Manpower & Immigration, Post
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Airlines - Air Canada, CPAir, Pacific
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Unions and
Associations - CALPA, CATCA, CALEA, CALFAA,
CALDA, CLC, IAMAW and ATAC.

MOT Employee
Unions - PIPS and PSAC.

(c) Airport Security Committees - A.O. 78

Membership: Airport authority, local law enforcement
authorities, rescue and fire fighting
services, airlines, air traffic services,
cargo operators, postal services, customs,
health & immigration, general aviation,
ground services, and other airport tenants.

Status:

(a) Mr. W.M. McLeish, Director General, Civil Aeronautics was
appointed National Civil Aviation Security Co-ordinator.

Mr. S.T. Grant, Executive Officer, Civil Aviation Security
was appointed as alternate Civil Aviation Security Co-
ordinator.

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Restricted

000094

Restricted

November 1974

- 2 -

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- (c) Airport Security Committees are established and have been active at the nine (9) International Airports as well as a number of major Domestic Airports. Terms of Reference related to these Committees have been distributed. The objective is to extend the formation of these Committees to all airports under MOT jurisdiction.

Copies of Minutes of Airport Security Committee meetings are received by Ottawa, enabling prompt advice and assistance on outstanding problems.

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Restricted

000095

Restricted

November 1974

- 3 -

2. MODIFICATION AND DESIGN OF EXISTING AND FUTURE FACILITIES TO
MAXIMIZE PHYSICAL AND STRUCTURAL SECURITY FEATURES:

Policy: A.O. 50

The design authority shall incorporate security features in the design, alteration and construction of airports and airport buildings for the purpose of protecting facilities and zones against unlawful criminal acts and the prevention of unauthorized access by persons or vehicles to non-public areas.

- (a) Detailed physical security surveys - International Airports.
- (b) Summary Report and Recommendations.
- (c) Implementation.
- (d) Detailed physical security surveys - Major Domestic Airports.
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- (f) Implementation.
- (g) Security systems.

Status:

- (a) Field studies were undertaken at nine (9) International Airports to evaluate and identify additional physical security requirements.
- (b) Detailed reports were prepared for each airport which formed the basis for capital expenditure estimates presented and approved by Treasury Board for the erection of perimeter barriers at the International Airports.
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Restricted

000096

Restricted

November 1974

- 4 -

- (d) Field studies were undertaken at twenty-three (23) Major Domestic Airports to evaluate and identify additional physical security requirements.
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- (f) Anticipated completion date for installation of security barriers is mid 1975.
- (g) A key-card access control system has been evaluated and is cost-effective where manpower is reduced.

Master Security Specifications (M.S.S.) have been developed and are stored in DKF Master Specification IBM 360 computer.

A committee composed of MOT representatives has been formed at Ottawa to co-ordinate referred comments and resolve conflicts or uncertainties in the Standard and Master Specifications. Representatives named to date:

KSP - A.B. McIntosh
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KFB - E.J. Gray

KMD - N.H. Burren
CAX - J. Cook
ATS - W.R. Lane
TAC - G. Seman

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Restricted

000097

Restricted

November 1974

- 5 -

3. IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF ALL PERSONS SEEKING
ACCESS TO AND PERMITTED ON THE AIRSIDE OF AIRPORTS
OR IN RESTRICTED AREAS:

Policy: A.O. 71

Personal identification measures are to be established by Airport Managers to control access by persons into restricted areas. The identification measures employed shall be according to need.

Status:

The above policy provides flexibility of methods to achieve the desired control at all MOT operated airports.

Identification measures could include identification cards, access lists or personal recognition.

Equipment for manufacturing colour coded identification cards is being used at all International Airports and will be extended to other airports as the need arises.

The Airport Traffic Regulations (amended Airport Vehicle Control Regulations) provide enforcement authority to control access to restricted areas of airports.

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Restricted

Restricted

November 1974

- 6 -

4. IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF VEHICLES SEEKING ACCESS
TO AND PERMITTED ON THE AIRSIDE OF AIRPORTS OR IN
RESTRICTED AREAS:

Policy: A.O. 45

All vehicles, for which authority is requested to operate on restricted areas of airports shall be equipped with standard identification markings prescribed by the Ministry before such authority can be given.

Objective:

Develop a means to readily identify authorized vehicles and isolate unauthorized vehicles on the airside.

Status:

The policy and accompanying standards are currently under review to determine the most acceptable approach to meeting the objective.

The Airport Traffic Regulations (amended Airport Vehicle Control Regulations) provide enforcement authority to control vehicles on restricted areas of airports.

It is intended that the Vehicle Identification program be implemented when a reasonable degree of completion of security barriers and controlled access points has been reached to permit the checking of vehicles entering the airside of airports.

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Restricted

Restricted

November 1974

- 7 -

5. PURCHASE, INSTALLATION AND
OPERATION OF DEVICES TO SCREEN:

- (a) Passengers and Carry-on Baggage.
- (b) Checked Baggage.
- (c) Cargo.
- (d) Mail.

Policy: A.O. 48

Detection devices may be provided at all Canadian International Airports for use by the airlines to prevent or deter the carriage aboard aircraft of any sabotage device or weapon in carry-on baggage or on the passenger's person.

Status:

The above policy statement is being amended to relate the provision of equipment to air carriers' security programs.

Purchase and Installation -

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Ten (10) low level X-ray devices have been installed at International Airports to examine carry-on baggage. Additional information from Regions will provide the basis for further procurement.

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Restricted

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Restricted

November 1974

- 8 -

Operation

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Items B and D are included in the program of Research and Development.

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Restricted

000101

Restricted

November 1974

- 9 -

6. DEVELOPING, IMPLEMENTING AND MAINTAINING NATIONALLY
ACCEPTED PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH UNLAWFUL ACTS
AGAINST CIVIL AVIATION INCLUDING:

- unscheduled landing of an unlawfully seized aircraft.
- implementing bomb search and disposal procedures.

Status:

A Planning Guide for the development of airport emergency procedures to deal with hijacking, bomb threats and bomb disposal has been distributed to all Regions and airports.

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Restricted

000102

Restricted

November 1974

- 10 -

7. DEVELOPING AND MAINTAINING "EMERGENCY PLANS"
BASED ON A NATIONALLY ACCEPTED FORMAT:

The plan must provide for all airport emergencies.

Examples:

- Emergency Crash on Airport
- Emergency Crash off Airport
- Emergency Stand-by
- Structural Fires
- Emergency Bomb Threat
- Hijacking
- Armed Attack
- Sabotage
- Radiation Hazard
- Disasters
- Others

Objective:

To develop a guide for use at all MOT Airports.

Status:

A guideline has been produced and distributed to all Regions and Airports.

. . . /11

Restricted

000103

Restricted

November 1974

- 11 -

8. POLICING AND SECURITY STAFF:

MOT Headquarters, Region and Airport Staff.

RCMP Security Guard Service at International and Domestic Airports.

Status:

1. MOT staffing is almost completed. Twenty-eight of the thirty-two security officers authorized for Airports and Construction Branch have been appointed.
2. MOT staffing summarized:

<u>HQ OTTAWA</u>			
9 positions - two vacant			
<u>Region HQ</u>	<u>2 each</u>	<u>Airports</u>	
Atlantic	- staffed	Gander	1 - staffed
Quebec	- two vacant	Halifax	1 - staffed
Ontario	- staffed	Montreal	2 - staffed
Central	- staffed	Ottawa	1 - staffed
Western	- staffed	Toronto	2 - staffed
Pacific	- staffed	Winnipeg	1 - staffed
		Calgary	1 - staffed
		Edmonton	1 - staffed
		Vancouver	1 - staffed

3. The RCMP have established a Security Guard Service composed of constables specially recruited and trained for airports commanded and supervised by experienced officers and NCOs.
4. The Special Constables have the powers of a peace officer, wear the regular uniform of the RCMP and carry firearms. They receive an intensive nine (9) week training course oriented to airport security duties. The constables have not been tasked with passenger and baggage security screening, other than to provide the necessary police presence.
5. The RCMP Security Guard Service duties at airports include:

. . . /12

Restricted

000104

Restricted

November 1974

- 12 -

Law enforcement
Traffic control
Security guarding & patrolling
Crowd control
Police presence at passenger
security screening points

- 6. The RCMP replace Canadian Corps of Commissionaire personnel who are now being phased out of security duties at airports staffed by the Security Guard Service.
- 7. RCMP establishment and strengths.

Location	Establishment <u>74/75</u>	Strength <u>31 Oct. 74</u>
HQ Ottawa	5	4
Gander	27	26
Halifax	29	24
Montreal	109	68
Ottawa	42	33
Toronto	132	135
Winnipeg	39	37
Calgary	45	44
Edmonton	39	37
Vancouver	57	59
St. Johns, Nfld.	8	5
Moncton	8	8
Saint John, N.B.	8	6
Sydney	7	7
Fredericton	7	7
Goose Bay	12	11
Quebec	18	18
Sept Iles	8	7
Mont Joli	7	6
Windsor	10	9
London	8	8
Sault Ste. Marie	7	6
North Bay	7	6
Regina	13	13
Saskatoon	10	9
Thunder Bay	10	9

. . . /13

Restricted

November 1974

- 13 -

Whitehorse	7	7
Penticton	7	7
Victoria	10	9
Prince George	7	6
*Hamilton	10	0
*Sudbury	7	0
*Edmonton Industrial	14	0
Dog Handlers	6	6
Stolport Montreal	8	See Note
Stolport Ottawa	7	See Note
	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTALS	755	637

NOTE: Stolport Montreal manned by MIA (8)
Stolport Ottawa manned by "A" Division (6)

. . . /14

Restricted

November 1974

- 14 -

9. ENSURING THAT AN ADEQUATE PROGRAM OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IS INITIATED AND MAINTAINED TO SUPPORT THE OBJECTIVES AND GOALS OF THE AIRPORT SECURITY PROGRAM:

Status:

An Associate Committee on Aviation Security has been established under the auspices of the National Research Council and is active in research efforts to develop, among other things, an infallible explosives detector.

A TAC/KSP Team is actively considering the relative merits of various detection devices to ensure that we embody the latest technological advances in the MOT statements of requirements and techniques.

A program to evaluate the usefulness of dogs in the detection of explosives has been launched. Explosives detection dogs are presently located at Montreal, Vancouver, Edmonton, Winnipeg, Gander and Toronto International Airports.

A feasibility study is underway relating to the development of aircraft isolation areas and an emergency search shelter for processing flights known or suspected to be carrying bombs, bomb disposal equipment and techniques.

Frequent contact is maintained with the Federal Aviation Agency and Department of Transportation in the U.S.A. to exchange information on aviation security matters.

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000107

BOMB/HIJACKING THREATS AGAINST CANADIAN REGISTERED AIRCRAFT *

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>
AIR CANADA	28	28	28	121	51	48
C.P. AIR			20	23	16	18
EASTERN PROVINCIAL AIRWAYS			5	1	2	0
NORDAIR				0	0	0
QUEBECAIR				2	2	0
TRANSAIR				0	0	13
PACIFIC WESTERN AIRLINES				13	23	34
WARDAIR				0	0	0
			<u>53</u>	<u>160</u>	<u>93</u>	<u>112</u>

* Statistics do not include joking threats threats made during passenger/baggage screening.

Civil Aviation Security
 As of November 18, 1974

Issued: MOT CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY
 As of: Nov. 7, 1974

HIJACKING STATISTICS - CANADIAN INVOLVEMENT

CANADIAN REGISTERED AIRCRAFT	1930-67	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	TOTAL
Successful					1(1)				1(1)
Incomplete**		1(1)			2	2***			5(1)
Unsuccessful							1*		1*
Sub-Total	0	1(1)	0	0	3(1)	2	1*	0	7(2)
<hr/>									
U.S. REGISTERED AIRCRAFT									
Successful									
Incomplete**					2(2)	2(1)			4(3)
Unsuccessful									
TOTAL	0	1(1)	0	0	5(3)	4(1)***	1*	0	11(5)

* Hijacking attempted prior to aircraft becoming "In Flight".

** An incomplete hijacking is one in which the hijacker is apprehended/killed during hijacking or as a result of "hot pursuit".

*** Figure includes attempted hijack of Air Canada Aircraft terminated in Frankfurt West Germany.

() Represent attempted hijackings to Cuba.

Issued: MQT Civil Aviation Security
 As of: November 7, 1974

WORLDWIDE REPORTED HIJACKING ATTEMPTS

	1930-67	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	TOTAL
CANADA Sub-Total		1 (1)			3 (1)	2***	1*	0	7 (2)
Successful					1 (1)				1 (1)
Incomplete**		1 (1)			2	2***			5 (1)
Unsuccessful							1*		1*
USA-Sub-Total	12 (9)	22 (19)	40 (37)	27(15)	27(14)	31 (7)	2 (0)	6 (0)	167(101)
Successful	7 (6)	18 (18)	33 (31)	18(14)	12(10)	10 (6)	1 (0)	2 (0)	101(85)
Incomplete**	1 (1)	1 (1)	1 (1)	5(1)	9(1)	14 (0)	1 (0)	2 (0)	34(5)
Unsuccessful	4 (2)	3 (0)	6 (5)	4(0)	6(3)	7 (1)	0	2 (0)	32(11)
WORLD									
Successful	45 (11)	29 (26)	70 (58)	55 (31)	22(13)	23 (9)	3 (1)	6 (1)	275(151)
Incomplete** USA & CANADA	1 (1)	1 (1)	1 (1)	5 (1)	9(1)	14 (0)	1 (0)	2 (0)	34(5)
Unsuccessful	19 (4)	5 (1)	16 (11)	24 (4)	27(9)	25 (2)	3 (0)	12 (1)	137(34)
TOTAL	65 (16)	35 (28)	87 (70)	84 (36)	58(23)	62 (11)	7 (1)	20 (2)	446(190)

* Hijacking attempted prior to aircraft becoming "In flight".

** An incomplete hijacking is one in which the hijacker is apprehended/killed during hijacking or as a result of "hot pursuit".

*** Figure includes attempted hijack of Air Canada Aircraft terminated in Frankfurt West Germany.

() Represents attempted hijackings to Cuba.

EXPLOSIONS ABOARD AIRCRAFT

NUMBER INCIDENTS AND PERSONS KILLED BY YEAR

<u>Year</u>	<u>No. of Incidents</u>	<u>No. Killed</u>
1949	2	36
1950	1	0
1952	1	0
1955	2	60
1956	1	0
1957	2	1
1959	1	1
1960	2	47
1962	1	45
1964	1	15
1965	1	52
1966	1	28
1967	4	66
1968	1	0
1969	4	33
1970	9	84
1971	3	25
1972	7	114
1973	5	92
1974	3	73
TOTAL	52	772

Civil Aviation Security
As of November 18, 1974

Civil Aviation Security

As of: Oct.1, 1974

Kinds of Weapons Involved in Hijacking Attempts.

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number of Incidents</u>	
	<u>Canada</u>	<u>USA</u>
Firearms (Alleged and Real)	6	122
B.B. Gun		1
Knives (Alleged and Real)		24
Bombs (Alleged and Real)	3	50
Sharpened Tooth Brush	1	
Tear Gas Pen		1
Broken Bottle		1
Fire Threat		1
Hatchet		1
Acid		1
Ice Pick		1
Razor or razor Blade		4
Nail		1

* Several hijackers used combinations of two or more weapons.

DRAFT

SCHEDULE

1. Section 800 of the Air Regulations is amended by adding thereto the following subsections:

"(5) Where the owner or operator of an aircraft receives or is informed of a threat considered to be against the safety of a specific aircraft or flight he shall immediately take all such measures as are reasonably necessary to ensure the safety of the aircraft and the protection of the passengers and crew members, including

(a) in every case, advising the appropriate police and aerodrome authorities and the pilot-in-command of the aircraft of the circumstances of the threat; and

(b) in the case where the aircraft is on the ground, ensuring that

(i) the aircraft is moved to a place of safety on the aerodrome, as directed by the aerodrome authorities, and

(ii) the aircraft, the passengers and their personal belongings and the baggage, goods and cargo on board the aircraft are examined.

(6) Where an aircraft is being operated on the ground, the pilot-in-command shall comply with any direction given pursuant to subparagraph (5)(b)(i), unless such compliance would be likely to endanger the safety of the passengers, crew members or aircraft."

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NATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY ALERT LEVELS

NORMAL

DEFINITION

- A normal condition exists when there is no known specific threat to commit unlawful acts against civil aviation in Canada, or Canadian air carriers operating abroad.

ACTIVITIES

Ministry of Transport

- to control access to the airside and other restricted areas of the airport.
- to maintain routine security patrols and surveillance.
- to maintain a 24 hour watch keeping service at Transport Canada, Ottawa.
- to provide communications for security.
- to develop and maintain airport contingency plans.

Air Carrier

- to maintain routine security inspection of passengers and carry-on baggage.
- to control access to company areas and facilities on the airport.

STAND-BY ALERT

DEFINITION

- A stand-by alert condition is declared when intelligence is assessed to indicate that a state of readiness is required.

ACTIVITIES

Ministry of Transport

- to intensify the control of access to the airside and other restricted areas of the airport.
- to increase the frequency of security patrols and surveillance

.../2

- 2 -

- to increase the police support at passenger screening points.
- to place on stand-by the NCASC Operations Room at Transport Canada, Ottawa, as well as Regional and Airport Emergency Co-ordination Centres.
- to review airport contingency plans and to confirm lines of communication to other agencies involved.

Air Carrier

- to intensify security measures at passenger inspection points.
- to increase the control to company areas and facilities on the airport.
- to review contingency plans with the Airport Manager.

MAXIMUM ALERT

DEFINITION

- A maximum alert condition exists when the threat is assessed as being imminent and maximum security measures are necessary.

ACTIVITIES

Ministry of Transport

- to activate contingency plans.
- to maintain stringent control of access to airside and other restricted areas of the airport.
- to activate the NCASC Operations Room at Transport Canada, Ottawa, as well as Regional and Airport Emergency Co-ordination Centres.

Air Carrier

- to maintain stringent security control and screening of passengers, baggage and goods going on to the airside of the airport.
- protect aircraft against unlawful access.
- passenger count aboard aircraft prior to departure.

POLICY STATEMENT

SECURITY SCREENING OF AIR CARRIER PERSONNEL ENTERING THE AIRSIDE OF AN AIRPORT

- (1) Air carrier air crew personnel may be permitted access to designated airport restricted areas through any security checkpoints without undergoing inspection of their person and personal belongings when the following conditions exist.
 - (a) The employee is wearing a proper air carrier uniform.
 - (b) The employee is displaying an approved identification card.
 - (c) The employee requires access in the performance of his or her duties.
- (2) All other air carrier personnel may be permitted access to designated airport restricted areas through any security checkpoints without undergoing inspection of their person and personal belongings when the following conditions exist.
 - (a) The employee is displaying a valid identification card or visitor's pass, issued by the airport manager, which authorizes access to the designated airport restricted area or is under an approved escort.
 - (b) The employee requires access in the performance of his or her duties.
- (3) Air carrier personnel who do not meet all the conditions indicated in paragraphs 1 and 2, shall undergo the same inspection of his person, personal belongings and baggage as any other passenger.
- (4) Air carriers shall instruct their employees to ensure personal baggage and goods that are not inspected at a checkpoint are examined by the owner for concealed weapons and explosives prior to being carried on board aircraft.



Transport
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RESTRICTED

12th February 1974

AVIATION NOTICE

RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR THE CARRIAGE OF FIREARMS ABOARD CANADIAN REGISTERED AIRCRAFT

1. Each law enforcement authority should establish procedures to ensure the following:
 - (a) The carriage of firearms aboard aircraft by a peace officer under its jurisdiction is limited to those situations which require that officer to be armed in flight to ensure the safe completion of his mission.
 - (b) Each peace officer it authorizes to carry a firearm aboard an aircraft is fully aware of:
 - (i) the procedures adopted by the air carrier, whose services he will be using, governing the carriage of firearms aboard aircraft,
 - (ii) the potential danger to the safe operation of the aircraft should officers take any action during a hijacking without direction of the pilot-in-command.
2. A peace officer whose mission requires him to carry a weapon aboard a particular flight shall carry out the following:
 - (a) Notify a responsible employee, preferably a supervisor, of the air carrier at the airport, at least one hour or in an emergency as soon as practicable prior to scheduled departure of his flight. The notification may be made in person or by telephone.
 - (b) Identify himself to a responsible air carrier employee, preferably a supervisor, at the airport by presenting credentials that include his clear, full-face picture, his signature and the signature of a responsible official of the law enforcement authority and complete the required form. A badge, shield or similar device may not be used as a sole means of identification.
 - (c) A peace officer not requiring his firearm on a particular flight shall carry it unloaded.
3. The air carrier shall establish procedures to ensure the following:
 - (a) Special handling of an armed peace officer as required.
 - (b) The identity of the armed peace officer is known to the pilot-in-command and other peace officers aboard unless confidentiality is requested by an undercover officer in which event the latter will be advised of the presence of the other armed peace officers without his presence or identity being disclosed to anyone.

W. M. McLeish,
Director General, Civil Aeronautics



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RESTRAINT

12 février 1974

AVIS AUX AVIATEURS

REGLES RECOMMANDEES CONCERNANT LE PORT D'ARMES A FEU A BORD D'AERONEFS IMMATRICULES AU CANADA

1. Chaque service de police devrait établir des règles en vue de s'assurer que:
 - (a) le port d'armes à feu à bord d'un aéronef, par un agent de la paix travaillant sous son autorité, soit limité aux situations nécessitant que l'agent soit armé pendant le vol afin de pouvoir s'acquitter de sa mission en toute sécurité.
 - (b) tout agent de la paix qu'il autorise à porter une arme à feu à bord d'un aéronef soit parfaitement au courant:
 - (i) des règlements adoptés par le transporteur aérien dont il utilisera les services, concernant le port d'armes à feu à bord d'un aéronef,
 - (ii) des dangers qui peuvent menacer la sécurité du vol de l'aéronef si un agent décidait, au cours d'un acte de piraterie, d'agir d'une manière quelconque sans attendre les directives du pilote commandant de bord.
2. Un agent de la paix chargé d'une mission nécessitant le port d'une arme au cours d'un vol particulier doit remplir les formalités suivantes:
 - (a) En informer un employé de la compagnie aérienne, de préférence un surveillant, en service à l'aéroport, au moins une heure avant l'heure de départ prévue de son vol ou le plus tôt possible dans un cas d'urgence, soit en personne ou par téléphone.
 - (b) S'identifier auprès d'un employé de la compagnie aérienne, de préférence un surveillant, en service à l'aéroport, en lui présentant des pièces d'identité portant une photographie très nette, prise de face, sa signature ainsi que la signature d'un membre responsable du service de police; remplir également la formule appropriée. Une insigne, une médaille ou tout autre plaque semblable ne suffit pas comme pièce d'identité.
 - (c) Un agent de la paix qui n'a pas besoin de son arme à feu sur un vol en particulier devra le porter déchargé.
3. Le transporteur aérien doit établir les règlements à observer en ce qui a trait aux questions suivantes:
 - (a) Le traitement spécial accordé aux agents de la paix armés, selon le cas.
 - (b) L'identité d'un agent de la paix armé sera connue du pilote commandant de bord et des autres agents de la paix qui se trouvent à bord à moins qu'un agent secret ne demande à demeurer incognito; dans ce cas l'agent secret sera informé de la présence d'autres agents de la paix armés sans que sa présence ou son identité soit révélée à quiconque.

W.M. McLeish,

Directeur Général, Aéronautique Civile

Registration
SOR/74-469 2 August, 1974

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT ACT
GOVERNMENT PROPERTY TRAFFIC ACT

Airport Traffic Regulations

P.C. 1974-1753 30 July, 1974

His Excellency the Administrator in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Transport, pursuant to section 25 of the Department of Transport Act and section 2 of the Government Property Traffic Act, is pleased hereby to revoke the Airport Vehicle Control Regulations made by Order in Council P.C. 1964-1326 of 25th August, 1964¹ and to make the annexed Regulations respecting the control of motor vehicles, pedestrians, aircraft and equipment at airports in substitution therefor, effective August 15, 1974.

REGULATIONS RESPECTING THE CONTROL OF MOTOR VEHICLES, PEDESTRIANS, AIRCRAFT AND EQUIPMENT AT AIRPORTS

Short Title

1. These Regulations may be cited as the *Airport Traffic Regulations*.

Interpretation

2. In these Regulations,

"aerodrome" means an area of land, water (including the frozen surface thereof) or other supporting surface used, designed, prepared, equipped or set apart for use either in whole or in part for the arrival, departure, movement or servicing of aircraft and includes any buildings, installations and equipment used in connection therewith; (*aérodrome*)

"aircraft" means any machine used or designed for navigation in the air but does not include a machine designed to derive support in the atmosphere from reactions against the earth's surface of air expelled from the machine; (*aéronef*)

"airport" means an aerodrome for which an airport licence has been issued by the Minister; (*aéroport*)

"airport manager" means the Department of Transport official in charge of the airport or his duly authorized representative; (*directeur d'aéroport*)

"animal" means any domestic animal and includes poultry; (*animal*)

"apron" means that part of an airport, other than the manoeuvring area, intended to accommodate the loading and unloading of passengers and cargo, the refuelling, servicing, maintenance and parking of aircraft and the movement of aircraft, vehicles and pedestrians to allow execution of those functions; (*aire de trafic*)

Enregistrement
DORS/74-469 2 août 1974

LOI SUR LE MINISTÈRE DES TRANSPORTS
LOI RELATIVE À LA CIRCULATION SUR LES
TERRAINS DU GOUVERNEMENT

Règlement sur la circulation aux aéroports

C.P. 1974-1753 30 juillet 1974

Sur avis conforme du ministre des Transports et en vertu de l'article 25 de la Loi sur le ministère des Transports et de l'article 2 de la Loi relative à la circulation sur les terrains du gouvernement, il plaît à Son Excellence l'Administrateur en conseil d'abroger le Règlement sur la conduite des véhicules sur les aéroports, établi par le décret C.P. 1964-1326 du 25 août 1964¹ et d'établir, à compter du 15 août 1974, le Règlement concernant le contrôle de la circulation des véhicules à moteur, des piétons, des aéronefs et du matériel aux aéroports, ci-après.

RÈGLEMENT CONCERNANT LE CONTRÔLE DE LA CIRCULATION DES VÉHICULES À MOTEUR, DES PIÉTONS, DES AÉRONEFS ET DU MATÉRIEL AUX AÉROPORTS

Titre abrégé

1. Le présent règlement peut être cité sous le titre: *Règlement sur la circulation aux aéroports*.

Interprétation

2. Dans le présent règlement,

«aérodrome» désigne une étendue de terre ou d'eau (y compris la surface gelée d'une étendue d'eau) ou toute autre surface d'appui utilisée, conçue, préparée, équipée ou destinée à être utilisée, en totalité ou en partie, pour l'arrivée, le départ, les manœuvres ou l'entretien courant des aéronefs et comprend les bâtiments, les installations et le matériel utilisés à ces fins; (*aerodrome*)

«aéronef» désigne toute machine utilisée ou conçue pour la navigation aérienne, mais ne comprend pas une machine conçue pour se maintenir dans l'atmosphère grâce à la réaction, sur la surface de la terre, de l'air expulsé par la machine; (*aircraft*)

«aéroport» désigne un aérodrome pour lequel le Ministre a délivré un permis d'aéroport; (*airport*)

«agent» désigne

- a) un membre de la Gendarmerie royale du Canada,
- b) un membre de la sûreté provinciale ou municipale, et
- c) toute personne autorisée par le Ministre à faire observer le présent règlement; (*constable*)

«aire de manœuvre» désigne la partie d'un aéroport ordinairement utilisée pour le décollage et l'atterrissage des aéronefs et pour les manœuvres se rattachant au décollage

¹ SOR/64-354, *Canada Gazette Part II*, Vol. 98, No. 17, September 9, 1964

¹ DORS/64-354, *Gazette du Canada Partie II*, Vol. 98, n° 17, 9 septembre 1964

“apron traffic” means all aircraft, vehicles, pedestrians and equipment utilizing the apron area of the airport; (*trafic de l'aire de trafic*)

“commercial passenger vehicle” means any taxi, bus or other vehicle used or intended for use in the transportation of persons for compensation; (*véhicule commercial pour passager*)

“constable” means

- (a) a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police;
- (b) a member of a provincial or municipal police force, and
- (c) any person authorized by the Minister to enforce these Regulations; (*agent*)

“cross-walk” means

- (a) any portion of a road, apron or other area designated by a sign or surface marking as a pedestrian crossing, and
- (b) that part of a road at an intersection that is included within the connections of the lateral lines of the sidewalks on opposite sides of the road or, in the absence of curbs, from the edges of the road; (*passage pour piétons*)

“Department” means the Department of Transport; (*Ministère*)

“driver” means a person who is driving or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle or bicycle; (*conducteur*)

“intersection” means the area embraced within the prolongation or connection of the lateral curb lines or, in the absence of curb lines, of the lateral boundary lines of two or more roads that join one another at an angle whether or not one road crosses the other; (*carrefour*)

“loading area” means any portion of an airport designated by a sign and made available to the public for loading or unloading; (*aire d'embarquement*)

“manoeuvring area” means that part of an airport ordinarily used for the take-off and landing of aircraft and for the movement of aircraft associated with the take-off and landing, but does not include the apron; (*aire de manœuvre*)

“Minister” means the Minister of Transport; (*Ministre*)

“motor vehicle” means an automobile, over-snow vehicle, truck, bus or any self-propelled vehicle or device in, upon or by which a person or property is or may be transported, carried or conveyed upon land and includes a machine designed to derive support in the atmosphere from reactions against the earth's surface of air expelled from the machine; (*véhicule à moteur*)

“over-snow vehicle” means a vehicle that is capable of being propelled or driven otherwise than by muscular power, that runs on tracks or skis or on tracks and skis and that is designed for operation on snow or ice; (*autoneige*)

“owner”, with respect to a motor vehicle, means a person who holds legal title to it or a person in whose name it is or is required to be registered by the laws of a province and includes a conditional purchaser, lessee or mortgagor who is entitled to or is in possession of the motor vehicle; (*propriétaire*)

“park” means the standing of a motor vehicle whether occupied or not, except for the purpose of and while actually engaged in loading or unloading passengers or goods; (*laisser en stationnement*)

“parking meter” means an automatic or other mechanical device erected for the purpose of controlling the parking of

ou à l'atterrissage, à l'exclusion des aires de trafic; (*manœuvring area*)

«aire d'embarquement» désigne toute partie d'un aéroport, désignée par un écriteau et accessible au public pour l'embarquement ou le débarquement; (*loading area*)

«aire de trafic» désigne la partie d'un aéroport autre que l'aire de manœuvre, destinée à l'embarquement et au débarquement des voyageurs, au chargement et au déchargement du fret, au ravitaillement en carburant, à l'entretien courant et technique et au stationnement des aéronefs ainsi qu'aux mouvements des aéronefs, des véhicules et des piétons devant permettre l'exécution de ces fonctions; (*apron*)

«animal» désigne tout animal domestique et comprend la volaille; (*animal*)

«autoneige» désigne un véhicule qui peut être propulsé ou conduit autrement que par un effort musculaire, se déplaçant sur des chenilles ou des skis ou sur des chenilles et des skis et qui est conçu pour être conduit sur la neige ou la glace; (*over-snow vehicle*)

«carrefour» désigne l'aire d'une route comprise entre les prolongements ou les lieux de rencontre des lignes des trottoirs latéraux ou, s'il n'y en a pas, des lignes latérales limitant deux routes ou plus qui se rejoignent à un angle, que les routes se croisent ou non; (*intersection*)

«conducteur» désigne une personne qui conduit un véhicule à moteur ou une bicyclette ou qui en a effectivement le contrôle; (*driver*)

«directeur d'aéroport» désigne le fonctionnaire du ministère des Transports chargé de l'aéroport ou son représentant dûment autorisé; (*airport manager*)

«emplacement de stationnement» désigne la partie d'un aéroport dont l'usage pour le stationnement des véhicules à moteur est réglé par un parcomètre; (*parking space*)

«laisser en stationnement» signifie arrêter un véhicule, occupé ou non, sauf pour embarquer ou débarquer des passagers ou des marchandises; (*park*)

«Ministère» désigne le ministère des Transports; (*Department*)

«Ministre» désigne le ministre des Transports; (*Minister*)

«parcomètre» désigne un appareil automatique ou un autre appareil mécanique installé pour régler le stationnement d'un véhicule à moteur dans un emplacement de stationnement et pour mesurer et enregistrer la durée du stationnement; (*parking meter*)

«passage pour piétons» désigne

a) toute partie de route, d'aire de trafic ou d'une autre zone signalisée comme passage pour piétons par des écriteaux ou des marques au sol, et

b) la partie d'une route qui, à une intersection, est comprise entre les prolongements des lignes latérales des trottoirs situés aux côtés opposés de la route ou, s'il n'y a pas de trottoir, à partir des bords de la route; (*cross-walk*)

«pièce d'identité valable» désigne un document délivré par le directeur de l'aéroport et autorisant son titulaire à avoir accès à une zone réglementée de l'aéroport; (*valid identification*)

«piéton» désigne une personne à pied et comprend un invalide dans un fauteuil roulant ou un enfant dans un landau; (*pedestrian*)

any motor vehicle in a parking space and for measuring and recording the duration of such parking; (*parcomètre*)

“parking space” means a part of an airport used for parking motor vehicles and controlled by a parking meter; (*emplacement de stationnement*)

“pedestrian” means a person on foot and includes an invalid or child in a wheelchair or carriage; (*piéton*)

“restricted area” means an area of an airport designated by a sign as an area access to which by persons or vehicles requires the production of valid identification; (*zone réglementée*)

“road” includes any highway, street or place designed and intended for or used for the passage of motor vehicles; (*route*)

“sidewalk” means that part of a road or apron that is constructed for the use of pedestrians; (*trottoir*)

“valid identification” means a document issued by the airport manager authorizing the holder to have access to a restricted area of the airport. (*pièce d'identité valable*)

Application

3. These Regulations apply to every airport under the administration and control of the Minister and the roads thereon.

Enforcement

4. The Minister may authorize any person to act as a constable to enforce these Regulations.

PART I

OPERATION OF MOTOR VEHICLES

Prohibition

5. (1) No person shall operate a motor vehicle on an airport unless

(a) he holds all licences and permits that he is, by the laws of the province and the municipality in which the airport is situated, required to hold in order to operate the motor vehicle in that province and municipality; and

(b) the motor vehicle is registered and equipped as required by the laws of the province and the municipality in which the airport is situated.

(2) For the purpose of these Regulations, a provincial certificate of motor vehicle registration shall be *prima facie* proof of ownership of the motor vehicle.

«propriétaire», employé à l'égard d'un véhicule à moteur, désigne une personne au nom de laquelle le véhicule est ou doit être immatriculé en vertu des lois d'une province, et comprend l'acheteur dans le cas d'une vente sous condition, un locataire ou un *mortgagor* qui a droit à la possession du véhicule à moteur ou qui en a la possession; (*owner*)

«route» comprend une route, rue ou place désignée et conçue pour être utilisée ou utilisée pour la circulation de véhicules à moteur; (*road*)

«trafic de l'aire de trafic» désigne tous les aéronefs, véhicules, piétons et matériel utilisant l'aire de trafic de l'aéroport; (*apron traffic*)

«trottoir» désigne la partie d'une route ou d'une aire de trafic qui est construite pour l'usage des piétons; (*sidewalk*)

«véhicule à moteur» désigne une automobile, une autoneige, un camion, un autobus ou tout autre véhicule ou appareil autopropulsé dans lequel, sur lequel ou au moyen duquel une personne ou une chose est ou peut être transportée, portée ou déplacée sur terre, y compris une machine conçue pour se maintenir dans l'atmosphère grâce à la réaction, sur la surface de la terre, de l'air expulsé par la machine; (*motor vehicle*)

«véhicule commercial pour passager» désigne tout taxi, autobus ou autre véhicule utilisé ou destiné à être utilisé pour le transport rémunéré des personnes; (*commercial passenger vehicle*)

«zone réglementée» désigne une aire d'aéroport signalisée par un écriteau comme étant une zone dont l'accès pour les personnes ou véhicules est subordonné à la présentation de pièces d'identité valables. (*restricted area*)

Application

3. Le présent règlement s'applique à tout aéroport soumis à l'administration et au contrôle du Ministre ainsi qu'à toutes les routes qui s'y trouvent.

Observation

4. Le Ministre peut autoriser toute personne à remplir les fonctions d'agent pour faire observer le présent règlement.

PARTIE I

CONDUITE DES VÉHICULES À MOTEUR

Interdiction

5. (1) Il est interdit de conduire un véhicule à moteur sur un aéroport à moins

a) d'être titulaire de toutes les licences et de tous les permis que les lois de la province et les règlements de la municipalité où est situé l'aéroport obligent à posséder pour la conduite de ce véhicule à moteur dans cette province et cette municipalité; et

b) que le véhicule à moteur ne soit immatriculé et équipé conformément aux lois de la province et aux règlements de la municipalité où est situé l'aéroport.

(2) Aux fins du présent règlement, un certificat provincial d'immatriculation de véhicule à moteur crée une présomption jusqu'à preuve du contraire du droit de propriété du véhicule à moteur.

Compliance with Provincial and Municipal Laws

6. (1) No person shall operate a motor vehicle on an airport otherwise than in accordance with the laws of the province and the municipality in which the airport is situated.

(2) In this Part, the expression "laws of the province and the municipality" does not include laws that are inconsistent with or repugnant to any of the provisions of the *Government Property Traffic Act* or these Regulations.

Traffic Signs and Devices

7. (1) The Minister may mark or erect or cause to be marked or erected on any airport traffic signs or devices

- (a) prescribing the rate of speed;
- (b) regulating or prohibiting parking and designating parking, loading or restricted areas;
- (c) prescribing load limits for any motor vehicle or class of motor vehicles;
- (d) prohibiting or regulating the use of any road or place by any motor vehicle or class of motor vehicles, or by persons or animals;
- (e) designating any road as a one-way road;
- (f) stopping motor vehicles;
- (g) regulating pedestrian traffic; and
- (h) directing or controlling in any other manner traffic on the airport.

(2) Except as authorized by subsection (1), no person shall mark or erect any traffic sign or device on any airport.

8. Any traffic sign or device on any airport bearing the words "Department of Transport", "Ministère des Transports", or an abbreviation thereof, or purporting to have been erected by or under the authority of the Minister, shall be deemed *prima facie* to have been erected pursuant to this Part.

9. The driver of a motor vehicle on an airport shall obey the instruction of any traffic sign or device applicable to that driver or motor vehicle.

Traffic Direction and Control

10. No person shall, on an airport, drive

- (a) a motor vehicle other than an over-snow vehicle, except on a road; or
- (b) an over-snow vehicle except with the permission of the airport manager.

11. (1) The driver of a motor vehicle on an airport shall comply with any traffic directions given to him by a constable.

(2) A constable may, for the purpose of ensuring the orderly movement of all traffic on an airport, direct or control such traffic.

Observation des lois provinciales et des règlements municipaux

6. (1) Il est interdit de conduire un véhicule à moteur sur un aéroport, si ce n'est conformément aux lois de la province et aux règlements de la municipalité où l'aéroport est situé.

(2) Dans la présente partie, l'expression «lois de la province et règlements de la municipalité» ne comprend pas les lois ou règlements incompatibles avec les dispositions de la *Loi relative à la circulation sur les terrains du gouvernement* ou du présent règlement.

Signalisation

7. (1) Le Ministre peut installer ou faire installer sur tout aéroport des panneaux ou des dispositifs de signalisation pour

- a) prescrire la vitesse;
- b) réglementer ou interdire le stationnement et désigner des aires de stationnement, des aires d'embarquement ou des zones réglementées;
- c) prescrire des limites de charge applicables à tout véhicule à moteur ou à toute catégorie de véhicules à moteur;
- d) interdire ou réglementer l'usage d'une route ou d'un endroit par tout véhicule à moteur ou toute catégorie de véhicules à moteur ou par des personnes ou des animaux;
- e) désigner une route comme route à sens unique;
- f) arrêter les véhicules à moteur;
- g) réglementer la circulation des piétons; et
- h) diriger ou contrôler de toute autre manière la circulation sur l'aéroport.

(2) Sauf autorisation prévue au paragraphe (1), il est interdit d'installer sur un aéroport des panneaux ou des dispositifs de signalisation quels qu'ils soient.

8. Les panneaux ou dispositifs de signalisation qui sont installés sur un aéroport, qui portent les mots «Ministère des Transports», «Department of Transport», en entier ou en abrégé, ou qui sont donnés comme ayant été installés par le Ministre ou sur son autorisation, sont censés avoir été installés conformément à la présente partie.

9. Le conducteur d'un véhicule à moteur sur un aéroport doit suivre les instructions que donnent les panneaux ou les dispositifs de signalisation et qui sont applicables à lui ou au véhicule à moteur.

Réglementation de la circulation

10. Il est interdit, sur un aéroport, de conduire

- a) un véhicule à moteur autre qu'une autoneige ailleurs que sur une route; ou
- b) une autoneige sans l'autorisation du directeur de l'aéroport.

11. (1) Le conducteur d'un véhicule à moteur sur un aéroport doit se conformer aux directives de circulation que lui donne un agent.

(2) Un agent peut, afin d'assurer un écoulement ordonné de la circulation sur un aéroport, diriger ou réglementer cette circulation.

12. Every person on an airport shall produce to a constable upon demand

- (a) any permit issued to him under this Part;
- (b) any licence or permit he holds authorizing him to drive a motor vehicle; and
- (c) any certificate of registration referred to in subsection 5(2).

13. Every driver of a motor vehicle who is directly or indirectly involved in an accident on an airport shall

- (a) report the accident forthwith as required by the laws of the province in which the accident occurred; and
- (b) if any property of Her Majesty is damaged by the accident, report the accident forthwith to a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the airport manager.

14. No person shall operate or park a motor vehicle

- (a) on an apron unless he has the permission of the airport manager; or
- (b) in any area designated by a sign as a restricted area unless he is in possession of valid identification.

15. Where an apron traffic control unit, as defined in Part IV, has been established at an airport, the operator of a motor vehicle on the apron shall acknowledge and obey any instruction received from the unit.

Parking

16. No person shall park a motor vehicle in any area designated by a sign as an area in which parking is prohibited.

17. No person shall, without the permission of the Minister, park a motor vehicle on any portion of an airport that is grassed or that is not intended for the use of motor vehicles.

18. No person shall park a motor vehicle in a place designated by a sign as a loading area.

19. No driver of a commercial passenger vehicle shall load or unload passengers at an airport except in an area designated by a sign as an area in which passenger loading or unloading is permitted.

20. Where an area is designated by a sign as an area in which parking is reserved for persons holding permits or tickets, or as an area in which parking is prohibited except under a permit, no person shall park a motor vehicle in that area unless

- (a) he holds a permit authorizing him to park in that area;
- (b) where an identifying label or ticket has been issued with the permit, the label or ticket is affixed to and exposed on the lower right corner of the windshield of the motor vehicle; and

12. Sur un aéroport, une personne doit présenter à un agent, sur demande,

- a) tout permis qui lui a été délivré en vertu de la présente partie;
- b) toute licence ou tout permis l'autorisant à conduire un véhicule à moteur, dont elle est titulaire; et
- c) tout certificat d'immatriculation dont il est question au paragraphe 5(2).

