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18836

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Vol 26

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EXAMINED BY / EXAMINÉ PAR

M. Bourbon

DATE 2007-03-05

VOLS ACCESSION NO. 18836

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TITLE—TITRE:

DISARMAMENT -
MEASURES -
PLANS AND PROPOSALS -
TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION (INITIATIVES)


DESARMEMENT -
MESURES -
PLANS ET PROPOSITIONS
TRUDEAU MISSION DE PAIX (INITIATIVES)

Retention period-Période de retention:

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MR DAVOIT *D* obtained this from *ROJ. MF*

**TRANSCRIPT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S NEWS CONFERENCE, PRAGUE,
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THURSDAY, JANUARY 26, 1984**

**TRANSCRIPTION DE LA CONFÉRENCE DE PRESSE ACCORDÉE PAR LE PREMIER
MINISTRE À PRAGUE (TCHÉCOSLOVAQUIE), LE JEUDI 26 JANVIER 1984**

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Q. Prime Minister, could you comment on some of the peace initiatives by Yuri Andropov which have been published in the Pravda newspaper?

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GILBERT LAVOIE (La Presse) Monsieur le Premier ministre, hier vous avez évoqué la possibilité d'inviter les chefs de gouvernement à Stockholm peut-être. Est-ce qu'il s'agit là tout simplement d'une idée ou si vous avez l'intention de presser davantage, si vous avez l'intention d'en faire une proposition?

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Q. In which way can countries of the Third World help (inaudible) Canada?

A. At the Commonwealth meeting in New Delhi in November, where the Heads of Government of some 48 nations were assembled -- most of those countries being from the Third World -- this question was discussed and I answered it by indicating that it was possible that at some stage in the resumed dialogue between East and West that the Third World might have a role to play. But, at this stage, I believe that the tensions exist essentially between East and West and that it is a stage during which both East and West countries must, of themselves, reduce the tensions and moderate the language which separates them.

I pointed out also to the Third World leaders that, in 1985, the Non-Proliferation Treaty was up for review and that there should be an interplay of influences between the non-nuclear signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the nuclear signatories, and that if, collectively, we succeeded in reducing the threat of horizontal and vertical proliferation, considerable amounts of the funds which are being expended on military hardware could be devoted to developing the Third World.

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BOB EVANS (CTV) Mr. Prime Minister, acknowledging that you are not here primarily as a negotiator, nevertheless, was any mention made during your conversation dealing with confidence and destruction on both sides; of all the SS-20 build-up by the Soviet Union -- the effect that might have on the West -- and if it wasn't, was there any acknowledgement that it is a threat to the West (inaudible) to the NATO deployment in Western Europe?

A. The short-hand answer is yes to your first question and no to the second. We did discuss the interplay of forces between the East and West and the fact that that interplay had been resulting in escalation of armaments by both sides and that somehow we had to break that escalation. Returning to my theme, that meant, essentially, emerging from the period of crisis during which the arms race has been intensified in the way you suggest, and beginning to create an atmosphere of trust and security where de-escalation will be possible. I think we are in a period of cautious hope where trust can begin to be built. The language is slightly less sharp, but still ambiguous -- as I believe Mr. Halton's question pointed out and the other question on Mr. Andropov -- but I would guess that the kind of linkage that you suggest exists in people's minds even if they don't speak of it. I spoke of it, if you understand, but only half of my proposition was responded to.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, as little powers within opposing alliances, is there anything specific that either (...) Canada or Czechoslovakia can do when the MBFR talks resume in Vienna?

A. Yes, we discussed both the MBFR talks in Vienna and the meetings in Stockholm as areas where both our countries could exercise their influence. The Prague Declaration did refer to the talks in Vienna and you probably know that I have been talking about it a great deal, too. As I have said -- and as Mr. MacEachen, our Foreign Minister, has said -- we must respond to the latest proposals made by the Warsaw Pact countries half a year ago. That led to our minister in Brussels in December urging the NATO countries to work together at the political level to prepare that response. I think the Warsaw Pact proposal was a step in the right direction and I think we must also answer it positively.

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- 4 -

Q. Your Excellency, Canada is very popular in Czechoslovakia. We have learned how to play hockey from you and I think we are not so bad at it! I think that your peace initiative will promote the popularity of Canada in this country. But what is to be done now so that the dialogue yields concrete results? That is my first question.

My second question will be a controversial question. We have been informed about President Reagan's speech delivered to the Congress. He spoke in his message of peace about peace; and he was offering his hand. It seems to us that his hand is empty and that the words are deceitful. (The speech came) at the same time as a proposal was made to the US Congress calling on the protection of people which the International Herald Tribune calls an extremely cynical attempt to prepare for a war in outer space. This is the militant program for peace to support Mr. Reagan. As a matter of fact, this is a (inaudible) to a conflict of the highest level, i.e., a nuclear conflict. Do you think, Prime Minister, after the experience from Geneva, that the dialogue -- when rhetoric on peace and confidence is a cynicism of advertising slogans covering or disguising war -- do you think that this is acceptable for socialist countries? What in your view, should the USA do?

A. Your two questions are linked. You mentioned hockey in your first question and I see the two superpowers like two hockey teams. They are supposed to play a peaceful game, but sometimes a fight breaks out and one side begins to strike the other side and the other side strikes back. I suppose it is an academic question as to who strikes first. What is important is to stop the fighting and to get on with the game. That is what interests the Canadian people. They know that if a fight breaks out between the two superpowers, it will be different from a hockey game in that all the spectators will also be destroyed. So, we are like the spectators or the referees at a hockey match: We are telling the players to get back to the table, get back to the game. Insofar as we are players, we have returned to the game in Stockholm and so have the Warsaw Pact countries. I have just said that we intend to do the same in Vienna. I wish the two superpowers would listen to what was said in the Prague Declaration last January and return to the table in Geneva. So, there is really nothing very controversial about your question. We have to create an atmosphere of trust. So, we are like the referees.

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SAIS

MF
THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
School of Advanced International Studies

CENTER OF CANADIAN STUDIES

January 26, 1984

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
Dear Mr. Delvoie:

On behalf of the Center of Canadian Studies, I would like to thank you for taking the time to speak with us during our recent study trip to Canada. Your contribution helped make this year's trip the most interesting and productive ever.

Should your travels bring you to the Washington area, we hope you will visit us at the Center.

Again, our sincere appreciation.

Sincerely yours,



Charles F. Doran
Director



The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, OTTAWA (IDDZ)

SECURITY / Sécurité

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM The Canadian Embassy, WASHINGTON

DATE January 26, 1984

REFERENCE / Référence

ACC	REF	DATE MAY 25 1984	NUMBER 105
FILE 28-6-1-TRUDEAU	MISSION		DOSSIER
			OTTAWA

SUBJECT / Sujet: Prime Minister's Peace Initiative: Letter from Admiral La Rocque

MISSION

ENCLOSURES / Annexes

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Fowler

Enclosed for your information is a copy of a letter which we have received at the Embassy from Admiral Gene La Rocque, the Director of the Center for Defense Information. Admiral La Rocque expresses his support for the Prime Minister's peace initiative. As you are aware, we do not consider the Center for Defense Information to be one of the most important arms control or peace organizations in this city. It does however have some influence. Its publications tend to be very useful for the kinds of information they provide. On the other hand, however, the Center for Defense Information is far better at pointing out problems than it is at providing solutions. For example, the Executive Director of the Arms Control Association said that his analysts are in almost daily touch with the analysts at the Center for Defense Information. However, from his point of view, the CDI is in the business of defense information, as its title suggests, rather than arms control. The other limitation of the CDI is that it tends to be too much of a personal vehicle for Admiral La Rocque, and to a lesser extent Admiral Carroll, rather than a public policy analysis center.

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ACTION	INFO
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The Embassy

Center For Defense Information

303 CAPITC ALLERY WEST, 600 MARYLAND AVENUE, S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024

TELEPHONE: 202/484-9490
TELEX 904059 WSH (CDI)

January 24, 1984

Mr. R. J. Lysyshyn
First Secretary
Canadian Embassy
1746 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Mr. Lysyshyn:

Prime Minister Trudeau has embarked on a noble cause and his comments make a good deal of sense. I agree with his concern about over emphasis on capabilities and too little emphasis on intentions. We need measures to reduce tensions, mitigate hostility, and build confidence as the Prime Minister clearly calls for in his 27 October speech.

I agree he and other leaders need to "look at" structures to stabilize East-West relations and move toward a regular dialogue. But I would like to urge the Prime Minister to take the lead in initiating some specific proposals to accomplish these goals. Canada and European nations could be a bridge between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.


Enclosed is a copy of Project 2000 with possible utility along this line. Willy Brandt has told me he hoped to suggest this to the SPD in November 1983. I have had interest from other nations as well.

I do believe Prime Minister Trudeau is in a unique position in the world to prepare some specific steps because of his personal conviction and universal respect.

I would be pleased to meet with you to discuss this matter further if you wish.

I have taken the liberty of enclosing a piece I have done on Central America, Canada and the U.S. which is an outgrowth of a paper I prepared for the Kissinger Commission at the request of Jim Wright, the majority leader of our House of Representatives.

Sincerely,



Gene R. La Rocque
Rear Admiral, USN (Ret.)
Director

Enclosures
GRL/smb

Gene R. La Rocque
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, (Ret.)
Director

Eugene J. Carroll, Jr.
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Deputy Director

William T. Fairbourn
Major General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)
Associate Director

James A. Donovan
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)
Associate Director

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Center For Defense Information

303 CAPITOL GALLERY WEST, 600 MARYLAND AVENUE, S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024

TELEPHONE: 202/484-9490
TELEX 904059 WSH (CDI)

PROJECT 2000

Understanding - Cooperation - Prosperity

The beginning of 1983 is a reminder that soon the world will be entering the 21st Century. There is little doubt that the next 17 years will see continued growth in the variety and number of expensive new weapons, increasing the likelihood of the destruction of our cities, our homes, our environment and perhaps every one of us. The course the United States and the Soviet Union are pursuing leads only to war--a nuclear war. If, as citizens, we do nothing both nations will "stay the course." If we try, I believe we can change this deadly course.

Looking back, "detente" served a purpose, but cannot be revived. It was little more than a holding action, a skeptical and wary acceptance of the status quo. There was little in it to suggest a need for better understanding or cooperation and nothing which intrinsically provided for changing conditions or new leaders. Hence, it was destined for the early demise which was, in fact, its fate.

Looking ahead, if the Soviet Union, Europe and the U.S. are to avert a nuclear war, we must embark on a dynamic program to enhance cooperation and understanding among these nations. If we continue as we are, we will find it increasingly necessary to deny housing, health care, education and the benefits of a stable economy to people everywhere. Or, worse, we will drift, stumble or be pushed into a nuclear war. President Eisenhower expressed it best:

"What can the world, or any nation in it hope for if no turning is found on this dread road. The worst to be feared and the best to be expected can be simply stated. The worst is atomic war. The best would be this: a life of perpetual fear and tension, a burden of arms draining the wealth and labor of all peoples, a wasting of strength that defies the American system or the Soviet system or any system to achieve true abundance and happiness for the peoples of this earth. Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired, signifies in the final sense a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and not clothed."

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Since neither of Eisenhower's prescient options are even remotely acceptable, I believe we can and must make an effort to change course. In preparing for the 21st Century, we ought to devote the last years of this Century to measures that will improve the understanding and cooperation among

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My idea is this. Spend the next three years drafting a series of blueprints for specific areas of understanding, cooperation and prosperity. Practical blueprints for cooperative programs in science, education, trade, housing, health and so on could be developed by delegates to a series of conferences in different European countries.

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Only Europeans, Soviets and citizens of the U.S. would be involved. This is a manageable group in size, with similar cultural and economic backgrounds. If these nations understand each other, cooperate and prosper, Latin America, Asia and Africa would all benefit.


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Obviously, this is a very ambitious plan will and cost a great deal of money. Just how much, I do not know. But when I see that President Reagan plans to allocate \$1 Billion a day for the U.S. military starting in 1986, I believe a million or two to encourage understanding, cooperation and prosperity would be well spent in a constructive effort to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

The time is ripe for a series of multi-national blueprint conferences because of the considerable activity around war and peace issues now taking place in so many countries. Thus far, there has been little effort to link them together and concentrate their impact.

It would appear to me that this solid, sensible concept could be funded by a major foundation or a consortium of responsible people with sufficient resources. I do not conceive this as a project for the Center for Defense Information, but as a much larger and broader enterprise.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Gene R. La Rocque". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large loop at the end.

Gene R. La Rocque
Rear Admiral, USN (Ret.)
Director

Center For Defense Information

303 CAPITOL GALLERY WEST, 600 MARYLAND AVENUE, S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024

TELEPHONE: 202/484-9490
TELEX 904059 WSH (CDI)

North and Central American Economic Federation

Three hundred and fifty million Americans live in ten separate political entities in North and Central America. No physical barriers, no oceans, no rivers, no mountains, bar movement from one country to another. From Panama to Canada only little red lines on a map separate one nation from another. Although language, cultures, history, and political structures vary significantly, our proximity on the same land mass dictates that our futures will increasingly be interrelated.

As we move into the 21st Century we can influence but not control the quality nor the nature of our relationships with the other nations of North and Central America. Our influence will be most effective and sustained if our relationship is based on positive cooperative actions clearly perceived as beneficial to each of the ten nations. Negative actions, such as denial of trade or use of military force, either covert or overt, can force acquiescence in the short run but will be divisive in the long run.

As we look to the 21st Century we need to formulate a positive policy designed to provide the incentive for all the nations of North and Central America to remain within the economic sphere of the United States, i.e., a capitalist, free enterprise economic system.

If all the nations from Panama to Canada have similar economic and fiscal systems, the opportunity for economic cooperation and mutual prosperity will be enhanced. Logic and common sense suggest we emphasize our common interests.

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000551

The nations and the people of North and Central America have two interrelated elemental factors which motivate all nations of North and Central America, i.e., a desire to prosper economically and an intense patriotism.

Our economic future and political stability will increasingly be influenced to our benefit or detriment depending on our response to the powerful drives in Central America and Mexico. But first we must recognize that this intense patriotism and strong desire for an improved way of life cannot be separated.

With a little effort and sensible planning Central America, Mexico, the United States and Canada could become a viable, mutually rewarding economic entity while preserving the sovereignty of each nation. Integrated into an economic federation with provision for increased mobility of labor and capital the abundant natural resources, financial and productive skills of the 350 million Americans living side by side could become a model of peaceful cooperation for other areas of the world.

Serious consideration should be given to the formation of a voluntary economic federation of North and Central America based on mutual respect for sovereignty while facilitating economic progress. A similar relationship is the European Economic Community which has surpassed the expectations of its initiators and could serve as a model for North and Central America.

As in the European model, a North and Central American Economic Federation (NCAEF) would not be directly involved in the internal political affairs of the individual nations but, as with the European model, the economic systems of

member nations should be structured along capitalist free enterprise lines. If a nation of North or Central America opts for a central communist economy, it obviously could not function as a full partner in an economic federation of free enterprise nations.

Initially, all nations of North and Central America need not be members of the economic federation but if economic federation benefits member nations there will be an incentive for non member nations to join even if it requires acceptance of a market economy.

Obviously, the EEC is an imperfect model because of the greater homogeneity in size, population, industrial capacity, etc., but some comparable formula could be devised.

The time is short. The U.S. and Canada cannot continue to witness increased poverty in Central America while we and Canada grow richer. If we do nothing to improve the economic plight of Central America all of Central America and Mexico will be motivated to move to a state controlled economy in the near future.

In the long run we cannot, by military means, prevent the nations of Central from "going communist." We may be able to do so by encouraging the establishment of an economic federation. It is worth careful consideration.



MP

TRANSMITTAL SLIP - NOTE D'ENVOI

TO/À MINA

FROM/DE IDDZ

SUBJECT/SUJET Reply to Questions on The Senate December 20 on The PM's proposal for a Conference of The Five Nuclear Powers.

ATTACHMENT
PIÈCE JOINTE

Security Sécurité
File Dossier
Date January 26, 1984

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EXT 401

The Prime Minister has stated that none of the five nuclear weapons states has rejected the proposal for a meeting of the five nuclear powers. Three of the five - Great Britain, France and China - have maintained that there should be certain preliminary steps, including substantial reductions by the two superpowers of their nuclear arms, before a five-power conference to limit all strategic nuclear arsenals should be held. The United States has expressed general interest in such a conference at a future date. As the Prime Minister has not met with the Soviet leaders, there has been no Soviet response to this idea, although the Soviet Union did put forward a similar proposal some years ago.

The Prime Minister has suggested that preliminary discussions amongst the five nuclear weapon states might take place at the United Nations in New York.

CGO 002/26

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Jan. 26/74

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JAN 26 1984

INFO

---VISIT TO WISCONSIN--JAN 9-13, 1984

P.M.'s PEACE INITIATIVE:

AMBASSADORS' SPEECH MADISON: ACID RAIN

ON TERRITORY VISIT TO WISCONSIN TO FIRM UP DETAILS FOR AMBASSADOR
GOTLIEB'S FALL SPEAKING ENGAGEMENT AT UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN IN
MADISON, SPOKE WITH MEMBERS OF GOVERNOR ROBERT EARLE'S OFFICE.
ACCORDING TO DON SCHOTT, GOV.'S EXEC. ASST., WISCONSIN GOV. HAS
SUBMITTED 3/3 RESOLUTIONS FOR THE FORTHCOMING NATIONAL GOVERNOR'S
CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON, TWO OF WHICH ARE OF SPECIFIC INTEREST TO
CANADA.

2. FIRST RESOLUTION CALLS FOR A NUCLEAR ARMS FREEZE. SCHOTT SAID
GOV. EARLE LAUDS P.M.'s INITIATIVE ON PEACE AND SECURITY AND ADDED
THAT MANY PERSONS, PARTICULARLY JOURNALISTS, HAVE ASKED THE GOV.
WHY HE HAS NOT SPOKEN WITH THE P.M. SINCE THE GOV. AND P.M. HAVE
SIMILAR VIEWS ON THE NEED TO REDUCE WORLD TENSIONS. SCHOTT INDICATED
THE QUESTIONERS HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT FROM THE GOVERNOR'S POINT OF
VIEW, SUCH A MEETING HAD NOT/TAKEN PLACE, NOT/NOT BECAUSE OF THE
INCOMPATIBILITY OF THE P.M.'S AND GOV.'S VIEWS BUT BECAUSE OF THE
INAPPROPRIATENESS OF A GOVERNOR SPEAKING WITH A FOREIGN HEAD OF STATE.
SCHOTT GAVE IMPRESSION THAT GOV. EARLE WOULD WELCOME A MEETING WITH THE
P.M. IF ISSUE OF PROTOCOL COULD BE OVERCOMR.

3. EARLE'S ENVIRONMENTAL AID INDICATED THAT EARLE'S RESOLUTION ON ACID
RAIN AT GOV.'S CONFERENCE WOULD SIMPLY CALL FOR A "SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION"
OF SO2 IN THE U.S. WHILE THE GOV. IS PERSONALLY SYMPATHETIC TO THE
CANADIAN POSITION OF A 50% REDUCTION IN SO2 EMISSIONS, IN ORDER TO HAVE
ANY CHANCE OF IT BEING PASSED, THE GOV. THINKS THAT THE RESOLUTION
NEEDS TO BE COUCHED IN VERY GENERAL TERMS.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

D. LYSNE

GENERAL RELATIONS

312
427-1031

DAVID E. LYSNE, CONSUL



IDR/J.R.Francis/2-7921

TO/À • IFB

FROM/DE • IDR

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •
SUJET • Peacekeeping: Committee of 33
Multi-National Force in Lebanon

Mr. Mac
Mr. Smith
[Signature]

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Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
January 26, 1984
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IDR-0321

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
During the York University Seminar on Peace-keeping January 25, I had an opportunity to discuss the work of the UN Committee of 33 with George Sherry, Deputy to the Under Secretaries-General for Special Political Affairs, UN. I asked whether there was anything we could do to revive the Committee's negotiations for formal guidelines for peacekeeping. Mr. Sherry replied that for all practical purposes the UN had guidelines - they dated from October, 1973 when the provisional rules for UNEF II were agreed to. Although allegedly ad hoc, having no constitutional value as a precedent, they had been used as a model for two subsequent forces: UNDOF and UNIFIL. The Soviet Union was prepared to accept the UNEF arrangements provided they were not formalized. From the viewpoint of those in the UN concerned with establishing and running peacekeeping, the present situation was therefore satisfactory.

2. He said the Committee of 33 did no harm so long as it did not try to accomplish anything. He said the Committee had roughly the same status as the Changing of the Guard at Buckingham Palace. It represented the continuation of historical traditions, but no longer served a useful purpose. I observed that the Guard was at least a tourist attraction. He (and Bill Barton who joined us) said that the Committee provided opportunities for UN representatives to serve as Chairmen, rapporteurs etc, so that it was part of the office-sharing system. Abolishing it would do no harm, but might create the impression that countries no longer cared about peacekeeping. The present semi-active status seemed the most desirable.

3. Subsequently Mr. Sherry commented on the Multi-national Force in Lebanon. He said he could see two possible alternatives for the United States. It could have chosen to support the present government and have come in with sufficient military force (perhaps 20 divisions) and

.../2

appropriate rules of engagement to enforce its will. Alternatively it could have come in with a small peacekeeping force, limited arms and restricted rules of engagement to supervise the implementation of an agreement which had been negotiated and concurred in by all factions. Instead it had chosen to undertake the first task, with a force suited to the second one. There was a name for this kind of operation. Suicide.



J.R. Francis,
Director,
Defence Relations Division.

TO/A IFB, IDDZ, IDD, IDA, ETS, ZSI, URR

FROM/DE • IDR

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Briefing on USA Space Defence Concepts
SUJET

IDR/A.A.Després/2-6205/r1

Security/Sécurité

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Accession/Référence

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Date

January 26, 1984

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M.Archdeacon

NDHQ/DNACPOL

Mr. Barton
Mr. Herman
LCol. MacPherson

A US interdepartmental delegation from the State Department, the Department of Defense and ACDA will be in Ottawa on February 2nd for a briefing on USA space defence concepts. The presentation, which is meant for middle ranking officials, will take approximately 90 minutes and will cover technical aspects of space defence, the status of USA programmes, and an intelligence briefing on Soviet research and development in space defence. Participants require a security clearance at the level of top secret.

2. The US team will comprise the following:
- Charles Duelfer - Office of Policy Analysis, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, State Department;
 - William Furness - Office of Strategic Forces Policy, Department of Defense;
 - BGen Robert Rankin, Assistant for Directed Energy Weapons, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering;
 - David Wallen - Bureau of Strategic Programmes, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA);
 - Donald Hoggard - Soviet briefer, State Department.

2. The briefing will take place in the Conference Room 7th Floor, Tower A, in the Pearson Building, at 10:30, February 2nd. Discussions will continue after lunch (1430) if necessary. Addressees or their staff who wish to participate should contact Rosemary Learmonth, 2-3042.

Després
for Defence Relations Division.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

Mr. McNeil
Dr. Calder
Mr. Bythoff
W. J. file

TO
À The Under-Secretary of State for
External Affairs, OTTAWA (IDDZ)

SECURITY
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FROM
De The Canadian Embassy, WASHINGTON

DATE January 26, 1984

REFERENCE
Référence

NUMBER
Numéro 105

SUBJECT
Sujet Prime Minister's Peace Initiative:
Letter from Admiral La Rocque

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PCOOTT/
Fowler

Enclosed for your information is a copy of a letter which we have received at the Embassy from Admiral Gene La Rocque, the Director of the Center for Defense Information. Admiral La Rocque expresses his support for the Prime Minister's peace initiative. As you are aware, we do not consider the Center for Defense Information to be one of the most important arms control or peace organizations in this city. It does however have some influence. Its publications tend to be very useful for the kinds of information they provide. On the other hand, however, the Center for Defense Information is far better at pointing out problems than it is at providing solutions. For example, the Executive Director of the Arms Control Association said that his analysts are in almost daily touch with the analysts at the Center for Defense Information. However, from his point of view, the CDI is in the business of defense information, as its title suggests, rather than arms control. The other limitation of the CDI is that it tends to be too much of a personal vehicle for Admiral La Rocque, and to a lesser extent Admiral Carroll, rather than a public policy analysis center.

[Signature]
The Embassy

Center For Defense Information

303 CAPITOL HILL, WEST, 600 MARYLAND AVENUE, S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024

TELEPHONE: 202/484-9490
TELEX 904059 WSH (CDI)

January 24, 1984

Mr. R. J. Lysyshyn
First Secretary
Canadian Embassy
1746 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Mr. Lysyshyn:

Prime Minister Trudeau has embarked on a noble cause and his comments make a good deal of sense. I agree with his concern about over emphasis on capabilities and too little emphasis on intentions. We need measures to reduce tensions, mitigate hostility, and build confidence as the Prime Minister clearly calls for in his 27 October speech.

I agree he and other leaders need to "look at" structures to stabilize East-West relations and move toward a regular dialogue. But I would like to urge the Prime Minister to take the lead in initiating some specific proposals to accomplish these goals. Canada and European nations could be a bridge between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.


Enclosed is a copy of Project 2000 with possible utility along this line. Willy Brandt has told me he hoped to suggest this to the SPD in November 1983. I have had interest from other nations as well.

I do believe Prime Minister Trudeau is in a unique position in the world to prepare some specific steps because of his personal conviction and universal respect.

I would be pleased to meet with you to discuss this matter further if you wish.

I have taken the liberty of enclosing a piece I have done on Central America, Canada and the U.S. which is an outgrowth of a paper I prepared for the Kissinger Commission at the request of Jim Wright, the majority leader of our House of Representatives.

Sincerely,



Gene R. La Rocque
Rear Admiral, USN (Ret.)
Director

Enclosures
GRL/smb

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000561

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303 CAPITOL GALLERY WEST, 600 MARYLAND AVENUE, S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024

TELEPHONE: 202/484-9490
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PROJECT 2000

Understanding - Cooperation - Prosperity

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
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Center For Defense Information

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TELEPHONE: 202/484-9490
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000565

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Serious consideration should be given to the formation of a voluntary economic federation of North and Central America based on mutual respect for sovereignty while facilitating economic progress. A similar relationship is the European Economic Community which has surpassed the expectations of its initiators and could serve as a model for North and Central America.

As in the European model, a North and Central American Economic Federation (NCAEF) would not be directly involved in the internal political affairs of the individual nations but, as with the European model, the economic systems of

member nations should be structured along capitalist free enterprise lines. If a nation of North or Central America opts for a central communist economy, it obviously could not function as a full partner in an economic federation of free enterprise nations.

Initially, all nations of North and Central America need not be members of the economic federation but if economic federation benefits member nations there will be an incentive for non member nations to join even if it requires acceptance of a market economy.

Obviously, the EEC is an imperfect model because of the greater homogeneity in size, population, industrial capacity, etc., but some comparable formula could be devised.

The time is short. The U.S. and Canada cannot continue to witness increased poverty in Central America while we and Canada grow richer. If we do nothing to improve the economic plight of Central America all of Central America and Mexico will be motivated to move to a state controlled economy in the near future.

In the long run we cannot, by military means, prevent the nations of Central from "going communist." We may be able to do so by encouraging the establishment of an economic federation. It is worth careful consideration.

①

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE — NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO The Canadian Embassy
A OSLO NorwayWITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)
CONFIDENTIAL/CEO
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. IDDZ-0101 DATE Jan. 26, 84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION — DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE — RÉFÉRENCE
	<p>Please find attached original letter from PM Trudeau to</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Mr. Knut Frydenlund Chairman Parliamentary Committee on Defence Oslo, Norway</p> <p style="text-align: right;">John McNee Task Force Working Group</p> 	
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION FEB - 7 1984 DATE	RETURN TO / RETOURNER À IDDZ/EXTOTT  SIGNATURE	

FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR — SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE — NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO **Tab Canadian Embassy**
A **OSL Norway**

CONFIDENTIAL/CEO
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANEXE(S)

NO. **IDDZ-0101** DATE **Jan. 26, 84**

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION — DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE — RÉFÉRENCE
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RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION		RETURN TO / RETOURNER À
DATE	SIGNATURE	IDDZ/EXTOTT



CANADA

PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

January 23, 1984

Hunt,

Dear Mr. ~~Frydenlund~~,

Permit me to take a moment to respond to your very supportive letter of October 30 and express appreciation for the sentiments it contains.

East/West relations are indeed in a parlous state but I have perceived among the many leaders I have met over the last several weeks a recognition that the situation is far from irreversible, that indeed there is political will to improve the dialogue. I strongly believe that all public figures must be active in addressing at least some of the divisive issues which, if left unchecked, could have indescribable consequences. My exchange of correspondence with your Prime Minister confirms that the Norwegian Government, for its part, shares this assessment and has promised to support efforts to improve East/West relations.

I recall with pleasure my visit to Norway in 1980 in the company of my son Justin and extend to you my sincere appreciation for your writing to me on this matter.

Yours sincerely, *with*
personal regards
John S. F.

Mr. Knut Frydenlund
Chairman
Parliamentary Committee on Defence
Oslo, Norway

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE — NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
A
Permanent Mission of Canada to the Office
of the United Nations at Geneva, and to
the Committee on Disarmament
GENEVA, Switzerland

WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)

CONFIDENTIAL/CEO

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. **IDDZ-0100**DATE **Jan. 26, 84**

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION — DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE — RÉFÉRENCE
	<p>Please find attached the background briefing book for the PM's visit to Eastern Europe.</p>	
	<p>John McNee Task Force Working Group</p>	
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION	RETURN TO / RETOURNER À	
DATE	SIGNATURE	IDDZ/EXTOTT

WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)

CONFIDENTIAL/CDN EYES ONLY

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

TO
À**The Canadian Embassy
VIENNA, AUSTRIA**NO. **IDDZ-0099** DATE **Jan. 26,**
1984**MBFRk**

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION — DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE — RÉFÉRENCE
<p>Please find attached the background briefing book for the PM's visit to Eastern Europe.</p>		
<p>John McNee Task Force Working Group (IDDZ)</p>		
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION		RETURN TO / RETOURNER À
DATE	SIGNATURE	IDDZ/EXTOTT

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO / À
 Delegation of Canada to the North Atlantic
 Council (BNATO)
 BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

CONFIDENTIAL/CEO

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. IDDZ-0098

DATE JAN 26, 84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
	<p>Please find attached the background briefing book for the PM's visit to Eastern Europe.</p> <p><i>Return to</i></p> 	
	<p>John McNee Task Force Working Group (IDDZ)</p> <p><i>Rapid review much appreciated.</i></p> <p><i>Thank you</i> (1)</p>	

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

RETURN TO / RETOURNER À

30 Jan

DATE

John Zappa

SIGNATURE

IDDZ/EXTOTT



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

27 JAN 84 0012 212 10

SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ CONFIDENTIAL PERS INFO NO/NO DISTR

FM/DE FM EXTOTT. IDDZ0097 26JAN84

TO/À TO GENEV, ~~NO/NO DISTR~~

INFO BEESLEY DE DELVOIE
DISTR FROM

REF ---REPLACEMENT FOR SKINNER

SUBJ/SUJ ARSENE DESPRES, CURRENTLY DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF DEFENCE RELATIONS DIV, IS DUE TO BE POSTED ABROAD THIS SUMMER. DESPRES HAS EXPRESSED STRONG PROFESSIONAL AND PERSONAL INTEREST IN BEING POSTED TO GENEV TO REPLACE SKINNER. I HAVE INDICATED TO PERSONNEL BUREAU THAT I FULLY SUPPORT DESPRES CANDIDACY FOR GENEV AND HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT HE IS AT PRESENT LEADING CANDIDATE FOR JOB, ALTHOUGH FOR VARIETY OF REASONS RELATED TO INTERTWINING POSTING DECISIONS, PERSONNEL DOES NOT/NOT EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO MAKE OFFICIAL PROPOSAL TO YOU FOR SEVERAL WEEKS.

2. DESPRES IS VERY ABLE, EFFECTIVE AND MATURE OFFICER. HE IS ALSO FULLY BILINGUAL AND HARD-WORKING. HE HAS FIVE YEARS OF EXPERIENCE IN FIELD OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AND WOULD, I AM SURE, DO A FIRST-RATE JOB AS DISARMAMENT COUNSELLOR AT YOUR MISSION. HIS POSTING TO GENEV WOULD FIT IN WELL WITH PLANS TO FURTHER DEVELOP SMALL CADRE OF FS OFFICERS WITH INTEREST AND REAL EXPERTISE IN ACD QUESTIONS.

3. REGARDS.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG L.A. Delvoie/sd

IDDZ

5-5912

L.A. Delvoie
SIG L.A. Delvoie



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

27 JAN 84 120 212 10

SECURITY /
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0096 26JAN84

TO/À TO PRMNY

INFO INFO GENEV

REF DISTR IDR IDA IDD IMU IMD

SUBJ/SUJ REF YOURTEL WKGR0143 23JAN

---PM INITIATIVE: WORKING PAPER ON MEASURES RESTRAINING STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY

WE APPRECIATE COMMENTS IN YOUR REFTEL ON PROPOSALS OUTLINED IN DRAFT WORKING PAPER ON MEASURES RESTRAINING STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY.

2. IN RESPONSE TO YOUR COMMENTS ON ASAT MEASURE, WE WOULD MAKE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS. WHILE WE AGREE THAT LOW ALTITUDE SATELLITES ARE NOT UNIMPORTANT FOR THE STABILITY OF DETERRENCE, THEY ARE NOT AS CRITICAL TO CONFIDENCE (AND THEREFORE CREDIBILITY) EACH SIDE HAS THAT IN TIMES OF CRISIS THEIR RETALIATORY FORCES WOULD FUNCTION AS INTENDED. RETALIATORY FORCES AND THEIR ASSOCIATED SATELLITES ARE, THEREFORE, ALSO DEFENSIVE IN NATURE. SECURE AND CONTROLLABLE RETALIATORY FORCES ARE CRITICAL TO STABILITY OF DETERRENCE IN A MANNER WHICH VERIFICATION AND RECONNAISSANCE ARGUABLY ARE NOT.

3. WE WOULD AGREE THAT INEXPENSIVE OPTION OF EMP ASAT SYSTEM IS FEASIBLE. SUCH CAPABILITY COULD, HOWEVER, EASILY BE DEVELOPED IN ANY ASAT REGIME, WHETHER OF COMPREHENSIVE OR SELECTIVE NATURE. MORE IMPORTANTLY, IT IS QUESTIONABLE, EXCEPT IN SOME EXTREME SCENARIO, IF

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

DR. K. CALDER

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE



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PAGE TWO IDDZ0096 CONF

12

10

ANY STATE WOULD SEEK TO BLIND ENEMY S SATELLITES IN MANNER WHICH
WOULD EXPOSE ITS OWN TO EMP EFFECTS.

4. PROBLEM OF DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN HIGH-AND-LOW ALTITUDE SYSTEMS,
AND CONVERTING LATTER INTO FORMER, IS REAL. IT IS, HOWEVER, OUR CONTEN-
TION THAT CONVERSION COULD BE VERIFIED, AND THAT NO STATE WOULD RISK
USING HIGH ALTITUDE SYSTEM OF ANY TYPE WITHOUT HAVING FIRST TESTED
IT IN THIS MODE.

