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Vol 20

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EXAMINED BY / EXAMINÉ PAR

M. Boudreau

DATE 2007-03-02

SEMI ACTIVE

DEPARTMENT  
OF  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MINISTÈRE  
DES  
AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TITLE—TITRE:

DISARMEMENT  
MEASURES  
PLANS AND PROPOSALS  
TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION ( INITIATIVES )

DESARMEMENT  
MESURES  
PLANS ET PROPOSITIONS  
TRUDEAU MISSION DE PAIX ( INITIATIVES )

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Retention period-Période de retention:

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# CLOSED VOLUME VOLUME COMPLET

DATED FROM  
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84-01-06.

TO  
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84-01-11

**AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE - À METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER**

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28-6-1-Trudeau Peace Mission

VOLUME

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REF DELVOIE/SMITH TELECON 11JAN

---PM MTG WITH UN SEC GEN: SUMMARY

PMS BUSINESS-LIKE HOUR AND A HALF MTG JAN11 WITH UN SEC GEN PEREZ DE CUELLAR FOCUSED ON IDEA OF FIVE POWER CONF AND POSSIBLE WAYS IN WHICH UN MIGHT BE USED AS VEHICLE TO SET THIS PROCESS IN TRAIN. BOTTOM LINE DURING DISCUSSION WAS PEREZ DE CUELLARS VIRTUAL UNDERTAKING IN MID-FEB (FOLLOWING HIS RETURN FROM TRIP TO AFRICA AND POSSIBLY BEFORE TRIP TO STKHM FEB17) TO MEET WITH AMBS OF FIVE PERMANENT SC MEMBERS ON INDIVIDUAL BASIS TO WARN THEM OF DANGERS OF HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION AND UNRAVELLING OF NPT. PM, ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, MADE SURE THAT SEED OF IDEA WAS PLANTED THAT SEC GEN MIGHT MEET WITH ALL FIVE SC MEMBERS AT ONCE, AND IN SECRET IF NEED BE, AND TO GO FURTHER TO DISCUSS THEIR RESPONSIBILITY AS FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS AND PERMANENT MEMBERS OF SC FOR INNATL PEACE AND SECURITY MATTERS. DE CUELLAR MADE NO/NO COMMITMENT AT MTG IN THIS REGARD, AND WAS AT LEAST INITIALLY RATHER CAUTIOUS ON POSSIBLE PRESCRIPTIONS INVOLVING UN. PROPOSAL WAS NOT/NOT RULED OUT HOWEVER, AND IS EXPECTED TO BE SUBJECT OF FURTHER DISCUSSION AMONG SEC GEN AND HIS STAFF. PLRMIS WILL FOLLOW UP.

PAGE TWO WKGR2059 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

2.THERE WAS NO/NO SUPPORT ON OTHER HAND FROM EITHER SEC GEN, OR HIS TWO PRINCIPAL ADVISERS UNDER SECTY GENERALS URQUHART AND MARTENSON, TO SUGGESTION THAT MILITARY STAFF CTTEE MIGHT SOMEHOW BE UTILIZED AS FORUM IN WHICH FIVE PERM SC MEMBERS MIGHT BEGIN DISCUSSION OF ARMS CONTROL. ALL SAID THAT REASON IT WAS MORIBUND WAS LACK OF POLITICAL WILL AND THAT THIS WAS KEY ISSUE THAT HAD TO BE ADDRESSED. SEC GEN ALSO SAID THAT CTTEES REACTIVATION MIGHT HAMPER EFFORTS OF CD.

3.SEC GEN SHARED COMPLETELY PMS ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INNTL SITU AND NEED TO REDUCE RHETORIC BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND TO RESTORE DIALOGUE. HE URGED PM TO GO TO MOSCOW IN ORDER TO QUOTE COMPLETE CIRCLE UNQUOTE OF HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS. SEC GEN REVEALED (PROTECT) HE HAD RECENTLY WRITTEN TO BOTH ANDROPOV AND REAGAN CALLING ON THEM TO COME TO BARGAINING TABLE BUT HAD NOT/NOT YET RECEIVED REACTION FROM THEM. HE STRESSED PM CLD PLAY DISTINCTIVE ROLE IN CREATING BETTER ATMOSPHERE OF TRUST AS HE WAS DISTINGUISHED STATESMAN AND EVEN THOUGH MEMBER OF NATO WAS SEEN AS INDEPENDENT AND FAIR-MINDED THINKER.

4.AS HE DID DURING JAN 10 LUNCHEON AT 24 SUSSEX DRIVE WITH REPS OF CDN CTTEE FOR THIRD TRACK PM HINTED THAT AT SOME STAGE NATO MIGHT WANT TO GIVE CONSIDERATION TO POSSIBLE MORATORIUM ON INF DEPLOYMENT IN ORDER TO UNBLOC NEGOTIATIONS. THIS CLD NOT/NOT BE DONE IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE AND FURTHER NATO DEPLOYMENT WLD HAVE TO OCCUR BUT ALLIANCE

...3



PAGE THREE WKGR0059 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

HAD ALREADY MANIFESTED ITS STRENGTH AND DEMONSTRATING ITS POLITICAL WILL BE PROCEEDING WITH DEPLOYMENT AND AT SOME POINT NEW GESTURE MIGHT BE CALLED FOR.(NOTE:THIS INFO SHLD BE CLOSELY GUARDED).PM ALSO INFORMED SECGEN OF HIS SUGGESTION TO PM THATCHER AND PRES REAGAN THAT THERE MIGHT BE MERIT IN HAVING HEADS OF GOVT ATTEND STKHM MTG DURING EARLY PHASE OF CONF IN ORDER TO GIVE IT POLITICAL IMPULSE.

5.LAST 15 MINUTES OF MTG WERE DEVOTED TO EXPOSITION BY SECGEN OF HIS EFFORTS VIS-A-VIS CYPRUS PROBLEM,IRAN-IRAQ,AFGHAN,AND NAMIBIA WHICH WILL BE COVERED IN SEPARATE MSG FROM MISSION.

6.FOLLOWING MTG PM HELD TWENTY-FIVE MINUTE PRESS CONF IN JAM-PACKED ROOM WITH WIDE VARIETY OF INNATL PRESS INCLUDING REPS FROM USA,UK, GERMANY,JAPAN,USSR,BRAZIL AND INDIA ET AL.ALL THREE CDN TV NETWORKS WERE REPRESENTED.PM CONCENTRATED ON RESPONSIBILITY OF FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS AND CONCERNS ABOUT HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION.AS HE DID WITH SECGEN HE ALSO STATED THAT CDA WILL CIRCULATE THREE SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS(ASAT,MOBILITY AND VERIFICATION)IN CD FOLLOWING ITS RESUMPTION IN EARLY FEB.

7.FULL REPORT TO FOLLOW.

CCC/119 120218Z WKGR0059

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RBD RBRD RBP RBT ZSP ZSI IDD IDDZ IDA IDR  
---PM INITIATIVE-LET TO ANDROPOV-SOVEMB BRIEFING  
ON 09JAN RBD AND GARY SMITH OF TASK FORCE MET SOV AMB RODIONOV TO  
BRIEF HIM ON CONTENTS OF PM S LATEST LET TO ANDROPOV.  
2.IN HANDING OVER COPY OF LET RBD EXPLAINED THAT CDN SIDE HAS BEEN  
VERY MUCH AWARE OF SOV REQUEST THAT WE MAINTAIN PATIENCE AND  
UNDERSTANDING OF SOV DIFFICULTIES AT THIS TIME.THIS WE HAVE DONE BUT  
WE ARE NOW SEEKING SOV UNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION.PM S OBJECTIVE  
HAS BEEN TO MEET LEADERSHIP OF FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS AND HAS BEEN  
ACCOMPLISHED WITH EXCEPTION OF USSR.PM IS ANXIOUS TO COMPLETE THIS  
PHASE OF HIS PERSONAL INITIATIVE.THUS PM IS PREPARED TO MEET WITH  
OTHER DESIGNATED MEMBERS OF SOV LEADERSHIP IF ANDROPOV IS NOT/NOT  
AVAILABLE.  
3.AMB REPLIED WITH FORMULA REHEARSAL OF SOV SUPPORT FOR PM S  
INITIATIVE.LEADERSHIP,HE SAID,WAS ANXIOUS TO WORK WITH PM TO RESTORE  
DETENTE BUT CDN SIDE KNOWS REASONS WHY TIMING IS DIFFICULT.  
4.AMB SUGGESTED THAT IN MEANTIME SIDES COULD WORK ON QUOTE PRACTICAL

.../2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

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SIG M.T.MACE/lb

RBR

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SIG B.M.MAWHINNEY





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SIDE OF VISIT UNQUOTE I.E.BEGIN WORK ON TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION SUCH  
AS MIDDLE EAST,CENTRAL AMERICA,AND BILATERAL MATTERS AND AGREE ON  
PUBLIC QUOTE DOCUMENTS UNQUOTE IN ORDER TO ENSURE SUCCESSFUL VISIT.  
5.WHILE NOT/NOT TOTALLY DISCOUNTING SOV SUGGESTIONS,RBD EMPHASIZED  
THAT VISIT MUST BE DEVOTED LARGELY TO PM S INITIATIVE,THAT BILATERAL  
COMPONENT WOULD BE MINIMAL AND THAT MAIN PURPOSE WOULD BE TO  
EXCHANGE VIEWS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.  
PM WILL WANT TO DISCUSS HIS IDEAS AND GAIN BENEFIT OF SOV VIEWS ON  
WHAT CAN BE DONE TO INSTIL NEW POLITICAL LIFE TO EAST-WEST DIALOGUE.  
VISIT WOULD BE SHORT WORKING VISIT OF NOT/NOT MORE THAN TWO DAYS.  
PM WILL NOT/NOT WISH TO CONDUCT TOUR D HORIZON OF WORLD S PROBLEMS  
BUT RATHER STICK TO CENTRAL PROBLEM OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.  
6.RODIONOV RESPONDED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION AND IT WOULD BE  
CONVEYED IMM<sup>E</sup>DLY TO MOSCO.IN HIS VIEW,HOWEVER,DISCUSSION OF GLOBAL  
AND BILATERAL PROBLEMS WERE INTRINSIC TO SUCCESS OF VISIT.  
PRIORITY,HE AGREED,SHOULD BE GIVEN TO INITIATIVE BUT EXCHANGE OF  
VIEWS ON OTHER AREAS WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL.AMB ALSO WONDERED IF PM  
MIGHT BE PREPARED TO SPEAK ON SOVIET TV.ON LATTER SUGGESTION,RBD  
EXPRESSED DEFINITE INTEREST BUT WE REITERATED PM S FIRM WISH TO  
STICK TO PRIORITY ISSUE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.  
7.IN EVENING PM MET SOV AMB AT DINNER GIVEN BY CZECH AMB BUZEK(SEE  
SEPARATE TEL).PM REAFFIRMED TO RODIONOV HIS DESIRE TO KEEP


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PAGE THREE RBR0056 CONFD  
OBJECTIVES OF VISIT LIMITED IN ORDER TO CONCENTRATE ON KEY ISSUE AT  
HAND.PM ADDED THAT PERHAPS LUNCH OR DINNER CONVERSATION COULD BE  
EARMARKED FOR OTHER MATTERS.  
8.SOVS SEEM TO WISH TO DILUTE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF VISIT BY STEERING  
FOCUS AWAY FROM EAST-WEST RELATIONS.THIS MAY WELL BE AS RESULT OF  
LEADERSHIP DIFFICULTIES THEY FACE AND REVIEW OF FOREIGN POLICY NOW  
APPARENTLY UNDERWAY.MORE LIKELY,HOWEVER,IS SOV DESIRE TO AVOID  
PLACING THEMSELVES IN POSITION WHERE THEY MAY FEEL THEY HAVE TO OFFER  
MORE THAN GENERAL SUPPORT FOR INITIATIVE.THEY PROBABLY DO NOT/NOT  
WISH TO LEND THEIR VOICE TO INITIATIVE IN ANY DEGREE GREATER THAN  
THAT OF USA.SOVS MAY BE WONDERING HOW THAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED.





TRANSCRIPT OF A SCRUM GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER FOLLOWING A MEETING  
WITH UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR, NEW  
YORK, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 11, 1984

TRANSCRIPTION D'UNE ENTREVUE SUR LE VIF ACCORDÉE PAR LE PREMIER  
MINISTRE À LA SUITE D'UNE RÉUNION AVEC M. JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR,  
SECRÉTAIRE-GÉNÉRAL DES NATIONS-UNIES, À NEW YORK, LE MERCREDI 11  
JANVIER 1984

J'ai parlé au Secrétaire-général de l'initiative de paix  
d'une façon générale mais j'ai mis l'accent particulièrement sur deux  
aspects de l'initiative : la première, la réunion des cinq puissances  
nucléaires, et la seconde, la stratégie de suffocation. Je lui ai  
dit que nous avons présenté devant le comité sur le désarmement à  
Genève -- nous avons présenté au mois de février pour le début de la  
session -- trois mémoires sur les trois questions que j'ai déjà  
mentionnées, soit les engins anti-satellites, soit la vérification  
par moyens nationaux, et troisièmement, l'initiative qui touchait à  
la mobilité des engins nucléaires. Je lui ai aussi parlé assez  
longuement d'une possibilité de réunir les cinq. Je vais répondre à  
des questions mais je ne veux pas faire une déclaration trop longue.

In brief, I talked to the Secretary General about where I  
was at in the Canadian peace initiative, very briefly summarized  
where I had been and what I had heard. But I wanted to discuss more  
particularly with the Secretary General and his assistants the  
possibility of moving the five nuclear power conference idea into the  
United Nations. And secondly, I told him that on the suffocation  
initiative, we intended to present three papers to the committee on  
disarmament in Geneva which will be reconvening early in February --  
to present three papers on those three aspects: the anti-satellite  
weapon systems; secondly, the problem of verification by national  
means of new weapons developments; and thirdly, the danger of having  
over mobility of ICBMs -- the danger that posed for verification.

So, in essence, that is what we discussed, though we went  
into detail on various aspects of that.

- 2 -

Q. Prime Minister, what do you think that five nuclear powers can achieve which the two major nuclear powers can't achieve face-to-face?

A. I think the two major nuclear powers have the main responsibility. They are the ones, the super-powers, who have something like 95 per cent of all the nuclear war-heads; the other three together only have five per cent. So obviously, the greater responsibility is there. But I am not prepared -- nor should I think the nations of the world are prepared -- to let the other three off the hook, as it were. They are nuclear powers. They have a responsibility by virtue of their standing as the permanent members of the Security Council. They have a special responsibility to pursue the objectives of the Charter. And as we know, the objectives of the Charter are the settlement of disputes by peaceful means; the pursuit of peace and security. Those are objectives of the Charter and the five permanent members have special obligations under the Charter. They have certain rights -- a right to veto any action -- but conversely they have obligations to initiate actions. And I think it is important that those five permanent members be brought together to discharge their responsibilities.

You asked what they could achieve. It is unlikely that they could achieve, initially, any progress in reduction of nuclear arms -- and I think that is the sense of your question: If the two super-powers are not prepared to reduce, what do the other three matter? Well, I think it is important to understand that the meeting shouldn't necessarily begin with a proposal to reduce. It can begin with agenda-setting; it can begin with a mandate that the five would give themselves to make progress; it can begin with nuclear confidence-building measures, and so on.

So, they have responsibilities. Until now, most of them have been inclined to sort of wish me luck in my proposal in saying, "God go with you; we can't go". But I think they do have obligations and that it is up to the international community to point out those obligations to them. This is what I suggested to the United Nations Secretary General: that the United Nations should consider the invitation to the five nuclear powers -- who, I repeat, happen to be the five permanent members of the Security Council -- an invitation to begin to discharge their responsibilities.

Q. But doesn't that actually make the nuclear equation more complicated, Mr. Prime Minister, to have five rather than two?

.../3



- 3 -

A. Yes, it is complicated.

Q. And, therefore, more difficult?

A. Not necessarily more difficult. I think it has been demonstrated that when the two super-powers talk alone in Geneva, they don't make progress fast; and when they talk outside Geneva, they have been inclined to shout at each other rather than to talk. I think that when there are other people in the room assisting at a negotiating process, it tends to keep the negotiators, I guess, in a little more temperate tone.

So it is complicated, once again, if you are counting numbers at the outset, because counting -- how you measure the three against the two, and so on -- is complicated. But that is not the objective of the Canadian peace initiative. It is not first and foremost to achieve a mathematical success, to count numbers and be pleased. The objective is to get the politicians involved in what is their duty: to reduce the threat of nuclear war. And anything that can get the politicians talking about that -- particularly the five nuclear powers -- I think is a progress. Progress is being made next week in Stockholm when the NATO countries, the Warsaw Pact countries, and the neutrals and non-aligned will be meeting at the political level. Now that is progress, and that is good. But the same thing should be pursued at the level of the five nuclear powers.

JOHN FERGUSON (Southam News): Prime Minister, yesterday the Secretary General said that he hoped that after you stepped down as Prime Minister that you would play a role in international affairs as a peace negotiator, possibly attached to the UN. He suggested that he would tell you that today in the meeting. Did he raise it and what is your reaction?

A. He did not raise it and, therefore, I did not have any reaction. I just wondered if -- because I saw the news item on the plane coming down here -- people had put words in his mouth. I think presumably he is happy to see me stay on as Prime Minister because he did not offer me any job for after.

Q. Prime Minister, if you can make an assessment on the consensus that you have registered at the high level and of course the collective groupings, what would you say was the impression you have had and finally, what do these groups say about the East-West confrontation and who is to be blamed?

.../4

- 4 -

A. Well, responding as briefly as I can, I think that most everybody says now -- not everybody, but most everybody says -- that the tensions are too high and the dialogue should be resumed: dialogue between East and West in general; dialogue between the two super-powers in particular. The danger of nuclear war is present. Populations of the world -- and we had a meeting in Delhi, as you know, of the Commonwealth nations representing -- what is it? 60 per cent or something of the people of the world? I am not sure -- but it is obvious that people are concerned about the heightened tensions, the lack of dialogue. So that is what people are saying.

You are asking me how I would assess results. What is certainly happening in the past some months is that after a peak in tensions at the time of the Korean Airline disaster, I think there has been a lessening, if not of tensions, at least a lessening of shouting of one side against the other. And there has been a preparedness to meet at the political level and to begin to talk as between equals.

I would refer you to the NATO declaration in December where the foreign ministers of all the NATO countries agreed on a communiqué which said, "Look, we don't seek superiority. We seek equality. We want our legitimate security interests to be recognized but we recognize the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union. We don't think a nuclear war can be won or should be fought". This is a different kind of word than those that had been used until, I guess, the end of the first half of 1983. So, in that sense, I repeat, there is at least a lower number of decibels in the exchange. To use Carrington's phrase, there is less of the "megaphone diplomacy". There is an actual political meeting of the political leaders of the East and West, as will take place in Stockholm next week, including a meeting between the foreign minister of the Soviet Union and the foreign minister of the United States.

Q. Then, in the face of this danger, no one is blaming anybody except in the endangered areas?

A. I would not say that. On the contrary, many on the western side are saying it is all the fault of the Soviet Union. And obviously, we heard from Mr. Gromyko very recently that it is all the fault of the West. I am not saying that we have reached the stage where we begin to find that blamelessness exists on neither side -- that may be for a later stage. But at this stage we are beginning to talk. And I think that is progress.

.../5



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LUC LAVOIE (TVA): M. le Premier ministre, est-ce que vous avez toujours l'intention de vous rendre à Moscou et est-ce que la diplomatie canadienne a réussi à déterminer qui vous pouviez rencontrer là-bas et à quelle date?

R. La réponse à ces questions est "peut-être bien".  
J'aimerais bien me rendre à Moscou parce que sans cela mon initiative ne serait pas complète, si je peux dire. Je n'aurais pas vu l'autre des super-grands. Mais pour ce qui est des dates, tout ce que je peux dire et c'est tout ce que je sais, c'est que de part et d'autre on cherche des dates. J'ai parlé à l'ambassadeur soviétique, j'ai eu une réunion avec lui et avec les Tchèques il y a quelques jours et on a discuté de la question mais tout ce que je peux dire c'est qu'il n'y a pas de date connue pour le moment.

Q. Dans une entrevue accordée à Southam News par M. Perez de Cuellar hier, il semble vous offrir un job comme médiateur international après votre retraite. Est-ce que cela a été discuté avec M. de Cuellar?

R. Je ne dis pas qu'il ne faut jamais se fier aux rapports de presse mais je dois dire que le Secrétaire-général ne m'a pas parlé de cela. Il ne m'a pas offert d'emploi et j'en ai tiré la conclusion qu'il était très content de me voir rester comme Premier ministre.

Q. Prime Minister, what role do you see for the Non-Aligned Movement in pushing forward this idea, and particularly the Prime Minister of India who is the Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement?

A. As you know, it was a subject which was discussed in November for two days in Delhi and another day-and-a-half in Goa. I don't know what role they can play. I must say I don't know what role they will play. And, in frankness, I must confess that I am not all that heartened by the approach that the non-aligned and the third-world generally have taken to the whole problem of horizontal proliferation. As you know, in my concern, I think that the five nuclear powers have a great responsibility to begin reducing their nuclear armaments, especially the two super-powers, but parallel and jointly with that, I feel that there is a great danger in horizontal proliferation and that if nuclear weaponry begins to spread to an increasing number of countries, the world will be even more unsafe than it is now. We discussed that question at length, as I say, at our meetings in India and the communiqué alluded to it in a somewhat weak way and there was great condemnation for the super powers -- or, I would say, great enjoinders that the super-powers get down to

.../6

- 6 -

business and reduce their super weaponry. But there was only a weak expression of hope that the spreading of nuclear weapons horizontally to a greater number of states -- by which I mean third-world or non-aligned states -- would not be encouraged.

So, I think the world must be made conscious of that danger that it is a danger of the nuclear powers ever getting more and more nuclear weaponry but that there is also a danger of the nuclear know-how and nuclear weapons being possessed by a increasing number of states. And on that latter point, I think it is fair to say that many of the non-aligned leaders say, "Until the super-powers have begun reducing, don't talk to us about not acquiring".

Q. Would you describe it as an unattainable idea, Mr. Prime Minister, that Soviets and US vote for the first time since 1979, were to continue to the U.N. Charter Review Committee of talks centering in that Charter Review Committee on veto limitations and on the saying by the chairman, Al Arabi, of Egypt, that he personally would like to see movement towards world government?

A. I wouldn't like to say that it is an unattainable idea. I would just hope that you wouldn't saddle me with the obligation of making sure that it is attained at this particular time. I think that is a great idea. It is an idea for the future. I think that, whether we like it or not, we are still living in the era of nation states who are very jealous of their sovereignty and indeed, my answer to the previous question on horizontal proliferation was an illustration that sovereign nations feel it is their right to acquire a nuclear weapon if they want to. So the era of sovereignty and the feeling of right to possess is still stronger than the idea of supranationhood which hopefully will grow on the world in times to come.

DAVID HALTON (CBC): Two questions, if I may, Prime Minister. How receptive was the Secretary General to your suggestion that he invite the five to a disarmament conference, and was there any discussion of the UN as a forum?

A. Well, I made the point that the UN should be considered as a forum for that. But I also made the point that obviously at this stage if there were any meeting of the five -- even at the ambassadorial level, either collectively in one room, or individually with the United Nations Secretary General -- five meeting individually on a one-to-one basis as it were -- if that were to happen, I could only see it happening very secretly and privately and not under the glare of cameras in Geneva or elsewhere. And for that

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ry reason, I practically invited the Secretary General not to tell me whether he thought the idea was a good one and whether he was going to proceed with it. So I really can't answer that question because I don't know the answer. I doubt whether if you ask the Secretary General if he will want to tell you if he is going to proceed with that great idea that I had.

Q. My second question is on your suffocation strategy. There are reports from Washington that the US Administration is about to include about \$2 billion worth of spending in their budget in the next few weeks on the first stage of the Star Wars (...). I was wondering (...) proposed ban on high altitude (...)?

A. I think we are into the very fundamental question of words and deeds. At this stage, I think we are being successful, at least modestly, in indeed having words of dialogue begin to be exchanged. Whether they will be followed by deeds or not I suppose is something we can speculate upon. It is obvious that the deeds will not follow immediately; they will follow if it looks as though the words are numerous enough and sincere enough. All I can say on that particular question is that we don't have eons of time, but we do have time. I mean, Star Wars, if it is ever going to happen, is at least 20 years away. I mean the technology will take ten years even to begin to know if it is attainable, and many more years to develop. I am not saying it is too early to talk of suffocating that technology -- and indeed we are talking about it -- but I would not conclude that the words are hypocritical when one or the other side talks of peace.

You happen to know the figures expended by the American administration, but neither you or I can know what is being spent by the Soviet administration, so, for all I know, the words of peace being used by the Warsaw Pact or by the NATO Pact may not be followed by substance. But that is the job of the nations of the world and of the peoples of the world: to make sure that, first, the intentions are expressed, and then, that they are made to be sincere. So, all I can say is that I would not conclude that the thing won't happen because the words haven't been immediately followed by deeds.

Q. Prime Minister, how did you feel about President Reagan's seemingly lukewarm reaction to your plan and proposal, and do you plan to meet with Mr. Andropov?

.../8

- 8 -

A. Well, yes, I am still hoping to meet with Mr. Andropov, but I do not know if it will be possible in this time-frame. Nobody does know. I would guess, insofar as what you describe as lukewarm, I guess is a value judgment on your part. Considering the things that President Reagan was saying a year-and-a-half ago, I would say his attitude was not lukewarm; that there was something warmer than cold. But, what is lukewarm?

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**TRANSCRIPT OF A SCRUM GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER FOLLOWING A MEETING WITH UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR, NEW YORK, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 11, 1984**

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**TRANSCRIPTION D'UNE ENTREVUE SUR LE VIF ACCORDÉE PAR LE PREMIER MINISTRE À LA SUITE D'UNE RÉUNION AVEC M. JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR, SECRÉTAIRE-GÉNÉRAL DES NATIONS-UNIES, À NEW YORK, LE MERCREDI 11 JANVIER 1984**

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J'ai parlé au Secrétaire-général de l'initiative de paix d'une façon générale mais j'ai mis l'accent particulièrement sur deux aspects de l'initiative : la première, la réunion des cinq puissances nucléaires, et la seconde, la stratégie de suffocation. Je lui ai dit que nous avons présenté devant le comité sur le désarmement à Genève -- nous avons présenté au mois de février pour le début de la session -- trois mémoires sur les trois questions que j'ai déjà mentionnées, soit les engins anti-satellites, soit la vérification par moyens nationaux, et troisièmement, l'initiative qui touchait à la mobilité des engins nucléaires. Je lui ai aussi parlé assez longuement d'une possibilité de réunir les cinq. Je vais répondre à des questions mais je ne veux pas faire une déclaration trop longue.

In brief, I talked to the Secretary General about where I was at in the Canadian peace initiative, very briefly summarized where I had been and what I had heard. But I wanted to discuss more particularly with the Secretary General and his assistants the possibility of moving the five nuclear power conference idea into the United Nations. And secondly, I told him that on the suffocation initiative, we intended to present three papers to the committee on disarmament in Geneva which will be reconvening early in February -- to present three papers on those three aspects: the anti-satellite weapon systems; secondly, the problem of verification by national means of new weapons developments; and thirdly, the danger of having over mobility of ICBMs -- the danger that posed for verification.

So, in essence, that is what we discussed, though we went into detail on various aspects of that.

.../2



Q. Prime Minister, what do you think that five nuclear powers can achieve which the two major nuclear powers can't achieve face-to-face?

A. I think the two major nuclear powers have the main responsibility. They are the ones, the super-powers, who have something like 95 per cent of all the nuclear war-heads; the other three together only have five per cent. So obviously, the greater responsibility is there. But I am not prepared -- nor should I think the nations of the world are prepared -- to let the other three off the hook, as it were. They are nuclear powers. They have a responsibility by virtue of their standing as the permanent members of the Security Council. They have a special responsibility to pursue the objectives of the Charter. And as we know, the objectives of the Charter are the settlement of disputes by peaceful means; the pursuit of peace and security. Those are objectives of the Charter and the five permanent members have special obligations under the Charter. They have certain rights -- a right to veto any action -- but conversely they have obligations to initiate actions. And I think it is important that those five permanent members be brought together to discharge their responsibilities.

You asked what they could achieve. It is unlikely that they could achieve, initially, any progress in reduction of nuclear arms -- and I think that is the sense of your question: If the two super-powers are not prepared to reduce, what do the other three matter? Well, I think it is important to understand that the meeting shouldn't necessarily begin with a proposal to reduce. It can begin with agenda-setting; it can begin with a mandate that the five would give themselves to make progress; it can begin with nuclear confidence-building measures, and so on.

So, they have responsibilities. Until now, most of them have been inclined to sort of wish me luck in my proposal in saying, "God go with you; we can't go". But I think they do have obligations and that it is up to the international community to point out those obligations to them. This is what I suggested to the United Nations Secretary General: that the United Nations should consider the invitation to the five nuclear powers -- who, I repeat, happen to be the five permanent members of the Security Council -- an invitation to begin to discharge their responsibilities.

Q. But doesn't that actually make the nuclear equation more complicated, Mr. Prime Minister, to have five rather than two?

.../3

A. Yes, it is complicated.

Q. And, therefore, more difficult?

A. Not necessarily more difficult. I think it has been demonstrated that when the two super-powers talk alone in Geneva, they don't make progress fast; and when they talk outside Geneva, they have been inclined to shout at each other rather than to talk. I think that when there are other people in the room assisting at a negotiating process, it tends to keep the negotiators, I guess, in a little more temperate tone.

So it is complicated, once again, if you are counting numbers at the outset, because counting -- how you measure the three against the two, and so on -- is complicated. But that is not the objective of the Canadian peace initiative. It is not first and foremost to achieve a mathematical success, to count numbers and be pleased. The objective is to get the politicians involved in what is their duty: to reduce the threat of nuclear war. And anything that can get the politicians talking about that -- particularly the five nuclear powers -- I think is a progress. Progress is being made next week in Stockholm when the NATO countries, the Warsaw Pact countries, and the neutrals and non-aligned will be meeting at the political level. Now that is progress, and that is good. But the same thing should be pursued at the level of the five nuclear powers.

JOHN FERGUSON (Southam News): Prime Minister, yesterday the Secretary General said that he hoped that after you stepped down as Prime Minister that you would play a role in international affairs as a peace negotiator, possibly attached to the UN. He suggested that he would tell you that today in the meeting. Did he raise it and what is your reaction?

A. He did not raise it and, therefore, I did not have any reaction. I just wondered if -- because I saw the news item on the plane coming down here -- people had put words in his mouth. I think presumably he is happy to see me stay on as Prime Minister because he did not offer me any job for after.

Q. Prime Minister, if you can make an assessment on the consensus that you have registered at the high level and of course the collective groupings, what would you say was the impression you have had and finally, what do these groups say about the East-West confrontation and who is to be blamed?

A. Well, responding as briefly as I can, I think that most everybody says now -- not everybody, but most everybody says -- that the tensions are too high and the dialogue should be resumed: dialogue between East and West in general; dialogue between the two super-powers in particular. The danger of nuclear war is present. Populations of the world -- and we had a meeting in Delhi, as you know, of the Commonwealth nations representing -- what is it? 60 per cent or something of the people of the world? I am not sure -- but it is obvious that people are concerned about the heightened tensions, the lack of dialogue. So that is what people are saying.

You are asking me how I would assess results. What is certainly happening in the past some months is that after a peak in tensions at the time of the Korean Airline disaster, I think there has been a lessening, if not of tensions, at least a lessening of shouting of one side against the other. And there has been a preparedness to meet at the political level and to begin to talk as between equals.

I would refer you to the NATO declaration in December where the foreign ministers of all the NATO countries agreed on a communiqué which said, "Look, we don't seek superiority. We seek equality. We want our legitimate security interests to be recognized but we recognize the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union. We don't think a nuclear war can be won or should be fought". This is a different kind of word than those that had been used until, I guess, the end of the first half of 1983. So, in that sense, I repeat, there is at least a lower number of decibels in the exchange. To use Carrington's phrase, there is less of the "megaphone diplomacy". There is an actual political meeting of the political leaders of the East and West, as will take place in Stockholm next week, including a meeting between the foreign minister of the Soviet Union and the foreign minister of the United States.

Q. Then, in the face of this danger, no one is blaming anybody except in the endangered areas?

A. I would not say that. On the contrary, many on the western side are saying it is all the fault of the Soviet Union. And obviously, we heard from Mr. Gromyko very recently that it is all the fault of the West. I am not saying that we have reached the stage where we begin to find that blamelessness exists on neither side -- that may be for a later stage. But at this stage we are beginning to talk. And I think that is progress.

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LUC LAVOIE (TVA): M. le Premier ministre, est-ce que vous avez toujours l'intention de vous rendre à Moscou et est-ce que la diplomatie canadienne a réussi à déterminer qui vous pouviez rencontrer là-bas et à quelle date?

R. La réponse à ces questions est "peut-être bien". J'aimerais bien me rendre à Moscou parce que sans cela mon initiative ne serait pas complète, si je peux dire. Je n'aurais pas vu l'autre des super-grands. Mais pour ce qui est des dates, tout ce que je peux dire et c'est tout ce que je sais, c'est que de part et d'autre on cherche des dates. J'ai parlé à l'ambassadeur soviétique, j'ai eu une réunion avec lui et avec les Tchèques il y a quelques jours et on a discuté de la question mais tout ce que je peux dire c'est qu'il n'y a pas de date connue pour le moment.

Q. Dans une entrevue accordée à Southam News par M. Perez de Cuellar hier, il semble vous offrir un job comme médiateur international après votre retraite. Est-ce que cela a été discuté avec M. de Cuellar?

R. Je ne dis pas qu'il ne faut jamais se fier aux rapports de presse mais je dois dire que le Secrétaire-général ne m'a pas parlé de cela. Il ne m'a pas offert d'emploi et j'en ai tiré la conclusion qu'il était très content de me voir rester comme Premier ministre.

Q. Prime Minister, what role do you see for the Non-Aligned Movement in pushing forward this idea, and particularly the Prime Minister of India who is the Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement?

A. As you know, it was a subject which was discussed in November for two days in Delhi and another day-and-a-half in Goa. I don't know what role they can play. I must say I don't know what role they will play. And, in frankness, I must confess that I am not all that heartened by the approach that the non-aligned and the third-world generally have taken to the whole problem of horizontal proliferation. As you know, in my concern, I think that the five nuclear powers have a great responsibility to begin reducing their nuclear armaments, especially the two super-powers, but parallel and jointly with that, I feel that there is a great danger in horizontal proliferation and that if nuclear weaponry begins to spread to an increasing number of countries, the world will be even more unsafe than it is now. We discussed that question at length, as I say, at our meetings in India and the communiqué alluded to it in a somewhat weak way and there was great condemnation for the super powers -- or, I would say, great enjoinders that the super-powers get down to

.../6

liness and reduce their super weaponry. But there was only a weak expression of hope that the spreading of nuclear weapons horizontally to a greater number of states -- by which I mean third-world or non-aligned states -- would not be encouraged.

So, I think the world must be made conscious of that danger that it is a danger of the nuclear powers ever getting more and more nuclear weaponry but that there is also a danger of the nuclear know-how and nuclear weapons being possessed by a increasing number of states. And on that latter point, I think it is fair to say that many of the non-aligned leaders say, "Until the super-powers have begun reducing, don't talk to us about not acquiring".

Q. Would you describe it as an unattainable idea, Mr. Prime Minister, that Soviets and US vote for the first time since 1979, were to continue to the U.N. Charter Review Committee of talks centering in that Charter Review Committee on veto limitations and on the saying by the chairman, Al Arabi, of Egypt, that he personally would like to see movement towards world government?

A. I wouldn't like to say that it is an unattainable idea. I would just hope that you wouldn't saddle me with the obligation of making sure that it is attained at this particular time. I think that is a great idea. It is an idea for the future. I think that, whether we like it or not, we are still living in the era of nation states who are very jealous of their sovereignty and indeed, my answer to the previous question on horizontal proliferation was an illustration that sovereign nations feel it is their right to acquire a nuclear weapon if they want to. So the era of sovereignty and the feeling of right to possess is still stronger than the idea of supranationhood which hopefully will grow on the world in times to come.

DAVID HALTON (CBC): Two questions, if I may, Prime Minister. How receptive was the Secretary General to your suggestion that he invite the five to a disarmament conference, and was there any discussion of the UN as a forum?

A. Well, I made the point that the UN should be considered as a forum for that. But I also made the point that obviously at this stage if there were any meeting of the five -- even at the ambassadorial level, either collectively in one room, or individually with the United Nations Secretary General -- five meeting individually on a one-to-one basis as it were -- if that were to happen, I could only see it happening very secretly and privately and not under the glare of cameras in Geneva or elsewhere. And for that



Every reason, I practically invited the Secretary General not to tell me whether he thought the idea was a good one and whether he was going to proceed with it. So I really can't answer that question because I don't know the answer. I doubt whether if you ask the Secretary General if he will want to tell you if he is going to proceed with that great idea that I had.

Q. My second question is on your suffocation strategy. There are reports from Washington that the US Administration is about to include about \$2 billion worth of spending in their budget in the next few weeks on the first stage of the Star Wars (...). I was wondering (...) proposed ban on high altitude (...)?

A. I think we are into the very fundamental question of words and deeds. At this stage, I think we are being successful, at least modestly, in indeed having words of dialogue begin to be exchanged. Whether they will be followed by deeds or not I suppose is something we can speculate upon. It is obvious that the deeds will not follow immediately; they will follow if it looks as though the words are numerous enough and sincere enough. All I can say on that particular question is that we don't have eons of time, but we do have time. I mean, Star Wars, if it is ever going to happen, is at least 20 years away. I mean the technology will take ten years even to begin to know if it is attainable, and many more years to develop. I am not saying it is too early to talk of suffocating that technology -- and indeed we are talking about it -- but I would not conclude that the words are hypocritical when one or the other side talks of peace.

You happen to know the figures expended by the American administration, but neither you or I can know what is being spent by the Soviet administration, so, for all I know, the words of peace being used by the Warsaw Pact or by the NATO Pact may not be followed by substance. But that is the job of the nations of the world and of the peoples of the world: to make sure that, first, the intentions are expressed, and then, that they are made to be sincere. So, all I can say is that I would not conclude that the thing won't happen because the words haven't been immediately followed by deeds.

Q. Prime Minister, how did you feel about President Reagan's seemingly lukewarm reaction to your plan and proposal, and do you plan to meet with Mr. Andropov?

.../8

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A. Well, yes, I am still hoping to meet with Mr. Andropov, but I do not know if it will be possible in this time-frame. Nobody does know. I would guess, insofar as what you describe as lukewarm, I guess is a value judgment on your part. Considering the things that President Reagan was saying a year-and-a-half ago, I would say his attitude was not lukewarm; that there was something warmer than cold. But, what is lukewarm?

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NOTES FOR PM'S REMARKS ON LEAVING THE  
UN SECRETARY-GENERAL'S OFFICE ON JANUARY 11, 1984

I have been discussing with the Secretary-General the role of the United Nations in the search for peace, and I am happy to say that our views on the matter are very similar, both on the problems faced and possible solutions to them.

The fundamental purpose of the United Nations according to its Charter is to maintain international peace and security and seek the peaceful resolution of international disputes. As the Secretary-General would be the first to agree, the UN is in need of strengthening in order to fulfill this critical aspect of its functions. The functioning and strengthening of the UN's peace and security role is the responsibility of all UN members. This concern was the central theme of Canada's keynote address at the opening of the last General Assembly in September and we have strongly supported the Secretary-General's efforts over the last two years to take practical measures in this regard.

However, the Charter confers on the Security Council primary responsibility, within the UN, for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Council must be the major focus of efforts to strengthen the UN, and we look for leadership in this endeavour to the Council's members, especially its permanent members. These five countries, who

- 2 -

alone have the power to prevent action by the Security Council through the use of the veto, also have an equally important responsibility to stimulate action to strengthen the effectiveness of the Council and uphold its authority. In particular, these five permanent members, who also happen to be the nuclear weapon states, have the primary obligation to initiate effective and concrete arms control and disarmament measures in the cause of international peace. It is time for them to do so. In their capacity as nuclear powers, they might begin the process of discussing confidence-building measures and crisis management as a prelude to the eventual negotiation of limitations and then reductions of their nuclear arsenals. Surely, this would be the greatest contribution to peace and security that they could make in these tense and pressing times.

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TO/À • MGTC

FROM/DE • IDDZ

REFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Appreciation  
SUJET

Security/Sécurité
Unclassified
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
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Number/Numéro
IDDZ-0024

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ANNEXES

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
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MGD

We are most appreciative of your exceptional efforts in response to the special demands which the Prime Minister's Task Force has placed on the Communications Centre.

2. In particular, we recall the work involved in getting out two series of letters from the P.M. to NATO heads of government in October and November and numerous urgent messages to the PMDEL during the course of the P.M.'s visit to Japan, Bangladesh, India, China and the Gulf.

3. Thank you for your continuing help.

  
L. A. Delvoie  
Chairman  
Task Force Working Group

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CONFIDENTIAL

January 11, 1984


IDDZ-0022

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (through R.R. Fowler)

Initiative: Letter to Andropov

Attached for your signature is a letter to Andropov in which the typographical error contained in the text submitted to you previously has been corrected.

I very much regret that we did not catch the error before the letter was sent to you.



L. A. Delvoie  
Chairman  
Task Force Working Group



TO/À                    IDDZ/Mr. Delvoie

FROM/DE              •    IDDZ/J. McNee

REFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT              •    The Final Speech  
SUJET

Security/Sécurité	<b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	January 11, 1983.
Number/Numéro	IDDZ-0021

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The PM's final speech in which he brings his full-scale personal initiative to a conclusion should:

- 1) report on the results of the initiative and assess its achievements: declaration of victory or concession of defeat?
- 2) future prospects for E/W relations and international security
- 3) extricate the PM gracefully from intensive personal involvement in the initiative (if the cause is so urgent and important, why is the PM abandoning it after only four months?)
- 4) how is the effort to be continued? - passing on the torch (to whom - Govt of Cda? role of the proposed centre?)

