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Notes For Remarks By The Prime Minister
On Peace And Security
Montreal, November 13, 1983

~~(TRANSLATION)~~

On previous occasions, I have taken the opportunity of these events to discuss the future of Quebec and of Canada. Broadening our horizons today, I would like to speak to you about peace, about disarmament, and about our future as inhabitants of a world in disarray.

We meet together as part of the long-standing democratic process in this country -- a process which, as your generous presence shows, is alive and well in Canada. We take pride in the vigour and diversity of our political life, in the bright promise of our future.

If our future depended on Canadians alone, we could be confident that it was safe and sound. But no nation today holds its future securely in its own hands. We share this planet with about 160 other nations, all of whom interact with us in a global system embracing our security, our economy, the health of our environment, and the quality of our lives.

Those 160 governments are, however, by no means the only players. The stage is crowded with alliances, with regional associations, with international institutions such as the United Nations, with multinational corporations, with cartels, pressure groups and lobbies of all kinds.

We are all of us -- you and I and our families, citizens, governments and corporations -- on that crowded global stage, which is alive with our hopes and our fears, our failures and our successes. But there are today three dominant and disturbing trends which, when set side by side, threaten to bring down the curtain on our human performance.

The first trend is an increasing resort to the use of force in the settlement of international disputes. Despite the solemn affirmation of the UN Charter that "all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force" there have been, since 1945, approximately 130 conflicts in which 35 million human lives have been lost.

There is a habit of aggression which is gaining ground. An abdication of the political process in deference to military solutions. A coarse element of belligerence, of menacing rhetoric, of governments which rise and fall at gun-point. The trend is global -- and it is gathering speed.

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(TEXTE)

La paix et la sécurité ne sont pas de froides abstractions. Elles sont la garantie de l'avenir de l'humanité, de l'épanouissement de l'esprit humain et de la survie de notre planète.

Le choix qui s'impose à nous est donc clair et pressant. Ou bien nous nous laissons entraîner par le courant aveugle qui nous mène à la guerre nucléaire, ou bien nous rassemblons nos énergies et nous travaillons ensemble à maîtriser les forces qui pèsent sur nous, sur nos enfants et sur le monde.

Quant à moi, j'ai fait mon choix. J'ai choisi de lutter, et je sais que je peux compter sur votre appui.

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This brutalization of political life takes on a particularly dangerous tone when it is driven by the clash of confrontational ideologies, and armed with sophisticated weapons. Weapons claiming an annual expenditure on the order of 600 billion dollars for nuclear and conventional arms combined. Weapons claiming too great a share of the budgets of impoverished Third World nations. Weapons which promote a rising tide of violence and engulf more peaceful ways to resolve disputes.

The second trend is the steady unravelling of the international regime designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

This proliferation has two fundamental directions. We call it vertical proliferation when we mean the development of ever-larger nuclear weapons programmes, ever more-advanced in destructive technology, by the five nuclear-weapons states: the USA, USSR, France, UK and China. We call it horizontal proliferation when we mean the potential spread of nuclear weapons to other states. Some of these other nations have the capacity now to produce nuclear arms. Some are on the verge of doing so.

We are today preoccupied mainly with the evident need to assert restraint over the arsenals of all five nuclear powers. But from a global perspective, and in the near term, the consequences of horizontal proliferation pose an equally grave threat. Perhaps more grave, since the use of nuclear weapons by other nations would be unchecked by the assurance of mutual destruction which obtains among the five powers.

It was precisely to arrest both kinds of proliferation that a formal agreement -- the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- came into effect in 1970, and is up for review in 1985. That treaty represented an implicit covenant between those nations with nuclear weapons and those without: an undertaking by the nuclear powers that they would pursue negotiations in good faith on arms control and on limiting the spread of their weapons technology; and an undertaking by other states that they would forego the military use of nuclear energy in return for the benefits of its peaceful use, in fields such as energy, medicine, or agriculture.

But the trend is for this bargain to come unstuck. The treaty stands now at a cross-roads between peaceful aspiration and military strategy. It is the crossroads at which nuclear and non-nuclear countries -- East and West, North and South -- preoccupied with their survival, with their sovereignty, or with current conflicts, will decide whether the covenant still holds.

The third trend which threatens the global system is the worsening state of relations between East and West, particularly of relations between the two superpowers. Two weeks ago, when I spoke in Guelph, I deplored the absence of high politics in East-West relations, and the tendency for arms control negotiations to run their course outside any structure of understanding of, and respect for, each

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(TRADUCTION)

Lors de ma tournée en Europe, j'ai été encouragé de voir à quel point mes objectifs rejoignent ceux des leaders que j'ai rencontrés. Et j'aimerais confirmer ce soir mon intention de me rendre à Tokyo samedi prochain pour y rencontrer le premier ministre Nakasone.

La participation du Japon à la déclaration de Williamsburg, dans laquelle les dirigeants des pays industrialisés convenaient, en mai dernier, d'utiliser toutes leurs ressources politiques pour réduire les dangers de guerre, revêt un caractère historique et constitue un reflet du monde où nous vivons. Ma visite au Japon veut témoigner de l'indivisibilité de la sécurité universelle à l'ère atomique.

Je peux vous dire que, outre les consultations déjà en cours avec les États-Unis, j'ai pris contact avec l'Union soviétique et la Chine, deux puissances nucléaires dont tant de choses dépendent.

C'est avec empressement que je prendrai part aux discussions sur la paix et la sécurité lors de la conférence des chefs de gouvernement du Commonwealth, à New Delhi, où je me rendrai en quittant le Japon. Je suis particulièrement impatient de m'entretenir avec le premier ministre Indira Gandhi sur la question de la non-prolifération et de connaître ses vues, en tant que présidente du Conseil des pays non alignés, sur les liens à établir entre désarmement et développement.

Je suis satisfait des progrès accomplis et heureux de l'accueil réservé à mes propositions. Je suis néanmoins conscient des critiques que suscite chez certains commentateurs la démarche étapiste que nous favorisons. Certains lui préféreraient l'élan passionné en faveur d'un projet utopique. D'autres sont paralysés par la complexité des enjeux. Je suis d'avis qu'il faut "faire" la paix progressivement, avec prudence et réalisme. Nous devons éviter de brusquer une confiance politique des plus fragiles, et construire avec précaution en tâchant de nous retrouver sur un terrain commun et solide.

Une action politique s'impose avec d'autant plus d'urgence que la multiplication des conflits et des confrontations risque de déborder notre aptitude à comprendre ce qui se passe et notre capacité d'y remédier.

Lorsqu'il inventa la dynamite, en 1867, Alfred Nobel croyait que la perspective effarante d'une application militaire de sa découverte forcerait les nations à vivre en paix. Aujourd'hui la puissance d'une bombe nucléaire est sans commune mesure avec la force des explosifs classiques, et devant pareille démesure, notre esprit vacille.

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other's security needs. I reaffirmed our fidelity to the NATO two-track decision, and declared my hope that we might add a "third rail" of political energy, of dialogue and of confidence, in order to improve the downward course of relations between East and West.

~~(TEXT)~~

I ask you now to consider these three trends in relation to each other -- laminated together, as they are in life. An increasing resort to the use of force. The growing reality of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. And a superpower relationship which is charged with animosity. I believe it is evident that only a global approach to peace and security can reverse the path of this sinister, composite trend-line.

Because, as tensions build, the East-West relationship becomes particularly vulnerable to events on the periphery. An endemic instability is evident in areas largely understood to be the sphere of influence of one or the other superpower. At other flashpoints, such as the ever-volatile Middle East, we see the tinder for a spreading conflagration.

The penetration of East-West rivalry into the Third World will reach its deepest and most dangerous point if, despite the Non-Proliferation Treaty, front-line antagonists -- locked in rivalry or combat -- begin to arm themselves with nuclear weapons.

(TRANSLATION)

As Canadians, our energies are deeply devoted to the security of the Western community, on this continent and in Europe. But our loyalties, our national and global interests, by no means end there.

Canada's place on the Pacific Rim gives us a privileged relationship with Japan, with China, and with the Association of South-East Asian Nations and, of course, with Australia and New Zealand. Our extensive programme of development assistance takes us to many parts of the world, remote in distance, but close in partnership. Our standing in the community of francophone nations, and in the Commonwealth, demands that we share the full range of political, economic and security concerns to which our national character gives us access.

That is why, in pursuing an initiative to improve the prospects for peace, I determined from the start that our approach must be global in scope and in perspective. Such an approach is dictated by the complex interlinkage of disarmament and development; of superpower animosity and Third World rivalries; of the resort to force and the availability of weapons; of nuclear balances in Europe and in Asia.

One man representing one country cannot promise a miracle, let alone deliver one. I have absolutely no illusions about the complexity of the issues in play. Nonetheless it is essential, in my judgement, to seek stability at a number of points along the downward trend-line, and to recognize that peace and security in the modern age are indivisible.

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Aucune des superpuissances n'a encore mis au point un système anti-satellites à haute altitude. Une interdiction de le faire est donc encore possible. Sans une entente de ce genre, on devra dépenser, des deux côtés, des sommes énormes qui pourraient être employées à des fins plus constructives. Sans une entente, on se lancera dans une surenchère qui rendrait plus probables encore les accidents et les erreurs de calcul. Qui plus est, un succès à ce chapitre contribuerait à relancer les négociations sur les systèmes anti-satellites fonctionnant à basse altitude.

Une autre menace à la stabilité serait que les armes stratégiques intercontinentales deviennent tellement mobiles qu'il soit pratiquement impossible de les repérer. Cela pourrait remettre en question la capacité des deux camps, ou de tout organisme international, à vérifier l'application des ententes de limitation des armements.

Le Canada continue pour sa part à consacrer ses énergies et ses ressources à l'étude des problèmes de vérification, dont dépendront la durabilité et la crédibilité des mesures de contrôle. Et il constate comme tout le monde que la possibilité d'un contrôle véritable des armements se trouverait considérablement accrue si l'on se préoccupait des problèmes de vérification au moment de la mise au point d'un nouveau système stratégique plutôt que d'attendre l'étape des négociations.

J'ai donc l'intention de soumettre, en temps opportun et aux autorités compétentes en matière de désarmement, des documents réclamant une entente internationale en vue 1) d'interdire l'essai et le déploiement de systèmes anti-satellites à haute altitude, 2) de limiter la mobilité excessive des missiles balistiques intercontinentaux et 3) d'exiger que tout nouveau système d'armements stratégiques soit entièrement vérifiable par les moyens techniques nationaux.

Il s'agit là de mesures importantes dont les détails sont souvent de nature technique. Mais, si nous parvenons à donner une impulsion politique à l'idée d'asseoir les cinq grands à une même table de négociation, si nous obtenons un nouvel engagement politique à l'égard du Traité sur la non-prolifération, si nous redonnons un élan aux négociations de Vienne sur la question de l'équilibre des forces classiques et du relèvement du seuil nucléaire en Europe, si enfin nous nous appliquons à restreindre les progrès qualitatifs dans le domaine de la technologie stratégique de façon à favoriser la vérification, alors nous aurons suscité une approche vraiment globale des problèmes de paix et de sécurité.

Comme je l'ai souligné à mes collègues européens, il est essentiel que ce programme commun, ce filet de sécurité dont dépend notre survie, soit soutenu par les leaders politiques au plus haut niveau; que nos entretiens à l'échelle nationale et internationale reçoivent une véritable relance politique et que nous travaillions à définir les intérêts toujours plus nombreux qui nous rendent solidaires, à commencer par notre condition humaine et notre avenir commun sur cette planète.

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I am encouraged by this momentum, and heartened by the response. But I am also well aware that critics of my initiative have difficulty in grasping this step by step approach. Some would prefer the passionate embrace of an unattainable ideal. Others are paralyzed by the complexities of the issues in play. I believe that peace must be waged steadily, with caution and with realism. We must work with due respect for the fragility of political trust, for the importance of building carefully, for the need to search out common ground on which to stand.

The imperative of political action is made all the more urgent by the pace of conflict and confrontation, which threatens to overtake our ability to understand what is happening, and our capacity to manage it.

Let me remind you that when Alfred Nobel invented dynamite in 1867 he believed that the prospect of its military application was so awesome that governments would be forced to live in peace. And yet today we have long since lost the ability to comprehend the force of a nuclear blast in terms of any comparison with traditional explosives.

(TRANSLATION) 

Peace and security are not cold abstractions. Their purpose is to preserve the future of mankind, the growth of the human spirit, and the patrimony of our planet.

The choice we face is clear and present. We can without effort abandon our fate to the mindless drift toward nuclear war. Or we can gather our strength, working in good company to turn aside the forces bearing down on us, on our children, on this Earth.

As for me, I choose to move forward, and I know I do so with your support.

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La première est le recours croissant à la force pour régler les différends internationaux. Malgré la déclaration solennelle de la Charte des Nations Unies demandant que "les membres de l'Organisation s'abstiennent, dans leurs relations internationales, de recourir à la menace ou à l'emploi de la force", nous avons connu, depuis 1945, quelque 130 conflits qui ont entraîné la perte de 35 millions de vies humaines.

L'habitude de l'agression se répand et de plus en plus le processus politique cède la place aux solutions militaires. La belligérance et les propos menaçants font florès et les gouvernements naissent et tombent par les armes. La tendance est universelle, et elle va en s'accroissant.

Cette brutalisation de la vie politique devient particulièrement inquiétante lorsqu'elle s'enracine dans des conflits entre idéologies irréconciliables et qu'elle est soutenue par des armes sophistiquées, nucléaires ou classiques, dont la fabrication absorbe annuellement quelque 600 milliards de dollars. Des armes qui engloutissent une tranche beaucoup trop importante des budgets des pays du tiers monde et qui, par leur nature même, incitent à la violence plutôt qu'au règlement pacifique des différends.

La deuxième tendance est l'effritement accéléré du régime international destiné à prévenir la prolifération des armes nucléaires.

Cette prolifération revêt une double dimension. Nous l'appelons verticale pour désigner la mise sur pied, par les cinq États nucléaires, États-Unis, URSS, France, Royaume-Uni et Chine, de programmes d'armement nucléaire toujours plus ambitieux et toujours plus perfectionnés dans leur puissance de destruction. Et nous parlons de prolifération horizontale pour caractériser la propagation des armes nucléaires dans d'autres États qui sont sur le point d'en fabriquer ou qui auront bientôt la capacité de le faire.

Notre principale préoccupation aujourd'hui est évidemment de limiter les arsenaux des cinq puissances nucléaires. Mais, d'un point de vue mondial et à court terme, les conséquences de la prolifération horizontale apparaissent tout aussi graves. En fait, elles le sont peut-être davantage, car les petites puissances nucléaires ne seraient pas retenues, comme le sont les cinq grandes, par la certitude d'une destruction mutuelle et finale si elles avaient recours aux armes nucléaires.

La conclusion du Traité sur la non-prolifération, entré en vigueur en 1970 et qui doit être révisé en 1985, visait précisément à empêcher la prolifération horizontale aussi bien que verticale. Ce traité était en fait un pacte implicite entre les États dotés d'armes nucléaires et ceux qui n'en ont pas. D'un côté, les puissances nucléaires s'engageaient à négocier de bonne foi des limites sur le

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It is therefore my intention to introduce, at the appropriate time and in the appropriate disarmament forum, papers calling for (a) international agreement to ban the testing and deployment of high-altitude anti-satellite systems; (b) to restrict excessive mobility of ICBMs; and (c) to require that future strategic weapon systems be fully verifiable by national technical means.

These are measures of substance, often technical in their detail. But if we can generate a political impulse toward a five-power nuclear conference, toward renewed political commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, toward action at the MBFR talks to balance conventional forces and to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe, toward a restriction of qualitative developments in strategic technology, and toward their verification, then we would have motivated a truly global and comprehensive approach to the crisis of peace and security.

It is essential, as I told my colleagues in Europe, that this interlocking programme, this safety net for our very survival, be guided by political leadership at the highest level. That our own consultations, and talks with others, be quickened by a jolt of political energy. That we work to identify steadily increasing areas of mutual interest, starting from our common humanity and our common fate on this earth.

~~(TEXT)~~

I return from Europe profoundly encouraged by the extent to which my purposes are shared by a community of other leaders. Therefore I would like to confirm tonight my intention to travel to Japan, to consult Prime Minister Nakasone in Tokyo next Saturday.

Japan's association with the Williamsburg Declaration last May, in which the leaders of the industrialized democracies agreed to devote our full political resources to reducing the threat of war, expresses both the resonance of history and the reality of the present day. My visit there will bear witness to the indivisibility of global security in the nuclear age.

I can also announce that, in addition to the consultations under way with the United States, I have initiated consultations with the Soviet Union and with China -- two nuclear powers on whom much depends.

I look forward to taking an active part in the discussion of peace and security issues at the New Delhi meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government, where I will be heading after Japan. I look forward particularly to consultations with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on the matter of non-proliferation, and on her perspective, as current chairman of the council of non-aligned nations, on the linkage between disarmament and development.

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nombre et la diffusion de leurs armes nucléaires. De leur côté, les autres États convenaient de renoncer à l'emploi du nucléaire à des fins militaires, à condition de pouvoir en bénéficier dans des secteurs pacifiques comme ceux de l'énergie, de la médecine ou de l'agriculture.

Mais tiraillé entre les exigences de la paix et les impératifs de la guerre, ce pacte est bien près de se rompre. Les États tant nucléaires que non nucléaires, ceux de l'Est comme de l'Ouest, ceux du Nord comme du Sud, en sont maintenant au point où ils doivent décider si le pacte tient toujours, si leur besoin de survivre doit primer sur l'idée qu'ils se font de leur souveraineté.

La troisième des tendances qui comportent un danger pour l'ensemble de la planète est la dégradation des relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest, plus particulièrement des rapports entre les deux superpuissances. Dans un discours prononcé à Guelph, il y a deux semaines, je déplorais l'absence de haute politique dans les relations Est-Ouest, et la tendance de chacune des parties à négocier la limitation des armements sans faire effort pour comprendre les besoins de sécurité de l'autre. J'ai réaffirmé notre adhésion à la stratégie à deux voies de l'OTAN et exprimé l'espoir qu'on en ajoute une troisième, la voie de la volonté politique, du dialogue et de la confiance, afin de contrer la dégradation des relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

(TRADUCTION)

Si l'on examine ensemble les trois tendances que je viens de mentionner, recours accru à la force, risque grandissant de prolifération des armes nucléaires et rapports imprégnés d'animosité entre les superpuissances, on s'aperçoit qu'elles convergent et nous mènent à la catastrophe. Il devient dès lors évident que seule une approche globale des problèmes de paix et de sécurité peut renverser le cours sinistre de ces tendances.

Avec la montée de la tension, en effet, les relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest sont particulièrement sensibles aux événements survenant à la périphérie. On constate une instabilité endémique dans des régions généralement reconnues comme faisant partie de la sphère d'influence de l'une ou de l'autre superpuissance. Dans d'autres points volatiles du globe, le Moyen-Orient en est l'exemple patent, tous les éléments d'une conflagration se trouvent réunis.

Et l'extension au tiers monde des rivalités entre l'Est et l'Ouest atteindra son point culminant et le plus dangereux si, malgré le Traité sur la non-prolifération, les forces en présence -- belligérants ou simples antagonistes -- commencent à se doter d'armes nucléaires.

(TEXTE)

Certes, en tant que Canadiens, nous sommes avant tout attachés à la communauté occidentale; nous recherchons d'abord la sécurité sur ce continent et en Europe. Mais notre loyauté, nos intérêts nationaux et internationaux, ne s'arrêtent pas là.

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Another negotiating forum will open in Stockholm this January. Its lengthy title, showing the complexity of its task, is the "Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe". It is imperative that this Conference not lose its way in litigation about procedures, or in the linguistics of technicality. I have therefore proposed that we consider the merits of high-level political representation at the very start of the Stockholm negotiations.

A fourth element in my initiative flows from the strategy of suffocation which I first proposed to the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. That strategy -- which still requires, and awaits, the support of the five nuclear powers for its implementation -- needs further elaboration to keep pace with technological advances. Arms control measures must address those new technologies which, by their very nature, would make stability a more elusive goal.

I have in mind a ban on the testing and deployment of those anti-satellite systems designed to operate at high altitude. Such weapons could attack the global communications which are of critical importance for crisis management. Destruction of the other side's command and control network, at a time of crisis, would leave him blind and mute at the very moment when stability demands awareness and response, not the panic reaction of "launch on warning."

Neither superpower has yet developed an anti-satellite system for high altitudes. An agreement not to do so is therefore still possible. No agreement means vast expenditure by both sides -- funds better spent on more worthy projects. No agreement means a further spiral of competition -- a competition particularly vulnerable to accident or miscalculation. Moreover an agreement could encourage movement toward negotiations about anti-satellite weaponry designed to operate at lower altitudes.

I am also concerned about another potentially destabilizing development, which is the possibility that new intercontinental strategic weapons may be so highly mobile as to be virtually invisible. This would call into question the ability of either side, or any international body, to verify arms control agreements.

Canada continues to devote attention, and resources, to problems of verification which must be resolved if arms-control measures are to be durable and trusted. We believe that the prospects for arms control would be considerably enhanced if the verification factor were taken into account in the developmental stage of any new strategic system -- rather than leaving it to the point where systems are put on the bargaining table.

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Notre ouverture sur le Pacifique nous assure des relations privilégiée avec le Japon, la Chine, l'Association des Nations de l'Asie du Sud-Est et, bien entendu, l'Australie et la Nouvelle-Zélande. Notre vaste programme d'aide au développement s'étend à de nombreux pays éloignés géographiquement, mais rapprochés par les liens étroits qu'ils entretiennent avec le Canada. Notre place au sein de la francophonie et du Commonwealth nous invite à partager les préoccupations politiques et économiques et le besoin de sécurité des pays que nous y côtoyons.

C'est pourquoi, avant même de tenter un geste pour améliorer les perspectives de paix, j'ai décidé que notre démarche devait adopter une perspective globale. Une telle approche nous est dictée par l'interaction complexe entre le désarmement et le développement, entre l'animosité des superpuissances et les rivalités au sein du tiers monde, entre le recours à la force et la disponibilité des armes, entre l'équilibre nucléaire en Europe et celui en Asie.

Il est certain que le représentant d'un seul pays ne peut promettre de miracle, et encore moins en accomplir. Je ne me fais aucune illusion sur la complexité des problèmes en cause. J'estime toutefois essentiel de rechercher des crans d'arrêt sur la pente descendante où nous sommes engagés, de reconnaître qu'à notre époque, la paix et la sécurité sont indissociables, et de constater que sur ce point aussi nos pays sont interdépendants.

Heureusement, je ne suis pas seul à penser ainsi. D'autres dirigeants partagent mes préoccupations, et un nombre croissant d'entre eux sont décidés à subordonner la science de la guerre à l'art de la politique. Leur appui m'encourage.

Vous n'ignorez pas que je rentre d'Europe, où j'ai eu des entretiens avec les dirigeants d'un certain nombre de pays de l'Alliance atlantique, avec Sa Sainteté le Pape et avec Sa Majesté la Reine des Pays-Bas. Je reviens au pays avec le sentiment que nos amis et alliés appuient mon initiative de paix et partagent ma conviction quant à l'urgence de la situation. Ils sont d'accord en particulier sur la nécessité d'ajouter à notre stratégie une troisième voie pour rétablir la confiance et les communications entre les parties.

J'ai soumis à mes collègues européens, afin qu'ils puissent les étudier et les raffiner en fonction de leur propre expérience, les éléments d'un programme de gestion de la crise actuelle. Permettez-moi de vous exposer quelques-uns de ces éléments que mes interlocuteurs se sont engagés à examiner personnellement.

Le premier porte sur la nécessité de créer, aussitôt que possible au cours de l'année prochaine, une tribune pour la négociation des limites globales à fixer aux arsenaux des cinq États nucléaires. Ce projet est sans préjudice des négociations sur les forces nucléaires de portée moyenne et des pourparlers START entre les États-Unis et l'URSS, ces entretiens ne s'étendant pas, et c'est normal, aux forces nucléaires de la Grande-Bretagne, de la France et de la Chine.

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If the five nuclear-weapons states could begin to strengthen their side of the non-proliferation bargain, then the rest of us could more easily bring good sense to bear on those who have not yet signed on. No doubt we need to increase the incentives for Third World states to forego nuclear weapons -- there must be a direct linkage between disarmament and development. And we shall also have to ensure that a full range of safeguards adequately governs the transfer, from all nuclear suppliers, of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The area of safeguards is one in which Canada has taken a leading part for many years, and will continue to do so. -

Those two elements begin to address the global dimension of security in the nuclear age. But we must also recognize that there is in the heart of Europe a most dangerous concentration of forces -- conventional as well as nuclear. A war in Europe could destroy everything that each side desires to protect.

Throughout my talks with European leaders, there ran a common theme of concern at the present imbalance of conventional forces between the two sides. The Warsaw Pact conventional forces heavily outweigh those of NATO. There is an apprehension in Western Europe that the Warsaw Pact forces could be tempted to gamble on a conventionally-armed attack. They would throw down the challenge to Western leaders either of accepting defeat, or of being the first to resort to the use of nuclear weapons in our own defense.

As long as this imbalance of conventional forces persists, so does the risk that nuclear weapons would be brought into action at an early stage of any conflict. That is why we say that the nuclear threshold in Europe is too low. And of course we can never be certain that the use of nuclear weapons in the European theatre would not escalate rapidly to ever more-massive nuclear retaliation on an intercontinental scale. The conclusion we draw is that the best way to raise the nuclear threshold is to establish a more reasonable balance of conventional forces. ✓

10 How then do we achieve this balance? This question prompts the third element of my approach. The simple, though expensive, answer is for the West to increase its conventional forces until they match those of the Warsaw Pact. I see this as a last resort. The far more sensible approach would be for both sides to reduce their conventional forces to mutually agreed levels, a task to which we have devoted the past ten years at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna. There is today some sign of movement in those talks, but at far too slow a pace. Hard questions remain to be resolved. That is why I explored, with my colleagues in the Alliance, ways to break the deadlock in Vienna, ways to give fresh political impetus to the MBFR talks.

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Ce que nous devons rechercher pour ces cinq États, c'est une tribune de négociation qui reconnaîtrait le droit des États-Unis et de l'URSS à l'égalité stratégique, ou à ce qu'un récent rapport de la Commission trilatérale appelait "la parité inévitable". Une tribune qui fournirait un cadre stable, légitime et mutuellement acceptable où puisse s'établir un rapport entre les forces des superpuissances et celles des trois autres États dotés d'armes nucléaires.

Ainsi, ni la Grande-Bretagne, ni la France, ni la Chine n'aurait à craindre que ses forces soient soumises à des restrictions décrétées sans tenir compte de ses intérêts nationaux.

Une fois établis les rapports entre les niveaux d'armements des cinq puissances nucléaires, elles pourraient commencer à discuter des réductions prévues dans le Traité sur la non-prolifération, ainsi que des mesures pour contrôler l'aspect qualitatif de la course aux armes stratégiques.

Le deuxième élément du programme serait de renforcer le Traité sur la non-prolifération, ce pacte dont je vous ai déjà parlé entre les pays dotés d'armes nucléaires et ceux qui n'en ont pas. Quelque 119 nations ont signé ce Traité, mais un certain nombre d'États importants n'y ont pas encore adhéré, dont plusieurs possèdent dès maintenant, ou posséderont bientôt les moyens de mettre au point leurs propres armes atomiques.

Si les cinq puissances nucléaires prenaient l'initiative de mieux respecter les obligations que leur impose le Traité sur la non-prolifération, nous, les autres signataires, pourrions plus facilement tenter de convaincre d'autres pays de signer. Il faudrait, sans aucun doute, trouver des moyens supplémentaires d'inciter les États du tiers monde à renoncer aux armes nucléaires. C'est pourquoi il nous faut établir un rapport direct entre le désarmement et le développement. Nous devons aussi veiller à ce que des garanties étendues et adéquates président à tout transfert de technologie nucléaire à des fins pacifiques, quel que soit le pays fournisseur. Le Canada a fait un travail de pionnier dans ce domaine des garanties, et il continuera à oeuvrer à leur renforcement.

Les deux éléments du programme que je viens d'exposer portent sur la dimension planétaire de la sécurité à l'ère nucléaire. Mais il faut aussi reconnaître qu'il y a, au coeur de l'Europe, une concentration alarmante de forces classiques aussi bien que nucléaires. Une guerre sur le vieux continent risquerait de détruire tout ce que chaque camp désire préserver.

Voilà pourquoi la question du déséquilibre actuel entre les forces classiques des deux camps est revenue fréquemment dans mes entretiens avec les dirigeants européens. Les forces classiques du Pacte de Varsovie étant nettement supérieures à celles des pays de l'OTAN, on craint en Europe de l'Ouest que les pays du Pacte ne soient tentés de miser sur cette supériorité pour risquer une attaque. Les dirigeants occidentaux seraient alors acculés à un dilemme cornélien: 000706
ou bien accepter la défaite, ou bien déclencher la guerre nucléaire.

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Moreover, I am not alone. Other leaders have joined their concerns with mine. There is a growing community of political leadership which is determined to subject the science of arms to the art of politics. I draw encouragement from the support of that community.

You will know that I have just returned from meetings in Europe with several leaders of the Atlantic Alliance, with His Holiness the Pope, and with Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands. I return from Europe with clear expressions of support for my initiative, confident that my sense of urgency is shared by our friends and allies. I found a particular consensus on the need to lay down a third rail of confidence and communication -- a rail charging our dealings with the other side with a current of political energy.

I took to my European colleagues for discussion, and for refinement in light of their own views, elements of a programme for political management of the current crisis. I return with the assurance of their personal attention to this programme. Let me set out some of the elements.

The first is the need to establish, as soon as possible in the course of the coming year, a forum in which global limits might be negotiated for all five nuclear-weapons states. This proposal is without prejudice to the INF or START talks between the USA and USSR. But those talks, and rightly so, do not cover British, French or Chinese nuclear forces.

What we must seek to provide is a negotiating forum for those five states which recognizes the rights of the United States and the Soviet Union as strategic equals -- what a recent Trilateral Commission report calls "inevitable parity" between them -- and which provides a mutually acceptable and stable framework for the relationship between the forces of the other three states and those of the superpowers.

In this way neither Britain, nor France, nor China need fear that their forces will be subject to restraints which do not recognize their own national interests.

Once relative levels of armament were stabilized, I believe the five nuclear powers could begin to address the reductions called for by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to consider measures to control the qualitative aspects of the strategic arms race.

A second element is remedial action to shore up the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself -- that covenant between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states which I mentioned a few minutes ago. The Treaty has been signed by some 119 nations. But a number of key states remain aloof, including several with the capacity now, or the potential soon, to develop their own nuclear arms.

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Tant que ce déséquilibre persistera, le risque d'un recours aux armes atomiques demeurera présent. C'est pourquoi nous affirmons que le seuil nucléaire est trop bas en Europe. Et, bien sûr, personne ne saurait être certain que l'utilisation d'armes atomiques sur le vieux continent ne mènerait pas à des représailles nucléaires de plus en plus massives à l'échelle intercontinentale. Nous croyons donc que la meilleure façon de relever le seuil nucléaire est d'établir un équilibre plus raisonnable entre les forces classiques.

Comment, dès lors, réaliser cet équilibre? Voilà, la question à laquelle tente de répondre le troisième élément de mon programme.

La solution simple mais coûteuse serait d'augmenter les forces classiques des pays de l'Ouest jusqu'à ce qu'elles rejoignent celles du Pacte de Varsovie. Ce serait un pis-aller. Car la façon la plus intelligente de procéder serait que les deux camps réduisent leurs forces classiques à des niveaux mutuellement acceptables. C'est précisément cet objectif que nous poursuivons depuis dix ans dans le cadre des négociations sur les réductions mutuelles et équilibrées des forces, qui se déroulent à Vienne. Or, les choses avancent à un rythme beaucoup trop lent, et il reste des questions cruciales à trancher. C'est pourquoi j'ai exploré avec mes interlocuteurs les moyens de débloquent les négociations de Vienne en leur imprimant un vigoureux élan politique.

Il faut aussi savoir, à ce propos, qu'une autre négociation s'ouvrira en janvier à Stockholm. Son seul titre de "Conférence sur les mesures de confiance et de sécurité et sur le désarmement en Europe" indique la complexité des problèmes auxquels elle s'attaque. Il importe d'éviter, dès le départ, que cette conférence ne s'enlise dans les disputes de procédure ou le jargon technique. J'ai donc proposé qu'on examine les avantages d'une présence politique à un haut niveau dès l'ouverture des discussions.

Le quatrième élément de mon programme est lié à cette stratégie de l'asphyxie que j'ai proposée pour la première fois lors de la session extraordinaire des Nations Unies sur le désarmement, en 1978. Cette stratégie, dont la mise en oeuvre requiert et réclame toujours l'appui des cinq puissances nucléaires, doit être raffinée pour tenir compte des progrès de la technologie. Les mesures de contrôle des armements ne peuvent ignorer les nouvelles technologies qui, par leur nature même, nous éloigneraient de la stabilité que nous cherchons à établir.

Je songe donc à une entente pour interdire l'essai et le déploiement de systèmes anti-satellites à haute altitude. De telles armes menacent, en effet, l'ensemble des moyens de communication dont nous dépendons pour gérer les crises. Que -- pendant un conflit -- l'une ou l'autre des parties en présence soit privée de son réseau de commandement et de conduite des opérations, et elle se trouverait totalement démunie au moment même où le maintien de la stabilité dépendrait précisément de sa capacité de prévoir, de réagir et de ne pas céder à la panique pour riposter à l'aveuglette.

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À VÉRIFIER AU MOMENT DE L'ALLOCUTION - SOUS EMBARGO JUSQU'À 13 H

NOTES POUR UNE ALLOCUTION DU PREMIER MINISTRE
SUR LA PAIX ET LE DÉSARMEMENT
MONTREAL, LE 13 NOVEMBRE 1983

(TEXTE)

Au cours des dernières années, j'ai profité de ces rencontres pour faire le point sur l'avenir du Québec et du Canada. Élargissant aujourd'hui notre horizon, j'aimerais vous parler de paix, de désarmement et de notre avenir comme habitants d'un monde en désarroi.

Notre rencontre s'inscrit dans la longue tradition démocratique de notre pays, et votre présence ici témoigne de la vigueur de cette tradition de liberté dans la diversité qui fait notre force et nous donne foi en l'avenir.

Si cet avenir ne dépendait que de nous, nous pourrions dormir en paix. Mais de nos jours, aucun État ne peut se targuer d'être seul maître de son destin. Nous partageons cette terre avec quelque 160 autres pays, et cette cohabitation entraîne une interaction à l'échelle planétaire qui influe sur notre sécurité et notre économie, comme sur la qualité de notre environnement et de notre vie.

Mais les gouvernements de ces 160 pays sont loin d'être les seuls protagonistes sur la scène mondiale. Une multitude d'alliances, d'associations régionales, d'institutions internationales comme les Nations Unies, de sociétés multinationales, de cartels et de groupes de pression de tout genre veulent avoir leur mot à dire.

En fait, nous voulons tous, vous, moi, nos familles, nos compatriotes, les gouvernements et les entreprises, avoir notre part de bonheur sur cette planète où se jouent nos espoirs, nos angoisses, nos échecs et nos réussites. Mais trois grandes tendances se profilent à l'horizon qui risquent, en se conjuguant, de provoquer une chute de rideau sur ce que Balzac appelait la comédie humaine.



MESSAGE

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---DISCOURS DU PM A MONTREAL

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SUIT TEXTE DU DISCOURS DU PREMIER MINISTRE.

2.EMBARGO JUSQU'A 12:30 HEURE D'OTTAWA.

3.COMCENTRE VEUILLEZ COPIER TEXTE CI-JOINT. DEBUT DU TEXTE CIT.

FIN DU TEXTE. FINCIT.

28-6-1-T. Trudeau Peace Mission.

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À VÉRIFIER AU MOMENT DE L'ALLOCUTION - SOUS EMBARGO JUSQU'À 13 H

CIT

NOTES POUR UNE ALLOCUTION DU PREMIER MINISTRE
SUR LA PAIX ET LE DÉSARMEMENT
MONTRÉAL, LE 13 NOVEMBRE 1983

(TEXTED)

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La première est le recours croissant à la force pour régler les différends internationaux. Malgré la déclaration solennelle de la Charte des Nations Unies demandant que "les membres de l'Organisation s'abstiennent, dans leurs relations internationales, de recourir à la menace ou à l'emploi de la force", nous avons connu, depuis 1945, quelque 130 conflits qui ont entraîné la perte de 35 millions de vies humaines.

L'habitude de l'agression se répand et de plus en plus le processus politique cède la place aux solutions militaires. La belligérance et les propos menaçants font florès et les gouvernements naissent et tombent par les armes. La tendance est universelle, et elle va en s'accroissant.

Cette brutalisation de la vie politique devient particulièrement inquiétante lorsqu'elle s'enracine dans des conflits entre idéologies irréconciliables et qu'elle est soutenue par des armes sophistiquées, nucléaires ou classiques, dont la fabrication absorbe annuellement quelque 600 milliards de dollars. Des armes qui engloutissent une tranche beaucoup trop importante des budgets des pays du tiers monde et qui, par leur nature même, incitent à la violence plutôt qu'au règlement pacifique des différends.

La deuxième tendance est l'effritement accéléré du régime international destiné à prévenir la prolifération des armes nucléaires.

Cette prolifération revêt une double dimension. Nous l'appelons verticale pour désigner la mise sur pied, par les cinq États nucléaires, États-Unis, URSS, France, Royaume-Uni et Chine, de programmes d'armement nucléaire toujours plus ambitieux et toujours plus perfectionnés dans leur puissance de destruction. Et nous parlons de prolifération horizontale pour caractériser la propagation des armes nucléaires dans d'autres États qui sont sur le point d'en fabriquer ou qui auront bientôt la capacité de le faire.

Notre principale préoccupation aujourd'hui est évidemment de limiter les arsenaux des cinq puissances nucléaires. Mais, d'un point de vue mondial et à court terme, les conséquences de la prolifération horizontale apparaissent tout aussi graves. En fait, elles le sont peut-être davantage, car les petites puissances nucléaires ne seraient pas retenues, comme le sont les cinq grandes, par la certitude d'une destruction mutuelle et finale si elles avaient recours aux armes nucléaires.

La conclusion du Traité sur la non-prolifération, entré en vigueur en 1970 et qui doit être révisé en 1985, visait précisément à empêcher la prolifération horizontale aussi bien que verticale. Ce traité était en fait un pacte implicite entre les États dotés d'armes nucléaires et ceux qui n'en ont pas. D'un côté, les puissances nucléaires s'engageaient à négocier de bonne foi des limites sur le

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I am encouraged by this momentum, and heartened by the response. But I am also well aware that critics of my initiative have difficulty in grasping this step by step approach. Some would prefer the passionate embrace of an unattainable ideal. Others are paralyzed by the complexities of the issues in play. I believe that peace must be waged steadily, with caution and with realism. We must work with due respect for the fragility of political trust, for the importance of building carefully, for the need to search out common ground on which to stand.

The imperative of political action is made all the more urgent by the pace of conflict and confrontation, which threatens to overtake our ability to understand what is happening, and our capacity to manage it.

Let me remind you that when Alfred Nobel invented dynamite in 1867 he believed that the prospect of its military application was so awesome that governments would be forced to live in peace. And yet today we have long since lost the ability to comprehend the force of a nuclear blast in terms of any comparison with traditional explosives.

(TRANSLATION)

Peace and security are not cold abstractions. Their purpose is to preserve the future of mankind, the growth of the human spirit, and the patrimony of our planet.

The choice we face is clear and present. We can without effort abandon our fate to the mindless drift toward nuclear war. Or we can gather our strength, working in good company to turn aside the forces bearing down on us, on our children, on this Earth.

As for me, I choose to move forward, and I know I do so with your support.

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nombre et la diffusion de leurs armes nucléaires. De leur côté, les autres États convenaient de renoncer à l'emploi du nucléaire à des fins militaires, à condition de pouvoir en bénéficier dans des secteurs pacifiques comme ceux de l'énergie, de la médecine ou de l'agriculture.

Mais tiraillé entre les exigences de la paix et les impératifs de la guerre, ce pacte est bien près de se rompre. Les États tant nucléaires que non nucléaires, ceux de l'Est comme de l'Ouest, ceux du Nord comme du Sud, en sont maintenant au point où ils doivent décider si le pacte tient toujours, si leur besoin de survivre doit primer sur l'idée qu'ils se font de leur souveraineté.

La troisième des tendances qui comportent un danger pour l'ensemble de la planète est la dégradation des relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest, plus particulièrement des rapports entre les deux superpuissances. Dans un discours prononcé à Guelph, il y a deux semaines, je déplorais l'absence de haute politique dans les relations Est-Ouest, et la tendance de chacune des parties à négocier la limitation des armements sans faire effort pour comprendre les besoins de sécurité de l'autre. J'ai réaffirmé notre adhésion à la stratégie à deux voies de l'OTAN et exprimé l'espoir qu'on en ajoute une troisième, la voie de la volonté politique, du dialogue et de la confiance, afin de contrer la dégradation des relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

(TRADUCTION)

Si l'on examine ensemble les trois tendances que je viens de mentionner, recours accru à la force, risque grandissant de prolifération des armes nucléaires et rapports imprégnés d'animosité entre les superpuissances, on s'aperçoit qu'elles convergent et nous mènent à la catastrophe. Il devient dès lors évident que seule une approche globale des problèmes de paix et de sécurité peut renverser le cours sinistre de ces tendances.

Avec la montée de la tension, en effet, les relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest sont particulièrement sensibles aux événements survenant à la périphérie. On constate une instabilité endémique dans des régions généralement reconnues comme faisant partie de la sphère d'influence de l'une ou de l'autre superpuissance. Dans d'autres points volatiles du globe, le Moyen-Orient en est l'exemple patent, tous les éléments d'une conflagration se trouvent réunis.

Et l'extension au tiers monde des rivalités entre l'Est et l'Ouest atteindra son point culminant et le plus dangereux si, malgré le Traité sur la non-prolifération, les forces en présence -- belligérants ou simples antagonistes -- commencent à se doter d'armes nucléaires.

(TEXTE)

Certes, en tant que Canadiens, nous sommes avant tout attachés à la communauté occidentale; nous recherchons d'abord la sécurité sur ce continent et en Europe. Mais notre loyauté, nos intérêts nationaux et internationaux, ne s'arrêtent pas là.

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It is therefore my intention to introduce, at the appropriate time and in the appropriate disarmament forum, papers calling for (a) international agreement to ban the testing and deployment of high-altitude anti-satellite systems; (b) to restrict excessive mobility of ICBMs; and (c) to require that future strategic weapon systems be fully verifiable by national technical means.

These are measures of substance, often technical in their detail. But if we can generate a political impulse toward a five-power nuclear conference, toward renewed political commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, toward action at the MBFR talks to balance conventional forces and to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe, toward a restriction of qualitative developments in strategic technology, and toward their verification, then we would have motivated a truly global and comprehensive approach to the crisis of peace and security.

It is essential, as I told my colleagues in Europe, that this interlocking programme, this safety net for our very survival, be guided by political leadership at the highest level. That our own consultations, and talks with others, be quickened by a jolt of political energy. That we work to identify steadily increasing areas of mutual interest, starting from our common humanity and our common fate on this earth.

(TEXT)

I return from Europe profoundly encouraged by the extent to which my purposes are shared by a community of other leaders. Therefore I would like to confirm tonight my intention to travel to Japan, to consult Prime Minister Nakasone in Tokyo next Saturday.

Japan's association with the Williamsburg Declaration last May, in which the leaders of the industrialized democracies agreed to devote our full political resources to reducing the threat of war, expresses both the resonance of history and the reality of the present day. My visit there will bear witness to the indivisibility of global security in the nuclear age.

I can also announce that, in addition to the consultations under way with the United States, I have initiated consultations with the Soviet Union and with China -- two nuclear powers on whom much depends.

I look forward to taking an active part in the discussion of peace and security issues at the New Delhi meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government, where I will be heading after Japan. I look forward particularly to consultations with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on the matter of non-proliferation, and on her perspective, as current chairman of the council of non-aligned nations, on the linkage between disarmament and development.

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Notre ouverture sur le Pacifique nous assure des relations privilégiées avec le Japon, la Chine, l'Association des Nations de l'Asie du Sud-Est et, bien entendu, l'Australie et la Nouvelle-Zélande. Notre vaste programme d'aide au développement s'étend à de nombreux pays éloignés géographiquement, mais rapprochés par les liens étroits qu'ils entretiennent avec le Canada. Notre place au sein de la francophonie et du Commonwealth nous invite à partager les préoccupations politiques et économiques et le besoin de sécurité des pays que nous y côtoyons.

C'est pourquoi, avant même de tenter un geste pour améliorer les perspectives de paix, j'ai décidé que notre démarche devait adopter une perspective globale. Une telle approche nous est dictée par l'interaction complexe entre le désarmement et le développement, entre l'animosité des superpuissances et les rivalités au sein du tiers monde, entre le recours à la force et la disponibilité des armes, entre l'équilibre nucléaire en Europe et celui en Asie.

Il est certain que le représentant d'un seul pays ne peut promettre de miracle, et encore moins en accomplir. Je ne me fais aucune illusion sur la complexité des problèmes en cause. J'estime toutefois essentiel de rechercher des crans d'arrêt sur la pente descendante où nous sommes engagés, de reconnaître qu'à notre époque, la paix et la sécurité sont indissociables, et de constater que sur ce point aussi nos pays sont interdépendants.

Heureusement, je ne suis pas seul à penser ainsi. D'autres dirigeants partagent mes préoccupations, et un nombre croissant d'entre eux sont décidés à subordonner la science de la guerre à l'art de la politique. Leur appui m'encourage.

Vous n'ignorez pas que je rentre d'Europe, où j'ai eu des entretiens avec les dirigeants d'un certain nombre de pays de l'Alliance atlantique, avec Sa Sainteté le Pape et avec Sa Majesté la Reine des Pays-Bas. Je reviens au pays avec le sentiment que nos amis et alliés appuient mon initiative de paix et partagent ma conviction quant à l'urgence de la situation. Ils sont d'accord en particulier sur la nécessité d'ajouter à notre stratégie une troisième voie pour rétablir la confiance et les communications entre les parties.

J'ai soumis à mes collègues européens, afin qu'ils puissent les étudier et les raffiner en fonction de leur propre expérience, les éléments d'un programme de gestion de la crise actuelle. Permettez-moi de vous exposer quelques-uns de ces éléments que mes interlocuteurs se sont engagés à examiner personnellement.

Le premier porte sur la nécessité de créer, aussitôt que possible au cours de l'année prochaine, une tribune pour la négociation des limites globales à fixer aux arsenaux des cinq États nucléaires. Ce projet est sans préjudice des négociations sur les forces nucléaires de portée moyenne et des pourparlers START entre les États-Unis et l'URSS, ces entretiens ne s'étendant pas, et c'est normal, aux forces nucléaires de la Grande-Bretagne, de la France et de la Chine.

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Another negotiating forum will open in Stockholm this January. Its lengthy title, showing the complexity of its task, is the "Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe". It is imperative that this Conference not lose its way in litigation about procedures, or in the linguistics of technicality. I have therefore proposed that we consider the merits of high-level political representation at the very start of the Stockholm negotiations.

A fourth element in my initiative flows from the strategy of suffocation which I first proposed to the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. That strategy -- which still requires, and awaits, the support of the five nuclear powers for its implementation -- needs further elaboration to keep pace with technological advances. Arms control measures must address those new technologies which, by their very nature, would make stability a more elusive goal.

I have in mind a ban on the testing and deployment of those anti-satellite systems designed to operate at high altitude. Such weapons could attack the global communications which are of critical importance for crisis management. Destruction of the other side's command and control network, at a time of crisis, would leave him blind and mute at the very moment when stability demands awareness and response, not the panic reaction of "launch on warning."

Neither superpower has yet developed an anti-satellite system for high altitudes. An agreement not to do so is therefore still possible. No agreement means vast expenditure by both sides -- funds better spent on more worthy projects. No agreement means a further spiral of competition -- a competition particularly vulnerable to accident or miscalculation. Moreover an agreement could encourage movement toward negotiations about anti-satellite weaponry designed to operate at lower altitudes.

I am also concerned about another potentially destabilizing development, which is the possibility that new intercontinental strategic weapons may be so highly mobile as to be virtually invisible. This would call into question the ability of either side, or any international body, to verify arms control agreements.

Canada continues to devote attention, and resources, to problems of verification which must be resolved if arms-control measures are to be durable and trusted. We believe that the prospects for arms control would be considerably enhanced if the verification factor were taken into account in the developmental stage of any new strategic system -- rather than leaving it to the point where systems are put on the bargaining table.

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Ce que nous devons rechercher pour ces cinq États, c'est une tribune de négociation qui reconnaîtrait le droit des États-Unis et de l'URSS à l'égalité stratégique, ou à ce qu'un récent rapport de la Commission trilatérale appelait "la parité inévitable". Une tribune qui fournirait un cadre stable, légitime et mutuellement acceptable où puisse s'établir un rapport entre les forces des superpuissances et celles des trois autres États dotés d'armes nucléaires.

Ainsi, ni la Grande-Bretagne, ni la France, ni la Chine n'aurait à craindre que ses forces soient soumises à des restrictions décrétées sans tenir compte de ses intérêts nationaux.

Une fois établis les rapports entre les niveaux d'armements des cinq puissances nucléaires, elles pourraient commencer à discuter des réductions prévues dans le Traité sur la non-prolifération, ainsi que des mesures pour contrôler l'aspect qualitatif de la course aux armes stratégiques.

Le deuxième élément du programme serait de renforcer le Traité sur la non-prolifération, ce pacte dont je vous ai déjà parlé entre les pays dotés d'armes nucléaires et ceux qui n'en ont pas. Quelque 119 nations ont signé ce Traité, mais un certain nombre d'États importants n'y ont pas encore adhéré, dont plusieurs possèdent dès maintenant, ou posséderont bientôt les moyens de mettre au point leurs propres armes atomiques.

Si les cinq puissances nucléaires prenaient l'initiative de mieux respecter les obligations que leur impose le Traité sur la non-prolifération, nous, les autres signataires, pourrions plus facilement tenter de convaincre d'autres pays de signer. Il faudrait, sans aucun doute, trouver des moyens supplémentaires d'inciter les États du tiers monde à renoncer aux armes nucléaires. C'est pourquoi il nous faut établir un rapport direct entre le désarmement et le développement. Nous devons aussi veiller à ce que des garanties étendues et adéquates président à tout transfert de technologie nucléaire à des fins pacifiques, quel que soit le pays fournisseur. Le Canada a fait un travail de pionnier dans ce domaine des garanties, et il continuera à oeuvrer à leur renforcement.

Les deux éléments du programme que je viens d'exposer portent sur la dimension planétaire de la sécurité à l'ère nucléaire. Mais il faut aussi reconnaître qu'il y a, au coeur de l'Europe, une concentration alarmante de forces classiques aussi bien que nucléaires. Une guerre sur le vieux continent risquerait de détruire tout ce que chaque camp désire préserver.

Voilà pourquoi la question du déséquilibre actuel entre les forces classiques des deux camps est revenue fréquemment dans mes entretiens avec les dirigeants européens. Les forces classiques du Pacte de Varsovie étant nettement supérieures à celles des pays de l'OTAN, on craint en Europe de l'Ouest que les pays du Pacte ne soient tentés de miser sur cette supériorité pour risquer une attaque. Les dirigeants occidentaux seraient alors acculés à un dilemme cornélien: 000718 ou bien accepter la défaite, ou bien déclencher la guerre nucléaire.

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If the five nuclear-weapons states could begin to strengthen their side of the non-proliferation bargain, then the rest of us could more easily bring good sense to bear on those who have not yet signed on. No doubt we need to increase the incentives for Third World states to forego nuclear weapons -- there must be a direct linkage between disarmament and development. And we shall also have to ensure that a full range of safeguards adequately governs the transfer, from all nuclear suppliers, of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The area of safeguards is one in which Canada has taken a leading part for many years, and will continue to do so. -

Those two elements begin to address the global dimension of security in the nuclear age. But we must also recognize that there is in the heart of Europe a most dangerous concentration of forces -- conventional as well as nuclear. A war in Europe could destroy everything that each side desires to protect.

Throughout my talks with European leaders, there ran a common theme of concern at the present imbalance of conventional forces between the two sides. The Warsaw Pact conventional forces heavily outweigh those of NATO. There is an apprehension in Western Europe that the Warsaw Pact forces could be tempted to gamble on a conventionally-armed attack. They would throw down the challenge to Western leaders either of accepting defeat, or of being the first to resort to the use of nuclear weapons in our own defense.

As long as this imbalance of conventional forces persists, so does the risk that nuclear weapons would be brought into action at an early stage of any conflict. That is why we say that the nuclear threshold in Europe is too low. And of course we can never be certain that the use of nuclear weapons in the European theatre would not escalate rapidly to ever more-massive nuclear retaliation on an intercontinental scale. The conclusion we draw is that the best way to raise the nuclear threshold is to establish a more reasonable balance of conventional forces.

How then do we achieve this balance? This question prompts the third element of my approach. The simple, though expensive, answer is for the West to increase its conventional forces until they match those of the Warsaw Pact. I see this as a last resort. The far more sensible approach would be for both sides to reduce their conventional forces to mutually agreed levels, a task to which we have devoted the past ten years at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna. There is today some sign of movement in those talks, but at far too slow a pace. Hard questions remain to be resolved. That is why I explored, with my colleagues in the Alliance, ways to break the deadlock in Vienna, ways to give fresh political impetus to the MBFR talks.

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Tant que ce déséquilibre persistera, le risque d'un recours aux armes atomiques demeurera présent. C'est pourquoi nous affirmons que le seuil nucléaire est trop bas en Europe. Et, bien sûr, personne ne saurait être certain que l'utilisation d'armes atomiques sur le vieux continent ne mènerait pas à des représailles nucléaires de plus en plus massives à l'échelle intercontinentale. Nous croyons donc que la meilleure façon de relever le seuil nucléaire est d'établir un équilibre plus raisonnable entre les forces classiques.

Comment, dès lors, réaliser cet équilibre? Voilà la question à laquelle tente de répondre le troisième élément de mon programme.

La solution simple mais coûteuse serait d'augmenter les forces classiques des pays de l'Ouest jusqu'à ce qu'elles rejoignent celles du Pacte de Varsovie. Ce serait un pis-aller. Car la façon la plus intelligente de procéder serait que les deux camps réduisent leurs forces classiques à des niveaux mutuellement acceptables. C'est précisément cet objectif que nous poursuivons depuis dix ans dans le cadre des négociations sur les réductions mutuelles et équilibrées des forces, qui se déroulent à Vienne. Or, les choses avancent à un rythme beaucoup trop lent, et il reste des questions cruciales à trancher. C'est pourquoi j'ai exploré avec mes interlocuteurs les moyens de débloquer les négociations de Vienne en leur imprimant un vigoureux élan politique.

Il faut aussi savoir, à ce propos, qu'une autre négociation s'ouvrira en janvier à Stockholm. Son seul titre de "Conférence sur les mesures de confiance et de sécurité et sur le désarmement en Europe" indique la complexité des problèmes auxquels elle s'attaque. Il importe d'éviter, dès le départ, que cette conférence ne s'enlise dans les disputes de procédure ou le jargon technique. J'ai donc proposé qu'on examine les avantages d'une présence politique à un haut niveau dès l'ouverture des discussions.

Le quatrième élément de mon programme est lié à cette stratégie de l'asphyxie que j'ai proposée pour la première fois lors de la session extraordinaire des Nations Unies sur le désarmement, en 1978. Cette stratégie, dont la mise en oeuvre requiert et réclame toujours l'appui des cinq puissances nucléaires, doit être raffinée pour tenir compte des progrès de la technologie. Les mesures de contrôle des armements ne peuvent ignorer les nouvelles technologies qui, par leur nature même, nous éloigneraient de la stabilité que nous cherchons à établir.

