

INCOMING MESSAGE

ORIGINAL

FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA
TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, PARIS.

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification

SECRET

File No.

50030-AB-40
52 58

Priority

System

No.

Date November 25, 1953.

CYPHER-AUTO

852

Rec'd- November 26, 1953.

Departmental
Circulation

Reference:

MINISTER
UNDER/SEC
D/UNDER/SEC
A/UNDER/SEC'S
POL/CO-ORD'N
SECTION
U.N.DIV.

Subject:

Barracks in Germany for Prospective Danish
Brigade.

J.18

Addressed External No. 852 repeated Dominion No. 117
(London please pass copy to CJS London as our No. 263).

At the council meeting of November 25 the SGLO put before the council a problem submitted to the standing group by SACEUR. The latter is most anxious to persuade the Danes to reinforce to brigade group strength the present small Danish unit in Schleswig-Holstein, in order to fill the gap created by the withdrawal of the Norwegian brigade some months ago. The Danes cannot attempt to reach a decision until January 1, 1954. In the meantime the United Kingdom has been paying the requisition charges on the empty barracks involved, and has decided that it will not carry this charge beyond December 1. Hence there is the problem of retaining the barracks for about two months, so that if the Danes meet SACEUR's request they can take them over. SACEUR wishes to have the barracks available, as this is likely to influence the Danish Government's decision.

2. The Standing Group supported SACEUR's views and asked the council if a way could not be found to retain the rights to these barracks for a two month period.

3. A first suggestion was that NATO find the money to pay the requisition charges at the rate of some pounds 20,000 per month. This was promptly rejected.

4. After further discussion, it was agreed to request the Allied High Commission to approach Chancellor Adenauer in the matter, to see if the barracks could be held available without charge for the two month period. We would doubt whether the Chancellor will be able to arrange this, and accordingly we think it likely that the barracks will revert to German use.

D/M DND
D/M FINANCE
CCOS (P)
CGS
JAC

EUROPEAN

Bonn
Washington
Copenhagen
JMC

Done Form

Date Nov 27

Ext. 180 C

DUPLICATE

OTTAWA FILE

No.

50030-AB-40

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

Despatch No.

Date

July 8, 1953

FROM:

THE CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL AND

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference

Subject

Council Meeting of July 8 - Item III: Application of Protocol on Status of International Military Headquarters to Headquarters Allied Land Forces South Eastern Europe.

The application of the Protocol was approved by the Council. We raised the only question and did so simply because we had not received instructions and wanted to be sure that Canada's position was fully protected.

2. We warned the Council that Canadian authorities had in the past been a bit uncertain as to the wisdom of some of the clauses in the Protocols and that, in particular, we did not wish to give the impression that similar privileges would automatically be extended by Canada if, at some future date, a NATO headquarters were established in our country.

3. Admiral Dick pointed out that there were in fact some headquarters still to be covered by the Protocols, although he mentioned only the ones in Southern Europe.

Copies Referred

To

No. of Enclosures

none

Post File

No.

J. F. W. Humphreys

THE DELEGATION

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

Ext. 180

Refer
Short M. 1770
Dh 12
European
WFO

OTTAWA FILE
No. 50030-AB-40

29 50

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TOP SECRET

Despatch No. 1573
Date November 19, 1952

FROM: THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL AND THE OEEC, PARIS
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference: Our despatch No. 1409 of November 5, 1952

Subject: Division of Responsibility in Wartime between Norwegian Authorities and the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces, Northern Europe

The Council, at its meeting on November 19, noted the report which had been circulated by the Norwegian Representative on this subject (C-M(52)102).

2. There seemed to be some misunderstanding as to the stage reached in the negotiations: while the Norwegian Representative was under the impression that the agreement had been cleared with SHAPE and the Standing Group, the Standing Group Liaison Officer was of the opinion that, so far, it had merely been discussed by the Norwegian authorities with the Commander-in-Chief, Northern Europe.