5. YOUR COMMENTS ON VERIFICATION PROPOSAL ARE WELL MADE. HOWEVER, IT
IS NOT INTENT OF THIS PROPOSAL TO PRECLUDE DEPLOYMENT OF INVULNERA-
BLE SYSTEMS BUT RATHER TO ENSURE THAT INVULNERABLE SYSTEMS WOULD BE
MADE VERIFIABLE, AS WAS INTENT, FOR EXAMPLE, OF CARTER ADMINISTRA-
TION M-X BASING PLAN. YOUR EXAMPLE OF SUBMARINES DOES NOT SEEM TO
APPLY, SINCE THESE ARE WIDELY CONSIDERED VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL
TECHNICAL MEANS IN TERMS OF THEIR NUMBERS AND CHARACTERISTICS,
ALTHOUGH NOT LOCATION.

6. PROBLEM OF CLANDESTINE DEVELOPMENT IS CERTAINLY CONCERN OF ALL
ARMS CONTROLLERS. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS GENERALLY REGARDED AS BEING
EXTREMELY UNLIKELY THAT STATE COULD DEVELOP, TEST, AND DEPLOY
STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS WITHOUT BEING DETECTED. YOUR SUGGESTION
THAT MORE MODEST PROPOSAL MIGHT BE TO PROHIBIT ACTIVITIES, DESIGNED
TO INHIBIT VERIFICATION IS, AS FAR AS WE KNOW EXACTLY WHAT IS
CURRENTLY CONTAINED IN SALT I AND II. MAJOR PROBLEM HERE HAS BEEN
DEMONSTRATING QUOTE INTENT TO INHIBIT VERIFICATION. THIS HAS LED

UNQUOTE

...3



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PAGE THREE IDDZ0096 CONF 12 | 10

~~REDACTED~~ TO PROPOSALS THAT ENCRYPTION OF TELEMTRY BE PROHIBITED.

.NFO

**CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

P R 262115Z¹⁶ JAN 84

FM NDHQ OTTAWA

TO ZEN/CDLS LONDON ENG //COMD//

INFO RCCPJSZ/EXTOTT //IDDZ/IDD/IDR/PED/PER/ZSI//

RCCPJSZ/BNATO

RCCPJSZ/STKHM //SCDEL//

RCCPJSZ/PEKIN

RCCPJSZ/LDN

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAN EYES ONLY CPP 378

SUBJ: CONTACT WITH CHINESE DEFENCE ATTACHE

REF: A. YOURTEL COMD 0005 231040Z JAN(NOTAL)

1. WE WERE INTERESTED TO LEARN OF APPROACH TO YOU BY NEW CHINESE DEFENCE ATTACHE REPORTED REFTEL.CURIOSITY ON PART OF ANY CHINESE ATTACHE IN ALL THINGS SOVIET IS HARDLY SURPRISING,BUT APPARENT DESIRE OF YOUR COLLEAGUE IN LDN TO ESTABLISH DIALOGUE WITH YOU ON STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS,IN PARTICULAR ON CURRENT ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS IS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST. WHILE RECENT VISIT OF ZHAO MAY HAVE PROVIDED USEFUL PRETEXT FOR CALL,WE WOULD BE INCLINED TO THINK IT MORE LIKELY THAT PMS PFACE INITIATIVE WHICH IDENTIFIES NEED TO

PAGE 02 RCCPJCR3051 C O N F I D E N T I A L CAN EYES ONLY CPP 379

STIMULATE POLITICAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST ON MATTERS AFFECTING SECURITY IN TIME OF WORSENING TREND IN RELATIONSHIP IS AT ROOT.

2. WHEN OPPORTUNITY NEXT PRESENTS ITSELF YOU MAY WISH, WITHOUT GOING INTO DETAILS OF WESTERN POSITION OR CANADIAN AIMS, TO REVIEW WESTERN OBJECTIVES AT STKHM IN GENERAL TERMS. FIRST PHASE OF CONFERENCE IS CONCERNED WITH CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES (CSBMS). AIM OF CSBMS IS TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE IN ORDER TO PAVE WAY TO DISARMAMENT IN CONVENTIONAL AND, ULTIMATELY, NUCLEAR FORCES. ANY FORCE REDUCTIONS, HOWEVER, WOULD BE SUBJECT OF A SECOND PHASE OF CDE. POSITED ON THEORY THAT NUCLEAR WAR IS MOST LIKELY TO ARISE OUT OF ESCALATION OF CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT, WEST INTENDS THAT CSBMS SHOULD DEAL WITH CONVENTIONAL FORCES. TO ACHIEVE GOALS, CANADA AND ALLIES ARE PRESENTING COMPREHENSIVE PACKAGE OF MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE CSBMS WHICH, IF ADOPTED AND IMPLEMENTED, COULD SET STAGE FOR REDUCTIONS. WPO AND NNA, HOWEVER, MAY WISH TO TALK ABOUT NUCLEAR FORCES AS WELL, OR IN LIEU. WPO CAN BE EXPECTED TO PUT UP STIFF OPPOSITION TO ADOPTION OF WESTERN PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO LEAD ULTIMATELY TO GREATER TRANSPARENCY IN MILITARY ACTIVITIES. WITH DIAMETRICAL DIFFERENCE IN PHILOSOPHY AND OBJECTIVES, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT FIRST PHASE OF CONFERENCE WILL BE LONG, SOMETIMES ACRIMONIOUS, AND DIFFICULT.

PAGE 03 RCCPJCR3051 C O N F I D E N T I A L CAN EYES ONLY CPP 378
SUCCESS WILL COME SLOWLY. WE WILL BE INTERESTED TO RECEIVE VIEW OF
CHINESE ON WESTERN PHILOSOPHY AND AIMS, AND SOVIET APPROACH TO
CONFERENCE.

3. ON PROPOSED FIVE POWER NUCLEAR CONFERENCE AIM OF PM WILL BE KNOWN
TO YOU FROM HIS 13 NOV SPEECH IN MONTREAL. BACKGROUND PAPER UPON
WHICH PROPOSAL WAS BASED IS AVAILABLE THROUGH HICOM/BEATTIE. PURPOSE
IN PROPOSING THAT ALL FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS ENGAGE IN DISCUSSIONS WAS
TO PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY FOR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT TWO SUPERPOWERS HAVE
LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN LIMITATIONS ON EXPANSION OF NUCLEAR CAPABILI-
TIES OF OTHER THREE NUCLEAR POWERS, AS WELL AS TO BRING PRESSURE TO
BEAR ON USA AND USSR TO REACH AGREEMENT IN START. WE RECOGNIZE THAT
CONSTRAINTS ON THEIR STRATEGIC FORCES IN ABSENCE OF SIGNIFICANT RE-
DUCTIONS IN SUPERPOWER ARSENALS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO CHINA (AND UK
AND FRANCE), BUT HOLD VIEW THAT OBJECTIVE OF CHINESE WHICH IS THAT TWO
PRINCIPAL PLAYERS SHOULD FIRST BE PERSUADED TO MAKE CHANGES IN THEIR
NUCLEAR POLICIES (REFTEL) IS MORE LIKELY TO BE ACCOMPLISHED IF USA AND
USSR ARE JOINED IN DISCUSSIONS BY OTHER THREE. INTERESTINGLY, SOME MOVE-
MENT FROM EARLIER, RIGID, CHINESE POSITION WAS EVIDENT WHEN ZHAO, DURING
RECENT VISIT, INDICATED THAT CHINESE WOULD PARTICIPATE IN ANY MEETING
OF AMBASSADORS TO UN OF FIVE POWERS WITHOUT INSISTING ON PRECONDITIONS.

PAGE 04 RCCPJCR3051 C O N F I D E N T I A L CAN EYES ONLY CPP 378
WE WILL BE INTERESTED TO LEARN WHETHER YOUR INTERLOCUTOR ALSO SHOWS
GREATER FLEXIBILITY NEXT TIME ROUND.

4. YOU SHOULD OF COURSE CONSULT CLOSELY WITH HICOM ON MATTER.

5. CIS CONCURS.

BT

CCC/253 262315Z PJCR3051

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

*Ref: cc to
PCO/ [unclear]
MNA Done
DMF 27/1/84
+ file*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM ATHNS ZFGR5053 26JAN83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO LDN PARIS WSHDC COPEN/SCDEL BNATO PEKIN PRGUF BGRAD BUCST DELHI
MOSCO WSAW

DISTR IFB CPD IDR IDA RBR RSD RSR

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0045 17JAN

---PM INITIATIVE

AT SOCIAL OCCASION LAST NIGHT WE HAD OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF IN
DETAIL MAHERITSAS (SENIOR DIPLO ADVISER IN PM PAPANDREOUS OFFICE)
ABOUT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PMS PEACE INITIATIVE, USING FOR THIS
PURPOSE BACKGROUND INFO IN REFTEL.

2. MAHERITSAS WAS NOT/NOT PREPARED TO OFFER DETAILED COMMENTS ON
VARIOUS ASPECTS OF PM INITIATIVE EXCEPT THAT HE DID SAY THAT HIS
PM HAD BEEN SURPRISED AT INCLUSION OF EAST BERLIN IN PMS CURRENT
ITINERARY GIVEN EAST GERMANY'S QUOTE COMPLETE SUBSERVIENCE
TO USSR UNQUOTE. OTHERWISE HE WAS FULL OF EFFUSIVE PRAISE FOR
EFFORT UNDERTAKEN BY PM TRUDEAU AND CONVEYED PM PAPANDREOUS
SUPPORT AND BEST WISHES.

3. RE PAPANDREOUS OWN ATTEMPTS TO LESSEN NUCLEAR WAR DANGER AND
TO PROMOTE REACTIVATE NEGOTIATION ON ARMS REDUCTION, HE PROMISED
HE WOULD PROVIDE US WITH COPY OF RECENT PAPANDREOU-CEAUCESCU
JOINT APPEAL. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT THERE WERE FURTHER MOVES
IN THE OFFING AND CURRENTLY MUCH CONSULTATION BETWEEN PAPANDREOU,

...2

PAGE TWO ZFGR5053 CONFD

CEAUCESCU, MRS GANDHI AND OTHERS ABOUT ANOTHER POSSIBLE APPEAL
EMANATING THIS TIME FROM A BROADER BASIS. MAHERITSAS IMPLIED THAT
THERE HAD BEEN RECENT PHONE CONVERSATIONS ABOUT THIS BETWEEN CDN
AND GREEK PMS.

CCC/216 270530Z ZFGR5053

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

Division Phoned _____
Person _____
Local Time _____

NONCLASSIFIE

DE BNATO YBGR2035 26JAN84

A EXTOTT LIDDZ LIVRAISON 260900

INFO CNGNY

DISTR FPR IDR

REF NOTRETEL YBGR2025 23JAN

---RENCONTRE DU PM AVEC LA REDACTION DU NEW YORK TIMES

PRIERE NOUS ADDRESSER RAPIDEMENT TEXTE DEMANDE DANS TEL EN REF

CAR VOUDRIONS LE DISTRIBUER AVANT FIN DE SEMAINE.

UUU/070 261110Z YBGR2035

Division Phoned.....
Pers
Local time 1940

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

MF
AD

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR1088 26JAN84

TO EXTOTT UDDZ URR DELIVER BY 261600

INFO MOSCO BNATO CANMILREPNATO LDN ROME PARIS BONN VMBFR HAGUE
PEKIN TOKYO PRMNY NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD/DACPOL/DNACPOL/DSTRATA/CIS
GENEV PMDEL/DAVOS OSLO COPEN ATHNS WSAW BUCST BPEST STKHM/SCDEL
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDR RBD ZSI MINE MINT UGB IDD RBR RCR
RSR RCD RSD CPD ZSP URT URE LCD LSD RGB

REF OURTEL UNGR1086 26JAN

---USA/USSR RELATIONS

REFTEL GIVES TEXT OF PRES REAGANS REMARKS ON THE SOV UNION IN HIS STATE OF UNION ADDRESS. THIS SPEECH DELIVERED TO PRIME TIME NATION-WIDE AUDIENCE PROBABLY REACHED FAR LARGER AUDIENCE THAN USA/USSR RELS SPEECH OF 16JAN AND IS THEREFORE MORE EFFECTIVE FOR TELLING PUBLIC OF A POLICY CHANGE. THIS SPEECH IS IMPORTANT FOR ITS CLEAR UNAMBIGUOUS MESSAGE ABOUT USA DESIRE FOR PEACE AND ESPECIALLY FOR ITS VERY CONCILIATION LANGUAGE ABOUT USSR. THERE WERE REALLY NO/NO SHOTS TAKEN AT USSR AT ALL. REALLY SUSTAINED BIPARTISAN APPLAUSE FOLLOWED HIS LINEQUOTE A NUCLEAR WAR CANNOT/NOT BE WON AND MUST NEVER BE FOUGHT UNQUOTE.

2. THE PRES HAD USED THIS PHRASED IN HIS SPEECH TO THE JPNSE DIET, BUT HIS DIET SPEECH HAD NOT/NOT BEEN WIDELY COVERED. DURING PMS VISIT THE PRESIDENTS USE OF THIS SENTENCE IN JAPAN WAS DISCUSSED AND PM ENCOURAGED PRES TO GO ON SAYING IT IN US. IN ADVANCE OF PMS

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR1088 CONFD

ARRIVAL 15DEC83 NSC HAD EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS TO EMB ABOUT PMS. INTENTION TO REFER TO THIS STATEMENT IN HIS PRESS STATEMENT AFTER MTG WITH REAGAN. USE OF THIS SENTENCE IN STATE OF UNION MESSAGE CAN BE TAKEN AS SIGN OF SOME EVOLUTION OF ADMIN THINKING ON THIS ISSUE.

3. REAGAN'S COMMENTS WHEN TAKEN WITH ANDROPOV'S INTERVIEW AND ZAGLADIN FOLLOW-UP INTERVIEW ADD UP TO MAJOR CHANGE AWAY FROM MEGAPHONE DIPLOMACY. NEITHER SIDE IS, HOWEVER, GIVING ANYTHING AWAY AND NEITHER SIDE HAS COME UP WITH SPECIFICS FOR DISCUSSION. HOWEVER, USA BELIEVES SOVS ARE DOING MORE THAN GETTING OFF THE LIMB THEY WERE LEFT ALONE ON BY SHIFT IN REAGAN RHETORIC. USA BELIEVES USSR IS INDEED WILLING TO NEGOTIATE. KEY ISSUE IS, OF COURSE, INF MISSILES. USA OFFICIALS ARE SLOWLY COMING TO FULL REALIZATION OF EXTENT OF SOV OBJECTION TO THESE MISSILES AND ARE BEGINNING TO ADMIT THAT EARLIER ASSERTIONS THAT DEPLOYMENT WLD FORCE SOVS TO BEGIN TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY MAY HAVE BEEN OVERLY SIMPLIFIED. SOV SIGNALS ALL POINT TO NEED TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT USA INF DEPLOYMENT. THAT QUOTE SOMETHING UNQUOTE NEED NOT/NOT NECESSARILY BE DISMANTLING ALREADY DEPLOYED MISSILES BUT CLEARLY SOVS ARE SAYING THEY REQUIRE A GESTURE. THEY MAY HAVE IN MIND SOMETHING LIKE A PAUSE IN DEPLOYMENTS OR A LOWER DEPLOYMENT. PROBLEM OF COURSE IS THAT SOVS HAVE STILL NOT/NOT ACKNOWLEDGED THE SIGNIFICANCE AND RELEVANCE OF THEIR OWN SS20 DEPLOY ENT. UNTIL THEY DO THEIR CONDITIONS REMAIN ONE-SIDED AND ARE RECOGNIZED HERE IN WSHDC AS ONE-SIDED.

5. SOV AMB DOBRYNIN ATTENDED PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO CONGRESS AFTER HAVING MISSED LAST FEW, AND WAS VISIBLY IN BUOYANT MOOD OVER TONE OF REAGAN'S COMMENTS.

CCC/241 261756Z UNGR1088

Division Phoned 5-5912
Person C.F.
Local Time 1047

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WSHDC UNGR1086 26JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ URR PMDEL/PRGUE PMDEL/DAVOS FLASH
INFO MOSCO BNATO CANMILREPNATO LDN ROME PARIS BONN VMBFR HAGUE
PEKIN TOKYO PRMNY NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/PPP/DACPOL/DNACPOL/DSTRATA/
CIS GENEV OSLO COPEN ATHNS WSAW BUCST BPEST STKHM/CDEDEL
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDR RBD ZSI MINE MINT UGB IDD RBR RCR
RSR RCD RSD CPD ZSP URT URE LCD LSD RGB

---USA-USSR RELATIONS

IN CASE TEXT NOT/NOT AVAILABLE LOCALLY, FOLLOWING ARE PARAS IN
STATE OF UNION MESSAGE OF USA-USSR RELATIONS.

QUOTE

TONIGHT, I WANT TO SPEAK TO THE PEOPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION TO TELL
THEM: IT IS TRUE OUR GOVERNMENTS HAVE HAD SERIOUS DIFFERENCES. BUT OUR
SONS AND DAUGHTERS HAVE NEVER FOUGHT EACH OTHER IN WAR. IF WE
AMERICANS HAVE OUR WAY, THEY NEVER WILL.

QUOTE ONLY ONE SANE POLICY UNQUOTE

PEOPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION, THERE IS ONLY ONE SANE POLICY, FOR YOUR
COUNTRY AND MINE, TO PRESERVE OUR CIVILIZATION IN THIS MODERN AGE:
A NUCLEAR WAR CANNOT/NOT BE WON AND MUST NEVER BE FOUGHT. THE ONLY
VALUE IN OUR TWO NATIONS POSSESSING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS TO MAKE SURE
THEY WILL NEVER BE USED. BUT THEN WOULD IT NOT/NOT BE BETTER TO
DO AWAY WITH THEM ENTIRELY?

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR1086 UNCLAS

PRESIDENT DWIGHT EISENHOWER, WHO FOUGHT BY YOUR SIDE IN WORLD WAR II, SAID THE ESSENTIAL STRUGGLE QUOTE IS NOT/MERELY MAN AGAINST MAN OR NATION AGAINST NATION. IT IS MAN AGAINST WAR UNQUOTE.

AMERICANS ARE PEOPLE OF PEACE. IF YOUR GOVERNMENT WANTS PEACE THERE WILL BE PEACE. WE CAN COME TOGETHER IN FAITH AND FRIENDSHIP TO BUILD A SAFER AND FAR BETTER WORLD FOR OUR CHILDREN AND OUR CHILDRENS CHILDREN. AND THE WHOLE WORLD WILL REJOICE. THAT IS MY MESSAGE TO YOU.

UNQUOTE.

UUU/241 261519Z UNGR1086

CGO 002/26

300 12

Refecto: MINA 1/1 Done
DMF 27/1/84
IFB
PCO/ Fowler
+ file
RD

RESTRICTED

FM/IN CHICAGO YFGRO222
EXTOTT/URR BAG
INFO FMB WSHDC/COSSAGE/JUTZI/NEW YORK CON GEN DE OTT
DISTR LDDZ URE UGP A
REF
SUBJ/SUJ ---VISIT TO WISCONSIN--JAN 9-13, 1984

P.M.'s PEACE INITIATIVE:
AMBASSADORS' SPEECH MADISON: ACID RAIN

ON TERRITORY VISIT TO WISCONSIN TO FIRM UP DETAILS FOR AMBASSADOR GOTLIEB'S FALL SPEAKING ENGAGEMENT AT UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN IN MADISON, SPOKE WITH MEMBERS OF GOVERNOR ROBERT EARLE'S OFFICE. ACCORDING TO DON SCHOTT, GOV.'S EXEC. ASST., WISCONSIN GOV. HAS SUBMITTED 3/3 RESOLUTIONS FOR THE FORTHCOMING NATIONAL GOVERNOR'S CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON, TWO OF WHICH ARE OF SPECIFIC INTEREST TO CANADA.

2. FIRST RESOLUTION CALLS FOR A NUCLEAR ARMS FREEZE. SCHOTT SAID GOV. EARLE LAUDS P.M.'s INITIATIVE ON PEACE AND SECURITY AND ADDED THAT MANY PERSONS, PARTICULARLY JOURNALISTS, HAVE ASKED THE GOV. WHY HE HAS NOT SPOKEN WITH THE P.M. SINCE THE GOV. AND P.M. HAVE SIMILAR VIEWS ON THE NEED TO REDUCE WORLD TENSIONS. SCHOTT INDICATED THE QUESTIONERS HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT FROM THE GOVERNOR'S POINT OF VIEW, SUCH A MEETING HAD NOT/TAKEN PLACE, NOT/NOT BECAUSE OF THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF THE P.M.'S AND GOV.'S VIEWS BUT BECAUSE OF THE INAPPROPRIATENESS OF A GOVERNOR SPEAKING WITH A FOREIGN HEAD OF STATE. SCHOTT GAVE IMPRESSION THAT GOV. EARLE WOULD WELCOME A MEETING WITH THE P.M. IF ISSUE OF PROTOCOL COULD BE OVERCOME.

3. EARLE'S ENVIRONMENTAL AID INDICATED THAT EARLE'S RESOLUTION ON ACID RAIN AT GOV.'S CONFERENCE WOULD SIMPLY CALL FOR A "SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION" OF SO2 IN THE U.S. WHILE THE GOV. IS PERSONALLY SYMPATHETIC TO THE CANADIAN POSITION OF A 50% REDUCTION IN SO2 EMISSIONS, IN ORDER TO HAVE ANY CHANCE OF IT BEING PASSED, THE GOV. THINKS THAT THE RESOLUTION NEEDS TO BE COINED IN VERY GENERAL TERMS.

DRAFTED BY

D. LYSNE

GENERAL RELATIONS

312
427-1031

DAVID E. LYSNE, CONSUL

INFO

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BUCST UYGR0192 26JAN84

TO PRGUE/PM DEL DELIVERY BY 261130

INFO WSAW BONN MOSCO WSHDC LDN PARIS BNATO BPEST BGRAD NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/
CPP PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/DURDIN/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN EXTOTT (IDDZ)
DISTR XDV MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RBR RBD RBP

---PM VISIT TO ROMANIA:PROGRAM

FOLLOWING PROGRAM HAS BEEN AGREED WITH ROMANIAN AUTHORITIES.GRATEFUL
FOR YOUR COMMENTS IF ANY:

01FEB

1500 PLANE ARRIVES AT OTOPENI AIRPORT;

MEDIA DEPLANES FIRST;

AMBASSADOR AND CHIEF OF PROTOCOL GO UP TO GREET PM;

PM DESCENDS AND MEETS ROM OFFICIALS;

PM DASCALESCU ACCOMPANIED BY SOME MINS AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES

(4 OR 5 ALTOGETHER)WILL GREET PM.(WE UNDERSTAND THAT ONE OR TWO

VICE-PRES OF COUNCIL OF STATE MIGHT ALSO BE THERE.IN ROM PROTOCOL,
THEY OCCUPY A POSN HIGHER THAN PM.)

PM MEETS CDNS;

TWO PMS WALK TO SMALL HONOUR GUARD;

TWO NATL ANTHEMS WILL BE PLAYED(DURATION OF ARRIVAL CEREMONY
15 MINUTES)

1515 PM LEAVES TERMINAL FOR GUEST HOUSE BY CAR ACCOMPANIED BY PM
DASCALESCU PLUS ONE INTERPRETER.

...2

PAGE TWO UYGR0192 CONF

1530 PM AND OFFICIAL DEL ARRIVE AT GUEST HOUSE, PALAIS FLOREASCA. REST
OF OFFICIAL DEL GOES TO HOTEL TRIUMF (HOTEL USED FOR OFFICIAL
GUESTS ONLY).

1605 PM LEAVES PALAIS FLOREASCA.

1615 FIRST SESSION BETWEEN PM AND PRES CEAUSESCU AT PALACE OF COUNCIL
OF STATE (EX-ROYAL PALACE).

1900 END OF SESSION. RETURN TO OFFICIAL GUEST HOUSE.

1950 LEAVE PALAIS FLOREASCA FOR DINNER.

2000 OFFICIAL DINNER AT PALACE OF COUNCIL OF STATE. (FOR OFFICIAL
DINNER WE SUGGESTED TO ROM AUTHORITIES TO INVITE ALL OFFICIAL
PARTY PLUS PMS SON, MR R COOPER, OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPHER, AMBASSADOR,
MR DN GORESKY, FIRST SECRETARY AND CONSUL AND MR TD MARR, FIRST
SECRETARY (COMMERCIAL) AND CONSUL FOR A TOTAL OF 16 CDNS).

2130 OR 2200 END OF OFFICIAL DINNER. RETURN TO PALAIS FLOREASCA.

02FEB

0920 LEAVE PALAIS FLOREASCA.

0930 SECOND SESSION WITH PRES CEAUSESCU AT PALACE OF COUNCIL OF STATE.

1200 END OF SESSION. PM LEAVES FOR SCRUM WITH PRESS.

1215 SCRUM AT PRESS CENTER OF HOTEL INTERCONTINENTAL.

1245 LEAVE FOR PRIVATE LUNCH.

1450 PM RETURNS TO PALAIS FLOREASCA WHERE HE IS MET BY PM DASCALESCU.

1500 DEPARTURE OF TWO PMS FOR AIRPORT.

...3

PAGE THREE UYGR0192 CONF

1515 ARRIVAL AT AIRPORT.

DEPARTURE CEREMONY.PMS WALK TO HONOUR GUARD.TWO NATL ANTHEMS
PLAYED.SALUTE CDNS.SALUTE ROM DEL.CDN DEL BOARDS AIRCRAFT.
PM BOARDS AIRCRAFT.

1530 AIRCRAFT SEPARTS.

2.SEPARATE TEL ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOLLOWS.

CCC/181 260930Z UYGR0192

R E S T R I C T E D

FM EXTOTT PPR0186 26JAN84

TO TOKYO DELIVER BY 271100

INFO PCOOTT/CARON

DISTR MINA DMF PGB PPD LIDDZ

---LETTER FROM PM TRUDEAU TO PM NAKASONE

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER FROM PM TRUDEAU TO PM NAKASONE WHICH
HAS BEEN SIGNED BY PM. ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW BY BAG.

2. QUOTE MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER, MAY I FIRST CONVEY TO YOU MY
CONGRATULATIONS ON THE RE-ELECTION OF YOUR GOVT AND OF COURSE ON
YOUR OWN VICTORY IN YOUR CONSTITUENCY. BECAUSE OF OUR COUNTRIES
CLOSE TIES, CDNS HAVE FOLLOWED WITH CONSIDERABLE INTEREST THE PROGRESS
OF THE ELECTION. I KNOW THAT YOU LED THE CAMPAIGN UNDER DIFFICULT
CIRCUMSTANCES BUT THAT, WITH THE INAUGURATION OF YOUR CABINET, YOU
ARE READY TO ADDRESS ANEW THE TASK OF GOVERNING YOUR CTRY. (PARA)
I WAS DELIGHTED TO HAVE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO VISIT TOKYO, ALL
TOO BRIEFLY, IN NOV. I KNOW THAT IT WAS AN EXCEPTIONALLY BUSY TIME
FOR YOU POLITICALLY, AND I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR GRACIOUS
HOSPITALITY DESPITE THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. YOUR WARM SUPPORT FOR
MY PROPOSALS TO TRY TO IMPROVE EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND TO REVERSE
THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE WAS VERY HEARTENING, AND I THANK YOU FOR IT.
I WAS PLEASED TO LEARN THAT YOU REPORTED EXTENSIVELY TO THE DIET
ON OUR CONVERSATION. (PARA) AS AN IMPORTANT SUMMIT CTRY, JPNS ONGOING
COMMITMENT TO PLAY A ROLE IN EASING EAST/WEST TENSIONS, AS
REITERATED IN YOUR LETTER OF 28DEC IS ESSENTIAL IF WE ARE TO
SUCCEED IN PERSUADING THE SUPERPOWERS TO MOVE SUBSTANTIVELY TO A

...2

PAGE TWO PPR0186 RESTD

GREATER DEGREE OF ACCOMMODATION AND ACCORD.(PARA)AT THE
COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVT MTG IN NEW DELHI I SPOKE OF OUR SHARED
CONCERNS OVER THE CURRENT STATE OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND THE
DANGERS OF VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS.I WAS HEARTENED BY THE RESPONSE I RECEIVED FROM MY FELLOW
COMMONWEALTH LEADERS WHO SPECIFICALLY ENDORSED MY INITIATIVE IN
THE GOA DECLARATION ON INTL SECURITY.THE CHINESE LEADERS
SUPPORTED THE GENERAL POLITICAL PURPOSE OF MY INITIATIVE,ALTHOUGH
THEY ARGUED THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY IS TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR
ON THE SUPERPOWERS TO REDUCE THEIR ARSENALS.(PARA)YOU WERE KIND
ENOUGH TO OFFER TO HELP IN DEVELOPING MY INITIATIVE QUOTE FROM
THE SIDE UNQUOTE AND IN THIS REGARD IT STRIKES ME THAT THERE ARE
SEVERAL AREAS WHERE WE COULD WORK TOGETHER.WE COULD, FOR EXAMPLE,
TRY TO DISCOURAGE HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION IN TALKS WITH THE
NEAR-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES.ALSO,I WOULD WELCOME ANY SUPPORT THAT YOU
MIGHT PROVIDE ON THE PROPOSAL FOR A FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE.IT IS
ESSENTIAL THAT THESE COUNTRIES DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY ARE PREPARED
TO TAKE STEPS TO LIMIT THEIR OWN NUCLEAR ARSENALS IN CONFORMITY
WITH THE NPT.A THIRD AREA WOULD BE THAT OF MAINTAINING OPEN LINES
OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP,BOTH BY HIGH-LEVEL
VISITS TO MOSCOW AND BY INVITING INDIVIDUAL LEADERS TO OUR
COUNTRIES.I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY FURTHER THOUGHTS OR
SUGGESTIONS THAT YOU MIGHT HAVE ON THIS SUBJECT AND THANK YOU

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PAGE THREE PPR0186 RESTD

AGAIN FOR YOUR OFFER TO SUPPORT MY EFFORTS.(PARA)IN DEC,I
RECEIVED ENCOURAGING SUPPORT FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN WHO ENDORSED
MY EFFORTS TO REDUCE TENSIONS AND TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN
EAST AND WEST.AT THIS STAGF I DETECT HOPEFUL SIGNS,INCLUDING THE
RESULTS OF THE NATO MINISTERAL MTG IN EARLY DEC,THAT PROGRESS IS
BEING MADE IN REVERSING THE DANGEROUS TREND IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS.
(PARA)PLEASE ACCEPT,PRIME MINISTER,MY BEST PERSONAL WISHES FOR A
HAYPY AND PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR.YOURS SINCERELY,WITH PERSONAL REGARDS
PIERRE.UNQUOTE.

CCC/265 262300Z PPR0186

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

**CDN EYES ONLY,
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

FM LDN XNGR0185 26JAN84

TO EXTOTT RBR DELIVER BY 261200

INFO BNATO WSHDC BONN PARIS MOSCO ROME BRU HAGUE COPEN MDRID WSAW
GENEV PRMNY ATHNS VMBFR BPEST BCUST PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/
CPP/CORAE/DNACPOL/DSTRATA/CIS

DISTR RBD RGB DMF RCR IDR IDA IDD IDDZ IFB ZSI CPD

REF OURTELS XNGR0087 12JAN 0119 17JAN 2056 210CT

---EAST/WEST RELATIONS:BRITISH POST-STOCKHOLM REFLECTIONS

SUMMARY:IN WIDE-RANGING, OFTEN PHILISOPHICAL OVERVIEW OF POST-
CCSBMDE INAUGURATION, FCO SOVIET DEPT HAS SUGGESTED THAT EVENTS OF
LAST WEEK, DESPITE THEIR QUOTE PECULIARITIES UNQUOTE COULD MARK
SIGNIFICANT TURN IN TIDE OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS:CCSBMDE OPENING,
MORE IMPORTANT FOR WHAT HAPPENED OUTSIDE FORMAL CONFERENCE THAN
WITHIN, SET BROAD CONTEXT FOR ENHANCING EAST/WEST CONFIDENCE
OVER TIME; PRESIDENT REAGANS SPEECH SET FOUNDATIONS FOR WELCOME
CHANGE IN ATMOSPHERE (THOUGH IT IS SEEN HERE AS SHORT ON
SUBSTANTIVE CARROTS WHICH SOVIETS COULD RESPOND TO); SHULTZ/GROMYKO
BILATERAL WAS SIGNIFICANT IF ONLY FOR FACT THAT IT HAPPENED,
AND THAT IT LASTED AS LONG AS IT DID. FOREIGN SECRETARY HOWES
OWN BILATERAL WITH GROMYKO, THOUGH IT CONTAINED NOTHING NEW AND
GAVE LITTLE OR NO INDICATION OF SOVIET READINESS TO TAKE UP
REAGAN CHALLENGE, WAS NOT NEGATIVE IN SENSE OF GROMYKOS EARLIER

...2

PAGE TWO XNGR0185 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

CCSBMDE STATEMENT.

2.REPORT: PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPEECH IS CLEARLY SEEN HERE AS LONG-EXPECTED STEP IN RIGHT DIRECTION; DESPITE INCLINATION IN SOME QUARTERS TO SEE IT LARGELY IN RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC USA PRESSURES (INCLUDING SECRETARY SHULTZ HIMSELF) AND IN CONTEXT OF FORTHCOMING ELECTION, THERE IS APPRECIATION HERE THAT REAGAN HAS USED SPEECH TO INDICATE NEW SENSE OF DIRECTION, AND THAT IN TIME, SOVIETS WILL HAVE TO RESPOND. ANDROPOV PRAVDA INTERVIEW IS NOT TAKEN AS FINAL ANSWER-THOUGH OFFICIALS ARGUE SOVIETS WILL BE CONTENT TO ALLOW WEST TO QUOTE STEW UNQUOTE, IN THE HOPE THAT INTER-ALLIANCE DIVERGENCES WILL BECOME MORE TROUBLESOME OVER COMING MONTHS. OFFICIALS SUGGEST THAT USA WAS RIGHT TO HAVE SHOWN SPEECH TO SOVIETS IN ADVANCE: ONE OF FAULTS IN RELATIONSHIP IS TENDENCY TO THROW THINGS AT EACH OTHER. ON OTHER HAND, IT IS INEVITABLE, GIVEN SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND INHERENT SLOWNESS OF THEIR OWN BUREAUCRACY, THAT NEITHER GROMYKO SPEECH NOR ANDROPOV RESPONSE WOULD TAKE UP OPPORTUNITY WHICH CHANGED TONE IN PRESIDENT'S APPROACH MIGHT OFFER.

3. SPEECH ITSELF, WHILE SEEMING REVERSION TO 1970S STYLE, WAS STRONG ON ATMOSPHERE BUT THIN ON SUBSTANCE; THERE WERE NO CARROTS OF SORT THAT NIXON OFFERED IN HIS EXCHANGE WITH BREZHNEV, -NO SPECIFIC OFFERS OF POTENTIAL IN AREAS SUCH AS TRADE, AND NOTHING

...3

PAGE THREE XNGR0185 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

SPECIFIC ON ARMS CONTROL. THUS ANDROPOV HAD AMPLE ROOM TO SUGGEST THAT SPEECH CONTAINED MORE WORDS THAN PROPOSALS. ON ARMS CONTROL, HOWEVER, OFFICIALS HERE ARGUE THAT REAGAN WAS RIGHT NOT TO ATTEMPT TO GIVE ANYTHING AWAY: QUOTE WEST SHOULD NOT BE SEEN TO BE TRYING TO LURE SOVIETS BACK TO ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH MAKING CONCESSIONS NOT IN KEEPING WITH WESTERN SECURITY UNQUOTE, -A BY. NOW FAMILIAR LINE FROM FCO.

