

50219 - AK-40 Vol 2


ACCESS TO INFORMATION L'ACCES A L'INFORMATION
EXAMINED BY / EXAMINE PAR: <i>R.B. Reynolds</i>
DATE / DATE: <i>June 29, 1989</i>

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MS (H&IR)

FEB 22 1985

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Ottawa, November 28, 1958.

Dear General Foulkes:

Canada-United States Bilateral Agreement on
Atomic Information for Mutual Defence Purposes.

You will have received a copy of telegram 2835 of November 19 from our Embassy in Washington reporting a discussion which a member of the Embassy staff had with an officer of the International Affairs Section of the Atomic Energy Commission and a member of the Military Liaison Committee on the subject of the implementation of the United States-Canada Bilateral Agreement for Atomic Energy Co-operation. In paragraph 6 of this telegram it was indicated that the United States authorities are already working on a draft of a new Canada-United States agreement in order that Canada might take advantage of the amendments to the Atomic Energy Act passed at the last Session of the United States Congress. The telegram goes on to say that the proposed "scope and means" paper being drafted in Washington to provide a framework for dealing with the RCN's interest in obtaining information on nuclear propulsion plants for a submarine, would only serve to bridge the gap between the present agreement and a new military agreement. AK

2. I share the belief my predecessor expressed to you in his letter of October 7, of the need for a new agreement to cover the uses of atomic energy for mutual defence purposes. In my view, the need for a new agreement becomes increasingly more urgent. Not only is one required to regularize the situation which exists at the present moment whereby a certain amount of information is made

General C. Foulkes, CB, CBE, DSO, CD,
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff,
"A" Building,
OTTAWA, Ontario.

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available to us in a manner which is not, strictly speaking, in accord with a literal reading of the present civil and military agreements, but also, in the absence of a new agreement drawn up in terms designed to take advantage of the liberalized provisions of the United States Atomic Energy Act, we are formally being denied certain advantages and opportunities which the revised Act offers. You will recall from the recent meeting in Washington with senior officials of the United States Government that General Loper said that the conclusion of a new bilateral agreement would be necessary in order to meet the point you raised about salvage and safety in connection with SAC over-flights of Canadian territory. He also mentioned the inability of the United States, in the absence of a new agreement, to provide us with information on the safety factors of the new Mark 90 torpedo. A further reason favouring an up-to-date military agreement is more of a political nature; it would make it easier for the Government to deal with possible questions in the House and make existing and future co-operation, generally, easier to explain to our allies.

3. The fact that the Americans are already working on a draft, I take as evidence that they are anxious to be helpful. It might be useful to take advantage of this situation to give early consideration to what Canadian requirements might be in order that any particular points which occur to you could be passed on informally to the United States authorities to assist them in the drafting of the proposed new agreement. You will recall in this connection that General Loper said he thought this draft would be similar to the United Kingdom agreement, except for the question of design information. A further point which occurs to me is that provision of the United States Atomic Energy Act which requires any agreement entered into by the United States Government under its terms to lie before the Congress for a period of sixty days. Thus, assuming that agreement on a text can be reached before Congress opens early in January, the agreement would not enter into force until early in March. In any event that would be the earliest date for it to become effective

4. We should be grateful to have your comments on this matter.

Yours sincerely,

P. V. LEPAN

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

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TO EXTERNAL 2744 PRIORITY
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TRIPARTITE TECHNICAL COOPERATION

WE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR YOU TO HAVE A SUMMARY OF THE
STRUCTURE AND PROGRESS OF THE TRIPARTITE TECHNICAL WORKING GROUPS.
DR GREEN, THE DEFENCE RESEARCH MEMBER, HAS BEEN GOOD ENOUGH TO PROVIDE
THE FOLLOWING: BEGINS:

FROM: DEFENCE RESEARCH MEMBER, CJS(W)

SUBJ: TRIPARTITE TECHNICAL COOPERATION

PENDING THE REACTIVATION OF THE COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE (CPC)
TO BE THE SUPERVISORY BODY OF THE TRIPARTITE TECHNICAL
COOPERATION PROGRAM (TTCP), AN AD HOC COMMITTEE WAS FORMED TO DIRECT
THE PROGRAM IN NON-ATOMIC FIELDS. ITS MEMBERS ARE THE ASSISTANT SECRE-
TARY OF DEFENSE (RESEARCH & ENGINEERING) FOR THE USA, THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE DEFENCE RESEARCH POLICY COMMITTEE FOR THE UK AND THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE DEFENCE RESEARCH BOARD FOR CANADA. THE AD HOC COMMITTEE WILL
PROBABLY CONTINUE TO FUNCTION AS ONE OF THE TWO SUB-COMMITTEES OF
THE CPC, ANOTHER SUBCOMMITTEE PRESUMABLY BEING FORMED BETWEEN THE UK
AND THE USA TO SUPERVISE COOPERATION IN ATOMIC FIELDS.

2. THE MEMBERS OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE HAVE NAMED WASHDC DEPUTIES TO
PROVIDE CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION OF THE ACTIVITIES IN THE NON-ATOMIC
SUB-GROUPS. THE CANADIAN DEPUTY IS DR JJ GREEN, THE DEFENCE RESEARCH
MEMBER IN WASHDC. THE DEPUTIES COMMITTEE HAS BEEN MEETING ABOUT ONCE A
MONTH AND ITS MEMBERS HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH ONE ANOTHER, AS REQUIRED,
TO CLEAR DAY-TO-DAY BUSINESS.

3. IN OTT THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DEFENCE RESEARCH BOARD WAS NAMED BY
THE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE TO ACT AS THE EXECUTIVE AGENT OF THE
COMMITTEE IN ALL MATTERS DEALING WITH TTCP, AND DR GREEN, REP IN WASHDC.
THE DIRECTOR OF PLAS, DRB HQ CARRIES ON THE DAY-TO-DAY COORDINATION
WITH RPS OF THE SERVICES APPOINTED AS FOLLOWS:

THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF NAVAL TECHNICAL SERVICES FOR THE RCN
THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF FOR THE ARMY

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CHIEF OF OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE RCAF.

4. THE FOLLOWING SUB-GROUPS HAVE, AT THIS DATE, BEEN ACTIVE IN VARIOUS DEGREES:

SUB-GROUP "F" - DEFENCE AGAINST BALLISTIC

SUB-GROUP "G" - UNDERSEA WARFARE

SUB-GROUP "H" - AIRCRAFT AND AEROPROPULSION SYSTEMS

SUB-GROUP "I" - THERMIONIC TUBES

SUB-GROUP "J" - INFRA-RED

SUB-GROUP "K" - RADAR TECHNIQUES

5. SUB-GROUP "K" WAS FORMED AFTER THE ORIGINAL DISCUSSIONS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT OTHER SUB-GROUPS MAY BE FORMED AND CONSIDERATION IS BEING GIVEN TO ONE ON ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS AND MATERIALS AND ONE ON ARMAMENT, EXPLOSIVES AND PROPELLENTS. SUB-GROUP "E" - BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WARFARE, AND SUB-GROUP "D" - DELIVERY SYSTEMS, ARE EXPECTED TO BECOME ACTIVE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

6. THE NUMBERS OF DEPT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE REPS ON THE VARIOUS SUB-GROUPS ARE INDICATED BELOW. DRB HAS REPS ON ALL SUB-GROUPS AND THE SERVICES HAVE MADE NOMINATIONS TO MANY OF THEM, DEPENDING ON THEIR INTEREST. ALL NOMINATIONS MUST BE APPROVED BY CDRB ON BEHALF OF CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE. IN MOST SUB-GROUPS A DRB REP IS THE LEADING OR COORDINATING CANADIAN MEMBER. REPRESENTATION AT TTCP MEETINGS IS SUBJECT TO CDRB'S APPROVAL WHICH IS USUALLY SOLICITED BY THE LEADER OF EACH SUB-GROUP. IN ADDITION CHAIRMAN, CHIEFS OF STAFF APPROVAL MUST BE OBTAINED IF THE MEETING IS HELD OVERSEAS.

MEMBERSHIP ON SUB-GROUPS

SUB-GROUP "C" - 1 RCN, 1 DRB

SUB-GROUP "D" - 1 RCAF OBSERVER, 1 DRB NOMINATION PENDING

SUB-GROUP "E" - 1 DRB

SUB-GROUP "F" - 1 DRB, 1 ARMY, 1 RCAF

SUB-GROUP "G" - 1 DRB, 1 RCN, 1 RCAF

TECHNICAL WORKING PANELS OF "G"

SURFACE SYSTEMS - 1 RCN

AIRBORNE SYSTEMS - 1 RCAF, 1 RCN

SUBMARINE SYSTEMS - NIL

MINE WARFARE AND TORPEDO COUNTERMEASURES - 1 RCN

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RESEARCH - 1 DRB

ADMINISTRATIVE WORKING PANELS

TECHNICAL INFORMATION AND RESEARCH - 1 RCN

PATENTS - 1 JAG

SUB-GROUP "H" - 1 DRB, 1 RCAF

WORKING PANELS

VTOL/STOL - 1 DRB, 1 RCB, 1 ARMY, 1 RCAF

DRONES - 1 RCAF, 1 DRB

PROPULSION - NOMINATION PENDING

SUB-GROUP "I" - 2 DRB, 1 ARMY, 1 RCB, 2 ATOMIC ENERGY OF CANADA LIMITED

SUB-GROUP "J" - 2 DRB, 1 RCN, 1 RCAF

SUB-GROUP "K" - 1 DRB, 1 RCAF, 1 RCN, 1 ARMY, CJS(W)

WORKING PANELS

ELECTRONIC SCANNING TECHNIQUES

ECCM

RADAR TECHNIQUES

(NOMINATIONS PENDING)

WASHINGTON STEERING GROUP - 1 DRB, CJS(W)

7. THE NEW PROGRAM (TTCP) WILL BE OF BROADER SCOPE THAN PREVIOUS TRI-PARTITE AGREEMENTS. IT IS TRI-SERVICE AS WELL AS TRIPARTITE. IT IS QUITE LIKELY THAT IT WILL ACHIEVE SOME REAL COOPERATION IN THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE THREE COUNTRIES PRIMARILY BECAUSE IT WILL BE RESPONSIBLE TO A BODY OF VERY HIGH LEVEL, THE CPC, WHICH HAS THE POWER TO RESOLVE LEGAL OR POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES.

8. IT IS PERHAPS TOO EARLY TO ASSESS CRITICALLY THE WORK OF THE PANELS PARTICULARLY SINCE SOME OF THEM HAVE NOT YET OR HAVE ONLY RECENTLY BECOME ACTIVE. SUB-GROUP "G" ON UNDERSEA WARFARE WAS THE FIRST TO BE ACTIVATED AND HAS ALREADY ACCOMPLISHED A GREAT DEAL OF SOLID WORK, AND HOLDS PROMISE OF SIZEABLE ACCOMPLISHMENTS. SUB-GROUP "F" SHOULD BE OF THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE FROM THE DEFENCE POINT OF VIEW. IT HAS NOT YET, IN MY OPINION, FULFILLED THE PROMISE HELD OUT FOR IT BUT I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT IT WILL EVENTUALLY ACHIEVE REAL IMPORTANCE. SUB-GROUP "E" IS FACED WITH UNUSUAL DIFFICULTIES PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF LACK OF NATIONAL POLICIES. THERE IS, HOWEVER, A RECORD OF GOOD TRIPARTITE COLLABORATION IN BW AND CW WHICH MAY HELP TO OFFSET THIS. SUB-GROUP

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"H" HAS MADE A HESITANT BEGINNING WITH NOT MUCH TO SHOW FOR IT AS YET. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, SOME IMPORTANT AREAS OF INTEREST HERE TO ALL THREE SERVICES PARTICULARLY THAT OF VERTICAL TAKEOFF AND LANDING OR STEEP TAKEOFF AND LANDING AIRCRAFT. THERE IS INTENSE INTEREST IN ALL THREE COUNTRIES IN THIS FIELD AND REAL BENEFITS COULD COME FROM AN EFFECTIVE WORKING COLLABORATION. SUB-GROUPS "I" AND "J" HAVE ONLY JUST HELD THEIR FIRST MEETINGS IN OCT IN THE UK. SUB-GROUP "J" SHOULD BE OF CONSIDERABLE INTEREST BECAUSE OF THE GROWING VITAL IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT OF INFRA-RED. SUB-GROUP "K" HAS ONLY JUST HELD ITS FIRST MEETING BUT APPEARS TO BE OFF TO A GOOD START WITH THE CREATION OF TWO WORKING PANELS. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THIS WILL BE AN EFFECTIVE SUB-GROUP IMPROVING OUR COOPERATION IN A HIGHLY IMPORTANT FIELD. ENDS.

COPY 15000 OF 17
FM WASHDC NOV6/58 TOPSEC
TO EXTERNAL 2738 PRIORITY
INFO TT CCOS FM OTT
REF YOURTEL DL882 NOV4
COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE

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Copy No 14 of 50219-40

BEFORE APPROACHING THE STATE DEPT ON THE QUESTIONS RAISED IN PARAS THREE TO FIVE OF YOUR REF TEL, WE THOUGHT IT ADVISABLE TO SPEAK FIRST WITH JOHN ROPER OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY ON THE GENERAL POINTS RAISED. WE DO NOT THINK THAT ROPER WAS ABLE TO ADD MUCH TO THE VARIOUS REPORTS ON THIS SUBJECT WHICH HAVE BEEN ALREADY FORWARDED TO YOU, PARTICULARLY IF THE COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO THE COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE ARE READ ALONG WITH OUR TEL 2527 NOV27/57 AND SUBSEQUENT MSGS ON TRIPARTITE TECHNICAL COOPERATION. IT MAY, HOWEVER, BE HELPFUL TO SUMMARIZE ROPER'S COMMENTS ON THE BASIS OF OUR DISCUSSION WITH HIM THIS MORNING.

2. HE RECALLED THAT THE PROPOSALS FOR THE REVIVAL OF THE CPC HAD THEIR ORIGIN IN THE MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER TOWARDS THE END OF 1957, AND IN PARTICULAR IN THE DECLARATION OF COMMON PURPOSE WHICH EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR "INTERDEPENDENCE", PARTICULARLY IN THE BROAD DEFENCE FIELD. SINCE SO MANY OF THE PROBLEMS IN THIS FIELD HAD PROVEN BY EXPERIENCE TO BE BEST HANDLED THROUGH TRIPARTITE DISCUSSION AND CONSULTATION, CANADA HAD BEEN INCLUDED ON THE VARIOUS TECHNICAL SUBGROUPS WHICH WERE SET UP IN DEC LAST IN THOSE AREAS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO CANADA BUT EXCLUDING GROUPS DEALING WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS MATTERS ON WHICH UNDER USA ATOMIC ENERGY LEGISLATION COOPERATION ON A TRIPARTITE BASIS WAS NOT FEASIBLE. ARISING OUT OF THIS BASIC CONCEPT OF "INTERDEPENDENCE", THE UK HAD SUBSEQUENTLY GONE FORWARD WITH ITS PARTICULAR BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE USA PROVIDING FOR A WIDER EXCHANGE OF WEAPONS AND MISSILE DESIGN IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REVISIONS APPROVED BY CONGRESS TO THE MCMAHON ACT. AT THE SAME TIME, WORK WAS STARTED ON A TRIPARTITE BASIS THROUGH THE VARIOUS TECHNICAL GROUPS IN THE NONNUCLEAR FIELD WHICH MET AND HAVE CONTINUED TO MEET IN WASHDC.

3. IN ORDER TO PROVIDE AN UMBRELLA FOR THESE PRACTICAL FORMS OF

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COOPERATION IN THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FIELD, AND AT THE SAME TIME TO PROVIDE FOR APPROPRIATE MINISTERIAL MACHINERY THROUGH WHICH THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION COULD BE GUIDED AND STIMULATED WHEN THE NEED AROSE, THE OBVIOUS CHOICE SEEMED TO BE TO LOOK AGAIN AT THE COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE AND READAPT IT TO MEET PRESENT NEEDS. EXPERIENCE HAD SHOWN HOW EFFECTIVE THE CPC HAD PROVEN IN WARTIME COOPERATION. SINCE THE ORGANIZATION, ALTHOUGH INACTIVE FOR SOME YEARS HAD NEVER BEEN TERMINATED, IT WAS THOUGHT THAT WIDER TERMS OF REF SHOULD BE GIVEN TO IT TO PERMIT HIGH LEVEL SUPERVISION OF THE VARIOUS TRIPARTITE TASKS IN THE NON NUCLEAR AS WELL AS THE NUCLEAR FIELD. FURTHER IT WOULD MAKE FOR A DEFENSIBLE POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE FRENCH. WHILE ROPER POINTED OUT THAT CANADA WOULD INDEED BE A FULL MEMBER OF THE REVIVED COMMITTEE, AS HE HAD INDICATED TO US EARLIER IN AUG (SEE OUR TEL 1890 AUG 15) BECAUSE OF USA LEGISLATION RESTRICTING EXCHANGES IN THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FIELD, AND THE SPECIAL POSITION OF THE UK, ASPECTS OF THE STUDY OF COOPERATION IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD RELATING PARTICULARLY TO ATOMIC WARHEADS WOULD HAVE TO BE HANDLED ON A BIPARTITE RATHER THAN ON A TRIPARTITE BASIS. THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR PROPULSION, ON THE OTHER HAND, WOULD BE ONE IN WHICH HE ASSUMED WE WOULD HAVE A CONTINUING INTEREST. BY APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENT OF THE AGENDA, HE THOUGHT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DEVISE FLEXIBLE PROCEDURES WHICH WOULD MEET THIS SPECIAL PROBLEM. IN THE OTHER NON NUCLEAR AREAS OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, HE THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS MUCH TO BE SAID FOR A PERIODIC CHECK BY RESPONSIBLE MINISTERS ON THE PROGRESS OR LACK OF PROGRESS BEING MADE, AND THAT THE CPC, WITH ITS REVISED TERMS OF REF COULD SERVE THIS OBJECTIVE. IN PARTICULAR, THE UK ATTACHED IMPORTANCE, HE THOUGHT, TO THE ROLE WHICH THE SECRETARY OF STATE COULD PLAY IN CUTTING THROUGH SOME OF THE PENTAGON ROADBLOCKS TO MORE EFFECTIVE TRIPARTITE COOPERATION. FINALLY, HE CONSIDERED THAT NO MATTER HOW ABLE THE SENIOR DEFENCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PEOPLE MIGHT BE, THEIR WORK COULD BE FACILITATED AND TO SOME EXTENT DIRECTED THROUGH JOINT DISCUSSION ON THE PART OF RESPONSIBLE MINISTERS AND

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APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICIALS AS THE NEED AROSE.

4. FINALLY, WITH REF TO THE QUESTION OF DEFENCE PRODUCTION RAISED IN PARAS OF YOUR MSG, ROPER GAVE US A LITTLE FURTHER BACKGROUND TO THAT PROVIDED BY SIR RICHARD POWELL, AS REPORTED IN OUR TEL 2362 SEP26.

DURING POWELL'S RECENT VISIT, THE QUESTION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF TRIPARTITE PRODUCTION ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN RAISED INFORMALLY IN A LARGE MEETING BY MANSFIELD SPRAGUE OF THE DEPT OF DEFENSE. SUBSEQUENTLY POWELL AND QUARLES HAD HAD THEIR TALK, AS REPORTED IN PARAS OUR REF TEL. POWELL'S VIEW, HOWEVER, HAD BEEN THAT IT WOULD BE MOST UNDESIRABLE TO BEGIN TO DRAW UP COMPREHENSIVE PLANS FOR PRODUCTION POOLING. HE HAD URGED THAT THE APPROACH SHOULD BE AN EMPIRICAL ONE BASED UPON THE PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT GROUPS WHOSE CONTINUING WORK WOULD INDICATE PRACTICAL AREAS IN WHICH EFFECTIVE TRIPARTITE COOPERATION ON SPECIFIC PRODUCTION PROJECTS MIGHT EVENTUALLY DEVELOP. AS WE UNDERSTAND THE POSITION, THERE DOES NOT, THEREFORE, SEEM TO BE ANY INTENTION HERE FORMALLY TO WIDEN THE DRAFT TERMS OF REF ALREADY SUBMITTED TO US FOR THE CPC TO INCLUDE DEFENCE PRODUCTION. RATHER, THE EXPECTATION WOULD BE THAT OUT OF THE TRIPARTITE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ARRANGEMENTS AREAS OF POSSIBLE PRODUCTION COOPERATION MIGHT GRADUALLY REVEAL THEMSELVES. AT ANY RATE, ROPER THOUGHT THAT THIS ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM WAS NOT BEING PRESSED BY THE USA OR THE UK AT THE PRESENT TIME.

4. WE ALSO SPOKE WITH COURTNEY AND SPIEGEL OF THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR ATOMIC ENERGY MATTERS LATER TODAY. COURTNEY, AS ROPER HAD DONE EARLIER, CONFIRMED THAT THE PROPOSALS AROSE FROM THE CONCEPT OF "INTERDEPENDENCE," AND ATTEMPTED TO FOLLOW ALONG IN A PRACTICAL WAY FROM THE NATO DISCUSSIONS OF LAST DEC AS TO THE IMPORTANCE OF MAKING PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS TO IMPLEMENT THIS CONCEPT. THE REVIVAL OF THE CPC WAS NOT, HE SAID, SPECIFICALLY RELATED EITHER TO THE UK BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS OR TO THE CURRENT QUESTIONS NOW UNDER DISCUSSION WITH US RELATING TO THE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITY INTO THE DEFENCE OF NORTHAMERICA. HE RECOGNIZED CLEARLY THAT CANADIAN

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MINISTERS WOULD WISH TO PARTICIPATE AS A FULL MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE, BUT RECALLED THAT SINCE WE WERE NOT ENGAGED IN THE PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, EXCHANGES OF INFO IN FIELDS RELATING TO INFO CONCERNING NUCLEAR WARHEADS WOULD HAVE TO BE RESTRICTED UNDER USA LEGISLATION TO A US-UK BASIS. HE FULLY RECOGNIZED, HOWEVER, OUR INTEREST IN SUCH FIELDS, FOR EXAMPLE, AS NUCLEAR PROPULSION (ON WHICH A SEPARATE MSG IS GOING FORWARD), AND AGREED THAT ONCE THE MACHINERY OF THE CPC IS FUNCTIONING, THE SCOPE OF THE VARIOUS WORKING GROUPS WHICH HAVE BEEN IN BEING SINCE LAST DEC COULD BE REVIEWED, SUBJECT OF COURSE TO THE BASIC RESERVE INDICATED ABOVE. COURTNEY CONFIRMED ROPER'S VIEW THAT THE NEW CPC COULD PERFORM A USEFUL FUNCTION IN REVIEWING AND LAYING DOWN GUIDE LINES FOR THE VARIOUS FORMS OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION. ON THE QUESTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE CPC TO DEFENCE PRODUCTION, COURTNEY MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEIR PRESENT DRAFT DID NOT ENVISAGE EXTENDING THE SCOPE OF THE COMMITTEE TO THE PRODUCTION FIELD, BUT WAS RESTRICTED TO RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. HE THOUGHT THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO SAY HOW POSSIBLE DEFENCE PRODUCTION COOPERATION COULD BEST BE ORGANIZED ON A TRIPARTITE BASIS, AND WE DID NOT HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT ANY PARTICULAR URGENCY WAS ATTACHED TO THIS PART OF THE PROBLEM.

5. IT IS HOPED THAT ON THE BASIS OF THESE REPORTS YOU WILL SOON BE IN A POSITION TO LET US HAVE DEFINITIVE COMMENTS, AND IF POSSIBLE YOUR APPROVAL OF THE PROPOSAL FOR THE REACTIVATION OF THE CPC. DISCUSSION ON THE CPC AT THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION IN NOV, OR AT THE MINISTERIAL MEETING IN DEC COULD THEN DEAL WITH PROGRAMMING AND ANY SPECIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA WE MIGHT WISH TO BRING FORWARD.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

RESTD

Security ~~TOP SECRET~~

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Type of Document.....*Tel*..... No. *DL882* Date... *Nov. 4/58*.....
From.....*E.A.*.....
To.....*Washington*.....
Subject: *Combined Policy Committee*

Original on File No.....*50214-40*.....

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Other Cross Reference Sheets on.....

Prepared by.....*[Signature]*.....



CANADA

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HS (H&IR)
FEB 22 1985

Chairman, Chiefs of Staff
Secretary to the Cabinet

OFFICE OF
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

~~TOP SECRET~~

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OTTAWA,
October 20, 1958

Orig. on - 50214-D-40
Copies on { 50210-F-40
{ 50245-40

Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons

I attach for your information copies of telegram 2105 of October 14 from our Embassy in Washington which deals in part with CINCNORAD's position with respect to the use of nuclear weapons. It would seem that CINCNORAD has not received advance authorization from the President to use nuclear weapons.

2. The telegram deals as well with the general question of arrangements under which Canada might acquire nuclear weapons. We find it particularly interesting that United States officials should suggest that the United States-United Kingdom arrangements, under which the President and the Prime Minister share responsibility for the use of nuclear weapons in certain circumstances, would be relevant to any Canada-United States arrangements.

3. I believe that we should accept the United States offer set out in the attachment. I think it would be appropriate, therefore, to arrange for an early Meeting of Consultation at which the problems connected with the acquisition, storage and control of nuclear weapons might be the primary subject for discussion. There are other reasons as well why an early Meeting of Consultation should be arranged.

4. I understand that at a recent meeting which Mr. Légar had with you it was agreed that CINCNORAD's responsibilities with respect to the declaration of increased status of military readiness should be discussed

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at a Meeting of Consultation. When the possibility of a meeting of the Ministerial Committee on Defence was discussed with Mr. Dulles (Washington telegram 2473, October 9), he assumed that preparatory work for the Committee's meeting would be undertaken at a Meeting of Consultation.

5. I understand that the Cabinet, as a result of its consideration on October 15 of your Minister's submission on the acquisition of nuclear weapons, authorized us to explore, with the United States Government, the terms under which Canada would be able to acquire the necessary defensive nuclear weapons. A Meeting of Consultation would be an ideal first step in carrying out the Cabinet's desires.

6. It may be desirable to limit the agenda of the next Meeting of Consultation. At earlier meetings it has been customary to include as a formal agenda item a review of United States objectives in the world's major diplomatic situations. Perhaps, for the next Meeting of Consultation, we could dispense with this general topic and concentrate primarily on the specific topics of immediate relevance to the December meeting of Ministers. I believe we should, however, include as item on the Far Eastern situation. In the circumstances, the agenda might look something like the following:

- (a) problems connected with the acquisition and control of defensive nuclear weapons in Canada;
- (b) problems connected with the declaration by CINCPAC of increased states of military readiness;
- (c) other matters to be considered by the Canada-United States Committee on Joint Defence.
- (d) the Far Eastern Situation.

3.

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7. I assume it would not be necessary under (c) above to deal at length with the substance of the other items which have been proposed for the Ministerial Meeting, i.e. the integration of Canada-United States defense production and cost sharing arrangements to cover the immediate programmes in the air defence field. The first Canada-United States meeting on integrated defence production has already taken place and a further one is scheduled for the middle of November. I understand that cost sharing arrangements are under discussion now between the Department of National Defence and the United States Defence Department. It would seem to involve unnecessary duplication of effort to discuss these items at length at the Meeting of Consultation.

8. I should be grateful if you could let me have your comments on the suggestions outlined above in order that an early approach might be made to the State Department to arrange for a Meeting of Consultation. I suggest that the meeting should be scheduled for about the middle of November, so that we will be given an opportunity to consider what effect our discussions with senior United States officials should have on our briefs for the December meeting of Ministers. Perhaps the Interdepartmental Panel on the Economic Aspects of Defence would serve as a convenient body in which to co-ordinate the results of these various meetings with United States officials before final briefs are prepared for the Canadian Ministers who will attend the December meeting.

(SGD.) N.A. Robertson

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

ACCESS SECTION / SECTION DE L'ACCÈS

DOCUMENT REMOVED FROM FILE / DOCUMENT RETIRÉ DU DOSSIER

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Description of document / Description du document

Telex # 2501 from Washington to External

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Access to Information Act / Reason for Removal

Loi sur l'accès à l'information / Retrait en vertu de

Exemption / Exception

EXEMPTION / EXCEPTION 13(1)(a) 15(1)
ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT
LOI SUR L'ACCÈS À L'INFORMATION

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FM WASHDC OCT9/58 CONF
TO EXTERNAL 2468 OPIMMEDIATE

REF YOURTEL DL788(PARA2)OCT7

NORAD--USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

DALE, ACTING DIRECTOR OF BNA OFFICE OF STATE DEPT TOLD US THIS AFTERNOON THAT THE PENTAGON HAD PREPARED FOR MR QUARLES, WHO IS EXPECTING TO SEE THE PRESS TODAY ON OTHER MATTERS, A BRIEF STATEMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE RAYMOND STORY TO BE USED ONLY REPEAT ONLY IN THE EVENT THAT A QUESTION IS RAISED. THE STATEMENT AS GIVEN TO US WOULD READ AS FOLLOWS:

"AS IS WELL KNOWN, NORAD IS EQUIPPED WITH ATOMIC CAPABLE WEAPONS FOR USE IN DEFENCE OF THIS COUNTRY AND CANADA AGAINST BOMBER ATTACK. THE LAW VESTS THE CONTROL OF THESE WEAPONS IN THE PRESIDENT.

"OBVIOUSLY, FOR SECURITY REASONS, WE DO NOT DISCUSS IN WHAT MANNER THE PRESIDENT MAY EXERCISE THIS CONTROL."

2. DALE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL FOR US TO HAVE THIS TEXT AND INDICATED HE HOPED TO HAVE FURTHER INFO FOR US ON THE POINTS WE HAD RAISED IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

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et 50219-D-40
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50210-F-40*

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FM WASHDC OCT3/5/58 SECRET
TO EXTERNAL 2451 OPIMMEDIATE

REF YOURTEL DL788 OCT7

NORAD--USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH CJS ABOUT THE RAYMOND STORY IN YESTERDAY'S
NY TIMES AND THE JOINT STAFF IN TURN HAS SPOKEN WITH THE PENTAGON
WHOSE OFFICIALS ADVISED CJS THAT GENERAL PARTRIDGE HAD BEEN
MISQUOTED AND THAT THE STATEMENT ON WHICH THE PRESS REPORT IS
BASED HAD BEEN WELL WITHIN THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK OF THE NORAD
EXCHANGE OF NOTES.

2. WE HAVE ALSO TAKEN UP THE MATTER WITH THE BNA OFFICE OF
STATE DEPT. DALE, THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF THAT OFFICE, CONFIRMED THAT,
FROM THEIR INQUIRIES, THE STORY CONTAINS A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT
INACCURACIES AS TO WHAT WAS SAID BUT ADDED THAT NEITHER THE
PENTAGON NOR THE STATE DEPT WAS PLANNING AT THIS STAGE TO
ISSUE ANY CORRECTIVE STATEMENT. THE GROUNDS FOR THIS WERE MAINLY
THAT ANY STATEMENT OF CLARIFICATION WOULD GIVE RISE TO FURTHER
QUESTIONS. IN VIEW OF THE INTEREST OF THIS GENERAL MATTER TO NATO,
CONSIDERATION IS BEING GIVEN (ALTHOUGH NOTHING HAS BEEN DECIDED AS
YET) TO THE POSSIBLE NEED FOR SOME STATEMENT OF CLARIFICATION BEING
MADE BY THE USA DELEGATION IN THE COUNCIL. DALE SAID THAT THEY WERE
LOOKING FURTHER INTO THE D THAT HE WOULD HAVE SOMETHING
MORE TO SAY TO US BOTH ON THE PRESS REPORT AND ON THE SUBSTANCE
OF THE MATTER IN A DAY OR SO.

50219-RK 40	
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*Caf 50309-40**
50245-40
50219-D-40
50210-F-40

FM WASHDC OCT7/58 RESTD
TO EXTERNAL 2444 OPIMMEDIATE

YOUR ATTENTION WILL ALREADY HAVE BEEN DRAWN TO JACK RAYMOND'S STORY
IN TODAY'S NY TIMES DATED LINE COLORADO SPRINGS ATTRIBUTING TO GENERAL
PARTRIDGE THE STATEMENT THAT "HIS IS THE ONLY COMMAND AUTHORIZED TO
FIRE A NUCLEAR WEAPON IN COMBAT WITHOUT THE SPECIFIC APPROVAL OF
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER."

Orig 50309-40

50219-AK-40	
58	✓

EXTERNAL OTT OCT7/58 SECRET
TO WASHDC DL788 OPIMMEDIATE

REF YOURTEL 2444 OCT7

NORAD-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

*C.C. 50245-40
50210-F-40
50219-D-40*

THANK YOU FOR DRAWING OUR ATTENTION TO THE NY TIMES ARTICLE WHICH ATTRIBUTES TO GENERAL PARTRIDGE THE VIEW THAT HIS COMMAND IS AUTHORIZED TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN COMBAT WITHOUT THE SPECIFIC APPROVAL OF PRESIDENT EISENHOWER.

2. BECAUSE OF THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THIS MATTER WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD SEEK THE STATE DEPT'S COMMENTS ON THIS PRESS STORY AS A MATTER OF URGENCY. IF THE PRESS STORY IS ACCURATE WE WOULD WISH THE STATE DEPT TO GIVE US DETAILS ON WHAT EXACT AUTHORIZATION HAS BEEN GIVEN TO GENERAL PARTRIDGE. NATURALLY WE WOULD BE PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS TO HAVE THE STATE DEPT'S COMMENTS ON THAT PARA OF THE PRESS ARTICLE WHICH INDICATES THAT NORAD WAS GIVEN ITS AUTHORIZATION TO USE ANY WEAPON NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT ITS MISSION WHEN THE JOINT CANADA-USA COMMAND WAS ESTABLISHED SEP 1957.

3. IF THE STORY IS INACCURATE WE SHOULD BE INTERESTED TO KNOW IF THE USA AUTHORITIES PLAN TO ISSUE ANY CORRECTIVE STATEMENT.

4. FOR YOUR OWN INFO THE ACCURACY OR INACCURACY OF THIS STORY IS IMMEDIATELY RELEVANT TO RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH WILL BE MADE PROBABLY WITHIN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS TO THE CABINET CONCERNING THE ACQUISITION AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC WEAPONS FOR USE BY CANADIAN FORCES.

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FM WASHDC OCT2/58 SECRET
TO EXTERNAL 2417 OPINMADIATE

REF OURTEL 1868 AUG13

COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE

SINCE IT IS SOME TIME SINCE THE STATE DEPT APPROACHED US WITH
PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE REACTIVATION OF THE COMBINED POLICY
COMMITTEE, I THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF WE COULD HAVE AN INDICATION
OF YOUR VIEWS IN THE MATTER, AND IF POSSIBLE IF WE COULD GIVE
DEPARTMENTAL OFFICIALS HERE SOME IDEA OF OUR RESPONSE TO THESE
IMPORTANT PROPOSALS

ROBERTSON

COPY ...17... OF 17

FM WASHDC SEP26/58 ~~TOP SECRET~~
TO EXTERNAL 2362 PRIORITY
INFO LDN

VISIT OF UK MINISTER OF DEFENCE

AS YOU KNOW, DUNCAN SANDYS HAS RECENTLY COMPLETED A BRIEF VISIT TO WASHDC, AND IS AT PRESENT TOURING USA MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS. SIR RICHARD POWELL, PERMANENT SECRETARY OF THE UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, AND ROOPER OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY HERE, CALLED AT THE EMBASSY YESTERDAY AND WE HAD A BRIEF DISCUSSION WHICH PROVIDES SOME INSIGHT INTO THE NATURE OF THE LATEST ROUND OF UK-USA DEFENCE TALKS.

2. THE CENTRAL CORE OF THE DISCUSSION REVOLVED AROUND THE CONCEPT OF "INTERDEPENDENCE" WITH PARTICULAR REF TO COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF ADVANCED WEAPONS. THERE WAS CONSIDERATION OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT WHEREBY THE USA HAS BEEN SUPPLYING BRITAIN WITH IRBMS, AND EXCHANGES OF INFO WITH RESPECT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ICBM. THERE WAS ALSO AN EXAMINATION OF THE WIDER POSSIBILITIES FOR COOPERATION IN WEAPONS DESIGN THAT HAVE BEEN OPENED UP BY THE NEW USA ATOMIC ENERGY LEGISLATION, AND THE USA-UK BILATERAL AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR A WIDER EXCHANGE OF WEAPONS AND MISSILE DESIGN INFO IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD. POWELL NOTED THAT A FURTHER BILATERAL AGREEMENT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO MAKE POSSIBLE TRANSFERS TO THE UK OF FISSILE MATERIALS FOR WEAPONS PURPOSES. THE UK WAS INTERESTED IN OBTAINING INFO AND ASSISTANCE FROM THE USA IN DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR PROPELLED SUBMARINE.

3. OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO CANADA WERE POWELL'S REFS TO THE POSSIBILITY OF THE EXTENSION OF THE FORMS OF TRIPARTITE COOPERATION NOW ENVISAGED IN THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FIELD UNDER THE PROPOSALS FOR THE REACTIVATION OF THE COMBINED POLICO COMMITTEE (SEE OUR TELS 1868 & 1869 AUG13) TO THE FIELD OF DEFENCE PRODUCTION. POWELL SAID THAT IN THE COURSE OF THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH QUARLES, THE LATTER HAD MENTIONED THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE DURING MR PEARKES' VISIT TO WASHDC WITH RESPECT TO STRENGTHENING USA-CANADIAN COOPERATION IN THE DEFENCE PRODUCTION FIELD. ON THE UK SIDE THE IDEA HAD BEEN ADVANCED THAT, RATHER THAN ENVISAGE TWO BILATERAL SETS OF COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS RELATING TO DEFENCE PRODUCTION, IT MIGHT BE PREFERABLE TO AIM AT DEVELOPING TRIPARTITE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE PRODUCTION FIELD ON

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PAGE TWO 2362

FEB 22 1925

LINES SIMILAR TO THOSE NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION IN THE FIELDS OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. POWELL SAID THAT IN THE UK VIEW THERE WAS MUCH TO BE SAID FOR SUCH A CONCEPT. GUARLES WAS OF THE SAME OPINION AND EXPECTED TO RAISE THE MATTER SHORTLY WITH MR PEARKES AT AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY. THE MACHINERY FOR ORGANIZING SUCH TRIPARTITE CO-OPERATION POWELL THOUGHT, MIGHT BE DEVELOPED UNDER THE GENERAL MINISTERIAL AUTHORITY PROVIDED FOR IN THE DRAFTS YOU ARE NOW EXAMINING RELATING TO PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE. POWELL ADDED THAT THE UK WAS QUITE HAPPY WITH THE DRAFT DOCUMENTS TO WHICH OUR EARLIER TELS REFERRED, AND HE HOPED THAT CANADA WOULD SOON BE IN A POSITION TO INDICATE ITS VIEWS ON THE PROPOSALS FOR REVIVING THE CPC

ROBERTSON

FM WASHDC AUG13/58 SECRET
TO LONDON 1890 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO WASHDC (FOR MINISTER & MR ROBERTSON) OPIMMEDIATE

REF OURTELS 1868 AND 1869 AUG13

COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE

JOHN ROPER OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY, WHO HAS BEEN WORKING ON THE
UK-USA BILATERAL AGREEMENT ON ATOMIC ENERGY USES FOR MUTUAL DEFENCE

PURPOSES AND ON THE PROBLEMS OF REVIVING THE COMBINED POLICY
COMMITTEE, GAVE US TODAY HIS IMPRESSIONS OF HOW THE PROPOSED ARRAN-

GEMENTS MIGHT WORK. IN THE FIRST PLACE, HE THOUGHT THAT THE PARTI-

CIPATION OF MR DULLES IN THE TOP-LEVEL COMMITTEE WOULD BE USEFUL

IN CLEARING THE PATH FOR PROJECTS WHICH MIGHT OTHERWISE BECOME

OBSTRUCTED BY THE COMPLEX OF INTERDEPARTMENTAL USA RESPONSIBILITIES.

AS HE POINTED OUT, THERE IS AT PRESENT (AS YOU ARE AWARE) AN AD HOC

SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE ON WHICH THE THREE GOVTS ARE REPRESENTED AT

THE OFFICIAL LEVEL IN WASHDC, ARISING OUT OF THE TRIPARTITE TECH-

NICAL TALKS OF LAST FALL. HE IMAGINED THAT THIS BODY WOULD BECOME

ESSENTIALLY A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE CPC UNDER THE PROPOSED ARRANGE-

MENTS, WITH ITS RESPONSIBILITIES CONTINUING TO COVER THE NON-NUCLEAR

FIELD. AS INDICATED IN THE AIDEMEMOIRE, IT IS ENVISAGED THAT

INITIALLY A SUBCOMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR ASPECTS WILL ALSO BE ESTABLISHED.

ROPER POINTED OUT THAT BECAUSE OF THE SPECIAL BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS

BETWEEN THE USA AND THE UK RELATING TO COOPERATION IN THE WEAPONS

FIELD, IT WOULD PROBABLY BE NECESSARY FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR

MATTERS TO BE BROKEN DOWN INTO TWO MAIN FIELDS: (1) NUCLEAR PROPULSION,

IN WHICH CANADA WOULD HAVE A CLEAR AND DIRECT INTEREST, AND (2) THE

WEAPONS FIELD, WHICH WOULD BE ESSENTIALLY ON A USA-UK BASIS. THERE

WOULD OBVIOUSLY ALSO BE QUESTIONS OF SUPPLY OF MATERIALS RELATING

TO EACH OF THESE TWO PRINCIPAL FIELDS. ROPER'S THOUGHT THEREFORE WAS

THAT SO FAR AS COOPERATION IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD WAS CONCERNED,

FLEXIBLE ARRANGEMENTS WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE WITH RESPECT TO THE

AGENDA OF MEETINGS AND TO THE SECRETARIAT IN RECOGNITION OF THIS

PARTICULAR PROBLEM.

2. HE WAS CONSCIOUS OF THE DIFFICULT POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE FRENCH,

BUT SAID THAT THIS COULD PERHAPS BEST BE DEALT WITH BY ENSURING

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PAGE TWO 1890

THAT THE REACTIVATION OF THE CPC(WHEN ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN AGREED) SHOULD BE PRESENTED AS A CONTINUATION OF EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS, RATHER THAN AS A NEW DEPARTURE, AND HE TOO EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR KEEPING PUBLICITY TO A MINIMUM.

3. INCIDENTALLY, WHILE DISCUSSING THIS MATTER WITH HIM, ROPER REFERRED TO THE UK-USA BILATERAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGREEMENT FOR MUTUAL DEFENCE PURPOSES(COPY OF WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN FORWARDED TO YOU), AND SAID THAT ON THE WHOLE IT WAS A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT. THERE WAS ONE PROBLEM HOWEVER ON WHICH THE UK FELT THEIR POSITION HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN ADEQUATELY MET, AND WHICH RELATED TO THE SUPPLY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS FOR WEAPONS PURPOSES. WHILE THE UK IS PRODUCING MATERIAL IN THIS CATEGORY, ROPER POINTED OUT THAT ITS PRODUCTION IS CONSIDERABLY CHEAPER IN THE USA. WHAT THE UK WOULD EVENTUALLY LIKE TO ACHIEVE IS AN ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY MATERIALS ARE SUPPLIED FROM THE UK AND PROCESSES IN THE USA. THIS WOULD MORE FULLY REFLECT THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF INTERDEPENDENCE. AT THE TIME OF THE PASSAGE OF THE BILATERAL, HOWEVER, THERE HAD BEEN CONSIDERABLE ACTIVITY BY THE URANIUM LOBBY IN THE USA AND IT HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO WORK OUT ARRANGEMENTS ON THESE LINES. THE UK HOPED, HOWEVER, TO REVERT TO THE QUESTION, PERHAPS NEXT YEAR.

4. WE DREW ROPER'S ATTENTION TO THE DISCUSSION IN OUR HOUSE COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRES ON ATOMIC ENERGY MATTERS(VOLUME 3 COVERING PROCEEDINGS OF AUG4). HE SAID THAT IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT THE FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMME HAD BEEN CONSIDERABLY ADVANCED EVEN BEFORE GENERAL DEGAULLE'S RETURN, AND THAT THE PROCESS HAD NOW BEEN ACCELERATED. IT WAS DOUBTFUL WHETHER ANY STEPS COULD NOW BE TAKEN TO REVERSE THE PROCESS OR TO RESTRAIN FRANCE IN ITS EFFORTS TO BECOME AN ATOMIC MILITARY POWER.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Security *SECRET*....

50219-AK-40		
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Type of Document... *Letter* No..... Date... *Aug. 15/58*
From..... *E.A.*
To..... *Pres. Atomic Control Bd. - C.C.S. & Sec. to the Cabinet*
Subject: *U.S. Proposal to reactivate the Combined
Policy Cmtee to facilitate co-operation
in atomic matters among the U.S. - U.K. &
Canada*

Original on File No... *50219-40*.....

Copies on File No.....

Other Cross Reference Sheets on.....

Prepared by... *[Signature]*

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CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

SECRET

MINUTES OF THE 615th MEETING
January 8, 1958.

IV. UNDERSEA WARFARE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (SECRET)

33

32. The Committee had for considerations:

- a) a report from the CNS, CAS and CDRB concerning Undersea Warfare Research and Development, and
- b) a memorandum from the Chairman, Defence Research Board, entitled "Tripartite Discussions on Areas of Technical Cooperation".

(CSC:1888.1 TD:15B of 3 and 7 Jan 58)

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33. The Chief of the Naval Staff referring specifically to the paper on "Undersea Warfare Research and Development", explained that the immediate requirement was to nominate Canadian representatives to the Undersea Warfare Research and Development Committees in order that the tripartite discussions on technical cooperation in this field could proceed. He pointed out that US and British representatives had been nominated and that it was the intention to commence these discussions at the end of January.

35

34. General Foulkes suggested that the Chiefs of Staff decide on the recommendations made by the Chairman, DRB, in his paper, since these recommendations included the recommendations put forward by the Chief of the Naval Staff, the Chief of the Air Staff and the Chairman, Defence Research Board.

36

35. The Deputy Minister agreed that value would be gained from Canadian representation on these various committees, but suggested that it would be desirable to find out at an early stage what the continuing role of these committees might be. He referred particularly to the large amount of work which had been undertaken by the Committees on Military Standardization and the small amount of benefit which had accrued from their activities.

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36. The Committee agreed:

- a) to approve the recommendations in CDRB's paper "Tripartite Discussions on Areas of Technical Cooperation";
- b) that the Coordinator Joint Staff would inform CJS(W) as to the names of the Canadian representatives on the Undersea Warfare Research and Development Committees;
- c) that CJS(W) would be asked to find out
 - i) the channel of responsibility of the Technical Cooperation Committees;
 - ii) the method of implementation of their findings; and
 - iii) what action was now necessary with regard to the setting up of the other committees.

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FLUSHDC DEC18/57 TOPSEC CDN EYES ONLY
TO EXTERNAL 2671 PRIORITY

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REF OUR TEL 2670 DEC18

ATOMIC ENERGY CONSULTATIONS

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY SIR RICHARD POWELL,
DATED NOV25,REFERRED TO IN OUR REF TEL.BEGINS:

STATEMENT BY SIR RICHARD POWELL

THE UK REGARD THE PRESENT DISCUSSIONS AS PAVING THE WAY FOR THE
MEETING OF THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE WHICH IS DUE ON DEC3.

2.THE PRINCIPLES WHICH THE UK CONSIDERS SHOULD BE APPLIED
TO FUTURE COOPERATION WITH THE USA IN THE FIELDS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY
AND DEFENCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ARE:-

- (I)DIVISION OF LABOUR
- (II)RATIONALIZATION OF EFFORT
- (III)AVOIDANCE OF DUPLICATION

3.AS WAS AGREED DURING THE MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME
MINISTER,EXCHANGE OF INFO IS NOT SUFFICIENT;WHAT IS NEEDED IS AN
ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES AND EFFORTS,EXTENDING TO SPECIFIC PROJECTS.

4.BASIC RESEARCH SHOULD,HOWEVER,CONTINUE INDEPENDENTLY IN BOTH
COUNTRIES,WITH THE FULLEST POSSIBLE EXCHANGE OF INFO BETWEEN THEM.

5.IN THE WORLD OF TODAY COOPERATION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DEFENCE
AGAINST THEM IS THE HEART OF THE PROBLEM.THE UK RECOGNISES THAT
ANY PLANNING ON THESE SUBJECTS MUST BE CONTINGENT UPON THE APPRO-
PRIATE AMENDMENT OF THE USA ATOMIC ENERGY ACT.

6.THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING OF THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE WILL BE
THE"BLUEPRINTING"OF AREAS AND TYPES OF COOPERATION.WHAT THE UK
HOPES FOR IS COOPERATION RIGHT ACROSS THE BOARD FOR THE WHOLE
FIELD OF DEFENCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.THE FIELD IS,HOWEVER,
SO VAST THAT IT MUST BE BROKEN DOWN INTO SEPARATE AREAS.THE UK
HAS THEREFORE PRODUCED SUGGESTIONS FOR DIVIDING THE WORK OF THE
TECHNICAL COMMITTEE INTO SEPARATE CATEGORIES.