3. The Council agreed, however, that there was no objection to the proposed agreement and that there was no need for the matter to be placed again on the agenda on the understanding that, in due course, the agreement would be cleared with the military authorities concerned if that had not already been done.

A. J. P. Murray

THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE

Copies Referred To... 24 NOV 1952

No. of Enclosures
.....none.....

Post File
No. 6/7

34:3 42 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

For Sale by the
Copies Requested

Ref
USSEA *CCOS*
European *LIB*
Oniz *DMD*
52 *50*

OTTAWA FILE

No. 50030-AB-40

Despatch No. 1409

Date November 5, 1952

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

FROM: THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL AND THE OEEC, PARIS
 TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference.....

Subject: Arrangements between SACEUR and Norway as regards Coastal Defence

13 NOV 1952

In the course of the special closed session of the Council which was held at the end of the regular meeting on November 5, the Norwegian Representative reported that his Government were about to negotiate an agreement as contemplated in MC/36 final (para. 24 b i) whereby the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Northern Europe (Admiral Brind) will assume responsibility for the defence of the Coasts of Norway. SHAPE and he believed the Standing Group had been informed but the Norwegian Government felt that the Council should also be advised of the proposed arrangement. He proposes therefore to confirm the above information in a letter to Lord Ismay who will circulate it so that Council may take formal note of the arrangement at the November 19 meeting.

Copies Referred

To.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

No. of Enclosures

.....none.....

Post File

No. 6/7

cc: Oslo

OTTAWA FILE
No.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

Despatch No.
Date November 13, 1952

FROM: THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY ORGANIZATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference: ...
Subject: Arrangements between SACM and ...
Defense

In the course of the special
closed session of the Council which
was held at the end of the regular
meeting on November 8, the Norwegian
Representative reported that his
Government was about to announce
an agreement as contemplated in
NO/36 (para. 24 b) whereby
the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces,
Northern Europe (AFCENT) will
assume responsibility for the defense of the
coasts of Norway. SACM and he believed
the Working Group had been informed that
the Norwegian Government felt that the
Council should also be advised of the
proposed arrangement. He proposed therefore
to submit the above information in a
letter to Lord Islay who will circulate
it so that Council may take formal note
of the arrangement at the November 14 meeting.

[Handwritten signature]

THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE

1952 NOV 13 AM 9:22

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
RECEIVED

13 NOV 1952
Copies Retained To:
No. of Enclosures None
Post File 6/1
65: 6510

Ext. 180 A

Refer
McClaxton
Gen Joulles
UAE A
Mr. Gagebrook

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
 Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

Mr. Taylor
Mr. Callen
Mr. Ritchie
Cde. Rayner

Done
Nov 28/52
Mr. McK

OTTAWA FILE

No. 50030-AD-40

Despatch No. 1.3.4.3

Date. October 31, 1952.

52 50
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

- SECRET

FROM: THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL AND OEEC, PARIS

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference.....

Subject: Informal Meeting of the Council; Report by General Ridgway.

3: NOV 1952

At the invitation of the Secretary General, General Ridgway attended yesterday's informal meeting of the Council to give a general, informal report on the status of the forces under his command.

2. By way of an introduction, he made two points. First, he thought it essential that a spirit of cooperation and teamwork should characterize the relations between the civil and military sides of the Organization. Secondly, he wished to assure the Council that the senior military commanders fully recognized their subordinate position in relation to the civil authority of NATO.

3. In developing the main theme of his thesis, General Ridgway said that, in his view, the quality of military forces depended essentially on three factors: leadership, training and equipment. Within the NATO forces under his command, there were deficiencies in all three.

4. Troops that were not well lead could not be expected to give a good account of themselves, however well trained and equipped. With this in mind, the importance of developing really high quality officer of non-commissioned officer corps could scarcely be over-emphasised. It was difficult of achievement because the build-up process was time consuming. To begin with, careful selection from a broad cross-section of the population was imperative. In order to attract the right type of candidate, pay and condition of service had to be made at least as attractive as comparable civil occupations.