4. THEN THERE WAS GROMYKOS SPEECH: ANTI-USA, BUT NOTABLY NOT ANTI-EUROPEAN. FCO VIEW IS THAT WHILE SPEECH CONTAINED NO QUOTE GIVE UNQUOTE IT EQUALLY DIDNT CLOSE DOOR TO POINT WHERE IT COULD NOT BE REOPENED. SHULTZ/GROMYKO MEETING, WHILE EVIDENTLY BUSINESSLIKE, IS THOUGHT HERE TO HAVE DONE NO MORE THAN RECONFIRM SOVIETS UNBENDING ATTITUDE. BUT FACT THAT MEETING HAPPENED AT ALL, LASTED AS LONG AS IT DID, AND WAS RELATIVELY FREE OF VITUPERATION MAY GIVE SOME GROUNDS FOR HOPE. (FCO TELL US THEY HAVE NOT HEARD OF ANY COMMON GROUND HAVING BEEN REACHED, EVEN ON ISSUES WHERE SOME GIVE AND TAKE MIGHT HAVE OCCURED-EG MIDDLE EAST).

5. LOOKING AT WHERE THESE DEVELOPMENTS HAVE LEFT WESTERN COUNTRIES, AND PARTICULARLY UK, FCO SOVIET DEPT SUGGEST THAT BY AND LARGE IN SOVIET EYES, THEIR OWN RELATIONS WITH USA ARE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR, -IN FACT, TO SOVIETS, THE ONLY EQUATION THAT REALLY MATTERS. DECISION IN MOSCO AS TO WHEN TO BEGIN TO DO BUSINESS AGAIN WILL

...4

PAGE FOUR XNTDØ185 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

THUS BE SEEN IN USA/USSR TERMS., STIMATE HERE IS THAT THIS WILL
COME ONLY GRADUALLY AND ON BASIS OF THEIR PERCEPTION OF DEVELOP-
MENTS IN USA. SOVIETS CLEARLY HAVE INTENSE DISLIKE AND DISTRUST
OF REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, AND, AS IT IS NOW COMMONPLACE TO OBSERVE,
WILL NOT WANT TO HELP PRESIDENT BE RE-ELECTED. ON OTHER HAND,
THEY ARE REALISTIC, AND MUST THEREFORE BE PREPARED TO ASSESS AT
SOME POINT WHETHER REAGAN WILL WIN OR NOT; THEY WILL APPRECIATE
THAT WERE THEY TO BLOCK EVERYTHING IN LEAD-UP TO ELECTION, THIS
WOULD ONLY CONFIRM REAGANS UNDERLYING FEELING CONCERNING SOVIET
LEADERSHIP. IT MIGHT WELL ASSIST RATHER THAN HURT PRESIDENTS
RE-ELECTION CHANCES, AND WOULD CERTAINLY MAKE DEALING WITH POST-
ELECTION REAGAN ADMINISTRATION THAT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT.

6. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, NUMBER OF AREAS WHERE SOME MOVEMENT SHOULD
BE SOUGHT AND MIGHT BE POSSIBLE: POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER
SHULTZ/GROMYKO BILATERAL MEETING, PERHAPS IN SUMMER OF THIS YEAR,
IS NOT RULED OUT HERE, BUT FCO HAVE HEARD OF NO DATES YET BEING
DISCUSSED. ON OTHER HAND, ANDROPOV/REAGAN SUMMIT IS NOT SEEN AS
VERY LIKELY. (RATHER RESIGNEDLY, OFFICIALS SUGGEST THAT SUMMIT
SHOULD HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN 1982 WHEN, THEY SAY, UK PRESSED VERY
HARD WITH USA IN FAVOUR). INF OFFERS NO WAY OUT IN BRITISH EYES:
NEITHER GROMYKO NOR ANDROPOV HAVE SAID ANYTHING TO CONTRADICT
FIRM KVITSINSKI STATEMENT THAT SOVIETS WILL NOT RETURN TO INF

...5

PAGE FIVE XNGR0185 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

TALKS AS LONG AS EUROMISSILES REMAIN DEPLOYED.(WHEN WE ASKED ABOUT GROMYKOS SUGGESTION IN HIS OPENING CCSBMDE STATEMENT THAT QUOTE READINESS UNQUOTE MIGHT IMPLY THAT EXPRESSION OF USA INTENT RATHER THAN ACTUAL REMOVAL OF DEPLOYED MISSILES WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO PAVE WAY FOR RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS,FCO REPLIED THAT THIS WAS HIGHLY MISLEADING:THEY SAID THAT THIS FORMULATION OF LANGUAGE HAS BEEN USED SINCE LAST NOVEMBER,AND THAT IN THEIR VIEW OFFERED NO IMPLICATION OF SOVIET READINESS TO RENEW INF TALKS)BUT ON START,BRITISH DO EXPECT SOVIETS TO BE QUOTE MORE CAREFUL UNQUOTE.WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN HINTS OF ACCEPTABILITY OF COMBINED TALKS,THERE HAS BEEN NO PROPOSAL,AND OFFICIALS HERE,-EVEN BEFORE ANDROPOV ARTICLE,-DID NOT EXPECT THERE TO BE ONE.THEY SEE ANDROPOV AS TELLING WEST THAT SOVIETS ARE QUITE PREPARED TO AWAIT USA INITIATIVE.

7.MBFR IS SEEN HERE AS PROVIDING RAY OF HOPE,AND OFFICIALS ARE PLEASED THAT TALKS MAY BEGIN AGAIN AS EARLY AS 16MARCH.THEY KNOW HOWEVER THAT NOTHING HAS HAPPENED EITHER ON EASTERN OR WESTERN SIDE SINCE CHRISTMAS RECESS TO LEAD TO TALKS BEING MORE POSITIVE THAN WHEN THEY BROKE OFF.IN PARTICULAR,GIVEN UK WEL -KNOWN POSITION ON WESTERN MBFR NEGOTIATING STANCE,THEY NOTE THAT SOVIETS ARE UNLIKELY TO BRING TO RESUMED TALKS NEW IDEAS WHICH WOULD BE ADVANCE ON ALREADY TABLED EASTERN BLOC POSITION.OTHER

...6

PAGE SIX XNGR0185 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

SOVIET ARMS CONTROL IDEAS ARE DESCRIBED HERE AS QUOTE A GRAB-BAG REHASH OF VINTAGE CONCEPTS UNQUOTE WHICH OFFER LITTLE OPPORTUNITY FOR ENHANCING PRAGMATIC DIALOGUE WHICH WEST HAS IN MIND.

8. OFFICIALS HERE EXPECT USA ADMIN TO FOCUS ON QUOTE LITTLE TECHNICAL THINGS UNQUOTE: EG BERING STRAIT NEGOTIATIONS, HOT LINE TALKS OF PAST WEEK, CONSULAR AGREEMENT WHICH WAS LEFT OVER FROM PRE-KOREAN AIRLINE INCIDENT DAYS. SHULTZ, DURING HIS VISIT TO LONDON JUST PRIOR TO CCSBMDE OPENING, REFLECTED WORD FOR WORD PRIME MINISTER THATCHERS IDEAS ON BROADENING DIALOGUE, ON FLESHING IT OUT INTO AREAS INCLUDING, BUT EXTENDING BEYOND, ARMS CONTROL.

9. TURNING SPECIFICALLY TO UK/SOVIET DIALOGUE (BUT IMPLICITLY INCLUDING EFFORTS OF OTHER NATO PARTNERS TO DEAL WITH EAST, INCLUDING CDN INITIATIVE), OFFICIALS SUGGEST THAT TO SOVIETS, ANY BUT SOVIET/USA RELATIONS IS OF SECONDARY IMPORTANCE: PRESS SPECULATION OF PAST WEEK (PARTICULARLY FROM RICHARD OWEN, TIMES CORRESPONDENT IN MOSCO) THAT SOVIETS MIGHT LOOK TO BRITISH AS ALTERNATE WESTERN INTERLOCUTOR IS DESCRIBED HERE BL NTLY AS QUOTE RUBBISH: REST OF US ARE ALL PASSENGERS ON USA RAIN, AND THERE IS LITTLE DISTINCTIVE THAT UK OR OTHERS COULD OR SHOULD SHOULD DO WHICH WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY INFLUENCE DIRECTION OF

...7

PAGE SEVEN XNGR0185 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

JOURNEY IF USA IS NOT ON BOARD UNQUOTE. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT EACH COUNTRY SHOULD NOT TAKE ITS OWN INITIATIVES, BOTH BILATERALLY AND AS MEMBERS OF WESTERN ALLIANCE, BUT SIMPLY TO SUGGEST THAT COUNTRIES OTHER THAN USA CAN NOT EXPECT SOVIETS TO SEE THEM AS PRIME ELEMENTS IN EQUATION, -AND THAT IN PAST, SOVIETS HAVE LEARNED THAT EFFORTS TO ATTEMPT QUOTE REVERSE DIFFERENTIATION UNQUOTE IN DEALING WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES HAVE NOT PROVED VERY SUCCESSFUL. 10. HOWE/GROMYKO TALKS IN STOCKHOLM APPARENTLY REINFORCED THIS VIEW. GROMYKO WAS QUOTE IMMENSELY FIT UNQUOTE, SPOKE FLUENTLY WITH NO PAPER, BUT IN VERY STIFF FASHION. HE WAS DESCRIBED BY THOSE AT MEETING AS ACTING AS MAN IN HIS EARLY SIXTIES. HE HAD NOTHING TO GIVE AWAY, BUT IN BRITISH VIEW, WOULDNT HAVE GIVEN ANYTHING TO BRITAIN IN ANY CASE THAT HE HADNT ALREADY GIVEN TO USA. MIDDLE EAST WAS REVIEWED BRIEFLY, BUT AGAIN GROMYKO HAD NOTHING NEW TO SAY.

12. IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE, MAIN THRUST HERE WILL BE TO BUILD ON PAST WEEK - TO FIND MEANS OF IMPLEMENTING DIALOGUE WHICH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER HAS CALLED FOR IN HER MANSION HOUSE AND BLACKPOOL SPEECHES, AND WHICH SHE REPEATED AGAIN IN HER 20 JAN INTERVIEW WITH NEW YORK TIMES.

13. APART FROM PMS VISIT TO HUNGARY FEB 02-04, BRITISH OFFICIALS

...8

PAGE EIGHT XNGR0185 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

ARE NOT LOOKING FOR MAJOR PROJECTS WHICH WOULD HAVE IN THEMSELVES
SUBSTANTIAL EFFECTS ON EAST/WEST DIALOGUE:HOWE RAISED ISSUE OF
MORE BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH GROMYKO,BUT OFFICIALS TELL US
LATTER WAS NOT MORE THAN QUOTE NON-COMMITTAL,WITH NO OBJECTIONS
UNQUOTE.HOWE APPARENTLY TOLD GROMYKO,AS HE LATER TOLD HOUSE OF
COMMONS IN CAREFULLY FORMULATED STATEMENT, QUOTE I HOPE TO BE
ABLE TO ARRANGE A MEETING OF A MORE SUBSTANTIAL SORT WITH YOU
(MR GROMYKO)BEFORE WE MEET,AS WILL BE NORMAL PRACTICE,AT
UNGA UNQUOTE.HE RENEWED INVITATION TO DEPUTY FOREIG MINISTER
KORNIENKO TO PAY VISIT TO BRITAIN POSTPONED AT TIME OF KAL
INCIDENT,AND SUGGESTED THERE MAY ALSO BE ROOM FOR MINISTERIAL
EXCHANGE ON ENERGY SIDE.SENIOR OFFICIAL VISITS HAVE BEEN GOING
ON IN ANY CASE,AND ARE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE.THUS AT BILATERAL
LEVEL-(AS OPPOSED TO CONTINUING STRONG SUPPORT FOR RESUMPTION
OF DISARMAMENT TALKS,AND DIALOGUE WITHIN CCSEBMDE)-THIS WILL
BE THE STUFF THAT PM THATCHERS QUOTE SENSIBLE PRAGMATIC DIALOGUE
UNQUOTE WILL BE MADE OF.

CCC/253 261517Z XNGR0185

BURROUGHS DEX 3500

P. 1

FEX-3502
(212) 246-7424

1/3
UNCLASSIFIED
NONCLASSIFIE

Facsimile
TRANSMISSION
fac-similé

**ACTIVITÉ
SUITE A DONNER**

Our file/no. dossier:

NYC 66

NO. GRPA - 112 DATE 26 JANUARY 1984

PAGES T H R E E
(incl. cover)
(y compris la page
couverture)

FROM: Canadian Consulate General
DU : Consulat général du Canada
NEW YORK

SECTION: General Relations & Public Affairs
Mr./Ms. BRADY/
M./Mad. Weatherup

TO : Mr./Ms.
A : M./Mad.

Department:
Service : EXTOTT: LIDDZ URR SFP

Phone :
Téléphone :

Subject :
Objet : NEW YORK TIMES (A-2) 26 Jan/84 "QUEBEC INDEPENDENCE.."

PHOTO: TRUDEAU BEGINS PEACE MISSION

72 THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, JANUARY 26, 1984

2/3

Quebec Independence: The Vision Has Faded

By DOUGLAS MARTIN

Special to The New York Times

MONTREAL — With more than a quarter of the youth in Quebec Province unemployed and the winter winds particularly stinging this year, the grand political dreams of Quebec's recent past seem increasingly anachronistic.

"Independence is an obsolete concept, an idea of the 50's," Robert Bourassa, leader of the province's opposition Liberal Party, said in a recent interview.

In a separate interview, Premier René Lévesque, whose Parti Québécois has promoted the idea of a Quebec at least partly independent from the rest of Canada since assuming power in 1976, insisted that personally he is "just as dedicated to the basic question" of separatism. But he acknowledged that his party must adapt to changed circumstances, and predicted a heated debate over how to address the issue when the Parti Québécois holds its annual convention in June.

"I'm going to listen," he said.

Liberals Lead in Poll

Signs that Mr. Lévesque's vision is in grave trouble extend beyond his expressed flexibility. In a recent poll conducted among 2,009 people in Quebec by Crop Inc. of Montreal Mr. Bourassa's Liberals led the Parti Québécois 66 to 24 percent; with two victories in December, the Liberals have beaten the Parti Québécois in 18 consecutive by-elections, and a Gallup Poll last September showed only 9 percent of Quebecers felt separatist sentiment was "very strong" compared with 23 percent in 1976.

Making matters worse for the Parti Québécois have been a series of scandals and what are perceived as missteps over the past year. One former top minister is in jail for sex offenses; another was convicted for trying to steal a coat from a department store, and still another gave a government contract to his brother's company without asking for tenders. Furthermore, the government has received mountains of publicity for a \$27,000 job-development grant to a saloon in suburban Montreal featuring striptease dancers.

Jobs Are a Priority

The Parti Québécois has also retreated from its broad social agenda, a retrenchment reflected by such actions as a much tougher stance on public sector expenditures, the highest in Canada, and an easing of laws guaranteeing the paramouncy of the French language.

"No bloody legislation is there for-

ever in its pristine beauty," Mr. Lévesque said.

Still, political analysts say separatist sentiment never entirely disappears in Quebec, whose six million people, 82 percent French-speaking, are surrounded by more than 18 million English-speaking Canadians.

"Separatism has been buried several times in my lifetime, and will be again," Richard D. French, a Liberal member of Quebec's National Assembly, said. "But it won't be, if you know what I mean."

Mr. Bourassa's return to the Liberal leadership, however, represents a turn to more pragmatic concerns. He served as Quebec's Premier in the six years before Mr. Lévesque's assumption of power in November 1976. Although his term was marred by still unproven charges of scandal, he is best remembered for creating employment through huge government projects, particularly the giant James Bay hydroelectric project in Northern Quebec.

"When people think of Bourassa, they think of jobs," he said. "Bourassa — jobs."

The Liberal leader's economic priority is easing unemployment among people between 18 and 24 years of age, which in some regions of the province exceeds 50 percent and averages nearly 30 percent. Pointing out that James Bay alone provided more than 135,000 jobs over the last decade, he is pushing the idea of expanding the project if energy markets can be enlarged in the northeastern United States.

Mr. Bourassa believes jobs and economic growth will be the main issues in Quebec at least until the end of this decade. "It's less flashy, but first things first," he said.

Wages Are Rolled Back

Mr. Lévesque is repeatedly stressing the same concerns, and cites the reduction of Quebec's soaring taxes as a key goal. To this end, he rolled back public sector wages last year, provoking a bitter strike among some of his party's key supporters.

"If you don't make your common cake as big and as rich as possible, there's nothing to distribute," he said. "The recession has made that clear as never before."

There have also been substantial easing of Quebec's language law, a major factor in driving 130 major corporations out of the province over the past decade. Critics had ridiculed some of the enforcement actions taken by so-called tongue troopers under the law,

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United Press International

TRUDEAU BEGINS PEACE MISSION: Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau of Canada and his son Sacha with Prime Minister Lubomir Strougal of Czechoslovakia in Prague. The leaders met for what Mr. Strougal called "frank and open talks" on reducing tensions between superpowers. It was Mr. Trudeau's first stop on four-country tour to promote his peace plan.

including the taping over the English word "street" on signs; the seizure of 10,000 "Dunkin' Donuts" bags in 1977, and the prosecution of an English hospital last year for not providing a patient the opportunity "to die in French."

Last year, the Parti Québécois government made specific changes in the law to expand the availability of education in English, ease French language requirements in the testing of professionals and allow English-speaking institutions to communicate without attaching French translations.

Changes Made in Bill

More important, changes have been made in the preamble to Bill 101, the 1977 French-language legislation underlining the special status of English and English institutions. "We've gone through the most difficult time," Eric Maldoff, president of the Alliance Quebec, a 40,000-member English rights group said. "A spirit of optimism has begun to emerge."

Underlying this spirit is an expected ruling by the Supreme Court of Canada in February outlawing other features of Bill 101 that the English consider discriminatory. The Quebec government has already lost in trial and appeals courts in the province.

"The language debate, as we knew it, will never come back again," Mr. Bourassa said.

This new situation, with a more relaxed posture by the Quebec government toward English, is a direct result of the realization of former Premier

Daniel Johnson's dream of making Quebec as French as Ontario is English. "He probably never imagined such a goal would be practically achieved in a matter of 15 years," Jacques Parizeau, Quebec Finance Minister, said recently in a speech to the Empire Club of Canada in Toronto.

Still, Mr. Lévesque has not completely renounced what one Montreal journalist calls "folkloric nationalism." He still maintains that any companies that took jobs out of the province are not the sort of corporate citizens Quebec wants anyway. "I couldn't care less," he declared.

Such thinking is why Mr. Bourassa thinks the Parti Québécois will suffer "the biggest defeat in Quebec's history" when an election is held, probably in about 14 months.

His plan is nonetheless to be extremely cautious in addressing what his strategists deem the continuing strengths of the current Parti Québécois leadership: an ability to benefit from a cyclically improving economy; skill in using polls, television and the other tools of modern politics; a proven capacity to tug at the heart strings of Quebecers, and perhaps even a number of attractive alternatives to Mr. Lévesque's leadership.

Specifically, the Liberals are not forgetting that almost no one gave the Parti Québécois much chance after they lost a 1980 referendum asking for authority to negotiate a special status for the province. But the party came back to win in 1981.

INFO

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PCOOTT PC00081 26JAN84

TO PMDELDAVOS/FOWLER DELIVER BY 270900

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---PMS TOAST-BUCST

FOLLOWING IS FRENCH TEXT OF PROPOSED REMARKS FOR PMS TOAST IN BUCST. THIS TEXT HAS BEEN EXTENSIVELY REWORKED BY REGINALD DAY AND MICHELLE BAZLEY, WHO HAVE PRODUCED MORE AN ADAPTATION THAN STRICT TANSLATION OF ORIGINAL ENGLISH TOAST. IT DIFFERS SUBSTANTIALLY FROM ENGLISH ORIGINAL ON OCCASION, BUT INCORPORATES MAJOR THEMES AND IDEAS. IN CIRCUMSTANCES WILL PROVIDE NEW ENGLISH VERSION FOR PRESS PURPOSES EARLY NEXT WEEK.

QUOTE PROJECT DE TOAST POUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE

BUCAREST - 1ER FEVRIER 1984

MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT,

JE TIENS TOUT D ABORD A VOUS EXPRIMER MA RECONNAISSANCE POUR VOTRE BIENVEILLANTE INVITATION E POUR L ACCUEIL CHALEUREUX QUE VOUS M AVEZ RESERVE AUJOURD HUI. HE VEUX EGALEMENT VOUS RENDRE HOMMAGE POUR VOS EFFORTS INLASSABLES EN FAVEUR DE LA PAIX ET DE LA STABILITE INTERNATIONALES.

CES DERNIERS MOIS, JE ME SUIS RENDU AUPRES DE

...2

PAGE TWO PC00081 CONF

NOMBREUX CHEFS D ETAT ET DIRIGEANTS MONDIAUX POUR LES
CONSULTER ET LEUR PROPOSER DES MOYENS DE REDUIRE LES
TENSIONS EXISTANT ACTUELLEMENT DANS LE MONDE. LES DEMARCHES
QUE VOUS AVEZ ANTEPRISES DE VOTRE COTE POUR ROUVRIR LE
DIALOGUE ENTRE L EST ET L OUEST M ONT INCITE A VENIR VOUS
CONSULTER EGALEMENT.

IL Y A NEUF ANS, MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT, NOUS
ETIONS A HELSINKI POUR SIGNER L ACTE FINAL DE LA CONFERENCE
SUR LA SECURITE ET LA COOPERATION EN EUROPE. VOUS AVIEZ A
CETTE OCCASION TENU LES PROPOS SUIVANTS:

CIT NOUS AURIONS TORT DE NOUS IMAGINER QUE NOUS
POURONS DESORMAIS NOUS CROISIER LES BRAS EN TOUTE
QUIETUDE... L HISTOIRE JUGERA CERTAINEMENT NOS
DECLARATIONS ET LES DOCUMENTS QUE NOUS ALLONS
SIGNER, MAIS ELLE JUGERA AUSSI LES MOYENS QUE
CHACUN DE NOS ETATS ET CHACUN DE NOUS PRENDRONS EN
TANT QUE DIRIGEANTS POLITIQUES POUR DONNER SUITE
AUX ENGAGEMENTS ENONCES DANS CES DOCUMENTS. FINCIT.

COMBIEN JUSTES ETAIENT CES PROPOS ET COMBIEN
PROPHETIQUES ILS SE SONT REVELES. LA DETERIOIRATION DES
RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES DEPUIS 1975 NOUS A PROUVE A QUEL
POINT LA CRAINTE ET LA MEFIANCE POUVAIENT COMPROMETTRE
L ESPRIT DE HELSINKI.

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PAGE THREE PC00081 CONFID

MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT, NOS PEUPLES APPREHENDENT
L AVENIR ET, PAR-DESSUS TOUT, LES PERSPECTIVES D UNE GUERRE
NUCLEAIRE. JE COMPRENDS LEUR APPREHENSION ET JE LA PARTAGE.

IL FUT UN TEMPS, JE SUPPOSE, OU LA GUERRE ETAIT
UNE NOBLE ENTREPRISE, DANS LAQUELLE ON S ENGAGEAIT AVEC DES
BUTS ELEVES. CONTRAIREMENT A L ACTE FINAL D HELSINKI, LE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL RECONNAISSAIT ALORS UNIQUEMENT LES ETATS
ET LEURS INTERETS, SANS EGARD POUR LES INDIVIDUS. AUSSI UN
PHILOSOPHE ECLAIRE COMME JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU POUVAIT-IL
AFFIRMER: CIT ON FAIT LA GUERRE AUX ETATS, NON AUX PEUPLES FINCIT.

NOUS RECONNAISSONS TOUTEFOIS MAINTENANT--LE XXE
SIECLE NOUS EN A FOURNI DE DOULOUREUX EXEMPLES SUR TOUS LES
CONTINENTS--QUE LES GUERRES SONT D ABORD DIRIGÉES CONTRE
LES INDIVIDUS, POPULATIONS CIVILES AUTANT QUE COMBATTANT ,
ET NON CONTRE DES ETATS INANIMES.

NOUS RECONNAISSONS DE MEME QU IL SERAIT INSENSE, A
L ERE NUCLEAIRE, DE DISCUTER DES STRATEGIES LES PLUS
SUSCEPTIBLES D ASSURER LA VICTOIRE, CAR SI JAMAIS UN
TROISIEME CONFLIT MONDIAL ECLATAIT, IL EST FORT PEU PROB BLE
QU UNE DES PARTIES EN SORTIRAIT VICTORIEUSE. AUTREMENT D T,
SI NOUS ECHOUONS DANS NOS EFFORTS POUR SAUVEGARDER LA P IX,
NOUS ERONS TOUS PERDANTS.

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PAGE FOUR PC00081 CONF

ON CONNAIT BIEN LA MAXIME LATINE: CIT QUI DESIDERAT
PACEM, PRAEPARET BELLUM FINCIT. (SI TU VEUX LA PAIX, PREPA E LA
GUERRE.) (VEGECE, IVE S. APR. J. - C.)

LE PRINCIPE DE LA DISSUASION NUCLEAIRE S APPUIE
SUR CETTE MAXIME. MAIS NOS PREPARATIFS DE GUERRE, SUR LES
PLANS PSYCHOLOGIQUE ET MILITAIRE, NE RISQUENT-ILS PAS DE
NOUS ACCAPARER AU POINT DE NOUS FAIRE PERDRE DE VUE LES
PERSPECTIVES DE PAIX?

L HUMANITE TOUT ENTIERE EST AUJOURD HUI CONFRONTEE
A L EFFROYABLE REALITE DE LA COURSE AUX ARMEMENTS
NUCLEAIRES. DEVANT L AMPLEUR DU DESASTRE QUI GUETTE NOTR
MONDE, IL EST ABSOLUMENT ESSENTIEL QUE NOUS, DIRIGEANTS
POLITIQUES, NE CHERCHIONS PAS DE FAUX-FUYANTS. NOUS NE
POUVONS PLUS ENROBER NOS PROPOS D UNE RHETORIQUE FAUSSEMENT
RASSURANTE.

JAMAIS NOUS N AVONS EU AUTANT DE RAISONS DE NE
PLUS NOUS ENTRETUER. ET JAMAIS NOUS N AVONS EU AUTANT DE
RAISONS DE NOUS SENTIR ASSOCIES A UNE MEME CAUSE. SI NOUS
NE CHERCHONS PAS DES MAINTENANT A REDUIRE LES ARSENAUX
NUCLEAIRES EXISTANTS ET A EMPECHER LA PROLIFERATION DES
ARMES ATOMIQUES, NOUS RISQUONS SERIEUSEMENT DE LEGUER A NOS
ENFANTS UNE PLANETE MENACEE CHQUE JOUR DAVANTAGE
D ANEANTISSEMENT.

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PAGE FIVE PC00081 CONF

MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT, VOUS ET MOI SOMMES
CONSCIENTS DES DIFFERENCES IDEOLOGIQUES, POLITIQUES ET
ECONOMIQUES QUI SEPARANT NOS DEUX PAYS. DE PLUS, NOUS
SOMMES MEMBRES D ALLIANCES MILITAIRES OPPOSEES. MAIS VOUS
ET MOI SAVONS, ET C EST CELA QUI COMPTE, QUE NOUS POUVONS
TRANSCENDER NOS DIVERGENCES. C EST CE QUI NOUS UNIT QUI
IMPORTE, NON CE QUI NOUS DIVISE.

ETANT DEUX PUISSANCES MOYENNES, NOUS NE POUVONS
PRETENDRE ETRE OU DEVENIR DES PIECES MAITRESSES SUR
L ECHIQUIER DU DESARMEMENT. CE SONT LES DEUX
SUPERPUISSANCES QUI SONT, AU PREMIER CHEF, RESPONSABLES DE
LA COURSE AUX ARMEMENTS. C EST DONC D ABORD A ELLES QU IL
REVIENT D ARRETER L ESCALADE NUCLEAIRE.

MAIS CELA NE SIGNIFIE NULLEMENT QUE NOUS DEVONS
NOUS SOUSTRAIRE A TOUTE PREOCCUPATION D IDEALISME ET
RENONCER A TOUTE DEMARCHE SUSCEPTIBLE D APPORTER LA PAIX A
NOTRE TEMPS. EN VENANT A BUCAREST ET EN ME RENDANT DANS
D AUTRES CAPITALES EUROPEENNES, J AI DONC CHERCHE A TIRER
PARTI D UNE TRADITION ETABLIE DE CONSULTATION SUR LES
QUESTIONS DE SECURITE EUROPEENNE.

MAIS LA CONSULTATION ME SEMBLE AVOIR PERDU UNE
PARTIE DE SON ELAN. J AI NEANMOINS BON ESPOIR QUE, GRACE A
DES CONTACTS PERSONNELS DIRECTS, LES DIRIGEANTS DE L EST ET

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PAGE SIX PC00081 CONF

DE L OUEST POURRONT IMPRIMER UNE IMPULSION ET UNE
DETERMINATION NOUVELLES A CE PROCESSUS.

IL FAUT DE PLUS S EFFORCER D APPLIQUER LES
PRINCIPES DE L ACTE FINAL D HELSINKI, QUI APPELLENT UN
ACCROISSEMENT DES CONTACTS PERSONNELS ET UNE PLUS GRANDE
LIBERTE DE MOUVEMENT ENTRE L EST ET L OUEST. RIEN, EN
EFFET, N ENGENDRE AUTANT LA CRAINTE ET LA MEFIANCE MUTUELLES
QUE L ISOLEMENT. ET UN PAYS QUI SE REPLIE SUR LUI-MEME
RISQUE LES PIRES DECEPTIONS.

BREF, IL NOUS FAUT SUSCITER UN CHANGEMENT PROFOND
D ATTITUDES ET D INTENTIONS. AUCUNE PAIX, POUR ETRE
DURABLE, NE PEUT REPOSER EXCLUSIVEMENT SUR DES AJUSTEMENTS
NUMERIQUES OU TECHNIQUES, SI IMPORTANTS SOIENT-ILS, APPORTES
AUX STOCKS D ARMES. UNE PAIX REPOSANT SUR DE PAREILS
FONDEMENTS SERAIT ASSUREMENT TRES FRAGILE.

MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT, JE SUIS HEUREUX DE RAPPELER
L COOPERATION FRUCTUEUSE QUI EXISTE DEPUIS FORT LONGTEMPS
ENTRE LA ROUMANIE ET LE CANADA, ET CE NON SEULEMENT DANS LES
SECTEURS BILATERAUX. NOUS AVONS, PAR EXEMPLE, TRAVAILL DE
CONCERT A LA SOLUTION DE QUESTIONS INTERNATIONALES LIEES A
LA PAIX, A LA SECURITE ET AU DESARMEMENT AU SEIN DE TRIBUNES
COMME L ASSEMBLEE GENERALE DES NATIONS UNIES, LE COMITE DU
DESARMEMENT ET LA CONFERENCE SUR LA SECURITE ET LA
COOPERATION EN EUROPE.

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PAGE SEVEN PC00081 CONF

JE SUIS DONC PARTICULIEREMENT SATISFAIT ET
ENCOURAGE QUE NOUS PARTAGIONS DES OBJECTIFS COMMUNS:
REDUIRE LES TENSIONS INTERNATIONALES, NOTAMMENT ENTRE L EST
ET L OUEST, ET INSTAURER, A L ECHELLE PLANETAIRE, UN CLIMAT
DE PAIX QUI RENDRA PLEINEMENT REALISABLES LA SECURITE ET LA
PROSPERITE POUR TOUTES LES NATIONS.

PERMETTEZ-MOI, MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT, DE PROPOSER
CE TOAST A VOTRE SANTE, A L AMITIE ET A LA COOPERATION
CONTINUES ENTRE LE CANADA ET LA ROUMANIE, AINSI QU AU SUCCES
DE NOS EFFORTS EN FAVEUR DE LA PAIX MONDIALE. UNQUOTE.

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MESSAGE

**ACTION
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SCDEL

R. Vanier
R. VANIER

2/15

Mr. President,

1. Allow me to offer sincere thanks to the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden for its hospitality and its efforts to ensure the smooth functioning of this Conference.

At the same time, I extend best wishes to Ambassador Jan af Sillén, Executive Secretary of the Conference, and his associates for a successful performance of their duties.

2. The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe takes place in a difficult international situation. The dangers to peace in Europe and the world at large have multiplied with the beginning of the deployment of new US nuclear weapons on Western European soil. The peoples are facing one of the severest trials in the post-war period. They are seeing their physical existence threatened and they are going out of their way to avert that peril. This illustrates the tasks of this Conference and imposes an extraordinary responsibility on the participating States.

It is indeed imperative that every effort be made to halt this course of events which imperils the human race, and to help lead international relations back

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2

onto the quiet paths of peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial co-operation. The 1970s were a decade of hope and encouragement for the peoples. That decade must not be followed by years of resignation and growing fear of war. That is the mandate given to this Conference in the Concluding Document of Madrid. The German Democratic Republic is ready to co-operate with goodwill in its fulfilment.

3. The Stockholm Conference is the result of intense efforts pursued over many years by all those who are concerned about peace and security in Europe. The pursuit of peaceful and prosperous relations between States in Europe as a basis of collective security on this continent is characteristic of socialist policy. There has been a straight line from the pertinent proposals made by the socialist States in the 1950s, that is in a period marked by the "cold war" against them; their proposal of 1966 for a European security conference and their urgent call to convene it before the end of 1969, up to their initiative for this gathering which has opened here today.

This line - who would deny it - has proved viable and must be pursued. Its most important and highly beneficial result for the peoples of Europe was the shift in international affairs towards détente and peaceful co-operation. The Final Act of Helsinki, the system of European East-West treaties, and the extensive network of political as well as economic and cultural contacts between the European States and peoples proved that in our time détente is not only necessary but also possible. All this is ample evidence showing that national security cannot be divorced from international security and that, as a general condition, security can only be achieved if the rationale of political behaviour consists in

- reason and realism,
- equality and equal security, i.e. respect for the legitimate security interests of all parties involved,
- non-pursuit of military superiority, and
- political will for co-operation and ultimately for fruitful mutual rapport in the interests of peace.

Our continent thus set a generally recognized example for political solutions to conflicts and relaxed relations between States.

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Yet, the further course of international developments also confirmed the conclusion that, in the final analysis, international security is only stable if political détente is complemented with military détente.

The imperialist arms buildup and the pursuit of military superiority, the policy of force and the course of "credible deterrence" go hand in hand with doctrines purporting that a nuclear war to "decapitate" the Soviet Union was fightable, limitable to Europe and winnable. This is a direct challenge on the Helsinki Final Act, and it is bound to diminish trust, to produce confrontation and even to endanger peace. And this is the case at present.

4. As to the Stockholm Conference, the German Democratic Republic will - as Erich Honecker, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the Council of State of the GDR, has declared - "make active use of it to assist in reducing military confrontation on our continent and making relations between States once more politically calculable".