13. Tout conducteur d'un véhicule à moteur qui est directement ou indirectement impliqué dans un accident sur un aéroport doit

- a) signaler immédiatement l'accident, conformément aux lois de la province dans laquelle l'accident s'est produit; et
- b) si l'accident a causé des dommages aux biens de Sa Majesté, signaler immédiatement l'accident à un membre de la Gendarmerie royale du Canada ou au directeur de l'aéroport.

14. Il est interdit de conduire ou de laisser en stationnement un véhicule à moteur

- a) sur une aire de trafic sans l'autorisation du directeur de l'aéroport; ou
- b) sur toute aire désignée par un écriteau comme zone réglementée à moins d'être en possession de pièces d'identité valables.

15. Lorsqu'un organe du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic, défini dans la partie IV, a été établi dans un aéroport, le conducteur d'un véhicule à moteur se trouvant sur l'aire de trafic doit accuser réception de toute instruction reçue de cet organe et s'y conformer.

Stationnement

16. Il est interdit de laisser un véhicule à moteur en stationnement dans une zone désignée par un écriteau comme une zone où le stationnement est interdit.

17. Il est interdit, sauf sur autorisation du Ministre, de laisser un véhicule à moteur en stationnement sur une partie gazonnée de l'aéroport ou sur toute partie qui n'est pas destinée à être utilisée par des véhicules à moteur.

18. Il est interdit de laisser un véhicule à moteur en stationnement dans un endroit désigné par un écriteau comme étant une aire d'embarquement.

19. Il est interdit au conducteur d'un véhicule commercial pour passagers d'embarquer ou de débarquer des passagers à un aéroport sauf dans une zone désignée par un écriteau comme une zone où l'embarquement ou le débarquement des passagers est autorisé.

20. Lorsqu'une zone est désignée comme zone de stationnement réservée à l'usage des détenteurs de permis ou de billets ou comme zone où il est interdit de stationner sans permis, nul ne doit laisser un véhicule à moteur en stationnement dans cette zone, sauf

- a) s'il possède un permis qui l'autorise à stationner dans ladite zone;
- b) si, dans le cas où une vignette ou un billet d'identification a été délivré avec le permis cette vignette ou ce billet est apposé bien en évidence dans l'angle inférieur droit du pare-brise du véhicule à moteur; et

(c) he parks the motor vehicle in accordance with the terms of his permit.

21. Where an area is designated by a sign as an area in which parking is permitted for a period of time, no person shall park a motor vehicle in that area for any greater period of time than that indicated on the sign.

22. Where an area is designated by a sign as an area in which parking is prohibited during certain hours, no person shall park a motor vehicle in that area during the hours when parking is prohibited.

23. Where an area is designated by a sign as an area in which parking is permitted in parking spaces located adjacent to parking meters, no person shall park a motor vehicle in such a parking space unless that person pays for use of the parking space by depositing in the parking meter immediately adjacent thereto the fee stipulated on such meter with respect to the use of that space.

24. No person shall allow a motor vehicle to remain parked in a parking space beyond the maximum period stipulated on the parking meter with respect to the use of that space.

25. Subject to section 27, where an area is designated by a sign as an area in which parking is permitted in parking spaces, no person shall park in that area except within a parking space.

26. Subject to section 27, no person shall park a motor vehicle in a parking space regulated by a parking meter in such a manner that the motor vehicle is not wholly within the space designated as the parking space for use with respect to that parking meter.

27. Where a motor vehicle is longer or wider than one parking space, the required deposit shall be placed in each parking meter that regulates a space or any part of a space occupied by that vehicle.

28. No person shall deposit in a parking meter any coin other than a coin that is current in Canada or the United States.

29. For the purposes of section 28, "current" means lawfully current in Canada or the United States by virtue of a law, proclamation or regulation in force in Canada or the United States, as the case may be.

30. Where an area is designated as an area in which parking is reserved for a class of persons, no person shall park in that area unless he is a member of that class.

31. (1) The Minister may issue or authorize the issue of permits and labels for the purposes of this Part.

(2) The Minister or a person authorized by him may at any time revoke a permit issued under this Part.

(c) s'il laisse le véhicule à moteur en stationnement conformément aux conditions de son permis.

21. Lorsqu'une zone est désignée par un écriteau comme zone où le stationnement est autorisé pour une période de temps déterminé, il est interdit de laisser un véhicule à moteur en stationnement dans cette zone au delà de la période indiquée sur l'écriteau.

22. Lorsqu'une zone est désignée par un écriteau comme zone où le stationnement est interdit pendant certaines heures, il est interdit de laisser un véhicule à moteur en stationnement dans cette zone aux heures où le stationnement y est interdit.

23. Lorsqu'une zone est désignée par un écriteau comme zone où le stationnement est autorisé dans des emplacements de stationnement situés près de parcomètres, il est interdit de laisser un véhicule à moteur en stationnement dans un emplacement de stationnement à moins de payer pour l'usage de l'emplacement de stationnement en déposant dans le parcomètre approprié le montant qui y est indiqué pour l'usage de l'emplacement.

24. Il est interdit de laisser un véhicule à moteur en stationnement dans un emplacement de stationnement au delà de la période maximale indiquée sur le parcomètre qui règle l'usage de cet emplacement.

25. Sous réserve des dispositions de l'article 27, lorsqu'une zone est désignée par un écriteau comme zone où le stationnement est autorisé dans des emplacements de stationnement, il est interdit de laisser un véhicule en stationnement dans cette zone ailleurs que dans un tel emplacement.

26. Sous réserve des dispositions de l'article 27, il est interdit de laisser un véhicule à moteur en stationnement dans un emplacement de stationnement dont l'usage est réglé par un parcomètre de façon que ce véhicule ne soit pas entièrement placé dans les limites de l'emplacement désigné comme emplacement de stationnement à utiliser relativement à ce parcomètre.

27. Lorsqu'un véhicule à moteur dépasse en longueur ou en largeur un emplacement de stationnement, le montant exigé doit être déposé dans chacun des parcomètres qui règlent les emplacements qu'occupe en entier ou en partie ce véhicule.

28. Il est interdit de déposer dans un parcomètre des pièces de monnaie autres que celles qui sont courantes au Canada ou aux États-Unis.

29. Aux fins de l'article 28, des pièces de monnaie «courantes» désignent des pièces de monnaie qui ont cours légal au Canada ou aux États-Unis en vertu d'une loi, d'une proclamation ou d'un règlement en vigueur au Canada ou aux États-Unis, suivant le cas.

30. Lorsqu'une zone est désignée comme zone de stationnement réservée à l'usage d'une certaine catégorie de personnes, il est interdit d'y laisser un véhicule en stationnement, à moins de faire partie de ladite catégorie de personnes.

31. (1) Le Ministre peut délivrer des permis et des vignettes aux fins de la présente partie, ou en autoriser la délivrance.

(2) Le Ministre ou une personne autorisée par lui peut, à tout moment, retirer une autorisation délivrée en vertu de la présente partie.

(3) Unless sooner revoked, a permit issued under this Part is valid only for the period stated thereon and a label furnished with the permit is valid only during the period that the permit is valid.

32. A constable who finds a motor vehicle parked in contravention of this Part may, at the expense of the owner, remove the vehicle and, if he deems it necessary to protect the vehicle or the interests of the owner, store it in a suitable place.

Speed

33. No person shall drive a motor vehicle on a road at a rate of speed in excess of the speed limit indicated for that road by a sign.

34. Unless otherwise authorized by the airport manager, no person shall drive a motor vehicle on an apron at a rate of speed in excess of 15 m.p.h.

35. No person shall drive a motor vehicle on an apron or manoeuvring area in a manner that is dangerous to persons, aircraft, vehicles or equipment, having regard to all the circumstances including the amount of traffic thereon or reasonably expected to be thereon.

36. The provisions of this Part relating to motor vehicles apply with such modifications as the circumstances require to a bicycle or any cycle regardless of the number of wheels it may have.

Animals

37. No person shall allow an animal owned by him or under his control to be at large on an airport.

38. A constable or person in charge of an airport may, at the expense of the owner of the animal, cause any animal found at large on the airport to be confined or driven off the airport or impounded in accordance with the laws of the province and municipality in which the airport is situated.

Penalties

39. (1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3) and section 40, every person who contravenes any provision of this Part is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to both.

(2) Every person who contravenes any provision of these Regulations governing the parking of motor vehicles shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding fifty dollars.

(3) Where a person is convicted of driving a motor vehicle in contravention of this Part, the convicting court or judge may, in addition to any other penalty imposed, make an order prohibiting that person from driving any motor vehicle on any lands belonging to or occupied by Her Majesty in right of Canada for any period not exceeding one year from the date of the conviction.

(3) A moins d'avoir été retiré, un permis délivré en vertu de la présente partie n'est valable que pour la période de temps qui y est mentionnée et une vignette donnée avec le permis n'est valable que durant la période de validité du permis.

32. Un agent qui trouve un véhicule à moteur stationné par infraction aux dispositions de la présente partie peut, aux frais du propriétaire, enlever le véhicule et, s'il le juge nécessaire pour protéger le véhicule ou les intérêts du propriétaire, remiser le véhicule dans un lieu approprié.

Vitesse

33. Il est interdit de conduire un véhicule à moteur sur une route à une vitesse qui dépasse la vitesse maximale indiquée par un écriteau pour cette route.

34. Il est interdit de conduire un véhicule à moteur sur une aire de trafic à une vitesse de plus de 15 milles à l'heure, sauf si le directeur de l'aéroport en donne l'autorisation.

35. Il est interdit de conduire un véhicule à moteur sur une aire de trafic ou une aire de manœuvre d'une façon qui puisse mettre en danger des personnes, des aéronefs, des véhicules ou du matériel, compte tenu de toutes les circonstances, notamment du trafic qui se trouve sur ces aires ou qu'on peut s'attendre à y trouver.

36. Les dispositions de la présente partie relatives aux véhicules à moteur s'appliquent, avec les modifications requises par les circonstances, à une bicyclette ou à tout cycle, quel que soit le nombre de ses roues.

Animaux

37. Il est interdit à quiconque de laisser en liberté sur un aéroport un animal qui lui appartient ou est sous sa surveillance.

38. Un agent ou la personne qui dirige un aéroport peut, aux frais du propriétaire de l'animal, faire enfermer, faire chasser de l'aéroport ou faire mettre en fourrière tout animal trouvé en liberté sur un aéroport, conformément aux lois de la province et aux règlements de la municipalité où est situé l'aéroport.

Sanctions

39. (1) Sous réserve des dispositions des paragraphes (2) et (3) et de l'article 40, quiconque enfreint une disposition de la présente partie est passible, sur déclaration sommaire de culpabilité, d'une amende d'au plus cinq cents dollars ou d'un emprisonnement d'au plus six mois, ou des deux peines à la fois.

(2) Quiconque enfreint une disposition du présent règlement relative au stationnement des véhicules à moteur, est passible, sur déclaration sommaire de culpabilité, d'une amende d'au plus cinquante dollars.

(3) Lorsqu'une personne est déclarée coupable de conduite d'un véhicule à moteur en infraction aux dispositions de la présente partie, le tribunal ou le juge qui rend le jugement peut, sans préjudice de toute sanction infligée d'autre part, rendre une ordonnance interdisant à ladite personne de conduire un véhicule à moteur sur les terrains appartenant à Sa Majesté du chef du Canada ou occupés par elle, pour une durée d'au plus un an à compter de la date de la déclaration de culpabilité.

(4) Every person who drives a motor vehicle contrary to an order made pursuant to subsection (3) is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to both.

40. (1) Any person who is alleged to have contravened any provision of this Part governing the parking of a motor vehicle may, at any time within seventy-two hours from the expiration of the day on which the contravention is alleged to have occurred, excluding holidays, register a plea of guilty to the alleged offence by paying into court, either personally or by mail,

- (a) five dollars, where the alleged offence relates to parking in a reserved parking area;
- (b) five dollars, where the alleged offence relates to parking in a no parking area;
- (c) two dollars, where the alleged offence relates to over-time parking;
- (d) five dollars, where the alleged offence relates to parking a vehicle in such a manner as to obstruct traffic;
- (e) ten dollars, where the alleged offence relates to parking in a loading area; or
- (f) five dollars, where the alleged offence relates to any parking offence not referred to in paragraphs (a) to (e).

(2) Any amount paid pursuant to subsection (1) shall be paid into the court designated by the Minister for such payment.

(3) Where a payment referred to in subsection (1) is sent to the court by mail, the payment into court shall be deemed to have been made on the day on which the payment was mailed.

(4) Where a person who is alleged to have contravened a provision of this Part governing the parking of a motor vehicle has, in accordance with subsection (1), paid money into court with respect to that contravention, no further penalty shall be imposed on him for that contravention.

PART II
PEDESTRIANS
Prohibition

41. No person who is not in possession of valid identification shall enter upon or remain in any area that is designated by a sign or device as a restricted area unless authorized to do so by the airport manager.

42. Every person found upon or in any area in contravention of section 41 may be removed therefrom by a constable, but such removal shall be without prejudice toward any other proceeding that may be taken.

43. Where a portion of a road or apron has been designated as a cross-walk, no pedestrian shall proceed to cross the road or apron except within the designated cross-walk.

(4) Quiconque conduit un véhicule à moteur en infraction à une ordonnance rendue en vertu du paragraphe (3), est passible, sur déclaration sommaire de culpabilité, d'une amende d'au plus cinq cents dollars ou d'un emprisonnement d'au plus six mois, ou des deux peines à la fois.

40. (1) Toute personne présumée coupable d'infraction à une disposition de la présente partie, relative au stationnement d'un véhicule à moteur, peut, dans un délai de soixante-douze heures, jours fériés non compris, après la fin du jour au cours duquel la présumée infraction aurait été commise, déposer un aveu de culpabilité relatif à la présumée infraction en payant au tribunal, soit personnellement, soit par la poste,

- a) cinq dollars, si la présumée infraction concerne le stationnement dans une zone de stationnement réservée;
- b) cinq dollars, si la présumée infraction concerne le stationnement dans une zone où le stationnement est interdit;
- c) deux dollars, si la présumée infraction concerne le stationnement au-delà de la période permise;
- d) cinq dollars, si la présumée infraction concerne le stationnement d'un véhicule d'une façon qui puisse gêner la circulation;
- e) dix dollars, si la présumée infraction concerne le stationnement dans une aire d'embarquement; ou
- f) cinq dollars, si la présumée infraction concernant le stationnement n'est pas mentionnée aux alinéas a) à e).

(2) Tout montant payé en vertu des dispositions du paragraphe (1) devra être payé au tribunal que le Ministre aura désigné pour recevoir ce paiement.

(3) Lorsqu'un paiement mentionné au paragraphe (1) est envoyé au tribunal par la poste, ce paiement est censé avoir été effectué le jour où il a été mis à la poste.

(4) Lorsqu'une personne présumée coupable d'infraction aux dispositions de la présente partie relatives au stationnement d'un véhicule à moteur, a, conformément aux dispositions du paragraphe (1), payé au tribunal l'amende imposée pour cette infraction, aucune autre sanction ne pourra lui être imposée pour ladite infraction.

PARTIE II
PIÉTONS
Interdictions

41. Il est interdit à quiconque n'est pas en possession de pièces d'identité valables de pénétrer dans une zone désignée par un écriteau ou un dispositif de signalisation comme zone réglementée, ou d'y demeurer, sans l'autorisation du directeur de l'aéroport.

42. Un agent qui trouve une personne quelconque dans une zone, en infraction aux dispositions de l'article 41, peut expulser cette personne de ladite zone mais cette expulsion se fera sans préjudice de toute autre poursuite qui pourra être engagée.

43. Lorsqu'une partie de route ou d'aire de trafic a été désignée comme passage pour piétons, il est interdit à un piéton de traverser la route ou l'aire de trafic ailleurs qu'en ce passage.

44. Where a sidewalk or path is located beside a road or apron a pedestrian shall, at all times when reasonable and practicable to do so, use the sidewalk or path and shall not walk or remain on the road or apron.

45. Where there is no sidewalk or path located beside a road, a pedestrian walking along or upon the road shall, at all times when practicable to do so, walk on the left side or shoulder of the road facing on-coming traffic.

46. No pedestrian on an apron shall impede, interfere with or obstruct in any way the free movement of other apron traffic except in the course of his or her employment relating to the control of such traffic.

47. Where no cross-walk has been designated, every pedestrian crossing a road shall yield the right-of-way to motor vehicles using the road.

48. A pedestrian shall obey the instruction of any traffic sign or device and comply with any traffic directions given by a constable to him.

Smoking and Littering

49. No person shall

(a) smoke, carry or deposit lighted cigars, cigarettes, pipes or matches or carry a naked flame

(i) on an apron or any open deck gallery or balcony contiguous to and overlooking an apron,

(ii) in any area where smoking is specifically prohibited by a sign, or

(iii) in any other place at an airport under such circumstances as may or might be likely to endanger persons or property;

(b) throw, deposit or knowingly leave on a road, apron or manoeuvring area any glass, nails, tacks, scraps of metal, chemical substance or other material that may damage an aircraft or motor vehicle; or

(c) throw, deposit or knowingly leave on any airport any form of trash or garbage except in containers provided for that purpose.

Penalties

50. (1) Every person who contravenes section 41 is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to both.

(2) Subject to section 51, every person who contravenes any provisions of this Part other than section 41 is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding fifty dollars.

51. (1) Any person who is alleged to have contravened any provision of this Part other than section 41 may, at any time within seventy-two hours from the expiration of the day on which the contravention is alleged to have occurred, excluding

44. Lorsqu'un trottoir ou un chemin longe une route ou une aire de trafic, un piéton doit à n'importe quel moment, lorsqu'il est judicieux et possible de le faire, emprunter le trottoir ou le chemin et ne pas marcher ou demeurer sur la route ou l'aire de trafic.

45. Lorsqu'il n'y a pas de trottoir ou de chemin le long d'une route, un piéton circulant sur la route doit à n'importe quel moment, quand cela est possible, marcher sur le côté gauche ou sur l'accotement gauche de la route afin de faire face au trafic.

46. Il est interdit à tout piéton se trouvant sur l'aire de trafic d'entraver, de gêner ou d'embarrasser de quelque façon que ce soit le libre mouvement de tout autre trafic sur l'aire de trafic, sauf dans l'exercice de ses fonctions relatives au contrôle de ce trafic.

47. Lorsqu'aucun passage pour piétons n'a été désigné, tout piéton traversant une route devra céder le droit de passage aux véhicules à moteur utilisant la route.

48. Un piéton doit obéir aux instructions de tout panneau ou dispositif de signalisation et se conformer aux directives que lui donne un agent.

Interdiction de fumer et de jeter des ordures

49. Il est interdit

a) de fumer, porter ou déposer des cigares, cigarettes, pipes ou allumettes allumés ou de porter une flamme nue

(i) sur une aire de trafic ou sur une terrasse, une galerie ou un balcon ouvert, contigu à l'aire de trafic et surplombant cette aire,

(ii) dans toute zone où des écriteaux interdisent expressément de fumer, ou

(iii) dans tout autre endroit de l'aéroport dans des circonstances qui seraient ou sont susceptibles de mettre en danger des personnes ou des biens;

b) de jeter, déposer ou consciemment laisser sur une route, une aire de trafic ou une aire de manœuvre du verre, des clous, des pointes, des morceaux de métal, une substance chimique ou tout autre matière qui puissent endommager un aéronef ou un véhicule à moteur; ou

c) de jeter, déposer ou consciemment laisser sur un aéroport des rebuts ou déchets sous quelque forme que ce soit, sauf dans les poubelles prévues à cet usage.

Sanctions

50. (1) Quiconque enfreint une disposition de l'article 41 est passible, sur déclaration sommaire de culpabilité, d'une amende d'au plus cinq cents dollars ou d'un emprisonnement d'au plus six mois, ou des deux peines à la fois.

(2) Sous réserve des dispositions de l'article 51, toute personne qui enfreint une disposition de la présente partie autre que celles de l'article 41, est passible, sur déclaration sommaire de culpabilité, d'une amende d'au plus cinquante dollars.

51. (1) Toute personne présumée coupable d'infraction à une disposition de la présente partie autre que celles de l'article 41, peut, dans un délai de soixante-douze heures, jours fériés non compris, après la fin du jour au cours duquel la présumée infraction aurait été commise, déposer un aveu de

holidays, register a plea of guilty to the alleged offence by paying into court, either personally or by mail,

- (a) two dollars, where the alleged offence relates to crossing a road or apron otherwise than at a designated cross-walk;
- (b) two dollars, where the alleged offence relates to walking on a road or apron in contravention of section 44;
- (c) two dollars, where the alleged offence relates to walking on a road in contravention of section 45;
- (d) five dollars, where the alleged offence relates to impeding, interfering or obstructing the free movement of an aircraft on the apron or manoeuvring area in contravention of section 46;
- (e) five dollars, where the alleged offence relates to failing to yield the right-of-way to motor vehicles in contravention of section 47;
- (f) five dollars, where the alleged offence relates to disobeying instructions of any traffic sign or device or instruction given by a constable;
- (g) ten dollars, where the alleged offence relates to smoking in contravention of paragraph 49(a) or to littering in contravention of paragraph 49(b);
- (h) ten dollars, where the alleged offence relates to littering a road, apron or manoeuvring area in contravention of paragraph 49(b); and
- (i) ten dollars, where the alleged offence relates to throwing, depositing or knowingly leaving trash or garbage in contravention of paragraph 49(c).

(2) Any amount paid pursuant to subsection (1) shall be paid into the court designated by the Minister for such payment.

(3) Where a payment referred to in subsection (1) is sent to the court by mail, the payment into court shall be deemed to have been made on the day on which the payment was mailed.

(4) Where a person who is alleged to have contravened any provision of this Part other than section 41 has, in accordance with subsection (1), paid money into court with respect to that contravention, no further penalty shall be imposed on him for that contravention.

PART III

REGISTRATION OF MOBILE EQUIPMENT

Interpretation

52. In this Part,
"equipment" means

- (a) any motor vehicle or mobile device used in the direct fuelling or defuelling of aircraft, or
- (b) any other motor vehicle or mobile device of a specialized nature for use in the maintenance, repair and servicing of an aircraft on the ground, including testing equipment and cargo and passenger handling equipment;

"gross weight", with respect to any equipment, means the total weight of the equipment as specified by its manufacturer;

culpabilité relatif à la présumée infraction, en payant au tribunal, soit personnellement, soit par la poste,

- a) deux dollars, si la présumée infraction consiste à traverser une route ou une aire de trafic ailleurs que sur un passage pour piétons désigné;
- b) deux dollars, si la présumée infraction consiste à marcher sur une route ou une aire de trafic en infraction aux dispositions de l'article 44;
- c) deux dollars, si la présumée infraction consiste à marcher sur une route en infraction aux dispositions de l'article 45;
- d) cinq dollars, si la présumée infraction consiste à entraver, gêner ou embarrasser le libre mouvement d'un aéronef sur l'aire de trafic ou l'aire de manœuvre en infraction aux dispositions de l'article 46;
- e) cinq dollars, si la présumée infraction consiste à refuser de céder le droit de passage aux véhicules à moteur en infraction aux dispositions de l'article 47;
- f) cinq dollars, si la présumée infraction consiste à ne pas se conformer aux indications d'un panneau ou d'un dispositif de signalisation ou aux directives données par un agent;
- g) dix dollars, si la présumée infraction consiste à fumer en infraction aux dispositions de l'alinéa 49a) ou à jeter des ordures en infraction aux dispositions de l'alinéa 49b);
- h) dix dollars, si la présumée infraction consiste à jeter des ordures sur une route, une aire de trafic ou une aire de manœuvre en infraction aux dispositions de l'alinéa 49b); et
- i) dix dollars, si la présumée infraction consiste à jeter, déposer ou sciemment laisser des rebuts ou des déchets en infraction aux dispositions de l'alinéa 49c).

(2) Tout montant payé en vertu des dispositions du paragraphe (1) devra être payé au tribunal que le Ministre aura désigné pour recevoir ce paiement.

(3) Lorsqu'un paiement mentionné au paragraphe (1) est envoyé au tribunal par la poste, ce paiement est censé avoir été effectué le jour où il a été mis à la poste.

(4) Lorsqu'une personne présumée coupable d'infraction aux dispositions de la présente partie autres que celles de l'article 41, a, conformément aux dispositions du paragraphe (1), payé au tribunal l'amende imposée pour cette infraction, aucune autre sanction ne pourra lui être imposée pour ladite infraction.

PARTIE III

IMMATRICULATION DU MATÉRIEL MOBILE

Interprétation

52. Dans la présente partie,

«année d'immatriculation» désigne la période commençant le premier janvier d'une année et se terminant le dernier jour de décembre de la même année;

«matériel» désigne

- a) tout véhicule à moteur ou appareil mobile utilisé pour faire ravitailler directement des aéronefs ou les vidanger, ou
- b) tout autre véhicule à moteur ou appareil mobile de nature spécialisée devant servir à l'entretien technique et courant et à la réparation d'un aéronef au sol, y compris

"registration year" means the period commencing on the first day of January in any year and ending on the last day of December in that year.

Registration

53. Subject to this Part, the owner of equipment used at airports shall register that equipment each year in accordance with this Part.

54. No person shall operate any equipment at an airport unless that equipment has been registered in accordance with this Part.

55. Sections 53 and 54 do not apply to equipment operated exclusively on airport areas leased from the Department by the owner of the equipment.

56. (1) Applications for the registration of equipment shall be made in the form prescribed by the Minister and delivered together with the fees prescribed by this Part to the airport manager at the airport at which the equipment is to be used.

(2) On receipt of the application and fees described in subsection (1), the airport manager may, if he is of the opinion that the equipment for which registration is applied for can be safely operated at the airport, issue a registration certificate for that equipment.

Fees

57. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the annual registration fee payable in respect of any equipment shall be fifteen dollars or the amount obtained by multiplying the gross weight of the equipment, calculated in thousands of pounds, by fifteen dollars, whichever is the greater amount.

(2) Where any equipment is registered after the thirtieth day of June in any registration year, the fee shall be one-half of the fee prescribed by subsection (1).

58. (1) Where equipment registered at any airport is replaced by other equipment of a similar kind, there shall be paid to the airport manager of that airport

(a) if the other equipment is of an equivalent or lower gross weight than the equipment replaced, a registration fee of five dollars; or

(b) if the other equipment is of a greater gross weight than the equipment being replaced, a registration fee equal to the amount obtained by multiplying the difference between the gross weight of the equipment being replaced and the other equipment, calculated in thousands of pounds, by fifteen dollars.

(2) The registration certificate for any equipment that is being replaced at an airport shall be surrendered to the airport manager of that airport.

59. Where equipment registered under this Part is sold or transferred, the new owner of the equipment shall, before operating the equipment at an airport, notify the airport manager of that airport, and the airport manager may,

(a) on payment of a fee of five dollars by the new owner,

le matériel d'essai et le matériel utilisé pour la manutention des marchandises et le déplacement des passagers; «poids brut», appliqué à du matériel, désigne le poids total du matériel mentionné par le fabricant.

Immatriculation

53. Sous réserve des dispositions de la présente partie, le propriétaire de matériel utilisé à un aéroport doit immatriculer ce matériel chaque année conformément aux dispositions de la présente partie.

54. Il est interdit d'utiliser à un aéroport du matériel qui n'a pas été immatriculé conformément à la présente partie.

55. Les articles 53 et 54 ne s'appliquent pas au matériel utilisé exclusivement sur les aéroports et qui est loué au Ministère par le propriétaire du matériel.

56. (1) Les demandes d'immatriculation de matériel doivent être présentées en la forme prescrite par le Ministre et elles doivent être remises, accompagnées du droit prescrit dans la présente partie, au directeur de l'aéroport où le matériel sera utilisé.

(2) Dès la réception de la demande et du droit mentionnés au paragraphe (1), le directeur de l'aéroport peut, s'il est d'avis que le matériel visé par la demande d'immatriculation peut être utilisé en toute sécurité à l'aéroport, délivrer un certificat d'immatriculation à l'égard de ce matériel.

Droit

57. (1) Sous réserve des dispositions du paragraphe (2), le droit annuel d'immatriculation exigible à l'égard de tout matériel est de quinze dollars, ou le montant obtenu en multipliant par quinze dollars le poids brut du matériel (exprimé en milliers de livres) en prenant le plus élevé de ces montants.

(2) Lorsque le matériel est immatriculé après le trente juin d'une année d'immatriculation, le droit d'immatriculation exigible sera la moitié du droit annuel prescrit au paragraphe (1).

58. (1) Si du matériel immatriculé à un aéroport est remplacé par du matériel du même genre, il doit être payé au directeur dudit aéroport

a) un droit d'immatriculation de cinq dollars, s'il s'agit de matériel d'un poids brut équivalent ou inférieur à celui du matériel remplacé; ou

b) un droit d'immatriculation égal au montant obtenu ou en multipliant par quinze dollars la différence entre le poids brut du matériel remplacé et celui de l'autre matériel, exprimée en milliers de livres, si l'autre matériel est d'un poids brut supérieur à celui du matériel remplacé.

(2) Le certificat d'immatriculation de tout matériel qui est remplacé à un aéroport doit être remis au directeur dudit aéroport.

59. En cas de vente ou de cession de matériel immatriculé en vertu de la présente partie, le nouveau propriétaire du matériel doit, avant de l'utiliser sur un aéroport, en aviser le directeur dudit aéroport et ce dernier peut,

a) contre paiement d'un droit de cinq dollars par le nouveau propriétaire,

- (b) on surrender of the registration certificate previously issued for that equipment to the previous owner, and
(c) upon being satisfied that the equipment may be safely operated at the airport,

issue a new registration certificate for the equipment.

60. Where a certificate of registration for any equipment is lost, a duplicate certificate may be issued by the airport manager on payment of a fee of five dollars.

61. The Minister or airport manager may exempt any equipment or class of equipment from the provisions of this Part.

62. Certificates of registration for any equipment shall be carried at all times on the equipment and shall be produced for examination upon request by a constable or by a duly authorized representative of the Department.

63. Any person who contravenes any provision of this Part is guilty of an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars.

PART IV

CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT ON APRONS

Interpretation

64. In this Part,

“apron traffic control clearance” means authorization by an apron traffic control unit for an aircraft to proceed on a controlled apron; (*autorisation du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic*)

“apron traffic control instruction” means a directive issued by an apron traffic control unit for airport apron traffic and gate control purposes; (*instruction du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic*)

“apron traffic control unit” means staff at an airport that provides apron traffic control service at the airport and includes the staff of a mobile control vehicle; (*organe du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic*)

“controlled apron” means an apron at an airport where apron traffic control service is provided; (*aire de trafic contrôlée*)

“operator”, in respect of an aircraft, means the person in possession of the aircraft, whether as owner, lessee, hirer or otherwise, and in section 68 includes the person in whose name the aircraft is registered; (*exploitant*)

“owner” has the same meaning as in the *Air Regulations*; (*propriétaire*)

“park” means the standing of an aircraft, whether occupied or not; (*laisser en stationnement*)

“pilot-in-command” means the pilot responsible for the operation and safety of an aircraft. (*pilote commandant de bord*)

- b) sur remise du certificat d'immatriculation délivré au propriétaire précédent à l'égard de ce matériel, et
c) s'il estime que ce matériel peut être utilisé en toute sécurité sur ledit aéroport,

délivrer un nouveau certificat d'immatriculation à l'égard de ce matériel.

60. En cas de perte d'un certificat d'immatriculation, le directeur de l'aéroport peut délivrer un duplicata de ce certificat contre paiement d'un droit de cinq dollars.

61. Le Ministre ou le directeur de l'aéroport peut exempter tout matériel ou toute catégorie de matériel des dispositions de la présente partie.

62. Les certificats d'immatriculation de tout matériel doivent toujours accompagner ce matériel et ils doivent être présentés pour vérification à la demande d'un agent ou d'un représentant dûment autorisé du Ministère.

63. Quiconque contrevient aux dispositions de la présente partie est coupable d'une infraction et est passible, sur déclaration sommaire de culpabilité, d'une amende d'au plus cent dollars.

PARTIE IV

CONTRÔLE DE LA CIRCULATION DES AÉRONEFS SUR LES AIRES DE TRAFIC

Interprétation

64. Dans la présente partie,

«aire de trafic contrôlée» désigne une aire de trafic à un aéroport où le service de contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic est assuré; (*controlled apron*)

«autorisation du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic» s'entend d'une autorisation qu'un organe du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic donne à un aéronef pour lui permettre d'évoluer sur une aire de trafic contrôlée; (*apron traffic control clearance*)

«exploitant», en ce qui concerne les aéronefs, désigne la personne en possession de l'aéronef, que cette personne en soit propriétaire, preneur à bail, locataire ou autre, et, dans l'article 68, comprend la personne au nom de laquelle l'aéronef est immatriculé; (*operator*)

«instruction du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic» désigne une consigne émanant d'un organe du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic et ayant pour objet le contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic et jusqu'aux postes d'embarquement; (*apron traffic control instruction*)

«laisser en stationnement» signifie l'immobilisation d'un aéronef, qu'il soit occupé ou non; (*park*)

«organe du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic» désigne le personnel d'un aéroport qui assure le service de contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic de l'aéroport et comprend le personnel d'un véhicule de contrôle mobile; (*apron traffic control unit*)

«pilote commandant le bord» désigne le pilote responsable de la conduite et de la sécurité d'un aéronef; (*pilot-in-command*)

«propriétaire» a la même signification que dans le *Règlement de l'Air*. (*owner*)

General

Généralités

65. The operator or pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall
(a) maintain

- (i) a continuous watch on the radio frequencies designated for apron communications, or
- (ii) where a continuous radio watch is not possible, a watch for such instructions as may be issued by visual means from an apron traffic control unit;

(b) observe other apron traffic for the purpose of avoiding collision; and

(c) where an apron traffic control unit is in operation, obtained, either by radio or by visual signal, authorization for his movements from that unit.

66. No person shall operate or park an aircraft on an apron negligently, recklessly or in any other manner that endangers or is likely to endanger life or property.

67. (1) No person shall move or park an aircraft on a controlled apron except in compliance with an apron traffic control clearance or an apron traffic control instruction.

(2) The operator or pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall immediately, upon receipt of an apron traffic control clearance or an apron traffic control instruction, acknowledge that he has received that clearance or instruction.

68. No person shall park an aircraft on a controlled apron beyond the time limit set in the last apron traffic control instruction that was received by the operator or pilot-in-command before the aircraft was parked, or that is later issued by the apron traffic control unit and delivered to the owner or operator of the aircraft or the person in whose name the aircraft is registered.

69. (1) An airport manager may order that an aircraft parked at an airport be moved.

(2) The operator or pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall comply with any instructions or orders given to him by the airport manager pursuant to subsection (1).

(3) Where an aircraft is parked at an airport

- (a) beyond the time limit set by an apron traffic control unit,
- (b) in an unauthorized place, or
- (c) in a manner that obstructs traffic

the airport manager may, at the expense of the operator of the aircraft, cause the aircraft to be moved and if he deems it necessary for the protection of the aircraft, store it in a suitable place.

65. L'exploitant ou le pilote commandant de bord d'un aéronef doit

a) assurer

- (i) une veille permanente à l'écoute des fréquences radio assignées aux communications concernant l'aire de trafic, ou,
- (ii) si une veille radio permanente n'est pas possible, une veille qui permette de recevoir les instructions que peut communiquer par des moyens visuels un organe du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic;

b) observer les autres mouvements qui ont lieu sur l'aire de trafic afin d'éviter les collisions; et

c) obtenir de l'organe du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic, s'il s'en trouve un en activité, soit par radio, soit par signaux optiques, l'autorisation de manœuvrer.

66. Il est interdit de conduire un aéronef ou d'en laisser un en stationnement sur une aire de trafic d'une façon négligente ou imprudente ou qui expose ou soit susceptible d'exposer la vie ou des biens à un danger.

67. (1) Il est interdit de déplacer un aéronef ou d'en laisser un en stationnement sur une aire de trafic contrôlée si ce n'est conformément à une autorisation du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic ou à une instruction du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic.

(2) L'exploitant ou le pilote commandant de bord d'un aéronef doit immédiatement, dès réception d'une autorisation du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic ou d'une instruction du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic, accuser réception de cette autorisation ou de cette instruction.

68. Il est interdit de laisser un aéronef en stationnement sur une aire de trafic contrôlée au-delà de la durée maximale précisée dans la dernière instruction du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic que l'exploitant ou le pilote commandant de bord a reçue avant de laisser l'aéronef en stationnement, ou dans une instruction que l'organe du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic a donnée ultérieurement et a fait remettre au propriétaire ou à l'exploitant de l'aéronef ou à la personne au nom de laquelle l'aéronef est immatriculé.

69. (1) Le directeur d'un aéroport peut ordonner le déplacement d'un aéronef en stationnement sur l'aéroport.

(2) L'exploitant ou le pilote commandant de bord d'un aéronef doit se conformer aux instructions et aux directives qui lui sont données par le directeur d'un aéroport en vertu des dispositions du paragraphe (1).

(3) Lorsqu'un aéronef est laissé en stationnement dans un aéroport

- a) au-delà de la durée maximale autorisée par un organe du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic,
- b) à un endroit où le stationnement n'est pas autorisé, ou
- c) d'une façon qui gêne la circulation

le directeur d'un aéroport peut, aux frais de l'exploitant de l'aéronef, faire déplacer l'aéronef, et, s'il le juge nécessaire pour la protection de l'aéronef, le faire remiser en un lieu convenable.

70. (1) Subject to subsection (2), any person who contravenes any provision of this Part is guilty of an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than five hundred dollars or to imprisonment for six months or to both.

(2) Where a contravention of this Part relates to the parking of an aircraft, the penalty shall be a fine not exceeding fifty dollars.

70. (1) Sous réserve des dispositions du paragraphe (2), quiconque contrevient aux dispositions de la présente partie est coupable d'infraction et est passible, sur déclaration sommaire de culpabilité, d'une amende d'au plus cinq cents dollars ou d'un emprisonnement d'au plus six mois ou des deux peines à la fois.

(2) Lorsqu'une infraction aux dispositions de la présente partie concerne le stationnement d'un aéronef, la sanction sera une amende d'au plus cinquante dollars.

Registration
SOR/74-227 4 April, 1974

Enregistrement
DORS/74-227 4 avril 1974

AERONAUTICS ACT

LOI SUR L'AÉRONAUTIQUE

Civil Aviation Security Measures Order

Ordonnance sur les mesures de sécurité de l'aviation civile

The Minister of Transport, pursuant to the Aeronautics Act and the Civil Aviation Security Measures Regulations, is pleased hereby to make the annexed Order Respecting Civil Aviation Security Measures.

En vertu de la Loi sur l'aéronautique et du règlement concernant les mesures de sécurité en aviation civile, il plaît au ministre des Transports de rendre le décret suivant à l'égard des mesures de sécurité en aviation civile.

Dated at Ottawa, this 2nd day of April, 1974

Fait à Ottawa ce 2 avril 1974

JEAN MARCHAND
Minister of Transport

Le ministre des Transports
JEAN MARCHAND

ORDER RESPECTING CIVIL AVIATION
SECURITY MEASURES

ORDONNANCE CONCERNANT LES MESURES DE
SÉCURITÉ DE L'AVIATION CIVILE

Short Title

Titre abrégé

1. This Order may be cited as the *Civil Aviation Security Measures Order*.

1. La présente ordonnance peut être citée sous le titre: *Ordonnance sur les mesures de sécurité de l'aviation civile*.

Interpretation

Interprétation

2. In this Order,

2. Dans la présente ordonnance,

"aircraft" means an aeroplane of more than 12,500 pounds maximum certificated take-off weight that is used in a domestic or international scheduled or charter commercial air service;

«aéronef» s'entend d'un avion dont le poids maximal certifié au décollage est de plus de 12,500 livres et qui est utilisé en service aérien commercial à horaire fixe ou d'affrètement sur les lignes intérieures ou internationales;

"Minister" means the Minister of Transport;

«mesures de sécurité» s'entend des mesures de sécurité prescrites par l'article 3 du *Règlement sur les mesures de sécurité relatives à l'aviation civile*;

"owner or operator" means an air carrier named in the schedule to the *Civil Aviation Security Measures Regulations*;

«Ministre» désigne le ministre des Transports;

"security measures" means the security measures prescribed by section 3 of the *Civil Aviation Security Measures Regulations*.

«propriétaire ou exploitant» désigne l'un des transporteurs aériens nommés dans l'annexe du *Règlement sur les mesures de sécurité relatives à l'aviation civile*.

Submission of Security Measures

Présentation des mesures de sécurité adoptées

3. Every owner or operator of aircraft registered in Canada shall, within sixty days after this Order comes into force, submit to the Minister a written description of the security measures that it has established, is maintaining and is carrying out or that it intends to establish, maintain and carry out.

3. Tout propriétaire ou exploitant d'un aéronef immatriculé au Canada doit, dans les soixante jours qui suivent la date d'entrée en vigueur de la présente ordonnance, présenter par écrit au Ministre une description des mesures de sécurité qu'il a établies, qu'il maintient et met en œuvre ou qu'il entend établir, maintenir et mettre en œuvre.

Registration
SOR/74-226 4 April, 1974

Enregistrement
DORS/74-226 4 avril 1974

AERONAUTICS ACT

LOI SUR L'AÉRONAUTIQUE

Civil Aviation Security Measures Regulations

Règlement sur les mesures de sécurité relatives à l'aviation civile

P.C. 1974-786 2 April, 1974

C.P. 1974-786 2 avril 1974

His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Transport, pursuant to section 5.1 of the Aeronautics Act, is pleased hereby to make the annexed Regulations Respecting Civil Aviation Security Measures.

Sur avis conforme du ministre des Transports et en vertu de l'article 5.1 de la Loi sur l'aéronautique, il plaît à Son Excellence le Gouverneur général en conseil d'établir le Règlement concernant les mesures de sécurité relatives à l'aviation civile, ci-après.

REGULATIONS RESPECTING CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY MEASURES

RÈGLEMENT CONCERNANT LES MESURES DE SÉCURITÉ RELATIVES À L'AVIATION CIVILE

Short Title

Titre abrégé

1. These Regulations may be cited as the *Civil Aviation Security Measures Regulations*.

1. Le présent règlement peut être cité sous le titre: *Règlement sur les mesures de sécurité relatives à l'aviation civile*.

Interpretation

Interprétation

2. In these Regulations,
"Act" means the *Aeronautics Act*;
"aircraft" means an aeroplane of more than 12,500 pounds maximum certificated take-off weight that is used in a domestic or international scheduled or charter commercial air service;
"Minister" means the Minister of Transport;
"owner or operator" means an air carrier named in the schedule.

2. Dans le présent règlement,
«aéronef» s'entend d'un avion dont le poids maximal certifié au décollage est de plus de 12,500 livres et qui est utilisé en service aérien commercial à horaire fixe ou d'affrètement sur les lignes intérieures ou internationales;
«Loi» désigne la *Loi sur l'aéronautique*;
«Ministre» désigne le ministre des Transports;
«propriétaire ou exploitant» désigne l'un des transporteurs aériens nommés dans l'annexe.

