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ACTION REQUEST

CGSB 6-GP-12
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ACTION
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NOTE & FORWARD
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YOUR REQUEST

PREPARE MEMO TO:

REPLY FOR SIGNATURES OF:

REMARKS:

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FROM

[Signature]

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LOCATION

DNOR

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11/04



NSS 1961-1

BY AIR MAIL

From: Deputy Director, Tactical & Staff
Duties Division and Standardisation,
Admiralty, London, S.W.1.

To: Director, General Planning Group, (Op-001)
Office of Chief of Naval Operations,
U.S. Navy Department,
Washington, D.C.



Director of Naval Standardisation,
Canadian Naval Staff,
Department of National Defence,
Ottawa.

Copies to: British Joint Services Mission (Naval Staff), (1 copy)
Washington, D.C.

Senior Naval Liaison Officer, (1 copy)
U.K. Services Liaison Staff,
Ottawa.

Naval Member, Canadian Joint Staff, (1 copy)
Washington, D.C.

Date: 29th July, 1952

Ref: S.S.C/P(52) 5.

NAVAL TRIPARTITE STANDARDISATION

OTTAWA CONFERENCE OF DIRECTOR'S OF STANDARDISATION
(JUNE 1952)

The Standardisation Steering Committee on behalf
of the Admiralty have considered in detail the points of
agreement reached at the Ottawa Conference and approve the
actions proposed.

W. Duncan

for DEPUTY DIRECTOR, TACTICAL & STAFF DUTIES DIVISION AND STANDARDISATION

NHS 1961-19

CONFIDENTIAL

17 July 1952


FROM: Director of Naval Standardization,
Naval Headquarters,
Ottawa, Canada.

TO: Director, General Planning Group (Op 001)
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington 25, D.C.

Deputy Director, Tactical and Staff Duties
Division and Standardization,
Admiralty,
London, S.W.1, England.

NAVAL TRIPARTITE AND NATO STANDARDIZATION
MINUTES OF CONFERENCE

The Minutes of the Conference of Directors of Standardization of the Navies of the United States, Great Britain and Canada, which was held in Naval Headquarters, Ottawa, commencing Monday 16 June 1952, have been approved by Canadian Naval Staff.


(J.V. Steele)
Commander, R.C.N.
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL STANDARDIZATION

Copies to: British Joint Services Mission (with a copy of the Minutes)
(Naval Staff)
Box 165 Benjamin Franklin Station,
Washington, D.C.

Naval Member, Canadian Joint Staff (with a copy of the Minutes)
1700 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.,
Washington 6, D.C.

Senior Naval Liaison Officer, (with a copy of the Minutes)
(U.K. Services Liaison Staff)
Boxborough Apartments,
95 Laurier Avenue W.,
Ottawa, Canada.

Canadian Naval Representative, (with a copy of the Minutes)
Military Agency for Standardization,
Honorvo House, 66, Ennismore Gardens,
London, S.W.7, England.

to Rus
for Despatch
Date 17/7
S/N 8

M E M O R A N D U M

FROM: Director of Naval Standardization
TO: Vice Chief of the Naval Staff

J. V. Steele
Think you
[Signature] 14/7

NAVAL STANDARDIZATION
MINUTES OF D STAN CONFERENCE

Submitted in reply to your questions dated 8 July, one folio down, that,

Item 1 Para (d) - This simply means that instead of the representatives of the R.C.N. having to go to Washington, the U.S. and British Working Party members will come to Ottawa. This does not put us under any obligation other than that of providing an office in which the work can be carried out. I foresee no difficulty and subject to your approval, I will take the necessary steps to expedite the work.

Item 3 (a) - The agreements reached by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) are only binding upon the civil aviation authorities in each country. In Canada, as in some other countries, civil aviation is controlled by the Dept. of Transport, and therefore ICAO agreements have to be approved by that Department. I am informed that that is as far as they go. They are not binding upon the Armed Forces and quite frequently are not acceptable to them. It is true to say that ICAO is similar in nature to the MAS in that, quite frequently, they merely agree to disagree. I feel that there is little cause for concern as both the RCAF and the USN are keeping a very close watch on ICAO activities. We may count upon our own Air Force to keep us informed. I have arranged with VCAS (A/Stand) that they send me a copy of all ICAO standardization correspondence so that I may be aware of the existence of ICAO studies when we are initiating similar or parallel projects in the Tripartite or NATO programmes. CNA is being kept fully informed.

J. V. Steele

(J.V. Steele)
Commander, R.C.N.
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL STANDARDIZATION

OTTAWA, 11 July 1952

NSS 1961-19

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M E M O R A N D U M


FROM: Director of Naval Standardization
TO: Vice Chief of the Naval Staff

*Approved
AMSN 14/7*

NAVAL STANDARDIZATION
MINUTES OF D STAN CONFERENCE

Submitted for your approval are the Minutes of the recent Conference of the Co-Ordinators of standardization for the Royal Navy, United States Navy and the Royal Canadian Navy, (Flag A).

2. Copy of the Agenda is attached (Flag B).



(J.V. Steele)
Commander, R.C.N.
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL STANDARDIZATION

OTTAWA, 30 June 1952

JN Stan

*Item 1.
para. (d) - What will
- this involve?
Item 3 - (a) - are not I.C.A.C.
agreements approved by Government -
and therefore binding? - or are
- they now of the nature of U.S.A.
work - id. set government - where possible?*

AMSN 8/7

CONFIDENTIAL

NAVAL STANDARDIZATION

THIRD CONFERENCE OF DIRECTORS OF STANDARDIZATION
OF THE NAVIES OF THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN
AND CANADA.

HELD IN NAVAL HEADQUARTERS, OTTAWA

16-17 JUNE 1952

ATTENDING: CAPTAIN W.M. RYON USN
CAPTAIN ROLAND LEONARD DSC. RN
COMMANDER JAMES V. STEELE GML. RCN

also

COMMANDER P.R. WARD RN
CAPTAIN M.A. MEDLAND RCN
CAPTAIN (E) J.B. CALDWELL RCN
CAPTAIN P.K. WILL USN
G/C A.O. ADAMS RCAF

AGENDA

Item 1

The Conference agreed that -

- (a) The Allied, Tactical, Hydrographic and Exercise Publications listed in item 1 of the Agenda should be progressed as quickly as possible.
- (b) Highest priority should be given to ATP-6 - Mine Countermeasures Doctrine.
- (c) ATP-5 and ATP-6 should not be tabled in the Military Agency for Standardization, NATO, until complete agreement has been reached on a tripartite basis.
- (d) A Working Party is required in order to progress the urgent requirement for ATP-6 and, to a lesser degree, ATP-5. The Director of Naval Standardization, RCN, agreed to take the necessary action to initiate such a Working Party by proposing that the RCN should act as host and that the meeting of the Working Party should be held in Ottawa.

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- 2 -

- (e) All the publications listed in item 1 of the Agenda should be agreed on a tripartite basis before being released to NATO.
- (f) These publications should be written in two parts, written concurrently, (1) the version which upon completion will be ready for immediate release to NATO;
 - (2) an annex which contains information which will not be divulged beyond the tripartite navies.

It was stressed that these two parts to each publication should be written concurrently to preserve continuity of thought and to avoid omissions.

- (g) Amendments to the NATO version of these publications and to any other publications in these series should be dealt with no more frequently than once every six months, and that the Custodian of the project should be the Co-ordinator of such amendment lists.

Item 2 It was agreed that -

- (a) When the 800 odd Co-ordinated Statements which have been produced by the ASCC have been sifted and statements which have a Naval application submitted for consideration by the Director, General Planning Group, the Director of Tactical and Staff Duties Division and Director of Naval Standardization, items which are considered to be desirable for application to the tripartite navies will be drawn up as Tripartite Naval Standardization Agreements. It was considered that the drawing up of these items will not present a major task because:-
 - (i) it is improbable that they will exceed 50 in number;
 - (ii) the method by which they will be drawn up as Standardization Agreements will be simply that of covering the ASCC Statements with the cover sheet prescribed for STDs in the

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- 3 -

Tripartite Naval Standardization Agreement signed in Washington 1950, and no rewording or other alteration to the ASCC Statements will be necessary.

- (b) The appointment of an United States Navy Officer to the Monitoring Committee of the ASCC will provide a link with the day to day work of the ASCC.
- (c) The appointment of an United States Naval Officer to the ASCC should facilitate the transfer of equipment for trial purposes between the tripartite Airforces and tripartite Naval Aviation.

Item 3 It was agreed that -

- (a) Agreements reached by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) are not binding upon the tripartite Navies unless approved by the Naval Ministries. Naval interest in the affairs of ICAO should be confined to keeping a watching brief on I.C.A.O. agreements with a view to possible application to the three Navies.
- (b) If it is considered that an I.C.A.O. Agreement has a desirable application to the three Navies, that Agreement shall be drawn up as a Tripartite Naval Standardization Agreement in the same manner as that used when dealing with ASCC Co-ordinated Statements.

Item 4 It was agreed that -

- (a) The substance of item 4 of the Agenda and the solution thereto are embodied in the decision made on item 2 of the Agenda.

Item 5 It was agreed that -

- (a) As the recommendations made by the combined US-UK-Canada Sonobuoy Technical Working Group in the Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of that Group satisfy the Tripartite Operational Requirement ABC-NAVY-H-3, up to, and to some extent beyond, 1954, no other action is required to implement this project.

CONFIDENTIAL

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- 4 -

Item 6 It was agreed that -

- (a) Experience has shown that the Terms of Reference for the three Co-Ordinators of Standardization as laid down in the Tripartite Naval Standardization Agreement now require amendment, observing that work has progressed to a stage at which items of materiel cannot be excluded completely.
- (b) The Director of Naval Standardization should initiate action to amend these Terms of Reference by proposing that the word "detailed" should be inserted before the word "items" in para 4 sub-para (c) of the Tripartite Naval Standardization Agreement.

Item 7 It was agreed that -

- (a) Note should be taken of the fact that the three Co-Ordinators of Standardization observe that the approved recommendation made at the previous meeting in London in December 1951 namely, that all MAS projects should bear the name of the originator, has been largely disregarded by the Naval Board of the MAS.
- (b) Each of the members of the Conference should draw the attention of his Naval Member of the MAS to this matter.
- (c) Some projects have now reached a stage when a reassessment of the difficulties and labour involved should be balanced against the value of the completed project. The Conference recommends that the Naval Board of the Military Agency for Standardization should cause periodical revisions to be made, with a view to withdrawing projects whose expense in time and effort is out of proportion to their end value.
- (d) The Terms of Reference for NAVY/0/15, the NATO Book of National Preferences for Naval Equipment should be changed to the extent that, only that equipment be listed, with respect to which, the Navies are willing to furnish information to others. Doubt was expressed as to whether the usefulness of the book was worth the effort being put into its compilation.

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- 5 -

Item 8 It was agreed that -

- (a) There is a tendency to classify too highly certain of the projects undertaken by the Naval Board of the MAS, and that each member of the Conference should advise his representative to the MAS that steps should be taken to guard against such over-classification.

Item 9 It was agreed that -

- (a) In the event of war, standardization will probably continue although there may be some changes in methods of implementation due to the incursion of Allied Commanders. If a war should commence prior to the completion of the tactical and doctrinal publications now being prepared, completion of these publications must be given the highest priority, if necessary, at the expense of other items.

Item 10 It was agreed that -

- (a) Although little action has been taken in Field "Y" - Docking and Refitting - it remains a useful broad field of endeavour.
- (b) A publication should be prepared which will contain the basic fundamentals of the docking and refitting practices of each Navy, in order that appropriate facilities may be afforded when ships of one Navy are docked or refitted in the yards of another. Field "Y" should deal essentially with an exchange of information and not with true standardization involving material.

Item 11 It was agreed that -

- (a) A standard Ship Indicator Table is a highly desirable requirement and, in satisfaction of the urgent Canadian request, it was pointed out that the Conference was aware of the existence of a final draft table produced by the Tripartite Working Party in Washington, and which would be submitted to the three Navies in the immediate future for official approval.

CONFIDENTIAL

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NAVAL STANDARDIZATION

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OF THE NAVIES OF THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN
AND CANADA.

HELD IN NAVAL HEADQUARTERS, OTTAWA

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CONFIDENTIAL

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NAVAL STANDARDIZATION

THIRD CONFERENCE OF DIRECTORS OF STANDARDIZATION
OF THE NAVIES OF THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN
AND CANADA.

TO BE HELD IN NAVAL HEADQUARTERS, OTTAWA

16-20 JUNE 1952

ATTENDING:- CAPTAIN W.M. RYON USN
CAPTAIN ROLAND LEONARD DSC. RN
COMMANDER JAMES V. STEELE GM. RCN

The following RCN Collaborating Authorities or their representatives
will be available to discuss specific problems in the broad fields
indicated.

Commodore Keighly-Peach DSO. OBE. RN	C.N.A.	Field "D"
Captain M.A. Medland RCN	D.W.T.	Fields "A-EFGHIJKLN"
Captain A.H.G. Storrs DSC. RCN	D.N.P.O.	Fields "C" and "O"
Captain (E) J.B. Caldwell MBE. RCN	A/CNTS(S)	Field "Y"
Commander (SB) J.P. Singleton RCN	D.S.D.	Field "M"
Commander J.A. Charles RCN	D.N. Comm	Field "B"
Ordnance Commander G. Taylor RCN	D.E.S.S.	Field "Z"

also

Group Captain A.O. Adams RCAF	RCAF D/Stan	A.S.C.C.
Lt. Col. R.A. Campbell	Can. Army D/Stan	

PROGRAMME

Monday 16 June 1952

0900 Assemble in Directorate of Naval Standardization,
Room 3128 "A" Building, Naval Headquarters.
Discuss and approve Agenda.