Je songe donc à une entente pour interdire l'essai et le déploiement de systèmes anti-satellites à haute altitude. De telles armes menacent, en effet, l'ensemble des moyens de communication dont nous dépendons pour gérer les crises. Que -- pendant un conflit -- l'une ou l'autre des parties en présence soit privée de son réseau de commandement et de conduite des opérations, et elle se trouverait totalement démunie au moment même où le maintien de la stabilité dépendrait précisément de sa capacité de prévoir, de réagir et de ne pas céder à la panique pour riposter à l'aveuglette.

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Moreover, I am not alone. Other leaders have joined their concerns with mine. There is a growing community of political leadership which is determined to subject the science of arms to the art of politics. I draw encouragement from the support of that community.

You will know that I have just returned from meetings in Europe with several leaders of the Atlantic Alliance, with His Holiness the Pope, and with Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands. I return from Europe with clear expressions of support for my initiative, confident that my sense of urgency is shared by our friends and allies. I found a particular consensus on the need to lay down a third rail of confidence and communication -- a rail charging our dealings with the other side with a current of political energy.

I took to my European colleagues for discussion, and for refinement in light of their own views, elements of a programme for political management of the current crisis. I return with the assurance of their personal attention to this programme. Let me set out some of the elements.

The first is the need to establish, as soon as possible in the course of the coming year, a forum in which global limits might be negotiated for all five nuclear-weapons states. This proposal is without prejudice to the INF or START talks between the USA and USSR. But those talks, and rightly so, do not cover British, French or Chinese nuclear forces.

What we must seek to provide is a negotiating forum for those five states which recognizes the rights of the United States and the Soviet Union as strategic equals -- what a recent Trilateral Commission report calls "inevitable parity" between them -- and which provides a mutually acceptable and stable framework for the relationship between the forces of the other three states and those of the superpowers.

In this way neither Britain, nor France, nor China need fear that their forces will be subject to restraints which do not recognize their own national interests.

Once relative levels of armament were stabilized, I believe the five nuclear powers could begin to address the reductions called for by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to consider measures to control the qualitative aspects of the strategic arms race.

A second element is remedial action to shore up the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself -- that covenant between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states which I mentioned a few minutes ago. The Treaty has been signed by some 119 nations. But a number of key states remain aloof, including several with the capacity now, or the potential soon, to develop their own nuclear arms.

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Aucune des superpuissances n'a encore mis au point un système anti-satellites à haute altitude. Une interdiction de le faire est donc encore possible. Sans une entente de ce genre, on devra dépenser, des deux côtés, des sommes énormes qui pourraient être employées à des fins plus constructives. Sans une entente, on se lancera dans une surenchère qui rendrait plus probables encore les accidents et les erreurs de calcul. Qui plus est, un succès à ce chapitre contribuerait à relancer les négociations sur les systèmes anti-satellites fonctionnant à basse altitude.

Une autre menace à la stabilité serait que les armes stratégiques intercontinentales deviennent tellement mobiles qu'il soit pratiquement impossible de les repérer. Cela pourrait remettre en question la capacité des deux camps, ou de tout organisme international, à vérifier l'application des ententes de limitation des armements.

Le Canada continue pour sa part à consacrer ses énergies et ses ressources à l'étude des problèmes de vérification, dont dépendront la durabilité et la crédibilité des mesures de contrôle. Et il constate comme tout le monde que la possibilité d'un contrôle véritable des armements se trouverait considérablement accrue si l'on se préoccupait des problèmes de vérification au moment de la mise au point d'un nouveau système stratégique plutôt que d'attendre l'étape des négociations.

J'ai donc l'intention de soumettre, en temps opportun et aux autorités compétentes en matière de désarmement, des documents réclamant une entente internationale en vue 1) d'interdire l'essai et le déploiement de systèmes anti-satellites à haute altitude, 2) de limiter la mobilité excessive des missiles balistiques intercontinentaux et 3) d'exiger que tout nouveau système d'armements stratégiques soit entièrement vérifiable par les moyens techniques nationaux.

Il s'agit là de mesures importantes dont les détails sont souvent de nature technique. Mais, si nous parvenons à donner une impulsion politique à l'idée d'asseoir les cinq grands à une même table de négociation, si nous obtenons un nouvel engagement politique à l'égard du Traité sur la non-prolifération, si nous redonnons un élan aux négociations de Vienne sur la question de l'équilibre des forces classiques et du relèvement du seuil nucléaire en Europe, si enfin nous nous appliquons à restreindre les progrès qualitatifs dans le domaine de la technologie stratégique de façon à favoriser la vérification, alors nous aurons suscité une approche vraiment globale des problèmes de paix et de sécurité.

Comme je l'ai souligné à mes collègues européens, il est essentiel que ce programme commun, ce filet de sécurité dont dépend notre survie, soit soutenu par les leaders politiques au plus haut niveau; que nos entretiens à l'échelle nationale et internationale reçoivent une véritable relance politique et que nous travaillions à définir les intérêts toujours plus nombreux qui nous rendent solidaires, à commencer par notre condition humaine et notre avenir commun sur cette planète.

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other's security needs. I reaffirmed our fidelity to the NATO two-track decision and declared my hope that we might add a "third rail" of political energy, of dialogue and of confidence, in order to improve the downward course of relations between East and West.

(TEXT)

I ask you now to consider these three trends in relation to each other -- laminated together, as they are in life. An increasing resort to the use of force. The growing reality of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. And a superpower relationship which is charged with animosity. I believe it is evident that only a global approach to peace and security can reverse the path of this sinister, composite trend-line.

Because, as tensions build, the East-West relationship becomes particularly vulnerable to events on the periphery. An endemic instability is evident in areas largely understood to be the sphere of influence of one or the other superpower. At other flashpoints, such as the ever-volatile Middle East, we see the tinder for a spreading conflagration.

The penetration of East-West rivalry into the Third World will reach its deepest and most dangerous point if, despite the Non-Proliferation Treaty, front-line antagonists -- locked in rivalry or combat -- begin to arm themselves with nuclear weapons.

(TRANSLATION)

As Canadians, our energies are deeply devoted to the security of the Western community, on this continent and in Europe. But our loyalties, our national and global interests, by no means end there.

Canada's place on the Pacific Rim gives us a privileged relationship with Japan, with China, and with the Association of South-East Asian Nations and, of course, with Australia and New Zealand. Our extensive programme of development assistance takes us to many parts of the world, remote in distance, but close in partnership. Our standing in the community of francophone nations, and in the Commonwealth, demands that we share the full range of political, economic and security concerns to which our national character gives us access.

That is why, in pursuing an initiative to improve the prospects for peace, I determined from the start that our approach must be global in scope and in perspective. Such an approach is dictated by the complex interlinkage of disarmament and development; of superpower animosity and Third World rivalries; of the resort to force and the availability of weapons; of nuclear balances in Europe and in Asia.

One man representing one country cannot promise a miracle, let alone deliver one. I have absolutely no illusions about the complexity of the issues in play. Nonetheless it is essential, in my judgement, to seek stability at a number of points along the downward trend-line, and to recognize that peace and security in the modern age are indivisible.

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(INTRODUCTION)

Lors de ma tournée en Europe, j'ai été encouragé de voir à quel point mes objectifs rejoignent ceux des leaders que j'ai rencontrés. Et j'aimerais confirmer ce soir mon intention de me rendre à Tokyo samedi prochain pour y rencontrer le premier ministre Nakasone.

La participation du Japon à la déclaration de Williamsburg, dans laquelle les dirigeants des pays industrialisés convenaient, en mai dernier, d'utiliser toutes leurs ressources politiques pour réduire les dangers de guerre, revêt un caractère historique et constitue un reflet du monde où nous vivons. Ma visite au Japon veut témoigner de l'indivisibilité de la sécurité universelle à l'ère atomique.

Je peux vous dire que, outre les consultations déjà en cours avec les États-Unis, j'ai pris contact avec l'Union soviétique et la Chine, deux puissances nucléaires dont tant de choses dépendent.

C'est avec empressement que je prendrai part aux discussions sur la paix et la sécurité lors de la conférence des chefs de gouvernement du Commonwealth, à New Delhi, où je me rendrai en quittant le Japon. Je suis particulièrement impatient de m'entretenir avec le premier ministre Indira Gandhi sur la question de la non-prolifération et de connaître ses vues, en tant que présidente du Conseil des pays non alignés, sur les liens à établir entre désarmement et développement.

Je suis satisfait des progrès accomplis et heureux de l'accueil réservé à mes propositions. Je suis néanmoins conscient des critiques que suscite chez certains commentateurs la démarche étapiste que nous favorisons. Certains lui préféreraient l'élan passionné en faveur d'un projet utopique. D'autres sont paralysés par la complexité des enjeux. Je suis d'avis qu'il faut "faire" la paix progressivement, avec prudence et réalisme. Nous devons éviter de brusquer une confiance politique des plus fragiles, et construire avec précaution en tâchant de nous retrouver sur un terrain commun et solide.

Une action politique s'impose avec d'autant plus d'urgence que la multiplication des conflits et des confrontations risque de déborder notre aptitude à comprendre ce qui se passe et notre capacité d'y remédier.

Lorsqu'il inventa la dynamite, en 1867, Alfred Nobel croyait que la perspective effarante d'une application militaire de sa découverte forcerait les nations à vivre en paix. Aujourd'hui la puissance d'une bombe nucléaire est sans commune mesure avec la force des explosifs classiques, et devant pareille démesure, notre esprit vacille.

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This brutalization of political life takes on a particularly dangerous tone when it is driven by the clash of confrontational ideologies, and armed with sophisticated weapons. Weapons claiming an annual expenditure on the order of 600 billion dollars for nuclear and conventional arms combined. Weapons claiming too great a share of the budgets of impoverished Third World nations. Weapons which promote a rising tide of violence and engulf more peaceful ways to resolve disputes.

The second trend is the steady unravelling of the international regime designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

This proliferation has two fundamental directions. We call it vertical proliferation when we mean the development of ever-larger nuclear weapons programmes, ever more-advanced in destructive technology, by the five nuclear-weapons states: the USA, USSR, France, UK and China. We call it horizontal proliferation when we mean the potential spread of nuclear weapons to other states. Some of these other nations have the capacity now to produce nuclear arms. Some are on the verge of doing so.

We are today preoccupied mainly with the evident need to assert restraint over the arsenals of all five nuclear powers. But from a global perspective, and in the near term, the consequences of horizontal proliferation pose an equally grave threat. Perhaps more grave, since the use of nuclear weapons by other nations would be unchecked by the assurance of mutual destruction which obtains among the five powers.

It was precisely to arrest both kinds of proliferation that a formal agreement -- the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- came into effect in 1970, and is up for review in 1985. That treaty represented an implicit covenant between those nations with nuclear weapons and those without: an undertaking by the nuclear powers that they would pursue negotiations in good faith on arms control and on limiting the spread of their weapons technology; and an undertaking by other states that they would forego the military use of nuclear energy in return for the benefits of its peaceful use, in fields such as energy, medicine, or agriculture.

But the trend is for this bargain to come unstuck. The treaty stands now at a cross-roads between peaceful aspiration and military strategy. It is the crossroads at which nuclear and non-nuclear countries -- East and West, North and South -- preoccupied with their survival, with their sovereignty, or with current conflicts, will decide whether the covenant still holds.

The third trend which threatens the global system is the worsening state of relations between East and West, particularly of relations between the two superpowers. Two weeks ago, when I spoke in Guelph, I deplored the absence of high politics in East-West relations, and the tendency for arms control negotiations to run their course outside any structure of understanding of, and respect for, each

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FINCIT

CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY - UNDER EMBARGO UNTIL 1300 HRS

**Notes For Remarks By The Prime Minister
On Peace And Security
Montreal, November 13, 1983**

(TRANSLATION)

On previous occasions, I have taken the opportunity of these events to discuss the future of Quebec and of Canada. Broadening our horizons today, I would like to speak to you about peace, about disarmament, and about our future as inhabitants of a world in disarray.

We meet together as part of the long-standing democratic process in this country -- a process which, as your generous presence shows, is alive and well in Canada. We take pride in the vigour and diversity of our political life, in the bright promise of our future.

If our future depended on Canadians alone, we could be confident that it was safe and sound. But no nation today holds its future securely in its own hands. We share this planet with about 160 other nations, all of whom interact with us in a global system embracing our security, our economy, the health of our environment, and the quality of our lives.

Those 160 governments are, however, by no means the only players. The stage is crowded with alliances, with regional associations, with international institutions such as the United Nations, with multinational corporations, with cartels, pressure groups and lobbies of all kinds.

We are all of us -- you and I and our families, citizens, governments and corporations -- on that crowded global stage, which is alive with our hopes and our fears, our failures and our successes. But there are today three dominant and disturbing trends which, when set side by side, threaten to bring down the curtain on our human performance.

The first trend is an increasing resort to the use of force in the settlement of international disputes. Despite the solemn affirmation of the UN Charter that "all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force" there have been, since 1945, approximately 130 conflicts in which 35 million human lives have been lost.

There is a habit of aggression which is gaining ground. An abdication of the political process in deference to military solutions. A coarse element of belligerence, of menacing rhetoric, of governments which rise and fall at gun-point. The trend is global -- and it is gathering speed.



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	R E S T R I C T E D	12	10
FM/DE	FM EXYOTT IDDZ0126 12NOVB3	<i>28-6-1-Museum Peace Mission</i>	
TO/À	TO USHDC DELIVER BY 122000		
INFO	REF KINSMAN-SMITH TELECON 12NOV		
DISTR	---		
REF			
SUBJ/SUJ	FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF BACKGROUND PAPER ON FIVE POWER CONF THAT YOU SHOULD HAND OVER TO STATE DEPT ASAP.THIS IS SAME TEXT THAT WAS GIVEN TO USA EMB ON TUESDAY AND LEFT WITH OUR EMBS IN EUROPE DURING PM VISIT LAST WEEK. 2.TEXT AS FOLLOWS.QUOTE. (CONCENTRE: PLEASE COPY ATTACHED TEXT) UNQUOTE.		

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MESSAGE PREPARATION

- 1) Use OCR element and set typewriter for 10 pitch. Observe right margin marked "10". If typewriter capable of 12 pitch only, ensure that right margin, marked "12", is observed.
- 2) Use full capitals and double line feed at all times.
- 3) Security Classification: "UNCLASSIFIED" is to be typed without spacing between letters. All other classifications are to have one space between the letters, e.g. C O N F I D E N T I A L
- 4) Use only one space between words in the address portion of the message, e.g.
TO LDN PARIS IMMED WSHDC
DISTR PUA APO APR MFP
- 5) Subject line is indicated by three dashes in front of the subject, e.g. --- REVISED FSIDS
- 6) First paragraph is neither numbered nor indented. All subsequent paragraphs are numbered. Do not use space between the paragraph number and the first letter of the text, e.g. 3. THE POST...
- 7) Do not use space before or after punctuation marks, e.g. WILL ARRIVE BERNE, 15 JUN. THE etc.
- 8) Use only the following punctuation: period, comma, semi-colon, colon, dash, oblique stroke, brackets and question mark.
- 9) Following signs must be spelled out: \$ (DOLLARS), % (PERCENT), # (NUMBER), " (QUOTE), and ' (UNQUOTE). In English the apostrophe is omitted to form a single word, while in French the apostrophe is replaced by a space.
- 10) Always repeat negatives NO and NOT as NO/NO and NOT/NOT. DO NOT/NOT underline.
- 11) End of page of multi-page messages is identified on a separate line, at left margin with only three periods and the number of the following page, e.g.
...2
- 12) Do not use punctuation at the end of the message when there is a signature.

PRÉPARATION DES MESSAGES

- 1) Employer le LOC et régler la machine au pas "10". Placer la marge droite à "10". Si vous avez une machine de pas "12", placer la marge droite à "12".
- 2) Toujours utiliser les majuscules et le double interligne.
- 3) La cote de sécurité "NONCLASSIFIÉ" doit être dactylographiée sans espace entre les lettres. Toutes les autres doivent l'être avec un espace, par exemple: C O N F I D E N T I E L
- 4) Pour l'adresse, utiliser seulement un espace entre chaque mot, par exemple:
A LDN PARIS IMMED WSHDC
DISTR PUA APO APR MFP
- 5) Faire précéder le sujet de trois tirets, par exemple: ---DSE REVISÉES
- 6) Le premier paragraphe n'est jamais numéroté et commence à la marge. Tous les paragraphes suivants sont numérotés. Ne pas laisser d'espace entre le numéro du paragraphe et la première lettre du texte, par exemple: 3. LA MISSION...
- 7) Ne pas laisser d'espace avant ou après les signes de ponctuation, par exemple: ARRIVERAI À BERNE, 15 JUN. LE etc.
- 8) Utiliser seulement les signes de ponctuation suivants: point, virgule, point virgule, deux points, tiret, barre oblique, parenthèses et point d'interrogation.
- 9) Les signes suivants doivent être dactylographiés en toutes lettres: \$ (DOLLARS), % (POUR CENT), # (NUMÉRO), " (CITATION) et ' (FIN DE CITATION). En anglais, omettre l'apostrophe et ajouter la terminaison au mot pour en faire un seul mot. En français remplacer l'apostrophe par un espace.
- 10) Répéter toujours les négatifs NO et NOT comme ceci: NO/NO NOT/NOT (en français les négatifs ne sont pas répétés).
- 11) Sur les messages comportant plus d'une page, indiquer sur une ligne séparée, à la marge à gauche, le numéro de la page suivante en le faisant précéder de trois points seulement, par exemple:
...2
- 12) Ne pas mettre de ponctuation à la fin du message quand il comporte une signature.

FIVE POWER NUCLEAR CONFERENCE

QUOTE

I

Subject:

This paper describes the substance of an initiative which could result in a structure of arms limitation for the five declared nuclear weapons states.

II Background

Arms control negotiations designed to limit strategic nuclear weapons have thus far only taken place between the Superpowers. The other three declared nuclear weapons states (France, Great Britain and China) have not been involved, and their arsenals remain unconstrained by international agreement.

III The Proposal

A framework for the regulation of nuclear forces would lend overall predictability to the strategic balance, thereby reducing incentives to increase deterrent forces. Should negotiations produce a ratio of allowed strategic forces as between the parties, the expansion of forces beyond these mutually agreed levels would be constrained. This predictability, and the quantitative ceiling on national forces, would in turn increase the chances for meaningful arms reductions.

This initiative is designed to avoid the serious pitfalls contained in other proposals of this type. These include: the unacceptable aggregation of British, French and U.S. forces; the discussion of the forces of other states in bilateral fora; and unwarranted and unacceptable restraints on national deterrents in the absence of significant reductions in Superpower forces.

The following are designed to serve as general guidelines and considerations bearing upon the substance and process for negotiations designed to create an agreement on global nuclear arms limitation.

Process

- (a) Formal negotiations should be preceded by working-group consultations designed to set the agenda, terms of reference, and guiding principles of subsequent talks.
- (b) These initial meetings should be convened without substantive preconditions except for agreement as to the overall purpose of the process. Preconditions as to substance are to be avoided since these may well decrease incentives to participate.

- 2 -

- (c) Talks should not be conducted on a bloc-to-bloc basis, but on the basis of individual state participation. Each state would retain a veto on the substance of any agreements.

Substance

- (a) The overall purpose of the negotiations would be to reach agreement on fixed ratios of national strategic forces.
- (b) In order to secure Superpower agreement, those ratios would have to reflect Superpower de jure equality, thereby avoiding the deficiencies of such approaches as the current Soviet INF proposals.
- (c) Actual ratios should be the subject of negotiations.
- (d) The unit of account should be left open to negotiation, but agreement would be most likely if "warheads on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles" were to be adopted as the unit of measurement. This would have the virtue of corresponding to Western and Soviet principles in the INF and START negotiations; of encouraging a move towards less vulnerable, single-warhead systems and away from vulnerable and destabilizing MIRVed systems; of preventing circumvention of the intent of the agreement through placing a larger number of warheads on a fixed number of launchers; and of not "handicapping" British, French, and Chinese forces which generally have less MIRV potential.
- (e) Currently planned modernization programs would have to be accommodated within the negotiated ratios, in order to secure agreement.
- (f) These negotiations and the resulting agreement should not be a substitute for ongoing START and INF talks, or their successors, but rather a complement. Should circumstances dictate, the agreement could be renegotiated to reflect the outcome of these other negotiations. These other agreements could not, however, violate the agreed limits contained in the global accord. They might, however, result in additional constraints and measures designed to reduce weaponry beyond those measures agreed to in the five-power agreement.
- (g) Parties should be entitled to withdraw from the agreement given adequate notification (to be negotiated) in situations of perceived threat to their national security.

- 3 -

- (h) Qualitative modernization programs which did not violate the agreed ratios should be allowed, subject to the other arms control agreements.
- (i) All air, land, and sea-based systems deemed through negotiations to be strategic in nature should be included.
- (j) If forces of less than intercontinental range were deemed to be strategic by the participants, they could be aggregated with those of intercontinental range with a freedom to deploy systems wherever this was deemed desirable by the parties, subject to the restrictions of other arms control agreements. (This could force a tradeoff between Superpower intercontinental and theatre forces which could both dampen incentives for an arms race in the European theatre, and at the same time allow some asymmetries in the theatre deployments which could solve some of the problems arising in the current INF negotiations in Geneva).
- (k) It would probably be necessary (and desirable) to attach specific numerical totals to the agreed ratios, thereby precluding quantitative increases beyond the agreed ratios which would legitimize proportional increases in the size of the forces of other parties.
- (l) In order to accommodate ongoing arms control efforts, the establishment of precise ratios may have to await the outcome of the START and INF negotiations. These negotiations will provide the necessary predictability for the establishment of realistic ratios. In order to provide incentives for agreement in START and the INF talks, it would be desirable if the Superpowers committed themselves to global talks as part of these other agreements, should they be negotiated.
- (m) Other agreed qualitative restraints could be negotiated as desired by the parties, as could collateral measures designed to enhance crisis management and increase confidence between the parties. These might include:
 - (i) a ban on high altitude ASAT systems.
 - (ii) a requirement for verifiability by National Technical Means.
 - (iii) restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs.

UN9 11/87



MGTC/M. FILE/DIARY

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ **C O N F I D E N T I A L** 13 Nov 83 00 342 121 10

FM/DE
TO/A
INFO
DISTR
REF
SUBJ/SUJ

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0125 12NOV83

TO LDN

DELIVER BY 140900

INFO PC00TT/FOWLER

DISTR IDR IDA

---PM INITIATIVE: 5 POWER PROPOSAL

GIVEN MRS THATCHERS COMMENTS AT LUNCH ABOUT 5 POWER PROPOSAL, IT IS
ESSENTIAL THAT YOU FOLLOW UP AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT WITH
ACLAND OF FCO AND COLES OF PM S PRIVATE OFFICE TO EXPLAIN ACTUAL
DETAILS OF CDN PLAN. YOU SHD USE AS BACKGROUND AND HAND OVER 3 PAGE
PAPER SMITH LEFT WITH SCHRAM.

2. IN YOUR PRESENTATION YOU SHD STRESS THAT CONCERNS RAISED BY
MRS THATCHER ABOUT AGGREGATION OF USA, UK AND FRENCH ARSENALS AND
NEED FOR MODERNIZATION OF UK NUCLEAR FORCES HAVE ALREADY BEEN TAKEN
INTO ACCOUNT IN OUR PROPOSAL.

3. GRATEFUL EARLY RESPONSE.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG  G. SMITH

IDDZ

5-2394

SIG  L.A. DELVOIE



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ **R E S T R I C T E D** 28-6-1-TRM 13 NOV 01 302 12 10

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TO/À TO LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN RÔME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU HAGUE
INFO WSHDC TOKYO PEKIN CNGNY PRMNY MOSCO DELHI *RNATA* **DELIVER BY 130900**
DISTR DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB RGB RSD RCD IDD IDR IDA FPR
REF
SUBJ/SUJ REF OURTEL IDDZ0119 OF 11NOV

---PM MONTREAL SPEECH - REVISED SUMMARY BACKGROUND NOTES AND PRESS GUIDANCE

PLEASE NOTE THAT EARLIER VERSIONS OF SPEECH SUMMARY, AND TWO PAPERS HAVE BEEN ALTERED AND YOU SHOULD DESTROY COPIES SENT FROM OTTAWA FRIDAY PM. CHANGES ARE NOT EXTENSIVE BUT THEY *REFLECT PMS VIEWS* ARE IMPORTANT AND TRANSLATIONS SHOULD BE ALTERED ACCORDINGLY. SUMMARY AS FOLLOWS TO BE RELEASED NOT BEFORE 1230 OTTAWA TIME SUNDAY. OTHER TWO PAPERS ON FIVE POWER AND SUFFOCATION AS FOLLOWS AND AS AMENDED ARE FOR BRIEFING PURPOSES ONLY AND SHOULD NOT BE RELEASED OR DISTRIBUTED. FOLLOWING IS NEW GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR MEDIA ON SPEECH, THEN REVISED SUMMARY AND REVISED PRESS GUIDANCE PAPERS ON FIVE POWER AND SUFFOCATION. REGRET THAT FRENCH TRANSLATION OF SUMMARY NOT POSSIBLE DUE TO REVISIONS AND LATE ARRIVAL OF FINAL SPEECH TEXT.

2.TEXT BEGINS.QUOTE

(COMCENTRE: PLEASE COPY ATTACHED TEXTS MARKED A.) B.) C.) *D.)*

TEXT ENDS.UNQUOTE

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

P. Gossage
P. GOSSAGE

IDDZ

5-2394

SIG

L.A. Delvoie
L.A. DELVOIE

~~DRAFT~~

A. PM MONTREAL SPEECH - PRESS GUIDANCE

There are three aspects of the speech of interest to media.

- 292 - 1) His analysis of three trends which heighten the risk of East-West confrontation. To be emphasized here is the linkage of trends, the need for a comprehensive approach, for in fact a "safety net" of alternate discussions, dialogues, and fora which expand the possibility of some positive movement particularly as deployment and serious problems in INF approach.
- 2) His reporting of the reaction of Alliance leaders to his initiative. This is the most sensitive area of the speech and must be treated with great delicacy. It would be very imprudent to go beyond the kind of general support in principle the PM found which is reflected in the speech. Characterization of specific reactions to specific proposals from individual capitals is to be avoided completely at this stage. The process is ongoing. There are elements of a consensus among certain leaders on a small number of ideas but it is premature to predict which ideas will fly. There may be indications in some capitals that one or the other proposal is considered unrealistic but that's precisely why the PM's mission is so important and why he is determined to go the second mile.

- 2 -

- 3) The four proposals themselves. Here you can use the two papers as amended. They elaborate as far as we want to at this stage on the Five Power and Suffocation themes and should demonstrate that these ideas have been well thought out. They are not, however, to be distributed. Nor should media think that this extra detail exhausts what is in fact in these proposals. More detailed technical supporting material was left behind in some capitals for study by the governments visited. It should be again emphasized that the five power idea is without prejudice to (i.e. not interfere in any way with) INF and START and is not meant to replace these negotiations. Moreover we do not foresee any such forum before deployment, and as the speech points out, are calling for it only during the course of the new year.
- 4) Process responses. Moscow and Peking have received messages. You must not go beyond this at this point. It is still far too early to speculate on the usefulness of visiting Moscow. Our understanding is that Washington is open to a visit by the PM, but again it is premature to speculate. At time of writing a detailed reply of PMs letter to Reagan was still being prepared. The next step is Tokyo and CHOGM. As the speech states the PM will actively talk peace and security issues with Commonwealth heads. Again, emphasize PM does not see himself as a

- 3 -

message carrier from one state to another or between the superpowers. His discussions have been on the substance of his proposals and he will be writing each leader visited this week.

- pg 4
- 5) Needless to say that media will now start to try and make judgements as to the mission's success or failure, will focus on how specific proposals outlined may or may not go down in Washington [and Moscow, and whether the PM's efforts are conducive to bring a productive superpower summit any closer. It would be best at this interim phase in the initiative to state that PM's objective is to improve the overall chances of some dialogue in a number of possible fora and that at this stage we are hopeful. How far the process can go only time will tell.

~~Time: 4.15 pm~~

B. Speech Summary

In a speech in Montreal Sunday Prime Minister Trudeau said he returned from meetings with Alliance leaders and His Holiness The Pope confident they agreed on the urgent need to apply political will and energy to improving the currently critical state of East-West relations. The Prime Minister also revealed the broad lines of a peace programme he discussed with European leaders during his trip.

Before elaborating on these proposals The Prime Minister outlined three contemporary trends which heightened the risk of East-West confrontation. He said the first trend was an increasing resort to the use of force to settle international disputes and pointed to the approximately 130 conflicts since 1945 in which 35 million lives have been lost. He characterized the cause as quote an abdication of the political process in deference to military solutions unquote. He termed the second trend the proliferation of nuclear weapons, both in the quantity and destructiveness of the arsenals of the nuclear powers and in the threat of the number of countries possessing a nuclear capability growing. He said that the 1970 Non Proliferation Treaty may be coming unstuck. Quote The treaty now stands at a crossroads between peaceful aspiration and military strategy unquote, he said.

- 2 -

The third trend was the worsening state of East-West relations and the absence of high politics and understanding between the superpowers. He warned that this animosity made the East-West relationship vulnerable to events on the periphery, and increased the danger of the spread of conflagration from flashpoints such as the Middle East.

The Prime Minister said the linkage of disarmament and development, of superpower animosity and third world rivalries, of the resort to force and the availability of weapons and of the nuclear balance in Europe and Asia dictated an approach to improve the prospects for peace that was comprehensive in scope.

He elaborated on four elements of a programme of political management of the current crisis which he had discussed with European leaders.

The first was the need to establish in the course of next year a forum for the negotiation of global limits among all five declared nuclear powers. He emphasized this project would be without prejudice to (i.e. not interfere in any way with) INF or START negotiations.

- 3 -

p96

What would be sought was a stable framework for the relationship between the forces of the other three states and those of the superpowers. The agreement should recognize the strategic equality of the two superpowers.

The second part of the programme would be to bolster the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty with the five nuclear states strengthening their side of the bargain, and to provide incentives for Third World States to forego nuclear weapons. There must be a direct linkage between disarmament and development.

The Prime Minister then addressed the urgent problem of the imbalance of conventional forces in Europe and the anxiety this created. Quote As long as this imbalance of conventional forces persists, so does the risk that nuclear weapons be brought in at an early stage of any conflict unquote, he said.

The third element of his programme was therefore to give fresh high level political attention to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna and the January Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe in Stockholm.

- 4 -

The Prime Minister said the fourth element of his programme would be to provide three specific measures based on his strategy of quote suffocation unquote. He proposed that there be a ban on the testing and deployment of high-altitude anti-satellite systems. He also said that he would introduce papers calling for international agreement designed to restrict excessive mobility of ICBMs, in order to enhance verification, and to require that future strategic weapons systems be verifiable by National Technical Means.

The Prime Minister said that he had told European leaders that it was essential that this interlocking programme be guided by political leadership at the highest level and that he returned quote profoundly encouraged by the extent to which my purposes are shared by a community of other leaders unquote. He said quote I found a particular consensus on the need to lay down a third rail of confidence and communication -- a rail charging our dealings with the other side with a current of political energy. unquote

He confirmed that he would take his consultations to Tokyo for meetings with Prime Minister Nakasone on November 19th and that he was beginning consultations with the USSR and China. He also said he would be actively addressing peace and security issues at the forthcoming Commonwealth Heads of Government meetings in New Delhi.

- 5 -

Quote We can without effort abandon our fate to the mindless drift toward nuclear war unquote, he concluded, quote or we can gather our strength, working in good company to turn aside the forces bearing down on us, on our children, on our earth. As for me, I choose to move forward. Unquote

PS 8 Q. Press Guidance Five-Power Nuclear Arms Talks

Summary:

The Prime Minister announced that he is pursuing an initiative to secure the agreement of the five declared nuclear powers (USA, USSR, France, UK, China) to commence talks as soon as possible in the course of next year designed to place limits, for the first time, on the nuclear arsenals of all five states.

Background:

Arms control negotiations designed to limit or reduce strategic nuclear weapons have thus far only taken place between the Superpowers. The arsenals of the other three states remain unregulated by international agreement. Previous attempts to secure the involvement or inclusion of these states and their forces in arms control efforts have not been acceptable because of the perception that they would work to the advantage of one party and could lead to limits on the nuclear forces of France, Britain, and China which did not respect their legitimate national interests.

Yet none of the five powers have rejected - in principle - the idea of their eventual inclusion in nuclear arms control negotiations. The Canadian initiative is designed to translate this willingness into reality, by avoiding the pitfalls of past proposals and respecting the legitimate interests and security requirements of all five nuclear weapons states.

Substance:

While the precise substance of negotiations designed to place limits on the nuclear forces of the five powers would, of course, be left up to these states to define through mutual agreement, the Prime Minister has suggested that to enhance the prospect of agreement these talks should take place on a state-to-state rather than bloc-to-bloc basis. They should, moreover, reflect the reality and principle of Superpower strategic equality.

One approach could be to arrive at mutually agreed levels of strategic forces based on fixed ratios. The expansion of forces beyond these levels should be prohibited. Such an agreement could enhance the predictability of the nuclear balance, reduce incentives for nuclear force expansion, increase the chances for eventual force reductions, and reduce the prospect of nuclear proliferation.

- 2 -

It is not intended that other arms control negotiations concerning strategic or intermediate range nuclear forces currently underway in Geneva be prejudiced (i.e. interfered with in any way) by this proposal. The results of these negotiations could be integrated into a five-power agreement, or could serve as complementary restraints on nuclear forces.

P910 In order to increase the prospects for agreement, and to maximize the value of the resulting accord, it would be desirable that as many classes and types of weapons be included as is acceptable to the participants.

In addition, qualitative constraints on new strategic technologies could be included in the talks. Amongst other possibilities, these could include the following measures also being proposed by the Prime Minister: a ban on high-altitude anti-satellite systems; restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs; and a requirement that future strategic weapons systems be verifiable by National Technical Means.

The resulting agreement could serve a function similar to that of the SALT I agreement negotiated between the Superpowers. As with that agreement, it is hoped that broad quantitative limits could be set on strategic arsenals, limits which could serve as the initial basis for more comprehensive negotiations designed to lead eventually to reductions in nuclear forces, and further qualitative restraints on certain types of weapons technology.

2 Press Guidance Proposals to Implement the Strategies of
Suffocation and Stabilization

Summary:

The Prime Minister has announced that he intends to propose three specific measures designed to enhance strategic stability, through placing restraints on undesirable military technologies and bolstering the capacity of arms control agreements to manage strategic nuclear competition.

Background:

In general terms, these proposals are designed to develop further the strategies of suffocation and stabilization announced by the Prime Minister in 1978 and 1982 at UNSSOD I and UNSSOD II respectively. They address qualitative aspects of the arms race by suggesting limits on, or the banning of, certain technologies which threaten strategic stability. These measures could make a positive contribution to the stability of the nuclear balance and the progress of arms control. Steps will be taken to introduce these measures in the appropriate forum, and to consult with the relevant states on their substance.

Proposal A:

A BAN ON THE TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF HIGH ALTITUDE
ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS

P12 Satellite systems currently serve vital functions for the Superpowers: verification, early warning, and strategic communications/navigation. The development of systems designed to destroy these satellites would threaten the credibility of deterrent forces, increase instability, and inhibit verification and the maintenance of predictability in Superpower perceptions of each other's military programs and capabilities. Both Superpowers have for some time been engaged in research and development of anti-satellite weapons for use in lower levels of space (low-altitude). Research and development of such weapons for use in upper reaches of space (high-altitude) is much less developed. It is this area where developments would be most destabilizing, threatening vital communications satellites. A ban would, therefore, be stabilizing, and might spur subsequent action to restrict activity in low altitudes.

The Superpowers have engaged previously in anti-satellite talks. These were, however, broken off. Nevertheless, given that neither Superpower is near deployment of a high-altitude system, a ban might be greeted positively by both states. This might, in turn, be used as a building block for further anti-satellite restrictions. Both the USA and the USSR are much further ahead in the development of low-altitude anti-satellite capabilities.

- 2 -

This is not the case with respect to high-altitude systems, restrictions on which would also be easier to verify than those on low-altitude systems.

Proposal B:

A RESTRICTION ON GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY OF ICBMs, TOGETHER WITH
RESTRICTIONS ON THE FREQUENCY OF MOBILITY

In future, both superpowers may resort to mobile ICBMs in order to ensure invulnerability of their forces. Indeed, the Soviets have proposed that mobile ICBMs be allowed in START. Mobility, however, poses difficulties for the verification of arms control agreements, contributing to mutual mistrust and fear.

Restrictions on the area of movement, together with restrictions on the frequency of mobility, would greatly enhance the possibility of verification and would, therefore, be stabilizing. Such restrictions, moreover, need not prevent the systems from remaining relatively invulnerable.

It may be that for reasons of verification, both superpowers might be willing to accept a reciprocal restriction on as yet undeployed intercontinental systems.

Proposal C:

A REQUIREMENT THAT FUTURE STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEMS BE
VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS (NTM)

Successful and stabilizing arms control accords have so far depended on a capacity to verify those agreements through so-called National Technical Means (NTM) - primarily satellite systems. However, some new strategic weapon technologies hinder that process, as do some means of deployment based on deception. An agreement which would ensure that future strategic weapon systems are verifiable would be of significant value.

It can be assumed that both superpowers (not to mention others affected by their competition) share concerns in this area. Agreement, therefore, is theoretically possible. While the Soviet Union has shown less concern for verifiability than has the United States, it would be difficult for them to reject a proposal which would so directly take account of their emphasizing reliance on "National Technical Means".



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	C O N F I D E N T I A L	12	10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDDZ0123 12NOV83		
TO/A	TO MOSCO IMMEDIATE		
INFO	INFO: PEKIN		
DISTR	REF PEKIN TELWJGR0837 AND YOURTEL XYGR4119-01 11NOV.		
REF	---PM INITIATIVE ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS.		
SUBJ/SUJ	FOR OBVIOUS REASONS IT IS NOW IMPOSSIBLE FOR PM'S REP TO ACCEPT AN INVITATION TO VISIT MOSCOW EARLIER THAN 24NOV83. 2.WE WOULD VERY MUCH PREFER MOSCOW MEETING TO BE 25 AND/OR 26NOV OR THEREAFTER.SUGGEST YOU ADVISE MFA SOONEST TO AVOID THEIR PROPOSING DATES THAT WOULD BE DIFFICULT OR IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO ACCEPT.		

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

STG GEN.M. ARCHDEACON

IDDZ

5-2394

SIG L.A.DELVOIE

000747

External Affairs Canada Affaires extérieures Canada

F A C S I M I L E

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	C O N F I D E N T I A L	12	10
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TO/À	TO USHDC/LYSYCHYN		
INFO			
DISTR	---FIVE POWER NUCLEAR CONFERENCE		
REF	(CONCENTRE: PLEASE FAX ATTACHED TEXT)		
SUBJ/SUJ			

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG L.A.Delvoic/sc

IDDZ

5-2394

SIG L.A.Delvoic

MESSAGE PREPARATION

- 1) Use OCR element and set typewriter for 10 pitch. Observe right margin marked "10". If typewriter capable of 12 pitch only, ensure that right margin, marked "12", is observed.
- 2) Use full capitals and double line feed at all times.
- 3) Security Classification: "UNCLASSIFIED" is to be typed without spacing between letters. All other classifications are to have one space between the letters, e.g. C O N F I D E N T I A L
- 4) Use only one space between words in the address portion of the message, e.g.
TO LDN PARIS IMMED WSHDC
DISTR PUA APO APR MFP
- 5) Subject line is indicated by three dashes in front of the subject, e.g. --- REVISED FSIDS
- 6) First paragraph is neither numbered nor indented. All subsequent paragraphs are numbered. Do not use space between the paragraph number and the first letter of the text, e.g. 3. THE POST...
- 7) Do not use space before or after punctuation marks, e.g. WILL ARRIVE BERNE, 15 JUN. THE etc.
- 8) Use only the following punctuation: period, comma, semi-colon, colon, dash, oblique stroke, brackets and question mark.
- 9) Following signs must be spelled out: \$ (DOLLARS), % (PERCENT), # (NUMBER), " (QUOTE), and " (UNQUOTE). In English the apostrophe is omitted to form a single word, while in French the apostrophe is replaced by a space.
- 10) Always repeat negatives NO and NOT as NO/NO and NOT/NOT. DO NOT/NOT underline.
- 11) End of page of multi-page messages is identified on a separate line, at left margin with only three periods and the number of the following page, e.g.
...2
- 12) Do not use punctuation at the end of the message when there is a signature.

PRÉPARATION DES MESSAGES

- 1) Employer le LOC et régler la machine au pas "10". Placer la marge droite à "10". Si vous avez une machine de pas "12", placer la marge droite à "12".
- 2) Toujours utiliser les majuscules et le double interligne.
- 3) La cote de sécurité "NONCLASSIFIÉ" doit être dactylographiée sans espace entre les lettres. Toutes les autres doivent l'être avec un espace, par exemple: C O N F I D E N T I E L
- 4) Pour l'adresse, utiliser seulement un espace entre chaque mot, par exemple:
A LDN PARIS IMMED WSHDC
DISTR PUA APO APR MFP
- 5) Faire précéder le sujet de trois tirets, par exemple: ---DSE REVISÉES
- 6) Le premier paragraphe n'est jamais numéroté et commence à la marge. Tous les paragraphes suivants sont numérotés. Ne pas laisser d'espace entre le numéro du paragraphe et la première lettre du texte, par exemple: 3. LA MISSION...
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- 11) Sur les messages comportant plus d'une page, indiquer sur une ligne séparée, à la marge à gauche, le numéro de la page suivante en le faisant précéder de trois points seulement, par exemple:
...2
- 12) Ne pas mettre de ponctuation à la fin du message quand il comporte une signature.

FIVE POWER NUCLEAR CONFERENCE

Subject:

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II Background

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The following are designed to serve as general guidelines and considerations bearing upon the substance and process for negotiations designed to create an agreement on global nuclear arms limitation.

Process

- (a) Formal negotiations should be preceded by working-group consultations designed to set the agenda, terms of reference, and guiding principles of subsequent talks.
- (b) These initial meetings should be convened without substantive preconditions except for agreement as to the overall purpose of the process. Preconditions as to substance are to be avoided since these may well decrease incentives to participate.

- 2 -

- (c) Talks should not be conducted on a bloc-to-bloc basis, but on the basis of individual state participation. Each state would retain a veto on the substance of any agreements.

Substance

- (a) The overall purpose of the negotiations would be to reach agreement on fixed ratios of national strategic forces.
- (b) In order to secure Superpower agreement, those ratios would have to reflect Superpower de jure equality, thereby avoiding the deficiencies of such approaches as the current Soviet INF proposals.
- (c) Actual ratios should be the subject of negotiations.
- (d) The unit of account should be left open to negotiation, but agreement would be most likely if "warheads on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles" were to be adopted as the unit of measurement. This would have the virtue of corresponding to Western and Soviet principles in the INF and START negotiations; of encouraging a move towards less vulnerable, single-warhead systems and away from vulnerable and destabilizing MIRVed systems; of preventing circumvention of the intent of the agreement through placing a larger number of warheads on a fixed number of launchers; and of not "handicapping" British, French, and Chinese forces which generally have less MIRV potential.
- (e) Currently planned modernization programs would have to be accommodated within the negotiated ratios, in order to secure agreement.
- (f) These negotiations and the resulting agreement should not be a substitute for ongoing START and INF talks, or their successors, but rather a complement. Should circumstances dictate, the agreement could be renegotiated to reflect the outcome of these other negotiations. These other agreements could not, however, violate the agreed limits contained in the global accord. They might, however, result in additional constraints and measures designed to reduce weaponry beyond those measures agreed to in the five-power agreement.
- (g) Parties should be entitled to withdraw from the agreement given adequate notification (to be negotiated) in situations of perceived threat to their national security.

- 3 -

- (h) Qualitative modernization programs which did not violate the agreed ratios should be allowed, subject to the other arms control agreements.
- (i) All air, land, and sea-based systems deemed through negotiations to be strategic in nature should be included.
- (j) If forces of less than intercontinental range were deemed to be strategic by the participants, they could be aggregated with those of intercontinental range with a freedom to deploy systems wherever this was deemed desirable by the parties, subject to the restrictions of other arms control agreements. (This could force a tradeoff between Superpower intercontinental and theatre forces which could both dampen incentives for an arms race in the European theatre, and at the same time allow some asymmetries in the theatre deployments which could solve some of the problems arising in the current INF negotiations in Geneva).
- (k) It would probably be necessary (and desirable) to attach specific numerical totals to the agreed ratios, thereby precluding quantitative increases beyond the agreed ratios which would legitimize proportional increases in the size of the forces of other parties.
- (l) In order to accomodate ongoing arms control efforts, the establishment of precise ratios may have to await the outcome of the START and INF negotiations. These negotiations will provide the necessary predictability for the establishment of realistic ratios. In order to provide incentives for agreement in START and the INF talks, it would be desirable if the Superpowers committed themselves to global talks as part of these other agreements, should they be negotiated.
- (m) Other agreed qualitative restraints could be negotiated as desired by the parties, as could collateral measures designed to enhance crisis management and increase confidence between the parties. These might include:
 - (i) a ban on high altitude ASAT systems.
 - (ii) a requirement for verifiability by National Technical Means
 - (iii) restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs.

M. Fide

28-6-1 - Hudson Peace
Mission

CONFIDENTIAL

November 12, 1983

IDDZ-0121

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (through R.R.Fowler)

Initiative: Strategy of Suffocation:
Ban on the Production of Fissionable
Material for Weapons Purposes

We understand that after your recent meeting with PM Lubbers of the Netherlands, you indicated an interest in knowing where matters stood in endeavours to secure a ban on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Attached for your information is a short paper which records the course of events at the UN General Assembly and at the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

L. A. Delvoie

L. A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

cc: PCO/Mr. Osbaldeston
EA/Mr. Shenstone
DND/Mr. Anderson

CONFIDENTIAL

BAN ON THE PRODUCTION OF FISSIONABLE
MATERIAL FOR WEAPONS PURPOSES

At United Nations General Assembly 33 (1978), Canada introduced the text of a resolution, requesting the Committee on Disarmament to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, "at an appropriate stage of its implementation of the proposals set forth in the Programme of Action contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session". The resolution also emphasized the need for "adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned". The overwhelming vote in favour in plenary (108) isolated the socialist states in the negative column and only France abstained of all the western allies. Also isolated were the near-nuclear states, not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Efforts to inscribe the issue on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament during its first session in 1979 were successful to the extent that the item appears as part of the "decatalogue item" Nuclear Disarmament in All Aspects.

During the negotiation of the text of a procedural draft resolution at United Nations General Assembly 34 in 1979, the heretofore purely arms control nature of the Canadian text took on certain disarmament qualities, ("... and transfer of stocks to peaceful uses..."), which shifted towards the socialist hypothesis that nuclear disarmament should be negotiated as a single all-encompassing process. However, the subsequent increase in cosponsors and shifts in voting patterns were relatively insignificant compared to the threatened loss of Nuclear Weapons States support, principally of the UK. The resolution nevertheless passed in plenary by a vote of 118:9:12. Again the socialist countries were isolated (Cuba defecting to an abstention) with Egypt, as a "near nuclear state" making the only significant shift to yes. Canada again pursued the advancement of the proposal during the 1980 session of the Committee on Disarmament under the work programme item "Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament", joining with Australia in submitting a working paper (CD-90) which in effect is an historical and essentially factual review of the proposal.

The basic question at United Nations General Assembly 35 (1980) was whether or not to proceed with a new draft resolution, particularly in light of the information that the British would be seeking a plausible excuse to change their heretofore favourable vote should a resolution be introduced. The USA, though continuing to support the concept of a "cut-off" in the longer term, also had reservations about tabling a new draft. The Australian, Netherlands and Japanese delegations approached the Canadian

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

delegation with statements that they were under instructions to ensure introduction of a resolution. It was decided to risk a possible abstention by the USA and/or the UK on a draft procedural resolution similar to the previous year's text. The UK did abstain and the USA continued to vote in favour, both explaining their votes highlighting verification problems. As in previous and subsequent years, China did not take part in the vote.

On January 30/81 a working paper was produced in the Department of External Affairs, representing nearly two years of background research and inter/intra-departmental discussions. On verification the paper led to the conclusion that a ban could not at the present time be adequately verified. At UNGA 36 Canada again introduced a procedural resolution calling on the Committee on Disarmament to consider the matter "at an appropriate stage of its work" (which means after the realization of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). It was expected that no Nuclear Weapons States would support it. (We were informed that the UK would again abstain and considered a USA abstention likely because of the change in administration.) The USA delegation informed us that the USA would indeed abstain as it would appear inconsistent to support the resolution while the USA was increasing its production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. The vote was 125-14 (Socialists) - 6 (Argentina, Brazil, France, India, UK, USA). Cuba switched from its abstention in 1980 to a negative vote.

At UNGA 37 last year it was decided once again to introduce the resolution. The vote was 121-0-22 (Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico, USSR and the rest of its allies, France, UK, USA). The Soviets and their friends abstained, joining three of the most significant Non-Proliferation Treaty holdouts among the Neutral and Non-Aligned countries and the three Western nuclear weapon states. Mexico changed its vote from earlier support to an abstention. The change in vote by the USSR was related to the freeze resolutions which included a ban on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Having voted for the freeze resolutions, the USSR did not wish to appear to contradict itself by voting against our resolution.

At UNGA 38 this year, Canada has once again introduced the usual resolution. Voting patterns are expected to be the same as last year. In short, none of the nuclear weapons states seems prepared to negotiate a ban on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes at this time.



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	C O N F I D E N T I A L	12 NOV 83 16 42Z 10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDDZ0120 12NOV83	<i>28-6-1-Thudau Peace Mission</i>
TO/A	TO LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU HAGUE	
INFO	WSHDC <u>TOKYO PEKIN</u> GNGNY MOSCO DELHI <u>FLASH</u> IMMED	
DISTR	DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB RGB RSD RCD IDD IDR IDA FPR	
REF		
SUBJ/SUJ	---PM MONTREAL SPEECH-DELIVERY	
PM REVISIONS FROM FRIDAY NECESSITATE CONSIDERABLE REDRAFTING TODAY. EUROPEAN POSTS THEREFORE UNLIKELY TO RECEIVE TEXT IN MORNING LOCAL TIME SUNDAY BUT CAN STILL EXPECT TEXT DURING COURSE OF DAY. STILL HOPE THAT USA POSTS WILL RECEIVE TEXT SUNDAY MORNING LOCAL TIME. SPEECH SUMMARY AND OTHER MATERIAL SENT FRIDAY POSSIBLY SUBJECT TO MINOR CHANGE. ADVICE WILL FOLLOW WITH FINAL TEXT.		

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

P. Gossage/sc
SIG

IDDZ

5-2394

sg L.A. Delvoie



Office of
The Prime Minister

Cabinet du
Premier Ministre

le 12 nov 83

20-6-1- Trudeau Peace
Mission

Voici la version française
révisée, contenant des corrections
de style et celles du Premier ministre.

24/211

S'es père disposé

- 1) d'un texte en petits caractères
vers 11 heures, et
- 2) d'un texte en gros caractères
vers 13 heures.

Indifférent

COPIE PORTANT CORRECTIONS DU PREMIER MINISTRE

MESDAMES,

MESSIEURS,

CHERS AMIS,

JE VOUS REMERCIE D'ÊTRE VENUS DE NOUVEAU SI
NOMBREUX À CE DÉJEUNER-BÉNÉFICE DU PARTI LIBÉRAL DU CANADA.

AU COURS DES DERNIÈRES ANNÉES, J'AI PROFITÉ DE
CES RENCONTRES POUR FAIRE LE POINT SUR L'AVENIR DU QUÉBEC
ET DU CANADA. ELARGISSANT AUJOURD'HUI NOTRE HORIZON,
J'AIMERAIS VOUS PARLER DE PAIX, DE DÉSARMEMENT ET DE NOTRE
AVENIR COMME HABITANTS D'UN MONDE EN DÉSARROI.

NOTRE RENCONTRE S'INSCRIT DANS LA LONGUE TRADITION
DÉMOCRATIQUE DE NOTRE PAYS, ET VOTRE PRÉSENCE ICI TÉMOIGNE
DE LA VIGUEUR DE CETTE TRADITION. NOUS POUVONS ÊTRE FIERS
DU DYNAMISME ET DE LA DIVERSITÉ DE NOTRE VIE POLITIQUE ET
AVOIR FOI EN NOTRE AVENIR.

SI CET AVENIR DÉPENDAIT UNIQUEMENT DE NOUS,
NOUS N' ^{éprouverions} ~~AURIONS~~ AUCUNE ESPÈCE D'INQUIÉTUDE. ~~À AVOIR.~~

DE NOS JOURS, CEPENDANT, AUCUN ÉTAT NE PEUT SE TARGUER

D'ÊTRE SEUL MAÎTRE DE SON DESTIN. NOUS PARTAGEONS

CETTE TERRE AVEC QUELQUE 160 AUTRES PAYS, ET ~~il s'ensuit~~

^{une} ~~//~~ INTERACTION À L'ÉCHELLE PLANÉTAIRE ~~QUI S'ENSUIT~~

INFLUE SUR NOTRE SÉCURITÉ ET NOTRE ÉCONOMIE, COMME SUR

LA QUALITÉ DE NOTRE ENVIRONNEMENT ET CELLE DE NOTRE VIE.

MAIS LES GOUVERNEMENTS DE CES 160 PAYS SONT LOIN
D'ÊTRE ^{nos} ~~LES~~ SEULS PROTAGONISTES. IL ^{font aussi tenir compte d'} ~~EXISTE~~ UNE MULTITUDE
D'ALLIANCES, D'ASSOCIATIONS RÉGIONALES, D'INSTITUTIONS
INTERNATIONALES TELLES ~~QUE~~ LES NATIONS UNIES, DE
SOCIÉTÉS MULTINATIONALES, ~~DE GROUPEMENTS COMMERCIAUX,~~
DE CARTELS, ~~D'INTÉRÊTS PARTICULIERS~~ ET DE GROUPES DE
PRESSION DE TOUT GENRE.

VOUS ET MOI, NOS FAMILLES, NOS COMPATRIOTES,
LES GOUVERNEMENTS ET LES ENTREPRISES, ÉVOLUONS TOUS SUR
LA SCÈNE MONDIALE, OÙ SE JOUENT NOS ESPOIRS, NOS ANGOISSES,
NOS ÉCHECS ET NOS RÉUSSITES, MAIS TROIS GRANDES TENDANCES
INQUIÉTANTES SE PROFILENT À L'HORIZON QUI RISQUENT, EN
SE CONJUGUANT, DE ^{faire tomber à jamais sur tout le comédi humain} ~~METTRE UN TERME À TOUTE VIE SUR CETTE~~
~~TERRE,~~

LA PREMIÈRE EST LE RECOURS CROISSANT À LA FORCE
POUR RÉGLER LES DIFFÉRENDS INTERNATIONAUX. ~~M~~ALGRÉ LA
DÉCLARATION SOLENNELLE ⁺CONTENUE DANS LA CHARTE DES
NATIONS UNIES, / SELON LAQUELLE "LES MEMBRES DE L'ORGANISATION
S'ABSTIENNENT, DANS LEURS RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES, DE
RECOURIR À LA MENACE OU À L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE", NOUS
AVONS CONNU, DEPUIS 1945, QUELQUE 130 CONFLITS QUI ONT
ENTRAÎNÉ LA PERTE DE 35 MILLIONS DE VIES HUMAINES.

L'HABITUDE DE L'AGRESSION SE RÉPAND, LE
PROCESSUS POLITIQUE FAIT PLACE AUX SOLUTIONS MILITAIRES.
C'EST LE RÈGNE DE LA BELLIGÉRANCE ET DES PROPOS MENAÇANTS.
LES GOUVERNEMENTS NAISSENT ET TOMBENT PAR LES ARMES. LA
TENDANCE EST UNIVERSELLE, ET ELLE VA EN S'ACCENTUANT.