Security Measures Required

Mesures de sécurité requises

3. (1) Every owner or operator of aircraft registered in Canada shall establish, maintain and carry out security measures at aerodromes consisting of
(a) systems of surveillance of persons, personal belongings, baggage, goods and cargo by persons or by mechanical or electronic devices;
(b) systems of searching persons, personal belongings, baggage, goods and cargo by persons or by mechanical or electronic devices;
(c) a system that provides, at aerodromes where facilities are available, for locked, closed or restricted areas that are inaccessible to any person other than a person who has been searched and the personnel of the owner or operator;
(d) a system that provides, at aerodromes where facilities are available, for check points at which persons intending to board the aircraft of an owner or operator can be searched;
(e) a system that provides, at aerodromes where facilities are available, for locked, closed or restricted areas in which cargo, goods and baggage that has been checked for

3. (1) Tout propriétaire ou exploitant d'un aéronef immatriculé au Canada doit établir, maintenir et mettre en œuvre aux aéroports des mesures de sécurité qui comprennent
a) des systèmes de surveillance des personnes, effets personnels, bagages, biens et marchandises, effectuée par des personnes ou des dispositifs mécaniques ou électroniques;
b) des systèmes de fouille des personnes, effets personnels, bagages, biens et marchandises, effectuée par des personnes ou des dispositifs mécaniques ou électroniques;
c) un système prévoyant l'aménagement, aux aéroports où les installations le permettent, d'espaces gardés sous clé, fermés ou d'accès interdit aux personnes qui n'ont pas été fouillées ou qui ne font pas partie du personnel relevant du propriétaire ou de l'exploitant;
d) un système prévoyant, aux aéroports où les installations le permettent, des points de vérification où les personnes qui s'appretiennent à monter à bord d'un aéronef appartenant au propriétaire ou à l'exploitant peuvent être fouillées;
e) un système prévoyant l'aménagement, aux aéroports où les installations le permettent, d'espaces gardés sous clé,

loading on aircraft are inaccessible to persons other than persons authorized by the owner or operator to have access to those areas;

(f) a system of identification that prevents baggage, goods and cargo from being placed on board aircraft if it is not authorized to be placed on board by the owner or operator; and

(g) a system of identification of surveillance and search personnel and the personnel of the owner or operator.

(2) Every owner or operator of aircraft registered in Canada shall establish, maintain and carry out security measures on aircraft consisting of systems of searching the aircraft and persons, personal belongings, baggage, goods and cargo thereon by persons or by mechanical or electronic devices.

Minister's Order

4. The Minister may, by order, require an owner or operator of aircraft registered in Canada to submit to the Minister, within such time as the order prescribes, a description of the security measures that he has established, is maintaining and is carrying out or that he intends to establish, maintain and carry out.

Authorized Search

5. An authorized search shall be carried out

(a) in accordance with the systems referred to in paragraph 3(1)(b) and subsection 3(2) that the owner or operator has established, is maintaining and is carrying out; and

(b) using reasonable force, if necessary.

SCHEDULE

Air Carriers

- Air Canada
- CP Air
- Eastern Provincial Airways (1963) Ltd.
- Nordair Ltd.—Nordair Ltée
- Pacific Western Airlines Ltd.
- Quebecair
- Transair Limited
- Wardair Canada Ltd.

fermés ou d'accès interdit, dans lesquels les marchandises, les biens et les bagages qui ont été inspectés avant leur chargement à bord d'un aéronef peuvent être placés et auxquels ne peuvent avoir accès que les personnes qui en ont reçu l'autorisation du propriétaire ou de l'exploitant;

f) un système d'identification permettant d'éviter que des bagages, des biens ou des marchandises ne soient placés à bord d'un aéronef sans autorisation préalable du propriétaire ou de l'exploitant; et

g) un système d'identification du personnel de surveillance et de fouille et du personnel relevant du propriétaire ou de l'exploitant.

(2) Tout propriétaire ou exploitant d'un aéronef immatriculé au Canada doit établir, maintenir et mettre en œuvre à bord de l'aéronef des mesures de sécurité qui comprennent des systèmes de fouille de l'appareil, des personnes et des effets personnels, bagages, biens et marchandises qui s'y trouvent, effectuée par des personnes ou des dispositifs mécaniques ou électroniques.

Ordonnance du Ministre

4. Le Ministre peut, par ordonnance, exiger que le propriétaire ou l'exploitant d'un aéronef immatriculé au Canada lui remette, dans le délai prescrit dans l'ordonnance, une description des mesures de sécurité qu'il a établies, qu'il maintient et met en œuvre ou qu'il entend établir, maintenir et mettre en œuvre.

Fouille autorisée

5. Une fouille autorisée doit être effectuée

a) conformément aux systèmes mentionnés à l'alinéa 3(1)b) et au paragraphe 3(2) et que le propriétaire ou exploitant a établis, maintient et met en œuvre; et

b) en ayant recours à la force d'une manière raisonnable, au besoin.

ANNEXE

Transporteurs aériens

- Air Canada
- CP Air
- Eastern Provincial Airways (1963) Ltd.
- Nordair Ltd.—Nordair Ltée
- Pacific Western Airlines Ltd.
- Québecair
- Transair Limited
- Wardair Canada Ltd.



Transport
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Air

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RESTRICTED

12th February 1974

AVIATION NOTICE

RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR ESCORTING PRISONERS ABOARD AIR CARRIER AIRCRAFT

1. Prior to escorting a prisoner(s) aboard an air carrier aircraft, law enforcement officer(s) will notify a responsible representative of the air carrier, i.e., the duty supervisor in charge of the passenger counter, or the duty supervisor in charge of passenger service in the case of larger stations, or the station manager or acting station manager in case of smaller stations.
2. An air carrier should not accept a prisoner(s) for interline transportation unless concurrence has been obtained, in advance, from the other air carrier(s) involved. The booking air carrier should include in its booking message the name and identification of the prisoner(s) and the escorting officer(s).
3. A prisoner will not be transported unless he is escorted by one or more officers.
4. A prisoner considered by law enforcement agencies to be dangerous will not be transported unless he is escorted by one or more officers and he is securely restrained throughout the flight.
5. An escorting officer(s) will, upon boarding the aircraft, adequately identify himself to the flight attendants and will request that his presence on board be transmitted, as soon as possible, to the pilot-in-command and acknowledged.
6. Whenever possible, the escorting officer(s) and prisoner(s) will board the aircraft in advance of other passengers as "pre-boards".
7. Whenever possible, the escorting officer(s) and prisoner(s) will be assigned the rearmost seats in the aircraft.
8. Under no circumstances will a prisoner be seated adjacent to any normal or emergency exit. He will not be permitted to leave his seat without an escort.
9. Whenever possible, at least one officer will be seated between the prisoner and the aisle unless aircraft seating configuration prevents this arrangement.
10. The prisoner(s) will be escorted when a visit to the lavatory is necessary.
11. No intoxicating beverages will be served the escorting officer(s) or the prisoner(s) while on board the aircraft.
12. The prisoner(s) may be served food at the discretion of the escorting officer(s).



Transport
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RESTRAINT

12 février 1974

AVIS AUX AVIATEURS

PROCEDURES RECOMMANDEES POUR L' ESCORTE DE PRISONNIERS A BORD D' AERONEFS APPARTENANT A DES COMPAGNIES AERIENNES

1. Avant d'escorter un ou plusieurs prisonniers à bord d'un aéronef appartenant à une compagnie aérienne, le ou les agents de la force publique avertiront un représentant de la compagnie qui sera soit le responsable du comptoir des passagers, soit le responsable du service des passagers dans le cas d'une aéro-gare importante, soit le directeur de l'aéro-gare ou le directeur par intérim dans le cas d'aéro-gares de moindre importance.
2. Un transporteur aérien n'acceptera de transporter un ou plusieurs prisonniers sur un parcours nécessitant l'emprunt de plusieurs compagnies aériennes qu'après avoir obtenu l'accord de ces compagnies. La compagnie chargée de la réservation notera sur le bulletin de réservation le nom et le signalement du ou des prisonniers et du ou des agents chargés d'assurer l'escorte.
3. Un prisonnier ne sera transporté qu'à la condition d'être escorté par un ou plusieurs agents.
4. Un prisonnier reconnu dangereux par les tribunaux ne sera transporté qu'à la condition qu'il soit escorté par un ou plusieurs agents et mis hors d'état de nuire pendant toute la durée du vol.
5. Un agent chargé d'escorter un prisonnier se présentera au personnel de cabine dès qu'il sera monté à bord de l'appareil et demandera que sa présence à bord soit connue du pilote commandant de bord le plus tôt possible.
6. Chaque fois que cela sera possible, le ou les agents d'escorte et le ou les prisonniers embarqueront à bord de l'appareil avant les autres passagers en tant que "passagers pré-embarqués".
7. Chaque fois que cela sera possible, le ou les agents d'escorte et le ou les prisonniers occuperont les sièges situés tout à l'arrière de l'appareil.
8. En aucun cas, un prisonnier n'occupera un siège situé à proximité d'une porte d'accès ou d'une issue de secours. Il ne pourra quitter son siège sans être accompagné de l'agent chargé de l'escorté.
9. Chaque fois que cela sera possible, un agent au moins s'assiera entre le prisonnier et le couloir de l'avion sauf si la disposition des sièges de l'appareil empêche cet arrangement.
10. Le ou les prisonniers devront être accompagnés pour se rendre aux toilettes.
11. Aucune boisson alcoolique ne sera servie aux prisonniers ou aux agents d'escorte durant le vol.

13. Escorting officer(s) will be equipped with adequate restraining devices to be used in the event the prisoner(s) becomes unruly.
14. Whenever possible, the escorting officer(s) and the prisoner(s) will deplane after the terminating passengers leave the aircraft.
15. An air carrier may refuse to accept a prisoner if, in the judgement of a responsible representative of the air carrier, such acceptance might jeopardize the safety of other passengers.
16. An escorting officer(s) will not carry mace, tear gas, or similar incapacitating gas-generating devices aboard aircraft.
17. An escorting officer(s) will ensure that a prisoner(s) does not carry contraband, weapons, matches, or other potentially dangerous items aboard an air carrier aircraft.
18. An escorting officer(s) will be apprised, by his superiors, of the potential danger to the safe operation of the aircraft should he take any action during a hijacking attempt without direction from the pilot-in-command.
19. Under normal circumstances a prisoner(s) will not be shackled to any part of the aircraft, including seats, tables, etc.

W.M. McLeish.

W.M. McLeish,
Director General, Civil Aeronautics

12. Il est permis de servir à manger aux prisonniers si le ou les agents d'escorte le jugent à propos.
13. Le ou les agents d'escorte seront munis d'appareils de coercition qu'ils pourront utiliser si un ou plusieurs prisonniers deviennent trop turbulents.
14. Chaque fois que cela sera possible, le ou les prisonniers et le ou les agents d'escorte quitteront l'appareil après que les passagers arrivés à destination auront eux-mêmes débarqué.
15. Un transporteur aérien est en droit de refuser d'acheminer un prisonnier si l'un des responsables de la compagnie estime que cela risque de mettre en danger la sécurité des autres passagers.
16. Le ou les agents d'escorte ne pourront transporter à bord de l'aéronef ni matraque, ni gaz lacrymogènes ni aucun appareil dégageant un gaz inhibant.
17. Le ou les agents d'escorte s'assureront que le ou les prisonniers ne transportent pas d'objets prohibés, ou d'armes, ou d'allumettes ou encore d'autres objets pouvant présenter un danger à bord de l'aéronef.
18. Le ou les agents d'escorte seront avisés par leurs supérieures du danger qu'ils feraient courir à l'appareil si, en cas de tentative de détournement, ils s'avisaient d'agir sans attendre les consignes du pilote commandant de bord.
19. Dans des circonstances normales, le ou les prisonniers ne seront pas attachés à quelque partie que ce soit de la cabine, notamment aux sièges ou aux tables etc.

W.M. McLeish,



Directeur Général, Aéronautique Civile

Registration

SOR/74-469 2 August, 1974

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT ACT
GOVERNMENT PROPERTY TRAFFIC ACT

Airport Traffic Regulations

P.C. 1974-1753 30 July, 1974

His Excellency the Administrator in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Transport, pursuant to section 25 of the Department of Transport Act and section 2 of the Government Property Traffic Act, is pleased hereby to revoke the Airport Vehicle Control Regulations made by Order in Council P.C. 1964-1326 of 25th August, 1964¹ and to make the annexed Regulations respecting the control of motor vehicles, pedestrians, aircraft and equipment at airports in substitution therefor, effective August 15, 1974.

REGULATIONS RESPECTING THE CONTROL OF
MOTOR VEHICLES, PEDESTRIANS, AIRCRAFT AND
EQUIPMENT AT AIRPORTS

Short Title

1. These Regulations may be cited as the *Airport Traffic Regulations*.

Interpretation

2. In these Regulations,

"aerodrome" means an area of land, water (including the frozen surface thereof) or other supporting surface used, designed, prepared, equipped or set apart for use either in whole or in part for the arrival, departure, movement or servicing of aircraft and includes any buildings, installations and equipment used in connection therewith; (*aérodrome*)

"aircraft" means any machine used or designed for navigation in the air but does not include a machine designed to derive support in the atmosphere from reactions against the earth's surface of air expelled from the machine; (*aéronef*)

"airport" means an aerodrome for which an airport licence has been issued by the Minister; (*aéroport*)

"airport manager" means the Department of Transport official in charge of the airport or his duly authorized representative; (*directeur d'aéroport*)

"animal" means any domestic animal and includes poultry; (*animal*)

"apron" means that part of an airport, other than the manoeuvring area, intended to accommodate the loading and unloading of passengers and cargo, the refuelling, servicing, maintenance and parking of aircraft and the movement of aircraft, vehicles and pedestrians to allow execution of those functions; (*aire de trafic*)

¹ SOR/64-354, *Canada Gazette* Part II, Vol. 98, No. 17, September 9, 1964

Enregistrement

DORS/74-469 2 août 1974

LOI SUR LE MINISTÈRE DES TRANSPORTS
LOI RELATIVE À LA CIRCULATION SUR LES
TERRAINS DU GOUVERNEMENT

Règlement sur la circulation aux aéroports

C.P. 1974-1753 30 juillet 1974

Sur avis conforme du ministre des Transports et en vertu de l'article 25 de la Loi sur le ministère des Transports et de l'article 2 de la Loi relative à la circulation sur les terrains du gouvernement, il plaît à Son Excellence l'Administrateur en conseil d'abroger le Règlement sur la conduite des véhicules sur les aéroports, établi par le décret C.P. 1964-1326 du 25 août 1964¹ et d'établir, à compter du 15 août 1974, le Règlement concernant le contrôle de la circulation des véhicules à moteur, des piétons, des aéronefs et du matériel aux aéroports, ci-après.

RÈGLEMENT CONCERNANT LE CONTRÔLE DE LA
CIRCULATION DES VÉHICULES À MOTEUR, DES
PIÉTONS, DES AÉRONEFS ET DU MATÉRIEL
AUX AÉROPORTS

Titre abrégé

1. Le présent règlement peut être cité sous le titre: *Règlement sur la circulation aux aéroports*.

Interprétation

2. Dans le présent règlement,

«aérodrome» désigne une étendue de terre ou d'eau (y compris la surface gelée d'une étendue d'eau) ou toute autre surface d'appui utilisée, conçue, préparée, équipée ou destinée à être utilisée, en totalité ou en partie, pour l'arrivée, le départ, les manœuvres ou l'entretien courant des aéronefs et comprend les bâtiments, les installations et le matériel utilisés à ces fins; (*aerodrome*)

«aéronef» désigne toute machine utilisée ou conçue pour la navigation aérienne, mais ne comprend pas une machine conçue pour se maintenir dans l'atmosphère grâce à la réaction, sur la surface de la terre, de l'air expulsé par la machine; (*aircraft*)

«aéroport» désigne un aérodrome pour lequel le Ministre a délivré un permis d'aéroport; (*airport*)

«agent» désigne

- a) un membre de la Gendarmerie royale du Canada,
- b) un membre de la sûreté provinciale ou municipale, et
- c) toute personne autorisée par le Ministre à faire observer le présent règlement; (*constable*)

«aire de manœuvre» désigne la partie d'un aéroport ordinairement utilisée pour le décollage et l'atterrissage des aéronefs et pour les manœuvres se rattachant au décollage

¹ DORS/64-354, *Gazette du Canada* Partie II, Vol. 98, n° 17, 9 septembre 1964

"apron traffic" means all aircraft, vehicles, pedestrians and equipment utilizing the apron area of the airport; (*trafic de l'aire de trafic*)

"commercial passenger vehicle" means any taxi, bus or other vehicle used or intended for use in the transportation of persons for compensation; (*véhicule commercial pour passager*)

"constable" means

- (a) a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police;
- (b) a member of a provincial or municipal police force, and
- (c) any person authorized by the Minister to enforce these Regulations; (*agent*)

"cross-walk" means

- (a) any portion of a road, apron or other area designated by a sign or surface marking as a pedestrian crossing, and
- (b) that part of a road at an intersection that is included within the connections of the lateral lines of the sidewalks on opposite sides of the road or, in the absence of curbs, from the edges of the road; (*passage pour piétons*)

"Department" means the Department of Transport; (*Ministère*)

"driver" means a person who is driving or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle or bicycle; (*conducteur*)

"intersection" means the area embraced within the prolongation or connection of the lateral curb lines or, in the absence of curb lines, of the lateral boundary lines of two or more roads that join one another at an angle whether or not one road crosses the other; (*carrefour*)

"loading area" means any portion of an airport designated by a sign and made available to the public for loading or unloading; (*aire d'embarquement*)

"manoeuvring area" means that part of an airport ordinarily used for the take-off and landing of aircraft and for the movement of aircraft associated with the take-off and landing, but does not include the apron; (*aire de manœuvre*)

"Minister" means the Minister of Transport; (*Ministre*)

"motor vehicle" means an automobile, over-snow vehicle, truck, bus or any self-propelled vehicle or device in, upon or by which a person or property is or may be transported, carried or conveyed upon land and includes a machine designed to derive support in the atmosphere from reactions against the earth's surface of air expelled from the machine; (*véhicule à moteur*)

"over-snow vehicle" means a vehicle that is capable of being propelled or driven otherwise than by muscular power, that runs on tracks or skis or on tracks and skis and that is designed for operation on snow or ice; (*autoneige*)

"owner", with respect to a motor vehicle, means a person who holds legal title to it or a person in whose name it is or is required to be registered by the laws of a province and includes a conditional purchaser, lessee or mortgagor who is entitled to or is in possession of the motor vehicle; (*propriétaire*)

"park" means the standing of a motor vehicle whether occupied or not, except for the purpose of and while actually engaged in loading or unloading passengers or goods; (*laisser en stationnement*)

"parking meter" means an automatic or other mechanical device erected for the purpose of controlling the parking of

ou à l'atterrissage, à l'exclusion des aires de trafic; (*manœuvring area*)

«aire d'embarquement» désigne toute partie d'un aéroport, désignée par un écriteau et accessible au public pour l'embarquement ou le débarquement; (*loading area*)

«aire de trafic» désigne la partie d'un aéroport autre que l'aire de manœuvre, destinée à l'embarquement et au débarquement des voyageurs, au chargement et au déchargement du fret, au ravitaillement en carburant, à l'entretien courant et technique et au stationnement des aéronefs ainsi qu'aux mouvements des aéronefs, des véhicules et des piétons devant permettre l'exécution de ces fonctions; (*apron*)

«animal» désigne tout animal domestique et comprend la volaille; (*animal*)

«autoneige» désigne un véhicule qui peut être propulsé ou conduit autrement que par un effort musculaire, se déplaçant sur des chenilles ou des skis ou sur des chenilles et des skis et qui est conçu pour être conduit sur la neige ou la glace; (*over-snow vehicle*)

«carrefour» désigne l'aire d'une route comprise entre les prolongements ou les lieux de rencontre des lignes des trottoirs latéraux ou, s'il n'y en a pas, des lignes latérales limitant deux routes ou plus qui se rejoignent à un angle, que les routes se croisent ou non; (*intersection*)

«conducteur» désigne une personne qui conduit un véhicule à moteur ou une bicyclette ou qui en a effectivement le contrôle; (*driver*)

«directeur d'aéroport» désigne le fonctionnaire du ministère des Transports chargé de l'aéroport ou son représentant dûment autorisé; (*airport manager*)

«emplacement de stationnement» désigne la partie d'un aéroport dont l'usage pour le stationnement des véhicules à moteur est réglé par un parcomètre; (*parking space*)

«laisser en stationnement» signifie arrêter un véhicule, occupé ou non, sauf pour embarquer ou débarquer des passagers ou des marchandises; (*park*)

«Ministère» désigne le ministère des Transports; (*Department*)

«Ministre» désigne le ministre des Transports; (*Minister*)

«parcomètre» désigne un appareil automatique ou un autre appareil mécanique installé pour régler le stationnement d'un véhicule à moteur dans un emplacement de stationnement et pour mesurer et enregistrer la durée du stationnement; (*parking meter*)

«passage pour piétons» désigne

a) toute partie de route, d'aire de trafic ou d'une autre zone signalisée comme passage pour piétons par des écriteaux ou des marques au sol, et

b) la partie d'une route qui, à une intersection, est comprise entre les prolongements des lignes latérales des trottoirs situés aux côtés opposés de la route ou, s'il n'y a pas de trottoir, à partir des bords de la route; (*cross-walk*)

«pièce d'identité valable» désigne un document délivré par le directeur de l'aéroport et autorisant son titulaire à avoir accès à une zone réglementée de l'aéroport; (*valid identification*)

«piéton» désigne une personne à pied et comprend un invalide dans un fauteuil roulant ou un enfant dans un landau; (*pedestrian*)

any motor vehicle in a parking space and for measuring and recording the duration of such parking; (*parcomètre*)

“parking space” means a part of an airport used for parking motor vehicles and controlled by a parking meter; (*emplacement de stationnement*)

“pedestrian” means a person on foot and includes an invalid or child in a wheelchair or carriage; (*piéton*)

“restricted area” means an area of an airport designated by a sign as an area access to which by persons or vehicles requires the production of valid identification; (*zone réglementée*)

“road” includes any highway, street or place designed and intended for or used for the passage of motor vehicles; (*route*)

“sidewalk” means that part of a road or apron that is constructed for the use of pedestrians; (*trottoir*)

“valid identification” means a document issued by the airport manager authorizing the holder to have access to a restricted area of the airport. (*pièce d'identité valable*)

Application

3. These Regulations apply to every airport under the administration and control of the Minister and the roads thereon.

Enforcement

4. The Minister may authorize any person to act as a constable to enforce these Regulations.

PART I

OPERATION OF MOTOR VEHICLES

Prohibition

5. (1) No person shall operate a motor vehicle on an airport unless

(a) he holds all licences and permits that he is, by the laws of the province and the municipality in which the airport is situated, required to hold in order to operate the motor vehicle in that province and municipality; and

(b) the motor vehicle is registered and equipped as required by the laws of the province and the municipality in which the airport is situated.

(2) For the purpose of these Regulations, a provincial certificate of motor vehicle registration shall be *prima facie* proof of ownership of the motor vehicle.

«propriétaire», employé à l'égard d'un véhicule à moteur, désigne une personne au nom de laquelle le véhicule est ou doit être immatriculé en vertu des lois d'une province, et comprend l'acheteur dans le cas d'une vente sous condition, un locataire ou un *mortgagor* qui a droit à la possession du véhicule à moteur ou qui en a la possession; (*owner*)

«route» comprend une route, rue ou place désignée et conçue pour être utilisée ou utilisée pour la circulation de véhicules à moteur; (*road*)

«trafic de l'aire de trafic» désigne tous les aéronefs, véhicules, piétons et matériel utilisant l'aire de trafic de l'aéroport; (*apron traffic*)

«trottoir» désigne la partie d'une route ou d'une aire de trafic qui est construite pour l'usage des piétons; (*sidewalk*)

«véhicule à moteur» désigne une automobile, une autoneige, un camion, un autobus ou tout autre véhicule ou appareil autopropulsé dans lequel, sur lequel ou au moyen duquel une personne ou une chose est ou peut être transportée, portée ou déplacée sur terre, y compris une machine conçue pour se maintenir dans l'atmosphère grâce à la réaction, sur la surface de la terre, de l'air expulsé par la machine; (*motor vehicle*)

«véhicule commercial pour passager» désigne tout taxi, autobus ou autre véhicule utilisé ou destiné à être utilisé pour le transport rémunéré des personnes; (*commercial passenger vehicle*)

«zone réglementée» désigne une aire d'aéroport signalisée par un écriteau comme étant une zone dont l'accès pour les personnes ou véhicules est subordonné à la présentation de pièces d'identité valables. (*restricted area*)

Application

3. Le présent règlement s'applique à tout aéroport soumis à l'administration et au contrôle du Ministre ainsi qu'à toutes les routes qui s'y trouvent.

Observation

4. Le Ministre peut autoriser toute personne à remplir les fonctions d'agent pour faire observer le présent règlement.

PARTIE I

CONDUITE DES VÉHICULES À MOTEUR

Interdiction

5. (1) Il est interdit de conduire un véhicule à moteur sur un aéroport à moins

a) d'être titulaire de toutes les licences et de tous les permis que les lois de la province et les règlements de la municipalité où est situé l'aéroport obligent à posséder pour la conduite de ce véhicule à moteur dans cette province et cette municipalité; et

b) que le véhicule à moteur ne soit immatriculé et équipé conformément aux lois de la province et aux règlements de la municipalité où est situé l'aéroport.

(2) Aux fins du présent règlement, un certificat provincial d'immatriculation de véhicule à moteur crée une présomption jusqu'à preuve du contraire du droit de propriété du véhicule à moteur.

Compliance with Provincial and Municipal Laws

6. (1) No person shall operate a motor vehicle on an airport otherwise than in accordance with the laws of the province and the municipality in which the airport is situated.

(2) In this Part, the expression "laws of the province and the municipality" does not include laws that are inconsistent with or repugnant to any of the provisions of the *Government Property Traffic Act* or these Regulations.

Traffic Signs and Devices

7. (1) The Minister may mark or erect or cause to be marked or erected on any airport traffic signs or devices

- (a) prescribing the rate of speed;
- (b) regulating or prohibiting parking and designating parking, loading or restricted areas;
- (c) prescribing load limits for any motor vehicle or class of motor vehicles;
- (d) prohibiting or regulating the use of any road or place by any motor vehicle or class of motor vehicles, or by persons or animals;
- (e) designating any road as a one-way road;
- (f) stopping motor vehicles;
- (g) regulating pedestrian traffic; and
- (h) directing or controlling in any other manner traffic on the airport.

(2) Except as authorized by subsection (1), no person shall mark or erect any traffic sign or device on any airport.

8. Any traffic sign or device on any airport bearing the words "Department of Transport", "Ministère des Transports", or an abbreviation thereof, or purporting to have been erected by or under the authority of the Minister, shall be deemed *prima facie* to have been erected pursuant to this Part.

9. The driver of a motor vehicle on an airport shall obey the instruction of any traffic sign or device applicable to that driver or motor vehicle.

Traffic Direction and Control

10. No person shall, on an airport, drive

- (a) a motor vehicle other than an over-snow vehicle, except on a road; or
- (b) an over-snow vehicle except with the permission of the airport manager.

11. (1) The driver of a motor vehicle on an airport shall comply with any traffic directions given to him by a constable.

(2) A constable may, for the purpose of ensuring the orderly movement of all traffic on an airport, direct or control such traffic.

Observation des lois provinciales et des règlements municipaux

6. (1) Il est interdit de conduire un véhicule à moteur sur un aéroport, si ce n'est conformément aux lois de la province et aux règlements de la municipalité où l'aéroport est situé.

(2) Dans la présente partie, l'expression «lois de la province et règlements de la municipalité» ne comprend pas les lois ou règlements incompatibles avec les dispositions de la *Loi relative à la circulation sur les terrains du gouvernement* ou du présent règlement.

Signalisation

7. (1) Le Ministre peut installer ou faire installer sur tout aéroport des panneaux ou des dispositifs de signalisation pour

- a) prescrire la vitesse;
- b) réglementer ou interdire le stationnement et désigner des aires de stationnement, des aires d'embarquement ou des zones réglementées;
- c) prescrire des limites de charge applicables à tout véhicule à moteur ou à toute catégorie de véhicules à moteur;
- d) interdire ou réglementer l'usage d'une route ou d'un endroit par tout véhicule à moteur ou toute catégorie de véhicules à moteur ou par des personnes ou des animaux;
- e) désigner une route comme route à sens unique;
- f) arrêter les véhicules à moteur;
- g) réglementer la circulation des piétons; et
- h) diriger ou contrôler de toute autre manière la circulation sur l'aéroport.

(2) Sauf autorisation prévue au paragraphe (1), il est interdit d'installer sur un aéroport des panneaux ou des dispositifs de signalisation quels qu'ils soient.

8. Les panneaux ou dispositifs de signalisation qui sont installés sur un aéroport, qui portent les mots «Ministère des Transports», «Department of Transport», en entier ou en abrégé, ou qui sont donnés comme ayant été installés par le Ministre ou sur son autorisation, sont censés avoir été installés conformément à la présente partie.

9. Le conducteur d'un véhicule à moteur sur un aéroport doit suivre les instructions que donnent les panneaux ou les dispositifs de signalisation et qui sont applicables à lui ou au véhicule à moteur.

Réglementation de la circulation

10. Il est interdit, sur un aéroport, de conduire

- a) un véhicule à moteur autre qu'une autoneige ailleurs que sur une route; ou
- b) une autoneige sans l'autorisation du directeur de l'aéroport.

11. (1) Le conducteur d'un véhicule à moteur sur un aéroport doit se conformer aux directives de circulation que lui donne un agent.

(2) Un agent peut, afin d'assurer un écoulement ordonné de la circulation sur un aéroport, diriger ou réglementer cette circulation.

12. Every person on an airport shall produce to a constable upon demand

- (a) any permit issued to him under this Part;
- (b) any licence or permit he holds authorizing him to drive a motor vehicle; and
- (c) any certificate of registration referred to in subsection 5(2).

13. Every driver of a motor vehicle who is directly or indirectly involved in an accident on an airport shall

- (a) report the accident forthwith as required by the laws of the province in which the accident occurred; and
- (b) if any property of Her Majesty is damaged by the accident, report the accident forthwith to a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the airport manager.

14. No person shall operate or park a motor vehicle

- (a) on an apron unless he has the permission of the airport manager; or
- (b) in any area designated by a sign as a restricted area unless he is in possession of valid identification.

15. Where an apron traffic control unit, as defined in Part IV, has been established at an airport, the operator of a motor vehicle on the apron shall acknowledge and obey any instruction received from the unit.

Parking

16. No person shall park a motor vehicle in any area designated by a sign as an area in which parking is prohibited.

17. No person shall, without the permission of the Minister, park a motor vehicle on any portion of an airport that is grassed or that is not intended for the use of motor vehicles.

18. No person shall park a motor vehicle in a place designated by a sign as a loading area.

19. No driver of a commercial passenger vehicle shall load or unload passengers at an airport except in an area designated by a sign as an area in which passenger loading or unloading is permitted.

20. Where an area is designated by a sign as an area in which parking is reserved for persons holding permits or tickets, or as an area in which parking is prohibited except under a permit, no person shall park a motor vehicle in that area unless

- (a) he holds a permit authorizing him to park in that area;
- (b) where an identifying label or ticket has been issued with the permit, the label or ticket is affixed to and exposed on the lower right corner of the windshield of the motor vehicle; and

12. Sur un aéroport, une personne doit présenter à un agent, sur demande,

- a) tout permis qui lui a été délivré en vertu de la présente partie;
- b) toute licence ou tout permis l'autorisant à conduire un véhicule à moteur, dont elle est titulaire; et
- c) tout certificat d'immatriculation dont il est question au paragraphe 5(2).

13. Tout conducteur d'un véhicule à moteur qui est directement ou indirectement impliqué dans un accident sur un aéroport doit

- a) signaler immédiatement l'accident, conformément aux lois de la province dans laquelle l'accident s'est produit; et
- b) si l'accident a causé des dommages aux biens de Sa Majesté, signaler immédiatement l'accident à un membre de la Gendarmerie royale du Canada ou au directeur de l'aéroport.

14. Il est interdit de conduire ou de laisser en stationnement un véhicule à moteur

- a) sur une aire de trafic sans l'autorisation du directeur de l'aéroport; ou
- b) sur toute aire désignée par un écriteau comme zone réglementée à moins d'être en possession de pièces d'identité valables.

15. Lorsqu'un organe du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic, défini dans la partie IV, a été établi dans un aéroport, le conducteur d'un véhicule à moteur se trouvant sur l'aire de trafic doit accuser réception de toute instruction reçue de cet organe et s'y conformer.

Stationnement

16. Il est interdit de laisser un véhicule à moteur en stationnement dans une zone désignée par un écriteau comme une zone où le stationnement est interdit.

17. Il est interdit, sauf sur autorisation du Ministre, de laisser un véhicule à moteur en stationnement sur une partie gazonnée de l'aéroport ou sur toute partie qui n'est pas destinée à être utilisée par des véhicules à moteur.

18. Il est interdit de laisser un véhicule à moteur en stationnement dans un endroit désigné par un écriteau comme étant une aire d'embarquement.

19. Il est interdit au conducteur d'un véhicule commercial pour passagers d'embarquer ou de débarquer des passagers à un aéroport sauf dans une zone désignée par un écriteau comme une zone où l'embarquement ou le débarquement des passagers est autorisé.

20. Lorsqu'une zone est désignée comme zone de stationnement réservée à l'usage des détenteurs de permis ou de billets ou comme zone où il est interdit de stationner sans permis, nul ne doit laisser un véhicule à moteur en stationnement dans cette zone, sauf

- a) s'il possède un permis qui l'autorise à stationner dans ladite zone;
- b) si, dans le cas où une vignette ou un billet d'identification a été délivré avec le permis cette vignette ou ce billet est apposé bien en évidence dans l'angle inférieur droit du pare-brise du véhicule à moteur; et

(c) he parks the motor vehicle in accordance with the terms of his permit.

21. Where an area is designated by a sign as an area in which parking is permitted for a period of time, no person shall park a motor vehicle in that area for any greater period of time than that indicated on the sign.

22. Where an area is designated by a sign as an area in which parking is prohibited during certain hours, no person shall park a motor vehicle in that area during the hours when parking is prohibited.

23. Where an area is designated by a sign as an area in which parking is permitted in parking spaces located adjacent to parking meters, no person shall park a motor vehicle in such a parking space unless that person pays for use of the parking space by depositing in the parking meter immediately adjacent thereto the fee stipulated on such meter with respect to the use of that space.

24. No person shall allow a motor vehicle to remain parked in a parking space beyond the maximum period stipulated on the parking meter with respect to the use of that space.

25. Subject to section 27, where an area is designated by a sign as an area in which parking is permitted in parking spaces, no person shall park in that area except within a parking space.

26. Subject to section 27, no person shall park a motor vehicle in a parking space regulated by a parking meter in such a manner that the motor vehicle is not wholly within the space designated as the parking space for use with respect to that parking meter.

27. Where a motor vehicle is longer or wider than one parking space, the required deposit shall be placed in each parking meter that regulates a space or any part of a space occupied by that vehicle.

28. No person shall deposit in a parking meter any coin other than a coin that is current in Canada or the United States.

29. For the purposes of section 28, "current" means lawfully current in Canada or the United States by virtue of a law, proclamation or regulation in force in Canada or the United States, as the case may be.

30. Where an area is designated as an area in which parking is reserved for a class of persons, no person shall park in that area unless he is a member of that class.

31. (1) The Minister may issue or authorize the issue of permits and labels for the purposes of this Part.

(2) The Minister or a person authorized by him may at any time revoke a permit issued under this Part.

c) s'il laisse le véhicule à moteur en stationnement conformément aux conditions de son permis.

21. Lorsqu'une zone est désignée par un écriteau comme zone où le stationnement est autorisé pour une période de temps déterminé, il est interdit de laisser un véhicule à moteur en stationnement dans cette zone au delà de la période indiquée sur l'écriteau.

22. Lorsqu'une zone est désignée par un écriteau comme zone où le stationnement est interdit pendant certaines heures, il est interdit de laisser un véhicule à moteur en stationnement dans cette zone aux heures où le stationnement y est interdit.

23. Lorsqu'une zone est désignée par un écriteau comme zone où le stationnement est autorisé dans des emplacements de stationnement situés près de parcomètres, il est interdit de laisser un véhicule à moteur en stationnement dans un emplacement de stationnement à moins de payer pour l'usage de l'emplacement de stationnement en déposant dans le parcomètre approprié le montant qui y est indiqué pour l'usage de l'emplacement.

24. Il est interdit de laisser un véhicule à moteur en stationnement dans un emplacement de stationnement au delà de la période maximale indiquée sur le parcomètre qui règle l'usage de cet emplacement.

25. Sous réserve des dispositions de l'article 27, lorsqu'une zone est désignée par un écriteau comme zone où le stationnement est autorisé dans des emplacements de stationnement, il est interdit de laisser un véhicule en stationnement dans cette zone ailleurs que dans un tel emplacement.

26. Sous réserve des dispositions de l'article 27, il est interdit de laisser un véhicule à moteur en stationnement dans un emplacement de stationnement dont l'usage est réglé par un parcomètre de façon que ce véhicule ne soit pas entièrement placé dans les limites de l'emplacement désigné comme emplacement de stationnement à utiliser relativement à ce parcomètre.

27. Lorsqu'un véhicule à moteur dépasse en longueur ou en largeur un emplacement de stationnement, le montant exigé doit être déposé dans chacun des parcomètres qui règlent les emplacements qu'occupe en entier ou en partie ce véhicule.

28. Il est interdit de déposer dans un parcomètre des pièces de monnaie autres que celles qui sont courantes au Canada ou aux États-Unis.

29. Aux fins de l'article 28, des pièces de monnaie «courantes» désignent des pièces de monnaie qui ont cours légal au Canada ou aux États-Unis en vertu d'une loi, d'une proclamation ou d'un règlement en vigueur au Canada ou aux États-Unis, suivant le cas.

30. Lorsqu'une zone est désignée comme zone de stationnement réservée à l'usage d'une certaine catégorie de personnes, il est interdit d'y laisser un véhicule en stationnement, à moins de faire partie de ladite catégorie de personnes.

31. (1) Le Ministre peut délivrer des permis et des vignettes aux fins de la présente partie, ou en autoriser la délivrance.

(2) Le Ministre ou une personne autorisée par lui peut, à tout moment, retirer une autorisation délivrée en vertu de la présente partie.

(3) Unless sooner revoked, a permit issued under this Part is valid only for the period stated thereon and a label furnished with the permit is valid only during the period that the permit is valid.

32. A constable who finds a motor vehicle parked in contravention of this Part may, at the expense of the owner, remove the vehicle and, if he deems it necessary to protect the vehicle or the interests of the owner, store it in a suitable place.

Speed

33. No person shall drive a motor vehicle on a road at a rate of speed in excess of the speed limit indicated for that road by a sign.

34. Unless otherwise authorized by the airport manager, no person shall drive a motor vehicle on an apron at a rate of speed in excess of 15 m.p.h.

35. No person shall drive a motor vehicle on an apron or manoeuvring area in a manner that is dangerous to persons, aircraft, vehicles or equipment, having regard to all the circumstances including the amount of traffic thereon or reasonably expected to be thereon.

36. The provisions of this Part relating to motor vehicles apply with such modifications as the circumstances require to a bicycle or any cycle regardless of the number of wheels it may have.

Animals

37. No person shall allow an animal owned by him or under his control to be at large on an airport.

38. A constable or person in charge of an airport may, at the expense of the owner of the animal, cause any animal found at large on the airport to be confined or driven off the airport or impounded in accordance with the laws of the province and municipality in which the airport is situated.

Penalties

39. (1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3) and section 40, every person who contravenes any provision of this Part is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to both.

(2) Every person who contravenes any provision of these Regulations governing the parking of motor vehicles shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding fifty dollars.

(3) Where a person is convicted of driving a motor vehicle in contravention of this Part, the convicting court or judge may, in addition to any other penalty imposed, make an order prohibiting that person from driving any motor vehicle on any lands belonging to or occupied by Her Majesty in right of Canada for any period not exceeding one year from the date of the conviction.

(3) A moins d'avoir été retiré, un permis délivré en vertu de la présente partie n'est valable que pour la période de temps qui y est mentionnée et une vignette donnée avec le permis n'est valable que durant la période de validité du permis.

32. Un agent qui trouve un véhicule à moteur stationné par infraction aux dispositions de la présente partie peut, aux frais du propriétaire, enlever le véhicule et, s'il le juge nécessaire pour protéger le véhicule ou les intérêts du propriétaire, remiser le véhicule dans un lieu approprié.

Vitesse

33. Il est interdit de conduire un véhicule à moteur sur une route à une vitesse qui dépasse la vitesse maximale indiquée par un écriteau pour cette route.

34. Il est interdit de conduire un véhicule à moteur sur une aire de trafic à une vitesse de plus de 15 milles à l'heure, sauf si le directeur de l'aéroport en donne l'autorisation.

35. Il est interdit de conduire un véhicule à moteur sur une aire de trafic ou une aire de manœuvre d'une façon qui puisse mettre en danger des personnes, des aéronefs, des véhicules ou du matériel, compte tenu de toutes les circonstances, notamment du trafic qui se trouve sur ces aires ou qu'on peut s'attendre à y trouver.

36. Les dispositions de la présente partie relatives aux véhicules à moteur s'appliquent, avec les modifications requises par les circonstances, à une bicyclette ou à tout cycle, quel que soit le nombre de ses roues.

Animaux

37. Il est interdit à quiconque de laisser en liberté sur un aéroport un animal qui lui appartient ou est sous sa surveillance.

38. Un agent ou la personne qui dirige un aéroport peut, aux frais du propriétaire de l'animal, faire enfermer, faire chasser de l'aéroport ou faire mettre en fourrière tout animal trouvé en liberté sur un aéroport, conformément aux lois de la province et aux règlements de la municipalité où est situé l'aéroport.

Sanctions

39. (1) Sous réserve des dispositions des paragraphes (2) et (3) et de l'article 40, quiconque enfreint une disposition de la présente partie est passible, sur déclaration sommaire de culpabilité, d'une amende d'au plus cinq cents dollars ou d'un emprisonnement d'au plus six mois, ou des deux peines à la fois.

(2) Quiconque enfreint une disposition du présent règlement relative au stationnement des véhicules à moteur, est passible, sur déclaration sommaire de culpabilité, d'une amende d'au plus cinquante dollars.

(3) Lorsqu'une personne est déclarée coupable de conduite d'un véhicule à moteur en infraction aux dispositions de la présente partie, le tribunal ou le juge qui rend le jugement peut, sans préjudice de toute sanction infligée d'autre part, rendre une ordonnance interdisant à ladite personne de conduire un véhicule à moteur sur les terrains appartenant à Sa Majesté du chef du Canada ou occupés par elle, pour une durée d'au plus un an à compter de la date de la déclaration de culpabilité.

(4) Every person who drives a motor vehicle contrary to an order made pursuant to subsection (3) is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to both.

40. (1) Any person who is alleged to have contravened any provision of this Part governing the parking of a motor vehicle may, at any time within seventy-two hours from the expiration of the day on which the contravention is alleged to have occurred, excluding holidays, register a plea of guilty to the alleged offence by paying into court, either personally or by mail,

- (a) five dollars, where the alleged offence relates to parking in a reserved parking area;
- (b) five dollars, where the alleged offence relates to parking in a no parking area;
- (c) two dollars, where the alleged offence relates to over-time parking;
- (d) five dollars, where the alleged offence relates to parking a vehicle in such a manner as to obstruct traffic;
- (e) ten dollars, where the alleged offence relates to parking in a loading area; or
- (f) five dollars, where the alleged offence relates to any parking offence not referred to in paragraphs (a) to (e).

(2) Any amount paid pursuant to subsection (1) shall be paid into the court designated by the Minister for such payment.

(3) Where a payment referred to in subsection (1) is sent to the court by mail, the payment into court shall be deemed to have been made on the day on which the payment was mailed.