0930 Call on the Chief of the Naval Staff, Vice Admiral
E. Rollo Mainguy OBE. CD.

0945 Commence Agenda Item 1 et seq.

A G E N D A

1. Allied Tactical and Exercise Publications.
 - ATP 3 Anti-Submarine Evasive Measures
 - ATP 5 Minelaying Doctrine
 - ATP 6 Mine Countermeasures Doctrine
 - ATP 7 Air Support of Amphibious and Land Forces
 - ATP 8 Doctrine for Amphibious Operations
 - ATP 9 CIC/AIO Manual (Includes procedure for Shore Based Aircraft Control)
 - ATP 10 Search and Rescue (Air, Submarine, Surface)
 - AHP 1 "Q" Message System
 - AXP 1 Anti-Submarine Exercises
 - AXP 2 Gunnery Exercises
 - AXP 3 Air Defence Exercises
 - AXP 4 Torpedo Attack and Countermeasure Exercises
 - AXP 5 Communication Exercises
 - AXP 6 AIO/CIC Exercises
 - AXP 7 Radar Calibration Exercises
 - AXP 8 Tactical Exercises
 - 1.1 Working Parties required. Method of preparation.
 - 1.2 Priorities.
 - 1.3 Release of completed publication to N.A.T.O.
 - 1.4 Preparation of "tripartite only" annexes.
 - 1.5 Amendments. Procedure, approval of.
2. Air Standardization Co-Ordinating Committee (A.S.C.C.)
 - 2.1 Review of A.S.C.C. Agreements and their relationship to the Tripartite Naval programme.
 - 2.2 Method of application of A.S.C.C. Agreements as Naval Tripartite Standardization Agreements.
 - 2.3 Transfer of Naval Aviation equipment under the A.S.C.C. programme.
3. International Civil Aviation Organization (I.C.A.O.)
 - 3.1 Relationship between I.C.A.O. and Tripartite N.A.T.O. Agreements.
 - 3.2 Adoption of I.C.A.O. Agreements as Naval Tripartite Standardization Agreements.

4. Naval Air Operations
 - 4.1 Review of correspondence on tripartite project NAVY-D-1.
 - (a) D. Stan Admiralty 637/51 dated 18 June 1952
 - (b) D.N. Stan Ottawa 1961-24-1 dated 2 February 1952
 - (c) Director, General Planning Group 213P001 dated 31 March 1952
 - (d) D.N. Stan Ottawa 1961-24-1 dated 9 April 1952.
5. UK-US-Canada Sonobuoy Technical Working Group
 - 5.1 Relationship to tripartite project ABC-NAVY-H-3.
6. Tripartite Programme. Expansion.
 - 6.1 Extension of tripartite programme to items of materiel, stress being laid upon "interchangeability" rather than true standardization.
7. N.A.T.O. Standardization
 - 7.1 Review of projects in hand.
 - 7.2 Consideration of value of work done, vis-a-vis effort expended.
 - 7.3 Action to enforce London D Stan Agreement on Originator of MAS Projects.
8. Security Classification of Standardization
 - 8.1 Revision of policy to effect lowest possible classification.
 - 8.2 Tripartite Items, particularly Fields "O" and "Z".
 - 8.3 NATO Standardization as governed by D.C. 2/7 (Final) dated 8 April 1952.
9. Standardization in time of War
 - 9.1 Desirability, organization, staffs.
10. Tripartite Programme Field "Y" - Docking and Refitting
 - 10.1 Consideration of the usefulness of this project and ways and means by which it can be implemented.
11. Project ABC-NAVY-A-1 - Ship Indicator Table
 - 11.1 Immediate adoption of a common table is required by RCN new construction programme. Discuss feasibility of adopting latest U.S. proposal or production of Table of Equivalents in extension of ACP-165.

NAVAL STANDARDIZATION

THIRD CONFERENCE OF DIRECTORS OF STANDARDIZATION
OF THE NAVIES OF THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN
AND CANADA.

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PROGRAMME

Monday 16 June 1952

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Discuss and approve Agenda.
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E. Rollo Mainguy OBE. CD.
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1.1 Working Parties required. Method of preparation.

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2.3 Transfer of Naval Aviation equipment under the A.S.C.C. programme.

3. International Civil Aviation Organization (I.C.A.O.)

3.1 Relationship between I.C.A.O. and Tripartite N.A.T.O. Agreements.

3.2 Adoption of I.C.A.O. Agreements as Naval Tripartite Standardization Agreements.

/2

4. Naval Air Operations
 - 4.1 Review of correspondence on tripartite project NAVY-D-1.
 - (a) D. Stan Admiralty 637/51 dated 18 June 1952
 - (b) D.N. Stan Ottawa 1961-24-1 dated 2 February 1952
 - (c) Director, General Planning Group 213P001 dated 31 March 1952
 - (d) D.N. Stan Ottawa 1961-24-1 dated 9 April 1952.
5. UK-US-Canada Sonobuoy Technical Working Group
 - 5.1 Relationship to tripartite project ABC-NAVY-H-3.
6. Tripartite Programme. Expansion.
 - 6.1 Extension of tripartite programme to items of materiel, stress being laid upon "interchangeability" rather than true standardization.
7. N.A.T.O. Standardization
 - 7.1 Review of projects in hand.
 - 7.2 Consideration of value of work done, vis-a-vis effort expended.
 - 7.3 Action to enforce London D Stan Agreement on Originator of MAS Projects.
8. Security Classification of Standardization
 - 8.1 Revision of policy to effect lowest possible classification.
 - 8.2 Tripartite Items, particularly Fields "O" and "Z".
 - 8.3 NATO Standardization as governed by D.C. 2/7 (Final) dated 8 April 1952.
9. Standardization in time of War
 - 9.1 Desirability, organization, staffs.
10. Tripartite Programme Field "Y" - Docking and Refitting
 - 10.1 Consideration of the usefulness of this project and ways and means by which it can be implemented.
11. Project ABC-NAVY-A-1 - Ship Indicator Table
 - 11.1 Immediate adoption of a common table is required by RCN new construction programme. Discuss feasibility of adopting latest U.S. proposal or production of Table of Equivalents in extension of ACP-165.

1961-19

TD 178

FROM: OFFICE OF SENIOR NAVAL LIAISON OFFICER
(U.K. SERVICES LIAISON STAFF), CANADA
THE ROXBOROUGH, 95 LAURIER AVENUE WEST
OTTAWA, CANADA

TO: The Naval Secretary,
Department of National Defence,
Naval Headquarters,
Ottawa, Ontario.

File: SI-1-7-1
Date: 26th June, 1952.

Referred to	Staff
JUN 26 1952	
File No.	1961-1015
Chgd to	182016

I am pleased to forward herewith a letter
received from Captain R.F. Leonard, D.S.C., R.N., Deputy Director,
Tactical and Staff Duties Division and Standardisation.

P.R. Ward,
Commander, Royal Navy.
for Captain G.E. Fardell, Royal Navy
(Absent on Duty).

DH stand 27/6

Tactical and Staff Duties Division,
Admiralty,
Whitehall, S.W.1,
24th June, 1952.

Sir,

I should be grateful if you will convey to the appropriate authorities my deep appreciation of the kindness I had from many members of the Canadian Naval Staff during my visit to Ottawa.

I also wish to record my belief that something really useful was achieved by the tripartite discussions on Standardisation which were so admirably arranged and directed by Commander J.V. Steele, G.M., Royal Canadian Navy. The great measure of agreement reached was due very largely to Commander Steele's detailed grasp of his subject and his staff's ability to produce "chapter and verse" at a second's notice.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant.

Rowland Howard

Captain R.N.

At Cdr. J.N. Keenan R.N.

Captain G.E. Fardell, R.N.,
Senior Naval Liaison Officer,
(U.K. Services Liaison Staff), Canada,
The Roxborough, 95 Laurier Avenue, West,
Ottawa, Ontario.

VCMS
WMS
ALLM
for info.

JNS
File 1961-19
Feb rid of docket.
Tell C.R. it is wrong
file No. 000029

NSS 1961-19

10 June, 1952

FROM: Director of Naval Standardization,
Naval Headquarters,
Ottawa, Canada.

TO: Senior Naval Liaison Officer,
(U.K. Services Liaison Staff),
Roxborough Apartments,
95 Laurier Avenue W.,
Ottawa, Canada.

CONFERENCE - DIRECTORS OF STANDARDIZATION

Forwarded herewith are two (2) copies of the Agenda for
the forthcoming conference of the Directors of Standardization.



(J. V. Steele)
Commander, R.C.N.
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL STANDARDIZATION

H.Q. 1024

NAVAL SERVICE - MINUTE SHEET

SECRET

FILE NO. -NSS. 1962-19.....

REFERRED TO

REMARKS (With Signature, Position & Date)

TO: V.C.N.S. ✓

Sir:

Your Minute one folio down.

2. At the present time the MSA has thirty-nine Standardization Projects in hand in varying stages of progress. Some of these are non-technical and require the attention of the Commander appointed to the staff of NMCJS as Working Member. The remainder are technical and are dealt with mainly by the Technical Officers on the staff of NMCJS, their reports being co-ordinated by the Working Member. A few are being dealt with by Headquarters' representatives sent to London for that purpose.

3. It would seem that this is a very small task for the full-time services of an Executive Commander and, frankly, I do not see that an officer of that rank is necessary. A competent Lt Cdr would do. Policy decisions have to be referred to the Board Member (MSA), Captain Robertson, anyway. If any revision of NIOBE is under consideration I would prefer to see matters allowed to stand for a further three months, but I am prepared to say, that, in my opinion, a reduction in rank and/or numbers probably will be possible by that time.

Commander, RCN

000031

DIRECTOR OF NAVAL STANDARDIZATION

27 Dec 1951

W. J. ...
DN Stan.
JRS

NSS 1962-14

S E C R E T

FROM: Commander J.V. Steele, RCN,
Director of Naval Standardization.

TO: The Vice Chief of the Naval Staff.

DATE: 1 December, 1951.

REPORT ON VISIT TO LONDON, ENGLAND

DIRECTOR OF NAVAL STANDARDIZATION

Sir:

I have the honour to submit the following report on my recent visit to London, England.

2. The purpose of visit was to attend a conference of the three Directors of Standardization of the Tripartite Navies and to discuss NATO-Tripartite relationships with the respective members of the Naval Board of the Military Standardization Agency.

3. I departed Ottawa, by air, on Friday, 16 November 1951, and arrived in London at 1000 on Saturday 17 November. I reported to the Naval Member, Canadian Joint Staff (London) on arrival, and arranged to hold a preliminary discussion with him on Monday 19 November.

4. The forenoon of Monday 19 November was spent with NMCJS(L), Captain O.C.S. Robertson, RCN, discussing the outstanding problems of the Military Standardization Agency at considerable length. In essence, Captain Robertson explained that the Tripartite representatives to the MSA were not satisfied with the existing procedure for dealing with projects raised in the MSA programme and which were already in progress on a Tripartite basis. This procedure is such that if one of the non-tripartite members of the MSA raises a project which is already in hand in the Tripartite programme, the Tripartite representatives to the MSA vote that the project should be dealt with by the Custodian Method and endeavour to arrange that the custodian should be one of the Tripartite nations.

5. Captain Robertson made it clear that this practice was satisfactory only while the numbers of such projects taken in hand by the MSA were small. The time has now come when very few projects are being initiated by non-tripartite members with the result that the MSA is obliged to turn to another source of material for study. This source amounts to the residue of the erstwhile European Regional Planning Groups which have now been absorbed into the NATO. All of these groups were considering standardization when they were absorbed by NATO. Their incompleted standardization efforts were handed to the Military Standardization Agency by the Standing Group. Captain Robertson pointed out that a large number of these projects are, in fact, duplications of those presently in hand in the Tripartite programme and if the MSA is to vote that all these

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DN Stan.
Thank you
What about ...
members ...
Keep ...
occupants?
WJW
12/12

- 2 -

be dealt with by the Custodian Method, with a Tripartite nation as the Custodian, the work of the MSA will become a farce. It was this problem that Captain Robertson and his RN and USN counterparts wished to place before the conference of Directors of Standardization for solution.

6. On Monday afternoon I met the Director of Standardization, Admiralty, Captain C. Lloyd Davies, RN, and the USN Assistant for Standardization, Captain E.L. Woodyard, USN, in the office of the former at the Admiralty. Preliminary discussions were lively to say the least of them, and I found myself acting as a fender between the widely opposed viewpoints of the RN and USN. This seems to be the normal position of any RCN representative at MSA conferences on occasions when the RN and USN are at loggerheads.

7. The whole afternoon was spent defining the attitude of the three Navies towards NATO Standardization. The USN D/Stan was quite adamant in his stand that his navy would have no part of any project which did not arise from an agreed plan or operation and which did not stem, directly or indirectly, from an authority such as SHAPE, SACEUR, SACLANT, etc. He described the projects left incompleted by the erstwhile Regional Planning Groups as being so much waste paper which, as he saw it, the Naval Board of the Military Standardization Agency was using merely to keep that organization in existence. On the other hand, the British D/Stan put forward the argument that the MSA was responsible to the Standing Group and as such, had no option but to accept the directive to continue the incompleted study by the Planning Groups. The Admiralty, D/Stan, stressed the fact that if the whole principle of collective security means anything at all, it is vital that the smaller European nations should be tied together by every possible means. He claimed that Britain had done so much in the past to foster this principle that she would not be agreeable to jettisoning the incompleted efforts as so much waste paper.

8. It was clear to me that both the D/Stans had made up their minds on the matter, particularly the USN Member and that if anything at all was to be achieved, diplomacy must be the order of the day. However, the day now being well spent, I proposed that before any further discussions should take place between the three D/Stans, they should meet their Representatives to the MSA and hear what they had to say. This was arranged for the following morning.

9. On Tuesday morning a meeting was held in the headquarters of the Military Standardization Agency, Chesham Place, London, at which the three Directors of Standardization and the three Tripartite representatives to the MSA were present. Captain Peters, RN, Chairman of the Naval Board of the MSA, was in the Chair. Captain Peters described the work and the difficulties encountered by the MSA in much the same terms as those used by Captain Robertson on the previous day. He said that there was a growing feeling of suspicion among the smaller nations that the NATO Standardization programme was being controlled by the Tripartite countries, and not only did they disapprove of such control but also their greatest objection

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was based on the belief that the Tripartite countries were concluding agreements which were at variance with intentions expressed to NATO. Captain Peters also stressed the fact that the non-Tripartite members of NATO are under the impression that the Tripartite Standardization programme is a very much larger and more far-reaching undertaking than the Tripartite countries care to admit. For this reason, on behalf of the Tripartite members of the MSA, he hoped that the three D/Stans would agree to the immediate transfer of as many of the Tripartite studies to NATO as possible.