CETTE BRUTALISATION DE LA VIE POLITIQUE DEVIENT
PARTICULIÈREMENT INQUIÉTANTE LORSQU'ELLE A POUR CAUSE LES
CONFLITS ENTRE DES IDÉOLOGIES ET EST SOUTENUE PAR DES ARMES
SOPHISTIQUÉES, ^{militaires et classiques} ~~DES~~ ARMES DONT LA FABRICATION ABSORBE
ANNUELLEMENT QUELQUE 600 MILLIARDS DE DOLLARS, ~~ARSENAL~~
NUCLÉAIRES ET CLASSIQUES MIS ENSEMBLE. ~~DES ARMES QUI~~
^{armes qui} ENGLOUTISSENT UNE TRANCHE BEAUCOUP TROP IMPORTANTE DES
BUDGETS DES PAYS DU TIERS MONDE, ~~QUI SONT APPAUVRIS ET~~
~~PARALYSÉS PAR LE COMMERCE DES ARMEMENTS.~~ ~~DES ARMES QUI~~
^{et qui par conséquent} ~~INCITENT DE PLUS EN PLUS À LA VIOLENCE ET EXCLUENT LES~~
^{plutôt qu'un règlement}
~~MOYENS PACIFIQUES ET POLITIQUES DE RÉGLER DES DIFFÉRENDS.~~

LA DEUXIÈME TENDANCE EST L'EFFRITEMENT
CONSTANT DU RÉGIME INTERNATIONAL DESTINÉ À PRÉVENIR
LA PROLIFÉRATION DES ARMES NUCLÉAIRES.

ESSENTIELLEMENT, CETTE PROLIFÉRATION REVÊT
UNE DOUBLE DIMENSION. NOUS L'APPELONS VERTICALE POUR
DÉSIGNER LA MISE SUR PIED, PAR LES CINQ ÉTATS NUCLÉAIRES,
ÉTATS-UNIS, URSS, FRANCE, ROYAUME-UNI ET CHINE, DE
PROGRAMMES D'ARMEMENT NUCLÉAIRE DE PLUS EN PLUS
IMPORTANTS ET S'APPUYANT SUR DES MOYENS DE DESTRUCTION
DE PLUS EN PLUS RAFFINÉS. ET NOUS PARLONS DE
PROLIFÉRATION HORIZONTALE POUR CARACTÉRISER LA PROPAGATION
ÉVENTUELLE DES ARMES NUCLÉAIRES DANS D'AUTRES ÉTATS *qui ont ou*
~~CERTAINS PARMIS CEUX-CI ONT ACTUELLEMENT LES MOYENS DE~~
~~PRODUIRE DES ARMES NUCLÉAIRES, D'AUTRES SONT SUR LE~~
~~POINT DE LE FAIRE.~~

le point d'en fabriquer, ou qui ont la capacité de le faire.

Note: l'occupation principale aujourd'hui est de limiter la

~~NOUS NOUS PRÉOCCUPONS ACTUELLEMENT DU BESOIN~~

~~ÉVIDENT D'EN ARRIVER PAR DES MOYENS POLITIQUES À RESTREINDRE~~

croissance ~~DES ARSENAUX DES CINQ PUISSANCES NUCLÉAIRES. MAIS, D'UN~~

~~POINT DE VUE MONDIAL ET À COURT TERME, LES CONSÉQUENCES DE~~

~~LA PROLIFÉRATION HORIZONTALE APPARAISSENT TOUT AUSSI GRAVES.~~

la tentation des autres Etats
~~EN FAIT, ELLES LE SONT PEUT-ÊTRE DAVANTAGE, CAR DE RECOURS~~

~~AUX ARMES NUCLÉAIRES PAR D'AUTRES ÉTATS NE SERAIT PAS CONTENU~~

qui ont les cinq grands d'une et finale.
~~PAR LA CERTITUDE DE DESTRUCTION MUTUELLE QUE POSSÈDENT LES~~

~~CINQ PUISSANCES DOTÉES DE CES ARMES.~~

LA CONCLUSION DU TRAITÉ SUR LA NON-PROLIFÉRATION,

ENTRÉ EN VIGUEUR EN 1970 ET QUI DOIT ÊTRE REVISÉ EN 1985,

VISAIT PRÉCISÉMENT À EMPÊCHER LA PROLIFÉRATION TANT HORIZONTALE

QUE VERTICALE. CE TRAITÉ REPRÉSENTAIT UN PACTE IMPLICITE

ENTRE LES ÉTATS NUCLÉAIRES ET LES AUTRES. D'UNE PART, LES

négoziés
PUISSANCES NUCLÉAIRES S'ENGAGEAIENT À POURSUIVRE DE BONNE FOI
des limites sur le nombre et la diffusion des armes nucléaires.
~~LEURS NÉGOCIATIONS SUR LA LIMITATION DES ARMEMENTS ET DE LA~~

~~DIFFUSION DE LEUR TECHNOLOGIE MILITAIRE DANS CE DOMAINE. DE~~

LEUR CÔTÉ, LES AUTRES ÉTATS CONVENAIENT DE RENONCER À L'EMPLOI

~~DE L'ÉNERGIE~~ NUCLÉAIRE À DES FINS MILITAIRES, À CONDITION DE *pouvoir*

en BÉNÉFICIER DES AVANTAGES DE SON UTILISATION PACIFIQUE DANS

favoriser
DES SECTEURS COMME L'ÉNERGIE, LA MÉDECINE OU L'AGRICULTURE.

~~MAIS CE PACTE SEMBLE ÊTRE EN TRAIN DE SE ROMPRE.~~

Mais terrible
~~IL EST DALLÉ OTÉ ENTRE LE DÉSIR DE PAIX ET LA STRATÉGIE~~

ce pacte semble bien prêt de se rompre.

MILITAIRE. LES ÉTATS TANT NUCLÉAIRES QUE NON NUCLÉAIRES,

ceux PAYS DE L'EST COMME DE L'OUEST, *ceux* DU NORD COMME DU SUD,

~~PRÉOCCUPÉS PAR LEUR SURVIE, PAR LEUR SOUVERAINETÉ OU PAR~~

sont maintenant au point où ils

~~DES CONFLITS ACTUELS, DOIVENT MAINTENANT DÉCIDER SI LE PACTE~~

~~EST TOUJOURS VALABLE~~ *très fragiles, en regard aux idées qui les ont fait de leur souveraineté, ou de leur besoin de survivre aux conflits*

qui les menacent.

LA TROISIÈME TENDANCES QUI MENACE L'ENSEMBLE DE LA

de PLANÈTE, EST LA DÉGRADATION DES RELATIONS ENTRE L'EST ET

L'OUEST, PLUS PARTICULIÈREMENT DES RAPPORTS ENTRE LES DEUX

SUPERPUISSANCES. DANS UN DISCOURS PRONONCÉ À GUELPH, IL Y

A DEUX SEMAINES, JE DÉPLORAI L'ABSENCE DE HAUTE POLITIQUE DANS

LES RELATIONS ENTRE L'EST ET L'OUEST, ET LA TENDANCE DES *chacune des*

parties à vouloir

~~NÉGOCIATIONS SUR LA LIMITATION DES ARMEMENTS À SE DÉROULER EN~~

sans aucun effort de compréhension des ~~DEHORS DE TOUTE STRUCTURE DE COMPRÉHENSION ET DE RESPECT DES~~

de l'autre. BESOINS DE SÉCURITÉ DES PARTIES, J'AI RÉAFFIRMÉ NOTRE ADHÉSION

À LA STRATÉGIE À DEUX VOLETS DE L'OTAN, ET EXPRIMÉ L'ESPOIR

animé D'Y AJOUTER UN TROISIÈME VOLET, CARACTÉRISÉ PAR L'ÉNERGIE

et un sens du POLITIQUE, ~~LE~~ DIALOGUE, ~~ET LA CONFIANCE~~, AFIN DE CONTRER LA

DÉGRADATION DES RELATIONS ENTRE L'EST ET L'OUEST;

EXAMINONS ENSEMBLE CES TROIS TENDANCES L'UNE
PAR RAPPORT À L'AUTRE: RECOURS ACCRU À LA FORCE, RISQUE
GRANDISSANT DE PROLIFÉRATION DES ARMES NUCLÉAIRES ET
RAPPORTS IMPRÉGNÉS D'ANIMOSITÉ ENTRE LES SUPERPUISSANCES.

IL EST ÉVIDENT QUE SEULE UNE APPROCHE GLOBALE ^{au problème de} VISANT À LA
PAIX ET ^{d'obtenir par} ~~de~~ SÉCURITÉ PEUT RENVERSER LE COURS SINISTRE ~~AMORCÉ~~
^{la conjuration de} ~~PAR~~ CES TENDANCES.

AVEC LA MONTÉE DE LA TENSION, EN EFFET, LES
RELATIONS ENTRE L'EST ET L'OUEST SONT PARTICULIÈREMENT
SENSIBLES AUX ÉVÉNEMENTS SURVENANT À LA PÉRIPHÉRIE. ON
CONSTATE UNE INSTABILITÉ ENDÉMIQUE DANS DES RÉGIONS
GÉNÉRALEMENT RECONNUES COMME FAISANT PARTIE DE LA SPHÈRE
DE L'INFLUENCE DE L'UNE OU DE L'AUTRE SUPERPUISSANCE,
DANS D'AUTRES POINTS VOLATILES DU GLOBE, LE MOYEN-ORIENT
EN EST L'EXEMPLE PATENT, TOUS LES ÉLÉMENTS D'UNE
CONFLAGRATION SE TROUVENT RÉUNIS.

ET L'EXTENSION AU TIERS MONDE DES RIVALITÉS
ENTRE L'EST ET L'OUEST ATTEINDRA SON POINT CULMINANT ET
LE PLUS DANGEREUX SI, MALGRÉ LE TRAITÉ SUR LA NON-
PROLIFÉRATION, LES FORCES EN PRÉSENCE -- BELLIGÉRANTS
OU SIMPLES ANTAGONISTES -- COMMENCENT À SE DOTER D'ARMES
NUCLÉAIRES.

Certes, EN TANT QUE CANADIENS, NOTRE LOYAUTÉ VA ^{avant tout} D'ABORD
À LA COMMUNAUTÉ OCCIDENTALE; NOUS RECHERCHONS ^{d'abord} LA SÉCURITÉ
SUR CE CONTINENT ET EN EUROPE. MAIS NOTRE LOYAUTÉ, NOS
INTÉRÊTS NATIONAUX ET INTERNATIONAUX, NE S'ARRÊTENT PAS
LÀ.

LA SITUATION GÉOGRAPHIQUE DU CANADA EN BORDURE
DU PACIFIQUE NOUS ASSURE DES RELATIONS PRIVILÉGIÉES AVEC
LE JAPON, LA CHINE, L'ASSOCIATION DES NATIONS DE L'ASIE DU
SUD-EST ET, BIEN ENTENDU, L'AUSTRALIE ET LA NOUVELLE-ZÉLANDE.
NOTRE VASTE PROGRAMME D'AIDE AU DÉVELOPPEMENT S'ÉTEND À DE
NOMBREUX PAYS ÉLOIGNÉS GÉOGRAPHIQUEMENT, MAIS AVEC LESQUELS
NOUS SOMMES ÉTROITEMENT LIÉS. NOTRE ^{place}PRESTIGE AU SEIN DE LA
FRANCOPHONIE ET DU COMMONWEALTH NOUS ^{invite à}~~FAIT UN DEVOIR DE~~
PARTAGER L'ENSEMBLE DES PRÉOCCUPATIONS POLITIQUES, ÉCONOMIQUES
^{sécuritaires (?) des pays que nous y rencontrons.}
~~ET (DE SÉCURITÉ) AVEC LESQUELLES NOTRE RAYONNEMENT NOUS MET~~
~~EN CONTACT.~~

C'EST POURQUOI, AVANT MÊME D'ENTREPRENDRE ~~NON~~ ^{une}
INITIATIVE POUR AMÉLIORER LES PERSPECTIVES DE PAIX, J'AI
DÉCIDÉ QUE NOTRE DÉMARCHE DEVAIT AVOIR UNE ^{importance}~~PORTÉE~~ GLOBALE, ~~ET~~
~~S'ÉTENDRE À TOUS LES DOMAINES.~~ UNE TELLE APPROCHE EST DICTÉE
PAR LA COMPLEXITÉ DE L'INTERACTION ENTRE LE DÉSARMEMENT ET LE
DÉVELOPPEMENT; ENTRE L'ANIMOSITÉ DES SUPERPUISSANCES ET LES
RIVALITÉS AU SEIN DU TIERS MONDE; ENTRE LE RECOURS À LA FORCE
ET LA DISPONIBILITÉ DES ARMES; ENTRE LES ÉQUILIBRES NUCLÉAIRES
EN EUROPE ET EN ASIE.

IL EST CERTAIN QUE LE REPRÉSENTANT D'UN SEUL
PAYS NE PEUT PROMETTRE DE MIRACLE, ET ENCORE MOINS EN *faire*.
~~ACCOMPLIR.~~ JE NE ME FAIS AUCUNE ILLUSION SUR LA COMPLEXITÉ
DES PROBLÈMES EN CAUSE. J'ESTIME TOUTEFOIS ESSENTIEL DE
des points d'arrêt sur la courbe descendante
~~RECHERCHER LA STABILITÉ À UN CERTAIN NOMBRE DE POINTS SUR~~
~~LA PENTE OÙ NOUS SOMMES ENGAGÉS,~~ ET DE RECONNAÎTRE QU'À
NOTRE ÉPOQUE, ~~LA~~ PAIX ET ~~LA~~ SÉCURITÉ SONT INSÉPARABLES, *indissociables, et qu'en*
ce point aussi nos pays ont intérêt.
~~NOUS NOUS DEVONS DE RECONNAÎTRE ÉGALEMENT LE NOUVEAU~~
~~CARACTÈRE GLOBAL DE LA SÉCURITÉ.~~
Heureusement,
~~pa~~ JE NE SUIS D'AILLEURS PAS SEUL À PENSER AINSI.
D'AUTRES DIRIGEANTS PARTAGENT MES PRÉOCCUPATIONS, ~~et~~ UN
d'univers *des idées*
NOMBRE CROISSANT ~~DE~~ LEADERS SONT DÉTERMINÉS À SUBORDONNER
LA SCIENCE DE LA GUERRE À L'ART DE LA POLITIQUE. LEUR
APPUI M'ENCOURAGE.

VOUS N'IGNOREZ PAS QUE JE RENTRE D'EUROPE, OÙ J'AI
EU DES ENTRETIENS AVEC DES DIRIGEANTS DE PAYS DE L'ALLIANCE
ATLANTIQUE, AVEC SA SAINTETÉ LE PAPE ET AVEC SA MAJESTÉ LA
REINE DES PAYS-BAS. JE REVIENS AU PAYS AVEC LE SENTIMENT QUE
offrent mon initiative de faire et qu'il
NOS AMIS ET ALLIÉS PARTAGENT MA CONVICTION QUANT À L'URGENCE
DE LA SITUATION. ~~ET AVEC L'ASSURANCE QU'ILS EXAMINERONT~~
~~PERSONNELLEMENT LES PROPOSITIONS QUE JE LEUR AI SOUMISES.~~
~~ILS M'ONT PAR AILLEURS CLAIREMENT EXPRIMÉ LEUR APPUI POUR MON~~
ils sont d'accord en particulier sur la nécessité
~~INITIATIVE ET ILS ONT CONVENU EN PARTICULIER DU BESOIN~~
D'AJOUTER À NOTRE STRATÉGIE UN TROISIÈME VOLET ^{qui} ~~POUR RÉTABLIR~~ ^{entre les parties.} ~~SE~~
LA CONFIANCE ET LES COMMUNICATIONS ~~ET DONNER UNE IMPULSION~~
~~POLITIQUE NOUVELLE À NOS RAPPORTS AVEC UN ENGAGEMENT RENFORCÉ.~~

J'AI SOUMIS À MES COLLÈGUES EUROPÉENS, AFIN
QU'ILS PUISSENT LES ÉTUDIER ET LES RAFFINER EN FONCTION DE
LEURS PROPRES VUES, LES ÉLÉMENTS D'UN PROGRAMME DE GESTION
DE LA CRISE ACTUELLE. PERMETTEZ-MOI DE VOUS EXPOSER
QUELQUES-UNS DE CES ÉLÉMENTS, *mes collègues intéressés*
qui se sont engagés à
examiner personnellement.

de creis

LE PREMIER PORTE SUR LA NÉCESSITÉ D'ÉTABLIR
UNE TRIBUNE POUR LA NÉGOCIATION DES LIMITES GLOBALES À FIXER
AUX ARSENAUX DES CINQ ÉTATS NUCLÉAIRES. CE PROJET EST SANS
PRÉJUDICE DES NÉGOCIATIONS SUR LES FORCES NUCLÉAIRES DE
PORTÉE MOYENNE ET DES POURPARLERS START ENTRE LES ÉTATS-UNIS
ET L'URSS, ~~Mais~~ CES ENTRETIENS NE S'ÉTENDANT PAS, ET C'EST
NORMAL, AUX FORCES NUCLÉAIRES DE LA GRANDE-BRETAGNE, DE LA
FRANCE, NI DE LA CHINE.
ET (?)

CE QUE NOUS DEVONS RECHERCHER POUR CES CINQ ÉTATS,
C'EST UNE TRIBUNE DE NÉGOCIATION QUI RECONNAÎTRAIT LE DROIT
DES ÉTATS-UNIS ET DE L'URSS À L'ÉGALITÉ STRATÉGIQUE, OU À CE
QU'UN RÉCENT RAPPORT DE LA COMMISSION TRILATÉRALE APPELAIT
"LA PARITÉ INÉVITABLE". UNE TRIBUNE QUI FOURNIRAIT UN CADRE
STABLE, LÉGITIME ET MUTUELLEMENT ACCEPTABLE OÙ PUISSE
S'ÉTABLIR UN RAPPORT ENTRE LES FORCES DES SUPERPUISSANCES
ET CELLES DES TROIS AUTRES ÉTATS DOTÉS D'ARMES NUCLÉAIRES.

AINSI, NI LA GRANDE-BRETAGNE, NI LA FRANCE,
NI LA CHINE N'AURAIT À CRAINDRE QUE SES FORCES ^{seraient} SOIENT
SOUMISES À DES RESTRICTIONS DÉCRETÉES SANS TENIR COMPTE
DE SES INTÉRÊTS NATIONAUX, ~~DÉFINIS SELON SES VOEUX.~~

^{établis ~~à l'initiative~~ des rapports entre}
UNE FOIS ~~QUE~~ LES NIVEAUX NATIONAUX D'ARMEMENTS ^{les}
~~AURAIENT ÉTÉ ÉTABLIS, LES CINQ PUISSANCES NUCLÉAIRES,~~
^{elles} POURRAIENT COMMENCER À DISCUTER DES RÉDUCTIONS PRÉVUES
DANS LE TRAITÉ SUR LA NON-PROLIFÉRATION, AINSI QUE DES
MESURES POUR CONTRÔLER L'ASPECT QUALITATIF DE LA COURSE
AUX ARMES ~~NUCLÉAIRES~~ STRATÉGIQUES.

LE DEUXIÈME ÉLÉMENT DU PROGRAMME SERAIT DE
RENFORCER LE TRAITÉ SUR LA NON-PROLIFÉRATION, CE PACTE
DONT JE VOUS AI DÉJÀ PARLÉ ENTRE LES PAYS DOTÉS D'ARMES
NUCLÉAIRES ET CEUX QUI ~~EN SONT DÉPOURVUS~~. *en leur ont pas.* QUELQUE 119
NATIONS ONT SIGNÉ CE TRAITÉ, MAIS UN CERTAIN NOMBRE D'ÉTATS
IMPORTANTES N'Y ONT PAS ENCORE ADHÉRÉ, DONT PLUSIEURS ~~ONT~~ *président*
DÈS MAINTENANT, OU ~~AURONT~~ *président* BIENTÔT LES MOYENS DE METTRE AU
POINT LEURS PROPRES ARMES NUCLÉAIRES.

SI LES CINQ PUISSANCES NUCLÉAIRES PRENAIENT
L'INITIATIVE DE MIEUX RESPECTER LES OBLIGATIONS QUE LEUR
IMPOSE LE TRAITÉ SUR LA NON-PROLIFÉRATION, ~~JE PENSE QUE LES~~ *nous - les autres*
~~AUTRES PARTENAIRES N'HÉSITERAIENT PAS, COLLECTIVEMENT, À~~ *signataires - pourrions plus facilement*
~~TENTER DE CONVAINCRE LES PAYS NON SIGNATAIRES D'Y ADHÉRER.~~ *d'autres pays à signer.*
~~NOUS DEVRONS SANS AUCUN DOUTE TROUVER DES MOYENS SUPPLÉMENTAIRES~~ *Et faudrait que nous*
D'INCITER LES ÉTATS DU TIERS MONDE À RENONCER AUX ARMES
NUCLÉAIRES: *c'est toujours* IL DOIT Y AVOIR UN RAPPORT DIRECT ENTRE LE
DÉSARMEMENT ET LE DÉVELOPPEMENT. ET NOUS DEVRONS AUSSI
VEILLER À CE QUE DES GARANTIES ÉTENDUES ET ADÉQUATES
PRÉSIDENT À TOUT TRANSFERT DE TECHNOLOGIE NUCLÉAIRE À DES
FINS PACIFIQUES, QUEL QUE SOIT LE PAYS FOURNISSEUR. LE
CANADA A FAIT UN TRAVAIL DE PIONNIER DANS CE DOMAINE DES
GARANTIES, ET IL CONTINUERA À OEUVRER À LEUR RENFORCEMENT.

LES DEUX ÉLÉMENTS DU PROGRAMME QUE JE VIENS
D'EXPOSER PORTENT SUR LA DIMENSION GLOBALE DE LA SÉCURITÉ
À L'ÈRE NUCLÉAIRE. MAIS IL FAUT AUSSI RECONNAÎTRE QU'IL
Y A, AU COEUR DE L'EUROPE, UNE CONCENTRATION ALARMANTE DE
FORCES CLASSIQUES AUSSI BIEN QUE NUCLÉAIRES. UNE GUERRE
SUR LE VIEUX CONTINENT RISQUERAIT DE DÉTRUIRE TOUT CE QUE
CHAQUE CAMP DÉSIRE PRÉSERVER.

De là il suit
que LA QUESTION DU DÉSÉQUILIBRE ACTUEL ENTRE LES
FORCES CLASSIQUES DES DEUX CAMPS EST REVENUE FRÉQUEMMENT
DANS MES ENTRETIENS AVEC LES DIRIGEANTS EUROPÉENS. EN
EFFET, LES FORCES CLASSIQUES DU PACTE DE VARSOVIE SONT
NETTEMENT SUPÉRIEURES À CELLES DES PAYS DE L'OTAN. ON
CRAINT DONC EN EUROPE DE L'OUEST QUE LES PAYS DU PACTE
NE SOIENT TENTÉS DE MISER SUR CETTE SUPÉRIORITÉ POUR RISQUER

occultant ainsi *à un dilemme croissant :*
UNE ATTAQUE, LES DIRIGEANTS OCCIDENTAUX POURRAIENT ALORS
ou bien accepter la défaite, ou bien déclencher la guerre nucléaire.
~~SE VOIR OBLIGÉS DE RECOURIR AUX ARMES NUCLÉAIRES SOUS PEINE~~
~~DE SUBIR UNE DÉFAITE.~~

*dès le début d'un
tout conflit*

TANT QUE CE DÉSÉQUILIBRE PERSISTERA, LE
RISQUE D'UN RECOURS ~~RAPIDE~~ AUX ARMES NUCLÉAIRES DEMEURERA
PRÉSENT. C'EST POURQUOI NOUS AFFIRMONS QUE LE SEUIL
NUCLÉAIRE EST ~~ACTUELLEMENT~~ TROP BAS. ET, BIEN SÛR,
PERSONNE NE SAURAIT ÊTRE CERTAIN QUE L'UTILISATION D'ARMES
NUCLÉAIRES EN EUROPE NE MÈNERA ^{il} PAS À DES REPRÉSAILLES
NUCLÉAIRES ^{de plus en} ~~ENCORE~~ PLUS MASSIVES À L'ÉCHELLE INTERCONTINENTALE.
NOUS CROYONS DONC QUE LA ^{meilleure} ~~SEULE~~ FAÇON DE RELEVER LE SEUIL
NUCLÉAIRE EST D'ÉTABLIR UN MEILLEUR ÉQUILIBRE ENTRE LES
FORCES CLASSIQUES.

COMMENT, DÈS LORS, RÉALISER CET ÉQUILIBRE ?
VOILÀ LA QUESTION À LAQUELLE TENTE DE RÉPONDRE LE
TROISIÈME ÉLÉMENT ^{de mon} ~~DU~~ PROGRAMME.

LA SOLUTION SIMPLE MAIS CÔTEUSE SERAIT

D'AUGMENTER LES FORCES CLASSIQUES DES PAYS DE L'OUEST
JUSQU'À CE QU'ELLES REJOIGNENT CELLES DU PACTE DE VARSOVIE.

~~JE CONSIDÈRE CELA COMME UNE SOLUTION DE DERNIER RECOURS.~~

C'est bien sûr un pis-aller. Car

LA FAÇON LA PLUS INTELLIGENTE DE PROCÉDER SERAIT QUE LES

DEUX CAMPS RÉDUISSENT LEURS FORCES CLASSIQUES À DES NIVEAUX

MUTUELLEMENT ACCEPTABLES. C'EST PRÉCISÉMENT CET OBJECTIF

QUE NOUS POURSUIVONS DEPUIS DIX ANS DANS LE CADRE DES

NÉGOCIATIONS SUR LES RÉDUCTIONS MUTUELLES ET ÉQUILIBRÉES

DES FORCES, QUI SE DÉROULENT À VIENNE. CERTAINS INDICES

^{On}
~~LAISSENT CROIRE AUJOURD'HUI QUE LES CHOSES AVANCENT, MAIS~~

À UN RYTHME ~~ENCORE~~ BEAUCOUP TROP LENT, ~~ET~~ IL RESTE DES

QUESTIONS CRUCIALES À TRANCHER. ~~MAIS LES CHANCES D'EN~~

~~ARRIVER FINALEMENT À UNE ENTENTE SONT SUFFISAMMENT RÉELLES~~

~~POUR QUE LES DIRIGEANTS DES PAYS DE L'EST ET DE L'OUEST~~

~~PRENNENT LA PEINE DE DONNER UN NOUVEL ÉLAN POLITIQUE AUX~~

~~NÉGOCIATIONS DE VIENNE.~~

*C'est pourquoi je propose
que les ^{ministres} ministres des Affaires étrangères de tous les*

pays participant se rendent à Vienne pour donner

un nouvel élan politique aux négociations.

C'est pourquoi j'ai exploré avec mes collègues les meilleures

manières de donner un nouveau dynamisme aux négociations de

Il faut aussi savoir à ce sujet,
qu'une AUTRE NÉGOCIATION S'OUVRIRA EN JANVIER À

STOCKHOLM. SON SEUL TITRE DE "CONFÉRENCE SUR LE RÉTABLISSEMENT
DE LA CONFIANCE ET DE LA SÉCURITÉ ET SUR LE DÉSARMEMENT EN
EUROPE" INDIQUE LA COMPLEXITÉ DES PROBLÈMES AUXQUELS ELLE

S'ATTAQUE. IL IMPORTE ^{d'éviter au passage} QUE CETTE CONFÉRENCE NE S'ENLISE PAS

DANS LES DISPUTES DE PROCÉDURE OU LE JARGON TECHNIQUE. SA

PREMIÈRE TÂCHE EST DE NÉGOCIER EN MATIÈRE D'ACTIVITÉS MILITAIRES
CLASSIQUES. MAIS LES TRAVAUX DE LA CONFÉRENCE TOURNERONT COURT

S'ILS NE SONT PAS SOUTENUS PAR DES GESTES DE CONFIANCE POLITIQUE

TELLE LA PRÉSENCE INSPIRANTE DES MINISTRES ~~DES~~ L'OUVERTURE DES

DISCUSSIONS.

Cela suppose aussi une présence politique de

LE QUATRIÈME ÉLÉMENT DU PROGRAMME EST LIÉ À CETTE

STRATÉGIE DE L'ASPHYXIE QUE J'AI PROPOSÉE POUR LA PREMIÈRE FOIS

LORS DE LA SESSION EXTRAORDINAIRE DES NATIONS UNIES SUR LE

DÉSARMEMENT, EN 1978. CETTE STRATÉGIE, DONT LA MISE EN OEUVRE

REQUIERT ET RÉCLAME TOUJOURS L'APPUI DES CINQ PUISSANCES

NUCLÉAIRES, DOIT ÊTRE RAFFINÉE POUR TENIR COMPTE DES PROGRÈS

DE LA TECHNOLOGIE. LES MESURES DE CONTRÔLE DES ARMEMENTS

DOIVENT TENIR COMPTE DES NOUVELLES TECHNOLOGIES QUI, PAR LEUR

NATURE MÊME, NOUS ÉLOIGNERAIENT DE LA STABILITÉ QUE NOUS

CHERCHONS À ÉTABLIR.

JE SONGE À UNE ENTENTE POUR INTERDIRE LA MISE
AU POINT ET LE DÉPLOIEMENT DE SYSTÈMES ANTI-SATELLITES À
HAUTE ALTITUDE. DE TELS ARMES MENACENT, EN EFFET, L'ENSEMBLE
DES MOYENS DE COMMUNICATION DONT NOUS DÉPENDONS POUR GÉRER
LES CRISES. ^{- pendant un conflit -} QUE L'UNE OU L'AUTRE DES PARTIES EN PRÉSENCE
SOIT PRIVÉE DE SON RÉSEAU DE COMMANDEMENT ET DE CONDUITE
DES OPÉRATIONS, ~~PENDANT UN CONFLIT~~ ET ELLE SE TROUVERAIT
TOTALEMENT DÉMUNIE AU MOMENT MÊME OÙ LE MAINTIEN DE LA
STABILITÉ DÉPENDRAIT PRÉCISÉMENT DE SA CAPACITÉ DE PRÉVOIR,
DE RÉAGIR ET DE NE PAS CÉDER À LA PANIQUE POUR RIPOSTER
À L'AVEUGLETTE.

AUCUNE DES SUPERPUISSANCES N'A ENCORE MIS AU
POINT UN SYSTÈME ANTI-SATELLITES À HAUTE ALTITUDE. UNE
INTERDICTION DE LE FAIRE EST DONC ^{encore} ~~PARFAITEMENT~~ NÉGOCIABLE.
SANS UNE ENTENTE DE CE GENRE, ON DEVRA DÉPENSER DES DEUX
CÔTÉS DES SOMMES ÉNORMES QUI POURRAIENT ÊTRE EMPLOYÉES À
DES FINS PLUS CONSTRUCTIVES. SANS UNE ENTENTE, ON SE
LANCERA DANS UNE SURENCHÈRE ^{qui rendrait encore plus probable les accidents} ~~SUJETTE AUX ACCIDENTS ET AUX~~
^{Qui plus est,} ~~Plus~~ ERREURS DE CALCUL. [^] UN SUCCÈS À CE CHAPITRE CONTRIBUERAIT
À RELANCER LES NÉGOCIATIONS SUR LES SYSTÈMES ANTI-
SATELLITES FONCTIONNANT À BASSE ALTITUDE.

UN AUTRE ÉLÉMENT ME SEMBLE AUSSI MENACER
L'ÉQUILIBRE ENTRE LES FORCES, À SAVOIR, LA POSSIBILITÉ
QUE LES ARMES STRATÉGIQUES INTERCONTINENTALES DEVIENNENT
TELLEMENT MOBILES QU'IL SOIT PRATIQUEMENT IMPOSSIBLE DE
LES REPÉRER, CELA POURRAIT REMETTRE EN QUESTION LA
CAPACITÉ DES DEUX CAMPS, OU DE TOUT ORGANISME INTERNATIONAL,
À VÉRIFIER L'APPLICATION DES ENTENTES DE LIMITATION DES
ARMEMENTS. POUR SA PART, LE CANADA CONTINUE À CONSACRER
DES ÉNERGIES ET SES RESSOURCES À L'ÉTUDE DES PROBLÈMES DE
VÉRIFICATION, DONT DÉPENDRONT LA DURABILITÉ ET LA CRÉDIBILITÉ
DES MESURES DE CONTRÔLE.

LA POSSIBILITÉ D'UN CONTRÔLE VÉRITABLE DES
ARMEMENTS SE TROUVERAIT CONSIDÉRABLEMENT ACCRUE SI L'ON SE
PRÉOCCUPAIT DES PROBLÈMES DE VÉRIFICATION AU MOMENT DE LA
MISE AU POINT D'UN NOUVEAU SYSTÈME STRATÉGIQUE PLUTÔT QUE
D'ATTENDRE L'ÉTAPE DES NÉGOCIATIONS.

J'AI DONC L'INTENTION DE SOUMETTRE, EN TEMPS
OPPORTUN ET AUX AUTORITÉS COMPÉTENTES EN MATIÈRE DE
DÉSARMEMENT, DES DOCUMENTS RÉCLAMANT UNE ENTENTE INTER-
NATIONALE EN VUE ^{1^e} D'INTERDIRE LA MISE AU POINT ET LE
DEPLOIEMENT DE SYSTÈMES ANTI-SATELLITES À HAUTE ALTITUDE,
^{2^e} DE LIMITER LA MOBILITÉ EXCESSIVE DES MISSILES BALISTIQUES
INTERCONTINENTAUX ET ^{3^e} D'EXIGER QUE TOUT NOUVEAU SYSTÈME
D'ARMEMENTS STRATÉGIQUES SOIT ENTIÈREMENT VÉRIFIABLE PAR
LES MOYENS TECHNIQUES NATIONAUX.

IL S'AGIT LÀ DE MESURES IMPORTANTES DONT LES DÉTAILS
SONT SOUVENT DE NATURE TECHNIQUE. MAIS, SI NOUS PARVENONS À
DONNER UNE IMPULSION À L'IDÉE D'ASSEOIR LES CINQ GRANDS À
UNE MÊME TABLE DE NÉGOCIATION, SI NOUS OBTENONS UN NOUVEL
ENGAGEMENT POLITIQUE À L'ÉGARD DU TRAITÉ SUR LA NON-
PROLIFÉRATION, SI NOUS REDONNONS UN ÉLAN AUX NÉGOCIATIONS DE
VIENNE SUR LA QUESTION DE L'ÉQUILIBRE DES FORCES CLASSIQUES
ET DU RELÈVEMENT DU SEUIL NUCLÉAIRE EN EUROPE, SI ENFIN NOUS
NOUS APPLIQUONS À RESTREINDRE LES PROGRÈS QUALITATIFS DANS LE
DOMAINE DE LA TECHNOLOGIE STRATÉGIQUE DE FAÇON À FAVORISER
LA VÉRIFICATION, ALORS NOUS AURONS SUSCITÉ UNE APPROCHE
VRAIMENT GLOBALE DES PROBLÈMES DE PAIX ET DE SÉCURITÉ.

COMME JE L'AI SOULIGNÉ À MES COLLÈGUES
EUROPÉENS, IL EST ESSENTIEL QUE CE PROGRAMME COMMUN, CE
FILET DE SÉCURITÉ DONT DÉPEND NOTRE SURVIE, SOIT SOUTENU
PAR LES LEADERS POLITIQUES AU PLUS HAUT NIVEAU; QUE NOS
ENTRETIENS À L'ÉCHELLE NATIONALE ET INTERNATIONALE
REÇOIVENT UNE VÉRITABLE RELANCE POLITIQUE ET QUE NOUS
TRAVAILLIONS À DÉFINIR LES INTÉRÊTS TOUJOURS PLUS NOMBREUX
QUI NOUS RENDENT SOLIDAIRES, À COMMENCER PAR NOTRE CONDITION
HUMAINE ET NOTRE AVENIR COMMUN SUR CETTE PLANÈTE.

I RETURN FROM EUROPE PROFOUNDLY ENCOURAGED BY
THE EXTENT TO WHICH MY PURPOSES ARE SHARED BY A COMMUNITY
OF OTHER LEADERS. THEREFORE I WOULD LIKE TO CONFIRM
TONIGHT MY INTENTION TO TRAVEL TO JAPAN, TO CONSULT
PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE IN TOKYO NEXT SATURDAY.

JAPAN'S ASSOCIATION WITH THE WILLIAMSBURG
DECLARATION LAST MAY, IN WHICH THE LEADERS OF THE
INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES AGREED TO DEVOTE OUR FULL
POLITICAL RESOURCES TO REDUCING THE THREAT OF WAR,
EXPRESSES BOTH THE RESONANCE OF HISTORY AND THE REALITY
OF THE PRESENT DAY. MY VISIT THERE WILL BEAR WITNESS TO
THE INDIVISIBILITY OF GLOBAL SECURITY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE.

I CAN ALSO ANNOUNCE THAT I AM ~~TAKING STEPS TO~~
beginning
~~INTENSIFY OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW~~ *and Beijing*
nuclear
~~THOSE TWO SUPERPOWERS ON WHOM SO MUCH DEPENDS. AND I~~
~~CAN STATE THAT A CONSULTATIVE PROCESS HAS BEGUN WITH THE~~
~~LEADERSHIP OF CHINA)~~

I LOOK FORWARD TO TAKING AN ACTIVE PART IN THE
DISCUSSION OF PEACE AND SECURITY ISSUES AT THE NEW DELHI
MEETING OF COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, ^{where I will be heading} ~~LATER THIS~~
^{after Japan.} ~~MONTH~~ I LOOK FORWARD PARTICULARLY TO CONSULTATIONS WITH
PRIME MINISTER INDIRA GANDHI ON THE MATTER OF NON-
PROLIFERATION, AND ON HER PERSPECTIVE, AS CURRENT CHAIRMAN
OF THE COUNCIL OF NON ALIGNED NATIONS, ON THE LINKAGE
BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT;

I AM ENCOURAGED BY THIS MOMENTUM, AND HEARTENED
BY THE RESPONSE. BUT I AM ALSO WELL AWARE THAT CRITICS OF
MY INITIATIVE HAVE DIFFICULTY IN GRASPING ^{this} ~~OUR~~ STEP BY STEP
^{a passionate embrace} APPROACH. SOME WOULD PREFER ~~THE SIMPLISTIC~~ PASSION OF AN
UNATTAINABLE IDEAL. OTHERS ARE PARALYZED BY THE COMPLEXITIES
OF THE ISSUES IN PLAY. I BELIEVE THAT PEACE MUST BE WAGED
STEADILY, WITH CAUTION AND WITH REALISM. WE MUST WORK WITH
DUE RESPECT FOR THE FRAGILITY OF POLITICAL TRUST, FOR THE
IMPORTANCE OF BUILDING CAREFULLY, FOR THE NEED TO ^{search out} ~~BEGIN TO~~
~~PUT OUR FEET ON COMMON GROUND~~ ^{on which to stand.}

THE IMPERATIVE OF POLITICAL ACTION IS MADE ALL THE MORE URGENT BY THE PACE OF CONFLICT AND CONFRONTATION, WHICH THREATENS TO OVERTAKE OUR ABILITY TO UNDERSTAND WHAT IS HAPPENING, AND OUR CAPACITY TO MANAGE IT.

LET ME REMIND YOU THAT WHEN ALFRED NOBEL INVENTED DYNAMITE IN 1867, HE BELIEVED THE PROSPECT OF ITS MILITARY APPLICATION WAS SO AWESOME THAT GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE FORCED TO LIVE IN PEACE. ~~And~~ YET TODAY WE HAVE LONG SINCE LOST THE ABILITY TO COMPREHEND THE FORCE OF A NUCLEAR BLAST IN TERMS OF ANY COMPARISON WITH ~~T~~RADITIONAL EXPLOSIVES.

LA PAIX ET LA SÉCURITÉ NE SONT PAS DE FROIDES
ABSTRACTIONS, ELLES SONT LA GARANTIE DE L'AVENIR DE
L'HUMANITÉ, DE L'ÉPANOUISSEMENT DE L'ESPRIT HUMAIN ET
DE LA SURVIE DE NOTRE PLANÈTE.

EN MAI 1982, J'AI ABORDÉ CE MÊME THÈME DE LA
SÉCURITÉ ET DE LA PAIX LORS D'UNE CÉRÉMONIE D'UNE COLLATION
DES GRADES À L'UNIVERSITÉ NOTRE-DAME, EN INDIANA. J'ÉTAIS
PRÉOCCUPÉ PAR LA CONFUSION APPARENTE QUI RÉGNAIT DANS LES
RELATIONS EST-OUEST ET PAR LA TENDANCE À VOULOIR CRÉER DES
LIENS ENTRE DES QUESTIONS EN APPARENCE ÉTRANGÈRES. LES
PAROLES QUE JE DISAIS ALORS RESTENT VRAIES:

ON NE SAURAIT NIER LA NÉCESSITÉ FONDAMENTALE DE
CONTENIR UNE COURSE AUX ARMEMENTS QUI MENACE LA
SURVIE DU GENRE HUMAIN.

ON NE SAURAIT NIER NON PLUS QUE POUR ARRIVER À
CONTENIR CETTE MENACE, CEUX QUI PEUVENT LA BRANDIR
DOIVENT SE PARLER ET SE COMPRENDRE.

DE TOUTE ÉVIDENCE, LA LIMITATION DES ARMEMENTS
EST UNE QUESTION D'INTÉRÊT MUTUEL. ET SON IMPORTANCE POUR
LE MAINTIEN DE LA STABILITÉ, VOIRE LA SURVIE DE L'HUMANITÉ,
DEVRAIT PRIMER TOUTE AUTRE CONSIDÉRATION;

CAR LE CHOIX QUI S'IMPOSE À NOUS EST CLAIR ET
PRESSANT. OU BIEN NOUS NOUS LAISSON ENTRAÎNER PAR LE COURANT
AVEUGLE QUI NOUS MÈNE À LA GUERRE NUCLÉAIRE, OU BIEN NOUS
RASSEMBLONS NOS FORCES ET NOUS TRAVAILLONS ENSEMBLE À
MAÎTRISER LES FORCES QUI PÈSENT SUR NOUS, SUR NOS ENFANTS
ET SUR CETTE PLANÈTE.

QUANT À MOI, J'AI FAIT MON CHOIX. J'AI CHOSI
DE LUTTER, JE SAIS QUE JE PEUX COMPTER SUR VOTRE APPUI.

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---PMS INITIATIVE-MEDIA COVERAGE-FRG

FOLLOWING BRIEFING BY AMBASSADOR ON MORNING OF PMS ARRIVAL
IN BONN, MEDIA AWARENESS HEIGHTENED OVER INITIATIVE. DURING BRIEFING
MAIN POINTS OF GUELPH SPEECH WERE COVERED AND THE 22 MEDIA REPS
PRESENT WERE GIVEN SPEECH AND GERMAN SUMMARY OF SPEECH.

2. AT PHOTO OPPORTUNITY PRIOR TO MTG WITH KOHL 10NOV PM BOTH
MAJOR GERMAN TV CHANNELS AND APPROX 20 OTHER MEDIA WERE PRESENT.
SHORT DESCRIPTION OF PURPOSE OF VISIT WAS ON BOTH TV CHANNELS
ON EVENING NEWS.

3. ADVANCE BRIEFING ALSO AFFORDED OPPORTUNITY FOR SEVERAL MAJOR
DAILIES TO COVER TRIP: QUOTE SUETTEUTSCHE ZEITUNG COVERED TRIP ON
PAGE TWO WITH SHORT PIECE ENTITLED QUOTE TRUDEAU VISITS KOHL.
REVIVING DETENTE UNQUOTE AND QUOTE FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG
UNQUOTE COVERS VISIT ON PAGE 5 WITH ARTICLE ENTITLED QUOTE TRUDEAU
ENLISTS KOHL FOR TALKS WITH NUCLEAR POWERS UNQUOTE.

4. AS ACTUAL TALKS TOOK PLACE AFTER PAPERS WENT TO PRINT, FEEL THIS
INITIAL COVERAGE GOOD. MORE IS EXPECTED AS WIRE SERVICES STILL
GLEANING INFORMATION ON FOLLOW-UP OF TRIP FROM ALL SOURCES.

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IFB
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CONFIDENTIAL
WITH ATTACHMENTS

URR-966

Handwritten: 6-1-1 Hudson River mission

000787

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

Messrs. Dam, Burt and Medas will be accompanied by Ambassador Robinson. We would propose that you be accompanied by Messrs. Marchand and Burney, if you agree. Should the Prime Minister accept your invitation, he may be accompanied by Mr. Fowler, for a total of nine. If you wish to expand the Canadian side further (Messrs. Massé, Dudoit and Graham) the U.S. would like to add an aide to Dam and the Minister from their Embassy in Ottawa, John Rouse.

Two elements pertaining to the visit remain outstanding:

a) As you know, the U.S. Embassy has suggested that Dam meet informally with members of the Standing Committee to provide a "more coherent outline" of U.S. action in Grenada. It is not clear whether Dam himself wants to have such a meeting or whether he has time for it. It could, therefore, quite easily be turned on or off. While such a session may be regarded as patronizing in some sense it would likely be harmless. A judgement on its utility depends essentially on whether you see merit in giving the U.S. officials more opportunity to explain their version of events.

b) Dam is also likely to meet with a group of Canadian journalists following the breakfast meeting. It is for consideration whether you wish to arrange something similar on the Canadian side. It might be sufficient to indicate at the end of the breakfast the basic description you intend to give to the meeting, both to the press and to the House of Commons.

D.H. Burney
Assistant Deputy Minister
United States Branch

de Montigny Marchand

CONFIDENTIAL

CANADA/U.S. RELATIONS POST GRENADA

Purpose:

This brief assesses the impact of events in Grenada on Canada/U.S. relations and provides a basis for discussion of this aspect for your breakfast meeting with Deputy Secretary Dam. Our task in meeting with Mr. Dam should be:

- a) to register frankly our dissatisfaction over the lack of consultation, as well as our reservations about the action;
- b) to solicit more information about the justification for the military intervention in Grenada;
- c) to help restore confidence to bilateral consultations reflecting the global objectives and commitments we share with the U.S.; and
- d) to focus on the situation which now pertains in Grenada and exchange views on future steps.

Background:

Canada was not consulted on the invasion of Grenada. We were informed in the evening of October 24 that a number of options were under consideration at a time when the invasion was imminent. We have since made clear our regret at the U.S. action, our dissatisfaction at not being consulted, given the extent of our interest in the Caribbean area, and our view that the invasion was not justified on the basis of information available to us and contravenes fundamental principles of international relations.

The invasion has been criticized by virtually all U.S. friends and allies but generally in measured terms with the obvious intention of avoiding any serious breach with the U.S. over the incident, either for bilateral reasons or in the interest of Western solidarity in the face of broader international problems, notably East/West relations and arms control.

Deputy Secretary of State Dam has just returned from visiting several Western European capitals to consult on the aftermath of the Grenada invasion, the situation in Lebanon and the state of the European INF arms control talks. This can be seen as a fence-mending mission to repair damage caused by the Grenada action, particularly the negative impact on European public opinion at a critical time in terms of deployment. (A copy of his presentation to NATO is attached.) His visit to Ottawa was prompted specifically by our request for additional information regarding Grenada.

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CONFIDENTIAL

The U.S. View

Despite our evident interests in the Caribbean, including our participation in trilateral consultations on the region with the U.S. and the U.K. and our association with the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the U.S. probably did not perceive the invasion of Grenada as seriously impinging on our bilateral relations. Even if it had, however, it is unlikely that this would have out-weighed the other larger factors influencing the U.S. decision.

The Administration no doubt sees the invasion in the light of its determination to challenge Soviet (and Cuban) advances against U.S. interests, especially in an area which they regard as crucial to U.S. security. Given the latter, the U.S. would view Canadian interests in the Caribbean as not being of the same magnitude.

Canadian interests in the Caribbean have been framed in social and economic terms without the geo-political or strategic dimension that is fundamental to the U.S. Canada's well-known views on the region - particularly our distaste for military remedies - would not encourage consultation on a plan involving military force. In addition, it has been clear that, in mounting the invasion, the U.S. was principally concerned with its military effectiveness. As a result, diplomatic consultations not central to the military operation were given short shrift.

The invasion should also be seen as exemplifying a unilateralist thread in U.S. policy, specifically on matters relating to the use of force. Post-invasion consultations are intended to smooth hard feelings but do not mean any change in the U.S. impulse, as a super-power, to act alone in its own perceived fundamental interests and if this is seen as effective. There is certainly no evidence from our most recent contacts with Washington to suggest that the U.S. feels obliged to apologize either for the lack of consultation or for the explanation of its actions.

The Administration must regard its operation as a real success both militarily and in other ways. It has been popular domestically, has the active support of other Caribbean States and appears to have been very popular as well with the Grenadians at large. The Americans appear to be operating now in the full flush of victory and basking in what they perceive as unprecedented domestic and on the spot enthusiasm for their action. (Recent polls suggest more than 70% support in the USA for the Grenada operation.) This initial and emotional optimism may well inhibit them from focussing more deliberately on medium term implications.

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CONFIDENTIAL

We should not discount the fact that, in Washington and in the Caribbean itself, there are strong sentiments of support for the invasion and for what many there see as the salutary removal of destabilizing, potentially threatening, elements from the region. The invasion may in fact have a salutary impact on the security of the region and on the policies of the USSR, Cuba and Nicaragua.

In spite of unhappiness at both the U.S. failure to consult and the U.S. action itself, the European allies appear eager to put the Grenada episode to rest quickly in order to close ranks on more fundamental, global issues. This is particularly true in the case of the U.K., which of late is concentrating almost exclusively on "where we go from here", but also with the French who continue to flag differences about the rationale behind the invasion but focus as well on future steps, particularly the need for early withdrawal of U.S. forces and prompt action enabling free elections. Canada presumably shares this attitude.

The U.N. Vote

The U.S. can also be expected to wish to heal matters with Canada. There has been no high level reaction to our abstention on the UNGA vote (108 for, 9 against, 27 abstentions) deploring the U.S. action. We were in good company (U.K., Japan, FRG, Belgium, New Zealand) in abstaining while other allies and friends (France, Italy, Netherlands, Denmark, Australia - by accident) voted against the U.S. and only Caribbean states participating in the invasion and a few others (Israel, El Salvador) supported the U.S. The U.S. could hardly have expected more of us and a U.S. official at the U.N. indicated, informally, appreciation for our abstention, which they recognized was difficult for us given our known views. Ambassador Gotlieb has told the U.S. that our abstention reflected our desire to preserve harmonious bilateral relations, despite our disagreement with the U.S. action.

Effect on Canada/U.S. Relations

In sum, there seems little prospect that there will be any direct, negative impact on continuing Canadian interests in bilateral relations at U.S. initiative. The viability and value of consultative arrangements in relation to bilateral relations remain intact. Our confidence in their value with respect to broader, international issues has, however, been damaged. The lesson may be that on such issues, in circumstances viewed by the U.S. as affecting its fundamental global concerns, we would be unwise to expect the U.S. to use those channels to consult us

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CONFIDENTIAL

before acting. We need not merely accept this passively as inevitable and should register our dissatisfaction with the U.S., but we need not, and should not, reject or dismantle the basic, existing consultative process nor call into question basic principles and objectives we continue to share with the U.S.

We should at least make clear, however, our desire to have full, accurate, timely and candid information on U.S. actions which affect the international environment. Otherwise, we are open to embarrassment and adverse public reaction in Canada which can only undermine our overall relationship, as well as our common global objectives.

Bilateral relations need not be jeopardized even if confidence has been reduced but efforts are required to rebuild greater confidence and a sense of trust, which is essential to effective management of the Canada/U.S. relationship.

Future Steps

As for Grenada, it would seem appropriate to flag those aspects on which we continue to disagree but to turn to actions which are needed to ensure an effective transition on the island to full and free elections and to the establishment of a stable, untainted, democratic government.

TALKING POINTS

- We are very disappointed at not being consulted adequately or candidly prior to the invasion, given our close relationship and the extent of our interests in the Caribbean. We have, after all, been involved in the trilateral (U.K., U.S.A., Canada) discussions with you on the area and been associated with your Caribbean Basin Initiative.
- While there is no advantage in continuing to emphasize unduly our concern over the breakdown in communications, the confidence and unity of the western allies has been affected by this episode, with implications that reach beyond our own hemisphere. In that sense Mr. Dam's visit, both to Canada and to Europe, is a welcome effort to re-establish close links of communication and to restore the degree of confidence necessary to bilateral consultations. We look forward to the opportunity of gaining additional information on events leading up to intervention in Grenada and to U.S. assessments regarding future steps.
- As we have made clear, we cannot regard the intervention as justified or in accordance with basic principles of international conduct. It is not easily reconciled with our position on Afghanistan and Cambodia and appears to have weakened our case in East-West relations and on arms control. This is unfortunate, particularly at a time when solidarity within the alliance is of paramount importance.

- 2 -

- It will be evident from our vote at the U.N. that we chose to balance our larger interests vis-à-vis the USA and the global concerns we share against our dismay about the use of military force in Grenada.
- We think it now most important to deal positively with the aftermath of the invasion and the future of Grenada.
- As you know we have indicated our readiness to participate in interim arrangements directed at restoring stability and democratic self-government in Grenada. But this is not an open-ended commitment.
- We believe, for instance, that all political elements in Grenada should be able to participate in whatever political process is introduced.
- We are not persuaded that the participation of those states which were involved in the military activity would be beneficial to the end result which even they anticipate.
- We would urge the earliest possible withdrawal of the invading forces from Grenada.

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-We are, frankly, puzzled by the negative view emerging in Washington and elsewhere about involving the Commonwealth Secretariat and Secretary-General Ramphal in transitional arrangements. We consider that more attention is needed to the medium and long-term implications of actions required to redress the current situation, as opposed to the short-term advantage of leaving matters exclusively in the hands of those now there.



MESSAGE

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28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

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SUBJ/SUJ

---PM MONTREAL SPEECH - SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND PAPERS

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY THAT CAN BE DISTRIBUTED AS IS AND TRANSLATED
FOR YOUR PURPOSES. IT IS WRITTEN IN PRESS RELEASE STYLE. IT CAN BE

RELEASED AT SAME TIME AS SPEECH TEXT IE 1230 OTTAWA TIME SUNDAY.

GUARD UNTIL THAT TIME. FRENCH TEXT OF SUMMARY WILL BE SENT TOMORROW.

2. ALSO FOLLOWING ARE TWO BACKGROUND PAPERS WHICH PROVIDE SUPPLEMEN-
TARY INFORMATION FOR BRIEFING PURPOSES ON TWO ELEMENTS PM'S PROGRAM

ME AS IN SPEECH - THE FIVE POWER NUCLEAR CONFERENCE IDEA, AND HIS

FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS. THESE PAPERS ARE AT

PRESENT NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION BUT CAN BE USED FREELY RESPONSIVELY

OR IN BRIEFINGS

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(COMCENTRE: PLEASE COPY ATTACHED)

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QUOTE

1) Speech summary

In a speech in Montreal Sunday Prime Minister Trudeau said he returned from meetings with Alliance leaders and His Holiness The Pope confident they agreed on the urgent need to apply political will and energy to improving the currently critical state of East-West relations. The Prime Minister also revealed the broad lines of a peace programme he discussed with European leaders during his trip.

Before elaborating on these proposals The Prime Minister outlined three contemporary trends which heightened the risk of East-West confrontation. He said the first trend was an increasing resort to the use of force to settle international disputes and pointed to the approximately 130 conflicts since 1945 in which 35 million lives have been lost. He characterized the cause as ^{QUOTE} "an abdication of the political process in deference to military solutions" ^{UNQUOTE}. He termed the second trend the proliferation of nuclear weapons, both in the quantity and destructiveness of the arsenals of the nuclear powers and in the threat of the number of countries possessing a nuclear capability growing. He said that the 1970 Non Proliferation Treaty may be coming unstuck. ^{QUOTE} "The treaty now stands at a crossroads between peaceful aspiration and military strategy" ^{UNQUOTE}, he said.