J. McNee  
Task Force Working Group  
on East-West Relations  
and International Security

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---VISIT OF RT BON JOE CLARK

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### Division Phoned

## Person

### Local Time

FOLLOWING IS LIST OF AMBASSADORS MET BY MR CLARK DURING HIS  
PLUS SECRETARY OF CD.  
VISIT TO GENEVA ~~XX~~

2. NO SEPARATE CALL WAS MADE ON AMB ROSE, WHO WAS LUNCHEON GUEST.

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**J. K. BENTLEY**



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1211 GENEVA 20

AMBASSADORS MET BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE JOE CLARK

DURING HIS VISIT TO GENEVA

- 2/3
- H.E. Mr. Rolf Ekéus  
Ambassador (Disarmament)  
Permanent Mission of Sweden to the Office  
of the United Nations  
9-11, rue de Varembe  
1211 GENEVA 20
  - H.E. Mr. Richard Butler  
Ambassador (Disarmament)  
Permanent Mission of Australia to the Office  
of the United Nations  
56-58, rue de Moillebeau  
1211 GENEVA 19
  - H.E. Mr. Mansur Ahmad  
Ambassador and Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic  
of Pakistan to the Office of the United Nations  
56, rue de Moillebeau  
1211 GENEVA 19
  - H.E. Mr. Machkund Dubey  
Ambassador and Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of India to the Office  
of the United Nations  
9, rue du Valais  
1202 GENEVA
  - H.E. Mr. Ryukichi Inai  
Ambassador (Disarmament)  
Permanent Mission of Japan to the Office  
of the United Nations  
10, avenue de Budé  
1202 GENEVA
  - H.E. Dr. Ian Cromartie, C.M.G.  
Ambassador (Disarmament)  
Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to  
the Office of the United Nations  
37-39, rue de Vermont  
1211 GENEVA 20
  - 3 - H.E. Mr. Rikhi Jaipal  
Secretary of the Conference on Disarmament  
PALAIS DES NATIONS  
1211 GENEVA 27

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- 2 -

- H.E. Dr. Henning Wegener  
Ambassador (Disarmament)  
Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic  
of Germany to the Office of the United Nations  
28c, chemin du Petit-Saconnex  
1211 GENEVA 19
- H.E. Mr. Stanislaw Turbanski  
Ambassador and Permanent Representative  
Permanent Representation of the People's  
Republic of Poland to the Office of the United Nations  
15, chemin de l'Ancienne-Route  
1218 Grand-Saconnex
- H.E. Dr. Harald Rose  
Ambassador and Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of the German Democratic Republic  
to the Office of the United Nations  
49, rue de Moillebeau  
1209 GENEVA

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---US/SOVIET RELATIONS

ATTENTION IS DRAWN TO DAVID BUCHAN ARTICLE QUOTE WAY REAGAN  
IS PLAYING MOSCOW OVERTURE UNQUOTE IN 11JAN FINANCIAL TIMES.  
2.COMCENTRE PLS SEND BY FACSIMILE.

J R SCHRAM/mg

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J R SCHRAM

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# Why Reagan is playing the Moscow overture

By David Buchan, recently in Washington

Shortly after the Stockholm meeting, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is due to send Congress a report on apparent Soviet failure to comply with key parts of earlier arms control agreements. The Administration is not backing away from the report; it drafted it over many months. But the timing is very awkward, for the contents will be damaging.

It suggests that the Soviets may have violated the spirit of the Salt 2 agreement by developing more than one new type of intercontinental missile since 1979. The Salt 2 accord is not legally binding since the U.S. Congress never ratified it, but both sides agreed to abide by its provisions. The Soviets may also have cheated on the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile treaty which is legally in force.

The latter allegation is based on a big new radar system which the Soviets appear to have built not on the perimeter of the country and therefore plausibly allowable as early warning against incoming missiles, but in the heart of Siberia and therefore probably as a guide to an expanded anti-ballistic missile system impermissible under the ABM treaty. It thus seems likely the fur will start flying again between Washington and Moscow.

Why, then, the relative optimism evoked by Mr Reagan and shared to a remarkable extent (for Washington) through the various echelons and departments of his administration?

The first point which Administration officials make is that the sharp words of the past year between Washington and Moscow should not be confused with real danger. Tense incidents — the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and the U.S. alert during the 1973 Yom Kippur war — can occur during periods of relative superpower calm, and according to the Administration, stem from Soviet miscalculation. There is less risk of such miscalculation since Mr Reagan rallied the military capability and political will of the U.S. and the West, and officials take as proof of this the fact that since 1981 the Soviet Union has opened up no new front like Afghanistan.

Besides, the President himself is eating a few of his harshest words. He recently said he

Second, the Administration believes it has a tenable and electorally defensible negotiating position, particularly in the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) talks where the impasse is most acute. As one senior official puts it: "The Soviets negotiated while they were deploying SS-20 missiles, and so will we negotiate while deploying Cruise and Pershing missiles. If the Soviets refuse to come back to the (INF) talks, the world should draw the appropriate conclusions."

Essentially, the Administration believes that the Soviet Union has stuck itself with a bad negotiating hand, and it should pay the price for storming out of the Geneva talks.

Further concessions on the INF issue would reward the Soviets for petulant behaviour, the Administration argues. goes. The Kremlinologists in the Administration believe that a prolonged interregnum in the Soviet Union set in the falling years of Brezhnev and will continue, with Mr Andropov too ill and too indebted to Marshall Dmitri Ustinov, the Defence Minister, for his present position to be able to "put the arm on the Soviet military," even if he wanted to.

"This is all the more reason not to make gratuitous concessions, since the Soviet leadership is not in a position to respond," the official Moscow-watchers in Washington say. The U.S. is, in particular, against subsidising the INF talks into the start of strategic arms negotiations as a ruse to get the Soviets back to Geneva.

and U.S. officials say Moscow has not even shown any sign it wants such a move.

Last and not least in this election year, the Reagan Administration sees little electoral danger on the coming campaign trail from its policy towards the Soviet Union. The Reagan political tacticians see the President as vulnerable on the tone of his policy — that is why it is moderating — but not the substance.

The immediate war issue in this election does not concern the Soviet Union, but Lebanon and the fate of the U.S. marines there; Lebanon and the risk of terrorism attendant on involvement in the Middle East is what is stirring Congress and Democratic presidential

Washington's official buildings.

However, the fact is that only those Democratic candidates with a very slim chance of winning their party's presidential nomination have bluntly attacked the Reagan policy towards the Soviet Union. Senator Alan Cranston, for instance, advocates a freeze on the U.S. nuclear arsenal, but hardly counts in the poll ratings. The other Democrats have the tricky job of appearing reasonable but not soft towards Moscow. Mr Walter Mondale, the Democratic frontrunner, says he would resubmit the Salt 2 treaty for ratification, a stance taken perhaps out of loyalty to the Carter administration of which he was part, but one which may be undermined by the forthcoming

report on Soviet arms control compliance. But Mr Mondale may not want in any case to stray far from the conservative foreign policy views of his AFL-CIO union backers.

The only other Democrat so far providing Mr Mondale much competition is Senator John Glenn. With several MIG fighter "kills" to his credit in the Korean War, the former astronaut has the most leeway to attack Mr Reagan on his policy towards the Soviet Union without arousing popular suspicion of "softness."

But the President has already moved on to part of the ground occupied by defence-conscious Democrats like Senator Glenn, by incorporating the "build down" approach (scrapping two old warheads for each new one) into his start negotiating position this year.

At all these, then, the ingredients on the American side for another worrying year of superpower stalemate on arms negotiations?

The Administration believes not. By standing firm, it says, the Soviets can probably be brought back to the negotiating table. The Soviets may hate the U.S. President, they have said so many times in recent months — but they will deal with him if they have to. This was shown in the brief summer 1983 thaw in relations when Moscow agreed to buy increased amounts of U.S. grain over the next five years and some other bilateral negotiations were resumed, before the KAL airliner incident froze relations. Moscow's professional America-watchers — Mr Georgi

Arbatov with his U.S. affairs institute in the Soviet Union and Mr Dobrynin with his more than 20 years' experience in Washington — do not go public with their predictions. But U.S. diplomats have picked up the private Soviet view that Mr Reagan will run for and win a second term.

It would be surprising perhaps if they did not take this view, which is the current political wisdom. But the fact that they appear to think along these conventional lines leads U.S. officials, who also noted Soviet dismay at the American popular backing for Mr Reagan's Grenada adventure, to believe they will soon be dealing with the Soviet Union again.

Yet this scenario depends on the Soviets seeing the Reagan Administration as it sees itself — firm but fair — and on many other imponderables internal to the secret workings of the Kremlin, such as the effect of the further prolongation of Mr Andropov's physical ill-health on his political health. If the Soviets will not act out their part of the Reagan Administration scenario, what might cause the Administration to change its stance?

It is hard enough for friends — witness Helmut Schmidt's public support for Ford over Carter in 1976 — to influence the outcome of U.S. elections, let alone enemies. The Soviets gave away with last year's grain agreement the one thing which Mr Reagan might have badly needed for electoral purposes this year. They clearly know that any obvious help to any particular candidate would be counter-productive, particularly after their failure to swing opinion in the more fertile soil of West Germany.

On the other hand, they have played American electoral politics before. They were delighted to have President Nixon in Moscow in 1972, though Senator Edward Kennedy was denied a reception in Moscow during his primaries battle with President Carter in 1980. The last time Mr Andropov appeared in public was to receive eight Democratic Senators, and were he to recover it is conceivable that he could give one or other presidential candidate the reception that President Assad of Syria has given the Rev Jesse Jackson.

31  
4/4 20620072

Mr Reagan may, in fact, find himself forced to respond to a very real hunger by many Americans for high-level contact with their principal adversary. Fourteen years of arms talks have accustomed most Americans to the psychological assurance of contact with their nuclear enemy, and the ending of those talks has created painful withdrawal symptoms. In the resulting vacuum, senators of both parties have proposed setting up joint U.S.-Soviet crisis control centres to prevent something like the KAL incident being reported on a nuclear scale.

According to a Time Magazine poll, the number of Americans who feel that the superpowers share an equal dread of nuclear war and therefore must negotiate has risen from 51 per cent before the INF and Start collapse, to 64 per cent last month.

The presidential candidates seem to sense this hunger. All of them advocate summitry with Soviet leaders, with Mr Mondale calling for regular annual summits. Mr Reagan himself says he is ready for a properly prepared summit. The irony—on which he cannot be faulted—is that at the moment he has no one to meet.

20-CDA-9

10

00027  
9

JUN. 12 '89 10418 PERMANENT MISSION OF UN GENEVA

P.004

AMBASSADORS MET BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE JOE CLARK  
DURING HIS VISIT TO GENEVA

2/3

- H.E. Mr. Rolf Eköus  
Ambassador (Disarmament)  
Permanent Mission of Sweden to the Office  
of the United Nations  
9-11, rue de Varembe  
1211 GENEVA 20
- H.E. Mr. Richard Butler  
Ambassador (Disarmament)  
Permanent Mission of Australia to the Office  
of the United Nations  
56-58, rue de Moillebeau  
1211 GENEVA 19
- H.E. Mr. Mansur Ahmad  
Ambassador and Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic  
of Pakistan to the Office of the United Nations  
56, rue de Moillebeau  
1211 GENEVA 19
- H.E. Mr. Muchkund Dubey  
Ambassador and Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of India to the Office  
of the United Nations  
9, rue du Valais  
1202 GENEVA
- H.E. Mr. Ryukichi Inai  
Ambassador (Disarmament)  
Permanent Mission of Japan to the Office  
of the United Nations  
10, avenue de Buis  
1202 GENEVA
- H.E. Dr. Ian Cromartie, C.M.G.  
Ambassador (Disarmament)  
Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to  
the Office of the United Nations  
37-39, rue de Vermont  
1211 GENEVA 20
- 3 - H.E. Mr. Rikhi Jaipal  
Secretary of the Conference on Disarmament  
PALAIS DES NATIONS  
1211 GENEVA 27

JHN.12 '84 13:15 PERMANENT MISSION OF UDR GENEVA

P.003

- 2 -

- H.E. Dr. Henning Wegener  
Ambassador (Disarmament)  
Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic  
of Germany to the Office of the United Nations  
28c, chemin du Petit-Saconnex  
1211 GENEVA 19
- H.E. Mr. Stanislaw Turbanski  
Ambassador and Permanent Representative  
Permanent Representation of the People's  
Republic of Poland to the Office of the United Nations  
15, chemin de l'Ancienne-Route  
1218 Grand-Saconnex
- H.E. Dr. Harald Rose  
Ambassador and Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of the German Democratic Republic  
to the Office of the United Nations  
49, rue de Moillebeau  
1209 GENEVA

3/3



MF

*Mr. McMe  
Sent to the office  
of Rt Hon Joe Clark  
By hand 1002 #30*

UNCLASSIFIED

FM GENEV YTGR0159 11JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 110900

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0020 10JAN

---VISIT OF RT HON JOE CLARK

FOLLOWING IS LIST OF AMBASSADORS MET BY MR CLARK DURING HIS  
VISIT TO GENEVA PLUS SECRETARY OF CD.

-HE MR ROLF EKEUS

AMBASSADOR(DISARMAMENT)

PERMANENT MISSION OF SWEDEN TO THE OFFICE  
OF THE UNITED NATIONS

9-11,RUE DE VAREMBE

1211 GENEVA 20

-HE MR RICHARD BUTLER

AMBASSADOR(DISARMAMENT)

PERMANENT MISSION OF AUSTRALIA TO THE OFFICE  
OF THE UNITED NATIONS

56-58,RUE DE MOILLEBEAU

1211 GENEVA 19

-HE MR MANSUR AHMAD

AMBASSADOR AND PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

OF PAKISTAN TO THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

...2

PAGE TWO YTGR0159 UNCLAS

56,RUE DE MOILLEBEAU

1211 GENEVA 19

-HE MR MUCHKUND DUBEY

AMBASSADOR AND PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE  
PERMANENT MISSION OF INDIA TO THE OFFICE  
OF THE UNITED NATIONS

9,RUE DU VALAIS

1202 GENEVA

-HE MR RYUKICHI IMAI

AMBASSADOR(DISARMAMENT)  
PERMANENT MISSION OF JAPAN TO THE OFFICE  
OF THE UNITED NATIONS

10 AVENUE DE BUDE

1202 GENEVA

-HE DR IAN CROMARTIE CMG

AMBASSADOR(DISARMAMENT)  
PERMANENT MISSION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM TO  
THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

37-39,RUE DE VERMONT

1211 GENEVA 20

#MR RIKHI JAIPAL

SECRETARY OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT  
PALAIS DES NATIONS

...3

PAGE THREE YTGR0159 UNCLAS

1211 GENEVA 27

-HE DR HENNING WEGENER

AMBASSADOR (DISARMAMENT)

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC  
OF GERMANY TO THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
28C, CHEMIN DU PETIT-SACONNEX

1211 GENEVA 19

-HE MR STANISLAW TURBANSKI

AMBASSADOR AND PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE  
PERMANENT REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLES  
REPUBLIC OF POLAND TO THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
15, CHEMIN DE L ANCIENNE-ROUTE  
1218 GRAND-SACONNEX

-HE DR HARALD ROSE

AMBASSADOR AND PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE  
PERMANENT MISSION OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC  
TO THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
49, RUE DE MOILLEBEAU  
1209 GENEVA.

2. NO/NO SEPARATE CALL WAS MADE ON AMB ROSE, WHO WAS LUNCHEON GUEST.

UUU/221 120935Z YTGR0159

m F

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT RBR0056 11JAN84

TO MOSCO DELIVER BY 120900

INFO LDN PARIS BONN ROME WSHDC HAGUE BRU BNATO PRMNY PEKIN TOKYO

WSAW PRGUE BPEST BUCST BGRAD CNBRA NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP/DGIS PCOOTT/

FOWLER

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RBD RBRD RBP RBT ZSP ZSI'IDD LIDDZ IDA IDR

---PM INITIATIVE-LET TO ANDROPOV-SOVEMB BRIEFING

ON 09JAN RBD AND GARY SMITH OF TASK FORCE MET SOV AMB RODIONOV TO  
BRIEF HIM ON CONTENTS OF PM S LATEST LET TO ANDROPOV.

2. IN HANDING OVER COPY OF LET RBD EXPLAINED THAT CDN SIDE HAS BEEN  
VERY MUCH AWARE OF SOV REQUEST THAT WE MAINTAIN PATIENCE AND  
UNDERSTANDING OF SOV DIFFICULTIES AT THIS TIME. THIS WE HAVE DONE BUT  
WE ARE NOW SEEKING SOV UNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION. PM S OBJECTIVE  
HAS BEEN TO MEET LEADERSHIP OF FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS AND HAS BEEN  
ACCOMPLISHED WITH EXCEPTION OF USSR. PM IS ANXIOUS TO COMPLETE THIS  
PHASE OF HIS PERSONAL INITIATIVE. THUS PM IS PREPARED TO MEET WITH  
OTHER DESIGNATED MEMBERS OF SOV LEADERSHIP IF ANDROPOV IS NOT/NOT  
AVAILABLE.

3. AMB REPLIED WITH FORMULA REHEARSAL OF SOV SUPPORT FOR PM S  
INITIATIVE. LEADERSHIP, HE SAID, WAS ANXIOUS TO WORK WITH PM TO RESTORE  
DETENTE BUT CDN SIDE KNOWS REASONS WHY TIMING IS DIFFICULT.

4. AMB SUGGESTED THAT IN MEANTIME SIDES COULD WORK ON QUOTE PRACTICAL

...2

PAGE TWO RBR0056 CONF

SIDE OF VISIT UNQUOTE I.E.BEGIN WORK ON TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION SUCH AS MIDDLE EAST,CENTRAL AMERICA,AND BILATERAL MATTERS AND AGREE ON PUBLIC QUOTE DOCUMENTS UNQUOTE IN ORDER TO ENSURE SUCCESSFUL VISIT.

5.WHILE NOT/NOT TOTALLY DISCOUNTING SOV SUGGESTIONS,RBD EMPHASIZED THAT VISIT MUST BE DEVOTED LARGELY TO PM S INITIATIVE,THAT BILATERAL COMPONENT WOULD BE MINIMAL AND THAT MAIN PURPOSE WOULD BE TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. PM WILL WANT TO DISCUSS HIS IDEAS AND GAIN BENEFIT OF SOV VIEWS ON WHAT CAN BE DONE TO INSTIL NEW POLITICAL LIFE TO EAST-WEST DIALOGUE. VISIT WOULD BE SHORT WORKING VISIT OF NOT/NOT MORE THAN TWO DAYS. PM WILL NOT/NOT WISH TO CONDUCT TOUR D HORIZON OF WORLD S PROBLEMS BUT RATHER STICK TO CENTRAL PROBLEM OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

6.RODIONOV RESPONDED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION AND IT WOULD BE CONVEYED IMMEDLY TO MOSCO.IN HIS VIEW,HOWEVER,DISCUSSION OF GLOBAL AND BILATERAL PROBLEMS WERE INTRINSIC TO SUCCESS OF VISIT.

PRIORITY,HE AGREED,SHOULD BE GIVEN TO INITIATIVE BUT EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON OTHER AREAS WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL.AMB ALSO WONDERED IF PM MIGHT BE PREPARED TO SPEAK ON SOVIET TV.ON LATTER SUGGESTION,RBD EXPRESSED DEFINITE INTEREST BUT WE REITERATED PM S FIRM WISH TO STICK TO PRIORITY ISSUE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

7.IN EVENING PM MET SOV AMB AT DINNER GIVEN BY CZECH AMB BUZEK(SEE SEPARATE TEL).PM REAFFIRMED TO RODIONOV HIS DESIRE TO KEEP

...3

PAGE THREE RBR0056 CONFD

OBJECTIVES OF VISIT LIMITED IN ORDER TO CONCENTRATE ON KEY ISSUE AT HAND. PM ADDED THAT PERHAPS LUNCH OR DINNER CONVERSATION COULD BE EARMARKED FOR OTHER MATTERS.

8. SOVS SEEM TO WISH TO DILUTE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF VISIT BY STEERING FOCUS AWAY FROM EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THIS MAY WELL BE AS RESULT OF LEADERSHIP DIFFICULTIES THEY FACE AND REVIEW OF FOREIGN POLICY NOW APPARENTLY UNDERWAY. MORE LIKELY, HOWEVER, IS SOV DESIRE TO AVOID PLACING THEMSELVES IN POSITION WHERE THEY MAY FEEL THEY HAVE TO OFFER MORE THAN GENERAL SUPPORT FOR INITIATIVE. THEY PROBABLY DO NOT/NOT WISH TO LEND THEIR VOICE TO INITIATIVE IN ANY DEGREE GREATER THAN THAT OF USA. SOVS MAY BE WONDERING HOW THAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED.

CCC/272 111951Z RBR0056

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR0035 11JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 110900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CP

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RBG RBD RBR IDR IDA

---PROPOSED VISIT OF PM

AMB MET TODAY WITH GEORGI ARBATOV, DIRECTOR OF INSTITUTE OF USA  
AND CDA TO DISCUSS SEVERAL ROUTINE MATTERS (SEPARATE TEL).  
DURING COURSE OF MTG ARBATOV RAISED QUESTION OF PROPOSED  
VISIT BY PM AND COMMENTED THAT VISIT HAD NOT/NOT BEEN FORGOTTEN  
BUT THAT TIME HAD TO BE CHOSEN. HE (ANDROPOV) WAS WORKING BUT HAD NOT/  
NOT MET WITH ANYONE YET. WHEN DOCTORS PERMITTED HE WLD HAVE LONG  
SERIES OF VISITORS TO RECEIVE. HE CLD NOT/NOT TAKE ONE AND NEGLECT  
OTHERS. SO HE HAD TO BE IN REALLY GOOD FORM BEFORE HE CLD EVEN START  
PROCESS. IN TERMS OF SPECIFIC PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY PM THERE  
WERE SOME DOUBTS. HOWEVER OVERALL DESIRE OF PM TO DO SOMETHING  
TO MOVE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD WAS APPRECIATED BY EVERYONE.  
REACTION OF TOP SOV LEADERSHIP WAS GOOD. CONCERNING PMS RECENT  
LETTER SUGGESTING WILLINGNESS TO MEET WITH PERSONS OTHER THAN  
ANDROPOV HIMSELF, ARBATOV STATED THAT HE DID NOT/NOT  
THINK SITUATION WAS AS HOPELESS AS THAT. ANYWAY, HE ADDED, SUCH  
AND ARRANGEMENT WLD LOOK RIDICULOUS. PMS INITIATIVE WAS QUOTE  
BIG CALIBER SHOT UNQUOTE USEFUL TO BOTH SIDES AND SHLD NOT/NOT  
BE WASTED.

...2

RECEIVED  
JAN 10 1982  
SECTION 1

PAGE TWO XYGR0035 CONFD

2.COMMENTS BY ARBATOV DO NOT/NOT OF COURSE CONSTITUTE OFFICIAL  
SOV REPLY TO PMS RECENT LETTER.HOWEVER,AS YOU KNOW ARBATOV IS  
CLOSELY LINKED TO ANDROPOV AS ADVISOR AND HAS COMMENTS CARRY  
WEIGHT.CERTAINLY HIS EXPLANATION OF SOV POSITION HAS FAMILIAR  
RING(SEE OURTEL 0021 OF 06JAN)AND IS UNDERSTANDABLE.

CCC/044 111035Z XYGR0035



MI  
D

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR0033 11JAN84

TO EXTOTT (IDDZ DELIVER BY 110900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CP

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RBD RBR IDR IDA

REF OURTEL XYGR0021 06JAN

---PM INITIATIVE

AT RECEPTION LAST EVENING SUSLOV(DIR SECOND EUROPEAN DIV MFA)

TOLD ME QUOTE UNOFFICIALLY UNQUOTE THAT HE WOULD HAVE ANSWER FOR  
ME(TO PMS LETTER)IN TWO DAYS.

ROBERTS

CCC/044 110800Z XYGR0033

mf

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR0032 11JAN83

TO EXTOTT RBR DELIVER BY 110900

INFO LDN PARIS RONN WSHDC BNAOT TOKYO WSAW PRGUE BPEST BGRAD

PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/CPD/DGIS

DISTR MINA USS DMF DMFX RGB RBD RBRD IDDZ IDD IDA IDR

REF YOURTEL RBR0054 10JAN

---DPM/SSEA MTG WITH GROMYKO

MEMBER OF SECOND EUROPEAN DIV MFA TOLD ME AT RECEPTION  
LAST EVENING, AND CONFIRMED TO US THIS AM, THAT TEL FROM GROMYKOS  
OFFICE WENT TO OTT SAYING THAT GROMYKO WOULD MEET DPM/SSEA IN  
STOCKHOM 19 JAN AT 1500 HRS. HE THOUGH SOV SIDE WAS ANTICIPATING  
MTG WOULD LAST QUOTE AT LEAST ONE HOUR UNQUOTE.

ROBERTS

CCC/044 110802Z XYGR0032

*Delvau 9/12*  
**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

Division	RCR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Person	Y.L.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Local Time	RSR 9:15	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
ACTION		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
circulation		
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6	12	
7		
8		
9		
10		

C O N F I E N T I A L

FM BONN ZQGR0017 11JAN84

TO LXTOTT LRCR DELIVER BY 110900

INFO PARIS ROME HAGUE BRU LDN CANDELNATO WSHDC MOSCO

PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA USS DMF IDDZ IFB RGB RSD RSR RBD RBR UGB

CPD IDR IDA

---REQUEST FOR CALL ON PM TRUDEAU-DR HANS J VOGEL

WE HAVE RECVD REQUEST FROM DIETRICH STOBBE,SPD,(FORMER

MAYOR OF BERLIN,CHAIRMAN OF INTERNAL SPD FOREIGN RELATIONS

CTTEE,VISITED OTT OCT83).PURPOSE OF CALL WAS TO DETERMINE WHETHER

PM TRUDEAU WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO MEET DR HANS J VOGEL LEADER

OF SPD OPPOSITION,IN OTT ON 06FEB PRIOR VOGEL VISIT TO

WSHDC FROM 07-09FEB.ON 09FEB HE HAS MTG WITH SECTY OF STATE

SHULTZ.THERE IS SOME POSSIBILITY THAT COURTESY CALL ON

PRES REAGAN OR VP BUSH WILL ALSO BE ARRANGED.

2.IF PM TRUDFAU IS AVAILABLE AND PREPARED TO MEET VOGEL,

VOGEL WOULD LIKE ALSO TO MEET WITH SSEA,CHAIRMAN OF PARL

FOREIGN RELATIONS CTTEE,AND E BORADBENT.STOBBE THOUGHT

IN VIEW OF PMS INITIATIVE THAT IT MIGHT BE TO EVERYONES MUTUAL

BLNEFIT THAT VOGEL MEET WITH PM TRUDEAU PRIOR TO VOGELS

MTGS IN WSHDC.

3.YOU WILL RECALL THAT VOGEL MADE REQUEST TO SEE PM DURING

LATTERS NOV83 VISIT TO BONN,BUT TIGHTNESS OF PMS SCHEDULE MADE

...2

*Alv. Receive objection can take place re AFaire de Paris et HT pour voir*  
*Concession. 1002. Cune Civil Justice could be taken. part de voir*  
*primer.*

PAGE TWO ZQGR0017 CONF

MTG IMPOSSIBLE. AT THAT TIME WE HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT  
ADVISABILITY OF MTG SINCE OUR FIRST PRIORITY WAS OF COURSE  
GETTING KOHL GOVT BEHIND PM INITIATIVE, AND IT WAS IMPORTANT  
NOT/NOT TO GIVE CHANCELLOR IMPRESSION THAT INTEREST IN  
OPPOSITION SPD UNDERSTANDING OF, OR SUPPORT FOR, INITIATIVE WAS  
OF ANYTHING LIKE COMPARABLE IMPORTANCE. THESE CONSIDERATIONS  
CLEARLY DO NOT/NOT WEIGH SO HEAVILY NOW THAT INITIATIVE IS  
WELL LAUNCHED AND KOHL SUPPORT CLEAR. CHANCELLOR SHOULD BE LESS  
SENSITIVE ABOUT PM-VOGEL MTG NOW THAT HE MIGHT HAVE BEEN LAST  
NOV, PARTICULARLY AS MTG WOULD BE IN OTT. WITH DECLINE IN SPD  
CREDIBILITY WITH NATOS GOVTS, RELATED TO ITS REJECTION OF  
DOUBLE TRACK DECISION, VOGEL VISITS TO WSHDC AND OTT PERHAPS  
DESIGNED TO ASSURE TWO GOVTS OF SPD CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR  
NATO, AND TO TRY TO IMPROVE SPD IMAGE INTERNATIONALLY.

4. STOBBE SAID THAT HE PREFERRED TO HAVE REQUEST FOR MTG COME  
FROM OUR EMB IN BONN RATHER THAN VIA FRG EMB OTT. THT IF  
PM IS NOT/NOT AVAILABLE, THEN IT WOULD BE BETTER TO HAVE REGRETS  
MADE HERE AND QUIETLY RATHER THAN USING OFFICIAL GERMAN  
CHANNELS. THIS WOULD SEEM TO SUGGEST SOME SPD NERVOUSNESS  
AS TO HOW FRG GOVT WOULD PERCEIVE REQUEST, AND ENJOINS SOME  
CAUTION ON OUR SIDE.

5. GRATEFUL RESPONSE SOONEST.

CCC/242 111245Z ZQGR0017

MF

INITIATIVE ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS  
AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Next Steps

<u>January 10</u>	Luncheon with members of the Committee for the Third Track
<u>January 11</u>	Visit to U.N. Secretary General in New York, followed by brief meeting with the press
<u>January 12</u>	Meeting with Editorial Board of the NEW YORK TIMES  Interview with CBC and TVA in Ottawa
<u>January 13</u>	Meeting with Malaysian Prime Minister in Ottawa
<u>January 16</u>	Luncheon with members of peace groups (?)
<u>January 17-18</u>	Follow-up with Premier Zhao Ziyang in Ottawa
<u>January 16-20</u>	DPM/SSEA attends NATO meeting and CDE opening in Stockholm
<u>January 27-28</u>	PM and DPM/SSEA participate in Davos Symposium (?)
<u>January 30-31</u>	Visit to Moscow (?)
<u>mid-February</u>	Major speech in House of Commons, Ottawa



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	UNCLASSIFIED	10 JAN 84 23 56Z 12	10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDDZ0020 10JAN83		
TO/À	TO GENEV <u>IMMEDIATE</u>		
INFO			
DISTR	---VISIT OF RT HON JOE CLARK		
REF	MR CLARK HAS ASKED FOR FULL NAMES (INCLUDING CHRISTIAN NAMES), TITLES		
SUBJ/SUJ	AND MAILING ADDRESSES OF ALL AMBS HE MET DURING HIS GENEV PROGRAM. <del>SO</del>		
	<del>THAT HE CAN WRITE THANK YOU LETS.</del>		
	2.GRATEFUL YOU PROVIDE FOR 12JAN.		

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG J. McNEE	IDDZ	5-5912	SIG L.A. DELVOIE

MB

Department of External Affairs



Ministère des Affaires extérieures

Canada

OTTAWA, ONTARIO  
K1A 0G2

Le 10 janvier 1983.

IDDZ-0019

Mme Adèle Lauzon  
a/s M. Réal Pelletier  
LA PRESSE PLUS  
7 ouest, rue St-Jacques  
Montréal, P.Q.


Madame,

... Suite à notre conversation téléphonique d'aujourd'hui, je vous envoie une copie du discours du premier ministre du 13 novembre à Montréal ainsi qu'une liste des principaux événements de son initiative.

Il faut ajouter à cette liste la rencontre du premier ministre avec le Président Reagan qui eut lieu à Washington le 15 décembre dernier, également la réunion avec le Secrétaire Général des Nations-Unies, M. Perez de Cuellar qui se tiendra à New-York demain le 11 janvier, et au cours de la semaine prochaine, la visite du premier ministre chinois M. Zhao Ziyang. La réunion avec quatre experts américains soit Messieurs Kennan, Hyland, Rostow, Carnesale eut lieu quant à elle le 29 octobre 1983.

J'espère que ces informations vous seront utiles et vous assure de ma collaboration ultérieure si vous le jugez nécessaire.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Madame, l'expression de mes sentiments distingués.

  
L.A. Delvoie  
Responsable  
Groupe de travail sur  
l'Initiative du P.M.

---PM INITIATIVE-CHRONOLOGY

FOLLOWING FOR REFERENCE ARE MAJOR EVENTS IN PMS PEACE INITIATIVE.

- 1)PM MTG IN OTT WITH DPM/SSEA,MND AND SENIOR OFFICIALS(SEP21)
- 2)DPM/SSEA MTG IN HALIFAX WITH SEC SHULTZ(OCT16)
- 3)PM LETS TO ALL NATO HEADS OF GOVT(OCT22-25)
- 4)PM SPEECH AT GUELPH UNIV(OCT27)
- 5)PM LETS TO SOVIET AND CHINESE LEADERS(EARLY NOV)
- 6)PM MTGS WITH PRES MITTERRAND,PM LUBBERS,QUEEN BEATRIX,PM MARTENS,  
HH THE POPE,PM CRAXI,PM THATCHER(NOV08-11)
- 7)PM SPEECH IN MTL(NOV13)
- 8)PM MTG WITH PM NAKASONE(NOV19)
- 9)PM PERSONAL EMISSARY(GEOFFREY PEARSON)VISITS TO PEKIN(NOV21-22)  
AND TO MOSCO(NOV25-26)
- 10)PM PARTICIPATION CHOGM IN N DELHI(NOV22-27)
- 11)PM VISIT TO PEKIN(NOV28-29)
- 12)DPM/SSEA SPEECH IN CHCGO(NOV29)
- 13)DPM/SSEA PARTICIPATION IN NATO MINISTERIAL MTG(DEC8-9)
- 14)PM MTGS OVER SIX WEEKS PERIOD WITH ROBT MCNAMARA,GEN ROGERS,  
GEN BRENT SCOWCROFT,GEORGE KENNAN,MEMBERS OF HARVARD NUCLEAR STUDY  
GROUP,GEORGI ARBATOV(OCT-NOV)



Department of External Affairs



Ministère des Affaires extérieures

Canada

OTTAWA, ONTARIO  
K1A 0G2

January 10, 1983

IDDZ-0018

Mr. S.W. Stillich  
c/o S.W. Stillich & Assoc.  
(Translators)  
Suite 704 - 185 Bay Street  
Toronto, Ontario  
M5J 1K6

Dear Mr. Stillich:

Thank you for your letter of December 28 and for your suggestions on how the Prime Minister might approach the Soviet leadership.

I have read your letter with care and have circulated it to my colleagues in the Task Force so that we will all have the benefit of your views should the Prime Minister, in the end, visit Moscow in the course of his current initiative. Obviously, the Soviets must be approached in a special manner.

It is clear that the Prime Minister is voicing the concerns of a great many Canadians when he speaks of the urgent necessity of halting the arms race and reversing the confrontational trend in East-West relations. We are appreciative of your support for his efforts.

Yours truly,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "L.A. Delvois".  
L.A. Delvois  
Chairman  
Task Force Working Group

c.c. Mr. Dan Heap, M.P., House of Commons



*WITH THE COMPLIMENTS OF*

*DAN HEAP, M.P.*

*SPADINA RIDING*

*Ottawa office  
Room 925, C.B.  
(613) 593-4264*

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323 College St. 00029  
(416) 967-9122*

S. W. Stillich  
c/o S. W. STILlich & ASSOC. (Translators)

SUITE 704 - 185 BAY STREET  
TORONTO, ONTARIO, CANADA M5J 1K6  
TELEPHONE (416) 364-5666

*Mr. McMe*  
*Pls prepare.*  
*reply*  
*hy*  
December 28th, 1983

Department of External Affairs  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A OG2

Attention: Mr. Louis A. Delvoie  
Chairman,  
Task Force Working Group

Re: Suggestions for the  
Prime Minister's conversations  
in Moscow

Dear Monsieur Delvoie,

Thank you very much for your letter of December 12th, 1983.

Following are a few points which may be of interest to you while preparing the grounds for the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow:

1. In connection with World War 2 Finland was able to relatively successfully negotiate with the Soviets because they created a friendly atmosphere; the Finnish delegates were drinking with their negotiating partners until late at night. To prepare the minds of the Soviets for concessions it is absolutely vital to convince them that one comes as a friend. This can be achieved by socializing with them.

A Soviet-Finnish treaty was signed very late at night after the negotiators had made friends among each other.

2. It would make a good impression upon the Soviets, if a knowledge of some of their literature could be displayed by the Prime Minister. This could be achieved by a few quotations which the Prime Minister could make of Russian literature, either in Russian or in English or French.

3. As soon as the Soviets feel that the Prime Minister has taken an interest in their own culture and history, their minds will be more open to suggestions. Therefore, it would be wise to show, during the conversations, that the Prime Minister is aware of their culture, history and political difficulties. There are possibly enough specialists on hand at Canadian universities who could provide the data suggested.

4. This also applies to the personnel accompanying the Prime Minister on his visit to Moscow. They too should be intellectually and socially prepared to play the indicated role.

5. A psychologist specializing in Soviet psychology should be consulted with regard to the emotional approach of the Soviets.

6. In the Soviet Union the most powerful man is probably the Defence Minister Dmitri Ustinov. It should be shown to him that in making vital concessions he could only win, whereas if the present armament race continues, he will encounter increasingly great obstacles such as the impression in the West that the Soviet Union wants to conquer the world. The Minister of Defence of the Soviet Union could greatly enhance his standing among his people, if he would free an important share of his military budget for further developing socialism as it is the objective in the Soviet Union. In this way an appeal could be made to his self-consciousness, his egoism, his ambitions. It could be pointed out that he could in this way improve the living conditions of the people. It is important to argue with the Soviets within the scope of their own terminology, their own way of thinking, to be able to convince them. Therefore, reference could be made to the advantages of disarmament for socialism.

7. Great concessions in the armament question would convince the peoples of the Western world that the Soviet Union wants peace. Concessions would generate a great propaganda victory for the Soviets, because they would win over millions of friends in the West for the Soviet Union.

8. With regard to the fear of the Soviets which is almost pathological, that there is a threat of invasion of the Soviet Union by Western powers, I would suggest that, to alleviate their anxiety, a kind of European cushion could be created. The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic could be united by way of a kind of loose federation which would ensure that this new Germany would not be considered a threat by the Soviets. This federation could be structured according to the Canadian model, where French speaking Canadians, being one of the two founding partners of the federation, enjoy special rights which cannot be taken away by any government. If other European countries would join this new federation, a powerful neutral element could be established which would stabilize and sublimate the relationship between the two superpowers. This, of course, would have to be worked out by competent politicians having a knowledge of East and West Germany.

Of course, this matter would have to be discussed with Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl as well. There is now a strong sentiment among Germans in both countries against a further polarization of the two superpowers and the grounds for advancing the indicated idea of a loose federation is more propitious than ever before since World War 2. It would subsequently amount to the creation of a European buffer continent between the US and the SU. Recently, the Toronto Star mentioned that according to unsubstantiated reports the idea of reunification of the two German states would seem acceptable to the Soviets.

9. Concessions by the Soviets would strengthen opposition in the US to President Reagan's armament program resulting in a great cut in armament spending. In turn, this would weaken the US economy which, at the present time, is greatly depending upon armament orders. In the eyes of the Soviets this would be a desirable political trend.

9. A visible scaling down of Soviet armaments would make the Federal Republic of Germany and other European countries more willing to make concessions in economic and other respects. I outlined this in my previous letter to you. In fact, the West German economy with its highly organized and efficient operation could be made available for helping the SU to solve some of its economic bottlenecks. But as long as Soviet armaments are considered a threat to Europe and the US there would be no such cooperation in the future.

10. In World War 2 the German armies penetrated deeply into Soviet territory. This was a tremendous shock to the Soviets. And this anxiety neurosis explains in part, why Soviet armaments have skyrocketed since World War 2. The fear of a possibility of Western invasion into the Soviet Union which is completely unrealistic, still lingers in the Soviet minds. An effort should be made to prove to them that this threat no longer exists. Due to the extensive geographical area, the distances involved, and the complicated nature of the problems connected with an invasion of the SU, it is not feasible at all. The Americans and the Germans would not be able to put such an Utopian plan into practice. The Germans have changed radically from the times of the Third Reich. In this context the Prime Minister should realize that the minds of the Soviets are still in a pathological state. Therefore, they should be treated cautiously like a mental patient is given therapy.

11. Of course, brief negotiations between high-ranking politicians or conversations which would include the points suggested, cannot do the whole job; what is needed additionally, is a continuing campaign in favour of friendship with the peoples of the other countries. If there is no climate or inner will to make friends, an agreement arrived at merely by negotiating intellectually, will not prove lasting. Therefore, continuing campaigns for friendship should be initiated, in both camps of course.

12. As a friendly gesture the Prime Minister should also bring a few small gifts (Canadian products) to Moscow.

13. To act as a buffer between the SU and the US Europe should develop a policy concept of its own (see item 8).

I hope, some of these suggestions can be incorporated in your planning work. I also hope the Prime Minister's noble endeavours will prove successful.

Yours very truly,  
*S. W. Stillich*  
S. W. Stillich  
President

S. W. Stillich, President  
S. W. Stillich & Ass.  
704-185 Bay Street, Toronto, Ont. M5J 1K6

Department of External Affairs  
Ottawa, Ont. K1A 0G2

Attention: Mr. Louis A. Delvoie,  
Chairman, Task Force  
Working Group



TO/À *4* IDDZ

FROM/DE • IMU

REFERENCE • Our memorandum IMU-21 of January 5  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Biographic Note on U.N. Official  
SUJET

Security/Sécurité

CONFIDENTIAL

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

20-UN-6

Date

January 10, 1984

Number/Numéro

IMU-0066

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

BIOC A-3  
PRMNY/Kergin  
IFB

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Enclosed is a biographic note on Mr. Diego Cordovez,  
U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs  
who we understand will be present for the Prime Minister's  
January 11 meeting with Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar.

R.M. Middleton  
Director  
United Nations Affairs Division

CONFIDENTIAL

January 9, 1984

DIEGO CORDOVEZ (ECUADOR)

Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs

Now in his late 40's Mr. Cordovez joined United Nations service in 1963 and served as Special Assistant to the Secretary-General of UNCTAD. His career has concentrated on the economic and social sectors of the United Nations. Among other posts from 1973 - 80 he served as Secretary of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and in 1975 was made Secretary of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Restructuring of the Economic and Social Sectors of the United Nations system. In 1980 he was appointed Assistant Secretary-General of Secretariat Services for Economic and Social Matters. At this point his career also broadened into political matters as in 1980 he became assistant to Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme mediating in the Iran/Iraq war; in 1981 he succeeded Perez de Cuellar as the Secretary-General's Special Representative on Afghanistan and in 1982 he assumed his present position as the other Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs with Brian Urquhart.