10. The ensuing discussion was both heated and lengthy. The USN D/Stan repeated his earlier stand that his Navy would not consider any NATO project which did not stem from an agreed plan or operation and insisted that the MSA should study only such projects as are initiated by what he described as a "responsible" authority. The British D/Stan agreed to this but stressed the necessity for completing the studies commenced by the Regional Planning Groups. For the RCN, I put forward the view that the Tripartite representatives to the MSA were, after all, well capable of deciding whether or not a project raised in the MSA was likely to serve some useful purpose and if any one or all of the Tripartite countries felt strongly about the matter, they always had the right to express their decision not to participate. As far as the transfer of projects from the Tripartite Programme to NATO is concerned, I said that I was strongly opposed to any such transfer unless the three D.Stans were in agreement that such a transfer would not result in unreasonable delay in achieving a Standardization Agreement. As far as the feelings of the other nations are concerned I felt that it was the responsibility of the Tripartite Representatives to the MSA to assure the smaller nations and France that the Tripartite countries were not concluding "Secret Agreements" which were at variance with statements made to NATO. From a purely Canadian viewpoint, I considered that it was up to the Canadian Naval Representative to the MSA to achieve this end and to put over the proposal that where a Tripartite study is in progress the non-Tripartite nations stand to gain everything and lose nothing by waiting for the completion of the Tripartite study, always assuming that the U.S. and Great Britain would agree to the transfer of the finished product to NATO when the Tripartite study had been completed.

11. Captain Peters replied saying that he appreciated that view but felt that in such circumstances the French Representative for example, on being advised to wait until the Tripartite study was completed, would rise with the cry "honor patri" and insist that he be allowed to take part in the study. This statement by Captain Peters set off another verbal explosion between the United States and British D/Stans, as a result of which it became evident that the discussion was causing considerable embarrassment as far as the USN representative to the MSA was concerned. He, Captain McCoombs, was in the difficult position of trying to be loyal to his MSA colleagues whilst coming under heavy fire from his own D/Stan. Seeing this, Captain Peters very wisely proposed that as the three D/Stans had now heard the story direct from the MSA Representatives they should attend a meeting of the MSA that afternoon and then meet again alone to formulate proposals for a solution. This was agreed to by all concerned.

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12. On Tuesday afternoon, in company with the other D/Stans, I attended a normal meeting of the full Naval Board of the Military Standardization Agency, after which, I must admit, common sense pointed clearly towards favouring a modified form of the USN attitude rather than that of the British. After nearly three hours around a table with some fifteen representatives, almost all of Captain's rank or above, it was difficult to define just what useful purpose had been achieved in the time spent dealing with an agenda of eleven items.

13. On Wednesday morning the three D/Stans again met and I regret to say that by evening little or no agreement had been reached.

14. On Thursday morning the three D/Stans met again and this time it was clear that all three of us had spent at least part of the night attempting to reach a compromise and to put down some ideas on paper in the form of a statement of proposed policy. As so frequently happens, this was all that was necessary to achieve agreement and by noon a Tripartite statement had been prepared as follows:

- (i) Every "invitation" to participate in a study, produced by the M.S.A., should have the origin of the subject clearly marked on the Document, i.e. did the request to conduct such a study originate from SHAPE, Standing Group, SACLANT, D.P.B., Naval Ministry, etc?
- (ii) In future, when an authentic request is received by the M.S.A. for a study of a subject which is already being progressed by ABC, the M.S.A. representatives of the ABC Powers will suggest to the other countries on the M.S.A. that they await the outcome of the study taking place by the ABC Powers. It should be made clear that such action is in the interests of efficiency to avoid the waste of effort in duplicating, and repetition of work already carried out.
- (iii) If this course of action is not agreed to, then a separate N.A.T.O. study should be initiated, the three ABC Powers obviously participating.
- (iv) This does not affect in any way new subjects which are introduced into the M.S.A. and which are not under study by the ABC Powers for which NATO studies could be originated in the normal manner.

15. On Friday morning the three D/Stans again met the three Representatives to the M.S.A. and presented them with the foregoing statement. It was discussed at length and all three MSA members agreed that notwithstanding clause (iii), it was improbable that much, if any, duplication would result. Presumably the "honour of France" is satisfied by having the option of duplication without necessarily taking up that option!

16. Later, I went over the whole situation once again with Captain Robertson and as a result I am now quite sure that he is very satisfied with the result of the meetings. He said

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- 5 -

that he felt confident that the non-Tripartite Members of the MSA would not raise any serious objections and as they frequently turned to Canada for guidance, he would make every effort to assure them that the existence of the Tripartite programme was in their best interests. Up to now, it has been difficult to do this without giving the impression that the Tripartite nations were hiding their activities from their allies. Now, there being no secret about the existence of the Tripartite programme, it will be possible to present a much more favourable picture to the smaller powers. The French do present a problem, but if all other members are satisfied to await the completion of a Tripartite study, it is probable that the French will agree, albeit, reluctantly.

17. The remainder of my visit was spent in completing a survey of all NATO projects in hand, with Commander Davidson, Working Member of the MSA and ironing out several difficult points which existed.

18. I am quite certain that as the result of this visit, Captain Robertson and his Staff are far more satisfied with the situation and that NATO-Tripartite relationship problems have ceased to exist.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "J. V. Stuebe". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, sweeping initial "J" and a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Commander, Royal Canadian Navy,
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL STANDARDIZATION DIVISION

OTTAWA, Canada.

NSS 1962-1

S E C R E T

FROM: Commander J.V. Steele, RCN.
Director of Naval Standardization.

TO: The Vice Chief of the Naval Staff.

DATE: 26 July, 1951.

REPORT ON VISIT TO LONDON, ENGLAND

DIRECTOR OF STANDARDIZATION

Sir,

I have the honour to submit the following report on my recent visit to London, England.

2. Purposes of Visit;

The purposes of this visit were twofold, namely,

- (i) To act as Assistant and Advisor to the Canadian Representative, Military Standardization Agency at meetings concerning the NATO Standardization Programme. This assistance and advice were provided at the request of the Canadian Naval Representative, made in his letter MSA-NAVY-UK-1962-8 dated the 24 May 1951. (see Appendix A to this report.)
- (ii) To discuss outstanding problems in the Tripartite and NATO Standardization programmes with the Director of Standardization Admiralty

3. I departed Ottawa by air on Tuesday, 26 June 1951, arriving in London Airport at 1500 on the 27 June where I was met by Lt. Cdr. J. C. Smyth RCN. I reported to the Canadian Joint Staff (London) at 0900 on Thursday 28 June, but was unable to see the Naval Member, Captain O.C.S. Robertson due to his absence from London on duty. Accordingly that day was spent in conference with the Chief Staff Officer, Lt. Cdr. Smyth and the many aspects of the NATO standardization programme were discussed.

4. On Friday 29 June I spent the morning with Captain Robertson, during which he expressed his views on the Canadian implication in the NATO standardization programme. I found that Captain Robertson was under the impression that the primary function of my visit was that of my capacity as Director of Standardization and not that of the Naval Headquarters representative requested by him in his letter dated 24 May (Appendix A) and as stated in CANAVHED message 181416Z June (see Appendix B to this report.) This explains CANAVBRIT message 181327Z June (see Appendix C to this report.)

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5. In the course of the discussions which took place on the 29 June, Captain Robertson informed me that he would not be attending the meetings scheduled to commence on Monday 2 July on the subject of "The Minimum Acceptable Basic Characteristics of Anti-Submarine Escort Vessels" as he was leaving for The Hague during the week end in order to be present at a meeting of the Naval Advisory Committee. He said that in his absence he wished Lt. Cdr. Smyth to be his representative at the standardization meetings and instructed me to fully brief Lt. Cdr. Smyth on the subject for discussion. Captain Robertson said that, broadly speaking, the Canadian delegate should not take the initiative in the subject but rather that he should leave it to the British and the U.S. delegates to lead the discussion. It was (and still is) my firm opinion that this was an opportunity to present, not only the Navies of the other NATO nations, but also to the Defence Production Board, a firm and concise expression of RCN intentions in the field of Anti-Submarine Escorts. I feel that such an expression would perhaps impress at least the smaller nations as well as the Defence Production Board and would tell them where Anti-Submarine escort vessels can be built, both now and in an emergency. As later experience showed, I was not altogether wrong, in this concept, for although in all three meetings, relative to the A/S Escorts the British "stole our thunder" it was quite clear to all that the smaller nations, including Italy, looked directly to Canada for guidance when issues were in dispute between the British and the United States.

6. On Monday 2 July the first Working Party met at 1030 in the MSA Headquarters, 36 Chesham Place to study the question of the minimum acceptable basic characteristics of Anti-Submarine Escort Vessels. Terms of Reference for this Working Party are attached hereto as Appendix D to this report. The meeting was opened by Capitaine de Vaisseau Poncet, Chairman of The Naval Board of the Military Standardization Agency. In conclusion of his opening remarks, Capitaine Poncet introduced Rear Admiral Brand USN of The Defence Production Board who is responsible for the initiation of the project under study. Admiral Brand explained that the DPB viewed with some concern, the deficiency in A/S Escorts required to meet the Medium Term Plan and he said that the reason for the initiation of the study was to obtain a guide as to what minimum basic characteristics would be acceptable in a building programme which might commence to meet a 1951-1952 emergency. I stress this clear definition given to us by Admiral Brand because I regret that I now have to report that I do not consider that the result of the study by the Working Party, serves any useful purpose whatsoever, that is, as far as standardization and DPB guidance are concerned. I fully realize the strength of such a statement but nevertheless I respectfully submit it as my carefully considered opinion.

7. Having elected a Chairman "Capitaine de Vaisseau Beret, French Navy) and a Deputy Chairman (Captain Leonard RN) the Working Party commenced a discussion of the various types of A/S Escorts required. Unfortunately, neither the Chairman nor the Deputy Chairman took anything like a realistic view of the problem; nor did they appear to make any effort to avoid the discussion becoming nothing more than expression of national intentions. Quite obviously, sound and firm chairmanship is essential to the success of any meeting composed of representatives of different nations and it was never more essential, or more

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conspicuous by its absence, than at this meeting. As a result, every time a point at issue on a type of Escort became a point of dispute, a further category, or class was created. An examination of Appendix E to this report, the Working Party report to the MSA, will amplify that statement. For example, the Second Rate Escorts shown in the Working Party report were created solely to satisfy the French delegate and do not apply to any other nation. Another case is that of the "Submarine Hunter". This craft, not in any sense an escort vessel, was included at the demand of the Italian delegate who quoted the French privilege with regard to the Second Rate Escort as a precedent for the inclusion of a one-nation type. No appeal to the Chairman to refuse the inclusion of this Submarine Hunter bore any fruit for the very obvious reason that the Chairman, himself the French delegate, did not wish to prejudice his own interests with regard to the Second Class Escort. The Deputy Chairman's attitude is portrayed in his remark "We might as well shove them all in". I cannot see that this was either a proper or a useful approach.

8. At the commencement of the third morning the Chairman produced what he described as being the draft Minutes. I report it in that manner because for some obscure reason, no Secretary had recorded agreements reached during the previous two days. Admittedly, it had been agreed at the outset that, in order to stimulate discussions, not all statements should be recorded in minutes but that a record would be made of conclusions and points of dispute. However, no conclusions of any sort had been properly recorded each day by a Secretary (in actual fact most of the time there was no Secretary present at all) with the result that practically all the third day was devoted to the inevitable disputing of what had, or had not been said on the previous days. The so-called draft minutes, figuratively were torn to shreds, the end product being the report shown as Appendix E of this report. I was given to understand that this most unsatisfactory practice is normal in the conduct of the MSA working party business.

9. Close examination of the report will show that it amounts to a list of types of Anti-Submarine Escorts, their functions and the Staff Requirements laid down as being necessary to perform those functions. In no way does this assist the Defence Production Board in its problem, since it does not represent an agreed definition of minimum acceptable basic characteristics of vessels to be built at the direction of the DPB to meet known deficiencies in an agreed Plan. It contributes nothing to the cause of standardization. Suppose, for example, the Defence Production Board desires to attempt to meet the deficiencies in Second Rate Escorts which appear in the Medium Term Plan, this report might suggest that the Board has only to direct the shipbuilding facilities of any one of the NATO countries to start building on the lines shown. In actual fact, as already stated, these Staff Requirements are peculiar to France alone and none of the other countries possess either the desire or the facilities for building this particular type of vessel. One can hardly visualize a complete change in the national viewpoints (to say nothing of national pride) of some nine nations in order to meet the idiosyncrasies of a tenth nation. However, it is not intended to suggest that the task was impossible, for such is not the case. It can be done but only if there is a completely realistic approach to the problem backed by a clear understanding of what is required.

This is where the Working Party completely failed in its task by merely recording under one nomenclature or another, the various classes of escort vessels which each and every nation intends to build--despite, or regardless of the well meant efforts of the Defence Production Board.

10. As I see it, the proper approach would have been to study the deficiencies in Anti-Submarine Escorts as shown in S.G. 581 (see Appendix F to this report) and having heard each national viewpoint on how each nation intends to meet its respective deficiencies, and having made every effort to bring the basic characteristics as near to a common Staff Requirement as possible, produce a "Table of Functional Equivalents" for the Board. Thus, providing that, a French built Anti-Submarine Escort Vessel fitted with 127 mm guns can carry out the same Ocean Escort duties as an American built Anti-Submarine Escort Vessel fitted with 5 inch 54 calibre guns, both the Defence Production Board and the Supreme Commander will be satisfied. The former will know what the French building potential is geared to produce, if directed, in an emergency and the latter will know what ships of all NATO nations fall into the same functional category. As it now stands neither Authority can be satisfied. Lastly, and with no desire to further complicate this issue, I would like to point out that if Anti-Submarine Escorts of the future are going to be categorized under the headings of Fast, First Rate, Second Rate, Third Rate, and Coastal Escorts, the day will come when it will be necessary to classify existing ships as belonging to one or other of these categories. When this happens, as well it must, the Canadian River Class frigate will be classed as a Coastal Escort, a statement which is so ridiculous that it requires no further comment.