- 2 -

The third trend was the worsening state of East-West relations and the absence of high politics and understanding between the superpowers. He warned that this animosity made the East-West relationship vulnerable to events on the periphery, and increased the danger of the spread of conflagration from flashpoints such as the Middle East. He said, ^{QUOTE} "my hope is that we might add a ^{QUOTE} "third rail" ^{UNQUOTE} of political energy, of dialogue and of confidence, in order to improve the downward course of relations between East and West." ^{UNQUOTE}

The Prime Minister said the linkage of disarmament and development, of superpower tensions and third world rivalries, of the resort to force and the availability of weapons and of the nuclear balance in Europe and Asia dictated an approach to improve the prospects for peace that was comprehensive in scope.

He elaborated on four elements of a programme of political management of the current crisis which he had discussed with European leaders.

The first was the need to establish a forum for the negotiation of global limits among all five declared nuclear powers. He emphasized that such discussion could be complementary to and need not replace INF or START

- 3 -

negotiations. What would be sought was a stable framework for the relationship between the forces of the other three states and those of the superpowers. The agreement should recognize the strategic equality of the two superpowers.

The second part of the programme would be to bolster the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty with the five nuclear states strengthening their side of the bargain, and to provide incentives - such as a direct linkage between disarmament and development - for Third World States to forego nuclear weapons.

The Prime Minister then addressed the urgent problem of the imbalance of conventional forces in Europe and the anxiety this created. ^{QUOTE} "As long as this imbalance of conventional forces persists, so does the risk that nuclear weapons be brought in at an early stage of any conflict" ^{UNQUOTE} he said.

The third element of his programme was therefore to give fresh political impetus to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna and to take steps to inject further political will into the January Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe in Stockholm by such steps as having Ministers attend its opening sessions.

- 4 -

The Prime Minister said the fourth element of his programme would be to provide three specific measures based on his strategy of ^{QUOTE}"suffocation"^{UNQUOTE}. He proposed that there be a ban on the testing and deployment of high-altitude anti-satellite systems. He also said that he would introduce papers calling for international agreement designed to restrict too-great mobility of ICBMs, in order to enhance verification, and to require that future strategic weapons systems be verifiable by National Technical Means.

The Prime Minister said that he had told European leaders that it was essential that this interlocking programme be guided by political leadership at the highest level and that he returned ^{QUOTE}"profoundly encouraged by the extent to which my purposes are shared by a community of other leaders."^{UNQUOTE} He confirmed that he would take his consultations to Tokyo for meetings with Prime Minister Nakasone on November 18th and that he was intensifying consultations with Washington, Moscow and Peking. He also said he would be actively addressing peace and security issues at the forthcoming Commonwealth Heads of Government meetings in New Delhi.

^{QUOTE}"We can without effort abandon our fate to the mindless drift toward nuclear war"^{UNQUOTE}, he concluded, ^{QUOTE}"or we can gather our strength, working in good company to turn aside the forces bearing down on us, on our children, on our earth. As for me, I choose to move forward."^{UNQUOTE}

2) Press Guidance Five-Power Nuclear Arms Talks

Summary:

The Prime Minister announced that he is pursuing an initiative to secure the agreement of the five declared nuclear powers (USA, USSR, France, UK, China) to commence talks designed to place limits, for the first time, on the nuclear arsenals of all five states.

Background:

Arms control negotiations designed to limit or reduce strategic nuclear weapons have thus far only taken place between the Superpowers. The arsenals of the other three states remain unregulated by international agreement. This situation has given rise to complications in the arms control negotiations in Geneva. Previous attempts to secure the involvement or inclusion of these states and their forces in arms control efforts have not been acceptable because of the perception that they would work to the advantage of one party and could lead to limits on the nuclear forces of France, Britain, and China which did not respect their legitimate national interests.

Yet none of the five powers have rejected - in principle - the idea of their eventual inclusion in nuclear arms control negotiations. The Canadian initiative is designed to translate this willingness into reality, by avoiding the pitfalls of past proposals and respecting the legitimate interests and security requirements of all five nuclear weapons states.

Substance:

While the precise substance of negotiations designed to place limits on the nuclear forces of the five powers would, of course, be left up to these states to define through mutual agreement, the Prime Minister has suggested that to enhance the prospect of agreement these talks should take place on a state-to-state rather than bloc-to-bloc basis. They should, moreover, reflect the reality and principle of Superpower strategic equality.

One approach could be to arrive at mutually agreed levels of strategic forces based on fixed ratios. The expansion of forces beyond these levels should be prohibited. Such an agreement could enhance the predictability of the nuclear balance, reduce incentives for nuclear force expansion, increase the chances for eventual force reductions, and reduce the prospect of nuclear proliferation.

- 2 -

It is not intended that other arms control negotiations concerning strategic or intermediate range nuclear forces currently underway in Geneva be constrained by this five-power process. The results of these negotiations could be integrated into a five-power agreement, or could serve as complementary restraints on strategic forces. In addition, the initiation of a five power arms control process could encourage the Superpowers to come to a satisfactory conclusion of their current bilateral talks.

In order to increase the prospects for agreement, and to maximize the value of the resulting accord, it would be desirable that as many classes and types of weapons be included as is acceptable to the participants.

In addition, qualitative constraints on new strategic technologies could be included in the talks. Amongst other possibilities, these could include the following measures also being proposed by the Prime Minister: a ban on high-altitude anti-satellite systems; restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs; and a requirement that future strategic weapons systems be verifiable by National Technical Means.

The resulting agreement could serve a function similar to that of the SALT I agreement negotiated between the Superpowers. As with that agreement, it is hoped that broad quantitative limits could be set on strategic arsenals, limits which could serve as the initial basis for more comprehensive negotiations designed to lead eventually to reductions in nuclear forces, and further qualitative restraints on certain types of weapons technology.

3) Press Guidance Proposals to Implement the Strategies of Suffocation and Stabilization

Summary:

The Prime Minister has announced that he intends to propose three specific measures designed to enhance strategic stability, through placing restraints on undesirable military technologies and bolstering the capacity of arms control agreements to manage strategic nuclear competition.

Background:

In general terms, these proposals are designed to develop further the strategies of suffocation and stabilization announced by the Prime Minister in 1978 and 1982 respectively. They address qualitative aspects of the arms race by suggesting limits on, or the banning of, certain technologies which threaten strategic stability. These measures could make a positive contribution to the stability of the nuclear balance and the progress of arms control. Steps will be taken to introduce these measures in the appropriate forum, and to consult with the relevant states on their substance.

Proposal A:

A BAN ON THE TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF HIGH ALTITUDE ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS

Satellite systems currently serve vital functions for the Superpowers: verification, early warning, and strategic communications/navigation. The development of systems designed to destroy these satellites would threaten the credibility of deterrent forces, increase instability, and inhibit verification and the maintenance of predictability in Superpower perceptions of each other's military programs and capabilities. Both Superpowers have for some time been engaged in research and development of anti-satellite weapons for use in lower levels of space (low-altitude). Research and development of such weapons for use in upper reaches of space (high-altitude) is much less developed. It is this area where developments would be most destabilizing, threatening vital communications satellites. A ban would, therefore, be stabilizing, and might spur subsequent action to restrict activity in low altitudes.

The Superpowers have engaged previously in anti-satellite talks. These were, however, broken off. Nevertheless, given that neither Superpower is near deployment of a high-altitude system, a ban might be greeted positively by both states. This might, in turn, be used as a building block for further anti-satellite restrictions. Both Americans and Russians have already developed significant capabilities in the low-altitude realm.

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This is not the case with respect to high-altitude systems, restrictions on which would also be easier to verify than those on low-altitude systems.

Proposal B:

A RESTRICTION ON GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY OF ICBMs, TOGETHER WITH
RESTRICTIONS ON THE FREQUENCY OF MOBILITY

In future, both superpowers may resort to mobile ICBMs in order to ensure invulnerability of their forces. Indeed, the Soviets have proposed that mobile ICBMs be allowed in START. Mobility, however, poses difficulties for the verification of arms control agreements, contributing to mutual mistrust and fear.

Restrictions on the area of movement, together with restrictions on the frequency of mobility, would greatly enhance the possibility of verification and would, therefore, be stabilizing. Such restrictions, moreover, need not prevent the systems from remaining relatively invulnerable.

Although the USSR has deployed a mobile medium-range missile (the SS-20), it may be that for reasons of verification, both superpowers might be willing to accept a reciprocal restriction on as yet undeployed intercontinental systems.

Proposal C:

A REQUIREMENT THAT FUTURE STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEMS BE
VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS (NTM)

Successful and stabilizing arms control accords have so far depended on a capacity to verify those agreements through so-called National Technical Means (NTM) - primarily satellite systems. However, some new strategic weapon technologies hinder that process, as do some means of deployment based on deception. An agreement which would ensure that future strategic weapon systems are verifiable would be of significant value.

It can be assumed that both superpowers (not to mention others affected by their competition) share concerns in this area. Agreement, therefore, is theoretically possible. While the Soviet Union has shown less concern for verifiability than has the United States, it would be difficult for them to reject a proposal which would so directly take account of their emphasizing reliance on ^{9447E} National Technical Means ^{UNQ UOT E}.

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MESSAGE

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--- ARMS TALKS: INITIATIVE OF PM TRUDEAU

REUTERS REPORT DATE-LINED GENEVA FROM YESTERDAY'S INTERNATIONAL
HERALD TRIBUNE.

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PAGE 1 OF 2

ACTION
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6- Mission

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INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE November 10, 1983

U.S. and Soviet Resume Geneva Talks; New U.S. Offer Is Reportedly Planned

Reuters

GENEVA — U.S. and Soviet officials resumed talks on limiting European-based medium-range nuclear missiles Wednesday amid reports that the United States was planning to make a last-minute offer before its deployment of new missiles next month.

The chief of the U.S. delegation, Paul H. Nitze, declined comment when he emerged from the talks at the Soviet mission. A U.S. spokesman said both sides agreed to hold another session next Tuesday.

On Monday, the chief Soviet delegate, Yuli A. Kvitsinsky, said at a reception at the mission to commemorate the Bolshevik Revolution that he did not expect new U.S. proposals to be made on Wednesday. He added that the Soviet potential for making new offers had been "exhausted."

Mr. Kvitsinsky hinted that Moscow would continue negotiating up to the deployment beginning in December of new U.S. Pershing-2 and cruise missiles.

After that, Soviet officials have said, Moscow will probably break off the talks. On Oct. 26, President Yuri V. Andropov said it would be "impossible" to continue negotiations if deployment begins.

Mr. Kvitsinsky repeated that the decisive obstacle to progress was the Western alliance's refusal to include British and French missiles in the negotiations.

According to reports from Washington, President Ronald Reagan is contemplating an offer that could include a limit on each

side of 600 medium-range missile warheads. Half of these would be deployed within range of Europe.

The proposal would be a response to an offer made by Mr. Andropov when he said that talks after deployment would not be possible.

In that speech, Mr. Andropov proposed the reduction of the medium-range missile force in Soviet Europe to 140 if NATO cancels plans to deploy its 572 rockets. There were these other developments Wednesday:

• In Brussels, Belgian officials welcomed an initiative by Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau of Canada for new disarmament talks

Mr. Trudeau, who was in Belgium as part of a tour of six European states, said that he was exploring the future of arms talks after NATO's deployment of the missiles.

After attending a lunch with Mr. Trudeau and Prime Minister Wilfried Martens, Foreign Minister Leo Tindemans said Mr. Trudeau's ideas were "an excellent initiative." Mr. Trudeau said that his plan would call for the five main nuclear powers — the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Britain and China — to hold joint talks on limiting nuclear arms.

• Also in Brussels, NATO sources reported that the alliance had denied a request by Denmark for a special meeting next month of alliance foreign ministers to discuss the deployment of the medium-range missiles. Denmark's minority government, under pressure from

an anti-missile opposition majority, made the request on Friday.

• In Bonn, Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Britain underlined their determination to abide by the plans to deploy the missiles.

Mr. Kohl, speaking at a news conference, called on the Soviet Union to drop its demand that the British and French weapons be included in the talks.

Mrs. Thatcher said she was less optimistic than Mr. Kohl that a solution could be reached. Both leaders called on Moscow not to carry out its threat to halt the negotiations if the missiles are deployed.

• Also in Bonn, the defense minister, Manfred Wörner and the British secretary of state for defense, Michael Heseltine, rejected a proposal from President Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania. The proposal attracted attention in NATO capitals on Monday because it said the French and British missiles should not be counted.


• In Sofia, parliamentary chairmen from the Warsaw Pact countries expressed approval of planned countermeasures to the deployment of the U.S. missiles, the Bulgarian news agency BTA said. The steps include the stationing of short-range missiles in Czechoslovakia and East Germany.

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---ARMS TALKS: INITIATIVE OF PM TRUDEAU

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GENEV FROM YESTERDAYS INNATL HEARLD TRIBUNE WHICH ALLEGES THAT
THE USA IS PLANNING TO MAKE A LAST MINUTE OFFER IN INF TALKS
BEFORE ITS DEPLOYMENT OF NEW MISSILES NEXT MONTH.

2.SAME REPORT STATES THAT BELGIAN OFFICIALS QUOTE WELCOMED AN
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REPORT GOES ON TO EXPLAIN THAT PM TRUDEAU HAD STATED THAT HIS
PLAN WOULD CALL FOR THE FIVE MAIN NUCLEAR POWERS(USA,USSR,
FRANCE,BRITAIN AND CHINA)TO HOLD JOINT TALKS ON LIMITING
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
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IN BONN, MEDIA AWARENESS HEIGHTENED OVER INITIATIVE. DURING BRIEFING
MAIN POINTS OF GUELPH SPEECH WERE COVERED AND THE 22 MEDIA REPS
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2. AT PHOTO OPPORTUNITY PRIOR TO MTG WITH KOHL 10NOV PM BOTH
MAJOR GERMAN TV CHANNELS AND APPROX 20 OTHER MEDIA WERE PRESENT.
SHORT DESCRIPTION OF PURPOSE OF VISIT WAS ON BOTH TV CHANNELS
ON EVENING NEWS.

3. ADVANCE BRIEFING ALSO AFFORDED OPPORTUNITY FOR SEVERAL MAJOR
DAILIES TO COVER TRIP: QUOTE SUETTEUTSCHE ZEITUNG COVERED TRIP ON
PAGE TWO WITH SHORT PIECE ENTITLED QUOTE TRUDEAU VISITS KOHL.
REVIVING DETENTE UNQUOTE AND QUOTE FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG
UNQUOTE COVERS VISIT ON PAGE 5 WITH ARTICLE ENTITLED QUOTE TRUDEAU
ENLISTS KOHL FOR TALKS WITH NUCLEAR POWERS UNQUOTE.

4. AS ACTUAL TALKS TOOK PLACE AFTER PAPERS WENT TO PRINT, FEEL THIS
INITIAL COVERAGE GOOD. MORE IS EXPECTED AS WIRE SERVICES STILL
GLEANING INFORMATION ON FOLLOW-UP OF TRIP FROM ALL SOURCES.

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Mr. Smith

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DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB PGB PED PER PPR RGB RCD RBD IDR IDA CPD

REF YOURTEL IDDZ 0-17 10NOV

---PM INITIATIVE ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INNATL SECURITY

I INFORMED MFA(SUSLOV) TODAY OF NAME OF PMS REP. HE WAS

OBVIOUSLY PLEASED, AND FOR MY PART I AM DELIGHTED. HOPE PEARSON


WILL STAY WITH US IN RESIDENCE

ROBERTS

CCC/144 111110Z XYGR4119

Mr. Smith

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**



UNCLASSIFIED

FM MOSCO XYGR4117 11NOV83

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ

INFO BNATO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADM POL/CPP

DISTR RBR RGB RED IDD

---PM INITIATIVE ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS

WE COMMEND TO YOUR ATTN ARTICLE BY JONATHAN ALFORD ENTITLED QUOTE
THE PLACE OF BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ARMS CONTROL
UNQUOTE PUBLISHED IN AUTUMN 83 EDITION OF RIIA PUBLICATION INNATL
AFFAIRS. ARTICLE HAS SPECIAL RELEVANCE TO IDEAS ON BRINGING ABOUT
FIVE-POWER NUCLEAR NEGS.

UUU/095 110846Z XYGR4117

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BONN ZQGR4087 11NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDEZ IMMED

INFO LDN WSHDC PARIS MOSCO BNATO ROME HAGUE MDRID BRU COPEN OSLO
PRMNY GENEV TOKYO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CIS ADM/CPD PCOOTT/FOWLER
BAG LISBON DE OTT HSNKI WSAW PRGUE BPEST EGRAD ATHENS STKHM DE PAR
DISTR MINA MINE USS DMF RGB IFB RCD RCR RCM RSD RSR RWP IDT IDA
ZSI ZSP IDR

---AMP MTG WITH VOGEL

SUMMARY:AMB MET WITH SPD LEADER VOGEL AT LATTERS REQUEST TO
DISCUSS PMS INITIATIVE.AMB GAVE BACKGROUND TO INITIATIVE
(ESSENTIALLY GUELPH SPEECH).VOGEL SAID HE SHARED PMS
CONCERN OVER CURRENT EAST-WEST SITUATION AND FACT TWO
POLITICAL CENTRES OF WORLD WERE NOT/NOT TALKING TO EACH OTHER.
HOWEVER IT WAS CLEAR VOGELS FIRST CONCERN WAS INF AND WHETHER
PM HAD BROUGHT ELEVENTH-HOUR SOLUTION FOR GENEV NEGS.HE
SAID SPD WOULD GIVE NO/NO TO DEPLOYMENT AT ITS SPECIAL
CONGRESS 18NOV BUT REAFFIRM ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP.HE
PREDICTED SCHMILT WOULD SUPPORT NEED TO DEPLOY INF BUT WOULD
BE CRITICAL OF GOVT AT SAME TIME.

2.PFPORT:AMP MET 11NOV WITH VOGEL WHO HAD ASKED TO SEE
PM ABOUT HIS INITIATIVE.AMB OUTLINED PMS CONCERNS/ANALYSIS
OF CURRENT SITUATION DRAWING ON GUELPH SPEECH AND BRIEFING
...2

28-6-1-Judicial Peace
Mission

PAGE TWO ZQGR4087 CONFD

NOTES PROVIDED YCOURTEL IDZ0043 26OCT.AFTER NOTING
SPD,ALTHOUGH IN OPPOSITION, WAS TRYING TO KEEP UP WITH POLICY
DEVELOPMENTS, VOGELS FIRST QUESTION WAS WHETHER PM HAD COME TO
EUROPE WITH ELEVENTH-HOUR PROPOSAL FOR SOLVING GENEV INF
NEGS IMPASSE.AMB SAID INF WAS ONE FACTOR THAT GAVE RISE TO PMS
CONCERN BUT INITIATIVE WAS NOT/NOT DIRECTED AT FINDING SOLUTION
FOR GENEV NEGS.HE MADE CLEAR PM WAS NOT/NOT MOVING FROM FIRM
SUPPORT OF TWO TRACK DECISION NOR/NOR ENTERTAINING IDEAS OF
MORATORIUM ON STATIONING.VOGEL SAID HE SHARED PMS CONCERN
OVER LONG-TERM EAST-WEST TRENDS AND FACT TWO POLITICAL CENTRES
OF WORLD WERE IN EFFECT NOT/NOT IN COMMUNICATION.HE AGREED
ON VALUE OF ENCOURAGING MEDIUM-SIZED NATIONS TO SPEAK OUT.
USE OF CHOGM WOULD BE USEFUL.ALL AVAILABLE BRIDGES SHOULD BE USED.
3.VOGEL OFFERED TO DESCRIBE SPD POSITION ON INF.HE
DESCRIBED IT IN CONTEXT OF GROWING PUBLIC CONCERN OVER CAPABILITY
MAN NOW HAD TO DESTROY,NOT/NOT ONLY CITIES,BUT ALL MANKIND.
TWO TRACK DECISION,INSPIRED BY SCHMIDT,HAD BEEN UNDERSTOOD BY SPD
AS MEANS TO APPROACH GOAL OF STOPPING ARMS RACE.THERE HAD BEEN
TIME HOWEVER NO/NO UNANIMITY ON DECISION--APPROX 35-40 PERCENT
HAD BEEN OPPOSED.VOGEL HIMSELF HAD BEEN IN SUPPORTING 60 PERCENT.TWO
TRACK HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL.IT HAD BROUGHT USA AND USSR TO
NEGOTIATING TABLE.DURING NEGS USA HAD MOVED AND USSR HAD
ADMITTED IT HAD TOO MANY INF MISSILES AND INDICATED IT WOULD
...3

GE THREE ZQGR4087 CONF

QUOTE BY DESTRUCTION UNQUOTE RETURN TO 1977-78 SITUATION WHEN,
AS NOTED IN BREZHNEV-SCHMIDT 1978 COMMUNIQUE, ROUGH BALANCE
EXISTED. USSR HAD ALSO NOW AGREED TO ON-SITE INSPECTION.

4. SPD THOUGH THIS LATEST SOVIET PROPOSAL WAS WORTH
SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. IF WSHDC PREFERRED TO REJECT PROPOSAL ON
GROUNDS IT WAS BETTER TO DEPLOY AND CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE FOR
BETTER DEAL, THEN NOT/NOT ONLY WOULD FRG SUFFER BUT
ALLIANCE WOULD BE DESTABILIZED. SPD THEREFORE RECOMMENDED
QUOTE TAKING IN HARVEST NOW UNQUOTE. AT SPECIAL SPD CONGRESS
18 NOV MAJORITY WOULD VOTE NO/NO TO DEPLOYMENT BUT NOT/NOT IN
FAVOUR OF LEAVING ALLIANCE. RESOLUTION WOULD INDICATE CLEARLY
SPD WANTED TO STAY IN ALLIANCE BUT WANTED MORE DISCUSSION OF
CERTAIN POINTS OF POLICY.

5. VOGEL WENT ON TO SAY CERTAIN USA STATEMENTS/ACTIONS GAVE
SPD CONCERN. EG TALK OF WINNABLE NUCLEAR WARS AND GAINING
SUPERIORITY IN ARMS. CONTEST BETWEEN TWO SYSTEMS WAS
INCREASINGLY LIMITED TO MILITARY SPHERE AND WITHIN THAT SPHERE
INCREASINGLY TO INF. WE IN WEST NEEDED TO DEVELOP BROADER
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, POLITICAL STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH EAST.
SPD WAS SERIOUSLY CONCERNED OVER GRENADA. THEY UNDERSTOOD
SUPERPOWER HAD TO DEFEND ITS INTERESTS BUT ONE OF WESTS
STRENGTHS HAD BEEN ITS RESPECT FOR AND OBSERVANCE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW. THIS HAD NOW BEEN PUT IN QUESTION. THEY
WERE NOT/NOT CONVINCED THAT INFO COMING OUT OF GRENADA JUSTIFIED
USA ACTION.

...4

PAGE FOUR ZQGR4087 CONF

6. RETURNING TO INF, VOGEL SAID THAT AT SPD CONGRESS SCHMIDT WOULD COME OUT IN FAVOUR OF DEPLOYMENT BUT AT SAME TIME HE WOULD CRITICIZE DIRECTION OF GOVT. BUNDESTAG WOULD VOTE IN FAVOUR OF DEPLOYMENT AND THEN FRG WOULD BE IN FOR DIFFICULT TIME. GOVT WAS PUBLICLY SAYING IT WOULD BE BUSINESS AS USUAL (WE WOULD PROBABLY SEE ANOTHER ONE BILLION DM LOAN) BUT INSIDE INFO AVAILABLE TO SPD SUGGESTED GOVT WAS PRIVATELY MORE ANXIOUS. SPD WOULD DO WHAT IT COULD TO HELP DURING THIS DIFFICULT TIME.

HOWEVER WHAT WAS REALLY NEEDED WAS FLEXIBILITY FROM MOSCO AND WSHDC AND DIALOGUE QUOTE AT THE TOP UNQUOTE.

7. AMB RESPONDED THAT PM WOULD AGREE WITH LAST POINT. HIS CONCERN WAS OVER POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE AND THAT MILITARY/TECHNOCRATS WERE EFFECTIVELY DETERMINING NATURE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP RATHER THAN POLITICAL LEADERS. AS GUELPH SPEECH NOTED THERE WAS INDEED NEED FOR NEW BROAD STRATEGY AND RE-EXAMINATION. IF POST HARMEL REPORT, BUT PMS FIRST PRIORITY WAS TO TAKE STEPS TO RESTORE POLITICAL CONFIDENCE.

8. IN RESPONSE TO AMBS QUESTION ON PUBLIC REACTION TO DEPLOYMENT VOGEL SAID PROBLEM WAS CAUSED BY FACT IT WOULD BE DONE AGAINST WISHES OF CLEAR MAJORITY. THIS WAS DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY. HE NOTED THAT GOVT COULD NOT/NOT TAKE CREDIT FOR FACT DEMOS DURING OCT ACTION WEEK HAD BEEN PEACEFUL. THIS HAD BEEN DUE TO RESTRAINT SHOWN BY ORGANIZERS, BY TRADES UNION

...5

PAGE FIVE ZQGR4087 CONF

AND POLICE. THERE WOULD OF COURSE BE MORE DEMONSTRATIONS. VOGEL
COULD NOT/NOT EXCLUDE THAT A FEW FRUSTRATED, DEMORALIZED PEOPLE
WOULD TURN TO VIOLENCE OR EVEN TERRORISM. BUT THEY WOULD NOT/NOT
CAUSE ANY REAL PROBLEM.

CCC/005 111725Z ZQGR4087

UNCLASSIFIED

FM DALAS YMAG3292 11NOV/83

TO EXTOTT IDD

INF PMOTT/AXWORTH WASH DC. CONGENY

DIST IFP UGB URD IDA IDR UGP SCC SCI

---PM PEACE INITIATIVE EDITORIAL

THE FOLLOWING DALLAS TIMES HERALD EDITORIAL (FRIDAY, NOV11/83)
WAS NOT/NOT DICTATED WORD FOR WORD FROM THIS OFFICE. IT ONLY
SOUNDS THAT WAY.

'TRUDEAU'S PEACE MISSION

WITH THE ARMS TALKS IN GENEVA SEEMINGLY AT AN IMPASSE AND RELATIONS
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION AT THEIR MOST
PERILOUS LEVEL IN DECADES. THIS WEEKS UNEXPECTED CANADIAN INITIATIVE
FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT MUST BE VIEWED AS A WORTHWHILE DEVELOPMENT.
EVEN THOUGH THE PROSPECTS FOR A DIPLOMATIC BREAKTHROUGH MAY BE
TRAGICALLY SLIM.

CERTAINLY, PRIME MINISTER PIERRE TRUDEAU IS RIGHT TO BE CONCERNED
ABOUT ESCALATING TENSIONS BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS AND THE APPARENT
LACK OF PROGRESS AT BOTH THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS (START)
AND THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) TALKS. AND HE
IS RIGHT TO WORRY THAT IN RECENT MONTHS U.S. SOVIET RELATIONS
HAVE BECOME 'DANGEROUSLY CONFRONTATIONAL' - AS A RESULT OF THE
AMERICAN INVASION OF GRENADA, THE CONTINUED FIGHTING IN LEBANON.
NATO'S PLANS TO DEPLOY A NEW GENERATION OF MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN
WESTERN EUROPE TO COUNTER THE HUNDREDS OF SOVIET SS 20S ALREADY IN
PLACE, AND THE SOVIETS' DECISION TO SHOOT DOWN AN UNARMED SOUTH
KOREAN JET-LINER WITH 269 PEOPLE, INCLUDING A U.S. CONGRESSMAN,
ON BOARD.

MR. TRUDEAU'S BELIEF IS THAT AN OUTSIDE PARTY, WHAT HE CALLS A
'THIRD-RAIL OF HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL ENERGY,' MAY BE NEEDED TO EASE
TENSIONS BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS AND TO HELP THEM RETREAT FROM THE
PRECIPICE OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION.

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PAGE TWO YMAG3292 UNCLAS

TEXT 'JUST AS WAR IS TOO IMPORTANT TO LEAVE TO THE GENERALS, SO THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS MAY HAVE BECOME TOO CHARGED
WITH ANIMOSITY FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS TO BE ENTRUSTED TO THEM'.
THE PRIME MINISTER SAID BEFORE EMBARK VRIUZGA.

NAIXOUR-DAY

TOUR OF EUROPEAN CAPITALS FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER HEADS OF STATE
ON HIS PEACE INITIATIVE.

'I AM DEEPLY TROUBLED BY AN INTELLECTUAL CLIMATE OF ACRIMONY AND
UNCERTAINTY, BY THE PARLOUS STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, BY A
SUPERPOWER RELATIONSHIP THAT IS DANGEROUSLY CONFRONTATIONAL,
AND BY A WIDENING GAP BETWEEN MILITARY STRATEGY AND TVQSUSI.'

SINCE PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU DID NOT MAKE PUBLIC ANY OF THE DETAILS
OF HIS DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL (WISELY, WE THINK), IT IS IMPOSSIBLE
TO JUDGE WHETHER THE PLAN MIGHT FIT INTO THE FRAMEWORK BEING
DISCUSSED AT THE ARMS TALKS IN GENEVA OR HOLD ANY ATTRACTION FOR
U.S. AND SOVIET LEADERS.


IRRESPECTIVE OF THE SPECIFICS OF HIS PROPOSAL, HOWEVER, MR. TRUDEAU
IS TO BE COMMENDED FOR ASSUMING THE MANTLE OF STATESMANSHIP AND
MAKING AN IMPORTANT EFFORT TO DEAL WITH THE MOST PRESSING ISSUE OF
OUR TIME. IT WOULD BE FOOLISH, OF COURSE, TO BE TOO OPTIMISTIC ABOUT
THE PRIME MINISTER'S CHANCES OF SUCCESS. BUT IF SOMEHOW HE CAN
CONVINCE BOTH MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON THAT COMPROMISE IS POSSIBLE

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PAGE THREE YMAG3292 UNCLAS

AND PERHAPS EVEN SHOW THEM THE WAY ABOUT HOW TO ACHIEVE IT, HE
WILL HAVE PERFORMED AN INCALCULABLE SERVICE FOR THE INHABITANTS
OF THIS PLANET.

UUU/825 112013Z YMAG3292



R E S T R I C T E D

FM TOKYO UIFC2132 11NOV83

TO EXTOTT XDV DELIVER BY 110900

INFO PMOOTT/DURDIN/SMITH PCOOTT/DURAND DELIVER BY 110900

PONN/PM DEL DELIVER BY 110900

DISTR PPR IDDZ

RFF YRTELS XDV1095 10NOV AND 1090 09NOV

---PM INITIATIVE:MEDIA ARRANGEMENTS

WE HAVE ADVISED MFA THAT PM VISIT WILL BE IN NATURE OF PRIVATE DIPLO INITIATIVE NOT/NOT INTENDED TO GENERATE PUBLICITY, AND FOR THIS REASON PM DOES NOT/NOT INTEND TO GIVE PRESS CONF FOLLOWING DISCUSSION WITH PM NAKASONE. WE ALSO NOTED THAT CDN SIDE WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF JPNSE SIDE WOULD TREAT VISIT IN SIMILAR MANNER. INTERLOCUTOR UNDERTOOK TO PASS THIS INFO TO PM NAKASONE'S OFFICE. 2. MFA HAS PROMISED ANSWER EARLY NEXT WEEK ON QUESTIONS OF ACCREDITATION AND PHOTO OPPORTUNITIES. HOWEVER THEY WISH TO KNOW IF THERE WOULD BE ANY EVENTS, OTHER THAN PHOTO OPPORTUNITY, FOR WHICH ACCREDITATION WOULD BE REQUIRED SINCE THERE IS TO BE NO/NO PRESS BRIEFING. GRATEFUL YOU ADVISE ASAP WHETHER THERE WILL BE ANY BRIEFINGS BY OFFICIALS OR OTHERS EVEN IF PM DOES NOT/NOT HOLD PRESS CONF. IF SO, WHO WILL DO IT, WHEN WILL IT BE HELD AND HOW SPECIFIC WILL IT BE? YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT WHILE THEY MIGHT BE WILLING TO LIMIT IT TO GENERALITIES, IT WILL BE HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT JPNSE WILL REFRAIN FROM GIVING PRESS BRIEFING; ESPECIALLY AS ELECTION WILL SOON BE HELD.

...2

PAGE TWO UIFC2132 RESTR

3.GRATEFUL YOU ADVISE WHAT PROGRAM YOU HAVE IN MIND FOR PRESS
THAT WOULD REQUIRE BUSES ETC REQUESTED PARA 5 YOURTEL XDV1094,
SO THAT WE MAY ADVISE MFA AND MAKE ANY ADVANCED PREPARATIONS
REQUIRED.

CCC/195 110740Z UIFC2132

CORRECTED COPY
EXEMPLAIRE CORRIGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CORRECTED COPY

FM TOKYO UIGR2115 11NOV83

TO EXTOTT XDV DELIVER BY 110900

INFO PCOOTT/DURAND PMOOTT/DURDIN/SMITH RCMPOTT/VIF5 NLHQOTT/DACT3-3

DISTR USS DMF PGE PPD PPR IDD IDDZ MGT

(DUTY OFFICER PLS ALERT MS C FOSTER HOME PHONE 745-1858)

REF YOURTELS XDV1090 09NOV XDV1097 10NOV

---PMS INITIATIVE: VISIT TO TOKYO 18/19NOV

FOLLOWING ARE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS RAISED REFEELS:

2.PE PARA3: ACCOMMODATION: IN LIGHT REFTTEL XDV1097(NOTAL),PM/DEL/

MEDIA WILL ALL BE ACCOMMODATED IN HOTEL OKURA/OKURA.ACCOMMODATIONS

SET UP WILL BE IDENTICAL TO JAN VISIT,IE PM WILL BE IN JPNSE STYLE

SUITE M781.TE JOHNSON WILL BE IN JPNSE STYLE SUITE M786 AND

INSPECTOR CARTER WILL BE IN JPNSE STYLE ROOM M779 WHICH IS

ADJACENT TO PMS SUITE.JPNSE SECURITY WILL BE IN M784 DIRECTLY ACROSS

THE HALL FROM INSPECTOR CARTER AND ADJACENT TO MR JOHNSON.ALTHOUGH

OTHER JPNSE STYLE SUITES IN PMS WING MAY BE USED BY REGULAR HOTEL

GUESTS NIGHT OF 18NOV,JPNSE SECURITY WILL SET UP NET TO ENSURE

CONTROLLED ACCESS FOR PRIVACY AND SECURITY.REST OF DEL WILL BE

ACCOMMODATED IN CONNECTING WING ON SAME FLOOR.WE ARE FORWARDING

FY FAX FLOOR PLAN FOR THIS FLOOR.GRATEFUL ROOM ASSIGNMENTS FOR


DEL ASAP.

(A)COSTS: SUITE FOR PM IS CDN DLRS 267(YEN 49,500)AND JOHNSON

CDN DLRS 238(YEN 44,100).ROOMS FOR DEL CDN DLRS 110(YEN 22,250).

SUITE FOR DEL OFFICE/CDA-BASED SCY CDN DLRS 316(YEN 58,500).ALL ROOMS

...2



PAGE TWO UIGR2115 CONF

ARE IN MAIN BLDG. TEN PERCENT TAX AND TEN PERCENT SERVICE MUST BE ADDED. TO AVOID ADDITIONAL HALF DAY CHARGE CHECK-OUT MUST BE BY 1500 HRS.

(B) MEDIA: SUITE PLUS 29 SWBS CONFIRMED IN SOUTH WING, HOTEL OKURA. COST FOR SUITE IS CDN DLRS 307 (YEN 56,700). SWBS ARE CDN DLRS 110 (YEN 20250). ALL QUOTES PLUS 10 PERCENT TAX 10 PERCENT SERVICE. IF YOU WISH MEDIA RMS TO BE ON SAME FLOOR AS SUITE, COST IS CDN DLRS 122 (YEN 22500).

(C) CREW: CONFIRMED 17 SWBS AT TOKYO PRINCE. COST: CDN DLRS 93.95 (YEN 15000 PLUS 1500 YEN SERVICE AND 1300 YEN TAX: TOTAL 17,800 YEN PER NIGHT).

(D) DEL OFFICE: DEL OFFICE WILL BE LOCATED ON SAME FLOOR AS OFFICIALS, IN A SUITE (M720). LIVING ROOM WILL BE CLEARED TO MAKE OFFICE AND CDA-BASED SCY WILL LIVE IN ADJOINING BEDROOM. CONFIRM THIS ARRANGEMENT ACCEPTABLE. ALL EQPT REQUESTED WILL BE SUPPLIED FROM WITHIN EMB RESOURCES EXCEPT FOR SMALL PHOTOCOPIER WHICH WILL BE RENTED. DO YOU WISH BV JOHNSTONES ROOM TO BE NEXT TO DEL OFFICE IE, M724? DEL SECTY WILL BE BRENDA REMUS.

(F) ALL ROOMS FOR OFFICIALS, MEDIA AND CREW WILL BE PRE-REGISTERED AND KEYS WILL BE AVAILABLE UPON ARRIVAL.

(G) AS USUAL, EMB OFFICIAL WILL BE AVAILABLE AT HOTEL ON ARRIVAL TO ASSIST.

(I) SEE A, B, C ABOVE.

4. RE YOUR PARA 4: ARRANGEMENTS FOR PMS SUITE IN PLACE; HOTEL WILL

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PAGE THREE UIGR2115 CONFID

STOCK ROOM AS REQUESTED.REQUIREMENTS IN PARA4(E) NOTED.HOTEL INSTRUCTED RE PHONES AND WE WILL ENSURE THIS IS CARRIED OUT.JPNSE SECURITY WILL FIRST SCREEN ALL MAIL AND PARCELS AND THEN FORWARD TO BV JOHNSTONE.

5.RE YOUR PARA5: FINANCE: WE DO NOT/NOT FORESEE ANY UNUSUAL EXPENDITURES REQUIRING PRIOR APPROVAL.WE WILL ADVISE COSTS FOR NECESSARY CAR/BUS/MINIVAN RENTALS. (B)WE HAVE INFORMED HOTEL THAT ALL OFFICIALS WILL BE SETTLING THEIR OWN ACCOUNTS. (C)HOTEL INFORMED OF ARRANGEMENTS RE DEL OFFICE. (D)NOTED. (E)PROGRAM: POST WILL PROVIDE APPROPRIATE PROGRAM ASAP.

6.RE PARA6: LOCAL TRANSPORTATION: REQUIRED CARS,BUSES AND BAGGAGE TRUCKS WILL BE AVAILABLE.WE ARE DISCUSSING WITH MFA PROVISION OF LIMO AND WILL ADVISE.TRANSPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR SAT 19NOV MTG POSS NO/NO PROBLEM. (E)VEHICLES WILL BE MARKED FOR EASY IDENTIFICATION. (C)SEATING ARRANGEMENTS FOR VEHICLES WILL BE PROVIDED IN DETAILED WORKING PROGRAM.

7.RE PARA7: AIR TRANSPORT: DIPLO NOTE FORWARDED TO MFA REQUESTING FLT CLEARANCES FOR CAF BOEING 707.WE EXPECT CLEARANCE WILL BE GRANTED FOR LANDING AT HANEDA BUT WILL ADVISE ASAP IF THIS NOT/NOT POSSIBLE.

8.RE PARA8: BAGGAGE: WILL ADVISE RE IMMIG/CUSTOMS CLEARANCE FOR DEL OFFICIALS AND MEDIA.

9.RE PARA8: ARRIVAL: IT IS ESSENTIAL JPNSE LANDING CARDS BE COMPLETED BEFORE ARRIVAL TO PREVENT CONFUSION AND DELAY.JOHNSTONE SHOULD STILL HAVE LARGE SUPPLY FROM JAN VISIT;IF NOT/NOT.CP AIR WILL HAVE SUPPLY IN VNCVR WHICH THEY CAN FORWARD TO YOU IN CTT.

...4

PAGE FOUR UIGR2115 CONFD

(F)WE ARE WORKING OUT ARRANGEMENTS WITH MFA FOR CLEARANCE OF DEL OFFICIALS AND MEDIA. (C)ARRIVAL SCENARIO WILL BE FORWARDED IN DETAILED PROGRAM ASAP.

10.RE PARA9: DEL OFFICE: SEE PARA2(D) ABOVE.CDA-BASED SCY BEING ASSIGNED.

11.RE PARA10: DO YOU REQUIRE FAR AND HASP SECURITY FILING CABINET? WE ARE MTG JPNSE MET POLICE 11NOV RE VISIT SECURITY AND WILL REPORT FURTHER.

12.RE PARA11: COMMUNICATIONS: REQUIREMENTS NOTED AND WILL BE IMPLEMENTED.

13.RE PARA12: EACH ROOM WILL BE PROVIDED WITH KIT CONTAINING CITY MAPS,GENERAL TOURIST INFO ETC.KITS WILL ALSO CONTAIN DEL ROOM LIST,SHORT BOOKLET CONTAINING USEFUL INFO ON TOKYO AND LIST OF TEL NUMBERS OF MISSION STAFF,BOTH OFFICE AND HOME.LIST OF MEDICAL FACILITIES ALSO INCLUDED ALTHOUGH IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT IN EMERGENCIES IT IS BEST TO WORK THROUGH HOTEL STAFF.

14.RE PARA13: DRESS: AND PARA14: WEATHER: NO/NO SPECIAL CLOTHING REQUIRED.TEMPERATURES RANGE FROM 10-15 DEGREES CENTIGRADE WITH NIGHTS COOL.RAID A POSSIBILITY,BUT FALL WEATHER TENDS TO BE GENERALLY SUNNY.

15.RE PARA15: MEDIA: SUBJ OF SEPARATE TEL.

CCC/232 110815Z UIGR2115

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

28-6-1-Judicial Peace
Mission
6

Division Phoned _____
Person _____
Local Time _____

UNCLASSIFIED

FM HAGUE YWGR1788 11NOV83

TO FXTOTT IDDZ PMOOTT/JOHNSON/COLEMAN DELIVER BY 111200
INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/ADMPOL/CPD LDN PARIS BONN BRU BNATO
ROME TT CFE LAHR/HQTRS COMM DE CAF
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR

IDD IDA IDR FPR

---PM INITIATIVE-GROESBEEK CEREMONY

PM AND PARTY WERE UNABLE TO ATTEND REMEMBRANCE DAY CEREMONY
ORGANIZED FOR THIS MORNING AT GROESBEEK CDN WAR CEMETERY
DUE TO HEAVY FOG IN AREA WHICH PREVENTED CHALLENGER FROM
LANDING AT VOLKEL AFF AS PLANNED.

2. PLANE CIRCLED AIRFIELD FOR SEVERAL MINUTES IN
HOPE THAT LANDING CONDITIONS WOULD IMPROVE BUT TO NO/NO
AVAIL. PILOT FINALLY MADE ONE LOW PASS OVER RUNWAY BEFORE
ABANDONING EFFORTS AND FLYING ON TO LDN.

3. ALL ASSEMBLED AT CEMETERY WERE EXTREMELY DISAPPOINTED
AT NEWS THAT PM HAD NOT/NOT BEEN ABLE TO LAND, PARTICULARLY
AS MANY HAS BEEN WAITING PATIENTLY THROUGHOUT DELAY IN COLD
AND DAMP WEATHER. CDN TELEVISION AND PRESS CREWS
IMMEDIATELY LEFT SITE UPON HEARING NEWS, MUCH TO OUR CHAGRIN
AND THAT OF OUR DUTCH HOSTS.

...2

PAGE TWO YWGR1788 UNCLAS

4. AMBASSADOR AND DUTCH DEFENCE MINISTER DE RUITER ARRIVED
SUBSEQUENTLY FROM VOLKEL AFB AND IMPRESSIVE AND
STIRRING CEREMONY WAS CONDUCTED WITH ASSISTANCE OF ROYAL
22ND REGIMENT, HONOUR GUARD, PIPER, BUGLER AND CHAPLAIN
FROM LAHR, DUTCH AIR FORCE BAND, LOCAL MUNICIPAL AND
PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS, BGEN DOUPE AND OFFICERS OF AFCEM-
BRUNSSUM AND DUTCH MILITARY AND POLICE AUTHORITIES.
UNDER ANY OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES, WEATHER WOULD HAVE BEEN
CONSIDERED SUITABLE FOR REMEMBRANCE DAY.

5. MANY THANKS TO OUR COLLEAGUES IN LAHR WHOSE
PARTICIPATION NEVERTHELESS MADE CEREMONY MEMORABLE
EXPERIENCE, DESPITE OBVIOUS DISAPPOINTMENT OVER PM S
ABSENCE DUE TO UNFORTUNATE CIRCUMSTANCES BEYOND
EVERYONES CONTROL.

UUU/029 111600Z YWGR1788

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

R E S T R I C T E D

FM ANKRA ZEGR1609 11NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO BONN PARIS LDN ROME OSLO HAGUE BRU MDRID LSBON ATHNS COPEN WSHDC
MOSCO BNATO PRMNY GENEV CNGNY PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MNI/CDS/ATMPOL/CPF
DISTR MINA USS DMF UGB URR RGE RFR RED RCD RSD RSR IDD IFB IDR IDA
ZSI ZSP

REF OURTELS ZEGR1524 1527 31OCT YOURTEL IDDZ0037 26OCT

---PM INITIATIVE ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS

DUE TO LATE ARRIVAL OF PMS SPEECH AND FACT LOCAL PRESS HAS BEEN
PREOCCUPIED BY TURKEYS 06NOV ELECTION, GRENADA INVASION AND ERZURUM
EARTHQUAKE THERE HAS BEEN NO/NO COVERAGE OF SPEECH IN LOCAL PRESS
OTHER THAN PUBLICATION THIS WEEK OF AP REPORT ON SPEECH IN ENGLISH
LANGUAGE PAPER, TURKISH DAILY NEWS. HOWEVER, WE HAVE VISITED SENIOR
EDITORIAL WRITERS AND COLUMNISTS AT 6 MOST INFLUENTIAL NATL NEWSPAPERS
AND HAVE PROVIDED THEM WITH BACKGROUND INFO ON PMS THINKING AND
POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER INITIATIVES TO FOLLOW UP GUELPH SPEECH. BY DOING
THIS WE BELIEVE WE HAVE LAID GROUNDWORK FOR MORE THOUGHTFUL REPORTAGE
ON PMS INITIATIVE, PARTICULARLY ON PART OF COLUMNISTS AT KEY NEWSPAPERS.
IT WLD AID US GREATLY IF WE CLD HAVE SUFFICIENT ADVANCE NOTICE OF NEW
INITIATIVES OR PROPOSED SPEECHES OR STATEMENTS BY PM IN ORDER TO LAY
GROUNDWORK HEREFOR TIMELY PRESS COVERAGE WHICH IS SUPPORTIVE OF CDN
OBJECTIVES. BELIEVE THAT SUCH COVERAGE HERE CLD BE HELPFUL IN
INFLUENCING POSITION OF TURKISH AUTHORITIES THEMSELVES. IN THIS REGARD.
WE WERE TOLD LAST NIGHT BY SENIOR MFA OFFICIAL THAT DUE TO RECENT
ELECTION AND EARTHQUAKE IT HAS NOT/NOT BEEN POSSIBLE FOR TURKISH

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PAGE TWO ZEGR1609 RESTR

AUTHORITIES TO FORMULATE DETAILED REPLY TO ALL POINTS MADE IN PMS LET. PM ULUSU HOWEVER, WANTS AT LEAST PRELIMINARY RESPONSE PREPARED AT REASONABLY EARLY DATE AND THIS IS NOW IN PREPARATION. A FULL RESPONSE MAY HAVE TO AWAIT ACCESSION TO POWER OF NEW PM AFTER CIVILIAN GOVT TAKES OVER AFTER 19 NOV. ANOTHER SENIOR MFA OFFICIAL HAS EXPLAINED THAT, WITH THE IMMINENT CHANGE OF GOVT, IT IS NOT/NOT EASY FOR TURKEY TO TAKE POSITION ON SUCH A SIGNIFICANT INITIATIVE.

2. PMS INITIATIVE WAS DISCUSSED EXTENSIVELY YESTERDAY BY AMB WITH DEFENCE MIN BUYULKEN. HE AGREED WITH BASIC RATIONALE UNDERLYING INITIATIVE. HE SAID THAT EFFORT TO PROMOTE RESUMPTION OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN BIG POWERS WAS VERY MUCH IN LINE WITH TURKISH BILATERAL POLICY WITH USSR. WHILE LEAVING SOVIETS IN NO/NO DOUBT OF TURKISH DETERMINATION TO DEFEND ITSELF TURKS WERE ALWAYS CAREFUL TO KEEP TEMPERATURE DOWN AND TO KEEP LINES OF COMMUNICATION OPEN. HE WAS SURE FOREIGN MINS SHARED HIS POSITIVE REACTION TO PMS CAMPAIGN TO LOWER TENSIONS.

CCC/244 111333Z ZEGR1609

MF
AD

28-6-1-*Thudreau Peace*
Mission
6

R E S T R I C T E D

FM HAGUE YWSV1103 11NOV83

TO EXTOTT MGTC DELIVER BY 110400

DISTR XDV IDDZ PPR

RFF TOKYO TEL UIFC2132 11NOV READDRESSED FM EXTOTT

IMPOSSIBLE TO RELAY REFTTEL TO PM DFL AS THEY ARE ON WAY TO
GROESBEEK FOR CEREMONY AT CEMETERY AT 0845Z. SUGGEST YOU
READDRESS AGAIN TO LDN.

CCC/155 110841Z YWSV1103

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

20.6.1 - Hudson Peace Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BONN ZQGR1033 11NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

DELIVER BY 111500

Division Phoned

Person

Local Time

1002

Miss Folger

1625 hours

100

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER LDN ROME BRU HAGUE MOSCO

DISTR MINA USS DMF UGB IFB IDD IDR IDA RGB RCD RST RSD RCR RBR

---PM INITIATIVE

SUMMARY:IN DISCUSSION 10NOV.PM RECEIVED SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT
FM CHANCELLOR KOHL FOR PROPOSITION THAT THERE IS NEED TO IMPROVE
ENVIRONMENT OF EAST/WEST DIALOGUE AND ESPECIALLY FOR VARIOUS
PROPOSALS ON CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS BY WHICH SUCH IMPROVEMENT
MIGHT BE SOUGHT.KOHL DID CAUTION NEED FOR PATIENCE AND
DETERMINATION GENERALLY IN DEALING WITH EAST,AT TIME WHEN USSR
FINDS IT DIFFICULT TO TAKE DECISIONS.BUT HE SUBSCRIBED FULLY
TO NEED FOR POLITICAL ACTION GO GIVE IMPETUS TO DIALOGUE.HE
AGREED NATO FORMINS MTG NEXT MONTH SHLD BE UTILIZED TO WORK OUT
POSSIBLE APPROACHES FOR STOCKHOLM AND VIENNA ALONG LINES SUGGESTED
BY PM;SUPPORTED CONCEPT OF FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS CONF;AND WAS
OTHERWISE SUPPORTIVE OF FACILITATING DIALOGUE.

2.REPORT:IN THREE-HOUR DISCUSSION,CHANCELLOR KOHL WAS
ACCOMPANIED BY MEYER-LANDRUT,STAATSEKRETAER;TELTSCHIK,KOHL'S
FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISER;AND WEFER(INTERPRETER).PM WAS ACCOMPANIED BY
AMBASSADOR,FOWLER AND SMITH.

3.PM'S INTRODUCTION REFERRED TO WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT COMMITMENT TO
MAKE QUOTE ALL POLITICAL EFFORTS UNQUOTE TO RESOLVE EAST, WEST

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PAGE TWO ZQGR1033 CONF

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DIFFERENCES. RECENT EVENTS INCLUDING GRENADA PRECLUDED HOPE THAT
DEPLOYMENT COULD BE AVOIDED. QUESTION THEREFORE WAS WHAT TO DO WHEN
DEPLOYMENT BEGAN AND USSR ABANDONED GENEV NEGOTIATING TABLE.
MEGAPHONE AND PRESS CONF DIPLOMACY WERE NOT/NOT CONDUCTIVE TO
SOLUTIONS, AND OTHERS COULD NOT/NOT INSERT THEMSELVES IN GENEV
PROCESS. THUS HE WANTED NOW TO DISCUSS WITH HIS COLLEAGUES WHETHER
IT WAS NECESSARY AND USEFUL TO SEEK WAYS TO IMPROVE EAST/WEST
ATMOSPHERE AFTER END OF NOV. FOR HIS PART, HE WANTED TO SEE SENSE
OF POLITICS INTRODUCED INTO MILITARY ACCOUNTING APPROACH IN CURRENT
NFGS AND HE WANTED HIGH LEVEL DIALOGUE POLITICS TO REPLACE E.G.
VIENNA MEFR STYLE NEGOTIATION. EQUALLY, HE FELT WEST MUST ANSWER
SIX MONTH OLD SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL IN VIENN; WESTERN FORMINS
SHOULD PERHAPS MEET IN VIENN TO GIVE WESTS RESPONSE; AND WE SHOULD
ENSURE THAT STOCKHOLM CDE WOULD NOT/NOT DEVELOP ALONG VIENN LINES,
E.G. THERE SHOULD BE STRESS ON POLITICAL RATHER THAN MILITARY
CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES (CEMS). SOONER OR LATER NATO WOULD HAVE
TO ADDRESS POLITICAL BASIS OF ITS MILITARY STRATEGY. FIRST
PRIORITY WAS TWO-TRACK IMPLEMENTATION AND THEREAFTER A MORE
THOROUGH POLITICAL EXAMINATION COULD BE UNDERTAKEN. IT WAS UP TO
OTHERS TO SEE THAT THE SUPRT POWERS DID NOT/NOT BREAK OFF
NEGOTIATION TRACK. HENCE POLITICAL ACTION WAS NEEDED IN VIENN AND
STOCKHOLM TO IMPROVE ENVIRONMENT, AS THERE WAS NEED OUTSIDE
EUROPE FOR IMPROVED ENVIRONMENT IN ORDER TO DEAL E.G. WITH
HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS.

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PAGE THREE ZQGR1033 CONF

4. KOHL'S OPENING RESPONSE WAS LENGTHY AND OFTEN ANECDOTAL. HE
SPELLED OUT AT ONCE TO ILLUSTRATE SHARED CONCERN WITH FRG. HE STRESSED
EAST/WEST QUESTION WAS MORE IMPORTANT FOR FRG THAN FOR ANYONE ELSE
AND NOT/NOT SIMPLY BECAUSE OF BERLIN AND TWO GERMANIES. THOSE
IN BONN HAD TO ACCEPT THEY WERE THREE HOURS BY TANK FROM THE EAST--
DISARMAMENT AND DETENTE WERE THEREFORE NOT/NOT THEORETICAL MATTERS
FOR THEM. KOHL THEN RELATED THIS NATIONAL SITUATION TO PLACE OF
FRG IN ALLIANCE. THOSE WHO SUGGESTED USA HAD ORDERED THE
EUROPEANS TO ACCEPT MISSILES WERE WRONG. SCHMIDT CORRECTLY HAD
URGED THE DEPLOYMENT POLICY UPON THE REST, AND KOHL HAD SUPPORTED
IT. (HE FELT TRAGIC THAT AT THE PARTY CONGRESS NEXT WEEKS
SCHMIDT WOULD GET ONLY FIVE TO TEN PERCENT SUPPORT FOR HIS POSITION
NOW; AND EVEN MORE TRAGIC WAS THAT 30-40 PERCENT OF SPD WERE NOW
AGAINST NATO MEMBERSHIP). HE RESPECTED THOSE OPPOSED TO DEPLOYMENT
WHO WERE MOSTLY MOTIVATED BY FEAR AND ANGUISH. PROFESSIONAL
AGITATORS WERE SMALL IN NUMBER--THOUGH WITH AMPLE FUNDS FROM THE
EAST IN EXCESS OF THE COMBINED RESOURCES OF THE TWO MAJOR PARTIES.
THUS PARLIAMENT WOULD SUPPORT DEPLOYMENT 21 NOV, AND WHILE
ACKNOWLEDGING THE RIGHT OF THOSE OUTSIDE PARLIAMENT TO CONTINUE TO
EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS, THE GOVT WAS NOT/NOT COMPOSED OF MISSILE
ADDICTS: IT WAS DOING ITS DUTY, NOT/NOT SAFFLE RATTLING. KOHL
REITERATED GENERAL RELEVANCE THESE DOMESTIC POLITICAL REALITIES
HAVE TO RESPONSES HE WOULD GIVE ON MORE DETAILED ASPECTS OF
EAST/WEST DIALOGUE.