7.THE CATEGORIES WHICH THE UK WOULD REGARD AS OF THE HIGHEST
PRIORITY ARE:-

- (I)ATOMIC WARHEADS AND THE USE OF FISSILE MATERIAL FOR THEM.
- (II)BALLISTIC MISSILES.
- (III)DEFENCE AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES.
- (IV)NUCLEAR PROPULSION FOR MILITARY PURPOSES.
- (V)USE OF TESTING FACILITIES(IF THE USA ARE INTERESTED IN THIS).

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8. AS A SUBSIDIARY LIST WHICH THE UK WOULD HOPE THAT THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE COULD COVER IN GENERAL TERMS DURING ITS FORTHCOMING MEETING THE UK WOULD SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING:-

- (I) ANTISUBMARINE DETECTION.
- (II) ANTISUBMARINE WEAPONS.
- (III) AIRCRAFT AND AERO ENGINES.
- (IV) GROUND TO AIR GUIDED MISSILES.
- (V) AIR TO GROUND GUIDED MISSILES.
- (VI) AIR TO AIR GUIDED MISSILES.
- (VII) BIOLOGICAL WARFARE.
- (VIII) CHEMICAL WARFARE.
- (IX) INFRA RED RESEARCH.
- (X) THERMIONIC TUBE RESEARCH.

9. IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF DIVISION OF LABOUR, THE UK WOULD STRESS THAT FOR POLITICAL AND PRACTICAL REASONS, IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL THAT A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF IMPORTANT WORK SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE DONE IN GREAT BRITAIN.

10. IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD, THE UK WOULD NOT CLAIM TO BE TECHNICALLY IN ADVANCE OF THE USA. WHAT THE UK HAS TO OFFER IS A STAFF OF ABOUT 7,000, INCLUDING SOME HUNDREDS OF THE HIGHEST QUALITY SCIENTIFIC GRADUATES, AND UP TO DATE FACILITIES. THE UK WOULD SUGGEST THAT THIS STAFF AND THESE FACILITIES SHOULD BE USED TO THE COMMON ADVANTAGE BY EMPLOYMENT ON PROJECTS TO BE AGREED BETWEEN THE UK AND THE USA.

11. THE APPLICATION OF THE POLICY OF INTERDEPENDENCE WILL RAISE CERTAIN FINANCIAL ISSUES. THE ADOPTION OF THE POLICY WILL MAKE IT NECESSARY FOR THE UK TO RELY MORE THAN IT HAS DONE IN THE PAST ON THE ACQUISITION OF COMPLETE WEAPONS AND COMPONENTS FROM THE USA. TO BALANCE THIS ADDITIONAL EXPENDITURE, THE UK BELIEVES THAT IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR THE USA TO ACQUIRE EQUIPMENT FROM GREAT BRITAIN. SUCH ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THE UK AND THE USA MIGHT NEED FITTING IN TO WIDER ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE. THE UK HOPES THAT ANGLO/AMERICAN COOPERATION WILL FORM THE CORE OF THESE WIDER ARRANGEMENTS, SO THAT IT MAY BE CLEAR THAT

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PAGE THREE 2671

ANGLO/AMERICAN COOPERATION IS NOT EXCLUSIVE BUT DESIGNED FOR THE BETTER SERVICE OF THE FREE WORLD AS A WHOLE.

12.FULL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WILL REQUIRE THE DEVELOPMENT AND FURTHER STUDY OF LICENSING ARRANGEMENTS AND THE HANDLING OF PROPRIETARY INFO.SOME DEVELOPMENT OF FIRM TO FIRM LINKS WILL NO DOUBT BE REQUIRED TO MEET THIS.

13.ON THE QUESTION OF MACHINERY,THE UK BELIEVES THAT THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE SHOULD BLUEPRINT THE AREAS AND TYPES OF COOPERATION IN GENERAL TERMS,SO THAT THEIR WORK MAY BE FOLLOWED UP BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SPECIALIST WORKING GROUPS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS OF COOPERATION.THE UK WOULD ASSUME THAT IN THESE GROUPS REPS OF THE USA AND BRITISH SERVICES WOULD BE INCLUDED,IN VIEW OF THEIR INTEREST IN THE FORMULATION OF OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS, AND IN THE PROGRESSING OF DEFENCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.

14.SOME CONTINUING INFORMAL MACHINERY WILL BE NEEDED TO STEER THE EXECUTION OF THE POLICY OF INTERDEPENDENCE AND COOPERATION IN THE FIELDS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY AND DEFENCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE TO HAVE A GROUP CONSISTING ON THE USA SIDE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE,THE SECRETARY OF DEFENCE,AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,AND ON THE BRITISH SIDE OF THE FOREIGN SECRETARY,THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE,AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY AUTHORITY.SUITABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ALTERNATES WOULD NO DOUBT BE NEEDED.THERE MIGHT ALSO HAVE TO BE A SENIOR GROUP OF OFFICIALS TO SUPERVISE GROUPS OF EXPERTS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS OF ACTIVITY WHO WOULD MAINTAIN THE DAY TO DAY COOPERATION.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHDC.,
NOV25/57.ENDS

DOWNGRADED TO *Secret*
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ceos
Secy State
Dm DDP
Dm Robinson
AEC (Dm Bennett)
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DS31/457
FM WASHDC DEC18/57 TOPSEC CDN EYES ONLY
TO EXTERNAL 2670 PRIORITY

ATOMIC ENERGY CONSULTATIONS

JOHN ROPER OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY HAS NOW GIVEN US COPY OF THE STATEMENT MADE BY SIR RICHARD POWELL TO WHICH REF WAS MADE IN OUR TEL 2554 DEC3. ROPER SAID THAT THE STATEMENT HAD BEEN EDITED IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE CERTAIN REFS BEARING ONLY ON THE NUCLEAR FIELD SINCE THIS MIGHT CAUSE SOME DIFFICULTIES WITH THE AMERICANS BECAUSE OF THEIR INTERPRETATION OF WHAT CAN OR CANNOT BE SAID TO THIRD PARTIES. ESSENTIALLY, HOWEVER, THE STATEMENT, AS GIVEN TO US, REPRESENTS WHAT WAS SAID BY SIR RICHARD POWELL ON NOV25 IN HIS MEETINGS WITH QUARLES. THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT AS GIVEN TO US BY ROPER IS CONTAINED IN OUR TEL 2671.

2. BEFORE MAKING ONE OR TWO COMMENTS ON DETAILS OF THE PAPER, ROPER AT OUR REQUEST OUTLINED SOMETHING OF THE BACKGROUND OF THE RECENT TRIPARTITE DISCUSSIONS TO WHICH WE WERE INVITED BY THE STATE DEPT MEMO OF NOV27. ROPER SAID THAT THE QUESTION OF THE INCLUSION OF CANADA IN THE TALKS WHICH HAVE RECENTLY TAKEN PLACE WAS NOT DISCUSSED BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT, BUT WAS FOLLOWED UP IMMEDIATELY AFTER THIS MEETING AS A LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE OF IMPLEMENTING THE IDEA OF INTERDEPENDENCE BY RECOGNIZING THE PARTICULARLY CLOSE WORKING ARRANGEMENTS WHICH HAD EXISTED AND WHICH SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE DEVELOPED BETWEEN THESE THREE COUNTRIES. APPROVAL FOR THE INVITATION TO CANADA WAS OBTAINED FROM THE UK AUTHORITIES BY THE BRITISH EMBASSY HERE, AND THE UK GOVT'S FAVOURABLE ATTITUDE WAS RECORDED IN THE STATE DEPT SUBMISSION WHICH PROPOSED THAT WE SHOULD BE APPROACHED (SEE MY TEL 2527 NOV27). ROPER EMPHASIZED THAT THERE WAS A COMMON RECOGNITION ON THE PART OF BOTH THE UK AND USA AUTHORITIES THAT ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN TO BRING CANADA IN TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE IN THESE TECHNICAL DEFENCE DISCUSSIONS.

3. IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT TWO GROUPS WERE SET UP UNDER POWELL AND QUARLES AND UNDER PLOWDEN AND STRAUSS TO SEEK TO MAP OUT POSSIBLE AREAS OF COOPERATION IN THE FIELDS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY AND DEFENCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AS A BASIS FOR THE MORE DETAILED

PAGE TWO 2670

WORK OF THE TECHNICAL GROUPS AND SUBCOMMITTEES WHICH LATER MET HERE ON DEC 3. ROPER EMPHASIZED THAT THE WORK OF THESE TWO GROUPS WAS MAINLY CONCERNED, AS THE STATEMENT BY SIR RICHARD POWELL INDICATES, WITH LISTING THE HIGH PRIORITY CATEGORIES OF COOPERATION AND INDICATING THE PRINCIPAL FIELDS REQUIRING A DETAILED EXAMINATION. HE EXPECTED THAT FOLLOWING THE CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST ROUND OF SUBCOMMITTEE TALKS THERE MIGHT BE SOME FURTHER DISCUSSION IN PARIS OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NATO MEETING ON FUTURE STEPS.

4. YOU WILL FIND THE POWELL STATEMENT A USEFUL OUTLINE AND BACKGROUND OF THE WORK OF THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE AND THE CONSTITUENT SUBCOMMITTEES WHICH HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED. WITH REGARD TO PARA 10, ROPER SAID THAT THE FIGURE OF 7,000 MENTIONED RELATES ONLY TO SCIENTISTS IN THE UK WORKING ON THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SIDE. HE ATTACHED PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO PARA 11, AND TO ITS EMPHASIS ON THE UK VIEW THAT THERE MUST BE A BALANCING OF ANY ADDITIONAL EXPENDITURES INCURRED BY THE UK IN THE USA FOR THE ACQUISITION OF CERTAIN NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY RECIPROCAL ARRANGEMENTS ON THE PART OF THE USA FOR THE ACQUIRING OF EQUIPMENT FROM THE UK. IN REPLY TO OUR QUESTION CONCERNING THE SECOND PART OF THIS PARA AS TO HOW SUCH BIPARTITE OR TRIPARTITE ARRANGEMENTS MIGHT BE FITTED INTO ANY WIDER NATO ARRANGEMENTS, WE WERE GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT THIS ASPECT HAS NOT YET BEEN GIVEN DETAILED THOUGHT. THE USA AUTHORITIES, ACCORDING TO ROPER, ARE ANXIOUS TO EXPLORE THESE MATTERS, FIRST WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE TRIPARTITE TECHNICAL COMMITTEES ENVISAGED, BEFORE EMBARKING ON THE MORE DIFFICULT TASK OF DEVELOPING COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS ON A WIDER BASIS.

4. FINALLY, ROPER DREW ATTENTION TO PARA 14 OF THE STATEMENT WHICH REFERS TO RECOGNITION OF THE NEED FOR CONTINUING MACHINERY TO STEER THE EXECUTION OF THE "POLICY OF INTERDEPENDENCE" IN THESE FIELDS. YOU WILL NOTE THAT THE UK SUGGESTION IS THAT THERE SHOULD BE A MINISTERIAL GROUP CONSISTING ON THE USA SIDE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENCE, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, AND ON THE BRITISH SIDE OF THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY AUTHORITY. IT WAS ADDED THAT SUITABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ALTERNATES WOULD NO DOUBT BE NEEDED.

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5.1. R EMPHASIZED THAT IN FACT THE UK POSITION IN THIS MATTER WAS FLEXIBLE, ALTHOUGH THEY ATTACHED IMPORTANCE IN ANY MINISTERIAL GROUP WHICH MIGHT BE FORMED TO HAVING THE USA SECRETARY OF STATE PARTICIPATE. USA VIEWS WERE NOT YET FIRM, AND THERE HAS BEEN SOME DISPOSITION HERE, WE GATHER, TO FAVOUR THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE FORMER COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE, OR A SIMILAR BODY, POSSIBLY UNDER SOME NEW NAME. NO FINAL DECISIONS, HOWEVER, HAVE BEEN TAKEN, AND DISCUSSIONS ARE CONTINUING ON THE FORM OF SUCH A MINISTERIAL STEERING GROUP. ROPER ASKED THAT WE SHOULD NOT, REPEAT NOT, FOR THE PRESENT RAISE WITH THE AMERICANS THIS POINT IN POWELL'S STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CONTINUING MACHINERY FOR THE PRESENT TIME.

6. ON THE NUCLEAR TALKS IN WHICH ONLY THE USA AND UK REPS PARTICIPATED, ROPER INDICATED THAT CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE, AND THAT IT HAD FINALLY PROVED POSSIBLE TO SEND FORWARD AN AGREED REPORT. THE REAL DIFFICULTY WHICH CANNOT BE OVERCOME UNTIL THE PRESENT AMERICAN LEGISLATION IS REVISED IS THAT THE EXCHANGE OF INFO AND VIEWS THUS FAR HAS TENDED TO COVER COMMON DEVELOPMENTAL AREAS IN WHICH BOTH GOVTS ARE NOW WORKING RATHER THAN THE MORE IMPORTANT PROBLEM, FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF RATIONALIZATION OF EFFORT, OF MAPPING OUT AND ASSIGNING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE AREAS IN WHICH ONE GOVT OR THE OTHER MAY HOLD A SUBSTANTIAL LEAD. FIRST AND IMPORTANT STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN, HOWEVER, AND THE UK AUTHORITIES ARE HOPEFUL THAT IN VIEW OF THE VAST EXPENDITURES WHICH THEY BELIEVE WILL BE REQUIRED IN THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FIELD A VALID DIVISION OF LABOUR WILL IN FACT BE DEVELOPED

ROBERTSON

Subject ATOMIC ENERGY

Date August 14/58

Publication HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES
Vol. 102, No. 71 1st Session
24th Parliament.
Tuesday, August 12, 1958.

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ATOMIC ENERGY

U.S.-CANADA—EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR MUTUAL DEFENCE

On the orders of the day:

Hon. L. B. Pearson (Leader of the Opposition): Mr. Speaker, I should like to ask the Minister of National Defence whether any negotiations have been initiated or are contemplated with the United States government with regard to the exchange of information on atomic matters for mutual defence.

Hon. G. R. Pearkes (Minister of National Defence): There have been departmental discussions on this matter, and any exchange has been made on a "need to know" basis.

[Later:]

Mr. Pearson: Mr. Speaker, I should like to ask the Minister of National Defence a question arising out of the reply he gave me a few minutes ago. In view of the fact that any exchange of atomic information on defence will be subject, I assume, to the limitations of the United States atomic energy act, is the government negotiating an agreement under that act which will remove those limitations in so far as exchange of information on defensive tactical military weapons is concerned?

Mr. Pearkes: The government is not negotiating any such agreement at the present time.

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INFO PERMISNY(FOR MINISTER AND MR ROBERTSON)OPIMMEDIATE

REF OURTEL 1868 AUG13

COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF TWO DRAFT DOCUMENTS REFERRED TO IN OUR REF TEL
WHICH WERE HANDED TO US TODAY BY SPIEGEL OF FARLEY'S OFFICE IN THAUG 14
STATE DEPT, BEGINS: AIDE MEMOIRE

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cy
THE USA GOVT BELIEVES THAT IN ORDER TO ADVANCE COOPERATION AMONG
THE USA, THE UK AND CANADA IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN MILITARY
FIELDS WHERE THE THREE COUNTRIES HAVE MUTUAL DEFENSE INTERESTS, IT
WOULD BE USEFUL TO ESTABLISH SOME SUPERVISORY INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGE-
MENT. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT FOR THIS PURPOSE THE COMBINED POLICY COM-
MITTEE BE REACTIVATED WITH APPROPRIATE NEW GUIDELINES.

THE COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE WAS ESTABLISHED BY THE AGREEMENT OF
AUG19/43, IN ORDER TO FACILITATE COOPERATION IN ATOMIC MATTERS AMONG
THE THREE ALLIES. AFTER THE END OF WORLD WAR II SUCH COOPERATION
BECAME MUCH MORE LIMITED, AND THE COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE FOR SOME
YEARS NOW HAS FUNCTIONED ONLY TO A SMALL EXTENT AND THROUGH CORRES-
PONDENCE. OF TWO SUBSIDIARY ORGANIZATIONS WHICH WERE ALSO ESTABLISHED,
THE COMBINED DEVELOPMENT AGENCY(ORIGINALLY THE COMBINED DEVELOPMENT
TRUST)AND THE SUBGROUP OF SCIENTIFIC ADVISORS, ONLY THE COMBINED
DEVELOPMENT AGENCY HAS CONTINUED ACTIVELY IN ITS FIELD, THE JOINT
PROCUREMENT OF URANIUM ORE.

IN THE FIELDS OF NON-ATOMIC WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT VARIOUS
ARRANGEMENTS FOR COOPERATION AMONG THE THREE COUNTRIES HAVE NOW BEEN
ESTABLISHED, PRINCIPALLY AMONG THE MILITARY SERVICES. SOME OF THE
COOPERATION CARRIED OUT UNDER THESE ARRANGEMENTS IS QUITE EXTENSIVE
AND IT IS DESIRED THAT THIS SHALL CONTINUE IN THE FULLEST POSSIBLE
WAY. MORE EXTENSIVE COOPERATION IN ATOMIC FIELDS MAY ALSO NOW BE
CARRIED OUT UNDER NEW USA LEGISLATION, AND IT IS BELIEVED THAT IT IS
MUTUALLY AGREED AMONG THE THREE COUNTRIES THAT IT IS IN THEIR COMMON
INTEREST TO CARRY THIS OUT TO THE FULLEST EXTENT POSSIBLE. COOPERATION
IN BOTH ATOMIC AND NON-ATOMIC FIELDS, IT IS BELIEVED, WOULD BE
FACILITATED BY CENTRALIZED SUPERVISION.

IT IS SUGGESTED ACCORDINGLY, THAT A FEASIBLE AND SATISFACTORY M
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OF ESTABLISHING THIS SUPERVISION WOULD BE TO REACTIVATE THE COMBINED
ICY COMMITTEE AND ASSIGN TO IT THE SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITY FOR
TECHNICAL COOPERATION FOR MILITARY PURPOSES IN BOTH ATOMIC AND NON-
ATOMIC FIELDS. AN OUTLINE OF PRINCIPLES FOR THE ORGANIZATION AND AC-
TIVITY OF SUCH A REACTIVATED COMMITTEE HAS BEEN WORKED OUT INFORMALLY
BY REPS OF THE THREE GOVTS AND IS ATTACHED HEREWITH. IF SUCH A PROCE-
DURE MEETS WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE THREE GOVTS A MEETING OF THE
COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE COULD BE CONVENED AT A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY
TIME AND THE NEW GUIDELINES FOR THE COMMITTEE ADOPTED AT THE MEETING.
IT IS BELIEVED THAT THIS PROCEDURE WOULD HAVE THE FURTHER ADVANTAGE
OF OBVIATING ANY UNDUE PUBLICITY BEING GIVEN TO THE ACTION, EVEN
THOUGH THE COMMITTEE'S EXISTENCE WOULD CONTINUE TO BE AN UNCLAS-
SIFIED MATTER.

IT IS UNDERSTOOD, OF COURSE, THAT COOPERATION BY EACH COUNTRY IN
VARIOUS PARTICULAR PROJECTS, WOULD BE GOVERNED BY ITS RELEVANT LAWS
AND AGREEMENTS WITH EITHER OR BOTH OF THE OTHER TWO; AND, FURTHERMORE,
THAT THE SUPERVISORY FUNCTION OF THE COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE WOULD
SUPPLEMENT BUT NOT RPT NOT REPLACE NOR INTERFERE WITH EXISTING
WORKING ARRANGEMENTS.

THE USA GOVT WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY COMMENT WHICH THE GOVTS OF
THE UK AND OF CANADA MIGHT WISH TO MAKE TO THIS SUGGESTED PROCEDURE
AND OUTLINE. ENDS

BEGINS: COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE

PREAMBLE

THE USA-UK-CANADA COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE, WHICH WAS ESTABLISHED
BY THE AGREEMENT OF AUG19/43, IS RECONSTITUTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF
FACILITATING AND SUPERVISING COOPERATION AMONG THE THREE GOVTS IN
MILITARY SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL FIELDS. ITS ACTIVITIES HENCEFORTH
WILL BE GOVERNED BY THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES:

OBJECTIVE

THE COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE, OPERATING WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONS AND STATUTES OF THE GOVTS REPRESENTED, WILL ESTABLISH
BROAD POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION
IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FOR MILITARY PURPOSES, BOTH NUCLEAR AND
NON-NUCLEAR. IN THE NUCLEAR ENERGY FIELD THE COMMITTEE WILL ALSO
CONTINUE TO SUPERVISE PROCUREMENT AND ALLOCATION OF RAW MATERIALS FOR
BOTH MILITARY AND CIVIL PURPOSES.

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~~RESPONSIBILITIES~~

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE WILL BE:

(1) TO REVIEW PERIODICALLY AND AS APPROPRIATE THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION BEING UNDERTAKEN AND PLANNED FOR THE FUTURE BY THE THREE GOVTS IN MILITARY FIELDS.

(2) TO DETERMINE OR AS NECESSARY RECOMMEND TO MEMBER GOVTS POLICIES AND PROCEDURES WHICH MAY BE APPROPRIATE TO MAKE MOST EFFECTIVE CO-OPERATION IN THESE FIELDS FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE AND SECURITY.

(3) TO GIVE POLICY GUIDANCE TO SUBORDINATE GROUPS AS REQUIRED.

(4) TO SUPERVISE THE COMBINED DEVELOPMENT AGENCY IN ITS CONTINUING FUNCTION OF PROCUREMENT OF RAW MATERIALS FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY.

(5) TO ALLOCATE RAW MATERIALS PROCURED BY THE COMBINED DEVELOPMENT AGENCY.

MEMBERSHIP

MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE IS AS FOLLOWS:

FOR THE USA: THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, OR THEIR ALTERNATES.

FOR THE UK: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY AUTHORITY, OR THEIR ALTERNATES.

FOR CANADA: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY CONTROL BOARD, OR THEIR ALTERNATES.

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE IS THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE USA.
ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES

(1) THE COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE, OR APPROPRIATE MEMBERS THEREOF, WILL MEET AS IS DETERMINED TO BE NECESSARY TO DISCHARGE ITS RESPONSIBILITIES.

(2) THE SECRETARIAT, CONSISTING OF ONE REP FROM EACH COUNTRY, WILL CONTINUE TO ASSIST THE COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE IN SUCH MANNER AS THE LATTER MAY DIRECT. SUCH ASSISTANCE MAY INCLUDE: PROVIDING AN OFFICIAL RECORD, PREPARING CORRESPONDENCE, KEEPING MINUTES, AND MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR MEETINGS.

(3) SUBCOMMITTEES MAY BE ESTABLISHED TO RENDER ADVICE AND REPORTS TO THE COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE, TO GIVE GUIDANCE TO THE TECHNICAL

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SUBGROUPS REFERRED TO IN(5)BELOW,AND TO RECEIVE REPORTS FROM THE TECHNICAL SUBGROUPS.INITIALY,A SUBCOMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR ASPECTS AND A SUBCOMMITTEE ON NON-NUCLEAR ASPECTS WILL BE ESTABLISHED.THE SUBCOMMITTEES MAY BE MODIFIED BY THE COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE AS MAY BE FOUND TO BE DESIRABLE.THE SUBCOMMITTEES,OR APPROPRIATE MEMBERS THEREOF,WILL MEET AS REQUIRED.

(4)TECHNICAL SUBGROUPS MAY BE FORMED ON AN AD HOC BASIS TO FACILITATE THE EXCHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT OF INFO IN ASSIGNED AREAS AND REPORT TO THEIR SUPERVISORY SUBCOMMITTEES ON PROGRESS ACHIEVED AND PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED.ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES WILL BE INFORMAL, SUBJECT TO GUIDANCE AND REQUIREMENTS ESTABLISHED BY THE SUBCOMMITTEES.THE INITIAL SUBGROUPS WILL BE IN THE AREAS IDENTIFIED IN THE REPORT OF THE USA-UK-CANADA TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS HELD IN DEC 1957.

(5)THE SUBCOMMITTEES AND TECHNICAL SUBGROUPS WILL ESTABLISH THEIR OWN ORGANIZATION AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AS MAY BE REQUIRED.

(6)DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE WILL REFLECT APPROVAL OF EACH GOVT PARTICIPATING.IN CASE OF DISAGREEMENT, INDIVIDUAL RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE MADE BY THE MEMBERS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE GOVTS.

(7)PARTICIPATION BY EACH MEMBER COUNTRY IN SPECIFIC AREAS OF COOPERATION WILL BE GOVERNED BY ITS RELEVANT LAWS AND AGREEMENTS WITH EITHER OR BOTH OF THE OTHER TWO MEMBER COUNTRIES.ENDS

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REF OURTEL 142 JAN21(ATOMIC ENERGY CONSULTATIONS)

COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE

WHILE IN THE COURSE OF EXAMINING THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS FOR AUG4, AND IN PARTICULAR THE REFS TO THE USA ATOMIC ENERGY LEGISLATION AND TO THE OLD COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE, BY COINCIDENCE WE WERE CALLED DOWN TO THE STATE DEPT THIS AFTERNOON TO BE TOLD OF USA PROPOSALS FOR REVIVING AND REACTIVATING THE COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE. AUG 14 1958

2. YOU WILL RECALL THAT IN CONNECTION WITH THE USA-UK-CANADA TECHNICAL COMMITTEE DISCUSSIONS OF LAST FALL THERE HAD BEEN SOME DISCUSSION, PARTICULARLY BETWEEN THE UK AND THE USA AUTHORITIES, ON THE NEED FOR USING MORE FULLY THE COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE AS A GENERAL SUPERVISORY BODY TO GOVERN COOPERATION BETWEEN THE THREE GOVTS IN MILITARY, SCIENTIFIC, AND TECHNICAL FIELDS (SEE FOR EXAMPLE OURTELS 2670 DEC18/57 AND 142 JAN21.)

3. MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TEL CONTAINS THE TEXT OF TWO DRAFT PAPERS WHICH WERE GIVEN TO US TODAY BY SPIEGEL OF PHIL FARLEY'S STAFF. THE FIRST PAPER PRESENTS IN THE FORM OF A DRAFT AIDE MEMOIRE A GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF THE CPC, AND PROPOSES ITS REACTIVATION WITH NEW SUPERVISORY TASKS FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION FOR MILITARY PURPOSES IN BOTH THE ATOMIC AND NON-ATOMIC FIELDS. THE DRAFT AIDE MEMOIRE REQUESTS THE COMMENTS OF THE CANADIAN AUTHORITIES ON THE PURPOSES SET FORTH IN THE DOCUMENT ITSELF, AND ALSO ON THE RELATED PAPER, (WHICH IS ALSO SUBMITTED TO US IN DRAFT FORM), DEALING WITH THE OBJECTIVES, RESPONSIBILITIES, MEMBERSHIP, AND ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES OF THE COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE.

4. COMMENTING ON THE PAPERS THEMSELVES, SPIEGEL DREW PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT IT IS PROPOSED THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND HIS OPPOSITE NUMBERS IN CANADA AND THE UK SHOULD BE FULL MEMBERS OF THE CPC. HE ALSO DREW ATTENTION IN PARTICULAR TO THE FACT THAT WITH THE REVISED TERMS OF REF PROPOSED, NON-NUCLEAR AS WELL AS NUCLEAR ASPECTS OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION WOULD BE INVOLVED.

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5. SPIEGEL MADE IT CLEAR THAT THERE HAS ALREADY BEEN A GOOD DEAL OF INFORMAL CONSULTATION THROUGH THE BRITISH EMBASSY HERE WITH THE UK AUTHORITIES ON THE IDEAS CONTAINED IN THESE DRAFT OUTLINES, BUT THAT THEY ARE AWAITING UK COMMENTS AS WELL AS OUR OWN COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSALS OUTLINED.

6. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE STATE DEPT HOPE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO KEEP OUR CONSULTATIONS ON THESE PROPOSED ARRANGEMENTS WHOLLY PRIVATE, AND INDEED WHEN AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON THE PROPOSAL AND THE TERMS OF REF, TO TRY TO ENSURE THAT THE REACTIVATION OF THE COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE (WHICH AS YOU ARE AWARE HAS NEVER BEEN TERMINATED ALTHOUGH IT HAS NOT RPT NOT BEEN ACTIVE SINCE 1951) IS PLAYED DOWN AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. IN PART WE GATHER THE REASON FOR THIS IS THE FRENCH POSITION, AND ALSO THE VIEW HERE THAT WORK OF THIS KIND CAN MOST FRUITFULLY BE DONE WITHOUT UNDUE PUBLICITY.

7. FINALLY SPIEGEL MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WAS NOT RPT NOT EXPECTED THAT THE CPC AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL WOULD BE REQUIRED TO MEET OFTEN, AND AS YOU WILL SEE, PROVISION IS MADE FOR ALTERNATE REPRESENTATION WHICH IN THE CONCEPTION OF THE STATE DEPT WOULD BE SUPPLIED MAINLY BY THE MISSIONS IN WASHDC, WITH WHATEVER ASSISTANCE MAY BE NECESSARY FROM THE CAPITALS CONCERNED.

8. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSAL AND ON THE TERMS OF REF AS SET FORTH IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TEL. ON THE BASIS OF THESE COMMENTS FROM OURSELVES AND THE UK, THE STATE DEPT WOULD PLAN TO PREPARE FINAL TEXTS FOR SUBMISSION TO GOVTS CONCERNED.

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USA-UK BILATERAL AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION ON THE USES OF ATOMIC
ENERGY FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATE DEPT PRESS RELEASE NO444 AUG4 CONCERNING
THE BRINGING INTO FORCE OF THIS AGREEMENT, BEGINS:

THE GOVTS OF THE USA AND THE UK TODAY EXCHANGED NOTES BRINGING INTO
FORCE THE BILATERAL AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION ON THE USES OF ATOMIC
ENERGY FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES. THE USA WAS REPRESENTED BY ACTING
SECRETARY OF STATE CHRISTIAN A. HERTER. VISCOUNT HOOD, BRITISH CHARGE
D'AFFAIRES, REPRESENTED THE UK. THIS AGREEMENT, WHICH WAS SIGNED ON JULY
BY SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN FOSTER DULLES AND VISCOUNT HOOD, WILL
PERMIT THE RESUMPTION OF COOPERATION BETWEEN AMERICAN AND BRITISH
SCIENTISTS IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH PROVED FRUITFUL
DURING THE LAST WAR BUT WHICH LAPSED THEREAFTER.

THE NEW AGREEMENT RESULTS FROM DECISIONS TAKEN BY PRESIDENT
EISENHOWER AND PRIME MINISTER MACMILLAN AS SET FORTH IN THE
DECLARATION OF COMMON PURPOSE OF OCT 25/57. AT THIS TIME, THE PRESIDENT
AND THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER AGREED THAT CLOSER COLLABORATION OF
THE SCIENTISTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES WOULD ACCELERATE THE NUCLEAR AD-
VANCEMENT OF BOTH NATIONS AND CONTRIBUTE TO THE DEFENSE OF THE
FREE WORLD.

THE PRESIDENT THEN UNDERTOOK TO REQUEST CONGRESS TO AMEND THE
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT AS MAY BE NECESSARY AND DESIRABLE TO PERMIT CLOSE
AND FRUITFUL COLLABORATION OF THE SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS OF GREAT
BRITAIN AND THE USA, AND OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES. AFTER CAREFUL
CONSIDERATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS, THE ACT WAS AMENDED BY
CONGRESS. UPON APPROVAL OF THE AMENDMENTS BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER,
THE USA AND THE UK HASTENED TO CONCLUDE THE PRESENT AGREEMENT.

ARTICLE XII OF THE AGREEMENT STATES THAT IT WILL ENTER INTO FORCE
WHEN EACH GOVT HAS NOTIFIED THE OTHER THAT IT HAS COMPLIED WITH ALL
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS. THIS, ON THE USA SIDE
REQUIRED THAT THE AGREEMENT LIE BEFORE CONGRESS FOR 30 DAYS. THIS
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PERIOD HAS EXPIRED, AND TODAY'S EXCHANGE OF NOTES BRINGS THE NEW AGREEMENT INTO FORCE.

TECHNICAL DISCUSSION WILL BE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO WORK OUT DETAILS OF THE EXCHANGES WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE. VISITS BY EXPERTS IN BOTH DIRECTIONS WILL, NO RPT NO DOUBT, OCCUR. THE OBJECTIVE OF BOTH GOVTS, HOWEVER, IS TO ESTABLISH A FULL, FRIENDLY WORKING RELATIONSHIP IN THIS FIELD ON A CONTINUOUS BASIS. SINCE EACH COUNTRY HAS A SUBSTANTIAL EFFORT-IN-BEING IN THIS FIELD, SUCH A RELATIONSHIP CANNOT BUT RESULT IN IMPROVED EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY IN THE CONTRIBUTIONS WHICH BOTH ARE MAKING TO THE COMMON DEFENSE AND SECURITY OF THE FREE WORLD. ENDS

Office of the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff
OTTAWA

August 6, 1958

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Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Release of Atomic Information
to Canadian Officers at NORAD

1. Please refer to your letter dated 5 June, 1958, on this subject.
2. We have delayed answering your letter pending the receipt of the official USA report of the meeting of 29 May, 1958 and the USA proposals concerning the release of atomic information to Canadian officers at NORAD. Although our Washington representatives have maintained contact with the US authorities since the meeting, we received no information concerning this subject until today.
3. In answer to the query in paragraph 2 of your letter it is our understanding that Canadian officers at NORAD are not able to obtain information which is available to their colleague. It is also our understanding that it is the US intention to find a way to permit all officers (US and Canadian) at NORAD to have access to the same information in sufficient measure to permit them to effectively carry out their functions at NORAD. It is reasonable to expect, applicable to both US and Canadian office, that officers will only get information for which they have a need-to-know.
4. In answer to the query in paragraph 3 of your letter we believe it is possible that Canadian officers at NORAD, under the USA proposal made at the meeting, could be given the information which might not be made available to the Canadian Government. The accountability for such information releases would, the US representatives said, be the concern of the USA authorities. Such releases would not be considered Government-to-Government releases.
5. We have learned unofficially from the Canadian Joint Staff, Washington, on 31 July, that the USA State-Defense Military Information Control Committee (Mr. Margrave the Chairman of the 29 May meeting is the Deputy Chairman of this Committee) intend to issue instructions to implement the USA proposal made at the meeting.
6. In view of the sensitivity of this subject and the desire of the US authorities to find an acceptable solution of the problem, we do not feel that this subject should be raised with the U.S. authorities until further correspondence is received from them concerning the proposed solution. We will of course keep you informed of any developments.

(Charles Foulkes)
General

Chairman, Chiefs of Staff

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D.L.(1) S.J. McCardle/ph

SECRET

August 5, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

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ATOMIC WEAPONS FOR THE RCAF -
NEWSPAPER REPORTS OF
MR. PEARKES' COMMENTS IN WASHINGTON

You asked for background information on the story appearing in this morning's Montreal Gazette to the effect that Mr. Pearkes told reporters (A) that Canada plans to ask the United States to provide atomic weapons for RCAF aircraft and (B) that this subject would be discussed at the first meeting of the Joint Canada-U.S. Cabinet Committee on Defence. The newspaper article does go on "(Mr. Pearkes said that) Any decision on atomic arms for RCAF fighters which now use only conventional weapons would have to come at Cabinet level".

We have been in touch with the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff who knows nothing further about the matter than that which you have read in the newspaper. He was not aware that Mr. Pearkes intended to raise this subject in Washington. He is attempting to get in touch with Mr. Pearkes by telephone.

We have spoken to the Embassy in Washington as well and understand that Mr. Pearkes met three representatives of Canadian newspapers in his hotel room; no member of the Embassy was present. The Embassy has drawn our attention as well to a New York Times story of August 4. The text is contained in telegram 1795 of August 4 from Washington a copy of which is attached. The article quotes "qualified observers" at NORAD and "a Canadian official" at Colorado Springs as expecting Canada to raise the question of sharing United States nuclear air defence weapons.

In the circumstances, I suggest that if specific questions are asked in the House about Mr. Pearkes' reported statement, you should take the line that questions might better be directed to Mr. Pearkes himself when he returns to Ottawa later this week.

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You will recall that the Cabinet considered last April a United States request for the deployment of nuclear weapons at Goose Bay and a related United States suggestion for discussions in military channels on the introduction of nuclear capability into the air defence system. The Cabinet's decision at that time was recorded in the following terms: "The Committee noted the report of the Minister of National Defence on the U.S. request for the deployment of nuclear weapons to existing storage facilities at Goose Bay and on the related request for discussions on the use of atomic weapons in defence, and deferred decision on them pending further consideration of the issues involved and further discussions with the U.S. authorities as required."

When and if the Government decides to permit the installation of BOMARC missiles in Canada or the equipping of Canadian aircraft with a nuclear missile, a decision will have to be taken as to the degree of control which the Canadian Government would wish to exercise over the use of these weapons. I suggest therefore that it would be inappropriate to comment at any length in the House on the introduction of nuclear capability in Canadian Air Defences until these decisions have been taken by the Government.

JULES LÉGER

J. L.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

The Under-Secretary of State for
External Affairs, Ottawa.
FROM: The Canadian Embassy,
Washington, D.C.

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1958 AUG 7 AM 11:44

85TH CONGRESS }
2d Session }

SENATE

{ REPORT
No. 2041

PROPOSED AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND FOR THE COOPERATION ON THE USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES

JULY 29, 1958.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. PASTORE, from the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, submitted the following

REPORT

[Pursuant to a proposed agreement for cooperation on the uses of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes]

REPORT

Pursuant to a recent amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 voted by the Congress, the President on July 3, 1958, approved and authorized the execution of a proposed agreement for cooperation between the United Kingdom and the United States pertaining to cooperation on the uses of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes. On that same day, the proposed agreement was submitted to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House and referred to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

The Subcommittee on Agreements for Cooperation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, after reviewing the proposed agreement and receiving testimony in executive session from representatives of the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the State Department, unanimously concluded and reported to the Joint Committee that the proposed agreement is in conformance with the letter and spirit of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

The Joint Committee on July 22, 1958, met and adopted the report and interposed no objections to the proposed agreement.

This report is made by the Joint Committee in accordance with the provisions of section 202 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

HEARING

The Subcommittee on Agreements for Cooperation held a hearing in executive session, July 11, 1958, to consider the proposed agreement. The following witnesses appeared at this hearing:

For the State Department:

Frederick Jandrey, Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs.

Philip J. Farley, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Disarmament and Atomic Energy.

Richard Breithut, Deputy Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Disarmament and Atomic Energy.

William N. Dale, Officer in Charge United Kingdom and Ireland Affairs.

John Pender, Office of the Legal Adviser.

For the Department of Defense:

Hon. Herbert B. Loper, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy.

Lt. Gen. Clovis E. Byers, United States Army, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Matters).

William E. Lang, United States Army, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Affairs).

Col. Delmar L. Crowson, United States Air Force, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy.

Lt. Col. Marvin Stanford, United States Army, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy.

Col. Sidney S. Rubenstein, United States Air Force, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Manpower and Personnel.

C. Donald Garrett, United States Air Force, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Manpower and Personnel.

Harry R. Van Cleve, Office of General Counsel.

Jere H. Dykema, Office of General Counsel.

For the Atomic Energy Commission:

Harold S. Vance, Commissioner.

John Hall, Deputy General Manager for International Affairs.

Gen. A. D. Starbird, Director, Military Applications.

Rear Adm. H. G. Rickover, Chief, Naval Reactors Branch.

J. A. Waters, Director of Security.

Paul Gaughran, Deputy Director Security.

Algie Wells, General Counsel's Office.

Frank Parks, General Counsel's Office.

Roland Anderson, General Counsel's Office (Patents).

Myron Kratzer, International Affairs Division.

Bryan LaPlante, congressional liaison.

BACKGROUND

Effective July 21, 1955, the United States entered into two agreements for cooperation with the United Kingdom. One pertained to the exchange of atomic information for mutual defense purposes and the other to civil uses of atomic energy. The United States entered into the 1955 agreements pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

Through the implementation of the 1955 agreements for cooperation and subsequent amendments, the United States within the limits

of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, has cooperated with the United Kingdom during the past 3 years in the exchange of certain scientific and military information to the benefit of both countries. Information relating to the design or fabrication of atomic weapons which could be communicated was limited by United States law to external characteristics, effects and the systems employed in their delivery or use to the extent that such did not reveal important information concerning the design or fabrication of the nuclear components.

In addition the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 prohibited the transfer by the United States to another nation of nuclear material for military purposes.

Notwithstanding the beneficial results to date of the cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom, in light of the current world situation, it has become evident that greater cooperation between the two countries is not only desirable but is essential. Accordingly, among various decisions reached by President Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Macmillan in their October 25, 1957, meeting was the following:

The President of the United States will request the Congress to amend the Atomic Energy Act as may be necessary and desirable to permit of close and fruitful collaboration of scientists and engineers of Great Britain, the United States, and other friendly countries.

The President in his state of the Union message to Congress on January 9, 1958, also pointed out:

It is wasteful in the extreme for friendly allies to consume talent and money in solving problems that their friends have already solved—all because of artificial barriers to sharing. We cannot afford to cut ourselves off from the brilliant talents and minds of scientists in friendly countries. The task ahead will be hard enough without handcuffs of our own making.

In accordance with this recognition, an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 was passed by the 85th Congress during the 2d session which permits, under carefully stated conditions, greater cooperation between the United States and other friendly countries in the exchange of military information and material. This amendment which was incorporated in Public Law 85-479 and signed by the President on July 2, 1958, permits greater exchange with military allies of information and material as follows:

1. Material, including nonnuclear parts of weapons, military reactors, and nuclear materials for use in military reactors and weapons;
2. Classified information (restricted data) of a nature to assist an individual nation or regional defense group such as NATO to improve its training and prepare for mutual defense; and
3. Classified information (restricted data) of a nature to assist another individual nation to improve its atomic weapon design, development or fabrication capability, and concerning military reactors.

Transfer of nuclear material for atomic weapons use and communication of sensitive restricted data concerning atomic weapons may only be transferred to a military ally that has made substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons and where the material or information is necessary to improve that country's atomic weapon design, development, or fabrication capability. Similarly, non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons may be transferred only to those nations that have made substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons.

Public Law 85-479 requires that prior to such cooperation the President must determine in writing that it will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security and that such cooperation may take place only while the cooperating nation is participating with the United States pursuant to an international arrangement by substantial and material contributions to the mutual defense and security.

In addition, the recent amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 provides that all proposed agreements for cooperation involving communication of classified information or transfer of material for military purposes must be submitted to the Congress and referred to the Joint Committee and not become effective if the Congress passes a concurrent resolution of disapproval within 60 days (30 days during the 85th Cong.).

The proposed agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom for cooperation on the uses of atomic energy for mutual-defense purposes, submitted to Congress on July 3, 1958, by the President, is the first such proposed agreement between the United States and an ally to come before Congress since amendment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 by Public Law 85-479.

SUMMARY OF PROPOSED AGREEMENT

The cooperation to be undertaken by the United States and the United Kingdom pursuant to the proposed agreement involves the exchange of certain restricted data and the transfer of a submarine nuclear propulsion plant, as well as special nuclear material for use in that plant.

The proposed agreement provides that the United States and the United Kingdom will exchange classified information necessary to the development of defense plans; the training of personnel in the employment of and defense against atomic weapons and other military applications of atomic energy; the evaluation of the capabilities of potential enemies in the employment of atomic weapons and other military applications of atomic energy; and the development of delivery systems for carrying atomic weapons. In addition, the proposed agreement provides for both nations to exchange classified information pertaining to atomic weapons necessary to improve each country's atomic weapon design, development, and fabrication capability.

The proposed agreement continues in effect the cooperation previously entered into between the United Kingdom and the United States with regard to the exchange of nuclear submarine reactor information. This cooperation has been taking place pursuant to a previous amendment to the existing 1955 agreement for cooperation pertaining to civil uses of atomic energy.

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For cooperation would henceforth be possible in the military research field. The proposed agreement provides that the United States, subject to terms and conditions acceptable to the United States, will authorize an American company to transfer by sale to the United Kingdom a complete submarine nuclear propulsion plant. It also provides for the sale to the United Kingdom of the nuclear material necessary to operate the submarine for a period of 10 years following the date the agreement becomes effective and subject to terms and conditions acceptable to the United States for an American company to transfer this nuclear material in the form of fabricated fuel elements.

The United Kingdom agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the United States against any liability or damage which might be caused by the equipment after it is removed from the United States.

Nuclear material sold by the United States pursuant to the agreement would be at prices equivalent to prices charged to domestic purchasers. Should the United Kingdom desire, the United States during a 10-year period would reprocess any of the nuclear material sold under the agreement in United States facilities either public or private on terms and conditions to be agreed.

If either country makes an invention or discovery, based upon information received by it under the agreement, each country will receive title to the patent in its own country in addition to a royalty-free license to use the patent in the other country. The country making such invention or discovery would obtain title to the patent in a third country in which case the country having furnished the original information on which the invention or discovery is based would be granted a royalty-free license.

The proposed agreement specifically requires that all cooperation under the agreement will take place only when the communicating or transferring nation determines that such cooperation will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to its defense and security, and during the time that the United States and the United Kingdom are participating in an international arrangement for their mutual defense and security through substantial and material contributions thereto.

The proposed agreement also provides that both countries will maintain appropriate security safeguards and standards and that any material or information exchanged pursuant to the agreement will not be transferred to unauthorized persons. The proposed agreement would remain in force until such time as both nations agree to its termination. The provision for exchange of information, however, may be terminated by either party following 1 year's advance notice to take effect at the end of a term of 10 years or thereafter on 1 year's notice to take effect at the end of any subsequent term of 5 years. The provision relative to nuclear material for use in the submarine propulsion plant is limited to a period of 10 years which may be extended only by amendment of the agreement.

COMMITTEE COMMENTS

In its report to Congress, in support of the 1958 amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (S. Rept. No. 1654, H. Rept. No. 1849), the Joint Committee was of the opinion that closer collaboration should be had between the United States and Great Britain in the atomic weapons field. The proposed agreement for cooperation,

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submitted to Congress on July 3, 1958, will make possible this closer collaboration and is in conformance with the letter and spirit of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by Public Law 85-479.

The information which may be exchanged under this agreement and the arrangements whereby it will be possible for the United Kingdom to purchase a submarine nuclear reactor plant in the United States will help significantly to conserve the scientific talents of the two nations and will contribute substantially to our mutual defense.

It is understood that in implementing the agreement and prior to the transfer of any material or communication of any information by the United States that the Joint Committee will be informed of the contemplated action and the details involved. It is also understood that in carrying out the arrangements whereby the United Kingdom will obtain an American nuclear submarine reactor and necessary information relating thereto that no interference will result to the United States naval reactors program which of necessity must continue its work at no less rapid rate than it has in the past.

The Joint Committee, as in the earlier 1955 agreement for cooperation with the United Kingdom on the exchange of atomic information for mutual defense purposes and the amendments thereto, closely reviewed the security arrangements and practices to be followed in implementing the proposed agreement. The committee in the past has required the Atomic Energy Commission to keep the committee informed on a current basis of the security practices followed and will continue to do this. The committee has received assurances that adequate security safeguards will be afforded to information and material transferred. In particular the committee received assurances as to the United Kingdom personnel security measures, and on the legal and practical arrangements applying to the transfer of restricted data or materials or equipment from the United Kingdom to a third nation under bilateral or trilateral exchange arrangements.

Similarly, the committee has closely reviewed the patent provision in the proposed agreement in order to assure that American interests are adequately protected in any invention or discovery resulting from information transferred.

There follows as appendix I the proposed agreement with the United Kingdom and the statutory correspondence; as appendix II, an unclassified statement by Mr. Frederick Jandrey, Deputy Secretary for European Affairs, Department of State, made before the Subcommittee on Agreements for Cooperation July 11, 1958, in support of the agreement; as appendix III, an interpretation of article VII of the proposed agreement, and as appendix IV, Public Law 85-479.

APPENDIX I

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND FOR THE COOPERATION ON THE USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on its own behalf and on behalf of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority,

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Considering that their mutual security and defense require that the [redacted] prepared to meet the contingencies of atomic warfare;

Considering that both countries have made substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons;

Considering that they are participating together in international arrangements pursuant to which they are making substantial and material contributions to their mutual defense and security;

Recognizing that their common defense and security will be advanced by the exchange of information concerning atomic energy and by the transfer of equipment and materials for use therein;

Believing that such exchange and transfer can be undertaken without risk to the defense and security of either country; and

Taking into consideration the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, which was enacted with these purposes in mind,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

GENERAL PROVISION

While the United States and the United Kingdom are participating in an international arrangement for their mutual defense and security and making substantial and material contributions thereto, each Party will communicate to and exchange with the other Party information, and transfer materials and equipment to the other Party, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement provided that the communicating or transferring Party determines that such cooperation will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to its defense and security.