With his varied United Nations background he is very knowledgeable on the multilateral process, both its pitfalls and strengths. While frank and open with those who enjoy his confidence, he is a very experienced and consummate diplomat with a good sense of the "art of the possible" on non-aligned issues and third-world trouble spots. He has an engaging and cultured personality and enjoys the friendship and confidence of the Secretary-General. Given his background unless specifically asked he is unlikely to offer comments on international security issues in the presence of the Secretary-General, Brian Urquhart and Jan Martenson who are more directly involved in these issues.



MASTER FILE

RC 13 DANISH EMBASSY

File No. 105.I.1/2

*Handed over to Smith  
by pmr Am B  
12/1/84  
- original given to  
Furber  
13/1/84.*

No. 1

The Embassy of Denmark presents its compliments to the Department of External Affairs and has the honour to convey to the Department the following message, which the Prime Minister of Denmark has sent to the Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada:

"My dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter dated 18 November, 1983 in which you elaborate on various aspects of your initiative to improve the presently strained East-West relationship. I am grateful to be given this opportunity to present the Danish government's views on the concrete proposals contained in your most recent message.

In the shorter term you suggest that all NATO members be represented at the inaugural meeting of the CDE in Stockholm on 17 January, 1984 at a high political level. I share with you the satisfaction that the NATO council meeting in Brussels 8-9 December revealed full agreement among the allies that their foreign ministers should attend the opening. This decision can be considered yet another token of the importance that we all attach to the imminent restoration and subsequent intensification of the high level political dialogue between East and West in general, and to the favourable and substantial outcome of the CDE in particular.

. / . / .

Department of External Affairs,  
O t t a w a }

- 2 -

In this connection I also welcome the ministers' decision that a thorough appraisal of East-West relations be undertaken with a view to achieving a more constructive East-West dialogue. This step, in my view, is fully in tune with the aims of your initiative and could, no doubt, further efforts to establish a more stable East-West relationship.

I have also studied your proposals to reinvigorate the MBFR negotiations. As I stated in my letter of 16 November, 1983, the Danish government is prepared to consider favourably any concrete steps aimed at promoting the achievement of this goal. Such steps seem even more needed now that the Eastern side has chosen to desist from setting a date for the resumption of the Vienna negotiations after the present recess.

It is not least against this background that the Danish government shares the view of a number of NATO members that now is the time for undertaking a review of the Western negotiating positions in order to re-define our strategies at the MBFR negotiating table and to resume as soon as possible substantial negotiations in Vienna. This approach could also result in a more active posture on the part of the West and in your words, Mr. Prime Minister, would demonstrate to the East and to our own publics our desire to make meaningful progress in the arms control field.

I will be awaiting the outcome of your further contemplations on the elements of your initiative with interest.

Yours sincerely,


(signed)

Poul Schlüter"

The Embassy has been advised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen that the letter, signed by Prime Minister Poul Schlüter on January 5, 1984, has been sent by special courier to this Embassy. As soon as it is received in Ottawa, the message will be brought to the Department of External Affairs for delivery to the Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada.

The Embassy of Denmark avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of External Affairs the assurances of its highest consideration.

Ottawa, January 10, 1984.



RBR/B.Mawhinney/2-7991/sk

External Affairs    Affaires extérieures  
Canada                Canada

TO/À                •    ETD  
FROM/DE           •    RBD

REFERENCE       •  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT           •    ALBANIA - SLOWPOKE REACTOR  
SUJET

*Mr. Smith  
for info*

*Reject IOA*

*done  
11/1/84*

*mf*

Security/Sécurité
<b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
January 10, 1984.
Number/Numéro
RBD0003

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ANNEXES

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I understand that we are fast approaching the point when a decision must be taken whether or not to proceed with a project to supply a Canadian manufactured low-enriched uranium fueled research reactor to Albania. I am aware that this project raises a number of technical and legal questions which have to be clarified. In addition, however, it raises a number of broader policy questions which, it seems to me, will have to be addressed before Canada proceeds further. In particular, the following aspects warrant careful study:

- the extent to which the Ministers' decision in April last year to put a hold on further moves to establish diplomatic relations with Albania may have a bearing on the project;
- the consular implications of an increased Canadian presence in Albania resulting from the reactor project;
- whether such a project is consistent with Canadian safeguard policies, and more particularly, whether it is compatible with the Prime Minister's initiative, inter alia, to strengthen the NPT regime.

I think it would be useful if an interdepartmental meeting could be convened to consider all aspects of the project prior to any further approaches to the International Atomic Energy Agency or Albanian representatives. As the lead division on this subject, I assume that you would wish to chair such a meeting. We would, of course, wish to participate.

I would be grateful for your views.

*Peter Hancock*  
Peter Hancock,  
Director General,  
USSR and Eastern Europe Bureau.

M F  
sent to IDD2  
11/1/84

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM JKRTA XEGR9022 10JAN84

TO EXTOTT PSR

INFO PMOOTT

DIOSTR IFB PGB PSD IDD IDA

REF YOURTEL PSR0010 03JAN

---FM MOCHTAR NEWYEARS MSG:PEACE INITIATIVE

IN HIS YEAR-END POLICY STATEMENT, FM MOCHTAR HAS REFERRED IN PRAISEWORTHY TERMS TO PM TRUDEAU'S PEACE INITIATIVE. TEXT AT END THIS TEL. MOCHTAR'S STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF PMS INITIATIVE IS ALL THE MORE VALUABLE BECAUSE NO/NO SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR SUPPORT WAS MADE; IT WAS FREELY OFFERED. WE BELIEVE ORIGIN OF INDON SUPPORT ANTEDATES PMS CURRENT PEACE INITIATIVE AND SHOULD BE SEEN AS ARISING OUT OF DISCUSSIONS ON THIS QUESTION PM TRUDEAU HELD WITH MOCHTAR DURING VISIT HERE ONE YEAR AGO.

2. DFA INFORMS US THAT INDON AMB OTT ALREADY HAS CONVEYED INDON SUPPORT DIRECTLY TO PM WHO EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION ACCORDINGLY.

3. AS YOU KNOW, DURING RECENT VISITS OF PGB AND PSR, DFA OFFICIALS EXPRESSED INTEREST IN PMS INITIATIVE (SEE OURTEL XEGR9451 12DEC) AND PUBLIC SUPPORT OF FM MOCHTAR IS CONSISTENT WITH INDON POSITION ON RISKS OF NUCLEAR WAR AND CONTINUATION OF ARMS RACE, WHICH WAS REITERATED BY MOCHTAR IN HIS STATEMENT BEFORE 38TH UNGA ON 30SEP. YOU WILL ALSO RECALL THAT INDON SUPPORTS REGIONAL APPROACH TO

...2

PAGE TWO XEGR9022 CONF

SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT AND ALONG WITH OTHER ASEAN STATES HAS  
ADVOCATED ZONE OF PEACE, FREEDOM AND NEUTRALITY IN SE ASIA (ZOPFAN)  
IN WHICH THERE WOULD BE PROVISION FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR  
FREE ZONE. MOCHTARS CALL TO INCL COUNTRIES NOT/NOT POSSESSING  
NUCLEAR ARMS IN NEGOTIATIONS AT SOME STAGE IS ALSO CONSISTENT  
WITH STANDING INDON POLICY. WE UNDERSTAND THAT INDONS REGARD PMS  
INITIATIVE AS FITTING WELL INTO CDN QUOTE BRIDGING UNQUOTE ROLE  
WHICH WAS THEME DURING PMS VISIT HERE.

4. DFA OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO ENQUIRE ABOUT PROGRESS OF PMS PEACE  
INITIATIVE. WHILE WE HAVE PROVIDED FULL ACCOUNT ON BASIS OF  
MATERIALS AVAILABLE TO US, IN VIEW OF THIS INTEREST AND PUBLIC  
INDON SUPPORT, YOU MIGHT WISH TO PROVIDE US WITH REPORTS OF  
EVOLUTION OF INITIATIVE WHICH WE CAN USE TO UPGRADE CONTENT OF OUR  
BRIEFINGS COMMENSURATE WITH INDON SUPPORT.

5. TEXT BEGINS: EUROPE AND DISARMAMENT - THE FAILURE OF USA-USSR NEGS  
IN GENEV FOLLOWED BY THE TERMINATION OF START AND MBFR NEGS WITH AN  
INCREASE IN NUCLEAR ARMS ON THE TWO CONTINENTS, BRIN S THE WORLD IN A  
CRITICAL SITUATION AND MAY DESTROY THE WORLD THROUGH NUCLEAR  
CONFLICT.

THERE IS NO/NO ALTERNATIVE BUT FOR TWO SUPER-POWERS TO START  
NEGOTIATING ONCE MORE AND START TO REDUCE THEIR NUCLEAR ARMS ARSENAL.  
WE HOPE FOR A FREEZE ON NUCLEAR ARMS VERTICALLY AS WELL AS  
HORIZONTALLY.

...3

PAGE THREE XEGR9022 CONFD

THEREFORE WE VALUE THE INITIATIVE OF PM TRUDEAU, WHICH AMONG  
OTHER THINGS PROPOSES A CONFERENCE OF THE 5 COUNTRIES WHICH POSSESS  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WITH THE PURPOSE TO REDUCE THEIR ARMS AND THUS  
CREATING POLITICAL STABILITY. IT HAS HOWEVER TO BE STRESSED HERE  
THAT NUCLEAR STRATEGY SHOULD NOT/NOT NECESSARILY BE THE MONOPOLY  
OF NUCLEAR POWERS, BECAUSE THE RESULTS OF A NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION  
WOULD AFFECT MANKIND AS A WHOLE. BECAUSE OF THIS, COUNTRIES WITHOUT  
NUCLEAR ARMS SHOULD AT A CERTAIN STAGE TAKE PART IN NEGS. TEXT ENDS  
CCC/111 110500Z XEGR9022

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F  
19

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR8001 10JAN84

T0 EXTOTT IDR DELIVER BY 101300

INFO CANMILREP NATO BRU VMBFR WSHDC LDN PARIS BONN ROME ATHENS HAGUE

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDDZ IDRA IDRL IDA

REF YOURTEL IDR0084 09JAN

---MBFR:CLN PROPOSAL

AS A RESULT OF DISCUSSION AT TODAYS LUNCHEON OF AMBASSADORS  
AND OF PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS, I HAVE NOW OBTAINED REACTIONS FROM  
NINE DELEGATIONS. WHILE NOT/NOT ALL THESE REACTIONS REFLECT  
SPECIFIC MINISTERIAL VIEWS, MOST WERE BASED ON INSTRUCTIONS.  
I THINK WE CAN TAKE IT THAT THEY REPRESENT FAIRLY THE WEIGHT  
OF OPINION IN CPAITALS. THIS OPINION IS UNIFORMLY NEGATIVE ON  
SUGGESTION OF HOLDING MINISTERIAL MTG IN CDA AT TIME AND FOR  
PURPOSES WE HAVE PROPOSED. I DOUBT THAT VIEWS OF REMAINING DELS WOULD  
ALTER THIS GENERAL PICTURE. DELS WHICH HAVE REACTED ARE BELGIUM,  
DENMARK, FRANCE, FRG, LUXEMBOURG, NORWAY, SPAIN, USA AND UK. DELS  
STILL TO REACT ARE GREECE, ICELAND, ITALY, NETHERLANDS, PORTUGAL  
AND TURKEY. MY CONCLUSION IS THAT THIS PARTICULAR DEVICE FOR  
MAINTAINING PRESSURE TO ENSURE TIMELY REVIEW OF WESTERN MBFR  
POSITION IN BROAD ARMS CONTROL CONTEXT HAS NOW BEEN PRESSED AS FAR  
AS IT REASONABLY CAN BE IN CIRCUMSTANCES. IF MINISTER WERE TO  
PROCEED AT STKHM TO CONFIRM HIS INVITATION, I FEAR WE WOULD RISK  
REBUFF. MY RECOMMENDATION, THEREFORE, IS THAT THIS IDEA SHOULD NOT/NOT  
...2

PAGE TWO YBDGR8001 CONF

BE PURSUE UNLESS CIRCUMSTANCES CHANGE, AND THAT WE SHOULD SEEK OTHER  
WAYS FOR ACHIEVING OBJECTIVE OF MAINTAINING PRESSURE FOR MBFR REVIEW.

2. SUMMARY OF NATIONAL REACTIONS FOLLOWS:

BELGIUM: IN PRINCIPLE, TINDEMANS STRONGLY FAVOURED MINISTERIAL MTGS  
BUT WITH VERY BROAD AGENDA. IN RECENT MONTHS, QUESTIONS OF ARMS CONTROL  
HAD BECOME PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT AND WERE CREATING PROBLEMS WITH  
PUBLIC OPINION. MINISTERIAL MTG CONCENTRATING ON ARMS CONTROL IN  
THESE CIRCUMSTANCES RISKED RAISING PUBLIC HOPES UNJUSTIFIABLY.

TINDEMANS THEREFORE PREFERRED TO CONCENTRATE FOR PRESENT ON POLITICAL  
DIMENSION OF EASTL-WEST RELATION RATHER THAN ARMS CONTROL ASPECT.

CONSEQUENTLY HE WAS NOT/NOT MUCH TEMPTED BY CDN PROPOSAL. OF COURSE,  
ALLIANCE HAD TO BE READY TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL  
QUESTIONS BUT PREPARATIONS TO DO SO SHOULD NOT/NOT BE CARRIED TO  
LEVEL OF MINISTERIAL IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. TO DO OTHERWISE PLAYED  
INTO SOVIET HANDS, SINCE RUSSIANS COULD EXPLOIT FRUSTRATIONS OF  
WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION OVER SLOW PROGRESS OF ARMS CONTROL

NEGOTIATIONS FOR WHICH WESTERN GOVTS WERE NOT/NOT ENTIRELY TO BLAME.

DENMARK: DANISH FM HAD NOT/NOT YET BEEN CONSULTED ABOUT CDN PROPOSAL  
BUT WOULD PROBABLY BE INCLINED TO SHARE NEGATIVE REACTION OF NUMBER  
OF NATO GOVTS TO CDN PROPOSAL. (MY DANISH COLLEAGUE TOLD ME PRIVATELY  
THAT HIS PM SHARED CDN VIEW ON IMPORTANCE OF MBFR REVIEW, HOWEVER.)

FRANCE: REPEATED FRENCH DIFFICULTIES ALREADY REPORTED (OURTEL  
YBGR8000 09JAN) AND ADDED ANOTHER: THAT INFORMAL MTG OF MINISTERS IN

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PAGE THREE YBDGR8001 CONF

STOCKHOLM PLUS ANOTHER MTG END-MAY IN WSHDC WAS PROBABLY REASONABLE FREQUENCY.

FRG:GENSCHER WAS MUCH IN FAVOUR OF INFORMAL MTGS.THEIR SUBJECT OUGHT HOWEVER TO BE A GENERAL REVIEW OF INNATL AFFAIRS RATHER THAN A SPECIFIC ITEM.THERE WERE ALSO QUESTIONS OF ROTATION OF INFORMAL MTGS AND THEIR TIMING.GIVEN PROSPECT OF DISCUSSIONS AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL AT SPRING MINISTERIAL MTG AT END OF MAY.TO CONVENE INFORMAL MINISTERIAL MTG BY END APRIL WAS PERHAPS INADVISABLE.WHILE LA SAPINIERE HAD IN FACT DISCUSSED ONE PARTICULAR SUBJ WHICH HAD BEEN ACUTELY ACTIVE AT TIME,THIS WAS ACCIDENTAL AND SHOULD NOT/NOT BE TAKEN AS A PRECEDENT.AS TO POSSIBLE PUBLIC WORRIES ABOUT INACTIVITY ON PART OF NATO GOVTS.ANY SUCH ACCUSATIONS WERE NOT/NOT WELL-FOUNDED AND COULD BE DISPROVEN BY REFERENCE TO EAST-WEST STUDY AND ALLIANCE INITIATIVES IN CDE.

LUXEMBOURG:BELIEVED MINISTERIAL MTG AS PROPOSED INADVISABLE.

NORWAY:AGREED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET ON WITH REVIEW OF ALLIANCE POSITION AND DID NOT/NOT EXCLUDE THAT MIN MTG MIGHT AT SOME STAGE PLAY PART IN PROCESS.BUT MANY DOUBTS ABOUT CDN PROPOSAL WERE JUSTIFIED.WORK ON MBFR HAD TO BE CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO EAST-WEST STUDY.IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO INTERJECT ADDITIONAL MTG BETWEEN NOW AND WSHDC MTG AND DIFFICULT FOR MINISTERS TO JUSTIFY TWO TRIPS TO NORTH AMERICA IN SUCH SHORT TIME.TRUE THERE MIGHT NOT/NOT BE TOTAL PARALLEL BETWEEN MBFR AND OTHER INTERRUPTED NEGOTIATIONS.POSSIPILITY

...4

PAGE FOUR YBDGR8001 CONF

THAT RUSSIANS MIGHT RETURN TO TABLE IN VIENNA COULD NOT/NOT BE EXCLUDED. IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR ALLIANCE TO BE PREPARED TO MEET SUCH AN EVENTUALITY. BUT IT COULD MAKE NECESSARY PREPARATIONS WITHOUT NECESSARILY CONVENING SPECIAL MINISTERIAL MTG.

SPAIN: SPANISH FM FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO PARTICIPATE IN ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS WHERE SPAIN WAS NOT/NOT A PARTICIPANT. THUS BOTH MBFR AND INF WERE SUBJECTS THAT LEFT HIM UNEASY, TO POINT WHERE HIS TENDENCY WAS ONLY TO ACQUIESCE IN ATTENDING SUCH DISCUSSION WHEN CLEAR MAJORITY OF HIS COLLEAGUES WERE IN FAVOUR OF CONVENING.

UK: FOREIGN SECRETARY AGREED INFORMAL MINISTERIAL MTGS WERE VALUABLE BUT DOUBTED THIS PARTICULAR PROPOSAL WAS TIMELY OR USEFUL. HE PREFERRED TO LOOK INSTEAD TO OCCASION WHICH WOULD BE OFFERED BY SUPER-RESTRICTED SESSION IN MAY TO DISCUSS MBFR IN BROAD EAST-WEST CONTEXT. SINCE VARIOUS ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN BROKEN OFF ON SOVIET INITIATIVE, ALLIES COULD PERFECTLY WELL JUSTIFY TO PUBLIC OPINION THAT CIRCUMSTANCES HINDERING PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL WERE NOT/NOT OF WESTERN MAKING.

USA: SHAREI MANY OF CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY OTHERS. USA WAS GOING THROUGH ITS OWN MBFR REVIEW AND WAS THEREFORE NOT/NOT IN POSITION TO AGREE AT THIS STAGE TO CDN PROPOSAL. IT WAS IN PRACTICE IMPOSSIBLE FOR SCHUTZ TO ENVISAGE ANOTHER MINISTERIAL MTG AT TIME SUGGESTED.

3. NEEDLESS TO SAY, I COUNTERED AS MANY OF THESE ARGUMENTS AS I REASONABLY COULD IN TIME AVAILABLE; IF I DO NOT/NOT REPEAT CDN ARGUMENTS IN THIS REPORT, IT IS BECAUSE THEY WERE BASED ON YOUR INSTRUCTIONS SO THAT YOU ALREADY KNOW THEM

TAYLOR

000315

CCC/054 101729Z YBGR8001

MF

UNCLASSIFIED

FM CNGNY YIGR0016 10JAN84

TO EXTOTT/URR DELIVER BY 101600

INFO WSHDC PMOOTT/COLEMAN/AXWORTHY PCOOTT/FOWLER

DIST IDDZ UGB FPR UGP SCD

REF OURTEL YIGR0010 06JAN84

---PM VISIT TO NEW YORK.

OFFICE OF SEYMOUR TOPPING TODAY PROVIDED US WITH LIST OF SNR  
TIMES PERSONNEL WHO WILL BE ATTENDING THE QUOTE ON-THE-RECORD MTG  
UNQUOTE WITH PM TRUDEAU. AS YOU CAN TELL FROM EXTREMELY  
HIGH LEVEL OF ATTENDEES, TIMES IS TAKING THIS MTG VERY SERIOUSLY.  
CONGEN TAYLOR WILL BE CONTACTING TOPPING TO ENQUIRE INTO LIKELY  
THRUST OF QUESTIONING. WE WILL ALSO CONTACT KAUFMAN AS WE ASSUME  
PMO WILL DO TOO. GRATEFUL YOU CONFIRM IMMEDIATELY WHETHER RALPH  
COLEMAN WILL BE ONLY OTT-BASED OFFICIAL TO ACCOMPANY PM AS TIMES  
WISHES TO RECEIVE NAMES/INFO ASAP ON ACCOMPANYING OFFICIALS. AS NOTED  
PREVIOUSLY, TAYLOR, BRADY AND MCKECHNIE WILL ATTEND. WE WILL ARRANGE  
FOR TRANSCRIPT. GRATEFUL ALSO INDICATION ASAP AS TO ANY INFO YOU MAY  
WISH US TO PROVIDE TIMES IN ADVANCE, IN ADDITION TO TEXTS OF PM  
SPEECHES TO DATE ON PEACE AND SECURITY INITIATIVE, TRANSCRIPT OF  
PMS MTG WITH JOURNALISTS AFTER SESSION WITH PRES REAGAN, AND  
SPECIAL CIA TODAY ISSUE ON SUBJ. WE WILL CONTACT IDDZ AND EMBWSHDC  
ON THIS MATTER. FYI TIMES AND OTHER NY-BASED PUBLICATIONS WILL COVER  
PM PRESS SESSION FOLLOWING DE CUELLAR MTG 11JAN.

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PAGE TWO YIGR0016 UNCLAS

2. LIST FOLLOWS:

A O SULZBERGER, PUBLISHER

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INFO CANMILREPNATO BRU VMBFR WSHDC LDN PARIS BONN ROME ATENS HAGUE

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDDZ IDRA IDRL IDA

REF YOURTEL IDR0084 09JAN

---MBFR:CDN PROPOSAL

AS A RESULT OF DISCUSSION AT TODAYS LUNCHEON OF AMBASSADORS  
AND OF PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS, I HAVE NOW OBTAINED REACTIONS FROM  
NINE DELEGATIONS. WHILE NOT/NOT ALL THESE REACTIONS REFLECT  
SPECIFIC MINISTERIAL VIEWS, MOST WERE BASED ON INSTRUCTIONS.  
I THINK WE CAN TAKE IT THAT THEY REPRESENT FAIRLY THE WEIGHT  
OF OPINION IN CPAITALS. THIS OPINION IS UNIFORMLY NEGATIVE ON  
SUGGESTION OF HOLDING MINISTERIAL MTG IN CDA AT TIME AND FOR  
PURPOSES WE HAVE PROPOSED. I DOUBT THAT VIEWS OF REMAINING DELS WOULD  
ATER THIS GENERAL PICTURE. DELS WHICH HAVE REACTED ARE BELGIUM,  
DENMARK, FRANCE, FRG, LUXEMBOURG, NORWAY, SPAIN, USA AND UK.. DELS  
STILL TO REACT ARE GREECE, ICELAND, ITALY, NETHERLANDS, PORTUGAL  
AND TURKEY. MY CONCLUSION IS THAT THIS PARTICULAR DEVICE FOR  
MAINTAINING PRESSURE TO ENSURE TIMELY REVIEW OF WESTERN MBFR  
POSITION IN BROAD ARMS CONTROL CONTEXT HAS NOW BEEN PRESSED AS FAR  
AS IT REASONABLY CAN BE IN CIRCUMSTANCES. IF MINISTER WERE TO  
PROCEED AT STKHM TO CONFIRM HIS INVITATION, I FEAR WE WOULD RISK  
REBUFF. MY RECOMMENDATION, THEREFORE, IS THAT THIS IDEA SHOULD NOT/NOT

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PAGE TWO YBDGR8001 CONF

BE PURSUEI UNLESS CIRCUMSTANCES CHANGE, AND THAT WE SHOULD SEEK OTHER  
WAYS FOR ACHIEVING OBJECTIVE OF MAINTAINING PRESSURE FOR MBFR REVIEW.

2. SUMMARY OF NATIONAL REACTIONS FOLLOWS:

BELGIUM: IN PRINCIPLE, TINDEMANS STRONGLY FAVOURED MINISTERIAL MTGS  
BUT WITH VERY BROAD AGENDA. IN RECENT MONTHS, QUESTIONS OF ARMS CONTROL  
HAD BECOME PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT AND WERE CREATING PROBLEMS WITH  
PUBLIC OPINION. MINISTERIAL MTG CONCENTRATING ON ARMS CONTROL IN  
THESE CIRCUMSTANCES RISKED RAISING PUBLIC HOPES UNJUSTIFIABLY.  
TINDEMANS THEREFORE PREFERRED TO CONCENTRATE FOR PRESENT ON POLITICAL  
DIMENSION OF EASTL-WEST RELATION RATHER THAN ARMS CONTROL ASPECT.  
CONSEQUENTLY HE WAS NOT/NOT MUCH TEMPTED BY CDN PROPOSAL. OF COURSE,  
ALLIANCE HAD TO BE READY TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL  
QUESTIONS BUT PREPARATIONS TO DO SO SHOULD NOT/NOT BE CARRIED TO  
LEVEL OF MINISTERIAL IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. TO DO OTHERWISE PLAYED  
INTO SOVIET HANDS, SINCE RUSSIANS COULD EXPLOIT FRUSTRATIONS OF  
WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION OVER SLOW PROGRESS OF ARMS CONTROL  
NEGOTIATIONS FOR WHICH WESTERN GOVTS WERE NOT/NOT ENTIRELY TO BLAME.  
DENMARK: DANISH FM HAD NOT/NOT YET BEEN CONSULTED ABOUT CDN PROPOSAL  
BUT WOULD PROBABLY BE INCLINED TO SHARE NEGATIVE REACTION OF NUMBER  
OF NATO GOVTS TO CDN PROPOSAL. (MY DANISH COLLEAGUE TOLD ME PRIVATELY  
THAT HIS PM SHARED CDN VIEW ON IMPORTANCE OF MBFR REVIEW, HOWEVER.)  
FRANCE: REPEATED FRENCH DIFFICULTIES ALREADY REPORTED (OURTEL  
YBGR8000 09JAN) AND ADDED ANOTHER: THAT INFORMAL MTG OF MINISTERS IN

...3

PAGE THREE YBDGR8001 CONF

STOCKHOLM PLUS ANOTHER MTG END-MAY IN WSHDC WAS PROBABLY REASONABLE FREQUENCY.

FRG:GENSCHER WAS MUCH IN FAVOUR OF INFORMAL MTGS.THEIR SUBJECT OUGHT HOWEVER TO BE A GENERAL REVIEW OF INNATL AFFAIRS RATHER THAN A SPECIFIC ITEM.THERE WERE ALSO QUESTIONS OF ROTATION OF INFORMAL MTGS AND THEIR TIMING.GIVEN PROSPECT OF DISCUSSIONS AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL AT SPRING MINISTERIAL MTG AT END OF MAY.TO CONVENE INFORMAL MINISTERIAL MTG BY END APRIL WAS PERHAPS INADVISABLE.WHILE LA SAPINIERE HAD IN FACT DISCUSSED ONE PARTICULAR SUBJ WHICH HAD BEEN ACUTELY ACTIVE AT TIME,THIS WAS ACCIDENTAL AND SHOULD NOT/NOT BE TAKEN AS A PRECEDENT.AS TO POSSIBLE PUBLIC WORRIES ABOUT INACTIVITY ON PART OF NATO GOVTS,ANY SUCH ACCUSATIONS WERE NOT/NOT WELL-FOUNDED AND COULD BE DISPROVEN BY REFERENCE TO EAST-WEST STUDY AND ALLIANCE INITIATIVES IN CDE.

LUXEMBOURG:BELIEVED MINISTERIAL MTG AS PROPOSED INADVISABLE.

NORWAY:AGREED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET ON WITH REVIEW OF ALLIANCE POSITION AND DID NOT/NOT EXCLUDE THAT MIN MTG MIGHT AT SOME STAGE PLAY PART IN PROCESS.BUT MANY DOUBTS ABOUT CDN PROPOSAL WERE JUSTIFIED.WORK ON MBFR HAD TO BE CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO EAST-WEST STUDY.IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO INTERJECT ADDITIONAL MTG BETWEEN NOW AND WSHDC MTG AND DIFFICULT FOR MINISTERS TO JUSTIFY TWO TRIPS TO NORTH AMERICA IN SUCH SHORT TIME.TRUE THERE MIGHT NOT/NOT BE TOTAL PARALLEL BETWEEN MBFR AND OTHER INTERRUPTED NEGOTIATIONS.POSSIPILITY

...4

PAGE FOUR YBDGR8001 CONF

THAT RUSSIANS MIGHT RETURN TO TABLE IN VIENNA COULD NOT/NOT BE EXCLUDED. IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR ALLIANCE TO BE PREPARED TO MEET SUCH AN EVENTUALITY. BUT IT COULD MAKE NECESSARY PREPARATIONS WITHOUT NECESSARILY CONVENING SPECIAL MINISTERIAL MTG.

SPAIN: SPANISH FM FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO PARTICIPATE IN ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS WHERE SPAIN WAS NOT/NOT A PARTICIPANT. THUS BOTH MBFR AND INF WERE SUBJECTS THAT LEFT HIM UNEASY, TO POINT WHERE HIS TENDENCY WAS ONLY TO ACQUIESCE IN ATTENDING SUCH DISCUSSION WHEN CLEAR MAJORITY OF HIS COLLEAGUES WERE IN FAVOUR OF CONVENING.

UK: FOREIGN SECRETARY AGREED INFORMAL MINISTERIAL MTGS WERE VALUABLE BUT DOUBTED THIS PARTICULAR PROPOSAL WAS TIMELY OR USEFUL. HE PREFERRED TO LOOK INSTEAD TO OCCASION WHICH WOULD BE OFFERED BY SUPER-RESTRICTED SESSION IN MAY TO DISCUSS MBFR IN BROAD EAST-WEST CONTEXT. SINCE VARIOUS ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN BROKEN OFF ON SOVIET INITIATIVE, ALLIES COULD PERFECTLY WELL JUSTIFY TO PUBLIC OPINION THAT CIRCUMSTANCES HINDERING PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL WERE NOT/NOT OF WESTERN MAKING.

USA: SHARED MANY OF CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY OTHERS. USA WAS GOING THROUGH ITS OWN MBFR REVIEW AND WAS THEREFORE NOT/NOT IN POSITION TO AGREE AT THIS STAGE TO CDN PROPOSAL. IT WAS IN PRACTICE IMPOSSIBLE FOR SCHUTZ TO ENVISAGE ANOTHER MINISTERIAL MTG AT TIME SUGGESTED.

3. NEEDLESS TO SAY, I COUNTERED AS MANY OF THESE ARGUMENTS AS I REASONABLY COULD IN TIME AVAILABLE; IF I DO NOT/NOT REPEAT CDN ARGUMENTS IN THIS REPORT, IT IS BECAUSE THEY WERE BASED ON YOUR INSTRUCTIONS SO THAT YOU ALREADY KNOW THEM

TAYLOR

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M. F.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSAW UMGR0042 10JAN84

TO EXTOTT RBR

INFO STKHM

DISTR MINA DMF IDDZ RGB RBD

REF OURTEL UMGR2277 29DEC83

---CDE:WSAW PACT MINISTERIAL ATTENDANCE

IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION 09JAN, JOZEF WIEJACZ, VICE MIN OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, INDICATED HE WOULD BE ACCOMPANYING FORMIN OLSZOWSKI TO OPENING OF CDE IN STKHM DEPARTING WSAW 16JAN. WHETHER OR NOT/NOT HE WILL ATTEND BILATERAL MTG WITH DPM/SSEA IS NOT/NOT KNOWN BUT GIVEN WIEJACZ PENCHANT TO BE OPEN AND FRANK, HIS CLOSE KNOWLEDGE OF ALL ASPECTS OF POLISH AFFAIRS AND HIS FORTHCOMING AND HELPFUL APPROACH DURING INITIAL STAGES OF MY TENURE IN WSAW (IE REFTEL), IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IF A LINE OR TWO OF APPRECIATION FOR WIEJACZ ASSISTANCE COULD BE ADDED TO DPM/SSEAS BRIEFING FOR HIS MTG WITH OLSZOWSKI. A LINE OR TWO IS NOT/NOT MUCH BUT IN LONG RUN MILEAGE GAINED COULD BE EXTREMELY USEFUL. THANKS

MCLaine

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## MESSAGE

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
REF IN HIS NOV13 SPEECH PM SAID DISCUSSION PAPERS ON THREE SUFFOCATION  
SUBJ/SUJ MEASURES WOULD BE INTRODUCED QUOTE AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME AND IN  
THE APPROPRIATE DISARMAMENT FORUM UNQUOTE. BACKGROUND PAPERS ON  
THESE THREE MEASURES ARE AT PRESENT BEING CONVERTED INTO DISCUSSION  
PAPERS. THOUGHT HERE HAS BEEN THAT CD WOULD BE MOST APPROPRIATE  
FORUM. WE WILL FORWARD FIRST DRAFT OF DISCUSSION PAPERS FOR YOUR  
COMMENT AS SOON AS THEY ARE READY.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

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
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L.A. Delvoie



UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

mf

Chancellor's  
Room

January 9, 1984

POINTS FOR PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU

1. Stress importance of Stockholm Talks, if Shultz-Gromyko meeting fails to have superpower negotiations resumed ( as is possible unless both sides agree to moratorium on further deployment) what next?

(a) Consider Trudeau visit to Stockholm before conference breaks up, with suggestion that a subcommittee be set up to study possibilities of reciprocal disengagement, denuclearization and disarmament based upon Gomulka/Rapacki proposals of 1957-1964. Freeze of nuclear armaments, complete denuclearization of East and West Germany and reduction of conventional forces reciprocally were then considered by a subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission in Geneva.

(b) Essential to end stalemate on Comprehensive Test Ban, if there is to be any move towards stability and away from dangers of escalation arising from current deployment of new technologies in nuclear weaponry.

3. If USA continues to refuse merging START and INF talks, consider approaching surmounting of obstacles to five nuclear power meeting by having recourse to Article 47 of the U.N. Charter, which established a Military Staff Committee composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council, with authority to advise the Security Council, among other things, with "the regulation of armaments and possible disarmament." This body, with representation of Canada (which is provided for in Art. 47) should draw up an agenda to reduce the dangers of the current proliferation of nuclear weapons.
4. As regards the projected visit by Prime Minister Trudeau to Moscow, this should not depend on the health of Mr. Andropov, but should proceed on the acceptance of the principle of "collective leadership" of the Politburo.

AD HOC COMMITTEE FOR THE THIRD RAIL CANADIAN PEACE INITIATIVE

c/o Science for Peace, University College, Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1

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We support the range of proposals which the Prime Minister has been advocating in his peace initiative. We also support the arms control measures for which Canada has long been pressing, such as a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests and a treaty to prohibit chemical warfare. And we support any efforts to persuade the superpowers that their security can be soundly based on the limitation of strategic arms.

We believe there are other possibilities which should be explored, additional steps that Canada can put forward. We believe that Canada has unique qualifications, both political and technical. Our acknowledged experience and excellence in the field of communications technology is but one example.

A particular factor that has guided us is the importance of information and knowledge. This is true in the case of a crisis. It is also true for the more fundamental objective of improving understanding between the peoples of countries with different histories, philosophies and cultural backgrounds.

Like the Prime Minister, we are very worried about the danger of accidental nuclear war, which seems to be increasing. We are concerned that this danger is being heightened by the speed with which events happen and by the prospect that the reaction time is becoming so short that carefully considered responses are becoming almost impossible.

We should like to put forward the following proposals for possible action by Canada:

1. The establishment of a Crisis Alert Centre, whose purpose would be to detect events that might lead to an international crisis and to alert those who would become involved, especially the superpowers. It would have to have access to the most modern means of gathering information and of rapid communications so that this information could be used. The Centre might be established in Canada, possibly with an international staff.

2. The International Satellite Monitoring Agency, which has been proposed by France, could be tied in to this Crisis Alert Centre. Now more than ever, it deserves Canada's support.

3. The newly established Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament should be supported by the government since its objectives include both public education through the dissemination of information, and research into arms control issues. It should be a vehicle for more effective dialogue between the government and the public.

4. The creation of a Peace Bank whose responsibility would be the collection and analysis of proposals from non-governmental organizations and individuals. This Bank could be housed at an existing organization, such as a peace research institute.

-2-

5. The restoration of the Exchange Agreements between Canada and the Soviet Union, or the negotiation of new ones in the cultural and academic fields. We believe this should be only a first step and that these exchanges should be expanded (to include young people, possibly during the International Year of the Youth in 1985, for example, or churchmen) because personal contact is an important foundation for improving international understanding.

6. We are attracted by the concept of Twinning. This has been done in the past as a means of establishing contact between cities, as one example. It might become the basis for a co-operative effort between Canada and a member of the Warsaw Pact (Poland or Hungary, perhaps), in an effort to find ways of positive co-operation and confidence-building between the two alliances.

7. The encouragement and the establishment on a secure basis of Peace Research and Instruction in Canadian institutions of higher learning. We believe that federal grants to support these activities would be regarded as a sign that Canada is determined to deal in a fundamental way with problems of world peace.

We are ready to discuss these proposals and to elaborate on them on a mutually convenient occasion.

Tom Clark  
Chandler Davis  
Eric Fawcett  
Franklyn Griffiths  
George Ignatieff  
Robert Laxer  
Robert Logan  
Derek Paul  
Robert Reford  
Frank Sommers  
Lynn Trainor

6 December 1983

Telephone: Eric Fawcett  
416 -- 978-5217

Mr D. ~~Mc~~ + Mr Smith

9-1-84

RE: MR CLARK'S VISIT TO USA

Peggy Mason of Mr Clark's office told me today  
that Mr Clark plans to visit New York for 26-28  
+  
Washington for 29-31.

She confirmed that Mr Clark had spoken with the  
embassy in Washington & he was relying on them to set up  
meetings with US govt. officials. Mr Clark has also  
asked Mr Pelletier to tie up meetings at the UN.

She will get back to us for help in organizing  
meetings with outside US experts.

I suggested that it might be simplest  
to work through the Task force in organizing  
the entire visit & I'll try to make the point  
again when she calls back.

JAM

RBR/M. Fairweather/2-6225/sk

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Briefing Book for the Visit to  
Canada by Romanian Foreign Minister,  
Stefan Andrei, February 7-9, 1984

Security/Sécurité

CONFIDENTIAL

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File/Dossier

Date

January 9, 1984

Number/Numéro

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ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

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
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Attached is an outline, with drafting responsibilities, of the briefing book for use by the Honourable A.J. MacEachen, Deputy Prime Minister and SSEA during the visit of Foreign Minister Andrei of Romania which will take place February 7-9.

The briefs should be prepared in established format (example attached). Please ensure that they are as concise as possible, and accompanied by talking points.

It would be appreciated if the briefs for which you are responsible could reach RBR by close of business January 20. If you have any questions, please contact Maureen Smith (6-2633) of this Division.

  
Barry Mawhinney,  
Director,  
USSR and Eastern Europe  
Relations Division.

VISIT BY FOREIGN MINISTER STEFAN ANDREI OF ROMANIA

February 7-9, 1984

Briefing Book Outline

- |   |           |
|---|-----------|
| 1. Programme /                            | RBR/XDV   |
| 2. Scenario                               | RBR       |
| 3. Romania's Independent Foreign Policy   | Bucharest |
| 4. Current Economic Conditions in Romania | ZEP       |
| 5. Romanian Internal Situation            | Bucharest |
| 6. Human Rights in Romania                | Bucharest |

Multilateral Subjects

- |  |         |
|--|---------|
| 7. East-West Relations                                 | RBR     |
| 8. East-West Economic Relations                        | EER     |
| 9. The Prime Minister's Initiative                     | IDDZ    |
| 10. INF/START/MBFR                                     | IDR     |
| 11. Stockholm Conference (CCSBMDE)                     | IDA     |
| 12. Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva           | IDA     |
| 13. Arms Control and Disarmament                       | IDA     |
| 14. Nuclear Weapons Free Zones                         | IDR     |
| 15. The Situation in Poland                            | RBR     |
| 16. Assessment of the Madrid Meeting<br>of the CSCE    | RBR     |
| 17. The Situation in Lebanon                           | GMR     |
| 18. Arab/Israeli Dispute                               | GMR     |
| 19. Iran/Iraq War                                      | GMR     |
| 20. China's Role in International Affairs              | PER     |
| 21. Afghanistan  | PSR     |
| 22. Situation in Southeast Asia: ASEAN<br>and Cambodia | PSR/PER |
| 23. Central America and the Caribbean                  | LCR     |
| 24. North-South Dialogue                               | EEA     |

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Bilateral Subjects

25. Nuclear Cooperation with Romania	RBT
26. General Commercial Relations	RBT
27. Commercial Relations - Countertrade	RBT
28. Canadian Textile and Clothing Policy	EST
29. Romania and the Canadian General Preferential Tariff (GPT)	FINOTT
30. Canadian Footwear Import Policy: Romania	ESF
31. Foreign Investment Insurance Agreement	EEF
32. Cooperation in Science and Technology	ETC
33. Canada-Romania Consular Relations	SIC
34. Family Reunification: Romania	RBP
35. Romanian Emigration Decree (No. 402)	RBP
36. Cultural Relations	RBP
37. Fisheries Relations	FANDOOTT

EXAMPLE OF BRIEF

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1002

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SUBJECT

1/2" margin ISSUE (caps)

single spaced

BACKGROUND

CANADIAN POSITION

ROMANIAN POSITION

EXAMPLE OF TALKING POINTS

TALKING POINTS

- double spaced
- no classification
- points are separated by dash

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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---MBFR:CDN PROPOSAL

MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE TELEPHONED THIS MORNING TO GIVE ME HIS PERSONAL COMMENTS ON INVITATION, WHICH WE HAD TRANSMITTED TO PARIS. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR CHEYSSON TO ACCEPT IN FORM PROPOSED. IN VIEW OF LONG-STANDING FRENCH POLICY ON MBFR, HIS MINISTER WOULD PROBABLY DECLINE INVITATION TO MTG WHOSE MAIN OBJECTIVE WAS TO DEAL WITH MBFR NOTWITHSTANDING FRENCH INTEREST IN PARTICIPATING IN DISCUSSION OF OTHER ARMS CONTROL SUBJS INCLUDING INF. I SAID YOU HAD BEEN CONSCIOUS IN FORMULATING INVITATION, OF PROBLEM THAT MIGHT BE POSED FOR FRENCH AUTHORITIES. I WAS SURE DPM/SSEA HAD IN MIND A MTG SUFFICIENTLY INFORMAL THAT ITS FOCUS ON MBFR WOULD NOT/NOT BE SO EXCLUSIVE AS TO CREATE DIFFICULTY FOR CHEYSSON ATTENDING. MERILLON SAID HE WAS SURE HIS MINISTER WISHED ALSO NOT/NOT TO CREATE DIFFICULTIES FOR HIS CDN COLLEAGUE. PERSONALLY, HOWEVER HE BELIEVED IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR FRENCH IF INVITATION MADE NO/NO ATTEMPT TO COMPROMISE: EITHER IT WOULD BE AN INVITATION TO A MTG ABOUT MBFR, IN WHICH CASE CHEYSSON WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY DECLINE; OR IT WOULD BE A MTG ABOUT ARMS CONTROL IN GENERAL, IN WHICH CASE HE WOULD BE ABLE TO ACCEPT

TAYLOR

CCC/070 091620Z YBGR8000

*Mr. Smith*  
*Let's speak*  
*D.*

*mf.*

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ACCORDING TO REPORT REFERRED TO PARA THREE(C) OF FPR0020 OF  
08JAN IT IS INTENDED THAT PARTICULARS OF PMS PROPOSAL BE  
CIRCULATED AT CD. GRATEFUL TO LEARN IF THIS REPORT IS CORRECT  
AND, IF SO, WHETHER INFO PAPER ON ACTION PROPOSAL IS CONTEMPLATED.  
CCC/221 091220Z YTGR0119

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REF BNATO TEL YBGR8504 06JAN

---MBFR:CDN PROPOSAL:BRITISH SCEPTICISM

SUMMARY:JUDGING FROM CONVERSATIONS AT FCO DEFENCE DEPT(ON WHICH  
UK PERM REP GRAHAMS BRIEFING FOR LUNCHEON 10JAN WILL BE BASED),  
BRITISH RESPONSE TO CDN MBFR PROPOSAL WILL BE QUOTE DOWNBEAT  
UNQUOTE.WHILE BRITS WOULD NOT REFUSE TO ATTEND MEETING WHICH  
WON GENERAL AGREEMENT,NOR WOULD THEY WISH TO STAY AWAY FROM  
MEETING SHCULD SOMETHING SPECIFIC DEVELOP WHICH IN THEIR VIEW  
WOULD MAKE IT WORTHWHILE CALLING MINISTERS TOGETHER.THEY ARE  
FRANKLY DUBIOUS THAT FURTHER INFORMAL MINISTERIAL GATHERING  
FOCUSSED ON MBFR BETWEEN CDF OPENING AND WASHINGTON NAC COULD  
BE JUSTIFIED.THEY ARGUE THAT WITHOUT CONCRETE PRIOR INDICATION  
OF WHAT WAS TO BE DISCUSSED(AND CONCLUSIONS TO BE REACHED),  
MINISTERS WOULD BE CONFRONTED WITH HAVING TO TALK ABOUT HIGHLY  
COMPLEX SUBJECT IN SUCH GENERAL TERMS THAT WOULD EITHER NOT  
JUSTIFY THEIR SPENDING WEEKEND ON IT,OR WOULD INCREASE PRESSURE  
...2

PAGE TWO XNGR0047 CONF

TO MAKE CONCESSIONS WHICH ARE NOT IN WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS IN ORDER TO MEET HEIGHTENED PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS WHICH MEETING WOULD CAUSE.