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PAGE FOUR ZQGR1033 CONFID

5. KOHL TURNED TO THE PROBLEM OF IMPROVING PROSPECTS FOR DIALOGUE. SOVIET SIDE HAD MADE NO/NO MOVEMENT IN GENEV AT ANY TIME. THIS HE ATTRIBUTED TO TRADITIONAL MISJUDGMENT OF THE SOVIETS REGARDING CIRCUMSTANCES OUTSIDE THEIR BORDERS: DICTATORS COULD NOT/NOT UNDERSTAND DEMOCRACY. THEY MISUNDERSTOOD THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE WEST. THEY WOULD ONLY NEGOTIATE AFTER DEPLOYMENT, SO IT IS INDEED RIGHT TO ASK WHAT DO WE DO THEN. QUOTE TO THAT EXTENT WE AGREE UNQUOTE. AND HE CONCURRED IT WAS RIGHT THAT IT IS POLITICAL DIALOGUE, NOT/NOT MISSILE-COUNTING. THAT IS NEEDED AT LEAST INITIALLY. HOWEVER, HE FORESAW NO/NO ICE AGE AFTER DEPLOYMENT: STOCKHOLM CDE WOULD TAKE PLACE; VIENNA MBFR WOULD GO ON THOUGH GENEV INF WOULD PROBABLY NOT/NOT CONTINUE; BUT OTHER FORA WERE NEEDED, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A FIVE NUCLEAR POWER NEGOTIATIONS WAS WORTH PROMOTING. HE KNEW THE ELYSEE HAD BEEN LOOKING AT THIS., AND FRG HAD HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FRENCH. THERE WERE OTHER POSSIBILITIES AS WELL. THE QUESTION WAS WHAT DOES THE USSR WANT, AND WHAT DO WE WANT.

6. KOHL SAID WHAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT/NOT WANT IS ANY DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN WAR. HIS POINT BY POINT ANALYSIS CONCLUDED THAT THE PROBLEM WITH THE USSR WAS THAT WHILE IN MILITARY TERMS, IT IS STRONGER THEN EVER BEFORE. IN IDEOLOGICAL TERMS, IT IS WEAK AS IT NEVER HAS BEEN IN THE PAST. TIME WAS NOT/NOT WORKING FOR THE USSR. BUT THE WEST MUST SHOW PATIENCE AND DETERMINATION. HE HAD

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PAGE FIVE ZQGR1033 CONF

FAVOURED THE TWO-TRACK APPROACH PRECISELY BECAUSE IT HAD A BUILT-IN TIME LIMIT. DIALOGUE WOULD BE DIFFICULT BUT THERE WOULD BE NO/NO ICE AGE PRECISELY BECAUSE OF THE TIME LIMIT: THE USSR TOO NEEDED DIALOGUE.

7. ON THE OTHER HAND, KOHL DOUBTED ANY EARLY TOP LEVEL USA/USSR CONTACT WOULD BE LIKELY GIVEN THE USA ELECTORAL TIMETABLE. HE DID NOT/NOT FAVOUR A SUMMIT AT ANY COST I.E., IF IT WERE FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES ONLY OR IF IT WERE TO LEAD SIMPLY TO FURTHER FRICTION. USSR DECISION MAKING WAS PARALYZED FOR TIME BEING. IT NEEDED DEPLOYMENT TO DISCIPLINE ITS SATELLITES. THE MISSILE QUESTION HAD BEEN OVERPLAYED BY MOSCOW. AFTER DEPLOYMENT, THE PROPAGANDA MACHINE WOULD GO FULL SPEED, BUT THEREAFTER NEW DIALOGUE SHOULD IF POSSIBLE. THERE WAS CONSTANT EVIDENCE THAT THE USSR WANTED BOTH BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL CONTACTS OUTSIDE SECURITY MATTERS, AND THIS WOULD CONTINUE. THE PROBLEM WAS TO FIND PRODUCTIVE WAYS AND MEANS FOR NEW DIALOGUE ON SECURITY ISSUES GIVEN THIS USSR SITUATION.

8. PM THEN PUT TO KOHL THREE BASIC QUESTIONS ABOUT STOCKHOLM CDE CONF, MFRR NEGOTIATIONS AND INTER-ELOC DIALOGUE AS POTENTIALLY VIABLE WAYS AND MEANS OF THIS KIND.

9. IN RESPONSE, FRG STATED IT WANTED FM STOCKHOLM CDE MUCH SAME AS CDA IN TERMS OF EXPANDED SUBSTANCE; ON LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION IT SUPPORTED SWEDISH PROPOSAL FOR FORMINS OPENING--IF GROMYKO AND SCHULTZ MET THERE THIS WOULD ILLUSTRATE DIALOGUE CONTINUES. SCHULTZ

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PAGE SIX ZQGR1033 CONF

WLD BE IN BONN NEXT WEEK AND GERMANS WOULD URGE HIM TO GO TO CIE.

10. SO FAR AS MBFR WAS CONCERNED, FRG AGREED ACTION TO RESPOND TO
SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL WOULD INDEED BE USEFUL. THEY WOULD NOT/NOT
PROCEED FOR THE MOMENT WITH THEIR OWN IDEAS BUT WOULD ENCOURAGE
ANYONE ELSE TO WHO HAD IDEAS AND COULD PERSUADE USA TO GO ALONG.

KOHL THOUGH PM WAS RIGHT, WHY NOT/NOT GIVE VIENNA NEGOTIATION LAST
CHANCE, AS LONG AS THIS WAS NOT/NOT SIMPLY FOR SHOW. BUT EFFORT
SHOULD BE AT RIGHT TIME AND IN RIGHT WAY. AFTER NATC DISCUSSION IN
DEC, SOMETHING COULD BE DONE IN STOCKHOLM, PM AGREED: WE SHOULD SUGGEST
IN STOCKHOLM THAT THERE BE MTG IN VIENNA AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL WHERE
WEST WOULD GIVE ANSWER TO LATEST SOVIET PROPOSAL. POLITICAL IMPETUS
WAS NEEDED AND THE PROBLEM, KOHL REPEATED, WAS TO GET THE USA TO GO
ALONG. THE SITUATION WAS LIKE THAT OF POSSIBLE USA/USSR SUMMIT: IF
THINGS WERE LEFT AS THEY ARE, USA WOULD NOT/NOT OF ITS OWN VOLITION
MOVE FORWARD. NEED WAS THEREFORE FOR WESTERN ALLIES TO USE NATC
MINISTERIAL MTG TO PREPARE FOR STOCKHOLM AND VIENNA IMPETUS.

11. ON QUESTION OF FURTHER CONTACT, KOHL AGREED ALL PRACTICAL
AVENUES SHOULD BE EXPLORED. PM HAD SUGGESTED USA/USSR SUMMIT, IF
NOT/NOT HELD WITHIN SIX MONTHS, COULD NOT/NOT TAKE PLACE FOR FURTHER
YEAR BECAUSE OF ELECTION SCHEDULE UNLESS PRESIDENT WAS PERSUADED TO
PROPOSE SUMMIT TO DEMONSTRATE HE IS MAN OF PEACE. KOHL CONCURRED
AND AGREED REAGAN WOULD NEED NUDGE FM HIS WESTERN SUMMIT PARTNERS,
WHOM HE RESPECTS, TO MAKE SUCH A MOVE. KOHL THOUGH REAGAN WOULD FIND
...7

PAGE SEVEN ZQGR1033 CONFD

IDEA ATTRACTIVE AND HE ALSO THOUGHT ANDROPOV, IF IN PLAY, WOULD BE ATTRACTED--WHEN HE MET ANDROPOV IN JULY, HE FELT HE WAS INDEED A MAN WHO WANTED TO MOVE THINGS.

12. CONCLUSION. PM CONSIDERED HE INDEED OBTAINED ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS HE HAD POSED. HE REGARDED DISCUSSION WITH KOHL AS VERY SATISFACTORY. PMDEL THOUGHT IT CONSTITUTED ONE OF MOST USEFUL OF SESSIONS DURING THIS TOUR. DISCUSSION WAS FRANK AND EASY (DESPITE USE OF INTERPRETER THROUGHOUT). AFTER INTRODUCTION OF SUBJECT BY PM, KOHL HIMSELF--IN RESPONSE WE THINK TO NATURE OF PMS PRESENTATION, GAVE COMPREHENSIVE FRG OVERVIEW., THIS OBTAINED NEED FOR EXTENDED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS. THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT CDA AND FRG WOULD WORK TOWARDS POSSIBLE DISCUSSION IN NATO NEXT MONTH OF STOCKHOLM AND VIENNA MOVES. NO/NO OTHER DETAILED CONSIDERATION WAS GIVEN TO THIS FOLLOW-UP HOWEVER. FIVE NUCLEAR POWER CONF AND POSSIBLE USA/USSR SUMMIT INSTIGATION WERE LIKEWISE NOT/NOT CONSIDERED IN TERMS OF PRECISE FURTHER ACTION BUT PMS VISIT HAS INDEED SET STAGE FOR POSSIBLE FURTHER CONSULTATION ON SUCH MATTERS. WE STATED KOHL, WHILE HIS ANALYSIS OF SOVIET SCENE IN PARTICULAR MAY BE SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT, FUNDAMENTALLY ACCEPTED OVERALL PROPOSITION ADVANCED BY PM. THUS AFTER SLOW START KOHL WARMED TO SUBJECT AND HIS EMPHASIS UPON NEED FOR PATIENCE AND DETERMINATION GENERALLY DID NOT/NOT DETER HIM FROM AGREEING UNRESERVEDLY TO INDIVIDUAL PROPOSALS. (NO/NO BILATERAL OR OTHER TOPICS WERE RAISED IN OTHER THAN PASSING ...8

PAGE EIGHT ZQGR1033 CONFD

FASHION--E.G.KOHL ALLUDED TO EMOTIVE NATURE OF SEALS ISSUE IN
GERMANY, IN FASHION MOSTLY SYMPATHETIC TO CDN POSITION ETC.

13. THIS TEL HAS NOT/NOT BEEN SEEN BY THE PMS DEL BEFORE DEPARTURE
AND IS SUBJECT TO THEIR VIEWS.

CCC/005 111907Z ZQGR1033

Mr. Smith

*Seen by
180*

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

28-6-1-1	Thompson Peace
6	Division: <u>Shaped</u>
	Person: <u> </u>
	Local Time: <u> </u>

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PEKIN WJGR0841 11NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER FY 110900

INFO WSHDC LDN PARIS BRU HAGUE ROME BONN PCOOTT/FOWLER

NDFQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPD

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFI PGR PED PER PPR RGB RCD RBR IDR IDA CPD

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0117 10NOV

---PM INITIATIVE ON EAST-WEST RELNS AND INNATL SECURITY

ASST MIN TO FOREIGN MIN, ZHU QIZHEN, ADVISED TODAY OF NAME OF PMS

SPECIAL ENVOY. PRESUME VISAS FOR PEARSON AND MEMBER OF PM TASK FORCE

WILL BE OBTAINED IN OTT. OR TOKYO. IF LATTER PLS CONFIRM SO THAT

ZHU QIZHEN CAN GIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO CHINESE EMBASSY TOKYO.

2. PLS CONFIRM PEARSON AND ASSOC ETA PEKIN SO HOTEL RESERVATIONS
CAN BE MADE.

CCC/002 110655Z WJGR0841

Mr. Smith *See by*
128

28-6-1 = Trudeau Peace
6. Mission

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

Division Phased _____
Person _____
Local Time _____

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PEKIN WJGR0837 11NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 110900

INFO WSHCC LDN PARIS BRU HAGUE ROME BONN MOSCO PCOOTT/FOWLER
NDHQOTT/MDN/CDS/ADMPOL/CPD

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFF IDA IDR PGB PED PER PPR RGB RCD RBD CPD
REF YOURTEL IDDZ0107 09NOV

---PM INITIATIVE ON EAST-WEST RELNS AND INNATL SECURITY
AMF DELIVERED PMS LET TO ASST MIN ZHU QIZHEN YESTERDAY AFTERNOON.
LATER ON AT DINNER WHICH FOREIGN MIN WU XUEQIAN GAVE IN HONOUR
OF AMBS OF COUNTRIES HE HAD RECENTLY VISITED(CDA/USA/TURKEY/OMAN),
WU XUEQIAN SAID HE WOULD BE GLAD TO RECEIVE PM TRUDEAUS PERSONAL
ENVOY ON 21NOV AND/OR 22.FOREIGN MIN EXPRESSED GENERAL INTEREST
IN PM TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE BUT OCCASION DID NOT/NOT LEND ITSELF
TO ENTER INTO DETAILS.CHINESE ARE NO/NO DOUBT FLATTERED BY
IMPORTANCE PM TRUDEAU ATTACHES TO CONSULTATION WITH THEM.
CCC/002 110615Z WJGR0837

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

UNCLASSIFIED

FM ROME WTGR0421 11NOV83

TO EXTOTT (IDDZ)

DELIVER BY 111100

INFO VATCN LDN BONN HAGUE BRU MOSCO PARIS ENATO PCOOTT, FOWLER

NIHQOTT/MND/CES/ADMPOL/CPD

DISTR MINA USS DMF UGB IFB IDD IDR IDA RGB RCD RSR RSD RBR

RFF OURTEL WTGR0419 11NOV

---PM INITIATIVE:EAST-WEST RELATIONS-ITALIAN COMMUNIQUE

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRESS RELEASE ISSUED AT CONCLUSION OF VISIT BY
PALAZZO CHIGI (OFFICE OF PM):

QUOTE THE PRESIDENT OF THE MINISTERS COUNCIL, HON. PIERRE CRAXI,
RECEIVED TO-DAY AT PALAZZO CHIGI THE HON. PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU,
PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA, DURING THE LATTERS VISIT TO ROME IN THE
FRAMEWORK OF HIS TOUR OF THE MAIN EUROPEAN CAPITALS. THE TALKS WERE
PURSUED IN THE COURSE OF A WORKING LUNCHEON OFFERED BY PRESIDENT
CRAXI IN HONOUR OF PREMIER TRUDEAU. THE LUNCHEON, WHICH TOOK PLACE AT
VILLA MADAMA, WAS ALSO ATTENDED BY THE HON. GUILIO ANDREOTTI, MINISTER
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE MAIN OBJECT OF THE CANADIAN PREMIERS VISIT WAS TO EXAMINE THE
STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS WHICH ARE GOING THROUGH ONE OF THE MOST
DIFFICULT POST-WAR CRISES. IN THIS CONTEXT THE HON. TRUDEAU ILLUSTRATED
TO HON. CRAXI A FEW PROPOSALS AIMED AT GIVING NEW IMPETUS TO THE EAST-
WEST DIALOGUE THROUGH THE CREATION OF AN ATMOSPHERE OF INCREASED
RECIPROCAL CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

THE CANADIAN PREMIER INFORMED THE ITALIAN PARTY ABOUT THE REACTIONS
TO HIS PREVIOUS TALKS WITH FRENCH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND, AS WELL AS
WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE NETHERLANDS, MR. LUBBERS, AND THE PRIME
MINISTER OF BELGIUM, MR. MARTENS.

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PAGE TWO WTGR0421 UNCLAS

IN EXPRESSING HIS APPRECIATION FOR ANY INITIATIVE ABLE TO CREATE A BASIS FOR RE-LAUNCHING THE PROCESS OF DETENTE, HON. CRAXI RECALLED THE STEADY COMMITMENT OF ITALY IN RESEARCHING THE MOST APPROPRIATE WAYS FOR IMPROVING THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE BASED ON SECURITY, AS WELL AS THE INCREASING EFFORTS OF THE GOVERNMENT IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE A BROADER AND MORE CONSTRUCTIVE COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE STATES AND THE PEOPLES.

HON. CRAXI ASSERTED, IN PARTICULAR, THAT ITALIAN GOVERNMENT INTENDS TO PURSUE ITS EFFORTS WITH A VIEW TO ENSURE THAT AN EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT MAY BE REACHED AT GENEVA, AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL OF FORCE, AS A PREMISE FOR A GENERALIZED PROCESS OF REDUCTION OF THE ARMAMENTS, BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL. HON. CRAXI ADDED THAT, IN THE OPINION OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT, THE METHOD OF NEGOTIATIONS MUST NEVER BE ABANDONED, ALWAYS MAINTAINING THE SEARCH FOR BALANCED CONDITIONS, CAPABLE OF ENSURING THE LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEFENCE AND SECURITY OF EVERYBODY.

IN THE COURSE OF THE TALKS, BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WERE ALSO EXAMINED. THE TWO STATESMEN EXPRESSED THEIR SATISFACTION WITH THEIR COURSE AND UNDERLINED THEIR DECISION TO EXPLORE EVERY MEANS FOR THEIR FURTHER STRENGTHENING. IN THIS CONNECTION HON. TRUDEAU AND HON. CRAXI AGREED ON THE NECESSITY OF MAINTAINING THE FREE FLOW OF EXCHANGES AND OF REMOVING ANY OBSTACLES THAT MIGHT POSSIBLY HINDER THEM.

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PAGE THREE WTGR0421 UNCLAS

AFTER A BRIEF EXAMINATION OF QUESTIONS RESPECTING THE ITALIAN COMMUNITY IN CANADA, THE TWO PARTIES EXPRESSED THEIR SATISFACTION FOR THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED ON THE TEXT OF A CULTURAL AGREEMENT WHICH BY NOW IS READY FOR SIGNATURE. PREMIER TRUDEAU REITERATED HIS INVITATION TO EFFECT AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO CANADA. THE INVITATION HAS BEEN ACCEPTED AND THE TIME OF THE VISIT SHALL BE AGREED UPON THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. UNQUOTE.

UUU/013 111500Z WTGR0421

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE ROME WTGR0419 11NOV83

A FXTOTT IDDZ LIVRAISON 111300

INFO PMDELLEN IMMED LEN VATCN BONN HAGUE BRU MOSCO PARIS BNATO

PCOOTT/FOWLER NLHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPD

DISTR MINA USS DMF UGF IFE IDD IDR IDA RGF RCD RSR RSI RCR RBR

---INITIATIVE DU PM:RELATIONS EST/OUEST--ENTRETIENS DE ROME

SOMMAIRE:LA VISITE DU PM A ROME S EST DERGULEE DANS UNE ATMOSPHERE
D AMITIE ET DE COMPREHENSION MUTUELLE.POURTANT,LE PRESIDENT DU
CONSEIL ITALIEN,CRAXI,BIEN QU ACCUEILLANT SES PROPOS AVEC EFFAUCUP
D INTFRET ET DE SYMPATHIE,NE LUI A PAS OUVERTEMENT MANIFESTE TOUT
L APPUI ET L ENTHOUSIASME QUE NOUS EN AVIONS ESComPTES.SON
ATTITUDE RESERVEE EST PROBABLEMENT ATTRIBUABLE A L AGGRAVATION
RECENTE D UNE CONTROVERSE QUI COUVE AU SEIN DE LA COALITION
GOUVERNEMENTALE SUR L ORIENTATION A DONNER A LA POLITIQUE
ETRANGERE ITALIENNE.

RAPPORT:LE PROGRAMME DE LA VISITE DU PM A ROME COMPRENAIT DEUX
SESSIONS:UN TETE-A-TETE DE TROIS QUARTS D HEURE A PALAZZO CHIGI
AVEC LE PRESIDENT DU CONSEIL ITALIEN CRAXI,AUQUEL ASSISTAIENT SON
CONSEILLER DIPLOMATIQUE BADINI ET,DU COTE CDN,L AMEASSADEUR,
FOWLER ET SMITH;UN DEJEUNER D UNE HEURE ET DEMIE A VILLA MADAMA
AUQUEL SE SONT AJOUTES,POUR L ITALIE,LE CONSEILLER POLITIQUE DU
PRESIDENT ACQUAVIVA,LE MINISTRE ANDREOTTI,LE SECGEN MalfATTI ET LE
DIRGEN DES AFFAIRES POLITIQUES BOTTAI DU MAE ET,POUR LE CDA,LE
CHEF DE CABINET DU PM JOHNSON ET LE MINISTRE-CONSEILLER DE

...2

28-6-1-Thursday
Division Phoned
Person
Local Time

PAGE DEUX WTGR0419 CONFID

L AMBASSADE MERKLINGER. ENTRE CES DEUX SESSIONS ITALIENNES. LE PM
A ETE RECU PAR LE PAPE EN AUDIENCE PRIVEE AU VATICAN.

3. EN DEBIT DE L ACCUEIL EMPRESSE ET FAVORABLE QU AVAIENT RECU DE
LA PART DES AUTORITES ITALIENNES LA LETTRE DE TRUDEAU A CRAXI
ET LE DISCOURS DE GUELPH. ET DE L EXCELLENTE PRESSE QU ONT ACCORDEE
LES MEDIA ITALIENS A L INITIATIVE DU PM A L ANNONCE COMME AU COURS
DE SA VISITE A ROME, SES ENTRETIENS N ONT PROVOQUE CHEZ SES
INTERLOCUTEURS ITALIENS QU UNE REACTION GARDEE, EMPREINTE DE RETENUE
ET DE RETICENCE A PREMIERE VUE INEXPLICABLES. IL FAUT. POUR EN
APPRECIER LA VERITABLE PORTEE ET SA SIGNIFICATION POUR L AVENIR,
REPLACER L ATTITUDE ITALIENNE D AUJOURD HUI DANS LE CONTEXTE
D UNE CONTROVERSE QUI SE DEVELOPPE ET S AMPLIFIE DEPUIS SA FORMATION
AU SEIN DU GOUVT DE COALITION A DIRECTION SOCIALISTE SUR
L ORIENTATION NOUVELLE QUE VOUDRAIT DONNER LE TANDEM CRAXI/
ANDREOTTI A LA POLITIQUE ETRANGERE DE L ITALIE, DANS LE SENS
PRECISEMENT DES PREOCCUPATIONS DE M TRUDEAU.

4. TOUT AU LONG DE SON TETE-A-TETE AVEC CRAXI, LE PM A PRESENTE UN
EXPOSE MAGISTRAL ET IMPRESSIONNANT DE SON ANALYSE ET DE SA
PERCEPTION DE L EVOLUTION DES RELATIONS EST-OUEST ET DES PREMIERS
ELEMENTS DU PROGRAMME D ACTION QUI SE DESSINE DANS SON ESPRIT
POUR EN RENVERSER LES TENDANCES LES PLUS INQUIETANTES, ALLANT SOUS
CERTAINS ASPECTS AU-DELA DES PRESCRIPTIONS QU IL AVAIT LAISSE
ENTREVOIR A GUELPH.

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5. LE LEITMOTIV DU MESSAGE DU PM, A ROME COMME DANS LES AUTRES
CAPITALES, A ETE LA NECESSITE ET L'URGENCE DE REDONNER AUX
RELATIONS EST-OUEST LE CARACTERE DE CITE HAUTE POLITIQUE FINCI
QU'IL AVAIT CONNU DANS LES ANNEES 60 ET AU DEBUT DES ANNEES 70--
EPOQUE RICHE EN TRAITES ET AUTRES ENGAGEMENTS CONTRACTUELS SUR LA
LIMITATION DES ESSAIS NUCLEAIRES, LE CONTROLE DES ARMES STRATEGIQUES,
LA NON-PROLIFERATION, L'INSTALLATION DU TELEPHONE ROUGE, ETC. IL
FALLAIT RECREER AU SEIN DE L'OTAN UN CLIMAT QUI FAVORISE LE DIALOGUE
ET L'OUVERTURE POLITIQUES, AMORTISSE LES BRUITS AGGRESSIFS DE LA
RHETORIQUE ET DE LA PROPAGANDE, APAISE LES HOSTILITES. LE CDA NE
PRETENDAIT A AUCUN ROLE DANS LE JEU DE LA COMPTABILITE NUCLEAIRE,
MAIS L'ENJEU DE LA DETERIORATION ACTUELLE DES RELATIONS
INTERNATIONALES ETAIT TROP GRAVE POUR LE SORT DE L'HUMANITE,
POUR QUE LE CDA, COMME L'ITALIE, S'ABSTIENNENT DE CONTRIBUER A
L'ELABORATION D'UNE NOUVELLE STRATEGIE POLITIQUE.

6. LE PM SE REFERA AUX PRINCIPAUX PROBLEMES ET AUX MESURES EVENTUELLES
SUIVANTS POUR ILLUSTRER ET ETAYER SA THESE CENTRALE ET LES OBJECTIFS
QU'IL SE PROPOSE:

A) L'OTAN DEVRAIT REEXAMINER SA STRATEGIE MILITAIRE DE DEFENSE
AVANCEE (FORWARD DEFENCE) AINSI QUE LE RAPPORT HARMEL, A LA LUMIERE
DU DEPLOIEMENT DES EUROMISSILES ET DES DECISIONS DE CES DERNIERES
ANNEES DE RETIRER DE L'EUROPE DE L'OUEST PLUS DE DEUX MILLE ARMES
NUCLEAIRES DE THEATRE, TENANT COMPTE DES CONCEPTS DU CITE NO FIRST

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USE FINCIT ET DU CIT NO EARLY FIRST USE FINCIT.ET TIRANT DE CE
REFEXAMEN LES CONSEQUENCES POUR LE FACONNEMENT D UNE STRATEGIE
POLITIQUE MIEUX ADAPTEE AUX CONDITIONS DE LA SECURITE;
POLE CIT SEUIL NUCLEAIRE FINCIT DOIT ETRE REHAUSSE PAR LA MISE
EN OEUVRE D UNE PLUS GRANDE EGALITE DES FORCES CONVENTIONNELLES.
SOIT A LA HAUSSE AU MOYEN D UN PLUS GRAND EFFORT DE L OTAN,SOIT
A LA BAISSSE AU MOYEN D UN ACCORD MEFR.LA NEGOCIATION DE VIENN
DOIT ETRE TIREE DE SON ENLISEMENT PAR UN ACTE DE VOLONTE POLITIQUE;
C)LES CINQ PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES(QUI SONT MEMBRES DU CONSEIL DE
SECURITE DE L ONU)DEVRAIENT EVENTUELLEMENT PROCEDER A UNE
NEGOCIATION STRATEGIQUE DEPASSANT LE CADRE TRADITIONNEL DE GRAND
A GRAND ET DE BLOC A BLOC,AU SEIN DUQUEL LE DROIT A LA PARITE
QUE RECLAMENT L URSS ET LES EUA POURRAIT ETRE DISCUTE ET EVALUE;
D)AUX PROBLEMES DU CONTROLE DE LA PROLIFERATION VERTICALE EST
INTIMEMENT LIE CELUI DE LA PREVENTION DE LA PROLIFERATION
HORIZONTALE.LEQUEL SEPA PORTE A L ATTENTION DE L OPINION
PUBLIQUE MONDIALE AU MOMENT DE LA PROCHAINE REVISION DU TRAITE
DE NON-PROLIFERATION EN 1985.COMBIEN PLUS DRAMATIQUES ET DANGEREUX
DEVIENDRAIENT LES CONFLITS LOCAUX SI L UN DES ADVERSAIRES EN
VENAIENT A POSSEDER L ARME ATOMIQUE.LE PM INFORMA CRAXI QU IL
PLAIDERAIT LA CAUSE DE LA NON-PROLIFERATION A LA CONFERENCE DU
COMMONWEALTH A DELHI,MAIS IL SAVAIT D AVANCE QU IL N EMPORTERAIT
LA CONVICTION QUE SI LES PAYS NUCLEAIRES CONTROLAIENT MIEUX LEURS
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PROPRES APPETITS EN LA MATIERE;

E) IL FALLAIT INSUFFLER A LA CONFERENCE DE LA CDE A STKHM UN ESPRIT POLITIQUE, ET EMPECHER QUE LES BUREAUCRATES ET LES GENFRAUX S'EN EMPARENT ET LUI FASSENT SUBIR LE MEME SORT QUE CELLE DES MEFR A VIENN. LES MESURES DE CONFIANCE QU'ELLE SERA APPELEE A DEFINIR DOIVENT ETRE NON SEULEMENT DE CARACTERE MILITAIRE, MAIS EGALEMENT POLITIQUE, ECONOMIQUE, CULTUREL;

F) LA NOMINATION DE CARRINGTON COMME SUCCESSEUR DE LUNS DEVRAIT OUVRIR UNE PHASE NOUVELLE DANS L'ATTITUDE ET LA POLITIQUE DE L'OTAN SUR LES QUESTIONS DE RELATIONS EST-OUEST. LE CDA, POUR SA PART, AURA DES POLITIQUES ET DES PROPOSITIONS A FORMULER A LA PROCHAINE REUNION DU CONSEIL ATLANTIQUE EN DEC SUR LES THEMES CI-HAUT MENTIONNES, POUR CE QUI CONCERNE NOTAMMENT LA POLITISATION DES NEGOCIATIONS DE VIENN ET DE STKHM.

7. DANS SES REPLIQUES, EPARSES ET HESITANTES, CRAXI S'ATTARDA SUR LA DIFFICULTE DE DIALOGUER AVEC L'URSS, PARTENAIRE MYSTERIEUX ET OBSCUR QUI NE CHERCHAIT QU'A EXPLOITER TOUTES LES SITUATIONS ET ASPIRATIONS DU TIER-S-MONDE A SON AVANTAGE ET A FORMENTER LE PACIFISME TOUT AUTANT QUE LE TERRORISME A SES FINS IMPERIALISTES. LE PM LUI FIT REMARQUER QUE LES CONFLITS LOCAUX, DONT UNE BONNE MOITIE AU MOINS N'ETAIENT PAS LE FAIT QUE L'URSS, N'AVAIENT RIEN A VOIR AVEC LA SITUATION QUI PREVALAIT EN EUROPE ET LES NEGOCIATIONS EN COURS A GENEV. CRAXI AFFIRMA TOUT DE MEME, EN CONCLUSION DE LA

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SEANCE DE LA MATINEE, OU IL ETAIT D ACCORD EN PRINCIPE AVEC
L INITIATIVE DU PM ET QUE L ITALIE S EFFORCAIT DE CONTRIBUER A LA
REDUCTION DES TENSIONS INTERNATIONALES. ELLE ENGAGERAIT AU DEBUT DE
L ANNEE UNE CIT OFFENSIVE DIPLOMATIQUE FINCIIT DIRIGEE VERS L EUROPE
DE L EST, EN SE RENDANT LUI-MEME EN HONGRIE EN FEV ET PROBABLEMENT
EN ROUMANIE ET EN ALLEMAGNE ORIENTALE PAR LA SUITE. PENDANT LE
DEJEUNER, NOS HOTES ITALIENS, BIEN QUE DES PLUS AMICAUX ET
SYMPATHIQUES COMME A L HABITUDE, GARDERENT LEUR DISTANCE A L ENDROIT
DE L INITIATIVE DU PM. LA CONVERSATION, AIMABLE ET DIVERSIFIEE A
SOUHAIT, TOUCHA A TOUT SAUF A L OBJET QUI JUSTIFIAIT CES AGAPES.

8. APRES LE DEPART DU PM, CRAXI EMIT EN SON NOM PROPRE UN COMMUNIQUE,
DONT NOUS VOUS TRANSMETTONS LA TRADUCTION DANS UN MESSAGE LISTINCT.
DANS LEQUEL IL INFORME LES MEDIA ITALIENS DE LA VISITE ET DE LA
MISSION DU PM CDN A ROME. LES REFERENCES QU IL Y FAIT AUX
RELATIONS BILATERALES, PAR AILLEURS PLUTOT FAVORABLES, N Y ONT ETE
INCLUES QUE POUR DES FINS DE POLITIQUE INTERNE ET N ONT FAIT EN
REALITE L OBJET D AUCUNE DISCUSSION.

9. A LA REFLEXION, DEUX FACTEURS PRINCIPAUX DE TACTIQUE POLITIQUE
SEMBLERAIENT EXPLIQUER L ATTITUDE CONTRAINTTE DU PRESIDENT DU CONSEIL
ITALIEN:

A) DEUX ECOLES DE PENSEE SE DISPUTE L AVANT-SCENE DE LA POLITIQUE
ETRANGERE ITALIENNE AU SEIN DE LA COALITION GOUVERNEMENTALE. LA
PREMIERE, ANIMEE PAR LE MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE SPADOLINI, CHERCHE
A PROLONGER L APPUI INCONDITIONNEL QU ACCORDE L ITALIE AUX EUA

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DEPUIS LA FIN DE LA DEUXIEME GUERRE MONDIALE. LA SECONDE, INSPIREE PAR LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES ANDREOTTI. BIEN QUE FIDEL AUX ENGAGEMENTS DE L ITALIE ENVERS SES ALLIES, NE VEUT PAS NEGLIGER, MEME AU RISQUE DE DEPLAIRE A L OCCASION AUX DIRIGEANTS AMERICAINS, LES OCCASIONS QUI SE PRESENTENT A SON PAYS DE PROMOUVOIR LE DIALOGUE ET L OUVERTURE POLITIQUE AVEC L URSS ET SES COMMETTANTS EN EUROPE DE L EST ET AU MOYEN-ORIENT DANS L INTERET MEME DE LA PAIX ET DE LA SECURITE. LE DEBAT ENTRE CES DEUX ECOLES DE PENSEE ET LEURS ADEPTES A ASSUME CES DERNIERS JOURS UNE TELLE APRET ET UN TEL DEGRE DE PERSONNALISATION QUE CRAXI LUI-MEME A JUGE NECESSAIRE DE CONVOQUER POUR SAMEDI MATIN LE 12 NOV UNE REUNION SPECIALE DU CONSEIL DES MINISTRES QUI SERA CONSACREE ESSENTIELLEMENT A CE SUJET. LE COMPROMIS QUI EN SORTIRA CONSTITUERA INDIRECTEMENT LA VRAIE REPONSE QUE CRAXI AURAIT SANS DOUTE VULU DONNER AUX PROPOS DE TRUDEAU.

EN SUR L INSTIGATION DU PARTI COMMUNISTE, UN DEBAT AURA LIEU AU PARLEMENT AU DEBUT DE LA SEMAINE PROCHAINE SUR LA QUESTION DU DEPLOIEMENT DES EUROMISSILES EN ITALIE. LE PCI A DEPOSE DEUX RESOLUTIONS PROPOSANT, D UNE PART, UN DELAI D UN AN DANS LE DEPLOIEMENT POUR PERMETTRE AUX NEGOCIATIONS DE GENEVE DE CONTINUER ET, D AUTRE PART, L ASSOCIATION DES PAYS DISPOSES EN PRINCIPE A ACCEPTER LES EUROMISSILES A PRENDRE PART A CES MEMES NEGOCIATIONS. LE DEBAT, QUI DURERA DEUX JOURS, DEVRAIT NORMALEMENT SE TERMINER PAR UN VOTE DE ...8

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CONFIANCE CONFIRMANT LA POLITIQUE DE LA DOUELE VOIE QUE L ITALIE
S EST LOYALEMENT IMPOSEE JUSQU A MAINTENANT. POURTANT, CRAXI A AVOUE
AU COURS DE SES CONVERSATIONS AVEC TRUDEAU QUE L ITALIE DEMANDERAIT
UN REPORT DE L ECHEANCE DU DEPLOIEMENT SI PAR HASARD, A LA SUITE
DE LA PRESENTATION D UNE NOUVELLE PROPOSITION CHIFFEE DES FUA,
L URSS SE DECLARAIT DISPOSEE A NEGOCIER SUR LE NOMBRE ET LE NIVFAU
DES EUROMISSILES ADMISSIBLES

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---VISITE DU PM TRUDEAU:RAPPORT DE PRESSE

BIEN QUE COINCIDANT AVEC PREMIERE VISITE D ETAT DE CHADLY ET DE

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ENTRETIENS TRUDEAU-CRAXI ONT ETE LARGEMENT REPRIS PAR PRESSE ECRITE,

PARLEE ET AUDIO-VISUELLE DANS JOURNEE DES 10 ET 11 NOV.VISITE DU

PM TRUDEAU AVAIT EGALEMENT FAIT OBJET D UNE COUVERTURE SATISFAISANTE

DANS PRESSE ECRITE ET PARLEE DU 09NOV.

2.TITRES OU ENTREFILETS DES ARTICLES UTILISES PAR 9 JOURNAUX ITALIENS

POUR TRAITER DES ENTRETIENS TRUDEAU-CRAXI DONNENT PRESQUE TOUS UNE

IMPRESSION FAVORABLE DE L INITIATIVE DU PM.EXPRESSIONS EMPLOYEES SONT

CIT TRUDEAU PROPOSE RELANCE DU DIALOGUE FINCIT.CIT PERSEVERER POUR

UN ACCORD A GENEVE FINCIT.CIT ITALIE ET LE CANADA D ACCORD:RELANCE

DE LA DETENTE FINCIT.CIT TRUDEAU ET CRAXI PARLENT DE PAIX FINCIT.UN

SFUL JOURNAL(DE DROITE LIBERALE)DONNE UNE PRESENTATION MOINS POSITIVE.

IL INTITULE SON ARTICLE PAR UNE EXPRESSION QUI PEUT SE TRADUIRE

COMME SUIIT CIT NE COURONS PAS DEUX LIEVRES A LA FOIS FINCIT.

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Article of the W.S.J., 11 November 83, Editorial

"Quotable but not notable"

was a collection of writers, politicians and other sorts of activists. Some of these leaders got siphoned off into the Reagan administration, and were thus disqualified from future internal Democratic Party politics.

Others grew closer to the establishment. Democrats after 1980. These Jacksonites were ready to sympathize with a hawkish Reagan foreign policy, but they could not stand to see themselves as tax cutters and friends of

Jackson wing is still alive and well to provide him with advisers and keep his nose tucked a little bit to the right. All that would be that the Grenada success. All that was needed to revitalize that. But for months before Grenada, the wing had done barely more than twitch. If it is to have any influence at all after the Grenada aura has faded away, someone had better see to it that these people generate more signs of activity.

Quotable but Not Notable

There are occasionally comments made on current events that fall somewhat short of earth-shattering wisdom or significance. We like to keep half an eye on these, and here-with offer some pickings from this week's unfortunately rich crop.

• Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau is on a six-country swing through Europe preaching nuclear disarmament and urging that the U.S. (!) be flexible at the Geneva talks. "We have to reintroduce political dialogue in a very tense situation," Mr. Trudeau said. He had no proposals, but mysteriously added, "If the Soviets leave the negotiations, we have to find other ways to resume the dialogue."

• Joseph Cardinal Bernardin of Chicago, in accepting this year's \$50,000 Albert Einstein International Peace Prize, urged "cold realism." We were hopeful until we read on and saw that far from pointing to Soviet breaches of past agreements, including nuclear and chemical-weapons treaties, he said, "Arms control should be insulated from the multiple factors which make the superpower political relationship volatile and unpredictable."

• The Herald, Zimbabwe's leading newspaper, splashed on its front page a report that the U.S. was planning to

give South Africa the bomb. That, if true, would be a big story. But of course it's false, as readers might have guessed when they saw the source was an unnamed Soviet news agency.

• A U.S. State Department official argued that the U.S. should not follow through on plans to prohibit the import of goods from the Soviet Union that were built by slave labor. Mark Palmer, deputy assistant secretary of state, acknowledged that 4 million Soviets, including political prisoners, are serving sentences of forced labor. But, he said, "neither the exact magnitude of the contribution forced labor makes to the total output nor the specific items produced with such labor have been determined." He no doubt wants a notarized report from a troupe of lawyers and accountants.

• The European Council and the European Community pooch-pooched the election in Turkey even before it was held. The European Commission said afterward, in a fine oxymoron, "We hope the new government and newly elected parliament will advance quickly and in a real sense toward the reintroduction of democracy." (Our italics.)

We won't burden our readers with this sort of thing too often. It's just that we thought you should know.

Asides

'Cool Excess'

Scientists have added a new term to their rapidly expanding lexicon—"cool excess." It has nothing to do with The Modern Jazz Quartet or the political style of François Mitterrand, but rather describes envelopes of cool gases and other matter around some stars that could be the beginnings of new solar systems. The Infrared Astronomical Satellite (IRAS), a joint venture of the U.S., Britain, and Holland that went into orbit last January, has found 50 nearby stars with "cool excess." The star Vega seems to have an even more clearly evolving solar system. Which of course reinforces

Hearing-gate Hedging

"Hearing-gate," in case you missed it, was the discovery by some Republican congressmen not long ago that someone had altered the official transcript of a 1982 House environmental hearing in such a way as to make them look stupid. Now, Congressman Robert S. Walker of Pennsylvania wants the House Committee on Standards of Conduct to turn over what it has learned about this, if anything, to the Justice Department. But Democrat Louis Stokes, the committee chairman, fears that might breach the principle of separation of powers

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By contrast, in spite of v sentiment among the staff gates, the group's politics were bland and unexciting members declared themselves civil liberties and the environment asserted that U.S. troops areas should be given authority themselves.


More of the delegates' the job of adopting a constituting officials. In the constitution one major issue was the partition of large states and "We should regionalize the tors," a New England deside of the argument, "s have representation." could cause a shoo-in for unqualified," answered a sylvania. A man from Wisconsin with the bickering. tains the only people in the my family that I trust," ploded. "We'd better get trust here, instead of trying thing in writing." He got

The other major division autonomy vs. national conditional office wanted the local fund-raising projects, flicts and keep everybody with the law. But who w that response from headqu timely? one protester asked the right to appeal? The delingly voted the measure do alist authors would have them reproducing the debat organizations everywhere.

Mr. Muller, now the V director, whom everyone may not have expected this quite this way. In the begin was an elite outfit. "The V promised us editorial support," and amplified our voice," he enjoyed unusual access White House, the Phil Don "we failed to win one leg because the group had home. Mr. Muller was re VVA become a membership "Membership is a distraction," he explained one of h he saw that membership w to exert political pressure, gan recruiting.

Now that VVA was gesecunds. Handling and cc members, were the new p to let the national leader veterans' benefits issues in bigger political debates, guys are more conservative pected them to be," Mr. Mured. But he allowed that ing to try to use his office group leftward on general "My position is well known and raised a clenched fist, racy!" Among the bland po, he pointed out, was one quarters a mandate to sp such broad political quest

The veterans of VVA an They are beginning to pa usual sort of American or and the usual sort of vetera tics. The rules of the Ame nance forced Mr. Muller



man engineer

0 mph is accomplished in 8
seconds. Handling and cc
ie to what you would expect
its cars—the result of adv
drive technology and a p
d suspension.
side the sumptuous interior
quiet prevails. Gracefully
s mounted flush with the ro
inate wind noise.
uperior Quality Backed E
Warranty. To in-
the quality of the Au

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BRU ZVSV0069 11NOV83

TO EXTOTT MGTC IMMED

DISTR MGT IDDZ


REF YOURTEL IDDZ0113 10NOV

---PM INITIATIVE:SPEECH IN MONTL

GPATEFUL YOU ADVISE VIA TELEX(21613 DOMCAN B)WHEN FRENCH VERSION
OF SUPJ SPEECH IS ENTERED INTO SWITCH FOR TRANSMISSION.

2.GUARD WILL NOTIFY CM ON CALL,WHO WILL HANDLE DISTR SUBJ TEL.

CCC/126 111010Z ZVSV0069





MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

11 NOV 83 04 17Z

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

11 NOV 83 04 12Z

10

SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0118 10NOV83

TO/À

TO PMDEL BONN DELIVER BY 110600

INFO

FOR FOWLER

DISTR

REF

---PURPOSE OF BURT-DAM MISSION

SUBJ/SUJ

WE HAVE RECHECKED ALL BASES IN OTT AND WSHDC, HAVE GONE OVER ALL INFO
EMANATING FROM EUROPEAN POSTS AND FROM SCG MTG IN ROME, AND CAN FIND
NO/NO EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT BURT/DAM MISSION IS PRELUDE TO
ANNOUNCEMENT OF NEW USA PROPOSALS ON INF ON MONDAY. ON CONTRARY, ALL
EVIDENCE WE HAVE, WITH EXCEPTION OF NYORK TIMES REPORT OF LAST WEEK-
END, SUGGESTS THAT THAT IS NOT/NOT PURPOSE OF BURT/DAM MISSION TO
EUROPE OR OF DAM VISIT TO OTT. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD ONCE AGAIN IN WSHDC
THAT DAM WISHES TO SEE SSEA TO DISCUSS GRENADA.

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

L.A. Delvoie/sc

IDDZ

5-2394

SIG

SIG

Kevin Delvoie

000860



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	C-O-N-F-I D E N T I A L
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDDZ0117 10NOV83
TO/À	TO MOSCO PEKIN ^{DB 111200} DELIVER BY 110900
INFO	
DISTR	INFO WSHDC LDN PARIS BRU HAGUE ROME BONN MOSCO PCOOTT./FOWLER
REF	NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPP
SUBJ/SUJ	DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB PGB PED PER PPR RGB RCD RBD IDR IDA CPD ---PM INITIATIVE ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INNATL SECURITY PERSONAL REP OF PM MENTIONED IN LETS TO ANDROPOV AND ZHAO WILL BE GEOFFREY PEARSON, FORMER AMB TO MOSCO AND FORMER ADVISOR ^{ON DISARMAMENT} TO GOVT. HE WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED ON VISITS TO MOSCO AND PEKIN BY MEMBER OF PM TASK FORCE ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INNATL SECURITY. YOU MAY SO INFORM HOST GOVTS.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

L.A. Delvoie/sc

IDDZ

5-2394

SIG

SIG

Barry Delvoie



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	C O N F I D E N T I A L	1 NOV 83 01 06 22 10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDDZ0116 10NOV83	<i>28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission</i> DELIVER BY 110900
TO/À	TO LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU HAGUE	
INFO	WSHDC TOKYO PEKIN CNGNY MOSCO DELHI	
DISTR	DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB RGB RSD RCD IDD IDR IDA FPR	
REF		
SUBJ/SUJ	---PM INITIATIVE - PRESS GUIDANCE	
<p>PM WILL ANNOUNCE TO PRESS ON EXIT FROM 10 DOWNING STREET AT APPROX 1430 GMT THAT HE WILL BE REPORTING ON HIS TRAVELS AND ELABORATING ON HIS PROPOSALS AT SPEECH IN MONTREAL SUNDAY. WE ARE THEREFORE ANNOUNCING SAME SIMULTANEOUSLY IN OTTAWA, AND ADVISING PRESS THAT COPIES WILL BE AVAILABLE ON SUNDAY AT APPROX 1230 OTTAWA TIME. THERE WILL BE NO PRE-RELEASE. BACKGROUND PAPER AND PRESS GUIDANCE BEING PREPARED FOR FORWARDING TO YOU TO ARRIVE SATURDAY. FINAL TEXT WILL BE TELEXED AS SOON AS READY, LIKELY SATURDAY. SUMMARY IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH WILL ALSO BE PREPARED AND SENT FOR ARRIVAL SUNDAY AM LATEST. SPEECH IS SUBSTANTIVE AND WILL ANSWER MANY QUESTIONS THAT THOSE JOURNALISTS WHO ARE SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN INITIATIVE HAVE HAD. DISTRIBUTION AND BRIEFINGS SHOULD THEREFORE BE CARRIED OUT WITH THIS IN MIND.</p>		

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

P. GOSSAGE

IDDZ

5-2394

L.A. DELVOIE



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

11 NOV 83 01 05Z 12

10

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0115 10NOV83
TO/À TO PMDEL BONN DELIVER BY 110600
INFO FOR FOWLER
DISTR INFO PC00TT/OSBALDESTON/DOMBRAIN LDN TAVIV BERUT NDHQOTT/CIS
REF
SUBJ/SUJ WSHDC/AMB/KINSMAN

28-6-1-Judeau Peace Mission

DISTR USS DMF IFB UGB GMR GMD ZSI

REF YOURTEL PMDL0004 10NOV

---PM MTG WITH MRS THATCHER:POSSIBLE USA REACTION ^{TO EVENTS} IN LEBANON

WE HAVE NO/NO INFO ON THIS SUBJ BEYOND THAT CONTAINED IN WSHDC TEL
UNGR2419 OF 08NOV.WE HAVE RECEIVED NO/NO INDICATION TO EFFECT THAT
MRS THATCHER MAY WISH TO RAISE THIS SUBJ WITH PM.

2.FOR BACKGROUND INFO, YOU WILL BE PROVIDED WITH INTELLIGENCE ASSESS-
MENT ON CURRENT SITUATION IN LEBANON IMMEDIATELY ON YOUR ARRIVAL IN
LDN.

3.WITH REF TO YOUR REQUEST FOR VIEWS, WE QUOTE BELOW PARAGRAPH WHICH
IT HAS BEEN PROPOSED BE INCLUDED IN LET FROM SSEA TO SECTY OF STATE
SHULTZ ON MIDEAST.THIS TEXT HAS BEEN CLEARED BY DMF, BUT WE HAVE SO
FAR RECVD NO/NO REACTION FROM SSEA.

4.TEXT BEGINS.QUOTE.AS I REVIEW THESE OBSERVATIONS ON MY RECENT
VISIT TO THE REGION, I AM AWARE THAT YOU ARE GRAPPLING WITH THE
AGONIZING PROBLEM OF HOW YOUR GOVERNMENT MIGHT RESPOND EFFECTIVELY
AND CONSTRUCTIVELY TO THE BRUTAL ATTACK OF OCTOBER 23 ON THE MARINES
HEADQUARTERS IN LEBANON.I FULLY APPRECIATE THE PRESSURES FACED BY

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG L.A.Delvoie/sc

IDDZ

5-2394

L.A.Delvoie



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

PAGE TWO IDDZ0115 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY 12| 10

THE ADMINISTRATION TO REACT IN SOME APPROPRIATE AND UNDERSTANDABLE
MANNER, WHILE AVOIDING, AS PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS SAID, ANY TEMPTATION
TO QUOTE STRIKE OUT BLINDLY UNQUOTE. IN WEIGHING THE AVAILABLE
OPTIONS, I KNOW YOU WILL HAVE VERY MUCH IN MIND THE SPECIAL AND
POSITIVE ROLE WHICH THE UNITED STATES IS UNIQUELY QUALIFIED TO PLAY,
AND FOR WHICH YOUR FRIENDS IN THE AREA LOOK TO YOU, IN PROMOTING THE
EVENTUAL ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE WITH JUSTICE IN THE REGION. UNQUOTE.
TEXT ENDS.

28-6

1-TRUBERT	
20	DOSSIER
44	

A-7

10 Nov 83 22 13z

MESSAGE

MGTC CIRC DIARY FILE

SECURITY SÉCURITÉ

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPT. OF DEFENSE
FM EXTOTT RBD024 10NOV83

PRECEDENCE

From

To/Cc

Info

TO LDN PARIS BONN BRU

---PM INITIATIVE AND EAST/WEST RELATIONS

GRATEFUL YOU ENSURE RBD/RBD INFOED ALL TELS ON ABOVE SUBJS.

Distr

Ref

Sub/Obj

DRAFTER RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION DIRECTION


TELEPHONE

APPROVED / PROUVÉ

SIG. /cb

RBD

2-5303


SIG. Peter A. Hancock



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

MGTC M. FILE DIARY

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	UNCLASSIFIED	11 NOV 83	01112	12	10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDDZ0114 10NOV83				
TO/À	TO WSHDC				
INFO					
DISTR	---PM S INITIATIVE TD OF P.GOSSAGE - CODING CORRECTION				
REF	PLSE CHANGE THE CODING FOR TD OF P.GOSSAGE IN REPLACING				
SUBJ/SUJ	NUMBER 027 BY NUMBER 030.				
<div data-bbox="933 714 1453 966" data-label="Text"><p>28-6-1-Tudor Peace Mission</p></div>					

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

J. MCNEE

IDDZ 94

5-2394

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE

000866

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0113 10NOV83

TO/À

TO LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN-OSLO BRU HAGUE

INFO

DISTR

WSHDC TOKYO PEKIN CNGNY IMMEDIATE

REF

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB RGB RSD RCD IDD IDR IDA FPR

SUBJ/SUJ

---PM INITIATIVE:SPEECH IN MONTREAL

WHILE PM COMMITMENT TO SPEAK IN MTL ON SUN 13NOV IS FIRM, NO/NO

FINAL DECISION HAS YET BEEN MADE AS TO WHAT SPEECH PM WILL GIVE.

(THERE ARE THREE QUITE DISTINCT DRAFTS STILL IN PLAY.) FINAL DECISION

ON WHAT SPEECH WILL BE GIVEN WILL PROBABLY NOT/NOT BE MADE UNTIL

LATE EVENING FRI 11NOV. YOU MAY BE SURE THAT AS SOON AS THAT DECISION

IS TAKEN, TEXT WILL BE FORWARDED TO YOU AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.

MOST WE CAN SAY AT THIS STAGE IS THAT POSTS SHOULD ENVISAGE MAKING

CONTINGENCY ARRANGEMENTS FOR TYPING AND DISTRIBUTION OF SPEECH IN

COURSE OF DAY SAT 12NOV.

2. FURTHER GUIDANCE AND INFO WILL BE PROVIDED AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE

MOMENT.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

L.A. Delvoie/sc

IDDZ

5-2394

SIG

SIG

L.A. Delvoie



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flècheSECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

CONFIDENTIAL

10 NOV 83 12 02Z 10

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0112 10NOV83

TO/À

TO PMDEL/BONN

DELIVER BY 101830

INFO

DISTR

FOR FOWLER

REF

INFO PC00TT/OSBALDESTON PM00TT/PRESS OFFICE WSHDC BONN LDN

SUBJ/SUJ

DISTR MINA FPR USS DMF IFB

---PM INITIATIVE:RESPONSE FROM PRES REAGAN

NEEDLESS TO SAY,WE FULLY SHARE YOUR CONCERNS AND HAVE BEEN PRESSING AMERICANS HARD ON DAILY BASIS.WE HAVE TODAY SPOKEN ALONG LINES YOUR REFTTEL TO USA EMB OTT AND TO STATE AND WHITE HOUSE IN WSHDC.WE STRESSED URGENCY OF QUESTION AND MADE NO/NO BONES ABOUT WHAT WE REGARD AS SOURCE OF PRESENT DIFFICULTY(I.E.ROBINSON INTERVIEW).WE HAVE ASKED FOR CLEARCUT USA REACTION WITHIN NEXT 24HRS,IN FORM EITHER OF PRESIDENTIAL LET ITSELF OR OF CONFIRMATION THAT LET WILL NOT/NOT BE FORTHCOMING UNTIL PRES RETURNS FROM ASIA.SHALL KEEP YOU INFORMED.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

L.A.Delvoie/sc

IDDZ

5-2394

SIG

SIG

L.A.Delvoie



Department of External Affairs

Ministère des Affaires extérieures

Canada

OTTAWA, K1A 0G2

November 10, 1983

SECRET (with attachments)

IDR-4287

28-6-1 = Bureau Peace Mission

Mr. Joseph P. Caron,
Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat,
Privy Council Office,
Langevin Building,
Ottawa.