11. A counter argument to the proposal made in the foregoing paragraph might be that of lack of standardization of ammunition etc. and there is no doubt that this presents a serious problem. However, it is far from being an unsurmountable one as the example quoted portrays. The French 127 mm gun is exactly the same bore as the American 5 inch and there is nothing to stop the French from using American ammunition for this gun if they so desire. Thus if the ships and their armaments are "functional equivalents" and at least some of the logistic problems are solved by interchangeable ammunition we have gone a long way towards achieving true Standardization and I feel that the time would have been better spent if we had taken this view and had devoted our energies to trying to reconcile the differences between items which, unlike the French 127 mm and the American 5 inch, are not interchangeable.

12. The second Working Party commenced on Thursday 5 July with the task of determining the types of guns needed for installation in the A/S Escort Vessels to be built in the event of a 1951-52 emergency. This Working Party opened in the same manner as the previous one, Commander M.J. Ross, Royal Navy being elected as Chairman and Commander J. Nielson, Royal Danish Navy as Deputy. Again no Secretary was present but detailed records of discussions were made by the Chairman as a basis for the Minutes of the Meeting.

13. This Working Party began its task well but once again sight was lost of the fundamental reason for the study and the Meeting resolved itself into a rather one sided statement of the superiority of the gun of one Nation over that of the gun of another. Apart from serving little useful purpose, this was a most disappointing meeting because the

- 5 -

Canadian and the United States arguments on the subject of the gun armament of First Rate Escorts were ruled out of order on the grounds that the 3 inch 50 calibre gun Mark 33 could not be discussed as it did not appear on the list of weapons declared to be Militarily Acceptable in Standing Group Memorandum No. 581. This greatly embarrassed the Canadian and United States delegates, particularly the latter who had been briefed in Washington a few days previously and who had been instructed to present the 3 inch 50 calibre gun Mark 33 as the United States choice of a suitable weapon for First Rate Escorts. Just how this unfortunate omission occurred, I do not know, but as experience showed the error made by the RCN delegate in not establishing the accuracy of S.G.M. 581 was duplicated by the USN member of the MSA Naval Board.

14. Ensuing discussions, on the Gun Armament of the proposed Anti-Submarine Escorts was based upon the list of guns classed as being "Militarily Acceptable", copy of which is attached as Appendix G to this report. Actually this list was prepared by the Gunnery Sub-Committee of the Western European Regional Group.

15. At the end of three days discussion the Chairman, adjourned the meeting for two weeks, in order that the delegates might return to their respective Ministries and to discuss progress to date. It was at this eleventh hour that the American delegate informed the meeting that as the result of urgent messages which had passed between himself and Washington on the subject of the absence of the 3 inch 50 calibre Mark 33 gun from the Militarily Acceptable List, he was now in a position to inform the meeting that the United States Navy had agreed to release all details of this gun for discussion by NATO standardization Working Parties, on a security classification of NATO Secret. This, was a step in the right direction and it permitted at least some reference to the gun which we intend to fit as the main gunnery armament of our A/S Escorts. However, coming as it did at the last moment, the Chairman was not agreeable to re-opening the previous discussion on the subject of the most suitable gun for the First Rate Escorts and as the records show, the USN and RCN were obliged to agree to the fitting of two 4 inch twin mountings as the main armament of the First, Second, and Third Rate A/S Escorts. In some ways it might be felt that the Chairman should have permitted a fresh discussion in the light of the U.S. statement concerning the 3 inch Mark 33 but when it is realized that a statement made by a delegate to a working party can hardly be considered to constitute an authorized amendment to a Standing Group Document (S.G.M. 581), it must be admitted that the Chairman's action was probably well advised in the circumstances. The Chairman said he appreciated the position of the USN and RCN delegates in regard to this matter and that he hoped that when the Working Party reconvened in two weeks time, an adjustment to the statements of the USN and RCN views would be made. A copy of the rough record of the discussions is attached hereto as Appendix H to this report.

16. The third Working Party which I attended commenced on Tuesday 10 July to study the Anti-Submarine Armament of the proposed A/S Escorts. The elected Chairman of this Working Party was again the British delegate in the person of Cdr. Raynsforth RN.

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17. The Chairman opened the meeting by saying that he considered the proper approach to the problem would be that of allowing each nation to describe the Anti-Submarine weapons which were covered by the Terms of Reference of the Working Party, that is, Anti-Submarine weapons which would be available or ready to go into production during a 1951-1952 emergency and which would be fitted in the ships to be built in a programme resulting from such an emergency. There then followed a brief description by the Admiralty delegate of the weapon, Squid, followed by what, in all fairness I can only describe as an Admiralty sales campaign of Asdic sets. This sales campaign covered all A/S sets which the British have released to NATO together with fullest details of cash prices and delivery dates. To me, this was the proverbial straw that broke the camels back, for I cannot see what purchase prices have got to do with a Working Party directed to determine the best equipment available or ready to go into production for ships to be built by one or all of the ten maritime nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. However, since the Speaker was also the Chairman, the feeble protests of the US, Canadian and several other delegates fell on deaf ears. One item of interest which did emerge as a result of the British delegate's statement was that of a remark by the senior member of the three Italian delegates present, Captain Sotgiu. When the question of Squid and associated asdic sets was being described by the British delegate, the Italian Captain interjected the clearly audible remark to his colleagues, "I see no point in referring to this Squid and using the term "Ahead Throwing Weapon" when their latest weapon throws projectiles all around the ship". Clearly despite security on the subject of Limbo, the Italians are well aware of the existence of that weapon and it is not at all improbable that they will produce their own version in time to forestall the British. I took the opportunity to mention this to the British delegate at the end of the meeting and found he was inclined to agree with me and he told me something which I did not know, to wit, that the British are having some difficulty with regard to the production of Limbo because of the fact that some part of this weapon is covered by patent rights held by an Italian.

18. The question of discussing the capabilities of Asdics was raised at this meeting on the grounds that the Terms of Reference of the Working Party very clearly refer to the Anti-Submarine Weapon only and that therefore the Asdic, which is not a weapon but a detection and control arrangement, should not be considered at all. The previous Working Party on the gun armament of the A/S Escorts had ruled out all fire control equipment and therefore it was suggested that the same attitude should be taken with regard to the Asdic. This was debated at some length, ending in an appeal to the U.S.N. member of the M.S.A. Naval Board who happened to be present as an observer. He, Captain McCombs USN said that although the wording of the Terms of Reference clearly referred to the "weapon" or the "armament", he felt that the Naval Board intended that the Working Party should also consider the detection apparatus or control equipment. This interruption is recorded here in order that my criticisms of the MSA may be justified.

19. Further discussions in this field were confined to the general capabilities of the more common US and British A/S detection equipment, no reference being made to A/S weapons other than Squid, Hedgehog Depth Charges and a very general remark on the possibility of an A/S homing torpedo.

20. Having seen these first three Working Parties in action and having prepared briefs for Lt. Cdr. Smyth and Lt. Cdr. Turnbull who were to attend ensuing meetings on the Minesweepers, M/S Equipment and Seaward Defences generally, I felt that my presence in London was no longer required. Captain Robertson agreed to this and so after two or three days spent with the Director of Standardization, Admiralty, I returned to Canada by air.

21. My visits to the Admiralty began with a call on the Director of Standardization and resulted in some satisfactory decisions on urgent projects, e.g. replenishment at sea. On the second day, I paid a formal call on Rear Admiral Evans Lombe CB. Deputy Chief of Naval Staff and Board Member responsible for RN Standardization. The Admiral was very keen to hear the results of the first MSA efforts and I was interested to observe that he too held out little hope for their value from a standardization point of view.

22. To summarize, the net result of my visit may be expressed in the following impressions gained:-

- (i) The Naval Board of the M.S.A. must issue clear and concise Terms of Reference for Working Parties and must adhere to them rigidly. If this is not done, Working Party discussions will wander at the will of any of the delegates and not even the best of Chairmanship will be able to produce agreed results.
- (ii) Business of MSA Working Parties must be conducted in the proper manner. A Secretary must be in attendance at all times to record expressed national viewpoints when spoken, and to record each step made towards agreement. Haphazard notations by the Chairman serve no useful purpose and lead to undesirable disputes between delegates.
- (iii) M.S.A. Working Parties must confine their efforts to the appointed task and refrain from crystal gazing into the future, particularly when the subject for study is that of armament or technical equipment. Hopes, dreams and probabilities cannot be used as material for achieving NATO-wide standardization. Working Parties which are unable to achieve true standardization in the form of an agreed concept of piece of equipment should endeavor to produce the next best thing, namely, a table of functional equivalents. This, at least, will assist the Defence Production Board in its efforts to meet deficiencies and will provide the SACLANT with a definition of the forces under his Command.

.....8

(iv) Owing to the great difficulty which is experienced in overcoming national pride, national economies and many other factors which militate against true standardization of equipment every effort should be made to progress the tripartite standardization programme and items in progress in that programme should not be transferred to the MSA until tripartite agreement has been reached. In the past, such a policy has been criticized on the grounds that the United States, Canadian, and British powers must not produce a "fait accompli" if the NATO spirit is to survive. This is a fallacy since the other delegates are well aware of the existence of the tripartite programme and are quite ready to seek the guidance and the help of the ABC nations. This was very clear at the London meetings and I particularly noted that when a dispute took place between the U.S. and the U.K delegates, the smaller nations turned to Canada for guidance. Furthermore, the current policy of transferring items now in progress in the tripartite programme to the MSA on a basis of "Custodian Method providing the Custodian is UK, US, or Canada" can hardly be described as anything other than producing a "fait accompli". I consider that the best method of achieving NATO standardization is to achieve tripartite standardization first and then supply the result (sanitized or otherwise) to the subject when it is raised by the MSA.

(v) In no circumstances should either the NATO or the tripartite standardization programmes be sacrificed to the desire "to acquire information". Several times, during discussions between myself and the Director of Standardization, Admiralty, I was greatly exasperated when told that even if the MSA shows little promise of being a useful organ of standardization it is an excellent means of exchanging information. That is not the function of the MSA and as far as the RCN is concerned all desires for information are being fully satisfied by the Information Exchange Project system in the tripartite programme.

.....9

- 9 -

23. It is observed that since my return, the fourth Working Party has met in London to study the minimum acceptable basic characteristics of Minesweepers but has failed to reach any agreement.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'J.V. Steele', with a large, sweeping flourish underneath.

(J.V. Steele)
Commander, R.C.N.
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL STANDARDIZATION.

A

COPY :

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

NAVAL SERVICE

**NATO
SECRET**

24th May, 1951.

Our File MSA-NAVY/UK-1962-8.

Your file

FROM: The Canadian Naval Representative to the Military
Standardization Agency,
66, Ennismore Gardens,
London, S.W.7.

TO: The Naval Secretary,
Naval Headquarters,
Ottawa, Canada.

FOR: The Director of Naval Standardization
Naval Headquarters,
Ottawa, Canada.

- APPENDICES:
- A. Proposed Standardization of Nets and Booms required for the Seaward Defence of Ports. SA/1028/51. Copy No. 6.
 - B. Proposed Standardization of Loops and Harbour Defence Asdics for the Seaward Defence of Ports. SA/1029/51. Copy No. 6.
 - C. Proposed Standardization of Seaward Defence Craft. SA/1030/51. Copy No. 6.
 - D. Proposed Standardization of the Gun Armament of Escort Vessels to be built by North Atlantic Treaty Nations. SA/1027/51. Copy No. 6.
 - E. Proposed Standardization of Minesweeping Equipment for Existing and Future Minesweepers. SA/1031/51. Copy No. 6.
 - F. Proposed Standardization of the A/S Armament of Escort Vessels. SA/1032/51.

NAVAL BOARD OF THE MILITARY STANDARDIZATION AGENCY.

1. Submitted for the information and consideration of the Department are the attached documents concerning advance notices of projects which have been submitted by the United Kingdom representative for study and necessary action by the Naval Board of the Military Standardization Agency.
2. The Terms of Reference for the Working Parties who will study these projects are now being prepared by the Working Staff, and a formal invitation for Canada to participate in these studies will be forwarded at an early date.

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3. The following is a summary of the projects - and the dates of the meetings of the Working Parties to be held in London:

<u>Project.</u>	<u>Date of Meeting in London.</u>		
Minimum Acceptable Basic Characteristics of New Construction A/S Escort Vessels. (Recommend representation from Canavhed with technical assistance from Canavbrit.)	2nd July, 1951.	Mon.	X
Standardization of Gun Armament of Escort Vessels to be built by NATO Nations. (Recommend representation from Canavhed with technical assistance from Canavbrit.)	3rd July, 1951.	Thurs.	X
A/S Standardization of the A/S Armament of Escort Vessels. (Recommend representation from Canavhed with technical assistance from Canavbrit.)	10 July, 1951.	Tuesday.	X
Minimum Acceptable Basic Characteristics of New Construction Minesweepers. (Recommend representation from Canavhed with technical assistance from Canavbrit.)	16th July, 1951.		X
M/S Standardization of Minesweeping Equipment for existing and future Minesweepers. (Recommend representation from Canavhed with technical assistance from Canavbrit.)	19th July, 1951.		X
Seaward Defence Craft. Recommend representation from Canavbrit with brief from Canavhed.)	30th July, 1951.		
H/D Loops and Harbour Defence Asdics for Seaward Defence of Ports. (Recommend representation from Canavbrit with brief from Canavhed.)	1st August, 1951.		
Nets and Booms required for Defence of Ports. (Recommend representation from Canavbrit with brief from Canavhed.)	3rd August, 1951.		