ARTICLE II

EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

A. Each Party will communicate to or exchange with the other Party such classified information as is jointly determined to be necessary to:

1. the development of defense plans;
2. the training of personnel in the employment of and defense against atomic weapons and other military applications of atomic energy;
3. the evaluation of the capabilities of potential enemies in the employment of atomic weapons and other military applications of atomic energy;
4. the development of delivery systems compatible with the atomic weapons which they carry; and
5. research, development and design of military reactors to the extent and by such means as may be agreed.

B. In addition to the cooperation provided for in paragraph A of this Article each Party will exchange with the other Party other classified information concerning atomic weapons when, after consultation with the other Party, the communicating Party determines that the communication of such information is necessary to improve the recipient's atomic weapon design, development and fabrication capability.

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ARTICLE III

TRANSFER OF SUBMARINE NUCLEAR PROPULSION PLANT AND MATERIALS

A. The Government of the United States will authorize, subject to terms and conditions acceptable to the Government of the United States, a person to transfer by sale to the Government of the United Kingdom or its agent one complete submarine nuclear propulsion plant with such spare parts therefor as may be agreed by the Parties and to communicate to the Government of the United Kingdom or its agent (or to both) such classified information as relates to safety features and such classified information as is necessary for the design, manufacture and operation of such propulsion plant. A person or persons will also be authorized, for a period of ten years following the date of entry into force of this Agreement and subject to terms and conditions acceptable to the Government of the United States, to transfer replacement cores or fuel elements for such plant.

B. The Government of the United States will transfer by sale agreed amounts of U-235 contained in uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 as needed for use in the submarine nuclear propulsion plant transferred pursuant to paragraph A of this Article, during the ten years following the date of entry into force of this Agreement on such terms and conditions as may be agreed. If the Government of the United Kingdom so requests, the Government of the United States will during such period reprocess any material sold under the present paragraph in facilities of the Government of the United States, on terms and conditions to be agreed, or authorize such reprocessing in private facilities in the United States. Enriched uranium recovered in reprocessing such materials by either Party may be purchased by the Government of the United States under terms and conditions to be agreed. Special nuclear material recovered in reprocessing such materials and not purchased by the Government of the United States may be returned to or retained by the Government of the United Kingdom and any U-235 not purchased by the Government of the United States will be credited to the amounts of U-235 to be transferred by the Government of the United States under this Agreement.

C. The Government of the United States shall be compensated for enriched uranium sold by it pursuant to this Article at the United States Atomic Energy Commission's published charges applicable to the domestic distribution of such material in effect at the time of the sale. Any purchase of enriched uranium by the Government of the United States pursuant to this Article shall be at the applicable price of the United States Atomic Energy Commission for the purchase of enriched uranium in effect at the time of purchase of such enriched uranium.

D. The Parties will exchange classified information on methods of reprocessing fuel elements of the type utilized in the propulsion plant to be transferred under this Article, including classified information on the design, construction and operation of facilities for the reprocessing of such fuel elements.

E. The Government of the United Kingdom shall indemnify and hold harmless the Government of the United States against any and all liabilities whatsoever (including third-party liability) for any damage or injury occurring after the propulsion plant or parts thereof, including spare parts, replacement cores or fuel elements are taken

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outside the United States, for any cause arising out of or connected with the design, manufacture, assembly, transfer or utilization of the propulsion plant, spare parts, replacement cores or fuel elements transferred pursuant to paragraph A of this Article.

ARTICLE IV

RESPONSIBILITY FOR USE OF INFORMATION, MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT AND DEVICES

The application or use of any information (including design drawings and specifications), material or equipment communicated, exchanged or transferred under this Agreement shall be the responsibility of the Party receiving it, and the other Party does not provide any indemnity, and does not warrant the accuracy or completeness of such information and does not warrant the suitability or completeness of such information, material or equipment for any particular use or application.

ARTICLE V

CONDITIONS

A. Cooperation under this Agreement will be carried out by each of the Parties in accordance with its applicable laws.

B. Under this Agreement there will be no transfer by either Party of atomic weapons.

C. Except as may be otherwise agreed for civil uses, the information communicated or exchanged, or the materials or equipment transferred, by either Party pursuant to this Agreement shall be used by the recipient Party exclusively for the preparation or implementation of defense plans in the mutual interests of the two countries.

D. Nothing in this Agreement shall preclude the communication or exchange of classified information which is transmissible under other arrangements between the Parties.

ARTICLE VI

GUARANTIES

A. Classified information, materials and equipment communicated or transferred pursuant to this Agreement shall be accorded full security protection under applicable security arrangements between the Parties and applicable national legislation and regulations of the Parties. In no case shall either Party maintain security standards for safeguarding classified information, materials or equipment made available pursuant to this Agreement less restrictive than those set forth in the applicable security arrangements in effect on the date this Agreement comes into force.

B. Classified information communicated or exchanged pursuant to this Agreement will be made available through channels existing or hereafter agreed for the communication or exchange of such information between the Parties.

C. Classified information, communicated or exchanged, and any materials or equipment transferred, pursuant to this Agreement shall be communicated, exchanged or transferred by the recipient

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Party or persons under its jurisdiction to any unauthorized persons, or, except as provided in Article VII of this Agreement, beyond the jurisdiction of that Party. Each Party may stipulate the degree to which any of the information, materials or equipment communicated, exchanged or transferred by it or persons under its jurisdiction pursuant to this Agreement may be disseminated or distributed; may specify the categories of persons who may have access to such information, materials or equipment; and may impose such other restrictions on the dissemination or distribution of such information, materials or equipment as it deems necessary.

ARTICLE VII

DISSEMINATION

Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted or operate as a bar or restriction to consultation or cooperation in any field of defense by either Party with other nations or international organizations. Neither Party, however, shall communicate classified information or transfer or permit access to or use of materials, or equipment, made available by the other Party pursuant to this Agreement to any nation or international organization unless authorized to do so by such other Party, or unless such other Party has informed the recipient Party that the same information has been made available to that nation or international organization.

ARTICLE VIII

CLASSIFICATION POLICIES

Agreed classification policies shall be maintained with respect to all classified information, materials or equipment communicated, exchanged or transferred under this Agreement. The Parties intend to continue the present practice of consultation with each other on the classification of these matters.

ARTICLE IX

PATENTS

A. With respect to any invention or discovery employing classified information which has been communicated or exchanged pursuant to Article II or derived from the submarine propulsion plant, material or equipment transferred pursuant to Article III, and made or conceived by the recipient Party, or any agency or corporation owned or controlled thereby, or any of their agents or contractors, or any employee of any of the foregoing, after the date of such communication, exchange or transfer but during the period of this Agreement:

1. In the case of any such invention or discovery in which rights are owned by the recipient Party, or any agency or corporation owned or controlled thereby, and not included in subparagraph 2 of this paragraph, the recipient Party shall, to the extent owned by any of them:

- (a) transfer and assign to the other Party all right, title and interest in and to the invention or discovery, or patent application or patent thereon, in the country of that other

Party, subject to the retention of a royalty-free, non-exclusive, irrevocable license for the governmental purposes of the recipient Party and for the purposes of mutual defense; and

(b) grant to the other Party a royalty-free, non-exclusive, irrevocable license for the governmental purposes of that other Party and for purposes of mutual defense in the country of the recipient Party and third countries, including use in the production of material in such countries for sale to the recipient Party by a contractor of that other Party;

2. in the case of any such invention or discovery which is primarily useful in the production or utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy and made or conceived prior to that time that the information it employs is made available for civil uses, the recipient Party shall:

(a) obtain, by appropriate means, sufficient right, title and interest in and to the invention or discovery, or patent application or patent thereon, as may be necessary to fulfill its obligations under the following two subparagraphs:

(b) transfer and assign to the other Party all right, title and interest in and to the invention or discovery, or patent application or patent thereon, in the country of that other Party, subject to the retention of a royalty-free, non-exclusive, irrevocable license, with the right to grant sub-licenses, for all purposes; and

(c) grant to the other Party a royalty-free, non-exclusive, irrevocable license, with the right to grant sublicenses, for all purposes in the country of the recipient Party and in third countries.

B. 1. Each Party shall, to the extent owned by it, or any agency or corporation owned or controlled thereby, grant to the other Party a royalty-free, non-exclusive, irrevocable license to manufacture and use the subject matter covered by any patent and incorporated in the submarine propulsion plant and spare parts transferred pursuant to paragraph A of Article III for use by the licensed Party for the purposes set forth in paragraph C of Article V.

2. The transferring Party neither warrants nor represents that the submarine propulsion plant or any material or equipment transferred under Article III does not infringe any patent owned or controlled by other persons and assumes no liability or obligation with respect thereto, and the recipient Party agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the transferring Party from any and all liability arising out of any infringement of any such patent.

C. With respect to any invention or discovery, or patent thereon, or license or sublicense therein, covered by paragraph A of this Article, each Party:

1. may, to the extent of its right, title and interest therein, deal with the same in its own and third countries as it may desire, but shall in no event discriminate against citizens of the other Party in respect of granting any license or sublicense under the patents owned by it in its own or any other country;

2. hereby waives any and all claims against the other Party for compensation, royalty or award, and hereby releases the other Party with respect to any and all such claims.

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D. 1. No patent application with respect to any classified information or discovery employing classified information which has been communicated or exchanged pursuant to Article II, or derived from the submarine propulsion plant, material or equipment transferred pursuant to Article III, may be filed:

(a) by either Party or any person in the country of the other Party except in accordance with agreed conditions and procedures; or

(b) in any country not a party to this Agreement except as may be agreed and subject to Articles VI and VII.

2. Appropriate secrecy or prohibition orders shall be issued for the purpose of giving effect to this paragraph.

ARTICLE X

PREVIOUS AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION

Effective from the date on which the present Agreement enters into force, the cooperation between the Parties being carried out under or envisaged by the Agreement for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information for Mutual Defense Purposes, which was signed at Washington on June 15, 1955, and by paragraph B of Article I bis of the Agreement for Cooperation on Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, which was signed at Washington on June 15, 1955, as amended by the Amendment signed at Washington on June 13, 1956, shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the present Agreement.

ARTICLE XI

DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of this Agreement:

A. "Atomic weapon" means any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means of transporting or propelling the device (where such means is a separable and divisible part of the device), the principal purpose of which is for use as, or for development of, a weapon, a weapon prototype, or a weapon test device.

A. "Classified information" means information, data, materials, services or any other matter with the security designation "Confidential" or higher applied under the legislation or regulations of either the United States or the United Kingdom, including that designated by the Government of the United States as "Restricted Data" or "Formerly Restricted Data" and that designated by the Government of the United Kingdom as "ATOMIC".

C. "Equipment" means any instrument, apparatus or facility and includes any facility, except an atomic weapon, capable of making use of or producing special nuclear material, and component parts thereof, and includes submarine nuclear propulsion plant, reactor and military reactor.

D. "Military reactor" means a reactor for the propulsion of naval vessels, aircraft or land vehicles and military package power reactors.

E. "Person" means:

1. any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, association, trust, estate, public or private institution, group, government agency or government corporation other than the United States.

PROPOSED AGREEMENT—ATOMIC ENERGY FOR DEFENSE 13

Atomic Energy Commission and the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority; and

2. any legal successor, representative, agent or agency of the foregoing.

F. "Reactor" means an apparatus, other than an atomic weapon, in which a self-supporting fission chain reaction is maintained and controlled by utilizing uranium, plutonium or thorium, or any combination of uranium, plutonium or thorium.

G. "Submarine nuclear propulsion plant" means a propulsion plant and includes the reactor, and such control, primary, auxiliary, steam and electric systems as may be necessary for propulsion of submarines.

H. References to this Agreement to the Government of the United Kingdom include the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority.

ARTICLE XII

DURATION

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other Government written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for the entry into force of this Agreement, and shall remain in force until terminated by agreement of both Parties, except that, if not so terminated, Article II may be terminated by agreement of both Parties, or by either Party on one year's notice to the other to take effect at the end of a term of ten years, or thereafter on one year's notice to take effect at the end of any succeeding term of five years.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Agreement.

Done at Washington this third day of July, 1958, in two original texts.

For the Government of the United States of America:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES,
Secretary of State.

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

Hood
*Her Majesty's
Chargé d'Affaires a. i.*

To the Congress of the United States:

It has become manifestly clear of late that the countries of the free world must, for their collective defense and mutual help, endeavor to combine their resources and share the large tasks that confront us. This is particularly true in the field of scientific research and development in support of greater collective security, notably in the field of military applications of atomic energy. Close collaboration between scientists and engineers of the United States and the United Kingdom during World War II proved most fruitful.

The free world again faces a similar challenge which the free nations can most effectively meet by cooperating with one another in genuine

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partnership. I pointed out to the Congress earlier this year that it was "wasteful in the extreme for friendly allies to consume talent and money in solving problems that their friends have already solved—all because of artificial barriers to sharing." Since then the Congress has responded with necessary changes in our legislation on the basis of which this Government has just concluded an agreement with the Government of the United Kingdom which provides the framework for closer cooperation on uses of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes.

Pursuant to that legislation I am submitting to each House of the Congress an authoritative copy of the agreement. I am also transmitting a copy of the Secretary of State's letter accompanying authoritative copies of the signed agreement, a copy of a joint letter from the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Secretary of Defense recommending my approval of this agreement and a copy of my memorandum in reply thereto setting forth my approval.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

THE WHITE HOUSE, July 3, 1958.

JULY 3, 1958.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The undersigned, the Secretary of State, has the honor to lay before the President with a view to its transmission to the Congress, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes, signed at Washington July 3, 1958.

This agreement was signed on behalf of the United States pursuant to the authorization granted in your memorandum of July 3, 1958, to the Secretary of Defense and the Acting Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. A copy of that memorandum was received by the Secretary of State from the President.

Faithfully yours,

(Signed) JOHN FOSTER DULLES.

UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
Washington, D. C.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The United States Atomic Energy Commission and the Secretary of Defense recommended that you approve the attached Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes. It is also recommended that you authorize the execution of this proposed agreement on behalf of the United States.

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Y will recall that in 1943, in the interest of our mutual defense, the United Kingdom suspended her own atomic energy program in the United Kingdom and sent to this country and Canada leading scientists to participate in the development of an atomic weapon. In the decade following World War II the British developed independently their own atomic weapons capability without benefit of United States collaboration. Under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, only limited cooperation was permitted and was undertaken pursuant to appropriate agreements for cooperation.

The proposed agreement for cooperation will constitute a framework for the removal of close collaboration with the United Kingdom in the field of military applications of atomic energy, and is, therefore, an important step forward in the implementation of your joint declaration of October 25, 1957, with Prime Minister Macmillan which affirmed the principle of interdependence among the countries of the free world.

The cooperation provided for in the agreement is authorized by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by Public Law 85-479. The United Kingdom is participating with the United States in international arrangements pursuant to which the United Kingdom is making substantial and material contributions to the mutual defense and security. In addition, the United Kingdom has made substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons. For example, the United Kingdom has achieved on its own the capability of fabricating a variety of atomic weapons and has constructed and operated the necessary facilities, such as weapons research and development laboratories, weapon manufacturing facilities, a weapon testing station; has trained personnel to operate these facilities, and has detonated both atomic and hydrogen bombs.

The cooperation provided in this agreement covers exchange of certain classified information and the transfer of certain equipment and special nuclear materials for use therein.

In the area of information, the agreement provides for the exchange of information within the limits of sections 144b and c of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by Public Law 85-479. The areas of information would cover the development of defense plans; the training of personnel; the evaluation of the capability of potential enemies in the employment of atomic weapons and other military applications; the development of delivery systems capable of carrying atomic weapons; design, development, and fabrication of atomic weapons; and research, development, and design of military reactors.

The agreement continues in effect submarine reactor cooperation already undertaken with the United Kingdom and provides for broader cooperation in the military reactor field in the future. Present cooperation in this area has been undertaken under our agreement for cooperation for civil uses, but henceforth will be carried out in accordance with the provisions of Public Law 85-479 and the proposed agreement.

In the area of equipment, the agreement provides that the United States will authorize, subject to terms and conditions acceptable to the Government of the United States, a person to transfer by sale to the United Kingdom one complete submarine nuclear propulsion plant. It also provides for the sale to the United Kingdom of the reactor fuel required for operation of this plant for a period of 10 years following the date of entry into force of the agreement, and for

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authorization, subject to terms and conditions acceptable to the Government of the United States, of a person or persons to transfer this fuel in the form of fabricated cores or fuel elements. These provisions are based upon authority of sections 91 (c), (2), and (3) of the act and set forth in article III of the agreement.

The United Kingdom agrees to indemnify the United States against liability for any damage which might be caused by the equipment after it is taken out of the United States.

Article III also provides specifically for the communication of information on the design, manufacture and operation of this propulsion plant and on the processing and reprocessing of its nuclear fuel.

Cooperation under this article is intended to develop a nuclear submarine capability in the British fleet at the earliest possible time with no interference to the United States naval reactors program and will promote the acquisition by the United Kingdom of the technological know-how essential to the maintenance and growth of this capability.

This agreement would remain in force until terminated by agreement of both parties, thus assuring continued protection for information and materials transferred, in accordance with the provisions of the agreement. However, article II, providing for exchange of information, may be terminated by agreement of the parties or by either party, following 1 year's advance notice, at the expiration of an initial term of 10 years, or upon the expiration of any succeeding term of 5 years. As noted above, the provision of fuel for the submarine propulsion plant is limited to a period of 10 years, which may be extended only by amendment of this agreement.

In accordance with the provisions of section 91, 144b and 144c of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as recently amended, the agreement specifically provides, in article I, that all cooperation under the agreement will be undertaken only when the communicating or transferring party determines that such cooperation will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to its defense and security, while the United States and the United Kingdom are participating in an international arrangement for their mutual defense and security through substantial and material contributions thereto. Cooperation under article II and III of the agreement would be undertaken only when these conditions prevail.

In addition to the foregoing provisions on the terms, conditions, duration, nature, and scope of cooperation, the agreement provides that the parties will maintain agreed security safeguards and standards. The agreement also contains a commitment that the recipient of any material or information transferred pursuant to the agreement will not transfer it to unauthorized persons or except as specifically provided in the agreement, beyond the jurisdiction of the recipient party.

Public Law 85-479 provides that the President will determine that with respect to implementation of the provisions of the agreement concerning exchange of information and the transfer of equipment and materials, proposed communication of information or any proposed transfer arrangement of equipment or materials "will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security." In accordance with our letter to you, dated January 27, 1958, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of

PROPOSED AGREEMENT—ATOMIC ENERGY FOR DEFENSE 17

De' we will recommend to you an Executive order whereby the President would authorize proposed communications or transfers only after joint review by the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and other interested agencies, and would authorize such communications or transfers in the absence of the President's personal approval only where the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission agree that the proposed cooperation and the proposed communication of restricted data or transfer of materials or equipment will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.

It is the considered opinion of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense that the performance of the proposed agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the United States. Accordingly, it is recommended that you (1) approve the program for transfer of one submarine nuclear propulsion plant and special nuclear material required for operation of this plant during the 10-year period following the date upon which the agreement enters into force; (2) determine that the performance of this agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the United States; (3) approve the proposed agreement for cooperation; and (4) authorize the execution of the proposed agreement for the Government of the United States by the Secretary of State.

The Secretary of State concurs in the foregoing recommendations.
Respectfully,

W. F. LIBBY,
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.
NEIL McELROY,
Secretary, Department of Defense.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, July 3, 1958.

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense; the Acting Chairman,
Atomic Energy Commission.

1. In your joint letter of July 3, 1958, to me, you recommended that I approve a proposed agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for cooperation on the uses of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes.

2. I note from your joint recommendation that the United Kingdom is participating with the United States in international arrangements pursuant to which it is making substantial and material contributions to the mutual defense and security, and the United Kingdom has made substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons. I note also that the proposed agreement will permit cooperation necessary to improve capabilities of the United States, and the United Kingdom, in the application of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes, subject to provisions, conditions, guaranties, terms, and special determinations, which are most appropriate in this important area of mutual assistance.

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3. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the agreement require certain determinations concerning cooperation under the agreement. In this regard, I shall expect to have your recommendations with respect to an Executive order which will facilitate the implementation of the agreement as proposed in your joint letter.

4. Having considered the cooperation provided for in the agreement, including your joint recommendation, security safeguards and other terms and conditions of the agreement, I hereby.

(a) Approve the program for transfer of one submarine nuclear propulsion plant and special nuclear material required for operation of this plant during the 10-year period following the date upon which the agreement enters into force;

(b) Determine that the performance of this agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the United States;

(c) Approve the proposed agreement for cooperation; and

(d) Authorize the execution of the proposed agreement for the Government of the United States by the Secretary of State.

5. In taking these actions, I have noted also the supplementary classified information, regarding the agreement, also jointly submitted to me.

6. After execution of the agreement, I shall submit it to the Congress.

7. I am forwarding a copy of this memorandum to the Secretary of State.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

APPENDIX II

STATEMENT BY MR. FREDERICK JANDREY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION, JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY

Mr. Chairman, I welcome this opportunity to summarize the reasons why the State Department considers this agreement with the United Kingdom on nuclear cooperation for mutual defense purposes to be of great importance to the achievement of our foreign policy and security objectives. This will be a brief statement since our views on the importance of closer nuclear cooperation with the United Kingdom were stated to the committee by the Secretary and other members of the Department in testifying on the recently enacted amendments to the Atomic Energy Act.

The objectives which this agreement seeks to promote were envisaged in the meetings between the President and the Prime Minister last October. In the declaration of common purpose issued at the conclusion of the meetings then held, the President and the Prime Minister cited persistent aspirations of the peoples of the free world for a just and lasting peace. They noted that to utilize most effectively the moral, intellectual and material strength of their two nations to bring about conditions in which such peace could prosper, it was necessary to provide adequate security for the free world. They stated that if the free nations of the world are steadfast and use their resources in harmonious cooperation, the totalitarian men

that confronts them will eventually recede. They pointed out that "the arrangements which the nations of the free world have made for collective defense and mutual help are based on the recognition that the concept of national self-sufficiency is now out of date. The countries of the free world are interdependent and only in genuine partnership, by combining their resources and sharing tasks in many fields, can progress and safety be found. For our part we have agreed that our two countries will henceforth act in accordance with this principle." Specific mention was made of the intention of the President to request Congress to amend the Atomic Energy Act to permit close and fruitful collaboration of the scientists and engineers of Great Britain, the United States and other friendly countries. They stressed the importance of this cooperative course of action to our international security objectives.

The proposed amendments to the Atomic Energy Act were recently enacted by the Congress with the objectives set forth in the declaration of common purpose in mind. These include promotion of our mutual security while we continue our pursuit of a satisfactory and meaningful agreement on the control of armaments.

The bilateral agreement which we have submitted to the committee was negotiated with careful regard to the reactions of the Congress as expressed during their considerations of the amendments to the Atomic Energy Act. The terms of the agreement are well within the limits of new cooperation sanctioned by those amendments.

Thus, this step toward closer cooperation with the United Kingdom will constitute an effective and timely contribution to free world security, fully consistent with congressional interest.

Our close relationship with the United Kingdom is of vital importance in today's world. Cooperation between our two countries will contribute to the growth of free world solidarity. It will also permit a strengthening of our mutual defenses coupled with a conservation of the scarce talents and resources of both nations.

The fruits of closer cooperation should begin to benefit in various ways the defense of both countries as this agreement is progressively implemented. As you know, the British have by now a substantial nuclear weapons capability. For us, the merging of British information and know-how in a common fund with our own, in accordance with provisions of the agreement now before you, should provide two direct benefits. Since nuclear weapons programs have been carried on independently by each country, we stand to gain from techniques developed by the British where they have solved the same problems which we faced by methods different from our own. For the same reason, where we find that British techniques developed separately are closely similar to those we have evolved, we can have added confidence in the evolution of our own program. Thus, our weapons program should profit measurably through the stimulation which inevitably results from the cross-fertilization of ideas.

The British also stand to gain very substantial benefits from this agreement which, in the long run, can serve only to strengthen the whole free world. In the first place, the exchange of information and certain materials which will now be possible should enable them to abandon the barren and costly course of continuing to develop through the advanced stages their nuclear weapons capability in the knowledge that they are in many respects merely duplicating techni-

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cal progress already achieved by their major ally. The fact that we will from now on be going forward in company with them will thus, have benefits of a deep psychological nature not only for British scientists, technicians and military specialists but for the British people as a whole. In addition, I believe that we are in advance of the British in enough aspects of this field so that they will be able to effect substantial savings in money, trained manpower and material resources by the adoption of knowledge and techniques we have already developed.

There is one final benefit to both countries which I should like particularly to emphasize. The United States and the United Kingdom, as the two most powerful states in the free world bound closely together by culture and political ideals, have formed the core of western resistance to Communist aggression and penetration since the beginning of the cold war. Divergencies in policy have, of course, occurred, but the two countries have, by and large, stood together and I believe that the allies of both of us have recognized the benefit to their own security which this close Anglo-American association has provided. Our close and increasing cooperation with the British will now be complemented by renewed close collaboration in the nuclear weapons field. The steps we are taking constitute an expressive symbol of full confidence between two allies in a field vital to the defense of both of them. The agreement before you does not by any means cover all aspects of the cooperation we contemplate with the United Kingdom. It does go far in that direction, and in so doing, it marks an important step forward in recognition of the interdependence of our two countries.

APPENDIX III

UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
Washington, D. C., July 23, 1958.

HON. JOHN O. PASTORE,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Agreements for Cooperation, Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, Congress of the United States.*

DEAR SENATOR PASTORE: While the Subcommittee on Agreements for Cooperation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in executive session on July 11, 1958, was considering the agreement for cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom signed July 3, 1958, the subcommittee requested the views of the executive branch with respect to its interpretation of article VII of the agreement.

In particular, the subcommittee asked whether the second sentence of article VII meant that the United States could authorize the United Kingdom to communicate to a third nation restricted data received from the United States even though there was not an appropriate agreement in force between the United States and that third nation.

This provision, which in pertinent part states: "Neither Party, however, shall communicate classified information * * * made available by the other Party pursuant to this Agreement to any nation * * * unless authorized to do so by such other Party * * *" was included in the agreement solely for the purpose of placing on the recipient nation a firm obligation not to recommunicate such information to a third nation without the express permission of the communicating nation.

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That provision stems from the terms of section 123 a. (4) of the Atomic Energy Act which requires "a guarantee by the cooperating party that any material or any Restricted Data to be transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation will not be transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the cooperating party, except as specified in the agreement for cooperation;." It was pointed out at the hearing that it could be argued that under this provision and the terms of article VII it might be theoretically possible for the Commission or the Department of Defense to authorize the United Kingdom to communicate restricted data or formerly restricted data received pursuant to the agreement to a third nation even though there was no appropriate agreement between the United States and that nation. We have considered that argument but in view of policies expressed in the Atomic Energy Act and the provisions of that act relating to international cooperation, we do not so construe section 123 a. (4).

Accordingly, it is our joint opinion that the United States could not authorize the United Kingdom to transmit any restricted data or formerly restricted data to a third country unless the United States and that third country are parties to an appropriate agreement under which the information in question would be transmissible directly by the United States to that third country. This would also be true with respect to material or equipment transferred to the United Kingdom pursuant to the agreement.

Members of the subcommittee suggested that future agreements, including any amendment of the agreement under consideration, provide specific restrictions on the right to authorize a recipient nation to communicate restricted data to a third nation. In our opinion, including such specific restrictions in future agreements is unnecessary in view of the conclusions expressed herein. However, the civil agreements for cooperation contain provisions of the type suggested, and while they merely identify legal limitations which in our opinion would be applicable in any event, we would have no objection to proposing inclusion of similar provisions in future military agreements if the committee deems that desirable.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT DECHERT,
General Counsel, Department of Defense.
L. K. OLSON,
General Counsel, Atomic Energy Commission.
LOFTUS BECKER,
Legal Adviser, Department of State.

APPENDIX IV

PUBLIC LAW 85-479

85TH CONGRESS, H. R. 12716

July 2, 1958

AN ACT To amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended
it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 91 of the Atomic

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Energy Act of 1954, as amended, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

"c. The President may authorize the Commission or the Department of Defense, with the assistance of the other, to cooperate with another nation and, notwithstanding the provisions of section 57, 62, or 81, to transfer by sale, lease, or loan to that nation, in accordance with terms and conditions of a program approved by the President—

"(1) nonnuclear parts of atomic weapons provided that such nation has made substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons, and other nonnuclear parts of atomic weapons systems involving Restricted Data provided that such transfer will not contribute significantly to that nation's atomic weapon design, development, or fabrication capability; for the purpose of improving that nation's state of training and operational readiness;

"(2) utilization facilities for military applications; and

"(3) source, byproduct, or special nuclear material for research on, development of, production of, or use in utilization facilities for military applications; and

"(4) source, byproduct, or special nuclear material for research on, development of, or use in atomic weapons: *Provided, however,* That the transfer of such material to that nation is necessary to improve its atomic weapon design, development, or fabrication capability: *And provided further,* That such nation has made substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons, whenever the President determines that the proposed cooperation and each proposed transfer arrangement for the nonnuclear parts of atomic weapons and atomic weapons systems, utilization facilities or source, byproduct, or special nuclear material will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, while such other nation is participating with the United States pursuant to an international arrangement by substantial and material contributions to the mutual defense and security: *Provided, however,* That the cooperation is undertaken pursuant to an agreement entered into in accordance with section 123: *And provided further,* That if an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to this subsection provides for transfer of utilization facilities for military applications the Commission, or the Department of Defense with respect to cooperation it has been authorized to undertake, may authorize any person to transfer such utilization facilities for military applications in accordance with the terms and conditions of this subsection and of the agreement for cooperation."

SEC. 2. Section 92 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, is amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 92. PROHIBITION.—It shall be unlawful, except as provided in section 91, for any person to transfer or receive in interstate or foreign commerce, manufacture, produce, transfer, acquire, possess, import, or export any atomic weapon. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to modify the provisions of subsection 31 a. or section 101."

SEC. 3. Subsection 123 a. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, is amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 123. COOPERATION WITH OTHER NATIONS.—No cooperation with any nation or regional defense organization pursuant to sections 54, 57, 64, 82, 91, 103, 104, or 144 shall be undertaken until—

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"The Commission or, in the case of those agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91 c. or 144 b. which are to be implemented by the Department of Defense, the Department of Defense has submitted to the President the proposed agreement for cooperation, together with its recommendations thereon, which proposed agreement shall include (1) the terms, conditions, duration, nature, and scope of the cooperation; (2) a guaranty by the cooperating party that security safeguards and standards as set forth in the agreement for cooperation will be maintained; (3) except in the case of those agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91 c. a guaranty by the cooperating party that any material to be transferred pursuant to such agreement will not be used for atomic weapons, or for research on or development of atomic weapons or for any other military purpose; and (4) a guaranty by the cooperating party that any material or any Restricted Data to be transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation will not be transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the cooperating party, except as specified in the agreement for cooperation;"

SEC. 4. Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, is amended in subsection b. by deleting the word "and" at the end thereof; in subsection c. by changing the period at the end thereof to a semicolon and inserting thereafter "and;"; and by adding the following new subsection:

"d. the proposed agreement for cooperation, together with the approval and determination of the President, if arranged pursuant to subsection 91 c., 144 b., or 144 c., has been submitted to the Congress and referred to the Joint Committee and a period of sixty days has elapsed while Congress is in session, but any such proposed agreement for cooperation shall not become effective if during such sixty-day period the Congress passes a concurrent resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the proposed agreement for cooperation: *Provided, however*, That during the Eighty-fifth Congress such period shall be thirty days (in computing such sixty days, or thirty days, as the case may be, there shall be excluded the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days)."

SEC. 5. Section 144a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, is amended to read as follows:

"a. The President may authorize the Commission to cooperate with another nation and to communicate to that nation Restricted Data on—

"(1) refining, purification, and subsequent treatment of source material;

"(2) civilian reactor development;

"(3) production of special nuclear material;

"(4) health and safety;

"(5) industrial and other applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes; and

"(6) research and development relating to the foregoing:

Provided, however, That no such cooperation shall involve the communication of Restricted Data relating to the design or fabrication of atomic weapons: *And provided further*, That the cooperation is undertaken pursuant to an agreement for cooperation entered into in accordance with section 123, or is undertaken pursuant to an agreement existing on the effective date of this Act."

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SEC. 6. Section 144 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, is amended to read as follows:

"b. The President may authorize the Department of Defense, with the assistance of the Commission, to cooperate with another nation or with a regional defense organization to which the United States is a party, and to communicate to that nation or organization such Restricted Data (including design information) as is necessary to—

"(1) the development of defense plans;

"(2) the training of personnel in the employment of and defense against atomic weapons and other military applications of atomic energy;

"(3) the evaluation of the capabilities of potential enemies in the employment of atomic weapons and other military applications of atomic energy; and

"(4) the development of compatible delivery systems for atomic weapons;

whenever the President determines that the proposed cooperation and the proposed communication of the Restricted Data will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, while such other nation or organization is participating with the United States pursuant to an international arrangement by substantial and material contributions to the mutual defense and security: *Provided, however,* That the cooperation is undertaken pursuant to an agreement entered into in accordance with section 123."

SEC. 7. Section 144 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsections:

"c. In addition to the cooperation authorized in subsections 144 a. and 144 b., the President may authorize the Commission, with the assistance of the Department of Defense, to cooperate with another nation and—

"(1) to exchange with that nation Restricted Data concerning atomic weapons: *Provided,* That communication of such Restricted Data to that nation is necessary to improve its atomic weapon design, development, or fabrication capability and provided that nation has made substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons; and

"(2) to communicate or exchange with that nation Restricted Data concerning research, development, or design, of military reactors,

whenever the President determines that the proposed cooperation and the communication of the proposed Restricted Data will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, while such other nation is participating with the United States pursuant to an international arrangement by substantial and material contributions to the mutual defense and security: *Provided, however,* That the cooperation is undertaken pursuant to an agreement entered into in accordance with section 123.

"d. The President may authorize any agency of the United States to communicate in accordance with the terms and conditions of an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 144 a., b., or c., such Restricted Data as is determined to be transmissible under the agreement for cooperation involved."

Approved July 2, 1958.



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TO EXTERNAL 1795 OPIMMEDIATE

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FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF NY TIMES STORY OF TODAY'S DATE DATED
COLORADO SPRINGS AUG2 AND HEADED "CANADA MAY SEEK USA ATOM WEAPONS":
QUALIFIED OBSERVERS WITHIN THE NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
EXPECT CANADA TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF SHARING USA NUCLEAR AIR
DEFENSE WEAPONS AT FORTHCOMING DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN DEFENSE
OFFICIALS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES.

ALTHOUGH USA AND CANADIAN AIR DEFENSES HAVE RECENTLY BEEN
LINKED IN THE NORAD ORGANIZATION HERE, ONLY USA PLANES ARE
AUTHORIZED TO CARRY THIS COUNTRY'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS, INCLUDING THE
NEW AIR-TO-AIR GENIE INTERCEPTOR MISSILE.

SPOKESMEN FROM BOTH NATIONS SAID THEY EXPECTED THAT A POSSIBLE
JOINT ATOMIC DEFENSE WOULD BE A MAJOR TOPIC OF A MEETING
SCHEDULED MON IN WASHDC BETWEEN GEORGE R PEARKE, CANADIAN MINISTER
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, NEIL H MCELROY.

MR PEARKE IS SCHEDULED TO VISIT THIS COMMAND WED, IN WINDING
UP A THREE DAY VISIT TO THE USA.

THE SHARING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR WARHEADS WOULD REQUIRE
REVISION OF THE NATION'S ATOMIC ENERGY LAWS. UNDER LEGISLATION
SIGNED BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER LAST MONTH, CERTAIN ATOMIC WEAPONS
INFO AND MATERIALS CAN BE SHARED WITH FRIENDLY ALLIES ADVANCED
IN THE FIELD.

UNDER THE LAW, AN AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED WITH BRITAIN. BUT
ONLY LIMITED INFO CAN BE GIVEN NATIONS, SUCH AS CANADA, THAT HAVE
NOT PRODUCED NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

A CANADIAN OFFICIAL HERE SAID CANADA BELIEVED IT HAD A SPECIAL
CLAIM ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR SECRETS THAT THE USA WAS INCLINED
TO SHARE WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.

HE SAID THAT AS VITAL AS USA-BRITISH DEFENSE LINKS WERE, THERE WAS
NO CLOSER DEFENSE PARTNERSHIP THAN THAT BETWEEN THIS COUNTRY
AND HIS.

IN AN AIR ATTACK AGAINST NORTH AMERICAN, NORAD HQ HERE, ESTABLISHED
FORMALLY LAST MAY UNDER GEN EARLE E PARTRIDGE, WOULD ASSUME
OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ALL CANADIAN AND USA AIR DEFENSE FORCES
TO PROVIDE A COORDINATED DEFENSE.

PAGE TWO 1795

GENERAL PARTRIDGE IS RESPONSIBLE TO THE CHIEFS OF STAFF OF BOTH NATIONS. HIS DEPUTY IS AIR MARSHAL C ROY SLEMON OF THE RCAF.

SINCE JULY 15 THE AIR DEFENSES UNDER THIS COMMAND HAVE BEEN ON AN "INCREASED READINESS" BASIS AS A RESULT OF THE MIDEAST CRISIS.

THE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES KEPT IN READINESS HAS BEEN DOUBLED, ACCORDING TO A SPOKESMAN.

THE QUESTION OF OBTAINING RIGHTS TO A NUCLEAR DEFENSE WEAPON SUCH AS THE GENIE IS TIMELY, OFFICIALS HERE SAID, BECAUSE OF CANADIAN PLANS TO REEQUIP ITS NINE AIR DEFENSE SQUADRONS WITH A NEW CRAFT CAPABLE OF CARRYING THE MISSILE.

REPORTEDLY A DECISION IS TO BE MADE LATER THIS YEAR ON WHETHER TO ORDER THE AVRO CF105 TWIN JET INTERCEPTOR AS A REPLACEMENT FOR THE AVRO CF100 CANUCK NOW IN USE. MORE THAN 200 PLANES MAY BE ORDERED.

THE SUPERSONIC CF105 IS NOW UNDER TEST. FULL PRODUCTION IS EXPECTED WITHIN TWO YEARS.

SPOKESMEN HERE SAID THAT CANADA WAS ALSO SEEKING TO INTEREST THE USA IN BUYING THE CF105 AS A "FOLLOW-ON" PLANE TO THE CONVAIR F102A, WHICH WENT INTO SERVICE IN MAY 1954 AND IS NOW BEING FLOWN BY TWENTY USAF SQUADRONS.

THE PURPOSE OF POOLING PURCHASES WOULD BE TO REDUCE COSTS FOR BOTH NATIONS. HOWEVER, THE USA ALREADY HAS UNDER DEVELOPMENT A FOLLOW-ON FOR THE F102A IN THE FORM OF THE CONVAIR F106A, ON WHICH AT LEAST 260,000,000 DOLLARS IN CONTRACTS HAVE BEEN PLACED.

AT PRESENT ONLY THE F89 SCORPION INTERCEPTOR, OF THE HALF DOZEN TYPES OF AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED BY SOME SIXTY USA AIR DEFENSE SQUADRONS, CAN BE ARMED WITH THE GENIE. THE F101B VOODOO, SCHEDULED TO ENTER THE OPERATIONAL INVENTORY LATER THIS YEAR, WILL ALSO HAVE ATOMIC CAPABILITY, AS WILL THE F106A.

VARIOUS NON NUCLEAR MISSILES, SUCH AS THE FALCON AND SIDEWINDER, ARE IN USE ON BOTH CANADIAN AND USA DEFENSE PLANES. HOWEVER THE ATOMIC GENIE WILL BE CAPABLE OF A FAR GREATER "KILL PROBABILITY."

IT WAS DESCRIBED HERE AS BEING CAPABLE OF COMPLETELY DESTROYING ANY AIRCRAFT WITHIN A MILE OF THE POINT OF DETONATION."

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
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To..... *EA*

Subject: *Amendment of U.S. Atomic Energy Act.*

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Date

JUL - 8 1958

Publication

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

London Unwraps Atom Pact

By Henry S. Hayward

Chief of the London News Bureau of The Christian Science Monitor

London Britons were told officially for the first time July 8 details of the new agreement with the United States on sharing atomic information.

Prime Minister Harold Macmillan presented the text of the agreement as a government white paper to the House of Commons while replying to questions by George Brown, a member of the Labor Party opposition who would be Minister of Defense if Labor were in power.

British reaction, on the whole, has been favorable, although some criticisms have been aired here. One is that this country cannot, without American consent, pass on to Commonwealth and Empire members any of the United States information.

Thus British-made H-bombs or A-bombs incorporating American devices or discoveries could not be handed over to the defense forces of, say, Australia or Canada without permission from Washington.

Criticism Expected

The Anglo-American agreement, moreover, confirms that H-bomb warheads for American Thor rockets to be based in Britain will remain under United States control indefinitely.

The expectation is that these stipulations, which a vocal minority in this country consider drawbacks, will be strongly criticized by socialist members in the House of Commons.

Far more prevalent, however, has been British appreciation of the fact that changes in American legislation will permit a considerable saving of money and effort on matters nuclear by Britain.

The sale to Britain of a submarine nuclear propulsion plant

is expected to prove a net gain for British scientists who are several years behind their American colleagues in this field.

It may mean that the Dreadnought, Britain's first nuclear submarine, will be ready in 1960 instead of 1962 or 1963. Work on an all-British version of the nuclear sub, however, is to continue.

Best of all, the agreement is overwhelmingly welcomed as signaling the end of a duplication and waste of talent that the Western powers cannot afford.

Britons, moreover, remain confident that the exchange of useful information will prove truly a two-way affair in which Americans will receive as well as give benefits.

Doctrine Pays Off

While this country no longer will need to commit so much of its limited capital and resources to nuclear experimentation in fields already probed by its closest ally, the problem of France and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies remains.

"It would be idle to pretend that France and other continental countries will look with favor on the Anglo-American agreement," The Times, of London, points out.

"They have been suspicious for long enough about what they

call the Anglo-Saxon nuclear hegemony," The Times said.

Britons frankly expect France to make a similar bid with limited resources to gain admission to the H-bomb club. But they will be surprised if Paris does not have to wait for a considerable time, as has London, before an exchange agreement with the United States can be arranged.

Ironically, if the Washington-London agreement had been possible three years ago, Britain might not have felt it imperative to develop its own H-bomb—although this was the very achievement that seems to have made an agreement possible.

From Britain's viewpoint, the new pact is evidence that Mr. Macmillan's doctrine of interdependence is paying off.

It is worth recalling nonetheless that many Britons regarded the granting of rocket bases in this country to the United States more as a generous and even dangerous concession on their part than as a gain in defense potential or as an economy. To such, the present nuclear agreement is welcome—but also seems quite justified.

As the Manchester Guardian puts it, Britain joined the nuclear club at Christmas Island a year ago. It now appears to have been elected to the executive committee.



Associated Press

Prime Minister Harold Macmillan

Handwritten notes:
D. H. for your
file
July 15/58
AB

FILE COPY
TO INTERNAL 1552 PRIORITY
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July 7, 1958

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JUL 8 1958

USA UK ATOMIC ENERGY AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION

ON JUL 3 PRESIDENT EISENHOWER SUBMITTED TO EACH HOUSE AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE USA AND THE UK FOR COOPERATION ON THE USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY FOR MUTUAL DEFENCE PURPOSES WHICH HAD BEEN SIGNED THAT DAY IN WASHDC, AND WHICH HAS BEEN RELEASED TO THE PRESS.

2. ACCORDING TO THE RECENTLY AMENDED TERMS OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 THIS NEW AGREEMENT MUST LIE BEFORE CONGRESS FOR THIRTY DAYS BEFORE IT BECOMES EFFECTIVE. IN THIS TIME CONGRESS MAY VETO OR AMEND IT BUT SUCH ACTION IS UNLIKELY ON THIS PARTICULAR AGREEMENT.

3. THIS IS A NEW AGREEMENT BUT ARTICLE X PROVIDES THAT COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES BEING CARRIED OUT UNDER PREVIOUS AGREEMENTS SHALL BE CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT.

4. THE AGREEMENT COVERS THE EXCHANGE OF CLASSIFIED INFO IN THE FOLLOWING FIELDS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENSE PLANS; THE TRAINING OF PERSONNEL; THE EVALUATION OF THE CAPABILITY OF POTENTIAL ENEMIES IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF ATOMIC WEAPONS AND OTHER MILITARY APPLICATIONS; THE DEVELOPMENT OF DELIVERY SYSTEMS CAPABLE OF CARRYING ATOMIC WEAPONS; DESIGN, DEVELOPMENT, AND FABRICATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS; AND RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND DESIGN OF MILITARY REACTORS.

5. THE AGREEMENT CONTINUES SUBMARINE REACTOR COOPERATION AND PROVIDES FOR BROADER COOPERATION IN THE MILITARY REACTOR FIELD IN THE FUTURE.

6. THE AGREEMENT FURTHER PROVIDES FOR THE SALE OF ONE COMPLETE SUBMARINE NUCLEAR PROPULSION PLANT TOGETHER WITH THE FUEL AND SPARE PARTS NECESSARY TO OPERATE THE PLANT FOR TEN YEARS.

7. ARTICLE III ALSO PROVIDES FOR THE COMMUNICATION OF INFO ON THE DESIGN, MANUFACTURE AND OPERATION OF THIS PROPULSION PLANT AND ON THE PROCESSING AND REPROCESSING OF ITS NUCLEAR FUEL.

8. A COVERING LET STATES: COOPERATION UNDER THIS ARTICLE IS INTENDED TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR SUBMARINE CAPABILITY IN THE BRITISH FLEET AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME WITH NO INTERFERENCE TO THE USA NAVAL REACTORS PROGRAM.

9. ARTICLE V STATES SPECIFICALLY UNDER THIS AGREEMENT THERE WILL BE NO

PAGE TWO 1552

TRANSFER BY EITHER PARTY OF ATOMIC WEAPONS." BUT ARTICLE II B STATES THAT EACH PARTY "WILL EXCHANGE WITH THE OTHER PARTY OTHER CLASSIFIED INFO CONCERNING ATOMIC WEAPONS WHEN, AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE OTHER PARTY, THE COMMUNICATING PARTY DETERMINES THAT THE COMMUNICATION OF SUCH INFO IS NECESSARY TO IMPROVE THE RECIPIENT'S ATOMIC WEAPON DESIGN, DEVELOPMENT AND FABRICATION CAPABILITY."

10. A COPY OF THIS NEW USA-UK BILATERAL AND ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS ARE BEING FORWARDED BY AIRMAIL.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

UNCLASSIFIED

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy,
Washington, D.C.

Reference: Our Telegram No. 1552 July 7,

Subject: USA-UK Agreement for the Cooperation
on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual
Defence Purposes.

Security:.....

No:.....1043

Date:.....July 7, 1958.

Enclosures:.....- 6 -

Air or Surface Mail: Air Mail

Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.

50219-AK-40

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References

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JUL 10 1958

*Distribution
relect on transmittal
step of July 11*

Enclosed is a copy of the
marginally noted agreement together
with five copies of President Eisenhower's
letter of transmittal to Congress and
other associated letters.

Refer - ceos.

See y to Tech.

Mr. Baughen (Exec. D.V.)

File

Wm. J. ... 7/15

H. Williamson

for The Embassy.

Internal
Circulation

[Handwritten mark]

Distribution
to Posts

1958 JUL 10 PM 3:35

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENCE

OTTAWA, ONTARIO

1958 JUL 10 PM 3:35

TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENCE

FROM THE SECRETARY OF DEFENCE

SUBJECT: [illegible]

REFERENCE: [illegible]

1. [illegible]

2. [illegible]

3. [illegible]

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11. [illegible]

12. [illegible]

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR THE PRESS

JULY 3, 1958

NO. 384

NEW UNITED STATES-UNITED KINGDOM BILATERAL AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION

The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom have today signed a new Atomic Energy Agreement for Cooperation which is being submitted to the United States Congress. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles signed for the United States and Lord Hood, British Charge d'Affaires, signed for the United Kingdom. This is the first Agreement to be negotiated under the recent amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, approved by the President on July 2, 1958.

The new Agreement when it comes into effect will permit a greater exchange of nuclear information and materials between the United States and the United Kingdom in order to improve their mutual defense capabilities.

In addition, the new Agreement makes possible the sale by an American firm to the British Government or its agent of a complete submarine nuclear propulsion plant, together with spare parts, and the fuel elements required to operate this plant for a period of ten years. Classified information for the design, manufacture and operation of such a plant will also be communicated.

This new Agreement is an outcome of the decisions reached between the President and the Prime Minister as set forth in the Declaration of Common Purpose of October 25, 1957. At that time the President undertook to "request the Congress to amend the Atomic Energy Act as may be necessary and desirable to permit close and fruitful collaboration of the scientists and engineers of Great Britain, the United States, and other friendly countries."

