



CMPP - CABINET COMMITTEE ON PRIORITIES AND
PLANNING

CMPP - 1970 Minutes

COMITÉ DU CABINET CHARGÉ DES PRIORITÉS ET DE
LA PLANIFICATION

CMPP - procès-verbaux

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
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SECRET WHEN
COMPROMISE COULD
REASONABLY BE EXPECTED
TO CAUSE **SERIOUS INJURY**
TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST

DÉSIGNATION SECRET

SECRET LORSQUE LE FAIT
QUE LEUR INTÉGRITÉ SOIT
COMPROMISE RISQUERAIT
VRAISEMBLABLEMENT DE
PORTER UN **PRÉJUDICE**
GRAVE À L'INTÉRÊT
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The Cabinet Committee On Priorities And Planning

Minutes

A meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning was held on October 20th, 1970, at 9:30 a.m., in the Briefing Room, East Block.

Present

The Prime Minister
(Mr. Trudeau) in the Chair,
The Secretary of State for
External Affairs
(Mr. Sharp),
The Minister of Public Works
(Mr. Laing),
The President of the Privy
Council
(Mr. MacEachen),
The President of the Treasury
Board
(Mr. Drury),
The Minister of Finance
(Mr. Benson),
The Minister of Industry,
Trade and Commerce
(Mr. Pepin),

The Minister of Regional
Economic Expansion
(Mr. Marchand),
The Minister of Justice
(Mr. Turner),
The Minister of National
Defence
(Mr. Macdonald),
The Minister of Agriculture
(Mr. Olson),
The Minister of Transport
(Mr. Jamieson),
The Solicitor General
(Mr. McIlraith).

Also Present

Mr. R. G. Robertson,
Mr. M. A. Crowe,
Mr. D. Wall,
Mr. C. R. Nixon,
Mr. P. Moreau,
(Privy Council Office)

Mr. M. Lalonde,
Mr. J. Davey,
(Prime Minister's Office).

Secretary

Mr. P. M. Pitfield, (Privy Council Office)

Assistant Secretaries

Mr. M. E. Butler, (Privy Council Office)
Mr. L. L. Trudel, (Privy Council Office)

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Strategy For Dealing With The F.L.Q.

The Director of the Briefing Team in the Privy Council Office, introduced Cabinet Document 1216-70, and the Annex, A Strategy for Dealing with the F.L.Q., and explained the document in detail. After he explained the memorandum and the charts set up in the Briefing Room, he described them as one somewhat probable scenario. It assumed the worst possible sequence of events in order to design a federal strategy which would be effective no matter what were the actions of the F.L.Q., planned or accidental. He stated that in his opinion there appeared to be a conscious pattern or possibly a directing force. The timing of the events seemed to build up to a crescendo at the weekends, when people had the maximum time to listen to the radio, watch television and be spectators. It appeared to him that the strong and determined stand of governments had caused the F.L.Q. to react violently resulting in the death of Pierre Laporte, Minister of Labour of the Province of Quebec. He thought there was a possibility that Mr. Cross, if not already assassinated, would be killed as well. He emphasized that if a coherent F.L.Q. strategy did not exist, the happenstance was very strong. The federal strategy would in any event cover both cases.

Mr. Davey said that a distinction should be made between the strategy of one person or one group such as the F.L.Q., as opposed to the strategy of telling people what to do based on what was likely to happen.

Mr. Nixon explained the possible federal strategy and outlined Immediate, Short Term and Medium Term Objectives, respectively as containment, stability and capacity for evolution. He explained that if the F.L.Q. were organized on a cellular basis, it was possible for them to mislead the government into believing F.L.Q. actions were independent and unco-ordinated. He said that, like chess, it was only possible to look so far ahead and to examine only a certain number of trigger events.