Dear Mr. Caron,

Further to your letter of October 31 to Mr. Delvoie (PMO Ref. No. 3298 200), please find attached a draft reply to President Reagan's letter to the Prime Minister of October 25.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

J.R. Francis,
Acting Director General,
Bureau of International
Security and Arms Control

cc: PMO/Correspondence (Nicole Fournier)
PCO/Judy Cameron
EA/CMR/Ted Johnston
NDHQ/CP
EA/IDDZ/L. Delvoier

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Ron,

Thank you for your letter of October 25 concerning the Autumn meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). I believe the meeting was a great success, and I am proud that Canada was able to be host to it.

The "Montebello Decision" on further reductions to NATO's nuclear stockpile was given extensive coverage by the Canadian media. I referred to it in a speech to a disarmament group at the University of Guelph the same evening, and can testify how well the decision was received.

Yours sincerely,

IDA

Ban on the Production of Fissionable Material for Weapons Purposes (FIZZ)

DISTRIBUTION

As requested, attached is a draft memo for the Prime Minister on the FIZZ initiative since 1978.

2. We note from Hague telegram YWGR0755 of November 9, 1983 reporting on the November 8 evening meeting with Prime Minister Lubbers that neither FIZZ nor SOS was mentioned. However, the Dutch continue to suggest that it would be desirable to strengthen our procedural resolution by having it request a UN study on the question by experts. We do not agree - as reflected in the attached self-explanatory material (including a copy of the usual draft procedural resolution that is again being tabled this year).

Ed Christoff

O.A. Chistoff,
Acting Director,
Arms Control &
Disarmament Division

OR/100
COMCENTRE
PHO/PCO

UNCLASSIFIED

NOV 10 18 12 '81

FM WSHDC UNGR2423 10NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDR NDHQOTT/CPP DELIVER BY 101400

INFO NDHQOTT/MND/ADMPOL/DCPOL/PCOOTT/ARCHDEACON CNGNY

DISTR IDD URR UGB TDU URD UTD ZSI IFB TDD GGB GMR GMD

---VISIT OF MND BLAIS

MET WITH GEORGE BADER TO DISCUSS MINS PROGRAM AT PENTAGON. WAS
ACCOMPANIED BY TELFORD. PROGRAM AT PENTAGON WILL NOW START AT 1400
HRS WITH HONOURS CEREMONY BECAUSE OF SCHEDULING PROGRAM WITH DR
DELAUER PENTAGON IS PROPOSING THAT MTG WITH WEINBERGER LAST UNTIL
1500, BE FOLLOWED BY ONE AND A HALF HOUR THREAT BRIEFING AND
THEN MTG WITH DELAUER AT 1630. WE ARE CONCERNED THIS WLD MAKE PRESS
CONFERENCE EXTREMELY LATE AND WLD TEND TO CROWD MIN FOR EVENING.
WE THEREFORE ASKED IF ATTEMPT CLD BE MADE TO SHORTEN THREAT
BRIEFING TO ONE HOUR AND CHANGE DELAUER FROM 1630 TO 1600 OR TO
1500. PENTAGON WILL GET BACK TO US.

2. TELFORD OUTLINED TO BADER SUBJS MND WLD BE RAISING AND BADER
PROVIDED FOLLOWING LIST OF SUBJS WEINBERGER WLD BE RAISING. THESE
WERE: GRENADA, START AND INF, CDN DEFENCE PLANNING (BADER SAID
WEINBERGER WLD SIMPLY IN GENERAL WAY EXPRESS AMERICAN CONCERN OVER
CURRENT CDN DEFENCE EXPENDITURES), TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (BADER SAID
WEINBERGER WLD WANT TO TALK ABOUT USA CONCERNS ON THIS SCORE),
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES (THIS IS SEEN AS AN AMERICAN INITIATIVE
AND USA IS DISAPPOINTED ABOUT LACK OF PROGRESS SO FAR IN NATO.

...2

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

PAGE TWO UNGR2423 UNCLAS

WEINBERGER IS THEREFORE LIKELY TO TRY AND ELICITE MNDS SUPPORT FOR MORE ACTION IN NATO), OUT OF AREA ISSUES (BADER SAID THIS WLD BE DISCUSSED ONLY IF MATTER HAD NOT/NOT BEEN RESOLVED AT NATO BY THEN).

3. TELFORD HAS SAID THAT MND WLD BE INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING MIDDLE EAST. BADER HAD NOT/NOT INCLUDED THIS IN HIS LIST BUT IN RESPONSE TO OUR QUESTION SAID THAT WEINBERGER WLD BE PREPARED TO RESPOND. WE BELIEVE THAT GIVEN CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MIDDLE EAST AND BUILD-UP OF AMERICAN FORCES IN AREA IT WLD INDEED BE MOST APPROPRIATE FOR MND TO RAISE SUBJ WITH WEINBERGER AND ASK FOR WEINBERGERS VIEWS AND ANY INDICATION OF USA INTENTIONS IN AREA THAT WEINBERGER CAN GIVE US. WE WLD THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT MND BE FULLY BRIEFED ON UP-TO-DATE DEVELOPMENTS IN MIDDLE EAST AND CDN CONCERNS JUST BEFORE HE LEAVES OTTAWA.

4. WE WILL REPORT FURTHER ON TIMINGS AT PENTAGON AS SOON AS WE HEAR BACK FROM THEM ON OUR REQUEST FOR REARRANGEMENTS OF TIMINGS THEY HAD PLANNED.

5. SINCE DRAFTING ABOVE HAVE BEEN TOLD DELAUER IS POSSIBLE ONLY AT 1630. PENTAGON ARGUES ALSO THAT ONE AND A HALF HRS IS MINIMUM TIME FOR MEANINGFUL THREAT BRIEFING. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR GUIDANCE ON MNDS WISHES. DOES HE AGREE TO 1630-1700 MTG WITH DELAUER FOLLOWED BY PRESS CONFERENCE AT 1730 AND RECEPTION AT 1830. ALTERNATIVE IS TO CANCEL DELAUER.

UUU/241 101731Z UNGR2423

000873

DISTR	OP
PM 12	12

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace
Mission

NOV 10 09:09

UNCLASSIFIED

FM KWAIT UWAG6264 10NOV83

TO TT RA MASLECK SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER MIDDLE
EAST/AFRICA ROYAL BANK OF CANADA 99 BISHOPSGATE LONDON EC2 PHONE
920-9212 TELEX NUMBER UNKNOWN DE LDN

---PRIME MINISTERS VISIT TO GULF-UAE

YOUR LETTER OF 12OCT RECEIVED BUT TRAVELS IN GULF PRECLUDED
RESPONSE.MOST GRATEFUL YOUR OFFER ASSISTANCE AND DESIRE TO
PARTICIPATE IN PMS UAE(NOV30)VISIT PLANS.AM IN TOUCH WITH HUGH
FERGUSON ALL POINTS.OTTAWA IS PLANNING TO HAVE CDN BUSINESS
CONTINGENT IN UAE,OMAN AND KWAIT.INVITATIONS TO SENIOR EXECS
INCLUDING ROYBANK SENT BY TELEX NOV08 FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OTTAWA
FOR REPLY IN 72 HOURS.HAVE NOT/NOT SEEN LIST OF RECIPIENTS.SUGGEST
YOU CHECK WITH GEOFF STYLES OR OTHER IN TORONTO HQ.KINDEST REGARDS,
IAN WOOD AMEASSADOR OF CANADA.

CANADIAN EMBASSY KUWAIT KUWAIT TLX 23549 MCAN KT.

UUU/129 100830Z UWAG6264

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

D I F F U S I O N R E S T R E I N T E

DE BONN ZQFC5105 10NOV83

A EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON ROME AHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO PRU HAGUE

WSHDC MOSCO BNATO PRMNY CNGNY GENEV TOKYO PCOOTT/FOWLER

PMOOTT/COLEMAN NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPP

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR IDD IDA IDR FPR

REFR VOTTEL IDDZ0070 02NOV

---VISITE PM

AMB A DONNE MATIN 10/11/83 CONFERENCE DE PRESSE DEVANT

VINGTAINE JOURNALISTES REPRESENTANT PRESSE ALLEMANDE.

INTERNATIONALE ET MEDIA ELECTRONIQUES SUR VOYAGE PM.

2. TEXTE DISCOURS GUELF A ETE A NOUVEAU DISTRIBUE ET

ATTENTION DES JOURNALISTES ATTIREE SUR PASSAGES LES PLUS

IMPORTANTS.

3. PAR AILLEURS BARBARA HALSIG A ECRIT POUR AGENCE DPA UN

ARTICLE QUI APPARAIT CE MATIN DANS JOURNAL DE BONN.

TACHERONS DE VOIR QUELS AUTRES MEDIA L ONT REPRIS.

IMPORTANT QUE HALSIG SOIT TENUE AU COURANT DES PROCHAINES

DISCOURS DU PM.

CCC/005 101625Z ZQFC5105

28-6-1-1-Hudeau Peace
Mission

**CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM MOSCO XYGR4114 10NOV83

TO EXTOTT RBR

INFO WSHDC LDN PARIS BON BNATO BUCST BPEST PRGUE WSAW BGRAD

PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA MINT MINE RBD RGB RBT EPRD RBP ITDZ ZSI UCB

---USA-SOVIET DIALOGUE

DIALOGUE BETWEEN USA AND SOVS MAY NOT/NOT BE AS DEAD AS IT SEEMS. I HAD LUNCH 09NOV WITH USA AMB ARTHUR HARTMAN, WHO HAS JUST RETURNED FROM USA. BEFORE LEAVING MOSCO 19OCT, HARTMAN HAD LONG TETE-A-TETE WITH GROMYKO, COVERING WATERFRONT. (THIS WAS ANNOUNCED BRIEFLY IN SOV PRESS). GROMYKO HAD COMPLAINED, NOT/NOT AGGRESSIVELY, THAT USA PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS ON DISARM AND OTHER IMPORTANT SUBJECTS WERE ASSUMING UNNECESSARILY QUOTE IDEOLOGICAL CHARACTER UNQUOTE. HARTMAN REPORTED COMPLAINT TO PRES REAGAN WHEN HE SAW HIM IN WSHDC. REAGAN SAID, WHY NOT/NOT? SOV PRONOUNCEMENTS WERE ALSO VERY IDEOLOGICAL. REAGAN INSTRUCTED HARTMAN NEVERTHELESS TO CONTINUE DIALOGUE WITH GROMYKO. HARTMAN INTENDS TO DO SO AND HAS INDICATION THAT GROMYKO IS WILLING.

2. MY IMPRESSION IS THAT GROMYKO IN HIS OLD AGE HAS AT LAST BECOME MORE THAN SKILFUL EXECUTOR OF INSTRUCTIONS. FOR BETTER OR WORSE HE IS NOW MAKING FOREIGN POLICY AND HIS INFLUENCE MAY EXTEND BEYOND FOREIGN POLICY FIELD. HARTMAN, SKILFUL, ARTICULATE AND WELL CONNECTED IN WSHDC, IS CERTAINLY WORTHY INTERLOCUTOR. I THINK THAT HERE AND IN WSHDC WE SHOULD TRY TO FOLLOW THIS CONVERSATION WHICH HAS OBVIOUS BEARING ON PM INITIATIVE.

...2

28-6-1-Hudson Peace
61 Mission

PAGE TWO XYGR4114 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

3.HARTMAN SAID THAT HE KNEW NOTHING ABOUT ANDROPOV AND WONDERED
IF HE WERE STILL IN CHARGE.COMMON BELIEF HERE IS THAT EVEN BEFORE
HE FELL ILL ANDROPOV HAD DELEGATED MOST FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS TO
GROYMKO.IF SO,THIS SOV-USA CONVERSATION TAKES ON SPECIAL
IMPORTANCE

ROBERTS

CCC/095 101459Z XYGR4114

C O N F I D E N T I E L
DE BONN ZQGR4083 10NOV83
A EXTOTT RCR

28-6-1 = Trudeau Peace
Mission

INFO PARIS BRU ROME LDN ATHNS WSHDC ENATO PCOOTT/FCWLER
PMOOTT/JOHNSON

DISTR IDDZ USS LMP RGV RCB RSR RBD IFB EER
REF NOTRETEL 1028 09NOV

---CONSULTATIONS RFA-GB(8-9 NOV)

SOMMAIRE:CONSULTATIONS BI-ANNUELLES SE SONT DERouleES DANS
ATMCSPHERE CORDIALE IHABITUELLE ET SANS ANICROCHE.RE
RELATIONS EST-OUEST,DEUX PARTIES ONT RENOUVELE LEUR
ENGAGEMENT A DOUILE-DECISION D OTAN ET VOLONTE DE STATIONNFR
EN CAS D ECHEC.CEPENDANT ON A INSISTE SUR MAINTIEN DIALOGUE
AVFC MOSCOU SOIT A GENEVE OU PLUS VRAISFMILAELEMENT A
STOCKHOLM.RE CEE:VOLONTE DE PRENDRE DECISIONS CONCFETES
LORS REUNION D ATHENES(5 DEC)ETS IIEEN ETAILIE;ON VEUT
EVITER TOUTE REMISE A PLUTARD DE SOLUTIONS AUX PROBLEMES
COMMUNAUTAIRES.RE GRENADE,ON NOTE VOLONTE DE PROJETER
VERS AVENIR ET EVITER DE REGARDER DERRIERE AFIN LE NE PAS
CREER NOUVELLES TENSIONS AVEC USA.RE LIBAN:MEME ATTITUDE
NON-CONFLICTUELLE A FGARD USA DOMINE.THATCHER A LIMITE SES
DECLARATIONS FUELIQUES SUR REPRESAILLES AMERICAINES
EVENTUELIES AU CONCEPT D AUTO-DEFENSE DONT JOUIT CHAQUE
CONTINGENT DES MNF.NATURE DES OPERATIONS DES USA SERAIT
...2

PAGE DEUX ZQGR4083 CONFID

DETERMINANTE DANS FORMULATION DE POSITION BRITANNIQUE ET CERTES AUSSI DE RFA.

2. RAPPORT: CONSULTATIONS BI-ANNUELLES RFA-G-F SE SONT, COMME D'HABITUDE, DEROUTEES DANS ATMOSPHERE CORDIALE ET DE BONNE ENTENTE. COMME PREVU A NOTRE TEL PART DU LION FUT RESERVEE AUX DISCUSSIONS SUR RELATIONS EST-OUEST (STATIONNEMENT INF), SUR PROBLEMES COMMUNAUTAIRES ET SUR POINTS CHAUDS DE SCENE INTERNATIONALE (LIBAN, GRENADE) ET LEUR EFFET DANS CONTEXTE OUEST-OUEST. SELON PRATIQUE HABITUELLE, MME THATCHER ETAIT ACCOMPAGNEE DE BROCHETTE DE 5 MINISTRES QUI ONT CONFERE AVEC LEURS HOMOLOGUES ALLEMANDS DE MULTIPLES SUJETS. OUTRE MIN HOWE ETAIENT PRESENT CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (LAWSON), MIN TRADE AND INDUSTRY (TEFFIT), MIN DEFENCE (HESELTINE) ET STATE SEC OF AGRICULTURE (MACGREGOR) QUI ONT RENCONTRE LEURS EQUIVALENTS ALLEMANDS (STOLTENBERG (FIN), LAMSDORF (ECON), WOERNER (DEF) ET ROHR (AGRIC)).

3. RELATIONS EST-OUEST (STATIONNEMENT INF): A DEUX SEMAINES DU DEBAT AU FUNDSTAGE SUR STATIONNEMENT INF. PM THATCHER ET CHANCELLIER KOHL ONT TENU A RAPPELER LEUR APPUI A DOUBLE-DECISION D'OTAN. ILS ONT SOULIGNE QU'USA ONT NEGOCIE DE BONNE FOI ET QUE CHANCES D'ATTEINDRE UN RESULTAT BIEN QUE MINCE EXISTENT. KOHL A DECLARE A PRESSE QUE C'EST SUBSTANCE DES NEGOCIATIONS N'EST PAS/PAS VUEE FINCIT; THATCHER SE DECLARAIT C'EST A LITTLE ...3

PAGE TROIS ZQGP4083 CONFD

LESS OPTIMISTIC FINEST. ADVENANT ECHEC DES NEGOCIATIONS DE
GENEVE, ON A INSISTE SUR NECESSITE DE MAINTENIR DIALOGUE AVEC
URSS SINON A GENEVE TOUT AU MOINS A CONF. DE STOCKHOLM SUR
DES ARMEMENT ET SECURITE. KOHL S'EST DIT PERSONNELLEMENT
CONVAINCU QU'URSS SERA ENCORE PLUS DISPOSEE A NEGOCIER APRES
STATIONNEMENT INF. MAE GENSCHER DANS ENTRETIENS AVEC HOWE A
QUALIFIE STATIONNEMENT COMME CONSTITUANT TEST SUR CAPABILITE
DES GOUVERNEMENTS DE FAIRE ACCEPTER POLITIQUEMENT A DES
POPULATIONS UNE DECISION D'OTAN. SOMME TOUTE ALLEMANDES ET
BRITANNIQUES ON UNE FOIS DE PLUS FORTIFIE LEURS POSITIONS
BIEN CONNUES SUR STATIONNEMENT EN ENVOYANT MESSAGE A MOSCOU
QU'ILS SCHAIENT MAINTENIR DIALOGUE POLITIQUE DIRECT ET
AUSSI/SURTOUT DIALOGUE URSS-USA. DEUX CHEFS DE GOUV SONT EN
POSITION DE FORCE DANS CE DEBAT POSSEDANT CHACUN UNE MAJORITE
SUR AU PARLEMENT.

4. CEE: DISCUSSIONS TECHNIQUES SE SONT DERoulees ENTRE
DIVERS MINISTRES CONCERNES PAR SECTEURS LITIGIEUX (ACIER,
AGRICULTURE, FINANCES, ECONOMIE). L'AME DE FONDS INDIQUE VOLONTE
DES DEUX PARTENAIRES D'ASSURER QUE REUNION D'ATHENES DU CONSEIL
(5 DEC) ASSURERA SOLUTIONS CONCRETES OU TOUT AU MOINS DE
ESQUISSES REELLES DE SOLUTIONS. BRIT ET ALLEMANDES VEULENT
EVITER REMISE A PLUS TARD DE DECISIONS QUI DOIVENT ETRE PRISES
MAINTENANT.

...4

PAGE QUATRE ZQGR4083 CONF

5. RELATIONS OUEST-OUEST ET CRISES: (1) GRENAD: GRENAD FUT
DISCUTEE EN TETE A TETE PAR MAE ET AUSSI PAR CHEFS DE GOUV.
ACCENT EST MAINTENANT MIS SUR L AVENIR. KOEL ET THATCHER, BIEN
QU INDISPOSES PAR PLUSIEURS ASPECTS DE CETTE AFFAIRE (ABSENCE
DE CONSULTATION, LEGALITE DOUTEUSE D INVASION ETC) ONT
DECIDE D AVANCER D UN PAS ET DE SE PENCHER SUR DEVELOPPEMENTS
FUTURS DE GRENAD ET RETOUR A DEMOCRATIE DANS MEILLEURS DELAIS.
SELON NOS INTERLOCUTEURS TANT AU MAE QU A AMBASSADE
FRITANNIQUE. IL EST CLAIR QU ON VEUT EVITER TENSION AVEC USA.
ON CONSIDERE INVASION DE GRENAD COMME JURIDIQUEMENT DOUTEUSE
MAIS POLITIQUEMENT DEFENDABLE. SOUCI PRINCIPAL EXPRIME PAR MAR
EST D EVITER DE DONNER PRISE A ARGUMENTATION SIMILAIRE D URSS
POUR JUSTIFIER INVASION ET RENVERSER UN REGIME QUI NE LUI
PLAIT PAS. (2) LIAN: ICI AUSSI FRIT ET ALLEMANDS SOUHAITENT
APPAISEMENT DE TENSION ET ILS NE VEULENT PAS/PAS METTRE EN
DANGER LEURS RELATIONS AVEC USA. SUITE A DECLARATIONS DE
THATCHER A LDN CONTRE TOUT ACTE DE REALIATION DES US AU
LIAN SON TON A FORTEMENT BAISSÉ A BONN. ELLE S EN EST TENUE A
UNE DECLARATION FORT BIEN ARTICULEE CIT ANY FORCE (MNF) IN
LEBABNON HAS RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE FINCIT. DISTINCTION EXISTE
CLAIREMENT ENTRE REACTION AMERICAINE LIMITEE CONTRE AUTEURS
DES ATTENTATS CONTRE MNF DANS CADRE D AUTO-DEFENSE ET UNE
ACTION MILITAIRE ORGANISEE CONTRE OBJECTIFS QUELCONQUES.
ADVENANT ACTES DE REPRESAILLES DE PART DES USA, G-B ET RFA
...5

PAGE CINQ ZQGR4083 CONFD

DEFINIRONT LEUR POSITION SELON NATURE DES OPERATIONS ET
POSSIBILITE DE QUALIFIER CES OPERATIONS DANS CADRE DU
CONCEPT D AUTO-DEFENSE.COMME DANS CAS DE GRENADE,G-B ET RFA
CHERCHENT A EVITER TOUT CLIVAGE ENTRE EUROPE ET USA A EGARD
DE SITUATION AU LIBAN;TOUT DEPENDRA D ATTITUDE/ACTES DES USA.

6.INITIATIVE PM:SELON NOS INTERLOCUTEURS,INITIATIVE PM
TRUDEAU N AURAIT PAS/PAS ETE DISCUTEE DIRECTEMENT ENTRE KOHL
ET THATCHER MAIS DELEGATIONS Y AURAIENT FAIT ALLUSION.AUCUN
COMMENTAIRE SUESTANTIEL NF FUT GLANE A DATE

7.DROIT DE MER N AURAIT PAS/PAS ETE SOULEVE DURANT CES
CONSULTATIONS.

CCC/005 110850Z ZQGR4083

MF
RD

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BONN ZOGR4082 10NOV83

TO EXTOTT XDV IMMED

INFO PMOOTT/JOHNSON PCOOTT/FOWLER HAGUE LDN

DISTR (IDDZ

---PM INITIATIVE

PM AND DFL ARRIVED COLOGNE/BONN AIRPORT AT 1740 HOURS

LOCAL TIME.ARE AT STEIGENBERGER HOTEL(0228-20191).

UUU/005 101710Z ZQGR4082

28-6-1 = Hussein Peace Mission

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2425 10NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 111000

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER BDGTN ENATO LDN HSNKI/CDE DEL PARIS MOSCO BONN
MXICO KNGTN PSPAN GRGTN HAVAN ROME PRMNY CNGNY BRU HAGUE MDRID
GENEV VIENN CNERA WLGTN OSLO ATHNS LSPON TOKYO NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/
ATMPOL/DIPOL/CPD

DISTR MINA LCR LCD USS DMF LGB ZSP ZSI UGE SIC IDA PGE RGB IFE
CCE GGE GMD GMR RBR RCD RCR LSR IMC UED IDD IDR URR UGE

---DMF MTG WITH EAGLEBURGER

DMF MET FOR ONE HOUR AND A HALF WITH EAGLEBURGER TODAY. DISCUSSION
COVERED MIDDLE EAST, EAST-WEST RELS (PMS INITIATIVE), AND GRENADA.
HIGHLIGHTS OF MIDDLE EAST DISCUSSION CONTAINED IN OURTEL UNGR2426.
THIS TEL GIVES BRIEF HIGHLIGHTS OF EAGLEBURGER REMARKS ON EAST-WEST
RELS AND GRENADA. WE WILL REPORT IN MORE DETAIL NEXT WEEK.

2. FAST-WEST RELS: EAGLEBURGER SAID USA REACTION TO PMS INITIATIVE
WAS GENERALLY FAVOURABLE AND THAT HE PERSONALLY BELIEVES THAT
INITIATIVE IS USEFUL. EAGLEBURGER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE IS A
PROBLEM IN COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS AND THAT USA
HAD TO BEAR SOME OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOLVING THIS PROBLEM.
EAGLEBURGER HAD NO/NO QUARREL WITH GENUINE CONCERN BEING EXPRESSED
BY PM, IT IS A SENSIBLE STEP ALTHOUGH HE HAD SOME REAL QUESTIONS
ABOUT SPECIFICS AND PARTICULARLY ABOUT A FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE.

...2

28-6-1-*Thudau Peace Mission*
4. |
Division Phoned _____
Person _____
Local Time _____

PAGE TWO UNGR2425 CONF

3. EAGLEBURGER SAW THAT THERE WLD BE PARTICULAR BENEFIT FOR PM
TO GO SEEK TO GO TO MOSCO TO SEE WHAT HE FINDS THERE BECAUSE
IN EAGLEBURGERS VIEW AT THIS TIME THERE IS QUOTE NO/NO ONE HOME
UNQUOTE. IT IS A SERIOUS PROBLEM AND SOV UNION SEEMS TO BE IN
MIDDLE OF ANOTHER SUCCESSION CRISIS. ANDROPOV IS NO/NO LONGER IN
CHARGE. IN THIS KIND OF SIT GOVT RUNS ON ITS OWN MOMENTUM. IT CAN
STAY IN RUTS OF ALREADY MADE DECISIONS BUT WITH NO/NO ONE A WHEEL
IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO GET OUT OF RUTS. DECISIONS THAT ARE MADE
COLLECTIVELY ARE ALWAYS TOWARDS THE HARDLINE APPROACH. USA HAD
NOTED LACK OF A MEANINGFUL INTERLOCUTOR ON SOV SIDE WHEN USA MADE
CONTACTS TO AVERT CRISIS AFTER MURDER OF KOREAN OFFICIALS BY NORTH
KOREANS. USA HAS ALSO NOTICED THAT THERE SEEMS TO BE LESS AND LESS
WILLINGNESS OR ABILITY ON PART OF SOVS TO CONTROL ACTIONS OF THEIR
SURROGATES INCLUDING OF COURSE SYRIA.

4. USA REALIZES SIT IS DANGEROUS AND IT WILL REQUIRE A GREAT DEAL
OF SOPHISTICATION TO DEAL WITH IT. PRES IS PERSONALLY AWARE OF THIS.
AT THE SAME TIME HOWEVER WHEN DECISION MAKING IN SOV UNION TENDS
TO HARDLINE EAGLEBURGER BELIEVES IT IS IMPORTANT THAT SOV UNION
GETS SOME TOUGH SIGNALS FROM WEST. ON INF EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT HE
FULLY EXPECTS DEPLOYMENT TO TAKE PLACE AND THAT SOVS WILL LEAVE
NEGOTIATING TABLE. HE IS VERY WORRIED ABOUT POST-DEPLOYMENT DYNAMIC
AND WILL WATCH CAREFULLY ACTION-REACTION SCENARIO AS IT DEVELOPS.
USSR WILL SPEND SOME TIME SCARING EUROPEANS BUT THERE IS ALWAYS
POSSIBILITY THEY WLD BE TEMPTED TO GO TOO FAR; FOR EXAMPLE BY

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR2426 CONF

HARRASSING BERLIN. EAGLEBURGER STILL BELIEVES THAT FRENCH AND UK SYSTEMS ARE A PHONY ISSUE AND THAT SOVS KNOW IT. EAGLEBURGER DOES NOT/NOT BELIEVE THAT SOVS WLD WANT TO RETURN TO A WALK IN THE WOODS KIND OF AGREEMENT. HOWEVER IF THEY DID WE WLD THEN HAVE THE MAKINGS OF A DEAL AS SOVS WLD BE FOR THE FIRST TIME ACKNOWLEDGING VALIDITY OF AT LEAST SOME USA DEPLOYMENTS. AT THIS TIME USA CLD NOT/NOT AGREE TO TOTAL ELIMINATION OF PII ALTHOUGH FURTHER DOWN THE LINE (IE MARCH) THIS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE.

5. RETURNING TO FIVE-POWER NEGS PROPOSAL EAGLEBURGER SUGGESTED SOVS MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN SUCH A FORUM IN ORDER TO PUSH THEIR IDEA THAT THEY ARE ENTITLED TO HAVE WEAPONS TO MATCH EVERYONE ELSE. HE DOUBTED VERY MUCH CHINESE WLD BE INTERESTED AND SUGGESTED THAT FRENCH AND UK WLD PROBABLY BE NOT/NOT INTERESTED. SCOWCROFT IS ALSO OF THIS VIEW, HE TOLD DMF TODAY). SUCH TALKS WOULD ALSO BE UNDESIREABLE TO CONDUCT IN PARALLEL TO START PROCESS, UNLESS PM WAS TALKING ABOUT SOMETHING AFTER SOVS AND USA HAVE REACHED A START AGREEMENT.

6. GRENADA: EAGLEBURGER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SIT WITH REGARD TO AMERICAN POPULARITY IN CARIBBEAN ESP GRENADA CLD BE VOLATILE. USA WILL NOT/NOT BE THERE LONG. USA HAS SOME PROBLEMS WITH IDEA OF COMMONWEALTH FORCE BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY USA/CARIBBEAN FRIENDS ARE NOT/NOT INTERESTED IN A COMMONWEALTH FORCE OR IN A UK PRESENCE. USA SIMPLY DOES NOT/NOT THINK COMMONWEALTH IS A Viable ALTERNATIVE. HOWEVER, USA WLD ACCEPT ANY PROPOSAL SUPPORTED BY THEIR EASTERN CARIBBEAN ALLIES.

CCC/230 110152Z UNGR2425

R E S T R I C T E D

FM TOKYO UIFC2083 10NOV83

TO EXTOTT XDV DELIVER BY 100900

INFO PMOOTT/DURDIN/SMITH PCOOTT/DURAND DELIVER BY 100900

ROME/PMDEL DELIVER BY 101500

DISTR PPR LIDDZ

REF YOURTEL 1094 09NOV

---MEDIA ARRANGEMENTS


EMB MEDIA COORDINATION OFFICER WILL BE ROBERT JONES. HOME PHONE

03)-447-2787. RE PARA4 REFTTEL: IN LIGHT OF SHORT TIME BETWEEN END OF
PRESS CONF SHLD ONE BE HELD) AND PROPOSED DEP, WILL FOUR PHONFS BE
SUFFICIENT? WILL TELEXES BE REQUIRED? IF SO, HOW MANY TERMINALS?

DO YOU WISH US TO ARRANGE PICK-UP FOR PHOTO AND FILM FOR SHIPMENT
TO CDA?

2. ARE PROCEEDING WITH OTHER ARRANGEMENTS. WILL ADVISE AS INFO
BECOMES AVAILABLE.

CCC/232 100850Z UIFC2083



C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM TOKYO UIGR2066 10NOV83

TO EXTOTT XDV DELIVER BY 100900

INFO PCOOTT/FOLWER PMOOTT/SMITH

DISTR USS DMF PGB PPD IDD PPR/IDDZ


REF OURTEL UIGR2015 09NOV

---PMS INITIATIVE-CONSULTATIONS WITH JPN

AFTER READING AP AND UPI NEWS REPORTS AND CONSULTING WITH MFA,
PRESS LINE WE ARE TAKING IS AS FOLLOWS: PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU WILL
BE VISITING JPN 18/19NOV ENROUTE TO COMWEL HEADS OF GOVT MTG. HE WILL
MEET PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE TO DISCUSS HIS INITIATIVE ON PEACE
AND SECURITY.

2.MFA IS EXPLAINING THAT INITIATIVE INVOLVES E/W RELNS AND
DISARMAMENT. NEITHER WE NOR/NOR MFA HAVE YET PROVIDED TIME OR PLACE
OF MTG.

CCC/232 100800Z UIGR2066



INFO

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

UNCLASSIFIED

FM LDN XNFC 1521 10NOV83

TO ROME/PM PRESS PARTY/JACQUEF HUDON IMMED

INFO BONN EXTOTT(DDZ HAGUE

---PM VISIT - GUARDIAN LDN 09NOV83

QUOTE THATCHER TO SEE TRUDEAU OVER US FEARS BY IAN AITKEN POLITICAL EDITOR.

2. AS ALARM MOUNTED ABOUT US INTENTIONS IN LEBANON THE PRIME MINISTER YESTERDAY REITERATED HER WARNING TO PRESIDENT REAGAN AGAINST TAKING ANY ACTION WHICH MIGHT MAKE THE ALREADY DESPERATE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST EVEN MORE MENACING.

3. AT THE SAME TIME, IT EMERGED THAT CANADA'S PRIME MINISTER MR. PIERRE TRUDEAU, IS ENGAGED IN AN ATTEMPT TO ORGANISE OPPOSITION TO A US MILITARY ATTACK IN LEBANON. THE SIGNS ARE THAT HE MAY HAVE THE TACIT SUPPORT OF MRS. THATCHER.

4. MR. TRUDEAU HAD NOT ORIGINALLY INTENDED TO CALL AT DOWNING ST DURING HIS BRISK ROUND OF THE CAPITALS OF EUROPE. HE IS UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE CHANGED HIS MIND AT THE LAST MOMENT, IN VIEW OF THE PRESENT MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

5. HE AND MRS. THATCHER DID NOT HIT IT OFF PARTICULARLY WELL DURING HER RECENT TRIP TO CANADA AND THERE WERE STRIKING DIFFERENCES OF APPROACH IN THEIR PUBLIC UTTERANCES ABOUT RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET BLOC.

...2

PAGE TWO XNFC1521 UNCLAS

6. BUT THE SIGNS ARE THAT THERE MAY, AFTER ALL, BE SOME IDENTITY OF VIEW ABOUT THE PRESENT POSTURE OF PRESIDENT REAGAN IN THE LEBANON CRISIS.

7. THERE WERE CLAIMS AND COUNTER CLAIMS IN LDN LAST NIGHT ABOUT WHO HAD MADE THE DECISION TO STAGE A MEETING BETWEEN MRS. THATCHER AND MR. TRUDEAU.

8. HE IS TO FLY IN TO GATWICK ON FRIDAY MORNING, WILL MOTOR TO LDN FOR LUNCH WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, AND WILL DRIVE BACK IN THE EARLY AFTERNOON TO RESUME HIS FLIGHT TO OTTAWA.

9. THE MAIN SUBJECT ON THE AGENDA IS BOUND TO BE THE LEBANON CRISIS BUT MRS. THATCHER WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY SEEK TO RECRUIT MR. TRUDEAU'S SUPPORT IN PREVENTING THE UNITED STATES FROM RESUMING ARMS SALES TO ARGENTINA.

10. BOTH SUBJECTS WERE REFLECTED IN THE COMMONS YESTERDAY WHEN MRS. THATCHER ANSWERED QUESTIONS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE FLYING TO BONN FOR A SUMMIT MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL. SHE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE UNITED STATES WAS ENTITLED TO ACT IN DEFENCE OF THEIR OWN FORCES IN THE LEBANON THEY SHOULD NOT TAKE ACTION WHICH MIGHT JEOPARDISE THE TALKS TAKING PLACE IN SWITZERLAND BETWEEN THE RIVAL LEBANESE FACTIONS.

11. SHE TOLD A TORY QUESTIONER: QUOTE I HOPE NOTHING WILL BE DONE WHICH WILL INCREASE THE TURMOIL OR WILL PUT AT RISK THE

...3

PAGE THREE XNFC1521 UNCLAS

RECONCILIATION TALKS THAT ARE TAKING PLACE UNQUOTE.

12. BUT SHE REFUSED TO GIVE AN ASSURANCE REPEATEDLY DEMANDED BY MR. NEIL KINNOCK, THE OPPOSITION LEADER, THAT BRITAIN WOULD WITHDRAW ITS TINY CONTRIBUTION TO THE PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN LEBANON IF THE AMERICANS WERE TO LAUNCH A RETALIATORY ATTACK ON THOSE THEY BELIEVE TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BOMB ATROCITIES AGAINST THE US MARINE HEADQUARTERS IN BEIRUT.

13. ON THE OTHER HAND, MRS. THATCHER DID NOT REJECT MR. KINNOCK'S CRITICISMS OF WHAT LOOKED LIKE US INTENTIONS IN LEBANON. INSTEAD, SHE INSISTED MORE THAN ONCE THAT HIS QUESTIONS WERE FOUNDED ON SOMETHING WHICH HAD NOT SO FAR HAPPENED.

14. BUT IT WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY PLAIN AT WESTMINSTER LAST NIGHT THAT BOTH MINISTERS AND TORY BACK BENCHERS ARE BECOMING ALARMED BY THE EXTENT OF ANTI-AMERICAN FEELING WHICH HAS BEEN RELEASED BY THE US INVASION OF GRENADA AND THE DANGER OF A RETALIATORY ATTACK IN LEBANON.

15. MRS. THATCHER'S WARNINGS TO PRESIDENT REAGAN WERE COUCHED IN NOTICEABLY LESS BELLIGERENT TERMS THAN HER SIMILAR REMARKS ON THE BBC WORLD SERVICE A WEEK AGO, AND EVEN THOSE EXPRESSED BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, SIR GEOFFREY HOWE. OFFICIALS MADE IT CLEAR THAT SHE IS DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE AS A HEALTHY AND GOING CONCERN, WHATEVER MAY HAPPEN IN THE CARIBBEAN AND

...4

PAGE FOUR XNFC1521 UNCLAS

THE MIDDLE EAST.

16. SHE INTENDED TO SAY AS MUCH IN THE COMMONS YESTERDAY, AND EVEN WENT TO THE TROUBLE TO PLANT A FEW QUESTIONS AMONG TORY BACKBENCHERS WHICH WOULD HAVE ENABLED HER TO SAY HER PIECE. UNLUCKILY FOR HER, THE SPEAKER, MR. BERNARD WEATHERILL, DID NOT CALL ANY OF THE PEOPLE PRIMED TO ASK THE QUESTION.

17. HOWEVER, BACKBENCH TORY MPS MADE THEIR ANXIETIES ABOUT THE ALLIANCE CLEAR LAST NIGHT AT A MEETING OF THEIR FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE. A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF THE 30 MPS PRESENT WERE ADAMANT THAT THE PRESENT BREACH BETWEEN LDN AND WASHINGTON MUST BE REPAIRED AS SWIFTLY AS POSSIBLE.

18. IT WAS NOT A UNANIMOUS VIEW. ONE TORY MP MR. ROBERT RHODES JAMES SAID IN A SPEECH IN LEWISHAM LAST NIGHT THAT RETALIATION BY THE AMERICANS MIGHT INFLICT HEAVY CASUALTIES ON INNOCENT PEOPLE CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE. MRS. THATCHER'S WARNINGS TO PRESIDENT REAGAN WERE TO HER ETERNAL CREDIT, QUOTE IF THE WARNINGS CONTINUE TO BE DISMISSED, ONE IS ENTITLED TO ASK THE QUESTION : WHAT SORT OF AN ALLIANCE IS THIS? UNQUOTE HE ADDED. ANNA TOMFORDE WRITES FROM BONN: QUOTE MRS. THATCHER AND DR. KOHL HELD TALKS IN BONN LAST NIGHT, FOCUSING ON MISSILE DEPLOYMENT, THE MIDDLE EAST AND US POLICY OVER GRENADA, UNQUOTE.

19. OFFICIALS SAID THAT THE TWO LEADERS WOULD ALSO DISCUSS THE NEW BUDGET PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY THE EEC COMMISSION. UNQUOTE.

UUU/170 101020Z XNFC1521

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM HSNKI/CCSBMDE DEL YZDL1108 10NOV83
TO EXTOTT IDA
DISTR IDAO IDAN (IDDZ
REF YOURTEL 1269 08NOV

28-6-1-*Trudeau Peace Mission*
6-

---CCSBMDE:PMS INITIATIVE

AS YOU KNOW,FM GENSCHER HASLREPEATEDLY MADE CLEAR HIS INTENTION TO ATTEND OPENING OF STKHM CONF.ALTHOUGH SOME OTHER WEST EUROPEAN FMS MAY HAVE THEIR DOUBTS,IT IS VIRTUALLY A FOREGONE CONCLUSION THAT ALL MEMBERS OF EC 10 WILL FOLLOW FRG LEAD.SOUNDINGS AMONGST EAST EUROPEANS PRODUCE MIXED PATTERN OF REPLY WITH SOME,SUCH AS HUNGARY,INDICATING AN INTEREST IN MINISTERIAL ATTENDANCE AND OTHERS,SUCH AS GDR,REGISTERING SCEPTICISM.

2.THERE HAS BEEN NO/NO REF WHATSOEVER BY ANYONE TO POSSIBILITY OF STKHM MTG OPENING AT HEAD OF GOVT LEVEL.IT IS TO POINT OUT THE OBVIOUS TO NOTE THAT THIS WOULD MEAN PARTICIPATION BY REAGAN AND ANDROPOV WITH CONSEQUENT INEVITABILITY OF A MTG.EVEN IF PM TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE YIELDS POSITIVE RESULTS IMMEDLY,I SUSPECT THEREWOULD BE MANY WHO MIGHT ARGUE THAT A US/USSR SUMMIT IN MID JAN WOULD BE PREMATURE.

CCC/274 101100Z YZDL1108

28.6.1 = Trudeau Peace
6 mission

R E S T R I C T E D

FM EXTOTT XDV1095 10NOV83

TO TOKYO DELIVER BY 110900

INFO PMCOOTT/DURDIN/SMITH PCOOTT/DURAND DELIVER BY 101700

BONN/PM DEL DELIVER BY 110700

DISTR PPR ADDZ


REF YOURTEL UIFC2083 10NOV AND GILLETT/FOSTER TELCCN 10NOV

---PM INITIATIVE:MEDIA ARRANGEMENTS

HAVE CONFIRMED WITH PMO NO/NO PRESS CONF WILL BE HELD. TRY TO IMPRESS
ON MFA PRIVATE DIPLOMATIC NATURE OF INITIATIVE AND OUR INTENTION
NOT/NOT TO BRIEF CDN PRESS.

2. REFTTEL PARA 1:4/4 PHONES WILL BE SUFFICIENT. PLS ARRANGE FOR 1/1
TELEX WITH OPERATOR. NO/NO NEED FOR PHOTO AND FILM PICK-UP ARRANGE-
MENTS.

CCC/025 101959Z XDV1095



C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE MDRID XQGR1062 10NOV83

A EXTOTT IDDZ WSHDC LIVRAISON 100900

INFO PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN PCOOTT/FOWLER LDN PARIS LSBON BONN ROME
ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU HAGUE MOSCO BNATO PRMNY CNGNY GENEV TOKYO

NDHQOTT/MDN/CDS/ADMPOL/CPD

DSITR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR IDD IDA IDR EPR

REF NOTRETEL XQGR1040 03NOV

---INITIATIVE DU PM-SECURITE EST-OUEST-REACTION DE LA PRESSE ESPAGNOLE
DEPUIS REFTEL AVONS OBTENU COURTS ARTICLES DANS LES TROIS PLUS
INFLUENTS JOURNAUX DE MADRID:CIT YA FINCIT DU 29OCT,CIT ABC FINCIT
DU 4NOV,ET CIT EL PAIS FINCIT DU 7NOV.IL S AGISSAIT DE BIEN BREVES
NOUVELLES SANS COMMENTAIRES EDITORIAUX.

2.IL NOUS PARAIT DONC DIFFICILE D EMOUVOIR PRESSE ET PUBLIC SANS
ACCROCHER D ABORD L INTERET DU PRESIDENT GONZALEZ.PAR EXEMPLE,ARTICLE
DANS QUOTIDIEN CIT YA FINCIT TITRE CIT LE PM DU CANADA DEMANDE L APPUI
DE FELIPE GONZALEZ FINCIT,ET FAIT ETAT DE LA LETTRE QUE PM A ENVOYEE
AU PRESIDENT POUR OBTENIR SON APPUI A L INITIATIVE DE GUELPH.COMME
NOUS L AVONS SOULIGNE DEJA,APPUI ACTIF DE GONZALEZ NOUS PARAIT
ESSENTIEL POUR SON EFFET D ENTRAINEMENT SUR PAYS SENSIBLES A
L INFLUENCE DE MADRID.ROLE DE MODERATEUR QU A JOUE L ESPAGNE A LA
FIN DE LA CSCE DE MADRID CONSTITUE BONNE INDICATION DU POTENTIEL
DE GONZALEZ POUR APPUYER EFFORTS DU PM.SI MAINTENANT QUE PRESIDENT
...2

PAGE DEUX XQGR1062 CONFD

EST DE RETOUR D AUTRICHE, IL DONNE UNE REPONSE VALABLE A LA LETTRE DU PM, IL VAUDRAIT GRANDEMENT LA PEINE QUE LE PM INCLUE ETAPE ESPAGNOLE DANS UNE SECONDE TOURNEE. L INTERET DE LA PRESSE ESPAGNOLE ET DU MONDE HISPANIQUE POURRAIT ALORS ETRE ASSURE.

3. COMME INSTRUMENT DE TRAVAIL, INSISTONS COMME AUTRES MISSIONS SUR L URGENCE DE RECEVOIR D AVANCE UN COURT RESUME DU DISCOURS DE DIMANCHE PROCHAIN QUI CONTIENNE ELEMENTS-CLES DU MESSAGE ET QU'IL NOUS SOIT POSSIBLE DE TRADUIRE RAPIDEMENT EN ESPAGNOL. CECI AURAIT SUREMENT DE MEILLEURES CHANCES D ACCROCHER JOURNALISTES ESPAGNOLS QUE LE DISCOURS ENTIER EN ANGLAIS OU FRANCAIS.

4. POUR WSHDC: AUCUNE AGENCE DE NOUVELLES OU JOURNAL ESPAGNOLS N AYANT ENCORE DE CORRESPONDANTS AU CDA, PRIERE D INCLURE DANS VOS BRIEFINGS CORRESPONDANTS A WSHDC DE L AGENCF EFE (AGENCE ESPAGNOLE DE PRESSE), DU JOURNAL CIT EL PAIS FINCIT (RAMON VILARO), DE LA CIT VANGUARDIA FINCIT (RAFAEL RAMOS) QUI FONT ASSEZ SOUVENT DES CHRONIQUES VALABLES SUR LE CDA.

CCC/290 101330Z XQGR1062

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

28-6-1-Thudreau Place
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BONN ZOGR1031 10NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO PARIS ROME HAGUE BRU LDN CANDELNATO WSHDC MOSCO

PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RSD RSR RCR RBD RBR UGB URR CPD IDR

IDA FER

---PM INITIATIVE-FRG MFA VIEWS

DR SCHAUFR, DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF POLITICAL DIVISION OF
AUSWARTIGES AMT(MFA), TOLS US THAT THEY HAD FORWARDED TO
CHANCELLOR KOHL ON 04NOV 10-PAGE COMMENTARY ON PRIME MINISTERS
LETTER TO CHANCELLOR AND HIS GUELPH SPEECH. TONE OF THEIR COMMENTS
HAD BEEN EXTREMELY POSITIVE. THEY CONSIDER PRIME MINISTERS
INITIATIVE FITS IN EXTREMELY WELL WITH FRG EVALUATION OF
REQUIREMENTS OF PRESENT EAST-WEST SITUATION. NATO DOUBLE TRACK
DECISION ON DEPLOYMENT; ON OTHER HAND, HE IS CALLING FOR MEANINGFUL
EAST-WEST DIALOGUE. IMPORTANCE OF REAFFIRMING FRG SUPPORT FOR EACH
OF THESE COULD NOT/NOT BE TOO FREQUENTLY STRESSED. IT SEEMED QUITE
PROBABLE THAT DEPLOYMENT WAS TO GO AHEAD AND GOVERNMENTS MAJOR
PREOCCUPATION IN THIS AREA REMAINED THE BUNDESTAG DEBATE ON 21NOV.
GOVERNMENT REMAINED CONFIDENT ABOUT ITS ABILITY TO CARRY OUT ITS
DECISION AND TO ACHIEVE PUBLIC ACQUIESCENCE IN THAT DECISION. IT
CONTINUED TO BE AWARE OF STRONG OPPOSITION OF POPULATION TO PRESENCE
OF MISSILES IN EAST. IN TERMS OF DIALOGUE WITH SOVIET UNION,

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PAGE TWO ZQGR1031 CONFD

DR SCHAUER NOTED THAT FRG HAD BEEN DETERMINED IN ITS OWN EFFORTS IN THIS DIRECTION. IN RECENT MONTHS, APART FROM THE MEETING WITH GROMYKO IN VIENNA, GENSCHER HAD MET WITH VIRTUALLY ALL OF HIS COUNTERPARTS FROM EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES.

2. FOREIGN OFFICE IS EXTREMELY CURIOUS ABOUT SPECIFIC PROPOSALS PRIME MINISTER MAY MAKE DURING HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH CHANCELLOR IN TERMS OF DEVELOPING AREAS LISTED IN HIS GUELPH SPEECH. IN ITS BRIEFING, MFA HAS SPECULATED INTER ALIA UPON PROPOSALS IN THE AREA OF EAST-WEST TRADING RELATIONSHIPS; NON-PROLIFERATION; AND POSSIBLE MEETING OF FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS. ON QUESTION OF DIALOGUE WITH EASTERN BLOC, MFA HAS COMMENTED THAT TYPE OF DIALOGUE DESIRED WOULD HAVE TO DEPEND ON SUBJECT BEING DEALT WITH: IN SOME CASES BILATERAL INTERACTION WOULD BE IMPORTANT, IN OTHERS, COLLECTIVE ACTION IN NATO OR PARIS CLUB OR SOME OTHER GROUPING WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE.

MBFR/FRG PROPOSAL:

3. ON STATUS OF CURRENT FRG MBFR INITIATIVE, DR SCHAUER COMMENTED THAT IT IS NOT/NOT DEVELOPING AT PRESENT MOMENT. THE STAGNATION RELATED NOT/NOT TO LACK OF ATTENTION FROM THE POLITICAL LEVEL. IN FACT, GENSCHER WAS CONSISTENTLY INVOLVED ON FRG SIDE AND CHANCELLOR KOHL IS WELL INFORMED. HE CONSIDERED THAT USA GOVERNMENT WAS ALSO ACTIVE AT POLITICAL LEVEL. PROBLEM WAS THAT THERE WERE REAL DIFFICULTIES AND DIFFERENT PROPOSALS ENCOUNTERED MANY ARGUMENTS INTER ALIA ON PART OF AMERICANS. POSSIBLY, IT WAS TIME FOR FRG TO

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PAGE THREE ZQGR1031 CONF

PRESENT A REVISED PROPOSAL, HOWEVER, THERE WERE NOT/NOT IN PROCFSS
OF CONSIDERING ONE AT PRESENT TIME. THEY CONSIDERED, IN ANY EVENT,
THAT INF QUESTION AND SUCCFSSFUL DEVELOPMENT OF CDF CONFERENCE
IN JANUARY WERE FAR MORE IMPORTANT.

FRG-UK SUMMIT, NOVEMBER 8 AND 9

4. AS ANTICIPATED, EAST-WEST ISSUES AND COMMON MARKET QUESTIONS
WERE AT TOP OF AGENDA. DR SCHAUER UNDERSTOOD THERE WERE NOT/NOT
UNEXPECTED DEVELOPMENTS IN DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN CHANCELLOR KOHL
AND MRS THATCHER ON EAST-WEST ISSUES. IN COURSE OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN
FOREIGN MINISTERS GENSCHER AND HOWE, THERE WAS SOME CONSIDERATION
GIVEN TO WHETHER SOME SPECTACULAR INITIATIVE ON PART OF FRG PRIOR
TO DEPLOYMENT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. THIS THOUGHT WAS FAIRLY QUICKLY
PUT ASIDE, DR SCHAUER SAID, AS BOTH WERE PERSUADED THAT ANY
SIGNIFICANT MOVE BY THE FRG AT THIS POINT WOULD BE INTERPRETED BY
SOVIET UNION AS SIGN OF WEAKNESS.

CANADA-FRG BILATERAL ISSUES

5. IN BRIFFING FOR CHANCELLOR KOHL, IT WAS PROPOSED THAT HE RAISE
WITH PRIME MINISTER QUESTION OF CANADA-EEC FISHERIES AGREEMENT AND,
IN PARTICULAR, URGE THAT CANADIAN GOVERNMENT ISSUE AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE LICENCES FOR 1984. HOWEVER CHANCELLORS SENIOR POLITICAL
MAN TELTSCHIK, CONSIDERED IT UNLIKELY THAT ANY BILATERAL ISSUE
WOULD BE RAISED.

CCC/005 101735Z ZQGR1031

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A13 + 7	170

NOV 11 07:37

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IMC0533 10NOV83

TO LDN DELIVER BY 110900

INFO PMOOTT/JOHNSON PCOOTT/FOWLER/DURAND-DELHI

REF YOURTEL XNGR4062 10NOV

---CHOGM OPENING SESSION-REPLY TO ADDRESS OF WELCOME

BECAUSE SEC GEN AND MRS GHANDI QUOTE ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE
UNQUOTE TO PM TRUDEAU REPLYING TO ADDRESS OF WELCOME AND FACT
THAT CDA IS PERHAPS BEST PLACED(AFTER GRENADA EVENTS)TO SPEAK
FOR AMERICAS REGION OF COMWEL,WE WOULD RECOMMEND PM ACCEPT.
AS YOU KNOW PM WILL BE INLDN 11NOV AND YOU SHOULD INFORM
FOWLER OF OUR VIEWS,AS WELL AS NAMES OF SPEAKERS INVITED AND
THOSE WHO HAVE ACCEPTED.

2.WE ARE PREPARING SHORT SPEECH FOR PMS REPLY.

CCC/278 102140Z IMC0533

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

DISTR	CP
A.3 PM 7	W

28-6-1 - Trudeau Race Mission

NOV 10 19:01

NONCLASSIFIE

DE BRU ZVGR0524 10NOV83

A EXTOTT IDDZ LIVRAISON 101500

INFO BREEC LIN/PMDEL HAGUE LDN BONN ROME MOSCO BNATO PARIS

PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CP

DISTR MINA USS DMF UGB IFB IDD IDR IFB IDA RGB RCD RSR RSD RCR RBR
REF ZVGR0509 31OCT

---VISITE DU PM: REACTION DES MEDIA

SOMMAIRE: COMPTE TENU DE LA BRIEVETE DE LA VISITE DU PM TRUDEAU EN BELG(5 HEURES), DU MANQUE DE CONFERENCE DE PRESSE ET DE DEUX EVENEMENTS CONCURRENTS (DEBAT PARLEMENTAIRE SUR LES EUROMISSILES ET TREMBLEMENT DE TERRE A LIEGE), LA VISITE DU PM TRUDEAU A ETE BIEN COUVERTE ET AVEC UN TON POSITIF PAR LES MEDIA BELGES EN PARTIE GRACE A DES INITIATIVES DE L AMBASSADEUR.

2. RAPPORT: COMME NOUS L AVONS FAIT REMARQUER DANS NOTRE TEL ZVGR0509 DU 31OCT, LE DISCOURS DU PM TRUDEAU, Y COMPRIS L ANNONCE DE SA VISITE AVAIT DEJA ATTIRE L ATTENTION DES MEDIA BELGES. LES PRINCIPAUX JOURNAUX AVAIENT NOTAMMENT REPRIS IN EXTENSO LES PROPOSITIONS DU PM POUR RESTAURER LE DIALOGUE POLITIQUE ENTRE L EST ET L OUEST ET POUR DONNER DE L IMPLUSION POLITIQUE AUX DISCUSSIONS SUR LE DESARMEMENT ET LA NON PROLIFERATION.

3. POUR MAINTENIR L INTERET DES MEDIA BELGES, EN DEBIT DU DEBAT AU PARLEMENT SUR LES EUROMISSILES AUMOMENT DE LA VISITE DU PM,

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PAGE DEUX ZVGR0524 NONCLAS

QUI ALLAIENT MOBILISER TOUTES LES RESSOURCES DES MEDIA NORMALEMENT AFFECTEES A LA POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, L'AMBASSADEUR DONNAIT LE 07 NOV, UN DEJEUNER POUR HUIT EXPERTS DE POLITIQUE ETRANGERE DES MEDIA BELGES ET UNE AMPLE DOCUMENTATION. CES EFFORTS AJOUTES A LA DIST INTENSIVE DU DISCOURS DE GUELF L'ATTENTION DES MEDIA SUR LA VISITE DU PM TRUDEAU.