2.REPORT:INITIAL CONVERSATIONS WITH DEFENCE DEPT,FCO,INDICATE THAT BRITISH ARE DECIDEDLY UNENTHUSIASTIC OVER CDN PROPOSAL FOR MBFR FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING.DEFENCE DEPT ARE IN PROCESS OF DRAFTING INSTRUCTIONS FOR BRITISH PERM REP GRAHAMS RESPONSE AT LUNCH 10JAN.GIST OF MESSAGE IS EXPECTED TO BE THAT AT CURRENT JUNCTURE,LASAPINIERE-TYPE OF MEETING ON MBFR WOULD BE QUOTE THIN GRUEL UNQUOTE FOR FMS:MINISTERS WILL MEET IN STKHM, (AND THOUGH THEY ARE TO FOCUS ON CDE WILL HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO COVER OTHER RLATED ISSUES SUCH AS MBFR),AND THEN AGAIN IN WASHINGTON.NATO REVIEWS OF MBFR AND OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS WILL NOT BE COMPLETED FOR SOME TIME.THUS,UNLESS SOMETHING SPECIFIC IS PRESENTED FOR DISCUSSION,FCO SEES LITTLE POINT AND SOME DANGER IN INFORMAL GATHERING OF MINISTERS TO FOCUS ON MBFR.ON OTHER HAND,IF THERE IS BREAKTHROUGH OR CONCRETE INITIATIVE,FCO WOULD NOT EXCLUDE SUCH A MEETING,NOR WOULD THEY REFUSE TO TURN UP IF OTHERS AGREED TO ATTEND.

3.AS THEY HAVE ON OTHER OCCASIONS ARGUED(SEE OURTEL XNGR0015 05JAN FOR UK VIEWS ON NATO EAST/WEST REVIEW),OFFICIALS HERE SUGGEST THAT MINISTERIAL MEETINGS RAISE PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS AND ...3

PAGE THREE XNGR0047 CONFD

THUS PRESSURES FOR MOVEMENT. WHILE THIS IS NOT PER SE NECESSARILY BAD, MEETING NOW ON MBFR IN PARTICULAR WOULD SIMPLY BRING PRESSURE ON WEST TO DO SOMETHING WHICH IN SECURITY TERMS WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO AGREE TO OVER PAST TEN YEARS OF NEGOTIATION. SOVIETS WOULD BE QUICK TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF FRUSTRATED PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS, AND AT TIME WHEN SOVIETS THEMSELVES ARE REFUSING TO NEGOTIATE IN OTHER FORA, LASAPINIERE-TYPE OF CONFERENCE WOULD GIVE IMPRESSION OF WEST CASTING ABOUT LOOKING FOR MEANS TO GET SOVIETS BACK TO TABLE, -AND BY IMPLICATION DEMONSTRATING MISPLACED SENSE OF WESTERN FAULT THAT ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS HIATUS EXISTS IN FIRST PLACE.

4. BRITISH VIEW (WHICH HAS NOT CHANGED OVER PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, -SEE OURTEL 4425 22DEC) IS THAT THERE IS LITTLE TO BE DONE IN MBFR WHICH WOULD NOT INVOLVE CHANGING SUBSTANTIVE POSITION. SINCE UK DOES NOT NOW SEE HOW MAJOR CONCESSIONS COULD BE MADE WHICH WOULD NOT DIRECTLY AFFECT WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS, THEY SEE LITTLE POINT IN MINISTERS FOCUSSED IN GENERAL TERMS ON WHAT IS IN THEIR VIEW HIGHLY TECHNICAL AND OFT- AND THOROUGHLY CONSIDERED SUBJECT. THIS VIEW MIGHT CHANGE IF MINISTERS WERE PROVIDED IN ADVANCE WITH SUFFICIENTLY DETAILED ALTERNATIVES, BUT IN FCO EYES THESE COULD ONLY EMANATE FROM NATO COUNCIL CONSIDERATION.

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JAN 9

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Diego Andres

Biography

Les. Berpin  
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JAN 9 3 32 PM '83

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Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim announced the appointment of Diego Cordovez as Assistant Secretary-General Office of Secretariat Services for Economic and Social Matters on April 13th. This Office has recently been established in accordance with General Assembly resolution 32/197 on restructuring of the economic and social sectors of the United Nations system. Mr. Cordovez has been Secretary of the Economic and Social Council since February 1973. In that capacity he has also served as Secretary of the Economic and Financial Committee of the General Assembly. As Director of the Council Secretariat he acted as Secretary of the World Population Conference (Bucharest, 1974), of the World Food Conference (Rome, 1974), of the World Conference of International Women's Year (Mexico City, 1975) and of the United Nations Water Conference (Mar del Plata, Argentina, 1977). He also served as Secretary of the ad hoc Main Committee of the sixth and seventh special sessions of the General Assembly. In October 1973 the Secretary-General designated Mr. Cordovez to serve as Secretary of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Restructuring of the Economic and Social Sectors of the United Nations System, established by the General Assembly at its seventh special session. From 1971 to 1973 Mr. Cordovez served as Senior Officer in the Office for Inter-Agency Affairs. Mr. Cordovez joined the United Nations in 1963 and was involved in the preparatory work for the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Following the establishment of UNCTAD in 1964, Mr. Cordovez served as Special Assistant to the Secretary-General of UNCTAD, in Geneva and New York, until December 1970.

appointed USA Special  
Political Affairs 1982  
Assistant to Olof Palme  
in mediation of Iran  
Iraq dispute 1980 -  
Special Rep on  
Afghanistan 1981 -  
(succeeding Páez de  
Cevallos)

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I E L  
DE ROME WTGR0003 09JAN84  
A EXTOTT/IDDZ

INFO PARIS BONN HAGUE BRU LDN CANDELNATO WSHDC GENEV VMBFR MOSCO  
STKHM PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB CPD IDD IDA RBD RCR IDR

---INITIATIVE DU PM ET CDE:VUES ITALIENNES

RESUME:LES AUTORITES ITALIENNES SUIVENT L'EVOLUTION DE L'INITIATIVE  
DU PM AVEC UN INTERET SOUTENU.ELLES RESTENT ATTACHEES EN PARTICULIER  
A LA NOTION D'UNE CONFERENCE DES CINQ PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES QUE  
L'ITALIE AVAIENT ETE LA PREMIERE A METTRE DE L'AVANT.ELLES  
PARTAGENT LES PREOCCUPATIONS DU CDA SUR L'AVENIR DU TRAITE DE NON-  
PROLIFERATION.ELLES ONT FORTEMENT L'IMPRESSION QUE L'URSS EPROUVE  
DES DOUTES ET DES DIFFICULTES A ETABLIR LA POLITIQUE QU'ELLE  
DEVRAIT SUIVRE A LA CDE A STKHM.LE PM CRAXI SE PROPOSE DE FAIRE  
PROCHAINEMENT DES VISITES DANS CERTAINS PAYS DE L'EST DE L'EUROPE  
DANS LE BUT DE CONTRIBUER A LA REVITALISATION DES RELATIONS  
POLITIQUES ENTRE L'EST ET L'OUEST.ANPREOTTI S'ENTRETIENDRA AVEC  
GROMYKO A STKHM LE 19JAN.

2.RAPPORT:FRANCESCHI,DIRGEN SUPPLANT POUR LES AFFAIRES POLITIQUES  
A LA FARNESINA,NOUS CONFIRMA LE 05JAN QUE LES AUTORITES ITALIENNES  
SUIVAIENT LES DEVELOPPEMENTS DE L'INITIATIVE DU PM TRUDEAU,DEPUIS  
SA VISITE A ROME EN NOV,AVEC UN INTERET SOUTENU.PAR PRINCIPE,  
L'ITALIE ACCORDAIT SON APPUI ET SON ENCOURAGEMENT A TOUTE IDEE

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NOTES  
SÉANCE 1211

PAGE DEUX WTGR0003 CONF

ET A TOUTE ENTREPRISE SUSCEPTIBLES DE FAIRE AVANCER LE DIALOGUE, LA NEGOCIATION ET LA DETENTE ENTRE L EST ET L OUEST ET, EN PARTICULIER, ENTRE LES DEUX SUPERPUISSANCES.

3. AU COURS DE LA CONVERSATION, FRANCESCHI OFFRIT LES COMMENTAIRES SUIVANTS SUR LES PROPOSITIONS RELATIVES AU CONTROLE DES ARMEMENTS SUGGEREES PAR LE PM:

A) L ITALIE RESTAIT ATTACHEE AU CONCEPT ET A L EVENTUALITE D UNE CONFERENCE DES CINQ PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES. SA POLITIQUE ET SON ATTITUDE PUBLIQUE EN LA MATIERE DEVAIENT TOUTEFOIS TENIR COMPTE DES RESERVES FONDAMENTALES CONCERNANT LES CONDITIONS PREALABLES ET L OPPORTUNITE D UNE TELLE CONFERENCE QUI AVAIENT ETE FORMULEES DEPUIS, NOTAMMENT PAR LES TROIS PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES MINEURES.

B) L ITALIE NE PARTICIPAIT A LA CONFERENCE DE VIENN SUR LES MBFR QU A TITRE D OBSERVATEUR, COMME LA HONGRIE. LES AUTORITES ITALIENNES SE DEMANDAIENT PRESENTEMENT DANS QUELLE MESURE LA NEGOCIATION DE VIENN, QUI PORTAIT SUR LES FORCES ET LES ARMEMENTS CONVENTIONNELS EN EUROPE, POURRAIT LE MOMENT VENU ETRE ENGLOBEE DANS CELLE DE STKHM. L ITALIE GARDAIT UN ESPRIT OUVERT A CE SUJET, BIEN QU ELLE ETAIT CONSCIENTE DES DIFFERENCES QUI EXISTAIENT ENTRE LES OBJECTIFS ET LES CHAMPS D APPLICATION, GEOGRAPHIQUE ET POLITIQUE, DES DEUX CONFERENCES.

C) AVANT DE FINALEMENT ADHERER AU TRAITE DE NON-PROLIFERATION, LES AUTORITES ITALIENNES S ETAIENT LIVREES A UN LONG ET DIFFICILE DEBAT

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SUR LA MEILLEURE POLITIQUE A SUIVRE A LONG TERME. DANS LA PHASE ACTUELLE, L'ITALIE PARTAGEAIT ENTIEREMENT, DANS L'INTERET MEME DE L'AVENIR DE L'HUMANITE, LES PREOCCUPATIONS DU CDA SUR LA NECESSITE DE PROLONGER, EN LES RENFORCANT, LES OBLIGATIONS ET LES ATTRAITS DU TRAITE. DE L'AVIS DE FRANCESCHI, IL EXISTAIT A CE PROPOS UN LIEN PSYCHOLOGIQUE ET POLITIQUE, COMPLEXE MAIS INDENIABLE, ENTRE LA PROLIFERATION VERTICALE ET LA PROLIFERATION HORIZONTALE.

D) L'ITALIE N'AVAIT PAS DE POSITION ARRETEE SUR LA QUESTION DE LA MOBILITE DES MISSILES STRATEGIQUES. ELLE TENDAIT A S'EN REMETTRE AU JUGEMENT DES EUA QUI EN DETENAIENT LA RESPONSABILITE ET LE CONTROLE. ELLE INCLINAIT A PENSER QUE LA VALEUR DE LA MOBILITE DES MISSILES DEVAIT SE MESURER NON SEULEMENT EN FONCTION DE LEUR VERIFIABILITE, MAIS EGALEMENT DE LEUR VULNERABILITE ET DE LEUR FORCE DE DISSUASION. FRANCESCHI REMARQUA, PAR ANALOGIE, QUE LA GRANDE MOBILITE DES PERSHINGS EN ALLEMAGNE CONTRIBUAIT NOTOIREMENT A LEUR SECURITE ET A LEUR POUVOIR DE DISSUASION.

E) L'ITALIE NE S'ETAIT PAS ENCORE SERIEUSEMENT PENCHEE SUR LE PROBLEME DU STATIONNEMENT D'ARMES NUCLEAIRES DANS L'ESPACE. LES RECHERCHES SCIENTIFIQUES N'EN ETAIENT VERITABLEMENT QU'A LEUR DEBUT EN CE DOMAINE. ENCORE FAUDRAIT-IL, PENSAIT FRANCESCHI, DISTINGUER ENTRE ARMES OFFENSIVES ET DEFENSIVES. IL ETAIT PLUTOT D'ACCORD AVEC NOUS QUE LES AVANTAGES STRATEGIQUES ET MILITAIRES QUE LES SYSTEMES DEFENSIFS POURRAIENT VALOIR A LEURS PROMOTEURS NE SERAIENT

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QUE TEMPORAIRES ET PARTIELS, DONC ILLUSOIRES ET TROMPEURS ET PARTANT PROFONDEMENT DESTABILISATEURS.

4. NOUS AVONS PROFITE DE L OCCASION POUR INFORMER FRANCESCHI, SUR LA BASE DES DIRECTIVES CONTENUES DANS VOTRE TEL IDDZ0311 23DEC83 A BONN, DES RESULTATS DE LA VISITE DU PM A WSHDC. NOUS L AVONS EGALEMENT ASSURE QUE NOUS NE MANQUERIONS PAS DE LE TENIR AU COURANT DES PROGRES ET DE L ISSUE DE LA VISITE QUE TRUDEAU COMPTE FAIRE A MOSCO.

5. FRANCESCHI NOUS A DEMANDE SI NOUS PARTAGIONS L IMPRESSION DES AUTORITES ITALIENNES QUE L URSS PARAISSAIT INCERTAINE ET INDECISE QUANT A LA LIGNE DE CONDUITE QU ELLE DEVRAIT SUIVRE A STKHM. LES AUTORITES SOVIETIQUES AVAIENT ACCEPTE DE RECEVOIR UNE DEL ITALIENNE A MOSCO IL Y A QUELQUE TROIS SEMAINES POUR Y PROCEDER A DES CONSULTATIONS SUR LA CDE, MAIS S ETAIENT DECOMMANDEES A LA DERNIERE MINUTE. DES POUR PARLERS AVEC LA FRANCE QUELQUE TEMPS PLUS TARD N AVAIT APPAREMMENT RIEN DONNE. L URSS, QUI ETAIT DE TOUTE EVIDENCE ENGAGEE DANS UN REEXAMEN EN PROFONDEUR DE SA POLITIQUE SUR LES RELATIONS EST-OUEST ET LE DESARMEMENT, ELABORAIT-ELLE UN DESSIN NOUVEAU ET INATTENDU?

6. QUOI QU IL EN SOIT, LE CHEF DE MISSION SUPPLEANT A L AMBASSADE DE L URSS A ROME, M KARLOV AVAIT PAR LA SUITE, AU COURS D UNE ENTREVUE A LA FARNESINA AVEC FRANCESCHI LUI-MEME, SOULIGNE AVEC VIGUEUR QU A STKHM SON PAYS S EN TIENDRAIT CIT AU MANDAT, RIEN QU AU MANDAT

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FINCIT QU AVAIT RECU LA CDE DE LA CSCE.TOUTE CONSIDERATION DES ARMEMENTS NUCLEAIRES Y SERAIT EXCLUE:IL NE POUVAIT ABSOLUMENT PAS ETRE QUESTION DE RELANCER LES NEGOCIATIONS DE GENEV PAR LE BIAIS DE STKHM.

7.FRANCESCHI AVAIT ALORS RETORQUE QU UNE STRICTE INTERPRETATION DU MANDAT DE LA CDE GUIDERAIT EGALEMENT LES PAYS DE L OTAN,LESQUELS PRESENTERAIENT LE MOMENT VENU DES PROPOSITIONS PRATIQUES,CLAIRES, VERIFIABLES,VISANT A AUGMENTER LA CONFIANCE ET A PREVENIR LES ATTAQUES PAR SURPRISE OU PAR ERREUR DE CALCUL EN EUROPE.KARLOV AVAIT AJOUTE,COMME IL FALLAIT S Y ATTENDRE,QUE L URSS VOUDRAIT POUR SA PART SOUMETTRE DES PROPOSITIONS RELATIVES A L ESPACE AERIEN ET MARITIME.IL ADMIT QU ELLE PORTERAIT UNE ATTENTION PARTICULIERE AUX SUGGESTIONS QUI POURRAIENT SE FAIRE JOUR CONCERNANT LA CREATION D UNE ZONE OU D UN CORRIDOR DENUCLEARISE.L ITALIE, COMMENTA FRANCESCHI,Y SERAIT FERMEMENT OPPOSEE PARCE QUE LES TERRITOIRES DE L OTAN ET DU PACTE DE VARSOVIE DE CHAQUE COTE DE LA LIGNE DE DEMARCATION ETAIENT D UNE VALEUR STRATEGIQUE,MILITAIRE ET GEO-POLITIQUE NETTEMENT DIFFERENTE.

8.AIGUILLONNE PAR FRANCESCHI,KARLOV RECONNUIT EGALEMENT QUE L URSS, FIDELE A ELLE-MEME,PROPOSERAIT L ADOPTION DE DECLARATIONS CONCERNANT NOTAMMENT LE NON-USAGE DE LA FORCE ENTRE L OTAN ET LE PACTE DE VARSOVIE.FRANCESCHI LUI AVAIT FAIT VALOIR QU UN TEL PROJET DEVAIT, DANS LE CONTEXTE DE LA CDE,TENIR COMPTE DES INTERETS DES PAYS NEUTRES ET NON-ALIGNES DE L EUROPE.AU SURPLUS,IL NE DEVRAIT EN

...6

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AUCUN CAS LEGITIME LA DOCTRINE BREJNEV EN PERMETTANT A L AVENIR  
LA REPETITION DES INTERVENTIONS ARMEES SOVIETIQUES DU PASSE EN  
HONGRIE, EN TCHECOSLOVAQUIE ET EN POLOGNE. L OTAN POURRAIT ETRE  
PORTEE A EXAMINER SERIEUSEMENT UNE DECLARATION QUI REMPLIRAIT CES  
CONDITIONS.

9. POUR TERMINER, FRANCESCHI REITERA QU A L INSTAR DU PM TRUDEAU,  
QUOIQUE SANS PLAN D ENSEMBLE ET SANS PROPOSITION PRECISE, CRAXI SE  
RENDRAIT DANS LES SEMAINES ET LES MOIS QUI VIENNENT A BPEST, A  
BUCST, PEUT-ETRE A BRLIN-EST, EVENTUELLEMENT A MOSCO, DANS LE BUT  
GENERAL DE CONTRIBUER A UN RELACHEMENT DE LA TENSION ET A UNE REPRISE DE  
RELATIONS POLITIQUES PLUS NORMALES ENTRE L EST ET L OUEST. A CETTE  
FIN ANDREOTTI, COMME PLUSIEURS DE SES COLLEGUES OCCIDENTAUX,  
RENCONTRERAIT GROMYKO A STKHM LE 19 JAN

HARDY

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MASTER FILE

Chronology of Major Soviet Positions  
on Arms Control & Disarmament

1983

- January 6                      Prague Declaration
- January 28                    Soviet Union makes counter proposal to Swedish initiative for the establishment of a battlefield nuclear weapons free zone in Europe.
- May 3                         Andropov makes revised proposal offering to reduce medium-range forces in Europe to NATO levels in numbers of warheads as well as in number of missiles and planes (including British and French systems).
- June 23                      Soviet draft treaty tabled. It proposes to set aside long-standing data dispute over existing manpower strengths and have each side take unspecified reductions over three years to reach parity at 900,000 men per side. East would accept principle of on-site inspection on "voluntary" (i.e., non-mandatory) basis. Other proposals - initial USA/Soviet reductions and collective interim freeze.
- August 19                    Soviets submit draft treaty on outer space to UN.
- August 25                    Andropov statement on INF offering to destroy missiles reduced from Europe in an INF agreement.
- October 25                   Soviet Defence Minister Ustinov announces the start of preparations to deploy new missiles in GDR and Czechoslovakia in response to NATO INF deployments.
- October 26                   Pravda interview with Andropov:  
"one imperative requirement: the balance of forces in Europe as regards medium-range nuclear arms must not be disrupted. The level of these arms on both sides can and must be radically lowered but in such a manner as to leave the ratio of forces between them unchanged."

- 2 -

1983

November 23      Soviets suspend INF talks.

November 24      Andropov announcement of the acceleration of the deployment of new short-range nuclear missiles in the GDR and Czechoslovakia.

December 8        Soviets leave START talks without setting a date for resumption.

December 15       Soviets leave MBFR talks without setting date for resumption (subsequently agreed for March 16, 1984).

1984

January 10        Soviets propose that WPO and NATO meet in 1984 for a preliminary exchange of views on the question of freeing Europe from chemical weapons.

January 24        Andropov comments in Pravda on conditions for resumption of INF talks and putting forward again old proposals on no first use of nuclear weapons and a non-aggression pact.

mf

January 6, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

Re: Luncheon with the "Third Rail  
Committee" on Tuesday, January 10, 1984

The "Third Rail Committee" is an ad hoc group of people interested in the peace initiative, based mainly in Toronto and Peterborough, Ontario. Their convenor is, as you know, Dr. Robert Laxer, a great personal admirer of yours, who was previously very involved in promoting the National Energy Program.

The group will be coming to 24 Sussex at 12:45 for a 1:00 p.m. luncheon. It is intended to meet with them in advance, during the morning in order to sound them out.

Those who have been invited in addition to Dr. Laxer are:

Mr. George Ignatieff, Chancellor of the University of Toronto, whom you know

Dr. Frank Summers, Past President of the Physicians for Social Responsibility, a practicing psychiatrist, and someone has swung over to very strong support for you -- he met you briefly at the Toronto Dinner on December 13

Dr. Eric Fawcett, President of Science for Peace, a physicist, who has done substantial work on the prevention of accidental nuclear war, and is very interested in strategies for conflict resolution

Dr. Christopher Ross, President of Psychologists for Social Responsibility, who is likely, based on correspondence received, to raise the issue of the Cruise testing in contrast to the peace initiative, and also possibly the problems that Operation Dismantle is having with Revenue Canada (apparently the organization which formerly acted as a trust and issued tax receipts for charitable donations to Operation Dismantle, the World Law Foundation, has now been deregistered by Revenue Canada on the grounds that the funds are being used for "political purposes"; Operation Dismantle has applied for charitable status, been denied, and appealed to the Federal Court of Canada.)

- 2 -

Mr. Murray Thompson, head of the Ottawa operation of Project Ploughshares; you met him, I believe, when the Church Leaders discussed peace matters with you earlier last year

Ms June Callwood, well-known Toronto writer and broadcast commentator

Ms Thelma Baker, Past President of the United Nations Association of Canada

Dr. Metta Spencer, organizer of the Canadian Disarmament Information Service, and Professor of Sociology at the University of Toronto. Ms Spencer may raise with you the issue of Olga Medvedkova, a Soviet peace activist who has been charged with assaulting two police officers in Moscow, following their beating of her

Mr. Walter Pitman, former President of Ryerson Polytechnical University and long time New Democratic Party activist

Mr. Mel Hurtig, Edmonton publisher of the forthcoming Canadian encyclopedia, whom I am sure you have met on a number of occasions

Professor Kenneth McNaught, Professor of History at the University of Toronto and well-known author of Canadian history books

Mr. Yvon Dugas, instructor at Algonquin College in Ottawa.

All of the above are members of the 33 member Third Rail Committee and signatories to the recent newspaper ad in the Toronto Globe and Mail supporting your initiative.

Your advisors for the meeting would comprise:

Geoffrey Pearson  
Louis Delvoie  
Peter Larsen  
David Crenna

As an approach to the conduct of the meeting, I would like to suggest that you perhaps begin by welcoming their activities on behalf of the initiative. (A second advertisement is slated to appear in the Globe and Mail of that day.)


- 3 -

You might then wish to turn to Dr. Laxer as the convenor of the group to start the discussion by indicating their views on both the initiative and the purpose of the meeting.

It is likely that several specific proposals for joint efforts between the Government and disarmament activists will be made:

- o a Canadian-based crisis resolution centre to help guard against accidental nuclear war such as that which could have been triggered by Korean airliner incident;
- o more extensive peace education;
- o a continuing seminar for bringing perspective to small-scale conflicts which could escalate;
- o additional funding for peace research and for involvement of the academic and professional communities in this field.

You might wish to refer such initiatives, which are highly consistent with the Speech from the Throne, to continuing discussion with the officials of the Task Force and Arms Control and Disarmament Division.



David Crenna

cc. T. Axworthy  
R. Fowler

IMU/D. George/3 D Puddington/39  
/2-2022 /6/6292

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

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DM IMU

DATE January 6, 1984

REFERENCE Smith/Puddington telcon of January 5

NUMBER IMU-0027  
Numéro

SUBJECT Speaking Notes for the Prime Minister on  
Leaving the UN Secretary-General's Office on  
January 11.

FILE 375032 JAN 6 1984	DOSSIER
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ENCLOSURES  
Annexes

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As requested, attached are brief speaking notes that the Prime Minister may wish to use when he meets the press at the conclusion of his January 11 meeting with Mr. Perez de Cuellar.

The notes highlight the obligation, assumed by all UN members under the UN Charter to maintain international peace and security. It focuses on the primary responsibility of the permanent members of the Security Council to promote effective nuclear disarmament measures and the urgent need for them to get on with the job.

R. M. Middleton  
Director  
United Nations Affairs Division

IMU/D.George/J D Puddington/jg  
/2-2022 /6-6292

D R A F T

Notes for PM's Remarks on Leaving the UN Secretary-General's  
Office on January 11, 1984.

I have been discussing with the Secretary-General the role of the United Nations in the search for peace, and I am happy to say that our views on the matter are very similar, both on the problems faced and possible solutions to them.

The fundamental purpose of the United Nations according to its Charter is to maintain international peace and security and seek the peaceful resolution of international disputes. As the Secretary-General would be the first to agree, the UN is in need of strengthening in order to fulfill this critical aspect of its functions. The functioning and strengthening of the UN's peace and security role is the responsibility of all UN members, and Canada for one is doing its part. [This concern was the central theme of Canada's keynote address at the opening of the last General Assembly in September and we have strongly supported the Secretary-General's efforts over the last two years to take practical measures in this regard. For countries like Canada there is no alternative to a viable and effective UN system.]

OMIT?

- 2 -

However, the Charter confers on the Security Council primary responsibility, within the UN, for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Council must be the major focus of efforts to strengthen the UN, and we look for leadership in this endeavour to the Council's members, especially its permanent members. These five countries, who alone have the power to prevent action by the Security Council through the use of the veto, also have an equally important responsibility to stimulate action to strengthen the effectiveness of the Council and uphold its authority. In particular, these five permanent members, who also happen to be the nuclear weapon states, have the primary obligation to initiate effective and concrete arms control and disarmament measures to cap the nuclear genie before it destroys all of us. It is time that these states began to match their diplomatic skills to their all-too-apparent genius for military technology. Surely, this would be the greatest contribution to peace and security that they could make in these tense and pressing times.



Department of External Affairs



Ministère des Affaires extérieures

Canada

OTTAWA, ONTARIO  
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January 6, 1984


Dear Reverend Bickford,

On behalf of the Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, I would like to thank you for your letter of November 11 on the Peace Initiative.

You will be pleased to know that the Prime Minister has received many letters of support such as yours. I wish to assure you that it is, in part, in response to the concerns of Canadians such as yourself that the Prime Minister has undertaken this important task.

Thank you for writing on this matter.

Yours sincerely,

  
Louis Delvoie  
Chairman

Task Force Working Group

Reverend W.D. Bickford  
Wesley United Church  
6 Cambridge Street  
Cambridge, Ontario  
N1R 3R6



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**ACTION REQUEST/FICHE DE SERVICE**

From Rev. W.D. Bickford		Ont.	No. A 03895
Subject disarmament An initiative		Action div./Dir. responsable IDA IDBZ	
Letter dated/Lettre en date du 83-11-11	Date rec'd in MINA Date de réception à MINA 83-11-16	Date sent to div. Date d'envoi à la dir. 83-11-16	Info. division(s)/Direction(s) informée(s)
Action to be completed and white slip returned to MINA by L'action doit être complétée et la feuille blanche retournée à MINA par			83-11-24
Comments/Commentaires			

ACTION REQUIRED/ACTION REQUISE	FOR DIV. USE/POUR L'UTILISATION DE LA DIR.
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for signature of SSEA Réponse pour la signature du SEAE	Date received/Date reçu Nov. 18, 1983
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for the signature of Réponse pour la signature de	Action officer/Agent responsable Joseph F. Caron
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Reply by Division Réponse de la direction	Disposition 11-11-1983
<input type="checkbox"/> For information and any necessary action Pour l'examen et suite à donner, s'il y a lieu	Date 11-11-1983
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <p>ALL TRANSFERS TO BE REPORTED TO MINA REGISTRY LE REGISTRE DE MINA DOIT ÊTRE AVISÉ DE TOUT CHANGEMENT</p> </div>	For MINA use/Pour utilisation de MINA

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
**ACTION REQUEST/FICHE DE SERVICE**

From Rev. W.D. Bickford		Ont.	No. N <sup>o</sup> <b>A 03895</b>
Subject Sujet <b>disarmament</b>			
Letter dated/Lettre en date du <b>83-11-11</b>	Date rec'd in MINA Date de réception à MINA <b>83-11-16</b>	Date sent to div. Date d'envoi à la dir. <b>83-11-16</b>	Action div./Dir. responsable <b>IDA 1112</b>
Action to be completed and white slip returned to MINA by L'action doit être complétée et la feuille blanche retournée à MINA par			<b>83-11-24</b>
Comments/Commentaires			

ACTION REQUIRED/ACTION REQUISE	FOR DIV. USE/POUR L'UTILISATION DE LA DIR.
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for signature of SSEA Réponse pour la signature du SEAE	Date received/Date reçu
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for the signature of Réponse pour la signature de	Action officer/Agent responsable
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Reply by Division Réponse de la direction	Disposition
<input type="checkbox"/> For information and any necessary action Pour l'examen et suite à donner, s'il y a lieu	Date
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;">           ALL TRANSFERS TO BE REPORTED TO MINA REGISTRY            LE REGISTRE DE MINA DOIT ÊTRE AVISÉ DE TOUT CHANGEMENT         </div>	For MINA use/Pour utilisation de MINA

**5-1047**

A 03895



## Wesley United Church

6 CAMBRIDGE STREET, CAMBRIDGE, ONTARIO N1R 3R6  
TELEPHONE 621-6060

Hon. Allan Rock.

House of Commons,  
Ottawa, Ontario:

Remembrance Day 1983

Dear Sir:


I wish to commend our Prime Minister on every effort toward the establishment of peace; and I urge you, sir, to lend your support to any initiative leading toward world nuclear disarmament. The very real possibility of the annihilation of the human race makes it imperative, I believe, to promote this course of action with the utmost speed and energy.

Thank you for your consideration of this matter.

Sincerely,


W. D. Bickford

(REV. W. D. BICKFORD)





WESLEY UNITED CHURCH

6 CAMBRIDGE STREET  
CAMBRIDGE, GALT, ONTARIO  
N1R 3R6



*The Rt. Hon. Allan Rock  
House of Commons,  
Ottawa,  
Ontario.*



Department of External Affairs



Ministère des Affaires extérieures

Canada

OTTAWA, ONTARIO

K1A 0G2

January 6, 1984

Dear Mr. Liebeck,

On behalf of the Prime Minister, permit me to thank you for your letter of November 25 which enclosed an interesting array of information on Dr. Abraham Hershberg and the International Committee of Peace and Religious Freedom. I think it can be said that Prime Minister Trudeau, in undertaking his Peace Initiative, seeks to achieve many of the objectives which Rabbi Hershberg has set for himself: the enhancement of dialogue between potential adversaries and the search for peaceful solutions to international problems.

I congratulate you for your continuing interest in this important matter and thank you for writing to the Prime Minister.

Yours sincerely,

  
Louis Delvoie

Chairman

Task Force Working Group

Mr. Horst Liebeck  
National Business Systems, Inc.  
3220 Orlando Drive  
Mississauga, Ontario  
L4V 1R5



PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE - BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVÉ

CONTROL FORM - PRIME MINISTER'S CORRESPONDENCE

FORMULAIRE DE CONTRÔLE - CORRESPONDANCE DU PREMIER MINISTRE

TO/A: Mr. Fowler

CC: Messrs. Osbaldeston, Darling, Clark (our file)

RE: LETTER FROM/LETTRE DE:  
Horst Liebeck

DATE:  
November 25, 1983

SUBJECT/SUJET:  
Work of Rabbi Dr. Abraham Hershberg

CORRESPONDENCE NO/NO DE LA CORRESPONDANCE:  
3347 006

Judy Cameron

DATE: December 14, 1983


☐ REPLY PREPARED FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S SIGNATURE.  
RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DU PREMIER MINISTRE.

☐ REPLY PREPARED FOR MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN'S SIGNATURE AND FORWARDED THROUGH JUDY CAMERON.  
RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DE MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN, TRANSMISE PAR JUDY CAMERON.

☐ REFERRED TO ANOTHER MINISTER THROUGH JUDY CAMERON TO MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN.  
RÉFÉRÉ À UN MINISTRE PAR JUDY CAMERON À MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN.

☐ NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. COPY RETAINED IN PCO FOR INFORMATION AND ORIGINAL RETURNED TO JUDY CAMERON.  
AUCUNE RÉPONSE NÉCESSAIRE. UNE COPIE EST CONSERVÉE AU BCP À TITRE D'INFORMATION. L'ORIGINAL RETOURNE À JUDY CAMERON.


ADDITIONAL REMARKS/OBSERVATIONS ADDITIONNELLES:



3317 006

Toronto, November 25, 1983

TO The Honourable  
Pierre Trudeau,  
Prime Minister of Canada  
Ottawa, Ontario.



Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Enclosed please find a communication from Rabbi Dr. Abraham Hershberg, Mexico City, with whom I just met and who has asked me to deliver said communication to you together with some brochures concerning his organization called International Committee of Peace and Religious Freedom.

May I add that my support for you and the Liberal Party goes back to the time when you were first elected Prime Minister as does my friendship with Barney Danson. I enclose a few reminders of that close relationship.

May I also wish you all success on your mission for peace which you are taking to India and The People's Republic of China next.

The work Dr. Hershberg is doing is quite identical with yours. I am looking forward to accompanying him to Cairo to help set up the Mohamed Anwar El Sadat foundation.

Dr. Hershberg would be delighted to receive your reply and any support his organization might receive through you and our government will be highly appreciated.

May I conclude by saying that I know Dr. Hershberg has dedicated his life to the above-noted organization for peace and he is doing an excellent job.

Wishing you continued success and another term as our Prime Minister, I remain

Yours Very Truly,

Horst Liebeck

*R. Fowler (20)*

RECEIVED  
C.C. P.M.O. FILE  
C.C. DOSSIERS C.P.M.



Peace Human Rights  
Paz y Derechos Humanos

# INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF PEACE AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

## COMITE INTERNACIONAL PRO PAZ Y LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Tres Picos 102  
Apartment # 3

LATIN AMERICAN OFFICE  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
PHONE 545-37-00  
MEXICO D. F.

November 8, 1983

Mr. H. Levek  
Toronto, Canada

My dear Mr. Levek,

It was a pleasure to meet you and discuss so many problems nationally and internationally. I would like to write to you about our conversation that you should join the Executive Committee of the World Organization of Peace and Freedom, W. O. P. F.


Our organization is doing great work to help peace internationally and human rights. We have in our organization very important people in the world of peace and freedom. As I told you, the important work that we did in Cairo, Egypt and Teheran, Iran, to help so many people of their sufferings. Now we are planning to start a march of peace in Cairo again because to make peace is really very weak, but we should do everything to strengthen it because this is the basic foundation for peace in the Middle East. Also we should help in Central America that it is troubled so much and about the prisoners of Israel in Syria. For that reason, we need you in our Executive Committee to help us in our march of peace and to get interested your so many good friends in our organization. Enclosed you get the pamphlets of our world organization; also the wonderful letter of President Sadaat that expressed about our organization work for peace and freedom in the Middle East and other statements of other leaders about the same thing.

We are also sending you a copy of the In-cooperation Certificate of the International Association of Peace and Freedom.

Wishing you all the success.

With the blessings of the All Mighty for you and all yours.

Sincerely yours,

  
Rabbi Dr. Abraham M. Hershenberg

AMHmyl.

ראש הממשלה  
THE PRIME MINISTER

Jerusalem, July 10, 1978.  
820 (3-1) 1

Dr. Abraham M. Hershberg  
President, World Organization of  
Peace and Freedom  
Campos Eliseos 199-102  
Mexico 5, D.F.

Dear Dr. Hershberg,

I thank you for your letter of June 29 and enclosure and  
for sharing your thoughts with me.

Israel continues in the effort of achieving true peace  
and security. The Cabinet agreed yesterday to accept  
President Carter's proposal that the Foreign Ministers of  
Israel and Egypt join Secretary of State Vance for talks in  
London as a next step in the Middle East negotiations.

May the Almighty prosper our path as we strive to  
achieve peace based on genuine security.

With warm greetings,

Sincerely,

*Menachem Begin*  
Menachem Begin

لله المجد والكرام

*The President  
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

Cairo, November 28, 1978.

Dear Rabbi Dr. HERSHBERG,

It was with a profound sense of recognition that I received your kind message of congratulations on awarding me Nobel Peace Prize, 1978, in appreciation of the efforts we exert to build real, just and lasting peace in the Middle East area.

I wish to reiterate here that our big peace drive is a sincere reflection of the people of Egypt's conviction that tolerance, co-existence and mutual fraternity constitute the solid bases of permanent peace and stability.

It is my great pleasure to extend to you and members of the International Committee of Peace and Religious Freedom heartfelt thanks for your deep support to the efforts being exerted, at the moment, to reach a final settlement, through negotiations, for the Arab-Israeli dispute to the benefit of the peoples of the area.

Kindly accept, most sincere regards, wishing you all the best of health, happiness and success.



Mohamed Anwar El Sadat.

RABBI DR. ABRAHAM M. HERSHBERG  
President, World Organization  
of Peace and Freedom  
U.S. Office, 82-45 Lefferts Blvd.  
Kew Gardens, 11415 N.Y.

الرئيس

Cairo, February 12, 1978.


RABBI, DR. ABRAHAM M. HERSHBERG  
President, World Organization of Peace & Freedom,  
82 - 46 Lefferts Blvd. - Kew Gardens. 11415 N.Y.

Dear Dr. Abraham,

With deep recognition, I have received your kind message of support to my peace initiative aimed at restoring fair, just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

It is a great pleasure for me, to express to you heartfelt thanks and appreciation for your noble sentiments towards me as well as for the tremendous efforts exerted by your Organization for the sake of world peace and order. It, also adds to my pleasure to extend to you an invitation to visit the Arab Republic of Egypt at the date which you deem most convenient.

While hailing this good spirit on the part of you and members of the International Committee for Peace and Religious Freedom, I wish you all the best of health, happiness and success.



Mohamed Anwar El Sadat.

## Mexican Rabbi Meets Sadat

CAIRO (AP)— Mexican Rabbi Abraham Herschberg, head of the World Peace Organization and the Latin American Rabbis Council, met Wednesday with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and reported that Sadat wants to renew direct talks with Israel.

The talks between Israel and Egypt were stopped Jan. 18, and indirect negotiations through U.S. mediation started up last month.

Herschberg said after his 90-minute meeting with Sadat, that the Egyptian president told him the only way of resolving the deadlock "is for the two highest leaders to meet face-to-face."