* * *

State--FD, Wash., D.C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOR THE PRESS

JULY 3, 1958

NO. 384-A

TEXT OF
AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN IRELAND
FOR THE COOPERATION ON THE USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY
FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on its own behalf and on behalf of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority,

Considering that their mutual security and defense require that they be prepared to meet the contingencies of atomic warfare;

Considering that both countries have made substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons;

Considering that they are participating together in international arrangements pursuant to which they are making substantial and material contributions to their mutual defense and security;

Recognizing that their common defense and security will be advanced by the exchange of information concerning atomic energy and by the transfer of equipment and materials for use therein;

Believing that such exchange and transfer can be undertaken without risk to the defense and security of either country; and

Taking into consideration the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, which was enacted with these purposes in mind,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

GENERAL PROVISION

While the United States and the United Kingdom are participating in an international arrangement for their mutual defense and security and making substantial and material contributions thereto, each Party will communicate to and exchange with the other Party information, and transfer materials and equipment to the other Party, in accordance with the provisions

of this

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of this Agreement provided that the communicating or transferring Party determines that such cooperation will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to its defense and security.

ARTICLE II

EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

A. Each Party will communicate to or exchange with the other Party such classified information as is jointly determined to be necessary to:

1. the development of defense plans;
2. the training of personnel in the employment of and defense against atomic weapons and other military applications of atomic energy;
3. the evaluation of the capabilities of potential enemies in the employment of atomic weapons and other military applications of atomic energy;
4. the development of delivery systems compatible with the atomic weapons which they carry; and
5. research, development and design of military reactors to the extent and by such means as may be agreed.

B. In addition to the cooperation provided for in paragraph A of this Article each Party will exchange with the other Party other classified information concerning atomic weapons when, after consultation with the other Party, the communicating Party determines that the communication of such information is necessary to improve the recipient's atomic weapon design, development and fabrication capability.

ARTICLE III

TRANSFER OF SUBMARINE NUCLEAR PROPULSION PLANT AND MATERIALS

A. The Government of the United States will authorize, subject to terms and conditions acceptable to the Government of the United States, a person to transfer by sale to the Government of the United Kingdom or its agent one complete submarine nuclear propulsion plant with such spare parts therefor as may be agreed by the Parties and to communicate to the Government of the United Kingdom or its agent (or to both) such classified information as relates to safety features and such classified information as is necessary for the design, manufacture and operation of such propulsion plant. A person or persons will also be authorized, for a period of ten years following the date of entry into force of this Agreement and subject to terms and conditions acceptable to the Government of the United States, to transfer replacement cores or fuel elements for such plant.

B. The

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PR 384-A

B. The Government of the United States will transfer by sale agreed amounts of U-235 contained in uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 as needed for use in the submarine nuclear propulsion plant transferred pursuant to paragraph A of this Article, during the ten years following the date of entry into force of this Agreement on such terms and conditions as may be agreed. If the Government of the United Kingdom so requests, the Government of the United States will during such period reprocess any material sold under the present paragraph in facilities of the Government of the United States, on terms and conditions to be agreed, or authorize such reprocessing in private facilities in the United States. Enriched uranium recovered in reprocessing such materials by either Party may be purchased by the Government of the United States under terms and conditions to be agreed. Special nuclear material recovered in reprocessing such materials and not purchased by the Government of the United States may be returned to or retained by the Government of the United Kingdom and any U-235 not purchased by the Government of the United States will be credited to the amounts of U-235 to be transferred by the Government of the United States under this Agreement.

C. The Government of the United States shall be compensated for enriched uranium sold by it pursuant to this Article at the United States Atomic Energy Commission's published charges applicable to the domestic distribution of such material in effect at the time of the sale. Any purchase of enriched uranium by the Government of the United States pursuant to this Article shall be at the applicable price of the United States Atomic Energy Commission for the purchase of enriched uranium in effect at the time of purchase of such enriched uranium.

D. The Parties will exchange classified information on methods of reprocessing fuel elements of the type utilized in the propulsion plant to be transferred under this Article, including classified information on the design, construction and operation of facilities for the reprocessing of such fuel elements.

E. The Government of the United Kingdom shall indemnify and hold harmless the Government of the United States against any and all liabilities whatsoever (including third-party liability) for any damage or injury occurring after the propulsion plant or parts thereof, including spare parts, replacement cores or fuel elements are taken outside the United States, for any cause arising out of or connected with the design, manufacture, assembly, transfer or utilization of the propulsion plant, spare parts, replacement cores or fuel elements transferred pursuant to paragraph A of this Article.

ARTICLE IV

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ARTICLE IV

RESPONSIBILITY FOR USE OF INFORMATION, MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT AND DEVICES

The application or use of any information (including design drawings and specifications), material or equipment communicated, exchanged or transferred under this Agreement shall be the responsibility of the Party receiving it, and the other Party does not provide any indemnity, and does not warrant the accuracy or completeness of such information and does not warrant the suitability or completeness of such information, material or equipment for any particular use or application.

ARTICLE V

CONDITIONS

A. Cooperation under this Agreement will be carried out by each of the Parties in accordance with its applicable laws.

B. Under this Agreement there will be no transfer by either Party of atomic weapons.

C. Except as may be otherwise agreed for civil uses, the information communicated or exchanged, or the materials or equipment transferred, by either Party pursuant to this Agreement shall be used by the recipient Party exclusively for the preparation or implementation of defense plans in the mutual interests of the two countries.

D. Nothing in this Agreement shall preclude the communication or exchange of classified information which is transmissible under other arrangements between the Parties.

ARTICLE VI

GUARANTIES

A. Classified information, materials and equipment communicated or transferred pursuant to this Agreement shall be accorded full security protection under applicable security arrangements between the Parties and applicable national legislation and regulations of the Parties. In no case shall either Party maintain security standards for safeguarding classified information, materials or equipment made available pursuant to this Agreement less restrictive than those set forth in the applicable security arrangements in effect on the date this Agreement comes into force.

B. Classified information communicated or exchanged pursuant to this Agreement will be made available through channels existing or hereafter agreed for the communication or exchange of such information between the Parties.

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C. Classified information, communicated or exchanged, and any materials or equipment transferred, pursuant to this Agreement shall not be communicated, exchanged or transferred by the recipient Party or persons under its jurisdiction to any unauthorized persons, or, except as provided in Article VII of this Agreement, beyond the jurisdiction of that Party. Each Party may stipulate the degree to which any of the information, materials or equipment communicated, exchanged or transferred by it or persons under its jurisdiction pursuant to this Agreement may be disseminated or distributed; may specify the categories of persons who may have access to such information, materials or equipment; and may impose such other restrictions on the dissemination or distribution of such information, materials or equipment as it deems necessary.

ARTICLE VII

DISSEMINATION

Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted or operate as a bar or restriction to consultation or cooperation in any field of defense by either Party with other nations or international organizations. Neither Party, however, shall communicate classified information or transfer or permit access to or use of materials, or equipment, made available by the other Party pursuant to this Agreement to any nation or international organization unless authorized to do so by such other Party, or unless such other Party has informed the recipient Party that the same information has been made available to that nation or international organization.

ARTICLE VIII

CLASSIFICATION POLICIES

Agreed classification policies shall be maintained with respect to all classified information, materials or equipment communicated, exchanged or transferred under this Agreement. The Parties intend to continue the present practice of consultation with each other on the classification of these matters.

ARTICLE IX

PATENTS

A. With respect to any invention or discovery employing classified information which has been communicated or exchanged pursuant to Article II or derived from the submarine propulsion plant, material or equipment transferred pursuant to Article III, and made or conceived by the recipient Party, or any agency or corporation owned or controlled thereby, or any of their agents or contractors, or any employee of any of the foregoing, after the date of such communication, exchange or transfer but during the period of this Agreement:

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1. in the case of any such invention or discovery in which rights are owned by the recipient Party, or any agency or corporation owned or controlled thereby, and not included in subparagraph 2 of this paragraph, the recipient Party shall, to the extent owned by any of them:

(a) transfer and assign to the other Party all right, title and interest in and to the invention or discovery, or patent application or patent thereon, in the country of that other Party, subject to the retention of a royalty-free, non-exclusive, irrevocable license for the governmental purposes of the recipient Party and for the purposes of mutual defense; and

(b) grant to the other Party a royalty-free, non-exclusive, irrevocable license for the governmental purposes of that other Party and for purposes of mutual defense in the country of the recipient Party and third countries, including use in the production of material in such countries for sale to the recipient Party by a contractor of that other Party;

2. in the case of any such invention or discovery which is primarily useful in the production or utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy and made or conceived prior to that time that the information it employs is made available for civil uses, the recipient Party shall:

(a) obtain, by appropriate means, sufficient right, title and interest in and to the invention or discovery, or patent application or patent thereon, as may be necessary to fulfill its obligations under the following two subparagraphs:

(b) transfer and assign to the other Party all right, title and interest in and to the invention or discovery, or patent application or patent thereon, in the country of that other Party, subject to the retention of a royalty-free, non-exclusive, irrevocable license, with the right to grant sublicenses, for all purposes; and

(c) grant to the other Party a royalty-free, non-exclusive, irrevocable license, with the right to grant sublicenses, for all purposes in the country of the recipient Party and in third countries.

B. 1. Each Party shall, to the extent owned by it, or any agency or corporation owned or controlled thereby, grant to the other Party a royalty-free, non-exclusive,

irrevocable

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irrevocable license to manufacture and use the subject matter covered by any patent and incorporated in the submarine propulsion plant and spare parts transferred pursuant to paragraph A of Article III for use by the licensed Party for the purposes set forth in paragraph C of Article V.

2. The transferring Party neither warrants, nor represents that the submarine propulsion plant or any material or equipment transferred under Article III does not infringe any patent owned or controlled by other persons and assumes no liability or obligation with respect thereto, and the recipient Party agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the transferring Party from any and all liability arising out of any infringement of any such patent.

C. With respect to any invention or discovery, or patent thereon, or license or sublicense therein, covered by paragraph A of this Article, each Party:

1. may, to the extent of its right, title and interest therein, deal with the same in its own and third countries as it may desire, but shall in no event discriminate against citizens of the other Party in respect of granting any license or sublicense under the patents owned by it in its own or any other country;

2. hereby waives any and all claims against the other Party for compensation, royalty or award, and hereby releases the other Party with respect to any and all such claims.

D. 1. No patent application with respect to any classified invention or discovery employing classified information which has been communicated or exchanged pursuant to Article II, or derived from the submarine propulsion plant, material or equipment transferred pursuant to Article III, may be filed:

(a) by either Party or any person in the country of the other Party except in accordance with agreed conditions and procedures; or

(b) in any country not a party to this Agreement except as may be agreed and subject to Articles VI and VII.

2. appropriate secrecy or prohibition orders shall be issued for the purpose of giving effect to this paragraph.

ARTICLE X

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ARTICLE X

PREVIOUS AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION

Effective from the date on which the present Agreement enters into force, the cooperation between the Parties being carried out under or envisaged by the Agreement for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information for Mutual Defense Purposes, which was signed at Washington on June 15, 1955, and by paragraph B of Article I bis of the Agreement for Cooperation on Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, which was signed at Washington on June 15, 1955, as amended by the Amendment signed at Washington on June 13, 1956, shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the present Agreement.

ARTICLE XI

DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of this Agreement:

A. "Atomic weapon" means any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means of transporting or propelling the device (where such means is a separable and divisible part of the device), the principal purpose of which is for use as, or for development of, a weapon, a weapon prototype, or a weapon test device.

A. "Classified information" means information, data, materials, services or any other matter with the security designation "Confidential" or higher applied under the legislation or regulations of either the United States or the United Kingdom, including that designated by the Government of the United States as "Restricted Data" or "Formerly Restricted Data" and that designated by the Government of the United Kingdom as "ATOMIC".

C. "Equipment" means any instrument, apparatus or facility and includes any facility, except an atomic weapon, capable of making use of or producing special nuclear material, and component parts thereof, and includes submarine nuclear propulsion plant, reactor and military reactor.

D. "Military reactor" means a reactor for the propulsion of naval vessels, aircraft or land vehicles and military package power reactors.

E. "Person" means:

1. any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, association, trust, estate, public or private institution, group, government agency or government corporation other than the United States Atomic Energy Commission and the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority; and

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2. any legal successor, representative, agent or agency of the foregoing.

F. "Reactor" means an apparatus, other than an atomic weapon, in which a self-supporting fission chain reaction is maintained and controlled by utilizing uranium, plutonium or thorium, or any combination of uranium, plutonium or thorium.

G. "Submarine nuclear propulsion plant" means a propulsion plant and includes the reactor, and such control, primary, auxiliary, steam and electric systems as may be necessary for propulsion of submarines.

H. References in this Agreement to the Government of the United Kingdom include the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority.

ARTICLE XII

DURATION

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other Government written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for the entry into force of this Agreement, and shall remain in force until terminated by agreement of both Parties, except that, if not so terminated, Article II may be terminated by agreement of both Parties, or by either Party on one year's notice to the other to take effect at the end of a term of ten years, or thereafter on one year's notice to take effect at the end of any succeeding term of five years.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Washington this third day of July, 1958, in two original texts.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

/s/

John Foster Dulles
Secretary of State

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN IRELAND:

/s/

Hood
Her Majesty's
Chargé d'Affaires a.i. 000250

JULY 3, 1958

FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY TO THE SENATE AND THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

CAUTION: The following message of the President scheduled for delivery to the Congress today, July 3, 1958, MUST BE HELD IN STRICT CONFIDENCE and no portion, synopsis or intimation of its contents may be given out or published UNTIL RELEASE TIME.

The same caution applies to all newspapers, radio and television commentators and news broadcasters, both in the United States and abroad.

PLEASE USE EXTREME CARE TO AVOID PREMATURE PUBLICATION OR ANNOUNCEMENT.

James C. Hagerty
Press Secretary to the President

THE WHITE HOUSE

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

It has become manifestly clear of late that the countries of the free world must, for their collective defense and mutual help, endeavor to combine their resources and share the large tasks that confront us. This is particularly true in the field of scientific research and development in support of greater collective security, notably in the field of military applications of atomic energy. Close collaboration between scientists and engineers of the United States and the United Kingdom during World War II proved most fruitful.

The free world again faces a similar challenge which the free nations can most effectively meet by cooperating with one another in genuine partnership. I pointed out to the Congress earlier this year that it was "wasteful in the extreme for friendly allies to consume talent and money in solving problems that their friends have already solved - all because of artificial barriers to sharing." Since then the Congress has responded with necessary changes in our legislation on the basis of which this Government has just concluded an Agreement with the Government of the United Kingdom which provides the framework for closer cooperation on uses of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes.

Pursuant to that legislation I am submitting to each House of the Congress an authoritative copy of the Agreement. I am also transmitting a copy of the Secretary of State's letter accompanying authoritative copies of the signed Agreement, a copy of a joint letter from the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Secretary of Defense recommending my approval of this Agreement and a copy of my memorandum in reply thereto setting forth my approval.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

THE WHITE HOUSE,

July 3, 1958.

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The following is the text of the letter to the President from the Secretary of State:

July 3, 1958

Dear Mr. President:

The undersigned, the Secretary of State, has the honor to lay before the President with a view to its transmission to the Congress, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Agreement Between The Government of the United States of America and The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes, signed at Washington July 3, 1958.

This Agreement was signed on behalf of the United States pursuant to the authorization granted in your memorandum of July 3, 1958 to the Secretary of Defense and the Acting Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. A copy of that memorandum was received by the Secretary of State from the President.

Faithfully yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

The President
The White House

- 3 -

Following is the text of the joint letter to the President from the Secretary of Defense and the Acting Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission:

Dear Mr. President:

The United States Atomic Energy Commission and the Secretary of Defense recommend that you approve the attached Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes. It is also recommended that you authorize the execution of this proposed Agreement on behalf of the United States.

You will recall that in 1943, in the interest of our mutual defense, the United Kingdom suspended her own atomic energy program in the United Kingdom and sent to this country and Canada leading scientists to participate in the development of an atomic weapon. In the decade following World War II the British developed independently their own atomic weapons capability without benefit of United States collaboration. Under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, only limited cooperation was permitted and was undertaken pursuant to appropriate Agreements for Cooperation.

The proposed Agreement for Cooperation will constitute a framework for the renewal of close collaboration with the United Kingdom in the field of military applications of atomic energy, and is, therefore, an important step forward in the implementation of your joint Declaration of October 25, 1957, with Prime Minister Macmillan which affirmed the principle of interdependence among the countries of the free world.

The cooperation provided for in the Agreement is authorized by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by Public Law 85-479. The United Kingdom is participating with the United States in international arrangements pursuant to which the United Kingdom is making substantial and material contributions to the mutual defense and security. In addition, the United Kingdom has made substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons. For example, the United Kingdom has achieved on its own the capability of fabricating a variety of atomic weapons and has constructed and operated the necessary facilities, such as weapons research and development laboratories, weapon manufacturing facilities, a weapon testing station; has trained personnel to operate these facilities, and has detonated both atomic and hydrogen bombs.

The cooperation provided in this Agreement covers exchange of certain classified information and the transfer of certain equipment and special nuclear materials for use therein.

In the area of information, the Agreement provides for the exchange of information within the limits of Sections 144b and c of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by Public Law 85-479. The areas of

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information would cover the development of defense plans; the training of personnel; the evaluation of the capability of potential enemies in the employment of atomic weapons and other military applications; the development of delivery systems capable of carrying atomic weapons; design, development, and fabrication of atomic weapons; and research, development, and design of military reactors.

The Agreement continues in effect submarine reactor cooperation already undertaken with the United Kingdom and provides for broader cooperation in the military reactor field in the future. Present cooperation in this area has been undertaken under our Agreement for Cooperation for civil uses, but henceforth will be carried out in accordance with the provisions of Public Law 85-479 and the proposed Agreement.

In the area of equipment, the Agreement provides that the United States will authorize, subject to terms and conditions acceptable to the Government of the United States, a person to transfer by sale to the United Kingdom one complete submarine nuclear propulsion plant. It also provides for the sale to the United Kingdom of the nuclear fuel required for operation of this plant for a period of ten years following the date of entry into force of the Agreement, and for authorization, subject to terms and conditions acceptable to the Government of the United States, of a person or persons to transfer this fuel in the form of fabricated cores or fuel elements. These provisions are based upon authority of Sections 91(c), (2), and (3) of the Act and set forth in Article III of the Agreement.

The United Kingdom agrees to indemnify the United States against liability for any damage which might be caused by the equipment after it is taken out of the United States.

Article III also provides specifically for the communication of information on the design, manufacture and operation of this propulsion plant and on the processing and reprocessing of its nuclear fuel.

Cooperation under this Article is intended to develop a nuclear submarine capability in the British Fleet at the earliest possible time with no interference to the United States naval reactors program and will promote the acquisition by the United Kingdom of the technological know-how essential to the maintenance and growth of this capability.

This Agreement would remain in force until terminated by agreement of both parties, thus assuring continued protection for information and materials transferred, in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement. However, Article II, providing for exchange of information, may be terminated by agreement of the parties or by either party, following one year's advance notice, at the expiration of an initial term of ten years, or upon the expiration of any succeeding

more

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term of five years. As noted above, the provision of fuel for the submarine propulsion plant is limited to a period of ten years, which may be extended only by amendment of this Agreement.

In accordance with the provisions of Section 91, 144b and 144c of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as recently amended, the Agreement specifically provides, in Article I, that all cooperation under the Agreement will be undertaken only when the communicating or transferring party determines that such cooperation will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to its defense and security, while the United States and the United Kingdom are participating in an international arrangement for their mutual defense and security through substantial and material contributions thereto. Cooperation under Article II and III of the Agreement would be undertaken only when these conditions prevail.

In addition to the foregoing provisions on the terms, conditions, duration, nature, and scope of cooperation, the Agreement provides that the parties will maintain agreed security safeguards and standards. The Agreement also contains a commitment that the recipient of any material or information transferred pursuant to the Agreement will not transfer it to unauthorized persons or except as specifically provided in the Agreement, beyond the jurisdiction of the recipient party.

Public Law 85-479 provides that the President will determine that with respect to implementation of the provisions of the Agreement concerning exchange of information and the transfer of equipment and materials, proposed communication of information or any proposed transfer or arrangement of equipment or materials "will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security." In accordance with our letter to you, dated January 27, 1958, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense will recommend to you an Executive Order whereby the President would authorize proposed communications or transfers only after joint review by the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and other interested agencies, and would authorize such communications or transfers in the absence of the President's personal approval only where the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission agree that the proposed cooperation and the proposed communication of restricted data or transfer of materials or equipment will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.

It is the considered opinion of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense that the performance of the proposed agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the United States. Accordingly, it is recommended that you (1) approve the program for transfer of one submarine nuclear propulsion plant and special nuclear material required for operation of this plant during the ten-year period following the date upon which the Agreement enters into force; (2) determine that the performance of this Agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the United States; (3) approve the proposed Agreement for Cooperation; and (4) authorize the execution of the proposed Agreement for the Government of the United States by the Secretary of State.

The Secretary of State concurs in the foregoing recommendations.

Respectfully,

W. F. Libby
Acting Chairman
Atomic Energy Commission

Neil H. McElroy
Secretary
Department of Defense

(OVER) 000255

- 6 -

THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington

July 3, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of Defense
The Acting Chairman
Atomic Energy Commission

1. In your joint letter of July 3, 1958, to me, you recommended that I approve a proposed Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland For Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes.
2. I note from your joint recommendation that the United Kingdom is participating with the United States in international arrangements pursuant to which it is making substantial and material contributions to the mutual defense and security, and the United Kingdom has made substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons. I note also that the proposed Agreement will permit cooperation necessary to improve capabilities of the United States, and the United Kingdom, in the application of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes, subject to provisions, conditions, guaranties, terms, and special determinations, which are most appropriate in this important area of mutual assistance.
3. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Agreement require certain determinations concerning cooperation under the Agreement. In this regard, I shall expect to have your recommendations with respect to an Executive Order which will facilitate the implementation of the Agreement as proposed in your joint letter.
4. Having considered the cooperation provided for in the Agreement, including your joint recommendation, security safeguards and other terms and conditions of the Agreement, I hereby
 - (a) Approve the program for transfer of one submarine nuclear propulsion plant and special nuclear material required for operation of this plant during the ten-year period following the date upon which the Agreement enters into force;
 - (b) Determine that the performance of this Agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the United States;
 - (c) Approve the proposed Agreement for Cooperation; and
 - (d) Authorize the execution of the proposed Agreement for the Government of the United States by the Secretary of State.
5. In taking these actions, I have noted also the supplementary classified information, regarding the Agreement, also jointly submitted to me.
6. After execution of the Agreement, I shall submit it to the Congress.
7. I am forwarding a copy of this memorandum to the Secretary of State.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

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000256

DL(1)/McCardle/Pearson/McL

50219-AK-40
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UNCLASSIFIED

July 7, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

United Kingdom-United States Bilateral Agreement on
Atomic Matters - Question in the House

The attached answer to the question asked by the Leader of the Opposition on July 4 has been checked with the Department of National Defence orally, and with our Embassy in Washington. Supplementary questions, if any, might more appropriately be answered by the Minister of National Defence.

JULES LEGER

J. L.

July 7, 1958.

UNITED KINGDOM-UNITED STATES BILATERAL AGREEMENT ON ATOMIC MATTERS -
QUESTION IN THE HOUSE

The following question was asked by the Leader of the Opposition on July 4:

"Mr. Speaker, I wish to direct a question to the Secretary of State for External Affairs. In view of the pattern of three-power co-operation developed during World War II on atomic matters, could the Minister inform the House whether Canada will be invited to join in the agreement signed, I think, the day before yesterday between the United Kingdom and the United States for cooperation on the uses of atomic energy for military defence purposes?"

ANSWER

The simple answer to the question is that Canada, while kept informed of developments by both London and Washington, did not join in what, according to my understanding, is a bilateral agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States. It is true that there was tripartite cooperation during the war on atomic energy matters and I feel confident that such cooperation would be re-activated if and when necessary. Since the war, however, cooperation with the United States in this field has, for the most part, assumed a bilateral form. Thus, Canada and the United Kingdom have had bilateral agreements with the United States in the atomic energy field both civil and military, for some years. My understanding is that the United Kingdom requirements, which are different from Canadian requirements, are such as to call for a new agreement at this time. When and if Canadian requirements call for a supplementary agreement with the United States, a similar course of action will no doubt be followed.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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Page	1

Subject

JUL - 4 1958

Date

Publication

LONDON TIMES

SHARING OF NUCLEAR SECRETS AGREED WITH AMERICA

From Our Own Correspondent

WASHINGTON, JULY 3

An undertaking to sell to Britain a complete propulsion unit for a nuclear-powered submarine is contained in the extended agreement between the American and British Governments for virtually full cooperation in the development of nuclear weapons, as negotiated under relevant revisions of the Atomic Energy Act which have been given final sanction in the past few days.

President Eisenhower lost no time to-day in sending the agreement to the Capitol so that it may lie before Congress for the requisite 30 days; both the White House and the two legislative chambers have acted with all urgency to give it effect before the summer adjournment.

Much of the agreement is obviously subject to secrecy, but some of its broad provisions are discussed in a covering letter from the heads of the Defence Department and the Atomic Energy Commission, who write of an intention to give the British fleet a nuclear submarine capability at the earliest possible time.

FUEL FOR 10 YEARS

The transfer of a propulsion unit envisages the sale to the United Kingdom of nuclear fuel required for its operation for 10 years in the form of "fabricated cores or fuel elements." Specific provision is also made for full information on the design, manufacture, and operation of the propulsion plant and on the processing and re-processing of its fuel.

The document recalls that during the war the British authorities, in the interests of mutual defence, suspended their own atomic developments and sent leading scientists to the United States and Canada to share in the production of an atomic weapon. In the decade after the war Britain had independently developed an atomic weapons capability without benefit of American collaboration; and the present agreement would constitute a framework for the renewal of close cooperation in the military field, as foreshadowed by the declaration of "interdependence" emerging from the October discussions of the President and Mr. Macmillan.

The document notes the progress already made by Britain in the nuclear fields and states that the agreement covers the exchange of "certain classified information" applying to the development of defence plans; the training of personnel; the evaluation of the capability of potential enemies in the employment of atomic weapons; the development of delivery systems capable of carrying atomic weapons; design, development and fabrication of atomic weapons; and research, development and design of military reactors.

The agreement requires a finding by the President, which he has formally given, that the proposed transfers of equipment and materials "will promote,

and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defence and security," and he has also authorized execution of the agreement by the Secretary of State.

It will have been noted that relevant revisions of the McMahon Act were modified in the Senate to limit major exchanges to countries with a "substantial" atomic capability—essentially Britain—and the admitted purpose of these modifications was to keep France out of the "nuclear club." Mr. Dulles, who left for Paris to-night, will no doubt be under pressure in this respect during his consultations with General de Gaulle; and after conferring with the President he said that he will discuss the possibility of concluding an agreement with France for the sharing of nuclear weapons.

WARHEADS A QUESTION FOR THE FUTURE

FROM OUR DEFENCE CORRESPONDENT

The Ministry of Defence, in answer to questions last night, said that it was too early to say whether the agreement would affect the holding of nuclear tests by Britain. The supply of nuclear warheads is still forbidden by American law, and though the amended Atomic Energy Act allows the supply of fissile material for both peaceful and military uses, this is not covered in the agreement. The supply of fissile material will, however, be a subject for future discussion, and would require a further bilateral agreement.

The sale of a complete submarine nuclear propulsion plant will substantially advance the date of the completion of the first British nuclear submarine. Britain will not, however, abandon work on the development of her own nuclear propulsion plant.

h. program file
July 15/58
JD

Ref: 50219-AK-40

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Subject

JUL - 4 1958

LONDON TIMES

Date

Distribution

THE NUCLEAR CLUB

The Anglo-American agreement on the exchange of information on nuclear weapons signed yesterday is the outcome of the declaration of common purpose made by the PRIME MINISTER and PRESIDENT EISENHOWER last October. An announcement was expected in London yesterday, but, apparently for reasons of protocol, was delayed, although details of the agreement were released in Washington. The need for a freer collaboration between the two countries was pointed out by MR. SANDYS in November, when he said bluntly that although there had been considerable cooperation, it had not "prevented wasteful duplication of effort all along the line, both in research and production." In particular the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, by precluding the exchange of information about the design and manufacture of nuclear warheads, which are integral to the design of so many modern weapons, tended to stultify agreements to collaborate in almost any field.

It is early yet to say what effects the agreement, when it becomes effective, will have on the production of nuclear weapons by Britain, but it ought to lead to a considerable saving of money and effort. It will, for instance, give Britain information on the design of nuclear warheads for ballistic rockets which will be valuable for the development of the British Blue Streak and other missiles. Similarly the sale to Britain of a submarine nuclear propulsion plant should be a great help to the British scientists working in this field, in which we are several years behind the Americans. Work is still, however, to proceed on the development of the British version, which presumably is too promising to be lightly set aside.

The agreement is therefore to be welcomed as a valuable step towards avoiding duplication and a waste of scientific talent that the west cannot afford. But there is the danger that it may tempt the Government to expand the nuclear weapons programme out of the savings that flow from the agreement. Many people have for long been disturbed by the irrelevance of much of our defence effort to the kind of threats that are likely to face us, and much needs to be done in the conventional field. Any savings there may be could usefully be applied to the strengthening of Transport Command, for example. To apply them to the production of extra ballistic rockets or hydrogen bombs would merely bring back the waste the agreement seeks to avoid.

The Americans obviously stand to get less out of the agreement than we do because they have more to give, though there is no reason to think that the flow of useful information from Britain will be insignificant. Until now American policy has been basically the same as it was in 1946, when the Atomic Energy Act was passed. It forbade any further exchange of information with any country, even with Britain and Canada, though both had helped America over the threshold of atomic power. As MR. STRAUSS, the chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, has said: "We sought to lock the doors and bar the windows of the anteroom that we had been first to enter." But within three years Russia was in the anteroom, too. Even so, when the A.E.C. was empowered by Congress in 1954 to give allies information about the military effects of nuclear weapons, it still had to hold back important discoveries in their composition and design.

What then has moved Congress to make its latest amendment to the Act? Primarily it is the feeling that there is nothing to be gained from standing aloof while America's strongest ally uses her limited capital and scientific resources to achieve the kind of nuclear status she is obviously bent on having. The same case, in a lesser degree, can of course be made for France. But in the discussions on the amendment MR. DULLES and others made it abundantly clear to Congress that there was no intention of using it to create more atomic Powers. The sole purpose was to allow closer cooperation with Britain, and this is provided for by a clause limiting the exchange of information about the design and manufacture of nuclear weapons to allies who have made "substantial progress" in the development of nuclear weapons.

GENERAL DE GAULLE has said that if no agreement on disarmament can be reached France is determined to become a nuclear Power. It would be idle to pretend, then, that France and other Continental countries will look with favour on the Anglo-American agreement. They have been suspicious for long enough about what they call the Anglo-Saxon nuclear hegemony. The rumblings of discontent were already being heard at the W.E.U. assembly meeting in Paris yesterday. This poses a serious question for America as the leader of the western alliance. Can she afford to stand aloof and watch France using her limited resources to achieve membership of the nuclear club? Would it not be better to co-operate with the inevitable and avoid the resentment that is otherwise likely to arise? America's answer thus far has been to authorize the issue of nuclear weapons and delivery systems to allies under the aegis of N.A.T.O., but to keep the nuclear warheads under American control. In the long run this is unlikely to be enough. The only way France and ultimately other allies might have

been persuaded to forswear their nuclear ambitions would have been if Britain had renounced her nuclear status, leaving America as the sole nuclear guardian of the west. But this was never seriously in prospect because of the heavy investment Britain had made in the nuclear weapons field. Whatever the rights and wrongs of France's case, however, it is most unlikely that Congress could be brought to give France the information Britain is to receive. A laborious nuclear apprenticeship such as Britain herself has undergone seems likely to be France's lot: in part, it will be the price of Sakiet.

14 for your file
SLB
July 16/58

PLEASE RETURN CLIPPING SERVICE
For file - 50219-AK-40

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Subject

U.S. - U.K. - Information

Date

JUL - 4 1958

Publication

TORONTO GLOBE AND MAIL

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COMMON WEALTH DIVISION	
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U.S. Will Help Britain to Build A-Submarines

By PHILIP DEANE

Globe and Mail Staff Reporter

Washington, July 3—President Eisenhower submitted to Congress today the text of an agreement under which Britain can receive the blueprints of U.S. nuclear weapons, one complete nuclear power plant for a submarine and fissionable material such as Uranium 235 or plutonium.

State Secretary Dulles indicated the United States might give France also a nuclear plant for submarines.

The U.S. attitude toward other countries, such as Canada, is not known but will be discussed in Ottawa next week in talks between Prime Minister Diefenbaker and Mr. Eisenhower.

The agreement with Britain says this sharing of secrets is for the sake of better defense. It will go into force if within 30 days it is not opposed by a majority of both houses of Congress. Such a rejection by Con-

gress seems unlikely since the agreement follows closely the report on having atomic secrets prepared by the joint congressional committee on atomic energy.

Here are the other highlights of the agreement published today: Nuclear information will be exchanged on defense plans, on Russia's nuclear arsenal, on missiles and on military reactors.

The United States will supply the fuel for the submarine power plant Britain will get.

Under the agreement Britain cannot give to other countries nuclear secrets it receives from the United States nor can the United States give away British secrets. Both Britain and the United States undertake not to relax the rules of secrecy which each country has in operation now. (This could affect transfer of information from Britain to Canada.) The country that gives a secret can impose on the country that receives it conditions as to who will have access to the secret.

Further, if Britain invents something new thanks to information received from the United States, then the patent for this new invention will belong to both the United States and Britain. The same rule applies for U.S. inventions made possible by information received from Britain.

This agreement is expected to release many British scientists for original research, scientists who have been wasting their time duplicating work already done in the United States. Britain, moreover, will be able to build warheads that fit the U.S. missiles that U.K. forces will receive this year.

It was understood that while Britain would control these missiles, their warheads would remain nearby under U.S. control, so that London and Washington would have to agree before the missiles could be used.

With Britain building her own warheads she will be able to threaten right back—without U.S. permission—if Mr. Khrushchev, as he did during the Suez crisis, threatens to bomb London.

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50219-D-40.

DS4/674
FM EXTERNAL OTT JUL2/58 CONFD
TO WASHDC DL575

AMENDMENT OF USA ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

THANK YOU FOR HELPFUL REPORTS YOU HAVE BEEN SENDING ON AMENDING OF
USA ATOMIC ENERGY ACT. WE WOULD DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO HANSARD JUL1
WHICH RECORDS MINISTER'S ANSWER IN HOUSE TO QUESTION WHICH WAS SUBJECT
OF OURTEL DL558 JUN25.

2. WE HAVE ALSO BEEN INFORMED BY EARNSCLIFFE THAT ANNOUNCEMENT OF NEW
UK-USA AGREEMENT IN ATOMIC ENERGY FIELD WILL BE MADE WITHIN DAY OR
TWO. WHILE WE WERE NOT RPT NOT GIVEN A GREAT DEAL OF INFO ABOUT AGREE-
MENT WE BELIEVE IT IS MEANT TO COVER (A) EXCHANGE OF INFO NECESSARY
FOR IMPROVEMENT OF ATOMIC WEAPONS DESIGN DEVELOPMENT AND MANUFACTURING
ABILITY AND (B) PURCHASE BY UK OF A COMPLETE NUCLEAR SUBMARINE PROPUL-
SION PLANT.

3. WE SHAL CONTINUE TO BE INTERESTED IN FURTHER REPORTS FROM YOU ON
DEVELOPMENTS OCCASIONED BY PASSAGE OF AMENDED ATOMIC ENERGY ACT IN
USA.

BL(1)/McCardle/McL

50219-AK-40	
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CONFIDENTIAL

July 2, 1958

The Secretary to The Cabinet

The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff

UK-US Atomic Bilateral Agreement

There are attached for your information copies of papers left with us by the United Kingdom High Commissioner's Office which concern the likely announcement within the next day or two of a United Kingdom-United States agreement in the atomic energy field.

We were offered no further information than that which is included in the attachments. It would seem that the new United Kingdom-United States agreement will be designed to cover (a) the exchange of information necessary for the improvement of atomic weapons design, development and manufacturing ability, and (b) the purchase of a complete nuclear submarine propulsion plant.

D. V. LEPAN

Under Secretary of State
for External Affairs

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Security *CONFIDENTIAL*

50219-AK-40		
43		✓

Type of Document..... *Letter* No. Date..... *July 2/58*

From..... *USSEA*

To..... *Chairman, Chiefs of Staff*

Subject: *Amendment of U.S. Atomic Energy Act*

Original on File No..... *50219-D-40*

Copies on File No.....

Other Cross Reference Sheets on.....

Prepared by..... *[Signature]*

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Orig. 50219-D-40.

1482

D. 666
FM WASHDC JUN26/58 CONF
TO EXTERNAL 1482 OPIMMEDIATE

REF OURTEL 1475 JUN26 & YOURTEL DL558 JUN25
AMENDMENTS TO ATOMIC ENERGY ACT 1954

BREITHUT OF THE STATE DEPT HAS BRIEFED US ON THE OUTCOME OF THIS
MORNING'S MEETING OF THE JOINT CONFERENCE COMMITTEE WHICH WAS CONSIDER-
ING SENATOR ANDERSON'S AMENDMENTS.

2. THE AMENDMENT DETAILED IN PARA1(A) OF OUR REF TEL HAS BEEN DROPPED
AND THE FOLLOWING SUBSTITUTED FOR CLAUSE(1) OF SECTION 91 C OF THE
ACT(S3912, PAGE 2, LINE 1):

"(1) NON-NUCLEAR PARTS OF ATOMIC WEAPONS, PROVIDED THAT SUCH NATION HAS
MADE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ATOMIC WEAPONS, AND
OTHER NON-NUCLEAR PARTS OF ATOMIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS INVOLVING RESTRICTED
DATA, PROVIDED THAT SUCH TRANSFER WILL NOT RPT NOT CONTRIBUTE SIG-
NIFICANTLY TO THAT NATION'S ATOMIC WEAPON DESIGN, DEVELOPMENT, OR
FABRICATION CAPABILITY; FOR THE PROPOSE OF IMPROVING THAT NATION'S
STATE OF TRAINING AND OPERATIONAL READINESS."

IN ADDITION, WHEREVER ATOMIC WEAPONS ARE MENTIONED IN THE PROVISOS AT
THE END OF CLAUSE(4) THE PHRASE "OR ATOMIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS" HAS BEEN
ADDED.

3. SUBSECTION 144 B (5) REMAINS DELETED AS INDICATED IN OUR REF TEL.
SPOKESMEN WILL, HOWEVER, INDICATE TO BOTH HOUSE AND SENATE THAT
THE INTENDED SENSE OF THE BROAD LANGUAGE OF THE DELETED PROVISION IS
ALREADY MET BY OTHER SECTIONS OF THE AMENDED ACT WHICH ARE INTERPRETED
TO COVER THE COMMUNICATION OF RESTRICTED DATA ON THE CONSTRUCTION,
MAINTENANCE, OPERATION AND USE OF MILITARY REACTORS, ON DEFENCE
AGAINST RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE AND ON MEDICAL ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR
WARFARE.

4. THE DECISION OF THE JOINT CONFERENCE COMMITTEE HAS BEEN SIGNED AND
MAY EVEN BE PLACED BEFORE BOTH HOUSES TODAY. THE SPEED WITH WHICH
THEY ACT ON IT WILL DEPEND ON THEIR CALENDAR BUT MAY WELL BE
SOONER THAN INDICATED IN OUR REF TEL. MEANWHILE THE INFO ABOUT THEIR
DECISION SHOULD BE HELD CONFIDENTIAL.

5. IN BREITHUT'S PERSONAL OPINION THESE AMENDMENTS WOULD NOT RPT NOT
AFFECT ANY POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENTS WITH CANADA. JUDGING FROM HIS

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PAGE TWO 1482

EXPERIENCE WITH THE COMMITTEE, HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT IF SUCH ARRANGEMENTS AS SEEMED MUTUALLY DESIRABLE COULD NOT BE ACCOMMODATED WITHIN THE LEGISLATION THE JOINT COMMITTEE AND CONGRESS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE READY TO APPROVE THEM SPECIFICALLY WHEN THE TIME CAME.

6. CONCERNING THE EFFECT OF THE AMENDMENTS ON RELATIONS WITH THE UK, BREITHUT SAID THAT THE PLANS REMAINED UNCHANGED AND THAT THEY HOPED VERY MUCH TO HAVE THE FIRST NEW BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE UK READY FOR TABLING JUST AS SOON AS THE LEGISLATION IS PASSED.

7. WE ASKED BREITHUT WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY REACTION FROM THE FRENCH TO THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS OR TO SOME OF THE REMARKS MADE DURING THE DEBATE. BREITHUT INFORMED US THAT THE FRENCH HAVE SHOWN GREAT RESTRAINT AND APPARENTLY RECOGNIZE THAT ANY PROTEST WOULD MAKE THE SITUATION WORSE. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE FRENCH EMBASSY HERE IN ITS REPORTS TO PARIS HAD BEEN EMPHASIZING THE FACT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN DOING ITS BEST TO GET SATISFACTORY LEGISLATION IN THE FACE OF THE OBVIOUSLY STRONG VIEWS HELD IN CONGRESS.

DS15/665
FM WASHDC JUN25/58 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 1465 OPIMMEDIATE

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Orig. 50219-D-40

REF OUR TEL 1454 JUN24

AMENDMENTS TO ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954

WE ASSUME THAT THOSE CONCERNED IN OTT WITH MILITARY ASPECTS OF ATOMIC ENERGY(INCLUDING THE POSSIBLE EVENTUAL PROCUREMENT OR PRODUCTION OF CERTAIN WEAPONS ITEMS)HAVE BEEN STUDYING THE SUCCESSIVE CHANGES IN THIS LEGISLATION AS THEY HAVE BEEN REPORTED FROM HERE.WE TAKE IT THAT THE ABSENCE OF ANY COMMENT MEANS THAT THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE TOO UNSATISFACTORY FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW AND WOULD NOT RPT NOT INTERFERE WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY EXISTING OR PROSPECTIVE BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN CANADA AND THE USA.IF THERE ARE ANY OBSERVATIONS WHICH YOU WOULD WISH US TO CONVEY TO THE USA AUTHORITIES IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR US TO HAVE THEM AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.IN FACT, IT MAY WELL BE THAT THE LEGISLATION HAS REACHED SUCH AN ADVANCED STAGE THAT IT WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO HAVE IT(OR ITS CONGRESSIONAL INTERPRETATION)ALTERED IN ANY SIGNIFICANT RESPECT IN THE TIME REMAINING.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM:The Canadian Embassy,.....
.....Washington, D.C.

Reference:.....
Subject:..... NORAD -- Release of Atomic
..... Information to Canadians at NORAD
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.....

Security:....Confidential.....
No:.. 82/.....
Date:.. May 29, 1958.....
Enclosures:.. (Two).....
Air or Surface Mail:.....
Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.	
50219-AK-40	
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Referred to C.E.O.S.
Copy to Secy to Lab. Dir.
AE & B.
Techn. Div.
M. H. H. (C.E.S.A.)

References
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Copy to 50309-40

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2 JUN 1958

Early this week the Embassy became aware that last December our Joint Staff had been approached by Mr. Robert Margrave of the Office of Munitions Control of the Department of State in his capacity as Deputy Chairman of the State Department -- Department of Defence Military Information Control Committee regarding the desirability of working out an arrangement under the terms of the Canada-United States military agreement on the exchange of atomic information to enable Canadian officers on the staff of NORAD to receive certain documents which are classified "Atomic Restricted Information". For the purpose of working out an arrangement, a team of officers from National Defence Headquarters came to Washington on May 27 for a meeting held yesterday at the State Department. The Embassy was represented in this meeting.

2. As we understand it, the question had been raised by United States officers at NORAD who asked for guidance and clearance from Washington. The problem being faced by Canadian officers at NORAD is essentially twofold: there are a number of documents available to United States officers wholly devoted to atomic information which cannot be released to Canadians, even on a "need-to-know" basis, without specific clearance from higher authority. This problem, however, is of a somewhat lesser nature than the second problem which is that there are a considerable number of documents which may contain only one or two paragraphs of "Atomic Restricted" information and which, for that reason, cannot be made available to Canadians. A solution to the problem had to be determined by the requirements of the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954; in particular it had to be decided whether the information should be passed on a government-to-government basis, and what method of accountability should be devised. There was no question that any of the information which Canadian officers at NORAD might be able to obtain would go beyond the scope of the Canada-United States military agreement.

3. At the meeting at the State Department yesterday, agreement was quickly reached. The Department of Defence and the State Department proposed that any "atomic restricted" information required by Canadians at NORAD would be released to them on authority granted by the Department of Defence with the concurrence of the Atomic Energy Commission to CINCCONAD and not to NORAD even though both are for the moment at least, the same person, i.e., General Partridge. There would be no problem of accountability for the RCAF as this could be looked after/

Internal
Circulation

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Distribution
to Posts

- 2 -

by CINCCONAD. It would be assumed that any information obtained in this way by Canadian officers would not be passed on to other Canadian Commands or to NATO. The Canadian Service representatives readily agreed to this suggestion which, in point of fact, represented an easier solution than they had anticipated, as it absolves the Department of National Defence from any responsibility for accountability.

4. It was further agreed that the State Department would draw up a record of the meeting upon which the Joint Staff would be asked to comment. A copy of this will be forwarded to you when received. It was also agreed that the terms of the agreement reached would be made an addendum to the document dated February 29, 1956, concerning the procedural arrangements for implementing the bilateral military agreement.

— 5. Attached are copies of letters exchanged between the Joint Staff and the Department of National Defence which will give you background information in this matter.

G. L. Rae
The Embassy

C O PYJ

CONFIDENTIAL

CJS 250-7

23 December 1957

Chairman,
Chiefs of Staff,
Department of National Defence,
Ottawa, Ontario

Release of Atomic Information to
Canadian Officers at NORAD

1. A meeting was held with Mr. Robert Margrave, Deputy Chairman, State-Defence Military Information Control Committee, to discuss the release of atomic information to Canadian Officers at NORAD.
2. U.S. officers at NORAD have asked for guidance and clearance in this matter and S-DMICC has been given the task of establishing channels and procedures for the release of atomic information to Canadian officers at NORAD. The U.S. suggests that a conference be held, early in the new year, to establish mutually suitable arrangements for such releases.
3. These arrangements would be based on the minimum requirements dictated by U.S. law. These requirements being:
 - (a) Accountability of atomic information passed to Canada and,
 - (b) Atomic information must be released on a government to government basis.
4. The U.S. will welcome Canadian suggestions as to how these releases at NORAD may be effected. The following arrangements do not indicate a U.S. position but will satisfy U.S. requirements:
 - (a) A Canadian officer at Colorado Springs to be designated as a control point to receive atomic information. NOTE - This officer, while acting as a control point would be an agent of the Canadian Government and not of his particular Service.
 - (b) Documents would be released first to the Canadian Government through existing channels or simultaneously to the Canadian Government through existing channels and to the Canadian control point at Colorado Springs.
 - (c) Oral and visual releases at Colorado Springs would be summarized as outlined in Procedural Arrangements to the Military Agreement and the summary or resume passed to the Canadian control point at Colorado Springs.

.....

CONFIDENTIAL

000270

C O P Y

IN REPLY, PLEASE QUOTE
No. CSC 1894.2

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

JOINT STAFF

8 May, 1958

Chairman,
Canadian Joint Staff, Washington,
2450 Massachusetts Avenue,
Washington 8, D.C.,
U.S.A.

Release of Atomic Information to Canadian Officers at NORAD

1. Reference CJS 259-7 dated 23 December, 1957.
2. A solution based on paragraph 4 of your letter would appear to offer the only legal means under the present agreement of making releases of atomic information to Canadians at NORAD. To press at this time for an amendment to the present Agreement to permit releases to be made on any other basis to Canadian personnel serving on a joint headquarters such as NORAD, in the face of the proposed extension to the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954, would seem to raise a complex matter at an inopportune time.
3. It is likely that a new bilateral agreement will have to be negotiated (or at least the present Agreement altered) when the US Act is amended. At that time consideration should be given to the formulation of an arrangement whereby atomic information may be released more readily to Canadian personnel at NORAD.
4. The US authorities may be informed that Canada is agreeable to a meeting with US representatives to establish channels and procedures for the release of atomic information under the present Agreement to Canadian officers at NORAD along the lines described in paragraph 4 of your letter at reference.
5. The Canadian group to this meeting would consist of:
 - (a) RCAF representative from NORAD;
 - (b) RCAF Member, Joint Special Weapons Committee;
 - (c) Representative CJS (W);
 - (d) Executive Secretary, JSWPC;
 - (e) Representative, JSC

So far as Canada is concerned, the meeting could be held during the week of 12 May or 26 May, 1958 in Washington, whichever is convenient to the US authorities.

(Robert P. Rothschild)
Brigadier
for Chairman, Chiefs of Staff.

c.c.
Exec Secretary, JSWPC (8)
Exec Secretary, JSC
JAG

- 2 -

- (d) Information released in (b) and (c) would be reported by the Canadian control point at Colorado Springs to the Canadian Government for inclusion in the annual report to the U.S.