(4) Where a person who is alleged to have contravened a provision of this Part governing the parking of a motor vehicle has, in accordance with subsection (1), paid money into court with respect to that contravention, no further penalty shall be imposed on him for that contravention.

PART II
PEDESTRIANS
Prohibition

41. No person who is not in possession of valid identification shall enter upon or remain in any area that is designated by a sign or device as a restricted area unless authorized to do so by the airport manager.

42. Every person found upon or in any area in contravention of section 41 may be removed therefrom by a constable, but such removal shall be without prejudice toward any other proceeding that may be taken.

43. Where a portion of a road or apron has been designated as a cross-walk, no pedestrian shall proceed to cross the road or apron except within the designated cross-walk.

(4) Quiconque conduit un véhicule à moteur en infraction à une ordonnance rendue en vertu du paragraphe (3), est passible, sur déclaration sommaire de culpabilité, d'une amende d'au plus cinq cents dollars ou d'un emprisonnement d'au plus six mois, ou des deux peines à la fois.

40. (1) Toute personne présumée coupable d'infraction à une disposition de la présente partie, relative au stationnement d'un véhicule à moteur, peut, dans un délai de soixante-douze heures, jours fériés non compris, après la fin du jour au cours duquel la présumée infraction aurait été commise, déposer un aveu de culpabilité relatif à la présumée infraction en payant au tribunal, soit personnellement, soit par la poste,

- a) cinq dollars, si la présumée infraction concerne le stationnement dans une zone de stationnement réservée;
- b) cinq dollars, si la présumée infraction concerne le stationnement dans une zone où le stationnement est interdit;
- c) deux dollars, si la présumée infraction concerne le stationnement au-delà de la période permise;
- d) cinq dollars, si la présumée infraction concerne le stationnement d'un véhicule d'une façon qui puisse gêner la circulation;
- e) dix dollars, si la présumée infraction concerne le stationnement dans une aire d'embarquement; ou
- f) cinq dollars, si la présumée infraction concernant le stationnement n'est pas mentionnée aux alinéas a) à e).

(2) Tout montant payé en vertu des dispositions du paragraphe (1) devra être payé au tribunal que le Ministre aura désigné pour recevoir ce paiement.

(3) Lorsqu'un paiement mentionné au paragraphe (1) est envoyé au tribunal par la poste, ce paiement est censé avoir été effectué le jour où il a été mis à la poste.

(4) Lorsqu'une personne présumée coupable d'infraction aux dispositions de la présente partie relatives au stationnement d'un véhicule à moteur, a, conformément aux dispositions du paragraphe (1), payé au tribunal l'amende imposée pour cette infraction, aucune autre sanction ne pourra lui être imposée pour ladite infraction.

PARTIE II
PIÉTONS
Interdictions

41. Il est interdit à quiconque n'est pas en possession de pièces d'identité valables de pénétrer dans une zone désignée par un écriteau ou un dispositif de signalisation comme zone réglementée, ou d'y demeurer, sans l'autorisation du directeur de l'aéroport.

42. Un agent qui trouve une personne quelconque dans une zone, en infraction aux dispositions de l'article 41, peut expulser cette personne de ladite zone mais cette expulsion se fera sans préjudice de toute autre poursuite qui pourra être engagée.

43. Lorsqu'une partie de route ou d'aire de trafic a été désignée comme passage pour piétons, il est interdit à un piéton de traverser la route ou l'aire de trafic ailleurs qu'en ce passage.

44. Where a sidewalk or path is located beside a road or apron a pedestrian shall, at all times when reasonable and practicable to do so, use the sidewalk or path and shall not walk or remain on the road or apron.

45. Where there is no sidewalk or path located beside a road, a pedestrian walking along or upon the road shall, at all times when practicable to do so, walk on the left side or shoulder of the road facing on-coming traffic.

46. No pedestrian on an apron shall impede, interfere with or obstruct in any way the free movement of other apron traffic except in the course of his or her employment relating to the control of such traffic.

47. Where no cross-walk has been designated, every pedestrian crossing a road shall yield the right-of-way to motor vehicles using the road.

48. A pedestrian shall obey the instruction of any traffic sign or device and comply with any traffic directions given by a constable to him.

Smoking and Littering

49. No person shall

(a) smoke, carry or deposit lighted cigars, cigarettes, pipes or matches or carry a naked flame

(i) on an apron or any open deck gallery or balcony contiguous to and overlooking an apron,

(ii) in any area where smoking is specifically prohibited by a sign, or

(iii) in any other place at an airport under such circumstances as may or might be likely to endanger persons or property;

(b) throw, deposit or knowingly leave on a road, apron or manoeuvring area any glass, nails, tacks, scraps of metal, chemical substance or other material that may damage an aircraft or motor vehicle; or

(c) throw, deposit or knowingly leave on any airport any form of trash or garbage except in containers provided for that purpose.

Penalties

50. (1) Every person who contravenes section 41 is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to both.

(2) Subject to section 51, every person who contravenes any provisions of this Part other than section 41 is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding fifty dollars.

51. (1) Any person who is alleged to have contravened any provision of this Part other than section 41 may, at any time within seventy-two hours from the expiration of the day on which the contravention is alleged to have occurred, excluding

44. Lorsqu'un trottoir ou un chemin longe une route ou une aire de trafic, un piéton doit à n'importe quel moment, lorsqu'il est judicieux et possible de le faire, emprunter le trottoir ou le chemin et ne pas marcher ou demeurer sur la route ou l'aire de trafic.

45. Lorsqu'il n'y a pas de trottoir ou de chemin le long d'une route, un piéton circulant sur la route doit à n'importe quel moment, quand cela est possible, marcher sur le côté gauche ou sur l'accotement gauche de la route afin de faire face au trafic.

46. Il est interdit à tout piéton se trouvant sur l'aire de trafic d'entraver, de gêner ou d'embarrasser de quelque façon que ce soit le libre mouvement de tout autre trafic sur l'aire de trafic, sauf dans l'exercice de ses fonctions relatives au contrôle de ce trafic.

47. Lorsqu'aucun passage pour piétons n'a été désigné, tout piéton traversant une route devra céder le droit de passage aux véhicules à moteur utilisant la route.

48. Un piéton doit obéir aux instructions de tout panneau ou dispositif de signalisation et se conformer aux directives que lui donne un agent.

Interdiction de fumer et de jeter des ordures

49. Il est interdit

a) de fumer, porter ou déposer des cigares, cigarettes, pipes ou allumettes allumés ou de porter une flamme nue

(i) sur une aire de trafic ou sur une terrasse, une galerie ou un balcon ouvert, contigu à l'aire de trafic et surplombant cette aire,

(ii) dans toute zone où des écriteaux interdisent expressément de fumer, ou

(iii) dans tout autre endroit de l'aéroport dans des circonstances qui seraient ou sont susceptibles de mettre en danger des personnes ou des biens;

b) de jeter, déposer ou consciemment laisser sur une route, une aire de trafic ou une aire de manœuvre du verre, des clous, des pointes, des morceaux de métal, une substance chimique ou tout autre matière qui puissent endommager un aéronef ou un véhicule à moteur; ou

c) de jeter, déposer ou consciemment laisser sur un aéroport des rebuts ou déchets sous quelque forme que ce soit, sauf dans les poubelles prévues à cet usage.

Sanctions

50. (1) Quiconque enfreint une disposition de l'article 41 est passible, sur déclaration sommaire de culpabilité, d'une amende d'au plus cinq cents dollars ou d'un emprisonnement d'au plus six mois, ou des deux peines à la fois.

(2) Sous réserve des dispositions de l'article 51, toute personne qui enfreint une disposition de la présente partie autre que celles de l'article 41, est passible, sur déclaration sommaire de culpabilité, d'une amende d'au plus cinquante dollars.

51. (1) Toute personne présumée coupable d'infraction à une disposition de la présente partie autre que celles de l'article 41, peut, dans un délai de soixante-douze heures, jours fériés non compris, après la fin du jour au cours duquel la présumée infraction aurait été commise, déposer un aveu de

holidays, register a plea of guilty to the alleged offence by paying into court, either personally or by mail,

- (a) two dollars, where the alleged offence relates to crossing a road or apron otherwise than at a designated cross-walk;
- (b) two dollars, where the alleged offence relates to walking on a road or apron in contravention of section 44;
- (c) two dollars, where the alleged offence relates to walking on a road in contravention of section 45;
- (d) five dollars, where the alleged offence relates to impeding, interfering or obstructing the free movement of an aircraft on the apron or manoeuvring area in contravention of section 46;
- (e) five dollars, where the alleged offence relates to failing to yield the right-of-way to motor vehicles in contravention of section 47;
- (f) five dollars, where the alleged offence relates to disobeying instructions of any traffic sign or device or instruction given by a constable;
- (g) ten dollars, where the alleged offence relates to smoking in contravention of paragraph 49(a) or to littering in contravention of paragraph 49(b);
- (h) ten dollars, where the alleged offence relates to littering a road, apron or manoeuvring area in contravention of paragraph 49(b); and
- (i) ten dollars, where the alleged offence relates to throwing, depositing or knowingly leaving trash or garbage in contravention of paragraph 49(c).

(2) Any amount paid pursuant to subsection (1) shall be paid into the court designated by the Minister for such payment.

(3) Where a payment referred to in subsection (1) is sent to the court by mail, the payment into court shall be deemed to have been made on the day on which the payment was mailed.

(4) Where a person who is alleged to have contravened any provision of this Part other than section 41 has, in accordance with subsection (1), paid money into court with respect to that contravention, no further penalty shall be imposed on him for that contravention.

PART III

REGISTRATION OF MOBILE EQUIPMENT

Interpretation

52. In this Part, "equipment" means

- (a) any motor vehicle or mobile device used in the direct fuelling or defuelling of aircraft, or
- (b) any other motor vehicle or mobile device of a specialized nature for use in the maintenance, repair and servicing of an aircraft on the ground, including testing equipment and cargo and passenger handling equipment;

"gross weight", with respect to any equipment, means the total weight of the equipment as specified by its manufacturer;

culpabilité relatif à la présumée infraction, en payant au tribunal, soit personnellement, soit par la poste,

- a) deux dollars, si la présumée infraction consiste à traverser une route ou une aire de trafic ailleurs que sur un passage pour piétons désigné;
- b) deux dollars, si la présumée infraction consiste à marcher sur une route ou une aire de trafic en infraction aux dispositions de l'article 44;
- c) deux dollars, si la présumée infraction consiste à marcher sur une route en infraction aux dispositions de l'article 45;
- d) cinq dollars, si la présumée infraction consiste à entraver, gêner ou embarrasser le libre mouvement d'un aéronef sur l'aire de trafic ou l'aire de manœuvre en infraction aux dispositions de l'article 46;
- e) cinq dollars, si la présumée infraction consiste à refuser de céder le droit de passage aux véhicules à moteur en infraction aux dispositions de l'article 47;
- f) cinq dollars, si la présumée infraction consiste à ne pas se conformer aux indications d'un panneau ou d'un dispositif de signalisation ou aux directives données par un agent;
- g) dix dollars, si la présumée infraction consiste à fumer en infraction aux dispositions de l'alinéa 49a) ou à jeter des ordures en infraction aux dispositions de l'alinéa 49b);
- h) dix dollars, si la présumée infraction consiste à jeter des ordures sur une route, une aire de trafic ou une aire de manœuvre en infraction aux dispositions de l'alinéa 49b); et
- i) dix dollars, si la présumée infraction consiste à jeter, déposer ou sciemment laisser des rebuts ou des déchets en infraction aux dispositions de l'alinéa 49c).

(2) Tout montant payé en vertu des dispositions du paragraphe (1) devra être payé au tribunal que le Ministre aura désigné pour recevoir ce paiement.

(3) Lorsqu'un paiement mentionné au paragraphe (1) est envoyé au tribunal par la poste, ce paiement est censé avoir été effectué le jour où il a été mis à la poste.

(4) Lorsqu'une personne présumée coupable d'infraction aux dispositions de la présente partie autres que celles de l'article 41, a, conformément aux dispositions du paragraphe (1), payé au tribunal l'amende imposée pour cette infraction, aucune autre sanction ne pourra lui être imposée pour ladite infraction.

PARTIE III

IMMATRICULATION DU MATÉRIEL MOBILE

Interprétation

52. Dans la présente partie,

«année d'immatriculation» désigne la période commençant le premier janvier d'une année et se terminant le dernier jour de décembre de la même année;

«matériel» désigne

- a) tout véhicule à moteur ou appareil mobile utilisé pour faire ravitailler directement des aéronefs ou les vidanger, ou
- b) tout autre véhicule à moteur ou appareil mobile de nature spécialisée devant servir à l'entretien technique et courant et à la réparation d'un aéronef au sol, y compris

"registration year" means the period commencing on the first day of January in any year and ending on the last day of December in that year.

Registration

53. Subject to this Part, the owner of equipment used at airports shall register that equipment each year in accordance with this Part.

54. No person shall operate any equipment at an airport unless that equipment has been registered in accordance with this Part.

55. Sections 53 and 54 do not apply to equipment operated exclusively on airport areas leased from the Department by the owner of the equipment.

56. (1) Applications for the registration of equipment shall be made in the form prescribed by the Minister and delivered together with the fees prescribed by this Part to the airport manager at the airport at which the equipment is to be used.

(2) On receipt of the application and fees described in subsection (1), the airport manager may, if he is of the opinion that the equipment for which registration is applied for can be safely operated at the airport, issue a registration certificate for that equipment.

Fees

57. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the annual registration fee payable in respect of any equipment shall be fifteen dollars or the amount obtained by multiplying the gross weight of the equipment, calculated in thousands of pounds, by fifteen dollars, whichever is the greater amount.

(2) Where any equipment is registered after the thirtieth day of June in any registration year, the fee shall be one-half of the fee prescribed by subsection (1).

58. (1) Where equipment registered at any airport is replaced by other equipment of a similar kind, there shall be paid to the airport manager of that airport

(a) if the other equipment is of an equivalent or lower gross weight than the equipment replaced, a registration fee of five dollars; or

(b) if the other equipment is of a greater gross weight than the equipment being replaced, a registration fee equal to the amount obtained by multiplying the difference between the gross weight of the equipment being replaced and the other equipment, calculated in thousands of pounds, by fifteen dollars.

(2) The registration certificate for any equipment that is being replaced at an airport shall be surrendered to the airport manager of that airport.

59. Where equipment registered under this Part is sold or transferred, the new owner of the equipment shall, before operating the equipment at an airport, notify the airport manager of that airport, and the airport manager may,

(a) on payment of a fee of five dollars by the new owner,

le matériel d'essai et le matériel utilisé pour la manutention des marchandises et le déplacement des passagers; «poids brut», appliqué à du matériel, désigne le poids total du matériel mentionné par le fabricant.

Immatriculation

53. Sous réserve des dispositions de la présente partie, le propriétaire de matériel utilisé à un aéroport doit immatriculer ce matériel chaque année conformément aux dispositions de la présente partie.

54. Il est interdit d'utiliser à un aéroport du matériel qui n'a pas été immatriculé conformément à la présente partie.

55. Les articles 53 et 54 ne s'appliquent pas au matériel utilisé exclusivement sur les aéroports et qui est loué au Ministère par le propriétaire du matériel.

56. (1) Les demandes d'immatriculation de matériel doivent être présentées en la forme prescrite par le Ministre et elles doivent être remises, accompagnées du droit prescrit dans la présente partie, au directeur de l'aéroport où le matériel sera utilisé.

(2) Dès la réception de la demande et du droit mentionnés au paragraphe (1), le directeur de l'aéroport peut, s'il est d'avis que le matériel visé par la demande d'immatriculation peut être utilisé en toute sécurité à l'aéroport, délivrer un certificat d'immatriculation à l'égard de ce matériel.

Droit

57. (1) Sous réserve des dispositions du paragraphe (2), le droit annuel d'immatriculation exigible à l'égard de tout matériel est de quinze dollars, ou le montant obtenu en multipliant par quinze dollars le poids brut du matériel (exprimé en milliers de livres) en prenant le plus élevé de ces montants.

(2) Lorsque le matériel est immatriculé après le trente juin d'une année d'immatriculation, le droit d'immatriculation exigible sera la moitié du droit annuel prescrit au paragraphe (1).

58. (1) Si du matériel immatriculé à un aéroport est remplacé par du matériel du même genre, il doit être payé au directeur dudit aéroport

a) un droit d'immatriculation de cinq dollars, s'il s'agit de matériel d'un poids brut équivalent ou inférieur à celui du matériel remplacé; ou

b) un droit d'immatriculation égal au montant obtenu ou en multipliant par quinze dollars la différence entre le poids brut du matériel remplacé et celui de l'autre matériel, exprimée en milliers de livres, si l'autre matériel est d'un poids brut supérieur à celui du matériel remplacé.

(2) Le certificat d'immatriculation de tout matériel qui est remplacé à un aéroport doit être remis au directeur dudit aéroport.

59. En cas de vente ou de cession de matériel immatriculé en vertu de la présente partie, le nouveau propriétaire du matériel doit, avant de l'utiliser sur un aéroport, en aviser le directeur dudit aéroport et ce dernier peut,

a) contre paiement d'un droit de cinq dollars par le nouveau propriétaire,

- (b) on surrender of the registration certificate previously issued for that equipment to the previous owner, and
(c) upon being satisfied that the equipment may be safely operated at the airport,

issue a new registration certificate for the equipment.

60. Where a certificate of registration for any equipment is lost, a duplicate certificate may be issued by the airport manager on payment of a fee of five dollars.

61. The Minister or airport manager may exempt any equipment or class of equipment from the provisions of this Part.

62. Certificates of registration for any equipment shall be carried at all times on the equipment and shall be produced for examination upon request by a constable or by a duly authorized representative of the Department.

63. Any person who contravenes any provision of this Part is guilty of an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars.

PART IV

CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT ON APRONS

Interpretation

64. In this Part,

“apron traffic control clearance” means authorization by an apron traffic control unit for an aircraft to proceed on a controlled apron; (*autorisation du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic*)

“apron traffic control instruction” means a directive issued by an apron traffic control unit for airport apron traffic and gate control purposes; (*instruction du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic*)

“apron traffic control unit” means staff at an airport that provides apron traffic control service at the airport and includes the staff of a mobile control vehicle; (*organe du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic*)

“controlled apron” means an apron at an airport where apron traffic control service is provided; (*aire de trafic contrôlée*)

“operator”, in respect of an aircraft, means the person in possession of the aircraft, whether as owner, lessee, hirer or otherwise, and in section 68 includes the person in whose name the aircraft is registered; (*exploitant*)

“owner” has the same meaning as in the *Air Regulations*; (*propriétaire*)

“park” means the standing of an aircraft, whether occupied or not; (*laisser en stationnement*)

“pilot-in-command” means the pilot responsible for the operation and safety of an aircraft. (*pilote commandant de bord*)

- b) sur remise du certificat d'immatriculation délivré au propriétaire précédent à l'égard de ce matériel, et
c) s'il estime que ce matériel peut être utilisé en toute sécurité sur ledit aéroport,

délivrer un nouveau certificat d'immatriculation à l'égard de ce matériel.

60. En cas de perte d'un certificat d'immatriculation, le directeur de l'aéroport peut délivrer un duplicata de ce certificat contre paiement d'un droit de cinq dollars.

61. Le Ministre ou le directeur de l'aéroport peut exempter tout matériel ou toute catégorie de matériel des dispositions de la présente partie.

62. Les certificats d'immatriculation de tout matériel doivent toujours accompagner ce matériel et ils doivent être présentés pour vérification à la demande d'un agent ou d'un représentant dûment autorisé du Ministère.

63. Quiconque contrevient aux dispositions de la présente partie est coupable d'une infraction et est passible, sur déclaration sommaire de culpabilité, d'une amende d'au plus cent dollars.

PARTIE IV

CONTRÔLE DE LA CIRCULATION DES AÉRONEFS SUR LES AIRES DE TRAFIC

Interprétation

64. Dans la présente partie,

«aire de trafic contrôlée» désigne une aire de trafic à un aéroport où le service de contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic est assuré; (*controlled apron*)

«autorisation du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic» s'entend d'une autorisation qu'un organe du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic donne à un aéronef pour lui permettre d'évoluer sur une aire de trafic contrôlée; (*apron traffic control clearance*)

«exploitant», en ce qui concerne les aéronefs, désigne la personne en possession de l'aéronef, que cette personne en soit propriétaire, preneur à bail, locataire ou autre, et, dans l'article 68, comprend la personne au nom de laquelle l'aéronef est immatriculé; (*operator*)

«instruction du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic» désigne une consigne émanant d'un organe du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic et ayant pour objet le contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic et jusqu'aux postes d'embarquement; (*apron traffic control instruction*)

«laisser en stationnement» signifie l'immobilisation d'un aéronef, qu'il soit occupé ou non; (*park*)

«organe du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic» désigne le personnel d'un aéroport qui assure le service de contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic de l'aéroport et comprend le personnel d'un véhicule de contrôle mobile; (*apron traffic control unit*)

«pilote commandant le bord» désigne le pilote responsable de la conduite et de la sécurité d'un aéronef; (*pilot-in command*)

«propriétaire» a la même signification que dans le *Règlement de l'Air*. (*owner*)

General

65. The operator or pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall
(a) maintain

- (i) a continuous watch on the radio frequencies designated for apron communications, or
- (ii) where a continuous radio watch is not possible, a watch for such instructions as may be issued by visual means from an apron traffic control unit;

(b) observe other apron traffic for the purpose of avoiding collision; and

(c) where an apron traffic control unit is in operation, obtained, either by radio or by visual signal, authorization for his movements from that unit.

66. No person shall operate or park an aircraft on an apron negligently, recklessly or in any other manner that endangers or is likely to endanger life or property.

67. (1) No person shall move or park an aircraft on a controlled apron except in compliance with an apron traffic control clearance or an apron traffic control instruction.

(2) The operator or pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall immediately, upon receipt of an apron traffic control clearance or an apron traffic control instruction, acknowledge that he has received that clearance or instruction.

68. No person shall park an aircraft on a controlled apron beyond the time limit set in the last apron traffic control instruction that was received by the operator or pilot-in-command before the aircraft was parked, or that is later issued by the apron traffic control unit and delivered to the owner or operator of the aircraft or the person in whose name the aircraft is registered.

69. (1) An airport manager may order that an aircraft parked at an airport be moved.

(2) The operator or pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall comply with any instructions or orders given to him by the airport manager pursuant to subsection (1).

(3) Where an aircraft is parked at an airport

- (a) beyond the time limit set by an apron traffic control unit,
- (b) in an unauthorized place, or
- (c) in a manner that obstructs traffic

the airport manager may, at the expense of the operator of the aircraft, cause the aircraft to be moved and if he deems it necessary for the protection of the aircraft, store it in a suitable place.

Généralités

65. L'exploitant ou le pilote commandant de bord d'un aéronef doit

a) assurer

- (i) une veille permanente à l'écoute des fréquences radio assignée aux communications concernant l'aire de trafic, ou,
- (ii) si une veille radio permanente n'est pas possible, une veille qui permette de recevoir les instructions que peut communiquer par des moyens visuels un organe du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic;

b) observer les autres mouvements qui ont lieu sur l'aire de trafic afin d'éviter les collisions; et

c) obtenir de l'organe du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic, s'il s'en trouve un en activité, soit par radio, soit par signaux optiques, l'autorisation de manœuvrer.

66. Il est interdit de conduire un aéronef ou d'en laisser un en stationnement sur une aire de trafic d'une façon négligente ou imprudente ou qui expose ou soit susceptible d'exposer la vie ou des biens à un danger.

67. (1) Il est interdit de déplacer un aéronef ou d'en laisser un en stationnement sur une aire de trafic contrôlée si ce n'est conformément à une autorisation du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic ou à une instruction du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic.

(2) L'exploitant ou le pilote commandant de bord d'un aéronef doit immédiatement, dès réception d'une autorisation du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic ou d'une instruction du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic, accuser réception de cette autorisation ou de cette instruction.

68. Il est interdit de laisser un aéronef en stationnement sur une aire de trafic contrôlée au-delà de la durée maximale précisée dans la dernière instruction du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic que l'exploitant ou le pilote commandant de bord a reçue avant de laisser l'aéronef en stationnement, ou dans une instruction que l'organe du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic a donnée ultérieurement et a fait remettre au propriétaire ou à l'exploitant de l'aéronef ou à la personne au nom de laquelle l'aéronef est immatriculé.

69. (1) Le directeur d'un aéroport peut ordonner le déplacement d'un aéronef en stationnement sur l'aéroport.

(2) L'exploitant ou le pilote commandant de bord d'un aéronef doit se conformer aux instructions et aux directives qui lui sont données par le directeur d'un aéroport en vertu des dispositions du paragraphe (1).

(3) Lorsqu'un aéronef est laissé en stationnement dans un aéroport

- a) au-delà de la durée maximale autorisée par un organe du contrôle de la circulation sur l'aire de trafic,
- b) à un endroit où le stationnement n'est pas autorisé, ou
- c) d'une façon qui gêne la circulation

le directeur d'un aéroport peut, aux frais de l'exploitant de l'aéronef, faire déplacer l'aéronef, et, s'il le juge nécessaire pour la protection de l'aéronef, le faire remiser en un lieu convenable.

70. (1) Subject to subsection (2), any person who contravenes any provision of this Part is guilty of an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than five hundred dollars or to imprisonment for six months or to both.

(2) Where a contravention of this Part relates to the parking of an aircraft, the penalty shall be a fine not exceeding fifty dollars.


70. (1) Sous réserve des dispositions du paragraphe (2), quiconque contrevient aux dispositions de la présente partie est coupable d'infraction et est passible, sur déclaration sommaire de culpabilité, d'une amende d'au plus cinq cents dollars ou d'un emprisonnement d'au plus six mois ou des deux peines à la fois.

(2) Lorsqu'une infraction aux dispositions de la présente partie concerne le stationnement d'un aéronef, la sanction sera une amende d'au plus cinquante dollars.

BUREAU OF MANAGEMENT CONSULTING

GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

OTTAWA



PROJECT NO. 2-686
OCTOBER 1973

SECRET

AIRPORT SECURITY
INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT ARRIVALS
NCASC - MOT
SECOND REVISION

SECRET

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page No.</u>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	1
TERMS OF REFERENCE	2
Background	3
METHODOLOGY	4
THE MANPOWER AND IMMIGRATION POSITION	5
ALTERNATIVES	8
Passenger List	8
Partial Passenger List	10
Pre Examination	11
Visas	12
International Travel Card or Card Passport	12
Automatic Passport Readers	14
International Sanctions	15
Ad Hoc Action	15
CONCLUSION	18

APPENDIX

A - NCASC SUB-COMMITTEE ON SECURITY

SECRET

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Fingerprinting is the only means of positive identification presently available. Because Canada cannot impose fingerprinting methods, except in criminal matters, positive identification is not a practicable possibility.

2. Available methods for the detection of terrorists and control of their activities are ultimately dependent upon intelligence. In order to create the strongest possible response capability, we recommend that M & I continue to rely mainly on intelligence information to design Ad Hoc measures for the constraint of alien terrorist movements toward Canada.

3. There is evidence to support further study of the following courses of action which could provide added deterrents to terrorist movements:
 - (a) The invention of scenarios and development of corresponding Ad Hoc procedures.
 - (b) Examination of an abbreviated passenger list from the standpoint of terrorist detection.
 - (c) Examination of automatic passport readers and computer scanning of lookout lists.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

4. The Bureau of Management Consulting was retained by the Superintendent, Commercial and Public Services, Airports and Construction Service, Ministry of Transport acting in his capacity as chairman of a NCASC Sub-Committee on Security.

5. The Terms of Reference for the BMC assignment were:

- " 1. To study a request for lists containing relevant information about passengers arriving by international flights. Such lists to enable positive identification and to be submitted for processing and analysis prior to passenger arrival processing at Canadian Ports of Entry.
2. To determine the feasibility and means of screening arriving international flight passengers to identify potential terrorists and other known undesirable persons who pose a threat to civil aviation security.
3. To examine the rationale of the proposal; consider alternatives to the above-mentioned lists; examine timing and processing requirements for maintenance of high facilitation levels; and consider the response authorities may take if screening techniques do identify suspect individuals."

Background

6. As a result of discussions at the Fourth National Civil Aviation Security Meeting of November 8, 1972, a Sub-Committee was formed to consider a request by the Canadian Department of Manpower and Immigration that passenger manifests be demanded of all arriving flights at Canadian Ports of Entry. The purpose of the check of these manifests would be to determine whether or not included in the passengers on board arriving flights, there are individuals who would pose a threat to the security of civil aviation or the Nation's security. There was considerable support for this proposal by representatives at the meeting and it was agreed that the matter deserved in-depth examination to determine the feasibility of the proposal and whether or not it would fulfil its intended objective. The Sub-Committee was expected to have representation from air carriers and employee associations represented at that meeting as well as representation from IDISC, MOT, RCMP, M & I, Customs, and the National Facilitation Committee.

METHODOLOGY

7. A work plan was developed contemplating a two-stage study. Stage one was to consist of the following steps:

- (a) Examination of the passenger list proposal.
- (b) Consideration of alternative means to accomplish the same objective.
- (c) Consideration of the implications of the passenger list proposal upon airport and airline operations, communications, layout, staffing, procedures, responsibilities, authorities, legislation, facilities etc.
- (d) Recommendation of a plan of action, possibly leading to stage two, appropriate to the situation as disclosed in the preceding steps.

8. Discussions were confined to members of the Sub-Committee.

Appendix A is a sub-committee membership list. The discussions, while unstructured, were designed to provide information about procedures currently in use, inherent shortcomings, appraisal of the passenger list proposal and alternative suggestions.

9. Analysis of the notes of the first round of discussions pointed toward an alternative solution and further selected interviews were then held to test assumptions prior to making a recommendation. A report was issued and later recalled when it was found that complete information had not been made available. Further interviews were conducted and the present report prepared.

THE MANPOWER AND IMMIGRATION POSITION

10. As a result of aircraft hijackings in recent years and the incidents at Lod and Munich in 1972, staff at Manpower and Immigration (M & I) have devoted considerable thought to alternatives available to control the entry of terrorists into Canada. While there are large numbers of undesirables who would be unwelcome in Canada for various reasons, it is terrorists, a relatively small group of individuals, who pose a serious threat to the peace and security of the country. It is they who prompted M & I concern and they have been the focus of attention throughout this study.

11. During its deliberations M & I had two principal objectives - first, the positive identification of passengers arriving by international flight, and second, the detection of potential terrorists so that appropriate action could be taken to curtail their movements and activities. A number of alternatives were considered and the passenger list was selected as the alternative which had the highest level of feasibility and effectiveness at the present time.

12. Early in the study it became apparent that the passenger list proposal was designed to alleviate some of the difficult constraints under which M & I must operate. These constraints are of such a nature that they do from time to time lead to operational anomalies. Examples of some of the constraints are as follows:

- (a) Statutory Requirements - Apart from some specific classes, such as convicted criminals, the power to refuse a visitor entry to Canada is at the discretion of the Immigration Officer at the Port of Entry. At the busier airports initial immigration screening is seconded to an officer at the Primary Inspection Line. In many cases the PIL officer is a Customs officer and he is expected to carry out inspections for Immigration, Customs, Health and the average rate of three per minute during busy periods. Those requiring documentation as well as doubtful passengers are sent to Secondary examination operated by the Inspection Services. Both the PIL and Immigration

Secondary officers have several lookout lists containing many thousands of names and because of the impossibility of memorizing so many names, do, with experience, develop a sixth sense about the desirability of admitting a visitor. The provisions of the Immigration (Board/Appeal) Act protect the rights of the bona fide visitor but at the same time act as a deterrent to the exercise of the Immigration officers' "sixth sense" particularly if adequate evidence is lacking. Hence, a terrorist may get through. It is understood that legislation recently passed will curtail access to immigration appeal procedures and substantially alleviate this situation.

- (b) Fragmentary Intelligence - Frequently, there is insufficient intelligence to justify action or an entry on lookout lists and while M & I may be convinced that action should be taken to head off a threat it is not certain of the timing, the target of the event or the identity of the perpetrators.
- (c) Failure of intelligence to support rulings - On several occasions M & I has based action on intelligence reports only to find substantiating evidence unavailable when required in support of the action. The nature of some intelligence is such that it can be used to reinforce an operational judgement but it cannot be used in a legal sense as in an appeal hearing. While M & I understands the reasons for the occasional unavailability of such intelligence the tenuous legal position in which it has found itself in the past now causes it to hesitate before acting on further such information.
- (d) The difficulty of positive identification - Is the John Doe who is now applying for admission in fact the same John Doe whose name appears on the lookout list?
- (e) The potential for violence implicit in the challenge of a dangerous terrorist by an officer who lacks the training and equipment required to maintain control.
- (f) The desire to perform more effectively without compromising passenger facilitation and the visitors favourable image of Canada. The feeling of some lack of effectiveness persists despite the fact that the rate of immigration interceptions has undergone a four fold increase since introduction of the Primary Inspection Line (PIL).

13. While the M & I representatives to the Sub-Committee were not prepared to vigorously defend the passenger list suggestion they are determined to find some method to improve their effectiveness and they are quite open to suggestions.

14. If Canada becomes the target of a foreign terrorist attack, some Government response will be expected by the population and imposition of the passenger list might well be the immediate result. Legislation requiring passenger manifests is presently contained in the Immigration Act and the Customs Act and could be enforced on short notice by removal of Ministerial exemption, albeit with less than completely positive results.

ALTERNATIVES

15. During the course of the study the passenger list was discussed and alternative suggestions were invited. Several of the alternatives had been considered and dismissed by M & I in its original work. Each of the alternatives, starting with the Passenger List as proposed by M & I, is commented upon in this section.

Passenger List

16. While still only a concept, the suggestion envisages the carrier collecting the names of all passengers on an incoming overseas flight and their transmission to M & I in Canada. Upon receipt, M & I will check the names against those contained in lookout lists and, where matches occur, these will be nominated for Immigration Secondary Examination and possible further action. Ideally, the information on each passenger will include at least full name, date of birth, nationality and passport number.

17. When the requirement for Passenger Manifests on Canada bound international flights was discontinued in the 1950's, the manifest, arriving with a flight of 50-60 passengers, was already redundant because of the volume of passengers and the time constraints to process them. The carriers had difficulty in producing error free lists! With aircraft now capable of landing 8 times as many passengers, the list, to be useful, should be compiled at point of takeoff and transmitted ahead for checking prior to flight arrival.

18. Of the 12 members of the Sub-Committee, only one gave the passenger list unqualified support, four provided qualified support and seven were absolutely opposed.

19. The supporting vote was not cast to meet specific M & I objectives, but rather, to provide a general purpose investigative tool, which it is felt, is sadly lacking at present.

20. Qualified support was given in the face of doubts as to the effectiveness of the procedure if subsequent analysis revealed that it would indeed be effective and that this effectiveness would justify the cost.

21. Opposition was for several reasons. Among economic arguments were the cost of compiling and transmitting information over complex communications networks and possible demurrage on expensive equipment while list errors and inaccuracies were traced and corrected. Operational objections included; the potential for compilation and transmission errors, the difficulties of translating, spelling and pronouncing non-western European names from original listing through transmission, comparison with lookout lists and final use at the PIL. Other operational objections included; staffing requirements to handle inevitable last minute boarding peaks, airline personnel flying without travel documents and load surges as passengers descend on airports such as Toronto and Montreal at the rate of 3000 per hour during peak periods. Several objectors, commenting on the fact that only overseas flights were meant to be included, pointed to the possibility of infiltrators performing an end run and entering via the U.S. or Southern Services. It has been indicated that the terrorists who attacked the 1972 Olympic Games began arriving in Germany three months before the games, from all points of the compass and used every means of transport from aircraft to shanks mare.

22. However, the key objections are concerned with the M & I objectives of a positive identifier and the detection of terrorists.

23. The only known method for the positive identification of an individual is the fingerprint. The passenger list has no connection with fingerprints and consequently fails as a positive identifier.

24. All contributors to the study were quick to point out that any self-respecting infiltrator would travel under some name other than that by which he was known, and, unless up to date intelligence on his travel plans was available for lookout lists, the passenger list would fail to call attention to his pending arrival.

25. It is not unusual for individuals to travel under aliases, and, indeed, it is not illegal provided the alias is not assumed for the perpetration of a crime. As an example, one airline reported that up to 50 percent of the passengers on some travel agency arranged holiday flights are booked under assumed names. The airlines have no power to insist that passengers travel under their correct names. Recently, in its European operations, Air Canada, as part of its own security program has been checking tickets against travel documents and either questions or reports name differences to the appropriate authorities. They feel they cannot refuse passage for this reason alone.

26. If a terrorist were to turn up under an alias with appropriate travel documents the passenger list would fail in its detection role and the security of the country would be as vulnerable as if no passenger list had existed at all.

27. The passenger list thus fails to satisfy both objectives. If introduced it would prove misleading to the extent that it induced a false sense of security in those relying on its supposed effectiveness.

Partial Passenger List

28. As an alternative to the complete list it has also been suggested that only data about Canada bound foreigners be collected and transmitted ahead of the flight in view of the fact that the entry of returning Canadians cannot be prevented even if they are terrorists. Like the full list, it is desirable that it be received for checking prior to flight arrival in order that appropriate preparation could be made in the event a terrorist was identified.

29. It is agreed within M & I that terrorist counter intelligence activities would learn of the list in due course and would then have to resort to other methods such as forgery to escape detection but these deviations in themselves might lead to detection.

30. Notwithstanding the possibility of deviations leading to detection the partial list suffers from the same disadvantage as the complete list. It is not a positive identifier and it will not detect the terrorist travelling under an unknown alias. To a lesser degree the economic and operational objections associated with a full list also apply.

Pre Examination

31. Examination of Canada bound passengers at points of departure for Canada by Canadian Immigration Officers is one of the suggestions considered and subsequently rejected by M & I.

32. To the extent that officials would identify terrorist suspects and declare them inadmissible to Canada, potentially dangerous individuals would be kept off aeroplanes, thus providing a measure of security to air crews and the passengers who are undergoing increasingly rigorous preboard screening in the interests of flight safety.

33. However, the present Immigration Acts, with built-in protections for the freedom of the individual, place the question of admissibility with the Immigration Officer at the Port of Entry and make no provision for preclearance abroad. The maintenance of a network of Immigration Stations overseas would be expensive.

34. Like the Passenger List, Preclearance does not address the objectives of positive identification and detection. In effect, the immigration function would be no different to that under the passenger list except that it is performed in another place.

Visas

35. It has been suggested that we adopt a system whereby all visitors to Canada will be required to apply for and obtain Canadian Visas before presenting themselves for admission to Canada. This suggestion also was considered by M & I and, while opinion was divided, it did not receive outright rejection.

36. At present, nationals of all Arab States are required to obtain Canadian Visas which are issued by Immigration Officers at various points throughout the world. These officers are supplied with lookout lists and in the process of issuing the visas can check for inadmissible individuals at leisure. In fact, visa applications are questioned and forged documents have been discovered.

37. To be effective as a screening device all non-Canadians would have to obtain visas. It is probable that this requirement would bring an end to bilateral free travel agreements and Canadians travelling abroad would likewise be required to obtain visas for all countries visited.

38. Despite the fact that visa processing does provide leisure for checking, a visa can be forged thus circumventing the check. In addition, some states are sympathetic to the aims of terrorist groups and will co-operate in the supply of bona fide travel documents to those planning travel under aliases.

39. Again, the visa does not meet the objectives of a positive identifier and while it does supply extra time for detection it does not actively assist detection.

International Travel Card or Card Passport

40. The International Card type passport, suitable for machine reading, has recently been the subject of study as a facilitation device. As originally conceived the document would carry an electronic or mechanical

code of the finger or hand print of the person to whom the card was issued and with appropriate equipment a match between bearer and card could be established. Recent research indicates that each individual has a unique voice print observable on an oscilloscope. Possibly the voice print could be used instead of the fingerprint. Any such card could be used to record the entry of visitors automatically and scan lookout lists for undesirables.

41. To the extent that issuing authorities produced only genuine cards and unauthorized card producers went out of business, this is the one suggestion that meets the objective of a positive identifier. It does so because of its fingerprint content. The fact that forgeries are possible should not discourage the use of documents per se but encourage activities to discover means of making the practice of forgery more difficult and greater effort to discover forgery when it has occurred. Canada has recently agreed to recognize passport cards issued by other countries but will not adopt their use in the immediate future because of the cost of conversion from the present system.

42. In connection with international travel documents and identity cards, J.E. Ledbetter of the Canadian Transport Commission comments,

"It is recognized that the association of fingerprint procedures with criminal matters and a "Police State" stimulate a reluctance to introduce or even propose such measures, however, with a proper educational program such measures might become more acceptable to a majority of the Canadian Public.

Such an educational programme would point out that Canadians now use various forms of identification in their every day life, at banks, for driving cars, admission to clubs, etc. Certainly an identification card or passport card with fingerprint, photograph, signature and blood type which was difficult to forge would be justified for the purposes of clearing the

country of unwanted aliens and keeping out terrorists.

The responsible citizen might be persuaded that the burden of keeping such a card and producing it on demand would be justified by the increased safety and security of the individual. It should also be accepted by the citizens of the country that liberty and security sometimes require the sacrifice of some freedoms and the acceptance of some onerous controls.

It is suggested that in the absence of any indication of abatement of terrorist activities and in recognition of the continuing problem of aliens, a long term programme to gain acceptance of a positive identity card should be included in the recommendations as a most desirable alternative."

43. While the International Travel Card deserves support for the protection of identity it provides to the great bulk of legitimate travellers, it does depend on a high level of international co-operation and agreement. Like all documentation it is vulnerable to abuse by determined forgers and consequently, is not a foolproof screening device. As a detection device it is no more effective than the passenger list.

Automatic Passport Readers

44. West Germany has developed a system whereby a visitor's identification card is placed on an optical viewing device at the equivalent of the PIL desk. The image is transmitted to an off site operator at a computer terminal who feeds the appropriate information into a computer where it is compared with lookout lists. If the visitor is clean the terminal operator signals the PIL officer with a green light, if the visitor matches an individual on the lookout list, a red light is flashed and the visitor subjected to further examination.

45. Such a system has the advantage of allowing rapid comparison with the thousands of names on the lookout lists. However, it does require larger resources than those presently committed to entry control and as was illustrated at Munich, proved to be far from foolproof largely because of loss of control in the issue of identification cards. Had the system been designed to use standard passports control would have been tighter but the operators and computer programme more sophisticated in order to handle foreign names.

46. A terrorist with valid travel documents and an unknown alias could still get through however.

International Sanctions

47. It has been suggested that international sanctions sponsored by such bodies as the United Nations against countries harbouring or encouraging the activities of terrorists would constitute an effective deterrent. It is apparent that world opinion is hardening against law breakers who take advantage of rules and regulations designed for the orderly conduct of business. These regulations must be examined, their effectiveness assessed from the security standpoint and every available improvement incorporated without delay.

48. While the idea is attractive to a population subscribing to the philosophy of law and order it is not a solution which can be applied unilaterally for the security of Canada.

Ad Hoc Action

49. Of all the alternatives, this is the one which was most frequently mentioned during the study. It contemplates a high level of co-operation and communication between the intelligence community, interested authorities and the carriers.

50. Because of the highly sensitive nature of the subject the consultant has not been provided with a comprehensive picture of intelligence activities. However, intelligence about the identity and movements of terrorists is frequently available and it is this intelligence which forms the basis of terrorist lookout lists. The RCMP is the source of M & I intelligence.