5. Speaking briefly about training, General Ridgway drew upon his own experience, and said that combat losses varied almost directly in proportion to the quality of training. Inasmuch as the length of the military service period was a matter for the civil authorities of the countries to determine, the quality of the training was to a considerable extent, in their hands. With respect to equipment, the position was one over which he personally was deeply concerned. The shortage of ammunition was particularly acute. There were little or no reserves of major equipment. Production capacity was inadequate. As yet, no overall logistical organization had been developed.

6. Turning to the brighter side of the picture, General Ridgway saw good reasons for encouragement. While there were shortcomings, in some important respects, there were great assets in others. During visits to all but a few of the NATO countries over the past five months, he had been impressed by what he saw. Teamwork, particularly in the international headquarters, was of a high order. Ministries of defence and the people of the various countries seemed confident of their ability to defend themselves, and indeed, determined to do so. The morale of the troops, their

- 2 -

initiative and professional competence was of a uniformly high standard.

7. General Ridgway then moved on to a point of basic strategy. As the NATO countries could not hope to maintain standing forces on a scale comparable to those of the Soviet Union, some alternative had to be found. That alternative was to provide relatively small, highly-trained, mobile and well equipped forces, (to take the initial shock) backed by an effective reserve. To be effective, the reserve elements should be built around a nucleus of long service personnel and have sufficient annual refresher training to maintain them at a reasonable standard of readiness.

8. General Ridgway concluded his remarks by reaffirming his intention:

- (a) to defend all the NATO territory and the NATO people within his command; and
- (b) in the event of war, to preserve intact all his major units


9. During the question period, the following were the principal points that emerged:

- (a) Standardization. Encouraging progress had been made in the field of standardization of procedures. Exercises, such as "Main brace", had been useful in pointing up problems in this connection.
- (b) Period of Warning. The likely period of warning of a Soviet attack was difficult to predict with any degree of accuracy. The Soviet Union had the capability of launching an immediate attack, with little or no warning.
- (c) Soviet Buildup in East Germany. Although there were indications of an increase in the strength of present Soviet units in East Germany, there was no evidence of new units being moved into that area.
- (d) Lines of Communication between East Germany and the Soviet Union. Present lines of communication between East Germany and the Soviet Union were adequate for a rapid buildup of forces in the former area. There was no evidence of a significant buildup of the lines of communications
- (e) Headquarters. Satisfactory progress had been made in establishing subordinate headquarters, although more than had been anticipated originally would be needed. Communications between headquarters was a difficult problem which had not yet been solved.
- (f) Military Service. General Ridgway thought that, having regard to complexity of modern warfare, the minimum period of military service should be two years.
- (g) NATO Defence College. Generals Ridgway and Grunther both felt strongly that the NATO Defence College was serving a useful purpose. There should be no change in either the length of the course or the number of courses per year.
- (h) The Language Problem. The language problem in NATO would undoubtedly become more acute in time of war. Some countries were taking action to ease this difficulty. Certain of the Command Headquarters were giving courses in French and other languages. The matter was being taken up with the Standing Group.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

- 3 -

- (i) Priority as Between Fully Effective Divisions on the One Hand, and Increased Goals on the Other, Bearing in mind what General Ridgway had said when this subject was raised at the Joint Meeting of the Council and the Standing Group (paragraph 24 and 25 of my despatch No.1342)
I expressed the hope that he might find it convenient to return later, during the course of the Annual Review, and discuss the matter further with the Council.



THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Ext. 102A

Copy on 50102-A-4

OTTAWA FILE

No. *50030-AB-4*

52

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

Letter No.

Date....October..8..1952.....

Copy on 50030-A-4

FROM: THE CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL AND
THE OEEC, PARIS
TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference.....
Subject:.....Council Meeting of October 8...SACEUR's Status Report...