Sadat said a meeting with President Jimmy Carter and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin "is a possibility." He added that he had been "discouraged" before his visit to the United States, but the talks with Carter were "heartening." Herschberg also said that Sadat liked the idea of a meeting of non-government and religious leaders in Teheran to analyze the Middle East problem. The rabbi met last week with the Shah of Iran and is due to visit Jordan and Syria.

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(Pink Zone) Niza 38-



HOUSE OF COMMONS  
CANADA

Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0A6  
July 23, 1974

Dear Horst -

Many thanks for your congratulations.  
It was a great election result and  
I am looking forward to a full term  
of relative sanity.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely,

Horst Liebeck,  
Sky Beach Investments Limited,  
R.R. 1, Unionville, Ontario.

PARLIAMENTARY  
SECRETARY



CANADA

SECRÉTAIRE  
PARLEMENTAIRE

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER  
CABINET DU PREMIER MINISTRE

Dear Horst -

Just a note to thank you for your  
much appreciated support.

I will do everything possible to  
justify your confidence.

With every good wish, I am,

Yours sincerely,

Barnett J. Danson, M.P.,  
York North.





HOUSE OF COMMONS  
CANADA

Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0A6  
July 23, 1974

*Dear Sir -*

Just a note to say how much I appreciated your support of my campaign.

As you are well aware, our effort was successful thanks to the thoughtfulness of you and others.

Sincerely,

Barney Danson

Belfrey Investments Limited,  
R.R. 1,  
Unionville, Ont.



HOUSE OF COMMONS  
CANADA

JUL 4 1974

Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0A6  
June 28, 1974

Dear *Horst* -

Just a note to say how much I appreciate your support of my campaign.

Things are going well thanks to the thoughtfulness of you and others.

I hope you will join us on July the eighth to celebrate victory.

Yours sincerely,

  
Barney Danson, M.P.  
York North

Mr. Horst Liebeck,  
Boardwalk Investments Ltd.,  
R.R. 1,  
Unionville, Ontario.



Minister  
National Defence

Ministre  
Défense nationale

Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0A6  
June 17, 1979

Dear *Barney Danson* -

Just a quick note to say how much I  
appreciated the wine and cheese party.

It was a great gang of people and I found  
their questions particularly good

I cannot tell you how much I appreciate  
your support.

Yours sincerely,

*Barney Danson*  
Barney Danson M.P.  
York North

Mr. & Mrs. H. Liebeck,  
Glenbourn Drive,  
Cachet Country Club,  
Unionville, Ont.

December 13, 1983.

Horst Liebeck,  
National Business Systems, Inc.,  
3220 Orlando Drive,  
Mississauga, Ontario.  
L4V 1R5

Dear Horst Liebeck:

On behalf of the Prime Minister, I acknowledge  
your letter of November 25.

Please be assured that it and the enclosed  
documentation will be brought to Mr. Trudeau's  
attention.

Yours sincerely,

Original Signed by  
Original signé par

Marie-Andrée Bastien,  
Correspondence Director.

Original to: R. Fowler

cc: FILE 3347 006

MAB/jgb

Department of External Affairs

Canada

Ministère des Affaires extérieures



OTTAWA, ONTARIO  
K1A 0G2


January 6, 1984

Dear Mr. Aihara,

On behalf of the Prime Minister, I would like to reply to your letter of November 17 addressed to Prime Minister Trudeau while he was in Japan. His schedule, of course, did not permit his accepting your invitation but I would like to take a moment to congratulate you on your efforts for enhancing the awareness of the dangers of nuclear war.

It is our hope that Prime Minister Trudeau's initiative will reduce somewhat the risk of incurring the type of tragedy which caused such suffering in Hiroshima and Nagasaki less than 40 years ago.

Yours sincerely,

  
Louis Delvoie  
Chairman

Task Force Working Group

Mr. Kazumitsu Aihara  
Director  
Hiroshima YMCA  
7-11 Hatchobori  
Hiroshima, Japan

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE - BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVE

CONTROL FORM - PRIME MINISTER'S CORRESPONDENCE

FORMULAIRE DE CONTRÔLE - CORRESPONDANCE DU PREMIER MINISTRE

TO/A:

Mr. Fowler

CC:

Messrs. Osbaldeston, Darling, Clark (our file)

RE: LETTER FROM/LETTRE DE:

Kazumitsu Aihara

DATE:

November 17, 1983

SUBJECT/SUJET:

Invitation to visit Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum

CORRESPONDENCE NO/NO DE LA CORRESPONDANCE:

3348 012

Judy Cameron

DATE: December 16, 1983

☐

REPLY PREPARED FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S SIGNATURE.

RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DU PREMIER MINISTRE.

☐

REPLY PREPARED FOR MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN'S SIGNATURE AND FORWARDED THROUGH JUDY CAMERON.

RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DE MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN, TRANSMISE PAR JUDY CAMERON.

☐

REFERRED TO ANOTHER MINISTER THROUGH JUDY CAMERON TO MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN.



RÉFÉRÉ À UN MINISTRE PAR JUDY CAMERON À MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN.

☐

NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. COPY RETAINED IN PCO FOR INFORMATION AND ORIGINAL RETURNED TO JUDY CAMERON.

AUCUNE RÉPONSE NÉCESSAIRE. UNE COPIE EST CONSERVÉE AU BCP À TITRE D'INFORMATION. L'ORIGINAL RETOURNE À JUDY CAMERON.

ADDITIONAL REMARKS/OBSERVATIONS ADDITIONNELLES:



**HIROSHIMA YMCA**  
THE YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF HIROSHIMA  
Shinichi Iida  
President  
Kazumitsu Aihara  
General Secretary  
3348 012

## *10 more Hiroshima's*

CITIZENS' CAMPAIGN TO URGE WORLD LEADERS TO VISIT HIROSHIMA

17 November 1983

Honorable Pierre Trudeau  
Prime Minister of Canada  
c/o Embassy of Canada  
Tokyo, Japan

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Congratulations on your recent efforts for peace! Thank you very much for working for a summit conference between the leaders of the world's five nuclear powers, as was reported in the Mainichi Daily News yesterday (please see enclosed article).

We would like to strongly urge you to pay a visit to Hiroshima City and to see the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum while you are in Japan. We realize that we are giving you particularly short notice, and yet we feel that your role as a major "statesperson of peace" would be enhanced if you would follow in the footsteps of Pope John Paul II who came to Hiroshima in 1981 and Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme who was here in 1982.

We are not sure whether or not you paid a visit to Hiroshima during one of your earlier trips to Asia, but whatever the case, we pray that you will come here at this time (as Prime Minister), and that you will, at this crucial juncture in human history -- as the possibility of a major nuclear confrontation makes our future look bleaker and bleaker, take the "message of Hiroshima" with you to the meeting of Commonwealth heads in New Delhi next week.

We are enclosing a number of pamphlets and photocopies to help encourage you to come this way. We hope that you will look at all of them, and that they will help you make the decision to include, somehow, a stopover in Hiroshima on your way from Tokyo to New Delhi.

Please feel free to contact us if we may be of any assistance to you. Even though this letter comes to you at a very late hour, we hope that you will feel a special inspiration to grace Hiroshima with your presence.

Pope John Paul II made the following words the major theme of his speech which he delivered at Peace Park in Hiroshima two years ago: "To remember the past is to commit oneself to the future. To remember Hiroshima is to abhor nuclear war." We hope you are moved by these words.

Sincerely yours,

*Laurence Wiig*

Laurence Wiig  
Member, Board of Directors  
Hiroshima World Friendship Center  
Telephone 022-222-6616 or 251-5520

Kazumitsu Aihara  
Director

ORIGINAL TO *R. Fowler*  
ORIGINAL ENVOYÉ À  
C.C. P.M.O. FILE  
C.C.-DOSSIERS C.P.M.

Department of External Affairs



Ministère des Affaires extérieures

Canada

OTTAWA, ONTARIO  
K1A 0G2

January 6, 1984


Dear Ms. Burpee,

On behalf of the Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, I would like to thank you for your letter of November 11 on the Peace Initiative.

You will be pleased to know that the Prime Minister has received many letters of support such as yours. I wish to assure you that it is, in part, in response to the concerns of Canadians such as yourself that the Prime Minister has undertaken this important task.

Thank you for writing on this matter.

Yours sincerely,

  
Louis DeVoie  
Chairman

Task Force Working Group

Helen Burpee  
68 Naird Avenue  
Toronto, Ontario  
M6E 4G7

A-04221

68 Nairn Ave  
Toronto, Ontario  
M6E 4G7  
November 18, 1983

Hon. Allan MacEachen  
Minister for External Affairs  
House of Commons  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0A2

Dear Mr MacEachen:

I am encouraged at the peace initiatives being undertaken by our Prime Minister, Mr Trudeau. This will help to get the nuclear powers negotiating together.

If only we could have progress in disarmament negotiations the world would be safer for the children

I hope the Cabinet is giving Mr Trudeau every support in his peace initiative.

Yours sinerely,

*Helen Burpee*





External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

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Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
CABINET DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

ACTION REQUEST/FICHE DE SERVICE

Elen Burpee Ont.			No. NO <b>A 04221</b>
Subject Sujet <b>re disarmament &amp; PM peace initiatives</b>			Action div./Dir. responsable <b>IPA 1002</b>
Letter dated/Lettre en date du <b>03-11-10</b>	Date rec'd in MINA Date de réception à MINA <b>03-11-20</b>	Date sent to div. Date d'envoi à la dir. <b>03-11-28</b>	Info. division(s)/Direction(s) informée(s)
Action to be completed and white slip returned to MINA by L'action doit être complétée et la feuille blanche retournée à MINA par			<b>83-12-05</b>
Comments/Commentaires			

ACTION REQUIRED/ACTION REQUISE	FOR DIV. USE/POUR L'UTILISATION DE LA DIR.
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for signature of SSEA Réponse pour la signature du SEAE	Date received/Date reçu <b>11-11-10</b>
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for the signature of Réponse pour la signature de	Action officer/Agent responsable <b>[Signature]</b>
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply by Division Réponse de la direction	Disposition
<input type="checkbox"/> For information and any necessary action Pour l'examen et suite à donner, s'il y a lieu	Date
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <b>ALL TRANSFERS TO BE REPORTED TO MINA REGISTRY</b>  <b>LE REGISTRE DE MINA DOIT ÊTRE AVISÉ DE TOUT CHANGEMENT</b> </div>	For MINA use/Pour utilisation de MINA

**5-1047**

## ACTION REQUEST/FICHE DE SERVICE

ACTION REQUIRED/ACTION REQUISE	FOR DIV. USE/POUR L'UTILISATION DE LA DIR.
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for signature of SSEA Réponse pour la signature du SEAE	Date received/Date reçu <b>November 29/83</b>
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for the signature of Réponse pour la signature de	Action officer/Agent responsible <del>S. Dymov</del> J. Brown
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Reply by Division Réponse de la direction	Disposition <i>[Signature]</i>
<input type="checkbox"/> For information and any necessary action Pour l'examen et suite à donner, s'il y a lieu	Date <b>11-29-83</b>
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;">           ALL TRANSFERS TO BE REPORTED TO MINA REGISTRY LE REGISTRE DE MINA DOIT ÊTRE AVISÉ DE TOUT CHANGEMENT         </div>	For MINA use/Pour utilisation de MINA

Department of External Affairs



Ministère des Affaires extérieures

Canada

OTTAWA, ONTARIO  
K1A 0G2

January 6, 1984

Dear Professors,

Permit me to reply to your letter of November 2 addressed to the Prime Minister as well as attach a reply to the letter addressed to the Prime Minister by Metta Spencer on behalf of the Non-Governmental Organizations represented at the Guelph Conference.

Having had the pleasure of attending part of the Guelph Conference with the Prime Minister, I can confirm that in terms of organization, theme, seriousness of purpose and the high level of attendance, the Conference served as the ideal forum for undertaking the peace initiative. Guelph University and the organizers of the Conference have played an important role in launching this endeavour.

I would be grateful if you could convey the attached to Ms. Spencer for transmittal to the concerned NGOs.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Louis Delvoie".  
Louis Delvoie

Chairman  
Task Force Working Group

Professor H. Wiseman  
Professor F. Boehnert  
Chairmen  
University of Guelph  
College of Social Science  
Department of Political Studies  
Guelph, Ontario  
N1G 2W1

Department of External Affairs



Ministère des Affaires extérieures

Canada

OTTAWA, ONTARIO  
K1A 0G2

January 6, 1983

Dear Ms. Spencer,

On behalf of the Prime Minister, permit me to reply briefly to your letter of October 30, which was sent in the aftermath of the Prime Minister's participation in the Peace and Security Conference at Guelph University.

Firstly, I can assure you that the Prime Minister greatly appreciates the expressions of support he has received from many individual Canadians and organizations such as those represented at the Guelph Conference. It is in part in response to the concerns of these very Canadians for the maintenance of peace that he undertook his peace initiative.

While he understands your view regarding cruise missile testing, the Prime Minister has frequently reiterated the point that Canada's ability to speak out on matters of war and peace is contingent on the assumption of our legitimate security responsibilities, which the Canadian Government, with the support of the vast majority of the Canadian people, has chosen to pursue through membership in NATO. Cruise missile testing in Canada is one way of giving substance to our commitment to collective security.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Louis Delvoie".

Louis Delvoie

Chairman

Task Force Working Group

Ms. M. Spencer  
c/o University of Guelph  
Guelph, Ontario  
N1G 2W1

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE - BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVÉ

CONTROL FORM - PRIME MINISTER'S CORRESPONDENCE

FORMULAIRE DE CONTRÔLE - CORRESPONDANCE DU PREMIER MINISTRE

A: Mr. Fowler

Messrs. Osbaldeston, Darling, Clark (our file)

LETTER FROM/LETTRE DE:  
Prof. Wiseman

DATE:  
November 2, 1983

SUBJECT/SUJET:  
Response to Guelph Keynote Address

CORRESPONDENCE NO/NO DE LA CORRESPONDANCE:  
3313 015

Judy Cameron

DATE:  
November 10, 1983

☐ REPLY PREPARED FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S SIGNATURE.  
☐ RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DU PREMIER MINISTRE.

☐ REPLY PREPARED FOR MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN'S SIGNATURE AND FORWARDED THROUGH JUDY CAMERON.  
☐ RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DE MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN, TRANSMISE PAR JUDY CAMERON.

☐ REFERRED TO ANOTHER MINISTER THROUGH JUDY CAMERON TO MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN.  
☐ RÉFÉRÉ À UN MINISTRE PAR JUDY CAMERON À MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN.

☐ NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. COPY RETAINED IN PCO FOR INFORMATION AND ORIGINAL RETURNED TO JUDY CAMERON.  
☐ AUCUNE RÉPONSE NÉCESSAIRE. UNE COPIE EST CONSERVÉE AU BCP À TITRE D'INFORMATION. L'ORIGINAL RETOURNE À JUDY CAMERON.

ADDITIONAL REMARKS/OBSERVATIONS ADDITIONNELLES:

UNIVERSITY OF GUELPH

COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE  
Department of Political Studies


GUELPH, ONTARIO, CANADA - N1G 2W1  
Telephone (519) 824-4120

Retum  
Cognoscere  
Causas



November 2nd, 1983

The Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau  
Prime Minister of Canada  
House of Commons  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0A6



Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Representatives of over sixty Non-Governmental Organizations and churches who have participated in the Conference on **STRATEGIES FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN A NUCLEAR AGE** at the University of Guelph, have asked that we transmit their considered response to your keynote address (appended herewith).

There was, as we had hoped, a good deal of vibrant interaction among the N.G.O.'s as well as their active and constructive participation in the conference proceedings. Every encouragement and facility was provided to enhance this activity. The concept and the format of the Conference were designed to maximize interaction between the N.G.O.'s, international experts and government representatives, educators, clerics and the general public. In setting the stage for the Conference, it was our view as co-chairmen that, while we would have entertained resolutions from the floor (a heated and risky business conducted before the media) a consensus expression emanating from learned discussion in the corridors and workshops, would be the better outcome. Their letter to you is the result of that process. We are gratified with this outcome.

Mr. Prime Minister, you have taken a bold and necessary initiative for Canada and the World in the cause of peace. We applaud and support this initiative, and are deeply honoured that you chose to launch it at the University of Guelph.

While the Conference itself is over, it's reverberations will go on for some time. Please be assured that we are ready to assist in any appropriate manner to further the profoundly critical task that you have set for yourself as the Prime Minister of Canada.

Sincerely,

Prof. H. Wiseman  
Co-chairman

Prof. G. Bochnert  
Co-chairman

HW/GB/mmca  
Encl.

ORIGINAL TO *R. Finkel*  
ORIGINAL INVOYÉ À  
C.C. P.M.O. FILE  
C.C. DOSSIERS C.P.M.

30 October 1983

Rt. Hon. Pierre Elliott Trudeau  
Prime Minister of Canada  
Office of the Prime Minister  
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0A1

Dear Prime Minister:

On this, the final day of the Peace and Security Conference at Guelph, we take this opportunity as members of the numerous non-governmental organizations attending this conference, to respond to your keynote address.

We thank you for your thoughtful comments and congratulate you for your wise decision to seek a reduction of international tensions. Your visit to this meeting demonstrates a welcome response to the urgency of the situation. We take heart from your initiative and deeply appreciate the energy that you will bring to the task. We are, moreover, pleased that you are highlighting the opportunities of the Stockholm meetings that will begin on January 25. Surely these initiatives deserve our warmest applause.

At the same time, you must realize that your speech fell short of our expectations in certain respects. We all believe that your new quest for peace would be strengthened if the brave words were matched by an even braver deed: the rejection of cruise missile testing in Canada. Surely this testing is motivated by political, not military, considerations, and will exacerbate, not mitigate, international tensions. Nor can we accept the argument that such testing is in any way an obligation to NATO. Nearly \$1 billion worth of ALCMs have already been manufactured, we understand, undermining exactly the purposes to which you express commitment.

Nor is the cruise the only imminent threat. We worry about the deployment of the Pershing II missiles in Europe and urge you to oppose it with all your strength.

You have our wholehearted support for this important mission.

Sincerely yours,

Metta Spencer

For the NGOs represented at the Guelph Conference

copies to:

Mr. Broadbent

Mr. McRae

Mr. Mulroney

Mr. Ogle

Mr. Roche



NGOs PARTICIPATING IN THE "STRATEGIES FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN A NUCLEAR AGE  
CONFERENCE, OCTOBER 27-30, 1983, UNIVERSITY OF GUELPH

Prepared (overnight) from names listed at the NGO meetings of Saturday,  
October 29, by Peace Research Institute-Dundas. We regret errors occasioned  
by misreading of handwritting. There was no time for alphabetizing.

A. Durovecz  
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Benefit Federation  
8 Sabiston Dr.  
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477-3190

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Toronto, Ont. M5R 2W6  
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Lorne Sabsay  
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Osgood Hall Law School  
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Helen Tucker  
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1524 Douglas Dr.  
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Herbert Clark  
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885 Keith Rd.  
West Vancouver, B.C.  
(604) 922-9259

Gordon Hunsberger  
Mennonite Central Committee  
50 Kent Ave.  
Kitchener, Ont.  
745-8458

Robert Vanderberg  
Canadian Crossroads International  
RR#1 Norval  
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Nancy Pocock  
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Dave Wright  
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361-1444 business

Hans Simm  
Peace Brigades - Canada  
RR 4 Perth, Ont. K7H 3C6  
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Annemarie Borgmann  
Green Party  
Bundeshaus  
5300 Bonn.  
F.R.G.  
0049-228-167583

Harvey Feit  
Unofficial Representative of  
Canadian Anthropology Societies  
88 Cline Ave. N.  
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Priscila E. Kalevar  
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NGOs GUELPH CONFERENCE 1983

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Canadian Peace Research and Education Assoc.  
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Brandon, Man. R7A 6A9

Eryl Court  
Unitarians for Peace  
109 Wilton St  
Toronto, Ont. M5A 4A3  
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George Hermanson  
Education for Nuclear Disarmament  
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University of British Columbia  
Vancouver, B.C.  
(604) 224-3722

Dr. Alan Newcombe  
Peace Research Institute-Dundas  
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Representative of the Bishop's College School  
to the Guelph Conference  
Bishop's College School  
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Women's International League for  
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Trent Lane (Carol Milligan)  
University of Guelph  
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730 Bathurst St.  
Toronto, Ont.  
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JO's PARTICIPATING IN "STRATEGIES FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN A NUCLEAR AGE"

3

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Brantford Ontario N3R 1H9

Alain Veilleux  
Association etudiante  
Cegep La Pocatiere  
La Pocatiere, Qc G0R 1Z0  
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Edmonton Alberta  
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Edmonton Peace Council  
Edmonton Referendum Committee  
Committee for Nuclear Disarmament  
U.N. Disarmament Work Committee

Frank Brab  
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Canadian Crossroads

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Beth Richards  
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Jan Carrothers  
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Ontario N4S 7P3

Terry Gardner  
University College Uof T  
Toronto M5S 1A1

Eryl Court  
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Unitarians for Peace

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OPIRG  
Amnesty International

Rob Shave  
North York Action for Disarmament  
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494-0309

Anne Adelson  
Toronto Disarmament Network  
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Marie N. Choquet  
Middle East Discussion Group  
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Claire Perry  
Voice of Women, B.C.  
End the Arms Race, Vancouver  
1710 Knox Road Vancouver BC V6T 1S3  
(604) 224-0203

Paul McRae  
Parliamentarians for World Order  
House of Commons Ottawa  
(613) 992-6418

Ernie Regehr  
Project Ploughshares  
Conrad Grebel College Univ Of Waterloo  
888- 6415

Eric Fawcett, Science For Peace  
University College U of T, Toronto  
M5S 1A1 (416) 978-6928 (-5217)

Brenda Milne Exec Director,  
Physicians for Social Responsibility  
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V6K 2N2 (604) 733-3161

Zvonko V. Stoyanovich  
Operation Dismantle  
Box 3887 Station "C" Ottawa  
K1Y 4M5 613 722-6001

Firdaus Kharas  
United Nations Association  
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K1P 5A6 (613) 232-5751

NGOs GUELPH CONFERENCE 1983

Citizenship Division  
Bruce Presbytery United Church  
Women  
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Chesley, Ont. N0G 1L0  
363-2337

Saligeen Anti-Nuclear Effort (SANE)  
Nancy Van Sickle  
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Chesley, Ont. N0G 1L0  
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Betsy Carr  
Voice of Women  
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Bruce Presbytery United  
Church of Canada  
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John McArthur  
Windsor Coalition for Disarmament  
Third World Resource Centre  
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S. Helen Kobelsky  
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Waterdown, Ont. L0R 2H0

CANDIS (Network Centre for Toronto)  
10 Trinity Square  
Toronto, Ont.  
(416) 585-2255

3313 015

November 9, 1983.

Professor H. Wiseman,  
Co-chairman,  
University of Guelph,  
College of Social Science,  
Department of Political Studies,  
Guelph, Ontario.  
N1G 2W1

Dear Professor Wiseman and Co-signer:

On behalf of the Prime Minister and in his  
absence, I acknowledge your letter of November 2.

Please be assured that it and the enclosed  
correspondence will be brought to Mr. Trudeau's  
attention upon his return.

Yours sincerely,

Original Signed by  
Original signé par

Marie-Andrée Bastien,  
Correspondence Director.

Original to R. Fowler

MAB/lc

Department of External Affairs



Canada

Ministère des Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA, ONTARIO

K1A 0G2

January 6, 1984.

Dear Mr. Young,

On behalf of the Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. MacEachen, permit me to reply to your letter of November 21 which included the brief article by Eric Downton which appeared in the Vancouver Sun. Mr. MacEachen and indeed the Prime Minister has received many letters from Canadians such as yourself expressing wholehearted support for enhanced East/West dialogue and other elements in the peace initiative. Indeed, it is in part in response to the deeply felt concerns of Canadians such as yourself that the Prime Minister has made these efforts. I know he appreciates the support which many Canadians have given him.

I cannot agree completely with your view that Canada's relations with the USSR be conducted strictly in the context of East/West relations although I would agree that these relations are tremendously important. We have extensive bilateral relations with the USSR because of the variety of ties which link our two countries: trade, political relations, various bilateral agreements and other forms of contact. Without this framework of relations, it would be extremely difficult to convey to the Soviets our concerns about the human rights situation in their country.

Thank you very much for taking the time to write on this matter.

Yours sincerely,

Louis Delvoie

Chairman

Task Force Working Group

Mr. John A. Young

President

Canada-Asia Consulting Services

460-1070 Douglas Street

Victoria, British Columbia

V8W 2C4



External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
CABINET DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

ACTION REQUEST/FICHE DE SERVICE

John A. Young B.C.		No. No <b>A 04297</b>
Subject Sujet <b>President - Canada-Asia Consulting Services</b>		Action div./Dir. responsable <b>IDA IDDZ</b>
Letter dated/Lettre en date du <b>83-11-21</b>	Date rec'd in MINA Date de réception à MINA <b>83-12-01</b>	Date sent to div. Date d'envoi à la dir. <b>83-12-01</b>
re PM Trudeau's peace efforts		Info. division(s)/Direction(s) informée(s) <b>83-12-09</b>
Action to be completed and white slip returned to MINA by L'action doit être complétée et la feuille blanche retournée à MINA par		
Comments/Commentaires		

ACTION REQUIRED/ACTION REQUISE	FOR DIV. USE/POUR L'UTILISATION DE LA DIR.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Reply for signature of SSEA Réponse pour la signature du SEAE <b>if you agree</b>	Date received/Date reçu <b>Dec. 2 1983</b>
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for the signature of Réponse pour la signature de	Action officer/Agent responsable <b>J. Stropher (L. Stropher)</b>
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply by Division Réponse de la direction	Disposition <b>in the (white slip)</b>
<input type="checkbox"/> For information and any necessary action Pour l'examen et suite à donner, s'il y a lieu	Date <b>Dec 6, 1984</b>
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <b>ALL TRANSFERS TO BE REPORTED TO MINA REGISTRY</b>  <b>LE REGISTRE DE MINA DOIT ÊTRE AVISÉ DE TOUT CHANGEMENT</b> </div>	For MINA use/Pour utilisation de MINA

5-1047

External Affairs Canada Affaires extérieures Canada

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
CABINET DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

**ACTION REQUEST/FICHE DE SERVICE**

m		No. <b>A 04297</b>	
Subject Sujet <b>John A. Young B.C.</b>		Action div./Dir. responsable <b>IPA IDPZ</b>	
President - Canada-Asia Consulting Services		Info. division(s)/Direction(s) informée(s)	
re P. Trudeau's peace efforts			
Letter dated/Lettre en date du <b>82-11-27</b>	Date rec'd in MINA Date de réception à MINA	Date sent to div. Date d'envoi à la dir. <b>88-12-01</b>	
Action to be completed and white slip returned to MINA by L'action doit être complétée et la feuille blanche retournée à MINA par		<b>88-12-03</b>	
Comments/Commentaires			

ACTION REQUIRED/ACTION REQUISE	FOR DIV. USE/POUR L'UTILISATION DE LA DIR.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Reply for signature of SSEA Réponse pour la signature du SEAE <b>if you agree</b>	Date received/Date reçu
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for the signature of Réponse pour la signature de	Action officer/Agent responsable
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply by Division Réponse de la direction	Disposition
<input type="checkbox"/> For information and any necessary action Pour l'examen et suite à donner, s'il y a lieu	Date
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;">           ALL TRANSFERS TO BE REPORTED TO MINA REGISTRY LE REGISTRE DE MINA DOIT ÊTRE AVISÉ DE TOUT CHANGEMENT         </div>	For MINA use/Pour utilisation de MINA

**5-1047**





**Canada-Asia  
Consulting  
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460-1070 Douglas Street Tel (604) 383-8877  
Victoria, B.C.  
Canada V8W 2C4 Telex 049 7347 VIC

November 21, 1983

The Honourable Allan MacEachen  
Minister of External Affairs,  
House of Commons  
Ottawa, Ontario

A-04297

Dear Sir:


I attach a copy of an Article written by Eric Downton which recently appeared in the Vancouver Sun, October 24, 1983.

I wholeheartedly agree with the sentiments expressed in the article. The U.S.S.R. is a brutal dictatorship which flagrantly violates the most elementary human and democratic rights of its citizens. Canada should maintain only those associations with the U.S.S.R. which may help to reduce the risk of nuclear annihilation.

All thinking, peace-loving Canadians will wholeheartedly support Prime Minister Trudeau's current effort to avoid a nuclear catastrophe. Mr. Trudeau enjoys an impressive level of respect in the international community, and there are few, if any, Heads of State who are better equipped, intellectually and experientially, to cope with the complexity surrounding a solution to the question of world peace and security for all people.

Why wouldn't the House of Commons attempt to pass a unanimous resolution of support for Mr. Trudeau's peace efforts? It could greatly strengthen his peace-seeking mission if the nations of the world were to be aware that the Parliament of Canada unanimously endorsed the efforts of its Prime Minister at this time of great world peril.

Yours sincerely,

  
John A. Young  
President

JAY:eip

# Subsidized slander

VANCOUVER SUN

OCTOBER 24, 1983

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act / Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

A Soviet export that's black and white and Red all over

ERIC DOWNTON

... a Vancouver writer on international affairs.

**A**S DEDICATED atheists, the rulers of the Soviet marxist empire generally scorn biblical exhortations. But there is one particular New Testament maxim for which they have deep respect: "The truth shall make you free."

But it is a negative kind of respect, a facet of the Kremlin's historical paranoia. Soviet leaders go to incredible lengths to hide the realities of world affairs from their own people, but they sustain a tremendous effort to exploit for their own purposes the freedom of information cherished in the Western democracies, to use that freedom to undermine non-communist societies.

You can watch Moscow's campaign of propaganda and disinformation at work right here in Vancouver, or in any other major Canadian city.

Basically it is a two-pronged operation. Shops specializing in the sale of international newspapers and magazines can receive publications from the Soviet Union and the Russian-controlled satellites of Eastern Europe at low cost; the Soviet embassy in Ottawa sends a large amount of propaganda material to many thousands of recipients across the country.

In terms of Soviet-Canadian relations it is entirely a one-way affair — complete in the Russians' favor. The *Sun* and other Canadian newspapers are not allowed to be sold in Vladivostok or Moscow or any other Soviet city. Not even in Odessa, the "sister" city to Vancouver. All Western publications are banned from public sale throughout the Soviet Union, apart from a few censored Communist publications. The Canadian embassy in Moscow, in common with all non-communist embassies there, is forbidden to dispatch material direct to private Soviet citizens.

The distribution of Soviet press material in Canada is heavily subsidized by Moscow. The major Russian-language newspapers and magazines, and many publications in other tongues, especially English, come to Vancouver by air. Here they are sold at low prices, practically given away.

From the press office of the Soviet embassy at 400 Stewart Street in Ottawa pours a stream of propaganda handouts. The stuff goes to government offices, the news media, politicians, business houses, educational institutions, libraries, trade unions, clubs, cultural societies, and thousands of private citizens.

Most frequently issued are the "News Releases." These are devoted largely to anti-Western tirades from Tass, the government-controlled news agency.

Then come "From the Soviet Press" and the "Press Bulletin." Most issues carry long extracts from the more virulent articles in the Soviet press, or from militant statements by the Kremlin hierarchy.

Those three publications are a pipeline for a torrent of slander against Canada, Canadians, and Canadian institutions. Usually the vicious smearing is inferential, through Canada's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or Ottawa's links with Washington. Sometimes there are direct attacks on Canadian personalities or policies.

Thus the Russians are taking advantage of the privilege of freedom of information — denied in their own



'HOWEVER, AND ON THE OTHER HAND...'

country — to denigrate and slander Canadian democracy.

Editing and distribution of this scurrilous material is handled at 400 Stewart Street by Canadian hirelings. But the responsibility for spilling this propaganda sewage across the country lies with the Soviet ambassador.

True to form, the Trudeau administration has never protested this abuse of diplomatic privilege by the Russians. Imagine how that administration would shriek to high heaven if the Americans stooped to similar tactics.

"Soviet News and Views" is another production of the Soviet embassy press office. It is a glossy little periodical that coyly and cosily extols Canadian-Soviet ties, particularly in the cultural and economic fields.

It also presents a very cosmetic picture of life in the Soviet Union. According to recent editions the Soviet econo-

my is doing splendidly, shops are overflowing with consumer goods, inflation and unemployment are nonexistent, the educational, health, and welfare services are superb, most Soviet Jews are very happy, religious freedom is encouraged, and Moscow buys Canadian wheat not because the Russians are short of foodstuffs themselves but to do Ottawa a favor and to help Canadian farmers.

South Korean airliner. None of the Stewart Street propaganda sheets has expressed direct official sympathy for the Canadians murdered in that incident, or recorded the Canadian outrage.

Quite the contrary. Moscow's propaganda outpost in the shadow of Parliament Hill is turning out material harshly critical of public and official Canadian attitudes.

As an ally of the United States we are accused of furthering "a hysterical anti-Soviet campaign," of helping to sabotage efforts toward nuclear disarmament, of making an "illegal decision" to condemn the Soviets at a meeting of the International Civil Aviation Organization in Montreal.

In short, we are accused by these Moscow propaganda sheets, produced on Canadian soil, of being warmongers,

the entire budget of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation for a year.

Open societies accept the disadvantages in their conduct of international relations caused by the refusal to censor the news media. Television reporting from Vietnam, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and Central America, for example, has caused serious repercussions against the Western powers involved.

But much of the world — possibly including our prime minister — is less concerned than it should be about Soviet atrocities in Afghanistan or the Russian military's repressive role in Eastern Europe because it does not see the brutal realities on TV screens.

Ottawa could easily restrain the Soviet embassy's propaganda activities. Mailing privileges for printed matter could be suspended. We could rule that the Soviet embassy in Ottawa will receive treatment comparable to that given the Canadian embassy in Moscow.

But while Pierre Trudeau remains in office, any move to change this one-sided propaganda operation is extremely unlikely.

But at least Canadians generally can be alerted to what is happening. Here in Vancouver we need not be fooled by our brace of marxist aldermen, or by those extreme left-wing doctors and educationists who hold forth in public or assiduously dash off letters to editors. Those people would have us believe the Kremlin seeks friendly cooperation with Canada.

The truth is that as dedicated marxists the Soviet leaders are fanatically committed to work for the eventual collapse of the political system now being practised in Canada. Propaganda activities by the Soviet embassy in Ottawa are designed to advance that aim.

Any Canadian marxist will tell you that the desired objective is "dictatorship of the proletariat."

What does that mean?

Here is how it is defined by the ultimate authority, Lenin. And the words are enshrined in Moscow's official version of Lenin's collected works:

"The scientific concept of dictatorship of the proletariat means nothing more or less than unrestricted power, absolutely unimpeded by law or regulations, and resting directly on force." □

## The Soviet embassy in Ottawa is a fountain of disinformation and slander of our democracy

my is doing splendidly, shops are overflowing with consumer goods, inflation and unemployment are nonexistent, the educational, health, and welfare services are superb, most Soviet Jews are very happy, religious freedom is encouraged, and Moscow buys Canadian wheat not because the Russians are short of foodstuffs themselves but to do Ottawa a favor and to help Canadian farmers.

All that sounds impressive and presumably is lapped up by those gullible Canadian marxists who believe anything Moscow says. In fact such claims are a farrago of untruths and half-truths, as shown by recent admissions from senior Soviet officials of flaws and failures in the country's economic performance.

The tone of propaganda emanating from the Soviet embassy in Ottawa has risen a couple of octaves in shrill abrasiveness since the shooting down of the

of resorting to lies and hypocrisy against the righteous, peace-loving Soviet Union.

In the Soviet Union's rigidly censored news media there has been no reference to the Canadian view of the South Korean airliner affair, or of the claims for compensation for Canadians killed. And the Canadian embassy in Moscow is certainly not permitted to distribute stridently anti-Soviet statements — or statements of any kind.

What we receive through the mail in Vancouver from the Soviet embassy is a very small yet nevertheless highly significant reminder of Moscow's all-embracing censorship policy. For the Kremlin, the suppression and distortion of the news is an essential part of the regime's operation.

In one week Moscow spends more on radio and television jamming devices, to prevent the Soviet people from receiving broadcasts from abroad, than



# Subs'd zed slander

VANCOUVER SUN

OCTOBER 24, 1983

A Soviet export that's black and white and Red all over

ERIC DOWNTON

... a Vancouver writer  
on international affairs.

**A**S DEDICATED atheists, the rulers of the Soviet marxist empire generally scorn biblical exhortations. But there is one particular New Testament maxim for which they have deep respect: "The truth shall make you free."

But it is a negative kind of respect, a facet of the Kremlin's historical paranoia. Soviet leaders go to incredible lengths to hide the realities of world affairs from their own people, but they sustain a tremendous effort to exploit for their own purposes the freedom of information cherished in the Western democracies, to use that freedom to undermine non-communist societies.

You can watch Moscow's campaign of propaganda and disinformation at work right here in Vancouver, or in any other major Canadian city.

Basically it is a two-pronged operation. Shops specializing in the sale of international newspapers and magazines can receive publications from the Soviet Union and the Russian-controlled satellites of Eastern Europe at low cost; the Soviet embassy in Ottawa sends a large amount of propaganda material to many thousands of recipients across the country.

In terms of Soviet-Canadian relations it is entirely a one-way affair — complete in the Russians' favor. The *Sun* and other Canadian newspapers are not allowed to be sold in Vladivostok or Moscow or any other Soviet city. Not even in Odessa, the "sister" city to Vancouver. All Western publications are banned from public sale throughout the Soviet Union, apart from a few censored Communist publications. The Canadian embassy in Moscow, in common with all non-communist embassies there, is forbidden to dispatch material direct to private Soviet citizens.

The distribution of Soviet press material in Canada is heavily subsidized by Moscow. The major Russian-language newspapers and magazines, and many publications in other tongues, especially English, come to Vancouver by air. Here they are sold at low prices, practically given away.


From the press office of the Soviet embassy at 400 Stewart Street in Ottawa pours a stream of propaganda handouts. The stuff goes to government offices, the news media, politicians, business houses, educational institutions, libraries, trade unions, clubs, cultural societies, and thousands of private citizens.

Most frequently issued are the "News Releases." These are devoted largely to anti-Western tirades from Tass, the government-controlled news agency.

Then come "From the Soviet Press" and the "Press Bulletin." Most issues carry long extracts from the more virulent articles in the Soviet press, or from militant statements by the Kremlin hierarchy.

Those three publications are a pipeline for a torrent of slander against Canada, Canadians, and Canadian institutions. Usually the vicious smearing is inferential, through Canada's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or Ottawa's links with Washington. Sometimes there are direct attacks on Canadian personalities or policies.

Thus the Russians are taking advantage of the privilege of freedom of information — denied in their own



'HOWEVER, AND ON THE OTHER HAND...'

country — to denigrate and slander Canadian democracy.

Editing and distribution of this scurrilous material is handled at 400 Stewart Street by Canadian hirelings. But the responsibility for spilling this propaganda sewage across the country lies with the Soviet ambassador.

True to form, the Trudeau administration has never protested this abuse of diplomatic privilege by the Russians. Imagine how that administration would shriek to high heaven if the Americans stooped to similar tactics.

"Soviet News and Views" is another production of the Soviet embassy press office. It is a glossy little periodical that coyly and cosily extols Canadian-Soviet ties, particularly in the cultural and economic fields.

It also presents a very cosmetic picture of life in the Soviet Union. According to recent editions the Soviet econo-

South Korean airliner. None of the Stewart Street propaganda sheets has expressed direct official sympathy for the Canadians murdered in that incident, or recorded the Canadian outrage.

Quite the contrary. Moscow's propaganda outpost in the shadow of Parliament Hill is turning out material harshly critical of public and official Canadian attitudes.

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Expected, and the number of fronts by those who feel such protests are not helpful to the cause of peace.

In Edmonton Saturday, Defence Minister Jean-Jacques Blais suggested peace demonstrators are playing into the hands of the Soviet Union at a time when Geneva disarmament negotiations with the United States are at a crucial stage.

"The consequence of course is the potential weakening of (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) because we recognize that if we are to be effective at the bargaining table there has to be resolve amongst the NATO allies," Blais said.

In Vancouver, a parade more than four blocks long wound through Kitsilano, from the marshalling area in Jericho Park to Vanier Park, where the marchers listened to speakers and singers.

At 11 a.m., the starting time, grim-faced marshals were looking at only several hundred participants. It had been raining off and on all morning and there were fears the weather was keeping people away.

But then the sun broke through and within 15 minutes the ranks had swelled tenfold. At the demonstration's peak in Vanier Park, there were about 5,000 people, although organizers claimed 12,000.

The group included union members, church-goers, professional associations, community groups and political parties ranging from the New Democratic Party to the marginal left.

Ald. Libby Davies, representing Vancouver city council, said the tests are "the thin edge of the wedge for Canadian complicity in the arms race." She called on all federal representatives to oppose the testing.

Protests took place from St. John's to Yellowknife.

protests" in mid-November at the Litton Systems of Canada Ltd. plant, the U.S.-owned company making guidance systems for the cruise.

"We will come back over and over again," said Angela Browning, a spokesman for a group called Simply Against Cruise Testing. "We won't go home." That kind of single-minded purpose wasn't evident in all the protests.

In Ottawa, for example, where only about 2,500 showed up on Parliament Hill, it was a rally for causes ranging from women's rights to equality for "the French and English nations" in Canada, and the cruise.

But there were also counter-protests, notably in Cold Lake, Alberta, where about 50 anti-cruise marchers were pelted with eggs near the Canadian forces base that will be headquarters for the testing.

In Toronto, too, there was a dramatic counter-protest by the father of the late Mary Jane Hendrie, killed when Soviet jets downed a Korean Air Lines jumbo jet Sept. 1.

The deaths of the 10 Canadians and 259 others should be a reminder that the Soviet Union is "a force of evil" that Western nations must arm against, Thomas Hendrie told about 400 demonstrators at the U.S. consulate.

Vancouver's turnout was a pale shadow of the 60,000 who demonstrated for peace in April. But Carmela Allevato, vice-president of End the Arms Race that organized the rally, claimed the April march was "a Vancouver special" that took much longer to organize than Saturday's spontaneous event.

Another group of 200 B.C. residents in Comox

troops mobilizing for the war against nuclear disarmament.

The Vancouver demonstration was sponsored by End the Arms Race, a coalition of union, community and church groups, which includes the Vancouver and District Labor Council and the Vancouver Council of Churches.

## Missile protesters fight on

LONDON (AP) — Bolstered by a turnout of 1.5 million anti-nuclear activists in weekend demonstrations, western European protest leaders vow to carry on their fight even after NATO starts deploying 572 U.S. cruise and Pershing 2 missiles.