4. It will be noted that the date of the meetings of the Working Party which is to study project NAVY/J/L(T of R) - "The Study of the Minimum Acceptable Basic Characteristics of New Construction Minesweepers" - has been changed to 16th July, 1951, in order that projects concerning Gun Armament and A/S Armament of Escort Vessels can be studied concurrently with the main project concerning "Minimum Acceptable Basic Characteristics of New Construction A/S Escort Vessels", which is being held on 2nd July, 1951.

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5. In respect to the project concerning Seaward Defence as outlined in Appendices A, B and C, it is considered that Lieut. Commander A.R. Turnbull, R.C.N., who will be assuming his appointment as Staff Officer Seaward Defence on the Staff of Canavbrit in early July, could well act as Canadian Naval Representative to the Meetings on these projects. Should this be Headquarters' intention, he should be briefed on Headquarters' policy prior to taking up his appointment.

6. The question of representation to the project concerning "Minimum Acceptable Basic Characteristics of New Construction A/S Escort Vessels" was outlined in the Canadian Naval Representative's letter dated 16th May, 1951, MSA-NAVY-U.K. - 1962-8. It is considered that the team which will attend this project should attend the meetings for projects outlined in Appendices D, E and F. - as these projects will be closely related.

7. It is requested that receipt for the enclosed documents be acknowledged on the attached form.

(Original Signed)

(O.C.S. Robertson)
Captain, R.C.N.

(ENC.)

NATO
SECRET

NAVAL MESSAGE

CANAVBRIT

SECRET

CANAVHED

B

URMSG 151529A. LETTER CONFIRMING MYMSG 021711Z
AIR MAILED TO-DAY CONFIRMING THAT CANADIAN NAVAL
REPRESENTATIVE SHALL BE CAPT. O.C.S. ROBERTSON
RCN ASSISTED BY CMDR. J. V. STEELE RCN WHO WILL
ARRIVE IN LONDON BY T C A P.M. 27 JUNE. CMDR.
STEELE WILL BE FULLY BRIEFED ON ITEMS CONTAINED
IN PARA THREE OF URLTR MSA-NAVY-UK-1962-8
DATED 24 MAY 1951.

REPRESENTATION AT MEETINGS ON SEAWARD DEFENCE CRAFT
LOOPS AND A/S DEFENCES AND NETS AND BOOMS MAY BE
MADE BY LT. COMDR. A.R. TURNBULL RCN WHO HAS BEEN
FULLY BRIEFED BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR THE U.K.
CAPT. R. BAKER RCNR WILL PROVIDE ANY TECHNICAL
ADVICE REQUIRED BY THE CANADIAN NAVAL REPRESENTATIVE
AT MEETINGS ON NEW CONSTRUCTION A/S ESCORTS VESSELS
AND NEW CONSTRUCTION MINESWEEPERS. NO OTHER
REPRESENTATION IS BEING SENT FROM CANAVHED.

181416Z

NAVAL MESSAGE

CANAVHED

SECRET

CANAVBRIT

MYMSG 151529A

LETTER NOT YET RECEIVED. CONSIDER ATTENDANCE OF
D. STAN AT THESE MEETINGS WOULD BE OF LITTLE VALUE,
BUT VISIT BY D. STAN IN EARLY OCTOBER AS SUGGESTED
IN PARA. 8 OF MYLTR MSA-NAVY-UK-1962-2 DATED 8TH
JUNE, 1951 WOULD BE APPRECIATED. THIS MATTER HAS
BEEN DISCUSSED WITH CNP WHO CONCURS.

2. REQUEST BRIEF FOR CANAVBRIT TO ATTEND MEETINGS
ON PROJECT NAVY/H/1, NAVY/H/3 AND NAVY/E/2 BE
FORWARDED AIRMAIL.

1813274

**Pages 51 to / à 86
are withheld pursuant to section
sont retenues en vertu de l'article**

13(1)(b)

**of the Access to Information Act
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

H.Q. 1024

NAVAL SERVICE - MINUTE SHEET

NSS 1961-2

FILE NO. -

REFERRED TO

V.C.N.S.

[Handwritten scribbles]

[Handwritten signature]

RA.

REMARKS (With Signature, Position & Date)

12 June, 1951.

Sir,

Your minute on my report, one folio down -- no further action is required.

Your approval was given on 6th June (see Flag A) and the other D. Stan's advised accordingly on 7th June (see Flag B).

[Handwritten signature: J.V. Steele]

(J.V. Steele)
Commander, RCN
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL STANDARDIZATION

- 2 -

was worried that if the U.S.N. agreed, the R.C.N. would be forced to refuse to take part by reason of personnel shortages. Furthermore, I was convinced that the proposals were over elaborate. However, Admiral Good's sentiments were perfectly clear and I left his offices much relieved.

5. Meetings with Collaborating Authorities;

Meetings with the sixteen Collaborating Authorities were extended at intervals over the whole time spent in Washington. Many questions of procedure were discussed and clarified and I feel that the time was well spent. Broad details of each meeting are attached as Appendix A to this report.

6. Conference of Directors of Air Warfare on Standardization;

On Wednesday 11th April 1951 in company with Captain H.N. Rolfe, R.N. Director of Naval Aviation I attended the conference of Directors of Air Warfare and Air Combat Training held in Room 5D629 the Pentagon. Summary of details of this conference are contained in Appendix B to this report.

7. Captain P. Welby-Everard, R.N., Director of Standardization Admiralty. Preliminary Discussions;

On Thursday 19th April 1951 Captain P. Welby-Everard, R.N. Director of Standardization Division, Admiralty arrived in Washington. Preliminary discussions commenced immediately and continued throughout the day. The Admiralty Director of Standardization had expressed his desire to discuss the Tripartite Standardization programme on a bipartite basis (U.K. -Canada) before the Tripartite Conference commenced on Monday 23rd April. These discussions showed that the state of general agreement and accord which existed between the U.S.N. and the R.C.N. on standardization procedure did not always extend to the R.N. Broad details of these preliminary discussions are attached as Appendix C to this report.

8. Conference of Directors of Standardization;

On Monday 23rd April 1951 the conference of Directors of Standardization commenced in Room 4D674 in the Pentagon. The first session of this conference took the form of a general discussion led by Rear Admiral Good, after which the Admiral passed the chairmanship of the Conference to his Deputy, Captain Laidlaw, U.S.N. and work commenced on the Agenda. Details of this Conference are attached as Appendix D to this report.

9. Standardization Files.

During this visit to Washington it was observed that the work of those members of the staff of N.M.C.J.S. who are concerned with the tripartite standardization programme was greatly impeded by the fact that papers on standardization were filed on many different files and because N.M.C.J.S. was completely unaware of the allocation of the 1961 and 1962 series to Tripartite and NATO standardization respectively.

- 3 -


Apparently the Central Registry of National Defence Headquarters does not advise N.M.C.J.S. of the creation of block files for specific fields of work with the result that a letter bearing a Headquarters file reference NSS 1961-28 means nothing to N.M.C.J.S. since he has not been advised of the creation of that file and the subject matter thereof. As a result, he is obliged to either remember the relevant local file or search through his files indicated by the substance of the letter. All this has added greatly to the staff work involved.

10. After some discussion on the subject with Commander P.E. Haddon R.C.N., Chief of Staff to the Naval Member, I spent several whole days extracting the papers on all subjects of the Tripartite Standardization Programme from current files, and created some forty local ones in the 1961 and 1962 series. On completion, the up-to-the-moment situation on any one of the subjects, Tripartite or NATO, was available immediately. It is obvious that N.M.C.J.S. must be free to create his own files but I feel that when we are dealing with subjects producing large volumes of correspondence, e.g. standardization, we can greatly facilitate the staff work of Joint Staff's by advising them more promptly of new files created in Naval Headquarters. With this in mind, I intend to pass such information immediately the file is created. This is purely a "housekeeping" matter but it is a one of some concern when the volume of correspondence is measured against the personnel available to deal with it.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'J.V. Steele'. The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, looping initial 'J' and a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

(J.V. Steele)
Commander, R.C.N.
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL STANDARDIZATION.

Report by Director of Naval
Standardization, on visit to
Washington, April 1951.

SECRET

APPENDIX "A"

DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S.N. COLLABORATING AUTHORITIES

IN THE VARIOUS FIELDS OF TRIPARTITE

STANDARDIZATION

Field "A"

Sea Command Tactical Requirements.

Collaborating Authority: - Head, Tactics and Doctrine
Branch OP-345

Captain Burrowes - U.S.N.

The primary subject for standardization in this field is that of standard ship nomenclatures. A proposed list of one, two and three letter designations has been prepared by the Communications team presently working in Washington. This list was submitted to C.N.O. who passed it to his Fleets for comment. Fleet comment was unanimous in its approval. However, the change in nomenclatures of the existing ships necessitated reference to the Bureau of Ships. At this point progress came to a standstill, BuShips refusing to accept the paper on the grounds that it involved too great an expenditure of effort and money changing all existing records.

2. OP-312 requested that no pressure should be brought to bear at the present time as any such pressure would embarrass C.N.O. in what is already a very delicate situation. Theoretically C.N.O. should be in a position to issue a directive on the matter but in view of the BuShips responsibility direct to Congress on financial matters, C.N.O. is having some difficulty in dealing with the situation. On the one hand, his Fleets approve (a paramount consideration as far as C.N.O. is concerned) and on the other hand a semi autonomous department within his Navy is obstructing progress. Agreed to await developments and to refrain from exerting pressure at the present time. Otherwise, procedure etc. is considered to be quite satisfactory.

One Operational Requirement in hand.

Field "B"

Communications

Collaborating Authority: - OP-20C

No difficulties experienced in this field. Most of the work to be done is that of writing publications. The Washington team of Communications Officers is highly satisfactory. Standardization is, in effect, almost complete.

Field "C" Naval Control of Shipping

Collaborating Authority : - Head, Shipping Control Branch
OP-338

Captain Richardson U.S.N.

Work in this field is confined to the preparation of manuals. This is a continuation of work initiated by the erstwhile CANUKUS Group. Much work has been completed but progress is considered to be slow due to length of time taken in Canada. OP-338 requested that this be raised with D.N.P.O. who is the Collaborating Authority. This has been done but it is noted that the delay is due to the fact that the work involves the full time efforts of S.O. Trade who has other matters to consider.

One Operational Requirement in hand.

Field "D" Naval Air Operations

Collaborating Authority: - Head, Tactics, and Combat
Training Branch OP-552

Captain Schaede U.S.N.

At the time of the visit, no progress had been made in this field, and OP-552 was not very enthusiastic about it. His attitude could be summed up in his remark "Mister, when you are up there in the clouds and the enemy is in your sights - standardization means nothing." However, after some lengthy discussion, OP-552 was persuaded that there are many factors involved in "getting the man up into the clouds and bringing him down again." The Conference of Directors of Air Warfare which followed some days later was a very much down-to-earth affair with the result that satisfactory progress is now being made.

One Operational Requirement is in hand.

Field "E" Air Defence of Forces at Sea.

Collaborating Authority: - Fleet Training and Readiness
Branch OP-341D

Captain Krick U.S.N.

Progress in this field was considered to be satisfactory, seven Operational Requirements with supporting Collaboration Objectives are in hand. No criticisms offered.

Seven Operational Requirements in hand.

Field "F" Surface Force Operations

Collaborating Authority: - Head, Atlantic Fleet
Operation Branch OP-332

Captain Young U.S.N.

This field of standardization has proved to be a dead end. No progress is being made because none of the Collaborating

- 3 -

Field "F", Contd...

Authorities are able to find an Operational Requirement which has not been dealt with under some other field of standardization. Discussed at length with Captain Young but the only conclusion made was that this field appears to be obsolescent if not obsolete.

No Operational Requirements in hand.

Field "G" Submarine Operations

Collaborating Authority: - Head, Submarine Tactics
and Doctrine Branch OP-311D

Captain Fulp U.S.N.

R.C.N. interest in this field is confined to the subject of Search and Rescue Operations. To date, the U.S. have indicated their intention to accept the procedure laid down in AFO 1199/49 when in European waters and the British have agreed to use the U.S.N. procedure known as "Event One Thousand" in the Atlantic or "ComSubPac No 1-50 Annex A" when in North American waters. All this is outside the Tripartite Standardization Agreement and nothing concrete is on paper. Accordingly, it is desirable that the two procedures for Search and Rescue be recorded as Collaboration Objectives supporting the Operational Requirement for common Search and Rescue procedures.

2. To this proposal OP-311D is proving difficult. He agrees that common procedures are necessary and admits that the AFO 1199/49 or "Event One Thousand" are acceptable but he is most reluctant to put this down in the form of a written agreement. His objection is that such an agreement would amount to a "directive to the Fleets", an unacceptable step in his opinion.

3. As a counter agreement, I said I considered that a Standardization Agreement was precisely the reverse of a directive to the Fleet. It was an acceptance of the Search and Rescue procedure initiated by the Fleet, as official policy; so much so that it was being promulgated to the two other navies as U.S.N. policy. Somewhat reluctantly, Captain Fulp accepted this argument and requested that the R.C.N. Collaborating Authority should reopen the matter by letter. This is being done, now.

One Operational Requirement pending.

Field "H" Anti-Submarine Operations

Collaborating Authority: - Head, U.S.N. Anti-Submarine
Branch OP-312

Captain McFadden U.S.N.

Progress in this field was considered to be quite satisfactory. The only objections raised were on the question of certain tactics. These are the subjects of discussions on the Collaborating Authority level at the present time.

Five Operational Requirements in hand at the present time.

Field "I" Minelaying Operations

Collaborating Authority: - Head, Mines and Mining
Section, Mine Warfare
Branch OP-315B

Captain A.C. Burrows U.S.N.

It was agreed that progress in this field was satisfactory except for certain evidence of lack of co-ordination in the Admiralty and which is delaying the conclusion of agreements. Admiralty objected to the RCN - USN agreed proposals on the grounds that they were incomplete and proposed an additional requirement. When Board approval had been obtained by D. Stan. Admiralty, it was found that he had omitted the additional requirement raised by the R.N. in the first instance. Apart from this, there were no objections to the progress or the procedure.