51. Airline security sections are tied directly to other intelligence networks. As recipients they are alerted about suspects and they report activities as suspects come to their attention. At any location there is an exchange of information between airlines and the appropriate authorities. All are well informed and alert. In its international operations, Air Canada has adopted procedures which do frequently identify terrorist movements and these are noted and reported to other airlines and the appropriate authorities.

52. M & I has an intelligence apparatus specifically geared to handle terrorist movements. It has very close ties and a good working relationship with the chief source of such intelligence in Canada and is in constant contact. When fast action is required, communication between the intelligence office and the front line is direct and instructions are positive and explicit. In such cases, the intelligence office subsequently advises Senior Management of the action taken. However, there is evidence that the information is not always available at middle management levels and as a result middle management is unaware of the reasons for the activities of employees for whom it is responsible.

53. In addition, Front Line Immigration Officers sometimes receive information from other than the formal sources and they do act on such information.

54. If M & I were to develop more comprehensive vertical communications, a higher level of confidence would be fostered at all levels without necessarily compromising confidential intelligence.

55. In addition, the encouragement of interdepartmental links at similar working levels and familiarization with airline processing procedures would facilitate the design of appropriate ad hoc measures to intercept terrorists in the event of any alerts.

56. While this procedure does not meet the objective of positive identification it does concentrate on detection. It concentrates on the identity and movement of suspected terrorists and through more comprehensive understanding reduces potential surprises. From a stronger knowledge base more positive control can be exercised.

CONCLUSION

57. Because of the reluctance to employ fingerprint identification procedures in Canada, the problem of positive identification must remain unresolved until the reluctance is overcome or other methods developed. However, even if the fingerprint identification was acceptable, the print can act as little more than a device for matching the visitor with his travel documents. Alone, without appropriate libraries of world population prints, appropriately cross-indexed, it fails as a detection device.
58. In our opinion, for the present and immediate future, the probability of detection and subsequent control of terrorist movements will reach an optimum with maximum development and use of intelligence. For this reason we recommend that M & I choose the Ad Hoc Action option.
59. Terrorist groups are reported to be skilled at infiltration and quick to study security systems set up for their control. They are said to be travelling about Europe at will testing security systems. When the mechanics of a system have been learned, techniques are developed to overcome or bypass it. As one means of combatting these activities it is suggested that any system be designed with phases and succeeding phases be introduced when appropriate in order to keep ahead of the counter measures. Because action under the Ad Hoc option will be tailored to events, it has as many phases as events and will be the most difficult of the options to infiltrate and sidestep. It will, however, not necessarily be infallible.
60. Implicit in this option is a continuation of the close link between the specialist intelligence function within M & I and that part of the intelligence community which deals with terrorists. Possibly the greatest impact from the option will be the psychological lift, improved knowledge and understanding can contribute at all levels with M & I.

While M & I can in fact take action in the absence of positive identification and an infallible method of dealing with undesirables seeking admission to Canada is unlikely; good intelligence; well trained examining officers; a high level of co-operation between the intelligence community, the carriers and inspection services utilizing a combination of methods can overcome many activities by would be terrorists in Canada.

61. In our opinion the terms of reference include two separate issues, first; the identification and control of terrorist movements, and second; the collection of lists of aliens in Canada. While both are legitimate objectives we believe they have become inadvertently intertwined. Identification and control of terrorists is in fact the prime objective. Lists of admitted aliens are doubtless of great benefit to those responsible for their supervision but could be obtained from landing cards prepared in flight and any improperly filled cards referred to a special secondary desk by the PIL officer.

62. For the future, we believe that in addition to Ad Hoc action several areas of study deserve further attention. These are:

- (a) The invention of scenarios (various alternatives of entry and attack) which might be attempted by alien terrorists and the development of corresponding Ad Hoc patterns and procedures with which to meet them.
- (b) Further examination of the costs of the partial passenger list proposal and the benefits such a procedure could contribute to the objective of terrorist detection.
- (c) Examination of the costs and benefits to be derived from installation and use of automatic passport readers and computer scanning of lookout lists similar to those now in use in Germany.
- (d) Examination of the Swiss system of passport photocopy and its facilitation of any necessary follow up of the admitted alien.

SECRET

APPENDIX A
Page 1

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SECRET

APPENDIX A
Page 2

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CLOSED VOLUME VOLUME COMPLET

DATED FROM À COMPTER DU	<i>Dec 71</i>	TO JUSQU'AU	<i>July 79</i>
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AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE - À METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER

DO NOT ADD ANY MORE PAPERS - NE PAS AJOUTER DE DOCUMENTS

FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE - POUR CORRESPONDANCE ULTÉRIEURE VOIR

FILE NO. - DOSSIER N°

1H - 246-2

VOLUME

2

CONFIDENTIAL

J. Hucker,
Director General,
Enforcement Branch.

IH246-2

J. R. Armit,
Director,
Intelligence Division.

July 9, 1979.

Diverted Iranian Airline Flight

1. Further to our conversation re the attached telex, please be advised that Newfoundland Regional office knew nothing of the case until our call to Al Dicks.
2. Al then checked with Gander and determined our CIC representative in Gander learned of the incident, by mere accident over coffee at approximately 9:30 - 10 a.m. the following morning.
3. As I understand the procedures, this is not in accordance with established instructions. You may wish to have Bill Burton's staff follow-up with the appropriate M.O.T. staff.

encs.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
ORIGINAL SIGNÉ PAR
J.R. ARMIT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L
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PSPB (L. CLOUTIER) DE OMP
PSPE (S. CARLSON)
EANDI (J. ARMIT)
P DIR OTT DE OMP
SS(D) 1717/443
TERRORISM - INTERNATIONAL - HIJACKINGS THREATS
AGAINST AIRLINES - GENERAL
D946-0-214-6



THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED.

AN IRANIAN AIRLINES FLIGHT FROM NEW YORK TO LONDON, ENGLAND WAS DIVERTED TO GANDER INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AT APPROXIMATELY 0216 HOURS THIS DATE AS A RESULT OF A THREAT AGAINST THE AIRCRAFT RECEIVED AT NEW YORK. THE AIRCRAFT IS A 747 AND HAS 289 PASSENGERS AND 16 CREW MEMBERS. THE CABIN OF THE AIRCRAFT WAS SEARCHED, HOWEVER, ALLIED PERSONNEL REFUSED TO UNLOAD THE BAGGAGE AREA AND THE PLANE DEPARTED GANDER FOR LONDON AT 11:30 LOCAL TIME WITHOUT A BAGGAGE SEARCH. YOU WILL BE ADVISED OF ANY PERTINENT INFORMATION RECEIVED.

INSP. A. SYNNETT,
A/OIC D OPS.
CCC/591 041755Z OMP4706

Jim:



For information

✓ return when if you
wish.

AS. 28/5.



Government of Canada / Gouvernement du Canada

MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO / À

ARA - Moncton CPA - Winnipeg
QRA - Montreal WRA - Edmonton
ORA - Toronto PRA - Vancouver

FROM / DE

National Civil Aviation
Security Intelligence/Information


SUBJECT / OBJET

Civil Aviation Security Intelligence/Information

SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ
OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE 670-7-(CAX)
YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE
DATE May 23, 1979.

Enclosed for your information are copies of the following Security Summaries concerning recent unlawful acts against civil aviation:

- CAX-79-11 Re: Unsuccessful Hijacking of Aeroflot Aircraft on February 27, 1979.
- CAX-79-12 Re: Successful Hijacking of Nicaraguan Aircraft on March 8, 1979.
- CAX-79-13 Re: Incomplete Hijacking of Continental Airlines Aircraft, March 16, 1979.
- CAX-79-14 Re: Unsuccessful Hijacking of Pan American Aircraft on April 4, 1979.


P.E. Arpin,
National Civil Aviation
Security Co-ordinator.

RONA

Encl.

CAX - 79 - 11

SUBJECT: UNSUCCESSFUL HIJACKING OF AEROFLOT AIRCRAFT ON FEBRUARY 27,
1979

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION SHOULD BE DISSEMINATED ON A NEED-TO-KNOW
BASIS ONLY.

ON FEBRUARY 27, 1979, AN AEROFLOT AIRCRAFT, A TUPOLEV TU 154, FLIGHT
212, EN ROUTE FROM OSLO TO MOSCOW WITH AN INTERMEDIATE STOP AT STOCKHOLM,
WAS HIJACKED BY THREE PERSONS.

THE HIJACKERS, TWO FEMALES AND ONE MALE, HIJACKED THE AIRCRAFT
APPROXIMATELY 20 MINUTES PRIOR TO ITS SCHEDULED LANDING AT STOCKHOLM.
REPORTEDLY, THE HIJACKING BEGAN WHEN ONE OF THE FEMALE HIJACKERS
IGNITED A MOLOTOV COCKTAIL WHICH STARTED A SMALL FIRE WHICH WAS QUICKLY
EXTINGUISHED BY THE CABIN CREW. AT APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TIME A MALE
HIJACKER, BRANDISHING ANOTHER MOLOTOV COCKTAIL, THREATENED THE CAPTAIN
BY STATING THAT HE WOULD SET THE AIRCRAFT ON FIRE. HE WAS DISTRACTED
AND OVERPOWERED BY A PASSENGER AND CREWMEMBER.

THE AIRCRAFT PROCEEDED TO LAND AT STOCKHOLM WHERE THE
HIJACKERS WERE TAKEN INTO CUSTODY. THE
THREE CLAIMED TO BE MEMBERS OF THE ANANDA

MARC RELIGIOUS SECT. THE HIJACKING WAS ALLEGEDLY A POLITICAL PROTEST
AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION.

THE THREE HIJACKERS WERE TRIED IN STOCKHOLM ON CHARGES OF ATTEMPTED
HIJACKING AND WERE GIVEN PRISON SENTENCES RANGING FROM 18 MONTHS TO
3 YEARS.

Original signed by
Joseph K. Frank

RICHARD F. LALLY
DIRECTOR, CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY SERVICE, ACS-1

SUBJECT: SUCCESSFUL HIJACKING OF NICARAGUAN AIRCRAFT

CAX-79-12

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION SHOULD BE DISSEMINATED ON A NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS ONLY.

ON MARCH 8, 1979, A NICARAGUAN GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT, A PIPER NAVAJO, WAS HIJACKED WHILE ON THE GROUND AT BLUEFIELDS, NICARAGUA, A PORT CITY ON THE ATLANTIC COAST OF NICARAGUA, BY THREE ARMED MEMBERS OF THE SANDINISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT, A NICARAGUAN GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION.

P/S CARD

CARDED 29-5-79 IL

THE HIJACKERS, ARMED WITH SUBMACHINE GUNS, ORDERED THE PILOT TO FLY TO VENEZUELA BUT LATER ELECTED TO GO TO SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA, AFTER BEING TOLD THAT THE AIRCRAFT DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH FUEL TO GET TO VENEZUELA. REPORTEDLY, THE HIJACKERS INTENDED ON SELLING THE PLANE IN VENEZUELA IN ORDER TO BUY ARMS AND AMMUNITION.

THE AIRCRAFT LANDED AT SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA, WHERE THE HIJACKERS SURRENDERED TO LOCAL AUTHORITIES. THE THREE HIJACKERS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY IDENTIFIED AS SANTIAGO CARMONA PALACIOS, MARVIN WILSON CAMANO AND PALO ROBLETO. ON MARCH 9, THE THREE HIJACKERS ALONG WITH 13 OTHER SANDINISTAS WERE DEPORTED FROM COSTA RICA TO PANAMA.

Original signed by
Joseph E. Blum

RICHARD F. LAFFIN
DIRECTOR, CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY SERVICE, ACS-1

SUBJECT: INCOMPLETE HIJACKING OF CONTINENTAL AIRLINES AIRCRAFT

CAX-79-13

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION SHOULD BE DISSEMINATED ON A NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS ONLY. ALL TIMES REFERENCED ARE IN MOUNTAIN STANDARD TIME.

ON MARCH 16, 1979, A CONTINENTAL AIRLINES AIRCRAFT, FLIGHT 62, A B-727 EN ROUTE FROM LOS ANGELES TO MIAMI WITH INTERMEDIATE STOPS AT PHOENIX, TUCSON AND HOUSTON WAS HIJACKED BY ONE MALE PASSENGER

APPROXIMATELY 15 MINUTES AFTER DEPARTING PHOENIX. THE AIRCRAFT CARRIED 87 PASSENGERS AND 7 CREW.

AT 0930 ~~THE HIJACKER, IDENTIFIED AS JOHN CARLETON KIVLEN,~~ APPROACHED A STEWARDESS STATING THAT HE HAD A "CUTTER" AND WAS TAKING OVER THE AIRCRAFT. HE DEMANDED \$200,000 AND SAFE PASSAGE TO CUBA. THE CAPTAIN WAS NOTIFIED OF THE HIJACKER'S DEMANDS AND THE AIRCRAFT PROCEEDED TO LAND AT THE TUCSON INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. THERE, ALL PASSENGERS AND ALL BUT ONE CABIN CREWMEMBER, A FEMALE FLIGHT ATTENDANT, WERE RELEASED. THE FLIGHT CREW SUBSEQUENTLY DEPARTED THE AIRCRAFT VIA THE COCKPIT WINDOWS.

NEGOTIATIONS WERE INITIATED BETWEEN THE HIJACKER AND AUTHORITIES WHO COMMUNICATED WITH HIM THROUGH THE WINDOW OF THE DOOR AT THE TOP OF THE VENTRAL STAIRS. DURING THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FEDERAL AGENTS BOARDED THE AIRCRAFT THROUGH THE COCKPIT WINDOW. WHEN NEGOTIATIONS TERMINATED AND KIVLEN DEMANDED THAT THE REAR STAIRS BE RETRACTED, THE STEWARDESS BROKE AWAY FROM THE HIJACKER, RAN INTO THE REAR LAVATORY, AND LOCKED THE DOOR. AT THAT POINT AUTHORITIES ENTERED THE CABIN THROUGH THE REAR DOOR WHILE THE OTHERS APPROACHED THE HIJACKER FROM THE COCKPIT. THE HIJACKER WAS OVERPOWERED AND TAKEN INTO CUSTODY. THE "CUTTER" THAT HE MENTIONED DURING THE INCIDENT WAS DISCOVERED TO BE A FINGERNAIL.

FILE.

~~EVLEN WAS CHARGED WITH VIOLATIONS OF TITLE 49 U.S. CODE, SECTION 1472(F),
AIRCRAFT PIRACY. HE WAS REMANDED TO THE CUSTODY OF THE U.S. MARSHAL IN
LIEU OF ONE MILLION DOLLARS BOND. HE IS DESCRIBED AS A WHITE MALE,
DOB: 8/18/26, 5'11", 165 LBS, GRAY HAIR, BLUE EYES.~~

Original signed by
Joseph K. ~~Blair~~

RICHARD F. LALLY
DIRECTOR, CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY SERVICE, ACS-1

SUBJECT: UNSUCCESSFUL HIJACKING OF PAN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT ON

CAX-79-14

APRIL 4, 1979

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION SHOULD BE DISSEMINATED ON A NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS ONLY.

ON APRIL 4, 1979, AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO HIJACK A PAN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT, A B-747, BY ONE MALE ARMED WITH A KNIFE AND AN EXPLOSIVE DEVICE.

THE HIJACKER, IDENTIFIED AS DOMENICO SPERANZA, TOOK A YOUNG WOMAN AS A HOSTAGE AT THE SYDNEY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA. SPERANZA PROCEEDED WITH HIS HOSTAGE TOWARDS THE DEPARTURE CONCOURSE AND WAS MET BY A CUSTOMS OFFICER WHO ATTEMPTED TO ASSIST THE HOSTAGE. DURING THIS ALTERCATION THE HOSTAGE SUFFERED A SUPERFICIAL WOUND TO HER THROAT. THE HIJACKER AND HOSTAGE CONTINUED TO THE SECURITY CHECKPOINT WHERE, AFTER THREATENING THE HOSTAGE'S LIFE, BOTH HE AND THE HOSTAGE WERE ALLOWED TO PROCEED PAST THE CHECKPOINT TO THE STERILE AREA AND ON TO A GATE POSITION WHERE A PAN AM AIRCRAFT WAS PARKED. SERVICING PERSONNEL ON BOARD THE AIRCRAFT OPENED THE DOOR WHEN SPERANZA KNOCKED AND THE HIJACKER AND HOSTAGE BOARDED. THE SERVICING PERSONNEL WERE QUICKLY REMOVED FROM THE AIRCRAFT.

NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN BETWEEN THE HIJACKER AND AUTHORITIES. SPERANZA DEMANDED THAT THE AIRCRAFT BE REFUELED AND PREPARED FOR A FLIGHT TO MOSCOW VIA SINGAPORE AND ROME. REPORTEDLY, HE SOUGHT AN AUDIENCE WITH THE POPE AND WANTED TO MEET THE LEADER OF THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY. DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS THE HIJACKER BECAME AGITATED AND DEMANDED A DRINK OF WATER. WHILE HE WAS ACCEPTING THE WATER POLICE WERE ABLE TO REMOVE THE HOSTAGE FROM HIS

GRIP. ONE POLICEMAN SUFFERED A SLIGHT KNIFE WOUND DURING THE STRUGGLE.

ONCE THE HOSTAGE HAD BEEN TAKEN FROM THE AIRCRAFT, SPERANZA PRODUCED WHAT APPEARED TO BE A HOMEMADE BOMB AND THREATENED TO IGNITE THE DEVICE. AUTHORITIES ATTEMPTED TO SUBDUED HIM BY USING A HIGH PRESSURE WATER CANNON. THIS PROVED FRUITLESS AS THE HIJACKER DUCKED BETWEEN THE SEATS. ~~WHEN IT APPEARED THAT THE HIJACKER WAS GOING TO BE SUCCESSFUL IN HIS ATTEMPT TO LIGHT THE FUSE, HE WAS SHOT IN THE HEAD AND SHOULDER BY A POLICE DETECTIVE AND HE DIED LATER THAT EVENING.~~ THE DEVICE SPERANZA CARRIED WAS DETERMINED TO BE A BEER CAN LOADED WITH BLACK POWDER.

SPERANZA WAS BORN IN ITALY ON 8/25/24. HE WAS A NATURALIZED AUSTRALIAN CITIZEN.

Original signed by
Joseph K. Blank

RICHARD F. LALLY
DIRECTOR, CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY SERVICE, ACS-1

Jim:
If you do not
have the names of
these reported hijackers
you may wish to have
your staff card their
names

circulated
PA
JEP

9/4/79

15/5/79

FEP. FLOATER
& P.A.



Government of Canada / Gouvernement du Canada

MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO
A

ARA - Moncton CPA - Winnipeg
QRA - Montreal WRA - Edmonton
ORA - Toronto PRA - Vancouver

FROM
DE

National Civil Aviation
Security Co-Ordinator

[Handwritten signature]
9/4/79

SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ
OUR FILE -- N/RÉFÉRENCE 670-7-(CAX)
YOUR FILE -- V/RÉFÉRENCE
DATE March 30, 1979.

SUBJECT / OBJET: Civil Aviation Security Intelligence/Information

Enclosed for your information are copies of the following Security Summaries concerning recent unlawful acts against civil aviation:

- CAX-79-6 Re: Unsuccessful Hijacking of Tunis Air Aircraft on January 13, 1979.
- CAX-79-7 Re: Successful Hijacking of Middle East Airlines Aircraft on January 16, 1979.
- CAX-79-8 Re: Potential Hijacker - Nerssi Khalilifar, on February 12, 1979.
- CAX-79-9 Re: Incomplete Hijacking of United Air Lines Aircraft on January 27, 1979.
- CAX-79-10 Re: Successful Hijacking of a Bell 206B Jet Ranger Helicopter owned and operated by Olympic Helicopters Limited on February 23, 1979 at Montreal, Quebec.

[Handwritten signature]
P. E. Arpin,
National Civil Aviation
Security Co-ordinator.

Encl.

CAX-79-6

XXX

SUBJECT: UNSUCCESSFUL HIJACKING OF TUNIS AIR AIRCRAFT ON JANUARY 13,
1979

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION SHOULD BE DISSEMINATED ON A NEED-TO-KNOW
BASIS ONLY.

ON JANUARY 13, 1979, A TUNIS AIR AIRCRAFT EN ROUTE FROM FRANKFURT TO THE
RESORT ISLAND OF JERBA WITH AN INTERMEDIATE STOP IN TUNIS WAS HIJACKED
BY THREE ARMED MEN.

THE AIRCRAFT, A B-727 CARRYING 75 PASSENGERS AND 8 CREW, WAS HIJACKED
SHORTLY AFTER DEPARTURE FROM TUNIS. THE HIJACKERS DEMANDED TO BE TAKEN
TO BALETTA IN MALTA BUT THE AIRCRAFT WAS DENIED CLEARANCE TO LAND AND
PROCEEDED TO TRIPOLI, LIBYA, WHERE IT LANDED AFTER BEING GRANTED
PERMISSION TO LAND IN ORDER TO REFUEL. ALLEGEDLY, AFTER LIBYAN
AUTHORITIES LEARNED THAT THE AIRCRAFT WAS IN A HIJACKED STATUS THEY
DEMANDED THAT THE HIJACKERS EITHER RELEASE THE HOSTAGES OR REFUEL AND
THEN DEPART TRIPOLI.

THE HIJACKERS, REPORTEDLY ARMED WITH PISTOLS AND GRENADES,
DEMANDED FREEDOM FROM PRISON FOR A PROMINENT
TUNISIAN LABOR OFFICIAL WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY

BEEN JAILED FOR ORGANIZING ANTIGOVERNMENT RIOTS IN 1977. THEY FURTHER
DEMANDED THE LIFTING OF A HOUSE ARREST IMPOSED UPON A FORMER TUNISIAN
FOREIGN MINISTER.

THE AIRCRAFT REFUELED AND SUBSEQUENTLY DEPARTED WHEN THE HIJACKERS
DEMANDED AGAIN TO GO TO MALTA. APPROXIMATELY TWO HOURS LATER THE
AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO TRIPOLI. NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN AND APPROXIMATELY
SEVEN HOURS LATER ALL PASSENGERS WERE RELEASED. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE
HIJACKERS SURRENDERED AND THE CREWMEMBERS WERE RELEASED UNHARMED.

THE THREE HIJACKERS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS CHEDLY AYARI, CHIRAB DAKHLI
AND ABDESSELAM FERCHICHI, ALL TUNISIANS. ALL THREE ASKED FOR POLITICAL
ASYLUM. TUNISIA HAS REPORTEDLY ASKED FOR THE EXTRADITION OF THE
HIJACKERS.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:
RICHARD F. LALLY,

FEB 1 1979

RICHARD F. LALLY
DIRECTOR, CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY SERVICE, ACS-1

SUBJECT: SUCCESSFUL HIJACKING OF MIDDLE EAST AIRLINES AIRCRAFT ON

JANUARY 16, 1979

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION SHOULD BE DISSEMINATED ON A NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS ONLY.

ON JANUARY 16, 1979, A MIDDLE EAST AIRLINES AIRCRAFT, A B-707 CARRYING 73 PASSENGERS AND 9 CREW, EN ROUTE FROM BEIRUT, LEBANON, TO AMMAN, JORDAN, WAS HIJACKED BY 6 LEBANESE NATIONALS, ALL MALE, REPORTEDLY ARMED WITH PISTOLS, GRENADES AND A RIFLE.

THE HIJACKING OCCURRED APPROXIMATELY 50 MINUTES AFTER DEPARTURE FROM BEIRUT. THE HIJACKERS DEMANDED TO BE TAKEN TO CYPRUS; HOWEVER, CLEARANCE TO LAND WAS DENIED BY CYPRIOT AUTHORITIES. REPORTEDLY, GREEK AUTHORITIES WOULD ALSO NOT ALLOW THE AIRCRAFT TO LAND ON THE ISLAND OF CRETE. APPROXIMATELY 30 MINUTES LATER THE AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO BEIRUT WHERE NEGOTIATIONS PROCEEDED. THE HIJACKERS AGREED TO RELEASE ALL THE HOSTAGES IN EXCHANGE FOR THE OPPORTUNITY OF MAKING A STATEMENT TO THE PRESS REGARDING THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THEIR RELIGIOUS LEADER, IMAM MUSA AS-SADR, WHO REPORTEDLY WAS LAST SEEN IN LIBYA IN 1978.

SUBSEQUENT TO THE PRESS CONFERENCE THE HIJACKERS RELEASED ALL THE HOSTAGES AND SURRENDERED TO AUTHORITIES.

**ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
RICHARD F. LALLY**

FEB 1 1979

**RICHARD F. LALLY
DIRECTOR, CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY SERVICE, ACS-1**

UNCLAS. ALRGNS-1/700

SECURITY BULLETIN (RES: ACS-1600-19) ACS-79-5

CAX-79-8

SUBJECT: POTENTIAL HIJACKER - MERSSI KHALILIFAR, DOB: 6/6/57

ON FEBRUARY 12 SUBJECT CLIMBED OVER A TERMINAL BUILDING PERIMETER FENCE AT COLORADO SPRINGS MUNICIPAL AIRPORT AND BOARDED AN AIRCRAFT IN THE PROCESS OF LOADING PASSENGERS. WHEN CHALLENGED, HE STATED HE HAD NO TICKET AND WAS TAKEN INTO CUSTODY. DURING INTERVIEW OF THE SUBJECT, HE STATED HE WANTED TO RETURN TO IRAN TO JOIN THE REVOLUTION. HE CLAIMS TO BE A STUDENT AT MONTANA TECH AND WAS VISITING HIS BROTHER IN COLORADO SPRINGS. SUBJECT HAS ALSO STATED

THAT HE HAD WATCHED THE RAMP TO SEE IF THERE WERE ANY POLICE OFFICERS ABOUT AND THAT HE WANTED TO TEST THE SYSTEM.

FAA COMMENT: SUBJECT WAS IN THE CUSTODY OF COLORADO SPRINGS POLICE DEPARTMENT UNDER \$300 BOND. HE ALSO WAS BEING HELD FOR THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE UNDER \$1,500 BOND AS AN ILLEGAL ALIEN BECAUSE HE HAD NOT RENEWED HIS STUDENT VISA SINCE 1976. ON MARCH 7 INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED THAT BOND HAD BEEN MET AND SUBJECT WAS RELEASED. HE WAS TO RETURN ON MARCH 16 TO STAND TRIAL.

IN VIEW OF SUBJECT'S ILLEGAL STATUS, CHARGES AGAINST HIM AND STATEMENTS MADE, HE IS CONSIDERED A POTENTIAL HIJACKER.

KHALILIFAR IS DESCRIBED AS MALE, DARK COMPLEXION; 6' TALL; 140 LBS; BLACK EYES AND BLACK CURLY HAIR; ADDRESS: 2814 CONCORD STREET, COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO. HIS CURRENT WHEREABOUTS IS UNKNOWN.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
RICHARD F. LALLY

RICHARD F. LALLY
DIRECTOR, CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY SERVICE, ACS-1

UNCLAS. ALRGSS-1/700

CAX-79-9

SECURITY SUMMARY (RIS: ACS-1600-20) ACS-79- 9

SUBJECT: INCOMPLETE HIJACKING OF UNITED AIR LINES AIRCRAFT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION SHOULD BE DISSEMINATED ON A NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS ONLY. ALL REFERENCED TIMES ARE IN EASTERN STANDARD TIME.

ON JANUARY 27, 1979, A UNITED AIR LINES AIRCRAFT, FLIGHT 008, A B-747 EN ROUTE TO NEW YORK FROM LOS ANGELES, WAS HIJACKED BY ONE FEMALE PASSENGER. THE AIRCRAFT CARRIED 119 PASSENGERS AND 12 CREW.

SHORTLY AFTER DEPARTURE THE HIJACKER, IDENTIFIED AS IRENE TARAZEWICZ MCKINNEY, HANDED THE STEWARDESS A NOTE WITH INSTRUCTIONS THAT IT BE DELIVERED TO THE CAPTAIN. THE LETTER ANNOUNCED THE HIJACKING AND INSTRUCTED THAT ANOTHER LETTER, WRITTEN BY THE HIJACKER, BE READ OVER NATIONWIDE NETWORK TELEVISION BY CERTAIN CELEBRITIES INCLUDING LINDSEY WAGNER, CHARLTON HESTON AND JACK LEMMON. THE LETTER ADVISED THAT SHE HAD A NITROGLYCERIN EXPLOSIVE WHICH SHE WOULD USE TO BLOW UP THE AIRCRAFT IF HER DEMANDS WERE NOT MET.

AT APPROXIMATELY 1930 HOURS THE AIRCRAFT LANDED AT KENNEDY AIRPORT IN NEW YORK. THE HIJACKER WOULD NOT ALLOW ANY PASSENGERS TO DEPLANE UPON LANDING. AT APPROXIMATELY 2130 HOURS AN AGENT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WAS ALLOWED TO BOARD THE AIRCRAFT IN ORDER TO BRING A TELEPHONE ABOARD TO BE USED BY THE HIJACKER. THE AGENT REMAINED ON BOARD AND A LENGTHY CONVERSATION ENSUED BETWEEN HIMSELF AND THE HIJACKER. APPROXIMATELY 30 MINUTES LATER THE HIJACKER AGREED TO ALLOW 23 PASSENGERS TO DEPLANE. AT 0200 ON JANUARY 28, AFTER HOURS OF NEGOTIATIONS, THE AGENT OVERPOWERED AND SUBDUED THE HIJACKER WITH ASSISTANCE FROM A UNITED AIR LINES EMPLOYEE. THE WOMAN DID NOT HAVE AN EXPLOSIVE DEVICE AS SHE HAD

3 4

CLAIMED. MCKINNEY'S 19-PAGE LETTER WAS A RAMBLING RELIGIOUS COMMENTARY
ON HER VIEWS OF THE WORLD. SHE WAS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN DISTRAUGHT
OVER FAMILY PROBLEMS AND TROUBLES WITH HER RELIGIOUS FAITH AT THE
TIME OF THE HIJACKING.

MCKINNEY IS DESCRIBED AS A WHITE FEMALE, DPOB: 12/22/29, DETROIT,
MICHIGAN, 5'7" TALL, 120 LBS, BROWN HAIR, HAZEL EYES. SHE WAS CHARGED
ON JANUARY 29, 1979, WITH THE COMMISSION OF AIR PIRACY.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:
RICHARD F. LALLY..
RICHARD F. LALLY
DIRECTOR, CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY SERVICE, ACS-1

March 28, 1979.

SECURITY SUMMARY - CAX-79-10

Subject: Successful Hijacking of a Bell 206B Jet Ranger
Helicopter owned and operated by Olympic
Helicopters Limited on February 23, 1979,
at Montreal, Quebec.

At approximately 3:30 p.m. on 22 February, the Chief Pilot of Olympic Helicopters Limited, Cartierville Airport, received a telephone call from a "Harold Fenton" who asked about the cost to rent a helicopter for two hours the next day for a tour over Montreal and a trip to Quebec City and return. After providing the details, the Chief Pilot was informed by the caller that his secretary would call the next morning to confirm arrangements for the rental of the helicopter. Early Friday morning Fenton telephoned again and scheduled the charter for 10:30 a.m. Fenton was accompanied by a female identified as Vicky Baptiste and carried two hand bags when he later arrived at the office. Fenton paid the \$630.00 rental fee in cash. After giving the pilot Nguyen Huu Le, instructions for the flight the couple carried the two bags aboard the helicopter and sat in the rear seats.

Shortly after takeoff, Fenton handed the pilot the following note "Land at a safe place. I have something to tell you. Don't use the radio." When the pilot turned and saw that his two passengers each held a revolver he took off his headset and flew to the northeastern section of Montreal before setting the helicopter down in an open field.


Immediately after landing, Fenton moved to the front seat beside the pilot, took a machine gun out of one of the bags and told the pilot he would have to help him rob some banks. Fenton removed large letters to spell "POLICE" from the bag and then got out to put them on the front of the helicopter. Later, when Fenton and his accomplice encountered difficulty trying to close the rear doors of the helicopter, they put down their weapons and the pilot seized the opportunity to jump out of the helicopter and run away. During this attempted escape shots were fired before Fenton caught the pilot and forced him to return to the helicopter. The pilot was told he would be killed if he tried to escape again.

After they were back aboard the helicopter Fenton handed the pilot a map and indicated that he wanted to land at the shopping malls in the area which were marked thereon. The pilot was forced to fly over the city so his passengers could look at the various shopping malls before he was ordered to land at the Cavendish Mall. Before landing the pilot was handcuffed to the cyclic stick.

As soon as the helicopter touched the ground Fenton changed his mind and instructed the pilot to fly to Square Decarie and land in front of the shopping centre at the main entrance. The pilot obeyed and after landing at this site Fenton got out of the helicopter carrying one handbag and went into the shopping centre where he stayed about five minutes. The female accomplice remained in the helicopter with a revolver held to the pilot's head. When Fenton returned he said he did not want to rob that bank and ordered the pilot to take off and fly to another shopping centre. While aloft Fenton saw the Royal Bank of Canada sign at Place Vertu and ordered the pilot to land in front of it. After landing, Fenton got out of the helicopter carrying one handbag and the machine gun and went into the bank where he allegedly stole \$12,000.00. When he returned the pilot was ordered to fly to a subway station so his passengers could catch a metro train for downtown. The helicopter was then put down at an intersection near a subway station and the passengers jumped out with their bags.

As soon as the couple disappeared the pilot took off to return to Cartierville Airport. He put his headset back on and attempted to report the incident to the Dorval International Airport Control Tower but due to his poor English and excitement the transmission could not be understood. The helicopter landed at Cartierville Airport at 1:30 p.m.

The Montreal Urban Community Police, who apprehended Fenton and Baptiste on 2 March, have positively identified the two hijackers as Rory Shayne, age 28, a prison escapee and Micheline Dubiel, age 36, of Montreal. Both face several charges of armed robbery, conspiracy, kidnapping, forcible confinement and possession of prohibited firearms arising out of this and other crimes committed.



J. Cook,
A/Executive Officer,
Civil Aviation Security,
Transport Canada,
O t t a w a.

Jan:

You may wish
to have these
names coded.

J
of 2/2/79.

~~FLOATED~~
INFO ONLY

& PA
J

UNCLAS. AIRSIS-1/700

100
CAX-79-1

SECURITY SUMMARY (RIS: ACS-1600-20) ACS-79- 1

SUBJECT: UNSUCCESSFUL HIJACKING OF NATIONAL AIRLINES AIRCRAFT ON
DECEMBER 14, 1978

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION SHOULD BE DISSEMINATED ON A NEED-TO-KNOW
BASIS ONLY.

ON DECEMBER 14, 1978, A NATIONAL AIRLINES AIRCRAFT, FLIGHT 97, A B-727
CARRYING 54 PERSONS, EN ROUTE FROM NEW YORK TO MIAMI, WAS
HIJACKED BY ONE MALE PASSENGER.

THE AIRCRAFT WAS APPROXIMATELY 100 MILES SOUTH OF WILMINGTON,
NORTH CAROLINA, WHEN AT 0248 HRS (EST) A MAN IDENTIFIED AS GERALD EDMOND
CASEY APPROACHED A STEWARDESS WITH HIS HAND IN HIS POCKET SIMULATING A
WEAPON AND STATED THAT HE WANTED TO GO TO CUBA. THE HIJACKER DEMANDED
THAT ONE OF THE FLIGHT CREWMEMBERS COME INTO THE CABIN OF THE AIRCRAFT
AND AT ONE POINT CASEY ATTEMPTED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO ENTER THE COCKPIT.

2.

LATER, CASEY RETURNED TO HIS SEAT, STILL KEEPING HIS HAND IN HIS POCKET.
THE PILOT NOTIFIED AUTHORITIES OF THE SITUATION AND DIVERTED THE AIRCRAFT
TO CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA, WHERE IT LANDED AT 0306 HRS (EST).
FEDERAL AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES BOARDED THE AIRCRAFT AND TOOK THE HIJACKER
INTO CUSTODY WITHOUT INCIDENT. NO WEAPON WAS DISCOVERED EITHER ON
CASEY'S PERSON OR ON THE AIRCRAFT.

CASEY HAS A HISTORY OF MENTAL ILLNESS AND CHRONIC ALCOHOLISM AND IS
REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN INTOXICATED DURING THIS INCIDENT. HE IS DESCRIBED
AS A WHITE MALE, 53 YEARS OLD.

HE HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH AIR PIRACY.

cc: ACS-1/20/Divs
AMA-1/DPB-10/60
AP/MOT/RCMP/FOLDER

RICHARD F. LALLY
DIRECTOR, CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY SERVICE, ACS-1 3 3

UNCLAS 'LRGHS-1/700

SECURITY SUMMARY (RIS: ACS-1600-20) ACS-79- 2

CAX-79-2

SUBJECT:

**INCOMPLETE HIJACKING OF GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT ON
DECEMBER 16, 1978**

**THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION SHOULD BE DISSEMINATED ON A NEED-TO-KNOW
BASIS ONLY.**

**ON DECEMBER 16, 1978, A GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT, A CESSNA 172,
MT. EMPIRE FLYING SERVICE, WAS HIJACKED BY ONE ARMED MALE
WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY CHARTERED THE AIRCRAFT
FOR A LOCAL FLIGHT.**

**THE HIJACKER, IDENTIFIED AS WALTER H. SCOTT, CHARTERED THE AIRCRAFT
FROM THE MT. EMPIRE AIRPORT, RURAL RETREAT, VA. SCOTT WAS IN THE
COMPANY OF DR. JERRY GOSNELL, AN OPTOMETRIST FROM GREENVILLE, VA., WHEN
HE CHARTERED THE AIRCRAFT.**

**SHORTLY AFTER THE AIRCRAFT BECAME AIRBORNE, SCOTT PRODUCED A PISTOL AND
DIRECTED THE PILOT, JOHN GREAR, TO FLY TO CAMDEN, SOUTH CAROLINA. HE
FURTHER DEMANDED THE RELEASE OF A PATIENT BEING HELD IN THE SOUTH
CAROLINA STATE MENTAL HOSPITAL IN COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA, AND THAT
A REFUELING TRUCK BE READY AT THE CAMDEN AIRPORT WHEN THE AIRCRAFT
LANDED. HE THREATENED TO KILL BOTH GREAR AND GOSNELL IF HIS DEMANDS
WERE NOT MET.**

**WHILE THE AIRCRAFT WAS IN FLIGHT BETWEEN CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA, AND
CAMDEN, GREAR AND GOSNELL JUMPED THE HIJACKER AND OVERPOWERED AND
SUBDUED HIM. THE PILOT THEN LANDED THE AIRCRAFT AT THE LANCASTER
COUNTY AIRPORT, LANCASTER, SOUTH CAROLINA. SCOTT WAS TAKEN INTO
CUSTODY BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES THERE.**

CAN-79

A SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT SCOTT HAD ESCAPED FROM THE
SOUTH CAROLINA MENTAL HOSPITAL IN COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA, ON
DECEMBER 14, 1978. ON DECEMBER 15, SCOTT ABDUCTED DR. GOSNELL AT GUN-
POINT FROM HIS OFFICE AND ORDERED HIM TO A BANK IN WEST GREENVILLE
WHERE GOSNELL SECURED A \$5,000 LOAN AND WAS THEN FORCED BY SCOTT TO
TURN IT OVER TO HIM. SCOTT KEPT GOSNELL AS HOSTAGE UNTIL THE
TERMINATION OF THE HIJACKING ON DECEMBER 16.

SCOTT SUFFERED MINOR INJURIES DURING THE ALTERCATION ABOARD THE AIRCRAFT.
HE IS DESCRIBED AS A WHITE MALE, DPOB: 9/1/54, GREENVILLE, SOUTH
CAROLINA. HE HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH AIR PIRACY.

FAA COMMENT: THIS WAS THE FIFTH HIJACKING OF A GENERAL AVIATION
AIRCRAFT IN 1978, MORE THAN IN ANY OTHER YEAR SINCE 1975.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY: *1978*
RICHARD F. LALLY
RICHARD F. LALLY,
DIRECTOR, CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY SERVICE, ACS-1

cc: ACS-1/20/Divs
AMA-1/DPB-10/60
AP/MOT/RCMP/FOLDER

CAX - 79 - 3

SUBJECT: SUCCESSFUL HIJACKING OF INDIAN AIRLINES AIRCRAFT ON
DECEMBER 20, 1978

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION SHOULD BE DISSEMINATED ON A NEED-TO-KNOW
BASIS ONLY.

AN INDIAN AIRLINES AIRCRAFT, A B-737, CARRYING 132 PERSONS EN ROUTE TO
DELHI FROM CALCUTTA, WAS HIJACKED BY TWO MALE PASSENGERS ON DECEMBER 20,
THE HIJACKING BEGAN 10 MINUTES AFTER DEPARTURE FROM AN INTERMEDIATE STOP
AT LACKNOW. THE HIJACKERS HAD PREVIOUSLY BOARDED THE AIRCRAFT AT PATNA.
THEY REPORTEDLY ORDERED THE PILOT TO FLY TO KATMANDU, NEPAL, BUT WERE
PERSUADED INSTEAD TO ALLOW THE AIRCRAFT TO LAND AT VARANASI, 375 MILES
SOUTHEAST OF NEW DELHI.

AT VARANASI, A SQUAD OF COMMANDOS SURROUNDED THE AIRCRAFT AND NEGOTI-
ATIONS BEGAN BETWEEN THE HIJACKERS AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. ONE OF THE
PASSENGERS REPORTEDLY ESCAPED FROM THE AIRCRAFT SHORTLY AFTER IT LANDED.
THE TWO MEN DESCRIBED THEMSELVES AS BEING SUPPORTERS OF INDIRA GANDHI,
THE JAILED EX-PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA. THEY DISTRIBUTED
LEAFLETS ABOARD THE AIRCRAFT DEMANDING HER
RELEASE FROM JAIL AND THAT ALL CHARGES

3 4

AGAINST HER BE WITHDRAWN. THEY ALSO DEMANDED TO HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE.

AFTER NUMEROUS HOURS OF NEGOTIATIONS THE HIJACKERS RELEASED ALL
HOSTAGES AND SURRENDERED TO AUTHORITIES. THEIR WEAPONS WHICH HAD
PREVIOUSLY BEEN DESCRIBED AS PISTOLS AND A HAND GRENADE WERE DISCOVERED
INSTEAD TO BE TOY PISTOLS AND A CRICKET BALL.

THE HIJACKERS WERE REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN GRANTED THEIR DEMAND FOR THE
NEW CONFERENCE SUBSEQUENT TO THEIR SURRENDER. THEY HAVE BEEN
IDENTIFIED AS DEVENDRA NATH PANDEY AND BHOLA NATH PANDEY. BOTH MEN
WERE CHARGED WITH KIDNAPPING AND ILLEGAL CONFINEMENT.

2
CA 7-79

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
RICHARD F. LALLY

JAN 12 1979

RICHARD F. LALLY
DIRECTOR, CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY SERVICE, ACS-1

cc: ACS-1/20/Divs
AMA-1/DPB-10/60
AP/MOT/RCMP/FOLDER

UNCLAS. AIRCIS-1/700

CAX-79-4

SECURITY SUMMARY (RIS: ACS-1600-20) ACS-79- 4

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE ATTEMPT TO GAIN UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO AIRCRAFT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION SHOULD BE DISSEMINATED ON A NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS ONLY.