D-1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

16 OCT 1952

Admiral Dick reported General Ridgway's view that the peoples of the NATO countries should be fully informed of the actual situation. By this he meant that the nature and extent of the Soviet threat should be set out in realistic terms, that the inadequacy of our present means for meeting this threat should not be concealed and that proper publicity should be given to the steps being taken to correct the situation. While General Ridgway did not wish to have our present military deficiencies concealed, he considered it important that they should be presented in a manner which would not make them appear impossible to overcome. This essential information could only be presented effectively if there were an intelligent long term plan prepared.

2. The Secretary General had suggested earlier in the meeting, and there had been general agreement, that the military authorities should be asked to undertake as a matter of urgency the de-classification of much of the information on the Infrastructure Programme - information which, Lord Ismay had pointed out, any reasonably competent intelligence service must already have obtained. When this had been done, it would be possible to make public an effective and encouraging report on the progress which had been made in the infrastructure field. The present publicity on infrastructure was mainly limited to critical comments on individual projects which had gotten into difficulties, and Lord Ismay proposed when he met the press in the afternoon to tell them that a general briefing on infrastructure would shortly be arranged in order that this tendency could be corrected.

3. Admiral Dick's statement was followed by a discussion ranging over a number of different points. It was finally agreed that the Information Policy Working Group should collect from SHAPE and possibly other military agencies whatever intelligence data might be available concerning Russian military strength and priorities. It should discuss this data

Copies Referred

To.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

No. of Enclosures

.....none.....

Post File

No.

10

*Refer to
USIA
Economic
European
Info*

*Shorn NATO
Washington
London*

*Don Oct 20/52 ...2
m. Mack*

3

000657

OTAWA FILE
No.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

Letter No. 111
Date: October 2, 1952

FROM: THE CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL AND
THE DELEGATION TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL AND
TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference: Council Meeting of October 2, 1952
Subject: Status Report

Admiral Dick reported General Highway's view that the peoples of the NATO countries should be fully informed of the actual situation. By this he meant that the nature and extent of the Soviet threat should be set out in realistic terms. That the inadvisability of our present means for meeting this threat should not be concealed and that proper publicity should be given to the steps being taken to correct the situation. While General Highway did not wish to have our present military dispositions concealed, he considered it important that they should be presented in a manner which would not make them appear impossible to overcome. This essential information could only be presented effectively if there were an intelligent long term plan prepared.

The Secretary General had suggested earlier in the meeting, and there had been general agreement, that the military authorities should be asked to undertake as a matter of urgency the de-classification of much of the information on the infrastructure. Information which, Lord Lamsy had pointed out, any reasonably competent intelligence service must already have obtained. When this had been done, it would be possible to make public an effective and encouraging report on the progress which had been made in the infrastructure field. The present position on infrastructure was mainly limited to critical comments on individual projects which had gotten into difficulties, and Lord Lamsy proposed when he got the press in the afternoon to tell them that a formal division on infrastructure would shortly be arranged in order that this tendency could be corrected.

Admiral Dick's statement was followed by a discussion ranging over a number of different points. It was finally agreed that the Information Policy working group should collect from SHAPE and possibly other military agencies whatever intelligence data could be available concerning Russian military strength and policies. It should discuss this data

RECORDS-CLEAR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS


...

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

- 2 -

with the Standing Group, and should, in consultation with the latter, prepare a summary of the most reliable information on this point. This information would be used for the preparation of a document which would be distributed to governments and to the various NATO Agencies for guidance. The document would specify the information which, in the Council's view, might be used publicly. No effort would be made by NATO as such to publicize this information, but governments would be free to use it if they wished. This procedure would provide protection against contradictory statements being made by different governments or by various NATO authorities on Soviet capabilities.

4. The decision at a previous meeting that no figures or factual material concerning the progress of the Western re-armament programme should be used publicly until after the Annual Review was re-affirmed. (The Secretariat has since confirmed our own view that the decision mentioned in para 2 above must be regarded as an exception to this general rule.) It would be for the Council to decide in the light of the results of the Annual Review what policy should govern publicity for our own defence effort in the future, and we should in the interim continue to stand on the information given to the press on August 20.