Several British newspapers reported Sunday that the first batch of 16 cruise missiles — destined for Greenham Common U.S. Air Force base 80-kilometres west of London — would arrive in mid-November and would be activated Dec. 15.

Nine Pershing 2 rockets are to be deployed in West Germany at about the same time, barring a last-minute concession by the Soviet Union at arms control talks with the United States in Geneva, Switzerland.

A ranking Soviet official warned not to expect any breakthrough and said the NATO deployment will be countered by new Soviet missiles.

In West Germany, where about 200,000 demonstrators formed a 113-kilometre human chain Saturday between two U.S. military bases, organizer Matthias Hoppe said: "The peace movement is here to stay."

More than 600,000 people protested around West Germany and police made about 450 arrests.

"We will continue to campaign throughout the autumn to keep cruise missiles out of the English countryside," said Joan Ruddock, chairman of Britain's Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.

Elsewhere, 300,000 turned out in Brussels, 200,000 in Rome, 150,000 in Madrid and tens of thousands more in Paris, Stockholm and Vienna.

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
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


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Department of External Affairs



Ministère des Affaires extérieures

Canada

OTTAWA, ONTARIO  
K1A 0G2

January 6, 1984

Dear Mr. Taylor,

On behalf of the Prime Minister, permit me to  
reply to your letter of November 17.

The subjects of global negotiations for arms  
control and crisis management are indeed immensely  
complex, with ramifications extending beyond US and  
USSR relations and indeed beyond East/West relations as  
well. Perhaps because of this complexity, they are  
usually dealt with separately. The only exception  
would appear to be the SALT I negotiations which  
included the development of a code of conduct to  
facilitate the management of the American-Soviet  
relationship.

The Prime Minister's Initiative attempts to  
address some of the issues related to arms control and  
crisis management. His principal objective, however,  
remains that of enhancing the level of dialogue between  
East and West. Its approach is less comprehensive than  
the proposals you put forward in your letter.

Nevertheless, we thank you for bringing these  
matters to our attention.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Louis Delvoie".

Louis Delvoie

Chairman

Task Force Working Group

Mr. D. Wayne Taylor  
Faculty of Administrative Studies  
York University  
4700 Keele Street  
Downsview, Ontario  
M3J 2R6

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE - BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVE

CONTROL FORM - PRIME MINISTER'S CORRESPONDENCE

FORMULAIRE DE CONTRÔLE - CORRESPONDANCE DU PREMIER MINISTRE

A:

Mr. Fowler

Messrs. Osbaldeston, Darling, Clark (our file)

LETTER FROM/LETRE DE:

D. Wayne Taylor

DATE:

November 17, 1983

SUBJECT/SUJET:

Offer to present model for global negotiation and crisis management

CORRESPONDENCE NO/NO DE LA CORRESPONDANCE:

3333 048

Judy Cameron

DATE:

November 30, 1983

REPLY PREPARED FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S SIGNATURE.

RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DU PREMIER MINISTRE.

REPLY PREPARED FOR MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN'S SIGNATURE AND FORWARDED THROUGH JUDY CAMERON.

RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DE MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN, TRANSMISE PAR JUDY CAMERON.

REFERRED TO ANOTHER MINISTER THROUGH JUDY CAMERON TO MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN.

RÉFÉRÉ À UN MINISTRE PAR JUDY CAMERON À MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN.

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
AUCUNE RÉPONSE NÉCESSAIRE. UNE COPIE EST CONSERVÉE AU BCP À TITRE D'INFORMATION. L'ORIGINAL RETOURNE À JUDY CAMERON.

ADDITIONAL REMARKS/OBSERVATIONS ADDITIONNELLES:



FACULTY OF ADMINISTRATIVE STUDIES  
4700 KEELE STREET, DOWNSVIEW, ONTARIO M3J 2R6

November 17, 1983



Rt. Hon. P. E. Trudeau  
Prime Minister of Canada  
House of Commons  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0A2

Dear Prime Minister:

*Congratulations on the initiation of your mission to seek world peace through the control of nuclear, high-altitude and conventional weaponry. I sincerely hope that the world's leaders with whom you confer are as willing to reach a consensus as you are.*

*Under the auspices of the Economic Research and Systems Planning Group at York University—a laboratory of the Institut de la Vie based in Paris, —I have pursued a shared interest in arms control by developing a model for global negotiation and crisis management specifically adapted to the problematique of arms control. Last September I presented my paper at the Institut's Annual Symposium on the Co-Evolution of Man and the Biosphere in Helsinki, Finland before a select group of academicians from Canada, the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Sweden, Denmark and Finland. The American delegation included Dr. Robert Kupperman President Reagan's special advisor on terrorism and former chief arms control scientist.*

*My proposal basically addresses how the management of multilateral, multi-level negotiations can be integrated into a cybernetic system of arms monitoring, control, de-escalation and agreement verification compatible with a United Nations-like institutional setting. Extended into the longer term, my proposal also addresses how global resources freed from the so-called arms race can be re-deployed under negotiated terms into more environmentally complementary economic usages on a global scale.*

*The net effect would be to replace secrecy and deterrence with security and dialogue.*

/s...

ORIGINAL TO A. Fowler (19)  
ORIGINAL ENVOYÉ À  
C.C. P.M.O. FILE -  
C.C. DOSSIERS C.P.M.

- 2 -

Quite frankly, Prime Minister, I sincerely believe that a proposal such as mine is a very realistic system by which to implement your strategy of arms control and reduction through multilateral negotiation and management. At your convenience, my colleagues and I would welcome an opportunity to brief you on this proposal to assist you in your mission.

Until then we extend to you our very best wishes for success.

Yours very truly,



D. Wayne Taylor

DWT:jx



November 30, 1983.

Mr. D. Wayne Taylor,  
Faculty of Administrative Studies,  
York University,  
Room 355,  
4700 Keele Street,  
Downsview, Ontario.  
M3J 2R6

Dear Mr. Taylor:

On behalf of the Prime Minister and in his absence, I acknowledge your letter of November 17.

Please be assured that it will be brought to Mr. Trudeau's attention upon his return.

Yours sincerely,

Original Signed by  
Original signé par

Marie-Andrée Bastien,  
Correspondence Director.

Original to: R. Fowler

MAB/st  
3333 048

Department of External Affairs



Ministère des Affaires extérieures

Canada

OTTAWA, ONTARIO  
K1A 0G2

January 6, 1984

Dear Mr. Meincke,

On behalf of the Prime Minister, permit me to  
reply to your letter of November 1.

I believe, as you do, that Canada is well  
placed to play a peacemaking role between East and  
West. I cannot agree, however, that a reconsideration  
of the Canadian and NATO commitment to the 1979  
"two-track" decision is warranted. Indeed, I believe  
that such a move would further prejudice the chances  
for an agreement between the United States and the  
Soviet Union on the limitation or reduction of  
intermediate-range nuclear forces.

As you will recall, the "two-track" decision  
was taken in response to the concern, primarily of our  
European NATO allies, that Soviet INF deployments (the  
SS-20 missile) represented a threat to which United  
States strategic nuclear forces did not provide a  
credible deterrent. The decision was therefore taken  
to modernize allied forces through the deployment of  
Pershing II medium-range ballistic missiles and  
ground-launched cruise missiles, beginning in late  
1983. This decision was accompanied by an offer to  
negotiate with the Soviet Union to determine whether an  
agreement could be reached to bring about a more stable  
balance of these systems at a lower level, and was  
immediately followed by the unilateral withdrawal of  
1,000 nuclear warheads from NATO arsenals in Europe.  
(The planned withdrawal of a further 1,400 warheads has  
also been announced.)

Mr. Peter P.M. Meincke  
President  
University of Prince Edward Island  
550 University Avenue  
Charlottetown, P.E.I.  
C1A 4P3

- 2 -

Moving on to your second suggestion, I must say that I do not believe that there is any disposition on the part of our allies to trade off our contribution to NATO in exchange for some as yet undefined Canadian role as a global peacekeeper. The purpose of the Alliance is to ensure the collective security of its members, who in turn must make some tangible contribution to the maintenance of that security. Our allies are either major military powers or occupy vital strategic locations. The contribution of Canada, which is neither a major military power nor a front-line European state, does not loom especially large in the overall defence of Western Europe, but its very existence serves notice to any potential aggressor that Canada would be fully engaged if a conflict were to erupt. If we were to reduce our status to that of a non-contributing member, we would forfeit our right to the advantages of the collective security system and to the serious attention of our allies.

Canada's active membership in NATO has not prevented us from evolving the concept of peacekeeping, or from taking part in a large number of peacekeeping operations over the years. I see no reason why it should serve as an impediment to Canada continuing to play an active role in peacekeeping in the future.

Thank you for bringing your views to our attention.

Yours sincerely,



Louis A. Delvoie  
Chairman  
Task Force Working Group



Government of Canada  
Privy Council Office

Gouvernement du Canada  
Bureau du Conseil privé

Ottawa, Canada  
K1A 0A3

Date: Nov 8, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO: J. R. Francis  
Director DDR  
Dept. of External Affairs

Letter to the Prime Minister from:


Peter Meincke

PMO Ref. No: 3307 109

We have arranged with the Under Secretary's office that the Department's services can be drawn upon in preparing replies to letters which the Prime Minister has received on foreign affairs.

I would be grateful if you could prepare a draft reply to the attached letter and return it to me directly by Nov 16 with a copy to CMR/Johnston. It should be prepared as if for the Prime Minister's signature, although I would also welcome your advice on alternative ways of dealing with the matter, if appropriate.

If you have any questions, please call me at 593-5776.

  
Joseph P. Caron  
Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat

c.c. PMO/Correspondence (Nicole Fournier)  
PCO/Judy Cameron  
EA/CMR/Ted Johnston

cc R. Delvaux, 1DDZ

Canada

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE - BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVÉ

CONTROL FORM - PRIME MINISTER'S CORRESPONDENCE

FORMULAIRE DE CONTRÔLE - CORRESPONDANCE DU PREMIER MINISTRE

A: Mr. Fowler

Messrs. Osbaldeston, Darling, Clark, Our file

LETTER FROM/LETRE DE:

Peter P.M. Meincke, Pres. University of P.E.I.

DATE:

Nov. 1/83

SUBJECT/SUJET:

Canada in a Peacekeeping Role

CORRESPONDENCE NO/NO DE LA CORRESPONDANCE:

3307 109

Judy Cameron

DATE: Nov. 7/83

REPLY PREPARED FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S SIGNATURE.  
RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DU PREMIER MINISTRE.


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ADDITIONAL REMARKS/OBSERVATIONS ADDITIONNELLES:

3307 109



PRESIDENT'S OFFICE

UNIVERSITY OF PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND

550 UNIVERSITY AVENUE

CHARLOTTETOWN, PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND

CIA 4P3

November 1, 1983

The Right Honorable P. E. Trudeau  
Prime Minister  
Langevin Block  
Wellington Street  
OTTAWA, Ontario  
K1A 0A3

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

It was reassuring to see the reports of your clear affirmation of Canada's "commitment to collective security" and that you believe "our central purpose must be to create a stable environment of increased security for both East and West."

There can be no doubt "that it is futile to deny what both (Washington and Moscow) seem to lack at the present time is a political vision of a world wherein their nations can live in peace." and that..."the relationship between the super powers may have become too charged with animosity for East-West relations to be entrusted to them alone."

The question I would urge you and your colleagues, both in Cabinet and in NATO, to consider, is whether or not a continued Canadian commitment to the two-track policy is the best way in which Canada can serve these important goals and help to meet these urgent concerns. How can Canada best use its resources to prevent the "Rhythm of Crisis" reaching a "Crescendo of Catastrophe? Is the two track policy the best way in which Canada can help the world "to restore our confidence in ourselves and our faith in others..."

Have we perhaps arrived at the moment in history that begs the emergence of a nation totally dedicated to a peace keeping role, a nation that has the trust of the world, a nation that has clearly demonstrated its rejection of nuclear weapons, a nation that has no record of imperialist ambition, a nation that could enter anywhere without fear or favour?

RECEIVED BY R. Miller (19)  
ORIGINAL ENVOYÉ À  
C.C. P.M.O. FILE  
C.C. DOSSIERS C.P.M.

The Right Hon. P. E. Trudeau  
Page two  
November 1, 1983

Is Canada not, in fact, in the best position to fulfil such a role? Would our NATO allies, including the U.S., not be eager to trade their peace keeping commitments for our contribution to NATO at this time? Would we have had the recent tragedy in Lebanon if Canadians had been there rather than troops from the U.S. and France? Would Canadians not be ready and willing to support even an increase in the armed forces if the major goal were international security through peacekeeping? Such a distinct and crucial role would give a unique and widely supported *raison d'être* for our armed forces.


A Canada that was looked to by the world as its international peacekeeper would have been in the key position to act in Grenada.

A Canada that was looked to by the developing world for security from its neighbours and security from becoming embroiled in an ideological conflict between the super powers would contribute most to an environment for stability and economic development.

There are, I believe, some indications that you, personally, would prefer to see Canada play such a role.

I would like to take this opportunity to not only stress the urgent importance of Canada becoming the world's professional peacekeeper as soon as possible, but also to pledge my utmost personal support for such a move.

Yours sincerely,



Peter P. M. Meincke  
President

PPM/ccb

November 4, 1983.

Mr. Peter P.M. Meincke,  
President,  
University of Prince Edward Island,  
550 University Avenue,  
Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island.  
CIA 4P3

Dear Mr. Meincke:

On behalf of the Prime Minister, I acknowledge your letter of November 1.

Please be assured that it will be brought to Mr. Trudeau's attention.

Yours sincerely,

Original Signed by  
Original signé par

Marie-Andrée Bastien,  
Correspondence Director.

Original to R. Fowler

MAB/lc





Government of Canada  
Privy Council Office

Gouvernement du Canada  
Bureau du Conseil privé

Ottawa, Canada  
K1A 0A3

January 3, 1984

*Sheila*  
*The two top letters*  
*should be re-typed. The*  
*others can go with cc to PEO*  
*Done*  
*JD*

Cher M. Delvoie,

Vous trouverez ci-joint une série de réponses  
à des lettres adressées soit au Premier ministre, soit  
à M. MacEachen.

/// Nous serions très reconnaissant si vous  
pouviez nous faire parvenir copies des réponses  
signées.

Joseph P. Caron  
Politique étrangère et défense

Monsieur Louis Delvoie  
Ministère des Affaires extérieures  
Tour "C" 5<sup>e</sup> étage  
Immeuble Lester B. Pearson  
Ottawa (Ontario)  
K1A 0G2

Canada

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a stylized 'M' followed by a horizontal stroke.

MINA (2)  
FILE  
SMR  
FPR  
CIRC

right Prime Minister  
of State for External Affairs



Canada

vice premier ministre  
Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures

IDDZ FILE  
DIARY

OTTAWA, Ontario  
K1A 0G2

*January 6/84*

Dr. Paul Cappon, M.D., PhD.  
P.O. Box 1749  
Halifax, Nova Scotia  
B3J 3A5

Dear Dr. Cappon:

Thank you very much for your letter of November 17 and for your offer of working with the Prime Minister's Task Force on East-West relations and international security.

I am heartened by the support the Prime Minister's initiative has received from the Canadian public. It is very clear that he is voicing widespread concerns in Canada when the Prime Minister speaks of the urgent need for the restoration of confidence and re-establishment of political dialogue between East and West in order to reduce international tensions and to achieve progress in arms control.

The Prime Minister's Task Force is a very small working group of officials of my department, the Department of National Defence and the Privy Council Office who have been taken from their regular duties to work on this special project. It is not contemplated that this group will be expanded to include individuals beyond the public service.

I would like to thank you for your offer of assistance and for your support of the Prime Minister's efforts to work for peace.

Yours sincerely,

*(sgd by)*

Allan J. MacEachen

DEC 22 1983  
IDD  
A04444



External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
CABINET DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

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**ACTION REQUEST/FICHE DE SERVICE**

From De <b>Dr. Paul Cappon</b> <b>N.S.</b>		No. No <b>A 04444</b>
Subject Sujet <b>Physicians for Social Responsibility re Prevention of Nuclear War</b>		Action div./Dir. responsable <b>IDR 1852</b>
Letter dated/Lettre en date du <b>83-11-17</b>	Date rec'd in MINA Date de réception à MINA <b>83-12-06</b>	Date sent to div. Date d'envoi à la dir. <b>83-12-06</b>
Action to be completed and white slip returned to MINA by L'action doit être complétée et la feuille blanche retournée à MINA par		<b>83-12-11</b>
Comments/Commentaires		

ACTION REQUIRED/ACTION REQUISE	FOR DIV. USE/POUR L'UTILISATION DE LA DIR.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Reply for signature of SSEA Réponse pour la signature du SEAE <input type="checkbox"/> Reply for the signature of Réponse pour la signature de <input type="checkbox"/> Reply by Division Réponse de la direction <input type="checkbox"/> For information and any necessary action Pour l'examen et suite à donner, s'il y a lieu	Date received/Date reçu <b>1483</b> Action officer/Agent responsable <b>J McNEE</b> Disposition <b>Replying to SSEA agent</b> Date <b>21/83</b> For MINA use/Pour utilisation de MINA <b>JAN 6 1984</b>

ALL TRANSFERS TO BE REPORTED TO MINA  
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LE REGISTRE DE MINA DOIT ÊTRE AVISÉ DE  
TOUT CHANGEMENT

5-1047

EXT 439 (83/3)

FILE WITH ORIGINAL INCOMING LETTER/AU DOSSIER AVEC LA LETTRE ORIGINALE

00041  
3



External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

REFERRED BY THE OFFICE  
OF THE SECRETARY OF  
STATE FOR EXTERNAL  
AFFAIRS, MINISTER'S  
REGISTRY - LETTERS

TRANSMIS PAR LE CABINET  
DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT  
AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES  
DOSSIERS DU MINISTÈRE -  
LETTRES

5-2723

To/À  
AU

*FDA*

*IDDZ*

*m mella*  
*Fn*  
*repon*  
*pts.*  
*m*

☐

FOR INFORMATION AND ANY NECESSARY ACTION  
POUR EXAMEN ET SUITE À DONNER, S'IL Y A LIEU

☐

THIS LETTER HAS BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED  
ON A ACCUSÉ RÉCEPTION DE CETTE LETTRE

☐

BY TELEPHONE/PAR TÉLÉPHONE

☐

BY LETTER (Copy attached)/PAR LETTRE (Copie-jointe)

REMARKS/REMARQUES

*K. MacKinnon/FRIDA*  
*has acknowledge receipt*  
*of letter*

*RD*

Signature

*R. E. D'Aoust*

*83-1206*

Date 00041

4



Office of the Prime Minister    Cabinet du  
Premier ministre    Premier ministre

Ottawa, Canada  
K1A 0A2

October 25, 1983.

Dr. Paul Cappon,  
President,  
Physicians for Social  
Responsibility Nova Scotia,  
P.O. Box 1749,  
Halifax, Nova Scotia.  
B3J 3A5

Dear Dr. Cappon:

On behalf of the Prime Minister, I acknowledge  
your letter of October 21.

Please be assured that it and the enclosed  
documentation will be brought to Mr. Trudeau's  
attention.

Yours sincerely,

Marie-Andrée Bastien,  
Correspondence Director.

Telephone: Office 902-421-6541  
Home 902-425-8712

P. O. Box 1749  
Halifax, NS  
B3J 3A5

October 21, 1983

The Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau  
Prime Minister of Canada  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0A2

Dear Mr. Trudeau:

Please find enclosed a copy of a recent position paper which I prepared for the Liberal Party on possible policy innovations on the issue of nuclear arms and nuclear disarmament. My suggestions and perspectives may be timely, given the possibility of the Department of External Affairs considering new options for Canadian policy in this area.

I have included as appendices some extensive work which I have done in the field of nuclear arms during 1983. The main thrust, however, is to be found in the body of the position paper itself.

I have sent copies of this position paper to Lorna Marsden, Donna Davis in Nova Scotia, and the editors of Liberal Perspectives in Toronto. I hope to be meeting with some of these people to discuss these possibilities in the very near future.

Your comments on the position paper and its specific proposals will be very welcome; and will add to the discussion around the position paper as it is developed and refined.

Yours sincerely,



Paul Cappon, M.D., PhD.  
President, Physicians for Social  
Responsibility Nova Scotia.  
Member, Board of Directors, PSR Canada.

PC/bjc  
Enclosure

P.S. At the discretion of the Prime Minister and the Minister of External Affairs, I would be willing to participate in the Task Force review of Canada's possible interventions in the ameliorating of East-West relations and reductions in the arms race.

## RESUME OF CURRICULUM VITAE

March 1983

Paul Cappon

### I PERSONAL DATA

Date of Birth: February 3, 1948

Citizenship: Canadian

Languages spoken: English, French, passable Italian, some German

### II ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE

#### University Studies and Degrees held:

1. Honours B.A. in Economics and Political Science, McGill University, Montreal, P.Q., 1968
2. M.A. Sociology, University of Paris, 1970
3. Doctorate in Sociology, University of Paris, 1972
4. M.D., McMaster University, Hamilton
5. Internship Certificate, Dalhousie University
6. Licence to practice medicine, Province of Nova Scotia
7. Certificate as specialist, Canadian College of Family Physicians, 1982

#### University Teaching Experience:

- Assistant professor of Anthropology and Sociology, University of British Columbia, 1972-1977
- Affiliate Scholar, St. Mary's University, Halifax, lecturing in the Sociology of Health and Medicine and in Occupational Health, 1981 - present

#### Academic Interests and Teaching Experience in Social Sciences include:

sociology of health; health care organization and policy; social movements; social organization and institutions; Canadian and Quebec society; economic sociology; social classes; sociology of the arts; urban society.

### III PUBLICATIONS IN SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL PLANNING

#### Books

1. Conflit entre les Néo-Canadiens et les Francophones à Montréal, Presses de l'Université Laval, 1974.



2. In Our Own House: Social Perspectives on Canadian Literature,  
McClelland and Stewart, 1978.

#### Papers

1. "Nationalism and Linguistic and Inter-ethnic Conflict in Quebec",  
in The Canadian Ethnic Mosaic, ed. Driedger, McClelland and  
Stewart, 1978.
2. "The Green Paper: Immigration as a Tool of Profit" in Canadian  
Ethnic Studies, Vol. 7, 1975, and in Modernization and the  
Canadian State, Macmillan of Canada, 1978.
3. Review of books in the social sciences in various academic  
publications.
4. Articles in various newspapers and popular journals in the area of  
social sciences.

#### Unpublished Manuscripts

1. Study of Canadian Manpower Department Strategies: Outreach Projects,  
commissioned by Government of Canada, 1976.
2. Social Planning for the Burke Mountain New Town, part of the planning  
paper for the proposed New Town in the Fraser Valley, the work done  
in association with architects, urban planners and engineers and  
commissioned by the Government of British Columbia, 1975.

#### IV MEDICAL EXPERIENCE

1. Currently Director of Health Services, City of Halifax. The function  
is administrative, clinical, and programmatic, with the particular  
responsibility for an organization and clinical and administrative  
supervision of an Occupational Health Service for the City of Halifax
2. Research, writing, and lecturing publicly in the fields of Community  
Health and Occupational Health.
3. Active membership in the Canadian College of Family Physicians, the  
specialist college of Canadian family practitioners.
4. Physician licensed to practice medicine in Nova Scotia.
5. Certified provider of Advanced Cardiac Life Support.
6. Part-time lecturing at the university level in the Sociology of  
Health and Medicine and in Community and Occupational Health.
7. Member, lecturer, and consultant for the Nova Scotian and Canadian  
Public Health Associations.

V PAPERS IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE

1. "Occupational Health and Family Physician: Definition and Resources" in Canadian Family Physician, Vol. 28: February 1982.
2. "Occupational Health and Family Physician: History-taking - How Not to Miss an Occupationally-Related Disease" in the Canadian Family Physician, Vol. 28: March 1982.
3. "Models of Health Care: Community versus Engineering", in Proceedings of the North American Primary Care Research Group, Columbus, Ohio, 1982.
4. "Eight Years On: Where Have We Come Since the Lalonde Report?" Paper given at the annual meeting of the Public Health Association of Nova Scotia, 1981.
5. "Nova Scotia: Economic Change and Community Health, What Does the Future Hold?" Paper given at the annual meeting of the Public Health Association of Nova Scotia, 1982.
6. "Retrospective on the Lalonde Report". Paper given at the Nova Scotia meeting of the Canadian College of Health Executives, January 1983.
7. "Psychosocial Factors in Illness Absence from Work". Paper given at the World Psychiatric Association Congress, July 1983.

VI PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

1. Member - Canadian Public Health Association
2. Member - Canadian Society for Tropical Medicine & International Health
3. Member - Public Health Association of Nova Scotia
4. Member - Canadian Association of Anthropology and Sociology
5. Member - Canadian Medical Association
6. Member - The Medical Society of Nova Scotia
7. Member - Ontario Medical Association
8. Member - Canadian College of Family Physicians
9. Member - American Occupational Medical Association
10. Member - American Association of Preventive Medicine
11. Founding Fellow and Executive Member - Section on Occupational Psychiatry, World Psychiatric Association

VII. CURRENT INTERESTS AND CAREER OBJECTIVES

1. Community Medicine, including Occupational Health; Industrial Health; Environmental Health; and Health Care Administration
2. Sociology of Health and Medicine
3. The Politics of Health Care
4. International Health and Development

as well as the aforementioned interests in Sociology.

My general objective is the appropriate combination of my skills in medicine and in the social sciences in health care practice, administration, and in research, teaching and public policy planning. The teaching, research and public policy will include aspects of the social sciences, of the medical sciences and their interface in crucial disciplines like Occupational Health and Community Health.

Dr. Paul Cappon  
A Short Resume of Background in  
International Relations and Peace

Languages: fluent in French and English  
- also some Italian and German

Profession: physician and sociologist  
- Director of Health Services, City of Halifax -  
speciality Community and Occupational Health.  
- Formerly in Department of Anthropology and  
Sociology, UBC, teaching Sociology. Now  
teaching at St. Mary's University part-time  
in Sociology of Health.

International Background: - reads international news and  
analysis in four European languages.  
- lived four years in Europe.  
- work experience behind Iron Curtain  
(in Czechoslovakia for CBC)  
- spouse is from France. Two young  
children.  
- B.A., Master's and doctoral studies  
concentrated on international relations,  
development, social movements.

Status in Peace Movement: - member Canadian Pugwash Group  
- participant 25th Commemorative Pugwash  
Conference on Science and World Affairs  
- founder, Physicians Against Nuclear War  
- president, Physicians for Social  
Responsibility Nova Scotia  
- Director, Physicians for Social  
Responsibility Canada  
- organizer, cross-Canada speaking tour  
for Dr. Linus Pauling, October 1982  
- visits and discussions with 12 Members  
of Parliament or prime ministerial  
assistants on issues of international  
relations and peace  
- numerous contacts with scientists and  
academics on international relations  
and peace

# Socio-Political Aspects of the Nuclear Arms Race\*

Paul Cappon,\*\*B.A., M.A., Ph.D., M.D., C.C.F.P.

Halifax, N.S.

The objective of this paper is the discussion of some of the social, political and strategic factors which sustain the nuclear arms race, as well as a definition of the key terminologies and proposals of the movement for nuclear disarmament. The three principal topics include: (1) the main characteristics of the nuclear arms race; (2) common misconceptions about the nuclear arms race; and (3) Canada's role in the nuclear arms race.

## MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE

The first atomic bombs, manufactured by use of Canadian uranium, gave the U.S. a monopoly on nuclear weapons. At the 1982 Commemorative Pugwash Conference, Sir Mark Oliphant, the Australian scientist who worked on the original bomb, told me the following story: By 1945, he had recognized the danger to humanity of the 'bomb' and was working on the first UN nuclear disarmament committees. At that time, the USSR, bombless themselves, made the first proposal for a Nuclear Freeze. The U.S. rejected that call and Oppenheimer, masterminding the American development of nuclear weapons, confided to Sir Mark: "For God's sake, don't tell them we have only three bombs!" That was the first of many, many opportunities for nuclear disarmament which were missed. It is my belief that missing any more will cost us everything.

Subsequent history of the nuclear arms race has three salient socio-political and strategic characteristics: (1) use by the USA and USSR of possession of nuclear weapons in support of national policy (2) technical-strategic lead by the USA (3) proliferation.

### 1. National Policy

The production and potential use of nuclear weapons by both the superpowers has consistently been justified by use of the phrase "deterrence", implying fundamentally in political terms a defensive posture vis-à-vis a potential aggressor. Such justification has always been propagandistic and is especially so now. In fact, both superpowers traditionally have employed their threat in support of national policy, to project their power in geo-political terms.

During the American monopoly, coinciding with the first Cold War, the U.S. used the threat of the A-Bomb in its policy of "Containment" of the USSR. In geo-political terms, containment as supported by atomic weapons allowed the

United States in conjunction with European allies to acquire a dominant role in almost every part of the world, except Eastern Europe and China. Later attempts by Third World countries to escape American hegemony in its power bloc were met with hostility by successive U.S. Administrations, which chose to interpret any loosening of its geo-political grip in terms of an advance for Soviet power — in other words, the failure of containment. Thus, there have been dozens of coups d'états or rebellions engineered by the U.S. against Third World governments which proposed an independent path for themselves: Iraq, Iran, Greece, Chile, Southeast Asia, etc. The list over four decades is very long. American alliances were made to ensure a success of Soviet containment: SEATO to contain from Asia, the East, and Australia; NORAD to contain from across the Bering Straits; NATO to contain from Europe. As cowboys say, the U.S. had the USSR "surrounded".

Soviet policy then became centered on efforts to break out of this containment. One means was by actual attempts to increase its influence in Third World areas. Sometimes, a relaxation of these attempts was traded off by the USSR against a relaxation of American containment. A second means was by the enforced cohesion of the Eastern European buffer between the USSR and NATO European containment: thus open repression in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and less successful attempts at control over Yugoslavia and Rumania. The third means of breaking out of containment was the A-Bomb itself. It provided a credible force to back up the first two strategies of the national policy.

For the United States, the Atomic Bomb was the pillar of containment in Europe. The argument ran that the USSR and the Warsaw Pact had conventional military superiority in Europe, necessitating the American provision of a "nuclear umbrella" for Western Europe.

The period of the late 60s and early 70s, despite continuing geo-political competition in the Third World between the superpowers, and despite continued spiralling of nuclear weapon technology, was characterized by a relative detente between East and West. Friendly relations were established between France and the USSR, between West Germany and the USSR. Americans focussed more on China than on the USSR as potential enemy. There was even a lot of loose talk about an eventual convergence of Soviet and capitalist socio-economic systems. It is important to re-capitulate what political conditions made détente possible; because we must re-establish them if we are to retain even the remotest chance of avoiding holocaust. The main political conditions of détente were four in number:

#### a) Nuclear Weapon Parity

The most important requirement of détente was the American public acceptance of nuclear weapon parity with the USSR. Previous to this, the U.S. had publicly considered that, if God's country could not have a monopoly on nuclear

\*Based on a paper given April 8, 1983, at a Short Course on the Medical Aspects of Nuclear War.

\*\*Dr. Cappon is a practising physician in Halifax. He is a member of the National Board of Directors of Physicians for Social Responsibility; a member of the Canadian Pugwash Group; and a member of the International Pugwash Movement on Science and World Affairs.

†Editorial Comment: this topic has been omitted due to lack of space but is available from the author.

weapons, at least it could have superiority — and therefore project its national power more effectively than the USSR. Once parity was seemingly accepted, a climate of reasonable mutual confidence was established, which defused potential confrontation and made many arms treaties possible. These treaties in turn encouraged more confidence, even co-operation in some areas. In total, since 1959, there have been nine multilateral and 13 bilateral Soviet-American arms control treaties. It is extremely important to note that their provisions have *all* been respected by *both* sides until the potential violation of Salt I by President Reagan's militarization of space plans announced this year.

#### **b) Political Autonomy in Western Europe**

A second factor which allowed for détente was the establishment by Western European powers of greater political autonomy with respect to the U.S. NATO was no longer simply an American instrument. Individual NATO countries used that autonomy to improve relations with individual Eastern countries. Although the USSR discouraged an equal autonomy for Warsaw Pact countries, some Eastern Europeans were able to break away in terms of foreign relations because of the relaxation — Yugoslavia, Albania, Rumania all maintained independent foreign policies. The USSR itself established strong economic ties with several NATO countries, as well as Japan. War in Europe became the least likely of all possible East-West war scenarios.

#### **c) End of Containment**

A third factor, implicit in the first two, was the American relaxation of the doctrine of containment, supported by the nuclear weapons threat. It was perceived as an empty threat if mutually assured destruction pertained; and containment might not be necessary in the face of a relaxed Soviet attitude. *Critical to this posture* was the fact that arms agreements were negotiated and reached independent of the existence of conflicts and superpower competition around the world. (In a moment, we will see how the doctrine of "linkage" has changed this.) It was the absence of "linkage" of nuclear weapon negotiations to geo-political conflict which minimized the possibility of nuclear war even while conflicts as important as the war in South East Asia, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, or the CIA supported military coup in Chile were taking place. Soviets and Americans agreed that ultimate survival was just too important for nuclear arms negotiations to be dominated by the short-term geo-political aims — or *perceived* aims — of either side.

#### **d) Non-Aligned Movement**

The fourth important element in détente, bound up with the others, was the increased success of the non-aligned movement. Its independence diminished the hegemonic influence of USSR and USA in confrontational power blocs and thereby decreased the likelihood of their all-out confrontation in nuclear war.

*But*, underneath the surface of political détente, research and development of the arms we now see being deployed was underway. Nuclear arms agreements were not stringent enough to prevent this. Militarists' budgets were cut during détente, but not nearly enough to prevent this. And Cold War proponents still lurked in the back-ground, awaiting their next chance.

What has happened during the past five or six years is a combination of two things: all that military research into "modernized" nuclear weapons has reached fruition in possibility of undreamed-of devastation. One American Trident submarine equals hundreds of Hiroshimas. At the same time, détente has broken down; so that the political restraints on initiation of nuclear war have been pulled away. Therefore, the Terror of today.

#### **Breakdown of Détente**

What happened? What occurred in the late 70s to destroy détente? Simply that the four factors which I cited as building détente were all destroyed by the self-interested national policies of the superpowers.

The prerequisite of détente — the first factor — had been American acceptance of Soviet parity in nuclear weapons. This acceptance began to unravel for political and ideological reasons in the late 70s. Intensely patriotic, some Americans could not stomach military defeat and moral ignominy in South East Asia or humiliation in Iran. They wanted to see concrete evidence of American power. This ideology of superiority found its purest expression in the Reagan Administration. Nuclear weapon superiority over the USSR became official policy in 1982, with the enunciation of the Reagan Administration's "Defence Policy Guidance", which called for U.S. preparation for "protracted nuclear war" by attaining superiority in nuclear weapons. Soviet official policy since 1945 has consistently been the maintenance of nuclear weapon parity between the power blocs. This policy has not changed with the Reagan Administration; and, in fact, *all* independent arms control agencies and study groups claim that the USSR has *at most* parity with the USA; and some even that the U.S. now currently has a slight advantage overall.

The second major political breakdown involved the re-establishment of "linkage", just another word for the old policy of containment. The U.S. of the late Carter and Reagan Administrations began "to link" arms control with "Soviet behaviour" throughout the world. Maintenance of existing arms regulations and negotiations for new ones became contingent upon Soviet willingness to decrease its competition with the U.S. for influence. Thus, Salt II, negotiated during the détente 70s, was not ratified by the U.S. Linkage was intended by the U.S. to change the rules of the competition game, largely out of a perception that the USSR was doing too well in the game. Eventually, according to a Reagan speech last year to Britain's Parliament, the aim of the U.S. is "to reduce Marxism-Leninism to the ash heap of history". Thus, Afghanistan and Poland became obstacles for American willingness seriously to negotiate arms control, whereas American behaviour in Vietnam, Chile, or El Salvador never had affected Soviet willingness. Linkage was *not* their policy. For the U.S., the logical culmination of linkage in the face of perceived Soviet gains in the game of Third World competition was the attempt to gain nuclear military supremacy. Presumably, the projection of its increased power would block any further Soviet gains.

The third détente factor to crumble was the relative autonomy of allies within the blocs. The USSR's unwillingness to allow the same autonomy for Eastern Europe as Western Europeans enjoyed eventually diminished optimism about co-operation. The directness of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan furthered this mistrust, as did the indirect

intervention in Poland. But the most important factor was the install of new missiles targetted on Western Europe. This was a huge political and strategic blunder. Strategic arguments summoned by the Soviets were plausible: Britain and France had targetted the USSR; U.S. nuclear submarines and bombers could attack Soviet territory from Europe or the Baltic; and the multiple warheads used by the new SS-20's were possible only because the U.S. had refused all Soviet requests for an agreement to ban this type of weapon. But politically the deployment was a blunder because it destroyed Western Europe's autonomy, throwing it back under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and pushing it into the NATO cohesiveness which culminated in the 2-track policy and the eventual deployment of U.S. Cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe. With closing of ranks in the Western bloc, the USSR found it easier to justify re-tightening its straitjacket on the East: hence the Polish tragedy, which is a victim of the breakdown of détente as much as of its own internal contradictions.

Finally, the fourth pillar of détente — the strength of the non-aligned movement — crumbled as well. The superpowers, motivated by the new Cold War ideologies, reverted to the pre-détente doctrine: "If you are not with us, you're against us". This was the manifest lesson of Afghanistan; but the doctrine has reached its peak in the mercilessness of the Reagan Administration against all attempts at reform in the Third World. More people have been killed daily on average in El Salvador than in two years of troubles in Poland. The result of this renewed geo-political pressure is to turn each local conflict into a struggle between East and West, with all the inherent savage results to local people as well as the rise of Soviet-U.S. confrontation leading eventually to war. This, in brief, is why we now have the second Cold War.

## 2. Technical-Strategic Lead by the USA

The consistent pattern of the nuclear arms race, in the technical sphere, from Hiroshima on, has been the achievement by the U.S. of an advantage, followed by frantic attempts by the USSR to catch up. See Table I. Depending on the weapon and technology involved, the Soviet lag is anywhere from two to seven years. Dr. Linus Pauling referred to this when he addressed an Halifax audience last fall: "I don't see why the U.S. can't take one cautious, unilateral step towards nuclear disarmament. It has taken enough unilateral steps in the other direction!"

TABLE I  
Examples of Soviet Lag:

U.S. 1945	A-Bomb	U.S. 1949
U.S. 1954	H-Bomb	USSR 1955
U.S. 1958	ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile)	USSR 1958
U.S. 1960	Sub-launched ballistic missiles	USSR 1968
U.S. 1966	Multiple Warheads	USSR 1968
U.S. 1970	Multiple Independently targetted war-USSR head (MIRV)	USSR 1975
U.S. 1983	Long Range Cruise	USSR 1987

(adopted from *World Military and Social Expenditures* — Ruth Sivard)

The reasons for the Soviet lag have to do with a GNP only 50% of that of the U.S., and an inferior micro-electronics industry.

A current example of such a lag is the Cruise missile. The Cruise indeed represents an important technical breakthrough, which probably qualifies it as the new weapon most likely to start nuclear war. The Soviet response to Western development and deployment of this weapon will be to develop and deploy one of its own — with a two to three year lag time.

Another important example of the lag also illustrates just how easy it has been for propaganda to confuse people about the realities of nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy. In the 1960s, bigger nuclear warheads as measured by explosive power, were thought to be good. In the 1970s, American militarists realized that they got "more bang for the buck" from more warheads, and each with less explosive power or "megatonnage". It is for this reason that the modernized American arsenal contains more warheads than the Soviet arsenal but less megatonnage than its Soviet counterpart. This difference reflects an actual American advantage or Soviet lag in weapons development. However, in its propagandistic presentation of this discrepancy to the public, the American government does claim that greater Soviet megatonnage represents a Soviet nuclear weapon advantage which must be overcome by the United States increasing its arsenal to yet greater levels of missiles and of megatonnage.

At present, and without going into detail, the U.S. has an advantage over the USSR in two areas: submarines with nuclear weapons, and strategic bombers. The USSR has an advantage in medium-range missiles — those in Europe. In intercontinental missiles, there is rough equivalence. So the score is U.S. two, USSR one with one tie. Here I must add something very important: the U.S. strategy, which Canada is supporting and which will lead to deployment of Cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe, consists of an attempt to gain a draw out of the intermediate range game. Hence, the score would be U.S. two, USSR zero, with two draws. That would give the U.S. the overall nuclear superiority it seeks.

## 3. Proliferation

The third socio-political character of the nuclear arms race does not require much explanation. China, France, and Britain all have nuclear arsenals. In the latter two cases, these countries have decided to place increased rather than decreased reliance on "nuclear deterrence" over the next decade. All of these arsenals are directed specifically against the Soviet Union and do represent a significant strike capacity to be feared by the USSR.

In addition to these blatantly nuclear states, there are also several states which probably have nuclear weapons or could produce them within months: this list includes states which would be very likely to comply nuclear weapons in support of their emergent national interest, such as Israel and South Africa. Finally, there are dozens of states which have the capacity to produce nuclear weapons in a year or two, and which have indirectly been assisted in working in that direction by technological assistance from countries like Canada. An example of this type of country is Argentina, to which Canada supplied nuclear bundles even without the assurance that Argentina would abide by the non-proliferation treaty — in other words that it would use the

technology only for peaceful purposes. It is estimated that nuclear war caused by a smaller power which has nuclear capacity may be the third most likely cause of world nuclear war, following nuclear war by psychological or technical error and nuclear war as a manifestation of military confrontation between the USSR and the United States.

## CANADA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE ARMS RACE

### Canada's Background in Conventional Arms: A Preparation for Nuclear Role?

A few facts regarding Canada's participation in conventional arms race may give some understanding of our preparation for a significant role in the nuclear arms race.

1. Canada ranks ninth in the world as an exporter of arms, over \$500 million annually, of which \$300 million goes to the U.S. This also includes military equipment to regimes like Chile and El Salvador.
2. Recently, the Canadian government has approved more than \$80 billion for new military equipment.
3. The Defence Industry Productivity Programme (DIP), a grants programme, administered by the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, helps Canadian arms firms compete internationally. It paid out a reported \$151.6 million dollars in subsidies to Canadian arms contractors in the fiscal year 1981-1982.
4. The Canadian government and its agencies help expedite international military contracts, help industry participate in defence-oriented trade fairs and publishes an export shipper's guide to aid sale of military wares. Former Defence Minister Danson summed up Canada's conventional role nicely in 1978:  
"We may not be big in the bang, but we're big in the high technology buck. Since 1969, some 600 Canadian companies have sold six billion dollars in defence-related products. Defence exports provide, directly, some 25,000 jobs, typically scientists, engineers, and technicians. Indirectly, they create 100,000 jobs".
5. Canada has not allocated 0.1% of its defence budget (\$5 million) towards disarmament activities, as the UN Secretary General has suggested.