ON JANUARY 9 A FEMALE IDENTIFYING HERSELF AS A SECRETARY TO U.S. AMBASSADOR ANDREW YOUNG CALLED AMERICAN AIRLINES AT BRADLEY FIELD, WINDSOR LOCKS, CONNECTICUT. SHE REQUESTED RESERVATIONS ON AN AMERICAN FLIGHT FROM WINDSOR LOCKS TO LOS ANGELES ON THE SAME DAY. THE

RESERVATIONS WERE REQUESTED FOR AMBASSADOR YOUNG, HERSELF, THE MAYOR OF BRIDGEPORT, CONNECTICUT, AND THREE ARMED ESCORTS. SUBSEQUENT TO THIS CONVERSATION THE WOMAN CALLED AGAIN AND REQUESTED THAT A LIMOUSINE TAKE THE PARTY DIRECTLY TO THE AIRCRAFT. THE AIRLINE BECAME SUSPICIOUS AND REQUESTED THE WOMAN'S PHONE NUMBER. THEY CALLED HER BACK AND RECEIVED NO RESPONSE. THE AIRLINE THEN CALLED THE CONNECTICUT STATE POLICE WHO CALLED OFFICES OF BOTH THE MAYOR AND AMBASSADOR YOUNG. NEITHER OFFICE KNEW OF ANY TRAVEL ON THE 9TH OR OF ANY RESERVATIONS HAVING BEEN MADE. IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT THE UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE CALLER IDENTIFIED HERSELF USING THE SAME NAME AS AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S SECRETARY. THE TICKETS WERE NEVER PICKED UP AT BRADLEY FIELD FOR THE PROPOSED TRAVEL.

FAA COMMENT: THIS MAY HAVE BEEN AN ATTEMPT TO GAIN AN UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO AN AIRCRAFT. AIRPORTS AND AIR CARRIERS WHICH HANDLE VIP TRAVEL SHOULD ASSURE THAT PROCEDURES ARE IN EFFECT TO PRECLUDE THE PENETRATION OF PERSONS SEEKING TO GAIN ACCESS TO OPERATIONS AREAS OR AIRCRAFT BY THESE OR SIMILAR MEANS.

**ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
RICHARD F. LALLY** JAN 12 1979

**RICHARD F. LALLY
DIRECTOR, CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY SERVICE, ACS-1 3**

cc: ACS-1/20/Divs
AMA-1/DPB-10/60
AP/MOT/RCMP/FOLDER

SECURITY SUMMARY (RIS: ACS-1600-20) ACS-79- 5

CAX-79-5

SUBJEC

INCOMPLETE HIJACKING OF TWA AIRCRAFT ON DECEMBER 21, 1978

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION SHOULD BE DISSEMINATED ON A NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS ONLY. ALL REFERENCED TIMES ARE IN CENTRAL STANDARD TIME.

ON DECEMBER 21, 1978, A TWA AIRCRAFT, FLIGHT 541, EN ROUTE FROM LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY, TO KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, WITH AN INTERMEDIATE STOP AT ST. LOUIS, CARRYING 89 PERSONS, WAS HIJACKED AT APPROXIMATELY 1015 HRS DURING ITS APPROACH TO 2 6 KANSAS CITY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT.

ONE FEMALE PASSENGER IDENTIFIED AS BOBYN OSWALD, SITTING IN THE REAR OF THE AIRCRAFT, PASSED A NOTE TO A FLIGHT ATTENDANT WHICH STATED THAT THIS WAS A HIJACKING AND THAT SHE POSSESSED THREE STICKS OF DYNAMITE. IT FURTHER STATED THAT THE AIRCRAFT SHOULD HEAD FOR CARBONDALE, ILLINOIS, AND THAT GARRETT B. TRAPNELL, A PRISONER BEING HELD IN THE FEDERAL PENITENTIARY IN MARION, ILLINOIS, BE RELEASED IMMEDIATELY. THE NOTE CAUTIONED THAT IF THERE WAS ANY HESITATION IN MEETING THE DEMANDS THE AIRCRAFT WOULD BE BLOWN UP.

THE FLIGHT WAS DIVERTED TO THE AREA OF CARBONDALE, ILLINOIS, AND THEN PROCEEDED TO THE WILLIAMSON COUNTY AIRPORT IN MARION, ILLINOIS, PER THE HIJACKER'S INSTRUCTIONS. IT LANDED AT APPROXIMATELY 1048 HOURS. THERE, CONTACT WAS ESTABLISHED WITH THE AIRCRAFT. SUBSEQUENTLY, NEGOTIATIONS WERE BEGUN WITH THE HIJACKER.

PASSENGERS WERE INITIALLY ALLOWED TO LEAVE THE AIRCRAFT BASED ON THEIR AGE OR THEIR HAVING MEDICAL PROBLEMS. THE FIRST GROUP LEFT AT APPROXIMATELY 1320 HOURS AND THIS PROCESS CONTINUED IN SEGMENTS UNTIL 2045 HOURS WHEN OSWALD SURRENDERED TO FEDERAL AUTHORITIES ON BOARD THE AIRCRAFT. BY THAT TIME ALL BUT 3 6 ONE PASSENGER HAD ESCAPED. REPORTEDLY,

MANY OF THE PASSENGERS WERE ABLE TO EFFECT AN ESCAPE DISCREETLY WHEN OTHER PEOPLE WOULD RISE AND BLOCK THE HIJACKER'S VIEW OF THE ESCAPING PASSENGERS.

CN-79-5

OSWALD DID NOT HAVE AN EXPLOSIVE DEVICE IN HER POSSESSION. INSTEAD, SHE WAS DISCOVERED TO BE CARRYING THREE RAILROAD FLARES TAPED TO HER CHEST WITH TWO WIRES RUNNING FROM THE FLARES TO A PUSHBUTTON DOORBELL DEVICE WHICH SHE HELD IN HER HAND.

OSWALD HAS BEEN REMANDED TO THE ST. CLAIR COUNTY JAIL, BELLEVILLE, ILLINOIS, WHERE SHE REMAINS TO DATE. SHE HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH AIR PIRACY. SHE IS DESCRIBED AS A WHITE FEMALE, DOB: 12/17/61, BLOND HAIR, BLUE EYES, 5'7", 124 LBS.

FAA COMMENT: INVESTIGATION REVEALS THAT ROBYN OSWALD ASSEMBLED THE HOAX DEVICE AT HOME BUT LATER DECIDED SHE COULD NOT GET IT THROUGH THE SECURITY SYSTEM AND DECIDED INSTEAD TO CARRY THE COMPONENTS SEPARATELY. SHE WENT THROUGH THE CHECKPOINT WITH THE WIRES IN HER WALLET AND THE PUSHBUTTON DEVICE IN HER COIN PURSE. BOTH THE WALLET AND COIN PURSE WERE CARRIED IN A LARGER PURSE.

SHE CARRIED THE THREE FLARES UNDER HER ARMPITS UNDER A COAT. AS THE AIRCRAFT APPROACHED KANSAS CITY, OSWALD REPORTEDLY WENT INTO THE RESTROOM TO ASSEMBLE THE DEVICE. SHE HANDED THE FLIGHT ATTENDANT THE NOTE SHORTLY AFTER EMERGING FROM THE RESTROOM.

ROBYN OSWALD IS THE DAUGHTER OF BARBARA ANNETTE OSWALD, A HIJACKER WHO WAS SHOT AND KILLED DURING HER ATTEMPTED TAKEOVER OF A HELICOPTER ON MAY 24, 1978. IN THAT INCIDENT BARBARA OSWALD ATTEMPTED TO FORCE THE PILOT TO FLY TO THE FEDERAL PENITENTIARY AT MARION, ILLINOIS, IN AN EFFORT TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THREE WAITING PRISONERS, ONE BEING GARRETT B. TRAPNELL. ON DECEMBER 21, THE DAY OF THE TWA HIJACKING, TRAPNELL WAS STANDING TRIAL IN BENTON, ILLINOIS, FOR ATTEMPTED ESCAPE AND RELATED AIR PIRACY CHARGES STEMMING FROM THE HELICOPTER HIJACKING IN MAY.

TRAPNELL HIJACKED A TWA AIRCRAFT ON JANUARY 29, 1972, AND WAS SENTENCED TO CONCURRENT TERMS OF 20 AND 10 YEARS AND LIFE IMPRISONMENT FOR UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH CREW, POSSESSION OF A GUN AND AIR PIRACY. HE HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN NUMEROUS PLOTS TO SECURE HIS RELEASE FROM PRISON. THESE ARE REFERENCED IN SECURITY SUMMARY ACS-78-14 DATED JUNE 28, 1978.

THIS INCIDENT REPRESENTS THE EIGHTH HIJACKING IN 1978 OF A U.S. AIR CARRIER AIRCRAFT, MORE THAN IN ANY OTHER YEAR SINCE 1972.

ORIGINAL SUPPLIED BY: RICHARD F. LALLY. . . JAN 19 1979

RICHARD F. LALLY
DIRECTOR, CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY SERVICE, ACS-1

cc: ACS-1/20/Divs
AMA-1/DPB-10/60
AP/MOT/RCMP/FOLDER

DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER AND IMMIGRATION
MINISTÈRE DE LA MAIN-D'OEUVRE ET DE L'IMMIGRATION

MEMORANDUM - MÉMOIRE

24-10-78

TO - À: *Bice Jewett*
FROM - DE: *AD*

TWO POINTS

- ① You asked G. Laplante to have TRUJILLO & MASCARENAS entered into E115 AND C01L5. See my memo to J.A.
- ② If we (Intelligence Officers) wish something entered into the E115 and C01L5, we prepare the input document, not George. This is not his function, although he will, if necessary, do it at times. This input exercise has been the subject of a separate memo signed by Mr. Hueken to discourage this practice. We, too, have to comply.

OK file & forget.
[Signature]
98.11.24

P.A.
000211

DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER AND IMMIGRATION

MINISTÈRE DE LA MAIN-D'OEUVRE ET DE L'IMMIGRATION

MEMORANDUM - MÉMOIRE

TO - À: J. Armit

FROM - DE: H. Dawson

17-10-78
~~Asperique~~
convention
P.S. ✓ ~~and~~
10/10/78

This is the first time I've seen one of these for quite some time. A. Butroid ~~was~~ recruited these previously on a continuing basis and they were merely carded. They were not entered into the old Lookout or the integrated Lookout, nor as far as I am concerned should they start going into the FBI. These people are not Terrorists, they are cut and out criminals, and we don't program criminals as a matter of course into our systems.

Unless you advise to the contrary, and by so doing open up the FBI to another category of undesirable, I will simply have this report filed away with the others and have their names carded.



Government of Canada
Gouvernement du Canada

MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO
À

ARA - Moncton CRA - Winnipeg
 QRA - Montreal WRA - Edmonton
 ORA - Toronto PRA - Vancouver

FROM
DE


National Civil Aviation
 Security Co-ordinator

SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ
OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE 670-7 (CAX)
YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE
DATE October 11, 1978

SUBJECT
OBJET Civil Aviation Security Intelligence/Information

Enclosed for your information are copies of the following FAA Security Summaries concerning recent unlawful acts against civil aviation:

- CAX-78-19 re: Fugitive Hijackers
 on June 30, 1978
- CAX-78-20 re: Successful Hijacking on Aeromexico Airliner
 on May 17, 1978
- CAX-78-21 re: Unsuccessful Hijacking on KLM Aircraft
 on August 6, 1978
- CAX-78-22 re: Unsuccessful Hijacking on TWA Aircraft
 on August 25, 1978


 P.E. Arpin
 National Civil Aviation
 Security Co-ordinator
 Enc.

Intelligence :
Information
& appropriate action
 16/10/78.

UNCLAS. AIRGNS-1/700; AAC-1

SECURITY BULLETIN (RIS: ACS-1600-19) ACS-78- 22

SUBJECT: FUGITIVE HIJACKERS

ON JUNE 30, 1978, A GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT WAS HIJACKED BY THREE PRISONERS WHO WERE BEING TRANSPORTED FROM PUEBLO TO GREELEY, COLORADO. SHORTLY AFTER TAKEOFF THE PRISONERS OVERPOWERED THE PILOT AND EVENTUALLY ORDERED HIM TO LAND IN A FIELD SOUTHEAST OF MEADOWLAKE AIRPORT, APPROXIMATELY 10 MILES NORTHEAST OF COLORADO SPRINGS. THE PRISONERS HANDCUFFED THE PILOT AND ESCAPED WITH HIS .25 CALIBER PISTOL. ONE OF THE PRISONERS, IDENTIFIED AS

2 4

FRANCES BOND, WAS SUBSEQUENTLY APPREHENDED IN INDIANA. THE OTHER TWO INDIVIDUALS REMAIN AT LARGE.

THEY ARE IDENTIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

1. ADELADO SAMUEL TRUJILLO, DOB: 7/24/55, MEXICAN, MALE, 5'11", 140 LBS, BROWN HAIR, BROWN EYES, SCARS ON LEFT ARM AND LEFT LEG AND ON BACK.
2. RICHARD JUAN MASCARENAS, DOB: 5/19/52, MEXICAN, MALE, 5'8", 163 LBS, BLACK HAIR, BROWN EYES.

Handwritten notes:
CARD
S...
...
P...
P...
P...

THE TWO HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN CHARGED WITH POSSESSION OF AN ILLEGAL WEAPON AND AGGRAVATED ROBBERY OF DRUGS. BOTH INDIVIDUALS ARE CONSIDERED TO BE DANGEROUS. BOTH HAVE HOME ADDRESSES IN THE DENVER AREA. IN ADDITION TO THE .25 CALIBER REVOLVER, THEY ARE ALLEGED TO HAVE A SMALL POCKETKNIFE AND TWO CREDIT CARDS (PHILLIPS 66 AND MASTERCHARGE) WHICH THEY STOLE FROM THE PILOT WHO IS IDENTIFIED AS JAMES W. LAYNE.

FAA COMMENT: BASED ON THIS INCIDENT, THE TWO ESCAPED PRISONERS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS POTENTIAL THREATS TO THE AVIATION INDUSTRY. PHOTOGRAPHS OF THEM WILL FOLLOW.

George,

Will you have both
TRUSILLO and MASCARENAS
included in E115 and COILS

Bill

No

~~Answer~~

REQUEST THE ABOVE INFORMATION BE PASSED TO ATSFOS FOR FURTHER DISTRIBUTION
TO AIR CARRIERS AND AIRPORT MANAGERS, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND SECURITY
PERSONNEL.


FOR ATA: PLEASE PASS TO SECURITY OFFICERS OF MEMBER AIRLINES.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
RICHARD F. LALLY

RICHARD F. LALLY
DIRECTOR, CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY SERVICE, ACS-1



TRUJILLO, ADELADO SAMUEL
DOB: 7-24-55
Mexican Male
Ht: 5'11" Wt: 140 lbs.
Brown Hair Brown Eyes
Scars - Left Arm, Back, Left Leg



MASCARENAS, RICHARD JUAN
DOB: 5-19-52
Mexican Male
Ht: 5'8" Wt: 163 lbs.
Black Hair Brown Eyes

0111 8-200

SUBJECT: SUCCESSFUL HIJACKING OF AEROMEXICO AIRLINER ON MAY 17, 1978

ON MAY 17, 1978, AN AEROMEXICO DC-9, ON A DOMESTIC FLIGHT FROM TORREON TO MEXICO CITY, WAS HIJACKED BY TWO UNARMED MEN. THE AIRLINER CARRIED 93 PASSENGERS AND A 6-MEMBER CREW.

REPORTS INDICATE THE TWO INDIVIDUALS SENT A NOTE TO THE PILOT STATING THEY WERE ARMED AND DEMANDED TO BE PUT OFF IN MEXICO CITY. THE MEN, CLAIMING TO BE CARRYING A PACKAGE FULL OF DYNAMITE, THREATENED TO BLOW UP THE AIRCRAFT IF THEIR DEMAND TO BE TAKEN TO MEXICO CITY AND OTHER DEMANDS FOR PUBLICITY AND "ASSURANCE OF JUSTICE" WERE NOT MET. THE HIJACKERS DEMANDED JUSTICE IN THE FORM OF PROSECUTION OF MEXICO'S "CHEATING" DOCTORS.

THE TWO MEN WERE IDENTIFIED AS RAILROAD WORKERS WHO REPORTEDLY HAD BEEN RECENTLY FIRED IN A LABOR DISPUTE ON THE CHIHUAHUA PACIFIC RAILROAD IN MEXICO CITY.

AFTER ARRIVAL AT MEXICO'S BENITO JUAREZ AIRPORT, TWO INDIVIDUALS SURRENDERED TO MEXICAN POLICE AUTHORITIES WITHOUT INCIDENT.

THE PACKAGES WERE FOUND TO CONTAIN HARMLESS MATERIAL BUT NO EXPLOSIVES. NO INJURIES

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WERE SUSTAINED IN THE HIJACKING.

FAA COMMENT: REPORTS INDICATING THE MOTIVE FOR THE INCIDENT APPEAR IN CONFLICT. MOST REPORTS STATE THE REASON FOR THE HIJACK WAS FOR THE TWO MEN TO GAIN PUBLICITY AND TO "ASSURE JUSTICE."

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
RICHARD F. LALLY

RICHARD F. LALLY
DIRECTOR, CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY SERVICE, ACS-1

CAX-78 21

SUBJECT: UNSUCCESSFUL HIJACKING OF KLM AIRCRAFT ON AUGUST 6, 1978

ON AUGUST 6, 1978, A KLM AIRCRAFT, A DC-9, EN ROUTE TO MADRID FROM AMSTERDAM, WAS HIJACKED BY ONE MALE.

THE HIJACKER, ARMED WITH A TOY PISTOL, A SPRAY CAN WHICH HE CLAIMED TO BE A BOMB, AND A BOTTLE WHICH HE SAID CONTAINED A DANGEROUS CHEMICAL, FORCED HIS WAY INTO THE COCKPIT AND DEMANDED TO BE TAKEN TO ALGIERS. THE AIRCRAFT PROCEEDED TO ALGIERS BUT WAS REPORTEDLY DENIED LANDING RIGHTS BY ALGERIAN AUTHORITIES. AFTER INTERCESSION BY THE DUTCH AMBASSADOR, THE ALGERIANS AGREED TO ALLOW THE AIRCRAFT TO LAND.

AT ABOUT THAT TIME, WHILE THE AIRCRAFT WAS OVER THE MEDITERRANEAN, A CREWMEMBER AND THREE MALE PASSENGERS STORMED THE COCKPIT AND OVERPOWERED AND SUBDUED THE HIJACKER. THE AIRCRAFT PROCEEDED TO BARCELONA WHERE THE MAN WAS TAKEN INTO CUSTODY BY AUTHORITIES.

THE HIJACKER, A DUTCH STUDENT IDENTIFIED AS PAUL GOKKEL, ALLEGEDLY HAS A HISTORY OF MENTAL PROBLEMS. EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS TO HAVE GOKKEL

|| No

RETURNED TO THE NETHERLANDS HAVE BEEN INITIATED BY THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT.

Original signed by
Joseph K. Blank

RICHARD F. LALLY
DIRECTOR, CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY SERVICE, ACS-1

cc: ACS-1/20/Divs
AMA-1/DPB-10/60
AP/MOT/RCMP/FOLDER

TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE

NAME OF AGENCY	PRECEDENCE ACTION: INFO:	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
ACCOUNTING CLASSIFICATION	DATE PREPARED	TYPE OF MESSAGE: <input type="checkbox"/> SINGLE <input type="checkbox"/> BOOK <input type="checkbox"/> MULTIPLE-ADDRESS
FOR INFORMATION CALL		
NAME	PHONE NUMBER	

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF COMMUNICATION UNIT

(AX-78-22)

MESSAGE TO BE TRANSMITTED (Use double spacing and all capital letters)

TO:

SUBJECT: UNSUCCESSFUL HIJACKING OF TWA AIRCRAFT ON AUGUST 25, 1978

ON AUGUST 25, 1978, A TWA AIRCRAFT, A B-707, WAS HIJACKED BY UNKNOWN PERSON(S) AS THE AIRCRAFT APPROACHED SHANNON, IRELAND. THE FLIGHT ORIGINATED IN NEW YORK AND WAS EN ROUTE TO GENEVA.

DURING THE EARLY MORNING OF AUGUST 25, AN UNIDENTIFIED PASSENGER HANDED A STEWARDESS TWO NOTES AND DIRECTED HER TO TAKE THE NOTES TO THE CAPTAIN. THE INDIVIDUAL WORE A CAPE WHICH CONCEALED TWO UNIDENTIFIED OBJECTS BELIEVED BY THE STEWARDESS TO BE WEAPONS OF SOME SORT. SHE TOOK THE LETTERS TO THE COCKPIT AND DELIVERED THEM TO THE CAPTAIN.

THE AIRCRAFT FLEW TO COINTRIN AIRPORT IN GENEVA PER INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN THE LETTERS. THERE, THE AIRCRAFT TAXIED TO AN ISOLATED AREA. THE MESSAGES WERE LENGTHY AND RAMBLING AND TOUCHED UPON A VARIETY OF POLITICAL ISSUES. THEY DEMANDED FREEDOM FOR FORMER NAZI DEPUTY FUEHRER RUDOLPH HESS, FOR SIRHAN SIRHAN, THE CONVICTED ASSASSIN OF ROBERT KENNEDY AND FOR FIVE CROATIANS BEING HELD IN THE U.S. FOR THE HIJACKING OF A TWA AIRCRAFT IN SEPTEMBER 1976. THE MESSAGES CONTAINED SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW THE DEMANDS WERE TO BE MET AND ADVISED IF THEY WERE NOT THAT TWO EXPLOSIVE DEVICES LOCATED IN THE HOLD OF THE AIRCRAFT

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
PAGE NO. 3	NO. OF PGS. 5

TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE

NAME OF AGENCY	PRECEDENCE ACTION: INFO:	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
ACCOUNTING CLASSIFICATION	DATE PREPARED	TYPE OF MESSAGE <input type="checkbox"/> SINGLE <input type="checkbox"/> BOOK <input type="checkbox"/> MULTIPLE-ADDRESS
FOR INFORMATION CALL		
NAME	PHONE NUMBER	

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF COMMUNICATION UNIT

MESSAGE TO BE TRANSMITTED (Use double spacing and all capital letters)

TO:

WOULD BE DETONATED BY A SQUAD OF "UNITED REVOLUTIONARY SOLDIERS" AT 1730 GENEVA TIME. THE NOTE FURTHER STATED THAT THE HIJACKERS ON BOARD THE AIRCRAFT WERE HEAVILY ARMED.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS, THE MESSAGES WERE PASSED BY THE PILOT TO PERSONNEL ON THE GROUND. COMMUNICATIONS WERE ESTABLISHED WITH THE AIRCRAFT AND CONSULTATIONS BEGAN. IT WAS EVENTUALLY DECIDED TO SEND REPRESENTATIVES ABOARD THE AIRCRAFT WHO WOULD ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE HIJACKER(S). PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS WERE MADE BY THE CAPTAIN TO INDUCE THE HIJACKER TO IDENTIFY HIMSELF AND TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS. THESE ATTEMPTS WERE UNSUCCESSFUL.

AT APPROXIMATELY 1550 A TWA REPRESENTATIVE AND A GENEVA AIRPORT POLICE COMMANDER BOARDED THE AIRCRAFT AND ATTEMPTED TO IDENTIFY THE HIJACKER(S). WHEN NO RESPONSE WAS FORTHCOMING FROM ANY OF THE PASSENGERS, THE AIRCRAFT WAS ORDERED TO BE EVACUATED BY THE CAPTAIN. THIS EVACUATION OCCURRED AT APPROXIMATELY 1600, SOME EIGHT HOURS AFTER LANDING AT COINTRIN AIRPORT.

FOLLOWING THE EVACUATION ALL PASSENGERS WERE HELD UNDER THE CUSTODY OF SWISS AUTHORITIES. PASSPORTS WERE VERIFIED, FINGERPRINTS WERE TAKEN.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
PAGE NO. NO. OF PGS. 4 5

LUGGAGE WAS EXAMINED AND THE AIRCRAFT WAS THOROUGHLY SEARCHED. NO WEAPONS OR EXPLOSIVES WERE DISCOVERED AS A RESULT. THE SEARCH OF THE AIRCRAFT PRODUCED NUMEROUS ARTICLES INCLUDING A WIG AND FALSE BEARD. THESE PARAPHERNALIA ARE ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN WORN BY THE HIJACKER WHEN HE FIRST HANDED THE TWO MESSAGES TO THE STEWARDESS. THE STEWARDESS WAS SUBSEQUENTLY UNABLE TO IDENTIFY ANY OF THE PASSENGERS AS THE PERSON WHO HANDED HER THE NOTES.

TO DATE, THE PERSON(S) RESPONSIBLE FOR THE COMMISSION OF THIS INCIDENT HAVE NOT BEEN APPREHENDED. THE INVESTIGATION OF THIS MATTER IS

CONTINUING.
Original signed by
Joseph K. Blank

RICHARD F. LALLY
DIRECTOR, CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY SERVICE, ACS 01

cc: ACS-1/20/Divs
AMA-1/DPB-10/60
AP/MOT/RCMP/FOLDER

Alona ..

6th rd this guy.

Place on 1A 246-2

See if HD feels anything
else should be done.

Greg Sheppard

15/1/85

000222

Mr. W. Sorokan

Enforcement Research & Analysis
Division

Immigration Division
Dept. of Manpower & Immigration

with the
compliments of

avec les
hommages de

Civil Aviation
Security

Sécurité de
l'aviation civile



Transport
Canada

Transports
Canada

John Cook

000223

DEC 18 1977

OL
COILS 2103980
ACTY
29-6-78

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NSA, DIRNAVSERV, AFOSI, ASD/ISA, HQ MAC, HQ D/A, DIA,
COMMANDANT, CG, DEA WASH, PASS TO FAA EPIC

125# 063980
23.1.78
[Signature]

RECEIVED
DEC 3 1977
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
OTTAWA

Security Bulletin (RIS: ACS-1600-19) ACS-77-21
Subject: James Edward Banks - Threats to Hijack Airplane to Cuba

On September 30, James Edward Banks telephoned the General Attorney (Nationality), U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Baltimore, Maryland, inquiring as to the procedures to renounce his U.S. citizenship and further indicated he wanted to travel to Cuba to visit Fidel Castro. Banks was advised by INS that he would have to contact the State Department whereupon Banks became irritated, insisting he was going to Cuba and might have to hijack an airplane to get there.

Banks personally visited the INS office in Baltimore on October 16, advising of his desire to renounce his U.S. citizenship, whereupon he was interviewed by the General Attorney. During the interview Banks was described as being intoxicated and incoherent, again making statements that he would be forced to hijack a plane to Cuba.

Banks again appeared at the INS office on October 17, admonishing the General Attorney for not advising him of regularly scheduled flights from Canada to Cuba and reiterated that he would be forced to hijack a plane to Cuba and would leave Baltimore for Canada by bus and take a flight to Cuba.

On October 31, Banks visited the FBI office in Baltimore stating he was a member of the Black Panther Party and is not afraid of anyone as, in fact, he had shot three people, including his brother, and threw lye on his wife when he caught her cheating on him. Banks further mentioned he was going to Cuba and would have to hijack an airplane to get there. An article in the Baltimore News American in August 1968, entitled "Black Panther Here," reflected that James Banks was appointed head of the Black Panther Party in Baltimore by the Panther Headquarters in Oakland, California.

CARDED 18-1-78 IL

DEC 28 1977

2.

Banks was detained by the U.S. Secret Service in 1966 after he had gone to the White House in Washington, D.C., demanding to see the President. Records reveal Banks had been committed to the Crownsville State Mental Hospital, Anne Arundel County, Maryland, and additionally served time in the Maryland House of Corrections and had been arrested on (21) other occasions for various criminal offenses.

On October 21, the Assistant U.S. Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, advised that comments made by Banks did not constitute a violation of the Crime Aboard an Aircraft or Destruction of an Aircraft or Motor Vehicle statutes. No further action will be taken at this time; however, the Baltimore FBI will keep FAA advised.


Banks is described as follows: Male; Negro; DOB: 5-18-23; 5'9" tall; 175 lbs; Black hair; Brown eyes; Current Address: 336 E. 26th Street, Baltimore, Maryland; Other Address Used: 2312 Gilford Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland; Social Security No. 214-22-1144. The enclosed photograph is provided for your use and further dissemination as appropriate.

FAA Comment: Based on Banks' past criminal actions, mental history, and statements made by him to the effect that he might have to hijack an airplane to Cuba, he should be considered a potential threat to the aviation industry.

Regional Air Transportation Security Divisions have been requested to distribute copies to air carriers, airport managers, security and law enforcement personnel.

For ATA: Please pass to security officers of member airlines.

Sincerely,

for 
RICHARD F. LALIX
Director, Civil Aviation Security Service

Enclosure

cc: ACS-1/20/
RCMP/MDT

ACS-20:CCBOUCH:car:X68210:12/7/77



INFORMATION RECEIVED INDICATES THE BELOW LISTED JAPANESE PASSPORTS ARE
NO LONGER VALID AS A RESULT OF THE JAPANESE RED ARMY (JRA) HIJACKING OF A
JAPANESE AIRLINE AIRCRAFT ON SEPTEMBER 28, 1977.

<u>PASSPORT NO.</u>	<u>DATE OF ISSUE</u>	<u>NAME</u>
ME 4451277 - #063968	MARCH 16, 1977	ATSURO NARITA
ME 4879311 - 063966	AUGUST 5, 1977	KOJI AOKI
ME 2922056 - 063967	DECEMBER 5, 1975	TSUNEKAZU ISHII
ME 3755209 - 063968	SEPTEMBER 18, 1976	YOSHIMI TAKEMOTO
ME 3409736 - 063969	MAY 19, 1976	AKIRA SUZUKI
ME 3282781 - 063970	APRIL 8, 1976	YOSHIHIRO OYAMA
ME 1104630 - 063971	JANUARY 7, 1974	YOSHIRO OONO
PME 596740 - 063972	MARCH 19, 1973	SOTOAKI TOKUI
ME 3554677 - 063973	SEPTEMBER 18, 1976	TOMOSHIGE HONDA

FURTHER, THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT THE FOLLOWING PASSPORTS COULD BE
UTILIZED BY JAPANESE RED ARMY TERRORISTS IN THEIR PRESENT
FORM OR BY FORGING THEM:

1237#
E 9013341 - 063974
E 9013342 - 063975
E 9013343 - 063976
E 9013344 - 063977
E 9013345 - 063978
E 9013346 - 063979

FAA COMMENT: REQUEST THE ABOVE INFORMATION BE PASSED TO PSI FOR
DISTRIBUTION TO AIR CARRIERS SERVING OVERSEAS AND TO U.S. INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT MANAGERS. ANY INFORMATION DEVELOPED ON ABOVE PASSPORTS SHOULD
BE REPORTED TO PROPER AUTHORITIES AND THIS HEADQUARTERS.

FOR STATE DEPARTMENT: PASS TO POST OVERSEAS FOR DISTRIBUTION TO
HOST GOVERNMENT.

Original signed by
Joseph K. Blank

RICHARD F. LALLY
DIRECTOR, CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY SERVICE, ACS-1

cc: ACS-1/20/Divs
AMA-1/DPB-10/60/INTERPOL
RCMP/MOT/FOLDER

U.S. hijackers in Cuba anxious to return home

By ANN CRITTENDEN

© New York Times Service

NEW YORK — Several of the approximately 80 hijackers of U.S. aircraft who are living in Cuba are anxious to return to the United States. Despite the fact that the penalty for air piracy in the United States is from 20 years' imprisonment to death, two hijackers who were interviewed in Havana last week both said "we want to go home and take the responsibility for what we have done." Nevertheless, neither the Federal Bureau of Investigation nor the Federal Aviation Administration, nor the State Department, which has the

responsibility for such cases, has taken any steps to arrange for their extradition.

The cultural officer of the new U.S. diplomatic mission in Havana said that the hijackers have asked the mission to help in returning to the United States, "are not a political case."

The two hijackers, Jesus Gabriel Grant of Milwaukee and Richard Duane Witte of Pittsburgh, met U.S. reporters who were in Havana with visiting Representatives Frederick Richmond (D, N.Y.) and Richard Nolan (D, Minn.).

The two men said that of the dozen or so hijackers they know who are free in Havana, most want to return to the

United States. They said they knew of seven other hijackers in Cuban prisons. The majority of both groups are black, they said.

Both Grant, 27, and Witte, 24, said they were among the first individuals to appear at the U.S. mission when it opened in Havana last Sept. 1. Each says that he met Thomas Holladay, a counsellor officer, and were told, Grant said, that "now is not the time to put your case to the Cuban authorities."

Subsequently, the men said, they were told that they would be issued passports if they obtained permission to leave from the Cuban immigration authorities. They claim that Cuban officials, in turn, have told them that they will be allowed to leave only after they obtain passports. "They say they'll let us go when they want to," Witte said.

Mr. Holladay was not available for comment, but Wayne Smith, the Cuban affairs officer at the State Department in Washington, confirmed that several hijackers had asked the mission for assistance in getting out of Cuba and said "we tell them they have to have an exit permit from the Cuban Government."

"We would not take up the cudgels with the Cuban Government on their behalf," he added. "There are a lot of people far more deserving than the hijackers who are trying to get out."

In all, there have been about 120 hijackings of U.S. planes to Cuba since 1961. Throughout the 1960s, Cuba had refused to send the hijackers back, essentially treating them as political refugees.

However, air piracy be-

came more frequent, and when the hijackers, largely criminal or emotionally disturbed types, began to make trouble in Cuba, the Government took a tougher line. Although Cuba has never signed any of the international conventions mandating the

prosecution or repatriation of air hijackers, the Cuban Government began to put them in jail as soon as they landed, or sent them back.

Several U.S. hijackers have reported violent beatings while in jail and inability to find work upon release.

from L.S.

Laxity lends hijackers a global boarding pass

NEW YORK — (UPI) — Security is so lax at many airports around the world that hijackers can strike any time they choose. The biggest exception is Tel Aviv's heavily guarded Ben-Gurion international airport — and the departure lounge of any airport where passengers are boarding El Al flights.

The military dictatorships of South America have their own form of security precautions: there is no bargaining with hijackers, ransoms are not paid, and hijackers are likely to end up dead in a shootout.

In Ethiopia, armed guards aboard planes shoot would-be hijackers first and ask questions afterwards.

A worldwide survey by United Press International shows that with the exception of Canada and the United States, there are few, if any, security restrictions on internal flights. Checks on international flights range from good, in a few countries, to very poor in most.

Action by Spain


Spain increased security precautions recently because of heavy criticism that better controls might have prevented the hijacking of a Lufthansa jetliner with 86 passengers and crew aboard on a flight from Palma, Majorca, to Frankfurt, Germany. The Madrid newspaper 'Informaciones' coined a new aviation slogan: "To Fly from Spain means to fly dangerously."

It could be even more dangerous to fly from Athens. It was in Athens in 1976 that a band of Arab and German hijackers seized an Air France airbus and took it to Uganda where Israeli commandos rescued more than 100 passengers in the spectacular July 4 raid at Entebbe.

Despite assurances by authorities, security is lax day in and day out. Scores of airport and airlines employees have access to the transit area and could hand over arms to passengers already checked. Electronic devices are not always manned.

But Athens airport looked impregnable recently with young policemen armed with submachine guns guarding every corner. There was very detailed scrutiny of passengers entering the departure lounge.

West Germany imposed ultra-tight security precautions at its airports after the massacre of the Israeli sports team at the 1972 Munich Olympics. The airports are guarded with the same federal border protection troops who staged the Lufthansa rescue mission at Mogadishu, Somalia, ten days ago.



Hijackers can pick their spots, airport survey shows.

The survey showed there are tight controls on international flights in Switzerland — among the toughest in the world — Cairo, all the Scandinavian countries, Tokyo, Seoul (very tough), Taipei, Buenos Aires, Moscow, Manila, Amsterdam and San Juan.

In Ottawa, officials flatly refuse to issue any detailed information on what security measures are taken at Canadian airports.

"This is a very delicate matter we prefer to keep confidential," said one senior official at the Ministry of Transport. "By giving out information of any sort, we may possibly be helping a potential terrorist."

Even the number of handguns seized or the amount of money spent on airport security was classified as "confidential."

Fair to good controls exist at London, Beirut, Paris, Brussels and Tehran, and fair to lax safeguards in Singapore, Leningrad, Rome, Bogota, Mexico City, Central America, Panama, Peru, Colombia, Australia, Nairobi, Brussels.

But in many countries, including the Soviet Union, there are few security checks on domestic flights using short-range planes.

There are only occasional spot checks in Scandinavia, and pilots' associations have protested frequently to the government.

An example of laxity comes from Singapore. Departing passengers at Paya Lebar airport are closely screened, but then are free to walk up a flight of stairs to the transit lounge and mingle at the bar with other passengers who have not been screened and could be carrying anything from a hand grenade to a sub-machine gun.

Israelis vigilant

In Tel Aviv there is a difference. Plainclothes agents patrol the sidewalks outside the terminal with sub-machine guns. A special anti-terrorist squad is on permanent assignment inside. Security men check every piece of untended baggage and if no one claims it, it is taken away and blown up.

Men and women in orange jeans and shirts look inside every piece of baggage. Packages are unwrapped. Cameras are opened and looked through. Pocket calculators are made to calculate. Cigarette lighters are made to light. There are electronic and body searches.

The same thoroughness applies in other airports where passengers board El Al flights.

14246-2

Hijacked plane takes hostages to Kuwait after 100 are freed

NEW YORK (AP) — A Japanese jetliner commandeered by five heavily armed hijackers and carrying at least 30 hostages landed safely at Kuwait airport early today, a spokesman for Japan Air Lines announced in New York.

The hijackers, members of the ultra-leftist Japanese Red Army, had taken off from the Dacca airport yesterday after a terror-filled 5½-day siege in Bangladesh.

The plane took off after the terrorists freed more than 100 hostages and after hours of delay caused by hard tropical rains and a bloody but short-lived coup attempt by Bangladesh army rebels.

Along with the hijackers and the captives, the DC-8 also carried a \$6-million ransom and six comrades of the hijackers released from Japanese prisons in response to the terrorists' demands.

A Japan Air Lines official in New York said the plane carried fuel for 12 hours' flight, giving it a range of more than 5,000 miles, enough to reach either Libya or Yemen, countries where Red Army guerrillas have found refuge in the past.

In Tokyo, a JAL spokesman said the hijackers told the pilot to head for Kuwait.

One Japanese woman among the freed hostages said the experience was "terrifying and incredible." But she said the hijackers did not harm any of the passengers.

"Very bad time," she said. "Very, very bad time but we very lucky too."

Airport sources said the jet left 45 minutes before a Government-imposed curfew was to take effect in Bangladesh at 10 p.m. local time.

Bangladesh officials cleared the plane for takeoff despite a last-minute telephone appeal from Japanese Premier Takeo Fukuda, who asked that it be kept on the ground until all the passengers were freed.

Officials in the airport control tower, headquarters for Government negotiators involved in the tense radio communications with the hijackers, said there were 30 hostages — 24 passengers and six crew members — aboard when the plane left Dacca.

Airline officials in Tokyo gave a conflicting account, saying there were at least 29 passengers and between seven and nine crew members aboard.

Bangladesh officials said those still aboard included 17

Japanese, three U.S. citizens, two Australians, one Indonesian and one New Zealander. Their identities were not immediately known.

JAL had said there were 12 U.S. passengers among the 156 passengers and crew aboard the Paris-to-Tokyo flight when it was hijacked Wednesday after leaving Bombay and was forced to land at Dacca.

Among the U.S. passengers reported released in Dacca was former California assemblyman Walter Karabian and his wife, former Hollywood actress Carole Wells Karabian. The hijackers also freed California banker John Gabriel.

Officials said Mr. Gabriel

HIJACKERS — Page 2

100 killed in coup bid at Dacca

DACCA (Reuter) — More than 100 people were reported killed in an abortive coup attempt by dissident Bangladesh troops yesterday.

Unofficial reports said that 11 air force officers and 17 civilians may have been among those killed in the short-lived revolt, which broke out before dawn in an army camp and later spread to the airport, where the Government was preoccupied with the hijackers of a Japan Air Lines DC-8 jet.

Unofficial reports said the rebel soldiers stormed the airport control tower, where Air Vice-Marshal Abdul Ghafir Mahmud was negotiating with the hijackers. But he was not there at the time, although he later returned to resume talks.



The shooting only briefly held up tense negotiations with the hijackers.

Another group of dissidents briefly seized the Dacca radio station, but President Ziaur

\$3.75 million loss is N.B. price tag to create 50 jobs

Special to The Globe and Mail
SAINT JOHN — The New Brunswick Government has sold for \$1-million a mill it bought late last year for \$4.75-million.

When Clear Lake Sawmills used the mill in 1974, New Brunswick invested no money, but the federal Department of Regional Economic Expansion gave the mill \$900,000. But in the spring of 1976, Brunswick



Supported by a naut quarterback touchdowns to Montreal Alouett the Argos' third lead the Canadian reference. Page 3

Sentimental says farewe. A tearful Pele final game as a day in East R. both New York only teams to year career. Pag

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Their soul i psychedeli Funkadelic, a out experie black music become the st bearef for a n of his black Page 15.

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ONLY
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
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John Gabriel, 60, a banker from Montebello, Calif. reported to be seriously ill, is carried on a stretcher from the hijacked Japan Air Lines plane.

Hijackers take 30 hostages to Kuwait after freeing 100

From Page One
had been marked for execution by the terrorists if their demands were not met. He was reported seriously ill and was taken to a hospital after his release.

In a carefully staged drama the hijackers traded away more than 100 hostages in exchange for their ransom demands and finally for permission to leave Dacca airport.

The largest exchanges occurred early yesterday when 59 people were freed in a step-by-step trade of hostages for cash and comrades. Most of the released prisoners were

Red Army members jailed in Japan after previous terrorist incidents.

The hijacked jet had sat at an isolated berth near the marshy fringe of a runway

almost continuously since it landed.

In a tense moment Saturday, the hijackers — their patience apparently strained — ordered the plane into possible takeoff

position. The Government countered by rolling out a fleet of vehicles to block the runway, and the plane later returned to its isolated outpost still surrounded by vehicles.

Father says authorities tricked him

Evicted family returns to Queen's Park tent

By DONALD GRANT

Tiny and Bob Galloway were back in their tent in front of Queen's Park with their five children last night, hopeful that their dramatic protest would get them into a new house in Mississauga.

But Mr. Galloway wasn't that optimistic; he felt he had already been tricked once this weekend.

He was having a coffee with his mother and a friend inside the 'small' tent which housed the family on the Legislature lawn after their landlord gave them an eviction notice for being too far in arrears in their rent.

"Tiny's gone out to Mississauga with a real estate salesman," he explained. "He's offered us a house. It's for sale and as long as it's for sale, he'll rent it to us for \$200 a month."

"It'll take a while to sell. It's a tight market right now and any deal made wouldn't close until February," said Mr. McCreedy, who owns the house. "I anticipate they'll be there for three months. They should have other housing by that time. There's always a house somewhere."

Mr. McCreedy said "They can't afford a nickel. He's a shipper for a Rexdale company."

Mr. Galloway said the family packed up their camping gear and prepared to leave Queen's Park about 1 p.m. Saturday after a deal had been made for them to return to their York borough home. He said this "alleged deal" had been made by Toronto Ward 3 Alderman Richard Gilbert and a Metro Social Services worker to allow the Galloways to remain in their previous home until the Metro agency could

Mr. Gilbert told a reporter he decided to help the Galloways after City Hall received a telephone call from Tiny Galloway's sister. It was relayed to him by mistake (the Galloways live in York borough, just outside his ward).

"Nobody else was helping, so I thought I'd see what I could do."