5. The U.S. would be represented at this conference by a member of the S-DMICC and by Service officers, and has suggested similar Canadian representation. It is felt that the officer delegated as Canadian control point, Colorado Springs should be included in the Canadian delegation.

6. It is requested that, should the U.S. suggestion for a conference to establish procedures for the release of atomic information to Canadian officers at NORAD be concurred in, this office be notified of a tentative date suitable to the Canadian Delegation and the names and security data of the Canadian representatives.

(N.A. Sparling)
Major General)
Chairman
Canadian Joint Staff

DS4/592

FM WASHDC APR 17/58 UNCLAS
TO INTERNAL 827 PRIORITY
INFO TT LDN EMBASSY PARIS NATOPARIS FM OTT
PERMISNY FM WASHDC



REF OURTEL 825 APR 17

Original 50219-D-40

MR DULLES' STATEMENT BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AGREEMENTS FOR
COOPERATION, JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY, APR 17
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT CONCERNING SECOND GROUND FOR ADOPTION
OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 1954 ATOMIC ENERGY ACT, AS GIVEN BY MR
DULLES:

"I NOW TURN TO THE BEARING OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS UPON
OUR "DISARMAMENT", OR, TO BE MORE ACCURATE, "LIMITATIONS OF ARMAMENTS"
POLICIES.

I UNDERSTAND THAT CONCERN HAS BEEN EXPRESSED LEST THESE AMENDMENTS
WOULD PROMOTE THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS THROUGHOUT THE
WORLD, THUS MAKING IT MORE DIFFICULT TO SET UP INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS,
AND PERHAPS BRINGING NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE HANDS OF THOSE WHO
MIGHT PERHAPS USE THEM IRRESPONSIBLY.

I HAVE IN THE PAST EXPRESSED EMPHATICALLY OUR DEEP CONCERN THAT
THERE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE A PROMISCUOUS SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
WE DO NOT RPT NOT WANT SUCH WEAPONS TO GET INTO THE HANDS OF IRRES-
PONSIBLE DICTATORS AND BECOME POSSIBLE INSTRUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL
BLACKMAIL. AN EVER PRESENT THREAT OF THAT CHARACTER WOULD MAKE THE
WORLD A GRIM PLACE IN WHICH TO LIVE.

WE WOULD DELUDE OURSELVES, HOWEVER, IF WE CONCLUDED THAT THIS SOMBER
DEVELOPMENT COULD BE PREVENTED, OR EVEN RETARDED, BY REJECTING THESE
AMENDMENTS OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT. MATERIALS NEEDED TO MAKE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY AVAILABLE AS NUCLEAR POWER
PLANTS ARE BUILT. THE KNOWLEDGE NEEDED TO TURN THESE MATERIALS
INTO WEAPONS HAS BEEN INDEPENDENTLY ATTAINED BY THREE COUNTRIES,
AND THE SCIENTISTS OF MANY OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE THE SKILLS TO
ENABLE THEM TO DO THE SAME. THE ONLY EFFECTIVE PREVENTIVE IS THAT
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD BE GROUGHT UNDER INTER-
NATIONAL CONTROL.

THERE IS TODAY UNDERSTANDABLE RESISTANCE ON THE PART OF OTHER FREE
WORLD COUNTRIES TO AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD HAVE
...2

PAGE TWO 827

THE EFFECT, IF NOT THE PURPOSE, OF PERPETUATING FOR ALL TIME THEIR PRESENT NUCLEAR WEAPONS INFERIORITY, WITHOUT THE MITIGATION WHICH WOULD BE MADE POSSIBLE BY THESE AMENDMENTS. OTHER FREE NATIONS WOULD UNDERSTANDABLY FIND IT DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT THAT RESULT AND THE USA DOES NOT RPT NOT WANT TO SEEM TO BE SEEKING TO IMPOSE IT.

THE SITUATION IS ALTERED IF THE USA CAN AND WILL DEPLOY NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR COMMON DEFENSIVE USE IN CASE OF ARMED AGGRESSION, AND SHARE KNOWLEDGE WHICH WILL MAKE OUR ALLIES PARTNERS IN THIS ENDEAVOR. FAILURE TO DO THIS WILL CREATE RESISTANCE, PERHAPS INSUPERABLE RESISTANCE, TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL NEEDED TO PREVENT, OVER COMING YEARS, THE PROMISCUOUS SPREADING, AND POSSIBLE IRRESPONSIBLE USE, OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

THERE IS ANOTHER THOUGHT WHICH I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS IN THIS CONNECTION. THE USSR IS MAKING EXTREME EFFORTS TO BRING IT ABOUT THAT THE FREE WORLD NATIONS OF THE EURASIAN CONTINENT WILL BE LIMITED TO CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AS AGAINST THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY OF THE USSR. IF IT CAN SUCCEED IN THIS EFFORT, IT WILL HAVE ALREADY ACHIEVED A ONE-SIDED DISARMAMENT WHICH INVOLVES NO RPT NO CONTROLS OR LIMITATIONS WHATEVER ON THE USSR, BUT ONLY LIMITATION UPON THE NEIGHBORING NATIONS OF THE EURASIAN CONTINENT. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THERE WILL BE MUCH LESS INCENTIVE FOR THE USSR TO SEEK A BALANCED LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT....

...TO REALIZE THIS CONCEPT REQUIRES THE AMENDMENTS NOW PROPOSED TO THIS ACT. NOT RPT NOT THUS TO AMEND THE ACT WOULD IN EFFECT MAKE THE USA A PARTNER WITH THE USSR IN IMPOSING ON OUR NATO ALLIES SUCH AN INCAPACITY TO USE NUCLEAR TACTICAL WEAPONS THAT SOVIET DOMINANCE OVER WESTERN EUROPE WOULD BE LARGELY ACHIEVED AND LITTLE INCENTIVE WOULD BE LEFT FOR THE USSR TO LIMIT ITS OWN ARMAMENT. AND OUR NATO ALLIES WILL NOT RPT NOT FEEL THE STRENGTH AND CONFIDENCE NEEDED TO PURSUE VIGOROUS ANTI-COMMUNIST POLICIES IF THEY FEEL THAT THEY ARE DOMINATED BY A SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY AND THAT WE WILL NOT RPT NOT SHARE OUR NUCLEAR CAPABILITY ...3

PAGE THREE 827

WITH THEM, EVEN TO THE MODEST EXTENT REQUIRED TO ENABLE THEM TO SHARE
IN THE PLANNING OF A NUCLEAR DEFENSE AND MAKE THEM CAPABLE OF USING
NUCLEAR WEAPONS RECEIVED FROM US IF HOSTILITIES SHOULD OCCUR.

ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THESE AMENDMENTS ARE ENACTED, WE WILL NOT
RPT NOT HAVE DISARMED OUR ALLIES, AND THE USSR WILL HAVE AN IN-
CENTIVE, OTHERWISE LACKING, TO ACHIEVE BALANCED AND MULTILATERAL
LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT."



Department of National Defence

JOINT STAFF

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

No. CSC 2162.4
SECRET

50219-AK-	40
58	52

24 February, 1958.

ADDRESS REPLY TO
CHAIRMAN
CHIEFS OF STAFF,
OTTAWA.

CGS
CNS
CAS
CDRB

Boyle

Tripartite Technical Discussions
on Areas of Technical Cooperation
Sub-Committee C - Nuclear Propulsion

Reference CSC 1888.1 (TD 15) dated 20 December, 1957.

Attached is a copy of the Initial Report of Sub-Committee C - Nuclear Propulsion which has recently been received from the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), US Department of Defense.

It will be recalled that Sub-Committee reports D through J were issued under the letter at reference.

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126 FEB 1958

Robert P. Rothschild

(Robert P. Rothschild)
Brigadier
for Chairman, Chiefs of Staff

c.c.

D.M.
ESO/CCOS
JAG

Chairman, JSWPC)
RCN Member) CSC 1888.1(TD15)
RCAF Member) of 13 Jan 58 refers.
DRB Member)

Secretary to the Cabinet
→ Under Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

J
P
Y

S E C R E T

US-UK TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS

INITIAL REPORT OF SUBCOMMITTEE "C" - NUCLEAR PROPULSION

The subcommittee made the following findings:

1. Direct exchange of information between US and UK private contractors is desirable with respect to submarine propulsion reactors. The AEC undertook to report further whether this can be achieved under the current agreement.
2. The supply by the US of enriched uranium to the UK for submarine propulsion is discussed in the reports of Subcommittees "A" and "B".
3. The UK is not at present working in other fields of nuclear propulsion for military purposes but cooperation in any such fields may be desirable in the future.
4. Futuer legislation should permit the supply of fuel or fabricated fuel elements, and nuclear power plants or components, as well as cooperation under paragraph 3 above.

S E C R E T

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S E C R E T

DISCUSSION BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE "C"

1. Mr. Hall noted that at the November 23, 1957 US-UK meeting Chairman Strauss and Sir Edwin Plowden commented on apparent difficulties in the exchange of information on submarine propulsion between US and UK private contractors. He requested clarification of the type of arrangement desired by the UK. Sir Frederick Brundrett said that the only obstacle in the way of the desired cooperation on submarine development was an arrangement, agreed to by the governments, whereby the respective governmental contractors concerned, namely, Rolls Royce and Westinghouse, would interchange information directly. He said a similar arrangement on ballistic missiles was in effect between Rolls Royce and North American Aviation. Both Mr. Hall and Gen. Loper expressed the opinion that they saw no reason why an arrangement for direct contractors to exchange information within the scope of the agreement could not be effected. Mr. Hall said an immediate review of this question would be made.

2. With the exception of the problem of cooperation between direct private contractors, Sir Frederick said that the exchange of information on nuclear submarines was proceeding to their satisfaction.

3. Since the subject of the supply of nuclear material to the UK for military purposes had been thoroughly explored in the meeting of Subcommittees "A" and "B", the discussion was limited to Sir William Penney noting that they had presented their best estimates of the fuel requirements for the submarine at that meeting.

4. In answer to Adm. Foster's question as to the UK need for information in other areas such as surface ships, aircraft, missiles or rockets, Sir Frederick said their immediate interest was still the submarine. Specifically, they had no present plans for nuclear powered surface ships or aircraft and they were still in the thinking stage with respect to nuclear propelled rockets.

5. Sir William Penney noted that one of the basic principles which the UK considers should be applied to future cooperation is to plan the scientific effort to avoid duplication. He said Aldermaston, in the future, may put effort in these other fields. He hoped our legislation would be broad enough to permit full cooperation in such projects.

6. Sir Frederick Brundrett said the UK may have a military requirement for a package power reactor. In view of the US developments in this field, he thought this might be an area where US cooperation could obviate the UK undertaking a development program.

7. Adm. Foster inquired as to whether the UK contemplated obtaining fabricated fuel elements or reactor components from the US. Sir Frederick said this would depend on the eventual deployment of effort and the UK had not, as yet, reached the point where such decisions could be made. However, as in the case of information on other nuclear propulsion systems, he would not wish to foreclose on this possibility.

8. The Canadian representative noted that their military effort at the moment is restricted to the development work at Chalk River. They are considering, however, the development of a nuclear propulsion system for surface vessels of the frigate class. He said that Canada had no plans for nuclear powered aircraft.

FM WASHDC JAN21/58 SECRET
TO EXT AL 142 PRIORITY

50219-AX-40

REF OURTEL 2670 DEC18/57

ATOMIC ENERGY CONSULTATIONS(WORK OF TRIPARTITE COMMITTEES)

GENERAL SPARLING INFORMED ME YESTERDAY THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A REQUEST FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE IN OTTAWA FOR INFO CONCERNING:

(A)THE CHANNEL OF RESPONSIBILITY OF THE TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION COMMITTEES;

(B)THE METHOD OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINDINGS OF THE TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION COMMITTEES;

(C)WHAT ACTION IS NOW NECESSARY WITH REGARD TO THE SETTING UP OF THE OTHER COMMITTEES.

2.WE ARE REPEATING BELOW THE TEXT OF CJS MSG(JSU20 JAN17)WHICH IN PARAS2,3,AND 4,REPLIES TO THE QUESTIONS LISTED ABOVE.

3.SO FAR AS THE EMBASSY IS CONCERNED,WE HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED ANY APPROACH FROM THE STATE DEPT CONCERNING THE POSSIBLE REVIVAL OF THE COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE.YOU WILL RECALL HOWEVER THAT IN PARAS OF MY REF MSG ROPER OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY HAD INDICATED TO US THAT THE USA AUTHORITIES FAVOURED THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE FORMER CPC,BUT THAT NO FINAL DECISIONS HAD AT THE TIME BEEN TAKEN. WE SHALL KEEP IN TOUCH WITH THE STATE DEPT AND WITH THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN THIS REGARD AND REPORT ANY FURTHER INFO WHICH MAY BECOME AVAILABLE.

TEXT BEGINS:

SUBJECT:TRIPARTITE TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS ON AREAS OF TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

YOUR CSC 1888 1(TD15)OF 14 JAN 1958.

1.DISCUSSUONS WITH MR JB MACAULEY,DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENCE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING AND WITH ONE OF HIS ASSISTANTS MR SCHAUB BRING OUT FOLLOWING ANSWERS TO PARA3(C)OF ABOVE QUOTED LETTER.

2.YOUR PARA3(C)(I).AM TOLD IT WAS AGREED IN DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN SIR RICHARD POWELL,MR DULLES AND MR QUARLES TO REVIVE AND REORIENT THE WARTIME COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE AS THE TOP TRIPARTITE BODY TO WHOM THE VARIOUS TECHNICAL COOPERATION COMMITTEES WOULD REPORT.

WHILE I UNDERSTAND THAT A LETTER TO THIS EFFECT WILL BE COMING

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TO UJS FROM MACAULEY SHORTLY, OTHER INFO SUGGESTS THIS PROPOSAL MAY MORE LIKELY COME FROM STATE DEPT THROUGH AMBASSADOR. HOPE TO OBTAIN MORE INFO INFORMALLY FROM MACAULEY IN NEXT FEW DAYS. I AM NOT CONVERSANT WITH THE CPC BUT UNDERSTAND THAT REASON FOR REVIVING IT AND CONTINUING TO USE ITS NAME IS THAT IT IS STILL IN EXISTENCE AND IT IS HELPFUL TO BOTH USA AND UK FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL REASONS NOT TO SET UP A NEW CANADA-USA-UK COMMITTEE. AM TOLD THE USA MEMBERS OF CPC WILL BE MR JOHN FOSTER DULLES, MR MCELROY AND ADMIRAL STRAUSS. 3. YOUR PARA3(C)(II). IT IS HOPED THAT THE TERMS OF REF OF THESE VARIOUS COMMITTEES WILL ENABLE EACH COUNTRY TO PROCEED WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF

ITS FINDINGS UPON AGREEMENT WITHIN EACH COMMITTEE. IT IS CONSEQUENTLY HOPED THAT REF TO AN AGREEMENT BY THE CPC WILL ONLY BE NECESSARY IN ISOLATED SITUATIONS, WHERE DIFFICULTIES ARE EXPERIENCED WITHIN THE VARIOUS COMMITTEES.

4. YOUR PARA3(C)(III). MACAULEY STATES THAT HE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR INITIATING ACTION TO SET UP THE OTHER COMMITTEES.

TEXT ENDS

ROBERTSON



CANADA

Department of National Defence

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

No. CSC:1888.1TD:153

SECRET

ADDRESS REPLY TO.
SECRETARY
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE,
OTTAWA.

7 January 1958

Chairman Chiefs of Staff
CGS
CNS
CAS
CDRB

50219-AK-40	40
58	50

Copy On 50
50045-40

Tripartite Discussions on Areas of Technical Cooperation

1. Attached herewith for your consideration is a memorandum received from the Chairman, Defence Research Board concerning the above mentioned subject.
2. This memorandum concerns Item IV of the agenda of the Chiefs of Staff Committee 615th meeting to be held on 8 Jan 58 - "Undersea Warfare Research and Development".

T.W.T. Lucas
(F.W.T. Lucas)
Captain, RCN
Secretary

FWTL/6-6756/mck

c.c. Deputy Minister
Secretary to the Cabinet
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs
Coordinator Joint Staff.

Item of 615 mty CSC 8 Jan 58

DRBS 190-60/144-4
SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
DEFENCE RESEARCH BOARD

Office of the Chairman
O T T A W A

7 January, 1958.

Chairman
Chiefs of Staff

Tripartite Discussions on Areas of
Technical Cooperation

The situation in respect to this matter should be discussed in some detail by the Chiefs of Staff Committee. It is necessary to arrive at an agreed method of dealing with the various demands arising from the deliberations of the high level Tripartite Technical Committee which met in Washington during the week of 3-6 December, 1957.

A resume of the discussions of this Committee is contained in the paper CSC 1888.1 (TD 15) dated 10 December 57.

In brief, the Committee identified 10 fields of research and development where there could be an increase in the cooperative effort. These fields are:

- (a) Nuclear Materials
- (b) Nuclear Warheads
- (c) Military Propulsion and Power Reactors
- (d) Delivery Systems
- (e) Biological, Radiological and Chemical Warfare
- (f) Defence Against Ballistic Missiles
- (g) Anti-Submarine Detection and Defence
- (h) Aircraft and Aero Engines
- (i) Infra-red Research
- (j) Thermionic Valve Research

Sub-Committees of the main Committee held more detailed discussions of each of the above fields and agreed on certain actions in each case. The actions agreed on are contained in the paper CSC 1888.1 (TD 15) (JSWPC) dated 20 December, 1957. It will be noted that Canada was excluded from the discussions on fields (a) and (b).

In respect to field (g) dealing with Anti-Submarine Detection and Defence, a tripartite group met in Washington during the week 9-13 December, 1957. They constituted themselves a Steering Committee on Undersea Warfare Research and Development. The results of the meeting of this Committee together with recommendations are contained in a memorandum to Chiefs of Staff Committee, dated 20 December, 1957.

There has been no further activity in the other 7 fields in which Canada is involved nor any indication as to who will initiate further action. It appears to be somewhat loosely organized in Washington. On the other hand, national approval of the proposed actions may be necessary before further moves are made. Both these points need consideration.

- 2 -

Up to this point, this matter has been handled on an "ad hoc" basis. The Defence Research Board, on your instructions, acted as the coordinating agency for the Undersea Warfare Research and Development meetings. Subsequently, the JSWPC has been named as the coordinating agency in Joint Staff and presumably will relieve the Defence Research Board of this responsibility.

If the Undersea Warfare Research and Development field is indicative of the actions which may arise in other fields, it is apparent there will be a considerable effort required on the part of the Armed Services and DRB to provide representatives to attend discussions and formulate recommendations for consideration by the Tripartite Technical Committee and finally by national authorities.

In view of this, it is recommended that the Chiefs of Staff Committee:

- (a) Approve, in principle, continued participation by Canada in these discussions;
- (b) Approve the recommendations in the memorandum to Chiefs of Staff Committee dated 20 December 1957 on Undersea Warfare Research and Development;
- (c) Instruct the JSWPC to examine the situation as it now stands and will develop and forward recommendations to the Chiefs of Staff Committee for continuing Canadian participation. Such recommendations should include:
 - (i) Approval or otherwise of the agreed action proposed by the Tripartite Technical Committee (CSC 1888.1 (TD 15) (JSWPC) dated 20 Dec 57 and the extent of Canadian participation;
 - (ii) The establishment of a Tripartite Coordinating Committee in Washington to coordinate the activities arising from these discussions and to ensure action is initiated and carried through in the designated fields of research and development;
 - (iii) The probable need for an over-all tripartite agreement to facilitate cooperative activities arising from the discussions.

Cott
CHAIRMAN

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Under-Secretary

Security SECRET

Date January 7, 1958.

FROM: Defence Liaison (1) Division

File No.		
50219-AK-40		
58	/	/

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: Item 4 of the 615th Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee--
Tripartite Discussions on Areas of Technical Cooperation.

Re
In
I believe you are familiar with the correspondence exchanged with Washington on the subject of tripartite cooperation on research and development. Two papers are attached. One has been prepared by the Chairman, DRB and discusses the subject in general terms. The other is submitted by the CNS, the CAS and the Chairman, DRB, and is concerned with one particular aspect of tripartite cooperation--undersea warfare research and development. The general paper should probably be read first.

2. Mr. Zimmerman makes certain recommendations which concern both substance and procedure. Recommendations a) and b) request the Chiefs to approve continued participation by Canada in the discussions, in particular with regard to undersea warfare on which the greatest progress has been made. Recommendation c) suggests that the Joint Special Weapons Policy Committee in National Defence should co-ordinate future action and study certain further recommendations. Our interest here is that we should be kept informed of tripartite activities in these fields, particularly if there is to be "an over-all tripartite agreement" as suggested in C/iii. (You might point out in this regard that Canada was invited to participate in the discussion by the U.S. and U.K. Governments and that any initiative for an over-all agreement should probably come from them). You might say that if a tripartite co-ordinating committee is to be formed in Washington (C/ii) some arrangement should be made for liaison with the State Department and External Affairs.

CIRCULATION


- 2 -

3. The second memorandum explains that the undersea warfare field was chosen by the tripartite meeting as the field in which action should be taken first primarily because very close cooperation among the three countries has been going on in this field over a number of years. The sub-committee which considered this subject in Washington from December 9th to 13th recommended (its report is attached to the memorandum) that a working group be set up to draft proposals for close cooperation on research and development among the three countries in this field. The working group in turn has recommended that several sub-committees be established to review various aspects of the subject.

4. The memorandum, which is signed by all three Chiefs of Staff, makes two chief recommendations:

- (1) "That Canada participate fully throughout all phases of this cooperative programme in partnership with the U.S. and U.K."
- (2) "That Canada approve the organizational and procedural arrangements in connection with the Undersea Warfare Steering Committee and its sub-committees".

There does not appear to be any objection to these proposals.


Defence Liaison (1) Division.

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

50219-AK-40
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS
OTTAWA.

S E C R E T
CSC:1888.1 TD:15B
3 Jan 58

J-13

MEMORANDUM TO: Chairman Chiefs of Staff
CGS
CNS
CAS
CDRB

SUBJECT: Undersea Warfare Research and Development

1. The attached document concerning the above subject is forwarded for your consideration:

Memorandum to Chiefs of Staff Committee
dated 20 Dec 57
signed by CNS, CAS and CDRB.

2. This matter will be discussed at the 615th meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee to be held on 8 Jan 58 at 0930. (Item IV of agenda).

Released P. Lattreault
Brig
for (P.W.T. Lucas)
Captain, RCN
Secretary

FWTL/6-6756/mck

c.c. Deputy Minister
Secretary to the Cabinet
Under-Secretary of State ✓
for External Affairs
Coordinator Joint Staff.

Item 5, 615 mtg CSC 8 Jan 58 000286

SECRET

MEMORANDUM TO: Chiefs of Staff Committee

UNDERSEA WARFARE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Reference: (a) Memorandum CCOS to CNS, CAS, CGS, and CDRB dated 29 November, 1957, with attachments, Washington Message No. 2527, 27 November, 1957.

In Reference (a), the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff passed a Personal/Secret memorandum to each of the four Chiefs of Staff. This memorandum and its attachment outlined proposals for greatly improved Canadian-United States-United Kingdom cooperation on research and development in ten named fields. These fields were:

- (a) Nuclear Materials
- (b) Nuclear Warheads
- (c) Military Propulsion and Power Reactors
- (d) Delivery Systems
- (e) Biological, Radiological and Chemical Warfare
- (f) Defence against Ballistic Missiles
- (g) Anti-Submarine Detection and Defence
- (h) Aircraft and Aero Engines
- (i) Infra-red Research
- (j) Thermionic Valve Research

These ten fields were individually discussed at a high international level in Washington by sub-committees. The sub-committee deputed to consider Item (g), Undersea Warfare, recommended that, inasmuch as there had already been close cooperation in the undersea warfare field, a very competent tripartite working party be set up in the near future to draft proposals for closer cooperation on research and development among the three countries in this field. The first meeting of this Working Party took place in the Pentagon, 9 December, 1957 and subsequent meetings were held through that week. The Canadian representatives were:

Dr. F.H. Sanders - representing DRB

Captain P.F.X. Russell - representing the RCN

Group Captain R.A. Gordon - representing the RCAF

WORKING PARTY MEETINGS

2 A broad picture of the discussions held by the Working Group on Item (g), whose name is now the Canadian-US-UK Steering Committee on Undersea Warfare, is given in the attached report. Finer detail of the proceedings, including terms of reference of sub-committees, etc., is

SECRET

-2-

given in Appendices B - G of the report. The USW Steering Committee has proposed the setting up of seven working sub-committees. Five of these will be reasonably permanent in nature and will cover the following sub-divisions of the broad undersea warfare field:

Surface Systems

Airborne Systems

Submarine Systems

Mine Warfare and Torpedo Countermeasures Systems

Research

These committees will review all undersea warfare research and development projects in their respective fields to determine where unnecessary duplication exists or in what areas there is insufficient coverage. The other two sub-committees are more temporary in nature; one will deal with the interchange of technical information, personnel and equipment and the other with patents. These latter two Sub-Committees have been working in Washington over the past week with appropriate representation from the three countries. It has been recommended by the USW Steering Committee that the other five sub-committees be officially formed at the earliest possible date with the objective of their commencing deliveries early in 1958.

JOINT PROPOSALS BY CNS, CAS AND CDRB

3 The Chief of the Naval Staff, the Chief of the Air Staff and the Chairman, Defence Research Board, are prepared to provide appropriate officers from their individual Services to participate in the work of these sub-committees and recommend the following action:

- (1) That Canada participate fully throughout all phases of this cooperative programme in partnership with the United States and the United Kingdom.
- (2) That Canada approve the organizational and procedural arrangements in connection with the Undersea Warfare Steering Committee and its sub-committees.
- (3) That approval be given for Canada to be represented on the Undersea Warfare Steering Committee by Dr. F.H. Sanders, representing the Defence Research Board, Captain P.F.X. Russell, representing the Royal Canadian Navy, and Group Captain N.S.A. Anderson, representing the Royal Canadian Air Force.
- (4) That Canada nominate immediately the following principal members:

Research Sub-Committee - Dr. W.L. Ford, Superintendent,
Pacific Naval Laboratory, DRB

Surface Systems Sub-Committee - Cdr. D.R. Saxon, DSC, RCN

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Airborne Systems Sub-Committee - (RCAF to be named)

Mine Warfare and Torpedo Countermeasures Systems -
Cdr. J.R. Coulter, RCN

(It is to be noted that other Canadian associate members may attend sub-committee meetings but that restriction to one principal member has been recommended by the USW Steering Committee; also that the RCN proposes no Canadian representation on the Submarine Systems Sub-Committee.)

- (5) That official confirmation of Cdr. J.M. Leeming as the Canadian representative on the Technical Information and Personnel Sub-Committee and Mr. R.O. McGee as the Canadian representative on the Patents Sub-Committee be given.
- (6) That action to advise United States authorities through the Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff, be taken, if possible not later than 24 December.

OBSERVATIONS BY CNS, CAS AND CDRB


4. The Chief of the Naval Staff, the Chief of the Air Staff, and the Chairman, Defence Research Board, wish to draw to the attention of the Chiefs of Staff Committee the following points which are considered of great importance.

- (1) The Undersea Warfare field was chosen by the high level tripartite meeting as the field in which action should be taken first, primarily because very close cooperation among the three countries has been going on in this field over a number of years. We believe that the United States and the United Kingdom will take prompt action to name sub-committee members and begin proceedings. The three Services concerned are prepared to provide the necessary personnel.
- (2) Nine other fields of military activity, in which tripartite cooperation on research and development is recommended, remain to be covered. If the pattern of activity in these other fields parallels that described above for Undersea Warfare, it is clear that a quite large contribution by the four Services, of scientists and officers specialized in these fields, may be required.
- (3) It is the recommendation of the USW Steering Committee that these sub-committees rotate their place of meeting. Meetings will be held at various places in the three countries, chosen by mutual agreement of the executive members of the sub-committees, as most suitable for the particular programmes being discussed. Since some of the meetings will obviously have to take place in the United Kingdom and possibly in remote parts of the United States, it is clear that increased transportation and travelling expenses may be expected.

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
- (4) It must be kept in mind that the proposals for cooperative action by the three countries, as outlined in Reference (a), derive directly from meetings between the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the Prime Minister of Canada. It is believed that effective implementation of these directives can result only if programmes of the type outlined above are undertaken and carried out in a very thorough manner.


(H.G. DeWolf)
Vice-Admiral

CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF.


(H. Campbell)
Air Marshal

CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF.


(A.H. Zimmerman)
Chairman,

DEFENCE RESEARCH BOARD.

OTTAWA,
20 December, 1957.

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CANADIAN EYES ONLY

REPORT OF MEETINGS OF CANADIAN-US-UK STEERING
COMMITTEE ON UNDERSEA WARFARE

Washington, D.C. - December 9 - 13, 1957

- Appendices:
- A. Report of Sub-Committee (g) - U.S.-U.K.-Canada Technical Committee
 - B. Minutes of the First Meeting of the USW Steering Committee
 - C. Minutes of the Second Meeting of the USW Steering Committee
 - D. Recommendations Arising from the Third Meeting
 - E. General Form of Terms of Reference of Systems Sub-Committees
 - F. Terms of Reference of Sub-Committee on Research
 - G. Memorandum for All Members of Sub-Committees

Reference: (a) Memorandum CCOS to CNS, CAS, CGS, and CDRB dated 29 November, 1957, with attachment, Washington Message No. 2527, 27 November, 1957.

BACKGROUND

In Reference (a), the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff outlined proposals for US-UK-Canadian cooperation in research and development in a number of technical fields. Item (g) of this list of fields covered undersea warfare. In the course of high level meetings in Washington at which Canada was represented by the Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff and the Defence Research Member, the sub-committee deputed to consider undersea warfare met and submitted a brief report which is attached as Appendix "A". The chief outcome of this report was the establishment of a working group to commence a review of the research and development programmes of the US, UK, and Canada. Information was received in Ottawa 6 December, 1957, to the effect that this Working Group would hold its first meeting 0900 9 December in the Pentagon. This report is an outline of the discussions, agreements and recommendations of this Working Group in Field (g).

FIRST MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP

2. This meeting was chaired by RADM C.E. Weakley, USN, Director, Undersea Warfare Division and was attended by very senior personnel from the US and UK. These included Mr. J.B. Macauley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence (R and E), and RADM J.T. Hayward, USN, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (R and D) for the US, VADM R.F. Elkins, BJSM, Dr. H.F. Willis, CRNSS, and CAPT R.E. Portlock, RN-DUWM for the UK. ADM Elkins made an initial policy statement which he had discussed with ADM Burke, Chief of Naval Operations. This was to the effect that this Committee should

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indicate the country which should give prime emphasis to a project but should not establish fixed areas of responsibility for research and development. No country should be excluded from working in an area of emphasis of another country. Mr. Macauley affirmed the above to be substantially the United States view. The Canadian delegation suggested that it would not be at variance with this policy, however, if specific projects or sub-projects were named as the responsibility of a certain country. The meeting did not like the word responsibility and suggested that "emphasis on certain projects" was a more acceptable wording. (In later informal discussions, ADM Elkins urged the Canadian delegates to pass on his view to their respective Chiefs of Staff as he felt very strongly about the importance of this policy statement.)

3. The first subject discussed was the interchange of information, personnel, and technical equipment and the various difficulties which had arisen in the past. It was agreed that a sub-committee to be named the Technical Information and Personnel Sub-Committee, should be set up in the very near future to determine what could be done to improve this interchange. It was later confirmed that the membership of this committee would be CAPT K.M. Gentry for the USA, Dr. R.V. Alred for the UK and CDR J.M. Leeming for Canada. This Sub-Committee would be only an interim one and would be dissolved when it had accomplished its mission.

4. Closely related to the exchange of information was the problem of industrial information and patents covering this. The Working Group agreed that this was a very specialized field and that a second sub-committee called the Patents Sub-Committee should be set up to study the problem. It was later established that the membership of the Patents Sub-Committee would be CAPT Robillard for the US, Dr. Todd for the UK and Mr. R.O. McGee for Canada.

5. The Working Group agreed that the next step in the proceedings would be presentations by each of the three countries of a general review of their research and development programmes. Mr. Benton Schaub would act as recorder of the proceedings of the Working Group, by agreement to be called the Canadian-US-UK Steering Committee on Undersea Warfare. It was also agreed that nuclear weapons and their associated control systems, as applied to undersea warfare, would be discussed. Programme coordination and data exchange on technical details of nuclear warheads would be handled by a different working group and were not the direct concern of the USW Steering Committee.

6. The official minutes of the first meeting are attached as Appendix "B".

SECOND MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP

7. The second meeting of the USW Steering Committee was held in the afternoon, 11 December in the Pentagon. Presentations were made by the three countries covering the broad aspects of their undersea warfare research and development programmes. The UK presentation lasted an hour, the US forty minutes and the Canadian ten minutes. Notes on these presentations were taken by the Canadian delegates and a fairly comprehensive report is now being prepared by the CJS in Washington for transmission to National Defence Headquarters. As an

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illustration of the general tenor of the meeting, some very useful and hitherto unavailable information on the operational characteristics of nuclear USW weapons was outlined quite freely in the American presentation.

8. Following the presentation of programmes, the Steering Committee discussed the problem of carrying out a closer study of these programmes and determining how best to achieve integration of the various programmes so as to make optimum use of the combined technical resources and manpower of the three countries. It was agreed that five sub-committees, of a continuing nature, should be set up to cover the following subjects.

Surface Systems

Airborne Systems

Submarine Systems

Mine Warfare and Torpedo Countermeasures Systems

Research

A working group was designated by the Steering Committee to establish proposed Terms of Reference for the Sub-Committees. This working group would meet the following day, 12 December.

9. The minutes of the second meeting of the USW Steering Committee are attached as Appendix "C".

THIRD MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP

10. The USW Steering Committee held its final meeting in the afternoon, 13 December. The main items discussed were the Terms of Reference for the five technical sub-committees which had been prepared the previous day by an ad hoc working group. Agreement was reached on the terms of reference of the sub-committees and on the designation of an "executive member" for each sub-committee. The "executive member" would be, in effect, the coordinator and executive secretary for his particular sub-committee, though sub-committee meetings would be chaired by the member of the country in which the meeting would be held. The allocation of "executive memberships" was as follows:

Surface Systems - Canada

Airborne Systems - US

Submarine Systems - US

Mine Warfare and Torpedo Countermeasures Systems - UK

Research - UK

11. There was a quite extensive discussion of how these sub-committees and also the USW Steering Committee would exchange

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information. It was agreed that members of sub-committees should be authorized to communicate directly with each other and with members of other USW sub-committees; also that problems arising in the sub-committees which require resolution should be forwarded to the Recorder of the USW Steering Committee. The membership of sub-committees should normally be limited to one principal member from each country; membership of the Steering Committee a maximum of three. The minutes of the third meeting have as yet not been received but, for advance information of Canadian authorities, the following agreements are attached:

Appendix "D" - Agreements arising from the Third Meeting

Appendix "E" - General Form of Terms of Reference of Systems Sub-Committees

Appendix "F" - Terms of Reference of Sub-Committee on Research

Appendix "G" - Memorandum for All Members of the Sub-Committees

12. The USW Steering Committee discussed briefly the nature of its own Terms of Reference and concluded that these were outlined in the minutes of the first meeting and should be left to the Recorder to formulate. It was agreed that the three countries should be requested to name their respective representatives on the various Sub-Committees at the earliest possible date. This has already been done for the Information and Patents Sub-Committees and these groups are now meeting in Washington. The names of the UK and Canadian members of the USW Steering Committee were recorded as Captain R.E. Portlock, Dr. H.F. Willis and one other and Dr. F.H. Sanders, Captain P.F.X. Russell and Group Captain R.A. Gordon respectively; US nominations to be made at a later date.

13. The Steering Committee agreed that each of the technical sub-committees, when formed, would be requested to carry out a preliminary review of its field of activity and submit a report to the Steering Committee not later than 1 April, 1958. Although it was agreed that the Steering Committee would probably meet early in the New Year, the firm agreement was made for a meeting approximately mid-April of 1958 for the purpose of discussing the reports of the sub-committees and formulating recommendations for action.

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APPENDIX "A"

REPORT OF SUBCOMMITTEE G
US-UK-CANADA TECHNICAL COMMITTEE DISCUSSIONS
ANTISUBMARINE DEFENSE

The interchange of information between Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom in Antisubmarine Defense has been excellent throughout the years, and to some degree there has been common use of resources on joint projects. It was agreed that there was room for further progress, the sharing out of responsibility for items in a joint program so as to make the best over-all use of existing resources.

To implement the identification of potential areas of planned cooperation, a task force has been established consisting of competent and knowledgeable technical and operational personnel. This group which starts work next week will jointly review the Research and Development programs of all three countries and make specific recommendations regarding the division of effort.

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APPENDIX "B"

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

Research and Engineering

Minutes of the First Meeting
Canadian-US-UK Technical Steering Committee
on Undersea Warfare

December 9, 1957 at 1400
in Room 2B943 Pentagon
Washington, D.C.

Present

U.S.

Mr. J.B. Macauley - OASD (R&E)
RAdm. J.T. Hayward, USN - CNO (OP-03C)
RAdm. C.E. Weakley, USN - CNO (OP-31)
Capt. K.M. Gentry, USN - CNO
Mr. O.W. Helm, (ONR)
Mr. L.M. McKenzie (ONR)
Mr. Benton Schaub - OASD (R&E)
LCdr. L.G. Cole, USN - OASD (R&E)

U.K.

VAdm. R.F. Elkins, R.N.
Capt. R.E. Portlock, R.N. - Director of Underwater Weapons
Material
Dr. H.F. Willis - CRNSS
Dr. Ronald V. Alfred - BJSM
Cdr. A.G.W. Bellars, R.N., BJSM

CANADA

Group Capt. R.A. Gordon, RCAF
Capt. P.F.X. Russell, RCN (DUSW)
Dr. F.H. Sanders DRB-RCN

Admiral Elkins made an initial policy statement which he had discussed with Admiral Burke. In brief he stated that this committee should consider areas of emphasis which the individual countries would have but should not establish fixed lines of areas of cognizance responsibility. No country is to be excluded from working in an area of emphasis of another country. An initial objective of the committee should be the achieving of a full and timely interchange of all technical and program information and thinking.

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APPENDIX "B" (Cont'd)

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Mr. Macauley affirmed the above to be substantially the U.S. view and stated that the steering committee should basically keep in mind that their objective is to improve the utilization of the combined technical resources of the three countries by developing cooperation and coordination in the assigned technical area, Undersea Warfare.

It was established that Mr. Schaub OASD (R&E) member would act as recorder for the steering committee. The only requirement for formal minutes of the steering committee meetings will be to make any decisions a matter of record.

Although nuclear weapon systems will be covered in the review of programs by this committee, program coordination of and data exchange on technical details of nuclear warheads and propulsion will be handled by a separate group and is therefore of no direct concern to this committee.

The most significant problem which currently exists regarding the exchange of technical data is the result of applying the need to know security concept. It will have to be established that it is proper for the technical people of the three countries to be cleared to each other's research and development activities on a broad area basis, i.e., undersea warfare. When this is achieved, it will be possible to exchange information on a broad enough basis to cover thinking and planning regarding future programs as well as the unpublished research results upon which that thinking and planning is based.

The release of the confidential ASTIA Index to Canada and the UK and the exchange of technical personnel were both discussed as possible steps to aid in advancing towards the basic objective.

It was established that the question of patent rights was very difficult. Much of the undersea warfare development work is done in industry and therefore patent questions might easily arise to disturb the desired information exchange.

Two subcommittees were established to review specific areas and make recommendations to the steering committee. These were:

The Patent Subcommittee

Objectives:

To review the existing agreements and regulations regarding the exchange of data between the countries involved and to recommend what action, if any, should be taken to achieve the objectives of the steering committee.

Membership:

Capt. Robilard (US)
Dr. Todd (UK)
Dr. Orville McGee (Canadian)

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APPENDIX "B" (Cont'd)

The Technical Information and Personnel Subcommittee

Objectives:

To review the security systems of the three countries and to recommend operating procedures and/or changes which will permit full implementation of the objectives of the steering committee.

To develop a recommended realistic program which will achieve effective technical personnel cooperation among the countries.

To determine the action necessary to achieve the release of the confidential ASTIA Index to Canada and the UK.

To establish a recommended procedure whereby equipment may be exchanged as found desirable.

To investigate all other technical data exchange impediments which they foresee as standing in the way of achieving the objectives of the steering committee.

Membership:

Capt. Gentry (US)
Dr. Alfred (UK)
Cdr. J.M. Leeming (Canadian)

Admiral Hayward pointed out that the program coordination sought by this committee would only be achieved if the efforts were carried out on a continuing basis. Therefore, this committee will be called the Joint Canadian-US-UK Undersea Warfare Steering Committee and will consider its work as continuing indefinitely. Meetings should be held at regular intervals and at the request of any country.

It was agreed that the next step should be a general review of the research and development programs of the three countries as a preparation for the task of dividing the detailed joint program review into technical areas for consideration by subcommittees.

The next meeting will be held for this purpose on Wednesday, December 11, 1957 at 1330 in the Pentagon, Room 4E869.

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APPENDIX "C"

Minutes of the Second Meeting
Canadian-US-UK Technical Steering Committee
on Undersea Warfare

December 11, 1957 at 1330
in Room 4E 869 Pentagon
Washington, D.C.

Present

CANADIAN

Capt. P.F.X. Russell, DUSW
Dr. F.H. Sanders, DRB
Group Capt. R.A. Gordon VCAS/COPS/DTMRO
Air Commodore R.A. Cameron, RCAF
LCdr. P.C.H. Cooke, CJS
Dr. H.H. Waterman, CJS

US

Mr. Benton Hall Schaub, OASD
Capt. K.M. Gentry, OPNAV
Capt. R. Holden, OPNAV
Mr. O.W. Helm, ONR
Mr. L.M. McKenzie, ONR
LCdr. L.G. Cole, OASD
Capt. Donald MacDonald, OPNAV
Dr. R.M. Page, NRL
Mr. James W. Smith, ONR
Cdr. W.T. Holmes, OPNAV
Capt. C.C. Cole, OPNAV
Cdr. L.R. Vasey, OPNAV
Mr. James E. Cross, Office ASTSECNAVAIR

UK

VAdm. R.F. Elkins, ABJSM
Capt. R.E. Portlock, DUWM
Dr. H.F. Willis, CRNSS
Commodore D.G. Goodwin, CDS to ABJSM
Dr. Ronald J. Alred, Sci. Adv. BJSM
Cdr. A.G.W. Bellars, BJSM
Cdr. A.M.B. Buxton, BJSM
Mr. Harry K. Bourne, BJSM

Presentations were made by the three countries covering the broad aspects of their Undersea Warfare research and development programs. A short discussion of the material presented was held and then the subject of subcommittees was opened.

The Steering Committee agreed that the following five standing technical review subcommittees should be established:

Surface Systems

Airborne Systems

Submarine System

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APPENDIX "C" (Cont'd)

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Mine Warfare and Torpedo Countermeasure Systems

Research

A working group was designated by the Steering Committee to establish proposed terms of reference for the subcommittees. This working group was scheduled to meet in Room 3D1023 Pentagon at 0930 on December 12, 1957.

The next meeting of the Steering Committee will be held in Room 3C138 Pentagon at 1400 on December 13, 1957.

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APPENDIX "D"

POINTS OF AGREEMENT OF JOINT CANADA-US-UK
STEERING COMMITTEE ON UNDERSEA WARFARE -
3RD MEETING, 13 DECEMBER, 1957.
(NON-OFFICIAL)

The USW Steering Committee, at its 3rd meeting, 13 December, 1957, came to the following agreements:

- (1) To adopt the terms of reference for the technical sub-committees. (Attached herewith as Appendices "E" and "F")
- (2) That each technical sub-committee shall have a designated executive member who will be responsible for calling the meetings and recording and forwarding the reports of findings of the sub-committee to the Steering Committee.
- (3) That the chairman of each sub-committee meeting be a sub-committee member from the country in which the meeting is being held.
- (4) That "executive members" for each sub-committee be designated from the sub-committee membership by the country designated below:

Surface Systems	-	Canada
Airborne Systems	-	US
Submarine Systems	-	US
Mine Warfare and Torpedo		
Countermeasures Systems	-	UK
Research	-	UK

- (5) That members of sub-committees be authorized to communicate directly with each other and with other USW sub-committees.
- (6) That membership of countries on sub-committees normally be limited to one principal member with the minimum practicable number of associates.
- (7) That problems arising in the sub-committees which require outside resolution be forwarded to Mr. Benton Hall Schaub, Room 3D1023, Pentagon, Washington, DC, for resolution by designated representatives of all three countries who are located in the Washington area or by referral to the Steering Committee when found necessary.
- (8) The original proposal was that "A new IEP be established for use by membership of the Steering Committee and the technical sub-committees. The scope of this IEP to be Undersea Warfare." This point was discussed

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APPENDIX "D"

in some detail and it was left to the United States representatives to find a means for appropriate exchange of information. This may not be an IBI.

- (9) That any country expecting to effect a significant change of emphasis in an Undersea Warfare programme be required to notify the Steering Committee of that change.

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APPENDIX "E"

Joint CAN-US-UK Steering Committee on Undersea Warfare

..... Systems SubCommittee

The area of responsibility of this subcommittee will
be all

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The subcommittee will be responsible for the
following:

To maintain continuing review of the projects
under development in all three countries and to make
recommendations to the Steering Committee for integrating
the various programs, so as to make the best use of the
combined technical resources and manpower of the three
countries.

To advise the Steering Committee where
unnecessary duplications appear to exist, and also fields
which are insufficiently covered.

To make recommendations to the Steering
Committee concerning the subsequent development and
production of equipment, as directed by the Steering
Committee, when any research item approaches the development
stage and when any development item approaches the production
stage.

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APPENDIX "F"

Joint CAN-US-UK Steering Committee on Undersea Warfare
Research Subcommittee

The area of responsibility of this subcommittee will be all basic research and applied research in the area of undersea warfare. This is understood to include techniques which are not included in the development of equipments for service use.

The subcommittee will be responsible for the following:

To maintain a continuing review of research in all three countries and to point out to the Steering Committee the fields which appear to be insufficiently covered or overemphasized.

To take cognizance of new proposals for research, advise the Steering Committee on their potential value and make recommendations concerning subsequent work.

To report to the Steering Committee when any research item reaches the stage when a development application can be foreseen, giving an indication of its possibilities.

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APPENDIX "G"

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL MEMBERS OF SUBCOMMITTEES

SUBJECT: Establishment of Subcommittees

The Joint Canadian-US-UK Steering Committee on Undersea Warfare at its second meeting on December 11, 1957 decided to establish technical subcommittees to conduct a detailed review of the selected areas of Undersea Warfare. The Terms of Reference and membership lists for these subcommittees are enclosed.

Although these subcommittees are established on a continuing basis for detailed review, the Steering Committee desires to pinpoint at the earliest date the major areas where progress may be made toward a better integration of the combined programs. The subcommittees should make a quick initial review of their assigned area and submit recommendations to the Steering Committee prior to 1 April, 1958.

The executive member of each subcommittee will be responsible for calling the meetings and preparing reports. Meetings of the subcommittees will be chaired by the senior member of the host country.

Problems requiring action by the Steering Committee and reports to the Steering Committee should be forwarded through the Steering Committee recorder, Mr. Benton Schaub, OASD (R&E), Room 3D1023 Pentagon, Washington, 25, D. C. Fifteen copies of all reports should be submitted.

Executive members are authorized to communicate directly with each other regarding common problems.

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UK-USA AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR MISSILES BASES

THE DAILY TELEGRAPH OF DEC30 GAVE FRONT PAGE TREATMENT TO
EXTENSIVE QUOTATIONS FROM A STORY IN LAST SUNDAY'S WASHINGTON
STAR ABOUT THE ANGO-AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR MISSILES BASES.
2.WE SPOKE TO SNODGRASS OF THE PERMANENT UNDER-SECRETARY'S OFFICE
ABOUT THE ARTICLE.HE SAID IT WAS A PIECE OF INTELLIGENT GUESS-WORK
BUT SAID HE COULD NEITHER CONFIRM NOR DENY THE SPECIFIC DETAILS
OF INFO CONTAINED IN THE ARTICLE BECAUSE AS FAR AS THE FOREIGN OFFICE
WAS CONCERNED THE DRAFT OF THE AGREEMENT WAS STILL BEING WORKED
OVER IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND THE FOREIGN OFFICE WERE ONLY
BEING CALLED IN AS AND WHEN ANY NEW POINTS OF PRINCIPLE AROSE.
SNODGRASS SAID THAT NOTHING NEW HAD HAPPENED IN THIS RESPECT SINCE
NOV.

3.HOWEVER,HE COMMENTED SPECIFICALLY THAT THE SENTENCE IN THE FIRST
PARA SAYING THAT"FIELD COMMANDERS OF BOTH COUNTRIES COULD ACT
AUTOMATICALLY IN THE EVENT OF ATTACK"WAS AN EXAGGERATION.