THE DELEGATION

Ext. 300

*See Dup. attached**Refu**USSEA*

OTTAWA FILE

No. 50030-AB-40

52 50
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

Letter No. 1028

Date October 1, 1952

FROM: THE PERMANENT DELEGATION TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
AND O.E.E.C.
TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference... Telegram No. 385 of September 30th

Subject: SACEUR's Status Report - Discussion at Council Meeting of
October 1, 1952.

8 OCT 1952

The Secretary-General's memorandum (document C-M(52)77) suggested that it would not be useful for the Council to consider in detail the substance of the report prior to the Annual Review, and that it might be appropriate merely to recommend to governments that they direct their attention to the problems raised and make every endeavour to build up their forces.

2. The memorandum singled out one recommendation in General Ridgway's report as being appropriate for action by the Council at the present time. This was the suggestion "that action be initiated with all governments concerned to ensure that a public information programme is conducted to acquaint the civilian population of NATO with the problem and that it begin with the least practicable delay." The memorandum proposed that attention of governments be drawn to this recommendation and that the Working Group on Information Policy be invited "to proceed with its business as expeditiously as possible and to put forward concrete proposals to the Council at the earliest possible date".

3. This paper provoked a fairly wide ranging discussion involving several related issues. The Greek representative emphasized the importance of deciding as soon as possible on the general tone which should govern statements to be made by national authorities and NATO authorities alike. He saw a range of possibilities here, of which one extreme was to take a deliberately optimistic line such as that followed in the press briefing upon which the Council had decided at its meeting of August 20th (document C-R(52)18). The other extreme, indicating the direction which he himself would consider desirable, was to follow a line which he termed "realistic, even pessimistic". Such a line would pick up the spirit of General Ridgway's report. There was a good deal of rather wandering discussion on this question, with the general conclusion being reached that the line which should guide those who might have occasion to make statements on NATO developments should be one of "balanced optimism". The line should, however, take account of considerations brought out in the examination of a somewhat different point.

4. This other point was expressed most concisely by the Netherlands representative. The latter argued that it might be necessary in due course to decide between an "optimistic" and a "pessimistic" treatment, but that a

Copies Referred
To.....No. of Enclosures
-1

Post File

No.....

OTTAWA FILE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

See 139 8


- 2 -

more immediate problem was to reach a decision on the factual material which might be used. The manner of presentation was something which could be determined only after the content had been decided. He suggested that already some of the factual statements contained in General Ridgway's report had appeared in the press in rather garbled form, and it was unrealistic to expect that such gradual leakages could be entirely prevented. It would, therefore, be better to decide in advance how much factual information on the progress of the defence buildup could be used and thereby make it possible for this material to be given to the press in the most felicitous form. He pointed out, moreover, that it was somewhat ridiculous to pass on to governments the recommendation "that they acquaint the civilian population of NATO with the problem" without giving some sort of indication of what factual material might be used.

5. This last suggestion raised the question of what "problem" General Ridgway had had in mind in making his recommendation. Some representatives judged that SACEUR had been thinking merely in terms of a positive and vigorous presentation of the purposes of NATO and the tasks which lay before the Organization. Others suggested that General Ridgway's purpose had probably been more specific; he might well have wished to bring before the public of NATO countries both the accomplishments and the failures in the defence programme to date.

6. It was agreed finally that, at least until after the Annual Review, all those who might be making public statements having to do with NATO should be requested to avoid using specific figures or discussing the progress of particular features of the overall programme. In the meantime, the Standing Group Liaison Officer would discuss with General Ridgway and with the Standing Group the general problem of what factual material concerning the accomplishments of the programme might properly be made public. Following a report on this question the Council would decide what particular task should be laid upon the Information Policy Working Group, which could examine this question usefully only with fairly explicit guidance as to the purpose of the examination. These decisions, of course, in no way delayed the Council's recommendation to governments that they give their earnest consideration to the problems raised by the report.