Mr. Gilbert had hoped a temporary arrangement could be worked out to subsidize the family's rent until they could obtain Ontario Housing Corp. accommodation.

At that time, Mrs. Galloway said, "I'm hoping I made my point. If they still say we have to pay the rent, we're going right back in front of Queen's Park."

The house was without heat Saturday, but even so it was "a lot warmer" than the tent. "We were soaked last night," she said.

baby to spend the night at their home; Saturday morning a fast-food catering truck arrived with hot food.

Another visitor was less welcome. At about 3 a.m. Saturday a man came to the tent, asked if the occupants were the Galloways, and wanted to come inside. Tiny was awake; Bob was asleep.

The visitor turned out to be "drunk as hell," Tiny said, and "I was really frightened."

She said he gave her a song and dance about his problems, including the alleged fact that the police were after him.

Whether or not the Galloways enjoyed their sortie into the outdoors was irrelevant, she said. "It's not the point of enjoying it. It's the point of trying to get some action done."

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Toronto, Ontario M5V 2S9
Telephone 361-5222

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One Year	\$67.00
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IS QUALITY

W.S.

There is not too
much we can do
with this case
since he is a
citizen. I would
drop a line to Pearl
Hankins then but
explaining that there
is little we can
do unless he obtained
his citizenship by
fraudulent means
W.S.F.

000234

PLEASE ADDRESS
CORRESPONDENCE TO:

ROY THE COMMISSIONER
CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE
OTTAWA, CANADA
K1A 0R2



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
YOUR NO. IH600-1183
VOTRE N°

OUR NO. D 993-1967
NOTRE N°

18 July 1977

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. N.S. Fontanne,
Enforcement Research & Analysis,
Dept. of Manpower & Immigration,
Room 858,
Bourque Memorial Bldg.



Mr. H. G. F. ...

s.19(1)

Dear

Re: Jozef HOMOLA
s

Further to our conversation this date, the following is a summary of information contained in our file. The subject was born in Czechoslovakia on 9 February 1944 and arrived in Canada in October 1968. He proceeded to Hamilton, Ontario, where he enrolled in Manpower classes in November 1968. He was issued Social Insurance Number [redacted] and was employed as a carpenter. He was issued with Canadian Citizenship Certificate [redacted] on 30 November 1974.

2. On December 25, 1974, subject attempted to hijack an Air India flight en route from Beirut to Paris. The aircraft landed in Rome where subject was arrested by Italian authorities and sentenced to a minimum of five years in an Italian mental hospital. At that time he was in possession of Canadian passport KE577153 issued Ottawa, 2 December 1974.

3. We have learned that subject was recently ordered deported from Italy and arrived in Canada at Toronto International Airport on 1 July 1977. He is currently residing at 82 Sherman Ave., North, Hamilton, Ontario.

4. We would appreciate receiving your comments on future developments of this case.

*2nd list
All material
He is aware
of all this
3/5/77*

Yours truly,

G.S. Warren
G.S. Warren,
Assistant/Officer i/c
Security Intelligence
RCMP Security Service

etc. 2
GOUVERNEMENT
DE QUEBEC

3

Manpower and Immigration Main-d'œuvre et Immigration
Information Service Service d'information

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HIJACKERS

MOSCOW (REUTER) - TWO LITHUANIANS WHO HIJACKED A SOVIET AIRLINER IN 1970 ARE BEING EXPELLED FROM THE UNITED STATES; BUT WILL NOT BE TURNED OVER TO SOVIET AUTHORITIES; A U.S. EMBASSY SPOKESMAN SAID FRIDAY.

A SOVIET STEWARDESS WAS SHOT TO DEATH DURING A STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE PLANE.

THE HIJACKERS, PRAGAS BRAZINSKAS AND HIS SON ALGIRDAS, HAVE BEEN DENIED POLITICAL ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES; AND PROBABLY WILL BE DEPORTED TO VENEZUELA; THE EMBASSY DISCLOSED.

THE ANNOUNCEMENT CAME IN A LETTER FROM THE WHITE HOUSE; SIGNED BY PRESIDENTIAL AIDE VALERIO GIANNINI.

HE WROTE IN REPLY TO AN OPEN LETTER TO PRESIDENT CARTER; FROM TWO OF THE DEAD STEWARDESS FELLOW CREW MEMBERS.

PUBLISHED BY THE SOVIET NEWS MEDIA LAST MARCH THEIR LETTER CALLED FOR THE EXTRADITION OF THE HIJACKERS TO THE SOVIET UNION.

THE WHITE HOUSE LETTER SAID THE UNITED STATES REJECTED THE LITHUANIANS' REQUEST FOR ASYLUM ON GROUNDS THAT THE HIJACKING WAS A SERIOUS; NON-POLITICAL CRIME.

THE UNITED STATES IS "UNALTERABLY OPPOSED TO THE USE OF TERRORIST TACTICS-INCLUDING THE HIJACKING OF AIRCRAFT;" GIANNINI WROTE.

HE SAID THE HIJACKERS ENTERED THE UNITED STATES ILLEGALLY WHILE IN TRANSIT FROM VENEZUELA TO CANADA; AND PROBABLY WOULD BE DEPORTED TO VENEZUELA IF PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THEM WERE UPHOLD IN COURTS.

PRAGAS BRAZINSKAS WAS CONVICTED IN A TURKISH COURT AND SENTENCED TO EIGHT YEARS IN PRISON; BUT WAS RELEASED IN 1974 UNDER AN AMNESTY.

THE SOVIET MEDIA HAVE ACCUSED WASHINGTON OF DELAYING ACTION AGAINST THE HIJACKERS.

AN EMBASSY SPOKESMAN SAID THE UNITED STATES HAS ASKED THE SOVIET UNION TO GIVE THE WHITE HOUSE REPLY THE SAME PUBLICITY IN THE OFFICIAL MEDIA THAT THE CREW MEMBERS' LETTER TO CARTER RECEIVED LAST MARCH.

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Manpower and Immigration / Main-d'œuvre et Immigration

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IH295-22 - CROATIANS
IH246-2 - HIJACKING
IH256-Q-3 - TERRORISTS

WINNIPEG FREE PRESS SEP 15 1976

Hijacking back in fashion

The Croatian hijacking of a United States domestic flight and the ensuing drama has ended without casualties among the passengers. However, one policeman died and three others were injured when they tried to dismantle a bomb left by the hijackers in New York as an earnest of their intentions. The matter was thus hardly a lark, or "showbiz" as one of the hijackers jokingly put it. It was a murderous affair, quite apart from the anguish of the passengers and the enormous cost of the cross-Atlantic journeying, a cost that eventually will have to be defrayed by the taxpayer.

Meanwhile, Interpol has warned that Carlos, the arch-terrorist who, apart from all his other crimes, is responsible for the murder of two French policemen, was reported to be in Belgrade with a group of Palestinians planning a "revenge for Entebbe."

★ ★ ★

Hijacking is thus back in fashion and it is more than necessary that governments come to an agreement to put an end to this plague. The case of the Croatians was doomed from the beginning: They had nowhere to go. When, some time ago, Croatian terrorists hijacked a Swedish airliner and brought it to Spain, where the Franco regime was still in existence, they got short shrift from the Spanish police, who, they had hoped, would be sympathetic to their cause. On the other hand, Arab terrorists always find a haven, and even when captured can be sure that their stay in prison will be both short and comfortable. Indeed, one wonders whether President Giscard d'Estaing would have been as tough in dealing with the hijackers had the latter been Arabs rather than Croatians.

This, of course, is the crux of the matter: The governments most affected by the crime of hijacking have the means of dealing with it, but lack the will. The Yugoslavs would not go out of their way to nab Carlos and his band of killers. The Turks will not hang the Arabs who shot up a group of passengers at the Istanbul airport. The Greek Supreme Court is still undecided whether or not to quash the decision of the Athens Court of Appeal that ordered the release of the German terrorist, Rolf Pohle, described by the Greek judges as a "political prisoner." Chancellor Helmut Schmidt did not mince words when he told Greek Premier Karamanlis what Germany thinks of this sophism. However, it would appear that the Greeks take more heed of the terrorists than of their German allies. They do not seem to dismiss lightly the warnings of Pohle who told the Supreme Court: "Whatever your verdict, the Liberation movements, particularly the Greek, German and Palestinian, shall take note of your decision and act accordingly."

★ ★ ★

The Germans, who had been fairly successful in breaking up their own terrorist movement, have been anxious to secure an international treaty to deal with this menace that threatens to wreck our civilization. But it is an uphill struggle. The mealy-mouthed attitude of Canada, as expressed by Canada's new ambassador to the United Nations, William Barton, is typical of the "count me out" stand of most nations. Mr. Barton, who used to be quite outspoken about such international issues, has returned from Ottawa with new guidelines. He is worried that a new controversy over international terrorism would prove "counter-productive" and that it might not be the best way to tackle the issue. What is the best way Ottawa did not say. Unlike the French, the Canadians dutifully refuelled the hijacked plane at Gander and sent it on its way across the Atlantic. Our government is always very high-minded when it comes to international morality — as long as such high-mindedness requires no more than high-flown verbiage. When it comes to action, the government prefers to shut both eyes and then, to make quite sure it will not get involved, to turn the other way.

As long as Pohle, Carlos and other ruthless men whose hands are armed by the Soviet Union, to foster detente no doubt, are secure in their knowledge that Western governments are more afraid of them than they are of the axioms of law, which should govern the behavior of civilized nations, every passenger who boards a plane takes a frightening risk — one he should not have to take.



Manpower
and Immigration

Main-d'œuvre
et Immigration

Memorandum - Note de service

C
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TO
POUR

Chief ERA Officers,
Halifax - Montreal- Toronto-Winnipeg-Vancouver

Your File
Votre référence

Our File
Notre référence IH246-2

Date August 10, 1976.

FROM
ORIGINE

fr Director, Enforcement Research
and Analysis Division, Ottawa.

SUBJECT
OBJET

Terrorism - Hijackings

1. For your information, attached is a detailed report of the recent Air France hijacking which culminated in the Israeli intervention in Uganda.

enc.

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Government of Canada / Gouvernement du Canada

MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO / À

ARA - Moncton CRA - Winnipeg
QRA - Montreal WRA - Edmonton
ORA - Toronto PRA - Vancouver

FROM / DE

National Civil Aviation
Security Co-ordinator

SUBJECT / OBJET

Civil Aviation Security Intelligence/Information

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ
CONFIDENTIAL
OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE
670-7
YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE
DATE
August 5, 1976

With reference to previous correspondence dated July 30, 1976, and in particular FAA Security Summary (CAX-76-10) re Successful Hijacking of Air France Aircraft on June 27, 1976, the RCMP has provided additional information concerning this incident and a copy of the report is attached for your information.

for

W. M. McLeish
National Civil Aviation
Security Co-ordinator
Attach.

4/8/76

Donner
For info + file
plus

Copies of the memorandum sent to:

ATAC
Air Canada
EPA
Nordair
CP Air
Quebecair
Transair
PWA
Wardair
Time Air
Norcanair
Great Lakes
CALPA
Dept. Solicitor General
External Affairs
(Security & Intelligence)
Manpower & Immigration ✓
National Revenue
(Field Operations)

AAOS - Moncton
QAOS - Montreal
OAOS - Toronto
CAOS - Winnipeg
WAOS - Edmonton
PAOS - Vancouver
APGM - Mirabel
APGM - Toronto
APGM - Vancouver
APM - Calgary
APM - Edmonton
APM - Winnipeg
APM - Ottawa
APM - Halifax
APM - Gander
DGCA
DAS
KSP
CAX

CONFIDENTIAL

HIJACKING OF AIRFRANCE AIRBUS FLIGHT
OVER GREECE - 27 JUNE, 1976 - SUMMARY

INCIDENT (General Overview):

The Air France airbus, Flight 139 on a routine trip from Tel Aviv to Paris via Athens, was hijacked shortly after its departure from Athens on Sunday, June 27. It was commandeered by a group of four Palestinian terrorists who identified themselves as members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - Che Guevara commando unit. Later, in a call from Damascus, the PFLP (Rejection Front) officially claimed responsibility for the hijacking and cited France as an "historic enemy of Arabs" and a "junior partner of U.S. Imperialism." The Palestine Liberation Organization (Acceptance Front) under Yasser ARAFAT, disassociated itself from and denounced the PFLP action, charging the PFLP with attempting to subvert the established good relations that currently exist between the PLO and French Government.

The plane, along with approximately 257 passengers and crew, was ordered to Libya's Benghazi Airport where it subsequently took on food, water and a reported 34 tons of fuel. During this stop-over, Libyan officials were observed talking to the terrorists and a sick British passenger was released.

Sketchy and unconfirmed information indicates that, following a delay of between 4 to 7 hours, the airbus left Benghazi for Sudan but was refused landing permission. Other information, obtained later from the Captain of the airbus, tends to contradict the Sudan information and suggests that Wilfried BOESE (leader of the hijackers) knew in advance that, after their take-off from Benghazi, the plane's destination would be Uganda. In any event, the plane was directed to Entebbe Airport (located 25 miles outside Kampala, Uganda) and landed there during the early hours of June 28. President Idi AMIN Dada was well aware of the proposed Entebbe landing for, in a July 3rd press release, he stated that the plane was allowed landing permission only after he had consulted with the U.N. Secretary-General, Kurt WALDHEIM, and for "humanitarian reasons" - a reference no doubt to the plane's remaining limited supply (15 minutes) of fuel.

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

At Entebbe, a group of PFLP reinforcements were present (having been previously contacted by BOESE using the plane's radio) and warmly welcomed the hijackers. At this point, the terrorist command shifted to those on the ground and was assumed directly by their leader, Abdel Latif Abdel RAZAQ, a senior member of the PFLP.

Following the appearance of AMIN, the passengers and crew disembarked the plane and were held captive in an unused airport building. During their captivity, the complicity of the Ugandan soldiers with the terrorists became obvious - the soldiers took regular watch duty over the hostages and fraternized openly with the terrorists. The terrorists were made to feel comfortable and enjoyed full freedom of movement. AMIN appointed himself in charge of negotiating the exchange of passengers for terrorist prisoners located in Israel, France, Germany, Kenya and Switzerland. He was assisted in this task by the Somalian Ambassador to Uganda, Haski ABDULLAH (requested by and speaking on behalf of the terrorists) and the French Ambassador, Pierre RENARD, who represented the hostages.

Forty hostages were released on June 30, followed by a further release of 101 hostages on July 1, 1976. Negotiations resumed in Uganda for the release of the remaining 110 passengers and crew (98 of whom were either Israelis or Jews holding dual citizenship). After a protracted 3 day period of obstinate yet seemingly resolvable negotiations, the incident concluded with the July 3/4 Israeli rescue mission in which 3 hostages, 1 Israeli officer, 7 terrorists, and a reported 20 Ugandan soldiers were killed. Additionally, the Israelis destroyed 7 MIG 21 and 4 MIG 17 fighter aircraft. (NOTE: Entebbe is both a civilian and military airport). The fate of Dora BLOCH, a British hostage who at the time was situated in a Kampala hospital, is still not confirmed; however, a female body (along with 3 Ugandan male air traffic controllers) was found a few days after the raid. AMIN continues to maintain that BLOCH had been released from the hospital one day prior to the Israeli raid.

AIRPORT SECURITY:

Notwithstanding Greek protest to the contrary, all available information pinpoints Athens as the point of terrorist embarkation. Evidence overwhelming suggests that the terrorists boarded the plane from the transit lounge and may have originated their operation from either Saudi Arabia, Iraq or Bahrain (although there is some suggestion that they were among 5 individuals having arrived on the early morning Singapore-Athens via Kuwait flight). The Athens police conducted an official enquiry and insist that airport security had not been lax, that all passengers had been properly screened, and that the terrorists probably boarded the airbus in Tel Aviv. Because of the tight security at Ben Gurion Airport and only cursory searching of transit passengers by the Greeks (this lax security is supposedly well known to terrorists)

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

we tend to discount the Athen's police view.

MODUS OPERANDI:

The hijacking unit was composed of 4 individuals: two male Arabs (not further identified) and, two Europeans of which one was female and both of German nationality:

(a) Wilfried BOESE. The undeniable leader of the group and, according to some witnesses, called himself BASIL. He was suspected to have been involved in the Orly Airpost terrorist attack (19 JAN 75) and was expelled to Germany after his arrest by French authorities in June, 1975.

(b) Benga ERTURK. A German national arrested during a roundup of Turkish/Palestinian terrorists by French authorities in December, 1973. Also, as an anarchist ERTURK had contact with the German Baader-Meinoff terrorist group and had been connected with the foreign operations section of the PFLP under Wadia HADDAD.

From the Athens airport transit lounge, BOESE and ERTURK entered the first class section of the airbus while the two Arabs sat near the rear of the economy section. All four went into action 10 to 20 minutes after departing Athens. Each member carried one firearm and one grenade. BOESE was in charge of neutralizing the crew, ERTURK was in charge of the first class section and the two Arabs took care of the economy class passengers. Using the aircraft's intercom, BOESE identified the group as members of the PFLP Che Guevara commando unit while his accomplices gathered and searched all passengers in the economy section. One hour prior to landing at Benghazi, all identity papers (passports, identification cards, driver's licences, credit cards) were confiscated. Israeli passengers were then separated from the rest of the passengers.

While at Benghazi, the terrorists took from their travel bags several metal boxes (English cookie tins) containing aluminum foil wrapped candies with, what is believed, explosive powder interspersed. After distributing the candies to children passengers, the boxes were wired to detonators and placed in the front and rear of the plane. This was done in the presence of a number of passengers. The aluminum wrapping is believed to have been designed to thwart metal detection machines at the Athens airport.

All passengers were of the opinion that Benghazi was just a refueling stop. Witnesses noted the intervening of a Libyan government representative and some indicated that his exchange with the terrorists was unfriendly. We are unable to determine exactly the significance of this exchange but suggest the possibility that Libya, as a member of the recently formed peace-keeping team in Lebanon, may have felt that any suggestion of their complicity

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

with the hijackers would surely evoke a hostile reaction from Israel and thereby unnecessarily jeopardize their efforts in Lebanon.

The hijackers identified each other by numbers: 54 was designated for ERTURK, 39 for BOESE and one of the Arabs was number 10. All hijackers spoke correct English and it was in English that BOESE declared that the hijackers belonged to the PFLP and made a revolutionary political speech evoking the martyrs of the Palestinian resistance movement, Hamsri MAHOUD and Boudia MOHAMED. He also declared that the aim of the hijacking was to call the world's attention to the plight of the Palestinians and, to change French policy regarding Palestinians. He was no doubt referring to the 1975 arrests of several terrorists (including himself and ERTURK) operating in France and connected with the PFLP. The hijackers demands included the release of twenty Palestinian and other terrorists held by Israel, six held by West Germany, five held by Kenya, one held by Switzerland, and one held by France.

The plane was met at Entebbe by a group of 2/3 terrorists armed with machine-pistols. Buses had been pre-arranged and were used to transport the hostages to an unused airport building. In view of their behavior, witnesses estimate that the terrorists knew each other and that the reinforcements had been waiting in Kampala for some time. The terrorists, surrounded by elements of the Ugandan army, seemed to operate at ease. Upon landing at Entebbe, the relay group took command of the operation with the overall leadership being assumed by Abdel Latif Abdel RAZAQ. Unsubstantiated information suggests that approximately 2/3 other terrorists joined this group of 7 on June 29, boosting their total strength to 9/11.

Throughout the week of June 28, negotiations were conducted between the terrorists and the governments of those countries either directly affected by their demands or, having nationals amongst the list of hostages being held. Forty hostages were released on June 29 with an additional 101 being released on June 30. Of the remaining 110 passengers, 98 were either Israeli or Jews holding dual citizenship. The hijacking had now taken on the very definite characteristics of a classical Israeli-Arab confrontation. Even though the French air crew was still being held, the major threat was against the Israeli/Jewish hostages. This point, along with definite signs that AMIN was co-operating with the terrorists; the poor relations between Israel and Uganda; and the long held Israeli policy of not capitulating to terrorists demands by releasing prisoners, formed the basis of the Israeli military action on the 3/4 July, 1976.

Those terrorists killed during the Israeli rescue action have been identified as:

- (a) Wilfried BOESE
- (b) Benga ERTURK

000244

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

(c) Abdel RAZAQ, a.k.a. Abdel ELLATIF and Abou DARDA. A senior member of the PFLP who occupied a position of prominence in the foreign terrorist section under Wadia HADDAD.

(d) El Hag Faiz JABER. A former leader in the PFLP and involved in planning terrorist acts in Europe and elsewhere.

(e) Gail El ARGA, a.k.a. Yail El ARJA. Senior member of the PFLP in charge of operations in South America and subordinate to Tayasir QUBBAOF of the PFLP foreign liaison department. In addition to political and propaganda activity, assisted Wadia HADDAD in planning acts of terrorism.

(f) Abu ALI. not further identified.

(g) Abu KHALED. not further identified.

CONCLUSION:

This incident serves to illustrate that recent statistics, however reliable or vagarious they may be, only crudely delineate the scope of aircraft hijacking. For example, statistics show a marked increase in incidents from 1968 through 1972 and a marked decline in 1973. But, underlying this raw data are some significant changes in the character of the hijack offense and in the motivation of the offenders. Hijacking offenders may be classified generally as being psychopathologically, criminally or ideologically motivated. At issue here is that since 1968, hijacking has increasingly evolved into the weapon, or the platform, of persons acting out of ideological/political reasons. In this case, there is no doubt that the PFLP chose the Air France hijacking as a vehicle for the release of prisoners, for publicity for their cause, and, as a means of extending and intensifying their confrontation against the Western capitalist world generally and Israel specifically.

The act itself was not impulsive, poorly conceived nor clumsily executed. On the contrary, the hijacking provides clear evidence that the terrorists possessed the skills and instruments necessary to the successful execution of their plan, had engaged in careful and sophisticated planning, and, skillfully and rationally executed the entire operation.

The hijackers were well aware of the lax security afforded in-transit passengers at the Athens airport and gained the decided tactical advantage by seizing upon the opportunity this situation presented. Of concern here is the information suggesting that security measures at Athens have not tightened since the hijacking, and if anything, have deteriorated. One report has it that an airline manager tested the security a day after the incident and was able to walk through passenger control with a pistol without being detected. If this situation is allowed to continue, we can forecast Athens to be the staging ground for yet another hijacking or other terrorist-type operation.

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- 6 -

It goes without saying that the Israeli rescue mission handed the PFLP a spectacular and humiliating defeat. Euphoria over this outcome should not, however, lose sight of the firm determination (boarding on ideological fanaticism) that the PFLP attach to their cause and have regularly exhibited in the past. The PFLP are not likely to abandon their cause or the targetting of easily accessible aircraft and airports. What they may do, however, is to change their tactics. The protracted negotiations in which Israel was seen about to capitulate to the hijackers demands can now, in retrospect, be viewed as an Israeli manoeuvre aimed at gaining extra time. As a result, the PFLP are not likely to fall into the same trap and in future will probably insist on negotiations of a short-time elapse.

CALPA reports of hijack incidents
see reverse

(1H 246-2)

Cancelled by Records. JEP 23/12/75

5189-4-1

5189-4-2

155-27

Mar 21/74 ✓

Aug 12

Feb. 25/75

Apr 22/74

July 16

Feb 5/74 ✓

* June 18

May 7

5189-2

Apr 2

June 11/74

Aug 19/74

Mar 24

* June 18/74

Sep 20/74

Mar 11

Aug 2/74

Dec 11/74

Feb 19

* Dec 31/74

Jan 2 22

* Dec 31, 1974 ✓

1H 246-2

Oct 4/75

Sep 26/75

Sep 3/75

* Dec 3/74 ✓

* Jan 15/74 ✓

5189-4

1974
* Jan 15
* Feb 5
* Mar 21
* Apr 27
* Dec 3
* Dec 31

6 only.

A.B.
G.G.
G.L.
H.D.
G.L.

1. How important to whom in immigration
- 2.

Note 2.

This stuff going to TBS. directly means we lack some control. For example where is the 29 Aug 75 material.

Note: As these reports are not numbered there is no way of knowing if we are missing any.

Note

Took all H.D. files up to Policy Record to have Hijacking reports placed on one file. Also took off those reports which were on our 1H 246-2. Records will place all hijacking reports on one file and return to H. D. File 155-27 was a Housekeeping file. This was cancelled and the reports thereon will be placed on appropriate files

JSP
23/12/75

THE GLOBE AND MAIL 17 JANUARY 1974

Terrorists face few risks hijacking planes

BY JOHN GELLNER

VARIOUS PALESTINIAN guerrilla organizations call them "our heroes" while they refer to themselves as "suicide commandos". This poses the question of just how desperately dangerous it is for the terrorists to hijack airliners or engage in random killing at international airports.

Perhaps surprisingly, the answer is: risky, yes, but only at the moment of the actual action when surprise otherwise works in favor of the attackers; this past, terrorist operations are fraught with no more danger than, say, shoplifting—and probably with less.

The fact is that, so far, of the terrorists who did not blow themselves up or did not get shot in the course of their attacks (and these are a small minority), none has been in jail for longer than 20 months. Moreover, only three, all caught in Israel—Rima Tannous and Therese Halasseh, female members of a group which had tried to hijack a Sabena airliner on May 8, 1972, and the Japanese Koza Okamoto, one of the perpetrators of the massacre at Lod airport on May 30, 1972—are likely to languish for any length of time.

The reason why this is so is simple: The terrorists stage their attack. They may be arrested on the spot or they may get away in a hijacked aircraft, with crew and passengers as hostages. In the first case, after a while, a second commando unit hijacks another airliner and threatens to kill its occupants unless their imprisoned comrades receive safe conduct to an Arab country.

The Government that holds the original terrorists invariably yields. This is only natural: it doesn't want to saddle itself with responsibility for the death of 100 or more innocent people just to uphold the principle that justice must take its course.

If the terrorists get away in a hijacked machine, all they have to do is make the pilot land it at a convenient Arab airport. Libya, Kuwait and Dubai appear to be the favored locations, though Libya may have become less popular ever since three Arabs and one Japanese, who were involved in the inept and seemingly purposeless abduction (and subsequent destruction) of a Japan Airlines Boeing 747 on July 20, 1973, were arrested on landing in Benghazi and, as far as is known, are being kept in jail there.

Nothing of the kind has happened anywhere else, in an Arab country where Palestinian or Palestinian-allied hijackers have put down after a successful operation.

So, it can be said that both methods are sure-fire. There is in fact at least one Arab guerrilla, the redoubtable Leila Khaled, who tried them both—

and it worked each time. On Aug. 29, 1969, she and a male companion, Salim Issawi, hijacked a TWA machine and forced the pilot to land in Damascus. The purpose of the attack was achieved: seven Jewish passengers were exchanged against imprisoned fedayeen. The two hijackers then quietly surrendered to the Syrian authorities. They were released after six weeks.

Issawi remained in Syria. Miss Khaled went to Jordan, to plan her next action. It was the attempted seizure of an El Al airliner soon after take-off from Amsterdam's Schiphol airport on Sept. 6, 1970, and in itself it was a flop. Miss Khaled's male companion was killed by Israeli security guards. She was seized, disembarked in London during an intermediate stop, and imprisoned there. It took only a few days for her to be free again—she was released to save the lives of those aboard a BOAC passenger aircraft hijacked on Sept. 9, 1970, and redirected to the then guerrilla-held Zerka airfield in Jordan.

As far as is known, Miss Khaled now lives near Beirut, none the worse for her two thrilling experiences.

One really cannot blame Arab governments for not dealing sternly with terrorists who choose to seek refuge with them—so far, always in the sure knowledge that asylum will be granted. It would be worth the life of any Cabinet minister who ordered the judicial prosecution of an Arab terrorist, let alone his or her extradition to the country in which, or in the aircraft of which, the attack took place.

Prosecutors and judges involved in such a case would be in similar jeopardy. In any event, it has never been tried.

The assassination of the Jordanian Prime Minister, Wasfi at-Tal, on Nov. 28, 1971, in broad daylight, on the steps of a Government building in Cairo, was sufficient warning. Tal had played a leading role in the suppression of the Palestinian Arab fedayeen in Jordan. He was at the time in Cairo because Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was both keenly interested in re-establishing friendly relations with King Hussein and in mediating between the latter and the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

Even so, he did not dare deliver the murderers to justice. At last report, three of them live in Cairo, unmolested by the authorities; the fourth is in Beirut.

After the last and worst airport massacre, that at Rome's Fiumicino air terminal last Dec. 17, the Kuwaiti Government came up with a novel idea of how to rid itself of the responsibility for five men who had just surrendered—

IH256-Q-3
COPY FOR: IH246-2
IH295-14
IH295-23
IH295-24

without any qualms or fear of punishment, after killing 32 people and hijacking a Lufthansa airliner: let the PLO try them. The latter had officially condemned the attack as injurious to the higher interests of the Palestinians. Still, turning the culprits over to the PLO would be tantamount to letting terrorists get off yet again scot-free.

The PLO has no country, only claims to one. No Arab state would give it the sovereign right of dispensing justice to its territory. In any case, what would apply to Kuwaiti prosecutors and judges surely applies to any the PLO might appoint, as well: they would have to be heroes, not the guerrillas who call themselves that, to convict the accused.

No wonder terrorist attacks in airports and against airliners are becoming more frequent when they are relatively so safe for those who perpetrate them—relative to the nature of the action, that is, which but for those special circumstances would be risky in the extreme.

Nobody would deny that the Palestinians have grievances. The point is that even the most radical—or imbalanced—among them would probably not vent those grievances in such an utterly indiscriminate fashion if the risk of punishment was higher. That of getting killed in the attack is not great, in any case, provided the terrorist does not use explosives or has some expertise in handling them and keeps clear of aircraft likely to carry security guards who are quick on the trigger, Israeli

and Ethiopian above all, going by past occurrences.

After the massacres at Lod in May, 1972, Athens in August, 1973, and Rome last December, questions were asked about the purpose of such random actions. As far as I know, there were no Jews among the 62 people killed on these three occasions.

At Lod, many victims were Puerto Rican pilgrims to the Holy Land. In Athens, a U.S. couple and an Austrian were slain. In Rome, four high Moroccan Government officials were among those killed, yet Morocco actively supports the cause of the Palestinians, and Moroccan troops fought at the side of the Syrians in the last Middle East war and are still engaged on the Golan front.

The answer, of course, is that there is no point seeking one because there is none. If those who these days spread terror among air travellers in Europe—this is no overstatement: during a stay in Europe just at the time of the Fiumicino airport massacre I was struck by the sight of so many perfectly reasonable people genuinely worried about travelling by air—subscribe to any ideology, it is anarchism.


Eighty years ago, a French anarchist of the day, Emile Henry, accused of blowing up innocent guests in the Cafe Terminus near Paris' St. Lazare railway station, stated in court a tenet of his creed: "Il n'y a pas d'innocents" (There are no innocents).

Translated into terms applicable to the present case, an Arab terrorist might argue that as long as the Palestinians have no home and no hope for the future, nobody in the world can claim that it's none of his business—nobody is innocent, everybody must be prepared to suffer.

There have always been anarchists, in Czarist Russia, in fin-de-siecle France, right up to recent times and Weatherman in the United States or Renku Sekigun in Japan. All that was ever possible to do against people of that ilk was deter them from translating theory into practice.

The trouble is that there is simply no way of deterring those who attack airports and airliners, allegedly in furtherance of the cause of the Palestinians, as long as they have an assured haven in some Arab countries.

Anarchists of old would have envied them—and probably also despised them—for being able to perform their deeds with hardly any risk to themselves.



Arab hijacker Leila Khaled, presumably lives happily ever after in Beirut.



Wrecked Pan Am Boeing 707 set afire by Palestinians after they hijacked Lufthansa airliner in Rome last month.

2. SMUGGLING AND SURREPTITIOUS ENTRIES

BUFFALO Dec. 6 '73

JAN 15 1974

209-15

On 11/25/73 Canadian Immigration Authorities report that five citizens of Trinidad-Tobago applied for admission as visitors to Canada. Four were ordered deported back to Trinidad as the Canadian Immigration did not believe they were bonafide visitors. The fifth, Eldica Theresa GILDING, DOB: 1/3/24, Trinidad passport #198991 was admitted until 1/15/74. None of the subjects admitted to knowing each other but were all destined to the same address in Toronto, a Mrs. Sonia Bephia MUNGAL, 18 Newman Ave., Toronto. MUNGAL was on the same flight from Trinidad with the five subjects. MUNGAL was born in Trinidad on 4/14/27 and has a Trinidad passport #244983 with a valid B-2 visa issued in Toronto. She is also a visitor in Canada. One of the subjects ordered deported had the following U.S. address; Marjorie CHARLES, 180 St. Mark St., Brooklyn, N.Y. 11238. GILDING and two other subjects had the address of Mrs. Beatrice THOMPSON, 230 East Seaman Ave., Freeport, N.Y. 11520 in their possession. None of the subjects would explain the presence of the U.S. addresses. MUNGAL also owns the house at 22 Newman Ave., Toronto, where her daughter is living common-law with Kelvin RAMPERSAD believed to be Guyanese. RAMPERSAD drives a 1970 Buick, Ontario plates AKX-533. When the four subjects scheduled to be deported were about to leave on 11/28/73, the Canadian Immigration received a telephone bomb threat from a male caller stating that the plane they were about to leave on would be blown up if they were aboard. The plane was searched with no bomb being found. Canadian Authorities believe all the subjects came to Canada in order to gain entry into the U.S. surreptitiously. G-170 CBASIC, POE's notified.

JAN 15 1974

[Handwritten signature]
2/11/74

MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL.



TO
A

Chief, Intelligence Section,
Home Services Branch, Ottawa.

YOUR FILE No.
Votre dossier

RECEIVED
DEC 6 1973
I. UNIT
OTTAWA

OUR FILE No. IH246-TA-2.
Notre dossier

FROM
De

District Intelligence Officer,
Mississauga District.

DATE 4th Dec., 1973.

FOLD

SUBJECT
Sujet

BOMB THREAT - TORONTO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT.

1. At approximately 3:30 p.m. on 27th November, 1973 a bomb threat was received by one of our Airport Immigration Officers from an anonymous telephone caller. The pertinent part of the threat occurred as follows:

Caller: The people who are going out tomorrow who have been deported, you better not send them out.

Officer: I beg your pardon?

Caller: The people you are sending out tomorrow you better not send them out.

Officer: I am afraid I don't understand you.

Caller: If you send the people out there will be trouble. We will blow up the plane. There will be trouble.

2. The R.C.M.P. and Air Canada were immediately notified. They were informed that we had seven deportees scheduled to leave on Air Canada flight 960 on the morning of 28th November, 1973 (list is attached). R.C.M.P. Constable Robinson called for the Mississauga police to do an investigation. Detective Grey handled the case. Also co-operating was Glen Wood of Air Canada security.

3. The above authorities were made aware of a situation that the undersigned is investigating with regard to four of the deportees. These four, all citizens of Trinidad and Tobago arrived together on Sunday, November 25 1973, along with two other non-immigrants. One of the other non-immigrants was a Mrs. Sonia Mungal who has several children in Canada who are Landed Immigrants. The four deportees, plus the other non-immigrant, Mrs. Eldica Gilding, were all destined to 18 Newman Ave., Toronto. This home is supposedly owned by Mrs. Mungal, who also owns 22 Newman Avenue. All had inadequate funds, and all were destined to substantially the same address in the United States after their visit in Canada. However, only one had a U.S. visa - Mrs. Eldica Gilding. No Report under Section 22 of the Act was written on Mrs. Mungal, but all the others, including Mrs. Gilding, were the subject of Inquiries. Only Mrs. Gilding was not ordered deported and our District Supervisor of Special Inquiry Officers states that, had the Inquiry been better handled, a deportation order could have been issued against her also. The grounds used for all five inquiries was 5(p) of the Act. The names of both Mrs. Gilding and Mrs. Mungal were suggested to the authorities as likely suspects, but these leads were not pursued by Detective Grey because the anonymous caller had been a male. We are currently conducting an

CARDED 14-1-74 IL

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7/11/74

- 2 -

investigation in co-operation with the U.S. Border Patrol in Buffalo and our own Intelligence Section in Toronto to determine whether Mrs. Mungal is indeed running a smuggling racket. As soon as all the results are in we will be making full report to you.

4. On November 27, 1973 Terminal Two was thoroughly searched. The luggage of the deportees being held in detention at the Avion Hotel was also searched.

5. On November 28, 1973 two Mississauga police detectives escorted the deportees from the detention facilities to the airport. At the airport all the luggage of the passengers was closely checked and security was very strict.

6. Detective Grey's investigation, which seems to have been very cursory, ended with the successful take-off of the plane on November 28, 1973.

7. This occurrence report is transmitted to you in case similar incidents occur elsewhere.

Gerhard W. Volkening
G.W. Volkening

Encls:

c.c. Regional Intelligence Officer,
Ontario Region.

GWV/mds.

See attachment.

Card

Andrew GOOLCHARAN, ^c	15 August, 1952	- Trinidad & Tobago
Permanan BABULALL, ^c	7th July, 1937	- Guyana
Shordan ABDUL, ^c	28 December 1954	- Trinidad & Tobago
Joycelyn COX, ^c	11 December 1940	- Trinidad & Tobago
Stephen Claude AUGUSTINE, ^c	14 December 1940	- Trinidad & Tobago
Stephanie Barbara HARRISON, ^c	25 September 1923	- Trinidad & Tobago
Linus LANCASTER, ^c	23 September 1944	- Trinidad & Tobago

CARDED 14-1-74 IL

GWV/mds.

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10/15/73
copy plauson
114295-14 9

114246-2

The following was received from the FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION:
"It has been learned from a fairly reliable source that the FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATION has established a special security section which will concentrate on circumventing security measures at most international airports. These security personnel are busy collecting brochures on various electronic metal detection devices. Fedayeen personnel are also being dispatched to various European and Arab airports to board aircraft while carrying different types of plastic and metal in order to test the capabilities of various detection devices. The Fedayeen are in possession of a small sample of explosives which cannot be detected. After these samples have been tested, the Fedayeen intend to order more from, quote SOCIALIST, unquote, countries. The above information is an indication of the extreme precautions and planning the Fedayeen will take to make their operations work. Terrorists are planning several operations during the next few months with particular emphasis on aircraft hijacking." (Montreal Travel Control)

Copy of this was forwarded to
all R.I.Ds and D.I.Ds on 30/11/73
by J.J. Kosman together with an
article on the Fedayeen
organization taken
from the New Leader
of October 5, 1970. J.J. Kosman
30/11/73

Copy for
I 114246-2
JK 30/11/73

DONATION AND TAXATION

Financing the

Fedayeen

BY GERTRUDE SAMUELS



YASIR ARAFAT

THE ARMED Arab terrorist groups now dramatized in the non-Arab world as revolutionary or resistance movements of the dispossessed, called *fedayeen*, have evolved partly from extreme feelings of Arab nationalism, mostly from an avowed, mutual commitment—the destruction of Israel. (*Fedayeen* is Arabic for irregulars fighting against Israel. The

word comes from the root “sacrifice,” implying suicidal sacrifice.) No one has reliable statistics on their numbers or membership. Some analysts put the groups at around 10. A London research center in 1968 reported that no fewer than 30 *fedayeen* groups had announced their formation, but “some” had not seen action and had probably disbanded.

Estimates of their membership are also widely argued, ranging from “some hundreds” in the smaller groups to figures of 25-40,000 used by several writers. Many thousands are certainly in training camps in Jordan and Lebanon. In recent months, the loosely-aligned terrorist groups formed a Presidium of the Central Committee in Amman, apparently to coordinate policy. But it is questionable whether there is any more real unity among these competing guerrilla organizations than exists with the host governments on whose soil they are housed, honored and supplied with ample funds.

The two best-known groups, of course, are Al Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of

Palestine (PFLP). The former, the largest group and apolitical, is headed by kaffiyehed, mustached Yasir Arafat, who has been praised by Egypt's President Nasser and other government leaders of the 14-nation Arab League. Arafat has genuine status, heads a Palestinian parliament-in-exile, and has been an equal with King Hussein.

Last month's hijacking dramas in the desert tend to confirm that Al Fatah was not clued in to the explosive strategy of the most militant of the *fedayeen*, the Popular Front. In addition to destroying Israel, the declared aims of this Marxist-Leninist-oriented group are the elimination of Hussein's government in Jordan, and of American interests and influence in the Middle East.

The PFLP, despite its success in capturing the headlines, numbers only around 2,000 operatives and was first organized after the Six Day War of June 1967. Headed by Dr. George Habash, 43, a Palestine-born physician, it takes credit

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for all the mindless airliner hijackings since the initial one involving an El Al plane over Rome in July 1968, which it pirated to Algiers.

Much of the backing given the terrorist organizations is well known. Egypt has supported the Fatah with arms. Syria and Iraq maintain their own *fedayeen*. Jordan and Lebanon have housed and given support to guerrillas who long before the 1967 war were making forays against Israel's border settlements.

Speaking in hard tones, Yosef Tekoah, Israel's Ambassador to the United Nations, told a press conference after the September hijackings, "One cannot, and one should not, absolve the Arab governments. They actively cooperated with the hijackings."


Later, I asked him, "Which are the principal Arab governments financing these *fedayeen*?"

"There are no principal ones," he replied, "They're all financing them one way or other. The richer ones are giving them more—Kuwait, the Sudan. Saudi Arabia. The poorer ones not so much."

Documentation of the Ambassador's accusations can be gleaned from one authentic source, the Arabs themselves. Here is a description of how the *fedayeen* are financed, taken from a sampling of Arab press and radio broadcasts during the period August 1969-February 1970 as compiled by the Research Division of Israel's Ministry for Foreign Affairs:

"Abd al-'Aziz al-Nassri, Sudanese Ambassador to Jordan, had a meeting with a delegation of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, headed by Dr. George Habash. They were welcomed and informed that Sudan has contributed 20,000 pounds [\$57,000] to reinforce their struggle."—*As-Sudan al-Jadid*, August 14, 1969.

"The Palestine Liberation Organization Executive Committee [a central coordinating body of terrorist groups, also headed by Arafat]



has imposed a *liberation tax* ranging from 3-6 per cent of the income of every Palestinian, wherever he may live. The PLO office here appealed to Palestinians working with UNRWA. . . ."—*Syrian Arab News Agency*, Damascus, October 9, 1969.

"The second 'Week of Support for Terrorist Operations' in Damascus and the Syrian provinces is now in its fifth day. Contributions reached a peak when a man from Haleb paid 250,000 Syrian pounds [about \$50,000] for the gun of a terrorist martyr, which was auctioned at a party in Haleb."—*Ad-Difa*, Amman, November 6, 1969.

"The Libyan Revolutionary Government has expressed its readiness to pay one million sterling [\$2,400,000] annually to the terror organizations. This declaration was made during talks held in Tripoli on uniting the Palestine revolution."—*Roz*

ai-Youssej, Cairo, December 22, 1969.

"The Arab kings and presidents have decided to allocate 26 million pounds [about \$65 million] to meet the financial commitments of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the coming war, including 12 million pounds [about \$30 million] for the support of the Palestine revolution. . . . It has been learned that Libya has decided to help by underwriting 25 per cent of the Palestine revolution budget."—*Cairo Radio*, December 25, 1969.

"The Moroccan Minister of Economic Affairs stated in a press conference that Morocco would grant special financial assistance to the Arab resistance movement."—*Beirut Radio*, December 31, 1969.

"The Libyan Popular Committee for the support of Fatah has transmitted 400,000 Libyan pounds [\$1,120,000] contributed by the lo-

cal population to support the armed struggle."—*Al-Ahram*, Cairo, January 14, 1970.