Our approach for accomplishing this is a reasonable one because it is geared to the realities and requirements of the situation on our continent. It was publicized in the form of the Prague Declaration of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, adopted a little more than a year ago, and of the Moscow Statement of leading representatives of socialist States, issued in June 1983. This comprehensive blueprint for the strengthening of confidence and a lessening of tensions in the world and, above all, for the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe envisages measures against nuclear armaments and contains proposals for the limitation of conventional armaments and military activities as well as spheres of action. It points to the possibility of, and need for, negotiations to reduce the danger of war and limit armaments, and it traces out routes to measurable progress by those bodies which have been negotiating, alas unsuccessfully, on arms limitation and disarmament in part for more than ten years - despite unilateral advance concessions and signalling moves by the socialist countries.

It is illogical and incomprehensible why, for instance, the other nuclear-weapon-powers should meanwhile not have followed the USSR in undertaking a binding international commitment to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons, when they themselves assert time and

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again that they would not use nuclear weapons except in response to attack. Their readiness for such a renunciation would, at long last, be a credible move towards confidence- and security-building. Moreover, such a step would avert the risk of the Stockholm Conference suffering serious damage from the nuclear first-strike concepts and "decapitation" strategies hanging over it like the sword of Damocles.

In the present circumstances, political reason and responsibility also make it an urgent necessity to conclude a treaty on the mutual renunciation of the use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations between the Warsaw Treaty States and those of NATO. Such an accord would lay down in binding international legal terms that they forego the first use of both nuclear and conventional weapons, and could include obligations for joint practical measures to avert the danger of surprise attack.

Anybody who seeks to justify his rejection of this proposal by asserting that the prohibition of the use of force was already adequately established in the Charter of the United Nations must allow himself to be asked: Who would stand to lose at a time like this

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if NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, the largest military alliances confronting each other, were to expressly reaffirm in treaty form their general obligation to refrain from using force against each other, all the more so since other interested States would be invited to join in such a treaty? This would not weaken the Charter of the United Nations but would rather add to its authority. Who could plausibly disprove this?

Or is it that the well-known ideas and initiatives concerning the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones have lost anything of their relevance to the current situation? By no means! Serious thought should be given to them without delay.

I therefore wish to reaffirm with regard to the Swedish Government's widely known proposal to establish a corridor free of battlefield nuclear weapons in Central Europe that the German Democratic Republic is prepared to make available its entire territory for inclusion on the understanding that the principle of equality and equal security will be observed.

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Such an area could extend across all of Europe from North to South. That would not be much, it is true, but a step in the right direction, in fact a measure positively creating confidence.

Another confidence-building factor with immediate effect would be the removal of chemical weapons from our continent as proposed by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty on 10 January 1984. Such an agreement would not only dissipate the peoples' fear of a cruel warfare agent but would also set an inspiring example with regard to other devastating weapons and for other regions of the world.

This is the course of action to which the GDR feels committed and to which all participating States of this Conference should subscribe.

5. Like all the other socialist States, the German Democratic Republic has always shown initiative, a spirit of accommodation and compromise, i.e. the political will to reach results on all issues concerning peace, international security and disarmament. We have waived many a justified claim of our own for the sake of general agreement. This, too, is part of peaceful co-existence.

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We would like to see all participating States adopt such an approach. It has not escaped our attention that, as the Stockholm Conference was drawing near, some quarters professed a willingness to work for confidence-building and disarmament. They even want to stop speaking of the "evil empire" in future, but rather accommodate others. We will see before long the value of these verbal assurances, since it can be appraised from whether or not there is a readiness to

return to constructive common endeavour. Confidence cannot grow out of an arms buildup, and nothing can offset the mistrust that is bound to arise when more and more new missiles threaten the survival of nations. Hardly have the first missiles been reported operational, when there is new clamour for a continuation of the arms buildup course and a "credible deterrence" policy. In addition to the modernization of the so-called nuclear triad and plans for the militarization of outer space, there is already a demand being made for the rapid expansion of the conventional forces. But the strategy of "deterrence" provides no foundation for confidence and security between States. Building confidence as well as security today means first and foremost

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10

1. to halt the deployment of further US nuclear missiles in Western Europe and
2. to immediately dismantle the missiles already deployed.

There must be a return to the pre-deployment situation, straight and without subterfuge, so that no military counter-measures on our part will be required. Is it not worthwhile to commit oneself to the goal of a denuclearized Europe?

By contrast, it is not merely politically careless but even extremely dangerous to say to oneself or others that the new US missiles had not changed the situation and that business was as usual, as evidenced by this Conference, because to do so means to ignore the facts. These show, however, that important negotiations were blocked as they were deprived of their foundation.

Consequently, this Conference as well as the relations between the countries concerned are being burdened with problems which, to say the least, impede co-operation that ought to produce the indispensable results.

As regards the enhancement of confidence, a greater contribution than ever before can today be made through bilateral relations. Every State has to furnish proof of its

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performance in this respect by strictly fulfilling the obligations it assumed under the Helsinki Final Act and the system of European treaties. It is only along these lines and only through common endeavour that in the present situation the damage done can be contained.

If the guideline is political reason and realism, it will be possible to agree in the first stage of the Conference on such confidence- and security-building measures as provide for a mutual reduction of military activities, lower the scale of military exercises and, in particular, help lessen the danger of surprise attack.

Of course, we cannot overlook that not everything offered for this Conference under the heading of "confidence- and security-building" will actually meet that expectation. The mere notification of manoeuvres or major military exercises, for example, cannot by itself create confidence. Similarly, the purpose of the Conference would certainly not be served were it merely to be a forum for informing participating States about new arms programmes. And if the focus of discussion were to be ideas whose only and apparent purpose was to obtain military advantages, this would stand no test because it would engender new distrust, indeed increase insecurity in the end. Such an approach would be bound to deadlock the Conference.

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It is logical that enduring security can only be based on disarmament. Every effective step in that direction will by itself create more confidence than anything else agreed upon while the arms drive is going on. These considerations will guide us in both stages of this Conference.

The conferences of Helsinki, Belgrade and Madrid have shown that mutual understanding, peaceful co-operation and international security were strengthened whenever States were guided by respect for equality and equal security.

6. Mr. President,

The Madrid Meeting could not be wrecked because those interested in its success felt emphatic support forthcoming from all sections of public opinion in the European countries.

It is this awareness which makes us confident that international affairs can be steered back towards a good course. The Stockholm Conference can make specific efforts to contribute to this end, and these will be the more successful, the stronger the pressure of the international public for realistic action. For no-one with keen senses who followed with what intensity and expenditure the missile

deployment has been pursued can seriously believe that they would ever be prepared of their own accord to remove these missiles which are expected to give them a military advantage.

It remains the overriding concern of the German Democratic Republic's foreign and security policy to play its part in order to prevent a nuclear inferno and to secure world peace. This corresponds to the principled and hence unchanging course of socialist peace policy which the GDR has pursued since its foundation 35 years ago. Collective security in Europe built in a nuclear-weapon-free continent and with increasingly smaller military potentials and based on the political and territorial realities, is a rewarding goal.

It corresponds to the historical and humanist responsibility of the German Democratic Republic also as a German State to do everything so that no war will ever again start from German soil.

Let me summarize the proposals which, in the view of the German Democratic Republic, are most important because they are most urgent:

- renunciation in binding international terms of the first use of nuclear weapons by those nuclear powers that have not yet assumed such an obligation;

- a treaty on the renunciation of the use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations between the member States of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, which interested neutral and non-aligned countries could join;
- freeze on the nuclear arsenals;
- establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones or corridors in various parts of Europe;
- freeing Europe of chemical weapons;
- freeze on and reduction of the military budgets of all participating States;
- complementing and extending the confidence-building measures as contained in the Helsinki Final Act with a view to reducing the military activities of States and lessening the danger of surprise attack.

This is by far not an exhaustive presentation of our ideas. We are naturally prepared to examine all ideas and proposals put forward by other participating States that are capable of defusing the aggravated situation, building confidence and enhancing security.

As always and everywhere, the socialist German State will also in Stockholm be a predictable partner.

Thank you for your attention.

MF

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BONN ZQGR0037 26JAN84

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IDR IDA

REF YOURTEL RCR0100 20JAN

---VOGEL MTG WITH PM

ANSWERS TO REFTEL QUESTIONS AS FOLLOWS(1) ACCORDING TO STOBBE,
VOGEL DOES NOT/NOT INTEND TO RAISE ANY SUBJECTS THAT DO
NOT/NOT COME UNDER GENERAL HEADING OF EAST WEST REINS. HIS
PRINCIPAL CONCERN IS TO DISCUSS WHAT CAN BE DONE TO BREAK
THE QUOTE DEADLOCK IN E-W DIALOGUE UNQUOTE. RESTARTING
INF NEGS IN SOME FORM IS FOCUS OF HIS CONCERN BUT HE ALSO
SHARES BROADER CONCERNS RAISED BY PM. VOGEL WOULD OF COURSE
WISH TO RECEIVE BRIEFING ON PMS INITIATIVE, PARTICULARLY EAST
EUROPEAN SWING. IN SPEAKING WITH STOBBE WE GAINED IMPRESSION
REITERATION OF PURPOSE OF INITIATIVE BY PM WOULD BE USEFUL.
STOBBE REALIZES SPD AND CDN GOVT COME AT E-W QUESTION FM
SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT STARTING POINTS-EG CDA SUPPORTS INF
STATIONING AND IS ASSISTING CRUISE TESTING. HOWEVER AT
SAME TIME THERE WAS CAST TO CDN POSITION THAT WAS DIFFERENT
FM POSNS TAKEN BY OTHER NATO MEMBERS, EG WSHDC AND BONN.
CONCLUSION OF THIS REMARK FM STOBBE WAS THAT VOGEL DID NOT/NOT

...2

PAGE TWO ZQGR0037 CONF

WANT MERELY TO COMPARE SPD AND CDN GOVT POSITIONS OR VIEWS,
BUT TO DISCUSS CONCRETELY WHAT COULD BE DONE TO IMPROVE E-W
SITUATION FURTHER TO PMS INITIATIVE.FYI WHEN WE SUGGESTED
THAT IN RECENT WEEKS THERE WERE SIGNS(EG REAGAN SPEECH)OF
IMPROVEMENT IN E-W ATMOSPHERE,STOBBE DISAGREED.REAGAN
SPEECH CONTAINED NO/NO NEW ELEMENT OF IMPORTANCE.USA
STILL DID NOT/NOT ACCEPT USSR AS SUPERWPOER EQUAL,AND
THERE WOULD BE NO/NO SIGNIFICANT BREAKTHROUGH UNTIL IT DID.
(2)VOGEL IS LOW-KEY,PROFESSORIAL YET HUMANE INDIVIDUAL WHO
HAS DONE CREDITABLE JOB IN HEALING SOME OF DIVISIONS IN
SPD THAT EXISTED AT TIME SCHMIDT STEPPED DOWN.HOWEVER
HE HAS NOT/NOT REALLY PUT HIS STAMP ON PARTY.HE DOES
NOT/NOT HAVE CHARISMA AND DYNMISM OF BRANDT OR
INTELLECTUAL POWR OF SCHMIDT OR POLITICAL SAVVY OF
WEHNER.HE IS VIEWED BOTH BY PARTY INSIDERS AND OUTSIDE
OBSERVERS AS SOMEWHAT COLORLESS BUT HARDWORKING AND SERIOUS
WITH GOOD MIND AND ANALYTICAL ABILITY.HE HAS BEEN MODERATING
INFLUENCE ON LEFTWARD MOVEMENT OF SPD OVER PAST YEAR BUT IS
PERCEIVED AS HAVING BEEN MORE CARRIED WITH IT THAN DIRECTING
IT.INTELLECTUAL DIRECTION OF PARTY IS BEING DETERMINED MORE BY
BRANDT THAN BY VOGEL AND,WITH RETIREMENT OF WEHNER,BRANDT
IS IN FACT SPIRITUAL LEADER OF SPD.VOGELS RELNS WITH SCHMIDT ARE
FRIENDLY-1THERE IS RESPECT ON BOTH SIDES-BUT NOT/NOT WARM.

...3

PAGE THREE ZQGR0037 CONFD

THEY ARE CERTAINLY FAR BETTER THAN SCHMIDTS RELNS W TH BRANDT, WHICH ARE COLD AND DISTANT. SINCE STEPPING DOWN SCHMIDT HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LONER, AND VOGEL DOES NOT/NOT NUMBER AMONG HIS CIRCLE OF FRIENDS.

(3) VOGELS STANDING WITH POPULATION AT LARGE CAN BE ONSTRUED FM DESCRIPTION ABOVE. HE IS RESPECTED FOR HIS KNOWLEDGE AND PROFESSIONAL ABILITY BUT HAS NOT/NOT MADE IMPACT HE MIGHT HAVE HAD HE MORE FORCEFUL PERSONALITY. HE REGULARLY COMES BEHIND BOTH SCHMIDT AND KOHL AS MOST POPULAR GERMAN POLITICIAN, BUT WELL AHEAD OF GENSCHER OR STRAUSS. SPD STANDING WITH POPULATION IS LARGELY WHERE IT WAS IN MAR83 IN FED ELECTION IE ABOUT 38/38 PERCENT. SOME OBSEVERS POINTED TO LAND ELECTION SUCCESS IN HESSE AND BREMEN LAST FALL AS INDICATION SPD WAS MAKING UNEXPECTEDLY RAPID COMEBACK, THANKS LARGELY TO CDU FAILURE TO IMPROVE ECON CONDITIONS. THIS THEORY NO/NO LONGER ATTRACTS AS MANY SUPPORTERS AS IT DID. SPD IS NOT/NOT RISING IN NATL OPINION POLLS. IN MOVING TO LEFT SPD IS HOPING TO TAKE OVER POLITICAL CONSTITUENCY NOW SUPPORTUNG GREENS. WHILE STRATEGY TO DATE HAS NOT/NOT BEEN APPRECIABLY SUCCESSFUL FOR SPD, IN LONGER TERM IT COULD PROVE TO BE. SPD IS ALSO ONLY J ST BEGINNING TO FIND ITS OPPOSITON VOICE. UNTIL MOST RECENTLY GOVT WEAKNESS ON ECONOMY AND NUMBER OF SCANDALS (LAMBSDORFF,

...4

PAGE FOUR ZQGR0037 CONFID

WOERNER)HAD NOT/NOT BEEN TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF BY SPD.HOWEVER,
LACK OF HIGH PROFILE FOR SPD IN OPPOSITION IS IN PART
REFLECTION OF VOGELS STYLE AND NOT/NOT SPDS FAILURE
TO OFFER SUBSTANTIVE ALTERNATIVES.VOGEL HAS
CLEARLY BEEN TRYING TO PROVIDE CONSTRUCTIVE OPPOSITION-SOME
IN HIS PARTY CONTEND HE MERELY LACKS COURAGE TO GO FOR
THE JUGULAR.

CCC/242 2616002 ZQGR0037

MR. DeLoraine There is only one change

ACTION SUITE A DONNER

UNCLASSIFIED FM PMDELPRGUE PMDEL0013 26JAN84

of substance: p.4 re heads of govt + CBE.

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 262900

MF

INFO MOSCO GENEV BNATO WSHDC STKHM/SCDEL LDN PARIS BONN ROME HAGUE VIENN PRMNY PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP BGRAD BUCST WSAW BPEST VMBFR BRU OSLO

DISTR MINA USS MDF IFB IDR IDA RBR ZSI RCR URR RGB RBD

---PMS VISIT:TOAST BY PM TRUDEAU

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF TOAST DELIVERED BY PRIME MINISTER PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU AT DINNER 25JAN:QUOTE

I WISH TO EXPRESS MY DEEP APPRECIATION TO YOU, PRIME MINISTER, FOR YOUR INVITATION TO VISIT CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND FOR THE WARMTH AND HOSPITALITY WITH WHICH YOU HAVE GREETED ^{ME} ALL OF US HERE.

PRIME MINISTER, THE DESIRE TO BANISH WAR FOREVER FROM HUMAN AFFAIRS ^{IS} MUST BE AS OLD AS WAR ITSELF, AND AS ANCIENT AS THAT DESIRE ARE THE EFFORTS OF ^{STATSMEN} LEADERS TO FIND THE PRACTICAL MEANS, IF NOT/NOT TO BANISH IT, AT LEAST TO REDUCE ITS LIKELIHOOD.

IT IS FITTING THAT WE SHOULD BE SPEAKING OF PEACE HERE IN PRGUE. FOR THIS BEAUTIFUL AND ANCIENT CITY, THIS HISTORICAL SEAT OF LEARNING, OF SCIENCE AND ARCHITECTURE, IS A MONUMENT TO WHAT IS BEST IN EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION. ITS BEAUTY AND PROSPERITY HAVE LONG STOOD, AGAINST THE TIDES OF HISTORY, AS A TESTAMENT TO THE RESILIENCE OF THE HUMAN SPIRIT.

PRESIDENT HUSAK ^(added) YOURSELF AND I WERE BOTH IN HELSINKI IN 1975 TO SIGN THE FINAL ACT. AT THAT TIME, HE STATED THAT EUROPE WAS AT A CROSSROADS. IF I MAY QUOTE HIM FURTHER:QUOTE FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HISTORY, THE NATIONS

PAGE TWO PMDL0013 UNCLAS

OF EUROPE HAD SEIZED THE OPPORTUNITY TO CREAT THE REAL
CONDITIONS OF PEACE, SECURITY AND COOPERATION TO AND THAT
IN SPITE OF ALL THE EXISTING POLITICAL, ECONOMIC,
PHILOSOPHICAL AND SOCIAL DIFFERENCES UNQUOTE.

EUROPE IS ONCE AGAIN AT THE CROSSROADS,
PRIME MINISTER. I AM CONVINCED THAT IN THE NATIONS OF
EAST AND WEST, THOUGHTFUL PEOPLE ARE ASKING WHAT CAN BE
DONE TO CHANGE THE COURSE OF EVENTS, EVENTS WHICH SEEM
TO BE GOVERNED BY A LOGIC, AT ONCE TERRIFYING AND
INELUCTABLE. THE SILENCE WHICH NOW ENVELOPS THE ARMS
CONTROLS NEGOTIATIONS ONLY SERVES TO HEIGHTEN THIS
CONCERN, BY GIVING TO THE COURSE OF EVENTS A LIFE OF
ITS OWN, INDEPENDENT OF THE WILL OF STATESMEN.

*dis little
shortened*
PRIME MINISTER, FEW ISSUES HAVE AROUSED SO
MUCH ANXIETY, EVEN DREAD, AS THAT OF NUCLEAR WAR.

(added)
FOR THE HOPES AND FEARS OF MANKIND ARE
NOWHERE MORE CLEARLY AT STAKE THAN IN THE ISSUE OF WAR,
AND PARTICULARLY NUCLEAR WAR. NOR WOULD IT COME AS A
SURPRISE THAT THE YEARNING FOR PEACE IS ACUTELY FELT IN
EUROPE, A CONTINENT RAVAGED BY SO MANY WARS. AND
OF COURSE CANADAS HISTORY, ITS SECURITY AND ITS FUTURE
HAVE BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE CLOSELY BOUND UP WITH
THAT OF EUROPE.

...3

PAGE THREE PMDL0013 UNCLAS

WE BOTH HAVE, THEN, A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY,
INDEED A DUTY, AS STATESMEN TO DO OUR UTMOST TO REDUCE
THE DANGER OF WAR AND THE BURDEN OF THE ARMS RACE.
THIS IS OUR DUTY NOT/OT ONLY TO OUR OWN PEOPLES,
CZECHOSLOVAKIA^S AND CANADIANS, BUT TO THE WHOLE OF
HUMANITY. FOR IN THE EVENT OF A NUCLEAR WAR, MUCH OF
WHAT MANKIND HAS BUILT THROUGH CENTURIES OF LABOUR
WOULD DISAPPEAR INTO THE LONG DARK NIGHT OF NUCLEAR
WINTER.

TO THE GENERATIONS THAT HAVE BEQUETHED THIS
CIVILIZATION TO US, TO THE GENERATIONS WHO WILL IN
THEIR TURN INHERIT IT, WE HAVE THE SOLEMN OBLIGATION TO
GIVE OUR FULL MEASURE TO THE SEARCH FOR PEACE.

*we must dedicate
ourselves*

CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND CANADA ARE NOT/NOT
SUPERPOWERS. WE PRESIDE OVER NO/NO GREAT ARSENAL OF
WEAPONS, NOR GRAND MILITARY MACHINES. WHAT WE MUST DO,
PRIME MINISTER, AS MIDDLE POWERS WHO ARE ALSO MEMBERS
OF OPPOSING ALLIANCES, IS TO FIND AN AREA IN WHICH WE
CAN BEST MAKE OUR CONTRIBUTION. AND THAT AREA, I
SUGGEST, IS PRECISELY THE POLITICAL SPHERE.

STATESMEN MUST SPEAK TO EACH OTHER DIRECTLY.
AS THE POLITICAL LEADERS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES, WE CAN
DEMONSTRATE BY OUR ACTIONS THAT SUCH DIALOGUE IS

...4

PAGE FOUR PMDL0013 UNCLAS

POSSIBLE AND FRUITFUL, AND COUNSEL OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES TO FOLLOW A SIMILAR PATH. ALL OF THESE ARE WELL WITHIN OUR POWER. TO DREAM OF PEACE IS NOT/NOT ENOUGH, PRIME MINISTER. ALL TOO OFTEN IN THIS CENTURY, WE HAVE SEEN SUCH HOPES, HOWEVER NOBLE AND LOFTY, DASHED AGAINST AN UGLY REALITY. PEACE WILL NOT/NOT BE BUILT BY DREAMS, NOR WILL IT BE ESTABLISHED BY A SINGLE GRAND GESTURE. RATHER, IN A THOUSAND WAYS, SOME SMALL, OTHERS GREATER, CONFIDENCE WILL BE CREATED, INTENTIONS MADE TRANSPARENT AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING INCREASED.

WE HAVE A SPECIAL STAKE IN DETENTE, PRIME MINISTER. THROUGH THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, THE CSCE PROCESS AND MEETINGS SUCH AS THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, WE HAVE CREATED THE MEANS TO REDUCE TENSIONS IN EUROPE.

I WAS THEREFORE ENCOURAGED THAT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE WAS HELD AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL. THIS WAS AN IDEA THAT WE HAD BEEN ESPECIALLY ACTIVE IN PROMOTING WITH OUR ALLIES. IT IS MY FIRM BELIEF THAT MINISTERS MUST CLOSELY MONITOR DEVELOPMENTS IN STOCKHOLM. THEY MUST BE READY TO RETURN TO STOCKHOLM, IF NECESSARY AT THE HEAD OF GOVERNMENT LEVEL, TO INJECT NEW ENERGY INTO THOSE TALKS THROUGH THEIR DIRECT PARTICIPATION.

IT IS VITAL THAT THE NOW DORMANT ARMS CONTROL

...5

PAGE FIVE PMDL0013 UNCLAS

TALKS BE RESUMED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT. THE
DECISION TO RETURN TO THE VIENNA TALKS ON THE REDUCTION
OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE IS A MOST WELCOME
DEVELOPMENT. I URGE THAT THE SAME LOGIC WHICH LED TO
THIS DECISION NOW BE APPLIED TO THE NEGOTIATIONS IN
GENEVA.

MODEST THOUGH OUR INFLUENCE IS, PRIME
MINISTER, WE ARE NOT/NOT POWERLESS. STEP BY STEP,
THE DIALOGUE CAN BE ESTABLISHED AND THE SEARCH FOR
PEACE ADVANCED.

THIS IS WHAT I HAVE LEARNED OVER THE PAST
SEVERAL MONTHS AS I PURSUED THE ^{MY} CANADIAN PEACE
INITIATIVE. THE ROAD WHICH HAS BROUGHT ME TO
CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND TO EASTERN EUROPE HAS PASSED THROUGH
MANY NATIONS. CONCERN IS EVIDENT EVERYWHERE, IN BOTH
THE EAST AND WEST, AS IS THE HOPE THAT THE CURRENT
NEGATIVE TREND CAN BE REVERSED. → 2 sentences were cut:

ARISTOTLE WROTE THAT POLITICS IS THE MASTER
SCIENCE, TO WHICH ALL OTHER ARTS, INCLUDING THE
MILITARY ART, ARE SUBORDINATE. HE REASONED THAT HIS
IS SO BECAUSE IT IS THE BUSINESS OF STATESMEN TO SET
THOSE SUPREME GOALS WHICH ARE TO GOVERN ALL THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE NATION.

...6

Statesman
knows that there are
no miracles to be had
in politics. I cert-
ainly have none to
offer, + I would not
wish to encourage
unrealistic expectations."

PAGE SIX PMDL0013 UNCLAS

STATESMEN MUST ASSERT THE PRIMACY OF POLITICS
OVER MILITARY AFFAIRS. THAT IS THE PRINCIPAL PURPOSE
OF MY VISIT AND THE COMMITMENT I ASK YOU TO SHARE.

I INVITE YOU, PRIME MINISTER, LADIES AND
GENTLEMEN TO RAISE YOUR GLASSES IN A TOAST TO THE
HEALTH OF PRESIDENT HUSAK, TO THE PEACE AND PROSPERITY
OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK PEOPLES AND TO CONTINUED DIALOGUE
BETWEEN CANADA AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA. UNQUOTE.

UUU/175 260930Z PMDL0013

CORRECTED COPY
EXEMPLAIRE CORRIGE

(FOURTH LAST LINE
PAGE THREE.)

Division Planned 35912

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

Local Time _____

MF
ME

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PMLDL PMLL0012 26JAN84

TO EXTOTT IIDZ DELIVER BY 260900

INFO MOSCC GENEV ENATO WSHDC STKHM/SCDEL LDN PARIS BONN ROME

HAGUE VIENN PRMNY PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPF BGRAD BUCST

WSAW BPEST VMBFR BRU OSLO

DISTR MINA USS MCF IFB IDR IDA RBR ZSI RCR URR RGB RBD

---PMS VISIT:TOAST BY PM STROUGAL

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF TOAST DELIVERED BY CZECHOSLOVAK PM LUBUMIR

STROUGAL AT DINNER 25JAN:

QUOTE

PRMIME MINISTER,

DFAR FRIENDS,

I AM HONOURED TO WELCOME THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA ON HIS
VERY FIRST VISIT TO THE CAPITAL OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA.ALLOW ME TO
OFFER YOU AND THOSE ACCOMPANYING YOU CORDIAL GREETINGS ON BEHALF
OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST
PARTY FO CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC,GUSTAV HUSAK,
AND ON BEHALF OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK PEOPLE,
WHO HAVE NEVER FORGOTTEN THAT OUR TWO NATIONS ARE LINKED BY OUR
ALLIANCE IN THE WAR AGAINST FASCISM.WE ARE SURE THAT THE CANADIAN
PRIME MINISTERS STAY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA,AND ESPECIALLY THE PRESENT
TALKS,ARE BOUND TO SERVE THE CAUSE OF PEACE,THE POLICY OF PEACEFUL
CO-EXISTENCE AND THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR IN WHICH,AS YOU
YOURSELF HAVE SAID,QUOTE NO-ONE CAN BE THE WINNER UNQUOTE.

...2

PAGE TWO FMEL0012 UNCIAS

OUR MEETING IS OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE. THESE OPEN TALKS ARE BEING ATTENDED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF COUNTRIES WHICH WITNESSED THE BIRTH OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND WHICH WERE PRESENT ROUND THE SAME TABLE IN HELSINKI FOR THE SIGNATURE OF THE FINAL ACT, BUT WHICH ARE NEVERTHELESS DIVIDED BY DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND THEIR ADHERENCE TO DIFFERENT ALLIANCES. FURTHERMORE, WE SEEK A COMMON LANGUAGE IN EXCEPTIONALLY COMPLICATED TIMES, PROBABLY THE MOST DANGEROUS SINCE THE END OF THE LAST WORLD WAR, BECAUSE THE DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE CONSTITUTES AN ATTEMPT TO UPSET THE STRATEGIC MILITARY BALANCE AND THREATENS THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.

WE HAVE REACTED TO THIS MEASURE IN AN UNEQUIVOCAL MANNER NOT/NOT ONLY IN CONFIRMITY WITH OUR OBLIGATIONS TO OUR ALLIES, BUT ALSO IN THE INTERESTS OF OUR OWN SECURITY, WITH AN AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION AND, LATER, WITH THE INSTALLATION OF A NETWORK OF OPERATIONAL TACTICAL MISSILES. WE HAVE LEARNT FROM THE BITTER EXPERIENCE OF THE PAST, THE BLOOD SHED IN BOTH WORLD WARS AND THE LOSS OF OUR INDEPENDENCE AFTER MUNICH, WHEN WE WERE SACRIFICED TO NAZI GERMANY BY THE WESTERN STATES. AND NOW NEW AMERICAN-OBVIOUSLY FIRST-STRIKE-MISSILES ARE AIMED AT CZECHOSLOVAKIA FROM THAT SAME DIRECTION, ONLY A FEW KILOMETERS FROM OUR WESTERN BORDERS. THIS THREAT TO OUR TERRITORY IS THE RESULT OF A FLAGRANT AMERICAN MEASURE WHICH IS WITHOUT PRECEDENT.

...3

PAGE THREE PMDL0012 UNCLAS

HOWEVER, I WISH TO ASSURE YOU, PRIME MINISTER, THAT THESE LATEST DEFENSIVE MEASURES HAVE IN NO/NO WAY ALTERED OUR DESIRE FOR CO-EXISTENCE AND OUR FAITH IN OVERALL PEACE AS THE ONLY REASONABLE CHOICE FOR THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD. THE ASPIRATION TO PEACE HAS RUN IN THE VEINS OF BOTH OUR PEOPLES SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL. IT IS NO/NO COINCIDENCE THAT PRAGUE WAS THE PLACE IN WHICH, AS EARLY AS THE MIDDLE AGES, KING GEORGE OF PODEBRADY FORMULATED HIS VISION OF PEACE AND COOPERATION. A SIMILAR IDEAL WAS ADVOCATED IN A DIVIDED WORLD BY THE GREAT PEDAGOGUE COMENIUS WHOSE FOLLOWERS WERE PERSECUTED IN EUROPE AND FLED OVER THE OCEAN TO SEEK REFUGE, AMONG OTHER PLACES, IN CANADA.

NOTHING, THEN, HAS CHANGED IN CZECHOSLOVAKIAS STAND ON SUCH VITAL QUESTIONS AS THE HALTING OF THE ARMS RACE AND DISARMAMENT, PARTICULARLY NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, THE NON-USE OF FORCE OR THREAT OF FORCE, THE INVIOLABILITY OF FRONTIERS, NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND THE RIGHT OF NATIONS TO SELF-DETERMINATION. THAT IS WHY WE ADHERED TO THE POLITICAL DECLARATION OF WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES ADOPTED IN PRAGUE IN JANUARY LAST YEAR WHICH TOOK THE HISTORICAL INITIATIVE OF PROPOSING AN AGREEMENT NOT/NOT TO RESORT TO FORCE AND TO MAINTAIN PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN WARSAW PACT AND NATO COUNTRIES. OUR DECISION TO WORK FOR PEACE IS FURTHER PROVED BY CZECHOSLOVAKIAS PARTICIPATION IN AND ITS STAND EXPRESSED AT THE CONFERENCE ON

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PAGE FOUR PMDL0012 UNCLAS

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT WHICH IS NOW IN ITS SECOND WEEK IN STOCKHOLM.

PRIME MINISTER,

I SHOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION OF YOUR PERSONAL STAND ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND THE POLICY OF DETENTE AND DISARMAMENT. IT HAS PERMITTED US TO FIND A COMMON LANGUAGE ON MANY QUESTIONS.

I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE CAREFULLY WATCHING YOUR PEACE INITIATIVE WHICH CAN DO MUCH TO RELIEVE THE TENSION IN OUR UNCERTAIN TIMES. WE PARTICULARLY WELCOME OUR SUPPORT FOR THE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE.

FINALLY, WE CAN SAY THAT WE EXPECT A GREAT DEAL FROM YOUR VISIT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR MUTUAL RELATIONS, WHICH-ALTHOUGH THERE ARE NO/NO PARTICULAR PROBLEMS OUTSTANDING-COULD STILL BE MUCH IMPROVED. IT IS OUR SINCERE WISH TO PROMOTE SUCH AN IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ACTION. I HOPE YOU WILL MAKE THE MOST OF YOUR VISIT TO GET TO KNOW OUR COUNTRY AND OUR PEOPLE, OUTSIDE THE FORMAL FRAMEWORK OF OUR TALKS.

I OFFER A TOAST TO EVERY THING WE HAVE DISCUSSED.

LET US RAISE OUR GLASSES AND DRINK

TO COOPERATION AND FRIENDSHIP TO THE PEOPLES OF CANADA AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA,

TO LASTING WORLD PEACE,

TO YOUR HEALTH, PRIME MINISTER,

TO THE HEALTH OF ALL PRESENT.

UNQUOTE.

UUU/209 260955Z PMDL0012

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PMDEL PMDL0012 26JAN84

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ DELIVER BY 260900

INFO MOSCO GENEV BNATO WSHDC STKHM/SCDEL LDN PARIS BONN ROME
HAGUE VIENN PRMNY PCOTT/FOWLER NDHOTT/ADM POL/ CPP BGRAD BUCST
WSAW BPEST VMBFR BRU OSLO

DISTR MINA USS MDF IFB IDR IDA RBR ZSI RCR URR RGB RBD

---PMS VISIT:TOAST BY PM STROUGAL

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF TOAST DELIVERED BY CZECHOSLOVAK PM LUBUMIR
STROUGAL AT DINNER 25JAN:

QUOTE

PRMIME MINISTER,

DEAR FRIENDS,

I AM HONOURED TO WELCOME THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA ON HIS
VERY FIRST VISIT TO THE CAPITAL OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA.ALLOW ME TO
OFFER YOU AND THOSE ACCOMPANYING YOU CORDIAL GREETINGS ON BEHALF
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YOURSELF HAVE SAID,QUOTE NO-ONE CAN BE THE WINNER UNQUOTE.

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PAGE TWO PMDL0012 UNCLAS

OUR MEETING IS OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE. THESE OPEN TALKS ARE BEING ATTENDED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF COUNTRIES WHICH WITNESSED THE BIRTH OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND WHICH WERE PRESENT ROUND THE SAME TABLE IN HELSINKI FOR THE SIGNATURE OF THE FINAL ACT, BUT WHICH ARE NEVERTHELESS DIVIDED BY DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND THEIR ADHERENCE TO DIFFERENT ALLIANCES. FURTHERMORE, WE SEEK A COMMON LANGUAGE IN EXCEPTIONALLY COMPLICATED TIMES, PROBABLY THE MOST DANGEROUS SINCE THE END OF THE LAST WORLD WAR, BECAUSE THE DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE CONSTITUTES AN ATTEMPT TO UPSET THE STRATEGIC MILITARY BALANCE AND THREATENS THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.

WE HAVE REACTED TO THIS MEASURE IN AN UNEQUIVOCAL MANNER NOT/NOT ONLY IN CONFIRMITY WITH OUR OBLIGATIONS TO OUR ALLIES, BUT ALSO IN THE INTERESTS OF OUR OWN SECURITY, WITH AN AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION AND, LATER, WITH THE INSTALLATION OF A NETWORK OF OPERATIONAL TACTICAL MISSILES. WE HAVE LEARNT FROM THE BITTER EXPERIENCE OF THE PAST, THE BLOOD SHED IN BOTH WORLD WARS AND THE LOSS OF OUR INDEPENDENCE AFTER MUNICH, WHEN WE WERE SACRIFICED TO NAZI GERMANY BY THE WESTERN STATES. AND NOW NEW AMERICAN—OBVIOUSLY FIRST-STRIKE—MISSILES ARE AIMED AT CZECHOSLOVAKIA FROM THAT SAME DIRECTION, ONLY A FEW KILOMETERS FROM OUR WESTERN BORDERS. THIS THREAT TO OUR TERRITORY IS THE RESULT OF A FLAGRANT AMERICAN MEASURE WHICH IS WITHOUT PRECEDENT.