Three Operational Requirements in hand at the present time.

Field "J" Mine Countermeasures Operations

Collaborating Authority: - Head, Minesweeping, Mine
Countermeasures Section,
Mine Warfare Branch OP-315C

Captain Steinke U.S.N.

Progress in this field of standardization is particularly active and discussions centre round the progressing of Information Exchange Projects. Two Operational Requirements already have been broken down into specific Standardization Projects and one I.E.P. on Mine Location Equipment was completed then and there. Working Panels are now considering the current research and development programme.

Two Operational Requirements are in an advanced stage at the present time.

Field "K" Operations by Coastal Forces

Collaborating Authority: - Asst. Head, Pacific Fleet
Operations Branch OP333C

Commander Palmer U.S.N.

R.C.N. interest in this subject is a limited one and rather more that of an Observer than otherwise. However, as there is some question of U.S.N. developments being of interest to the R.C.N., possibly from a Seaward Defence viewpoint, close attention is being paid to the current evaluation trials of four new U.S.N. craft. These trials will be completed by September 1951 at which time the study will be re-opened. The U.S.N. has no advance information of any consequence but promised to keep us advised of the progress of trials.

No Operational Requirements at the present time.

Field "L" Amphibious Operations

Collaborating Authority: - Head, Naval Amphibious
Activities Section,
Amphibious Warfare Branch
OP-343B.

Captain G. Purmort U.S.N.

Colonel Smoak U.S.M.C.

R.C.N. peacetime interest in this field is limited but not to the extent of being merely observers. Bombardment and beach approach procedures are among the several aspects of concern. Up to the time of this visit, no progress in standardization had been made nor did there appear to be any positive action impending. Discussions with Captain Purmort, Colonel Smoak and the British Combined Operations Representative, Colonel Ferguson-Warren R.M. resulted in an all day meeting between the above named Officers and myself and produced complete agreement on some four Operational Requirements with twelve Collaboration Objectives. A somewhat exhausted meeting broke up after nearly eight hours, non-stop discussion with the feeling that much had been achieved.

Four Operational Requirements in progress.

Field "M" Defence of Ports and Bases.

Collaborating Authority: - Head, Harbour Defence Branch
OP-314

Captain Burrows U.S.N.

Discussions on this subject centred around the fact that little or no progress has been made to date. Captain Burrows explained that this was due to the fact that during the summer months of 1951 a new form of harbour defence equipment was being tried out at a U.S. east coast base. He said that he had every confidence that this new equipment would eliminate the many deficiencies in existing materials but that he wished he could borrow a British X Craft to put the new gear to the supreme test. Questioned whether any U.S.N. craft would be used to attempt entry, Captain Burrows informed me that they were building a special submarine for that purpose but that due to low priority, it would not be available this year. He added that any official request from him for the loan of a British midget would lower the priority further and therefore if anyone (looking at me) was to hint to the R.N. that the loan of a craft would be of interest to all, the R.N. might respond by asking to be allowed to test the defences. The R.N. is now aware of the trials.

2. Pending the trial of this equipment, no progress was being made in standardization. I pointed out that the Director of Seaward Defence, R.C.N. had made some proposals in his letter NSS 1961-33 dated 7th September 1950 but that to date, no U.S.N. comment had been forthcoming. Captain Burrows promised to look into the matter and asked that D.S.D. make an early visit to Washington to discuss ways and means.

No progress in standardization to date.

Field "N" Sea Exercises and Training

Collaborating Authority: - Head, Training and Readiness
Branch OP-341

Captain Roane U.S.N.

No difficulties in procedure have been experienced in this field and, in general, the Collaborating Authorities are satisfied. Some difference of opinion has arisen over the inclusion of submarine exercises and training but this is being dealt with and no difficulty is anticipated.

One Operational Requirement in hand.

Field "O" Logistics

Collaborating Authority: - Head, Current Programme
Branch OP-401

It was agreed that progress in this field was highly satisfactory. Already the first field in which Operational Requirements had been defined, Logistics leads all other subjects as far as progress is concerned. It was also agreed that the system required no change and that work should continue even, if at some later date, part or all of the standardization in logistics would be passed to the Military Standardization Agency of N.A.T.O.

Eight Operational Requirements well in progress to date.

Field "Y" Docking and Refitting

Collaborating Authority: - Not yet nominated.

The field was agreed very shortly before my visit commenced and therefore no detailed discussion was possible at that time.

No progress yet.

Field "Z" Basic Engineering Practices

Collaborating Authority: - Head, Specifications and
Standards Branch M.44

Commander J.C. Radford U.S.N.

Discussions in this field were confined to the matter of the scope of the field and the apparent desire of the Admiralty to restrict that scope. Complete agreement was reached and the decision made that as far as the USN and RCN are concerned, there should be no restriction of scope.

Operational Requirements for tactics and doctrine are not defined in this field and standardization is applied direct to specific items of material.

Report by Director of
Naval Standardization on
visit to Washington D.C.
April 1951.

SECRET

B

APPENDIX "B"

CONFERENCE OF DIRECTORS OF AIR WARFARE AND
AIR COMBAT AND TRAINING

This conference was held in Room 5D629 The Pentagon on Wednesday 11th April 1951.

Those present were: -

Chairman;	Captain Schaede U.S.N. Head, Tactics and Combat Training Branch OP-552
	Captain H.N. Rolfe R.N. Director of Naval Aviation, Naval Headquarters.
	Captain Charles Evans R.N. Director of Air Warfare Admiralty.
Observers;	Commander Nigel Bailey R.N. British Joint Service Mission.
	Commander J.V. Steele R.C.N. Director of Standardization.

2. This Conference opened on a far from optimistic note, to say the least of it. The Conference held on the previous day on the subject of sonobuoys had completely failed to reach agreement and earlier discussions between OP-552 and myself had shown me that his attitude towards standardization was nothing more than lukewarm.

3. However, after numerous false starts due to the fact that neither the USN nor the RN delegates had studied the Tripartite Standardization Agreement sufficiently closely to understand the procedure, discussions commenced on an Admiralty proposal. Again, after numerous digressions from the point of procedure at issue, an Operational Requirement was agreed and Collaboration Objectives argued. By this time, all present clearly understood the structure of the programme and efforts to introduce Collaboration Objectives as Operational Requirements ceased.

.....Page 2

4. By midday agreement had been reached on one Operational Requirement supported by six Collaboration Objectives and three Standardization Projects. At this stage, I felt that some real progress had been made and that pressure for agreement on a further Operational Requirement might well do more harm than good. All delegates felt they understood standardization and future efforts could be conducted by letter.

5. The Director of Air Warfare, Admiralty then raised the question of the preparation of a combined publication on tactical and operational instructions. This was discussed briefly after which the meeting agreed that the U.S.N. delegate should put this proposal up on paper as a proposed second Operational Requirement. The Conference then concluded in an atmosphere of appreciably better understanding than existed at the outset.

Report by Director of
Naval Standardization on visit
to Washington D. C. April 1951.

SECRET

APPENDIX " C "

DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE DIRECTOR OF STANDARDIZATION
ADMIRALTY, CAPTAIN P.E. WELBY-EVERARD R.N. AND
THE DIRECTOR OF STANDARDIZATION NAVAL HEADQUARTERS
OTTAWA, HELD AT THE REQUEST OF THE ADMIRALTY
REPRESENTATIVE AS A PRELIMINARY TO THE CONFERENCE
OF DIRECTORS OF STANDARDIZATION.

At the request of the Director of Standardization, Admiralty, discussions took place between that Officer and myself on Thursday 19th April 1951 as a preliminary to the Conference of Directors of Standardization scheduled for the following week. These discussions took place in the British Joint Services Mission, Washington and were attended by the Chief Staff Officer, Captain Coney R.N.

2. The main theme of these discussions was the Admiralty D. Stan. proposals for changes in the approved procedure and machinery for achieving standardization. Before outlining these proposals, I feel that a description of the current facilities is necessary.

3. At the present time, the Collaborating Authorities are named Directors, or Heads of the various directorates and or divisions within the Admiralty, the Pentagon and Naval Headquarters. They correspond with each other directly and their function is to: -

- (a) Determine agreed Operational Requirements.
- (b) Determine agreed Collaboration Objectives supporting the Operational Requirements.

When such agreements have been reached and approved by Naval Staffs, Standardization Directives are issued to the Collaborating Authorities to take appropriate action to implement their own proposals. This action is taken by the Collaborating Authority in each Navy by calling together such technical or other representations as he deems fit. These meetings or panels break the Collaboration Objectives down into Standardization Projects which, as the name implies, are specific projects for standardization. The Panels correspond with each other as necessary under the signatures of their respective Collaborating Authorities. When meetings of the Panels of the three navies are necessary they are arranged by letter in the same manner. When the Panels have agreed and their tasks are complete, they pass the result of their labours to their Collaborating Authorities who, in turn, refer the matter to the three Directors of Standardization for action in the form of a Standardization Agreement. All the foregoing is prescribed in the Tripartite Standardization Agreement proposed by the Ad Hoc Committee on Standardization in May 1951 and subsequently approved by the three Chiefs of the three Navies.

4. The Admiralty Director of Standardization said he did not agree with this procedure. He considered that the machinery was satisfactory down to the Collaborating Authority level but he completely disagreed with the working of the Panels. He felt that nothing could be achieved byPage 2

/Para 4 contd...

means of the existing procedure and said he felt that a further level of direct communication was necessary and that a Co-Ordinator should be named at Panel level. Without such a Co-Ordinator, he held little hope for any satisfactory progress.

5. In reply to this opening statement, I stated that whilst I appreciated that the existing machinery was such that progress would be slow, I strongly opposed any proposal to add a further level of direct communication and any proposal to appoint a "sub-Co-Ordinator" for each project. In my opinion, progress was being expedited up to a point by direct communication between the existing Collaborating Authorities. Beyond that point, exchange of letters between individual members of working parties or Panels was both unnecessary and highly undesirable. If the Collaborating Authority was performing his duties efficiently - at least as efficiently as his many other commitments permit - he would not just reach agreement on a number of Operational Requirements with supporting Collaboration Objectives and then sit back and leave the matter to a so called "Co-Ordinator" on a lower level. I considered that within the limits of his capabilities, the Collaborating Authority was required to initiate, guide and co-ordinate the activities of all Panels dealing with Projects supporting subjects which he had sponsored within his own Navy. If such a procedure resulted in any undue delay, it could only be attributed to either inefficiency or pressure of other work in hand. As far as the RCN is concerned, I saw no reason to suggest that any delay in expediting the work was due to inefficiency and I saw every reason why it should be due to pressure of other work. Such being the case, the demand for yet another person or level in the form of the Admiralty proposed "co-ordinator" would merely aggravate the situation rather than rectify it. In actual fact, personnel commitments in the RCN were strained to the absolute limit as far as Standardization is concerned and the best that could be offered is that which exists at the present time. In conclusion, I stated that I considered that apart from the undesirability of further channels of direct communication I felt that the addition of another responsible authority on the Panel level would retard rather than expedite progress.

6. Captain Welby-Everard expressed his regret at my stand on this issue and said the matter would have to wait for discussion as an item of the agenda for the Conference but he had hoped that the RN and the RCN would reach a common viewpoint on this issue before the Conference commenced.

7. In extension of the question of ways and means of expediting the progress of standardization, I then raised the question of Information Exchange Projects, pointing out that much of the time taken by the Collaborating Authorities is spent in preparing I.E.P.'s in respect of projects to be discussed by Panels and the naming of interested directorates and persons comprising a Panel.

8. Originally, the Information Exchange Project system was created by the U.S.N. and was stated to be a procedure which was necessary in the best interests of security. Latterly, an Annex to certain I.E.P.'s has been added for the object of covering such matters as patent rights etc. These I.E.P.'s may or may not serve a most useful function as far as research, development, procurement etc. is concerned, but I cannot see why such a laborious instrument is necessary in standardization. If the primary function of the I.E.P. is that of security, then as far as the RCN is concerned I see no useful function in the I.E.P. since all RCN Collaborating Authorities are named as Directors responsible for the subject under discussion and ipso facto must be cleared to talk about it. As far as visits of RCN Panel members to their U.S.N. contemporaries are concerned, such visits, of necessity and simple courtesy, are advised before hand through the Naval Member, Canadian Joint Staff. Why then, any question of security? Their U.S.N. contemporaries are named and the RCN Officers are under orders to proceed to Washington to discuss standardization of a project - nothing else. If on the other hand, the question of safeguarding patent rights etc. is the primary function of the I.E.P. then surely the Burns - Templar Agreement and the Bilateral Agreement (Claxton - Johnson) takes care of that. Evidence of this latter statement is shown in the Annex to I.E.P.'s in which the wording is a facsimile of the Claxton - Johnson Agreement.

9. My proposal to the Admiralty D. Stan was that we should raise the matter with the U.S.N. member, and tactfully suggest that by far the largest part of the paper work involved in standardization could be eliminated by the withdrawal of the I.E.P. system from the standardization procedure.

10. Captain Welby-Everard stated quite frankly that he would strongly oppose any such proposals. His grounds were that the Admiralty hoped to extend the scope of the I.E.P. system to cover all conceivable fields of naval warfare research, development etc. by means of the standardization machinery thus establishing a means of acquiring information much more quickly than by formal application as is the present custom. He voiced this attitude most strongly and requested that above all else, I should not raise such an issue with the U.S.N. member. Whilst seeing his point, I could not but feel that as far as the Admiralty is concerned, the retention of the unwieldy I.E.P. in the standardization machinery is in support of greater issues, a fact which, however important to the Admiralty, was not at all in the best interests of progress of tripartite standardization. I still feel that if the I.E.P. system is withdrawn from the standardization programme progress will be expedited and Canada will lose nothing as far as information from the U.S.N. is concerned. However, observing the highly controversial nature of the issue, I decided to withhold any feelers towards the U.S.N. D. Stan until I had I had discussed the matter in full detail with the RCN Collaborating Authorities and possibly submitted a proposed amendment to the approved procedure to Naval Staff.