"It has been reported from Kuwait that the government of Kuwait told Yasir Arafat that it intended to allocate a fixed annual sum for terrorist operations."—*Akhbar al-Usbua*, Amman, January 15, 1970.

"Egypt supports the terrorist organizations. Cairo provides the resistance movement with much assistance. On this subject we are in constant touch with Arafat."—*Middle East News Agency*, Cairo, February 4, 1970.

I had also asked Ambassador Tekoah, "Is there evidence that the USSR is financing the *fedayeen*?"

"We do know that they're arming the Egyptians," he said, "who are in turn arming the *fedayeen*."

In fact, it is a Soviet goal to improve the efficiency of the terrorists—Soviet publications call them "national liberation forces"—along with that of the Egyptians. Most of the *fedayeen*'s weapons are Russian-made, coming from Egyptian and Syrian arsenals. "Take all the arms you want, and take whatever the fighters need from our production, which is abundant," Nasser told Arafat at the Rabat summit.

Just what is the game of Russian roulette today? With one turn of the wheel, the Russians appear eager to pursue peaceful coexistence with the West. Hence the conciliatory moves by the Soviet Union in the recent round of SALT, the strategic-arms-limitation talks in Vienna, where Russians enthusiastically shook the hands of American officials; hence the new treaty with West Germany.

With a second turn of the wheel, toward the Middle East, Moscow is back to its policy of direct involvement, of aggressive posture, evidently because it feels it has the upper hand there. It is known that Russian units operate and move around the SAM missile sites in the Suez area and inside Egypt. Meanwhile some 300 Egyptian pilots have gone to

the Soviet Union for training in flying MIG interceptors, bombers, fighter-bombers, and helicopters.

Inside Egypt, analysts assert, there are several thousand Russian instructors in aviation, anti-aircraft, tank warfare, commando operations; and advisers go right down to company levels. There are reports of 100 Russian pilots who fly operations and missions (for defense or attack, whatever the order from the Soviet commander).

THE OBJECTIVE of Soviet policy in the Middle East is clearly to expel all remnants of Western influence and fill the resulting vacuum permanently itself. Israeli spokesmen and studies show that the Russians have inserted themselves, through huge military help and economic support, in key areas throughout the whole region. In the Six Day War, the Egyptians lost close to \$1 billion of Russian materiel and planes. This, say Middle East experts, the Russians have not only replaced but increased, outfitting Egypt's new Air Force, armor divisions, and artillery units at a cost of \$3 billion.

Dr. Wynfred Joshua of the Stanford Research Institute, who formerly worked on national security studies for the Department of Defense, writes in her July 1970 report published by the National Strategy Information Center, "Soviet Penetration into the Middle East":

"The USSR's decision in early 1970 to assume a major share of Egypt's air defense indicates a more determined effort to demonstrate the credibility of its commitment to the Arabs and to undermine American influence in the Arab world. So long as the Russian stake in the Middle East remains high, the danger of escalation continues to exist. . . . The current level of turmoil offers unique opportunities for Soviet advances."

The paradoxes inherent in the Russian strategy stem from various theories about Soviet policy. As

seen by Gabriel Padon, press officer of the Israeli Consulate in New York and adviser on Arab Affairs to former Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, there are three basic theories:

"One holds that the Russians are not interested in an all-out peace or an all-out war, but want to keep the area simmering with tension. If there's peace, according to this reasoning, the Arabs could say, thank you very much, we don't need you any more; and if there's war, Moscow runs the risk of a confrontation with the United States.

"Another theory is that since the Russians now have control of Egypt and influence the entire Middle East, a peace on their terms would enhance their influence. The Russian press in referring to the Jarring mission never mentions the United States initiative for settlement; and the Russians do not compromise on their position, which is the Egyptian position, when it comes to the refugees and Israel's withdrawal to pre-1967 war borders.

"Finally, there are people in Israel who deeply believe that it is the Russian aim to destroy Israel.

"I support the first theory. I don't believe that it's a Russian national aim to destroy the State of Israel. But if Israel stands in the way of Russian ambitions in the Middle East, then the Kremlin won't hesitate to try to sweep Israel away, letting the Arabs do the job."

Experts note that the Soviet Union seems to be trying to check its Arab clients. But who will restrain the *fedayeen*? And who is to say when the *fedayeen* will want more from Moscow, perhaps recognition as a government-in-exile opposing Moscow's own clients—threatening blackmail by aligning themselves with Peking? Even during the recent hijackings, the Popular Front's Habash was conveniently in Hanoi.

Quite possibly that purist Omar asks the best question of all: "Who is the Potter, pray, and who the Pot?"

USINS INTELLIGENCE REPORT - 10 SEPTEMBER 1973

4. GENERAL INTELLIGENCE

The FAA has received information that the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) plans to hijack airplanes, particularly those of El Al Airlines, around the world during the next few months. The planes reportedly will be flown to Israel where they will be blown up in the air with the passengers aboard.
(COINT)

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IH 256-a-3
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IH 295-H

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**DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION**

Federal Aviation Administration

[14 CFR Part 121]

[Docket No. 13057; Notice No. 73-21]

**CARRIAGE OF WEAPONS AND ESCORTED
PERSONS**

Notice of Proposed Rule Making

The Federal Aviation Administration is considering amending Part 121 of the Federal Aviation Regulations to provide rules for the carriage of deadly or dangerous weapons and persons in the custody of law enforcement personnel aboard aircraft operated by Part 121 certificate holders. These amendments would also apply to air travel clubs certificated under Part 123 and to air taxi operators certificated under Part 135, when conducting operations governed by those parts with large airplanes.

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications should identify the regulatory docket or notice number and be submitted in duplicate to: Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the General Counsel, Attention: Rules Docket, AGC-24, 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20591. All communications received on or before September 25, 1973, will be considered by the Administrator before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this notice may be changed in the light of comments received. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments in the Rules Docket, for examination by interested persons.

Section 121.585 currently provides that no person may, while aboard an airplane being operated by a certificate holder, carry on or about his person a deadly or dangerous weapon, either concealed or unconcealed. Section 121.585 specifically states that it does not apply to officials or employees of a municipality or a State, or of the United States who are authorized to carry arms, and does not apply to crewmembers or other persons authorized by the certificate holder to carry arms.

Section 121.538(b) requires certain air carriers and commercial operators to adopt and put into use a screening system, acceptable to the Administrator, that is designated to prevent or deter the carriage aboard its aircraft of any explosive or incendiary device or weapon in carry-on baggage or on or about the persons of passengers, except as provided in § 121.585. In addition, § 121.538(c) requires each certificate holder to have an FAA approved security program, which includes the screening system prescribed by paragraph (b) of that section.

The FAA has observed that the large number of hijacking incidents over the past few years has created a potentially dangerous situation with respect to persons legally carrying arms aboard aircraft as authorized by § 121.585. Persons legally armed often have not been aware of the presence of other legally armed persons on board the same aircraft. Moreover, these persons are frequently escorting prisoners, whose presence requires additional security measures. In addition, there have been instances when inadequate identification procedures have resulted in the carriage of deadly or dangerous weapons by persons not authorized to do so under § 121.585. Such inadequate procedures have also disrupted law enforcement missions in which the officer's anonymity was essential to its success, because an uninform security officer or employee of a certificate holder questioned the officer's authority to carry a weapon, after he had already been cleared through the certificate holder's security procedures.

It is proposed to amend § 121.585 by adding a new paragraph (a) to regulate the carriage of a deadly or dangerous weapon by authorized persons. New paragraph (a) would require that an official or employee of a municipality or a State who intends to carry a weapon in the passenger compartment of a certificate holder's aircraft must show to the certificate holder's satisfaction that carriage of the weapon is necessary in connection with the performance of that person's official duty while aboard the aircraft, as, for example, during the escorting of a prisoner, when additional security is needed because the means of physically restraining the prisoner are limited. The rule would not provide for this showing of necessity by officials or employees of the United States, because of the interstate nature of their jurisdiction.

It is also proposed to amend § 121.585 to provide that crewmembers and other persons authorized by the certificate holder to carry weapons aboard its aircraft must also be authorized by the Administrator. In addition, such persons would have to have successfully completed an approved course of training in the use of arms. The purpose of these proposed changes is to ensure that only responsible, properly trained persons are permitted to carry weapons on board a certificate holder's aircraft.

In addition, § 121.585(a) would provide that a certificate holder may not carry an armed person aboard its aircraft unless it has been notified of the flight on which that person intends to carry the weapon at least one hour, or in an emergency as soon as practicable, before departure, and that person has identified himself to the certificate holder by presenting credentials that include his clear, full-face picture, his signature and the signature of his supervisor. The armed person would not be

allowed to use a badge, shield, or similar device as his sole means of identification.

Moreover, the proposed new provisions of § 121.585 would require the armed person to show to the satisfaction of the certificate holder that the armed person is familiar with its procedures for the carriage of a weapon aboard its aircraft, and would require the certificate holder to ensure that he has been identified to each law enforcement officer and each employee of the certificate holder responsible for security during boarding, the pilot in command, and any other person carrying a weapon in accordance with § 121.585(a).

A new paragraph (b) would be added to § 121.585 to provide that a deadly or dangerous weapon could not be carried in checked baggage unless the certificate holder determines that the weapon is unloaded, and the baggage is locked and carried in either the crew compartment or an area that is inaccessible to passengers. Only the passenger would retain the key to the baggage in which the weapon is carried.

The proposed amendments would add a new subparagraph (4) to § 121.538(c) to require that each certificate holder's security program include procedures, facilities, or a combination thereof designed to assure that only a person authorized under § 121.585 is permitted to carry a deadly or dangerous weapon on or about his person or in carry-on baggage while aboard any of its aircraft.

It is also proposed to add a new § 121.584 to Part 121 to provide rules for the carriage of a person in the custody of law enforcement personnel. No certificate holder would be permitted to carry such a person aboard its aircraft unless it has been notified, at least one hour before departure, of the identity of the escorted person and the flight on which he will be carried, and whether the escorted person is considered dangerous by the governmental entity having custody of him. In addition, the certificate holder would have to have been assured by the escort that the person in his custody does not have any article on or about his person that may be used as a deadly or dangerous weapon. The certificate holder would not be allowed to carry an escorted person who it has been notified is considered dangerous, unless that person is accompanied by at least two escorts, and it would not be allowed to carry more than one dangerous person and his escorts on an aircraft carrying other passengers.

Furthermore, the escorted person and his escort would have to be boarded before all other passengers board, and deplaned after all deplaning passengers have left, the aircraft. They would have to be seated in the rearmost passenger seats, other than in any lounge area, that are neither next to, nor directly across the aisle from, any aircraft exit. In addition, at least one escort would have to sit between the escorted person

(As published in the Federal Register 38 F. R. 20098 on July 27, 1973)

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and any aisle, and an escort would have to accompany the escorted person and keep him under surveillance at all times. The certificate holder would not be allowed to serve food or beverages, or provide metal eating utensils, to the escorted person without permission from the escort.

Section 121.575(b) would be amended to prohibit the serving of alcoholic beverages to a person carrying a deadly or dangerous weapon in accordance with § 121.585(a) or to a person being escorted in accordance with proposed § 121.584 or his escort. Under proposed § 121.585 (c) no person carrying a deadly or dangerous weapon on or about his person or in carry-on baggage, would be permitted to drink any alcoholic beverage while aboard a certificate holder's aircraft.

These amendments are proposed under the authority of sections 313(a) and 601(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 1354(a) and 1421(a)), and section 6(c) of the Department of Transportation Act (49 U.S.C. 1655(c)).

In consideration of the foregoing, it is proposed to amend Part 121 of the Federal Aviation Regulations as follows:

1. By amending paragraph (c) of § 121.538 by striking out the word "and" at the end of subparagraph (2) and the period at the end of subparagraph (3), and by adding the phrase "; and" at the end of subparagraph (3) and a new subparagraph (4) to read as follows:

§ 121.538 Aircraft security.

* * * * *

(4) Assure that only persons authorized under § 121.585(a) are permitted to carry deadly or dangerous weapons on or about their persons or in carry-on baggage while aboard any of its aircraft.

2. By amending paragraph (b) of § 121.575 to read as follows:

§ 121.575 Alcoholic beverages.

(b) No certificate holder may serve any alcoholic beverage to any person aboard any of its aircraft who—

- (1) Appears to be intoxicated;
- (2) Is escorting a person or is being escorted in accordance with § 121.584; or
- (3) Is carrying a deadly or dangerous weapon in accordance with § 121.585(a).

3. By adding a new § 121.584 to Part 121 to read as follows:

§ 121.584 Carriage of person in the custody of law enforcement personnel.

(a) No certificate holder may carry a person in the custody of law enforcement personnel, unless the following conditions are met:

- (1) The certificate holder has been notified at least one hour before departure—

(i) Of the identity of the escorted person and the flight on which he will be carried; and

(ii) Whether the escorted person is considered dangerous by the governmental entity having custody of him.

(2) The escort has assured the certificate holder that the escorted person does not have any article on or about his person that could be used as a deadly or dangerous weapon.

(3) The escorted person is in the custody of at least two escorts, if the certificate holder has been notified that the escorted person is considered dangerous by the governmental entity having custody of him.

(b) The certificate holder shall determine that adequate means of restraint have been provided by the escort.

(c) The escorted person and his escort shall be—

(1) Boarded before all other enplaning passengers board, and deplaned after all other deplaning passengers have left, the aircraft; and

(2) Seated in the rearmost passenger seats that are neither located in any lounge area, nor located next to or directly across from any aircraft exit.

(d) At least one escort shall—

(1) Sit between the escorted person and any aisle; and

(2) At all times accompany the escorted person and keep him under surveillance.

(e) The certificate holder may not—

(1) Carry more than one person who it has been notified is considered dangerous, and his escort, on an aircraft carrying other passengers; or

(2) Serve food or beverages, or provide metal eating utensils, to an escorted person unless authorized by the escort.

4. By amending § 121.585 to read as follows:

§ 121.585 Carriage of weapons.

(a) No certificate holder may permit any person to carry, nor may any person carry, while aboard an aircraft being operated by the certificate holder, on or about his person or in carry-on baggage a deadly or dangerous weapon, either concealed or unconcealed, unless the following conditions are met:

(1) The person carrying the weapon is either:

(i) An official or employee of a municipality or a State, or of the United States, for whom the carriage of a weapon is authorized in connection with the performance of his official duty while aboard the certificate holder's aircraft; or

(ii) A person who is authorized by the certificate holder and the Administrator, and who has successfully completed an approved course of training in the use of arms.

(2) The certificate holder has been:

(i) Notified of the flight on which the armed person intends to carry the weapon at least one hour, or in an emergency as soon as practicable, before departure; and

(ii) Shown to its satisfaction that the carriage of a weapon by any official or employee of a municipality or a State is authorized and necessary in connection with the performance of that person's duties while aboard the certificate holder's aircraft.

(3) The armed person has identified himself to the certificate holder by presenting credentials that include his clear, full-face picture, his signature and the signature of his supervisor. A badge, shield, or similar device may not be used as the sole means of identification.

(4) The certificate holder:

(i) Has been shown to its satisfaction that the armed person is familiar with its procedures for the carriage of a deadly or dangerous weapon aboard its aircraft; and

(ii) Has ensured that the identity of the armed person is known to each law enforcement officer and each employee of the certificate holder responsible for security during the boarding of the aircraft, the pilot in command, and any other person carrying a weapon while aboard the aircraft in accordance with this section.

(b) No certificate holder may permit any person to carry, nor may any person carry, while aboard an aircraft being operated by that certificate holder, in checked baggage a deadly or dangerous weapon, unless the following conditions are met:

(1) The certificate holder has determined that the weapon is unloaded.

(2) The baggage in which the weapon is carried is locked, and only the passenger checking the baggage retains a key.

(3) The baggage is carried in either the crew compartment or an area that is inaccessible to passengers.

(c) No person carrying a deadly or dangerous weapon on or about his person or in carry-on baggage may drink any alcoholic beverage while aboard an aircraft operated under this part.

Issued in Washington, D.C. on July 23, 1973.

JAMES M. YOHE,
Acting Director of Air
Transportation Security.

[FR Doc.73-15456 Filed 7-26-73;8:45 am]

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
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August 31, 1973.

Miss + M. Hepinis,

Policy Records has a new primary under "Crimes & Irregularities". It was made specifically for "Terrorism". Our new files are:

(Crimes & Irregularities)

5189 - 1	TERRORISM	- General
5189 - 2	TERRORISM	- Activity Reports
5189 - 3	TERRORISM	- Look outs
5189 - 4 - 1	TERRORISM	- Hijacking & Airport Incidents - General
5189 - 4 - 2	TERRORISM	- Hijacking & Airport Incidents - Conventions

We previously had these under:

5170 - 9 - 1	to	5189 - 1 &
		5189 - 4 - 1
5170 - 9 - 2	to	5189 - 4 - 2
5170 - 9 - 3	to	5189 - 3

New file: 5189 - 2 - Activity Report -

Please index for your records.

Thankyou,
 D. De Finney
 Indexer
 Policy Records
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HUNTINGDON, KINGSGATE, USOYOGS, VAN INTER. AIRPORT, VIC

U R G E N T

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM IDHQ:-

DATA SECURITY SERVICES HAVE DIFFUSED THE LIST OF THE
FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS OF JAPANESE ORIGIN WHO ARE
SUSCEPTIBLE OF COMMITTING ILLICIT ACTS AGAINST
AVIATION. WE HAVE NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THAN
THE NAMES.

ABE NASAHARU	NISHIME MANSUAI	AZUMA SCHOCHI
DR NOZUHARA		
HASHIZUME TAKERO	OKAMOTO TAKESHI	
HIDAKO TOSHIHIKO	OKUDERAOKUDERA GUGZU	HIDEO HOSGIMA
OSAMU SAKAI	HIROKE YATIMA	SAYOKE HAAYSHI
HISAO MOKIYAKA	SHIGENOBU/OKUTAIRO FUSAKO	INOUE YASUSHI
SHIGERU YOSSIDO	ISHIOAKE TOSHIO	SHINGARA KAN
ISHIGAMI TSUTOMU	SHOREI AZUMA	ISHIMINE TSUNEHIKO
TAKEIRO KATO	ISODA KENTARO	TAHARA HISAYOSHI
JIRE TAKAHSI	TAKAMARU TAMAYA	JUNICHYEE TAMAI
TAKINITO MICKY	KURIHARA TAIJI/TOICHI	TENPEI MUSHI
MANO KAKIKO	TOSHIMASA TSUTINADA	MASANORI SHISUDA
TSUNEO OHENA	MASUDA TAKOHO	WAKAMATSU KOJI
NASUNICHI OMATO	YCICHI TERAISHI	MATSUMOTO HITOSH
YOICHI AZUME	MISSURE TANAKA	YONEKO KOSHIMA
MOCHIJOKI	YOSHIMURA KAZUE	MRINAGA SOHSHI
HIROSHI		
YUICHI MOSUMOTO	MORITA AKIRA	WAKANO MARIKO

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The Globe and Mail SEP 28 1972

IH290-3 Supp. (1)

EOPY FOR: IH246-2

Black Panthers select new leader in Algiers

ALGIERS (Reuter) — The Black Panthers in Algiers yesterday announced that William Holder, a U.S. Army deserter who hijacked a plane here last June with his girl friend has been appointed their new leader.

He takes over from Pete O'Neal who had headed the small group of black U.S. militants here since January.

Shortly after the Panthers made their announcement, an anonymous phone call to the Reuter office said O'Neal had been killed, but Black Panther and Algerian sources said they had no reason to believe this was true.

The Panther announcement said Holder, 23, was formerly a member of the U.S. armed forces who deserted from the army in Vietnam after three years of active duty there "and joined the Afro-American liberation struggle."

"Before leaving Vietnam he became opposed to the Vietnam war and the imperialistic nature of the U.S. Government, and began to fight against the U.S. war effort while still in Vietnam," the statement said.

Holder and a white girl, Kathy Kerkow, hijacked a Western Airlines plane to Algiers in June. The Algerian Government returned the plane the same day and handed back the \$500,000 ransom Holder brought with him three weeks later.

CARDED 4-10-72 IL

111 298-3 (page 1)

16 SEPT 1972

COPIES FOR: IH600-596

IH246-2

Never really welcomed

Algeria cuts off Panthers

By HENRY GINIGER

(C) New York Times

ALGIERS — The international section of the Black Panther party, which established itself here in 1969, appears to have virtually ceased operations following an open break with the Algerian authorities.

The "Revolutionary peoples' communications network," consisting of a telex and a telephone, have been cut off, according to Peter O'Neal, the 32-year-old leader of the group, since Eldridge Cleaver officially left it last January.

Although refusing all comment, Algerian officials are believed to be anxious to see Cleaver and the panthers leave but do not wish to force them out. On their side, the Americans, who are also avoiding statements, are believed to be eager to leave but not sure where to go.

The result is a kind of impasse, which is expected to last for a considerable time.

The break came, actually, after a long period of incompatibility. The panthers are believed to have run up huge telex and telephone bills through frequent international calls, which is perhaps the major reason why the service was suspended. And they have also adopted a flamboyant,

noisy and aggressive life style that has reportedly not gone down well with most Algerians.

These strains reached the breaking point with the arrival here in June and August of two groups of airline hijackers from the United States. One brought \$500,000 and the other \$1 million in cash. Despite pleas by Cleaver and the hijackers to keep the money, it was returned to the airlines by the Algerian government.

The police guard placed around the panthers' white and blue villa on a narrow, steep side street in the Algiers suburbs last month has been removed and visitors are free to approach the house. The panthers are equally free to circulate in the city.

But aside from confirming to one newsman the loss of communications, O'Neal has refused to make statements to foreign newsmen, either because of instructions from the Algerian government or through his own prudence.

Completing the escalation that the panthers now find themselves in, the Algerian press, radio and television have ignored them completely for months. Cleaver is living apart from the panthers in an apartment in downtown Algiers.

Up to now he has been able to keep a working telephone, but he too is refusing all statements.

Also kept under wraps are the hijackers, whose whereabouts have not been made public and whose status has not officially been made known. The first to arrive were William Roger Holder, a 23-year-old black, and Catherine Kerow, a white girl. In the second group were Melvin and Jean McNair, Larry and Joyce Burgess, George Brown and three children belonging to the McNairs and Burgesses.

The two arrivals were followed by an open letter to President Houari Boumediene by Cleaver asking that the money be kept. To carry on the Afro-American liberation struggle, he said, "We must have money." A week later the hijackers also issued an open letter, believed to have been written either by Cleaver or by some other black panther, which made the same request.

The letters were published in the foreign press only and Boumediene was said to have been infuriated by their publication. The Algerians appeared to resent this kind of open pressure.

16 SEPT 1972

c.c. - IH700-1-1 Supp.(1)

TMM-Home
/11

Officers-in-Charge,
Intelligence Units,
Montreal - Toronto - Windsor - Vancouver

IH246-2

for Chief, Intelligence Section,
Home Services Branch, Ottawa

September 6,
1972.

Civil Aviation, Unlawful Interference With
aka Hijacking aka Air Piracy

1. This is to advise that we have created this file to accommodate correspondence dealing with unlawful interference with civil aviation.
2. We have placed a copy on this file of our correspondence dated June 28, 1972, under file IH700-5-12, captioned "Unlawful interference with Civil Aviation", which was sent to all Intelligence Units. You may wish to take similar action.



CANADA



DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER AND IMMIGRATION

Director, Home Services Branch

28-6-72

JSO

(1)

I intelligenced
is in your charge
intelligenced is in not
prepared to sign this
memo addressed
to you. OK for
others if you
say so

29/6/72
Mek. -
O.K. - Mr. [unclear]
was saying that
instructively, felt
was not sent
them me. -
1st. Has always
been correct. OK
call about
channels of communication

Handwritten notes and signatures on the right side of the page, including a large signature and the text "OK for others if you say so".

IMM. 1075 (6-70)

For your information. You may wish to advise the Regions.

c.c. OFFICERS in CHARGE, Intelligence Units,*see note below.
MONTREAL - TORONTO - WINDSOR - VANCOUVER.

CONFIDENTIAL

A/Chief, Enforcement Division
Chief, Admissions Division

COPY FOR: 1E246-2

IH700-5-12 Vol. 3

June 28, 1972.

Director, Home Services Branch.

Unlawful interference with Civil Aviation

1. Unlawful interference with civil aviation in recent months has placed considerable pressure on authorities to implement and co-ordinate programs designed to deter and prevent criminal acts against the air transportation industry.

2. One such program has been instituted by the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (L.E.I.U.) in the U.S.A. of which our Intelligence Section is a member. In October 1971 the L.E.I.U. was asked to advise the Federal Aviation Administration, (F.A.A.) of any information or criminal activity which may be injurious to the security of civil aviation. The information gathering process began immediately and the L.E.I.U. has now assembled data concerning:

- (a) Actual or suspected criminal activity directed against an airport, aircraft or FAA facility.
- (b) Arrests or convictions of FAA employees or individuals who hold FAA pilot certification.
- (c) Any movement or activities of dissident groups or individual leaders which may pose a threat to some portion of the air transportation industry.
- (d) Illegal use of aircraft.
- (e) Identification and activities of groups or individuals who may be suspected of planning to:
 - (1) Hijack an aircraft. (Air piracy)
 - (2) Interfere with the duty performance of any of the flight crew or attendants aboard aircraft.

*Note:- For your information with LEIU BULLETIN #71-40 dated November 12, 1971.

..2.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

- (3) Attempt to board an aircraft with an unauthorized concealed deadly or dangerous weapon.
- (4) Place a bomb or explosive device aboard an aircraft, at an air terminal, or FAA facility.
- (5) Impart or convey false information concerning attempts to do any of the above acts.


3. The F.A.A. has extensive information on aircraft type, registration and ownership, along with a register of all individuals who hold pilot certificates. The names and addresses of F.A.A. Regional Intelligence Officers or local F.A.A. Security Offices, are recorded with the Intelligence Section.

4. My reason for drawing your attention to this information is to make you aware of the facility that is available to us should we need to use it at some future date. It is true that this kind of information is available to us through the R.C.M.P., but there will be instances where urgency is a prime consideration, in which case we can go directly to our own sources, who, having primary jurisdiction, will obtain the particulars we need, more expeditiously.

ASC

10/10
28/6/77

LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE UNIT
REPRESENTING LAW ENFORCEMENT THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES



November 12, 1971

Bulletin No.: 71-40

*to be reviewed to our
be reviewed to our
to be reviewed to our
to be reviewed to our*

The office of AIR TRANSPORTATION SECURITY of the FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (FAA) is the federal agency charged with the responsibility of developing, implementing and coordinating programs designed to deter and prevent criminal acts against airports, aircraft, FAA facilities, or the air transportation industry.

Examples of programs, currently in operation, are the in-flight program (Sky Marshal Program), the passenger pre-board screening program, internal security program, airport security program, airline security program, and an investigations program covering airmen and certain violations of aeronautical statutes.

To carry out the coordination of these programs, security officers have been established at 33 key airports throughout the country. These offices are being assigned responsibility for a group of airports in an assigned area of coverage. There are more than 530 airports in the U.S. which handle commercial aircraft. It is expected that all of these will be included in the security office's areas of coverage.

For any of their programs to be successful, it is essential that the FAA Headquarters and its Security Offices, at airports, be constantly aware of any information or criminal activity which may adversely affect the security of the air transportation industry. With this thought in mind, Intelligence Units have been formed at the various FAA Regional Headquarters. These units are developing and implementing information collection and dissemination programs.

Since FAA is legally authorized to collect information only through overt sources, the assistance of Law Enforcement Intelligence Units is urgently needed.

Law Enforcement Intelligence Units are requested to advise FAA Regional Offices or local security officers of any information or criminal activity which may be injurious to the security of the air transportation industry. Of particular interest would be any information concerning:

- (a) Actual or suspected criminal activity directed against an airport, aircraft or FAA facility.
- (b) Arrests or convictions of FAA employees or individuals who hold FAA pilot certification.
- (c) Any movement or activities of dissident groups or individual leaders which may pose a threat to some portion of the air transportation industry.

d/12 Nov./71.

2

- (d) Illegal use of aircraft.
- (e) Identification and activities of groups or individuals who may be suspected of planning to:
 - (1) Hijack an aircraft. (Air piracy)
 - (2) Interfer with the duty performance of any of the flight crew or attendants aboard aircraft.
 - (3) Attempt to board an aircraft with an unauthorized concealed deadly or dangerous weapon.
 - (4) Place a bomb or explosive device aboard an aircraft, at an air terminal, or FAA facility.
 - (5) Impart or convey false information concerning attempts to do any of the above acts.

For those Law Enforcement Intelligence Officers who are not aware, FAA has an extensive file containing information concerning aircraft type, registration, and ownership. In addition, FAA maintains a register on all individuals who hold pilot certificates. File checks may be secured by contacting FAA Regional Intelligence Officers or local FAA security offices.

1. Eastern:

Salvatore Maggio, Chief
Air Transportation and Security Division, EA-90
Federal Aviation Administration
JFK, Jamaica, New York 11430
212+995-9520/9542

2. Southern:

Herbert R. Davis, Chief
Air Transportation and Security Division, SO-90
Federal Aviation Administration
Post Office Box 20636
Atlanta, Georgia 30320
404+526-7271

3. Southwestern:

James A. Ragsdale, Chief
Air Transportation and Security Division, SW-90
Federal Aviation Administration
Post Office Box 1689
Fort Worth, Texas 76101
817+624-4911, Extension 217

Page 3

4. Central:

Donald T. Heiman, Chief
Air Transportation and Security Division, CE-90
Federal Aviation Administration
601 East 12th Street
Kansas City, Missouri 64106
816+374-3901 (FTS)
374-3246 (Regional Duty Officer)

5. Western:

Jay R. Adsen, Chief
Air Transportation and Security Division, WE-90
Federal Aviation Administration
5651 West Manchester Avenue
Post Office Box 9007
Los Angeles, California 90045

213+670-7030, Extension 477 (Commercial)

6. Alaska:

Carl W. Bailey, Chief
Air Transportation and Security Division, AL-90
632 Sixth Avenue
Anchorage, Alaska
206+583-0150 (overseas operator) Ask for: 907+272-5561, Extension 477

7. Pacific:

Robert Groth, Chief
Air Transportation and Security Division, PC-90
Federal Aviation Administration
Post Office Box 4009
Honolulu, Hawaii 96812
415+556-0220 (overseas operator) Ask for: 808+546-9550

DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER AND IMMIGRATION
MINISTÈRE DE LA MAIN-D'OEUVRE ET DE L'IMMIGRATION

MEMOR. DUM - MÉMOIRE

TO - À: F.E.P.

FROM - DE: U.S.

Place this on a holding file (Temporary docket) until J.T.K. returns.

This clipping does not belong on the B.P.P. file. We should really have a separate file on "Unlawful Interference with Civil Aviation".

IH 246-2

U.S.
21/8/72



ACTION REQUEST - FICHE DE SERVICE

GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

GOUVERNEMENT DU CANADA

FILE NO.—DOSSIER N°

DATE

1H298-C-1

8 Aug 72

TO—À

*Ch. [redacted] Intelligence Officer
Ottawa*

FROM—DE

S.I.C. Immigration Intelligence

 PLEASE CALL
PRIÈRE D'APPELER

TEL. NO.—N° TEL.

EXTENSION—POSTE

 WANTS TO SEE YOU
DÉSIRE VOUS VOIR

DATE

TIME—HEURE

 WILL CALL AGAIN
DOIT RAPPELER

 ACTION
DONNER SUITE

 COMMENTS
COMMENTAIRES

 MAKE
FAIRE COPIES

 NOTE & RETURN
NOTER ET RETOURNER

RECEIVED

AUG

1972

APPROVAL

 DRAFT REPLY
PROJET DE RÉPONSE

 NOTE AND FILE
NOTER ET CLASSER

 NOTE & FORWARD
NOTER ET FAIRE SUIVRE

For your information

[Signature]

TS/SEA

CALL RECEIVED BY
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000276

Hijackers Are Escapees From Prison

BY MARYANNE CONHEIM
Free Press Staff Writer

Two New Jersey State Prison escapees—one a convicted murderer—are members of the Detroit "family" of hijackers who seized a Delta airliner and \$1 million ransom and forced it to fly to Algiers, the FBI said Wednesday.

The man who dressed as a priest on the Detroit to Miami flight and called himself "Rev. L. Burgess" and "Larry" is actually George Edward Wright, 29, who was serving a 30-year sentence for shooting and killing a service station attendant during a 1962 holdup in Freehold, N.J.

Neil Welch, special agent in charge of the Detroit FBI, said Wright escaped prison with another of the hijackers, previously identified as "Harry Singleton," who is really George Brown, 28.

Brown was serving a five year sentence for a 1967 armed robbery in Elizabeth, N.J.

Both men reportedly have extensive criminal records.

THE PAIR, along with Wright's common law wife, Joyce Tillerson, 21 and Melvin and Jean McNair, 23 and 25, have been charged with air piracy in Miami. Recommended bond is \$1 million apiece.

The mandatory minimum penalty for air piracy is 20 years in prison.

The five adults were accompanied by the McNairs' son and daughter, Yahari, 2, and Ayona, 1, and Miss Tillerson's daughter, Kenya, 2.


Welch said the McNairs came to Detroit from North Carolina about two years before Monday's hijacking.

They purchased a modest, two-bedroom bungalow at 746 Manistique on the east side on Sept. 27, 1971. FHA insured the house for \$14,150. The McNairs' payments were prompt and up to date, according to the finance company holding the mortgage.

According to education officials, Mrs. McNair was a 1969 graduate of Winston-Salem State College in North Carolina. She worked from Dec. 1, 1970, to June 21, 1971, as a physical education teacher of

Please turn to Page 13A, Col. 1

ESCAPEE George Edward Wright was the man who dressed as a priest on the flight and called himself "Burgess," the FBI said. He had taught classes at a modeling school.



Melvin and Jean McNair and their children, Ayona and Yahari.

Two Hijack Clan Members Are Prison Escapees

Continued from Page 1A

third-through-sixth-grade pupils at Cooper Elementary School, 6836 Georgia, on Detroit's near northeast side.

A co-worker remembered Mrs. McNair as a short, very pretty woman.

"I used to tell her she looked like one of her pupils and she would laugh," the co-worker said. "She did a very good job and had a very good rapport with the kids." School officials said she left her probationary teaching job when she had her second child.

McNAIR worked for about a year for Gino's, a pizzeria at 15036 Eight Mile, and was in managerial training. He was reportedly fired on Jan. 10, 1972 for "inability to meet job standards."

McNair was described by a coworker at Gino's as "a real likeable guy," and a punctual, hard worker.


A few months after his firing, the coworker said McNair dropped by Gino's, had grown a beard, and was "quite off the track," or acting oddly. The coworker said McNair had talked a great deal about astrology.

Wright attended the American Beauty modeling school and later taught a few classes there. The school has since changed its name to Auston Professional Modeling School.

He was asked to leave and not come back, according to a spokesman from the school, because he offended a number of students by using foul language and getting into heated arguments.

"I really don't know how to describe him," the spokesman said Wednesday. "I'd say he was unpredictable."

All five accused hijackers reportedly had applied for public assistance.



George Brown

Handwritten notes: "P.A." and "W. G. 18/8/72"

FBI AGENTS who entered the small, white frame house at 746 Manistique Monday night found a bizarre grave-like mound of dirt in the center of the living room.

Plants were stuck in the mound, and chunks of concrete were at the head of it. On top was a naked plastic doll with a penknife stuck in its back.

Also at the head of the mound were nine pennies arranged around a dish containing corn, bread, lettuce and potatoes.

At the foot of the mound was an empty chair with two track shoes half under it, and envelopes containing mortgage papers to the house.

Other occult artifacts were found in the room — a semi-circle of seven pennies around a small animal bone, a pink candle and a gold colored cup filled with a clear liquid.

Gundella, a local authority on witchcraft, commented on the occult find:

"They sound like a bunch of sick people.

"You've got a mixture of good and bad spells there. The doll and the concrete represent death. Satanic cults do that thing with the chair. It represent the absent person. The plants, the food and the money represent fertility and prosperity. They could've been aiming at more than one thing.

"But I think (the whole display) was there to mislead people.

"If they were really working

a spell, they'd clean the whole mess up and not let you see it. A witch always cleans up whatever she's working with. It would be wrapped, buried or disposed of in some way.

"In all the spells I know, it tells you specifically to do these things where they will not be found or seen."

WAYNE STATE University folklorist Dr. Ellen Stekert said the occult display appeared to come from a mixture of traditions—European witchcraft, African voodoo, numerology and astrology. "They sound like any number of educated counter-culture people," Dr. Stekert said. "Of course, they could have done it as a put-on."

A neighbor said the heap of dirt and other objects were meant to represent the death of the family's life in America and blessings on their new life in Africa.

But the band was under investigation by Algerian authorities in a secret location Wednesday, and U.S. authorities were hopeful that they might be returned, along with the \$1 million ransom.

The hijackers were not allowed to stay with the Black Panther group based in Algeria. The Panthers said in fact they doubted the hijackers were members of their party.

The group has been identified as connected with the terrorist Black Liberation Army, a group not affiliated with the Black Panthers.

Algerian authorities and the official press kept the story in low key although the government daily El Moujahid published their pictures. It said that Algeria had acted "as much by its traditions of struggle as of humanity and hospitality" in allowing them to stay here temporarily.

It added, however, that while Algeria was a refuge for all who fought for just causes, Algeria never wished to see refugees "stained by any impurity whatsoever."

OBSERVERS believed that after officials had finished their investigations of the band, which could take several weeks, the ransom money would be returned to Delta Airlines.

An Algerian information ministry official said the money, in \$50 and \$100 bills, was "under seal" while the government deliberated whether to return it to the airline.

The U.S. government formally asked Algeria to return the money and prosecute the hijackers.

The aircraft itself flew home from Barcelona, Spain, where the crew had rested overnight. The plane landed in Algiers Tuesday and was allowed to leave shortly thereafter.

TO/À INDEXER, POLICY RECORDS	FROM/DE I. M. Lepinis, Intelligence Section, Room 859	FILE NO. - ORIGINATOR REF. - EXPÉDITEUR IH246-2 FILE NO. - ADDRESSEE REF. - DESTINATAIRE
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SUBJECT
SUJET ► CIVIL AVIATION, UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH aka HIJACKING aka AIR PIRACY

MESSAGE

This is to advise that we created a file as captioned above. Its file number is as indicated above.

After this has been indexed, may we please have any parallel or allied file so that same may be cross-referenced. Please return this notice after it has served its purpose.

DATE: 5 September 1972 SIGNATURE: *I M Lepinis*

REPLY/RÉPONSE

We created a file entitled "Hijacking and Shooting Incidents at Airports" (file # 5170-9-1 & 5170-9-2).

Thanks for the cross reference.

DATE: *Sept. 11/72* SIGNATURE: *Seizon J Edwards*

c.c. File SF-T-38
c.c. File HQ2-88355
c.c. Department of External Affairs - Attention Security and Intelligence
Liaison Division - see page 3
c.c. Director of Immigration, Halifax - see page 3.

1H246-2
JEP
4/12/72

5410-3

Charles E. Wood, Esq.
Immigration Attaché,
United States Embassy,
OTTAWA, Ontario

OTTAWA, K1A 0J0
December 6, 1971.

Reference: Your 50/3-C

Dear Sir:

This refers to your letter of 12 November 1971 and your previous conversation with Mr. F. J. Murphy of this Division concerning the possibility of transit facilities through Canada for hijackers from Cuba to the United States.

For the purpose of this reply, I shall assume, as you have indicated, that the hijackers involved would be either citizens or permanent alien residents of the United States.

I would like to state at the outset that our Department has not, to date, formulated any particular policy, pro or con, in this respect, preferring for the time being, at least, to remain fluid and to treat any such requests on a case by case basis.

With regard to the question of passports and visas the requirements would vary depending on the citizenship of the persons concerned. As citizens of the United States, they would require neither passports nor visas to be admitted to Canada (although possession of such might be helpful for identity and facilitation purposes). Permanent alien residents of the United States are exempt from passport requirements only if entering Canada directly from the United States. The latter would, therefore, require passports coming from Cuba, although they would be exempt from non-immigrant visa requirements as persons passing in direct transit through Canada. The Swiss protection passport mentioned in your enclosure, would be an acceptable travel document in lieu of national passport if it would guarantee entry to the United States.

I might explain, at this point, however, that quite apart from passport or visa requirements or any other background history that such an individual might have causing him to be prohibited from admission to Canada, the mere fact of his admission to having committed an act of hijacking, which we would consider a crime involving moral turpitude, would be sufficient in itself to bring him within a prohibited class.

...2

- 2 -

Notwithstanding that, I presume that any request for transit privileges for any such person would originate from the Swiss Embassy to the Canadian Embassy in Cuba or through your Embassy to our Department here in Ottawa and we would be quite prepared to co-operate in that respect, subject, of course, to our being satisfied that his entry in transit would likely not involve any risk to the Canadian public health or safety, and that he would in fact, transit immediately and directly to the nearest border Port of Entry to the United States. We would, naturally, in such a case, wish to have as much advance notice as possible in order to conduct whatever investigation was felt necessary to assure ourselves on these points.

In the event of a favourable decision on our part, there is provision within our Immigration Act to authorize entry under Section 7(2), specifically:

- (i) Section 7(2)(b) - persons in transit through Canada under escort or guard,
- (ii) Section 7(2)(c) - as a holder of a permit (a Minister's Permit could be issued under Section 8 of the Immigration Act).

A third alternative to the above would be, after due process, to order deportation at the Port of Entry to Canada, and provided he did not appeal against the deportation order, deport him directly to his country of citizenship, i.e. the United States, if he were a United States citizen and agreeable to doing so, considering that he would have other options as to where he might be deported.

On the other hand, should such a person show up unannounced at a Port of Entry and be found, on examination, to have been a hijacker, he would automatically be detained for an Immigration Inquiry which would most likely result in a deportation order, directing that he be deported to the place whence he came to Canada, or to the country of which he is a national or citizen, or the country of his birth, or to such other country as may be approved by the Minister. Provided he did not appeal against the order and were a U.S. citizen he could be deported directly to the U.S.A. if he chose. If he were not a U.S. citizen, he might still be deported to the U.S.A. if he chose and if your government were willing to accept him. Should he decide, however, to enter an appeal against the deportation order, the execution of the order would be stayed pending the hearing of his appeal by the Immigration Appeal Board.

Inasmuch as we have not to date kept specific records on the entry of hijackers, as such, I cannot provide you with details of any such persons who may have been repatriated through Canada in the past. There have been a couple of cases where persons have arrived from Cuba by boat and were allowed visiting or shore leave privileges, but who disappeared and subsequently turned up inland seeking permanent residence. In two cases, deportation was ordered and both were deported to the U.S.A.

...3

- 3 -

I have given this reply, as you will observe, somewhat in detail, but I felt that, in outlining our position, I should appraise you of the possible alternatives, which might be considered or applied.

Yours sincerely,


F. D. Collins,
Chief,
Admissions Division,
Home Services Branch.

- Department of External Affairs - Attention Security and Intelligence Liaison Division - reference your file SI-2665 and memorandum of 29 October 1969. Attached for your information are copies of incoming correspondence. It would be appreciated if you would pass on copies of this correspondence to the Canadian Embassy in Havana and ask that they alert us immediately if any requests for transit via Canada are received from any such persons.

- Director of Immigration, Halifax - copies of incoming correspondence attached - this is for your information and you may wish to pass on to any of your District or local offices that might be affected - presumably St. John and Halifax in particular.