...3

PAGE THREE PMDL0012 UNCLAS

HOWEVER, I WISH TO ASSURE YOU, PRIME MINISTER, THAT THESE LATEST DEFENSIVE MEASURES HAVE IN NO/NO WAY ALTERED OUR DESIRE FOR CO-EXISTENCE AND OUR FAITH IN OVERALL PEACE AS THE ONLY REASONABLE CHOICE FOR THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD. THE ASPIRATION TO PEACE HAS RUN IN THE VEINS OF BOTH OUR PEOPLES SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL. IT IS NO/NO COINCIDENCE THAT PRAGUE WAS THE PLACE IN WHICH, AS EARLY AS THE MIDDLE AGES, KING GEORGE OF PODEBRADY FORMULATED HIS VISION OF PEACE AND COOPERATION. A SIMILAR IDEAL WAS ADVOCATED IN A DIVIDED WORLD BY THE GREAT PEDAGOGUE COMENIUS WHOSE FOLLOWERS WERE PERSECUTED IN EUROPE AND FLED OVER THE OCEAN TO SEEK REFUGE, AMONG OTHER PLACES, IN CANADA.

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PAGE FOUR PMDL0012 UNCLAS

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT WHICH IS
NOW IN ITS SECOND WEEK IN STOCKHOLM.

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TO LASTING WORLD PEACE,

TO YOUR HEALTH, PRIME MINISTER,

TO THE HEALTH OF ALL PRESENT.

UNQUOTE.

UUU/209 260955Z PMDL0012

INFO

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PMDELPRGUE PDEL0004 26JAN84

TO BERN DELIVER BY 261000

INFO CANDELDAVOS/DE GOUMOIS EXTOTT (IDDZ IMMED

DISTR MINA RGB RBGD RSE BPR

REF YOURTEL ZNGR0258 25JAN

---PRESS RELEASE

AGREE TO FIRST TWO SWISS PARAS YOUR REFTEL PLUS YOUR REVISION

PARA 3.

UUU/175 260930Z PDEL0004

Place the first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Placer le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche.

12 10

PAGE TWO PER0088 CONF

PARLIAMENT, BUSINESS-ORIENTED LUNCHESES HOSTED BY SENATE SPEAKER RIEL AND GOVGEN SCHREYER, CALLS BY MINS CHRETIEN/WHELAN/FOX/LALONDE PLUS LEADERS MULRONEY/BROADBENT, SIGNATURE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INSURANCE AGREEMENT(FIIA), PRESS CONF, THREE LARGE RECEPTIONS, SPECIAL GALA PERFORMANCE AT NAC, AND FORMAL DINNER HOSTED BY PM. THIS TEL SUMMARIZES MAIN SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF OTT VISIT ON INNATL SIDE, IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TEL WILL COVER BILATERAL DEVELOPMENTS, AND LATER TEL WILL REPORT ON ZHAOS SUBSEQUENT TRAVELS TO MONTL, TRNTO AND VNCVR JAN19-23. ~~DETAILS REPORTS WILL FOLLOW TO APPROPRIATE ADDRESSEES.~~

3. PEACE AND SECURITY. TRUDEAU/ZHAO DISCUSSIONS ON PMS INITIATIVE AT EXPANDED MTG 17JAN HAVE ALREADY BEEN REPORTED IN FULL TO SOME ADDRESSEES VIA IDDZ REFTEL. IN SUMMARY, PM REVIEWED RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (CHOGM, NATO DECLARATION, CDE PARTICIPATION, MORE CONCILIATORY REAGAN STATEMENTS, PROSPECTS FOR VISIT TO MOSCO). HE THEN ZEROED-IN ON HIS PROPOSAL TO UN SEC GEN PEREZ DE CUELLAR REGARDING PRIVATE MTG OF FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF SECURITY COUNCIL, PERHAPS AT AMBASSADOR LEVEL, DESIGNED TO ENCOURAGE RENEWAL OF CONSTRUCTIVE TALKS BETWEEN USA AND USSR, WITH OTHER THREE MEMBERS APPLYING APPROPRIATE PRESSURE ON THEM TO DO SO. IN REPLY, ZHAO AGREED WITH NEED FOR OUTSIDE PARTIES TO PRESS USA/USSR ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND PLEDGED THAT CHINA WOULD PARTICIPATE IN MTG CALLED BY SEC GEN ALONG LINES PM SUGGESTED WITHOUT/WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS (SUCH AS THOSE ANNOUNCED BY FM WU AT

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PAGE THREE PER0088 CONF D

LAST UNGA REGARDING HALT TO TESTING/MANUFACTURING OF WEAPONS AND REDUCTION OF EXISTING ARSENALS). ZHAO ALSO ECHOED SUPPORT FOR PMS INITIATIVE, AND PROMISED CONTINUED CONSULTATION ON THIS ISSUE, IN MAJOR PUBLIC STATEMENTS INCLUDING PARLIAMENTARY ADDRESS, PRESS CONF AND DINNER TOAST. HE DID NOT/NOT GO INTO MUCH DETAIL IN THESE FORUMS AS TO WHICH ASPECTS OF INITIATIVE CHINA IN FACT SUPPORTED, BUT HE DID FLAG PMS APPEAL FOR HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN DISARMAMENT AND MENTIONED UNSPECIFIED QUOTE NEW IDEAS UNQUOTE (PRESUMABLY UN MTG PROPOSAL) RAISED BY PM DURING TALKS. DISARMAMENT ISSUE WAS ALSO RAISED BY NDP LEADER BROADBENT, TO WHOM ZHAO EXPRESSED PESSIMISM OVER LIKELIHOOD OF MEANINGFUL RETURN TO INF NEGOTIATING TABLE BY USA/USSR, GIVEN LACK OF SINCERITY BOTH HAD SO FAR SHOWN; PREMIER EMPHASIZED THAT PRESSURE HAD TO BE APPLIED EQUALLY TO BOTH/BOTH SUPERPOWERS SIMULTANEOUSLY, ELSE OUTSIDE EFFORTS WOULD ONLY ACCELERATE TRADITIONAL PENDULUM-EFFECT OF ARMAMENT AND COUNTER-ARMAMENT.

4. TAIWAN. ALONG WITH HKONG, THIS ISSUE WAS RAISED CHIEFLY DURING TETE-A-TETE 17 JAN (ON WHICH LIKE DINNER CONVERSATION WE HAVE NOT/NOT YET RECEIVED FULL BRIEFING). WE UNDERSTAND THAT ZHAO CHARACTERIZED TAIWAN AS STILL A MAJOR IRRITANT IN SINO-USA RELATIONS, WITH CHINESE VIEWPOINT BEING THAT REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WAS NOT/NOT LIVING UP TO ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER 3 JOINT COMMUNIQUES DEFINING BILATERAL RELATIONS SINCE 1972 (SHANGHAI I, DIPLO RECOGNITION, SHANGHAI II).

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PAGE FOUR PERQ088 CONF D

CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTIONS AND PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS LAST DEC HAD
CAST DOUBT ON WSHDCS REAL INTENTIONS, AND ZHAO HAD MOMENTARILY
CONSIDERED CANCELLING HIS VISIT, BUT SUFFICIENT USA REASSURANCES HAD
BEEN FORTHCOMING. ZHAO EXPECTED TAIWAN ISSUE TO BE MAJOR TOPIC OF
DISCUSSION AGAIN WHEN PRES REAGAN ARRIVED IN PEKIN THIS APRIL.
PREMIER ALSO MENTIONED TAIWAN AS MATTER OF ONGOING SINO-USA
DISCUSSION AND ~~SIA~~^{DISA} AGREEMENT DURING HIS PARLIAMENTARY ADDRESS. LIKE FM
WU LAST OCT, ZHAO CALLED ON CHINESE-CDN COMMUNITY (AT RECEPTION
HOSTED BY OTT CHINESE REPS 18 JAN) TO WORK FOR REUNIFICATION OF CHINA,
BUT HE DID NOT/NOT, AS FAR AS WE ARE AWARE, MAKE ANY COMMENT ON CDN
TAIWAN POLICY IN PRIVATE OR PUBLIC.

5. HKONG. PM TRUDEAU MADE STRONG PRESENTATION OF CDN INTEREST IN
CONTINUED STABILITY AND PROSPERITY OF COLONY, GIVEN HIGH LEVELS OF
CAN INVESTMENT, TRADE, IMMIGRATION AND FAMILY CONTACTS THERE. ZHAO
REPLIED THAT CHINA ALSO DESIRED STABILITY AND PROSPERITY FOR ITS
OWN REASONS, AND WHILE TRANSFER TO CHINA OF SOVEREIGNTY (INCLUDING
BOTH NEW TERRITORIES UNDER 1898 LEASE AND OTHER TERRITORIES CEDED IN
1842/1860) WAS NOT/NOT/NEGOTIABLE, CHINA WOULD GUARANTEE CONTINUITY
OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS, POLITICAL AUTONOMY ETC. (SPECIFIC
GUARANTEES LISTED IN PARL ADDRESS INCLUDED QUOTE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
SYSTEMS AND LIFESTYLE... FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE AND STATUS AS FREE
PORT AND INNATL FINANCIAL CENTRE... ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL RELATIONS
WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES... INTERESTS OF RESIDENT AND FOREIGN

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PAGE FIVE PER0088 CONFD

INVESTORS PROTECTED UNQUOTE, ALL GUARANTEED BY SPECIAL LAW UNDER ARTICLE OF PRC CONSTITUTION REGARDING SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS). IN TALKS WITH PM, ZHAO ALSO CONFIRMED THAT BY END OF 1984 CHINA WOULD ANNOUNCE DEFINITELY WHAT FUTURE STATUS OF HKONG WOULD BE, ALONG LINES NEGOTIATED WITH UK IF POSSIBLE, BUT UNILATERALLY IF NEGOTIATIONS FAILED. IN PARL ADDRESS, ZHAO IN FACT EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD SUCCEED; WHEN QUESTIONED AT PRESS CONF ON THIS OPTIMISM, PREMIER REFUSED TO GIVE SPECIFIC REASONS, BUT STATED HE HAD CONCRETE GROUNDS BASED ON PROGRESS DURING LAST PHASE OF SINO-UK TALKS. ANOTHER PRESS QUESTION PROBED WHETHER HKONG AND TAIWAN SITUATIONS WERE LINKED; ZHAO AGREED THEY WERE, ADDING THAT ALL POLICIES APPLIED TO HKONG WOULD BE APPLIED TO TAIWAN AND THEN SOME, AS PART OF DRIVE FOR EARLY PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF BOTH REGIONS WITH PRC.

6. KOREA. THIS QUESTION WAS DISCUSSED DURING 17 JAN EXPANDED MTGS AND WE UNDERSTAND OVER DINNER THAT EVENING. ASKED TO DESCRIBE PRC POSITION, ZHAO EMPHASIZED THAT CHINA SHARED OTHER COUNTRIES DESIRE FOR PEACE AND STABILITY ON KOREAN PENINSULA, ADDING THAT IN HIS VIEW DPRK WOULD ALSO AVOID CONFRONTATION FOR FORESEEABLE FUTURE IN ORDER TO FREE RESOURCES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. HE CONFIRMED THAT PRC HAD DISCUSSED KOR/N PROPOSAL FOR TRIPARTITE TALKS (KOR/N, USA, KOR/S) WITH PRES REAGAN, NOTING THAT WHILE USA HAD IN FACT ORIGINATED TRIPARTITE IDEA, WITH PRC ACTING AS MESSENGER TO PYONGYANG, THERE WAS

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RELUCTANCE IN WSHDC TO CONFIRM THIS PROPOSAL NOW THAT KOR/N HAD MADE IDEA PUBLIC, RELUCTANCE PERHAPS BEING DUE TO UNFORTUNATELY COINCIDENT TIMING OF RANGOON BOMBING INCIDENT. WHEN ZHAO WAS IN WSHDC, USA ADMIN HAD PROPOSED FOUR-WAY TALKS WITH ADDITION OF CHINA; ZHAO SUGGESTED THAT PRC WAS CONSIDERING THIS IDEA BUT THAT INITIAL REACTION WAS NOT/NOT ENTIRELY POSITIVE. PREMIER THEN WENT ON TO SUPPORT GENERAL IDEA OF CONFEDERAL SYSTEM FOR KOREAN PENINSULA, WITH EXISTING SOCIO-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS MAINTAINED ON BOTH SIDES. PM TRUDEAU PRESSED ZHAO ON RANGOON INCIDENT AND ITS RELATION TO TIMING OF TRIPARTITE PROPOSAL ANNOUNCEMENT. ZHAO REITERATED PRC STAND AGAINST TERRORISM IN GENERAL, BUT DECLINED TO TAKE SIDES BETWEEN BURMA AND KOR/N ON BOMBING INCIDENT, CLAIMING PRC HAD NO/NO INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE ON WHICH TO JUDGE CONFLICTING CLAIMS; HE NOTED THAT BURMA HAD BEEN QUOTE UNDER PRESSURE UNQUOTE TO REACH FINDING IT DID, BUT URGED THAT IN ANY EVENT RANGOON INCIDENT SHOULD NOT/NOT BE ALLOWED TO IMPEDE PROGRESS OF KOREAN REUNIFICATION. LATER ON, PM ASKED WHO HAD BEEN PRESSURING BURMA; AFTER SOME HESITATION, ZHAO SAID KOR/N HAD ACCUSED KOR/S OF DOING SO, AND ALSO MENTIONED POSSIBILITY THAT KOR/S DISSIDENTS MIGHT HAVE BEEN BEHIND BLAST. IN CONTEXT OF TRIPARTITE PROPOSAL, PM ALSO ASKED IF USSR STILL HAD STRONG INFLUENCE IN KOR/N; ZHAO SAID MOSCO HAD LOST MUCH OF INFLUENCE IT HAD FEW YEARS AGO, WITH NO/NO SOVIET TROOPS NOW REMAINING IN KOR/N, FOR EXAMPLE.

7. SOUTHEAST ASIA. ON CAMBODIA, PM TRUDEAU OUTLINED CDAS POLICY OF

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SUPPORT FOR ASEAN AND COALITION GOVT, BUT EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT KHMER ROUGE (WHICH DID NOT/NOT ENJOY CDN SUPPORT) MIGHT TAKE OVER CG AFTER VIETNAMESE PULLOUT. ZHAO REPLIED BY CONFIRMING CHINESE SUPPORT FOR POST-PULLOUT FREE ELECTIONS; THIS WOULD FOLLOW INNATL CONF (WHICH PRC WOULD ATTEND) TO DRAFT GUARANTEES OF NON/NON-INTERVENTION IN CAMBODIA ON PART OF ALL MAJOR REGIONAL PLAYERS. CHINA, ZHAO WENT ON, WOULD ACTUALLY PREFER SIHANOUK TO KR AS LONG-TERM RULER OF CAMBODIA, BUT HAD TO SUPPORT KR FOR NOW AS ONLY VIABLE MILITARY OPPOSITION TO SRVN. PM AND ZHAO AGREED THAT SOME ASEAN MEMBERS STILL FEARED CHINA'S LONG TERM GOALS IN SE ASIA; ZHAO IDENTIFIED INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA IN PARTICULAR. PM ASSURED ZHAO ON BASIS RECENT MAHATHIR VISIT THAT MALAYSIANS WERE NOT/NOT TOO DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS, ALTHOUGH THEY WERE UNEASY ABOUT CONTINUED PRC CONTACTS WITH MALAYSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (MCP). ZHAO REPLIED THAT EVEN THIS WAS EXAGGERATED, SINCE ONLY PRC CONTACT WAS WITH RETIRED MCP LEADERS IN PEKIN, THERE BEING NO/NO PARTY-TO-PARTY RELATIONS WITH ACTIVE GUERRILLA FORCE; HE SUGGESTED THAT MALAYSIAN FEARS WERE BASED SIMPLY ON FACT THAT MOST MCP MEMBERS WERE ETHNIC CHINESE.

8. OTHER INNATL TOPICS. (A) PM AND ZHAO ALSO TOUCHED ON QUESTION OF INCREASING JPNS MILITARY SPENDING AND CAPABILITIES. ZHAO'S EXPOSITION WAS ALONG STANDARD LINES: SUPPORT FOR LEGITIMATE SELF-DEFENCE ROLE, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF GROWING SOVIET REGIONAL PRESENCE, COMBINED WITH CONCERN OVER SOCIO-CULTURAL BASIS OF MOVEMENT (WHICH CHINESE

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POINTEDLY REFER TO AS QUOTE RESURRECTION OF JPNSE MILITARISM
UNQUOTE)AND FEARS IT RAISED AMONG SMALLER E/ASIAN STATES.(B)DURING
PARL ADDRESS,ZH^{AD}AO NOTED QUOTE SINCERE WISH UNQUOTE IN CHINA FOR
IMPROVEMENT IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS,BUT LAMENTED THAT MOSCO HAD SO
FAR EVADED DISCUSSING CHINAS THREE KEY ISSUES(SOVIET OCCUPATION OF
AFGHANISTAN,SUPPORT FOR SRVN IN CAMBODIA AND MILITARY FORCES ALONG
SINO-SOVIET AND SINO-MONGOLIAN BORDERS).HE CALLED FOR GREATER
EFFORTS BY BOTH/BOTH SIDES.(C)PARL ADDRESS ALSO FLAGGED PRC SUPPORT
FOR BETTER NORTH/SOUTH AND SOUTH/SOUTH COOPERATION,EXPRESSING
APPRECIATION FOR CDN POSITIONS ON SUCH QUESTIONS AND PROPOSING SINO-
CDN RELATIONS AS MODEL FOR LDC/DC ECONOMIC COOPERATION/(D)DURING
18JAN CALL ON PREMIER ZHAO,MIN LALONDE CONFIRMED CONTINUED CDN
SUPPORT FOR IDA VII REPLENISHMENT AT 12 BILLION DOLLAR LEVEL,BUT
ALSO INDICATED THAT OTHER COUNTRIES REMAINED OPPOSED.ZHAO URGED CDA
TO USE ITS INFLUENCE ESPECIALLY ON USA,WHICH CHINA VIEWED AS KEY TO
BREAKING 9 BILLION DOLLAR BLOCK,AND MIN REPLIED THAT CDA CERTAINLY
INTENDED TO CONTINUE PRESSING WSHDC ON THIS SCORE.



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TRANSMITTAL NOTE AND RECEIPT
NOTE D'ENVOI ET REÇU

File No. — N° du dossier 012

<p>TO — À</p> <p>EXTOTT/IDDZ/McNee</p>	<p>ORIGINATOR AND ADDRESS — INITIATEUR ET ADRESSE</p> <p>CDN EMB/Washington/Lysyshyn</p>
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<input type="checkbox"/> With Enclosure(s) Avec annexe(s)		<input type="checkbox"/> Without Enclosure Sans annexe	

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Publications re Arms Control and U.S. Defense Policy

NOTE: Please pass on, on an urgent basis, to Miss Peggy Mason in Mr. Joe Clark's office.

<p>Originator's Signature — Signature de l'initiateur</p> <p></p> <p>Signature</p>	<p>Received By — Reçu par</p> <p></p> <p>Signature</p>
<p>Jan 25/84</p> <p>Date</p>	<p>Date</p>

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**ACTION FICHE DE
REQUEST SERVICE**

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IDDZ

File No. — Dossier N°

Date

From — De

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6-3667

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Returned your call
Vous a rappelé

Will call again
Vous rappellera

Wants to see you
Désire vous voir

Date

Time — Heure

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Message reçu par

Action
Donner suite

Approval
Approbation

Note & return
Noter et retourner

Comments
Commentaires

Draft reply
Projet de réponse

Note & forward
Noter et faire suivre

As requested
Comme demandé

Signature

Note & file
Noter et classer

This is copy of message we have just
received from Indian Hicom.

Original is being sent Today to PEO
and text is also conveyed to our Hicom
in Delhi.

000657

Mr. Mehta

*Here we go again.
You can make the
peace of this type of
this*

Message from Prime Minister of India

BEGINS

New Delhi, January 25, 1984.

Dear Prime Minister,

A delegation of the Parliamentarians for World Order met me last week to discuss their proposed initiative for resumption of a constructive dialogue to end and reverse the nuclear arms race. I am told they are also in touch with you.

They suggested that a few leaders should issue a joint public statement, indicating their willingness to help in whatever way possible to arrest the deterioration in the nuclear scene. I welcome the initiative. The crisis is so grave and stakes so overwhelmingly high that every such effort deserves support and encouragement. Your own personal commitment to this cause is well known.

Obviously, the joint statement should be one to which we can all subscribe. The PWO team proposed that senior officials representing the leaders should meet in early February to draft the statement. We have no objection.

As regards the meeting of the leaders themselves, the PWO delegation felt - and I agree - that it should be convened early and to have the desired impact, it would be necessary to have the personal participation of the Heads of State/ Government.

Unfortunately, it is not possible for me to leave India in the near future as the budget session of our Parliament begins in February. I realize, of course, that you also have many pressing pre-occupations at home. Nevertheless, if you decide, as I hope you will, to lend your valued support to this initiative, it would be a great honour if you could spare a day or two in early March to come to Delhi.

- : 2 : -

Besides Canada, the PUC have approached the leaders of Sweden, Greece, Spain, Romania and Tanzania. They are also contacting Mexico. I am writing similar letters to these Heads of State/Government.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

INDIRA GANDHI

The Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau,
Prime Minister of Canada.

ENDS

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED HANDOUT RE MF ✓
THE INITIATIVE FOR CANADIAN BEL TO
PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE
HAYOS

ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (ENGT
FR)

BACKGROUND

The Prime Minister's central purpose is to try to stop and reverse the worsening trend in East-West relations, and thus reduce international tensions and risks of confrontation. His chief proposal addresses the need to restore confidence and re-establish high-level political dialogue between East and West, and particularly between the two superpowers. In the wake of the KAL downing, East-West relations appeared to have touched a low point. There has been little genuine political dialogue between the two sides and no real political framework for arms control and other negotiations. The Prime Minister is interested in seeing if more propitious conditions can be created for building a constructive, working relationship between East and West.

The initiative involves a number of specific proposals - (a) a conference of the five nuclear weapon states to limit strategic nuclear arsenals (b) a concerted political effort to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime (c) a political impetus by the West to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks in Vienna to try to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe by achieving a stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels (d) the inauguration of the Stockholm Conference at senior political level.

Also related to the initiative are proposals for (a) a ban on the testing and deployment of high altitude anti-satellite systems (b) a requirement that future strategic systems be verifiable by National Technical Means and (c) restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs.

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CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS

1. Prime Minister's meeting with Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of National Defence and senior officials; creation of Task Force (September 21)
2. Prime Minister meets at Meach Lake with Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of National Defence, senior officials and ambassadors (October 7)
3. Prime Minister's letters to all NATO Heads of Government (October 22-25)
4. Prime Minister's speech at Guelph University (October 27)
5. Prime Minister's letters to Soviet and Chinese leaders (early November)
6. Prime Minister's meetings with President Mitterrand of France, Prime Minister Lubbers and Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands, Prime Minister Martens of Belgium, His Holiness the Pope, Prime Minister Craxi of Italy, Chancellor Kohl of West Germany, Prime Minister Thatcher of Great Britain (November 8-11)
7. Prime Minister's speech in Montreal (November 13)
8. Prime Minister's meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone (November 19)
9. Prime Minister's personal emissary (Geoffrey Pearson) visits Peking (November 21-22) and Moscow (November 25-26)

- 3 -

10. Prime Minister participates in Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in New Delhi (November 22-27)
- 11 Prime Minister's visit to Peking (November 28-29)
12. Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs participation in NATO ministerial meetings (December 8-9)
13. Prime Minister's meetings over six week period with leading experts on nuclear matters and East-West relations - Robert McNamara, General Rogers, General Brent Scowcroft, George Kennan, Members of the Harvard Nuclear Study Group, Georgi Arbatov. (October-November)
14. Prime Minister's visit to President Reagan in Washington (December 15)
15. Prime Minister's Meeting with U.N. Secretary General (January 11)
16. Visit of Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang (January 16-20)

REACTIONS

The Prime Minister has received encouraging support for the broad political purposes of the initiative in his consultations with European allies, the Chinese leadership, President Nakasone of Japan and President Reagan. The Prime Minister has found general agreement with his analysis of the dangerous state of East-West relations and the need for the re-establishment of political dialogue.

- 4 -

Also, Commonwealth Heads of Government specifically endorsed Prime Minister Trudeau's initiative in the Goa Declaration on International Security which reflected the Prime Minister's analysis of the gravity of the current situation and the importance of applying political will to the quest for international security. U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar has commended and encouraged the Prime Minister's efforts.

RESULTS

The degree of support which the Prime Minister has garnered for the main purposes of his initiative is of itself a positive result insofar as it may have a beneficial effect on the climate of East-West relations. The decisions taken at the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels in early December were particularly significant in furthering the purposes of the initiative:

- (a) an undertaking by NATO foreign ministers to attend the opening of the Stockholm Conference, followed by a decision by the Warsaw Pact to have its ministers attend.
- (b) an undertaking to review the NATO position on the MBFR negotiations;
- (c) the "Brussels declaration" which pledges NATO to work for "genuine détente" and constructive dialogue with the East in recognition of their mutual security interests and eschews any attempt to seek superiority.
- (d) a decision to review the state of East-West relations to search for ways in which they might be improved.

INITIATIVE DU PREMIER MINISTRE TOUCHANT LES RELATIONS EST-OUEST

ET LA SÉCURITÉ INTERNATIONALE

HISTORIQUE

L'objectif central du Premier ministre est de tenter d'arrêter et de renverser la tendance à la détérioration des relations Est-Ouest et, par voie de conséquence, de réduire les tensions internationales et les dangers d'affrontement. Sa principale proposition concerne la nécessité de redonner la confiance et de rétablir un dialogue politique de haut niveau entre l'Est et l'Ouest, et plus particulièrement entre les deux superpuissances. Après l'incident de l'aéronef des KAL, les relations Est-Ouest ont semblé avoir atteint un creux. Il y a peu de véritables discussions politiques entre les deux parties, et aucun cadre politique concret pour le contrôle des armements et les autres négociations. Le Premier ministre est intéressé à voir si des conditions plus propices peuvent être instaurées en vue de permettre des contacts constructifs entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

L'initiative comporte un certain nombre de propositions spécifiques - a) une conférence des cinq puissances nucléaires en vue de limiter les arsenaux nucléaires stratégiques; b) un effort politique concerté pour renforcer le régime de non-prolifération nucléaire; c) un réengagement politique de l'Occident envers les Pourparlers de Vienne sur des réductions mutuelles et équilibrées des forces pour tenter de hausser le seuil nucléaire en Europe en stabilisant l'équilibre des forces classiques à des niveaux d'armement moindres; d) l'inauguration de la Conférence de Stockholm à un niveau politique élevé.

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L'initiative comporte également des propositions visant

- a) l'interdiction de la mise à l'essai et du déploiement de systèmes antisatellite de haute altitude; b) l'exigence que les futurs systèmes stratégiques puissent être vérifiés par des moyens techniques nationaux; et
- c) des restrictions posées à la mobilité des missiles balistiques intercontinentaux (ICBM).

CALENDRIER DES PRINCIPALES ACTIVITÉS

1. Le Premier ministre rencontre le Vice-premier ministre, le ministre de la Défense nationale et des hauts fonctionnaires; création d'un Groupe spécial (21 septembre).
2. Le Premier ministre rencontre le Vice-premier ministre, le ministre de la Défense nationale, des hauts fonctionnaires et des ambassadeurs au lac Meach (7 octobre).
3. Le Premier ministre envoie des lettres à tous les chefs de gouvernement de l'OTAN (22-25 octobre).
4. Le Premier ministre prononce une allocution à l'université de Guelph (27 octobre).
5. Le Premier ministre envoie des lettres aux dirigeants soviétique et chinois (début novembre).

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6. Le Premier ministre rencontre le Président Mitterrand (France), le Premier ministre Lubbers et la Reine Beatrix (Pays-Bas), le Premier ministre Martens (Belgique), Sa Sainteté le Pape, le Premier ministre Craxi (Italie), le Chancelier Kohl (Allemagne de l'Ouest) et le Premier ministre Thatcher (Grande-Bretagne) (8-11 novembre).
7. Le Premier ministre prononce une allocution à Montréal (13 novembre).
8. Le Premier ministre rencontre le Premier ministre du Japon, M. Nakasone (19 novembre).
9. Le représentant personnel du Premier ministre (Geoffrey Pearson) visite Pékin (21-22 novembre) et Moscou (25-26 novembre).
10. Le Premier ministre participe à la Rencontre des Chefs de gouvernement du Commonwealth à New Delhi (22-27 novembre).
11. Le Premier ministre se rend en visite à Pékin (28-29 novembre).
12. Le Vice-premier ministre et secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures participe aux réunions ministérielles de l'OTAN (8-9 décembre).
13. Le Premier ministre rencontre, sur une période de six semaines, d'éminents experts des questions nucléaires et des relations

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Est-Ouest: Robert McNamara, le Général Rogers, le Général Brent Scowcroft, George Kennan, des membres du Harvard Nuclear Study Group, et Georgi Arbatov (octobre-novembre).

14. Le Premier ministre rend visite au Président Reagan à Washington (15 décembre).
15. Le Premier ministre rencontre le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies (11 janvier).
16. Visite du Premier ministre de la Chine, M. Zhao Ziyang (16-20 janvier).

RÉACTIONS

Le Premier ministre a reçu un appui encourageant pour les grands objectifs politiques de son initiative lors des consultations qu'il a eues avec les alliés européens, les dirigeants chinois, le Président Nakasone du Japon et le Président Reagan. Le Premier ministre a constaté que ses interlocuteurs partageaient généralement son analyse de l'état dangereux des relations Est-Ouest et qu'ils étaient conscients de la nécessité de rétablir le dialogue politique.

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De plus, les Chefs de gouvernement du Commonwealth ont spécifiquement endossé l'initiative du Premier ministre Trudeau dans la Déclaration de Goa sur la sécurité internationale, laquelle reflétait le point de vue du Premier ministre quant au sérieux de la situation actuelle ainsi qu'à l'importance de donner un nouvel élan politique à la recherche de la sécurité internationale. Le Secrétaire général Perez de Cuellar a loué et encouragé les efforts du Premier ministre.

RÉSULTATS

L'appui que le Premier ministre a reçu pour les grands objectifs de son initiative est en soi un résultat positif en autant qu'il peut avoir un effet bénéfique sur le climat des relations Est-Ouest. Les décisions prises à la Réunion ministérielle de l'OTAN tenue à Bruxelles au début de décembre ont appuyé tout particulièrement les objectifs de l'initiative; elles comprenaient notamment:

- a) un engagement des ministres des Affaires étrangères de l'OTAN d'assister à l'ouverture de la Conférence de Stockholm, suivi d'une décision du Pacte de Varsovie de demander à ses ministres d'y assister également;
- b) un engagement de réexaminer la position de l'OTAN sur les négociations MBFR;

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- c) la "Déclaration de Bruxelles" qui engage l'OTAN à rechercher une "détente véritable" ainsi qu'un dialogue constructif tenant compte des intérêts de sécurité du bloc de l'Est et excluant toute tentative pour obtenir la supériorité;

- d) une décision de revoir l'état des relations Est-Ouest pour rechercher des moyens de les améliorer.

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WORKING PAPER OUTLINING MEASURES FOR RESTRAINING
STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY

SUBJECT

This paper outlines three measures designed to enhance strategic stability through placing restraints on military technologies and bolstering the capacity of arms control agreements to manage the strategic nuclear relationship.

BACKGROUND

These proposals, and their associated papers, elaborate on ideas advanced by the Prime Minister of Canada on November 13, 1983. They are designed to place realistic limits on new strategic weaponry, the development and deployment of which would render arms control negotiations more difficult, and would act to destabilize the global nuclear balance.

Historically, arms control negotiations have failed to limit satisfactorily or preclude the deployment of particular strategic weapons technologies whose characteristics have been such as to cause the stability of deterrence to erode. Such deployments have, in turn, encouraged the deployment of countervailing systems, and have rendered the task of future arms control negotiations far more difficult.

By addressing weapons systems yet to be developed or deployed, and by proposing the upgrading of existing verification provisions, it is intended that dangerous new avenues of the arms competition be shut off before the cycle of weapons development and deployment begins. It is thereby hoped that the strategic relationship between the nuclear powers will be restricted to more stabilizing technologies and deployments, and that the task of arms control will be made more manageable.

These proposals are designed to maximize negotiability and stability. Taken together, or singly (as listed below and described in Annexes 1 - 3), they would contribute to the stability of the nuclear balance and the progress of arms control:

- an agreement to ban the testing and deployment of high-altitude Anti-Satellite systems

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- an agreement that states must demonstrate and ensure the verifiability of new strategic weapons systems
- an agreement to restrict the mobility of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).

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MEASURE I

I Proposal: An Agreement to Ban the Testing and Deployment of High-Altitude Anti-Satellite Systems (ASATs)

II Background/Rationale

1. There is an increasing reliance on satellite systems for various strategic purposes; these include the verification of arms control agreements, intelligence gathering, meteorology, early warning, and strategic communications and navigation. This reliance is likely to increase in the future as the capabilities represented by space-based systems are exploited.
2. In general terms, the use of satellites for passive military purposes is stabilizing. Although satellites may provide data and command and control capabilities useful for the initiation of conflict, the stabilizing functions of satellite technology override these concerns. Satellites are critical to the stability of deterrence and the progress of arms control. By providing warning, intelligence information, and secure command and control capabilities, satellites reduce the dangers of surprise attack and decrease incentives to adopt destabilising 'launch-on-warning' postures. In addition, by assuring more resilient control over retaliatory forces, the credibility of deterrence is enhanced.
3. In terms of arms control, the ability of satellites to verify compliance with existing agreements (so-called National Technical Means (NTMs)) has proven critical to the negotiation of arms control measures particularly those pertaining to strategic weapons. Other methods of verification, including on-site inspection, have proven difficult to negotiate, and do not in and of themselves represent adequate verification provisions.
4. In this connection, the ongoing development of anti-satellite capabilities is dangerous from the point of view of deterrence stability and

prejudicial to the future success of arms control. One operational ASAT capability already exists, while other systems are approaching the testing and deployment stages.

5. As currently designed, however, these systems are only able to operate against satellites in low orbit. These satellites are primarily used for reconnaissance and meteorology. More critical satellites used for strategic command, control and navigation reside at higher altitudes. The most destabilising development in ASAT technology would, therefore, be the development of ASAT systems which were capable of operating at these higher altitudes.
6. It would seem, therefore, that an important step in negotiating an arms control regime for ASAT systems would be to ban the testing and deployment of systems capable of high altitude operation. This agreement would be valuable in its own right and might, in addition, be seen as a crucial first step towards an overall ASAT ban. By addressing systems yet to be developed, but whose development would be even more serious than current programs, negotiability may be enhanced.