7. At various points in the discussion there was mention of the fact that the SACEUR report has no official status, being still under consideration by the Standing Group and not as yet approved by national military representatives. We were, therefore, not able to lay too much stress upon the suggestion made in para. 3 of your telegram under reference although our mention of it was not unsympathetically received. It was pointed out that the military guidance to be afforded the Council in the conduct of the Annual Review would take account of those elements in SACEUR's report which had been approved by the appropriate military authorities. In addition the report was in the hands of governments and its contents should therefore be used, to whatever extent the various governments might consider desirable, in instructing their representatives participating in the Annual Review.



PERMANENT DELEGATION.

000662

REQUIRE A SECRET

OTTAWA FILE

No.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TOP SECRET

Despatch No.

Date... September 11, 1952.....

FROM: THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL AND THE O.E.E.C.

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference.....

Subject:..... SACEUR's Status Report and Public Information.....

19 SEP 1952

In opening the Informal Council Meeting on September 11 Lord Ismay raised a point concerning SACEUR's Status Report (SHAPE 723/52). He said that while the Report had not yet been cleared with the various governments it was perhaps possible to take action as regards the recommendation in para 9 (d) that an attempt should be made to enlist the support of public opinion in member countries as regards the build-up of NATO forces. Lord Ismay said that the Council could reply that an Information Policy Working Group has already been appointed to make recommendations on this particular problem and that action could be expected soon.

2. In connection with public information projects Lord Ismay referred to the success of the Atlantic Community Conference in Oxford. He also expressed the hope that the Working Group might proceed somewhat more quickly in the future. He suggested that on occasions permanent representatives might attend its meetings and that it was perhaps not necessary in every case to await unanimous agreement before making recommendations for action. A number of representatives expressed the view that initiatives taken by private organizations are generally more effective than official ventures and they hoped that conferences similar to that held at Oxford might be organized in other countries.

3. The Standing Group liaison officer, in answer to a question I put to him, confirmed that SACEUR's report is primarily concerned with the build-up of land and air forces. As these reports are of considerable importance in relation to the Annual Review procedure he agreed that it would be useful to have similar data from SACLANC on progress achieved as regards the navy. He undertook to bring the matter to the attention of the military authorities concerned.

Copies Referred

To.....

No. of Enclosures

.....

Post File

No.....


Refer
U.S. SEA
Inf. Div.
Short NATO
Washington
European
Economic

Done
Sept 22/52
gl

for the

APW [Signature]

PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE



BEST AVAILABLE COPY

OTAWA FILE
100-100000

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
TOP SECRET

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA
FROM: [illegible]

In October the Internal Security Council meeting on September 11 Lord Larny raised a point concerning the Security Council Report (S.C.R. 232) and said that while the report had not been cleared with the various governments it was being possible to take action as regards the recommendation in para. 2(B) that an attempt should be made to gain the support of public opinion in member countries regarding the withdrawal of AID forces. Lord Larny said that the Council could reply that an information policy working group has already been appointed to make recommendations on this matter and that the action would be taken soon.

In connection with public relations objectives Lord Larny referred to the success of the Larny Committee's work in Africa. He also expressed the hope that the working group would be able to do what was chiefly in the interest of the countries concerned. He suggested that on occasions between representatives of the various countries and that it was possible to have a meeting in every case to wait until a decision had been reached. He suggested that a number of representatives be selected to visit the countries and that initiatives taken by these representatives are generally more effective than official ventures and that some conferences might be held in the future which might be organized in other countries.

The Canadian Crown Liaison Officer in New York, a question was raised concerning the S.C.R. report in relation to the report of the United Nations and the United States. As the report of the United Nations was in relation to the report of the United States, he said that it would be better to have a meeting in New York to discuss the report and to have a meeting in New York to discuss the report.

10 SEP 1952

Handwritten signature and initials.

Copies Returned

No. of Enclosures

File No.

No.

Handwritten notes:
refer
U.D.A.
Prof. Dr.
that H.A.O.
was in the
[illegible]

Handwritten notes:
[illegible]