The Committee examined carefully the material presented to them and then made a number of comments:

- (a) The Minister of Regional Economic Expansion said that, co-ordinated or not, it was difficult to explain why Mr. Laporte was killed.
- (b) The Secretary of State for External Affairs thought however, that the killing of Mr. Cross would have made the situation much worse.
- (c) Mr. Lalonde said that perhaps the arrests had disrupted their organization to a point where their collective judgment was impaired.
- (d) Mr. Davey said that, loosely organized or directed from above, the effects might be the same.
- (e) The Minister of Justice stated that the War Measures Act should be replaced by special legislation as soon as possible. He added that it was essential to create counter pressures to the use of force. He said that a review of police procedures would provide a basis of credibility for the government. He explained to the Committee the verbal understandings he had reached with the Quebec Minister of Justice on the limitations on the use of the emergency powers by provincial authorities which were:

- (1) to assemble a team of crown prosecutors to examine

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immediately and review the evidence against those persons arrested;

- (2) to release persons as soon as it was determined that there was inadequate evidence to warrant holding them;
 - (3) not to interfere with the legitimate political activities of anyone, particularly as regards the Montreal civic elections, by the use of the special powers;
 - (4) to ensure that persons arrested had access to legal counsel; and to provide to those juveniles arrested an opportunity to contact their parents.
- (f) The Prime Minister said that it was important for the federal government to be seen as consistent and in control. For this reason he was recommending the establishment of a Special Operations Centre under the supervision of his Principal Secretary and the Secretary to the Cabinet. Its terms of reference were such that ministers were not giving up political control or responsibility. He said it was necessary to co-ordinate all governmental initiatives and to inform and assist both the provincial and municipal governments of Quebec, when necessary.
- (g) The Minister of Transport said that in the handling of this crisis both the police and the government as a whole would be subject to close scrutiny once the issue had cooled off a bit. He appreciated the handicap under which the police normally had to operate but felt this crisis was not likely to be the last of its kind.

The Prime Minister concluded the discussion by emphasizing the need to be scrupulously fair in dealing with the Montreal civic elections. He said Drapeau was confident. He asked Ministers to keep in mind the consistent attitudes and images that were required by the outlined strategy. He said that steps would be taken as soon as possible to establish the Special Operations Centre to update continually and improve on the federal strategy.

The Committee noted:

- (a) the undertakings given by the Minister of Justice of Quebec to the Minister of Justice on the limitations on the use of the emergency powers by provincial authorities: to assemble a team of crown prosecutors to examine immediately and review the evidence against those persons arrested; to release persons as soon as it was determined that there was inadequate evidence to warrant holding them; not to interfere with the legitimate political activities of anyone, particularly as regards the Montreal civic elections, by the use of the special powers; to ensure that persons arrested had access to legal counsel; and to provide to those juveniles arrested an opportunity to contact their parents;
- (b) that it was absolutely essential that the arrangements made for handling of persons arrested under Public Order Regulations, 1970, be fair and appear to be fair; and that the Minister of Justice of Quebec should be encouraged to state publicly the limitations agreed to with the Minister of Justice;
- (c) that the Minister of Justice would inform the House about the agreed limitations on the use of the special powers.

The Committee agreed:

- I. (a) that there appeared to be an FLQ strategy which must

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be contained and pre-empted by a federal strategy which would retain and re-inforce the confidence in and support of all Canadians for their government;

- (b) that, at the same time, the ordinary processes of government must continue and be seen to continue;
- (c) that the government must then concentrate all its energies on understanding the legitimate forces for change in Canada, and must work with these forces to create a Canadian society which is and is seen to be, just and fair, and attractive to all Canadians:

II. that, based on the experience gained in the use of "Public Order Regulations, 1970", the Minister of Justice, in consultation with the Solicitor General, should prepare suitable legislation for introduction in the House to deal with the current FLQ situation and similar occurrences:

III. (a) that a Special Operations Centre for the Quebec situation be established under the direction of the Secretary to the Cabinet and of the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, to implement the strategy and with the following terms of reference:

- (i) political direction was NOT delegated to the chief of operations;
 - (ii) the chief of operations was to act in accordance with the directions of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet in implementing and conforming to the strategy and plan approved by Cabinet;
 - (iii) the chief of operations was to direct all information for action by departments and agencies through the responsible Minister;
 - (iv) the chief of operations should have access to the Prime Minister, the Secretary to the Cabinet and the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, to inform them of developments, to get instructions for actions and reactions and to receive directions;
- (b) that the provincial and municipal levels of government should be informed of the establishment of the Special Operations Centre and of the assistance available to them; and that their co-operation and support should be encouraged.

P. M. Pitfield,
Secretary.