III Evaluation

(a) Stability

The majority of the most critical command and control and navigation satellites are currently placed in higher altitudes. If ASATs capable of destroying these satellites were banned, the stability of deterrence would be enhanced. Moreover, by creating a sanctuary for satellite deployment at these altitudes, there would be an incentive to move satellites increasingly into higher orbits, where possible. In addition, it should be noted that low altitude satellites, though important for arms control verification, are not generally considered to be as critical to the stable functioning of deterrence. Should an ASAT ban at higher altitudes be negotiable, and prove enduring, sufficient confidence may be created to ban or restrict other systems.

(b) Negotiability

Currently deployed ASAT systems, or those under advanced development, are designed to provide matching low-altitude capabilities, to serve as a mutual deterrent against use and possibly as bargaining chips in future ASAT negotiations. They also seem intended to provide a military capability against low altitude satellites used to support general purpose forces.

No state has yet developed a high altitude ASAT capability. The reliance on high altitude satellites for critical command, control and communications systems is likely, however, to increase. The creation of a sanctuary at higher altitudes would preserve these satellites from potential destruction, thereby enhancing deterrence, and would foreclose a costly area of defence expenditure. These potential effects of a high altitude ASAT ban would be in the interests of all states concerned.

IV Details of Proposal

Although the precise nature and wording of the agreement should be left up to the negotiating parties, the following represent considerations which should be taken into account in constructing this proposal.

- (i) The ban should be on both deployment and testing. This arises from the fact that some systems may be difficult to distinguish from others in terms of their high-altitude capability. However, no party would contemplate deployment and use of a high altitude system without testing. Such testing, moreover, could be detected using ground and space-based systems.
- (ii) A ban on development is unlikely to be successful. States may insist on maintaining an active R and D program to avoid unanticipated developments and deployment by the other side. Moreover,

a ban on development would be difficult, if not impossible, to verify, even with more intrusive methods of inspection.

- (iii) The definition of 'testing' would have to be carefully worked out. It is possible, for example, to test an ASAT system without exploding the destructive mechanism. This may, therefore, require limitations on the proximity of satellites to each other and other measures such as limits on the testing of crucial ASAT components.
- (iv) ASATs can be deployed in a variety of basing modes. To secure agreement, a ban on land, sea, air and space-based systems would be the most advantageous.
- (v) All destructive mechanisms should be precluded including high explosives, nuclear weapons, lasers, particle beams, and direct kinetic kill.
- (vi) The altitude limit should be established at the maximum operational altitude of existing and developing systems. This would have to be resolved through negotiation. Distinguishing between high and low altitude systems would pose problems for verification. This might only be able to be drawn by the monitoring of testing against high altitude targets.
- (vii) A mechanism such as a Standing Consultative Commission is likely to be necessary to provide a forum for information exchange and to deal with compliance issues.
- (viii) All states should be encouraged to join this agreement.
- (ix) Verification arrangements would be difficult to agree upon given the existence of many devices with a marginal ASAT capability and the dynamic state of ASAT technology. Nevertheless, given the high value placed on high altitude satellites, it should be possible to establish an adequate verification regime.

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MEASURE II

I Proposal

An Agreement that States must Demonstrate and Ensure the Verifiability of New Strategic Weapons Systems.

II Background/Rationale

1. A central concern of arms control negotiations has always been the verifiability of provisions in the resulting agreements. Such verification is deemed necessary in order to ensure compliance, thereby enhancing mutual confidence, and preventing clandestine measures intended to circumvent treaty provisions.
2. Hitherto, verification means have resided primarily in so-called National Technical Means (NTMs). These include satellites, reconnaissance aircraft, radar facilities, etc. It has generally been felt that the types of technologies and the manner in which they have been restricted by past arms control agreements have been such as to allow for adequate verification utilizing NTMs. This is reflected in the absence of the requirement for on-site verification provisions in past strategic arms control agreements, and the provisions contained therein which oblige the participants to refrain from measures designed to interfere with the operation of NTMs.
3. Verification, however, is likely to become increasingly difficult as new strategic technologies are developed and deployed. Weapons developed without adequate attention to verifiability may make arms control negotiations increasingly difficult, may increase distrust as to treaty adherence, and may thereby act to decrease overall deterrence stability.
4. There are essentially two approaches to dealing with this problem. The first, on-site verification, has become increasingly relevant to ongoing arms control negotiations and the technologies they seek to limit. Such measures may, however, be inadequate, or difficult to

negotiate to the mutual satisfaction of the parties concerned. Therefore, the second approach to verification, that secured through National Technical Means, may require strengthening. Were measures agreed to and undertaken to ensure the verifiability of weapons to be deployed, through National Technical Means, the requirement for on-site or co-operative verification may be somewhat alleviated.

5. In this connection, it may be desirable to alter existing provisions concerning verification by National Technical Means. Thus far, it has simply been required that there be non-interference in the operation of NTMS, together with provisions designed to preclude concealment measures which are intended to impede verification by NTMS. Enhanced verifiability by NTMS may be secured if the party deploying a given weapon system is required to demonstrate that the system is indeed verifiable by NTMS. If the deploying party is unwilling or unable to do so to the satisfaction of others, the deploying party would be required to suggest other verification provisions which would ensure verifiability. Were these acceptable to the non-deploying party, such other verification provisions as agreed to would immediately become reciprocal for both parties in terms of similar weapons systems.
6. The net effect of such provisions would be such as to ensure that strategic weapons systems are designed and deployed so as to be verifiable by NTMs, or by NTMs and a combination of other verification techniques acceptable to the parties concerned.

III Evaluation

(a) Stability

As explained earlier, the enhancement of confidence in the adherence of the parties to arms control agreements is highly stabilizing. Verifiability is necessary for such mutual confidence. Given the potential development of new strategic weapons technologies which are difficult to verify by NTMs, the effect of this

proposal would be such as to increase the incentives to design weapons systems which were verifiable by NTMS. Were systems designed which were not verifiable by NTMS, there would be a requirement to agree to additional reciprocal on-site or co-operative measures. This would enhance deterrence stability through encouraging the verifiability of weapons systems, particularly of those new systems which were allowed by an arms control agreement, but whose characteristics would be such as to hamper verification.

(b) Negotiability

Although parties to arms control negotiations have displayed varying degrees of concern as to the question and methods of verification, all states share a general interest in maintaining adequate verification capabilities. This commonality of interest is likely to increase as new technologies are developed which would greatly impede the verification task. Given the reciprocal nature of this proposal, the parties to arms control negotiations should regard this measure as roughly equal in its effects.

V Details of Proposal

The precise nature and wording of the proposal should be left up to the parties concerned. Discussions as to verifiability and verification mechanisms should take place in a verification body which would serve as an adjunct to the Standing Consultative Commission created by the SALT I and SALT II agreements.

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MEASURE III

I Proposal:

An Agreement to Restrict the Mobility of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).

II Background/Rationale

1. At the centre of a stable deterrence system is the maintenance by both sides of a secure capacity for retaliation. If both sides maintain such a capability, neither will attack first, out of fear that such action could trigger a devastating response. On the other hand, a capability to engage in a disarming first strike against the nuclear forces of one's opponent would be destabilizing. Such a capability could generate fears of attack in a crisis, perhaps inducing the opponent to strike first in order to avoid being disarmed. Pressures to develop an equivalent capability could be created; the prospects for meaningful arms control would be seriously eroded. The confidence of states in their ability to retaliate, and therefore to deter, would be seriously eroded and the stability of the deterrence system as a whole would suffer.
2. In recent years concern has developed that such instabilities may be developing in the strategic balance. Trends in ICBM force characteristics (numbers, accuracy, destructive power, etc.) have led many to conclude that ICBM forces may be increasingly vulnerable to a disarming strike. Indeed, it is on the basis of such conclusions that radical reductions are being sought in ICBM assets at the START negotiations, and that planning is underway to move to less vulnerable basing modes for ICBM forces and single warhead ICBM's.
3. Of course these concerns over vulnerability apply primarily to one element of the triad of nuclear forces; bomber and submarine forces are not, at this time, considered to be vulnerable to the same degree. What is troubling is the possibility that the most reliable, capable and hitherto secure forces may be threatened. Although the logic of this concern is open to

debate, given the invulnerability of other elements of strategic forces, states nevertheless attach significance to the ICBM vulnerability issue, and are modernizing their forces partly as a consequence of this concern. In addition, problems at arms control talks have resulted from demands for reductions in ICBM capability.

4. In response to this issue, the development of mobile ICBM systems has begun. In general terms, such moves help to defuse the vulnerability question, and enhance the prospect for stable deterrence. Greater success in arms control negotiations may be expected as both sides would have reduced incentives - and capabilities - in the counterforce area.
5. It is possible, however, that a move towards mobility may be destabilizing because of the consequent difficulty this would pose in verifying by so-called National Technical Means (NTMs) (Satellites, radars, etc.). If this were allowed to transpire, arms control could become difficult to negotiate, and fears of "breakout" (unauthorized sudden increases in forces) could produce pressures for larger forces and generate considerable instability in the deterrence system.
6. It will be necessary and desirable, therefore, to preclude such developments through adequate verification procedures and force deployment patterns. On-site inspection and remote sensing may provide for some assurances in this regard, but are unlikely to be in and of themselves adequate. Perhaps more promising is the possibility of prior agreement to configuring mobile ICBM forces in such a manner that verification by National Technical Means (NTMs) is possible.
7. Some possible elements of this proposal are presented in Section IV, but details should be left up to the powers to negotiate. These details relate to as yet undetermined, but critical, factors such as mobile ICBM force size, and the characteristics of the missiles themselves.

III Evaluation

(a) Stability

As explained earlier, to the extent that mobile ICBMs are deployed, the stability of deterrence may be bolstered as there would be reduced first strike fears and incentives. If these deployments were accompanied by adequate verification procedures resulting from various agreed restrictions on ICBM mobility and deployment, arms control agreements legitimizing this shift in strategic forces in more stabilizing directions would become easier to secure. In addition, fears of unauthorized deployments would be reduced, if not eliminated.

(b) Negotiability

As noted earlier, there is likely to be a general move in the direction of mobile ICBMs. All states are likely to be in favour of measures designed to enhance the verifiability of such deployments, particularly if such measures would reduce the requirement for intrusive verification procedures.

IV Details of Proposal

Although the precise nature and wording of the proposal should be left up to the negotiating parties, the following represent considerations which should be taken into account in constructing this proposal.

i) Designated Areas of Deployment

The parties would agree to deploy mobile ICBMs only in certain fixed locales to be identified by agreement. Systems located outside these areas would be considered a violation of the agreement.

ii) Size and Nature of Deployment Area

In order to assist in verification, the size of the deployment area at the locales

identified in (i) above would have to be identified. These areas, in turn, should be distinguishable from surrounding territory, ideally by man-made barrier. In addition, designated entry and exit points for missiles being deployed or removed for repair or testing should be agreed to.

iii) Frequency of Movement

In addition to the above measures, it may be desirable to limit the frequency of movement of the missiles in order to assist satellite verification. Movement frequency would be established to enhance verifiability without thereby increasing vulnerability.

iv) Missile Storage

It may be desirable to establish guidelines for the storage of replacement and surplus missiles in order to enhance confidence that missile reload/refires are not being clandestinely deployed.

BIOGRAPHY OF MR. PIERRE AUBERT

Born on March 3, 1927 at La Chaux-de-Fonds, Neuchatel canton.

He studied at the University of Neuchatel where he graduated with Bachelor of Law degree and continued his studies at the University of Heidelberg.

He started a legal practice in La Chaux-de-Fonds in 1953. He began his political career at the cantonal level and, as is often the case in Switzerland, has served at various levels of Government before being elected Federal Counsellor in December 1977.

Elected to the position of General Counsellor of the city of La Chaux-de-Fonds which he occupied from 1960 to 1968.

Elected Member of the cantonal Parliament of Neuchatel from 1961 to 1975 and was President of the Neuchatel cantonal Parliament from 1969 to 1970.

Since 1971, he has been a member of the State Council (Federal Senate).

Elected Federal Counsellor on December 7, 1977 and re-elected in December 1979.

Appointed Minister of the Department of Foreign Affairs since February 1, 1978.

Served as Chairman of the Political Commission of the Council of Europe from May 16, 1981 under the Council's rotational system and was also President of the Swiss-Israeli Association.

President of the Swiss Confederation from January 1, to December 31, 1983.

He visited Canada as Minister of Foreign Affairs from April 25 to May 3, 1981 when he met the then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Dr. Mark MacGuigan.

Mr. Aubert speaks French but understands a little English.

Mr. Aubert is married and has two children.

PROFILE OF MR. PIERRE AUBERT

Mr. Aubert is considered to be the main architect behind the active role which Switzerland has recently taken on the international scene and its more open and positive approach, as a neutral country, to international events. This is reflected in the forthcoming attitude he has taken on the entry of Switzerland into the United Nations; the position taken by Switzerland on events in Poland and the shooting down of the South Korean airliner and a more active involvement by Switzerland in the CSCE and in the area of arms control and disarmament. However his open approach has not escaped internal criticism particularly from the more traditional and conservative elements within the Swiss/German Community.

Personally, Mr. Aubert is rather timid and constrained particularly when he expresses himself in public and at official events. In small groups, he can be cordial and friendly. He is the grandson of a pastor; has received very strict upbringing and has a strong sense of duty. He is firm in his ideas and does not hesitate to express his views on positions with which he does not agree.

Mr. Aubert attaches major importance to the CSCE and to the Stockholm Conference. For this reason he is particularly interested in the Prime Minister's peace initiative and how it might serve to advance the process of formal negotiations. He believes that it is necessary to establish confidence and to increase security before addressing the question of disarmament.

The Socialist Party to which Mr. Aubert belongs is facing certain difficulties and has threatened to withdraw from the Federal Council. It is not clear how this might affect Mr. Aubert's future. He is one of seven Ministers of the Swiss Government.

RCR/F. Nadeau/6-8782/PP

Done 10/2/84

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est-ouest - 15 février '84: Prof.
Dr. Michael Stürmer

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ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

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Le prof. Michael Stürmer, professeur d'histoire à l'Université de Nuremberg-Erlangen et professeur invité à l'Université de Toronto (jusqu'à la fin mars), est un spécialiste de l'Allemagne contemporaine et, plus particulièrement, de la problématique allemande dans les rapports est-ouest. Fait plus intéressant encore, Bonn nous confirme que le prof. Stürmer est le conseiller académique/histoire du Chancelier Kohl et on s'attend à ce qu'il continue de jouer ce rôle durant tout le mandat du Chancelier.

2. Comme nous, de nombreuses directions du Ministère et d'autres ministères s'intéressent à la place de "l'Allemagne" dans les rapports est-ouest et dans la dynamique de ces rapports en période de tension. A ce titre et du fait que sa proximité du pouvoir à Bonn, il nous semble que voilà un conférencier de premier ordre à inviter au Ministère.

3. Le prof. Stürmer a accepté notre invitation de participer à une "table-ronde" d'environ 2 heures sur le thème: "Le Chancelier Kohl et la question allemande", avec emphase sur la position de "l'Allemagne" dans les rapports est-ouest.

4. La présentation de 20 à 30 minutes sera suivie d'une période de questions que permettra d'orienter le débat selon les préoccupations des invités. A titre d'information, j'ajoute que le prof. Stürmer sera ensuite reçu à déjeuner par de Montigny Marchand.


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5. Comme je ne doute pas que le thème, mais surtout la stature du professeur offre un intérêt éminent pour les praticiens des rapports est-ouest, je vous invite instamment à assister à la présentation du 15 février, 10h30, à la salle de Conférence du 10ième étage, à la Tour A.

6. Le cas échéant, je vous saurais gré de confirmer à M. F. Nadeau (6-8782) de la direction RCR, votre intention de participer à la présentation du prof. Stürmer.

Le sous-ministre adjoint
Le secteur de l'Europe,



D. Molgat

Question Et-a qu'on a garde' une copie pour le H.C.

The Prime Minister has stated that none of the five nuclear weapons states has rejected the proposal for a meeting of the five nuclear powers. Three of the five - Great Britain, France and China - have maintained that there should be certain preliminary steps, including substantial reductions by the two superpowers of their nuclear arms, before a five-power conference to limit all strategic nuclear arsenals should be held. The United States has expressed general interest in such a conference at a future date. As the Prime Minister has not met with the Soviet leaders, there has been no Soviet response to this idea, although the Soviet Union did put forward a similar proposal some years ago.

y The Prime Minister has suggested that preliminary dicussions amongst the five nuclear weapon staes might take place at the United Nations in New York.

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Mr. Chairman

Let me in the first place express my thanks to the Swedish Government for the efforts and attention it has undertaken to create excellent conditions for this significant international forum which will undoubtedly enter into history as the Stockholm Conference, as a natural continuation of the process initiated a decade ago by the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation at which we have solemnly committed ourselves "to promote better relations among ourselves and ensure conditions in which our people can live in true and lasting peace free from any threat to or attempt against their security".

The fulfilment of this idea has not, by far, been a simple one in recent years. Yet those who remember Helsinki know that already at that time they harboured no illusions that everything will proceed smoothly. And indeed the opponents of the policy of détente have accumulated many obstacles, traps and wolf's holes on this road. Yet the Madrid Meeting has made a wise decision; to convene this Conference.

It proved how deep are the roots of political realism, how high is the feeling of responsibility of those who are concerned about the further destiny of the world; how attractive continues to be the policy of détente, the only alternative in this nuclear age, which has found enough power to withstand the attacks of its adversaries. Its reserves have not been used.

We expected from the Stockholm Conference that it will become an important contribution to transferring the process of détente also into the military sphere. We have a clear mandate for it. It is contained in the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting. It commits us to the duty to undertake new, effective and concrete actions to strengthen confidence and security and to achieve disarmament.

As for us, we have come to the Swedish Capital determined to contribute, to the maximum extent, to a constructive course and positive results of this forum, being determined to concentrate on the vital interests of our presence and not losing energy on minor questions. In this, we see one of the ways to better the tense international atmosphere.

So that - as said by President Gustav Husak in his New Year's speech - "mankind might achieve a better lot than to live in a world shaken by conflicts and under the threat of nuclear weapons".

Our common task is the more difficult due to the fact that we are meeting in an extraordinarily complicated international situation. What is more, owing to the deployment of new U.S. medium-range missiles in Western Europe, which has started, it has become acute to an extent that it is rightly called to be worst in the post-war period.

The growing aggressivity of imperialism expresses itself not only in Europe but also in other areas of the world especially in the Middle East, particularly in Lebanon, in the South of Africa and in Central America, as has been fully shown by the armed aggression into Grenada.

The imperialist circles, especially in the United States, are escalating a new dangerous round of arms race. Due to their fault, the Geneva talks on nuclear weapons have been marred. They have brought to a standstill the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. And all this is because they systematically reject the peaceful proposals of the USSR and the socialist countries with the aim to gain military superiority.

The idea that the newly installed nuclear weapons may become an "argument" in disarmament talks is an untenable and erroneous self-deceit.

Attempts of the United States to act in such a way lead only to one result: to blocking the talks and escalating tensions. The same as pretending as if nothing, after all, has changed by deploying the Pershing missiles. Do not the Governments of the countries on whose territory new U.S. missiles have not harmed the relations between the East and the West, that they have not endangered European security? That they are not again at the spirit of the treaties concluded between the Federal Republic of Germany and the socialist countries? How is it possible to appeal to the Soviet Union to resume the Geneva talks regardless of the deployment of U.S. missiles which has started and which upsets the military and strategic balance? To spread illusions as if perhaps Stockholm and bilateral contacts taking place during the Conference might replace the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear disarmament?

Or to hide through seemingly soft rhetorics the real essence of the policy of imperialist aggression?

As for really returning to the negotiating table, we support the position of the USSR expressed by its highest representative, Yuriy Andropov, on November 24, which is a very clear one: if the U.S.A. and other NATO countries are willing to return to the situation which had existed before the deployment of U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union will be willing to do the same.

We, in Czechoslovakia, cannot remain indifferent to this situation. All the more due to the fact that we are facing an increased threat of nuclear missiles to our country from the immediate vicinity of our western border. That is from the direction to which we are rightly particularly sensitive owing to our historical experience. We shall never admit Munich and its consequences to be repeated. We really are not naive. Therefore in this qualitatively absolutely new military and strategic situation we have taken necessary defensive measures. That is the starting of preparatory works to deploy missile complexes of operational and tactical destination. With a sufficient range so that they might reach most of the positions of new U.S. missiles deployed in West European countries and to neutralize the superiority to be gained due to a short time of flight of the Pershing missiles.

Czechoslovakia, as well as our allies in the Warsaw Treaty, has neither in the past or today identified itself with the concept of the "balance of fear" and of "armed peace" on ever higher piles of nuclear weapons. An approach like this in our epoch would mean to provoke sound reason. Especially if we realize - as has been said in the recently approved United Nations Declaration condemning nuclear war - that "such a war could lead to extinction of civilization upon Earth". In a nuclear age the idea that battles are won by one of the fighting countries is really no more valid.

It would be a loss of time to reflect on what steps to take to gain victory in a war. On the contrary. It is necessary to think about how to prevent an armed conflict in time and effectively. To survive a nuclear war is possible only if it is averted.

Czechoslovakia takes an explicit attitude to these cardinal questions of today. It consists in our lasting adherence to the policy of preserving peace, eliminating the danger of war, strengthening international security, reducing tensions, and expanding mutually advantageous co-operation. Within this framework on the principles of the peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems, our relations have been developing with most of the participating countries of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation.

4 We take no less consistent attitude to such vitally important questions, such as halting the arms race and transfer to disarmament, especially the nuclear one, the strengthening of the principle of respecting the national independence and sovereignty, inviolability of borders, non-interference into internal affairs, renunciation from the use or threat of force, equality and the right of peoples to decide their own destiny and other generally recognized principles in the relations among States.

7 This was firmly confirmed by us on all significant international occasions of the last period. At the Prague session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Member States, at the Moscow meeting of the highest Party and State officials of seven European Socialist countries, at the platform of the Prague World Assembly for Peace and Life Against Nuclear War as well as at the 38th session of the United Nations General Assembly.

This is also proved by the proposals contained in the Political Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty Member States of January last year, especially the proposal to conclude a Treaty on the Mutual Renunciation of the Use of Military Force and on the Maintenance of Peaceful Relations between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO Member States. Czechoslovakia which was entrusted to distribute this document handed it over to 134 Governments of the United Nations Member States, to its Secretary - General, to many political parties, social movements and international organizations. We were explaining its essence and clarifying the questions asked. It is possible to say that the document was accepted with interest and with a broad response in a number of countries, although the NATO States, to which it was primarily addressed, have not yet answered it.

4
We are convinced that especially in this international situation of existing tension the very fact of starting talks on such a Treaty would be an undeniable manifestation of good will of States to seek a way towards averting the danger of war, reviving détente and preserving peace. It is this very proposal which further concretizes and develops the generally valid prohibition of the use of force and the threat of force contained in the U.N. Charter. It concretizes and develops it in a way which the Charter not only admits but also presumes. In a similar way this principle is embodied in the mandate of our Conference anchoring the duty of States to refrain in mutual relations from the use of threat of force.

The obligation of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO Member States not to be the first to use nuclear or conventional weapons against each other and neither against third States could become its core. It could be supplemented by concrete obligations of the States of the twogroupings aimed at averting the danger of a sudden attack, at strengthening mutual confidence and at the talks on the limitation of armaments and on disarmament on the basis of equality and equal security.

Yet the proposal of the Treaty may go essentially farther than a number of attempts known from history to exclude war in the law as a means of international policy. It contains not only the binding norm - to refrain from the use of military force as first. It claims much more: an active co-operation in the most important spheres of strengthening international security, the duty to strengthen peaceful relations. In this very respect its adoption would mean an important contribution to the implementation of Helsinki agreements. It is as clear as the day that the contractual expression of the obligation would have a much greater political and legal importance than a mere declaration of States that they shall not use their weapons, save as an answer to an attack. The Treaty would be open also to other States, and not only in Europe.

Hence, there is no doubt that it is a proposal of a far-reaching significance. It is not merely a declarative act. It is, on the contrary, a concrete binding measure the implementation of which would lead to the strengthening of confidence and an increased stability and security in Europe.

A further very important step to protect the Continent from a nuclear catastrophe would be the commitment of nuclear powers not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The creation of nuclear-weapons-free-zones or corridors as they are considered in the North, in the South East and in the centre of Europe would contribute to attaining the same objective.

The elimination of chemical weapons would undoubtedly be of great importance, from the point of view of confidence and security, for the densely populated continent of Europe. A gradual creation of zones without chemical weapons as proposed in the latest significant proposal of the Warsaw Treaty States to the NATO States of January this year could become a step to achieve this goal. In order to discuss it we consider it useful to call a meeting of plenipotentiary representatives already this year.

It can be said with absolute certainty of all measures of this kind, expressed in the words of the mandate of the Conference, that they are militarily significant and in this sense fully correspond to its authorization. It is, however, evident that negotiations particularly on these questions require a corresponding will to achieve an agreement.

We consider it important to negotiate a whole further scale of confidence and security building measures. We shall not start negotiating on them, so to speak, from a zero. The participating States have at present already a certain experience from the implementation of these measures as they were embodied in the Final Act of Helsinki, be it the preliminary notification of large exercises, the exchange of observers, etc.

We think that in this respect further steps can be made which would reduce the possibilities of military confrontation and would contribute to the strengthening of security, confidence and peace in Europe.

Mr. Chairman,

Permit me to express my conviction that it is within our power to bring the Conference to the results which the European nations rightly expect from it. This, however, requires an equal degree of responsibility from all its participants.

The Czechoslovak delegation will do its utmost that the mandate given to the Stockholm Conference by the Madrid Meeting be fulfilled. Our course of policy is unalterable. The initiatives which we shall propose in its spirit proceed from the same political denominator. It is a consistent orientation towards peace, security and co-operation among the nations of Europe and of the whole world.

I thank you for your attention.



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

23 172	
12	10

SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

FM/DE
TO/À
INFO
DISTR
REF
SUBJ/SUJ

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0095 25JAN84

TO PMDEL/PRGUE/FOWLER CANDEL/DAVOS **DELIVER BY 260800**

INFO PCOOTT/ARCHDEACON


DISTR MINA MINT USS DMT DMF IFB RGB RBR EER IDA CPD EED EFB

---PM INITIATIVE:PM INTERVENTION AT DAVOS

FLWG ARE TALKING POINTS PREPARED FOR PM S USE FOR SEVEN-MINUTE INTERVENTION AT DAVOS INFORMAL SESSION OF WORLD LEADERS DEVOTED TO QUOTE INNATL SECURITY IN 1984:HOW CAN WE UNBLOCK THE SITUATION? UNQUOTE.YOU WILL RECALL THAT PM WAS INVITED TO FOCUS ON QUOTE CONCRETE PROPOSALS UNQUOTE IN HIS PRESENTATION.

2.FOR CANDEL/DAVOS:GRATEFUL YOU BRING THIS TEL TO ATTN OF DPM/SSEA, MIN REGAN AND DM OSTRY.

3.TEXT BEGINS.QUOTE
(COMCENTRE: PLEASE COPY ATTACHED TEXT TO UNQUOTE).
TEXT ENDS.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
 SIG J. Manne	IDDZ	5-5912	 L.A. Delvoite SIG

QUOTE

PRIME MINISTER'S INTERVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY IN 1984: HOW CAN WE UNBLOCK THE SITUATION?

- YOU HAVE ASKED ME TO OUTLINE "CONCRETE PROPOSALS" TO UNBLOCK THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SITUATION AND I AM PLEASED TO DO SO, SINCE I HAVE BEEN PROMOTING SUCH PROPOSALS FOR THE LAST FOUR MONTHS AS PART OF WHAT HAS COME TO BE KNOWN IN CANADA AS MY PEACE INITIATIVE.
- I BEGAN THIS INITIATIVE BECAUSE I WAS DEEPLY TROUBLED BY A WORSENING TREND IN RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, BY A SUPERPOWER RELATIONSHIP OF ESCALATING CONFRONTATION, BY A HIGH LEVEL OF INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS, BY EVER MORE POTENT NUCLEAR ARSENALS.
- THE SUPERPOWERS HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY ISOLATED FROM EACH OTHER, SEPARATED BY A WIDENING GULF OF SUSPICION. THERE IS AN ABSENCE OF HIGH POLITICS IN THEIR RELATIONS. THEY SEEM TO HAVE LOST SIGHT OF THEIR OVERARCHING POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP AND RESPONSIBILITIES.
- MY CHIEF PROPOSAL IS BASED ON THE NEED TO RE-ESTABLISH HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, AND PARTICULARLY BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS. WE MUST WORK TO RE-ESTABLISH THAT HABIT OF CONSULTATION AT THE MOST SENIOR LEVELS WHICH CHARACTERIZED DETENTE. A WIDER POLITICAL FRAMEWORK BASED ON RECOGNITION OF COMMON INTERESTS IS REQUIRED FOR ARMS CONTROL AND OTHER NEGOTIATIONS TO PROCEED SUCCESSFULLY.

- 2 -

- POLITICAL LEADERS MUST BE PREPARED TO ASSUME THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES TO THEIR PEOPLES AND TO HUMANITY. THEY MUST BE PREPARED TO BECOME ACTIVELY AND PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN THE CONDUCT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, TO IMPART TO THEM THE POLITICAL IMPULSE NECESSARY TO BREAK THE CURRENT IMPASSE.
- TO BEGIN TO BREAK THIS IMPASSE I HAVE PUT FORWARD THE FOLLOWING PROPOSALS:
- HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL CONTACTS WITH THE EAST: EAST-WEST RELATIONS ARE TOO IMPORTANT TO BE LEFT ENTIRELY TO THE SUPERPOWERS. WESTERN LEADERS SHOULD MULTIPLY THEIR CONTACTS WITH THE EAST IN ORDER TO CREATE CONDITIONS PROPITIOUS FOR DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS. MY CURRENT VISIT TO EASTERN EUROPE EXEMPLIFIES WHAT I HAVE IN MIND.
 - THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE - WE PROPOSED THAT FOREIGN MINISTERS ATTEND THE OPENING TO PROVIDE A SETTING FOR WIDE-RANGING EAST-WEST POLITICAL CONTACTS AND TO GIVE THIS IMPORTANT CONFERENCE POLITICAL IMPETUS AT THE OUTSET. THIS WAS ACHIEVED IN STOCKHOLM LAST WEEK.
 - MBFR TALKS IN VIENNA - I HAVE ARGUED THAT THE WEST MUST GIVE THESE NEGOTIATIONS A PUSH TO TRY TO RAISE THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD IN EUROPE BY ACHIEVING A STABLE BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES AT LOWER LEVELS. NATO IS CURRENTLY REVIEWING ITS POSITION ON THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS.

- 3 -

- A GLOBAL APPROACH TO THE LIMITATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: I HAVE CALLED FOR A CONFERENCE OF THE 5 NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES TO LIMIT STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENSALS. PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS AMONGST THE FIVE MIGHT BEGIN AT THE UNITED NATIONS.

- SIMULTANEOUSLY, WE MUST RENEW EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE RISKS OF THE HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY BUTTRESSING THE NPT.

- ALSO, AS PART OF MY INITIATIVE ARE PROPOSALS FOR:
 - (A) A BAN ON THE TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF HIGH ALTITUDE ANTI- SATELLITE SYSTEMS;

 - (B) A REQUIREMENT THAT FUTURE STRATEGIC SYSTEMS BE VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS;

 - (C) RESTRICTIONS ON THE MOBILITY OF ICBM'S.

- EACH OF THESE PROPOSALS HAS MERIT IN ITSELF AND PROGRESS ON ANY OF THEM WOULD ALSO IMPROVE THE POLITICAL CLIMATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

- WHILE I HAVE FOCUSED ON ITS POLITICAL AND MILITARY DIMENSIONS, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ALSO HAS AN IMPORTANT ECONOMIC DIMENSION. GLOBAL SECURITY PROBLEMS COMPLICATE AND INTERACT WITH GLOBAL ECONOMIC RECOVERY, THE THEME OF DAVOS.

- 4 -

- THE DEPTH OF THE RECENT RECESSION, AND THE UNBALANCED ECONOMIC RECOVERY NOW UNDERWAY, HAVE ACCELERATED CENTRIFUGAL TENDENCIES, EAST-WEST AND NORTH-SOUTH. THE EAST DRIFTS TOWARDS AUTARKY WHILE A FEW IN THE WEST CALL FOR ECONOMIC WARFARE. THE WEAKNESS OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN RECOVERY COULD DRAW THEM CLOSER TO THE EAST, WHILE THE RECENT BURST OF GROWTH OF THE USA MAY TEMPT SOME TO PRESS FOR ECONOMIC SUPREMACY OVER THE EAST.
- MASSIVE NEW MILITARY EXPENDITURES CAN DISTORT MACRO-ECONOMIC POLICY, DRAWING CAPITAL FROM INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES TO FINANCE LARGE DEFICITS, AND CHANNELLING RESOURCES AWAY FROM GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT. DEBT AND POVERTY FEED INSTABILITIES IN THE SOUTH THAT ENSNARE THE SUPERPOWERS OF THE NORTH. TRANS-ATLANTIC MACRO-ECONOMIC AND TRADE TENSIONS ARE MAGNIFIED BY DIVERGENT VISIONS OF EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS.
- WE DENY OURSELVES GAINS FROM TRADE, AND AT THE SAME TIME LIMIT THE CIVILIZING INFLUENCE OF INTERSECTING ECONOMIC INTERESTS, WHEN EAST-WEST RELATIONS STAGNATE. WHATEVER THE OBSTACLES, AND WITH NO ILLUSIONS, SHOULD WE NOT GIVE A FURTHER IMPULSE TO THE PURSUIT OF MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL ECONOMIC LINKS WITH THE EAST? HISTORY OF COURSE SUGGESTS ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND SECURITY COOPERATION CAN REINFORCE AND STABILIZE ONE ANOTHER; ALL THIS IS ENSHRINED - BUT APPARENTLY IN ICE - IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

- 5 -

-- BUT WHATEVER THE DIMENSION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY WE
EXAMINE - POLITICAL, MILITARY OR ECONOMIC - THE ESSENTIAL
INGREDIENT TO PROGRESS IS THE EXERCISE OF WILL AND LEADERSHIP
BY STATESMEN. WHILE I HAVE, AS REQUESTED, OUTLINED A NUMBER
OF "CONCRETE PROPOSALS" THESE ARE IN THE END NO BETTER THAN
THE STRENGTH OF THE COMMITMENT OF LEADERS TO ESPOUSE THEM,
PROMOTE THEM, NEGOTIATE THEM AND, MOST IMPORTANT, IMPLEMENT
THEM.