4. LE JOUR DE LA VISITE (29 NOV); LES DEUX PRINCIPAUX JOURNAUX FRANCOPHONES ONT NOTAMMENT COMMENTE L'INITIATIVE DU PM: CIT LA LIBRE BELGIQUE FINCIT, DANS UN EDITORIAL INTITULE CIT TRUDEAU A BRU: UN PELERINAGE PACIFIQUE FINCIT, APPUYAIT ENTIEREMENT LES OBJECTIFS DE TRUDEAU ET DE SON INITIATIVE. CIT LE SOIR FINCIT, AVEC UN ARTICLE D'OPINION UN PEU CYNIQUE QUANT AUX POSSIBILITES DE SUCCES DE L'INITIATIVE, RECONNAISSAIT LA NECESSITE D'UN TEL EFFORT.

5. LE LENDEMAIN (10 NOV); LA PRESSE NEERLANDOPHONE A PRIS LA RELEVÉ EN DONNANT UNE DESCRIPTION DES OBJECTIFS DE L'INITIATIVE TRUDEAU ET DES COMPTES RENDUS FACTUELS DE LA REUNION DES PM MARTENS ET TRUDEAU.

6. EN PLUS DU REPORTAGE A LA RADIO, LA TV FRANCOPHONE ET NEERLANDOPHONE MONTRAIENT DES IMAGES DU PM AVEC LE PM MARTENS, ET LE MAE TINDEMAN. LA TV FRANCOPHONE A PRESENTAIT DE PLUS DEUX COURTES INTERVIEWS DU PM TRUDEAU ET DU MAE BELGE. TINDEMANS Y REAGIT

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PAGE TROIS ZVGR0524 NONCLAS

TRES POSITIVEMENT A L INITIATIVE EN DISANT CIT TRUDEAU N EST NI
EUROPEEN,NI DES USA,IL EST ALORS TRES BIEN PLACE POUR PRENDRE CETTE
INITIATIVE FINCIT.LE PM TRUDEAU REPONDANT A UNE QUESTION,A MINIMISE
TOUT LIEN ENTRE SON VOYAGE ET LES NEGOCIATIONS INFO A GENEVE ET A
INDIQUE QUE SON ITITIATIVE VISAIT PLUTOT LA PERIODE SUIVANT LE
DEPLOIMENT DES EUPOMISSILES.

UUU/126 101800Z ZVGR0524

28-6-1-T Trudeau Peace Mission

S E C R E T

FM ROME WTGR0414 10NOV83

TO LDN/PMDEL DELIVER PY 111200

INFO EXTOTT IDR BONN NDHQOTT/ADMPOLE/CPP/CORAE/DSTRATE/DNACPOL/CIS
PCOOTT/FOWLER ENATO CANMILREPNATO PRU WSHDC MOSCO VMBFR GENEV PARIS
HAGUE OSLO COPEN ATHNS MDRID
DISTR MINA DMF IDA RCR RBR ZSI ZSP CPD RGX IDRL IDRA IDDZ IFB
RFF INATO TEL YBGR7091 08NOV

---INF:SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP(SCG)MEETING ROME 10NOV

SUMMARY:SCG HELD THIRD OF ITS MEETINGS IN INF EASING COUNTRIES IN
ROME 10NOV. EMPHASIS WAS ON POSSIBLE SOVIET POLITICAL AND MILITARY
COUNTER MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO USA LRINF DEPLOYMENTS, AND ON PUBLIC
HANDLING. GENERAL VIEW WAS THAT ALLIANCE WAS IN GOOD SHAPE IN IMMEDI-
ATE PREDEPLOYMENT PERIOD. SEVERAL REPS OF EASING COUNTRIES WERE OF
VIEW THAT NEW USA NEGOTIATING INITIATIVE WAS NEITHER NECESSARY NOR
DESIRABLE AT THIS TIME ALTHOUGH THERE WAS GENERAL SUPPORT FOR OUR
SUGGESTION THAT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE NUMBERS SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO
USA PROPOSALS ALREADY ON NEGOTIATING TABLE. DISCUSSION OF SCG PROGRESS
REPORT TO MINISTERS AND INF LANGUAGE IN DEC 83 NAC COMMUNIQUE ARE
SUBJECT OF FOLLOWING TEL. SCG ALSO CONSIDERED CEAUCESCU PROPOSALS.
RECEIVED BRIEFINGS ON CURRENT STATE OF INF NEGOTIATIONS AND INTELLI-
GENCE UPDATE ON SOVIET MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS.

2. REPORT: SHARMANS INTRO: SCG CHAIRMAN FURT SAID THAT WITH MASS
RALLIES OVER, PUBLIC FOCUS HAD SHIFTED FOR MOST PART FROM STREET DEMOS

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PAGE TWO WTGR0414 SECRET

TO PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES. LATEST ANDROPOV REMARKS RE IMPOSSIBILITY OF CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS ONCE NEW AMERICAN MISSILES APPEARED IN EUROPE LEFT RUSSIANS WITH LITTLE ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE AND HENCE THEY WERE OBLIGED TO DISRUPT NEGOTIATIONS IN SOME MANNER, WHETHER THIS WOULD BE BY CALLING RECESS OR WALKOUT REMAINED TO BE SEEN. ALLIANCE WOULD WANT TO MAKE CLEAR FOR ITS PART THAT SOVIET MOVE OF THIS SORT DID NOT/NOT SPEEL END OF NEGOTIATING PROCESS. MONTEFELLO DECISION HAD NOT/NOT YET RECEIVED ATTENTION DESERVED AND SHOULD BE POINTED TO AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY, INCLUDING PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, TO CONTRAST WITH SOVIET BUILD-UP.

3. GREEK REPS REHEARSAL OF HIS GOVTS PRO-POSTPONEMENT OF DEPLOYMENT AND INCLUSION OF UK/FR FORCES POSITIONS, WITH LAUDATORY REF TO CURRENT DANISH GOVT POSITION AND, ATTEMPT TO USE PM TRUDEAUS VIEWS ON QUOTE POLITICAL WILL UNQUOTE IN GUELPH SPEECH TO SUPPORT GREEK POSITION, PROVOKED SHORT, SHARP REACTIONS. DANISH RFP WAS ALMOST DISMISSIVE OF HIS CWN GOVTS INITIATIVE RE SPECIAL MTG OF FOREIGN MINISTERS, POINTING OUT THAT IDEA WAS DISMISSED BY ALL NATO ALLIES EXCEPT GREECE AND THIS FACT WOULD BE REPORTED TO FOLKETING NEXT WEEK.

4. WE REVIEWED PM TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE AND MADE CLEAR THAT CDN GOVT REMAINED ABSOLUTELY COMMITTED TO BOTH TRACKS OF DEC 1979 DECISION. UK CONSIDERED GREEK REMARKS AS TRAVESTY OF ACTUAL SITUATION, POINTING OUT THAT SUGGESTIONS OF LACK OF POLITICAL WILL ON USA PART DID NOT/NOT SQUARE WITH SIGNIFICANT MOVES USA HAD MADE TO ENCOURAGE PROGRESS IN

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INF NEGOTIATIONS.FURTHERMORE,HE INVITED GREEK TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE THAT POSTPONEMENT OF DEPLOYMENT WOULD PRODUCE SOVIET POLITICAL WILL TO REACH EQUITABLE AGREEMENT.UK ALSO CHALLENGED GREEK COMMENT THAT UK/FRENCH FORCES ISSUE WAS CENTRAL PROBLEM,POINTING OUT THAT IT WAS CAMOFLAGE FOR CENTRAL ISSUE OF USA MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPE. NORWAY,NETHERLANDS,FRG AND USA SUPPORTED UK VIEW ON POSTPONEMENT WITH USA ADDING THAT POSTPONEMENT WOULD NOT/NOT ONLY IMPAIR CHANCES FOR ACHIEVING NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT BUT ALSO,WOULD DAMAGE POLITICAL CREDIBILITY OF ALLIANCE,THEREBY WEAKENING DETERRENCE.

INF NEGOTIATIONS:USA DEPUTY INF NEGOTIATOR GLITMAN REPORTED THAT RUSSIANS HAVE CALLED LATEST USA INITIATIVES RE GLCM/P2 MIX AND GEOGRAPHIC BALANCE UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE THEY IMPLIED USA DEPLOYMENTS. WHILE RUSSIANS RECOGNIZED SOME POSSIBILITIES RE USA OFFER ON AIRCRAFT, SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES REMAINED.RUSSIANS HAVE NOT/NOT OFFERED MUCH ELAPORATION OF ANDROPOVS LATEST POSITION AS REPORTED BY PRAVDA 27OCT. GLITMAN REVIEWED UNACCEPTABLE FEATURES OF LATEST SOVIET POSITION INCLUDING FACT SOVIET OFFER OF 140 LAUNCHERS WAS LINKED TO SOVIET COUNT OF UK/FRENCH WARHEADS AND UK/FR MODERNIZATION PROGRAMMES.THIS IN EFFECT CALLED INTO QUESTION WHETHER ANY SS20 WOULD BE REDUCES. WHILE ANDROPOV SPOKE OF APPROX 140 MISSILES,SOVIET NEGOTIATORS HAVE HINTED THAT NUMBER COULD BE MORE OR LESS THAN THAT.RUSSIANS HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT WALK IN THE WOODS FORMULA WAS UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE IT ACKNOWLEDGED USA DEPLOYMENTS.SOVIET INF NEGOTIATOR KVITSINSKY TOLD

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ERG GROUP LED BY EGON BAHR THAT HIS ONLY SIN IN THIS REGARD HAD BEEN REPORTING WALK IN THE WOODS OFFER TO MOSCOW IN VIEW OF ITS ACCEPTANCE OF USA DEPLOYMENTS.

5. ANDROPOV PROPOSAL RE SS20 FREEZE IN ASIA WAS LINKED TO ACTIONS OF THIRD COUNTRIES INCLUDING PRC HENCE, RUSSIANS WOULD BE FREE TO APROGATE UNILATERAL FREEZE EVEN IF IT IN PART FORMED AGREEMENT WITH USA. RUSSIANS HAVE ALSO LINKED ASIAN FREEZE TO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN STRATEGIC SITUATION-THEY WOULD CONSIDER INCREASE IN USA AIRCRAFT OR INTRODUCTION OF MISSILES IN ASIA (WHETHER AMERICAN OR CHINESE) OR ALASKA AS UPSETTING THAT SITUATION. SINCE SOVIET FREEZE WOULD NOT/NOT BEGIN UNTIL INF AGREEMENT WAS RATIFIED, RUSSIANS COULD COMPLETE SS20 BASE CONSTRUCTION PRESENTLY BEGUN OR STARTED BEFORE THEN.

6. RUSSIANS PROVIDED MORE DETAIL ON HOW THEY WOULD COUNT AIRCRAFT IN AN AGREEMENT, STARTING FROM BASE FIGURES OF 938 SOVIET MEDIUM RANGE VESSES 857 USA/NATO MEDIUM RANGE AIRCRAFT I.E. SOVIET ADVANTAGE OF 81 AIRCRAFT. RUSSIANS WOULD EXCLUDE 175 F4 AND 65 F411 FOR TOTAL DISPARITY OF 321 AIRCRAFT IN THEIR FAVOUR, OR 40 PERCENT ADVANTAGE. RUSSIANS WOULD NOT/NOT COUNT TORNADO BUT WOULD INCLUDE MIRAGE AIRCRAFT. SOVIET NEGOTIATORS PRESENTED THEIR PACKAGE IN DISINGENUOUS QUOTE PACKAGE SOLUTION UNQUOTE BY PORTRAYING THEIR MOVEMENT ON GEOGRAPHIC AND AIRCRAFT ISSUES AS BALANCE TO NECESSARY USA MOVES THEY SEEK ON NO/NO USA DEPLOYMENTS AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THIRD COUNTRY FORCES.

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7. NEGOTIATIONS WERE PROCEEDING ON MEETING TO MEETING BASIS WITH RUSSIANS CITING ANDROPOV STATEMENT RE IMPOSSIBILITY OF CONTINUING IF USA DEPLOYMENT PROCEEDED. GLITMAN SAID RUSSIANS WERE FISHING FOR QUICK USA REJECTION OF THEIR PACKAGE TO DEMONSTRATE USA LACK OF INTEREST IN NEGOTIATIONS. USA WILL NOT/OBLIGE. SOVIETS HAVE ALREADY LAID GROUND SHOULD INF NEGOTIATIONS BREAK DOWN, TO PROPOSE MERGER WITH START. THEY HAVE MADE CLEAR THEY WOULD NOT/NOT CHANGE THEIR ATTITUDE RE DEPLOYMENT OF USA MISSILES IN EUROPE AND THAT POSTPONEMENT WOULD NOT/NOT BE LIMITED TO SPECIFIC TIME. CEAUSESCUS PROPOSALS HAVE NOT/NOT ARISEN IN NEGOTIATIONS.

INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING: USA REPORTED THAT ONE NEW SS20 BASE IN EASTERN USSR WAS OPERATIONAL SO THAT UNCLASSIFIED FIGURE NOT WAS 360 SS20 LAUNCHERS. ON BASIS OF ACCELERATED PACE OF CONSTRUCTION TWO MORE SITES COULD BE COMPLETED BY END 1983 WITH A FURTHER SITE, IN EARLY STAGE OF CONSTRUCTION, READY IN 1984. NO/NO NEW SS20 BASES HAVE BEEN SEEN IN WESTERN USSR SINCE BREZHNEV DECLARED MORATORIUM IN MARCH 1982 ALTHOUGH BASES UNDER CONSTRUCTION THEN WERE SINCE COMPLETED.

8. USA INTELLIGENCE CAN NEITHER CONFIRM NOR DENY ANDROPOV'S STATEMENT THAT SS5 HAVE NOW BEEN TAKEN COMPLETELY OUT OF COMMISSION ALTHOUGH THERE WERE NO/NO SIGNS OF DISMANTLEMENT AT SOME REMAINING SS5 BASES AS OF END AUGUST 1983. USA ESTIMATE OF OPERATIONAL SS4 IS 224 ALTHOUGH UNCLASSIFIED FIGURE REMAINS 232. IT IS CLEAR RUSSIANS HAVE HALTED SS4 DISMANTLEMENT PROGRAMME, PERHAPS EITHER TO RETAIN AS BARGAINING CHIPS

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IN INF OR TO COMPENSATE FOR IREZHNEV MORATORIUM.SS22 CURRENTLY ARE STILL ONLY DEPLOYED IN USSR WITH APPROX 120 LAUNCHERS AND SIMILAR NUMBER OF REFIRES(64 DEPLOYED OPPOSITE NATO-EUROPE).FORWARD DEPLOYMENT OF SS22 WOULD GREATLY INCREASE SOVIET COVERATE OF NATO-EUROPE. AS REGARDS REFIRES RUSSIANS ARGUED THAT SS20 COULD NOT/NOT BE REFIRED RAPIDLY AND THAT THEY WOULD LIMIT NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL MISSILES AT DEPLOYMENT SITES TO NO/NO MORE THAN 15 PERCENT.SS20 RANGE(WHETHER FOUR THOUSAND OR FIVE THOUSAND KILOMETERS)WOULD HAVE TO BE SPELLED OUT IN ANY AGREEMENT.

9.USA CIRCULATED PAPER ON RELIABILITY AND SAFETY OF GLCM/P2 WHICH INTERALIA POINTED OUT THAT FLIGHT TESTING WOULD CONTINUE THROUGHOUT LIFE OF THESE SYSTEMS AND THAT NO/NO TEST FIRINGS WOULD OCCUR IN EUROPE(COPY BY BAG).

POSSIBLE SOVIET COUNTER MEASURES:BURT SAID SOVIETS WERE UNLIKELY TO PROVOKE MAJOR USA/USSR CONFRONTATION BY SUCH AS MISSILE DEPLOYMENT IN CUBA OR PRESSURE ON BERLIN.IN POLITICAL REALM RUSSIANS WOULD CONTINUE EFFORTS TO RAISE PUBLIC FEARS OF BREAKDOWN IN EAST-WEST DIALOGUE AND SUGGEST EUROPEANS WERE TALING STEPS CONTRARY TO THEIR OWN INTERESTS.IT WAS LESS CLEAR WHETHER THEY WOULD DISRUPT START:MCST RECENT SIGNS SUGGESTED IT WAS UNLIKELY THEY WOULD DISRUPT MBFR,AND CDF WOULD BE UNAFFECTED.ON MILITARY FRONT,THERE WAS GOOD CHANCE SS20 MORATORIUM WOULD END BUT FORWARD DEPLOYMENT OF SS20 WAS UNLIKELY. SOVIETS COULD BECOME MORE VOCAL ABOUT THEIR DEPLOYMENTS IN ASIA.

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FURTHER, THEY COULD BE CONSIDERING SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES ON SOVIET SUBMARINES OFF USA COAST OR DEPLOYMENT OF AIR-LAUNCH CRUISE MISSILES, IN ORDER TO PUT USA IN QUOTE AN ANALOGOUS POSITION UNQUOTE. POSSIBLE SOVIET COUNTERMEASURES COULD BE DEALT WITH BY POINTING OUT THAT THEIR MILITARY PREPARATIONS HAVE BEEN UNDERWAY FOR LONG TIME, AND IN SOME CASES EVEN BEFORE INF NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN. PUBLICS COULD ALSO BE REMINDED THAT SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS WOULD MORE THAN marginally INCREASE SOVIET THREAT. POSSIBLE SOVIET WALKOUT OF NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE CONTRASTED TO USA WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE. NATOS MONTEBELLO DECISION ON REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE CONTRASTED FAVOURABLY WITH CONTINUED SOVIET BUILDUP. COMMITMENT TO PRINCIPLE OF ZERO SOLUTION SHOULD ALSO BE STRESSED.

PUBLIC HANDLING: FURTHER MOANED FACT THAT ORIGINAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF MONTEBELLO DECISION DID NOT/NOT GET DESIRED MEDIA PLAY. HE STRESSED THAT ALLIES SHOULD TAKE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO CALL ATTENTION TO MONTEBELLO DECISION. HE SUGGESTED ADDITIONAL PUBLIC THEMES TO BE DEVELOPED IN DEPLOYMENT PERIOD AHEAD AS FOLLOWS: (A) DON'T TREAT INITIAL DEPLOYMENTS AS WATERSHED BUT RATHER, AS PART OF LENGTHY PROCESS BEGINNING IN DECEMBER 1979 AND CONTINUING TO 1982 (B) REMIND THAT ALLIED FIRMNESS AND UNITY BROUGHT RUSSIANS TO NEGOTIATING TABLE (C) EMPHASIZE NATO POLICY OF EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE AT LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL OF ARMS.

12. CEAUSESCU PROPOSALS: FRG REP REVIEWED CONTENTS OF CEAUSESCU LETTER TO CHANCELLOR KOHL AS PER REFTEL. FRG REPLY WOULD EMPHASIZE IMPORTANCE ...8

PAGE EIGHT WTGR0414 SECRET

OF CEAUSESCU VIEWS RE UK/FRENCH FORCES AND ALSO RESTATE ALLIANCE COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATE EVEN AFTER END 1983 IF NECESSARY.USA SUGGESTED POCKETING THIRD COUNTRY FORCE PROPOSAL IN CEAUSESCU LETTER WITHOUT ENDORSING OVERALL PACKAGE.UK,ITALIAN AND DANISH REPS REPORTED RECEIVING ORAL COMMUNICATION RE PROPOSAL FROM ROMANIAN FM TO THEIR AMBASSADORS.ALL WERE AGREED THAT CEAUSESCU HAD LAUNCHED HIS PROPOSALS WITHOUT SOVIET INSPIRATION.

POSSIBLE NEW USA INITIATIVE:THERE WAS NO/NO DISCUSSION AT FORMAL MTG OF ANY NEW USA INITIATIVE,WITH ONLY FLEETING REF TO NUMBERS AS A MEANS OF EXPLAINING TO PUBLICS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PROPOSALS ALREADY MADE BY USA.DINNER MTG HOWEVER WAS TAKEN BY BURT AS OPPORTUNITY FIRST TO EXPLAIN THAT VISITS HE AND DAM WER MAKING WERE RELATED MAINLY TO GRENADA AND LEBANON RATHER THAN INF AND,SECOND,TO EXPLAIN THAT WHILE DISCUSSION WAS GOING ON IN WSHDC REGARDING POSSIBILITY OF A NEW USA INITIATIVE THERE AS YET WAS NO/NO DECISION ON EITHER ITS NECESSITY OR ITS DESIRABILITY.BUT DESCRIBED NYT REPORT AS INACCURATE IN THAT IT SUGGESTED RECOMMENDATIONS HAD BEEN ADOPTED.HE DID NOT/NOT COMMENT ON NUMBERS GIVEN IN GWERTZMAN ARTICLE.

11.IN DISCUSSION THAT FOLLOWED VIEW WAS EXPRESSED BY SEVERAL REPRESENTATIVES OF BASING COUNTRIES THAT NEW INITIATIVE AT THIS TIME WAS NEITHER NECESSARY NOR DESIRABLE.A NEW INITIATIVE NOW WOULD SIGNAL PANIC AT TIME WHEN DEMONSTRATION OF RESOLVE WAS NEEDED AND,WOULD GIVE POSSIBLY IRRESISTABLE PRESSURES TO DELAY DEPLOYMENT PROCESS

...9

PAGE NINE WTGR0414 SECRET

WHILE SOVIET SIDE WAS GIVEN TIME TO CONSIDER LATEST PROPOSALS. WHILE THERE WAS NO/NO SUPPORT FOR IDEA OF NEW INITIATIVE, THERE WAS GENERAL SUPPORT FOR OUR SUGGESTION (WHICH WE HAD ALSO MADE IN BONN MTG) THAT, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, NUMBERS SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO USA PROPOSAL ALREADY ON TABLE IN GENEVA AND THAT THESE SHOULD BE MADE PUBLIC. THIS WOULD BE AN ELABORATION RATHER THAN AN INITIATIVE AND WOULD FACILITATE EXPLANATION OF THE REASONABLENESS OF THE NATO POSITION IN WHAT IS THE INCREASINGLY LIKELY EVENT OF A SOVIET INTERRUPTION OF INF NEGOTIATIONS.

CCC/013 110842Z WTGR0414



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	UNCLASSIFIED	11 Nov 83	02 36z	12	10
FM/DE	FM PCOOTT/R.R.FOWLER (THROUGH EXTOTT IDDZ0111 10NOV83				
TO/À	TO MARGARET OSMER-MCQUADE,				
INFO	DIRECTOR OF PROGRAMS				
DISTR	COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS				
REF	EAST 68 STREET				
SUBJ/SUJ	NEW YORK, N.Y. USA 10021 TELEX 239852 CFR OR INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER				
REF YOUR TELEX OF 01NOV					
---INVITATION TO PM TRUDEAU TO SPEAK TO THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS.					
ON BEHALF OF THE PRIME MINISTER, PERMIT ME TO REPLY TO YOUR TELEX OF NOVEMBER 1 EXTENDING AN INVITATION TO SPEAK TO THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. DESPITE EFFORTS TO ARRANGE THE PRIME MINISTER S SCHEDULE TO ACCOMMODATE A SPEAKING ENGAGEMENT WITH THE CFR. IT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, NOT POSSIBLE TO ACCEPT AN INVITATION AT THIS TIME. THE PRIME MINISTER HOLDS THE CFR IN THE HIGHEST REGARD HOWEVER, AND WHEN A NEW YORK VISIT BECOMES POSSIBLE, WE WILL ADVISE YOU.					

28-10-1 Trudeau Peace Mission
de NYK

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

M. ARCHDEACON

IDDZ

5-2394

SIG

L.A. DEL VOIE

- Right vertical broken lines denote 69 characters using Elite type (12/inch) or Pica type (10/inch). — L'espace entre les pointillés verticaux correspond à 69 caractères élite (12/po.) ou pica (10/po).



Gouvernement
du Canada

MESSAGE

FILE — DOSSIER

FOR COMMUNICATION CENTRE USE — À L'USAGE DU CENTRE DE COMMUNICATIONS

FROM DE	ROBERT R. FOWLER, PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE, OTTAWA	NO.	
TO A	MARGARET OSMER-MCQUADE, DIRECTOR OF PROGRAMS COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS EAST 68 STREET NEW YORK, N.Y. U.S.A. 10021	DATE	
INFO		PRECEDENCE — PRÉSEANCE	
		SECURITY — SÉCURITÉ	
		12	10

ON BEHALF OF THE PRIME MINISTER, PERMIT ME TO REPLY TO
YOUR TELEX OF NOVEMBER 1 EXTENDING AN INVITATION TO
SPEAK TO THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. DESPITE
EFFORTS TO ARRANGE THE PRIME MINISTER'S SCHEDULE TO
ACCOMMODATE A SPEAKING ENGAGEMENT WITH THE CFR, ~~WE~~
~~REGRET TO ADVISE THAT IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO ACCEPT~~ ^{IS, UNFORTUNATELY, NOT} ~~THE~~ INVITATION AT THIS TIME. THE PRIME MINISTER HOLDS ^{AN} ~~THE~~ CFR
^{IN} THE HIGHEST REGARD ~~FOR THE CFR~~ HOWEVER, AND ^{WHEN A} ~~WHEN A~~
ACCORDINGLY, ~~SHOULD OUR FORWARD PLANNING INDICATE THAT A~~
NEW YORK VISIT ^{IS BECOMES} ~~IS~~ POSSIBLE, WE WILL ADVISE YOU.
~~ACCORDINGLY.~~

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Nov 1 15 29 '81

THE RIGHT HONORABLE PIERRE TRUDEAU
PRIME MINISTER
CANADA

ON BEHALF OF THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, I INVITE YOU TO
SPEAK TO OUR MEMBERSHIP WHEN YOU COME TO NEW YORK THIS DECEMBER.

AS YOU KNOW, OUR MEMBERS ARE LEADERS IN BUSINESS, ACADEMIA,
GOVERNMENT AND THE MEDIA. IF YOU WISH, YOUR INITIAL REMARKS
MAY BE ON THE RECORD. SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WOULD, OF COURSE,
BE UNDER OUR USUAL RULES OF NON-ATTRIBUTION. AS WE HAVE FOUND
THIS FORMULA THE MOST EFFECTIVE IN ATTRACTING THE HIGHEST
CALIBER OF PARTICIPANTS, COUNCIL MEETINGS OF THIS NATURE
PROVIDE AN EXCELLENT WAY FOR MATTERS OF EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE
TO NOT ONLY REACH THE GENERAL PUBLIC BUT TO BE DISCUSSED BY
THOSE WHO HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECISION MAKING IN THE UNITED
STATES. PRESIDENT SADAT OF EGYPT USED THIS FORMAT SUCCESSFULLY
DURING HIS LAST TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES.

I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU SOONEST AND TO WELCOMING YOU
ONCE AGAIN TO THE COUNCIL.

SINCERELY,

MARGARET OSNER-MCQUADE
DIRECTOR OF PROGRAMS

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

TELEX: 239852 CFR UR

184-586-1400
East 68 Street
NEW YORK, NY, U.S.A.
100 21

:CT

PMO PCO OTT

239852 CFR UR000

ORIGINAL TO *R. Fowler*
ORIGINAL ENVOYÉ *Mc T. Johnson*
C.C. P.M.O. FILE
C.C. DOSSIERS C.P.M.
H. Miller

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NOV 10 19:00

S E C R E T CDN EYES ONLY

FM/DE EXTOTT CMRT2341 10NOV83

TO/A ABDJN ADDIS ALGER ANKRA ATHNS BAIRS BERN BGOTA BNATO BNGKK
BONN BREEC BRSLA BRU BUCST CAIRO CNBRA CNGNY COPEN CRCAS DELHI
DUBLN DHAKA GENEV HAGUE HAVAN HRARE HSNKI ISBAD LAGOS LDN LIMA
LSBON LSAKA MDRID MOSCO MXICO NROBI OSLO PARIS PESCO PEKIN POECD
PRET PRMNY ROME SEOUL SJOSE TAVIV TOKYO VIENN VMBFR WDOAS WSAW
WSHDC VATCN

---TEL SUMMARY/SOMMAIRE DES TELS

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MORNING/MATINEE NO.341

1. INITIATIVE DU PREMIER MINISTRE: RELATIONS EST-OUEST

-BELGIQUE: ENTRETIEN AVEC LE PM MARTENS E 1E MRE TINDEMANS (BRU A IDDZ)
L AMBASSADEUR RAPPORTE QUE LES BELGES PARTAGENT LARGEMENT L ANALYSE
CANADIENNE, EN PARTICULIER SUR LES DANGERS QUE RECELENT L ABSENCE DE
DIALOGUE AU SOMMET ENTRE LES SUPERPUISSANCES, L INFLUENCE APPAREMMENT
CROISSANTE DES MILITAIRES EN URSS ET LES PERSPECTIVES DE
PROLIFERATION DES ARMES NUCLEAIRES. CEPENDANT, LE PM MARTENS NE
SOUSESTIME PAS/PAS LES OBSTACLES DE PARCOURS, NOTAMMENT D OBTENIR
L OREILLE DES SUPERPUISSANCES ET, EN PARTICULIER, CELLE DU PRESIDENT
REAGAN. (ZNGR0523 09NOV) (CONFD)

-NETHERLANDS: MTG WITH PM LUBBERS AND FM VAN DEN BROEK (HAGUE TO IDDZ)
THE AMBASSADOR REPORTS THE DUTCH LEADERS SHARED THE PMS CONCERNS

...2

PAGE TWO CMRT2341 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

ABOUT THE PRESENT STATE OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS. ALTHOUGH THEIR PERCEPTIONS OF THE SITUATION DIFFER SLIGHTLY FROM THOSE OF CDA, THE DUTCH LEADERS AGREE THAT AN INITIATIVE MUST BE UNDERTAKEN. THEY CONSIDER THAT SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATIONS WILL NOT/NOT TAKE PLACE UNTIL AFTER THE INF DEPLOYMENT. (YWGR2755 29NOV) (CONFD)

2. GRENADA: PERSPECTIVES AMERICAINES (WSHDC A LCR/URR/MINA)

L AMBASSADE RAPPORTE QUE LORS D UNE RENCONTRE LE 28NOV AVEC L AMBASSADEUR, LE SOUS-SECRETAIRE D ETAT MOTLEY A SOULIGNE QUE LA VASTE MAJORITE DE LA POPULATION DE LA GRENADA A ACCUEILLI L INTERVENTION AVEC ENTHOUSIASME. LES E.U. ESPERENT RETIRER LEURS TROUPES AUSSITOT QUE POSSIBLE; CEPENDANT, SELON M MOTLEY, LES PAYS DE L OECS, LA JAMAIQUE ET LA BARBADE NE SOUHAITENT VRAIMENT PAS/PAS LA PRESENCE D UNE FORCE DE MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX DU COMMONWEALTH, ESTIMANT QU ILS PEUVENT CONTROLER LA SITUATION EUX-MEMES. (UNGR2677 29NOV) (CONFD)

3. CIT INF FINCIT: RELATIONS EST-OUEST (BNATO A IDR)

LA DEL RAPPORTE QU AU COURS DE LA PRESENTATION DES E.U. AU CONSEIL DE L ATLANTIQUE NORD, M DAM A LAISSE ENTENDRE QU ON N A PAS/PAS A PREVOIR DE NOUVELLES INITIATIVES AMERICAINES A GENEV SANS CONSULTATION AU SEIN DE L ALLIANCE. IL A INVITE LES ALLIES DES E.U. A METTRE DE L AVANT LEURS IDEES. LA NORVEGE A SOULIGNE QU UNE INTERRUPTION EVENTUELLE DES NEGOCIATIONS DE GENEV NE DEVAIT PAS/PAS ...3

PAGE THREE CMRT0341 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

EMPECHER UN REGARD AU-DELA DE L HORIZON DE 1983 ET DE FAVORISER LA
POURSUITE DU DIALOGUE EST-OUEST SOUS SES AUTRES FORMES.L ALLEMAGNE
A FAIT APPEL A LA SOLIDARITE DE L ALLIANCE ET A LA POURSUITE DU
DIALOGUE AVEC MOSCO.(YBGR2453 09NOV)(CONFD)

4.COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVT MTG:POLITICAL ISSUES(PRMNY TO IMC)
THE MISSION REPORTS THE MTG OF CWLTH PERMREPS TO THE UN WITH THE
CWLTH SEC GEN TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE POLITICAL TOPICS AT THE UPCOMING
DELHI MTG REVIEWED CURRENT POLITICAL ISSUES INCLUDING GRENADA AND
FUNCTIONAL COOPERATION IN OTHER INNATL BODIES.HIGHLIGHTS INCLUDED
REFS TO PM TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE AND THE SECGENS IDEA FOR A COALITION
OF MIDDLE POWERS TO EXERT INFLUENCE ON THE SUPERPOWERS.(WKGR25457
08NOV)(RESTR)

5.COCOM LIST REVIEW:PHONE SWITCHING TECHNOLOGY(POECD TO FSE)
THE MISSION REPORTS THE USA PRESENTATION WAS DESIGNED TO SHOW THAT
THE APPLICATION OF THIS TECHNOLOGY TO WSAW PACT MILITARY
COMMUNICATIONS WOULD IMPROVE THEM GREATLY.THE DELS FROM THE UK AND
FRANCE DID NCT/NOT AGREE WITH THE USA CONTENTION THAT A CONSENSUS
HAS BEEN REACHED TO LIST SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THIS TECHNOLOGY AS TOO
SENSITIVE TO BE SUPPLIED TO PROSCRIBED AREAS(WFTD3960 09NOV)(CONFD)
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TO KWAIT DELIVER BY 120800

INFO AMMAN JEDDA LDN BERN PCOOTT/DURAND PMOOTT/JOHNSON

DISTR GRP GMR XDV

---PM'S VISIT TO GULF: BUSINESSMEN'S PORTION

WE ARE EXAMINING DIFFERENT POSSIBILITIES TO TRANSPORT APPROX 15 TO 25 SENIOR BUSINESSMEN WHO WOULD ATTEND 3 ROUND TABLE MEETINGS WITH PM TRUDEAU IN ABU DHABI 1300 HRS WED NOV 30, IN MUSCAT 1800 HRS FRIDAY DEC 2 AND IN KUWAIT 1530 HRS SATURDAY DEC 3.

2.WE HAVE ENQUIRED WITH ARAB WINGS IN AMMAN WHO CAN ONLY PROVIDE LEARJETS (8PASSENGERS) AND SABRELINERS (7PASSENGERS) COST PER PLANE FOR ABU DHABI-MUSCAT PORTION IS US DLRS 2765/2765 AND FOR MUSCAT-KUWAIT US DIRS 5500/5500.FUNDS FOR SUCH AN EXERCISE (IE A TRADE MISSION) COULD COME FROM GRP OR FROM BUSINESSMEN THEMSELVES.

3.GRATEFUL YOU AND INFO ADDRESSEES ADVISE US OF ANY LESS EXPENSIVE SUGGESTION YOU MAY HAVE.OTHER POSSIBILITY WOULD BE FOR GMT TO TELEX YOU FAIRLY ACCURATE LIST OF THOSE COMPANIES WHO WOULD HAVE ADVISED US (HOPEFULLY AS REQUESTED IN OUR OUT GOING TELEX) BY NOV 15 OF THEIR INTENTIONS AND FOR KUWAIT TO BLOCK APPROPRIATE NUMBER OF CONFIRMED FIRST CLASS SEATS ON REGULAR SCHEDULED AIRLINES,ALTHOUGH WE REALIZE THIS MAY BE DIFFICULT FOR MUSCAT-KUWAIT PORTION.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L


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TO LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU HAGUE
WSHDC TOKYO PEKIN CNGNY MOSCO DELHI DELIVER BY 110900
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB RGB RSD RCD IDD IDR IDA FPR

---PM INITIATIVE - PRESS GUIDANCE

PM WILL ANNOUNCE TO PRESS ON EXIT FROM 10 DOWNING STREET AT APPROX
1430 GMT THAT HE WILL BE REPORTING ON HIS TRAVELS AND ELABORATING
ON HIS PROPOSALS AT SPEECH IN MONTREAL SUNDAY. WE ARE THEREFORE
ANNOUNCING SAME SIMULTANEOUSLY IN OTTAWA, AND ADVISING PRESS THAT
COPIES WILL BE AVAILABLE ON SUNDAY AT APPROX 1230 OTTAWA TIME.
THERE WILL BE NO PRE-RELEASE. BACKGROUND PAPER AND PRESS GUIDANCE
BEING PREPARED FOR FORWARDING TO YOU TO ARRIVE SATURDAY. FINAL TEXT
WILL BE TELEXED AS SOON AS READY, LIKELY SATURDAY. SUMMARY IN ENGLISH
AND FRENCH WILL ALSO BE PREPARED AND SENT FOR ARRIVAL SUNDAY AM
LATEST. SPEECH IS SUBSTANTIVE AND WILL ANSWER MANY QUESTIONS THAT
THOSE JOURNALISTS WHO ARE SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN INITIATIVE HAVE
HAD. DISTRIBUTION AND BRIEFINGS SHOULD THEREFORE BE CARRIED OUT
WITH THIS IN MIND.

CCC/291 110106Z IDDZ0116



TEXT OF PRESENTATION BY
U.S. DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE DAM
TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
NOVEMBER 9, 1983

INTRODUCTION

--I AM GLAD TO HAVE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH YOU TODAY.

--AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE ALREADY VISITED THE CAPITALS OF SEVERAL OF THE GOVERNMENTS REPRESENTED HERE.

--THIS MEETING PERMITS ME TO CONSULT WITH ALL THE NATO-MEMBER GOVERNMENTS ON SEVERAL INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS THAT ARE OF CONCERN TO US ALL.

--MOST OF MY REMARKS CONCERN GRENADA BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THAT OUR ACTIONS THERE HAVE NOT/NOT BEEN WELL UNDERSTOOD IN EUROPE AND, TO SPEAK CANDIDLY, SOME ALLIED GOVERNMENTS FELT COMPELLED TO ACT BEFORE THEY COULD CONSIDER ALL THE ARGUMENTS AND ALL THE FACTS.

--I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO MAKE A FEW COMMENTS ABOUT INF AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

GRENADA

LEGAL AUTHORITY

--ON GRENADA, TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT, I SHOULD LIKE TO SET FORTH IN SOME DETAIL THE LEGAL BASES ON WHICH THE UNITED STATES ACTED.

--USA ACTIONS WERE GROUNDED IN THREE SOURCES OF LEGAL AUTHORITY:

--AN APPEAL BY GOVERNOR GENERAL SCOON FOR ACTION BY THE ORGANIZATION OF CARIBBEAN STATES (OACS) AND REGIONAL STATES;

--A REQUEST TO US BY THE OACS STATES TO ASSIST THEM IN RESPONDING TO THE GOVERNOR GENERAL'S APPEAL; AND

--PROTECTION OF USA NATIONALS.

--LET ME SKETCH OUT EACH OF THESE IN TURN.

GOVERNOR GENERAL'S APPEAL

--ON 24 OCT PRIME MINISTER ADAMS OF BARBADOS INFORMED US THAT GOVERNOR GENERAL SIR PAUL SCOON HAD USED A CONFIDENTIAL CHANNEL TO MAKE AN APPEAL FOR ACTION BY THE OACS AND OTHER REGIONAL STATES TO RESTORE ORDER IN GRENADA.

--WE WERE UNABLE TO CITE THIS APPEAL PUBLICLY UNTIL 26 OCT, WHEN

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PAGE CINO YBGR2454 CONF

THE GOVERNOR GENERALS SAFETY WAS ASSURED. THE GOVERNOR GENERAL WAS CONVINCED THAT ANY DIRECT AND OPEN CHALLENGE HE MIGHT MAKE TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL WOULD RESULT IN HIS DEATH.

SIR PAUL HAS SINCE CONFIRMED HIS APPEAL.

--WE BELIEVE THE LEGAL AUTHORITIES OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL REMAINED THE SOLE SOURCE OF GOVERNMENTAL LEGITIMACY ON GRENADA BECAUSE, FOLLOWING THE MURDERS ON 19 OCT, THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL DISSOLVED THE GOVERNMENT.

--THE RMC DID NOT/NOT CONSTITUTE A GOVERNMENT; IT DID NOT/NOT EVEN CLAIM TO BE ONE. NO/NO ONE KNEW HOW--OR WHEN--GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY WOULD BE REINSTITUTED.

--FOR THESE REASONS, WE AND THE OECS STATES ACCORDED THE GOVERNOR GENERALS APPEAL EXCEPTIONAL MORAL AND LEGAL WEIGHT.

OECS TREATY COLLECTIVE ACTION PROVISIONS

--SECOND, THE OECS STATES RESPONDED TO THE GOVERNOR GENERALS APPEAL UNDER THE 1981 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE ORGANIZATION.

--THESE ARTICLES DEAL WITH LOCAL AS WELL AS EXTERNAL THREATS TO PEACE AND SECURITY.

--BOTH THE OAS CHARTER AND THE UN CHARTER RECOGNIZE THE COMPETENCE OF REGIONAL SECURITY BODIES TO ENSURE PEACE AND STABILITY.

--THE OAS CHARTER STATES THAT ACTION PURSUANT TO A SPECIAL SECURITY TREATY DOES NOT/NOT CONSTITUTE INTERVENTION OR USE OF FORCE OTHERWISE PROHIBITED.

--MY SECOND POINT IS THIS: THE OECS ACTION WAS LAWFUL; IN TAKING

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PAGE SIX YBGR2454 CONF

LAWFUL ACTION THE OECS STATES WERE ENTITLED TO CALL UPON FRIENDLY STATES FOR ASSISTANCE. AND IT WAS LAWFUL FOR THE UNITED STATES, BARBADOS AND JAMAICA TO RESPOND.

PROTECTION OF USA NATIONALS

--THIRD, WE ACTED TO SECURE AND EVACUATE USA CITIZENS.

--THERE IS NO/NO REQUIREMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW COMPELLING A GOVERNMENT TO AWAIT A COMPLETE DETERIORATION OF ORDER OR ACTUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST ITS CITIZENS BEFORE TAKING ACTION.

--WE BELIEVE OUR CITIZENS WERE IN DANGER AND THAT WAITING LONGER WOULD HAVE PLACED A SUCCESSFUL RESCUE ACTION IN JEOPARDY.

--WE WERE NOT/NOT ABOUT TO COUNTENANCE ANOTHER IRAN HOSTAGE SITUATION.

NO/NO INTENTION TO SET BROAD PRECEDENT

--FINALLY, LET ME NOTE THAT WE HAVE NOT/NOT MADE, AND DO NOT/NOT INTEND TO ESTABLISH, ANY BROAD NEW PRECEDENT FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTION.

--THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS INSTANCE WERE UNIQUE. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR OUR ACTIONS WAS NARROWLY AND PRECISELY DRAWN AND WELL WITHIN ACCEPTED CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

WHAT WE HAVE FOUND SO FAR

--LET ME TURN NOW TO WHAT WE HAVE FOUND ON THE ISLAND.

--WE HAVE FOUND THE ORIGINAL TEXTS OF FIVE TREATIES GRENADA SIGNED DURING THE BISHOP REGIME--THREE WITH THE SOVIET UNION, ONE WITH CUBA AND ONE WITH NORTH KOREA. WE HAVE COPIES OF ALL FIVE

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FOR YOU.

--ALL FIVE TREATIES WERE SECRET.

--SECRECY WAS IMPORTANT TO ALL PARTIES INVOLVED--TO KEEP BOTH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE PEOPLE OF GRENADA UNAWARE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THESE MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS.

--TOGETHER THESE TREATIES PROVIDED FOR THE DONATION OF DLRS 37.8 MILLION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO GRENADA.

--UNDER THE SOVIET TREATIES GRENADA WAS TO RECEIVE:

270 SNIPER RIFLES

13,000 HAND GRENADES

50 ARMoured CARS

4,000 AUTOMATIC RIFLES

7,000 MINES

12,000 UNIFORMS.

--THE NORTH KOREAN TREATY PROVIDED SUCH ITEMS AS:

6,000 UNIFORMS

1,000 AUTOMATIC RIFLES

1,000 GAS MASKS

--THE TOTAL SOVIET AND NORTH KOREAN EQUIPMENT PACKAGE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN ADEQUATE TO EQUIP INTERNAL SECURITY FORCE OF APPROXIMATELY 500 MEN, A MILITIA FORCE OF ABOUT 1000 MEN AND AN ARMY OF SOME 10,000 MEN WELL ARMED WITH LIGHT AUTOMATIC AND ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, MORTARS AND A BATTALION OF 50 ARMoured PERSONNEL CARRIERS.

--THE CUBAN TREATY PROVIDES FOR 27 MILITARY SPECIALISTS TO BE

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ASSIGNED ON A PERMANENT BASIS. 9 OF THESE WERE TO SERVE ON THE GRENADA GENERAL STAFF. AN ADDITIONAL 12-13 SPECIALISTS WERE TO BE ASSIGNED ON A ROTATIONAL BASIS.

INVENTORY OF EQUIPMENT ON GRENADA

--WE HAVE NOT/NOT YET INVENTORIED ALL THE MILITARY EQUIPMENT WE HAVE FOUND OR NECESSARILY FOUND ALL THAT IS THERE.

--SO FAR, WE COUNTED:

OVER 20 THOUSAND AK-47S, LIGHT MACHINE GUNS AND OTHER SMALL ARMS;

MORE THAN FIVE MILLION ROUNDS OF SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION;

OVER 127 THOUSAND MORTAR ROUNDS OF VARIOUS CALIBERS;

OVER 6 THOUSAND ANTI-TANK ROCKETS;

MORE THAN 1400 GRENADES;

SOME 360 STICKS OF DYNAMITE AND MORE THAN 4 THOUSAND METERS OF DETONATING CORD;

2 ARMED PERSONNEL CARRIERS, A NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL WARFARE MOBILE WORKSHOP, AND FIVE OTHER MILITARY VEHICLES.

--YOU KNOW OF THE POINT SALINES AIRPORT, WHOSE 2900 METER RUNWAY WOULD ACCOMMODATE ALL CUBAN AND SOVIET AIRCRAFT.

--JUST EAST OF THE AIRPORT THERE HAD BEEN CONSTRUCTED THE CALVIGNY MILITARY FACILITY, WITH BARRACKS FOR 800-900 MEN AND A HARBOR APPROACH BEING ESTABLISHED.

--GRENADA ALSO HAD A 75,000 WATT RADIO TRANSMITTER WITH ENOUGH POWER TO COVER THE ENTIRE CARIBBEAN BASIN.

CURRENT AND FUTURE SITUATION

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PAGE NEUF YBGR2454 CONF

--LET ME COMMENT BRIEFLY ON THE CURRENT AND FUTURE SITUATION.

--HOSTILITIES ENDED ON 31OCT.

--SOVIET, EAST GERMAN, LIBYAN, BULGARIAN AND NORTH KOREAN PERSONNEL WERE EVACUATED ON 04NOV; REPATRIATION OF CUBAN DETAINEES BEGAN THE SAME DAY AND WAS ESSENTIALLY COMPLETED YESTERDAY. THE WOUNDED HAD BEEN EVACUATED EARLIER.

--WE ARE WITHDRAWING OUR TROOPS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE; THE MARINES AND RANGERS ARE OUT AND THE LEVEL OF AIRBORNE ARMY TROOPS IS NOW UNDER 3000.

--500 MILITARY ENGINEERS AND ADDITIONAL CIVILIAN AID SPECIALISTS HAVE GONE IN TO HELP RESTORE SERVICES AND REPAIR DAMAGE.

--THE GOVERNOR GENERAL HAS SAID THAT SOME SECURITY FORCE ADDITIONAL TO THE OECS CONTINGENT OF 300 WILL BE NEEDED DURING AN INTERIM PERIOD.

--THERE ARE A VARIETY OF POSSIBLE WAYS TO MEET THIS NEED. A COMMONWEALTH PRESENCE OF SOME KIND IS UNDER CONSIDERATION.

--OUR POLICY IN THESE MATTERS WILL BE GUIDED BY THE PREFERENCES OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL, THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT HE ESTABLISHES AND THE WISHES OF THE OECS STATES.

--THE GOVERNOR GENERAL HAS SAID THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT WILL CONSIST OF NON-POLITICAL ADMINISTRATORS. IT WILL GOVERN UNTIL ELECTIONS CAN BE HELD.

--THE GOVERNOR GENERAL HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THIS WILL BE AN OPEN
...10

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PROCESS. THE NEW JEWEL MOVEMENT, FOR EXAMPLE, IS NOT/NOT BEING DECLARED
ILLEGAL OR OTHERWISE RESTRICTED IN USE OF ITS CIVIL LIBERTIES.

--LET ME NOTE IN CONCLUDING MY REMARKS ON GRENADA THAT IT
APPEARS THAT THE JOINT OECS, CARIBBEAN AND USA ACTION WAS
SUPPORTED BY THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF GRENADIANS--91 PER CENT
ACCORDING TO A POLL CBS CONDUCTED ON THE ISLAND.

FINCIT.

CCC/054 091744Z YBGR2454

CONFIDENTIAL

November 11, 1983

GRENADA

Issue

The situation in Grenada and the prospects for a peacekeeping presence.

Background

Following the dramatic events of the past month in Grenada, highlighted by the murder of former Prime Minister Bishop and associates and the subsequent USA-led invasion of the island and the removal of the short-lived Revolutionary Military Council, the focus of attention is shifting to arrangements that will be necessary to ensure the orderly transition to democratic rule following the withdrawal of the occupying forces.

The first step in transitional arrangements was completed November 9 with the naming of the nine-person Interim Government, headed by Mr. Alister McIntyre, a distinguished Grenadian currently serving as Deputy Secretary General of UNCTAD. The Interim Government Ministers appear to be essentially apolitical technocrats and administrators as forecast by the Governor General, Sir Paul Scoon. It may be expected that some USA influence was felt in the selection by the Governor General of the interim regime, although McIntyre himself is reputed to be a man of independent judgement with no particular brief for the USA.

At the time of writing, Mr. McIntyre is in New York and the timing of his arrival in Grenada and swearing in are still not known. Hence, the questions of recognition and congratulating messages are not engaged.

The more controversial element of the post-withdrawal arrangements for Grenada concerns the establishment of some form of security system to fill the vacuum left by the departing troops. Commonwealth Secretary General Ramphal's proposal for a multinational Commonwealth presence is meeting with opposition from a number of quarters:

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- 2 -

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- a) the USA has expressed reservations about entrusting responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in Grenada to a group of third countries who did not participate in the "liberation" of the country;
- b) the Jamaican Government has indicated that it would prefer to see its own forces remain in Grenada until after elections are held there, partially, it would seem, to avoid the impression that Jamaican troops in any way played the role of an "aggressor" in Grenada, which might be suggested by a withdrawal in favour of "peace-keeping" forces;
- c) according to the USA, the OECS countries and Barbados similarly view their continued occupation of Grenada through the transitional period to elections as a legitimate extension of their role as "liberators";
- d) there are indications that some Latin American countries, notably Venezuela, are opposed to any transitional peacekeeping arrangement that include non-hemispheric countries and consequently view the Ramphal initiative with disfavour. In view of these objections, Ramphal himself now rates chances of a Commonwealth police force as less than 50-50. (In the circumstances, the prospects appear much lower than 50-50).

However, the interdiction of the Ramphal plan begs the question of how far and how long the USA writ will run in Grenada. Realpolitik suggests that, at the very least, the Ramphal plan is unlikely to be implemented while any significant military presence remains in Grenada. Even if it were possible, this would be in conflict with criteria which Ramphal has in mind and with which we have agreed.

On the other hand, McIntyre and his government may, within a relatively short period, become sensitive to criticisms, both in Grenada and outside, that they are subject to USA tutelage and may, in consequence, press for earlier withdrawal of the present occupying forces and their replacement by a police/paramilitary unit under Commonwealth auspices. Ramphal has raised the possibility,

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based on his contacts with McIntyre, of whether the latter will agree to continue with his new responsibilities if these conditions are not met, at least to the extent of transforming the role of the Jamaicans and Barbadians by having their soldiers withdrawn and replaced by police units invited in the company of other Commonwealth personnel.

Thus, we should not altogether discount the possibility of McIntyre asking for a Commonwealth presence organized under the auspices of the Commonwealth Secretary General. It is worth noting that the number two in the Interim Government, Mr. Nicholas Braithwaite, is a Commonwealth Youth Program Representative of Grenadian origin whom Ramphal sent to the island at CFTC expense and may, therefore, also think in Commonwealth Secretariat terms. Should a Commonwealth presence become a realistic option, it is very possible that, to be viable and acceptable to Grenada, the composition of the group would have to include "invader" as well as "non-invader" countries. This raises the question of whether such a group would be acceptable to Canada.

Canadian Position

Secretary General Ramphal has come to the view that the most likely option for a Commonwealth presence would be a Commonwealth Police Force comprised of Western Hemisphere participants only, i.e. Canada, Trinidad and Tobago, Bahamas, Jamaica and Barbados.

In the short term, it is likely that some form of Grenadian request for Canadian and other assistance will be received. In responding to these requests we shall have to take into consideration:

- a) the real and urgent requirements of Grenada and our ability to respond;
- b) our interest in contributing to a healing process in the Caribbean;
- c) concern not to take action which would be seen as undermining the authority and credibility of the Commonwealth;
- d) concern not to take action which could be construed as endorsing the invasion.

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- 4 -

CONFIDENTIAL

For example, we would wish to examine with particular caution any direct Grenadian requests involving military and para-military assistance.

USA Position

Senior State Department representatives have informed our Embassy in Washington that they see little role for Commonwealth presence in Grenada under the aegis of the Commonwealth Secretary General or the Commonwealth Secretariat. (Ramphal's personal credentials appear suspect among some USA officials, in part because of his close relations with non-aligned Commonwealth leaders and, in part, because of possibly unreasonable association of him with the Guyanese Government, whose actions over the Grenada invasion they resent).

This view seems to be shared by many of the US allies in the Eastern Caribbean. (Prime Minister Adams is reported as saying that "those who were not with us in the kitchen have no right to sit at the dining table"). The Americans are understandably leery of accepting any force or presence which would call into question -- by its character or mandate -- the legitimacy or justification of the invasion and are distrustful of a Commonwealth presence. While they seem to recognize the eventual necessity for some group to fill the vacuum following withdrawal of American forces, they would clearly prefer that this would be done by those countries which participated in the invasion (with police as opposed to military units) and/or by other acceptable countries acting individually and not as part of a formal Commonwealth exercise. The US clearly sees Canada in this category and the U.K. by offering police training assistance, has already moved in this direction.

We have learned, through Mr. Peter Dobell, that members of the U.S. congressional delegation, that recently visited Grenada, are recommending that the USA forces withdraw as quickly as possible and that an international constabulary force of between 300 and 800 men be sent in to maintain law and order and replace the Grenadian police who are "too politicized". This group would also provide training for a new Grenadian constabulary force. Dobell reports that the delegations (or at least, some leading members thereof) believe that Canada would be particularly well suited to perform this role.

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TALKING POINTS

1. While we have indicated our willingness to consider a contribution to an interim force in Grenada, our thinking thus far has been in a Ramphal/Commonwealth context. We would have to look very carefully at any role outside that context and would, of course, await a request from the new Government of Grenada.
2. We have an aid program already in place in Grenada with disbursements of \$1.6 million in 1982/83. Governor General Scoon has said to our High Commission that he is well disposed to the Canadian projects (essentially a cocoa rehabilitation plan, a central garage unit, and a port handling facility). We expect that these projects will be resuscitated very soon. We will consider additional requests sympathetically. We remain concerned to ensure that our aid to Grenada is not disproportionate to our aid to other equally poor islands of the Eastern Caribbean.

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- 2 -

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3. It is our view that is important to the future of both the McIntyre Government and the eventual elected Government that the process of democratization be seen to be taking place without the presence of "occupying troops". We have been encouraged by statements by the USA Administration that USA troops will leave promptly.
4. We are concerned by the sharp divisions which have developed within the Commonwealth Caribbean and are anxious to see what Ramphal has called "the healing process" pursued.