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Department of National Defence

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE
CSC 1888-1 (TD 15)
No. (JSWPC)

S E C R E T

JOINT STAFF

ADDRESS REPLY TO
CHAIRMAN
CHIEFS OF STAFF,
OTTAWA.

20 December, 1957

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D-1	Chief of the General Staff
1	Chief of the Naval Staff
2	Chief of the Air Staff
3	
4	
5	Chairman, Defence Research Board
6	
7	Tripartite Discussions on Areas
8	<u>of Technical Co-operation</u>
9	<u>Sub-Committee Reports</u>
10	

DEC 28 1957 1 CCOS letter of 29 November, 1957, to which was attached Embassy Washington telegram 2527 of 27 November, 1957, and CSC 1888.1 (TD15) of 10 December, 1957, refer.

2 Attached are copies of the reports of Sub-Committees D, E, F, G, H, I and J (referred to in telegram 2527) for your information. It is understood from the Canadian Joint Staff (Washington) that these reports represent an agreed tripartite version of the business conducted in the Sub-Committees.

Robert P. Rothschild

(Robert P. Rothschild)
Brigadier
for Chairman, Chiefs of Staff

Att.

c.c: DM
Secy Cabinet
Ext. Affairs

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REPORT OF SUBCOMMITTEE D - DELIVERY SYSTEMS

US-UK-CANADA TECHNICAL COMMITTEE DISCUSSIONS

A. Surface-to-Surface Category

(1) IRBM:

It was agreed that the field of ballistic missiles would best be covered by the following arrangement:

(a) The U.S. to complete the THOR and/or JUPITER project and possibly to continue the development to 2000 miles range.

(b) The U.K. to complete work on a missile for the 2000 to 3000 mile range.

(c) The U.S. to be responsible for the longer range missiles.

It was further agreed that the U.S. would take the lead in developing solid fuel missiles in this field but that it was desirable to set up a task force having U.S., U.K. and Canadian membership for the purpose of locating areas where the work might usefully be shared.

(2) Tactical Surface-to-Surface

It was agreed that coordination in this area was already underway through the Tripartite Army Standardization Committee, and that the appropriate U.S. member of the Committee would be asked to initiate a study by the Committee of the long term requirements in this field.

B. Air-to-Ground Category

The subcommittee considered that the present U.S. and U.K. programs should be reviewed immediately to see whether the requirements beyond RASCAL and BLUE STEEL could not be met by an integrated program. This examination should be carried out by a joint USAF-RAF task group.

C. Air Defense Category

The subcommittee reviewed the present programs of surface-to-air missiles. The geographical differences justified continuation of present firm projects but it was agreed that decision on further developments depended on definition of threat. It was clear that in any case the low level threat was serious and required attention. It was determined that the Department of Defense, the Ministry of Defense and the Department of National Defense should examine this matter in greater detail and develop arrangements for full cooperation.

S E C R E T

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

U.S.-U.K.-Canada Technical Committee Discussions
Report of Subcommittee E
Biological Warfare, Chemical Warfare, Radiological Defense

In this field there has been a complete coordination of effort to integrate programs. As recently as the autumn of 1957 the 12th Tripartite Conference between the U.S., U.K. and Canada was held. The subcommittee agreed that no further action should be taken until this report had been studied. After study arrangements should be made to discuss whether cooperation could be extended.

The Tripartite Conference did not cover all aspects of radiological warfare. The subcommittee agreed that Lt. Col. Walkling of the BJSM, Washington, should act as a focal point in establishing the necessary exchanges with those concerned with the U.S. programs in this field.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

PY

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Attendance List

Principal Representatives

U.K. Sir Frederick Brundrett, Ch. Defence Research Policy Committee
Canada Dr. John J. Green, Canadian Joint Staff, Washington
U.S. Mr. J. B. Mccauley, DASD (R&E)
Maj. Gen. Wm. M. Creasy, CCmLO, U.S. Army
Dr. C.L. Dunham, M.D., AEC

Others

U.K. Mr. J. Alvey, BJSM, Washington
Dr. Robt. Cockburn, Min. of Supply
Mr. T. M. Crowley, Defence Research Policy Cmte. (Sec.)
Mr. L. T. Dunnett, Ministry of Supply
* Mr. A. N. Hewson, BJSM, Washington
* Lt. Col. A.E. Walkling, BJSM, Washington

Canada Lt. Col. J. C. Bond, Canadian Army Hq., Ottawa
* Lt. Col. H. E. Staples, Canadian Joint Staff, Washington
and Army Chemical Center

U.S. Capt. E. Conrad, USN, AEC
Maj. D. M. Falk, USAF, DRD
Mr. G. J. Keto, AEC
Lt. Col. I. R. Mullen, OCCmLO/Army
Mr. James P. Parker, State Dept.
CDR S. J. Robinson, Jr., USN, OASD/ISA
Lt. Col. Harvey E. Sheppard, OCRD/Army
Lt. Col. A. H. Voegeli, DCS OPS/Army
Capt. T. R. Vogeley, USN, OPNAV (OP-34)
CDR R. L. Workman, USN, OPNAC
Dr. H. N. Worthley, OSAD (R&E) recorder

* Washington contacts

C O N F I D E N T I A L

COPY

C O N F I D E N T I A L

REPORT OF SUBCOMMITTEE F ON DEFENSE AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES
US-UK-CANADA TECHNICAL COMMITTEE DISCUSSIONS

(BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE)

Through the three existing bilateral arrangements, (US-UK, US-Canada, Canada-UK) some exchange of information had already taken place in all three areas involved in this problem:

- (1) Early Warning
- (2) Active defenses, including the anti-ballistic missile
- (3) Supporting research, component developments, and
electronic techniques

It was agreed that B.M. defense was a vital field for complete integration of effort, and to this end the subcommittee recommends:

(1) That the present bilateral arrangements in this area be converted into a trilateral arrangement for purpose of insuring full technical information exchange and program planning. The subcommittee noted that the implementation of specific actions of this trilateral group might be implemented on a bilateral basis due to the fact that only two nations may be interested parties in some actions.

(2) That immediate discussions and exchange of information take place which will include as two items: (a) a review by US and Canada of Ministry of Supply detailed proposals, particularly the specification for an early warning radar, (b) a review by UK and Canada of the reports and the studies of the US Department of Defense ad hoc committees which have recently reviewed the early warning, active defense and identification problems.

Additional Note: Following an earlier discussion on Subcommittee D, the very real need for setting up some permanent arrangements to insure as complete coverage as possible in the field of radar techniques was considered. The critical dependence of offensive and defensive weapons on their ground and airborne radar environment was accepted. It was agreed that an exchange of technical information and discussions of programs in this vital field was of the highest importance to all three countries.

It was agreed that the Department of Defense, the Ministry of Defense and the Department of National Defense would arrange for direct discussions between the appropriate experts in this field.
Attachment:
List of Conferees

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

ATTENDANCE

Subgroup F - Room 2B-943, Wednesday, 4 December 1957, 1400 hours.

UNITED KINGDOM

<u>NAME</u>	<u>OFFICE</u>
Sir Frederick Brundrett	Ministry of Defense
Mr. L. J. Dunnett	
Mr. S. F. Follett	
Mr. T. M. Crowley	
Mr. P. E. Pollard	
Lt. Col. Walkling	
Group Captain Fryer	
Dr. R. Cockburn	Ministry of Supply
Sir W. A. Penney	Atomic Energy Assn.

CANADA

Dr. J. J. Green	Can. Jt. Staff, Washington, DC
Mr. B. A. Walker	Can. Jt. Staff, Washington, DC
Major J. K. Ewing	Canadian Army Staff, Washington, DC
Group Capt. C.G.W. Chapman	Staff, Washington, DC

UNITED STATES

Mr. William Holaday	OSD
Mr. A. G. Waggoner	OSD
Dr. H. R. Skifter	OASD(R&E)
Mr. J. B. Macauley	OASD(R&E)
Mr. John W. Klotz	OASD(R&E)
Col. D. L. Crowsen	OSD
Mr. R. J. Courtney	State Department
Mr. H. F. Irwin	EUR/BNA-State Department
Mr. Edward E. Conrad	Atomic Energy Commission
Col. G. F. Brown	OSD(Internat'l Security Affairs)
Mr. John N. Irwin	OSD(" " ")
Major General Robt. Wood	OCR&D, Dept. of the Army
Col. H. P. Van Ormer	DCS OPS, Dept. of the Army
Lt. Col. O. E. Cowan	Chief R&D, Dept. of the Army
Lt. Col. J. R. M. Covert	OCR&D, Dept. of the Army
Lt. Cdr. P. E. Arbo	OP NAV, Dept. of the Navy
Brig. Gen. C. M. McCorkle	Hq. USAF

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

REPORT OF SUBCOMMITTEE G
US-UK-CANADA TECHNICAL COMMITTEE DISCUSSIONS
ANTISUBMARINE DEFENSE

The interchange of information between Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom in Antisubmarine Defense has been excellent throughout the years, and to some degree there has been common use of resources on joint projects. It was agreed that there was room for further progress, the sharing out of responsibility for items in a joint program so as to make the best over-all use of existing resources.

To implement the identification of potential areas of planned cooperation, a task force has been established consisting of competent and knowledgeable technical and operational personnel. This group which starts work next week will jointly review the Research and Development programs of all three countries and make specific recommendations regarding the division of effort.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

REPORT OF SUBCOMMITTEE H - AIRCRAFT AND AERO-ENGINES
US-UK-CANADA TECHNICAL COMMITTEE DISCUSSIONS

After discussion of the major aircraft and engine research and development programs of each country it was apparent that with the growing effort on guided missiles and the corresponding de-emphasis of manned aircraft the number of new military aircraft and engine projects will be severely limited, and the problem of surplus industrial capacity for development and production is becoming acute. The extent to which coordination could be effected in the field of new projects is largely governed by the type of new projects which the three countries contemplate.

The Subcommittee agreed on the following action:

- a. The U.S. Navy will examine the characteristics of the U.K. Blackburn and General NA-39 low altitude attack aircraft and the Canadian Argus for possible use to meet USN requirements.
- b. The U.S. Air Force will continue its evaluation of the Canadian CF-105 aircraft for possible use to meet USAF requirements.
- c. A tripartite team or task force group will be formed to examine the VTOL and STOL programs of all three countries to determine the extent to which an integrated program can be established in this area. The task force will be composed of representatives from all three countries and will hold its first meeting early in 1958.
- d. A tripartite team will be formed to examine the requirements for drones, both reconnaissance and target, the programs of the three countries and to make recommendations as to how these requirements can best be satisfied operationally and technically, having regard to the desirability of achieving an integrated program.
- e. A tripartite conference will be held early in 1958 to determine future trends in propulsion systems (including solid propellants) for all types of flying vehicles with the objective of exploring avenues of mutual cooperation and assistance in this area. In order to enlist the services of qualified personnel regardless of affiliation, it was proposed that representatives of the engine industry might participate as consultants to their respective governments rather than as representatives of their private companies. Further activity in establishing this conference will rest with the U.K. Ministry of Supply, the Canadian Department of National Defense, and the U.S. Department of Defense, OASD (R&E).

It was noted that VTOL and STOL aircraft problems are closely related to propulsion problems and that joint meetings of the VTOL/STOL task force and the propulsion conference members may be desirable.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

REPORT OF SUBCOMMITTEE I AND J

US-UK-CANADA TECHNICAL COMMITTEE DISCUSSIONS

ELECTRON TUBES AND INFRARED

Ways and means were discussed for improving the exchange of information among the US, UK and Canada in the areas of electron tubes, semi-conductor devices and infrared techniques.

It was concluded that:

1) existing electron tube organizations in US, UK and Canada (US-AGET, UK-CVD, and Canada-ECDC) would be utilized as a nucleus for the formation of a combined task group to study the research and development effort of the three countries in the area of electron tubes, semi-conductors and MASERS and to determine specific areas where cooperative research and development effort is desirable.

2) the US-AGET, UK-CVD and Canadian-ECDC proceed with the establishment of the combined task group to perform the functions recommended.

3) a combined US-UK and Canadian task group be formed in the area of infrared to strengthen the interchange of information in this area and to make recommendations concerning specific research areas where cooperative effort would be profitable.

Attachment:

List of Conferees

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

US-UK-CANADA DISCUSSIONS

ON TECHNICAL COOPERATION

SUBCOMMITTEES I AND J

VACUUM TUBES AND INFRARED

5 December 1957, 10:45 a.m. - 3E-1006

In Attendance:

United States

Mr. J. B. Macauley, OASD(R&E), Chairman
Mr. J. M. Bridges, OASD(R&E)
Lt. Col. C. G. Henline, OASD(R&E)
Dr. H. R. Skifter, OASD(R&E)
Mr. H. Harrison, U.S. Army, OCRD
Mr. J. J. Schmidt, Jr., U.S. Army, OCRD
Mr. Mack J. West, Navy, BuOrd
Lt. Col. T. G. Monroe, AFDRD
Mr. James P. Parker, Department of State

United Kingdom

Sir Frederick Brundrett
Dr. R. Cockburn
Mr. T. N. Crowley
Mr. L. Dunnett
Mr. J. Alvey, British Joint Staff Mission

Canada

Mr. B. A. Walker, Canadian Joint Staff
Mr. Roger S. Eaton, Canadian Joint Staff
Mr. H. H. Waterman, Canadian Joint Staff

C O N F I D E N T I A L



CANADA

Department of National Defence

JOINT STAFF

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

NO. CSC 1888.1 (TD 15)

CONFIDENTIAL

with SECRET
attachment

ADDRESS REPLY TO

CHAIRMAN
CHIEFS OF STAFF,
OTTAWA.

16 December, 1957.

*Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

Attention: J.J. McCardle, Esq.

Tripartite Discussions on Areas
of Technical Cooperation

1. Attached is a copy of Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff telegram JSW 473 of 14 December, 1957 concerning the referenced discussions, for your information.

2. This telegram is forwarded in accordance with the arrangement described in Embassy Washington telegram 2583 of 6 December, 1957.

F.W.T. Lucas
for (Robert P. Rothschild)
Brigadier
for Chairman, Chiefs of Staff.

Encl,

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ROUTINE

SECRET

BY SECURE MEANS

FM CJSW 140124Z

TO CCOS

S P E C T R A S E C R E T

JSW473 13 DECEMBER. FOR GENERAL FOULKES FROM SPARLING. NO CIRCULATION.
JSW467. CAN-US-UK STEERING COMMITTEE ON UNDERSEA WARFARE MET TODAY
AND APPROVED TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR FIVE ADDITIONAL SUB-COMMITTEES
AND COUNTRY DESIGNATED TO PROVIDE EXECUTIVE MEMBER FOR EACH AS FOLLOWS:
① SURFACE SYSTEMS - CANADA, AIRBORNE SYSTEMS - US, SUBMARINE SYSTEMS - US,
② Mine warfare and torpedo countermeasures - UK, RESEARCH - UK, EXECUTIVE
MEMBERS FOR INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND PATENTS SUB-COMMITTEES AND
STEERING COMMITTEE PROVIDED BY US. PARA TWO: MEMBERSHIP OF STEERING
COMMITTEE THREE EACH COUNTRY AND SUB-COMMITTEES NORMALLY ONE EACH
COUNTRY. PARA THREE. SUB-COMMITTEE NOMINATIONS REQUIRED TO PERMIT EARLY
COMMENCEMENT OF DETAILED REVIEW OF NATIONAL PROGRAMS. PARA FOUR.
PRELIMINARY REPORT OF FIVE SUB-COMMITTEES REQUIRED BY 1 APRIL LATEST
FOR CONSIDERATION BY STEERING COMMITTEE. PARA FIVE. PRESENT SERIES OF
MEETINGS COMPLETED.

20334/JED/141400Z DEC 57

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy,
Washington, D.C.

Reference:

Subject: Atomic Energy Consultation

Security: SECRET

No: 1701

Date: December 12, 1957

Enclosures: 1

Air or Surface Mail:

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.

50 219-AK-40

43.

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References

Enclosed herewith is the final text of the
Reports of: Sub-Committee D - Delivery Systems;
Sub-Committee E - Biological Warfare,
Chemical Warfare,
Radiological Defense;
Sub-Committee F - Defense Against
Ballistic Missiles;
Sub-Committee G - Antisubmarine Defense;
Sub-Committee H - Aircraft and Aero-Engines;
Sub-Committee I and J - Electron Tubes
and Infrared,
as made available to us by the Department of Defense.
Further copies of the report will be transmitted
directly to the Department of National Defence in Ottawa
by the Canadian Joint Staff.

Internal
Circulation

Distribution
to Posts

SECRET

REPORT OF SUBCOMMITTEE D - DELIVERY SYSTEMS

US-UK-CANADA TECHNICAL COMMITTEE DISCUSSIONS

A. Surface-to-Surface Category

(1) IRBM:

It was agreed that the field of ballistic missiles would best be covered by the following arrangement:

(a) The U.S. to complete the THOR and/or JUPITER project and possibly to continue the development to 2000 miles range.

(b) The U.K. to complete work on a missile for the 2000 to 3000 mile range.

(c) The U.S. to be responsible for the longer range missiles.

It was further agreed that the U.S. would take the lead in developing solid fuel missiles in this field but that it was desirable to set up a task force having U.S., U.K. and Canadian membership for the purpose of locating areas where the work might usefully be shared.

(2) Tactical Surface-to-Surface

It was agreed that coordination in this area was already underway through the Tripartite Army Standardization Committee, and that the appropriate U.S. member of the Committee would be asked to initiate a study by the Committee of the long term requirements in this field.

B. Air-to-Ground Category

The subcommittee considered that the present U.S. and U.K. programs should be reviewed immediately to see whether the requirements beyond RASCAL and BLUE STEEL could not be met by an integrated program. This examination should be carried out by a joint USAF-RAF task group.

C. Air Defense Category

The subcommittee reviewed the present programs of surface-to-air missiles. The geographical differences justified continuation of present firm projects but it was agreed that decision on further developments

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depended on definition of threat. It was clear that in any case the low level threat was serious and required attention. It was determined that the Department of Defense, the Ministry of Defense and the Department of National Defense should examine this matter in greater detail and develop arrangements for full cooperation.

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U.S.-U.K.-Canada Technical Committee Discussions
Report of Subcommittee E
Biological Warfare, Chemical Warfare, Radiological Defense

In this field there has been a complete coordination of effort to integrate programs. As recently as the autumn of 1957 the 12th Tripartite Conference between the U.S., U.K. and Canada was held. The subcommittee agreed that no further action should be taken until this report had been studied. After study arrangements should be made to discuss whether cooperation could be extended.

The Tripartite Conference did not cover all aspects of radiological warfare. The subcommittee agreed that Lt. Col. Walkling of the BJSM, Washington, should act as a focal point in establishing the necessary exchanges with those concerned with the U.S. programs in this field.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

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Attendance List

Principal Representatives

U.K. Sir Frederick Brundrett, Ch. Defence Research Policy Committee
Canada Dr. John J. Green, Canadian Joint Staff, Washington
U.S. Mr. J. B. Macauley, DASD (R&E)
Maj. Gen. Wm. M. Creasy, CCmLO, U.S. Army
Dr. C. L. Dunham, M.D., AEC

Others

U.K. Mr. J. Alvey, BJSM, Washington
Dr. Robt. Cockburn, Min. of Supply
Mr. T. M. Crowley, Defence Research Policy Cmte. (Sec.)
*Mr. L. T. Dunnett, Ministry of Supply
*Mr. A. N. Hewson, BJSM, Washington
*Lt. Col. A. E. Walkling, BJSM, Washington
Canada Lt. Col. J. C. Bond, Canadian Army Hq., Ottawa
*Lt. Col. H. E. Staples, Canadian Joint Staff, Washington
and Army Chemical Center
U.S. Capt. E. Conrad, USN, AEC
Maj. D. M. Falk, USAF, DRD
Mr. G. J. Keto, AEC
Lt. Col. I. R. Mullen, OCCmLO/Army
Mr. James P. Parker, State Dept.
CDR S. J. Robinson, Jr., USN, OASD/ISA
Lt. Col. Harvey E. Sheppard, OCRD/Army
Lt. Col. A. H. Voegeli, DCS OPS/Army
Capt. T. R. Vogeley, USN, OPNAV (OP-34)
CDR R. L. Workman, USN, OPNAV
Dr. H. N. Worthley, OASD (R&E) recorder

* Washington contacts

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CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF SUBCOMMITTEE F ON DEFENSE AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES US-UK-CANADA TECHNICAL COMMITTEE DISCUSSIONS

(BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE)

Through the three existing bilateral arrangements, (US-UK, US-Canada, Canada-UK) some exchange of information had already taken place in all three areas involved in this problem:

- (1) Early Warning
- (2) Active defenses, including the anti-ballistic missile
- (3) Supporting research, component developments, and
electronic techniques

It was agreed that B.M. defense was a vital field for complete integration of effort, and to this end the subcommittee recommends:

(1) That the present bilateral arrangements in this area be converted into a trilateral arrangement for purpose of insuring full technical information exchange and program planning. The subcommittee noted that the implementation of specific actions of this trilateral group might be implemented on a bilateral basis due to the fact that only two nations may be interested parties in some actions.

(2) That immediate discussions and exchange of information take place which will include as two items: (a) a review by US and Canada of Ministry of Supply detailed proposals, particularly the specification for an early warning radar, (b) a review by UK and Canada of the reports and the studies of the US Department of Defense ad hoc committees which have recently reviewed the early warning, active defense and identification problems.

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Additional Note: Following an earlier discussion on Subcommittee D, the very real need for setting up some permanent arrangements to insure as complete coverage as possible in the field of radar techniques was considered. The critical dependence of offensive and defensive weapons on their ground and airborne radar environment was accepted. It was agreed that an exchange of technical information and discussions of programs in this vital field was of the highest importance to all three countries.

It was agreed that the Department of Defense, the Ministry of Defense and the Department of National Defense would arrange for direct discussions between the appropriate experts in this field.

Attachment:
List of Conferees

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CONFIDENTIAL

ATTENDANCE

Subgroup F - Room 2B-943, Wednesday, 4 December 1957, 1400 hours.

UNITED KINGDOM

<u>NAME</u>	<u>OFFICE</u>
Sir Frederick Brundrett	Ministry of Defense
Mr. L. J. Dunnett	
Mr. S. F. Follett	
Mr. T. M. Crowley	
Mr. P. E. Pollard	
Lt. Col. Walkling	
Group Captain Fryer	
Dr. R. Cockburn	Ministry of Supply
Sir W. A. Penney	Atomic Energy Assn.

CANADA

Dr. J. J. Green	Can. Jt. Staff, Washington, DC
Mr. B. A. Walker	Can. Jt. Staff, Washington, DC
Major J. K. Ewing	Canadian Army Staff, Washington, DC
Group Capt. C.G.W. Chapman	Staff, Washington, DC

UNITED STATES

Mr. William Holaday	OSD
Mr. A. G. Waggoner	OSD
Dr. H. R. Skifter	OASD(R&E)
Mr. J. B. Macauley	OASD(R&E)
Mr. John W. Klotz	OASD(R&E)
Col. D. L. Crowsen	OSD
Mr. R.J.Courtney	State Department
Mr. H.F. Irwin	EUR/RMA-State Department
Mr. Edward E. Conrad	Atomic Energy Commission
Col. G. F. Brown	OSD(Internat'l Security Affairs)
Mr. John N. Irwin	OSD(" " ")
Major General Robt. Wood	OCR&D, Dept. of the Army
Col. H. P. Van Ormer	DCS OPS, Dept. of the Army
Lt. Col. O. E. Cowan	Chief R&D, Dept. of the Army
Lt. Col. J. R. M. Covert	OCR&D, Dept. of the Army
Lt Cdr. P. E. Arbo	OP NAV, Dept. of the Navy
Brig. Gen. C. M. McCorkle	Hq. USAF

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CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF SUBCOMMITTEE G US-UK-CANADA TECHNICAL COMMITTEE DISCUSSIONS ANTISUBMARINE DEFENSE

The interchange of information between Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom in Antisubmarine Defense has been excellent throughout the years, and to some degree there has been common use of resources on joint projects. It was agreed that there was room for further progress, the sharing out of responsibility for items in a joint program so as to make the best over-all use of existing resources.

To implement the identification of potential areas of planned cooperation, a task force has been established consisting of competent and knowledgeable technical and operational personnel. This group which starts work next week will jointly review the Research and Development programs of all three countries and make specific recommendations regarding the division of effort.

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REPORT OF SUBCOMMITTEE H - AIRCRAFT AND AERO-ENGINES

US-UK-CANADA TECHNICAL COMMITTEE DISCUSSIONS

After discussion of the major aircraft and engine research and development programs of each country it was apparent that with the growing effort on guided missiles and the corresponding de-emphasis of manned aircraft the number of new military aircraft and engine projects will be severely limited, and the problem of surplus industrial capacity for development and production is becoming acute. The extent to which coordination could be effected in the field of new projects is largely governed by the type of new projects which the three countries contemplate.

The Subcommittee agreed on the following action:

- a. The U. S. Navy will examine the characteristics of the U.K. Blackburn and General NA-39 low altitude attack aircraft and the Canadian Argus for possible use to meet USN requirements.
- b. The U. S. Air Force will continue its evaluation of the Canadian CF-105 aircraft for possible use to meet USAF requirements.
- c. A tripartite team or task force group will be formed to examine the VTOL and STOL programs of all three countries to determine the extent to which an integrated program can be established in this area. The task force will be composed of representatives from all three countries and will hold its first meeting early in 1958.
- d. A tripartite team will be formed to examine the requirements for drones, both reconnaissance and target, the programs of the three countries and to make recommendations as to how these requirements can best be satisfied operationally and technically, having regard to the desirability of achieving an integrated program.
- e. A tripartite conference will be held early in 1958 to determine future trends in propulsion systems (including solid propellants) for all types of flying vehicles with the objective of exploring avenues of mutual cooperation and assistance in this area. In order to enlist the services of qualified personnel regardless of affiliation, it was proposed that representatives of the engine industry might participate as consultants to their respective governments rather than as representatives of their private companies. Further activity in establishing this conference will rest with the U.K. Ministry of Supply, the Canadian Department of National Defense, and the U.S. Department of Defense, OASD (R&E).

It was noted that VTOL and STOL aircraft problems are closely related to propulsion problems and that joint meetings of the VTOL/STOL task force and the propulsion conference members may be desirable.

CONFIDENTIAL

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REPORT OF SUBCOMMITTEE I AND J

US-UK-CANADA TECHNICAL COMMITTEE DISCUSSIONS

ELECTRON TUBES AND INFRARED

Ways and means were discussed for improving the exchange of information among the US, UK and Canada in the areas of electron tubes, semi-conductor devices and infrared techniques.

It was concluded that:

1) existing electron tube organizations in US, UK and Canada (US-AGET, UK-CVD, and Canada-ECDC) would be utilized as a nucleus for the formation of a combined task group to study the research and development effort of the three countries in the area of electron tubes, semi-conductors and MASERS and to determine specific areas where cooperative research and development effort is desirable.

2) the US-AGET, UK-CVD and Canadian-ECDC proceed with the establishment of the combined task group to perform the functions recommended.

3) a combined US-UK and Canadian task group be formed in the area of infrared to strengthen the interchange of information in this area and to make recommendations concerning specific research areas where cooperative effort would be profitable.

Attachment:
List of Conferees

US-UK-CANADA DISCUSSIONS

ON TECHNICAL COOPERATION

SUBCOMMITTEES I AND J

VACUUM TUBES AND INFRARED

5 December 1957, 10:45 a.m. - 3E-1006

In Attendance:

United States

Mr. J. B. Macauley, OASD(R&E), Chairman
Mr. J. M. Bridges, OASD(R&E)
Lt. Col. C. G. Henline, OASD(R&E)
Dr. H. R. Skifter, OASD(R&E)
Mr. H. Harrison, U.S. Army, OCRD
Mr. J. J. Schmidt, Jr., U.S. Army, OCRD
Mr. Mack J. West, Navy, BuOrd
Lt. Col. T. G. Monroe, AFDRD
Mr. James P. Parker, Department of State

United Kingdom

Sir Frederick Brundrett
Dr. R. Cockburn
Mr. T. N. Crowley
Mr. L. Dunnett
Mr. J. Alvey, British Joint Staff Mission

Canada

Mr. B. A. Walker, Canadian Joint Staff
Mr. Roger S. Eaton, Canadian Joint Staff
Mr. H. H. Waterman, Canadian Joint Staff

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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FM: EXTERNAL	DATE	50 219-AK-40		SECURITY	
	Dec 10/57	43	✓	SECRET	
TO: LONDON	NUMBER	PRECEDENCE		COMCENTRE USE ONLY	
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Ref.: OURTEL DL1120
Subject: ATOMIC ENERGY CONSULTATIONS

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF WASHINGTON TELEGRAM 2527 OF NOVEMBER 27:

(COMMUNICATIONS: PLEASE TRANSMIT.)

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION		NO STANDARD DISTRIBUTION	
		DL(1) 2 COPIES	
ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	APPROVED BY
SIG..... NAME.....J.J.. MCCARDLE....	DL(1)	6-7921	SIG..... NAME.....JULES LÉGER.....

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

OUTGOING MESSAGE

FILE COPY 04

Copy of 84
FM: EXTERNAL

TO: LONDON

INFO: WASHINGTON FOR INFORMATION

DATE	FILE	SECURITY
DEC 10/57	50219 - AK-40 43 50	TOP SECRET
NUMBER	PRECEDENCE	COMCENTRE USE ONLY
DL1120	ROUTINE	

Ref.:

Subject: ATOMIC ENERGY CONSULTATIONS

AN APPROACH WAS MADE TO US ON NOVEMBER 27 IN OTTAWA AND WASHINGTON BY THE US AND UK GOVERNMENTS INVITING CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL TALKS WITH US AND UK REPRESENTATIVES AS TO THE AREAS AND TYPES OF COOPERATION WHICH MIGHT BE UNDERTAKEN IN THE ATOMIC ENERGY FIELD. THERE IS BEING REPEATED TO YOU SEPARATELY WASHINGTON TELEGRAM 2527 OF NOV27 WHICH CONTAINS THE TEXT OF THE US AIDE MEMOIRE GIVEN TO OUR AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON.

2. THE FACT OF THE MEETING OF THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE AND OF CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN IT HAS BEEN GIVEN A HIGH DEGREE OF SECURITY. PAPERS ON THE SUBJECT HAVE BEEN GIVEN MOST LIMITED DISTRIBUTION. WE THOUGHT HOWEVER THAT YOU SHOULD BE AWARE IN GENERAL TERMS OF THE MATTER.

3. IN ACCEPTING THE US AND UK INVITATION THE MINISTER IN A LETTER TO THE US AMBASSADOR AND THE UK ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER SAID IN PART: "THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT FULLY APPRECIATES THE NECESSITY OF KEEPING SECRET FOR THE TIME BEING THE FACT THAT THESE TALKS ARE TO TAKE PLACE

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ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE
SIG..... NAME.....J. J. McCARDLE.....	DL(1)	6-7921
		APPROVED BY JULES LÉGER

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AND THAT THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT IS TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH THEM. EVERY ATTEMPT WILL BE MADE TO PREVENT ANY LEAK OF INFORMATION IN THIS RESPECT FROM CANADIAN SOURCES. I THINK WE MUST HOWEVER TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE FACT OF THE MEETINGS AND OF CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN THEM MIGHT BECOME KNOWN TO THE PRESS. THIS MIGHT RESULT IN QUESTIONS IN THE HOUSE. I MUST THEREFORE RESERVE THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT WITH RESPECT TO DIRECT PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS SINCE THE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT DENY PARTICIPATION IN THE MEETINGS IF PRESSED ON THE POINT IN PARLIAMENT."

4. CANADA WAS REPRESENTED ON ALL THE SUB COMMITTEES EXCEPT THE FIRST TWO OUTLINED IN WASHINGTON TELEGRAM 2527 I.E. THOSE CONCERNED WITH NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND NUCLEAR WARHEADS. CANADIAN ATTENDANCE AT THE PROCEEDINGS OF THESE TWO SUB COMMITTEES WAS PRECLUDED BY US LEGISLATION IN THAT CANADA WAS NOT ENGAGED IN A NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM. US COOPERATION WITH THE UK IN THIS FIELD, WE WERE TOLD, WAS BASED UPON A US INTERPRETATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE MACMAHON ACT TO THE EFFECT THAT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE UK WOULD NOT REVEAL IMPORTANT INFORMATION CONCERNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH WAS NOT ALREADY AVAILABLE TO THE UK GOVERNMENT THROUGH IT OWN RESEARCH ACTIVITY.

5. THE FIRST STAGE OF THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE'S ACTIVITIES CAME TO AN END ON DECEMBER 6. THE WORK OF THE SUB COMMITTEES WILL BE CONTINUED AS APPROPRIATE AND CANADA WILL BE REPRESENTED TO THE DEGREE CONSISTENT WITH OUR REQUIREMENTS.

7. WE WOULD EMPHASIZE AGAIN THE NECESSITY OF MOST DISCREET HANDLING OF THIS SUBJECT UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION HAS BEEN STATED IN THE HOUSE. WE ANTICIPATE THE DISCUSSIONS IN THIS FIELD WILL BE CENTRED MAINLY IN WASHINGTON BUT WE THOUGHT YOU SHOULD BE GENERALLY AWARE OF WHAT HAS TAKEN PLACE IN THE EVENT THAT SOME OF THE UK REPRESENTATIVES AT THE MEETING OF THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE MIGHT RAISE THE SUBJECT WITH YOU.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Under Secretary

FROM: Defence Liaison (1) Division

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: Technical Atomic Discussions in Washington

Security TOP SECRET

Date December 12, 1957

File No.		
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There is attached for your signature, if you concur, a self-explanatory memorandum to Mr. Green on the above subject.

We were informed of the Prime Minister's attitude by Mr. Robinson. An attempt will be made before this memorandum goes to Mr. Green to clear it with the Prime Minister through Mr. Robinson. This may not prove possible in the course of the day. I suggest, however, that you might return the memorandum after signature to Defence Liaison (1) Division, who will despatch it to Mr. Green.

CIRCULATION

P. A. McCardle

Defence Liaison (1) Division

50219-AK-40	
43	-

PERSONAL & TOP SECRET

December 12, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. GREEN

Technical Atomic Discussions in Washington

The Prime Minister has asked me to provide you with an explanatory memorandum concerning United States-United Kingdom-Canada talks regarding cooperation on atomic energy matters which took place in Washington the first week of December.

2. An approach was made on November 27 to Mr. Smith here (by the United States Ambassador and the United Kingdom Acting High Commissioner in company) and to our Ambassador in Washington, extending an invitation for Canadian representation at discussions to begin on December 3 in Washington between United States and United Kingdom representatives on "the areas and types of cooperation which might be undertaken in the atomic energy field". A copy of Washington telegram 2527 of November 27 containing the United States aide memoire on the subject is attached for your information.

3. After consultation with the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Smith replied in writing on November 28 to the United States and United Kingdom representatives accepting the invitation and going on to say in part: "The Canadian Government fully appreciates the necessity of keeping secret for the time being the fact that these talks are to take place and that the Canadian Government is to be associated with them. Every attempt will be made to prevent any leak of information in this respect from Canadian sources. I think we must, however, take into account the possibility that the fact of the meetings and of Canadian participation in them might become known to the press. This

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"might result in questions in the House. I must therefore reserve the position of the Government with respect to direct parliamentary questions since the Government could not deny participation in the meetings if pressed on the point in Parliament." It was decided that Mr. Robertson, our Ambassador in Washington, should head Canadian representation to the meetings.

4. The Technical Committee itself met only briefly in the course of the week. The substantive discussion took place in the sub-committees. It became obvious when the Technical Committee assembled that the discussions were to be directed primarily to consideration of the military aspects of cooperation in the atomic energy field. Canada was excluded from meetings of the first two sub-committees, i.e., those concerned with nuclear materials and nuclear warheads. This exclusion was required by United States legislation since Canada was not engaged in a nuclear weapons programme. United States cooperation with the United Kingdom in these two fields was permitted under an interpretation of the United States McMahon Act involving a judgement by responsible United States authorities that the United States would not reveal important information concerning nuclear weapons which was not already available to the United Kingdom Government by reason of its own active role in the nuclear weapons field. The Technical Committee held its final meeting on December 6, but provision was made for continuing meetings of the sub-committees, and Canada will continue to be represented on them to the extent of our defence requirements.

5. Great emphasis has been laid by all concerned on the necessity for preventing any leak of information with respect to the existence of the Technical Committee and, additionally, the fact of Canadian participation in its discussions. Aside from the matter of military security, there is the political problem which could arise if certain of our NATO allies were to react adversely to the fact that an "inner circle" existed insofar as discussion of these highly sensitive subjects was concerned. (These most recent meetings could, of course, be related if necessary to the wartime cooperation in the atomic energy field between the United States,

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the United Kingdom and Canada.) The Prime Minister feels strongly in addition that any Canadian comment on this subject, which is made necessary by reason of leaks to the press, should come first in the House of Commons. The position of the Canadian Government on this subject has been fully reserved with our United States and United Kingdom colleagues.

6. It had been agreed between Ministers that if anything had to be said in the House of Commons, the Prime Minister would make the statement. The nature of his statement would, of course, be influenced to a degree by the nature of the press leak which would have had to precede it. However, the United Kingdom authorities had suggested a possible line which was set out in the following terms in a CTO telegram: "Canadian representative could say if questioned that he had been meeting some of his American technical colleagues. If asked point blank whether he had met any United Kingdom representatives, he could say that he had taken the opportunity to meet some United Kingdom contacts who were in Washington at the time!" The Prime Minister has indicated his general agreement with this kind of line and he wished you to be in a position to answer questions in the event that they arose in the House in the course of his absence from Ottawa. Our understanding of his attitude, however, is that nothing should be said about the matter unless you feel that you are under heavy pressure to make a statement, either by reason of direct questions in the House or by a story appearing in the press on the matter. In the circumstances, the exact terms of anything which you might wish to say should perhaps be left fluid for the moment. Officials of this Department will be prepared to give you whatever assistance you may desire in the event that you felt it essential during the Prime Minister's absence to say something about this subject. I might add that the distribution of paper on this subject has been limited strictly to those individuals who had a need to know.

JULES LÉGER

Under-Secretary of State for
External Affairs

★ although any statement would have to be based generally on the formula noted above

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DEFENCE LIAISON (1)/JJM/McL
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO:The Under-Secretary.....

SecurityTOP SECRET.....

FROM: ...Defence Liaison (1) Division.....

DateDecember 11, 1957.....

REFERENCE:

File No.

80219-AK-40

SUBJECT: ...Atomic Energy Consultations.....

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Sent
12.12.57

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There are attached for your signature telegrams to London outlining briefly Canadian participation in the Washington discussions concerning atomic energy cooperation between Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom.

2. I believe it would be desirable to keep Canada House in the picture in general terms; at least.

CIRCULATION

Parasembala
Defence Liaison (1) Division

11.12.57(us)



Department of National Defence
JOINT STAFF

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

NO. CSC 1888.1 TD 15

CONFIDENTIAL
with SECRET and TOP
SECRET attachments.

11 December, 1957.

ADDRESS REPLY TO
CHAIRMAN
CHIEFS OF STAFF,
OTTAWA.

Under-Secretary of State for
External Affairs

[Signature]
Attention: J.J. McCardle, Esq.

50219-AK	40
58	50

J-1

Tripartite Discussions on
Areas of Technical Cooperation

1. Embassy Washington telegram 2583 of 6 December 1957 refers.
2. Attached are copies of Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff, Washington telegrams JSW 454 and 455 of 4 December 1957, JSW 457, 458 and 460 of 5 December, 1957. These telegrams are forwarded in accordance with the arrangement described in paragraph 1 of telegram 2583.
3. A copy of JSW 467 of 10 December, 1957 is also attached for your information.

[Signature: Robert P. Rothschild]

(Robert P. Rothschild)
Brigadier
for Chairman, Chiefs of Staff.

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TO CCOS

S P E C T R A T O P S E C R E T

JSW 454 4 DEC 57 FOR GENERAL FOULKES FROM SPARLING. NO CIRCULATION

SUB COMMITTEE C NUCLEAR PROPULSION MET AT 0900 HOURS 4 DEC. CANADA WAS REPRESENTED BY DR JJ GREEN, COMMANDER ES SMITH, AND DR HH WATERMAN.

MR H WILLIAMSON FROM EMBASSY FAILED TO ARRIVE DUE TO WEATHER AND TRAFFIC

CONDITIONS. INITIAL DISCUSSION CONCERNED APPROVAL FOR DIRECT EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN WESTINGHOUSE AND ROLLS ROYCE ON NUCLEAR POWER

PLANTS FOR SUBMARINE PROPULSION. GENERAL LOPER SUGGESTED THIS COULD BE

ACCOMPLISHED BY AEC INFORMING WESTINGHOUSE THAT THEY MAY EXCHANGE

INFORMATION DIRECTLY WITH THE BRITISH COMPANY. ADMIRAL FOSTER REQUESTED

UK TO INDICATE EXTENT OF THEIR INTEREST IN NUCLEAR POWER FOR FRIGATES

AND AIRCRAFT TO ASSIST HIM IN REQUESTING APPROPRIATE AMENDMENTS TO US

LEGISLATION. BRITISH REPLIED THEY HAVE NO REQUIREMENT AT PRESENT FOR

INFORMATION EXCHANGE IN THESE AREAS. HOWEVER THEY WISH THIS TO BE LEFT

OPEN FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE DISCUSSIONS SINCE THEY HAVE NOT FINALIZED

THEIR VIEWS CONCERNING BEST APPLICATION OF THEIR EFFORTS. SIR WILLIAM

PENNEY SAID HE WISHED TO OPEN THIS SUBJECT ON A BROAD BASIS. IF THERE

IS TO BE SHARING OF THE RESEARCH EFFORT HE POINTED OUT THAT AWRE WOULD LIKE

TO PARTICIPATE AND SUGGESTED THEY MIGHT DEVELOP A CAPABILITY IN THE ROCKET

FIELD. UK DELEGATION STATED BRITISH ARMY REQUIRES INFORMATION ON PACKAGED

ATOMIC REACTORS ALTHOUGH NO PROCUREMENT PLANS EXIST AT PRESENT. ADMIRAL

FOSTER ASKED IF UK WISHED TO PROCURE FROM US NUCLEAR WAR PRODUCTS SUCH AS

SUBMARINE REACTOR CORES OR COMPLETE POWER PLANTS. AN EXTENSION OF EXISTING

LAWS WOULD BE NECESSARY TO PERMIT SALES OF SUCH EQUIPMENT. UK REPLIED THEY

ARE UNSURE WHETHER OR NOT THESE ITEMS WOULD BE PROCURED FROM US BUT MATTER

IS UNDER CONSIDERATION. GENERAL LOPER INDICATED POSSIBLE DIFFICULTY IN

SECURING CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL. FOR THE RECORD MEETING WAS INFORMED

THAT CANADA HAD NO FIRM NUCLEAR PROPULSION REQUIREMENT AT PRESENT TIME

BUT WE ARE MOST INTERESTED IN OBTAINING INFORMATION REGARDING NUCLEAR

POWER PLANTS FOR THE FRIGATE CLASS SHIP

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TO CCOS

S P E C T R A T O P S E C R E T

JSW455 4 DEC 57 FOR GENERAL FOULKES FROM SPARLING. NO CIRCULATION
SUB-COMMITTEE D DELIVERY SYSTEMS MET AT 1000 HOURS 4 DEC. CANADA
WAS REPRESENTED BY DR JJ GREEN, MR BA WALKER, G/C CGW CHAPMAN,
AND MAJOR JK EWING. THIS SUB-COMMITTEE WAS CONCERNED WITH ALL THE
VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF BALLISTIC AND GUIDED MISSILES. COMMENCING
WITH IRBM THE DISCUSSION REVEALED THAT UK-US PROGRAMMES DO NOT
OVERLAP. THE UK MISSILE HAS A RANGE OF 2200 MILES INTERMEDIATE
BETWEEN THOR OR JUPITER AND THE ICBM. COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE
UK AND US ALREADY EXISTS IN THIS AREA BY VIRTUE OF BALLISTIC
MISSILE POLICY COMMITTEE ON SECRETARY LEVEL (HORNER-BULLARD)
AND COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN NORTH AMERICAN AND ROLLS ROYCE
ON PROPULSION AND BETWEEN CONVAIR AND DE HAVILLAND ON VEHICLES.
DISCUSSION REVEALED A DESIRABILITY FOR MUCH CLOSER COLLABORATION
ON RESEARCH ASPECTS PARTICULARLY IN THE SOLID PROPELLENT FIELD
AND CANADIAN PARTICIPATION WAS WELCOMED. DISCUSSION OF SHORT RANGE
GROUND TO GROUND MISSILES REFERRED TO FOUR US ARMY PROJECTS -
LITTLE JOHN, LACROSSE, CORPORAL OR SERGEANT AND REDSTONE. AGAIN
THERE SEEMS TO BE NO DUPLICATION SINCE THE UK RED ROSE MISSILE
HAS UPWARDS OF 30 MILE RANGE DEPENDING UPON WARHEAD AND APPEARS
TO FIT BETWEEN LACROSSE AND CORPORAL. THIS PROJECT IS NOT FAR
ADVANCED WITH AVAILABILITY IN 1962. ANTI-TANK WEAPONS WERE MENTIONED
AND IN PARTICULAR THE AUSTRALIAN, US AND FRENCH WIRE CONTROLLED

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JSW 455

S P E C T R A T O P S E C R E T

PAGE TWO

MISSILES. UK ARE EVALUATING THE AUSTRALIAN MISSILE. THIS FIELD OF SHORT RANGE GROUND TO GROUND MISSILES WAS CONSIDERED TO BE ADEQUATELY COVERED BY THE EXISTING TRIPARTITE STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE THREE ARMIES. IN AIR TO GROUND MISSILES BOTH UK AND US HAVE PROGRAMMES FOR MISSILES AIMED AT 400 MILES RANGE TO IMPROVE CAPABILITY OF V-BOMBERS AND B52 RESPECTIVELY. USN HAVE REGULUS 2 WHICH IS COMPARABLE BUT IS NOT AIR LAUNCHED. IT WAS AGREED THAT THERE IS SCOPE FOR CLOSER COOPERATION IN GUIDANCE AND FUZING TECHNIQUES. USN REPRESENTATIVES REFERRED TO THE ACUTE PROBLEM OF ATTACKING SUBMERGED SUBMARINES WHERE THE REENTRY PROBLEM STILL EXISTS. THE UK IS NOT WORKING IN THIS FIELD. IN GROUND TO AIR MISSILE DISCUSSION UK INDICATED THEY HAVE A SHORT RANGE 20 THOUSAND YARD MISSILE WHICH WAS STAGE ONE IN THEIR OLD GROUND TO AIR PROGRAMME. SUBSEQUENT STAGES HAVE BEEN ABANDONED AND ONLY GREEN FLAX PROGRAMMES SURVIVE. THIS HAS 40 MILES RANGE, SEMI-ACTIVE GUIDANCE WITH ATOMIC WARHEAD SCHEDULED FOR ABOUT 1962. UK STRESSED SERIOUSNESS OF LOW LEVEL THREAT AND BELIEVED THERE IS NO GOOD ANSWER (EVEN HAWK). HERE AGAIN IS AN IMPORTANT AREA FOR COMBINED PLANNING AND RESEARCH PARTICULARLY IN GUIDANCE TECHNIQUES. IN THE AIR TO AIR FIELD SINCE THE UK POLICY IS NOT TO DEVELOP A FIGHTER AIRCRAFT BEYOND THE PRESENT GENERATION WITH THE BLUEJAY MISSILE THIS SUBJECT WAS NOT DISCUSSED BUT COGNIZANCE WAS TAKEN OF US-CANADIAN COOPERATION IN THIS ACTIVITY. THE DESIRABILITY FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TRIPARTITE WORKING PARTIES TO EXPLORE COLLABORATION IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THIS SUB-COMMITTEES FIELD OF INTEREST WAS RECOGNIZED AND IT WAS DECIDED THAT THIS WOULD AUTOMATICALLY RECEIVE CONSIDERATION IN THE SUB-COMMITTEE F ON BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE

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TO CCOS

S P E C T R A T O P S E C R E T

JSW457 5 DECEMBER 1957 FOR GENERAL FOULKES FROM SPARLING. NO

CIRCULATION. REFERENCE JSW455 4 DECEMBER 1957 PARA ONE:

ADD CDR F.S. WARD AND LCDR H.H. SMITH TO LIST OF CANADIAN

REPRESENTATIVES AT MEETING OF SUB-COMMITTEE D.