UNQUOTE

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BERN ZNTD5182 25JAN84

TO PMDELPRGUE/JOHNSTONE/DURDIN DELIVER BY 261000
INFO CANDELDAVOS/BULL/DE GOUMOIS/COPELAND IMMED EXTOTT/XDV
TT INTERCONVENTION ZURICH AIRPORT TLX 52407

ATT MR C ROSSI

EMF FOUNDATION, DAVOS TLX 74608

ATTN F HERREN DE BRN

DISTR (IDDZ) RGBD MINAMINT

REF OURTELS ZNTD5160 25JAN, ZNTD0055 21JAN AND ZNGR0055 21JAN

---DAVOS 84 PMS VISIT - ACCOMMODATION

PM DEL AND CANDEL DAVOS HOTEL ROOM LIST FOLLOWS:

1. STEIGENBERGER HOTEL BELVEDERE

PROMENADE 89, CH-7270 DAVOS-PLATZ

PHONE 083/2.12.81 - TLX 74330 BELVE CH

-PRIME MINISTER PE TRUDEAU	SUITE 346
-T JOHNSON	ROOM 345
-INSPG CARTER	ROOM 347
-R FOWLER	ROOM 352
-R COLEMAN	ROOM 443
-V JOHNSTONE	ROOM 451
-MS C VIAU	ROOM 351
-MINISTER A J MACEACHEN	SUITE 327

...2

PAGE TWO ZNTD5182 UNCLAS

-MINISTER AND MRS G REAGAN	ROOM	341
-AMBASSADOR M DE GOUMOIS	ROOM	305
-DR S OSTRY	ROOM	205
-A DUDOIT	ROOM	115
-P DINGLEDINE	ROOM	105
-R C FRAZEE, ROYAL BANK	ROOM	207
-C A DAGENAIS, THE SNC GROUP	ROOM	425
-WD MULHOLLAND, BANK OF MONTREAL	ROOM	330
-JWE MINGO, NATIONAL SEA PRODUCTS	ROOM	143
-PM DELEGATION OFFICE	ROOM	247

2. HOTEL SCHWEIZERHOF DAVOS

CH-7270 DAVOS-PLATZ

PHONE 083/2.11.51 - TELEX 74324 SHDAV CH

-PE MARTIN, THE CSL GROUP	ROOM	310
-PA OUTHIT, NOVA SCOTIA RESOURCES	ROOM	414
-ROGER BULL, DAVOS COORDINATOR	ROOM	306
-R COOPER	ROOM	101
-M MAILHOT	ROOM	104
-BILL YURKO MP(IND) EDMONTON EAST	ROOM	025

3. SUNSTAR PARK HOTEL

CH-7270 DAVOS-PLATZ

PHONE 083/2.12.41 TELEX 74392 SSTAR CH

WIM TURNER JR, CONSOLIDATED-BATHURST	ROOM	430
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...3

PAGE THREE ZNTD5192 UNCLAS

-JMLECLAIR,CANADIAN NATIONAL RAILWAYS ROOM 814
-RE HARRISON,CANADIAN IMPERIAL BANK OF COMMERCE ROOM 809
-G ST PIERRE,OGILVIE MILLS ROOM 705
-GL RICHARDSON,JAMES RICHARDSONS AND SONS ROOM 709
-OFFICE DELEGATION ROOM 126

4.MOROSANI POST HOTEL

CH-7270 DAVOS-PLATZ

PHONE 083/2.11.61 - TELEX 74350 POST CH

-RL RICHARDSON,FIRA ROOM 716
-LD CLARKE,SPAR AEROSPACE ROOM 712
-JC DELORME,TELEGLOBE CANADA ROOM 103
-R GARNEAU,MONTREAL CITY AND DISTRICT SAVING BANK ROOM 704
-AJ DE GRANDPRE,BELL CANADA ROOM 721
-WH HOPPER,PETRO-CANADA ROOM 206
-DG CAMPBELL,MACLEAN HUNTER ROOM 720

5.FLUELA SPORHOTEL

BANHOFSTRASSE 5,CH-7260 DAVOS-DORF

PHONE 083/6.12.21 - TELEX 74347 FLULA CH

-MR DESCHAMBAULT ROOM 335
-G SMITH ROOM 351
-P HANCOCK ROOM 424
-C CARDINAL ROOM 135
-W HORNER ROOM 235

...4

PAGE FOUR ZNTD5182 UNCLAS

6. PARDEN HOTEL

CH-7250 KLOSTERS

PHONE 083/4.11.41 - TELEX 74564 PARHO CH

-M COPELAND	ROOM	420
-M DURDIN	ROOM	304
-T PRUSAWOSKI	ROOM	121

-CANADIAN MEDIA (SEPARATE LIST)

7. HOTEL SILVRETTA

CH-7250 KLOSTERS

PHONE 083/4.13.53-TLX 74336 SILVR CH

-CANADIAN MEDIA (SEPARATE LIST)

-J HUDON	ROOM	011 UNQ OTE
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2. PM MEDIA DEL AND MEDIA HOTEL ROOM LIST FOLLOWS: QUOTE

A) PARDENN HOTEL

CH-7250 KLOSTERS

PHONE 083/4.11.41-TLX 74564 PARHO CH

-DURDIN MARTHA	ROOM	304
-COPELAND MICHAEL	ROOM	420
-T PRUSAWOSKI	ROOM	121
-BELLEY PIERRE	ROOM	204
-BOLAND TERRY	ROOM	104
-BREGG PETER	ROOM	412
-CLARK ANDREW	ROOM	421

...5

PAGE FIVE ZNTD5182 UNCLAS

-CLOUTIER DANIELLE	ROOM 212
-CONWAY FIONA	ROOM 228
-CHAMPAGNE JEAN-PIERRE	ROOM 210
-YOUNG CHRISTOPHER	ROOM 112
-KORING PAUL	ROOM 426

B.SILVRETTA HOTEL

CH-7250 KLOSTERS

PHONE 083/4.13.53 - TLX 74336 SILVR CH

-HUDON, JACQUES	ROOM 011
-GOAR CAROL	ROOM 126
-GREENOUGH WAYNE	ROOM 135
-HALTON DAVID	ROOM 112
-HEPBURN ROBERT	ROOM 018
-KELLEHER BRIAN	ROOM 132
-LAVOIE GILBERT	ROOM 133
-LEPRINCE JEAN-MICHEL	ROOM 109
-MASSE MIRIELLE	ROOM 049
-MONTGOMERY CHARLOTTE	ROOM 118
-PARSONS MICHAEL	ROOM 110
-ROBITAILLE GASTON	ROOM 019
-SINCLAIR MARGOT	ROOM 127
-SPARLING ANDREW	ROOM 007
-TRUDEL CHRISTIAN	ROOM 011
-EVANS BOB	ROOM 036
-GAYNOR CHRISTINE	ROOM 005 UNQUOTE

...6

000704

PAGE SIX ZNTD5182 UNCLAS

3. HUDON WILL NOTE THAT HE HAS BEEN RE-ASSIGNED FROM PARDENN HOTEL TO SILVRETTA HOTEL IN LARGE DWB FOR SINGLE OCCUPANCY GIVEN LACK OF AVAILABILITY OF SMALL SUITE PURPOSE BEING TO SPLIT PM MEDIA DEL BETWEEN TWO HOTELS. NOTE ALSO THAT PAUL KORING, CDN PRESS, HAS BEEN RE-ASSIGNED FROM SILVRETTA TO PARDENN HOTEL.

4. IN THE RUSH TO PRE-REGISTER AND ASSIGN ROOMS TO PM DEL AND MEDIA HOTELS HAVE WARNED US THERE MAY BE MINOR ALTERATIONS TO ABOVE LISTS PARTICULARLY FOR MEDIA GROUP IN KLOSTERS. SUGGEST THEREFORE THAT ALL PERSONS VERIFY ROOM NUMBER WHEN COLLECTING KEY FROM HOTEL CONCIERGE ON ARRIVAL.

UUU/205 260830Z ZNTD5182

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BERN ZNTD5179 25JAN84

TO CANDELDAVOS/BULL/DEGOUMOIS

INFO EXTOTT/XDV PCOOTT PMOOTT PMDELPRGUE/JOHNSTONE

DISTR (IDDZ RGED MINA MINT

REF MCLENNAN/DE GOUMOIS TELECON 25JAN

---DAVOS 84 - PM VISIT - ACCOMMODATION

EMF(HERRENS ASSISTANT MISS TRANSON)CALLED TODAY TO DRAW OUR
ATTN TO FACT THT EMF WILL ABSORB ACCOMMODATION EXPENSES FOR PM,
T JOHNSON AND CARTER;FOR MINA AND DUDOIT;AND FOR MINT AND
DINGLEDINE.THEY SEEK OUR CONFIRMATION THAT THIS ARRANGEMENT IS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH OUR EXPECTATIONS PARTICULARLY RE MEMBERS OF PMS
PART.GRATEFUL YOU ADVISE TRANSON DIRECTLY.

2.YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT EMF OFFER ALSO INCLUDES MINA,DUDOIT,
MINT AND DINGLEDINE ACCOMMODATION EXPENSES IN ZURICH HILTON
AIRPORT HOTELS TO REFER BILLS DIRECTLY TO INTERCONVENTION FOR
PAYMENT.

UUU/205 260830Z ZNTD5179

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BERN ZNTD5178 25JAN84

TO PMDELPRGUE/JOHNSTONE/DURDIN IMMED

INFO CANDELDAVOS/BULL/DE GOUMOIS/COPELAND PMOOTT PCOOTT EXTOTT/XDV

DISTR LIDDZ RGBD

---DAVOS 84 - PMS VISIT-TRAVEL TO BERLIN

HAVE LOOKED INTO DAVOS/ZURICH/BERLIN RETURN ROUTINGS. YOU MAY WISH
TO CONSIDER FOLLOWING ITINERARY:

FRI 27JAN

DAVOS PLATS DEP 12H11 OR 12H56 BY TRAIN

LANDQUART ARR 13H20 14H20

DEP 13H27 14H35

ZURICH ARR 14H47 15H45

DEP 15H04 16H04

ZURICH AIRPORT ARR 15H15 16H14

ZURICH AIRPORT DEP 16H50 FLIGHT OS240

VIENN ARR 18H05

DEP 18H40 FLIGHT IF781

EAST BERLIN(DDR) ARR 19H50

SUN 29JAN

EAST BERLIN(DDR) DEP 16H40 FLIGHT IF780

VIENN ARR 17H50

DEP 18H25 FLIGHT OS205

...2

PAGE TWO ZNTD5178 UNCLAS

ZURICH AIRPORT ARR 19H40
DEP BY MINIBUS TO DAVOS

ALTERNATIVELY:

WEST BERLIN DEP 10H25 FLIGHT BA3083

STUTTGART ARR 11H35

DEP 13H05 FLIGHT 24577

ZURICH AIRPORT ARR 13H40

DEP 14H31 BY TRAIN

ZURICH ARR 14H41

DEP 15H07

LANDQUART ARR 16H27

ARR 16H35

DAVOS PLATZ ARR 18H00

2. YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT TRAIN SERVICE BETWEEN DAVOS PLATZ AND
ZURICH AIRPORT REQUIRES CHANGE OF TRAINS IN BOTH LANDQUART AND
ZURICH CITY.

UUU/205 251530Z ZNTD5178

INFO

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BERN ZNTD5170 25JAN84

TO PMDEL/PRAGUE/JOHNSTONE/DURDIN DELIVER BY 251400

INFO CANDELDAVOS/BULL/DE GOUMOIS/COPELAND EXTOTT/IDDZ PMOOTT PCOOTT
DISTR XDV RGBD

REF YOURTEL YIGR0013 20JAN OURTEL ZNTD5129 23JAN

---DAVOS 84 - PMS VISIT - WEATHER

PRESENT SITUATION: NEW SNOW HAS FALLEN OVER NIGHT THROUGHOUT
SWITZERLAND. CONTINUING CLOUDY AND INTERMITTENT SNOW IN DAVOS. 90CM
SNOW IN THE VIALPAGE AND 180CM SNOW ON THE SKI PISTES AT ALTITUDE.
NOW FRESH, DRY AND POWDERY. TEMP TODAY MINUS 9 DEGREES CELSIUS.

2. LONG RANGE FORECAST. FURTHER SNOW WITH INTERMITTENT BLUE SKIES AND
UNSTABLE WEATHER EXPECTED THROUGH THE WEEKEND. SLIGHTLY WARMER DUE TO
PASSAGE OF QUOTE FOEHN UNQUOTE (IE LOCAL VERSION OF CHINOOK) WINDS ON
THUR 26JAN. SLIGHTLY WARMER ON WEEKEND BUT NEVER ABOVE FREEZING. AS OF
SUN COLDER ONCE AGAIN.

3. WEATHER FORECAST FOR SWITZERLAND MAY BE OBTAINED IN FRENCH LANGUAGE
BY PHONING (WITHIN SWITZERLAND) 021/162. NEW BULLETINS ISSUED 06H15,
09H15, 12H15, 15H00, 18H00 AND 22H15.

UUU/205 251240Z ZNTD5170

INEO

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BERN ZNTD5166 25JAN84

TO PMDEL/PRAGUE/JOHNSTONE/DURDIN DELIVER BY 251100

INFO CANDELDAVOS/BULL/DE GOUMOIS/COPELAND DELIVER BY 251000

PMOOTT PCOOTT EXTOTT/IDDZ

DISTR RGBD XDV

REF OURTEL ZNTD5136 3JAN

---DAVOS 84 - PMS VISIT-ACCREDITATION TO EMF SYMPOSIUM

FURTHER TO OUR REFTEL WE HAVE PROPOSED AND EMF HAS AGREED TO

FOLLOWING ACCREDITATIONS:

A)BLUE BADGE-HANCOCK AND SMITH

B)RED BADGE-COOPER(OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPHER)

UUU/205 250849Z ZNTD5166

INFO

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BERN ZNTD5165 25JAN84

TO PMDEL/PRAGUE/JOHNSTONE/DURDIN DELIVER BY 251100

TO CANDELDAVOS/BULL/DE GOUMOIS/COPELAND DELIVER BY 251000

PMOOTT PCOOTT EXTOTT LIDDZ

DISTR RGBD XDV

---DAVOS 84 - PMS VISIT-SECRETARIAL ASSISTANCE

UNDERSTAND FROM RGBD AND FROM JOHNSTONE THAT PM DEL OFFICE REQUIRES
CDA-BASED SECRETARY.

- 2.FOLLOWING ARRANGEMENT WILL BE DISCUSSED WITH AND SUBJECT TO
AGREEMENT OF DAVOS COORDINATOR BULL UPON HIS ARRIVAL DAVOS WED 25JAN.
WOULD PROPOSE THAT HOP SECRETARY B CANTIN BE ASSIGNED TO PM DEL
OFFICE IN BELVEDERE HOTEL AND THAT SHE BE REPLACED IN OFFICIAL DEL
OFFICE IN SUNSTAR PARK HOTEL BY MULTILINGUAL EMB LES MISS G PIFFARETTI.
- 3.WOULD FURTHER PROPOSE TO RELEASE ONE MORE MULTILINGUAL EMB LES
MRS MARIANNE BURKHARD TO BE ASSIGNED TO DURDIN MEDIA GROUP.
- 4.CANTIN ARRIVES DAVOS WE 25JAN AND WILL REMAIN AFTER PMS VISIT TO
WORK WITH OFFICIAL DEL IN SUNSTAR PARK UNTIL FEB02.
- 5.PIFFARETTI AND BURKHARD WILL ARRIVE DAVOS AFTERNOON OF THUR 26JAN
AND WILL RETURN TO BERNE AFTER PM DEPARTS MON 30JAN.
- 6.TRUST YOU CONCUR.

UUU/205 250845Z ZNTD5165

INFO

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BERN ZNTD5163 25JAN84

TO PMDEL/PRAGUE/JOHNSTONE/DURDIN DELIVER BY 251100

TO CANDELDAVOS/BULL/DE GOUMOIS/COPELAND DELIVER BY 251000

PMOOTT PCOOTT EXTOTT/IDDZ

DISTR RGD XDV

REF YGURTEL XDV0053 24JAN AND OURTEL ZNTD5155 24JAN

---DAVOS 84 - PMS VISIT-ACCOMMODATION

HAVE NOTED AXWORTHY WITHDRAWAL. HAVE ASSIGNED C VIAU TO HIS ROOM 351
IN BELVEDERE HOTEL WHICH MEANS THAT ALL PM DEL MEMBERS HOUSED ON
ONLY TWO FLOORS IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO INTERCONNECTING STAIRWELL
AND TO PM SUITE.

UUU/205 250840Z ZNTD5163

INFO

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BERN ZNTD5161 25JAN84

TO PMDELPRGUE/JOHNSTONE/DURDIN DELIVER BY 251100

INFO CANDELCAVOS/BULL/DE GOUMOIS/CANTIN DELIVER BY 251100

PMOOTT PCOOTT EXTOTT/IDDZ

MINA MINT RGBD RGB RSD SCS MGT XDV

---DAVOS 84 - PM S VISIT - PM DEL OFFICE

CAN NOW CONFIRM AVAILABILITY OF DOUBLE ROOM IN STEIGENBERGER HOTEL
BELVEDERE FOR USE AS PM DEL OFFICE (ROOM NO 247). OFFICE COULD NOT/NOT
BE LOCATED ON SAME FLOOR AS PM BUT IS OTHERWISE LOCATED IN CLOSE
PROXIMITY TO DEL MEMBERS.

2. HOTEL HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO REMOVE BEDS AND EQPT OOM WITH TWO
TABLES FOR DESKS, SEVERAL CHAIRS AND DESK LAMPS. REGRET NO/NO FOUR
DRAWER CABINET AND NO PHOTOCOPIER AVAILABLE TO LOCATE IN OFFICE.
UNDERSTAND YOU ARE BRINGING TYPEWRITER, STENO CHAIR AND SUPPLIES.

3. OFFICE WILL HOWEVER HAVE ACCESS TO BOTH: A) HOTEL RECEPTION
PHOTOCOPY FACILITIES AND B) PHOTOCOPIER RENTED FOR EXCLUSIVE USE CDN
SECURE COMCENTRE LOCATE IN ROOM 411 OF SAME HOTE.

UUU/205 250909Z ZNTD5161

INFO

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BERN ZNTD5160 25JAN84

TO PMDELPRGUE/JOHNSTONE/DURDIN DELIVER BY 251100

INFO CANDELCAVOS/BULL/DE GOUMOIS/COPELAND DELIVER BY 251100

PMOOTT PCOOTT EXTOTT VIDDZ

MINA MINT RGBD RGB RSD SCS MGT XDV

REF OURTEL ZNTD5149 24JAN TO INTERCONVENTION ZURICH

---DAVOS 84 - PM S VISIT - MEDIA ACCOMMODATION

YOU WILL HAVE SEEN REFTTEL WHICH GIVES HOTEL BREAKDOWN FOR MEDIA REPS AND PMS MEDIA DEL. ONLY UNALLOCATED JOURNALIST THEREIN WAS CHRISTOPHER YOUNG, SOUTHAM NEWS, YOUNG HAS NOW BEEN ASSIGNED TO SWB IN PARDEN HOTEL.

2. ALL MEDIA REPS AND MEDIA DEL HAVE BEEN PRE-REGISTERED

3. HAVE ASKED HOTELS FOR ROOMLIST WHICH WE WOULD HOPE TO HAVE AVAILABLE FOR YOU ON YOUR ARRIVAL ZURICH AIRPORT.

4. REF YOURTEL PM DELNY WKGR0128 20JAN, REGRET NO/NO SUITE AVAILABLE FOR HUDON IN EITHER PARDENN OR SILVRETTA HOTEL IN KLOSTERS VILLAGE. HAVE THEREFORE BOOKED HUDON INTO DWB FOR SINGLE OCCUPANCY. SELECTION OF DUTY FREE SPIRITS WILL BE DELIVERED TO HOTEL FOR HUDON (2 RYE, 2 SCOTCH, 1 GIN, 1 VOKDA, ALL LITER BOTTLES).

UUU/205 250915Z ZNTD5160

AC 10N
SUITE A DONNER

Division Phoned _____
Person _____
Local Time _____

**CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM PARIS WIGR3202 25JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 251000

INFO PRGUE/PMDEL/FOWLER DELIVER BY 251500 MOSCO ROME

DISTR DMF RGB RBR RBD IFB

---SPECIAL ADVISER ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS

PRIME MINISTERS MISSION:TALK WITH ARBATOV

FOLLOWING FROM FORD:

AT JOINT MTG OF PALME AND BRANDT COMMISSIONS IN ROME,ARBATOV SOUGHT ME OUT TO DISCUSS QUESTION OF VISIT OF PM TO MOSCO.HE ASKED ME TO REASSURE PM THAT DELAY IN AGREEING TO DATE FOR VISIT IS ENTIRELY MOTIVATED BY ILLNESS OF ANDROPOV AND THAT THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO/NO OTHER REASON.HE SAID THERE WAS NO/NO MYSTERY ABOUT ILLNESS OF ANDROPOV(ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT/NOT RESPOND TO MY QUESTION AS TO WHAT IT CONSISTED OF)BUT HE COULD INFORM ME CATEGORICALLY THAT ANDROPOV WOULD SOON BE FUNCTIONING AGAIN. (HIS ASSISTANT GENERAL MILSTEIN LATER TOLD ME TWO WEEKS).

2.PROBLEM,HOWEVER,WAS THAT WHEN HE RECOMMENCED HIS WORK HE WOULD HAVE TO GO SLOWLY AT FIRST;THERE WOULD BE A GREAT DEAL TO CATCH UP;AND HE WOULD HAVE TO CONCENTRATE ON HIS QUOTE ELECTION CAMPAIGN UNQUOTE FOR ELECTIONS FOR SUPREME SOVIET ON MAR4.HE WENT ON TO REITERATE VERY GREAT APPRECIATION IN LEADING SOVIET CIRCLES OF PRIME MINISTERS INITIATIVE(IN FACT IN DEBATE IN CONF ON JOINT DECLARATION ARBATOV PROPOSED LAUDATORY REF TO PMS MISSION,BUT

...2

PAGE TWO WIGR3202 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

THIS WAS FINALLY NOT/NOT ACCEPTED--NOT/NOT THAT THEY WERE OPPOSED TO IDEA BUT FELT IT INAPPROPRIATE TO SINGLE OUT ONE INITIATIVE).

3.I ASKED IF PMS VISIT HAD TO DEPEND ON SEEING ANDROPOV,BUT ARBATOV REPLIED THAT A VISIT WITHOUT A MTG WITH PRESIDENT WOULD NOT/NOT CARRY SAME WEIGHT.INDEED,HE ADDED,IT WOULD NOT/NOT BE WORTHWHILE.I SAID I COULD ONLY SPEAK PERSONALLY BUT I DID NOT/NOT THINK WE HAD ANY GREAT ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A BREAK-THROUGH. ARBATOV SAID CIRCUMSTANCES WERE UNFORTUNATELY AGAINST IT,BUT IT WAS PRECISELY AT SUCH A TIME THAT PMS MISSION WAS IMPORTANT,PARTICULARLY WHEN OTHER QUOTE INITIATIVES OR SO-CALLED INITIATIVES WERE HIGHLY SUSPECT,TO PUT IT MILDLY UNQUOTE.

4.I SAID I THOUGHT IT WAS A GREAT PITY THAT ANDROPOV HAD CLEARLY NOT/NOT HAD TIME OR OPPORTUNITY TO DO VERY MUCH.ARBATOV REPLIED QUOTE IT IS NOT/NOT A PITY,IT IS A TRAGEDY UNQUOTE.AS IF TO JUSTIFY FURTHER WHAT SEEMED TO ME MESSAGE THAT VISIT COULD NOT/NOT TAKE PLACE BEFORE MAR4,ARBATOV SAID HE THOUGHT SITUATION WOULD BE MORE PROPITIOUS FOR VISIT A LITTLE LATER,BUT HE WOULD NOT/NOT ELABORATE.

5.I MIGHT ADD THAT AFTER OFFICIAL DINNER IN VILLA MADAMA PRIME MINISTER CRAXI TALKED TO ME FOR SOME 10 MINUTES EXCLUSIVELY ABOUT PMS MISSION.HE SAID HE HAD BEEN VERY FAVOURABLY IMPRESSED BY IDEA BEHIND MISSION AND WAY IT WAS BEING CARRIED OUT.HE WAS PREPARED TO GIVE ANY SUPPORT WHICH MR.TRUDEAU THOUGHT USEFUL TO FURTHER MISSION.

...3

PAGE THREE WIGR3202 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

6.DURING DEBATE IN CONF INDOONESIAN PRESIDENT OF UN UNIVERSITY
IN TOKYO SUGGESTED THAT IN VIEW OF MTG OF MINDS OF PM AND UN
SECGEN,LATTER MIGHT CONSIDER JOINING PM ON HIS MISSION.

CRAZI SAID HE CONSIDERED THIS A MOST POSITIVE SUGGESTION WHICH
HE SUPPORTED.

7.I LEAVE ANY DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MESSAGE TO YOU.

FORD

CCC/047 251220Z WIGR3202

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BGRAD ZLGR3157 25JAN84

TO PRGUE/PMDEL EXTOTT RBR IMMED

INFO WSHDC LDN PARIS BONN ROME HAGUE BRU BNATO PRMNY PEKIN

TOKYO CNBRA MOSCO WSAW PRGUE BPEST BUCST NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CP/PP/CIS

PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RBD RBRD RBP RBT ZSP ZSI IDD IDDZ

IDA IDR FPR

---PM INITIATIVE:INVITATION TO VISIT BULGARIA

BULGARIAN AMB CALLED ON ME THIS AM TO HAND OVER ADVANCE TEXT(REPEATED

IN FOLLOWING PARAS)OF MESSAGE FROM BULGARIAN PRES ZHIVKOV TO PM

TRUDEAU,RENEWING INVITATION TO VISIT BULGARIA,WITH SPECIFIC REF TO

PM INITIATIVE.OFFICIAL INVITATION WILL BE CONVEYED Y BULG EMB OTT.

I TOLD HIM THAT ACCORDING TO OUR INFO THERE WAS VERY LITTLE

PROSPECT OF ADDING SOFIA TO PMS PRESENT ITINERARY,ALTHOUGH IT

MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO ACCEPT INVITATION AT SOME FUTU E DATE.

2.TEXT BEGINS QUOTE EXCELLENCY,I AM PLEASED TO RENEW THE INVITATION

EXTENDED TO YOU BY THE STATE COUNCIL AND THE GOVT OF THE PEOPLES

REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA,TO VISIT OUR COUNTRY.DURING YOUR STAY WE SHALL

HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON CURRENT INNATL ISSUES,

INCLUDING YOUR INTERESTING AND BROAD PROGRAMME OF IMPROVING THE

EAST-WEST RELATIONS ON WHICH I WAS BRIEFED BY MY MINISTER FOR

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

...2

PAGE TWO ZLGR3157 CONF

WE COULD ALSO DISCUSS THE BILATERAL BULGARIAN-CANADIAN COOPERATION AND OFFER YOU A GLIMPSE OF OUR COUNTRY AND ITS PEACE-LOVING PEOPLE.

I AM CONVINCED THAT YOUR VISIT AND EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS, ESPECIALLY IN THE PRESENT COMPLICATED INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, WOULD SERVE THE CAUSE OF STRENGTHENING OF PEACE, INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

TODOR ZHIVKOV, PRESIDENT OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA UNQUOTE.

FRASER

CCC/096 251245Z ZLGR3157

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Division Phoned 1DDZ
Person Mary
Local Time 1335

**CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM WSHDC UNGR1079 25JAN84

TO EXTOTT 1DDZ URR DELIVER BY 251500

INFO MOSCO BNATO CANMILREP NATO LDN ROME PARIS BONN VMBFR HAGUE

PEKIN TOKYO PRMNY NDHQOTT/ADM POL/ CPP/DACPOL/DNACPOL/DSTRATA/CIS

GENEV PMDEL/GENEV PMDEL/PRGUE OSLO COPEN ATHNS

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDR RBD ZSI MINE MINT UGB IDD RBR RCR

RSR RCD RSD CPD ZSP URT URE LCD LSD

REF OURTEL UNGR1070 23JAN

---USA-USSR RELATIONS: SIGNALS

FIRST REACTION HERE TO ANDROPOV INTERVIEW IS ENCOURAGEMENT. SEEN
IN COMBINATION WITH GENERALLY POSITIVE SHULTZ-GROMYKO MTG, TONE OF
ANDROPOV REMARKS IS TAKEN TO BE SOMETHING OF A RESPONSE TO TONE
OF REAGAN SPEECH LAST WEEK. AS POLICY PLANNING CHIEF FOR EAST-WEST,
RICHARD HAASS TOLD US, QUOTE THEYRE SHOWING A LITTLE ANKLE, IF NOT/NOT
A LITTLE LEG UNQUOTE.

2. THERE HAD BEEN SOME WORRY IN STATE THAT SHULTZ SPEECH TO CDE WITH
ITS EMPHASIS ON ILLEGITIMACY OF DIVISION IN EUROPE WOULD THROW DIRT
OVER THE ATTEMPT TO BE FORTHCOMING IN REAGAN SPEECH FEW DAYS EARLIER.
INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN SPEECHES HAD BEEN OBJECT OF CONSIDERABLE FIGHT
IN ADMIN AND AS USUAL, WE ARE TOLD THAT ORIGINAL LANGUAGE FAVOURED
BY NSC AND HARDER LINE ELEMENTS IN STATE HAD BEEN MUCH TOUGHER ON
POINT.

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR1079 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

3. THERE IS SOME SURPRISE THAT THIS EMPHASIS IN SHULTZ SPEECH HAS NOT/NOT BEEN NOTICED IN USA AS BEING AN INCONSISTENT SIGNAL. REST OF SPEECH, OF COURSE, WAS LESS AGGRESSIVE. NOR HAS STATE DEPT PICKED UP DISMAY ON POINT FROM WESTERN EUROPEANS WHICH IS SURPRISING SINCE EUROPEAN MEMBERS ^{OF PRESS} CERTAINLY PRESSED SHULTZ ON POINT AND INCONSISTENCY WAS REPORTED IN EUROPEAN PRESS WE HAVE SEEN.

4. SHULTZ SAID TO PRESS HIS REMARKS WERE NOT/NOT MEANT TO QUESTION LEGITIMACY OF SPECIFIC GOVTS, ONLY BARRIERS TO MOVEMENTS OF PEOPLE IN EUROPE. ORIGIN OF SHULTZ ATTACK ON DIVISION OF EUROPE LIES IN ATTACHMENT ON PART OF SOME IN ADMIN TO EASTERN EUROPEAN POLICY OF DIFFERENTIATION. SPEECH OF VP BUSH IN BPEST A FEW MONTHS AGO SET THE TONE FOR THOSE WHO FEEL OBLIGED TO PRESS ON DIFFERENTIATION OUT OF IDEOLOGICAL CONVICTION AND BECAUSE THEY SENSE NEED NOT/NOT TO DISCOURAGE DISSIDENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE. BUT THEY ARE UP AGAINST OTHERS IN ADMIN WHO SEE USA PRIORITIES AS BEING CENTERED ON USA-SOVIET RELATIONS AND NEED TO IMPROVE TREND LINE THERE. IN TERMS OF THIS OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE, IT IS RECOGNIZED SHULTZ REMARKS WERE QUOTE UNNECESSARY AND UNHELPFUL UNQUOTE AND IT IS THIS ARGUMENT WHICH MODIFIED THE MUCH SHARPER ORIGINAL TONE.

5. IN ANY EVENT, IT IS HOPED THAT STRENGTH OF SHULTZ REMARKS ON DIVISION OF EUROPE AND GROMYKOS OWN SPEECH WHICH WAS UNUSUALLY AGGRESSIVE HAVE CANCELLED THEMSELVES OUT. IT IS HOPED MORE PRODUCTIVE SIGNALS ARE CONTAINED IN TONE OF REAGAN AND ANDROPOV TEXTS.

CCC/230 251718Z UNGR1079

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM WSHDC UNSV0020 26JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ URR MGTC IMMED

INFO MOSCO BNATO CANMILREPNATO LDN ROME PARIS BONN VMBFR
HAGUE PEKIN TOKYO PRMNY NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD/DACPOL/DNACPOL/
DSTRATA/CIS GENEV PMDEL/GENEV PMDEL/PRGUE OSLO COPEN ATHNS
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDR RBD ZSI MINE MINT UGB IDD RBR
RCR RSR RCD RSD CPD ZSP URT URE LCD LSD
REF OURTEL UNGR1079 25JAN

---USA-USSR RELATIONS:SIGNALS

AMEND AT ORIGINATORS REQUEST PAGE 2 PARA3 5TH LINE

QUOTE EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF PRESS CERTAINLY PRESSED UNQUOTE.

CCC/241 260115Z UNSV0020

*Mr. Galdes
for info*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDR0309 25JAN84

TO WSHDC BONN DELIVER BY 260900

INFO BNATO VMBFR STKHM/SCDEL NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/ CPP/DNACPOL MOSCO LDN
GENEV

DISTR MINA MINE USS DMF IFB RGB RBD RBR (IDDZ IDA IDRA IDRL FPR
REF WSHDCTEL UNGR1071 23JAN

---MBFR:RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS

WE WERE INTERESTED IN WASH POST ARTICLE REPORTING THAT DECISION
REACHED BY PRESIDENT HAD CONSIDERABLE GRAYNESS ABOUT IT BUT THAT IT
DID HAVE SOME FLEXIBILITY.MR. SHENSTONE MAY WISH TO SEEK MORE INFO
FROM OFFICIALS IN STATE AND ACDA ON JAN27 ABOUT CONTENTS OF THIS
PROPOSAL WHICH ACCORDING TO DESCRIPTION APPEARS TO BE THE SORT OF
COMPROMISE WE AND GERMANS FELT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FALLING SOMEWHERE
BETWEEN STATE AND DEFENCE DEPT POSITIONS ALTHOUGH QUITE FAR FROM
IDEAL BONN WAS AIMING FOR.

2.FOR BONN:GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD SEEK APPOINTMENT WITH AMB RUTH TO
DISCUSS SUBJECT OF MBFR.WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ADDITIONAL INFO
WHICH COULD BE PROVIDED AS FOLLOW UP TO CONSULTATIONS IN OTT AND
DISCUSSIONS WITH MATHEWSON(CPP)ON MARGIN OF LAS SCG.

CCC/265 252339Z IDR0309



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

30 10

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

WDC 06/25

FAX

INFO

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

	1/2

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	UNCLASSIFIED	PA-281	25JAN84	12	10
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FM/DE
TO/A
INFO
DISTR
REF
SUBJ/SUJ

WSHDC
 DE OTT
 BH PMOOTT/COLEMAN
 EXTOTT LIDDE
 UG P FPR
 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR ARTICLE ON PM

COMCENTRE: PLS COPY ATTACHED.

TOP/TOD
 COMMUNICATIONS
 JAN 25 19 07 '84
 CANADIAN EMBASSY
 WASHINGTON

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
	Public Affairs	X207	
SIG P. Gossage/sg			SIG P. Gossage

Z/Z

Andropov backs Trudeau on his campaign for peace

OTTAWA
Soviet leader Yuri Andropov has expressed support for Pierre Elliott Trudeau's peace initiative but set no specific date for a

meeting between the two. Mr. Trudeau, seeking with his disarmament crusade to arrange a conference of the world's five nuclear powers, had hoped to visit



Moscow this month. Trudeau may instead visit Romania and East Germany as soon as next week, Canadian television reported Wednesday. Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu has endorsed the Trudeau initiative.

INFO

D I F F U S I O N R E S T R E I N T E

DE BERN ZNGR0258 25JAN84

A CANDELPRGUE DELIVERBY 251930

INFO CANDELDAVOS/DE GOUMOIS EXTOTT IDDZ IMMED

DISTR MINA RGB RGBD RSR FPR

TEXTE DE COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE QUE DEPT FEDERAL AFFAIRES ETRANGERS
SE PROPOSE, SUJET A NOTRE ACCORD, D EMETTRE JEU 26JAN A MIDI.

CIT LORS DE SON SEJOUR EN SUISSE, OU IL PARTICIPE AU SYMPOSIUM DE
DAVOS, M PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU, PREMIER MINISTRE CANADIEN, RENCONTRERA
LUN 30JAN84 A ZURICH M PIERRE AUBERT, CHEF DU DEPT FEDERAL DES
AFFAIRES ETRANGERES.