### In the Field of Nuclear Arms

Canada produces components for the U.S. nuclear arsenal in the following areas:

1. For Trident nuclear submarines — cranes by Heeds International, Port Moody, B.C.
2. For Cruise missiles — navigation systems by Litton, Rexdale, Ont.
3. For neutron bomb delivery — launcher production by Hawker-Siddely, Toronto.
4. Lots of uranium.

These commitments are added to a probable promise to test the Cruise missile, overflying of Canadian territory by American strategic bombers, and the frequent presence in Canadian waters and servicing in Canadian harbours of American submarines carrying nuclear weapons.

At the United Nations, Canada has recently voted NO to a resolution against nuclear neutron weapons; NO to agreement against stationing nuclear weapons on territories; NO to a resolution that states and statesmen resorting first to nuclear weapons will be committing the gravest crime against humanity; NO to a resolution favouring a nuclear weapons freeze, supported by the vast majority of U.N. members.

What socio-political factors have resulted in a vastly increased Canadian participation in the nuclear arms race? During the first Cold War, Canada's participation in the arms race was aligned on attitudes prevalent in the West: Canadian leaders felt committed to the extension of American power in a fight against "Communism". As time went on and Canada became increasingly tied into the American system of communication — and therefore, on the sociological level more bound up with specific American values and ideology — Canada identified itself more and more with American nuclear strategy. But never without some sort of fight at some level. In 1958, Major-General Macklin of the Canadian Armed Forces stated that Norad Air Defence Command, established in 1957, made the Canadian Air Force "a colonial military instrument serving the nuclear strategy of the United States". The Air defence Command passed Canadian freedom of action in military decisions to an integrated headquarters in Colorado Springs with the U.S. as "major partner" in a group of two. During the Cuban missile crisis, the U.S. initiated an alert. The Canadian PM held back his sanction for two days. But the Canadian forces went on full alert, following U.S. command, despite their own Government.

The Diefenbaker Government, fearful of American control, resisted a nuclear role. Lester Pearson, in 1962, supported that position in a speech to the Canadian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. But in 1963, he reversed his position and heavy American pressure helped the Liberals win the election of that year. The Pearson Government agreed to supply four nuclear weapon systems to the Canadian Forces but these were eliminated by the early 70s and Canada now has no nuclear weapons.

So Canada now does not build or control nuclear weapons systems, it just supplies parts. In addition, Canadian military men and politicians took a leading role in 1979 in the decision to deploy new nuclear weapons in Europe. There was no debate in Parliament about this decision.

What is the character of the nuclear disarmament movement in Canada? Most important is its diversity. Coalitions against nuclear war in this country generally contain church groups; professional groups; development groups; women's organizations; labour organizations; community associations; charities. The central tenet in most of these coalitions is the concept of the nuclear weapons free zone.

A last important question about Canada's role in the nuclear arms race: What is our influence? Here there are many misconceptions. Some Canadians seem to consider that Canada's middle power influence is minimal. (One must add that the Canadian Government has fostered this image of powerlessness. Perhaps it then becomes easier to deemphasize our role in the arms race.) In fact, Canada's position and influence are central to the Western powers. This country is something of a weathervane. Any clear dissociation by Canada from, for example, American nuclear



weapons policy, could seriously influence European powers. This would result in isolation of the United States, as a result of which it would be obliged to modify its policy or accept the breakdown of the NATO alliance. A declaration of a nuclear weapon free zone, because it implies rejection of American nuclear policy, would contain exactly that signal. On the other hand, the opposite course, the policy now being pursued by the Canadian Government, has the opposite effect. By collaboration with American nuclear policy, Canada connotes a centrality to that policy which tends to give it rationality in the eyes of Western Europe. We are the mediators or translators between Europe and the U.S. Hence our key

influential role in success or failure of nuclear escalation by the West. □

#### Bibliography


Instead of the usual bibliography, we refer the reader to Dr. Cappon's course-kit for physicians on the nuclear arms race, which constitutes the extended and annotated bibliography which provided the information for this article.

Available from Dr. Paul Cappon, Physicians for Social Responsibility, P.O. Box 5084, Armdale, N.S. B3P 4M6.

## HELP PREVENT

## THE FINAL EPIDEMIC, NUCLEAR WAR

*by joining*



## PHYSICIANS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, NOVA SCOTIA

P.O. BOX 5084 ARMDALE, HALIFAX, N.S. B3P 4M6, PHONE: (902) 423-9998

PSR Nova Scotia is an organization of DOCTORS AND OTHER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS committed to advance public knowledge of the imminent threat and health results of nuclear war and to press our governments for sane nuclear disarmament policies.

#### *PREVENTION OF THE LAST EPIDEMIC BY ADEQUATE PROPHYLAXIS*

We regard this as an issue of Preventive Medicine as well as social responsibility. PSR Nova Scotia is affiliated with PSR Canada which is in turn affiliated with International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (membership is over 50,000 doctors in over 40 countries, East and West). PSR has no political affiliations.

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
- be part of a world wide medical effort to prevent the Final Epidemic.
- be able to participate in PSR activities: attend educationals, contact political representatives, act as speaker etc.
- receive a regular PSR Nova Scotia newsletter.
- have access to educational materials from the PSR Nova Scotia Resource Centre.
- be able to participate in PSR elections and formulation of policy.

**For more information or to obtain a membership form please write or telephone.**

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**THE CANADIAN MEDICAL COALITION FOR THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR**

P. O. Box 1749  
Halifax, NS  
B3J 3A5

November 17, 1983

The Honourable Allan J. MacEachen  
Minister of External Affairs  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0G2

Dear Mr. MacEachen:

As indicated in the enclosed correspondence to the Prime Minister's office, I have written to Mr. Trudeau that I would be willing to be seconded to his most important task force on international relations and disarmament. I wanted to make you aware of my willingness to work with the task force in any way which may be effective and appropriate. I would be pleased to hear your reaction to this proposal. (Dr. John Savage, a medical colleague and a colleague in some of my international medical work, has agreed to recommend me to you for the task force.)

I have a background and experience which may be quite useful in connection with the work which the task force has been outlined. I am president of Physicians for Social Responsibility/Nova Scotia and a director of Physicians for Social Responsibility/Canada. I was a participant at the 25th Commemorative Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, and therefore have wide-ranging contacts among the leading scientific and diplomatic disarmament figures, and among purveyors of international goodwill. In addition, I have been a student of international relations for 15 years, having had the opportunity to complete a Doctorate in the Sociology of Development, including international development, in Paris in 1972. In addition, I have since before that time been reading the literature in the field of international relations and development in four European languages (English, French, German and Italian). My contacts and friends interested in the area include academics, physicians, scientists, and diplomats.

Recently, I have been attempting to make available my perspectives to the Liberal Party of Canada through a position paper, called Liberal Opportunities in Nuclear Disarmament, containing the germs of concepts which may be used for a furtherance of goals of international security. I have forwarded this position paper

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
The Honourable Allan J. MacEachen  
November 17, 1983  
Page 2

to Liberals like Audrey Gill, Lorna Marsden, and David Berger.

Finally, I think I could bring to the task force an appreciation of the North-South and developmental dimensions of international relations. I am a registered consultant in the area of Community Health for the World Bank and the Canadian International Development Agency. I am project director of the Third World Medical Equipment Assistance Project, which supplies serviceable, used Canadian medical equipment to developing countries in the Western Hemisphere. I think that the insights from this experience may be valuable in the considerations of the task force.

In enclosing my curriculum vitae and resume, I would hope that you could facilitate any contact between myself and the organizers of the task force.

Yours sincerely,



8-11-83

Paul Cappon, M.D., PhD. (Sociology)  
Director of Health Services,  
City of Halifax.


President, Physicians for Social Responsibility/Nova Scotia.

Director, Physicians for Social Responsibility/Canada.

Participant, 25th Commemorative Pugwash Conference on Science  
and World Affairs.

Atlantic Co-ordinator, Third World Medical Equipment Assistance  
Project.

PC/bjc  
Encls.



70-8 Nuclear Desaminate

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Department of External Affairs



Ministère des Affaires extérieures

Canada

OTTAWA, January 6, 1984

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Peter Roberts  
Canadian Ambassador  
Moscow

Dear Peter,

Attached for your background information are copies of two memoranda which we recently forwarded to the Prime Minister, and which you may find of interest. I should be grateful if you would limit their circulation within the Embassy to those with a direct interest in the subject matter and then ensure their destruction.

Allow me to tell you how much we have valued the excellent reporting from Moscow over the past few months and to wish you and your colleagues all the best for the New Year.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "L. A. Delvoie".  
L. A. Delvoie

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Jan 3/84  
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1002-0302  
Dec 19/83


January 6, 1983

IDDZ-0016

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

Initiative: Call on UN Secretary General

Attached for your consideration is a  
briefing book for your call on UN Secretary General  
Perez de Cuellar, January 11, 1984.



L.A. Delvoie  
Chairman  
Task Force Working Group

cc: PMO/Axworthy/Coleman

PCO/Osbaldeston/Fowler/Archdeacon

DND/Anderson

DEA/MINA/USS/DMF/IFB/IDA/IMU

MF

CONFIDENTIAL

January 6, 1983


IDDZ-0014

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

Initiative: Letter to President Andropov

Attached for your signature, is the original of your letter of January 5 to President Andropov, which was transmitted telegraphically to Moscow yesterday.

Also attached for your information is a telegram from our ambassador in Moscow reporting the reaction of the Soviet Foreign Ministry official to whom he delivered the text of your message.



L.A. Delvoie  
Chairman  
Task Force Working Group

cc: PCO/Fowler



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

O T T A W A, K1A 0A2

January 5, 1983

Dear Mr. President,

As we enter 1984, I have renewed confidence that the political will exists to repair lines of communication between East and West and to begin to build a more constructive relationship. I was pleased to receive support for this endeavour in your reply to my message of early November.

I have completed consultations with a large number of Western and Third World leaders. Without exception, I have received vigorous encouragement for my undertaking to reduce tensions and promote productive dialogue. I am pleased to note that Mr. Gromyko will be going to Stockholm and that he will have an opportunity to meet Western foreign ministers. I know that the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. MacEachen, looks forward to an opportunity to meet Mr. Gromyko privately to exchange views on a number of topical bilateral and international questions.

I remain firmly committed to the importance of deepening the dialogue with you and your colleagues in the Soviet leadership. In that regard, I fully understand that it has not yet been possible to fix a firm date for me to take up your personal invitation to visit Moscow. In planning the course of my initiative for the weeks ahead I still hope it will be possible to visit Moscow before the end of January. If, however, you believe that this would impose unduly on your personal agenda, I want you to know that I am prepared to meet in Moscow in that time period with those of your colleagues whom you might personally designate.

.../2

His Excellency Yuri Andropov  
President of the Presidium of the  
Supreme Soviet  
Moscow, USSR



- 2 -

Last November, my emissary outlined to Mr. Gromyko and other senior officials some of my ideas on positive steps to improve the level of East-West understanding. I would like to elaborate on the results of my consultations with other leaders thus far, and gain first-hand the assessment of the Soviet leadership of the international situation and the Soviet approach to the political challenges which face us all.

Mr. President, may I extend to you my sincere personal wishes for a happy and successful new year and my prayers for an early and full recovery.

Yours sincerely,

- 2 -

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Yours sincerely

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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REF YOURTEL IDDZ0009 05JAN

---PM INITIATIVE:VISIT TO MOSCO

SUMMARY:AMB THIS AM DELIVERED TO SUSLOV,HEAD,SECOND EUROPEAN DEPT, TEXT OT PM LET TO ANDROPOV.SUSLOV UNDERTOOK TO HAVE LET TRANSMITTED ASAP TO ITS DESTINATION.HIS OFF-CUFF COMMENTS PROVIDED LITTLE GROUNDS FOR OPTIMISM THAT THERE WILL BE EARLY SOVIET DECISION RE TIMING FOR POSSIBLE PM VISIT TO MOSCO,REGARDLESS OF WHETHER HE WERE TO BE RECEIVED BY ANDROPOV OR BY DESIGNATED COLLEAGUES.

2.PROMPTNESS WITH WHICH AMB WAS RECEIVED BY SUSLOV(LESS THAN TWO HOURS NOTICE),AND CARE WITH WHICH HE STUDIED UNOFFICIAL EMB TRANSLATION OF TEXT,REFLECT SOVIET INTEREST IN APPEARING TO TAKE POSITIVE INTEREST IN PMS INITIATIVE.HOWEVER,SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSAL FOR JAN VISIT(AMB EXPLAINED PREFERRED TIME PERIODS ORALLY)WHETHER ANDROPOV AVAIL OR NOT/NOT CLEARLY PUT SUSLOV IN QUANDARY AS TO HOW TO RESPOND.RESULT WAS MUCH HEDGING,INCLUDING ALLUSIONS TO FACTORS OF TENUOUS RELEVANCE.SUSLOV RECALLED GROMYKO STATEMENTS TO PEARSON TO EFFECT THAT TIMING OF ANY VISIT MUST BE LEFT OPEN FOR TIME BEING AND STATED FIRMLY THAT QUOTE THIS SITUATION HAS NOT/NOT CHANGED UNQUOTE.HE FURTHER NOTED THAT GROMYKO WLD BE GOING TO STKHM,

...2

PAGE TWO XYGR0021 CONFD

NECESSITATING STRENUOUS AND TIME-CONSUMING PREPARATIONS, AND THAT ASSESSING RESULTS OF STKHM MTGS WLD ALSO REQUIRE TIME. MOST IMPORTANT THING, HE SAID, WAS THAT ANY MTG BETWEEN PM TRUDEAU AND QUOTE SOVIET LEADERS UNQUOTE BE A SUCCESS. HE UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY LET PROMPTLY TO ADDRESSEE.

3. SUSLOVS GENERALLY UNFORTHCOMING REMARKS SHLD NOT/NOT, WE THINK, BE CONSTRUED AS REFLECTING NEGATIVE SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD PMS INITIATIVE ITSELF. IN PRESENT SITUATION, NORMAL CAUTION OF SOV OFFICIALS IS REINFORCED BY PROBLEM OF CURRENT ANDROPOV INCAPACITY TO PARTICIPATE IN PUBLIC EVENTS AND IMPORTANT RELATED POLICY ISSUE OF HOW TO PRESENT THIS SITUATION TO WORLD. SENIOR SOV OFFICIALS CELARLY HAVE NO/NO IDEA WHEN THIS AWKWARD SITUATION MIGHT BE RESOLVED. HOW TO DEAL WITH IT IS CERTAINLY MATTER TO BE DECIDED BY TIGHT CIRCLE OF PARTY LEADERS. LATTER, WHILE WISHING TO AVOID APPEARING INDECISIVE OR UNRESPONSIVE TO INITIATIVE WHICH HAS BEEN WIDELY LAUDED BY OTHER HEADS OF GOVT (BOTH EAST AND WEST) MAY AT SAME TIME NOT/NOT WELCOME PROSPECT OF VISIT WHICH, BECAUSE OF INEVITABLY HIGH MEDIA COVERAGE, CLD HAVE EFFECT OF HIGHLIGHTING EMBARRASSING LEADERSHIP GAP HERE AND CONSEQUENT ASSYMETRY IN RECEPTION OF CDN PM. RELECTANCE TO TAKE EARLY DECISION ON TIMING OF VISIT MAY ALSO BE REINFORCED BY UNCERTAINTIES ON HOW MINISTERIAL MTGS IN STKHM (ESP. SCHULZ-GROMYKO MTG) MAY AFFECT EAST-WEST ATMOSPHERE IN COMING WEEKS.

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MASTER

FILE

Delvoie

Please ~~thank~~ <sup>thank</sup> ~~if~~ he came to Ottawa I certainly should see him.  
But what about seeing him in N.Y. when I go?

January 6, 1983

IDDZ-0013

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

Initiative: Letter from John Glenn

We attach for your information an advance copy of a letter from John Glenn, US Senator for Ohio and a candidate in this year's presidential election. This letter was delivered to our Embassy in Washington today and transmitted by electronic facsimile, hence the quality of the copy.

*L.A. Delvoie*  
L.A. Delvoie

Chairman

Task Force Working Group

MR FOWLER

Bob

cc: PMO/Axworthy

PCO/Osbaldeston

DND/Anderson

DEA/MINA/USS/DMF/IFB/IDR

How about Friday  
Jan 20 in NYC?

*WJ*

External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

1/3

WDC 7/06

# ACTION SUITE A DONNER MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY  
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Local Time

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SUBJ/SUJ

ATTACHED IS COPY OF LETTER FROM SENATOR JOHN GLENN TO  
PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU DATED JAN 3/84.

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 COMMUNICATIONS  
 JAN 6 21 39 '84  
 CANADIAN EMBASSY  
 WASHINGTON

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

R.J. Lysyshyn/dt

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SIG

R.J. Lysyshyn



2/3  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20510

JOHN GLENN  
OHIO

January 3, 1984

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I wish to express appreciation for your tireless efforts on behalf of arms control. Your proposals have injected a jolt of political energy into the arms debate, helping to raise public consciousness concerning this crucial issue. You have my full agreement in arguing that in the nuclear age the superpowers have no choice but to continue a dialogue, and I also strongly endorse your proposal to involve other nuclear weapons states as soon as possible in the negotiations.

For some months, as a candidate for President, I have been advocating a comprehensive five-point approach to arms control: (1) a nuclear freeze; (2) reductions of nuclear weapons in U.S.-Soviet arsenals; (3) improved nuclear proliferation controls; (4) full involvement of the other nuclear weapons states in the process; and (5) a strengthened effort to control conventional arms as well as nuclear.


With regard to involving other nuclear weapons states, my own specific proposal, which I stated publicly in October, would be to initiate immediately an annual nuclear weapons states conference at the foreign minister level. I also agree with your suggestion that such efforts aim at a ban on anti-satellite weapons, a category of new and destabilizing weaponry we must do everything possible to discourage.

His Excellency  
Pierre Elliott Trudeau  
Prime Minister of  
Canada

Mr. Prime Minister, you have my respect and admiration for speaking out boldly on this topic of ultimate concern to mankind's future. If your schedule allows, I would deeply appreciate the opportunity to meet with you to discuss these matters in detail. Please accept my wishes for health and happiness in the New Year.

Personal regards.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "John Glenn", written in a cursive style.

John Glenn  
United States Senator





Government  
of Canada

Gouvernement  
du Canada

TRANSMITTAL NOTE AND RECEIPT  
NOTE D'ENVOI ET REÇU

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act  
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

File No. — N° du dossier

004

TO — À

EXTOTT/IDDZ

ORIGINATOR AND ADDRESS — INITIATEUR ET ADRESSE

CDN EMB/Washington/Lysyshyn

Security Classification — Classification de sécurité

☐ Confidential  
☐ Confidentiel

☐ Secret

☐ Top Secret  
☐ Très Secret



UNCLASSIFIED

☒ With Enclosure(s)  
☒ Avec annexe(s)

☐ Without Enclosure  
☐ Sans annexe

QUANTITY  
QUANTITÉ

REFERENCE/COPY NO. — N° DE RÉFÉRENCE

DESCRIPTION

Our fax POL0753 06Jan84

Attached is the original of the letter from Senator John Glenn to Prime Minister  
Trudeau dated January 3, 1984 that was faxed to you on January 6, 1984.

*Sent to PCO/Fowler  
by G. Smith  
16/1/84*

Originator's Signature — Signature de l'initiateur

*[Signature]*  
Signature

Jan 09/84  
Date

Received By — Reçu par

*[Signature]*  
Signature

16/7/84  
Date

GC 44A  
7540-21-874-1328

ADDRESSEE—RETAIN THIS COPY AND RETURN COPY NO. 2 TO ORIGINATOR  
DESTINATAIRE—CONSERVER CETTE COPIE ET RENVoyer LA COPIE N° 2 À L'INITIATEUR

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UNITED STATES SENATE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20510

January 3, 1984

JOHN GLENN  
OHIO

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

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For some months, as a candidate for President, I have been advocating a comprehensive five-point approach to arms control: (1) a nuclear freeze; (2) reductions of nuclear weapons in U.S.-Soviet arsenals; (3) improved nuclear proliferation controls; (4) full involvement of the other nuclear weapons states in the process; and (5) a strengthened effort to control conventional arms as well as nuclear.

With regard to involving other nuclear weapons states, my own specific proposal, which I stated publicly in October, would be to initiate immediately an annual nuclear weapons states conference at the foreign minister level. I also agree with your suggestion that such efforts aim at a ban on anti-satellite weapons, a category of new and destabilizing weaponry we must do everything possible to discourage.


His Excellency  
Pierre Elliott Trudeau  
Prime Minister of  
Canada

-2-

Mr. Prime Minister, you have my respect and admiration for speaking out boldly on this topic of ultimate concern to mankind's future. If your schedule allows, I would deeply appreciate the opportunity to meet with you to discuss these matters in detail. Please accept my wishes for health and happiness in the New Year.

Personal regards.

Sincerely,

  
John Glenn  
United States Senator



Government  
of Canada

Gouvernement  
du Canada

TRANSMITTAL NOTE AND RECEIPT  
NOTE D'ENVOI ET REÇU

File No. — N° du dossier

003

TO — À

EXTOTT/IDDZ

ORIGINATOR AND ADDRESS — INITIATEUR ET ADRESSE

CDN EMB/Washington/Lysyshyn

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Publications and correspondence re The United States Academy of Peace

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MESSAGE

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J. McNeen

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
January 6, 1983

IDDZ-0012

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (through R.R. Fowler)

Initiative: Five Power Conference

Further to our meeting on January 5, we attach for your consideration and comments a paper outlining a new approach to the proposal for a conference of the five nuclear weapons states. We also attach for ease of reference a paper outlining the proposal as originally formulated.



L.A. Delvoie  
Chairman  
Task Force Working Group

cc: PMO/Axworthy  
PCO/Osbaldeston  
DND/Anderson  
DEA/MINA/USS/DMF/IFB/IDR

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## FIVE POWER CONFERENCE

The Five Power Conference idea, as originally enunciated by the Prime Minister on November 13, envisaged as a first step the setting of limits on the nuclear arsenals of the five nuclear powers followed by a reduction agreement. The reduction phase was only to be seen as a very long term objective. The original concept did envisage that other items might appear on the agenda, such as crisis management, but did not highlight these items or specify in what sequence they might be addressed. The questions of sequence and timing were to be left to the five powers.

The British, French and Chinese reactions to this proposal have been negative. They have set preconditions which have the effect of placing this proposal at the bottom of the arms control agenda. They have cited the failure of the superpowers to carry out their obligations as if this absolved them of their own. None have provided any substantive criticism of the proposal. None have suggested any alternative for bringing their nuclear forces within the context of arms control. Since there is no way that they can be forced to negotiate if they are unwilling, it would appear as if a five power nuclear limitation conference is unlikely to occur in the near future.

In light of the above it is perhaps time to rethink the substance, sequence and timing of the five power concept. The idea might appear more attractive, and have a greater possibility of acceptance, if we were to adopt a longer-term, more gradualist strategy in which the limitation and reduction phases were left to a later stage of deliberations, being substituted by other items of substance which the nuclear powers might be more ready to address at an early stage. This strategy would involve changes in both substance and process.

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PROCESS: Instead of beginning with a conference or a summit we could suggest that the five powers begin informal, preliminary discussions at a lower level. This could be done at ambassadorial level by the representatives of the five powers at the UN or the CD. The ambassadors could, for example, discuss the agenda, terms of reference and guiding principles of any five power nuclear conference. The Military Committee of the Security Council might also assume some useful function in this regard. The conference itself would come at a later stage pending the successful outcome of these discussions.

SUBSTANCE: The agenda of the conference itself could be divided into a greater number of phases with the limitation and reduction phases only coming at the end. The initial phases could deal with a variety of important nuclear related issues, the discussion of which might be more attractive to the three smaller nuclear powers. Such phases could be, for example: (Sequence for illustrative purposes only)

Phase I: Negotiation of nuclear confidence building measures of the type currently being discussed in START as well as others which might be put on the table by the three smaller powers.

Phase II: Discussion of non-proliferation in view of the special responsibilities resting on the nuclear powers. The five share an interest in avoiding further proliferation. This phase could concentrate on the formulation of new measures to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

Phase III: Negotiation of nuclear crisis management measures. This could include extension of USA-USSR measures to the other three powers as well as consideration of new proposals being put forward in the open literature on crisis management (control of accidents, communications).



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Phase IV: Negotiations on restraints on new destabilizing technologies. The measures put forward by the Prime Minister under the rubric of suffocation could be addressed. Concerns expressed by France and UK about the development of strategic defensive systems could also be addressed.

Phase V - Pre-limitation phase: This phase would focus on those questions which would have to be settled before actual limits could be negotiated. This could include: definitions, inclusions/exclusions, unit of account, verification, compliance mechanisms and withdrawal provisions.

Phase VI: Limitations (as in original proposal)

Canadian Action: Even if we were to elaborate further the five power proposal, as suggested above, the question would still arise as to how this might be pursued by the Canadian government so as to prevent the proposal from withering on the vine. The following are some of the actions that might be undertaken:

1. Further enunciation in the PM's third speech.
2. A more detailed discussion paper could be circulated to the five nuclear powers as well as to other interested governments, e.g. Germany, Italy, Japan. This could be followed up by bilateral consultations.
3. Bilateral consultations could be conducted with those governments which have come out in support of the idea.

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- 4 -

4. Our ambassadors in the capitals of the five nuclear powers, at the UN, the CD, NATO and perhaps elsewhere could be instructed to reiterate the concept whenever and wherever appropriate.
5. Through an NGO we could finance a conference on this subject inviting, in particular, leading commentators from the five nuclear powers in order to raise their consciousness vis-a-vis this proposal. Leading figures who support the concept, such as Helmut Schmidt, could be included.

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DISCUSSION PAPER

A GLOBAL APPROACH TO STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

I Subject:

This paper provides the rationale, means and substance of an initiative which could result in a structure of arms regulation and limitation for the five declared nuclear weapons states.

II Background

1. Arms control negotiations designed to limit or reduce strategic nuclear weapons have thus far only taken place between the Superpowers. The other three declared nuclear weapons states (France, Great Britain and China) have not been involved, and their arsenals remain unregulated by international agreement.
2. There are several reasons for this which maybe summarized as follows:
  - (a) Superpower arms control negotiations have been designed primarily to regulate, limit and render predictable the global strategic nuclear relationship between the two main protagonists of the East-West system. In terms of priorities, comprehensive coverage of all nuclear weapons states has been considered secondary.
  - (b) The strategic capabilities of the non-Superpower nuclear weapons states have been relatively insignificant compared to those of Moscow and Washington, both in terms of quality and quantity. Considered national deterrents of last resort, these forces have not been regarded as important elements in the dynamics of the strategic balance.
  - (c) In the past, the emphasis of both Superpowers in terms of nuclear force modernization and deployment was at the intercontinental level. The existence of a rough balance in the theatre, and the absence of significant force modernization

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by the Superpowers, or the other three nuclear states, reduced incentives or requirements to include those systems in arms control negotiations.

- (d) The guiding principle of strategic arms control negotiations has been the reality and codification of parity between the Superpowers. In addition, for the United States, the extension of the nuclear guarantee to Europe has been seen to require at least equality. Any negotiations which involved a reduction in U.S. forces vis à vis the Soviet Union as compensation for the existence of other nuclear forces has been seen to offend these requirements and goals.
  - (e) The non-Superpower nuclear weapons states themselves have refused to have their independent nuclear forces subjected to limits resulting from bilateral negotiations. In addition, involvement in multilateral fora has been eschewed for fear that their existing capabilities and modernization plans or options might be sacrificed.
3. The barriers to the inclusion of non-Superpower nuclear weapons states have been reduced by recent developments. These developments include the following:
- (a) All three non-Superpower states are engaged in force modernization/improvement programs. While these forces will remain a small fraction of the total global nuclear arsenal, that fraction will grow. More importantly, however, the quality of these arsenals will improve substantially in terms of accuracy, reliability, range, invulnerability, etc. Soviet interest in regulating these forces is likely to increase, as, perhaps, might Washington's, should arms control agreements become substantially more difficult to negotiate in the absence of such regulation.
  - (b) Arms control negotiations between the Superpowers have expanded in their purview to the point where virtually all US and Soviet weapons which are strategic and

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nuclear in nature are covered. This has applied both to the types of weapons under consideration and the geographic scope of the negotiations. As negotiations have impinged on the European theatre, the absence of a mutually acceptable framework for the treatment of British and French forces has caused problems in the negotiations. These problems did not exist to a similar extent when negotiations involved weapons of only intercontinental range.

- (c) Trends in the deterrence system as a whole have increased pressures on the current structure of negotiations. The advent of parity between the Superpowers has increased the incentives (and necessity) to focus on the balance of nuclear (and conventional) forces in Europe. This has resulted in a series of related developments: British and French expansion of strategic forces; incentives for the Soviet Union to expand its theatre nuclear capability to exert military and political leverage on Western Europe in the context of Superpower parity; and concomitant efforts to bolster US/NATO deterrent capacity through INF modernization. This focus on European security in European terms has generated pressures for some sort of overall framework for the consideration of all nuclear forces in the European theatre.
- (d) In the Far East, Chinese nuclear capability is expanding, causing concern to both the Soviet Union and Western-oriented states. As Chinese forces have increased in numbers and range, the attempt to limit Soviet INF forces directed in part against (unregulated) Chinese capabilities has become more difficult. From a Western perspective, the prospect of larger Chinese forces of intercontinental range in the context of what are perceived to be potentially volatile political alignments may increase incentives to bring Chinese forces under some sort of arms control regime.

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4. Previous and current attempts to account for the existence of British, French and Chinese forces have, however, met with considerable opposition from some or all of the parties concerned. At the Geneva INF talks, Soviet demands for compensation for British and French systems, structured so as to disallow US INF modernization, have been rejected. In the Soviet view British and French modernization programs would be permitted, but at the price of a de jure Soviet right to increase its arsenal accordingly. This, in turn, would formalize a strategic relationship whereby the Soviet Union would have the right to maintain nuclear forces equal to those of Britain, France, and the United States combined. For obvious reasons, this legitimization of Soviet nuclear superiority has been rejected by these three countries and the Alliance as a whole.
5. In general terms, negotiations which directly prohibited British and French modernization, or which legitimized countermeasures of the sort described above, would be rejected by British, France and the United States. In particular, such constraints, in the absence of significant reductions in Superpower arsenals, would be unacceptable. In addition, the negotiation of any regulation of these forces in a purely bilateral forum would be intolerable for Britain and France. And lastly, other NATO countries would be extremely unhappy with any arrangement which replaced US theatre force deployments with British and/or French guarantees.

### III The Proposal

6. The drawbacks of previous efforts to provide for the comprehensive regulation of nuclear forces should not, however, be seen as suggesting that all such schemes are to be rejected. A satisfactory scheme may be necessary for the reasons outlined earlier, and, indeed, may be desirable in terms of strategic stability and progress in arms control negotiations. A framework for the regulation of nuclear forces would lend overall predictability to the strategic balance, thereby reducing incentives to increase deterrent forces. Should negotiations produce

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a ratio of allowed strategic forces as between the parties, future modernization plans would be constained by quantitative ceilings. This predictability, and the limitations on modernization, would in turn increase the chances for meaningful arms reductions.

7. The following are general considerations bearing on the substance and process for negotiations designed to create an agreement on global nuclear arms limitation.

8. Process

- (a) Formal negotiations should be preceded by preliminary consultations designed to set the agenda, terms of reference, and guiding principles of subsequent talks.
- (b) These initial meetings should be convened without substantive preconditions except for agreement as to the overall purpose of the process. Preconditions as to substance may well decrease incentives to participate.
- (c) Talks should not be conducted on a bloc-to-bloc basis, but on the basis of individual state participation. Each state would retain a veto on the substance of any agreement.

9. Substance

- (a) The overall purpose would be to reach agreement on fixed ratios of national strategic forces.
- (b) Those ratios would have to reflect Superpower de jure equality.
- (c) Actual ratios should be the subject of negotiations.
- (d) The unit of account should be subject to negotiation, but agreement would be most likely if "warheads on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles" were to be adopted as the unit of measurement. This would have the virtue of corresponding to Western principles in the INF and START negotiations; of encouraging a move towards

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less vulnerable, single-warhead systems and away from vulnerable and destabilizing MIRVed systems; of preventing circumvention of the intent of the agreement through placing a larger number of warheads on a fixed number of launchers; and of not "handicapping" British, French, and Chinese forces which generally have less MIRV potential.

- (e) Currently planned modernization programs would have to be accommodated within the negotiated ratios, in order to secure agreement.
- (f) These negotiations and the resulting agreement should not be a substitute for ongoing START and INF talks, or their successors, but rather a complement. Should circumstances dictate, the agreement could reflect the outcome of these other negotiations. These other agreements could not, however, violate the agreed limits contained in the global accord. They might, however, result in additional constraints and measures designed to reduce weaponry beyond those measures agreed to in the five-power agreement.
- (g) Parties should be entitled to withdraw from the agreement given adequate notification (to be negotiated) in situations of perceived threat to their national security.
- (h) Qualitative modernization programs which did not violate the agreed ratios should be allowed, subject to the other arms control agreements.
- (i) All air, land, and sea-based systems deemed through negotiations to be strategic in nature should be included.
- (j) If forces of less than intercontinental range were deemed to be strategic by the participants, they could be aggregated with those of intercontinental range with a freedom to deploy systems wherever this was deemed desirable by the parties, subject to the restrictions of other arms control agreements.



- 7 -

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- (k) It would probably be necessary (and desirable) to attach specific numerical totals to the agreed ratios, thereby precluding quantitative increases beyond the agreed ratios which would legitimize proportional increases in the size of the forces of other parties. (This is explained in Annex A).
- (l) In order to accomodate ongoing arms control efforts, the establishment of precise ratios may have to await the outcome of the START and INF negotiations. These negotiations will provide the necessary predictability for the establishment of realistic ratios. In order to provide incentives for agreement in START and the INF talks, it would be desirable if the Superpowers committed themselves to global talks as part of these other agreements, should they be negotiated.
- (m) Should China refuse to participate, it should be possible to negotiate a Four Power agreement designed to regulate the forces of Britain, France the US and USSR.
- (n) Other agreed qualitative restraints could be negotiated as desired by the parties, as could collateral measures designed to enhance crisis management and increase confidence between the parties. These might include:
  - (i) a ban on high altitude ASAT systems.
  - (ii) a requirement for verifiability by National Technical Means.
  - (iii) restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs.



## EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

## AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

MASTER FILE

TO  
A

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SECURITY RESTRICTED  
Sécurité

FROM IMU  
De

DATE January 6, 1984

REFERENCE Smith/Puddington telcon of January 5  
Référence

NUMBER  
Numéro

IMU-0027

SUBJECT Speaking Notes for the Prime Minister on  
Sujet Leaving the UN Secretary-General's Office on  
January 11.


<b>FILE</b>	<b>DOSSIER</b>
<b>OTTAWA</b>	
<b>MISSION</b>	

**ENCLOSURES**  
*Annexes*

X

## DISTRIBUTION

IFB

As requested, attached are brief speaking notes that the Prime Minister may wish to use when he meets the press at the conclusion of his January 11 meeting with Mr. Perez de Cuellar. 

The notes highlight the obligation, assumed by all UN members under the UN Charter to maintain international peace and security. It focuses on the primary responsibility of the permanent members of the Security Council to promote effective nuclear disarmament measures and the urgent need for them to get on with the job.

R. A. Bradley

R. M. Middleton  
Director  
United Nations Affairs Division

IMU/D. George/J D Puddington/jg  
/2-2022 /6-6292

~~D R A F T~~

Notes for PM's Remarks on Leaving the UN Secretary-General's  
Office on January 11, 1984.

I have been discussing with the Secretary-General the role of the United Nations in the search for peace, and I am happy to say that our views on the matter are very similar, both on the problems faced and possible solutions to them.

The fundamental purpose of the United Nations according to its Charter is to maintain international peace and security and seek the peaceful resolution of international disputes. As the Secretary-General would be the first to agree, the UN is in need of strengthening in order to fulfill this critical aspect of its functions. The functioning and strengthening of the UN's peace and security role is the responsibility of all UN members, ~~and Canada for one is doing its part.~~ This concern was the central theme of Canada's keynote address at the opening of the last General Assembly in September and we have strongly supported the Secretary-General's efforts over the last two years to take practical measures in this regard. ~~For countries like Canada there is no alternative to a viable and effective UN system.~~

omit?

- 2 -

However, the Charter confers on the Security Council primary responsibility, within the UN, for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Council must be the major focus of efforts to strengthen the UN, and we look for leadership in this endeavour to the Council's members, especially its permanent members. These five countries, who alone have the power to prevent action by the Security Council through the use of the veto, also have an equally important responsibility to stimulate action to strengthen the effectiveness of the Council and uphold its authority. In particular, these five permanent members, who also happen to be the nuclear weapon states, have the primary obligation to initiate effective and concrete arms control and disarmament measures <sup>in the course</sup> ~~to cap the~~ *of international peace* nuclear genie before it destroys all of us. It is time ~~for them to do so.~~ *IN THEIR CAPACITY AS NUCLEAR POWERS* ~~that these states began to match their diplomatic skills~~ *THEY MIGHT BEGIN THE PROCESS OF DISCUSSING CONFIDENCE* ~~to their all-too apparent genius for military technology.~~

Surely, this would be the greatest contribution to peace and security that they could make in these tense and pressing times.

BUILDING MEASURES AND  
CRISIS MANAGEMENT AS A  
PRELUDE TO <sup>THE</sup> ~~THE~~ <sup>CONSTRUCTIVE</sup>  
NEGOTIATION OF LIMITATIONS AND  
THEN REDUCING OF THEIR NUCLEAR ARSENALS.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TO  
À  
Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs, OTTAWA, IDDZ  
FROM  
De  
Canadian Embassy, The Hague  
REFERENCE  
Référence  
SUBJECT  
Sujet  
Prime Minister's initiative

SECURITY  
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DATE  
January 6, 1984  
NUMBER  
Numéro  
0003

FILE	DOSSIER
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ENCLOSURES  
Annexes

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RSR  
CO/FOWLER

--- The attached letter was sent to the Ambassador by a private Dutch citizen, Mr. Rien Heeroma of Groningen. It is the sort of unsolicited message, obviously drafted with great care which makes one appreciate that the PM's efforts in Europe touched sympathetic cords in the hearts of ordinary people. It should encourage the Prime Minister in his ongoing mission and I recommend that the original letter be forwarded to him.

--- 2. I have written to Mr. Heeroma to thank him for the letter and to tell him it was being forwarded to the Prime Minister.

*RAH Smith*  
The Embassy

Canadian Embassy



Ambassade du Canada

Sophialaan 7  
2514 JP The Hague

January 5, 1984

Dear Mr. Heeroma,

I thank you for your letter of December 14 which was prepared with such care in both form and content. I would like to assure you that your letter to Prime Minister Trudeau has been forwarded to him and I know that he would like me to thank you on his behalf for your message of support for his efforts to promote world peace and understanding.

Yours sincerely,

L.A.H. Smith  
Ambassador

Mr. Rien Heeroma  
Vaargeul 129  
Groningen

14 December 1985

RIEN EN ANNEKE HEEROMA

~~Ol Kösterij~~  
~~aan 184~~ Scheemda  
waargail 129  
9432 JT Groningen

The Embassy of Canada  
Sophieaan 7  
2544 JP 's Gravenhage

Dear Sir,

I'll ask you please to be so kindly to send this letter to the leader  
of your government, Mr Trudeau.

Yours sincerely

Pim Heeroma

MF

INFO

1



External Affairs / Affaires étrangères  
Department / Ministère

MESSAGE

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ATTACHED IS THE FIRST REFERENCE TO THE SUBJECT WE HAVE SEEN IN THE  
ALASKA PRESS. OF SIGNIFICANCE IS THAT THE ARTICLE IS BY JOHN HOLMES  
AND WAS FEATURED PROMINENTLY IN THE ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS OF 18DEC93.

CHAPTER RELATIONS

DIVISIONAL SECTION

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SIC

ALAN D. ROWE

*Alan D. Rowe*

1413043



# World leaders are listening to Trudeau

By JC HOLMES  
The Los Angeles Times

**T**ORONTO — The most significant fact about the "peace initiative" that Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau has been discussing in world capitals, and will discuss with President Reagan Thursday, may be that no one wants to reject it. It is essentially a plea to "reverse the trend" (Trudeau's words) toward conflict and arms escalation. The particular proposals — which include a meeting of all five nuclear powers, a ban on testing anti-satellite systems and renewed efforts to limit both vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferations — are ideas that might be considered in getting the East-West dialogue moving again.

Everywhere that Trudeau has sought support he has been welcomed: very warmly in Brussels, The Hague, Tokyo, the Vatican and by the assembled Commonwealth heads of government in New Delhi, and politely in Paris, Rome, London and Bonn. Most leaders agree with the good intentions and have reservations of one kind or another, but seem anxious to put forward proposals of their own to the same end. Of the nuclear powers, China seems the most interested, inviting Trudeau for a side trip from New Delhi to Peking. The Chinese want nuclear reduction but, like the British and French, insist that it is the superpowers, not they, who need goading.

According to the diplomatic correspondent of the London Daily Telegraph, "What (British Prime Minister Margaret) Thatcher listened to with wholehearted enthusiasm was Trudeau's proposal for an initiative conducted at high political level to pump new energy and confidence into the deflated remains of East-West dialogue." Such an imprecise prodding can be exasperating to those who have been locked in endless negotiation. Washington has not wanted to be rude, but there have been indications of annoyance with this "interference."

Yet Reagan could hardly refuse to listen. As neither Reagan nor Trudeau is expert in arms control, the discussion is likely to be in very general terms. U.S. officials have resented the implication that they share guilt with the Soviets for the arms race. (That bothers some of the Europeans, too. Americans also have worried about any interruption, at this delicate stage, of NATO strategy for the deployment of Pershing 2 and cruise missiles. Unlike the peace marchers, however, Trudeau's is a plea from an alliance member who accepts NATO's two-track position and who has recently agreed, against strong domestic opposition, to allow testing of the cruise in Canada.

The Soviets could have wrecked the campaign by embracing it. But they, too, have been inclined to ask, "Who, me?" Canada's former ambassador to Moscow, Geoffrey Pearson, has had informal talks with Soviet officials, and it seems likely that Trudeau will be invited to Moscow. But Trudeau

has disclaimed any suggestion that his role is that of a mediator. Like the Americans, the Soviets do not find much of interest in the specific arms-control suggestions.