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000936

PM wins support in Belgium, Netherlands

By Joel Walker
Southam News

ROME — Prime Minister Trudeau, fresh from a sympathetic audience in Belgium and the Netherlands, may receive further encouragement for his peace initiative today, especially from Pope John Paul.

With the NATO deadline for the deployment of the first cruise and Pershing missiles fast approaching, Trudeau indicated he was looking beyond the unsuccessful Euromissile negotiations in Geneva to efforts in the new year which might improve the atmosphere for superpower dialogue.

His talks today with Italy's new Socialist Prime Minister Bettino Craxi may indicate whether this country, a strong supporter of NATO's two-track nuclear policy and preparing to install cruise missiles next month in Sicily, is as sympathetic as the Low Countries to his mission.

On Wednesday, Trudeau's day began in The Hague with a 45-minute audience with politically-active Queen Beatrix who had asked for the meeting.

In both Belgium and the Netherlands, the governments are under domestic pressure to reject the cruise missiles. The parliaments of both countries have yet to give final approval for the missiles' deployment in late 1984.

The idea of a pause in the cruise deployment, after the first stage of installations Britain and Italy, has been discussed in many NATO countries lately, but Trudeau denied in Brussels that there had been any discussion of such a pause or that anyone had yet raised it.

He also indicated that his proposal for a five-power conference to negotiate global limits on the strategic arsenals of Britain,



Dutch Queen Beatrix greets Trudeau in The Hague Wednesday

— UPI photo

France, China, as well as the U.S. and the Soviet Union, was "not central" to his initiative. It was the first time he had admitted this since talking with French President Francois Mitterrand, who opposes such negotiations.

Trudeau, who received an especially-warm welcome from Belgian Foreign Minister Leo Tindemans, reiterated that he had been developing the point he made in a recent speech on political and economic-building measures and

ways to move the two superpowers away from military confrontation toward regular and productive dialogue.

He admitted that the illness of Soviet President Yuri Andropov has been discussed in his talks, but since he has no plans to go to Moscow, it is not an immediate problem for him.

Tindemans said Trudeau has a special position as an international broker because he is neither an American nor a European.

Calling Trudeau's effort "an excellent one" Tindemans added "when he tries to improve East-West relations in a long-term perspective, I approve totally of what he is trying to do."

Trudeau, meanwhile, remained unwilling to reveal details of his proposals. Asked whether he felt the beginnings of a consensus after his meetings with leaders in France, the Netherlands and Belgium, the Prime Minister dodged the question.

Trudeau goes full circle with Pearson-style role

Pierre Trudeau is not the first Canadian statesman to encounter home-front skepticism when he sets out to do something useful on the world stage.

Nor is he the first to keep Canadians in the dark about what he is seeking to do, assuming that the Canadian credentials are his to use as he sees fit.

In what are remembered as the great days of Canadian diplomacy, Louis St. Laurent and Lester Pearson often operated that way, without consulting or even informing the Canadian electorate.

The most spectacular example occurred in 1956 when Pearson, with St. Laurent's backing, engineered a United Nations solution to the Suez crisis.

The "bad guys" in that one were Britain, France and Israel, ganging up on Egypt. Pearson cleared his skirts as an honest broker by proclaiming Canada's unwillingness to be "ready, aye, ready" at Britain's call. St. Laurent underlined the message by saying that the days of European supermen were over.

Pearson came out of that exercise with the Nobel Peace Prize, but he left a large portion of the Canadian electorate in shock, and the Liberal government went down to defeat the following year.

When Pierre Trudeau came to power 10 years later, he set out to remake Canadian foreign policy, after heated but inconclusive debate inside and outside Parliament.

Canada's military contribu-



Comment

Charles
Lynch

as prime minister, Trudeau tried to rectify his defence oversights by allocating increasingly massive sums to re-equipping the air, land and sea forces, and agreeing to let the U.S. test its cruise missile in Canadian airspace.

He stayed out of the anti-Soviet rhetoric over the suppression of Solidarity in Poland and the shooting down of the South Korean jetliner, and he muted his anti-U.S. feelings about the invasion of Grenada.

Thus equipped, he set out this week for Europe in the role of peacemaker and honest broker, hoping to restore a measure of détente between East and West, encouraged by evidence that he still had some credentials with the Soviets and their allies.

Thus Trudeau has come full circle from his initial rejection of Pearson-style diplomacy, and has, in the words of one commentator, "walked under Lester Pearson's hat."

There is skepticism at home, as there was in Pearson's time. That's a risk diplomats run when they get out in front of public opinion and don't tell their electors what they are trying to do, and how they propose to do it.

The risk is heightened when

Peace mission's chances for success slim: Pitfield

By Bert Hill
Citizen staff writer

Senator Michael Pitfield said Wednesday chances are "very slim" that Prime Minister Trudeau will be able to re-open dialogue between the East and the West on nuclear arms controls.

But Pitfield said countries such as Canada must continue to try, since nuclear war is a growing threat.

Pitfield said the prospects for avoiding nuclear war are terrible because communication between the superpowers has broken down.

"Only by an act of political will can we break out of the quicksands of confrontation that, increasingly, are sucking us towards extermination," he told the Ottawa Board of Trade.

Pitfield is chairman of the Ca-

nadian delegation at United Nations disarmament talks in New York.

He said the survival of the human race is in the hands of the superpowers but "they are not talking in Geneva, they are not talking in Vienna, they are not talking in New York and they are really not talking to each other anywhere."

However, he defended the decision to allow the testing of the cruise missile in Canada, saying he is "quite satisfied that the cruise missile is not a first-strike weapon, that it is a defensive weapon."

Pitfield said: "disarmament is not an issue that belongs to the Right or Left. It belongs to all mankind. It deserves the strong support of the center where most of us stand."

Trudeau goes full circle with Pearson-style role

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When Pierre Trudeau came to power 10 years later, he set out to remake Canadian foreign policy, after heated but inconclusive debate inside and outside Parliament.

Canada's military contribution to the NATO alliance was cut in half, and a new philosophy of defence was announced, giving priority to the surveillance of Canada's own territory and coastlines, under the heading of sovereignty.

Next to home defence came the defence of North America, followed by fulfilment of diminished NATO commitments and finally the performance of whatever international peace-keeping roles might turn up.

Since then, Trudeau's global priorities have ranged all over the map — his attention wavered from the Communist bloc to the Pacific rim to Latin America, and he actually forged something he called a contractual link with Western Europe.

His "third option" tried to diminish Canada's economic, cultural and military dependence on the United States, but the "American fact" increased in importance, year by year.

And year by year, the Canadian forces were permitted to run down, in terms of equipment and morale, to where they could neither play a meaningful role in Europe nor pretend to be standing on guard at home.

During his fourth mandate



Comment

Charles Lynch

as prime minister, Trudeau tried to rectify his defence oversights by allocating increasingly massive sums to re-equipping the air, land and sea forces, and agreeing to let the U.S. test its cruise missile in Canadian airspace.

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There is skepticism at home, as there was in Pearson's time. That's a risk diplomats run when they get out in front of public opinion and don't tell their electors what they are trying to do, and how they propose to do it.

The risk is heightened when the would-be savior of the peace is on the political ropes, as Trudeau is today.

And that brings out the sarcastic side of Trudeau, as witness his little outburst in Brussels after Belgian Foreign Minister Leo Tindermans had flattered him by saying he was the ideal peacekeeper because he was neither a European nor an American.

Those are not unique credentials in a world that includes Africa, Asia, Latin America and way points, but when a man is promoting peace, every little boost helps. Yet Trudeau vented his spleen on reporters, saying with curled lip that "people know I like to strut on the international stage and that my standing in the polls is quite low, and that I'm really here in order to enjoy the great gastronomic events."

The heat in the global kitchen is intense, which is one reason Trudeau set out on his cooling mission. The way of the peacemaker is hard, as the Bible proclaims, and Trudeau shouldn't take his eyes off his main objective just because the home front isn't cheering him on. Especially when he won't tell us what he's proposing, in Canada's name.

Peace mission's chances for success slim: Pitfield

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Aide denies Mulroney will abolish NEP

...en news services
An aide to Brian Mulroney said Wednesday the Tory leader made a Calgary speech Tuesday that did not intend to say that a Conservative government would "dismantle" the national energy program.
Mulroney was quoted as saying, "With a majority Progressive Conservative government, you've seen the last of the confiscation and punitive provisions of the NEP. I guarantee you that."
The report that Mulroney intended to abolish the national energy plan was a hot topic Wednesday at an Ottawa meeting held to promote oil industry nationalism. It flared into a shouting match after Conservative MP

Paul Dick appeared to contradict Mulroney when he said the party would likely retain some elements of the federal program, reject others and then change the program's name.
Dick's comments prompted a flurry of shouts from members of the Committee for the Canadianization of the Petroleum Industry, who accused the MP of avoiding a stand on the issue.
Energy Minister Jean Chrétien, invited to the luncheon meeting with Dick and New Democrat Ray Skelly, had told reporters earlier he would welcome an election fight over the government's energy policy.
Dick said the Tories have supported the goals of self-sufficiency

and Canadian ownership since 1978, when policy was being developed for the 1979 election campaign.
"I want to make it clear that our party has always been in favor of Canadianization," added Dick, member for the Ontario riding of Lanark-Renfrew-Carleton and Tory deputy House leader.
Chrétien stayed at the meeting half an hour past his schedule, as members of the committee, primarily farmers, union representatives and ordinary citizens, prolonged the argument with Dick.
The energy minister joined the fight several times. Dick at one point had to yell at Chrétien so he could be heard. "Be fair Jean,

listen to what I said," he implored after Chrétien — reminding Dick's suggestion that the Tories might change little more than the title of the energy program — said the Liberals were interested in policy substance.
Robert Laxer, the committee chairman, predicted the report that Mulroney would dismantle the energy program would become a major election issue.
But Skelly, repeating New Democrat pledges of support for more Canadian participation in the petroleum industry, said the Tories do not need to develop policy for the campaign because of the party's high standing in public opinion polls.


Trafficking trial sees videotape of drug suspect

MONTREAL (CP) — The jury in the drug trafficking trial of Henri Marchessault, former head of the city police drug squad, saw a videotape Wednesday of the former detective handling cakes of a dark substance and a white powder in the drug squad vault.
"We see Marchessault removing four cakes of hashish and taking some white powder from each of five bags," Det.-Sgt. Jacques Duchesneau, a Montreal police drug specialist, testified before the videotape was shown.
Justice Gerald Ryan of Quebec Superior Court emphasized that Duchesneau's testimony constituted an opinion.
Earlier witnesses testified that hashish and cocaine seized in other cases were stored in the vault until they were no longer needed as evidence. The drugs are supposed to be burned in incinerators after leaving the vaults.
The jury of six women and six men watched clear images of Marchessault working in the vault. The video was taken March 19 by a hidden camera installed in the ceiling of the vault by RCMP Cpl. Robert Lanthier.
"This was not the first time I've installed a camera and nobody has ever found one yet," Lanthier said.
Marchessault faces 10 counts, including theft, possession, trafficking and conspiracy to sell a total of 36 kilograms of hashish and 184 grams of cocaine. The 25-year veteran of the force, who will be 45 in two weeks, was fired soon after his arrest March 21.
The charges allege that on March 19, 1983, Marchessault stole eight kilograms of hashish and the 184 grams of cocaine. The rest was allegedly taken earlier.
The videotape was shot at two frames a second, making the image jerky when played back. But the lighting in the vault was good and Marchessault, with his balding head and bulky frame, could clearly be seen taking a large knife to cut the heavy tape that sealed two boxes containing two-kilogram cakes of what Duchesneau described as hashish. "He took four round cakes of hashish," Duchesneau said.
He removed two cakes from each box and resealed the boxes with tape in a smooth operation. Then, in a longer process, "five bags of white powder are handled and parts of each bag are used to fill a sixth bag that Marchessault took out of the vault," Duchesneau

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
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
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
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
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IVANS DRAFT SPEECH FLOWS WELL, MAKES SOME
EXCELLENT POINTS AND WILL BE A USEFUL CONTRIBUTION TO
SPEECH III.

HOWEVER THERE IS ONE IMPORTANT IDEA WHICH DOES
NOT/NOT WITHSTAND ANALYSIS AND WEAKENS THE WHOLE. PAGE 4,
SECOND FULL PARA IN EFFECT MAKES THE QUOTE WINDOW OF
VULNERABILITY UNQUOTE ARGUMENT FOR BOTH SIDES. SCOWCROFT AND
OTHERS HAVE SAID THAT THERE IS NO/NO SUCH WINDOW OF
VULNERABILITY FOR THE US BECAUSE THE SUBMARINE LAUNCHED
AND BOMBER(AIRBORNE ALERT)LAUNCHED FORCES ARE INVULNERABLE
AND ARE SUFFICIENT TO DESTROY AN ADVERSARY MANY TIMES
OVER. THUS A PRE-EMPTIVE ATTACK BY EITHER SIDE AGAINST THE
LAND BASED ICBMS OF THE OTHER IS DETERRED NOW, AS IT HAS
BEEN FOR YEARS, BY THE CERTAINTY OF AN UNACCEPTABLY
DESTRUCTIVE RESPONSE. THIS ARGUMENT APPLIES EQUALLY TO PAGE
2, QUOTE THAT IS NO/NO LONGER THE CASE UNQUOTE.

THOUGH THE PERSHING II IS NOT/NOT NAMED IT IS
CHARACTERISED BY IMPLICATION AS TERRIBLY DESTABILISING, QUOTE
THIS KIND OF FORCE POSTURE IS MADNESS UNQUOTE(PAGE 4). THE
PM WOULD NOT/NOT WISH TO MAKE SUCH A STATEMENT, GIVEN HIS FIRM
SUPPORT FOR PERSHING DEPLOYMENTS.

...2

PAGE TWO PC01270 CONF NO/NO DISTRIBUTION

THERE IS A MINOR ERROR, BOTTOM OF PAGE 11, CANADA
IS ONE OF FIVE (BELGIUM, UK, FRANCE, US) NOT/NOT ONE OF
THREE WHO PERMANENTLY STATION TROOPS IN WEST GERMANY.

AS A COMPLETE SPEECH, THE MAJOR WEAKNESS IN OUR
VIEW STEMS FROM THE VERY STRENGTH AND ELOQUENCE OF THE
TEXT. AS ONE READS, THE INEVITABLE QUESTION ARISES: WHAT IS
TO BE DONE? THE ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION MUST BE INFERRED,
EXCEPT FOR THE SPECIFIC STATEMENTS THAT CANADA WILL INCREASE
SPENDING ON VERIFICATION MEASURES, AND WILL ALSO ADVOCATE
QUOTE JAW-JAW RATHER THAN WAR WAR UNQUOTE. SOMETHING MORE
THAN THAT SEEMS NECESSARY TO COMPLETE A SPEECH WHICH SO
ELOQUENTLY STATES OUR CURRENT PREDICAMENT.

IN SUM, A USEFUL BEGINNING FOR WORK ON
SPEECH III. BUT NOT/NOT YET SPEECH III ITSELF.

CCC/001 092039Z PC01270

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM HAGUF YWGR0755 09NOV83

TO FXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 091400

ROMF PMDEL DELIVER BY 100900

INFO PMDEL IMMED PCOOTT/FOWLER LDN BONN BRU MOSCO IARIS BNATO

NDHOOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPD WSHDC PRMNY GENEV

DISTR MINA USS DMF WGB IFB IDD IDR IFB IDA RGV RCD RSR RSD RCF RBR

---PM INITIATIVE ON EAST/WEST RELNS: MTGS IN HAGUE

SUMMARY:

MTGS IN HAGUE WENT EXTREMELY WELL. PM LUBBERS MET PM TRUDEAU AT AIRPORT AND ACCOMPANIED TO GUEST HOUSE WHERE FRIENDLY AND LIVELY EXCHANGES CONTINUED MOST OF EVENING AND EARLY NEXT MORNING. BOTH PM LUBBERS AND FM VAN DEN BROEK SHARED CDN CONCERNS ABOUT PRESENT STATE OF EAST-WEST RELNS. HAD SOME DIFFERING DIAGNOSES ABOUT CAUSES OF PRESENT TENSIONS. AGREED SOMETHING NEEDED TO BE DONE TO IMPROVE SITUATION, THOUGH MOST APPROPRIATE TIMING WOULD BE AFTER DEPLOYMENT HAD BEGUN. BROADLY SUPPORTED PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY IM TRUDEAU AND ENCOURAGED HIM TO PROCEED WITH MISSION. NO/NO REPORT YET AVAILABLE ON CONVERSATION WITH QUEEN BEATRIX.

...2

28-6-1- Trudeau Place
6 Mission

PAGE TWO YWGR0755 CONF

2.REPORT:MTGS WITH PM LUBBERS AND FM VAN DEN BROEK TOOK PLACE IN RELAXED AND TRANQUIL SETTING OF PMS OFFICIAL RESIDENCE, WITH NEARLY THREE HOURS OF LIVELY AND OCCASIONALLY VERY FRANK DISCUSSION OVER DRINKS AND DINNER ON NOV08.THE TWO PMS MET FOR TETE A TETE OVER BREAKFAST NOV09 WITH INTENTION OF TRYING TO PULL TOGETHER SOME OF THREADS OF PREVIOUS EVENINGS DISCUSSION.SINCE NO/NO OFFICIAL WAS WITH PM FOR BREAKFAST MTG OR FOR SUBSEQUENT MTG WITH QUEEN BEATRIX,THIS TEL WILL NEED TO BE SUPPLEMENTED BY REPORT ON DEBRIEFING FROM IM DEL. THIS TEL NOT/NOT SEEN BY PM DEL BEFORE DEPARTURE.

3.SINCE BOTH PM LUBBERS AND FM VAN DEN BROEK HAD OBVIOUSLY READ CAREFULLY PM TRUDEAUS LETTER AND GUELPH SPEECH, IT WAS NOT/NOT NECESSARY FOR CDN PM TO REPEAT MESSAGE IN DETAIL.RATHER, DISCUSSION MOVED OVER VARIETY OF EAST/WEST ISSUES AND PERHAPS FOCUSED MORE ON ANALYSIS THAN ON FUTURE COURSES OF ACTION. DUTCH INTERLOCUTORS WERE CLEARLY VERY RESPONSIVE TO PM TRUDEAUS CONCERNS AND SHARED MANY OF HIS PERCEPTIONS.SOME PARTS OF THEIR ANALYSIS LED THEM IN SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS THAN CDN ANALYSIS.THERE WAS BROAD AGREEMENT HOWEVER ON NEED FOR ACTION TO IMPROVE EAST/WEST DIALOGUE AND TO TAKE SPECIFIC INITIATIVES ALTHOUGH TIMING WAS SEEN TO BE IMPORTANT.

...3

PAGE THREE YWGR0755 CONF

4. DUTCH REACTIONS TO PM TRUDEAU'S MESSAGE NEED TO BE SEEN IN FOLLOWING CONTEXT WHICH CAME OUT CLEARLY DURING EXCHANGES. FIRST DUTCH GOVT HAS NO/NOT YET TAKEN FINAL DECISION ON INF DEPLOYMENT IN COUNTRY AND PM LUBBERS HIMSELF HAS DOUBTS ABOUT NUCLEAR ROLE ASSIGNED TO NETHS AND NEED TO STATION NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN COUNTRY HE ASKED HOW CDA HAD GOT AROUND ISSUE.). SECOND THERE ARE DIFFERENCES OF VIEW BETWEEN PM LUBBERS AND FM VAN DEN BROEK WITH LATTER BEING MORE HAWKISH IN ATTITUDE TO SOVIET UNION. THIRD, THERE IS TRADITIONAL DUTCH CAUTION IN WANTING TO WEIGH ISSUES VERY CAREFULLY BEFORE TAKING DECISIONS OR MAKING COMMITMENTS.

5. DUTCH ANALYSIS OF CURRENT SITUATION LED PM LUBBERS TO MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS, NOT/NOT ALL OF WHICH ARE SELF-CONSISTENT:

A) IN TIMES OF ECONOMIC DIFFICULTY SUCH AS EUROPEAN COUNTRIES CONTINUE TO FACE, POPULATIONS WILL RESPECT THOSE LEADERS WHO ACT TOUGH (THATCHER IN FALKLANDS OR REAGAN IN GRENADA) AND DO NOT/NOT GIVE IN TO BULLYING TACTICS FROM USSR. THERE IS SWING TO GREATER CONSERVATISM IN EUROPE. EVEN IN NETHS THE INTERNATIONALISM OF PAST DECADES HAS BEEN WEAKENING IN TERMS OF BOTH NORTH/SOUTH AND EAST/WEST). THUS ONE SHOULD NOT/NOT THINK OF EUROPE AS BEING MORE PACIFIST THAN IN PAST AND LOOKING FOR DEALS WITH SOVIET UNION.

...4

PAGE FOUR YWGR0755 CONF

B) DUTCH ANALYSIS OF SITUATION IN MOSCOW DOES NOT/NOT LEAD THEM TO HAVE PARTICULAR CONCERN ABOUT GROWING MILITARY INFLUENCE OR LOSS OF CONTROL BY CIVILIANS. RATHER THEY SEEM SOVIET GOVT AS HAVING BACKED SELF INTO CORNER THROUGH PROPAGANDA AND IT WOULD TAKE TIME FOR MOSCOW TO SET NEW COURSE. RUSSIANS HAD TO BE FIRST CONVINCED THAT EUROPEAN PEACE MOVEMENTS WOULD NOT/NOT SOLVE RUSSIAN PROBLEMS IN EUROPE.

C) FACT THAT SALT 2 HAD NO/NOT BEEN RATIFIED BY AMERICAN CONGRESS TENDED TO SHOW THAT EVEN RATIONAL AND BALANCED AGREEMENTS REACHED WITH MOSCOW COULD NOT/NOT ALWAYS BE IMPLEMENTED IN WEST.

D) RUSSIANS AS WELL AS AMERICANS WERE HARDBALLING IT IN GENEV TALKS AND IT WAS MOST UNLIKELY NOW THAT THESE WOULD LEAD ANYWHERE IN SHORT TERM. IT WAS ALREADY TOO LATE TO STOP INF DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE. BRITAIN, FRG AND ITALY WOULD GO AHEAD THOUGH NOT/NOT FOR TIME BEING AT LEAST NETHS AND BELGIUM). IT WAS ALSO PSYCHOLOGICALLY IMPORTANT FOR THE USA TO HAVE EVIDENCE THAT EUROPEAN ALLIES WERE PREPARED TO GO AHEAD WITH DEPLOYMENT.

F) NATO WAS IMPORTANT TO NETHS AND HAD BROAD SUPPORT FROM DUTCH PEOPLE. QUESTION WAS WHETHER NATO COULD BE MORE THAN A MILITARY ALLIANCE FOR DEFENCE AND HAVE BROAD POLITICAL ROLE IN PROMOTION OF EAST/WEST RELNS. (HERE THERE WERE OBVIOUS

...5

PAGE FIVE YWGR0755 CONF

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FM LUBBERS AND FM VAN DEN BROEK, WITH
FORMER IMPLYING POLITICAL COOPERATION AND DIALOGUE WITH
SOVIET UNION HAD TO TAKE PLACE OUTSIDE NATO WHILE LATTER
THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE AND INDEED ESSENTIAL TO BUILD UP
POLITICAL COOPERATION WITHIN NATO).

F) IMPORTANT EARLY STEP IN NETHS VIEW WOULD BE TO IMPROVE
CONSULTATION PROCESS BETWEEN EUROPE AND UNITED STATES.
GRENADA INCIDENT HAD COME AS SHOCK AND SHOWED DISARRAY IN
ALLIANCE WHICH NEEDED TO BE HEALED.

6. THESE TYPES OF POINTS, WHICH WERE SPREAD THROUGHOUT
CONVERSATION, SEEMED TO LEAD DUTCH INTERLOCUTORS TO TWO
CONCLUSIONS IN RESPONSE TO PMS GENERAL PRESENTATION: YES,
THERE WAS NEED FOR EFFORT BY MIDDLE POWERS TO PROMOTE
BETTER DIALOGUE BETWEEN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON AND TO EASE
TENSIONS; TIME FOR SUCH INITIATIVE WOULD BE POSSIBLY NEXT
SPRING, NOT/NOT EARLIER.

7. MAIN REASON FOR SUCH DEFERRAL OF ACTION OR EVEN SENDING
OF CLEAR SIGNAL TO MOSCOW, IN DUTCH VIEW, WAS INF DEPLOYMENT
ISSUE. IT WAS ALREADY TOO LATE TO STOP IT. IN FM LUBBERS
VIEW ANYTHING WHICH HELPED DEPLOYMENT WAS GOOD AND ANYTHING
WHICH HINDERED IT SHOULD BE AVOIDED. RUSSIANS WOULD
PROBABLY WITHDRAW FROM GENEV. TWO SIDES WOULD NEED TO
REFLECT ON IMPASSE. ONLY THEN INITIATIVE TO BRING SIDES

...6

PAGE SIX YWGR0755 CONF

TOGETHER WOULD BE INVALUABLE. FM VAN DEN BROEK IN PARTICULAR INTERVENED SEVERAL TIMES TO STATE HE DID NOT/NOT SHARE PESSIMISM OF THOSE WHO THOUGHT DEPLOYMENT WOULD MAKE FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS IMPOSSIBLE. QUOTE LET DEPLOYMENT BEGIN UNQUOTE WAS HIS THEME, MEANING TIME TO NEGOTIATE FURTHER WITH RUSSIANS WOULD BE DURING PERIOD AFTER SITING OF PERSHING AND CRUISE MISSILES IN BRITAIN, FRG AND ITALY BUT BEFORE NETHS AND BELGIUM.

8. WILL NOT/NOT IN THIS TEL ATTEMPT TO SUMMARIZE POINTS MADE BY PM TRUDEAU SINCE THEY WERE VARIATIONS ON THEMES KNOWN TO YOU. HE REPLIED TO DUTCH QUESTIONS ELEGANTLY AND EFFECTIVELY AND GENTLY STEERED CONVERSATION INTO POSSIBILITIES OF ACTION PROGRAM FOR FUTURE. IN PROCESS HE STRESSED CDN COMMITMENT TO NATO AND TWO-TRACK DECISION, NEED FOR POLITICIANS TO GIVE GREATER ATTENTION AND GUIDANCE TO EAST-WEST TALKS, RATIONALE FOR QUOTE THIRD RAIL UNQUOTE, AND REASONS FOR CDN CONCERN ABOUT PRESENT SITUATION. BOTH FM LUBBERS AND FM VAN DEN BROEK REACTED WARMLY TO HIS PRESENTATION AND FORMER REMARKED AFTERWARDS HOW MUCH HE HAD ENJOYED CUT AND THRUST OF EXCHANGES.

9. SORTS OF CONCLUSIONS WHICH WERE REACHED SEEMED TO BE ALONG FOLLOWING LINES.

...7

PAGE SEVEN YWGR0755 CONF

A) A) NETHS VERY MUCH WELCOMED GENERAL INITIATIVE BY PM TRUDFAU AND HOPED HE WOULD GO AHEAD WITH IT AFTER CONSULTATION WITH OTHER EUROPEAN PARTNERS. PM LUBBERS AGREED WITH PM TRUDEAU THAT NO/NO OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO WAS LIKELY TO HAPPEN UNLESS THEY HELPED TO MAKE IT HAPPEN.

B) MBFR NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA SHOULD BE TAKEN MORE SERIOUSLY AND EFFORT MADE TO GET THEM OUT OF QUOTE HAIR-SPLITTING, ACCOUNTANCY UNQUOTE STAGE. SOVIET UNION HAD MADE NO/NOT UNREASONABLE PROPOSITION AND THIS SHOULD BE REPLIED TO SUBSTANTIVELY. IF WE CANNOT/NOT MOVE LEVELS DOWN IN MBFR THEN WE WILL HAVE TO MOVE UP TO MATCH USSR AND THIS WOULD BE COSTLY AND UNPOPULAR. WE EITHER HAVE TO KILL MBFR OR ELSE TRY ONE LAST POLITICAL IMPULSE.

C) STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CDE SHOULD ALSO BE SUBJECT OF POLITICAL GUIDANCE FROM MINISTERSCHFYSSON HAD SAID HE AND OTHER EUROPEAN MINISTERS WOULD ATTEND AND POSSIBLY SCHULZ IF OTHERS DID) AND DELEGATIONS SHOULD GO TO STOCKHOLM WITH CLEAR POLITICAL STRATEGY IN MIND.

D) PM LUBBERS WAS MILDLY SUPPORTIVE OF IDEA OF FIVE NUCLEAR POWER CONFERENCE AND ASKED ABOUT MITTERRANDS RESPONSE. HE DID NOT/NOT BELIEVE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES WOULD WANT TO ACCEPT MONOPOLY OF FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS OR ACCEPT A SELF-LIMITATION ON HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION SO LONG AS THE FIVE DID NOT/NOT ACCEPT ADEQUATE VERIFICATION PROCEDURES FOR THEMSELVES.

...8

PAGE EIGHT YWGR0755 CONF

E)EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO GIVE BROADER POLITICAL INPUT
TO NATO.AFTER WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION ON PROPER ROLE
OF NATO THERE SEEMED TO BE CONSENSUS WITH PM TRUDEAU'S SUMMARY
THAT WHILE NATO SHOULD NOT/NOT BE ALL OUR FOREIGN POLICY IN
EAST-WEST RELNS, IT SHOULD HAVE IMPORTANT ROLE IN POLICY AS
WELL AS OPERATIONAL ASPECTS.CERTAIN POLITICAL QUESTIONS
HOWEVER HAD TO BE KEPT OUTSIDE NATO TO ALLOW EXPRESSIONS
OF DIFFERING VIEWS WITHOUT BEING SEEN AS DISLOYAL TO
WESTERN UNITY.

10.THESE CONCLUSIONS MAY WELL OF COURSE HAVE BEEN EXPANDED
OR MADE MORE SPECIFIC THE NEXT MORNING.

SMITH

CCC/029 091637Z YWGR0755

DATE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR4105 08NOV83

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ

INFO LDN PARIS WSHDC BONN ROME HAGUE BRU BNATO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RBR IDD IDA RBD RBF

REF MYTFL XYGR4102 04NOV

---PM INITIATIVE

IN REFTTEL I NEGLECTED TO SAY THAT I TOLD RYZHOV LEVEL AT WHICH
EMISSARY WOULD WANT TO HAVE HIS DISCUSSIONS. WHAT I SAID EXACTLY
WAS THAT HE(OR SHE) WOULD WISH TO MEET, IN ADDITION TO RYZHOV AND
HIS COLLEAGUES (WHOM I COULD NOT/NOT VERY WELL IGNORE) GROMYKO AND
PERSONS AT POLITICAL LEVEL IN CENTRAL CTTEE SECRETARIAT AND ON
ANDROPOVS STAFF. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT LEVEL OF RECEPTION WAS IMPORTANT
FOR US. RYZHOV MADE NO/NO COMMENT.

2. ON 07NOV AT KREMLIN RECEPTION I SAW SUSLOV (HEAD OF SECOND
EUROPPAN DEPT MFA). HE TOLD ME THAT LET HAD BEEN DELIVERED AND THAT
THERE WOULD BE REPLY WITHIN FEW DAYS.

3. PRAVDA OF 06NOV ANNOUNCED THAT 05NOV GROMYKO HAD RECEIVED
MEXICAN AMB WHO HAD DELIVERED LET FROM MEXICAN PRESIDENT TO
ANDROPOV. ACCORDING TO PRAVDA THERE WAS EXCHANGE ON INTERNATL MATTERS,
INCLUDING GRENADA ABOUT WHICH TWO COUNTRIES HAD IDENTICAL VIEWS.
MEXICAN AMB IS SAID TO HAVE EXPRESSED HIGH OPINION OF SOV
INITIATIVE ON INF. I DO NOT/NOT THINK WE NEED FEEL OUR NOSES
OUT OF JOINT THAT PMS LET WAS DELIVERED AT LOWER LEVEL AND WITHOUT

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28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
Mission

PAGE TWO XYGR4105 CONF

PUBLICITY. MEXICAN LET UNDOUBTEDLY DEALT WITH GRENADA AND SOVS WOULD
WANT TO EXPLOIT OCCASION TO REINFORCE THEIR PUBLIC POSITION ON
THAT SUBJ

ROBERTS

CCC/144 081130Z XYGR4105

28-6-1-Thudon Peace
Mission

4.

Dear Peace
Mission

LIDAC

Year	Percentage
1950	7
1960	8
1970	9
1980	10
1990	11
2000	12
2010	13
2020	14
2030	15
2040	16
2050	18

DUTCH HAVE INDEED NOW APPROACHED US, SUGGESTING THAT OUR TRADITIONAL
FIZZ RSLN BE STRENGTHENED ALONG LINES INDICATED PARA 2 YOUR REFTTEL
IE, THAT SEC GEN BE ASKED TO PREPARE STUDY ON QUOTE TECHNICAL
POSSIBILITIES AND DIFFICULTIES UNQUOTE OF FIZZ. DUTCH HAD NOT/NOT
YET RECEIVED REPORT FROM THEIR MISSION OTT ON CONVERSATION REPORTED
YOUR REFTTEL. WE REITERATED CONSIDERATIONS PARA 3 YOUR REFTTEL, ADDING
THAT EVIDENCE WAS NOT/NOT CONCLUSIVE THAT PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL
MEASURES COULD ALWAYS BE FORWARDED BY MEANS OF UN STUDIES; AND THAT
WE DOUBTED THAT FIZZ COULD BE ADVANCED IN SUCH A MANNER, PARTICULARL
AT THIS STAGE.

3.WF THEN TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO SEEK TRADITIONAL DUTCH SUPPORT FOR
FIZZ RESLN ALONG USUAL LINES.

3.TEXT OF RSLN,WHICH IS IDENTICAL TO THAT OF LAST YEAR WITH MINOR EDITORIAL CHANGES,BY FAX OT IDA ONLY).WILL BE CIRCULATING THIS TEXT TO BARTON GROUP MTG TOMORROW PM.

CCC/265 090001Z WKGR2454



C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDA1253 04NOV83

TO CANDELNY

INFO HAGUE GENEV BNATO CANMILREPNATO WSHDC MOSCO PARIS LDN VMPFR
VIAEA CNBRA DELHI ISBAD BGRAD STKHM TOKYO NDHQOTT/DNACPOL/ORAF
DISTR IDD IDR IMU ETN IDAO LDAN IDDZ RSD RSR

---UNGA 38:AGENDA ITEM 62(H):FIZZ-DUTCH PROPOSAL

DUTCH MFA HAS INSTRUCTED THEIR REPS TO APPROACH IDA AND CANDELNY
WITH SUGGESTION TO STRENGTHEN PRESENT CDN FIZZ RESOLUTION. AS
RESOLUTION COSPONSOR, DUTCH FEEL THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO PROGRESS
ON FIZZ SINCE 1978. THEY BELIEVE THAT TREATY WITH MUTUALLY VERIFIABLE
CEILING ON PRODUCTION OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL FOR WEAPONS PURPOSES
MAY BE POSSIBLE EVEN THOUGH NOT IN FORESEEABLE FUTURE. VERIFICATION
THROUGH IAEA SAFEGUARD SYSTEM WLD PRESENT DIFFICULT BUT SOLVABLE
PROBLEMS. DUTCH SUGGEST THAT EFFORT SHLD BE MADE TO STRENGTHEN
RESOLUTION BECAUSE OF TWO DEVELOPMENTS: (A) DUTCH, WITH REASON,
ANTICIPATE THAT 1985 THIRD NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE WILL BE DIFFICULT
WITH CRITICISM BEING LEVELLED AGAINST NWS FOR LACK OF PROGRESS
ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. CRITICISM CLD BE PARTIALLY DEFLATED WITH
ACTIVE NEGOTIATIONS ON ISSUES SUCH AS FIZZ. THERE WLD BE LINK
BETWEEN NPT ARTICLES ON SAFEGUARDS (ARTICLE THREE) AND NUCLEAR
ARMS LIMITATIONS (ARTICLE SIX). (B) DUTCH SUGGEST THAT THERE HAS
BEEN PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN SOVIETS AND IAEA ON SAFEGUARDS

...2

PAGE TWO IDA1253 CONF

FOR SOME SOVIET NUCLEAR FACILITIES. FURTHERMORE USSR HAS SHOWN SOME INTEREST IN FIZZ ALTHOUGH IN LARGER DISARMAMENT CONTEXT. AS WELL, CONCEPT HAS APPEARED IN VARIOUS FREEZE RESOLUTIONS.

2. DUTCH SUGGEST THAT, AS PART OF RESOLUTION, SEGGEN BE ASKED TO PREPARE STUDY ON QUOTE TECHNICAL POSSIBILITIES AND DIFFICULTIES UNQUOTE OF FIZZ. STUDY SHLD BE PREPARED BY NON-GOVT EXPERTS AS THEY WLD BE MORE FLEXIBLE THAN GOVT EXPERTS EVEN THOUGH PRIVY TO LESS INFORMATION.

3. WE POINTED OUT THAT CDN FIZZ RESOLUTION WAS ESSENTIALLY PROCEDURAL ONE AND THAT IT WAS NOT TIMELY TO INJECT SUBSTANCE INTO IT. PROGRESS ON FIZZ CLD ONLY COME AFTER REALIZATION OF CTBT AND CANDELYN HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PROCEED TO TABLE TRADITIONAL RESOLUTION (OURTEL IDA1237 02NOV). WE POINTED OUT THAT DUTCH MFA HAD RECEIVED PAPER OUTLINING CDN THINKING ON VERIFICATION OF FIZZ LAST YEAR (OURTEL XDA089 23MAR82). WE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT ANY TAMPERING WITH WORDING OF TRADITIONAL RESOLUTION MIGHT RESULT IN LESS SUPPORT FOR RESOLUTION. WE QUESTIONED DUTCH CLAIM THAT USSR POSITION ON IAEA VERIFICATION ROLE HAD BECOME MORE FLEXIBLE.

4. THIS LATEST DEMARCHE CLEARLY INDICATES CONTINUED DUTCH CONCERN ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES AND FOLLOWS PATTERN ESTABLISHED BY DUTCH FM DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO CDA, DUTCH MFA CONCERN IN CHEMICAL WEAPONS (OURTEL1175 18OCT83) AND INF MATTERS (BNATO TEL YBGR7076 04NOV).

5. GRATEFUL TO KNOW WHETHER DUTCH TRY TO PURSUE MATTER FURTHER.

CCC/003 959257Z IDA1253

2/2

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 33/91 H of 16 December 1978, 34/87 D of 11 December 1979, 35/156 H of 12 December 1980, 36/97 G of 9 December 1981, and 37/99/E of 13 December 1982, in which it requested the Committee on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of the implementation of the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, and of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to consider urgently the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration,

Noting that the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament for 1983 included the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects" and that the Committee's programme of work for both parts of its session held in 1983 contained the item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament",

Recalling the proposals and statements made in the Committee on Disarmament on those items,

Considering that the cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and the progressive conversion and transfer of stocks to peaceful uses would be a significant step towards halting and reversing the nuclear arms race,

Considering that the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices also would be an important measure in facilitating the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and explosive devices,

Requests the Committee on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to pursue its consideration of the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the General Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration.

(B)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDA1237 02NOV83

TO CANDELNY

INFO GENEV BNATO CANMILREPNATO WSHDC MOSCO PARIS LDN VMBFR VIAFA
CNBRA DELHI ISBAD HAGUE BGRAD STKHM TOKYO NDHQOTT/DNACPOL/ORAE
DISTR IDD IDR IMU ETN IDDZ IDAO IDAN

REF OURTEL IDA1189 20OCT YOURTEL WKGR2259 24OCT

---UNGA 38 AGENDA ITEM 62(H)FIZZ

AS INDICATED IN REFTELS, ARGUMENTS FOR DROPPING RESOLUTION THIS
YEAR ARE STRONG. THESE WERE REVIEWED AND DECISION TAKEN, AFTER FULL
CONSULTATION WITH PM TASK FORCE, TO PUT FORWARD TRADITIONAL FIZZ
RESOLUTION THIS YEAR. MAIN CONSIDERATION IN REACHING DECISION
RELATED TO PM INITIATIVE AND QUESTION OF OPTICS. CONCERN WAS THAT
THERE WAS VERY REAL DANGER THAT FAILURE TO TABLE FIZZ RESOLUTION
WOULD BE MISCONSTRUED BY THE INTERESTED CDN PUBLIC AS AN ABANDON-
MENT OF AN IMPORTANT CDN DISARMAMENT OBJECTIVE. DROPPING FIZZ RESO-
LUTION AT THIS TIME MIGHT APPEAR INCONSISTENT WITH PMS HIGH PROFILE
EFFORTS TO PROMOTE MOVEMENT IN ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
2. GRATEFUL THEREFORE IF YOU WOULD PROCEED WITH TRADITIONAL DRAFT
RESOLUTION.

CCC/080 022318Z IDA1237

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

MEMORANDUM

TO
A PFG

FROM
De XDA

REFERENCE
Référence

SUBJECT
Sujet Ban on Production of Fissionable Material for
Weapons Purposes (FIZZ): Dutch Request for Information

SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL
Sécurité

DATE March 23, 1982

NUMMER XDA-88
Numéro

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA	
28-6-4	
MISSION	

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

DISTRIBUTION

DFP

DFD

ESK
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24/3

The Dutch (who, as far as we know, continue to be in favour of an early UN "Comprehensive Study" on FIZZ) have repeatedly pressed us for any material we might have on FIZZ verification issues.

2. In our memorandum for the Prime Minister dated February 2, 1982, it was stated that:

"As regards the proposal for a ban on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, the U.S. moved to an abstention on our resolution at the U.N. General Assembly last year. Thus no nuclear weapons state is ready to negotiate such an agreement at the present time. We have been planning, after the U.S. completes its review of security policy, to propose bilateral consultations on the technical aspects of verifying such a ban and the introduction of the proposal at an appropriate stage in USA/USSR bilateral negotiations and subsequently in the Committee on Disarmament. In the light of those consultations, Canada might publicly call for pursuing the proposal bilaterally in the first instance and later in the multilateral body."

Last November, the Americans told us that they do not consider any move towards FIZZ in the foreseeable future to be realistic. Therefore, "at the appropriate stage" for the USA is not likely to be soon.

3. We think ~~that~~ THAT it would be appropriate to give the Dutch a simple statement of Canadian views on the verification of FIZZ at this stage, even before getting USA views. If you agree, please release the attached telegram to the Hague.

A.R. Menzies
Ambassador for Disarmament

000958

28-6-4

CONFIDENTIAL

FM EXTOTT XDA089 23MAR82

TO HAGUE

INFO GENEV BNATO LDN WSHDC MOSCO PARIS BONN CNBRA TOKYO PEKIN

VIAE/PRMNY NDHQOTT/PPP/DACPOL/ORAE AECBOTT/SINDEN

DISTR DFD DFR DFP PFG CMO ESE GEB

REF OURTEL DFD0198 18 FEB(NOTAL)

---BAN ON PRODUCTION OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL FOR WEAPONS
PURPOSES (FIZZ): DUTCH REQUEST

AS RESULT OF DUTCH REQUEST FOR ANY INFO WE MIGHT HAVE ON QUOTE
PROBLEM OF VERIFICATION UNQUOTE OF FIZZ, WE CONSIDERED POSSIBILITY
OF PROVIDING SUITABLE EXCERPTS FROM AN INTERNAL WORKING PAPER ON
SUBJ. HAVE NOW CONCLUDED THAT WHILE IT WOULD NOT/NOT BE DESIRABLE
TO PASS PARTS OF THAT PAPER OR ANY OTHER WORKING PAPERS, IT COULD
BE USEFUL TO INFORM DUTCH OF SOME OF TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS WE HAVE
REACHED WHICH DUTCH WILL APPRECIATE ARE BASED ON LESS THAN COMPLETE
INFO.

2. GRATEFUL THEREFORE IF YOU COULD CALL ON MEERBURG AT EARLY
OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS AND LEAVE BOUT DE PAPIER:

- IN RESPONSE TO MR MEERBURGS REQUEST FOR INFO, DUTCH AUTHORITIES
MAY BE INTERESTED IN CONCLUSIONS DRAWN BY CDN OFFICIALS BASED ON
INTERNAL EXAMINATION OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES THAT WOULD BE INVOLVED
IN VERIFICATION OF FIZZ IN LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN PAST TWENTY


...2



CHERVACKV/PP

DEF

6-6320



A.R. MENZIES

000959

PAGE TWO XDA089 CONF

YRS SINCE CUT-OFF PROPOSAL WAS FIRST PUT FORWARD. - THE VERIFICATION OF AN AGREEMENT TO BAN PRODUCTION OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL FOR WEAPONS PURPOSES WOULD INVOLVE TWO DISTINCT MECHANISMS: THE MONITORING OF DECLARED FISSIONABLE MATERIAL FACILITIES AND DETECTION OF POSSIBLE COVERT PRODUCTION AND STORAGE. ^{THE} -/FIRST VERIFICATION COMPONENT WOULD REQUIRE VERY SIGNIFICANT EXTENSION OF INTERNATL (IE IAEA) SAFEGUARDS COVERAGE AND CAPABILITIES BUT IS CONSIDERED TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE. IAEA MANPOWER AND MATERIAL RESOURCES WOULD NEED TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED, EITHER AS PART OF AN EXPANDED EXISTING ^{IE} SAFEGUARDS REGIME OR NEW ONE, TO MEET NEW QUANTITATIVE DEMANDS BROUGHT ABOUT BY DECLARATION OF ADDITIONAL NUCLEAR FACILITIES. THESE SHOULD COVER: (A) THOSE FACILITIES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES CIVILIAN CYCLES - NOT/NOT ALREADY SUBJ TO IAEA SAFEGUARDS; (B) INSTALLATIONS PRODUCING ^{HIGH GRADE} FISSIONABLE MATERIALS FOR REACTORS USED IN NUCLEAR PROPULSION OF SHIPS AND SUBMARINES; AND (C) ^{THE} EXISTING STOCKPILES OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL FOR WEAPONS PURPOSES. -/COMPLEMENTARY VERIFICATION COMPONENT (IE DETECTION OF COVERT OPERATIONS) NECESSARY TO PROVIDE AN ACCEPTABLE DEGREE OF INNATL CONFIDENCE THAT POLITICAL UNDERTAKINGS OF AGREEMENT WERE BEING HONOURED, IS AT THIS TIME (UNDERLINE AT THIS TIME FOR EMPHASIS) TECHNICALLY QUESTIONABLE AND HIGHLY UNLIKELY TO BE NEGOTIATED ^{THE} / SORT OF VERIFICATION MEASURES THAT WOULD NECESSARILY


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PAGE THREE XDA089 CONF D

BUILD UPON NATL TECHNICAL MEANS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES CONCERNED
AN
WOULD BE OF SUCH/INTRUSIVE NATURE AS TO BE PRACTICALLY NON-NEGOTIABLE
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRESENT INNATL ARMS CONTROL ENVIRONMENT.
-ONLY SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL COULD LEAD TO
THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AN EVENTUAL VERIFICATION REGIME ACCEPTABLE TO
NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES.

3. FOR YOUR INFO ONLY, WE BELIEVE THAT DUTCH CONTINUE TO BE IN
FAVOUR OF AN EARLY UN QUOTE COMPREHENSIVE STUDY UNQUOTE ON F1ZZ.
THEREFORE ON HANDING OVER THE BOUT DE PAPIER PLEASE ALSO MAKE
FOLLOWING POINT ORALLY: WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT WE WOULD NOT/NOT
WISH TO GO BEYOND OUR EXISTING PROCEDURAL RESOLUTION IN UNGA CALLING
ON THE CD TO CONSIDER FIZZ AT AN APPROPRIATE STAGE OF ITS WORK. IT
IS PREMATURE TO RAISE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES OR CALL FOR EARLY WORK ON
A TREATY OR ELEMENTS OF A TREATY.

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FM EXTOTT RBD0024 10NOV83

TO LDN PARIS BONN BRU

---PM INITIATIVE AND EAST/WEST RELATIONS

GRATEFUL YOU ENSURE RBD INFOED ALL TELS ON ABOVE SUBJS.

UUU/278 102213Z RBD0024

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**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM PMDELROME PMDL0006 10NOV83

TO EXTOTT(1DDZ DELIVER BY 100830

INFO PCOOTT/OSBALDESTON/DURAND

FROM FOWLER

REF FOWLER/DELVOIF TELCON 09NOV

---PM INITIATIVE: TOUCHING THE PEKIN BASE

YOU ARE AWARE THAT PM BELIEVES THAT THERE IS LOGIC IN HAVING
PERSONAL EMISSARY WHO HAS BEEN DESIGNATED TO EXPLORE TRUDFAUS
POSSIBLE VISIT TO MOSCO TAKE ON A SIMILAR VISIT TO PEKIN AND THAT
PM BELIEVES IF GEOFF PEARSON IS PREPARED TO GO TO MOSCO HE MIGHT
ALSO CONSIDER PEKIN. PM IS AWARE OF PROPOSAL WHEREBY PEARSON (PERHAPS
ACCOMPANIED BY MEMBER OF TASK FORCE) MIGHT ACCOMPANY CHOGM DELEGATION
TO TOKYO FOR MEETING WITH PM NAKASONE ON 19NOV AND PROCEED FROM
JAPAN TO PEKIN FOR SUCH CONSULTATIONS.

2. FROM THE OUTSET PM AND OSBALDESTON HAVE BEEN CONCERNED THAT 8-DAY
CHOGM PLUS ATTENDANT TRAVEL TO BANGLADESH AND THE PERSIAN GULF NOT/
NOT ONLY KEEP PM TOO LONG AWAY FROM BUSINESS OF CDN GOVT BUT ALSO
DETRACT FROM IMPACT AND URGENCY OF PEACE INITIATIVE. THUS WE CAN
HARDLY ADD TO ITINFRARY. WE CONSIDERED WHETHER PM MIGHT LEAVE INDIA
AND CHOGM IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING RESTRICTED SESSION OF HEADS OF GOVT
TO BE HELD IN GOA 26-27NOV TO UNDERTAKE INITIATIVE RELATED
ACTIVITIES; THEREBY MISSING FINAL 2 DAYS OF CHOGM. WE HAD INITIALLY
REJECTED THIS SCENARIO IN THAT (A) IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO PROGRAM

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28-6-1- Trudeau Peace
Mission

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PAGE TWO PMDL0006 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

LONG IN ADVANCE WITHOUT MAINTAINING SPONTANEITY OF GESTURE AND WITHOUT COMPROMISING BOTH CANADA'S COMMITMENT TO COMMONWEALTH AND INTEGRITY OF MRS GHANDI'S MEETING, AND (B) TO DO SO WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY REQUIRE CANCELLATION, SINCE THE OF VISIT TO GULF STATES AND THIS AGAINST SOMEWHAT UNHAPPY BACKGROUND OF MANY CANCELLATIONS AND RESCHEDULINGS OVER PAST FEW YEARS.

3. PM BELIEVES THAT IF INITIATIVE IS TO BE FULLY CREDIBLE, AND PARTICULARLY IF PROPOSAL RELATING TO FIVE POWER NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS IS TO HAVE CHANCE OF SUCCESS HE MUST CONSULT WITH ALL 5 NUCLEAR POWERS. HE WILL OF COURSE HAVE CONSULTED WITH FRANCE AND UK DURING CURRENT EUROPEAN TRIP AND HE IS TAKEN WITH IDEA THAT INITIATIVE-OR AT LEAST CURRENT PHASE OF INITIATIVE-SHOULD CONCLUDE WITH VISITS TO BOTH SUPER-POWERS, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON (IN NO/NO PARTICULAR ORDER). PM APPRECIATES, OF COURSE, THAT CHINESE PREMIER ZHOU WILL VISIT OTT IN MID-JANUARY AND WHILE THIS WILL AFFORD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS INITIATIVE WITH SENIOR MEMBER OF CHINESE GOVT, THE TIMING IS SOMEWHAT TOO LATE AND THE LEVEL OF THE INTERLOCUTOR NOT/NOT PERFECT.

4. THUS BEARING IN MIND THE ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENT OF SPONTANEITY, PM WISHES US TO CONSIDER WHETHER PEARSON MIGHT EXPLORE 20 OR 21 NOV WITH CHINESE IN PEKING POSSIBILITY THAT TRUDEAU COULD COME TO PEKING FROM DELHI MON MONDAY 28 NOV WITH A VIEW TO CONSULTING WITH SENIOR MEMBERS OF PRC GOVT (INCLUDING DENG) AND RETURN TO EITHER PICK-UP DEL IN DELHI

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PAGE THREE PMDL0006 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

30NOV OR, MORE LIKELY, PROCEED DIRECTLY TO ABU DHABI FOR SCHEDULED
BEGINNING OF PROGRAM THERE ON 30NOV. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS
AS TO: A) WHETHER THIS MAKES SENSE FROM A SUBSTANTIVE, INITIATIVE
RELATED, POINT OF VIEW; B) FROM A CHOGM POINT OF VIEW AND C) WHETHER IT
IS LOGISTICALLY FEASIBLE IE CAN IT BE DONE? IF SO, HOW?).

CCC/050 100816Z PMDL0006

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

M F

28-6-1-Troudeau Peace
mission

R E S T R I C T E D

FM PMDELROME PMDL0005 10NOV83

TO EXTOTT LDDZ DELIVER BY 100830

INFO PCOOTT/OSBALDESTON PMOOTT/PRESS OFFICE WSHDC BONN LDN

DISTR MINA FPR USS DMF IFB

FROM FOWLER

---PM INITIATIVE:MUCH AWAITED RESPONSE FROM REAGAN

PRESS CONTINGENT FOLLOWING PM OBSESSED WITH TRACKING NOW INFAMOUS

REPLY FROM REAGAN TO PMS LETTER RE INITIATIVE.EVER SINCE AMB

ROBINSON WAS QUOTED IN TORONTO STAR ?)LAST FRIDAY(04NOV)TO THE

EFFECT THAT HALF QUOTE POSITIVE AND LENGHTY REPLY HAS BEEN

PREPARED AND WOULD IMMINENTLY BE RECEIVED IN OTT END HALF QUOTE,

PRESS HAS DOGGED DEL WITH OQUERIES AS TO WHETHER OR NOT/NOT LETTER

HAS BEEN RECEIVED.WE HAVE OF COURSE FOLLOWED THE PROGRESS OF VARIOUS

DRAFTS FROM STATE THROUGH NSC TO OVAL OFFICE AND ACROSS PACIFIC.

WHILE IT IS NO/NO DOUBT THE STUFF OF INTERESTING PROCESS JOURNALISM,

IT DOES LITTLE TO ENHANCE BILATERAL RELATIONS OR INTERPRETATION OF

WSHDC INTEREST IN AND SUPPORT FOR PMS INITIATIVE.THUS,WHILE WE

WOULD HAVE LIVED RELATIVELY EASILY WITH NO/NO REPLY,HAD ROBINSON

NOT/NOT GENERATED CURRENT SPECULATION AS TO ITS NON RECFIPT,WE ARE

CONCERNED LEST THIS SILLY MATTER CLOUD OUR CHANCES FOR A GOOD

HEARING IN WSHDC.WOULD SUGGEST,THEREFORE,WE EITHER SECURE LETTFP

VERY QUICKLY EITHER FROM TOKYO(OR WHEREVER)OR ISSUE FIRM

ANNOUNCEMENT FROM OTT THAT NO/NO LETTER WILL BE FORTHCOMING UNTIL

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MOITDA
SERMOO A 3702

PAGF TWO PMDL0005 RESTR

AT LEAST, SAY, PRES REAGAN RETURNS FROM FAR EAST. WHATEVER ELSE THE
MUCH DISCUSSED WAIT HAS SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED EXPECTATIONS AS TO
THE TONE AND DEGREE OF SUPPORT WHICH WILL BE EVIDENT IN ANY EVENTUAL
REPLY AND THEREFORE HAS INCREASED THE DEGREE TO WHICH WE WILL BE
QUIZZED REGARDING SAME.

CCC/050 100816Z PMDL0005