MM TRUDEAU ET AUBERT AURONT DES ENTRETIENS PORTANT SUR LA SECURITE
EN EUROPE ET, PLUS PARTICULIEREMENT, LA CONFERENCE DE STKHM SUR LES
MESURES DE CONFIANCE ET DESECURITE ET LE DESARMEMENT EN EUROPE(CDE).

LE PREMIER MINISTRE CANADIAN PRESENTERA AU CHEF DU DEPT SON
PROJET DE CONFERENCE DE DESARMEMENT NUCLEAIRE QUI DEVRAIT REUNIR LES
5 PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES(CHINE, ETATS-UNIS D AMERIQUE, FRANCE, GRANDE-
BRETAGNE ET UNION SOVIETIQUE). FINCIT.

2. AVONS L'INTENTION DE SUGGERER PLUTOT LE TROISIEME PARA SUIVANT CIT
LE PREMIER MINISTRE DU CANADA FERA PART AU CHEF DU DEPT DE SES
PROPOSITIONS EN VUE DE REDUIRE LES ARMEMENTS NUCLEAIRES ET DE
PROMOUVOIR LA PAIX ET LA SECURITE. FINCIT.

3. SAURIONS GRE AVOIR VOS COMMENTAIRES SUR TEXTE DU COMMUNIQUE AVANT
DEMAIN 26JAN MIDI. A DEFAUT DE REACTION DE VOTRE PART, CONFIRMERONS AUX
AFFAIRES ETRANGERES NOTRE ACCORD SUR LEURS DEUX PREMIERS PARAS PLUS
LE TROISIEME QUE NOUS SUGGERONS EN 2.

CCC/205 251800Z ZNGR0258

000726

INFO

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BUCST UYGR0186 25JAN84

TO PRGUE DELIVER BY 251100

INFO WSAW BONN MOSCO WSHDC LDN PARIS BNATO BPEST BGRAD NDHQOTT/ADM POL/
CPP PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/DURDIN/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN EXTOTT IDDZ
DISTR XDV MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RBR RBD RBP

---PM VISIT TO ROMANIA

THIS IS TO CONFIRM TELECON WITH GJ SMITH, IDA, CONCERNING ARRIVAL TIME
IN ROMANIA. ROMANIAN AUTHORITIES AFTER EXTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH
SOV EMB INFORMED US THAT IT WOULD NOT/NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR PM TO
ARRIVE BEFORE MR GROMYKOS DEPARTURE. SOVS INSIST THAT FOR QUOTE
POLITICAL CONSIDERATION UNQUOTE GROMYKO DEPART BUCST BEFORE PM
ARRIVES. SINCE HIS DEPARTURE IS SCHEDULED FOR 1430 01FEB, IT IS
SUGGESTED THAT PM ARRIVAL BE SCHEDULED FOR 1500. ROMANIAN AUTHORITIES
EXPRESSED THEIR REGRETS AT THIS INCONVENIENCE.

2. SOV DEL, WHICH IS ARRIVING LATE AFTERNOON 30JAN, IS MADE UP OF:

A GROMYKO, FIRST VICE PRES OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF USSR AND FM;
KV RUSAKOV, SECTY OF THE CENTRAL CTTEE OF USSR; AND NV TALIZIN, MEMBER
OF CENTRAL CTTEE AND VICE PRES OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.

3. REGARDING SUBSTANCE OF VISIT, REFER TO OURTEL UYGR0150 20JAN.

CCC/181 250910Z UYGR0186

NONCLASSIFIE

DE EXTOTT RBR0172 25JAN84

A WSAW LIVRAISON 260800

INFO PRGUE PMDEL/DAVOS

DISTR XDV LIDDZ RBRD

REF VOTRETEL 0142 25JAN84

---DELEGATION CANADIENNE(EN FRANCAIS)LISTE PROTOCOLAIRE

LE TRES HONORABLE PIERRE ELLIOT TRUDEAU

PREMIER MINISTRE DU CANADA

R.FOWLER,SECRETAIRE ADJOINT DU CABINET(AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES ET
DEFENSE)BURFAU DU CONSEIL PRIVE

J.E.JOHNSON,CHEF DE CABINET DU PREMIER MINISTRE

P.HANCOCK,DIRECTEUR GENERAL,DIRECTION GENERALE DE L URSS ET DE
L EUROPE DE L EST,MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES

G.J.SMITH,DIRECTEUR,DIRECTION DU CONTROLE DES ARMEMENTS ET DU
DESARMEMENT,MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES

R.COLEMAN,SECRETAIRE DE PRESSE DU PREMIER MINISTRE

B.V.JOHNSTONE,CHEF ASSISTANT DU PROTOCOLE,MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES
EXTERIEURES

MLLE C.VIAU,SECRETAIRE PARTICULIERE DU PREMIER MINISTRE

MLLE C.DURDIN,ADJOINT SPECIAL DU PREMIER MINISTRE

J.HUDON,SECRETAIRE DE PRESSE ASSOCIE DU PREMIER MINISTR

INSPECTEUR G.CARTER,AGENT DE LIAISON SPECIAL POUR LA SECURITE,

...2

PAGE DEUX RBR-172 NONCL

GENDARMERIE ROYALE DU CANADA

PERSONNEL DE SOUTIEN

T.PRUSAKOWSKI,TECHNICIEN,CABINET DU PM

R.COOPER,PHOTOGRAPHE OFFICIEL,BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVE

MLLE C.CARDINAL,BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVE

W.HORNER,GARDE,MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES

J.MAILHOT,OPERATEUR,MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES

J.DESCHAMBAULT,ASSISTANT PREPOSE AUX BAGAGES,CABINET DU PM.

2.TEXTE DU TOAST DU PM POUR LA RDA EN POSSESSION DU PMDEL QUI

AVISERA SUR VOTRE DEMANDE DE CE TEXTE POUR TRADUCTION EN ALLEMAND.

UUU/258 260031Z RBR0172

NONCLASSIFIE

DE EXTOTT RBR0164 25JAN84

A PRGUE FLASH

INFO BPEST BUCST WSAW MOSCO BNATO PARIS BONN WSHDC TOKYO LDN PMOOTT/
LORTIE

DISTR MINA MINE MINT FPR (DDZ)

---TOAST DU PM TRUDEAU A PRGUE (TRADUCTION)

PRIERE PORTER IMMEDIATEMENT A L ATTENTION DE PMDEL TEXTE SUIVANT:

CIT: J AIMERAIS VOUS EXPRIMER, MONSIEUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE, MA VIVE
APPRECIATION POUR VOTRE INVITATION A VISITER LA TCHECOSLOVAQUIE AINSI
QUE POUR LA CHALEUR ET L HOSPITALITE AVEC LESQUELLES VOUS M AVEZ
ACCUEILLI ICI.

MONSIEUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE, LE DESIR DE BANNIR A JAMAIS LA GUERRE
DES AFFAIRES HUMAINES EST AUSSI ANCIEN QUE LA GUERRE ELLE-MEME; ET LES
HOMMES D ETAT ONT TOUJOURS DEPLOYE DES EFFORTS POUR TROUVER LES MOYENS
PRATIQUES, SINON DE LA BANNIR, DU MOINS D EN REDUIRE LA POSSIBILITE.

IL CONVIENT QUE NOUS PARLIONS DE PAIX ICI, A PRAGUE. PARCE QUE CETTE
MAGNIFIQUE VILLE ANCIENNE, CE CENTRE HISTORIQUE DU HAUT-SAVOIR, DE LA
SCIENCE ET DE L ARCHITECTURE ILLUSTRE LES MEILLEURS ELEMENTS DE LA
CIVILISATION EUROPEENNE. SA BEAUTE ET SA PROSPERITE ONT TOUJOURS TEMOIGNE
DE LA FORCE DE L ESPRIT HUMAIN, EN DEPIT DES VICISSITUDES DE L HISTOIRE.

LE PRESIDENT HUSAK ET MOI-MEME NOUS TROUVIONS A HELSINKI EN 1975 POUR
SIGNER L ACTE FINAL. A CE MOMENT-LA, IL DECLARAIT QUE L EUROPE ETAIT
ARRIVEE A UN TOURNANT. ET IL AJOUTAIT QUE POUR LA PREMIERE FOIS DANS

...2

PAGE DEUX RBR0164 NONCLAS

L HISTOIRE, LES NATIONS D EUROPE AVAIENT SAISI LA POSSIBILITE D INSTAURER LES CONDITIONS REELLES DE LA PAIX, DE LA SECURITE ET DE LA COOPERATION ET CE, EN DEPIT DE TOUTES LES DIFFERENCES D ORDRE POLITIQUE, ECONOMIQUE, PHILOSOPHIQUE ET SOCIAL.

L EUROPE SE TROUVE A NOUVEAU A UN POINT TOURNANT, MONSIEUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE. JE JUIS CONVAINCU QUE, DANS LES NATIONS DE L EST COMME DE L OUEST, DES GENS REFLECHIS SE DEMANDENT CE QUI PEUT ETRE FAIT POUR CHANGER LE COURS DES EVENEMENTS, EVENEMENTS QUI LEUR SEMBLENT SOUVENT ETRE GOUVERNES PAR UNE LOGIQUE A LA FOIS TERRIFIANTE ET INELUCTABLE. LE SILENCE QUI EST TOMBE SUR LES NEGOCIATIONS SUR LE CONTROLE DES ARMEMENTS NE PEUT QU ACCENTUER CETTE PREOCCUPATION EN DONNANT AUX EVENEMENTS UN COURS INDEPENDANT DE LA VOLONTE DES HOMMES D ETAT.

MONSIEUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE, J AFFIRME AVEC CONFIANCE QUE PEU DE QUESTIONS ONT SUSCITE AUTANT D ANXIETE, ET MEME DE TERREUR, QUE CELLE DE LA GUERRE NUCLEAIRE.

ET CETTE ANXIETE NE DEVRAIT PAS NOUS ETONNER, PARCE QUE LES ESPOIRS COMME LES CRAINTES DE L HUMANITE NE SONT NULLE PART PLUS NETTEMENT MIS EN JEU QUE PAR LA QUESTION DE LA GUERRE, ET PLUS PARTICULIEREMENT DE LA GUERRE NUCLEAIRE. NOUS NE DEVRIONS PAS NON PLUS NOUS ETONNER QUE CETTE ASPIRATION A LA PAIX SOIT VIVEMENT SENTIE EN EUROPE, UN CONTINENT RAVAGE PAR DE SI NOMBREUSES GUERRES. ET L HISTOIRE DU CANADA, AINSI QUE SA SECURITE ET SON AVENIR ONT ETE ET CONTINUERONT D ETRE ETROITEMENT LIES A CELLES DES PAYS D EUROPE.

...3

PAGE TROIS RBR0164 NONCLAS

A TITRE DE CHEFS D ETAT, NOUS AVONS DONC LA RESPONSABILITE TOUTE PARTICULIERE, ET MEME LE DEVOIR, DE FAIRE TOUS LES EFFORTS POUR REDUIRE LE DANGER D UNE GUERRE ET POUR ATTENUER LE FARDEAU DE LA COURSE AU ARMEMENT. C EST NOTRE DEVOIR NON SEULEMENT ENVERS LES CANADIENS ET LES TCHECOSLOVAQUES, MAIS ENVERS L ENSEMBLE DE L HUMANITE. PARCE QUE, DANS L EVENTUALITE D UNE GUERRE NUCEAIRE, UNE BONNE PARTI DE CE QUE L HUMANITE A ERIGE PENDANT DES SIECLES DE LABEUR DISPARAITRAIT DANS LA LONGUE ET SOMBRE NUIT DE L HIVER NUCLEAIRE.

POUR LES GENERATIONS QUI NOUS ONT LEGUE CETTE CIVILISATION, POUR LES GENERATIONS QUI EN HERITERONT A LEUR TOUR, NOUS DEVONS NE MENAGER AUCUN EFFORT DANS NOTRE RECHERCHE DE LA PAIX.

LA TCHECOSLOVAQUIE ET LE CANADA NE SONT PAS DES SUPERPUISSANCES. NOUS N AVONS NI ARSENAL IMPORTANT, NI GRANDES MACHINES MILITAIRES. MAIS EN TANT QUE PUISSANCES MOYENNES QUI SONT EGALEMENT MEMBRES D ALLIANCES OPPOSEES, NOUS NOUS DEVONS, MONSIEUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE, DE TROUVER UN DOMAINE DANS LEQUEL NOUS POURRONS LE MIEUX CONTRIBUER. ET CE DOMAINE, A CE QU IL ME SEMBLE, C EST PRECISEMENT LA SPHERE POLITIQUE.

LES HOMMES D ETAT DOIVENT SE PARLER DIRECTEMENT. A TITRE DE DIRIGEANTS POLITIQUES DE NOS PAYS RESPECTIFS, NOUS POUVONS MONTRER PAR NOS ACTIONS QU UN TEL DIALOGUE EST POSSIBLE ET FRUCTUEUX, ET CONSEILLER A NOS ALLIES ET AMIS DE SUIVRE LA MEME VOIE. VOILA DES CHOSES QUE NOUS POUVONS FORT BIEN FAIRE.

NOUS AVONS UN INTERET TOUT PARTICULIER DANS LA DETENTE, MONSIEUR LE

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PAGE QUATRE RBR0164 NONCLAS

PREMIER MINISTRE. GRACE A L ACTE FINAL D HELSINKI ,AU PROCESSUS DE LA CSCE ET A DES REUNIONS COMME LA CONFERENCE DE STOCKHOLM, NOUS AVONS ETABLI LES MOYENS DE REDUIRE LES TENSIONS EN EUROPE.

MAIS, MONSIEUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE, IL NE SUFFIT PAS DE REVER DE PAIX. TROP SOUVENT EN CE SIECLE AVONS-NOUS VU DE TELS ESPOIRS, SI NOBLES ET ELEVES QU ILS ETAIENT, SE HEURTER A LA SOMBRE REALITE. LA PAIX NE SERA PAS EDIFIEE PAR LES REVES, ET ELLE NE SERA PAS ETABLIE PAR UN SEUL GRAND GESTE. C EST PLUTOT PAR MILLE GESTES, CERTAINS PLUS IMPORTANTS QUE D AUTRES, QUE LA CONFIANCE SERA CREEE, QUE LES INTENTIONS SERONT RENDUES PLUS TRANSPARENTES, ET QUE LA COMPREHENSION EN SERA ACCRUE.

IL N Y A JAMAIS EU UN AUSSI GRAND BESOIN DE DIALOGUE POLITIQUE DE HAUT NIVEAU. LES CORRIDORS VIDES DE GENEVE EN SONT UN TEMOIGNAGE MUET.

C EST POURQUOI J AI ETE ENCOURAGE PAR L OUVERTURE DE LA CONFERENCE DE STOCKHOLM AU NIVEAU MINISTERIEL. C ETAIT LE UNE IDEE QUE NOUS AVONS CONTRIBUE ACTIVEMENT A PROMOUVOIR CHEZ NOS ALLIES. JE SUIS CONVAINCU QUE LES MINISTRES DOIVENT SUIVRE DE PRES LES DEVELOPPEMENTS DE STOCKHOLM. ILS DOIVENT ETRE DISPOSES A Y RETOURNER POUR DONNER SI NECESSAIRE UN NOUVEL ELAN A CES ENTRETIENS PAR LEUR PARTICIPATION.

IL EST ESSENTIEL QUE LES POURPARLERS SUR LE CONTROLE DES ARMEMENTS SOIENT REPRIS LE PLUS TOT POSSIBLE. LE DECISION DE REVENIR A LA TABLE DE NEGOCIATION DE VIENNE SUR LA REDUCTION DES FORCES CONVENTIONNELLES EN EUROPE EST UN DEVELOPPEMENT DES PLUS HEUREUX. ET JE DEMANDE QUE LA LOGIQUE QUI A MENE A CETTE DECISION SOIT MAINTENANT APPLIQUEE AUX

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NEGOCIATIONS DE GENEVE.

TOUTE MODESTE QUE SOIT NOTRE INFLUENCE, MONSIEUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE, NOUS NE SOMMES PAS SANS AUCUNE INFLUENCE. ETAPE PAR ETAPE, PAR DES VISITES COMME CELLE-CI AINSI QUE PAR LES NEGOCIATIONS DE GENEVE, DE VIENNE ET DE STOCKHOLM, LE DIALOGUE POURRA ETRE ETABLI ET LA RECHERCHE POUR LA PAIX FAVORISEE.

C EST CE QUE J AI APPRIS DANS LES DERNIERS MOIS ALORS QUE JE POURVUIVAIS MON INITIATIVE DE PAIX. LE ROUTE QUI M A AMENE EN TCHECOSLOVAQUIE ET EN EUROPE DE L EST A TRAVERSE BIEN DES NATIONS. L INQUIETUDE SE RETROUVE PARTOUT, TANT A L EST QU A L OUEST, TOUT COMME L ESPOIR QUE L ACTUELLE TENDANCE NEGATIVE POURRA ETRE RENVERSEE. LES HOMMES D ETAT SAVENT QU IL N Y A AUCUN MIRACLE EN POLITIQUE. JE N EN AI CERTAINEMENT AUCUN A OFFRIR, ET JE NE VOUDRAIS PAS ENCOURAGER LES ATTENTES IRREALISTES.

ARISTOTE A ECRIT QUE LA POLITIQUE EST LA SCIENCE MAITRESSE A LAQUELLE SONT SUBORDONNES TOUS LES AUTRES ARTS, Y COMPRIS L ART MILITAIRE. DANS SON RAISONNEMENT, IL EN EST AINSI PARCE QU IL APPARTIENT AUX HOMMES D ETAT D ETABLIR LES OBJECTIFS PRIMORDIAUX QUE DEVRONT REGIR TOUTES LES ACTIVITES DE LA NATION.

LES HOMMES D ETAT DOIVENT ASSURER LA PRIMAUTE DE LA POLITIQUE SUR LES AFFAIRES MILITAIRES. C EST LA LE PRINCIPAL BUT DE MA VISITE ET L ENGAGEMENT QUE JE VOUS DEMANDE DE PARTAGER.

JE VOUS INVITE, MONSIEUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE, MESDAMES ET MESSIEURS,

A PORTER UN TOAST A LA BONNE SANTE DU PRESIDENT HUSAK,
A LA PAIX ET A LA PROSPERITE DU PEUPLE TCHEQUE AINSI
QU A LA POURSUITE DU DIALOGUE ENTRE LE CANADA ET LA
TCHECOSLOVAQUIE. FINCIT.

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---EAST/WEST RELS:LONDON TIMES ARTICLE

FOLLOWING FACSIMILE OF ARTICLE MENTIONED REFTEL.

JOHN SCHRAM/SBW

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THE TIMES WEDNESDAY JANUARY 25 1984

Nato: tell - and trust - the people

The western alliance, 35 years on: Lawrence Freedman continues our series on the organization's future



The available evidence, based on polling in a number of key Nato countries, suggests that many do not suffer from a serious

problem with public opinion. As David Caplan and Richard C. Eichenberg, the authors of a recent survey for Chatham House, conclude, "public support for Nato remains high in all the European member states. Nor is there any sign that the legitimacy and utility of military institutions have been rejected as a matter of principle... Even on the issue of nuclear weapons, public opinion is not nearly as hostile as is commonly assumed".

The degree of comfort to be derived from this widespread support is qualified by the apparent lack of enthusiasm with which it is proffered. The evidence is quite contradictory when it comes to endorsing the official position on the more controversial issues such as cruise missiles, and far stronger feelings are exhibited by those in the anti-nuclear movement. As was confirmed by last year's CND conference, this movement is hostile to Nato and all its works, and not just the particular weapons that have inspired the latest protests.

Does this matter? The fact that opposition does not represent a majority view and is generally out of step within Nato, with the exception of Greece, has allowed established policies to continue undisturbed. However, the influence of the anti-nuclear movement on centre-left parties in Europe (in this case, with the dramatic exception of France) promises trouble for the future. In three or four years' time, perhaps for reasons more to do with economics than defence, there could be substantial changes in the policies of key member states.

A little more information on current policies in an area that suffers badly from official secrecy and reticence would not come amiss, but it would be illusory to

believe that it could turn the tide. For a start, many in the protest movements are often remarkably well informed - sometimes better informed - than those sent to oppose them in public debate. The suggestion that the protestors are merely dupes of Kremlin propaganda is unhelpful, inaccurate, and does slight justice to the real concerns that animate the protest.

Before Nato can improve on its communication with the public, it needs to sort out exactly what is to be communicated. One source of the present difficulty is that the prevailing sense of international crisis is not solely the responsibility of the Soviet Union. It is the United States, for example, that has failed to ratify any arms control agreements for more than 10 years. European governments might find it easier to counter criticisms of the US if they did not, themselves, agree with many of them.

It is this background of international tension that has given the nuclear debate its edge. For Nato this should be a warning of a serious weakness in alliance strategy. If talking loudly about nuclear weapons at times of moderate tension triggers such widespread dissidence, what would happen if a crisis seemed likely to turn into a real confrontation? For it is precisely at such times that, according to present doctrine, deterrence would have to be fortified by reminding the Soviet Union of the nuclear risks it would face as a result of aggressive action. Our recent experience suggests that the public in the West would not respond calmly to dire threats being uttered on its behalf.

Thus the difficulty in communicating Nato policy may be that certain key aspects of this policy are flawed. Politicians and officials

engaged in the nuclear debate tend to bemoan the "difficulty" and "paradoxical" nature of the whole concept of deterrence. The implication is that this fundamental idea, upon which international order is said to depend, can be understood only as a result of a prolonged intellectual effort. It is too complicated to compete with simple slogans that fit neatly on T-shirts or banners.

This is nonsense. The concept of deterrence is perfectly simple - even intuitive - and familiar to anyone who has brought up children, has been worried about crime, or been involved in industrial disputes. If it appears difficult or paradoxical it is because of the particular form in which it has been adopted in the West. The excessive reliance on the threat to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict forces Nato governments to pretend to be more irrational than they actually are, and definitely more than they wish to appear to their public. Nato is caught between the need to warn the Soviet Union that it might escalate a conflict, despite the suicidal implications of such a move, and to reassure the public that it would not be so reckless.

Because its policy is difficult to explain, the Nato establishment is happiest when it does not have to do any explaining. However, without the recent debate the alliance might not have discovered until too late just how divisive its strategy could be at precisely the time when unity is at a premium.

The requirement for public support is considered by some Nato supporters to put the alliance at a severe disadvantage with the Warsaw Pact signatories. Because the Soviet leaders are accountable only to themselves, and the satellite

countries are in no position to reject the policy line handed down from Moscow, they are presumed to have a capacity for decisive and, if necessary, ruthless, action.

Such a view betrays a striking lack of confidence in the political philosophy the alliance seeks to defend. Because the Kremlin's decisions are not critically examined, expensive mistakes remain uncorrected and often unacknowledged, while deeply entrenched prejudices rest unchallenged. The quality of Soviet policy suffers from the ease with which it is formulated, just as the quality of Nato's policies suffered when they were put together by an elite temporarily relieved of the requirement to explain itself.

The permanent isolation of the Soviet leaders means that they do not know whether they enjoy the trust of the people and the actual reception accorded their pronouncements. In explaining their security policies the appeal is not to reason but to heady national symbols, and in particular to the memory of the millions killed between 1941 and 1945.

The intensity of the recent debate in the West has encouraged a polarization and a dogmatism that does not help the search for a consensus. But this is in part a consequence of the previous lack of serious discussion of Nato policies. The most immediate causes of the current debate have been the general sense of international tension and the prominence of a number of nuclear weapon issues. If there is a more relaxed political climate and no new issues, the debate may fade. But it would be a shame if the opportunity were not used to encourage a constructive scrutiny of Nato policy and implement the sort of reforms necessary to ensure that the alliance is on much firmer ground the next time public attention is turned on its strategy and plans.

The author is Professor of War Studies at King's College, London.

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REFOURTEL XNGR0107 17JAN

---EAST/WEST RELS:LONDON TIMES ARTICLE

ATTENTION IS DRAWN TO LAWRENCE FREEDMANS ARTICLE ON NATO QUOTE

TELL-AND TRUST-THE PEOPLE UNQUOTE APPEARING IN 25JAN LONDON

TIMES.

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HANCOCK FROM MCLAIN

---PMS VISIT TO GDR

IN OURTEL UMGR0105 19JAN WE RECOMMENDED THAT PM RAISE EXPO 86 WITH HONECKER AS ONE OF FEW BILATERAL ISSUES. GDR AUTHORITIES WERE INITIALLY RELUCTANT AS IN THEIR VIEW THERE WERE INSUFFICIENT COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITIES TO WARRANT EXPENSE. ATTITUDE MAY/MAY CHANGE NOW THAT USSR AND CHINA ARE PARTICIPATING AND IF PM PUTS QUESTION DIRECTLY TO CHAIRMAN. WE THEREFORE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE QUESTION SHOULD BE RAISED. IF PM AGREES IT MIGHT BE POLITIC TO WARN GDR AUTHORITIES SO HONECKER IS IN POSITION TO PROVIDE MORE THAN OFF-HAND RESPONSE. GRATEFUL THEREFORE FOR INDICATION OF PMS INTENTIONS. 2. WE ARE PLEASED THAT JOHNSTONE AND DURDIN ARE MAKING ADVANCE VISIT TO BERLIN AS THEY WILL THEN BE IN POSITION TO BRIEF YOU IN ZURICH PRIOR TO ARRIVAL. YOU MAY HOWEVER WISH TO CONTACT WADE OR MYSELF FROM SWITZERLAND OVER WEEKEND. WE WILL BE AT METROPOL (PHONE 220-40) IN ROOMS 1020 AND 1011 RESPECTIVELY. IT MIGHT ALSO BE USEFUL TO KNOW WHERE YOU CAN BE REACHED IN ZURICH.

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---ANDROPOV COMMENTS TO PRAVDA

SUMMARY:ANDROPOV COMMENTS PUBLISHED 26JAN PRAVDA PROJECT
TOUGH,UNREPENTANT STANCE ON CENTRAL EAST-WEST QUESTIONS IN
MANNER DESIGNED TO PUT ONUS ON USA(AND WEST)TO COME UP WITH
NEW SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSALS AS BASIS FOR RELAUNCHING CONSTRUCTIVE
E-W DIALOGUE.LONG-STANDING SOVIET/WPO PROPOSALS(NO/NO FIRST
USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,NATO-WPO NON-AGRESSION PACT)ARE TROTTED
OUT AGAIN,BUT SPRINKLED WITH INDICATIONS OF SOVIET
READINESS TO SEEK PRACTICAL AGREEMENTS IN VARIETY OF LESS
CONTENTIOUS OR LESS PRESSING AREAS.ALSO,SPECIAL URGENCY IS
ATTACHED TO PREVENTING ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE,WITH
USA SPECIFICALLY CALLED UPON TO QUOTE START TALKS ON THIS
QUESTION PROMPTLY UNQUOTE.TIMING OF PUBLISHED COMMENTS
REFLECTS PERCEIVED NEED TO RESPOND TO REAGAN SPEECH AND DESIRABILITY
OF DEMONSTRATING THAT ANDROPOV,ALBEIT STILL INVISIBLE,IS
OPERATIONAL AND MAINTAINING FIRM HAND ON HELM OF SHIP OF STATE.

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PAGE TWO XYGR0100 CONFD

2.REPORT:25JAN PRAVDA FEATURED ON FRONT PAGE TEXT OF QUOTE REPLIES UNQUOTE BY YURI ANDROPOV TO ANONYMOUS QUESTIONS.ANDROPOV COMMENTS ARE DEVOTED ENTIRELY TO EAST-WEST ISSUES.DOMINANT TONE IS TOUGH AND UNREPENTANT,WITH SEVERAL HARSH RHETORICAL PASSAGES.USA ADMIN IS CASTIGATED FOR ITS QUOTE IMPERIALISTIC BRIGANDAGE UNQUOTE IN VARIOUS REGIONS,INCLUDING MIDEAST AND CENTRAL AMERICA.DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN MISSILES IN EUROPE IS SEEN AS CAUSE OF INCREASED POLITICAL AND MILITARY TENSION AND OF TORPEDOING OF NUCLEAR ARMS TALKS,A SITUATION FOR WHICH USA ADMIN PLUS NATO GOVTS OF COUNTRIES WHERE MISSILES ARE BEING DEPLOYED MUST BEAR QUOTE FULL RESPONSIBILITY UNQUOTE.USA LEADERS ARE ACCUSED OF QUOTE DELIBERATELY DISTORTING UNQUOTE WORLD SITUATION IN THEIR STATEMENTS.ANDROPOV ASSERTS CONSTANT SOV READINESS FOR DIALOGUE(QUOTE THERE IS NO/NO NEED TO CONVINCE US OF THE USEFULNESS AND EXPEDIENCE OF DIALOGUE UNQUOTE)BUT NOT/NOT FOR ITS OWN SAKE;DIALOGUE MUST BE CONDUCTED QUOTE ON AN EQUAL FOOTING UNQUOTE AND DIRECTED AT ATTAINMENT OF QUOTE CONCRETE ACCORDS UNQUOTE. HOWEVER,QUOTE THE AMERICAN LEADERSHIP,AS ALL SIGNS INDICATE,HAS NOT/NOT GIVEN UP ITS INTENTIONS TO CONDUCT TALKS WITH U FROM POSITIONS OF STRENGTH,FROM POSITIONS OF THREATS AND PRESSURE.WE RESOLUTELY REJECT SUCH AN APPROACH UNQUOTE.

3.RE GENEV INF TALKS SPECIFICALLY,ANDROPOV STATES THAT QUOTE THE AMERICAN SIDE WITH ITS OWN HANDS BROKE UP THE TALKS IN GENEV AND INFLICTED MUCH DAMAGE TO THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE USSR AND USA.

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PAGE THREE XYGR0100 CONF

UNQUOTE.WHILE USA PROFESSES ITS WILLINGNESS TO RETURN T GENEV TALKS,
ANDROPOV SEES NO/NO SIGN OF REQUIRED CHANGES IN USA POL CIES:QUOTE
THE PRESIDENTS SPEECH DOES NOT/NOT CONTAIN A SINGLE NEW IDEA,ANY NEW
PROPOSALS EITHER ON THE QUESTION OF LIMITING NUCLEAR ARMS IN EUROPE
OR ON OTHER QUESTIONS UNQUOTE.NEVERTHELESS USSR REMAINS OPEN TO
FURTHER NEGOTIATING EFFORTS ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL:QUOTE I HAVE
ALREADY SAID AND I WANT TO EMPHASIZE AGAIN THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO
USE ANY REAL CHANCE FOR CONDUCTING TALKS WITH THE AIM OF ATTAINING
PRACTICAL ACCORDS ON THE LIMITATION AND PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARMS
ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY.BUT
WE WILL NOT/NOT GO TO TALKS FOR THE SAKE OF TALKS...UNQUOTE.

USSR IS PREPARED TO SOLVE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR ARMS IN EUROPE ON A
QUOTE CONSTRUCTIVE,MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS.THIS REQUIRES ONLY
ONE THING-BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE USA AND NATO SHLD DISPLAY
READINESS TO RETURN TO THE SITUATION THAT HAD EXISTED BEFORE THE
COMMENCEMENT OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PERSHING IIS AND CRUISE
MISSILES UNQUOTE.

3.ANDROPOV GOES ON TO EXPRESS SOVIET CONVICTION THAT THERE ARE
POSSIBILITIES FOR QUOTE SERIOUS DISCUSSION UNQUOTE ON SEVERAL
PROBLEMS WHOSE SOLUTION WLD IMPROVE WORLD SITUATION AND SOVIET-
AMERICAN RELATIONS.EARLIER SOVIET/WPO PROPOSALS FOR AGREEMENT
ON NON-FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOR NON-USE OF FORCE
AGREEMENT BETWEEN NATO AND WPO MEMBERS ARE THEN RECALLED.STKHM CONF

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PAGE FOUR XYGR0100 CONF

IS CITED AS FORUM WHERE QUOTE A LOT CLD BE DONE UNQUOTE DURING
FIRST STAGE.

4. ANDROPOV GIVES SPECIAL EMPHASIS TO NEED TO PREVENT ARMS RACE IN
OUTER SPACE. HE REFERS TO USA WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT IN THIS REGARD,
RECALLS EARLIER SOV PROPOSALS (DRAFT TREATY) AND CALLS ON USA TO
QUOTE START TALKS ON THIS QUESTION PROMPTLY UNQUOTE.

5. RE MBFR, ANDROPOV STATES THAT IF WEST IS READY, SEARCH FOR PRACTICAL
SOLUTIONS TO QUESTIONS CAN BEGIN; SOVIET PROPOSALS ALREADY ON
TABLE QUOTE OFFER A QUICK APPROACH TO AGREEMENT UNQUOTE PROVIDED
THERE IS MUTUAL STRIVING FOR ACCORD. ANDROPOV ALSO AGAIN
PROPOSES EARLY SUPERPOWER AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR ARMS FREEZE.
ANDROPOV CONCLUDES THAT SOVS EXPECT QUOTE PRACTICAL DEEDS UNQUOTE
FM USA GOVT, WHICH QUOTE WILL FIND AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE FROM
US UNQUOTE.

5. TIMING OF PUBLISHED ANDROPOV REMARKS SEEMS TO ARISE FROM
PERCEIVED NEED FOR DIRECT AND EARLY RESPONSE AT HEAD OF STATE LEVEL
TO REAGAN'S 16 JAN STATEMENT IN EFFORT TO REDUCE ANY PROPAGANDA
ADVANTAGE THAT MAY BE ACCRUING TO USA. IT ALSO DOUBTLESS REFLECTS
INCREASED DESIRABILITY OF DEMONSTRATING TO BOTH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN
AUDIENCES THAT ANDROPOV, ALBEIT STILL INVISIBLE, IS OPERATIONAL
AND MAINTAINING FIRM HAND ON HELM OF SOVIET SHIP OF STATE.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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TO PMDELPRGUE/FOWLER DELIVER BY 260900

INFO EXTOTT MINA

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---LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN

IN CONJUNCTION WITH STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS, USA PRESIDENT HAS ADDRESSED FOLLOWING LETTER TO PM RE DEVELOPMENT OF MANNED SPACE STATION PROGRAM. COPY OF TEXT HAS BEEN FORWARDED TO EXTERNAL WITH REQUEST THAT RESPONSE FOR PMS CONSIDERATION BE PREPARED FOR HIS RETURN.

TEXT OF LETTER FOLLOWS:

QUOTE DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

DURING MY STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS THIS WEDNESDAY, 25JAN, I WILL BE ANNOUNCING THE UNITED STATES INTENTION TO PROCEED WITH DEVELOPMENT OF A MANNED SPACE STATION PROGRAM. IT IS MY HOPE THAT WE CAN WORK TOGETHER ON THIS PROJECT. TO DEVELOP THIS COOPERATIVE EFFORT I HAVE ASKED JAMES M. BEGGS, THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (NASA) TO ACT AS MY PERSONAL EMISSARY AND MEET WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

THERE ARE FURTHER FRONTIERS TO BE EXPLORED IN SPACE, TO THE BENEFIT OF US ALL. I LOOK FORWARD TO A REPORT FROM MR. BEGGS FROM WHICH WE CAN FORMULATE A PLAN FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THIS IMPORTANT PROGRAM. SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN. UNQUOTE.

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