11. It being very obvious that the preliminary discussions merely indicated that the accord which existed between the Director General Planning Group, his Assistant and myself did not extend to D. Stan Admiralty, the meeting closed without further exchange of views. The question of the necessity for the retention of the I.E.P. as a means of implementing the Tripartite Standardization Programme is being made the subject of a separate submission.

Report by Director of Naval
Standardization on visit to
Washington D. C. April 1951.

SECRET

APPENDIX "D"

CONFERENCE OF DIRECTORS OF STANDARDIZATION

The first Conference of Directors of Tripartite
Naval Standardization commenced at 1000 on Monday 23rd April
1951 in Room 4D674 The Pentagon; Washington.

Those present were: -

Chairman: - Rear Admiral Good
Director, General Planning Group
OP-001.
(Director of Standardization)
for the U.S.N.
Captain P.E. Welby-Everard R.N.
Director of Standardization
Admiralty, London
Commander J.V. Steele R.C.N.
Director of Standardization
Naval Headquarters

Also Present as observers: -

Captain J.S. Laidlaw U.S.N.
Assistant Director for
Standardization
Captain G.T. Coney R.N.
Chief Staff Officer
B.J.S.M.

Rear Admiral Good opened the Conference by
thanking the visiting delegates for coming to Washington and
expressed his hope that both the RN and the RCN would feel
that the journey was worth while. The Admiral addressed the
meeting in general terms for about an hour, saying amongst
other things that he was confident that the standardization
programme would be of benefit to all but that he did not
lose sight of the fact that in the closing stages of the Second
World War, he, as Commander of a task fleet made up of ships
of many nations, found no difficulty whatever in operating his
units. The Admiral passed comment on the close relationship
and the accord which he could see between the USN and RCN in
many of the discussions between the Collaborating Authorities.
From his remarks it was most evident that the Admiral was fully
conversant with the progress made in each and every field of
standardization and the points of disagreement in each.

Admiral Good then passed the Chairmanship of the Conference to his Assistant Director for Standardization, Captain J.S. Laidlaw USN.

2. The first item on the Agenda was that of "Procedure" for achieving Standardization. As already described in Appendix C to this report Captain Welby-Everard RN considered that a change should take place and that "Co-Ordinators" on the Project level should be appointed. He presented his case at some length, the immediate U.S.N. reaction being non-committal. I presented my views as already described and after considerable discussion in which the Admiralty D. Stan became hopelessly lost in his own terminology, the Chairman as U.S.N. representative agreed that no change was necessary in the present system and that as all three Navies were suffering from the same personnel shortage, particularly that of qualified Officers, slow progress in implementing the standardization programme must be accepted. Captain Laidlaw agreed that even if the rate of progress was below that acceptable, the appointment or naming of yet another level of correspondence was likely to add to the time taken rather than to reduce it. In a phrase, he summed up the situation "There are too many dear Joe letters already". In the light of the disagreement by the U.S.N. and the R.C.N., Captain Welby-Everard dropped his proposal.

3. The second item for discussion was one which inadvertently became more obvious than ever as the result of the first item, namely, that of nomenclatures. For some inexplicable reason, the terms used in the standardization programme were not clear to all three D. Stans'. Without wishing to appear as though we were ganging up on the Admiralty representative, once again it was clear that Admiralty departments were confused in their terminology. (See also Appendix B para 2). It was agreed that unpleasantly long as some of the terms are, e.g. Collaboration Objective, it was now too late to make a change without risking complete chaos. However, it was agreed that clear definitions of each expression should be agreed upon and included in the records of the Conference. Accordingly, this was done. (Appendix E Tab 1)

4. Standardization Directives was the third item for consideration. D. Stan Admiralty and D. Stan RCN both considered that the U.S.N. method of issuing the resultant of agreed discussions as a directive was vague and no real indication that work was to commence. Captain Laidlaw explained that not all U.S.N. Standardization Directives (known in the U.S.N. as Standardization Planning Directives) had been promulgated to the RN and the RCN and that in actual fact a firm directive had been issued in each case. D. Stan Admiralty pressed for an agreed statement of the correct procedure from the Standardization Directive to the Standardization Agreement. I pointed out that this should be clear to all in the approved report of the Ad Hoc Committee but D. Stan pressed his point for a further statement and as the U.S.N. D. Stan agreed, the point was granted. Agreed statement on procedure from the issuance of a Standardization Directive to the conclusion of a Standardization Agreement is attached hereto as Appendix E Tab 2.

5. The fourth item for consideration was that of the NATO (Military Standardization Agency) relationship with the Tripartite programme. A lengthy discussion took place on this subject in which it was agreed that now that the MSA is about to commence work, where possible, the subjects for discussion should be selected by the representatives of the tripartite nations on advisement by their respective Directors of Standardization. By this means, duplication of effort will be avoided, subjects which are unsuitable for NATO discussion (by reason of security) will not be attempted and at no time will there be any difference of opinion between the three representatives of the tripartite countries on the suitability or otherwise of a subject tabled for discussion. The meeting also agreed that, subject to consultation between the tripartite members, projects which are already in hand on a tripartite basis may be transferred to the MSA for inclusion in the NATO standardization programme. Details of these agreements are shown in Appendix E Tab 3.

6. In conclusion of the Conference, the members agreed to place the various findings and agreements reached before their respective Chiefs of Service for formal approval in order that the interpretations made therein might form the basis for further action under the Tripartite Standardization Programme.

SECRET

APPENDIX E

Y

TO THE REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR OF NAVAL STANDARDIZATION
R.C.N.

25 April 1951

NAVAL TRIPARTITE STANDARDIZATION PROGRAM

1. At a meeting between the three Directors of Standardization held in Washington between Monday, 23rd April and Wednesday, 25th April, the progress made during the last year was reviewed and full discussion took place on all outstanding questions.
2. In order to avoid possible misunderstanding in the future it was thought desirable to record formal statements on the more important items and these are set out in appendices as follows:
 - Appendix A - Definitions of terms used in the Tripartite Standardization Program.
 - Appendix B - Outline of procedure for achieving Tripartite Standardization.
 - Appendix C - Relationship with N.A.T.O. and the M.S.A.
3. It was agreed that each Director of Standardization would submit these statements for formal approval, as may be necessary within each Navy, and would notify the others when they have been approved; thereafter these statements would form the basis for further action under the Tripartite Standardization Program.

(Signed)

P.H.E. Welby Everard,
P.H.E. Welby Everard,
Captain, R.N.
Director of Standardization
Division
Admiralty

J.V. Steele
J.V. Steele,
Commander, R.C.N.
Director of Naval
Standardization

J.S. Laidlaw
J.S. Laidlaw,
Captain, U.S.N.
Assistant Director,
General Planning
Group for Standard-
ization.

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington 25, D. C.

25 April 1951

DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED IN THE TRIPARTITE

STANDARDIZATION PROGRAM

1. For the purposes of the International Naval Standardization Program the following definitions are submitted:

a. Operational Requirement - A broad statement of the need for combined action in support of an approved plan or agreed category of operations.

b. Collaboration Objective - A statement outlining one of the several courses of combined action necessary to support the operational requirement.

c. Standardization Project - One of the items required to be standardized in order to achieve the collaboration objective.

d. Collaboration Authority - The authority designated as being responsible for the creation of operational requirements and collaboration objectives thereto.

APPENDIX A

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington 25, D. C.

25 April 1951.

PROCEDURE

1. Approved Operational Requirements and Collaboration Objectives will be promulgated in each Navy as a directive to the Bureau and Departments concerned to examine the requirements and to determine the standardization projects necessary to support them.
2. The Collaborating Authorities will be responsible for coordinating this examination of the Operational Requirements and will be the channel for communication for reaching tripartite agreement on specific standardization projects necessary to support approved requirements.
3. Agreed standardization projects will be referred to the Directors of Standardization and will then be promulgated to the technical authorities concerned with instructions to negotiate a standardization agreement; where an I.E.P. already exists to cover the exchange of information on the project this will be quoted; where no I.E.P. exists one will be established to cover the project.
4. Draft standardization agreements will be referred through the Collaborating Authority concerned to the Directors of Standardization for submission for approval and recording.

APPENDIX B

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

Washington 25, D. C.

25 April 1951.

RELATIONSHIP WITH N.A.T.O. AND THE M.S.A.

It is agreed that: -

1. Where a standardization project is being undertaken by the MSA on a N.A.T.O. basis, it is undesirable to duplicate the work by *initiating* parallel studies on a tripartite basis; it is however recognized that in some cases, where security restrictions limit the information that can be given to N.A.T.O. it will be necessary to continue tripartite studies in a wider field, of projects also covered by the M.S.A.
2. Standardization projects that are suitable for N.A.T.O. should be referred to the M.S.A. for action in preference to carrying out a separate tripartite examination. As far as practicable tripartite standardization should be confined to those projects which are unsuitable for N.A.T.O. owing to security or other considerations.
3. The tripartite determination of operational requirements and standardization projects should be used as a basis for standardization in N.A.T.O. and the M.S.A. should be discouraged from carrying out a separate analysis of what is to be standardized within the broad fields already agreed.
4. Each of the three Navies should put forward to the M.S.A. such standardization projects as they consider suitable for N.A.T.O. but a consultation with the other two Navies should take place before putting forward any project that is already being considered on a tripartite basis.
5. The normal channels for tripartite consultation on all matters affecting N.A.T.O. standardization should be between the three Navies representatives on the M.S.A. but that this will not preclude discussion of N.A.T.O. matters between the three Directors of Standardization where this seems to be desirable.

APPENDIX C

- ① Need for results, now.
- ② Hence the necessity for continuing all basic efforts in the tripartite programme.
- ③ No proposals of any sort have been made by USN or RCN. The RN has proposed one item for transfer - the one in question - "Refresher at Sea".

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

No. NSS 1961-19) STAFF



CANADA

Department of National Defence

NAVAL SERVICE

Ottawa, 6th June 1951

FROM: Naval Secretary,
Naval Headquarters,
OTTAWA, Canada.

TO: Naval Member Canadian Joint Staff (Washington)
1700 Massachusetts Ave.
Washington, D. C. U.S.A.

NAVAL TRIPARTITE STANDARDIZATION

The attached report by Commander J.V. Steele R.C.N., Director of Naval Standardization on his recent visit to Washington is forwarded herewith for your information.


NAVAL SECRETARY.

To Geo
For Despatch
Date 6.11.51
Staff MB

845

2376

1	2	3	4	5	6
Type and Nomenclature	G U N				
	Standard Muzzle Velocity x	Rate of Fire Rounds/Min/Gun	Time of Flight x (See Note 1) (Secs)	Barrel Life Rounds	Method of Coolin
1. U.S. 5"/38 Single Mk. 30	2600 ft/sec	18	2.7 8.0 15.8	4000	None
2. U.S. 5"/38 Twin Mk. 38	2600 ft/sec	18	2.7 8.0 15.8	4000	None
3. French 127 m.m. Twin	2660 ft/sec	17	2.4 6.7 10.8	1200	None
4. Swedish 120 m.m. Bofors Power Twin	850 m/sec	40 - 45	Not yet known	Estimated at 500 or 600 but very much depending on sustained rate of fire.	Water and Glycer
5. U.K. 4.5" Mk. 6 Twin	2350 ft/sec	15 - 20	2.8 7.9 14.5	1500	None
6. 4" Twin Mk. 19 R.P. 51	2650 ft/sec	16	2.63 7.85 15.12	2400	None
7. 4" Single Mk. 25	2650 ft/sec	12	2.63 7.85 15.12	2400	None
8. U.S. 3"/50 Mk. 22	2700 ft/sec	20 - 30	2.6 10.1 18.3	2500	None
9. U.S. 3"/50 Mk. 26	2700 ft/sec	20 - 30	2.6 10.1 18.3	2500	None
10. French 57 m.m. Bofors Twin	2840 ft/sec	120	2000 yds - 3 5000 yds - 8.5	3000	Water cooled
11. Swedish 40 m.m. Bofors L 70 M 48	1000 m/sec	240 to 260	1000 m - 1.14 2000 m - 2.53 3000 m - 4.27	700 - 1000	Air cooled
12. U.K. 40 m.m. Bofor Twin Staag Mk. II x	2800 ft/sec	120	2.88 at 2000 yds	10,000	Water cooled
13. U.K. 40 m.m. Bofors Mk. 8 Single	2800 ft/sec	120	2.88	10,000	Air cooled gun
14. U.K. 40 m.m. Bofors Mk. 9 Single	2800 ft/sec	120	at 2000 yds	10,000	Air cooled gun
15. U.S. 40 m.m. Quad Mk. 2	2890 ft/sec	150	2.8 11.1 24.2	9,000	Water
16. U.S. 40 m.m. Twin Mk. 1	2890 ft/sec	150	2.8 11.1 24.2	9,000	Water
17. U.S. 40 m.m. Single Mk. 3	2890 ft/sec	150	2.8 11.1 24.2	9,000	None
18. U.S. 20 m.m. Twin Mk. 24	2770 ft/sec	450	5.0	10,000	None
19. U.S. 20 m.m. Single	2770 ft/sec	450	5.0	10,000	None

F.E.
13 R.
3-10

Note. Self destructive at approximately 8 seconds time of flight.