In Canada, early suspicion that this was simply a ploy to rescue the Liberal government from its abysmal poll ratings has been largely overcome. Trudeau is reflecting acute unease among Canadians about the ominous negotiating stalemate and the rising level of conflict. Opposition leader Brian Mulroney, with his ear to the electorate, has offered bipartisan support. Public support rallied after an anonymous Pentagon official told Canadian correspondents that Canada has no right to make arms proposals in view of its "disgraceful" record on defense.

Even Canadians who might agree with the assessment resented that word from Washington that lesser powers should mind their own business only strengthens their resolve to speak up.

"All he may accomplish in the end," one of Trudeau's officials has said, "is to send an impulse through the system." This initiative should not be regarded as anti-American, especially as it reflects a good deal of American opinion. But a government preoccupied with sending "signals" should recognize (in the quiet support given Trudeau) a signal of grave concern — not so much with U.S. policies as with the demonological bent of Reagan advisers. If America's allies are concerned with Moscow's attitude, it is not out of sympathy but awareness of the terrifying Soviet paranoia.

U.S. isolation in the United Nations and spreading anti-Americanism may not worry Washington, but it has frightened its friends, who count on American ballast to maintain the equilibrium of essential international institutions.

Without claiming it as a Canadian success, officials in Ottawa are happy that the NATO ministers have agreed to attend the Stockholm Conference on Arms Control and, as Trudeau has put it, "inject a little political energy into the East-West standoff."

Indeed, after meeting with Trudeau in Ottawa, it was the supreme allied commander in Europe, Gen. Bernard Rogers, who told Canadian journalists that "the direction I think we must take leads to Geneva, leads to Vienna, leads now to the Conference on Disarmament in Europe at Stockholm, all of which have a part to play in trying to get the growth of military might under control."

Referring to Trudeau, he added: "If his thrust is that we must have successful arms negotiation in order to achieve the future we want, then he and I agree."

□ John Holmes, a former undersecretary of state for external affairs, is counselor of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and professor of international relations at the University of Toronto.



Andrew Davis News  
Dec. 18, 1983

2 of 2

BF

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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REF YOURTEL IDR0054 05JAN

---MBFR:PROPOSED FOREIGN MINS MTG

GOTLIEB RAISED PROPOSED MTG ON MBFR WITH BURT. BURT SAID HE HAD  
ALREADY SEEN REPORT FROM BRU AS RESULT OF TAYLORS NOTE. HE SAID HE  
THOUGHT IDEA WAS A LITTLE PREMATURE AS USA IS ACTIVELY LOOKING AT  
MBR QUESTION. IN A FEW WEEKS IT MAY BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO TALK  
TO US ABOUT IT, BUT THAT A FOREIGN MINS MTG MAY BE UNNECESSARY. THERE  
IS FAR MORE MOMENTUM ON MBFR IN USA ADMIN THAN IS APPARENT.

2. BURT LIKED THE IDEA OF A GENERAL DISCUSSION ON ARMS CONTROL EVEN  
LESS AS IT WLD HAVE EFFECT OF PUTTING USA IN THE HOT SEAT PERHAPS  
BEFORE IT WAS PREPARED TO DO SO. HE PROMISED HOWEVER TO GIVE MATTER  
SERIOUS CONSIDERATION AND GET BACK TO US SOON. WILL ADVISE.

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**CDN EYES ONLY**  
**RESERVE AUX CDNS**

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DISTR MINA USS DMF DMFX IFB LDDZ IDRA IDRL IDA RGB RGD RBR UGB  
URD URR ZSP ZSI CPD RCD RCR

---ARMS CONTROL:MTG WITH ADELMAN

SUMMARY:LUNCHEON MTG WITH ACDA DIRECTOR ADELMAN REVEALED THAT ADMIN  
WAS STILL QUITE SERENE OVER INTERRUPTION IN ARMS CONTROL NEGS AND  
CONFIDENT USSR WOULD FIND IT IN SOVIET INTERESTS TO RETURN TO TABLE.  
ADELMAN IS OF VIEW INF TALKS SHOULD BE CONTINUED AS SEPARATE EXERCISE  
IF POSSIBLE.ON CDE,WHITE HOUSE MTG THIS MORNING SENT GOODBY OFF WITH  
FAIRLY MINIMALIST INSTRUCTIONS AND CONFIRMED USA POSITION ON RDF WILL  
NOT/NOT CHANGE.UNOFFICIAL REACTION OF ADELMAN TO PROPOSAL FROM CDA  
FOR MINISTERIAL IN EARLY SPRING TO DISCUSS MBFR WAS THAT SUBJECT  
COULD EASILY BE DEALT WITH AT MAY NAC MINISTERIAL IN WSHDC.ON ABM  
TECHNOLOGY,ADELMAN THOUGHT THAT ULTIMATELY USA R AND D WOULD NOT/NOT  
REALLY LEAD ANYWHERE.HE DISPLAYED SIMILARLY MODERATE VIEWS ON IMMI-  
NENT REPORT BY ADMIN ON SOVIET VIOLATION OF ARMS CONTROL TREATIES,  
SAYING STUDY WOULD BE KEPT SECRET AND DISCUSSED ONLY WITH CONGRESS,  
ALLIES AND,OF COURSE,SOVIETS.HE ALSO AGREED IT WAS HIGHLY IMPROBABLE  
SOVIET INTERESTS WOULD BE SERVED BY SEEING USA MILITARY PRESENCE  
REMOVED FROM EUROPE IN SHORT TERM.

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2.REPORT:LONG LUNCHEON MTG GOTLIEB AND KINSMAN HAD WITH ADELMAN AND ACDA COUNSELLOR GUHIN WAS USEFUL PRIMARILY IN WHAT ADELMAN REVEALED ABOUT QUOTE HORNETS NEST UNQUOTE OF ISSUES AND OPINIONS ON ARMS CONTROL TOPICS IN ADMIN.ONE OF ISSUES ON WHICH THERE IS BROAD CONSENSUS IS RESUMPTION OF ARMS CONTROL NEGS WITH USSR.(SEE ALSO OURTEL UNGR 1009 ON MTG HELD TODAY WITH ASST SECRETARY BURT).BUT ADELMAN CONFIRMED THAT ADMIN POSITION IS BASICALLY THAT BALL IS IN USSR COURT AND IT IS UP TO SOVIETS TO MAKE NEXT MOVE.ADELMAN THOUGHT IT WOULD BE IN SOVIET INTEREST TO REACH SEPARATE INF AGREEMENT AT EQUAL NUMBERS THOUGH HE RECOGNIZED IT COULD BE TRUE THAT USSR WOULD BE UNABLE TO RATIFY SUCH AGREEMENT IN A TREATY FOR DOCTRINAIRE AND COSMETIC REASONS.ADELMAN HAD BECOME CONVINCED USSR WAS GENUINELY WORRIED ABOUT P2 AND DID NOT/NOT BELIEVE USA WOULD HAVE DESIGNED BALLISTIC MISSILE WHICH WAS INCAPABLE OF HITTING MOSCO FROM GERMANY.ADELMAN HAD NOT/NOT BELIEVED IT EITHER WHEN HE TOOK PRESENT JOB BUT LEARNED TO HIS AMAZEMENT IT IS TRUE.HE WAS OF VIEW INF TALKS SHOULD NOT/NOT BE FOLDED INTO START NEGS BECAUSE INF ISSUES WOULD BECOME LOST THERE. HE EMPHASIZED THAT USA AND USSR WERE ACTUALLY QUITE CLOSE ON INF ISSUES.IF IT WERE NOT/NOT FOR FACT THAT WHOLE EXERCISE HAD BECOME SUCH A POLITICAL GAME,THEY COULD PROBABLY REACH AN AGREEMENT.

3.THERE WAS SOME SPECULATION AS THERE ALWAYS IS IN DISCUSSIONS HERE THESE DAYS ON WHAT AND WHO ARE MAKING THINGS TICK IN MOSCO.ADELMAN THOUGHT THAT THE LAST THING USSR WANTED TO DO AT THIS POINT WAS HELP

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RONALD REAGAN POLITICALLY AND THOUGHT SOVIETS WOULD BASICALLY STAY ALOOF FROM USA FOR THAT REASON. HOWEVER, USSR WOULD PURSUE THOSE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WERE IN OBJECTIVE INTEREST OF SOVIETS AND ADELMAN STILL THOUGHT ARMS CONTROL FELL INTO THAT CATEGORY.

4. ON CDE, ADMIN SAW EXERCISE AS FAIRLY LONG HAUL AND DID NOT/NOT ANTICIPATE ANY BREAKTHROUGHS OF CONSEQUENCE IN SHORT TERM. HOWEVER, REAGAN AGREED THIS MORNING THAT EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO KEEP ATMOSPHERE AS PRODUCTIVE AS POSSIBLE. (IN EARLIER MTG TODAY WITH ASST SECRETARY ABRAMS ON HUMAN RIGHTS SIDE, WE LEARNED THAT SHULTZ'S SPEECH WOULD AVOID POLEMICS EVEN THOUGH IT WOULD TOUCH UPON NEED TO CONTINUE VIGILANCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS SIDE). ADELMAN SAID THAT USA WOULD NOT/NOT CHANGE ITS MIND ON IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO ABILITY TO STAGE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCES FROM EUROPE WITHOUT IN ANY WAY HAVING TO NOTIFY USSR. (OURTEL UNGR1016 05JAN)

5. ON MBFR, ADELMAN ELABORATED ON POINT SHULTZ MADE AT LUNCH WITH PM TRUDEAU LAST MONTH TO EFFECT THAT NEGOTIATION ENABLES USA TO NEUTRALIZE CONGRESSIONAL SENTIMENT IN FAVOUR OF WITHDRAWAL OF USA TROOPS FROM EUROPE. ADMIN IS ABLE TO SAY THAT THIS WOULD AMOUNT TO UNILATERAL CONCESSION ON ISSUE UNDER NEGOTIATION WITH USSR AGAINST AGREED POSITION OF ALLIANCE. FOR THIS REASON ALONE, MBFR EXERCISE HAS BEEN WORTH IT FROM USA POINT OF VIEW.

6. ADELMAN BASICALLY CONFIRMED CONTENT OF OURTEL 1012 OF 05JAN ON WHETHER USSR IS SEEKING WITHDRAWAL OF USA MILITARY PRESENCE FROM EUROPE. BOTH HE AND LATER BURT AGREED IT MAY BE LONG TERM

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THEORETICAL OBJECTIVE BUT THAT FOR FORESEEABLE FUTURE USSR WOULD SEE USA PRESENCE AS BEING STABILIZING. IN THEIR VIEW, ADMIN THINKING WAS STILL VERY MUCH THAT USSR CONTINUED TO FEAR GERMANY. BURT NOTED THAT KUITLINSKY HAD ALSO TOLD BUSH THAT USSR WAS A EUROPEAN POWER AND USA WAS NOT. BUT HE DID BELIEVE THIS WAS PART OF PRACTICAL USSR POLICY.

7. ADELMAN THOUGHT CDN PROPOSAL FOR SEPARATE MINISTERIAL MTG THIS SPRING TO DISCUSS MBFR AND OTHER ISSUES AS OUTLINED YOURTEL IDR0054 05JAN WOULD BE PROBLEMATIC FOR ADMIN BUT BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE DUPLICATION WITH NAC MTG IN WSHDC IN MAY, HE DID AGREE TO LOOK HARD AT PROPOSAL ON ITS MERITS.

8. ON ABM AND HIGH ALTITUDE R AND D, ADELMAN PLAYED DOWN IMPORTANCE OF RECENT ADMIN DECISIONS. HE DESCRIBED ATTITUDE OF REAGAN TOWARD THESE ISSUES AS THAT OF QUOTE TEENAGER UNQUOTE. THE MORE YOU KNEW ABOUT SUBJECT, THE LESS YOU COULD BE PERSUADED IT WOULD REALLY LEAD ANYWHERE. EXTRA FUNDING THIS YEAR WAS LESS THAN A BILLION DOLLARS. BENEATH WEINBERGER AND IKLE AT PENTAGON, THERE WERE NO/NO DEFENCE ENTHUSIASTS. HOWEVER, HE THOUGHT THAT USA NEED TO KEEP ABREAST OF R AND D POSSIBILITIES IN THIS AREA MERITED MUCH MORE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION THAN HAD THUS FAR BEEN AWARDED BY SCIENTIFIC AND POLITICAL COMMUNITY BOTH IN USA AND ABROAD.

9. ON ALLEGATIONS OF SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF ARMS CONTROL TREATIES, ADELMAN SAID THAT ACDA HAD BEEN WORKING NIGHT AND DAY TO PRODUCE REPORT. HOWEVER, REAGAN HAD DECIDED HE WOULD PRODUCE USA CONCLUSIONS

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WITHOUT POLEMICS SINCE ACCUSATORY APPROACH, IF TAKEN DRAMATICALLY, WOULD ONLY UNDERMINE USA ABILITY TO CONDUCT AND CONCLUDE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, THERE WAS OBLIGATION TO LOOK INTO THESE THINGS. ADMIN HAD FOUND VIOLATIONS TO BE CLEAR IN CASE OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AND LESS CLEAR IN ALL OTHER CASES, INCLUDING DEVELOPMENT OF NEW ROCKETS, TELEMETRY, AND ABM RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. HE POINTED OUT THAT USA SATELLITE PHOTOGRAPHY HAS SO IMPROVED THAT CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET WEAPONS SYSTEMS BEING IDENTIFIED FOR FIRST TIME MAY NOT/ NOT BE INNOVATIONS BUT MAY RATHER SIMPLY BE ONLY NOW BECOMING VISIBLE. ON OTHER HAND CONSTRUCTION OF RADAR UNIT WHICH USA CONCLUDED THIS YEAR MAY WELL BE FOR ABM/R AND D PURPOSES HAS NONE OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF SATELLITE TRACKING STATION WHICH USSR CLAIMS IS ITS FUNCTION. THESE ISSUES ARE ALL BEING DISCUSSED WITH USSR IN SCC AND IT IS INTERESTING THAT SOVIET HAVE JUST ASKED FOR A NEW MTG IN FEB, THE FIRST SINCE INF DEPLOYMENT BEGAN. USA WILL TRY TO COMPLETE REPORT ON THIS SUBJECT BY END OF JAN AND WILL RELEASE ITS CONTENTS ONLY TO APPROPRIATE CTTEES OF CONGRESS AND TO NATO ALLIES. (BURT TELLS US NATO BRIEFING MAY BE NEXT WEEK)

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**ACTION  
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BH HOF COTT/RT HON CLARK DE OTT

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REF OURTEL YTGR8422 22DEC

---VISIT OF RT HON JOE CLARK TO GENEV:ACD DISCUSSIONS

WE ARE FORWARDING TO IDDZ(ONLY)FULL REPORT PROMISED IN REFTEL FOR

CLEARANCE BY MR CLARK AND SUBSEQUENT DISTR TO SUCH OTHER

ADDRESSEES AS DEEMED APPROPRIATE.

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**ACTION**  
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WSHDC/GOSSAGE BOSTN LNGLS SEATL SFRAN REGAM ATNTA BFALO CLVND DALAS  
DTROT MNPLS CNGNY PHILA NRLNS (DE CGO)  
URR UGP IDA SCS ZSP ZSI

—REPRINT OF GUELPH SPEECH BY P.M.

1. FOR PAST SIX MONTHS, POST HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH EDITORIAL GROUP OF BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS FIRST WITH REGARD TO CRUISE MISSILE TESTING AND LATER AS A RESULT OF P.M.S PEACE INITIATIVE.
2. IN THIS MANNER WE WERE ABLE TO HAVE P.M.S GUELPH SPEECH REPRINTED IN JANUARY ISSUE OF THIS PUBLICATION.
3. WE FEEL THAT THIS PUBLICATION SERVES AN IMPORTANT SECTOR OF THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY AND WILL MAINTAIN OUR CONTACT WITH THEM.
4. ATTACHED ALSO AN EDITORIAL FROM ST LOUIS POST DISPATCH 25DEC "THE INITIATIVE FROM CANADA" COMMENTING FAVORABLY ON THE EFFORTS OF THE PRIME MINISTER. WE FEEL THAT ASST EDITORIAL PAGE EDITOR JAMES LAWRENCE, JUST RETURNED FROM EDITORS BRIEFING 04DEC, WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN WRITING THIS EDITORIAL.

E. HORNBY

427-1031

D. LYSNE

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## *The Initiative From Canada*

The Canadian press reports that Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger dismissed Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau's peace initiative as something akin to marijuana-induced behavior. Mr. Eagleburger says the report was distorted and he regrets it. He ought to regret an insult to Canada that was far off the mark concerning Mr. Trudeau's efforts.

Mr. Trudeau has proposed a summit meeting of the five nuclear powers — the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China — to search for global limits on nuclear weapons and a ban on testing and deployment of anti-satellite weapons. He has said that he is not trying to interpose Canada between the superpowers, but he feels that the world's desire for peace is not getting through to them. So far the prime minister has carried his message to China,

Japan, India and six European countries, delaying a visit to Moscow because of Soviet leader Yuri Andropov's health problems.

Earlier this month Mr. Trudeau went to the White House, where he said President Reagan encouraged his efforts to reduce tensions. That was an appropriate response, whether or not the administration agrees with the Canadian's precise goals. Few nations so far have endorsed those; on the other hand, no nation has simply dismissed Mr. Trudeau's effort. The peoples of the world, including those in Warsaw Pact countries, are thoroughly frightened by the nuclear arms race and the unwillingness of the superpowers to control it.


Mr. Trudeau's effort to break the ice in the Cold War cannot be scorned by governments that understand what the world is thinking.

*Editorial*  
*For St. Louis Post Dispatch 25 Dec*

JANUARY 1984  
VOL. 40, NO. 1

# Bulletin

of the Atomic Scientists



The Bulletin Clock, symbol of the threat of doomsday looming over humanity, stands at three minutes to midnight.

## Editorial : 2 Three minutes to midnight

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
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On the cover: The quotation by social scientist Robert Redfield appeared on the cover of the October 1949 *Bulletin*, when the hands of the clock advanced to three minutes to midnight. Cover design by Lisa Grayson.

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# A peace initiative from Canada

Canada's prime minister, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, has not been conspicuous in advocating concrete steps for an end to the nuclear arms race (see October 1983 Bulletin). But in a remarkable speech given at the University of Guelph, Ontario, on October 27, 1983, Pierre Trudeau pledged in effect to devote the rest of his political career to "reducing the threat of war." We reprint below, with permission, a condensed version of the speech. The Bulletin welcomes the Prime Minister's initiative, believing it worthy of more general support. We will watch his progress with great interest. — The Editors

By Pierre Elliott Trudeau

**I AM DEEPLY TROUBLED** by an intellectual climate of acrimony and uncertainty; by the parlous state of East-West relations; by a superpower relationship which is dangerously confrontational; and by a widening gap between military strategy and political purpose. All these reveal most profoundly the urgent need to assert the pre-eminence of the mind of man over the machines of war.

There is today an ominous rhythm of crisis. Not just an arms crisis. It is a crisis of confidence in ourselves, a crisis of faith in others. How can we change that ominous rhythm? I start from what I suppose is a problem in epistemology—the difficulty all of us experience in trying to know what is going on in the world—to know it and to understand it in a manner that is accurate, that provides the ground for useful action.

Too often our knowledge and our judgments are true and false at the same time. This is often the distinctive sign of rapidly changing realities which tend to elude our understanding. For example, we know that there are, in the 1980s, many new kinds of power and many new centers of power. There is the power of oil, or of cheap labor, or of regional hegemony. We call it a multipolar world—which suggests that no nation can act in isolation, that no power is truly dominant. But surely it is also true, and perhaps now with a special force, that the superpower relationship is at this time as dominant and as crucial as it ever was in the 1950s, when we had a more simplistic bipolar model with which to understand the world.

Another example: military strategy is the subject of much debate these days. This is a positive sign. Many stra-

tegists, in rightly trying to increase the odds against the nuclear gamble, advocate increased strength in conventional weapons, and new doctrines for conventional deterrence. Some of these doctrines have the sound purpose of delaying, or even preventing, the terrible resort to nuclear weapons in any European conflict.

I believe that such a raising of the nuclear threshold in Europe is a concept of the first importance. It would not be an easy or inexpensive task. But even as I am attracted to this concept in its application to Europe, I am troubled by a broader implication. Non-nuclear weapons are in an advanced state of technology and are widely marketed. Sea-skimming missiles, laser-guided bombs and fragmentation weapons are available for distribution. Is it the purpose of nuclear arms control to make the world safe for conventional warfare? Surely a basic term is missing in this equation: the encouragement of an equilibrium of conventional arms and forces, balanced at lower rather than higher

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*Our central purpose must be  
to create a stable environment  
of increased security  
for both East and West.*

---

levels, an agreed framework of conventional deterrence against armed aggression—but significantly reducing any dangerous concentration of forces.

This is to some extent the task of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks (MBFR) in Vienna. But those talks will not succeed unless their importance in terms of military strategy is developed within a wider framework of East-West confidence and political will.

**LET ME SUGGEST** a further example of our difficulty in understanding a time which appears to be out of joint. Interdependence is the accepted description of the world as we know it. We think it describes a rational and positive condition, an ethic to be encouraged. But we are also learning that the consequences of interdependence are frequently unforeseen, often irrational, negative and out of control—rogue trends which promote inequality and deep strains among states.

If we have difficulty understanding the intricacies of interdependence, we are not yet even close to managing the economic linkages with peace and security. The debate




Pierre Elliott Trudeau is prime minister of Canada.

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over East-West economic relations reveals the fundamental and unresolved question of how much economic interdependence is desirable between the two systems. Some say less. Some say more. Those who argue for less are often, paradoxically, the first to advocate the punitive merit of economic sanctions, which are only effective if interdependence exists and if Soviet behavior is modified by the expectation of economic benefit. Moreover, some who argue for economic sanctions in the civilian sector apparently believe that this will influence Soviet military spending. Yet they may add that there is little if any relationship between civilian and military economies in the Soviet Union.

This particular debate tends also to lay open one of the most gaping self-inflicted wounds of the current period: the unfortunate tendency for a discussion which starts off about East-West relations to wind up in the fratricide of West-West relations. There have been days when I or



Ronald Reagan or Margaret Thatcher may seem to have been accused, for whatever reason or passion of the moment, of posing a greater threat to the security of the West than do the Soviets and their associates. It is almost as though the diversity, pluralism and freedom of expression which we are determined to preserve through the Alliance are not seen as appropriate within the Alliance.

The Alliance in arms against itself is a paradox rich with historical allusion. NATO will avoid that fate if we are wise. But institutions cannot grow to meet new challenges if their level of debate—their intellectual universe of discourse—does not expand to meet the changing realities of our environment. Therefore, I am uneasy with these paradoxes. I am not satisfied with our ability to analyze and understand the complexities of an entirely new phase in East-West relations. I am not reassured by the posture and rhetoric of an earlier wartime age. It is not our nerves which are being tested now, and these are not playing fields on which we stand and cheer. It is the killing-ground of life itself, and what is being tested is whether the force and will of our statecraft can reverse the momentum of the nuclear arms race.

**HOW DID WE ARRIVE** at such an impasse? Some of

the answers lie in the ragged course of East-West relations over the past 15 years. Those relations have an innate tendency to defy management and control. They are animated by competing philosophies and civilizations, and armed with weaponry that is global in scope.

I don't believe we had any illusions about the short-lived and much-maligned period of détente. But the process too soon became part of the problem. The main achievements of the late 1960s and early 1970s were carried forward with difficulty, perhaps with an overload of linkage. Détente rapidly showed signs of a process being drained of its substance. Core issues were held hostage by one side or the other—human rights, economic cooperation, hegemony in key spheres of influence. Détente became both divisible and reversible.

And yet, I am not ready to call détente a failure. It did coincide with, or provoke, an important impulse in the early 1970s which seems to have been lost without trace. It is the impulse toward political dialogue, toward regular consultation at the most senior levels of the East-West system.

With the loss of that impulse, and in the absence of high politics in the East-West relationship, it is not surprising that any shred of trust or confidence in the intentions of the other side appears to have vanished as well. Also missing, and this troubles me deeply, is much trace of political craft and creativity directed at ameliorating the intentions of the other side. There is a disturbing complacency, a readiness to adapt to the worse rather than to exert our influence for the better. We are, in short, de-politicizing the most important political relationship we have.

The responsibility for this lies partly, but by no means exclusively, with both superpowers. The United States and the Soviet Union outstrip the rest of us in their global reach, their armaments, and their leadership responsibilities. Naturally, they differ greatly—and I am not committing the fallacy of describing them as equals in any moral sense at all. Nevertheless, they breathe an atmosphere common to themselves and share a global perception according to which even remote events can threaten their interests or their associates.

It is therefore facile to deny the grave responsibilities which are shared in Washington and Moscow, or to deny that what both seem to lack at the present time is a political vision of a world wherein their nations can live in peace. What is essential to assert is that, just as war is too important to leave to the generals, so the relationship between the superpowers may have become too charged with animosity for East-West relations to be entrusted to them alone.

Military scientists make a routine distinction between capabilities—what weaponry the enemy has—and intentions—when, how and why they intend to use it. I am profoundly concerned that we are devoting far too great a proportion of our time to the enumeration of capabilities, and far too little to the assessment of intentions which govern the use of arms. We may at some point be able to freeze the

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nuclear capability in the world at greatly reduced levels. But how do we freeze the menacing intentions which might control those weapons which remain? Therein lies the inadequacy of the nuclear freeze argument.

**THIS IS A PERIOD** of deep questioning of many of the strategic concepts which have dominated the post-war world. New-school strategists, and critics from left and from right, are probing the fundamentals of strategic thought in the nuclear age from many points of view. They are in agreement, however, when they point to changing realities, to evolution in the psychology of those who live constantly with the spectre of nuclear war, and to the importance of weeding out obsolete ideas.

But much of this questioning, provocative as it is, strikes me as missing an important point. And that is the place of military strategy in the nuclear age. I believe that military strategy must, above all, serve a comprehensive set of political objectives and controls, which dominate and give purpose to modern weapons and to military doctrine. Our central purpose must be to create a stable environment of increased security for both East and West. We must aim at suppressing those nearly instinctive fears, frustrations or ambitions which have so often been the reason for resorting to the use of force.

Therefore it is essential to Western purposes, in my judgment, to maintain in our policies elements of communication, negotiation and transparency about our own intentions—plus a measure of incentive for the Soviet Union first to clarify, and then to modify, its own objectives toward the West. This was, in a limited sense, the philosophy which underpinned the NATO response to the Soviet buildup of SS-20 missiles in Europe. We had to ask ourselves what purpose of political intimidation could be served by that buildup. That is why we decided to respond with a two-track approach—deployment and negotiations. This approach has given the Soviet Union both the clear incentive to reach agreement and the table at which to do so. I and my fellow NATO heads of government remain firmly committed to that two-track decision.


Our two-track decision may also require a "third rail" of high level political energy to speed the course of agreement—a third rail through which might run the current of our broader political purposes, including our determination not to be intimidated.

The risk of accident or miscalculation is too great for us not to begin to repair the lines of communication with our adversaries. The level of tension is too high for us not to revive a more constructive approach to the containment of crises. The degree of mutual mistrust is too intense for us not to try to rebuild confidence through active political contact and consultation. Only in this way can the quality and credibility of efforts toward peace and security, from whatever quarter, be animated and reinforced. But it is a precondition of that goal that Western councils, particularly at the head of government level, benefit from the free

flow of ideas which we maintain in our own societies and which we advocate for others. That, too, forms part of our armament and we should not hesitate to deploy it.

The trend is for arms negotiations, like military strategy itself, to become ever more distanced from the political energy of the participants. The MBFR talks in Vienna have labored for over 10 years and produced very little by way of results. Those talks require urgent political attention if they are to move off dead center. Over the years, other leaders and I have made several proposals in that direction—proposals which now merit wider support.

We have high hopes for the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, opening in January 1984. We recognize the importance of agreement on confidence building measures of



Richard C. Loe, United States

a military nature. But these negotiations, important as they are, will not advance our larger hopes if they proceed in a political vacuum. The delicate framework of security in Europe cannot be balanced on the fate of one or two sets of negotiations alone. These negotiations must be grounded in a structure of stable East-West understanding: reciprocal acknowledgment of legitimate security needs, regular high-level dialogue, and a determined approach to crisis management. Here, again, we require that jolt of political energy which I have described as the third rail.

What is missing is a strategy of confidence-building measures of a political nature:

- steps that reduce tensions caused by uncertainty about objectives or by fear of the consequences of failure;
- steps that mitigate hostility and promote a modicum of mutual respect; and

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• steps that build an authentic confidence in humanity's ability to survive on this planet.  
In short, we must take positive political steps in order to reverse the dangerously downward trend-line in East-West relations.

We must work in a balanced and rational fashion, with a degree of trust, a degree of belief in the good sense of mankind, and with a strong recognition that the task is urgent. The negotiations on theater nuclear forces in Europe, and on strategic forces, are taking place between the superpowers. Canada is not at the table, and we have no wish to insert ourselves into this vital and delicate process. It is my hope, however, that we might help to influence the atmosphere in which these negotiations are being conducted, and thereby enhance the prospects of early agreement. We need to be realistic about the hard factors at play. We must appreciate the primordial drive for security and for sovereignty which is never very far below the surface of the arms control debate.

We will want to look at several elements:

• ways of designing a consistent structure of political and economic confidence with which to stabilize East-West relations;

• ways to draw the superpowers away from their concentration on military strength toward regular and productive dialogue, toward a sense of responsibility commensurate with their power;

• ways to persuade all five nuclear-weapons states to engage in negotiations aimed at establishing global limits on their strategic nuclear arsenals;

• ways of improving European security through the raising of the nuclear threshold, including the imposition of a political dynamic upon the static MBFR talks in Vienna; and

• ways to arrest the proliferation of nuclear weapons among other states.

It is my personal purpose to live up to the undertaking, made by leaders at the Williamsburg Summit last May, "to devote our full political resources to reducing the threat of war." The questions to be raised are not easy. There are priorities which inevitably conflict. A new climate of East-West confidence cannot be instilled in a day, nor can the arms race be stopped overnight. But in so far as I, and other leaders who share this purpose, can work together to build authentic confidence, I pledge that we shall.

Not to do so at this time would, I believe, amount to a form of escapism - an escapism well defined by the Harvard Nuclear Study Group in their thoughtful book, *Living with Nuclear Weapons*. The book cautions against two forms of escapism: to believe that nuclear weapons will go away and to think that nuclear weapons can be treated like other military weapons in history. And I would add a third form of escapism, in which we indulge at our peril. That is the escapism of allowing shrill rhetoric to become a substitute for foreign policy, of letting inertia become a substitute for will, of making a desert and calling it peace. □



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---PM INITIATIVE:ARRANGEMENTS FOR MTG WITH UN SEC GEN

FOLLOWING IS RECAPITULATION OF SUBSTANTIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR PM  
TRUDEAUS MEETING WITH UN SECRETARY GENERAL PEREZ DE CUELLAR WHICH  
HAVE BEEN MADE WITH VIRENDRA DAYAL,SEC GEN CHEF DE CABINET:

2.SCOPE OF MTG:WE HAVE INDICATED TO DAYAL THAT MTG FOR ONE HOUR AND  
HALF,1600 HOURS JAN 11,WILL LARGELY BE DEVOTED TO PRIME MINISTERS  
INITIATIVE-MOTIVES AND PROPOSALS;ACCOUNT OF MEETINGS PM HAS HAD  
WITH OTHER WORLD LEADERS;OUTLINING OF FURTHER STEPS AND JOINT  
ASSESSMENT OF PROSPECTS.WE HAVE ALSO STATED THAT PM WISHES TO  
EXPLORE WITH SEC GEN ANY ROLE WHICH UN MIGHT PLAY IN REVIVING  
DIALOGUE,PARTICULARLY BETWEEN FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES.IN THIS  
CONNECTION,CERTAIN SPECIFIC THOUGHTS MIGHT BE RAISED WITH SEC GEN  
SUCH AS ROLE WHICH SEC GEN HIMSELF MIGHT PLAY AS CONSEQUENCE OF  
HIS CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH SECURITY COUNCIL PARTICULARLY FIVE  
PERM MEMBERS AND POSSIBILITY FOR REVIVAL OF MILITARY STAFF CTTEE.WE  
OPINED THAT PM WOULD BE MOST INTERESTED IN HEARING ANY IDEAS WHICH  
SEC GEN HIMSLEF HAS ON SUBSTANCE OF INITIATIVE AND/OR RELATING TO  
UN MECHANISMS IN SUPPORT OF INITIATIVE.

...2





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---PATRIACHE ORTHODOXE ET CAMPAGNE DE PAIX DU PM

AUDIENCE ACCORDEE A ISTANBUL PAR PATRIARCHE DIMITRIOS, ELGISE ORTHODOXE,  
A PORTE SUR INITIATIVE DU PM. PATRIARCHE EN ETAIT DEJA INFORME PAR  
VOIE RELIGIEUSE. CIT COMME FEU ET CHALEUR VONT ENSEMBLE FINCIT, IL N Y  
AVAIT RIEN DE SURPRENANT A CE QU EFFORT EN FAVEUR DE PAIX VIENNE  
D UN PAYS COMME CDA. PATRIARCHE DANS SES PROPOS RATTACHAIT SENS  
D INITIATIVE DU PM A GRANDES CONSIDERATIONS PHILOSOPHIQUES ET MORALES  
SUR LA PAIX ENTRE LES HOMMES ET A L INTERIEUR D EUX-MEMES. IL OBSERVAIT  
QUE PAIX N EXISTAIT MEME PAS ENTRE LES EGLISES, QUI ETAIENT DIVISEES.  
LORS DE DERNIERE VISITE DE JEAN-PMUL II A ISTANBUL, PAPE ET PATRIARCHE  
ETAIENT TOMBES D ACCORD QUE PERIODE DE CONNAISSANCE RECIPROQUE ETAIT  
TERMINEE ET QUE DIALOGUE THEOLOGIQUE DEVAIT COMMENCER. PATRIARCHE ETAIT  
SATISFAIT DES PROGRES. IL COMPTAIT ENTREPRENDRE CONTACTS AVEC EGLISES  
ANGLICANE, LUTHERIENNE, ETC. ARTISAN DE PAIX LUI-MEME, PATRIARCHE SE  
DISAIT DONC BIEN PLACE POUR ENCOURAGER PM A POURSUIVRE SES EFFORTS.  
2. PATRIARCHE DIMITRIOS N A PAS ENVERGURE MONDIALE DE SON PREDECESSEUR  
ATHENAGORAS. IL A BENEFICIE DU FAIT QUE GOVT TURC EST INTERVENU DANS  
ELECTION POUR FAIRE ECARTER D AUTRES CANDIDATES PLUS REMARQUABLES.  
DIMITRIOS LE SAIT BEIN ET IL NE TENTE PAS DE SE FAIRE PASSER POUR UN  
AUTRE.

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---PM ITITIATIVE:VISIT TO MOSCO

SUMMARY:AMB THIS AM DELIVERED TO SUSLOV,HEAD,SECOND EUROPEAN DEPT,  
TEXT OT PM LET TO ANDROPOV.SUSLOV UNDERTOOK TO HAVE LET TRANSMITTED  
ASAP TO ITS DESTINATION.HIS OFF-CUFF COMMENTS PROVIDED LITTLE GROUNDS  
FOR OPTIMISM THAT THERE WILL BE EARLY SOVIET DECISION RE TIMING FOR  
POSSIBLE PM VISIT TO MOSCO,REGARDLESS OF WHETHER HE WERE TO BE  
RECEIVED BY ANDROPOV OR BY DESIGNATED COLLEAGUES.

2.PROMPTNESS WITH WHICH AMB WAS RECEIVED BY SUSLOV(LESS THAN TWO  
HOURS NOTICE),AND CARE WITH WHICH HE STUDIED UNOFFICIAL EMB  
TRANSLATION OF TEXT,REFLECT SOVIET INTEREST IN APPEARING TO TAKE  
POSITIVE INTEREST IN PMS INITIATIVE.HOWEVER,SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSAL  
FOR JAN VISIT(AMB EXPLAINED PREFERRED TIME PERIODS ORALLY)WHETHER  
ANDROPOV AVAIL OR NOT/NOT CLEARLY PUT SUSLOV IN QUANDARY AS TO HOOW  
TO RESPOND.RESULT WAS MUCH HEDGING,INCLUDING ALLUSIONS TO FACTORS OF  
TENUOUS RELEVANCE.SUSLOV RECALLED GROMYKO STATEMENTS TO PEARSON  
TO EFFECT THAT TIMING OF ANY VISIT MUST BE LEFT OPEN FOR TIME BEING  
AND STATED FIRMLY THAT QUOTE THIS SITUATION HAS NOT/NOT CHANGED  
UNQUOTE.HE FURTHER NOTED THAT GROMYKO WLD BE GOING TO STKHM,

...2

PAGE TWO XYGR0021 CONF

NECESSITATING STRENUOUS AND TIME-CONSUMING PREPARATIONS, AND THAT ASSESSING RESULTS OF STKHM MTGS WLD ALSO REQUIRE TIME. MOST IMPORTANT THING, HE SAID, WAS THAT ANY MTG BETWEEN PM TRUDEAU AND QUOTE SOVIET LEADERS UNQUOTE BE A SUCCESS. HE UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY LET PROMPTLY TO ADDRESSEE.

3. SUSLOVS GENERALLY UNFORTHCOMING REMARKS SHLD NOT/NOT, WE THINK, BE CONSTRUED AS REFLECTING NEGATIVE SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD PMS INITIATIVE ITSELF. IN PRESENT SITUATION, NORMAL CAUTION OF SOV OFFICIALS IS REINFORCED BY PROBLEM OF CURRENT ANDROPOV INCAPACITY TO PARTICIPATE IN PUBLIC EVENTS AND IMPORTANT RELATED POLICY ISSUE OF HOW TO PRESENT THIS SITUATION TO WORLD. SENIOR SOV OFFICIALS CELARLY HAVE NO/NO IDEA WHEN THIS AWKWARD SITUATION MIGHT BE RESOLVED. HOW TO DEAL WITH IT IS CERTAINLY MATTER TO BE DECIDED BY TIGHT CIRCLE OF PARTY LEADERS. LATTER, WHILE WISHING TO AVOID APPEARING INDECISIVE OR UNRESPONSIVE TO INITIATIVE WHICH HAS BEEN WIDELY LAUDED BY OTHER HEADS OF GOVT (BOTH EAST AND WEST) MAY AT SAME TIME NOT/NOT WELCOME PROSPECT OF VISIT WHICH, BECAUSE OF INEVITABLY HIGH MEDIA COVERAGE, CLD HAVE EFFECT OF HIGHLIGHTING EMBARRASSING LEADERSHIP GAP HERE AND CONSEQUENT ASSYMETRY IN RECEPTION OF CDN PM. RELECTANCE TO TAKE EARLY DECISION ON TIMING OF VISIT MAY ALSO BE REINFORCED BY UNCERTAINTIES ON HOW MINISTERIAL MTGS IN STKHM (ESP. SCHULZ-GROMYKO MTG) MAY AFFECT EAST-WEST ATMOSPHERE IN COMING WEEKS.

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---STKHM CONFERENCE:BILATL WITH GROMYKO

OUR INITIAL PHONE APPROACH TO OFFICIAL OF SECOND EUROPEAN  
DEPT,MFA,ELICITED UNDERTAKING TO PASS ON OUR REQUEST,COMBINED  
WITH URGING THAT QUOTE FORMAL APPROACH UNQUOTE BE MADE TO SOV  
EMB IN OTT(THIS DESPITE OUR NOTING THAT MATTER HAD ALREADY BEEN  
DISCUSSED WITH SOV EMB).WHILE CALLING ON DEPT HEAD SUSLOV  
LATER IN AM ON ANOTHER MATTER,AMB RESUMED CHARGE AND PUT REQUEST TO  
HIM.SUSLOV STATED GROMYKO WLD OF COURSE MUCH LIKE TO MEET  
WITH DPM/SSEA.HOWEVER UNCERTAINTY AROSE FROM NEED TO SCHEDULE LARGE  
NUMBER OF MTGS IN VERY COMPRESSED TIME PERIOD(SUSLOV MADE MILDLY  
FLIPPANT REMARK ABOUT CDA AGAIN GETTING ITS REQUEST IN LATE).HE  
NEVERTHELESS UNDERTOOK TO GET BACK TO US ASAP ON THE MATTER.WE HAVE  
IMPRESSION SECOND EUROPEAN DEPT WILL URGE POSITIVE RESPONSE DESPITE  
STRONG COMPETING PRIORITIES ON GROMYKOS TIME WHILE IN STKHM.

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---PM VISIT TO NEW YORK.

FOLLOWING REFTTELECON WE CONTACTED TOPPING, MANAGING EDITOR, NEW YORK TIMES(NYT) TO ENQUIRE INTO PROSPECTS FOR 20JAN PM TRUDEAU SESSION WITH NYT EDITORIAL BOARD FOCUSING PRIMARILY ON PMS PEACE INITIATIVE. NYT WILL BE QUOTE DELIGHTED UNQUOTE TO MEET WITH PM AND WE HAVE CONFIRMED SESSION FOR 10:30 AM FRI 20JAN IN 14TH FLOOR NYT BOARDROOM. MTG WILL LAST 45/45 MINS TO ONE HR. EXTREMELY HIGH DEGREE OF NYT INTEREST REFLECTED BY FACT PUBLISHER ARTHUR OCHS SULZBERGER WILL ATTEND MTG. OTHERS PRESENT WILL BE TOPPING, MAX FRANKEL, EDITOR OF EDITORIAL PAGE, KARL MEYER, SNR EDITORIAL BOARD MEMBER AND WARREN HOGE, FOREIGN EDITOR. NAMES OF OTHER EDITORS WILL BE PROVIDED SOON. NYT WILL ALSO ASSIGN ONE OF ITS TOP REPORTERS TO COVER MTG ON UNDERSTANDING, INITIATED BY US AFTER REFTTELCON, THAT MTG WOULD BE ON THE RECORD BASIS UNLESS SOME ASPECTS ARE SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED BY PM AS OFF RECORD OR FOR BACKGROUND ONLY.

2. GRATEFUL CONFIRMATION ASAP ON WHO WILL ACCOMPANY PM TO MTG. FOR OUR PART, CONGEN TAYLOR WILL ATTEND WITH BRADY AND MCKECHNIE AS NOTE-TAKERS.

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