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TO CCOS

S P E C T R A S E C R E T

JSW458 5 DECEMBER 1957 FOR GENERAL FOULKES FROM SPARLING. NO CIRCULATION. SUB-COMMITTEES "I" AND "J" ON INFRA-RED DETECTION AND THERMIONIC TUBES MET AT 1000 HOURS 5 DECEMBER. CANADA WAS REPRESENTED BY MR. B.A. WALKER, DR. H.H. WATERMAN AND DR. R.S. EATON. THE DISCUSSION DEALT WITH AREAS WITHIN WHICH INFORMATION SHOULD BE EXCHANGED AND PROGRAMMES COORDINATED. NO DETAILED ITEMS WERE MENTIONED OTHER THAN VERY HIGH POWER RADAR TUBE REQUIREMENTS. A TRIPARTITE GROUP WILL MEET AND EXAMINE THE WHOLE THERMIONIC TUBE AREA WHICH WILL INCLUDE SOLID STATE DEVICES BUT NOT INFRA-RED DETECTORS. THIS BODY WILL BE RECRUITED FROM THE NATIONAL COORDINATING BODIES WHICH ALREADY HAVE SOME DEGREE OF LIAISON. THESE ARE THE COMMITTEE ON VALVE DEVELOPMENT FOR THE UK, ADVISORY GROUP ON ELECTRON TUBES FOR THE US AND THE ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE FOR CANADA. A SECOND TRIPARTITE GROUP WILL CONSIDER INFRA-RED DETECTORS. WHILE THE US REPRESENTATIVES WILL COME FROM AGET THE UK AND CANADA WILL HAVE TO APPOINT PEOPLE FROM OUTSIDE THEIR CORRESPONDING ORGANIZATIONS. IN CONNECTION WITH BOTH THESE PROPOSED GROUPS THE UK REPRESENTATIVE POINTED OUT THE DESIRABILITY OF MAKING CONTACT WITH IMPORTANT WORK KNOWN TO BE GOING ON IN OTHER COUNTRIES. HE CITED PARTICULARLY PHILIPS OF EINDHOVEN AND CSF IN PARIS. US PROPOSED THAT ANY SUCH ACTION BE DELAYED UNTIL THE TRIPARTITE GROUPS HAVE MET.

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TO CCOS
S P E C T R A S E C R E T

JSW460 5 DEC 57 FOR GENERAL FOULKES FROM SPARLING. NO CIRCULATION SUBCOMMITTEE E BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WARFARE MET AT 0900 HOURS 5 DEC. CANADA WAS REPRESENTED BY DR JJ GREEN, LT COLONEL STAPLES AND LT COLONEL BOND. BRUNDRETT (UK) OPENED MEETING POINTING OUT THAT IN THIS AREA MOST EXCELLENT COOPERATION HAD TAKEN PLACE OVER A NUMBER OF YEARS BUT IN VIEW OF UK URGENT NEED FOR REALLOCATION OF EFFORT THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS TO EXAMINE POSSIBLE FURTHER COOPERATION AMONG THE THREE COUNTRIES. HE PROCEEDED TO NOTE THAT UK HAD EXCELLENT RESEARCH FACILITIES AT PORTON MANNED BY COMPETENT STAFFS. THE US HAD A MAJOR ADVANTAGE IN ITS DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES AND CANADA HAD UNIQUE FIELD TESTING FACILITIES. IT THEREFORE APPEARED REASONABLE TO EXAMINE WAYS AND MEANS OF SHARING THE WORK LOAD MORE INTIMATELY. FOR EXAMPLE UK MIGHT CONCENTRATE PREDOMINANTLY ON RESEARCH, CANADA ON FIELD TRIALS AND USA ON PRODUCTION. GREEN (CANADA) OUTLINED CANADIAN POSITION STRESSING THE CLOSEST OF TRIPARTITE COOPERATION THAT EXISTED IN THIS AREA. SPECIFIC ATTENTION WAS DRAWN TO THE SUFFIELD FIELD TRIAL CAPABILITIES, THE GROSSE ISLE ANTI ANIMAL BW ACTIVITIES AND THE CANADIAN CAPABILITIES IN CBR RESEARCH TO INCLUDE CW AGENT RESEARCH MEDICAL CW RESEARCH AND FLAME WARFARE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT CANADA IS AT THE MOMENT ACTIVELY REEXAMINING THE CBR PORTION OF ITS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. CREASY (US) AGREED THAT THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT UK CAPABILITIES AT PORTON WERE EXCELLENT BUT THAT THE EXTENT OF THE PORTON WORK WAS NOT MORE THAN TEN PERCENT OF THE US RESEARCH EFFORT AND THAT THERE WAS NO MUNITION DEVELOPMENT WORK GOING ON IN THE UK. HE READILY AGREED THAT THE SUFFIELD FACILITIES WERE UNIQUE AND ESPECIALLY VALUABLE FOR COLD WEATHER, BUT HE STRESSED THAT THE DUGWAY (US) PLANT WAS LARGER AND CONSIDERABLY MORE HIGHLY INSTRUMENTED. AS REGARDS GROSSE ISLE HE STATED THAT THE CAPABILITIES WERE LIMITED AND FOR THIS REASON THE US HAD AT ONE TIME OPERATED THE PLUM ISLAND FACILITY FOR ANTI ANIMAL WORK. HE NOTED THAT AT THIS TIME THE US HAD, BY NATIONAL AUTHORITY, NO OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE PROGRAM IN THIS FIELD. CREASY CONTINUED BY QUESTIONING HOW MUCH MORE COULD BE ACHIEVED IN VIEW OF THE ALREADY EXISTING CLOSE COOPERATION. CREASY AND BRUNDRETT DISCUSSED FEASIBILITY OF EXCHANGING RESEARCH WORKERS AMONGST THE COUNTRIES WITHOUT ARRIVING AT ANY FIRM CONCLUSIONS. BRUNDRETT STATED THAT THE IMPENDING UK CUTS IN THE CBR FIELD WERE DUE TO A LACK OF MILITARY DEMAND. CREASY POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS TRUE THAT FINANCIAL CUT BACKS WERE TAKING PLACE BUT IN RECENT MONTHS HE HAD OBSERVED A GROWING INTEREST IN CBR AND EXPECTED THIS TO REACH A PEAK IN 3 TO 5 YEARS. HE BELIEVED THIS WAS DUE TO A GROWING RELUCTANCE TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH COULD IN TURN RESULT IN A LACK OF SUITABLE WARHEADS FOR MISSILES UNLESS BW AND CW WERE EMPLOYED. HE NOTED THAT WITHIN A VERY FEW YEARS BW AND CW AREAS OF EFFECTIVENESS WOULD EXCEED THOSE OF COMPARABLE SIZED NUCLEAR WARHEADS. HE SUMMARIZED BY STRESSING THAT TO LET EFFORTS DROP IN THE CBR FIELD, AS WAS APPARENTLY HAPPENING IN THE UK WAS TO COURT NATIONAL DISASTER AND EVEN PERHAPS INTERNATIONAL FAILURE. BRUNDRETT WAS UNABLE TO DETECT

JSW 460

S P E C T R A S E C R E T

PAGE TWO

A COMPARABLE INCREASE IN INTEREST IN THE UK BUT PERSONALLY CONSIDERED IT A PITY TO LET THE PORTON FACILITIES DISAPPEAR AND FELT THAT CLOSE COORDINATION OF EFFORT MIGHT KEEP THEM ALIVE. GREEN SAID THAT NO ACTUAL CUT BACK HAD YET OCCURRED IN CANADA BUT THAT THE DEMAND FOR INCREASED RESEARCH EFFORT IN OTHER IMPORTANT DEFENCE FIELDS WOULD BE LEADING TO A MORE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF WHAT DRB WAS DOING IN THE CBR FIELD. THE NEED TO KEEP ABREAST OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS WAS NOT QUESTIONED BUT THE COST OF SUFFIELD APPEARED OUT OF LINE UNLESS IT WERE REQUIRED ON A TRIPARTITE BASIS. AS A RESULT OF CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT THE RECENT TRIPARTITE TOXICOLOGICAL CONFERENCE HAD IN FACT DIVIDED THE PROGRAMS AMONG THE THREE COUNTRIES AND UNTIL THE MAIN COMMITTEE HAD STUDIED THE REPORT OF THAT CONFERENCE THERE WAS NO NEED FOR FURTHER EFFORT TO EFFECT FULLER COOPERATION EXCEPT POSSIBLY IN THE AREA OF RADIOLOGICAL DEFENCE. IN THIS FIELD IT WAS RECOMMENDED AND AGREED THAT CONTACT OFFICERS (LT COLONEL A WALKLEY (BJSM) AND LT COLONEL H STAPLES (CJS(W))) WOULD IN COOPERATION WITH APPROPRIATE US AGENCIES CAREFULLY EXAMINE COORDINATION IN THIS FIELD. IN THIS MATTER THE AEC REPRESENTATIVE (DR DUNHAM) AGREED THAT AEC SHOULD WILLINGLY PARTICIPATE IN THIS EXAMINATION. THE CANADIEN OBSERVERS NOTED A LARGE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE US AND UK APPRECIATIONS OF RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE CW AND BW FIELD. US HELD THE VIEW THAT RUSSIAN USE ON AN INTERCONTINENTAL BASIS WAS PROBABLE AND THE UK THAT THIS WAS NOT SO. UK VIEWS APPROXIMATED THOSE OF CANADIAN JIB

20112/20113/FH/060030Z DEC 57

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PRIORITY

SECRET

BY SECURE MEANS

FM CJSW 102025Z
TO CCOS
S P E C T R A S E C R E T

JSW467 FOR GENERAL FOULKES FROM GENERAL SPARLING. NO CIRCULATION.
SUBCOMMITTEE G MET AND NAMED QUOTE UNDERSEA WARFARE STEERING COMMITTEE
UNQUOTE UNDER CHAIRMANSHIP DIRECTOR UNDERSEA WARFARE DIVISION (RADM
WEAKLEY)

PARA 2 OBJECT TO REVIEW UNDERSEA WARFARE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMMES OF CANADA UK AND US TO MAKE BEST USE OF EXISTING FACILITIES
IN 3 COUNTRIES

PARA 3 US AND UK FEEL IT IS UNDESIRABLE TO ALLOCATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PROJECTS OR AREAS OF RESEARCH BUT RATHER TO INDICATE THE COUNTRY WHICH
SHOULD GIVE PRIME EMPHASIS

PARA 4 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS TO BE BROADLY EXAMINED
WEDNESDAY AFTER WHICH SUBCOMMITTEES WILL BE ESTABLISHED TO EXAMINE ALL
PROJECTS IN DETAIL

PARA 5 TWO SUBCOMMITTEES FORMED ON QUOTE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION,
PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT UNQUOTE AND QUOTE PATENTS UNQUOTE THESE
COMMITTEES WILL COMMENCE WORK VERY SHORTLY

PARA 6 STEERING COMMITTEE WILL MEET AS REQUIRED TO DIRECT AND MONITOR
ALL SUBCOMMITTEES

20219/EME/102215Z DEC 57

FILE COPY

Ref: *Henry W. G. H.*
cc: S.
Mr. Robinson (2)
File - 50219-AK-40
John

DS12/443
FM WASHDC DEC9/57 SECRET
TO EXTERNAL 2594 OPIMMEDIATE

FOR UNDERSECRETARY

REF YOUR TEL DL1099 DEC6

ATOMIC ENERGY CONSULTATIONS

50219-AA-40
58 50

THIS WILL CONFIRM THAT FOLLOWING DISCUSSION WITH THE DEPT DEC6,
WE REQUESTED FARLEY IN THE STATE DEPT AND ROPER OF THE UK EMBASSY
TO SEE TO IT THAT THE LAST SENTENCE OF THE RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS
CONTAINING THE REF TO CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IS DELETED FROM ANY
COMMENT WHICH STATE DEPT OF FOREIGN OFFICE SPOKESMEN MIGHT FIND
IT NECESSARY TO MAKE IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE MEETINGS.
WE EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS YOUR VIEW THAT ANY STATEMENT WITH RES-
PECT TO CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN THESE TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS
SHOULD BE MADE FIRST IN PARLIAMENT. WE HAVE SEEN NO REF TO THE
MEETINGS IN THE PRESS, BUT SINCE, AS YOU KNOW, THE TECHNICAL DIS-
CUSSIONS ARE TO CONTINUE, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT QUESTIONS WILL BE
RAISED AT SOME FUTURE DATE.

S E C R E T



CANADA

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, CHIEFS OF STAFF
OTTAWA

9 December 1957.

File

5029-AK-40	
43	52

The Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
East Block,
Ottawa, Ontario.

File
Attention: Mr. J. A. McCardle

Special Tripartite Meetings in Washington

1. Enclosed herewith is a copy of the third report which has been sent to our Minister regarding the discussions that have been taking place at the Special Tripartite Meetings in Washington on 5 December 1957.

R. L. Raymont

(R. L. Raymont) Colonel,
Executive Staff Officer.

S E C R E T

6 December 1957.

The Minister

Special Tripartite Meetings in Washington - Third Report

1. The Sub-Committee on Biological, Radiological and Chemical Warfare met on the morning of 5 December 1957. The United Kingdom representative opened the meeting by pointing out that in this area most excellent cooperation had taken place over a number of years, but in view of the United Kingdom urgent need for reallocation of effort, the purpose of the meeting should be to examine possible further cooperation among the three countries. It was pointed out that the United Kingdom had excellent research facilities at Porton manned by competent staffs, but that the United States had a major advantage in its development and production capabilities and Canada had unique field testing facilities. It, therefore, appeared reasonable to examine ways and means of sharing the workload more intimately. For example, the United Kingdom might concentrate predominantly on research, Canada on field trials and the United States on production.

The Canadian representative outlined the Canadian position and stressed that the closest of tripartite cooperation existed in the area of research and field trials. Specific attention was drawn to the Suffield field trial capabilities, the Grosse Isle anti-animal biological warfare activities, and the Canadian capabilities in chemical, biological and radiological research to include chemical warfare agent research, medical chemical warfare research and flame warfare research and development. It was pointed out that Canada is at the moment actively re-examining the chemical, biological and radiological portion of the research development programme.

The United States representative agreed that there was no doubt that the United Kingdom capabilities at Porton were excellent but that the extent of the Porton work was not more than ten percent of the United States research effort and that there was no munition development work going on in the United Kingdom. He readily agreed that the Suffield facilities were unique and especially valuable for cold weather, but he stressed that the United States Dugway Plant was larger and considerably more highly instrumented. As regards Grosse Isle, he stated that the capabilities were limited and for this reason the United States had at one time operated their own facility at Plum Island for anti-animal work. He noted that at this time the United States had, by national authority, no offensive or defensive programme in this field. The United States representative continued by questioning how much more could be achieved in view of the already existing close cooperation. The United States and the United Kingdom representatives discussed the feasibility of exchanging research workers amongst the countries without arriving at any firm conclusions.

The United Kingdom representative stated that the impending United Kingdom cuts in the chemical, biological and radiological field were due to a lack of military demand. The United States representative pointed out that it was true that financial cut backs were taking place but in recent months he had observed a growing interest in the chemical, biological and radiological field and expected this to reach a peak in three to five years. He believed this was due to a growing reluctance to use nuclear weapons which could in turn result in a lack of suitable warheads for missiles unless biological warfare and chemical warfare were employed. The United States representative went

- 2 -

on to say that within a very few years biological warfare and chemical warfare areas of effectiveness would exceed those of comparable sized nuclear warheads. He summarized by stressing that to let efforts drop in the chemical, biological and radiological field, as was apparently happening in the United Kingdom, was to court national disaster and even perhaps international failure. The United Kingdom representative was unable to detect a comparable increase in interest in the United Kingdom but personally considered it a pity to let the Porton facilities disappear and felt that close coordination of effort might keep them alive. The Canadian representative stated that no actual cut back in Canada had occurred but that the demand for increased research effort in other important defence fields would be leading to a more critical examination of what the Defence Research Board was doing in the chemical, biological and radiological field. The need to keep abreast of current developments was not questioned but the cost of Suffield appeared out of line unless it was required on a tripartite basis.

As a result of considerable discussion it was concluded that the recent tripartite toxicological conference had in fact divided the programmes among the three countries and until the main committee had studied the report of that conference there was no need for further effort to effect fuller cooperation except possibly in the area of radiological defence. In this field it was recommended and agreed that Canadian contact officers would in cooperation with appropriate United States agencies carefully examine coordination in this field. In this matter the representative of the United States Atomic Energy Commission agreed that the Atomic Energy Commission should willingly participate in this examination.

The Canadian representatives noted a large difference between the United States and the United Kingdom appreciations of Russian involvement in the chemical warfare and biological warfare field. The United States held the view that Russian use on an intercontinental basis was probable and the United Kingdom view was that this was not so. In this connection the United Kingdom views approximated those of the Canadian views.

2. The Sub-Committees on Infra-red Detection and Thermionic Tubes also met on the morning of 5 December 1957. The scope of the discussion dealt with areas within such information should be exchanged and programmes coordinated. No detailed items were mentioned other than very high power radar tube requirements. It was agreed that a tripartite group will meet and examine the whole thermionic tube area which will include solid state devices but not infra-red detectors. This body would be recruited from the national coordinating bodies which already have some degree of liaison. These are the committee on valve development for the United Kingdom, the advisory group on electron tubes for the United States and the electronic components development committee for Canada. It was also agreed that a second tripartite group will consider infra-red detectors and while the United States representatives for this group will come from the United States advisory group on electronic tubes the United Kingdom and Canada will have to appoint people from outside their corresponding organizations. In connection with both these proposed groups the United Kingdom representative pointed out the desirability of making contact with important work known to be going on in other countries such as at the Philips Company in Eindhoven and Compagnie General de Telegraphie sans Fils in Paris. However, the United States representative proposed that any such action should be delayed until the tripartite groups have met.

R. A. Rayman

(Charles Foulkes)

General,

Chairman, Chiefs of Staff.

FILE COPY

Ref. 30219-AK-40

Refer: Secy to C. B. 58
ccos 58
DECH (Mr. Bennett.)
Mr. Robinson (2) -
DM/BDP - Mr. Golden.

DS35/437
FM WASHDC DEC 6/57 SECRET
TO EXTERNAL 2583 OPIMMEDIATE

FOR UNDER SECRETARY

ATOMIC ENERGY CONSULTATIONS-REPORTS OF SUBCOMMITTEES

THE CHAIRMAN, CJS, HAS SENT SERIES OF REPORT TO THE CCOS, JSW 454,
455 OF DEC 4, AND 457, 458 AND 460, OF DEC 5, ON THE SUBSTANTIVE DIS-
CUSSIONS. WE HAVE AGREED WITH CJS HERE THAT YOU WILL RECEIVE YOUR
COPIES THROUGH NATIONAL DEFENCE.

2. AT THE FINAL MEETING THIS MORNING, AT WHICH STRAUSS AND QUARLES
WERE PRESENT ON THE USA SIDE, WE TOOK FIRST THE REPORTS OF THE SUB-
COMMITTEES IN WHICH CANADA HAD PARTICIPATED, AND WITH MINOR REVISIONS
THESE WERE APPROVED. THE FINAL REPORTS THEMSELVES, WHICH PROVIDE
FOR CONTINUING WORK ON A TRIPARTITE BASIS, WILL BE TRANSMITTED BY
DR GREEN. WE TOOK THE OCCASION TO WELCOME OUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS
SERIES OF TALKS, AND TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THIS CLOSE COOPERATION
WOULD CONTINUE IN THE MEETINGS TO COME. BEFORE THE PRINCIPALS TURNED
TO CONSIDERATION OF THE WORK OF SUBCOMMITTEES (A) AND (B) ON THE NUCLEAR
SIDE, STRAUSS INDICATED THAT HE HOPED BEFORE VERY LONG IT WOULD BE
POSSIBLE TO INCLUDE CANADA IN THESE FIELDS IN WHICH WE HAD NOT
PARTICIPATED THIS WEEK.

3. I THINK I SHOULD ADD THAT THE CANADIAN REPS WHO WERE DIRECTLY
INVOLVED IN THESE TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS CONSIDER THAT THEY HAVE
BEEN OF REAL VALUE AND THAT A STRENGTHENED BASIS FOR CLOSE CONSUL-
TATION AND COOPERATION IN THESE FIELDS MAY BE EXPECTED AS A RESULT.
WE HAVE REPORTED SEPARATELY ON THE KIND OF LINE THAT MAY BE TAKEN
ONLY IN RESPONSE TO PRESS ENQUIRIES.

4. WE HAVE NOT, REPEAT NOT, REPEATED OUR MSGS ON THIS SUBJECT TO LONDON,
BUT WE ASSUME THAT YOU WILL WISH TO SEE THAT CANADA HOUSE IS
KEPT IN THE PICTURE ON THESE DEVELOPMENTS.

50219-AK-70	
58	50

*En file
JSM*

DS33/437
FM WASHDC DEC 6/57 SECRET
TO EXTERNAL 2581 OPIMMEDIATE

FOR UNDERSECRETARY

ATOMIC ENERGY CONSULTATIONS

AT THIS MORNING'S MEETING WHICH RECEIVED AND APPROVED THE REPORTS OF THE WORKING SUBCOMMITTEES (WE WERE PRESENT FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE WORK OF SUBCOMMITTEES (D) TO (I)), IT WAS GENERALLY FELT THAT SOME AGREED LINE SHOULD BE AVAILABLE IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS WHICH MAY BE RAISED ABOUT THESE MEETINGS. WHILE NO COMMUNIQUE IS TO BE ISSUED, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT MIGHT BE USED IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS WHICH MAY BE RAISED REGARDING MEETINGS IN WASHDC BETWEEN USA AND UK REPS: "REPS OF THE DEPTS AND AGENCIES CONCERNED WITH THE TECHNICAL DEFENCE SUBJECTS DISCUSSED AT THE MEETINGS IN OCT BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER HAVE BEEN MEETING IN WASHDC. THE CONVERSATIONS AT THE WORKING LEVEL WILL CONTINUE. TECHNICAL REPS OF THE CANADIAN GOVT PARTICIPATED IN MATTERS CONCERNED WITH THE DEFENCE OF THE NORTHAMERICAN CONTINENT."

SINCE IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER STATEMENT WILL IN FACT BE USED, AND SINCE USA-UK ARE PRIMARILY CONCERNED, IT SHOULD NOT BE USED IN REPLY EXCEPT IF PRESS GETS WIND OF THE TALKS.

FILE COPY

10

TO: WASHINGTON

DEC6/57

DATE _____

FUE

SECURITY

SECRET

NUMBER

PRECEDENCE

COMCENTRE
USE ONLY

DL-1099

OPIMMEDIATE

INFO:

Ref.: YOUR TEL 2581 DEC6

Subject: ATOMIC ENERGY CONSULTATION

THIS WILL CONFIRM CONTENT OF DISCUSSIONS THIS AFTERNOON BETWEEN
RAE AND MCCARDLE.

2. THE GOV'T AS YOU ARE AWARE FULLY SHARED THE VIEW OF THE U.K. AND USA GOV'TS AS EXPRESSED TO US LAST WEEK THAT EVERY ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO AVOID PUBLICITY CONCERNING THESE MEETINGS. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE ^{Does} ~~DID~~ NOT ~~THEREFORE~~ WISH THE FACT OF CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE MEETINGS TO BE DEALT WITH FIRST IN THE PRESS. AS YOU ARE AWARE THEREFORE HE DID NOT WISH US TO AGREE TO THE LAST SENTENCE IN THE PROPOSED FORMULA SET OUT IN YOUR TEL UNDER REF.

3. IF USE IS MADE IN WASHINGTON BY THE USA OR U.K. AUTHORITIES OF THE REST OF THE STATEMENT MR. PEARKES WILL AT SOME CONVENIENT OPPORTUNITY ANNOUNCE THE FACT OF CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE HOUSE.

4. I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU DID PASS THESE VIEWS TO YOUR USA AND U.K. COLLEAGUES THIS AFTERNOON AND THAT THEY FULLY UNDERSTAND OUR POINT OF VIEW.

LOCAL NO STANDARD
DISTRIBUTION

CCOS SEC TO CABINET SSRA MR. ROBINSON PRIME MINISTER
D.L. (1) 5 COPIES

ORIGINATOR

DIVISION

PHONE

APPROVED BY

SIG.....

NAME.....JTMCCARDIE/AH.....

D.L.(1)

2-3402

SIG.....

NAME.....

~~.....~~
JULES LÉGER

Fafele 50215-AK-40
58 50
[Signature]

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
NEED A SECRET

PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET

December 6, 1957

Dear Ed,

In the last few days (i.e., four or five days after the first messages arrived here) I have been brought in to some extent on the new developments relating to exchange of information on atomic and weapons matters.

The subject is, of course, in the hands of D.L. (1) at the divisional level, and I have not (at least so far) been involved in the drafting of our outgoing telegrams. One point did occur to me, however, which I thought it might be useful to put to you; Jim McCardle suggested that a personal note might be a more suitable channel than the official telegram net.

"For legislative reasons" Canada has not been invited to join the sub-committees on nuclear warheads and nuclear materials. As the MacMahon Act requires "need-to-know" justification for transfer of information, this exclusion is fair enough as far as warheads go. In the case of nuclear materials, however, you will recall that there are contract arrangements for supply to the USAEC of our plutonium output in excess of our (very small) domestic requirements; although our output is not great, it will

A. E. Ritchie, Esq.
The Canadian Embassy
Washington, D. C.

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2.

nevertheless not be negligible when the NRU reactor is in full production. It is my understanding that these arrangements specify limits upon the isotopic composition of the plutonium delivered to ensure that it shall be of weapons grade.

Neutron irradiation of uranium leads initially to the production of PU_{240} ; further irradiation, however, gives rise to absorption of neutrons not only in the remaining uranium but in the PU_{240} with its consequent conversion to PU_{241} and higher isotopes. Hence the isotopic composition of plutonium separated from neutron-irradiated uranium depends upon the amount of irradiation, with the PU_{240} content diminishing relatively as the irradiation increases. The PU_{240} percentage must be above a certain figure for the plutonium to be satisfactory for production of weapons; hence our contract commitments in effect limit the exposure we can give our uranium. One of the important factors in economic operation of any reactor, and particularly of one designed to produce electric power, is to achieve as high a rate of burn-up as possible, i.e., to attain a high total irradiation of the uranium fuel.

This means that our commitment to supply weapons-grade plutonium to the USAEC as a by-product of our reactors runs counter to the most efficient use of the reactors for our own primary (peaceful) purposes. Thus we would appear to have a real and direct interest in information relating to nuclear materials for weapons use.

I am not suggesting that we should seek membership on the nuclear materials sub-committee, which may be set up to deal with quite different questions. It would not be my place to make such a suggestion, and Bennett and others here have available the information on what is going on in Washington. Nevertheless, I thought it might be useful to you to know, if you did not already, of this very direct connection between USAEC procurement of nuclear materials for weapons production and Canadian interests relating to the operation of our reactors at Chalk River.

Yours sincerely,

David Kirkwood -

000357

File - 50219-AK-40 M. Cadieux/PS

December 6, 1957.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY

50219-AK-40	58
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Technical Discussions in Washington

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DEC 12 1957

Mr. Rae called from Washington; he tried to reach you (or Mr. Tremblay), and in your absence he asked me to convey to you as a matter of urgency, the message that the discussions under reference have been held today, and that in reply to any questions by the Press, it is proposed to make the following statement:

"Representatives of the Departments and Agencies concerned with the technical and defence subjects discussed at the meetings in October between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, have been meeting in Washington. Conversations at the working level will continue. Technical representatives of the Canadian Government participated on matters concerned with the defence of the North American continent."

Mr. Rae thought that the same statement might be used here if there are any questions. He would like to know as soon as possible if it is desired to make any changes in the statement.

cc: Mr. Tremblay

ml
M.C.

Web

Thurston 1222

P.M. has approved this

*For file
with working
Rep. Jm*

50219-AK-40		line.
CONFIDENTIAL		PR
December 6, 1957		

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBINSON:

Technical Atomic Discussions in Washington

I should be grateful if, in the absence from Ottawa of our Minister, you could deliver the following message to the Prime Minister as soon as possible:

We were informed today by our Embassy in Washington that government representatives at the meetings concerning Canada-United States-United Kingdom cooperation on atomic energy matters, which began in Washington on December 3 and the first set of which were completed today, agreed that in reply to any questions asked by the press, something along the following lines might be used:

"Representatives of the Departments and Agencies concerned with the technical and defence subjects discussed at the meetings in October between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, have been meeting in Washington. Conversations at the working level will continue. Technical representatives of the Canadian Government participated on matters concerned with the defence of the North American continent."

The above statement was not to be volunteered, but was to be held in reserve to be used only if there were direct queries from the press.

. . . 2

2.

This statement was shown to Mr. Pearkes this afternoon. He said he did not believe that Canadian agreement should be given to the use of this statement with the press. So far as he was concerned, he would wish any announcement concerning Canadian participation to be made first in the House. He had this in mind particularly because of what he had said in his Estimates speech about Canadian cooperation with the United States and the United Kingdom.

We have, therefore, instructed our Embassy to inform the United States and United Kingdom representatives that we cannot agree to the inclusion of the last sentence of the proposed reply to press questions. The Embassy were also instructed to advise their colleagues that the Minister of National Defence reserved his right to make a statement in the House concerning Canadian participation in the meetings, if a leak in Washington developed. We cannot prevent the United States and United Kingdom representatives from saying what they wish about their own cooperation. In the circumstances, however, the Canadian Government position so far as what is said in the House of Commons is fully reserved.

Mr Smith was away from
Ottawa when this matter came up.

Sh.
Under Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Pearce Kerich
agrees with
Mr. Pearkes.

WBR

1st para P. 2, but will
launch questions in
Parliament himself.

SECRET



OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, CHIEFS OF STAFF
OTTAWA

S0219-AK-40

58 50

6 December, 1957.

Royce
B
The Minister.

Agreed Statement regarding Technical Discussions in Washington

1. Confirming our telephone conversation regarding the possibility of a leak in Washington regarding the technical and scientific discussions which have been going on for the past week in Washington, it is my understanding that the United Kingdom and United States authorities wish to have an agreed release should the knowledge of these meetings leak. Therefore it is not possible to put a time embargo on this release so that you could inform the House prior to the release of this information. It has now been agreed that, should the United Kingdom or the United States authorities be forced to make a statement, they will make such a statement but with no reference to Canadian participation. It will then be possible for you to make a statement at some appropriate time in the House, refer to the statement made in the UK or US press, and mention that further to the statements regarding technical and scientific collaboration between the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada which you had referred to in presenting your estimates, you are pleased to inform the House that Canadian technical and scientific representatives have been participating in these technical discussions with the UK and US authorities in Washington. These technical discussions were a result of the meetings in October between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. The fields in which Canada was participating were mainly in connection with the defence of the Canada-United States Region of NATO, which included the subjects you had mentioned in your departmental estimates, such as, power reactors, anti-submarine detection and defence against ballistic missiles. ?

Charles Foulkes
(Charles Foulkes)

General,
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff.

c.c. Deputy Minister

Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. ✓

9.12.16(us)

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, CHIEFS OF STAFF
OTTAWA

56 50219-AK-40

5 December 1957

50219-AK-40	
43	50

The Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
East Block,
Ottawa, Ontario.

Attention: Mr. J. G. Gardle

Special Tripartite Meetings in Washington

1. Enclosed herewith are copies of the first and second reports which have been sent to our Minister regarding the discussions that have been taking place at the Special Tripartite Meetings in Washington on 3 and 4 December, 1957.
2. Copies of subsequent reports of the remaining meetings will also be sent to you.

R. L. Raymond

(Charles Foulkes)
General,
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff.

S E C R E T

4 December 1957.

The Minister

Special Tripartite Meetings in Washington - First Report

1. The opening meeting of the technical committee was held at the Pentagon on the morning of 3 December 1957 at which the following Canadian representatives were present:

Mr. Norman Robertson
Major General Sparling
Dr. Green - Defence Research Board

2. General Loper, the Chairman of the Military Liaison Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission of the United States presided. This introductory meeting only lasted thirty minutes and the Chairman referred to the background of the Eisenhower - MacMillan talks, stating that the present meetings were for the purpose of exploring ways and means of cooperation in the defence field more closely, and that the procedure would be for technical discussions to be carried on by various groups in specific fields. General Loper also referred to the decision which was taken by the U.K. and the U.S.A. to invite the Canadian Government to participate in these discussions. However, because of limitations under existing legislation Canadian representation would be welcomed in all the working parties including the one dealing with delivery systems but with the exception of those dealing with nuclear materials and nuclear warheads. Further, General Loper stated that since the USA position in the field of cooperation on atomic energy matters was under current review it would be necessary in these joint meetings to explore possible areas of cooperation under three possible sets of circumstances:

- (a) That a major revision may be made to existing legislation.
- (b) That a minor revision may be made.
- (c) That no revision at all may be made.

3. It was agreed that various working groups under the main technical committee would be set up under the following subjects:

- (a) Nuclear Materials
- (b) Nuclear Warheads
- (c) Military Propulsion and Power Reactors
- (d) Delivery Systems
- (e) Biological, Radiological and Chemical Warfare
- (f) Defence against Ballistic Missiles
- (g) Anti-Submarine Detection and Defence
- (h) Aircraft and Aero Engines
- (i) Infrared Research
- (j) Thermionic Valve Research

- 2 -

4. After the opening meeting concluded the meeting then moved into specific sub-committee meetings to discuss the above subjects in the following order with Canadian representation as follows:

3 December 1957

- (a) Nuclear materials - No Canadian representation
- (g) Anti Submarine Detection and Defence -
Commodore Robertson, Lieutenant Commander Cooke (RCN),
G/C Chapman (RCAF) and Doctors Green and Waterman (DRB).
- (h) Aircraft and Aero Engines - Dr. Green (DRB) and
G/C Chapman (RCAF).
- (b) Nuclear Warheads - No Canadian representation.

4 December 1957

- (c) Military Propulsion and Power Reactors - Doctors Green and Waterman (DRB); Lt. Cdr. Smith (RCN) and Mr. Williamson (Canadian Embassy).
- (d) Delivery Systems - Dr. Green and Mr. Walker (DRB),
G/C Chapman (RCAF), Major Ewing (Canadian Army) and
Lt. Cdr. Smith (RCN).
- (f) Defence against Ballistic Missiles - Dr. Green and
Mr. Walker (DRB), G/C Chapman (RCAF) and Major
Ewing (Canadian Army).

5 December 1957

- (e) Biological, Radiological and Chemical Warfare -
Dr. Green (DRB), Lt. Col. Bond and Lt. Col. Staples
(Canadian Army)
- (i) & (j) Infrared Research and Thermionic Valve Research -
Mr. Walker, Dr. Eaton and Dr. Waterman (DRB).

It is expected that the final session of the main committee will take place late Thursday afternoon, 5 December 1957.

5. At the Anti-submarine Detection and Defence Sub-Committee Meeting which met yesterday morning, Dr. Green acted as Joint Chairman. The U.K. suggested that in order to spread the load the U.K. effort might be directed predominantly to "detection" in which good work had already been done in conjunction with Canada, leaving the United States to concentrate on weapons. However, the United States initial reaction was that it was unlikely the United States could relinquish major portions of such a programme of research and development which was proceeding on a broad front. It was pointed out that there was already some variation in objectives, in that the U.K. is concerned with shallow water detection while the U.S. is concerned with deep water detection. It was considered that it was imperative to find ways and means for dividing the load and that it was finally agreed that a technical team should be established with as few members as is necessary from each of the three countries. This team would study the overall research and development programmes and make recommendations for closer cooperation or integration in anti-submarine defence. It has been suggested that Canadian representation on this team should include naval and air operational authorities in addition to scientific representation, and the Chairman, Defence Research Board, has been asked to suggest suitable representation after discussion with the Services concerned.

- 3 -

6. At the Aircraft and Aero Engines Sub-Committee Meeting which also met yesterday morning, Dr. Green again acted as Joint Chairman. The U.K. representative stated that they were developing no bombers beyond the present "V" bombers and no fighters beyond the present "P.1", and therefore, they are in the last stages of such military developments. However, the U.K. will have continued interest in developing military transports, low level reconnaissance, and attack aircraft. It was also mentioned that the U.S. Navy had an interest in some of these aircraft.

The CF 105, the Argus and the Caribou aircraft were mentioned and it was pointed out that Canada was anxious to see an interest developed in these aircraft. The U.S. representative stated that the USAF had a continued interest in the CF 105 and hoped that the USAF would be represented at its first flight. Performance and development plans for the Argus were outlined but the U.S. and the U.K. representatives made no comments.

The U.S. representative outlined new USAF projects such as the T38, a small supersonic trainer which appears to be dependent primarily on the development of high thrust to weight engines. This trainer may fly up to Mach 1.5 ($1\frac{1}{2}$ times the speed of sound) and a fighter version has been proposed by the contractor. Reference was also made to the F 105 all-weather long range two seater interceptor which should fly at Mach 3 (3 times the speed of sound) with a 1000 mile radius and a combat height of 65 to 70 thousand feet. It would be equipped with a sophisticated air to air missile system with a twenty-five mile range for the missile and 80 to 100 miles radar range. The U.S. representative also mentioned a replacement for the B52 aircraft which would be a bomber capable of Mach 3 (3 times the speed of sound) operating at 65,000 feet. It was also stated that the USAF are proceeding with manned aircraft because of the need for flexibility and emphasis was made to the inflexibility of unmanned missiles. In the research vehicle field, the U.S. also mentioned the X-15, which it is understood is a hypersonic manned aircraft with a proposed speed of Mach 10 (ten times the speed of sound) and an ultimate altitude of 250,000 feet, and also vertical take-off research aircraft. Mention was also made to the Avro project which is the supersonic jet lift fighter with a circular air foil instead of wings which is proceeding at low priority.

It was considered vital that the USA, UK and Canada get together in the field of short and vertical take-off and landing aircraft as efforts are now being dissipated in this field. It was, therefore, agreed that a joint tripartite task force should be created to review research and development in this field for the purpose of recommending better cooperation.

The UK representative stated that he was concerned as to the future of such excellent companies as Rolls Royce in view of the termination of military fighter and bomber developments and he recommended the "Conway" as suitable for USAF tanker aircraft. It was generally agreed that difficulties in this area stem from the existence of too many engine companies. However, the US representative believed that these would decrease in future and cited the example of Westinghouse who will be vacating this field. The U.S. also pointed out that a major difficulty in future was that engines cannot be developed independent of airframes they are too power and therefore greater specialization will follow as a result of this. It was also agreed that a tripartite conference on the future of propulsion might be useful which should be attended by government representatives on the defence side with industrial experts present not as representatives of industry but as specialist advisers to national representatives.

7. Further reports on the discussions in the various fields will be passed to you as received.

Original signed by
Gen. Charles Foulkes

(Charles Foulkes)
General,
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff.

000365

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The United Kingdom representative stated that the United Kingdom is anxious to tap recent U.S. advances in radar techniques and propose to send a party to the United States in the near future to discuss the United Kingdom surveillance radar proposal. It was agreed that while good exchange exists between the three countries on a bipartite basis it was most desirable that this be changed to a tri-partite basis but which would not in any way interfere with the bipartite method of operation. It was thought that development of this arrangement might be based on the present U.K. - U.S. ballistic missile policy committee on the secretary level which is considered to work well.

In this connection it should be pointed out that present Canadian research does not bear on the major problems troubling the United Kingdom which accounts for the reason why Dr. Robert Cockburn of the United Kingdom was pressing hard for access to U.S. information. It was also noticed that Sir Frederick Brundrett of the United Kingdom consistently modified Dr. Cockburn's statements to draw Canada into any shared programmes.

The United States representative announced that a decision had been reached to assign space travel, anti-missile and missile research and development authority and control of all funds to a non-service director in the United States Department of Defense who may, however, continue to operate through existing Service agencies.

(Charles Foulkes)
General,
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff.

- 2 -

has upwards of a 30 mile range depending upon the warhead and it appears to fit between the U.S. Lacrosse and Corporal missile. However, this project is not far advanced with availability scheduled for 1962. Anti-tank weapons were also discussed and in particular the Australian, United States and French wire controlled missiles. The United Kingdom are presently evaluating the Australian missile. This field of short range ground-to-ground missiles was considered to be adequately covered by the existing tripartite standardization agreement between the U.K., the U.S. and the Canadian Armies.

In the air-to-ground missiles, both the United Kingdom and the United States have programmes for missiles aimed at 400 miles range to improve the capability of the "V" bombers and the "B52" aircraft respectively. The United States Navy have "Regulus 2" which is comparable, although it is not air launched. It was agreed that there is scope for closer cooperation in guidance and fuzing techniques. The United States Navy representatives referred to the acute problem of attacking submerged submarines where the reentry problem still exists and the United Kingdom representative stated that they were not working in this particular field.

In the ground-to-air missile discussion, the United Kingdom indicated they have a short range 20,000 yard missile which was Stage 1 in their old ground-to-air programme. However, subsequent stages have been abandoned and only their "Green Flax" programme survived. This particular missile has a 40 mile range, semi-active guidance with atomic warhead, scheduled for availability about 1962. The United Kingdom stressed the seriousness of a low level threat and believed there was no good answer, even with their Hawk Aircraft. Here again it was agreed it was an important area for combined planning and research, particularly in guidance techniques.

In the air-to-air field, since the United Kingdom policy is not to develop a fighter aircraft beyond the present generation with the "Bluejay" missile, this subject was not discussed but cognizance was taken of the U.S. - Canadian cooperation in this activity.

The desirability for the establishment of tripartite working parties to explore collaboration in research and development in the various fields of interest of this sub-committee was recognized and it was decided that this would automatically receive consideration in the sub-committee (f) which is responsible for defence against ballistic missiles.

3. The Sub Committee on Defence against Ballistic Missiles met in the afternoon of 4 December 1957. The United Kingdom representative stated that the United Kingdom policy is to ensure retaliatory power by developing its own intermediate range ballistic missile with range improvement depending on the warhead. The United Kingdom is dubious about the feasibility of active defence but is considering a proposal for surveillance radar to be followed by consideration of the tracking problem. However, the United Kingdom hope to maintain close contact with new U.S. missile developments in order to design any possible future active defence around them.

The United States representative gave a lengthy exposition of U.S. Early Warning and active defence studies. The Early Warning System is to be implemented immediately and the United States may implement an early active defence system based on Nike-Zeus in spite of the known deficiencies. Unlike the United Kingdom the United States are not prepared to admit publicly that the population cannot be defended against the intercontinental ballistic missile. The United States representative also stated that the United States Air Force work on active defence consists of studies known to Canada, and referred to the excellent cooperation with Canada. The United States Defence Department is also studying the decoy problem and extending radio propagation studies to include an atmosphere polluted by atomic explosions. The meeting agreed that there were many areas calling for research, some of which are receiving attention as exemplified by the United States Air Force - Canadian Defence Research Board programme.

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S E C R E T

5 December 1957

The Minister

Special Tripartite Meetings in Washington - Second Report

1. The Sub Committee on Nuclear Propulsion and Power Reactors met on the morning of 4 December 1957, and initial discussion concerned approval for direct exchange of information between the Westinghouse Company of the United States and the Rolls Royce Company of the United Kingdom on nuclear power plants for submarine propulsion. The United States representative suggested that this could be accomplished by the Atomic Energy Commission of the United States informing the Westinghouse Company that they may exchange information directly with the British Company. The United Kingdom was also requested to indicate the extent of their interest in nuclear power for frigates and aircraft in order that the United States authorities could request appropriate amendments to present United States legislation. The United Kingdom stated that although they have no requirement at present for exchange of information in these particular areas, they wished it to be left open for possible future discussions since the United Kingdom have not finalized their views concerning the best application of their efforts. The United Kingdom representative also pointed out that if there is to be a sharing of the research effort that their own Atomic Warfare Research Establishment would like to participate and suggested they might develop a capability in the rocket field. It was further stated that the British Army requires information on packaged atomic reactors although no procurement plans exist at the present. The United Kingdom was asked if they wished to procure from the United States nuclear war products such as submarine reactor cores or complete power plants, as an extension of existing laws would be necessary to permit sales of such equipment. The United Kingdom replied that they were unsure whether or not these items would be procured from the United States but they had the matter under consideration. The United States indicated that there might be a possible difficulty in securing congressional approval. The meeting was informed that although Canada had no firm nuclear propulsion requirement at the present time we are most interested in obtaining information regarding nuclear power plants for the frigate class ship.

2. The Sub Committee on Delivery Systems which is concerned with all the various categories of ballistic and guided missiles also met on the morning of 4 December 1957. Commencing with the intermediate range ballistic missile, the discussion revealed that the present UK - US programmes do not overlap. The United Kingdom missile has a range of 2200 miles which is an intermediate range between the U.S. Thor or Jupiter missile and the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile. Collaboration between the United Kingdom and the United States already exists in this area by virtue of the present U.K. - U.S. missile policy committee on the secretary level and commercial agreements between the U.S. North American Company and the U.K. Rolls Royce Company on propulsion and between the U.S. Convair Company and the U.K. DeHavilland Company on vehicles.

The discussion also revealed the desirability for much closer collaboration on research aspects particularly in the solid propellant field and Canadian participation was welcomed.

Discussions on short range ground-to-ground missiles referred to four U.S. Army projects - Little John, Lacrosse, Corporal or Sergeant and Redstone. It would appear that there is also no duplication between the U.K. and the U.S. in this field since the U.K. "Red Rose" missile

TO EXTERNAL 2540 OPIMMEDIATE

FOR UNDERSECRETARY

REF OUR TEL 2554 DEC3

ATOMIC ENERGY CONSULTATIONS

WE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL NOW THAT THE WORKING PARTIES HAVE
STARTED TO HAVE A WORD WITH PHIL FARLEY, SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR ATOMIC
ENERGY AFFAIRS IN THE STATE DEPT, TO SEE HOW THEY ENVISAGE THE WINDUP
OF THESE MEETINGS AT THE END OF THIS WEEK. FARLEY SAID THAT AS MATTERS
WERE NOW DEVELOPING IN SUBCOMMITTEES (A) AND (B), IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT
TO ORGANIZE A PLENARY SESSION ON A TRIPARTITE BASIS TO CONSIDER THE
REPORTS UNDER THESE TWO ITEMS. THIS WAS BECAUSE A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT
SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS HAD ARISEN IN THE BILATERAL UK-USA TALKS
WHICH RAISED PROBLEMS WHICH COULD ONLY BE SETTLED AT THE STRAUSS-
QUARLES LEVEL. THE PRESENT PLAN, THEREFORE, WAS TO MOVE UP THE PROGRAMME
FOR THE FINAL SESSION AND TO DIVIDE IT INTO TWO PARTS. THE FIRST
MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE ON A UK-US BASIS AT 10:00AM ON FRI, AND
WOULD DEAL WITH THE REPORTS FROM SUBCOMMITTEES (A) AND (B). THERE WOULD
THEN BE A SECOND SESSION AT WHICH WE WOULD, OF COURSE, BE REPRESENTED,
TO DEAL WITH THE REPORTS FROM THE SUBCOMMITTEES ON WHICH THERE HAS
BEEN CANADIAN PARTICIPATION. FARLEY EXPLAINED THAT HAD IT BEEN POSSIBLE
TO BRING IN AN AGREED REPORT IN SUBCOMMITTEES (A) AND (B), A SINGLE
"PLENARY" SESSION MIGHT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE, BUT THIS DID NOT NOW SEEM
LIKELY.

2. HE ADDED THAT THE PROBLEMS WHICH HAD ARISEN IN THE UK-USA
NUCLEAR DISCUSSIONS REFLECTED UNRESOLVED POSITIONS WITHIN THE
ADMINISTRATION HERE AS TO HOW FAR IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE AND PRACTI-
CABLE TO GO ON A BILATERAL BASIS TO STRENGTHEN COOPERATION IN THE
NUCLEAR FIELD. THE THREE SETS OF ASSUMPTIONS MENTIONED IN PARA 4
OF OUR TEL 2554 DEC3 IN PART REFLECTED DIFFERENT JUDGEMENTS ON THE
PART OF AEC, DEFENCE DEPT AND STATE DEPT, ON THE SCOPE OF THE AMENDMENTS
TO BE SOUGHT IN MODIFICATION OF PRESENT LEGISLATION, (AS WELL AS VARYING
ESTIMATES OF WHAT CONGRESS IS LIKELY TO ACCEPT) AND ALSO ON THE EXTENT
TO WHICH, UNDER EACH OF THE MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS, PARTICULAR JOINT COOPERA-
TIVE PROGRAMMES COULD BE DEVELOPED IN PRACTICE. WHILE THE

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...WE PRESIDENT OUT OF THE PUBLIC ... OF COMMON PURPOSE ... A
BROAD GUIDING PRINCIPLE; THE JOINT USA-UK DISCUSSIONS REVEALED ...
THERE WERE STILL A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC PROBLEMS TO BE THRASHED OUT,
ALTHOUGH HE WAS HOPEFUL FOR A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME.