3-50
N. 33

2700 ft/sec
45

100

SGM 581

5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
G U N								A M M U N I T I O N	
Caliber	Method of Cooling	Maximum Range x (Yds)	Spare Column	Weight of Shell x	Weight of Explosive in Shell x	% Capacity (Wt. of Explosive) (Wt. of Shell)	Fuze	Fixed or Separate	Weight of Cartridge x or Complete Round
00	None	17,300		55.2 lbs	8 lbs	14.5%	Time, V.T. or Point Detonating	Separate	29 lbs ± .5 Cartridge
00	None	17,300		55.2 lbs	8 lbs	14.5%	Same	Separate	29 lbs ± .5 Cartridge
00	None	24,000		70 lbs	8 lbs	11.4%	Time and V.T.	Separate	43 lbs
Estimated at 500 or 600 very much depending sustained rate of fire	Water and Glycerine	20,000 m		23.5 Kg	± 26 Kg ²⁴ / ₄ ⁴² / ₁₄	11%	Time and V.T.	Fixed	Complete Round 42.5 Kg
00	None	20,000		55 lbs	4 lbs 1 oz	7.5%	Time and V.T.	Separate	30.8/16 - 33.6/16 lbs dependent on cordite used
00	None	19,400		35 lbs 14 oz	9 lbs 6 oz	26.1	Time and V.T.	Fixed	63 lbs 8 oz (complete round)
00	None	19,400		35 lbs 14 oz	9 lbs 6 oz	26.1	Time and V.T.	Fixed	63 lbs 8 oz (complete round)
00	None	14,000		13.0 lbs	0.8 lbs	6.1%	V.T., MTF or Point Detonating	Fixed	24.4 lbs Complete Round
00	None	14,000		13.0 lbs	0.8 lbs	6.1%	V.T., MTF or Point Detonating	Fixed	24.4 lbs Complete Round
00	Water cooled	14,300		6 lbs 9 oz	244 grams	8%	Direct Action Self Destroying	Fixed	14 lbs
00 - 1000	Air cooled	3000 m		0.96 Kg	0.115 Kg with tracer 0.127 Kg without "	1.2% and 1.3%	Direct Action Self Destroying	Fixed	2.4 Kg
000	Water cooled	3000		2 lbs	56 grams	6.6%	Direct Action Self Destroying	Fixed	4 lbs 14 ozs
000	Air cooled gun	12,000		2 lbs	56 grams	6.6%	Direct Action Self Destroying	Fixed	4 lbs 14 ozs
000	Air cooled gun	12,000		2 lbs	56 grams	6.6%	Direct Action Self Destroying	Fixed	4 lbs 14 ozs
000	Water	11,100 See Note		1.98 lbs	.15 lbs	7.5%	Point Detonating	Fixed	4.6 lbs Complete Round
000	Water	11,100 See Note		1.98 lbs	Same	Same	Same	Fixed	4.6 lbs Complete Round
000	None	11,100 See Note		1.98 lbs	Same	Same	Same	Fixed	4.6 lbs Complete Round
000	None	4800		.271 lbs	.024 lbs	9%	Point Detonating	Fixed	0.53 lbs Complete Round
000	None	4800		.271 lbs	Same	Same	Same	Fixed	0.53 lbs Complete Round

8 seconds time of flight.

14,200

NATO

PARTICULARS OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS - ANNEX "A" TO WR/WU 3006/51 REFERS

13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
MOUNTING							
Fixed or Separate	Weight of Cartridge x or Complete Round	Axes	Elevation and Training Limits	Elevation and Training Speeds Degs./Sec.	Elevation and Training Accelerations Degs./Sec. ²	Power or Hand	Electric Power Supplies (Kilowatts)
Separate	29 lbs ± .5 Cartridge	Biaxial	Elev. + 85° - 15° Trg. ± 150°	15°/Sec 28°/Sec	50°/Sec. ²	Power	36 (Peak)
Separate	29 lbs ± .5 Cartridge	Biaxial	Elev. + 85° - 15° Trg. ± 150° (Approx.)	Elev. 15°/Sec Trg. 25°/Sec	50°/Sec. ²	Power	95 (Peak)
Separate	43 lbs	Biaxial	Elev. -5 to 70° Trg. (L) 200° (R) 200°	Elev. 20° Trg. 25°	Elev.) 15° Trg.)	Power (Electric Motor)	(AD 440 V Max. 150 KVA Normal 40 KVA)
Fixed	Complete Round 42.5 Kg	Biaxial	Elev. -10° +85° Trg. No limit	Elev. 25°/Sec Trg. 22°/Sec	Elev. 57°/Sec. ² Trg. 75°/Sec. ²	Power (Reserve Hand)	± 130 Kw (440 V)
Separate	30.8/16 - 33.6/16 lbs dependent on cordite used	Biaxial	Elev. 80° Dep. 15° Trg. (R) 400° Trg. (L) 400°	Elev. 20 Trg. 20	Elev. 10 Trg. 10	Power	Inc. Ammo. Supply on Fixed St. 140 (Peak)
Fixed	63 lbs 8 oz (complete round)	Biaxial	Elev. 80° Dep. 10° Trg. (max) 340° or 670°	Elev. 20°/Sec Trg. 20°/Sec	Elev. 10°/Sec. ² Trg. 10°/Sec. ²	Power (Electric) + Hand	25.6 K.W.
Fixed	63 lbs 8 oz (complete round)	Biaxial	Elev. 80° Dep. 15° Trg. (R) 360° Trg. (L) 360°	Elev. 20°/Sec Trg. 20°/Sec	Elev. 25°/Sec (approx.) Trg. 20°/Sec (approx.)	Power (Electric)	117 K.W. (approx.)
Fixed	24.4 lbs Complete Round	Biaxial	Elev. + 85° - 15° Trg. + 355° (Approx.)	-	-	Hand	None
Fixed	24.4 lbs Complete Round	Biaxial	Same	24°/Sec 30°/Sec	50°/Sec. ² 50°/Sec. ²	Power	5 (Peak)
Fixed	14 lbs	Biaxial	- 10° to 95°	Elev.) 30° Trg.) 30°	Elev.) 30° Trg.) 30°	Power (Electric Motor)	60 Kw
Fixed	2.4 Kg	Biaxial	- 10° to 90°	Elev. 45 Trg. 85	Elev. 135 Trg. 127	Power Hydraulic Electric	220 or 110 Volts D.C. 13 to 3 amps.
Fixed	4 lbs 14 ozs	Biaxial but lateral deflection in Flyplane	- 11½° to 79°	Elev. 32 Trg. 32	Elev.) 32°/Sec. ² Trg.) approx.	Power (Hydraulic by Electric Motor)	220 V D.C. 46 amps
Fixed	4 lbs 14 ozs	Biaxial	-5 to 90 elev. continu- ous rotation restricted as necessary.	Elev. 32 Trg. 32 (64 T slewing)	Elev.) 32 Trg.) 32	Power (Battery) on mounting	-
Fixed	4 lbs 14 ozs	Biaxial	-12 to 87 elev. continu- ous rotation restricted as necessary.	Elev. 32 Trg. 32 (64 T slewing)	Elev.) 32 Trg.) 32	Power (Ships mains)	4.7
Fixed	4.6 lbs Complete Round	Biaxial	Elev. + 90° - 15° Trg. + 355 (Approx.)	Elev. 24°/Sec Trg. 30°/Sec	16.7°/Sec. ² 20.9°/Sec. ²	Power and Hand	Trg. 15 (Peak) Elev. 5 (Peak)
Fixed	4.6 lbs Complete Round	Biaxial	Same	Elev. 24°/Sec Trg. 30°/Sec	16.7°/Sec. ² 20.9°/Sec. ²	Power and Hand	-
Fixed	4.6 lbs Complete Round	Biaxial	Elev. + 90° - 6° Trg. Unlimited	Manual	Manual	Hand	-
Fixed	0.53 lbs Complete Round	Biaxial	Elev. 90° - 15° Trg. ± 360°	Manual	Manual	Free Swinging	* * See below
Fixed	0.53 lbs Complete Round	Biaxial	Elev. 90° - 15° Trg. + 360°	Manual	Manual	Free Swinging	* * * See below

* * Note. G.S. Mk. 20 115 V 60 cyc. 1pk start 26 amp. 2.P.F. run 3 amp. 73 P.F.

24x.5
30x.5

NATO

~~SECRET~~

000112

RET

50 + 2178
40
250) 20000 (78)
1778
2220
6.6

WR/WJ 3006/51 REFERS

20	21	22	23
MOUNTING AND GENERAL			
Electric Power Supplies (Kilowatts)	Total Weight Without Crew or Ammunition x	Remote Power Control	Method of Aiming
36 (Peak)	42,000 lbs	Yes	Sight or Director
95 (Peak)	96,000 lbs	Yes	Sight or Director
(AD 440 V (Max. 150 KVA (Normal 40 KVA	49 tons	Yes	Director or Joystick
± 130 Kw (440 V)	55 tons	Electro - Hydraulic Bofors	1. Director 2. Local Gyroscope 3. Local Sight
Inc. Ammo. Supply on Fixed St. 140 (Peak)	46	RP.41 Yes	Director or Reflector Sight (Local)
25.6 K.W.	17 tons approx.	Yes R.P.51	Director Joystick Hand
117 K.W. (approx.)	11 tons	Yes R.P.50	Director or locally by Joystick and N.R.S.3.
None	7600 lbs	No	Sight
5 (Peak)	9200 lbs	Yes	Sight or Director
60 Kw	13 tons	Yes	Director or Joystick
220 or 110 Volts D.C. 13 to 3 amps.	2250 Kg	Yes	Director or Scooter with Type 6 Sight
220 V D.C. 46 amps	15 tons	Not fitted	One man Joystick Gyro control
-	2 tons	Not fitted	One man Scooter Control with Type 6 Sight
4.7	1 1/2 tons	Not fitted	One man Scooter Control with Type 6 Sight
Trg. 15 (Peak) Elev. 5 (Peak)	23,200 lbs	Yes	Ring Sight or Director
-	13,000 lbs	Yes	Ring Sight or Director
-	2350 lbs	No	Ring Sight
See below	1375 lbs	No	Gun Sight Mks 14 or 20
See below	1080 lbs	No	Gun Sight Mks. 14 or 20

17 tons

24	25	26	27
Crew	Working Radius x	Maximum Force of Recoil x	Protection
11	12 ft	77,600 lbs per gun	1/8 in. S.T.S.
27	12 ft 6 ins	77,600 lbs per gun	1/4 in S.T.S.
16	10 ft 10 ins	40 (2 guns) tons	(3/8") D.D. (7/8") A.C.
22	7.47 m	2 + 26 tons	Shield, front top - 20 Sides, back - 15 m.m.
38	9 ft 6 ins	41 (2 guns) tons	DIHT (3/8")
16	138 ins	36 tons (2 guns horizontal)	Shield (normal or extended) 1/8" "D" steel
6 - 8	Not decided possibly 8 ft	24 tons	Shield not decided possibly 3/8" Front 3/16" Side
11	8 ft	27,500 lbs	None
11	8 ft	27,500 lbs	None
(4 on mounting 4 off mounting)	7 ft 10 ins	3.6 tons per gun	Partial Shield 3/8"
Director SPIHT Gun - 5	2150 m.m. 2250 m.m. with spare ammunition	2700 Kg	Splinter Shield in front
1 Officer + 5 on mounting 4 off mounting	9 ft 6 ins	10.45 tons down blow	1/2 splinter shield in front
(+ 1 off mounting to replenish continuous feed) if necessary	5 ft 6 ins	2 tons	No shield Aimer's calcs. 1/2" Birmabright
3 (2 on mounting + 1 off mounting)	5 ft 6 ins	2 tons	No shield. Aimer's calcs. 1/2" Birmabright
11 (including 4 off mounting 2nd loaders)	9 ft (Working Circle)	4800 lbs per gun - brake load	None
7 (including 2 off mounting 2nd loaders)	7 ft (Working Circle)	4800 lbs per gun - brake load	None
5 (including 1 off mounting 2nd loader)	5 ft 7 in (Working Circle)	4800 lbs brake load	None
-	5 ft (Working Circle)	-	-
-	5 ft (Working Circle)	-	-

*** Note. G.S. Mk. 14 115 V 60 cyc. lpk start. 24 amp 000113

RET

26	27	28	29
REMARKS			
Maximum Force of Recoil x	Protection	Place of Manufacture	x Weights and Distances either in Metric or British Units.
77,600 lbs per gun	1/8 in. S.T.S.	Naval Gun Factory	
77,600 lbs per gun	1/4 in S.T.S.	Naval Gun Factory - Northern Ord. Inc.	Note 1 At 30° Gun Elevation At 2000, 5000 and 8000 yards
40 (2 guns) tons	(3/8") D.D. (7/8") A.C.	Ruelle St. Chamond	
2 + 26 tons	Shield, front top - 20 Sides, back - 15 m.m.	1. Wilton-Tyemond - Holland 2. Bofors - Sweden	Loose barrel weight 545 Kg
41 (2 guns) tons	DIHT (3/8")	V.A. Elswick " Barrow H & W Ltd.	
36 tons (2 guns horizontal)	Shield (normal or extended) 1/8" "D" steel	V.A. Elswick V.A. Barrow Marshalls	
24 tons	Shield not decided possibly 3/8" Front 3/16" Side	V.A. Elswick	
27,500 lbs	None	Naval Gun Factory	
27,500 lbs	None	Naval Gun Factory	
3.6 tons per gun	Partial Shield 3/8"	Defa (Puteaux) Tuelle	
2700 Kg	Splinter Shield in front	Bofors	
10.45 tons down blow	1/2 splinter shield in front	Rose Bros. (Gainsborough) C.G. & T (Brechin) R.O.F. Nottingham Australia	Twin barrelled with full blind fire capabilities.
2 tons	No shield Aimer's calcs. 1/4" Birmabright	Bristol Aeroplane Co. Bristol	x Mk. 3 Mtg. similar but AC.440 V. 25 KVA - Column 20 14 1/2 tons - Column 21. Remote for Gun Direction - Column 22. 1 Officer + 4 on Mtg. 4 off Mtg. - Column 24. 9' - Column 25, and Rose Bros. only Column 28.
2 tons	No shield. Aimer's calcs. 1/4" Birmabright	Bristol Aeroplane Co. Bristol	
4800 lbs per gun - brake load	None	N.O.P. York Pa.	
4800 lbs per gun - brake load	None	N.O.P. York Pa.	
4800 lbs brake load	None	Firestone Co. Alcron Ohio	
-	-	Pontiac Div. G.M. Pontiac Michigan	
-	-	Various	

S.S. Mk. 14 115 V 60 cyc. lpk start 24 amp. 5.P.F. run 7.7 amp. 75 P.F. stand by 41.0 P.F.