3. WE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO CLARIFY WITH FARLEY THE BASIS ON
WHICH THIS SPECIAL COOPERATION IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD HAS BEEN WORKED
OUT WITH THE UK, AND THE CORRESPONDING BASIS ON WHICH CANADA HAS NOT BEEN
INCLUDED IN THIS PORTION OF THE CURRENT DISCUSSIONS. FARLEY EXPLAINED
THAT THE BASIS LAY IN SECTION 144(B) OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF
1954 (PL 703), THE TEXT OF WHICH WILL BE AVAILABLE TO YOU BUT WHICH,
FOR CONVENIENCE OF REF, READS AS FOLLOWS:

"B. THE PRESIDENT MAY AUTHORIZE THE DEPT OF DEFENSE, WITH THE
ASSISTANCE OF THE COMMISSION, TO COOPERATE WITH ANOTHER NATION OR
WITH A REGIONAL DEFENSE ORGANIZATION TO WHICH THE USA IS A PARTY,
AND TO COMMUNICATE TO THAT NATION OR ORGANIZATION SUCH RESTRICTED
DATA AS IS NECESSARY TO--

"(1) THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENSE PLANS;

"(2) THE TRAINING OF PERSONNEL IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF AND DEFENSE
AGAINST ATOMIC WEAPONS; AND

"(3) THE EVALUATION OF THE CAPABILITIES OF POTENTIAL ENEMIES IN
THE EMPLOYMENT OF ATOMIC WEAPONS,

WHILE SUCH OTHER NATION OR ORGANIZATION IS PARTICIPATING WITH THE
USA PURSUANT TO AN INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENT BY SUBSTANTIAL
AND MATERIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MUTUAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY:

PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT NO SUCH COOPERATION SHALL INVOLVE COMMUNICATION
OF RESTRICTED DATA RELATING TO THE DESIGN OR FABRICATION OF ATOMIC
WEAPONS EXCEPT WITH REGARD TO EXTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS, INCLUDING
SIZE, WEIGHT, AND SHAPE, YIELDS AND EFFECTS, AND SYSTEMS EMPLOYED IN
THE DELIVERY OR USE THEREOF BUT NOT INCLUDING ANY DATA IN THESE
CATEGORIES UNLESS IN THE JOINT JUDGMENT OF THE COMMISSION AND THE DEPT
OF DEFENSE SUCH DATA

WILL NOT REVEAL IMPORTANT INFO CONCERNING THE DESIGN OR FABRICATION
OF THE NUCLEAR COMPONENTS OF AN ATOMIC WEAPON; AND PROVIDED FURTHER,
THAT THE COOPERATION IS UNDERTAKEN PURSUANT AN AGREEMENT ENTERED
INTO IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 123."

PAGE THREE 2570

4. IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE AEC AND THE DEPT OF DEFENCE, THE CURRENT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE UK, IN VIEW OF THE ACTIVE UK ROLE IN THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FIELD WILL NOT REVEAL IMPORTANT INFO CONCERNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH IS NOT ALREADY AVAILABLE TO THE UK GOVT. SINCE, HOWEVER, CANADA IS NOT ENGAGING IN A NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMME, OUR INCLUSION IN SUCH DISCUSSIONS AT THIS STAGE UNDER EXISTING LEGISLATION WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF PRESENT LEGISLATION. IN OTHER WORDS, COOPERATION WITH THE UK IN THIS FIELD IS BASED UPON AN INTERPRETATION MADE IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE RESPONSIBLE USA AUTHORITIES OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS PARTICULAR SECTION OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT IN THE LIGHT OF THE UK NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMME.

5. IN VIEW OF THE NATURE OF THE WORK OF THE SUBCOMMITTEES WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN THE SUBJECT OF REPORTS BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT STAFF TO CCOS IN OTTAWA, AND THE NATURE OF THE FORTHCOMING SESSIONS ON FIR, I NOW THINK THAT IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY FOR HARTLEY ZIMMERMAN TO COME DOWN AS SUGGESTED IN PARA 6 MY TEL 2554 DEC 3. THIS IS ALSO THE VIEW OF DR GREEN, WHO HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH BOTH GENERAL LOPER AND BRUNDRETT ON THIS POINT

ROBERTSON

1111 COPY

Rey - cc's

Secretariat
Mr Robinson
DJP/DM
Mr Bennett

116
5/57

DS40/433
FM WASHDC DEC4X/57 SECRET
TO EXTERNAL 2569 OPIMMEDIATE

FOR UNDERSECRETARY

ATOMIC ENERGY CONSULTATIONS

50219-AK-40
58 50


GENERAL SPARLING HAS SENT US COPIES OF TWO CJS REPORTS JSW252
AND JSW451 OF DEC3 SUMMARIZING THE PROCEEDINGS OF SUBCOMMITTEES
(G)AND(H).WE ARE NOT,REPEAT NOT,REPEATING THESE TO YOU ON THE
ASSUMPTION THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO OBTAIN COPIES FROM NATIONAL
DEFENCE.

TOP SECRET



The Secretary of State for External Affairs
Canada

Ottawa, December 4, 1957.



seen by P.M.
Dec 6
H.B.R.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

It is my opinion that you cannot
refuse to answer in the House a question about
this matter. You could adopt, if pressed,
3(ii) of the accompanying telegram.

Robert B. Smith

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

Seen DWWK

TO: Mr. L. E. Couillard

PERSONAL & SECRET
Security

Date December 4, 1957

FROM: Defence Liaison (1) Division

File No.

50219-AK-40

REFERENCE:

Atomic Energy Consultations (Military)

SUBJECT:with the United States and the United Kingdom.....

The Under-Secretary has asked me to let you know that as a result of a sudden invitation extended to us both here and in Washington at the end of last week by the United States and United Kingdom authorities, a Canadian team headed by Mr. Robertson is participating in meetings of a so-called "Technical Committee" (with United States, United Kingdom and Canadian personnel) which began yesterday, December 3.

2. The information given to us about the nature of the meetings was very vague, although it is clear that the primary interest of the Technical Committee will be in the military field of atomic cooperation. We have been enjoined by all concerned to do all that is possible to prevent any leakage of information as to the existence of the Technical Committee and the fact of Canadian participation in it. As a result, very limited circulation is being given to the messages received on the subject. Messages so far have been circulated on a personal basis to the Ministers concerned and to the Secretary to Cabinet, the Chairman Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Bennett and the Deputy Minister of Defence Production.

3. Because of the interest of your Division in the Canadian atomic energy programme, you may wish at some stage to offer comments on the material which we get (which up to the present has been meagre in substance). I suggest if you agree, therefore, that Mr. Kirkwood of your Division might look over the material which we have to date and any further incoming messages of interest to you, with the object of keeping your Division fully in the picture.

Done 4/12/57
DWWK

Defence Liaison (1) Di 000374 n

DS32, 431
FM WASHDC DEC3/57 SECRET
TO EXTERNAL 2559 OPIMMEDIATE

FOR UNDERSECRETARY

REF OUR TEL 2554 DEC3

ATOMIC ENERGY CONSULTATIONS

FOLLOWING IS A REPETITION OF A MSG FROM GENERAL SPARLING TO CCOS,
NO. JSW 450 DEC3, REPORTING ON THE CHANGES IN THE SCHEDULE OF SUB-
COMMITTEE MEETINGS AGREED TO AT THIS MORNING'S GENERAL SESSION:

TEXT BEGINS:

1. EMBASSY TEL 2554 OF TODAY'S DATE COVERS WHAT WENT ON AT THIS
MORNING'S OPENING MEETING, AND I HAVE NOTHING ADDITIONAL TO ADD TO
IT. THIS MEETING LASTED ONLY SOME THIRTY MINUTES AND THEN MOVED
INTO SUBCOMMITTEE MEETINGS WITH THOSE ON SUBJECTS G AND H TAKING
PLACE THIS MORNING. OUR REPRESENTATION ON G CONSISTS OF COMMODORE
ROBERTSON AND LCDR COOKE FROM NAVY, G/C CHAPMAN FROM RCAF AND DRS
GREEN AND WATERMAN FROM DEFENCE RESEARCH. OUR REPS ON H ARE DR
GREEN AND G/C CHAPMAN. SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON SUBJECT A ALSO TOOK
PLACE THIS MORNING AND SUBJECT B IS TAKING PLACE THIS AFTERNOON,
BOTH WITH CANADIAN REPRESENTATION ~~INCLUDED~~ *Excluded (see source correction of Dec 4)*

2. PROGRAMME FOR TOMORROW 4 DEC IS SUBCOMMITTEES ON SUBJECTS C AND
D IN MORNING AND SUBJECT F IN AFTERNOON. OUR REPRESENTATION AS
FOLLOWS:

ON C DRS GREEN AND WATERMAN, CDR SMITH AND MR WILLIAMSON FROM
EMBASSY; ON D DR GREEN, MR WALKER, G/C CHAPMAN, MAJOR EWING AND
LCDR SMITH; ON F DR GREEN, G/C CHAPMAN, MR WALKER, AND MAJOR EWING.

3. THURS PROGRAMME WILL COVER SUBJECT E FOLLOWED BY I AND J COMBINED
ALL IN MORNING. OUR REPRESENTATION AS FOLLOWS:

FOR E DR GREEN, LT COL BOND, LT COL STAPLES; ON I AND J MR WALKER,
DR EATON AND DR WATERMAN.

4. FINAL SESSION OF MAIN COMMITTEE SCHEDULED FOR FRIDAY AFTERNOON.

5. WILL SEND REPORT ON WORK OF EACH SUBCOMMITTEE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
REPORTS ON SUBJECTS G AND H SHOULD BE DESPATCHED LATE THIS AFTERNOON.

6. CONSIDER IT MOST DESIRABLE THAT MR ZIMMERMAN ATTEND FINAL SESSION
OF MAIN COMMITTEE ON FRI. THERE APPEARS TO BE NO NEED FOR HIM TO
ARRIVE EARLIER THAN THURS EVENING. TEXT ENDS.

30219-AR-401

DS28/432
FM WASHDC DEC3/57 SECRET
TO FERNAL 2554 OPIMMEDIATE

FOR UNDERSECRETARY

REF OUR TEL 2548 DEC2

ATOMIC ENERGY CONSULTATIONS

THE OPENING MEETING WAS HELD AT THE PENTAGON THIS MORNING. A LARGE REPRESENTATION FROM BOTH THE USA AND UK SIDES. GENERAL LOPER, WHO AS YOU KNOW IS CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY LIAISON COMMITTEE OF THE AEC, PRESIDED, FLANKED BY SIR FREDERICK BRUNDRETT, PERMANENT SCIENTIFIC ADVISER TO THE UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, AND MYSELF. TO OPEN THE MEETING, GENERAL LOPER REFERRED TO THE BACKGROUND OF THE EISENHOWER-MACMILLAN TALKS, WHICH HAD BEEN FOLLOWED UP BY MEETINGS BETWEEN STRAUSS AND PLOWDEN AND QUARLES AND POWELL. HE REFERRED PARTICULARLY TO A USA-UK MEETING OF NOV23 AT WHICH TIME, IN EXPLORING WAYS AND MEANS OF COOPERATION IN THE DEFENCE FIELD MORE CLOSELY, IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE HELD TO SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE IN VARIOUS SPECIFIED FIELDS. GENERAL LOPER REFERRED TO THE DECISION WHICH HAD BEEN TAKEN JOINTLY TO INVITE THE CANADIAN GOVT TO PARTICIPATE IN THESE FURTHER EXPLORATIONS AND TO THE ACCEPTANCE OF THIS INVITATION. IT WAS HOPED TO BRING THE CANADIAN REPS IN TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE AND WITH DUE REGARD TO THE SUBJECT MATTER UNDER DISCUSSIONS. BECAUSE OF THE LIMITATIONS UNDER EXISTING LEGISLATION, CANADIAN REPRESENTATION WOULD BE WELCOMED IN ALL THE WORKING PARTIES WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THOSE DEALING WITH NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND NUCLEAR WARHEADS. THE CANADIANS, HOWEVER, WOULD BE WELCOMED AT ALL THE OTHER WORKING PARTIES (INCLUDING SUBCOMMITTEE(D), WHICH IS TO DEAL WITH DELIVERY SYSTEMS).

2. AT THE SUGGESTION OF SIR FREDERICK BRUNDRETT, A NUMBER OF CHANGES IN THE TIMETABLE WERE PROPOSED, WHICH MODIFY THE SCHEDULE TRANSMITTED IN OUR TEL 2548, AND WE SHALL SEND YOU THE REVISED TIMETABLE FOR YOUR INFO. BRUNDRETT ALSO PROPOSED GROUPING TOGETHER THE SUBJECTS TO BE DISCUSSED UNDER ITEMS(I) AND (J), AND THIS WAS AGREED. GENERAL LOPER, IN REPLY TO A QUESTION FROM SIR WILLIAM PENNEY, CLARIFIED THAT SUBCOMMITTEE(E) WOULD IN FACT BE DEALING WITH BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WARFARE.

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File Copy -

Referred Ceos
Secy to Tab. 3
Mr. Robinson
SSEA

Mr. Bennett. DEC 13
Mr. Goldstein.
Mr. [unclear]
Mr. [unclear]

PAGE TWO 2554

3. THERE WAS LITTLE OPPORTUNITY FOR GENERAL DISCUSSION. BRUNDRETT, HOWEVER, DID RAISE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE USA AUTHORITIES WOULD AGREE TO THE GENERAL STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES WHICH HE SAID HAD BEEN SET OUT AT THE EARLIER MEETING OF NOV 23 BY SIR RICHARD POWELL. HE IDENTIFIED THIS STATEMENT BY REMINDING THE MEETING THAT THE UK STATEMENT HAD PROPOSED COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO GOVTS IN THE VARIOUS FIELDS LISTED FOR THE PRESENT CONSULTATIONS, AND THE MOST EFFECTIVE USE OF THE FACILITIES OF EACH IN THE COMMON INTEREST. THE UK BUDGET PROVIDED CERTAIN SUMS FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND THEY WISHED TO SEE THE CLOSEST COOPERATION IN AVOIDING DUPLICATION AND IN MAKING THE MOST EFFICIENT USE OF RESOURCES AND MANPOWER. IN REPLY, ADMIRAL FOSTER, ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES OF THE AEC, REFERRED BRIEFLY TO THE METHODS OF WORK OF THE SUBCOMMITTEES, AS SUMARIZED IN THE SCHEDULE TRANSMITTED IN OUR REF TEL. WHILE HE WAS HOPEFUL THAT THE AMENDMENTS TO THE ATOMIC ENERGY LEGISLATION ON WHICH THEY WERE NOW WORKING WOULD INCREASE THE POSSIBILITIES OF COOPERATION, IT HAD TO BE RECOGNIZED THAT UNTIL THE LAW WAS CHANGED, THE USA SIDE WOULD NOT BE IN A POSITION TO ANSWER ALL THE QUESTIONS WHICH THE UK SIDE MIGHT PUT TO THEM IN THE COURSE OF THE CURRENT EXCHANGES. IN THIS CASE, HE SUGGESTED THAT THE SUBCOMMITTEES CONCERNED SHOULD SIMPLY LIST THE QUESTIONS TO BE NOTED FOR FURTHER STUDY AND CONSIDERATION IN THE LIGHT OF ANY LEGISLATIVE ACTION WHICH MAY BE TAKEN IN THE FUTURE. HE EXPLAINED THAT ANY RELUCTANCE ON THE USA SIDE IN THIS CONTEXT WOULD DERIVE ONLY FROM THE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY THE MANDATORY PROVISIONS OF PRESENT LEGISLATION.

4. GENERAL LOPER ADDED THAT SINCE THE USA POSITION IN THE FIELD OF COOPERATION ON ATOMIC ENERGY MATTERS WAS UNDER CURRENT REVIEW, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY IN THESE JOINT MEETINGS TO EXPLORE POSSIBLE AREAS OF COOPERATION UNDER THREE POSSIBLE SETS OF CIRCUMSTANCES:

(1) THAT A MAJOR REVISION MAY BE MADE TO EXISTING LEGISLATION;
(2) THAT A MINOR REVISION MAY BE MADE; (3) THAT NO REVISION AT ALL MAY BE MADE. THIS WOULD BE THE MOST REALISTIC BASIS OF PLANNING, AND EVEN UNDER THE THIRD ASSUMPTION, IT SHOULD STILL BE POSSIBLE TO EXPLORE CERTAIN LIMITED MEANS OF COOPERATION MORE FULLY.

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PAGE THREE 2554

5.FOLLOWING THE REPORTS OF THE WORKING PARTIES,GENERAL LOPER INDICATED THAT AT THE FRI MEETING(AT WHICH STRAUSS AND QUARLES WERE EXPECTED TO BE PRESENT)IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO SEE WHAT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE AND WHAT THE NEXT STEPS SHOULD BE.

6.THROUGHOUT THE DISCUSSION AT THIS FIRST MEETING,THE EMPHASIS WAS ON THE FACT THAT THESE WERE VERY MUCH FIRST STEPS.AT THE SAME TIME,IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT THERE IS IN FACT A CONSIDERABLE BACKGROUND OF EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE USA AND THE UK,AND I HAVE ASKED PRIVATELY FOR A COPY OF THE POLICY STATEMENT OF POWELL'S,TO WHICH BRUNDRETT REFERRED,SINCE IT MAY THROW MORE LIGHT THAN HAS BEEN AVAILABLE SO FAR ON THE CENTRAL OBJECTIVES OF THE PRESENT ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS.IN CONSULTATION WITH GENERAL SPARLING AND MEMBERS OF THE JOINT STAFF,WE ARE ARRANGING TO MAN THE VARIOUS WORKING PARTIES TO WHICH WE HAVE BEEN INVITED,AND I THINK THE POSITION CAN BE HELD ON THIS BASIS UNTIL THE END OF THE WEEK.AS MATTERS SEEM TO BE SHAPING UP,HOWEVER,MY VIEW IS THAT IT WOULD BE MOST USEFUL IF ZIMMERMAN COULD BE AVAILABLE ON THURS TO MEET WITH OUR REPS ON THE WORKING PARTIES AND TO BE PRESENT WHEN THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS ARE CONSIDERED AT THE GENERAL MEETING NOW PROPOSED FOR FRI
ROBERTSON

TOP SECRET

December 3, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

Canada-United States-United Kingdom Cooperation
on Atomic Energy Matters

There is attached for your consideration a copy of CRO telegram No. 2009 of November 30 which was given to us over the week-end by Earnscliffe. We understand that it is a response to Earnscliffe's telegram of late last week which included the text of your letter to Mr. Crombie accepting the United States and United Kingdom invitation for Canadian participation in a meeting in Washington on December 3 of a Technical Committee concerned with atomic energy cooperation. You will remember that in that letter you reserved the position of the Government with respect to direct parliamentary questions.

2. The attached telegram contains a suggested line of answering both press and parliamentary questions which the United Kingdom authorities have asked us to consider. The line set out in paragraph 3 is, we understand, the line which United Kingdom representatives plan to adopt.

3. Earnscliffe has indicated that they would be glad to have our views on these suggestions although they are not pressing us for a direct reply. I would recommend that we not at this stage tie ourselves too firmly to any particular line of answering. You might simply indicate to Earnscliffe that Ministers are aware of the United

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4-12.7(05)

4-12-8-22.

2.

Kingdom suggestions and will keep them in mind if and when the occasion for replying to questions arises.

4. Perhaps the most important thought in the attached telegram is contained in the last sentence, i.e., "Point of paramount importance is of course to avoid any disclosure that Technical Committee is in existence.". We share the view that everything possible should be done to avoid public reference to the Technical Committee, since its existence and our participation in its activities could put us in real difficulties with such NATO allies as France and Germany.

5. You may recall that in answer to a question in the House on October 29 as to whether Canada was to be included in any United Kingdom-United States plans for developing future atomic weapons, the Minister of National Defence replied in part on October 30: "We are sure that both the United States and United Kingdom regard Canada as a friendly country and therefore we would be included in any arrangements which might be made under these amendments (i.e., amendments to the MacMahon Act)".

6. You may wish to discuss this telegram with the Prime Minister. I would be grateful if you could indicate whether you agree with the reply suggested above for Earnscliffe.

J.H.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Under-Secretary.....

Security TOP SECRET.....

Date December 3, 1957.....

FROM: Defence Liaison (1) Division.....

File No.

50219-AK-40

REFERENCE:

Canada-United States-United Kingdom

SUBJECT: Cooperation on Atomic Energy Matters.....

Sent 7
4.12.57

There is attached for your signature if you concur a Memorandum to the Minister enclosing copy of a CRO telegram dealing with the matter of response to questions which might be asked either by the press or in the House concerning the atomic energy consultation which is to take place beginning today in Washington. We have, as you will see, recommended an indirect reply to Earncliffe.

2. This is a useful occasion to record an informal chat which we had last evening with Crombie, the United Kingdom Acting High Commissioner. He said his people had heard "from your scientists" that Canadian authorities were very disturbed that this meeting of the Technical Committee had been convened before the NATO meeting and further believed that the timing of the meeting had resulted from United Kingdom insistence in the face of a United States desire to hold off formal meetings until after the NATO Council meeting. Whether these remarks bespeak a bad United Kingdom conscience we do not know. We limited ourselves when replying to Crombie to saying that we knew of no ministerial views of this kind. We did say, however, it would have been easier for us if we had been given a little more time to prepare for the first meeting of the Technical Committee.

James MacLachlan
Defence Liaison (1) Division

4.12.7/55

12/25/57
FM WASHDC DEC2/57 SECRET
TO INTERNAL 2548 OPIMMEDIATE

FOR UNDERSECRETARY

REF YOUR TEL DL1068 DEC2

TRIPARTITE COOPERATION: SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS

THE FOLLOWING IS THE SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS PROVIDED BY STATE DEPT
OF THE USA-UK TECHNICAL COMMITTEE FOR PERIOD 3 TO 6 DEC/57,
INCLUSIVE:

TUES, 3 DEC/57

0900 - GENERAL MEETING IN PENTAGON, ROOM 3E869. (MCC00)

1000 - SUBCOMMITTEE A A NUCLEAR MATERIALS (CANADIANS NOT PRESENT)
IN PENTAGON, ROOM 3E869 (COOK, RECORDER)

USA REPS: LOPER, FOSTER, FINE, RW COOK (ASTERIK)

UK REPS: PENNY, JUKES, ROPER

1000 - SUBCOMMITTEE G - ANTISUBMARINE DEFENSE (CANADIANS PRESENT)
IN PENTAGON, ROOM 2B943 (DOD RECORDER)

USA REPS: MCCAULEY (ASTERIK) AND IRWIN

UK REPS: BRUNDRETT AND BELLARS

1400 - SUBCOMMITTEE B - NUCLEAR WARHEADS (CANADIANS NOT PRESENT)
IN PENTAGON, ROOM 2B943 (CONRAD, RECORDER)

USA REPS: LOPER (ASTERIK), STARBIRD, FINE

UK REPS: BRUNDRETT, PENNY, COCKBURN

1400 - SUBCOMMITTEE H - AIRCRAFT AND AERO-ENGINES (CANADIANS PRESENT)
IN PENTAGON, ROOM 3E1006 (MUSE, RECORDER)

USA REPS: MACAULEY AND HORNER (ASTERIK)

UK REPS: BRUNDRETT, DUNNETT, DICKEN, FRYER

WED, 4 DEC/57

0900 - SUBCOMMITTEE D - DELIVERY SYSTEMS (CANADIANS NOT PRESENT)
IN PENTAGON, ROOM 2B943 (WAGNER, RECORDER)

USA REPS: HOLODAY (ASTERIK), HORNER, IRWIN (LOPER & MACAULEY WILL
ATTEND)

UK REPS: BRUNDRETT, COCKBURN, PENNY

1400 - SUBCOMMITTEE C - NUCLEAR PROPULSION (CANADIANS PRESENT)
IN PENTAGON, ROOM 2B943 (SIEVERING, RECORDER)

USA REPS: FOSTER, LOPER, HALL (ASTERIK) (DAVIS WILL ATTEND)

UK REPS: PENNY, WATTS, FRYER, ROPER

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PAGE TWO2548

THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFO AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE
USA WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SES 793
AND 79, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

THURS, 5 DEC/57

0900 - SUBCOMMITTEE F - DEFENSE AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES (CANADIANS
PRESENT.) IN PENTAGON, ROOM 2B943 (SKIFTER, RECORDER)

USA REPS: HOLODAY (ASTERIK), SKIFTER, IRWIN

UK RPS: BRUNDRETT, COCKBURN, PENNY

0900 - SUBCOMMITTEE E - BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WARFARE (CANADIANS
PRESENT.) IN PENTAGON, ROOM 3E1006 (WORTHLEY, RECORDER)

USA REPS: MACAULEY (ASTERIK), CREASEY, DUNHAM

UK REPS: UNKNOWN

1400 - SUBCOMMITTEE I - INFRA RED (CANADIANS PRESENT)

IN PENTAGON, ROOM 3C138 (KLOTZ, RECORDER)

USA REP: MACAULEY

UK REP: UNKNOWN

1400 - SUBCOMMITTEE J - THERMONIC VALVES (CANADIANS PRESENT)

IN PENTAGON, ROOM 3E1006 (BRIDGES, RECORDER)

US REP: SKIFTER

UK REP: UNKNOWN

FRI, 6 DEC/57

1330 - FINAL SESSION IN ROOM 213, AEC BUILDING

ATTACHMENT: SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS

ASTERIK: CHAIRMAN OF SUBCOMMITTEE.

BODY OF REPORT

INITIAL REPORTS (INTERIM IF NECESSARY) SHOULD BE CIRCULATE TO THE
PRINCIPALS BY 10:00 OF FRI 6 DEC TO ACCOMPLISH THIS THERE SHOULD BE
DESIGNATED BY THE USA AND UK SIDE OF EACH SUBCOMMITTEE A "CHAIRMAN."
IT WOULD BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE TWO "CHAIRMEN" OF EACH SUBCOM-
MITTEE TO COMPLETE A REPORT OF SUBCOMMITTEE FINDINGS. THE SECRETARIAT,
USAEC, WILL ACCOMPLISH REPRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF REPORTS GIVEN
IT BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN. SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS TO BE BRIEF
COVERING AT LEAST:

A. AVENUES OF FURTHER COOPERATION THE SUBCOMMITTEE CONSIDERS

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PAGE THREE 2548
TO BE FRUITFUL.

B.RECOMMENDED MEASURES TO ACHIEVE FURTHER COOPERATION.

C.LEGISLATIVE OR OTHER BARRIERS TO ACCOMPLISHMENT WHICH NEEDS TO
BE OVERCOME.

D.RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF FURTHER PROGRESS.
PRESS ANNOUNCEMENTS.

THE SUBCOMMITTEES SHOULD INDICATE IN THEIR REPORTS AREAS WHICH ARE
CONSIDERED SUITABLE FOR POSSIBLE PRESS RELEASES.

(THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFO AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE
USA WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,TITLE 18,USC,SECS 793
AND 794,THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.)ENDS.

D 1431
FM SHDC DEC2/57 SECRET
TO LATERAL 2544 OPIMMEDIATE

FOR UNDERSECRETARY

REF OUR TEL 2538 NOV29

DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING TRIPARTITE COOPERATION IN ATOMIC ENERGY
AND TECHNICAL FIELDS

FARLEY, SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR ATOMIC ENERGY MATTERS CALLED US IN THIS MORNING TO PROVIDE SOME INFO ON THE PROGRAMME OF CONSULTATION ENVISAGED. WHILE HE SAID THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS WERE NOT YET FINAL, THE STATE DEPT THOUGHT THAT THE OPENING SESSION WOULD BEGIN TOMORROW MORNING, AT 9.00 AM, WITH BRUNDRETT, PENNEY, AND COCKBURN INCLUDED ON THE UK SIDE AND ON THE USA SIDE GENERAL LOPER, ADMIRAL FOSTER, AND POSSIBLY DR LIBBY, WHO AS YOU KNOW IS A MEMBER OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION. THUS, AS ENVISAGED THE OPENING MEETING WOULD BE AT THE TECHNICAL LEVEL, AND AS SOON AS THERE HAD BEEN AN OUTLINE OF THE BACKGROUND FOLLOWING ON FROM THE MACMILLAN-EISENHOWER TALKS AND A CLARIFICATION OF THE MAIN AREAS TO BE EXPLORED BY THE WORKING PARTIES, IT WAS HOPED THAT THE TECHNICAL WORKING PARTIES WOULD BEGIN THEIR WORK AT ONCE. THEIR TASK WOULD BE TO IDENTIFY THE POSSIBLE AREAS OF COOPERATION IN EACH OF THE PRINCIPAL SECTORS AND TO PRODUCE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE POOLING OF EFFORT IN THESE VARIOUS FIELDS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE AND AS A BASIS FOR SEEKING FURTHER GUIDANCE AND INSTRUCTIONS FROM GOVTS. THE INTENTION WAS THAT THE WORKING PARTIES SHOULD PRODUCE THEIR FIRST REPORT, WHICH WOULD BE ESSENTIALLY OF A PRELIMINARY CHARACTER, BY THURS, DEC5, AND THAT THIS REPORT ANY ANY SUGGESTIONS FOR FOLLOW-UP ACTION SHOULD THEN BE LOOKED AT BY THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON FRI, DEC6. FARLEY APPEARED TO BE THINKING IN TERMS OF A POSSIBLE SUSPENSION OF THE WORK OF THE PROCESS OF CONSULTATION AFTER THIS DATE UNTIL SOME POINT BEYOND THE NATO MEETING. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE DATE UNTIL SOME POINT BEYOND THE NATO MEETING. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE DATE OF DEC20 FOR A REPORT OF THESE VARIOUS STUDIES WAS ONLY IN THE NATURE OF A GENERAL TARGET AND HAD NO OTHER SIGNIFICANCE.

2. WE ASKED FARLEY WHETHER THE PROPOSED MEETINGS REPRESENTED THE PRODUCT OF CLOSE UK-USA CONSULTATION, AND, IF SO, WHETHER THEY WERE BASED UPON SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS AS A RESULT OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN

PAGE TWO 2544

THE TWO GOVTS. HE DREW ATTENTION TO THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH HAV^E BEEN HELD BETWEEN PLOWDEN AND STRAUSS, POWELL AND QUARLES, AND SAID THAT WHILE THERE HAD BEEN PRELIMINARY BILATERAL TALKS COVERING IN PARTICULAR THE NUCLEAR FIELD, SPECIFIC PROPOSALS HAD NOT YET BEEN DEVELOPED, NOR HAVE THESE DISCUSSIONS EXTENDED TO THE OTHER SPECIAL FIELDS OUTLINED IN THE AIDEMEMOIRE.

3. ONE POINT OF SUBSTANCE WHICH FARLEY RAISED WAS THE LIMITATIONS ARISING OUT OF PRESENT LEGISLATION IN THE ATOMIC ENERGY FIELD WHICH WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT AT THIS STAGE TO INCLUDE CANADA AS AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT IN THE DISCUSSIONS UNDER ITEMS (A) AND (B) DEALING WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND NUCLEAR MATERIALS. WHILE THESE SUBJECTS COULD BE DISCUSSED WITH THE UK AS AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT IN THESE FIELDS, THEIR INTERPRETATION OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO INCLUDE CANADA IN THE WORKING PARTIES DEALING WITH THESE TWO SPECIAL ASPECTS. IN REPLY TO OUR QUESTION, FARLEY INDICATED THAT THE DISCUSSION UNDER NUCLEAR MATERIALS WOULD RELATE ESSENTIALLY TO THE PROVISION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS (IE ENRICHED URANIUM) FOR WEAPONS PURPOSES. THUS IT IS CLEAR THAT WE ARE NOT EXPECTED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SUBGROUPS ON ITEMS (A) AND (B). HE MENTIONED THAT THERE MIGHT ALSO BE SOME DIFFICULTY ABOUT THE SUBGROUP ON ITEM (D), WHICH IS TO DEAL WITH DELIVERY SYSTEMS, BUT SAID THAT NO DIFFICULTY WOULD ARISE ABOUT OUR INCLUSION IF THE DISCUSSION WERE CONFINED TO THE CARRIERS, AND HE EXPECTED THAT THIS POINT WOULD BE CLARIFIED SHORTLY.

4. WE ARE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH CJS HERE ABOUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR STAFFING THE WORKING PARTIES, AND GENERAL SPARLING IS IN TOUCH WITH THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF ON ANY ADDITIONAL EXPERT REPRESENTATION WHICH MAY BE REQUIRED FROM CANADA. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE AFTER OUR FIRST MEETING TOMORROW TO SEE MORE CLEARLY THE IMPLICATIONS OF THESE SESSIONS, WHICH AS WE UNDERSTAND IT AT THIS STAGE WILL RELATE BOTH TO COOPERATION IN THE PARTICULAR DEFENCE RESEARCH FIELDS LISTED AND MAY LEAD TO THE POSSIBLE RATIONALISATION OF DEFENCE PRODUCTION IN CERTAIN FRUITFUL AREAS.

5. ON THIS LAST POINT, WE ASKED FARLEY WHAT CONNECTION THERE MIGHT BE BETWEEN THE PROPOSED MEETINGS AND THE FORTHCOMING NATO SESSION.

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PAGE THREE 2544

FROM HIS REPLY IT WOULD SEEM THAT THE OBJECTIVE IS TO CLEAR AS MUCH OF THE GROUND AS POSSIBLE BETWEEN THE THREE GOVTS WHO HAVE HAD A LONG HISTORY OF CLOSE COOPERATION IN THESE MATTERS ON AN INFORMAL BASIS, AND IN THE LIGHT OF ANY CONCLUSIONS WHICH MAY BE REACHED TO SEE THAT ANY PROPOSALS RAISED AT THE NATO COUNCIL WITH RESPECT, FOR EXAMPLE, TO THE POOLING OF DEFENCE PRODUCTION, ARE CONSISTENT WITH ARRANGEMENTS AND PLANS WHICH MAY BE DEVELOPED ON A TRIPARTITE BASIS.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

FILE COPY

OUTGOING MESSAGE

DS 20

FM: EXTERNAL

DATE	FILE	SECURITY
Dec 2/57	50219-AK-40 58 50	SECRET
NUMBER	PRECEDENCE	COMCENTRE USE ONLY
DL1068	OPIMMEDIATE	JULES LEGER

TO: WASHINGTON DC

INFO:

*On Robertson
Secy Wals
Refused - CEO ST
ACR 31/12/57
DM-ADP
Jules 3
ML*

Ref.: YOURTEL 2527 OF NOV27

Subject: ATOMIC ENERGY - CANADA US UK COOPERATION

FOLLOWING FOR ROBERTSON FROM LEGER:

THIS TELEGRAM IS MEANT TO CONFIRM INFORMATION WITH RESPECT TO THE MEETING OF THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON DECEMBER 3 WHICH HAS BEEN GIVEN TO YOU IN PART BY TELEPHONE.

2. MINISTERS AGREED THAT BECAUSE OF THE NEED FOR AN EARLY DECISION ON REPRESENTATION IN THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE AND OUR UNCERTAINTY ABOUT ITS TERMS OF REFERENCE YOU SHOULD ATTEND THE FIRST MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE AS SENIOR CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE AND THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE SHOULD DESIGNATE TECHNICAL PERSONNEL AS REQUIRED TO ADVISE YOU. MINISTERS RECOGNIZED THAT THIS WOULD BE AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT AND COULD BE REVIEWED WHEN FURTHER INFORMATION BECAME AVAILABLE TO ENABLE A JUDGEMENT TO BE MADE ON THE NATURE OF PERMANENT CANADIAN REPRESENTATION.

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LOCAL
DISTRIBUTION

NO DISTRIBUTION WHATEVER. PLEASE PROVIDE TEN COPIES TO
J.J. MCCARDLE, ROOM 279 (ORIGINATOR)

ORIGINATOR

DIVISION

PHONE

APPROVED BY

SIG.....
NAME... J J McCARDLE

DL(1)

6-7921

SIG.....
NAME.....

2.

3. THE UK AND US REPRESENTATIVES RAISED THIS MATTER WITH THE MINISTER ON NOVEMBER 27 IN MUCH THE SAME TERMS AS THOSE OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE WHICH WAS CONTAINED IN YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. THE TEXT OF THE MINISTER'S LETTER OF NOVEMBER 28 TO THE US AMBASSADOR IS INCLUDED BELOW FOR YOUR INFORMATION. A SIMILAR LETTER WAS SENT AT THE SAME TIME TO THE UK REPRESENTATIVE HERE IN OTTAWA.

4. THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE HAVE DESIGNATED MAJOR GENERAL SPARLING AND DR. GREEN TO ASSIST YOU IN THE MEETING TOMORROW, DECEMBER 3. THE CHIEFS OF STAFF ARE EXAMINING THE VARIOUS FIELDS MENTIONED IN YOUR TELEGRAM AND WILL BE OFFERING ADVICE THIS COMING WEEK AS TO THE FIELDS IN WHICH THERE IS A DIRECT CANADIAN INTEREST. FURTHER THOUGHT WILL BE GIVEN TO CANADIAN REPRESENTATION ON A CONTINUING BASIS WHEN THERE IS MORE CERTAINTY AS TO THE NATURE OF THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE'S OPERATIONS.

5. EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE BY ALL CONCERNED TO PREVENT ANY LEAKAGE OF INFORMATION REGARDING THIS SUBJECT. THE GOVERNMENT HAS, AS YOU WILL SEE FROM THE MINISTER'S LETTER, RESERVED ITS POSITION ON ANSWERS TO DIRECT QUESTIONS IN THE HOUSE.

~~LEGER~~

COMMUNICATIONS: PLEASE COPY ATTACHED TEXT.

INWARD TELEGRAM TO THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM OTTAWA

FRC

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS LONDON.

Rec'd Nov 30 from Eamscliffe *File 50219-AK-40*
SENT: 100 a.m. 30th November 1957. *58*
RECD: 8.10 a.m. 30th November 1957. *3/11/57*

PRIORITY.

O. T. P.

NO. 2009

Ottawa No. 2009, repeated Her Majesty's
Ambassador Washington.

Your telegram No. 1221 and Washington
telegram No. 2514 to Foreign Office (paragraph 2).

ASSOCIATION OF CANADA WITH DEFENCE
COOPERATION.

2. We fully understand Canadian difficulties
about publicity and reasons why Mr. Diefenbaker has had
to make reservation about questions in Parliament. You
will have seen from paragraph 2 of Washington telegram
under reference precautionary line that has been agreed
in respect of Brundrett and Penney. It seems to us
some similar formula is desirable to meet the two
Canadian cases.

(1) If presence of Canadian representative
at discussions is detected and questions are raised
by Press or

(11) If questions are asked in Canadian
Parliament.

3. Obviously answers to both must be
reasonably compatible. Possible line might be

(1) Canadian representative could say if
questioned, that he had been meeting some of his American
technical contacts. If asked point blank whether he
had met any United Kingdom representatives, he could
say that he had taken opportunity to meet some United

/Kingdom.....

TOP SECRET

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*This is it with
appropriate "line"
for "Canadian"*

INWARD TELEGRAM TO THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM OTTAWA

FRC

-2-

Kingdom contacts who were in Washington at the time.

(11) Canadian Prime Minister could say if questioned in Parliament, that Canadian representatives had joined United States and United Kingdom representatives in certain ad hoc technical discussions on defence subjects in Washington.

4. Please discuss with Canadians and let us know if they are thinking on these lines. Point of paramount importance is of course to avoid any disclosure that Technical Committee is in existence.

mws. 30.11.57.

One copy for High Commissioner
One copy for Deputy High Commissioner
One copy for Mr. Crombie
Copy sent to Cdr. Cavendish
Copy sent to Mr. F.S. Barton

File Copy
copy given to CCOS - Dec 2

Perfel
HSCM

DS 2430
FM WASHDC NOV 29/57 SECRET
TO EXTERNAL 2538 OPIMMEDIATE

FOR UNDER SECRETARY

REF OUR TEL 2527 NOV 27

DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING COOPERATION IN THE ATOMIC ENERGY FIELD

ROPER, WHO DEALS WITH THESE MATTERS IN THE BRITISH EMBASSY, HAS INFORMED US THAT THE FOLLOWING WILL BE THE UK REPS AT THE MEETINGS

BEGINNING DEC 3:

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

SIR F BRUNDRETT, PERMANENT SCIENTIFIC ADVISER, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MR TM CROWLEY, ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, AND

SECRETARY, DEFENCE RESEARCH POLICY COMMITTEE

ATOMIC ENERGY AUTHORITY

SIR WILLIAM PENNEY

MR JA JUKES, ECONOMIC ADVISER TO THE AUTHORITY

MINISTRY OF SUPPLY

MR LJ DUNNETT, DEPUTY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF SUPPLY

DR R COCKBURN, DIRECTOR OF MISSILES

2. IN ADDITION THE FOLLOWING MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH JOINT SERVICES

MISSION WILL BE IN ATTENDANCE FOR THE DISCUSSION OF THE ITEMS (A)

TO (J) IN THE DEPT OF STATE MEMO HANDED TO THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR

ON NOV 27. (A) AND (B), LT COLONEL WALKLING, (C) LT COLONEL WALKLING,

COMMANDER WATTS, RN, GROUP CAPTAIN FRYER, RAF, (D) MR POLLARD, COMMANDER

LANIECE, RN, GROUP CAPTAIN FRYER, RAF, COLONEL COX OR MAJOR PRESTON,

AIR COMMODORE DICKEN, (E) MR REWSON, (F) MR POLLARD, LT COLONEL WALKLING

AND GROUP CAPTAIN FRYER, (G) COMMANDER BELLARS, RN, (H) AIR COMMODORE

DICKEN AND GROUP CAPTAIN FRYER, (I) MR POLLARD, (J) MR ALVEY (BRITISH

NAVAL STAFF).

3. ROPER SAID THAT ALL THE OFFICERS REFERRED TO IN PARA 2 ARE FROM

THE BRITISH JOINT SERVICES MISSION IN WASHDC. THE SENIOR REPS LISTED

IN PARA 1 WILL BE ARRIVING IN WASHDC OVER THE WEEKEND, AND PLAN TO

BE HERE INITIALLY FOR ABOUT A WEEK. AT THE OPENING AND GENERAL

SESSIONS IT IS STILL NOT WHOLLY CLEAR WHO WILL ATTEND ON THE USA

SIDE, BUT HE SAID THAT THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT STRAUSS AND

QUARLES WILL BE THE PRINCIPAL REPS, IN WHICH CASE THE UK AMBASSADOR

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50219-AK-46
58 50

PAGE TWO 2538

WOULD ALSO PLAN TO BE PRESENT. IN VIEW OF THE VERY CLOSE RELATIONSHIP OF THE PROBLEMS TO BE DISCUSSED TO THE MACMILLAN VISIT AND THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE, THE BRITISH EMBASSY IS PLANNING TO KEEP A PRETTY CLOSE EYE ON THE PROCEEDINGS, INCLUDING THE VARIOUS WORKING PARTY SESSIONS, AND ROPER WILL BE FOLLOWING THESE CONTACTS AND CONSULTATIONS CLOSELY.

4. WE ASKED HIM WHAT THE SIGNIFICANCE WAS OF THE PRESENT TARGET REPORTING DATE OF DEC20. HE SAID THAT NO SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE WAS TO BE ATTACHED TO THIS, BUT THAT THEY WERE ANXIOUS TO START THESE INFORMAL TALKS AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE, AND THAT AFTER A FIRST ROUND AND REPORTING TO GOVTS, THE WORKING PARTIES MIGHT BE RECONVENED.

5. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AN INDICATION FROM YOU OF WHICH OF THE SUB GROUPS ARE CONSIDERED OF DIRECT INTEREST AND WHO OUR REPS ON THE SUB GROUPS DESIGNATED WILL BE.

6. IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO IDENTIFY MORE FULLY THE ROSTER OF USA REPS SUMMARIZED IN OUR TEL 2528 NOV27 AS FOLLOWS:

MATERIALS-PAUL F FOSTER, ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES, AEC.

-PAUL C FINE, CHIEF, OFFICE OF OPERATIONS ANALYSIS AND PLANNING, AEC.

-GENERAL HB LOPER, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY LIAISON COMMITTEE, AEC
WEAPONS -GEN ALFRED D STARBIRD, DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF MILITARY APPLICATION, AEC

RW/CW -DR CHARLES L DUNHAM, DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE, AEC.

WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO CHECK ON IRVIN AND MACAULEY, BUT WE SHALL DO SO AND LET YOU KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

SECRET & PERSONAL



DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, CHIEFS OF STAFF
OTTAWA

29 November, 1957.

50219-AK-40	
43	50

Dear Mr. Leger:

Thank you very much for your letter of 28 November, with which you enclosed a copy of telegram 2527 from Washington dealing with an invitation from the United States and United Kingdom governments for Canadian representation at the meetings in Washington to begin on 3 December.

In conversation last night with Mr. Tremblay, I suggested that Major General Sparling and Dr. J.J. Green, the Military and Scientific Adviser to the Ambassador in Washington, should accompany Mr. Robertson to the preliminary meeting on 3 December, when an assessment could be made of the additional Canadian requirements to take part in the various fields in which we have a direct interest. I have requested the Chiefs of Staff to examine the various fields mentioned in the telegram and to advise me early next week of the fields in which they have a direct interest and would wish to provide representation. I have drawn to the attention of the Chiefs of Staff the necessity of preventing any leakage of information regarding this subject.

Yours sincerely,

(Charles Foxlkes)

General,
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. Jules Leger,
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,
East Block,
Ottawa, Ontario.

2.12.7(us)

000394

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
~~Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information~~
after signing

000395

Defence Liaison (1)

J.J. McCardle/McL

50219-AK-46
58 50

SECRET

November 29, 1957

My dear Colleague,

I thought it might be useful to set out in this fashion for the record the decision which we reached with the Prime Minister yesterday concerning our response to the invitation of the United States and United Kingdom Governments for Canadian participation in the meetings, to begin in Washington on December 3, to consider the areas and types of cooperation which might be undertaken in the atomic energy field. For convenience of reference I attach a copy of telegram No. 2527 of November 27 from our Embassy in Washington which contains the text of the United States aide-memoire on the subject.

In our discussion yesterday we agreed that because of the need for an early decision on representation in the Technical Committee, and our uncertainty about the Committee's terms of reference, our Ambassador, Mr. Robertson, should attend the first meeting of the Committee as the senior Canadian representative and that the Department of National Defence should designate technical personnel as required to advise Mr. Robertson. We recognized that this would be an interim arrangement and could be reviewed when sufficient information became available to enable a judgement to be made on the nature of permanent Canadian representation.

Later in the day I informed the United States and United Kingdom representatives of the Canadian Government's decision. I attach for your information a copy of my letter to the United States Ambassador. A similar letter was given to the

The Honourable George R. Pearkes, V.C.
Minister of National Defence
Department of National Defence
Ottawa, Canada

Copy sent to Mr. Bryce - Rec 3
Jm

2.

United Kingdom Acting High Commissioner. Both of these letters were given to the individuals concerned late yesterday afternoon.

I understand as well that the Under-Secretary has written to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, asking him to provide us with the names of the Department of National Defence representatives who will assist Mr. Robertson at the December 3 meeting.

Yours sincerely,

(SIGNED) SIDNEY SMITH

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Under Secretary *in file*

Security S.E.C.R.E.T

Date November 29, 1957

FROM: Defence Liaison (1) Division

File No.

60219-AK-40

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: United States and United Kingdom Invitation for
Canadian Participation in Atomic Energy Meetings

There is attached for your signature, if you concur, a Memorandum to the Minister, which covers a letter for his signature to the Minister of National Defence. Since the Canadian decision to participate in the meetings in Washington is a matter of major importance, I believe there should be a record of it.

2. When we gave the Minister's letter last night to Mr. Crombie, the United Kingdom Acting High Commissioner, he made a special plea that every effort should be made by the Canadian Government to avoid publicity concerning Canadian participation in the work of the Committee. We undertook to pass his comments to you, but gave no commitment beyond that contained in the Minister's letter. Since we are not certain whether Mr. Merchant said anything further to you about the matter of publicity, we have not made reference to the United Kingdom's point in the Minister's letter to Mr. Pearkes. You may, however, think it desirable to say something to the Minister on this score.

3. We have not circulated the telegram from Washington on this subject to anyone other than the Secretary to the Cabinet and the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff. It strikes us that the Atomic Energy Control Board and perhaps the National Research Council should be informed of these developments, but we are uncertain as to what the Minister's attitude on this point would be. Since there may be a good deal of correspondence develop, it would be useful to know the desires of the Ministers with respect to circulation of such correspondence.

This should be done. I can do signature to AECB & NRC.

The ASSEA spoke to Mr. Bennett of AECB. He has 2 short copies of message in this subject to him. J.M.

Defence Liaison (1) Division

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29.11.39(US)

SEEN BY THE MINISTER

*File
50219-AH-40
58*

S E C R E T

November 29, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

United States and United Kingdom Invitation for
Canadian Participation in Atomic Energy Meetings

I attach for your signature if you concur a letter to the Minister of National Defence regarding the decision taken yesterday with respect to the United States and United Kingdom invitation for Canadian representation at the Washington meetings to begin on December 3 and to be concerned with further cooperation in the atomic energy field. I believe there is merit in recording the Ministerial decision in this respect.

2. As indicated in the letter, I have written to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, asking him to name Department of National Defence representatives for the Washington meetings. I have as well informed our Embassy in Washington of Mr. Robertson's designation as senior Canadian representative for the December 3 meeting.

J.H.

*Letter sent British Office
2/12/57*

29.11.57(55)

000399

R

D.L. (1)/JJM/McL

50219-AR-40	
43	50

Handwritten signature

SECRET

November 28, 1957

Dear Mr. Merchant,

I refer to our conversation of November 27 and to the aide-memoire given by the Department of State to our Ambassador in Washington on the same date concerning the invitation from the United States and United Kingdom Governments for Canadian representation at the meetings in Washington beginning on December 3, to consider the areas and types of cooperation which might be undertaken in the atomic energy field.

I am very pleased to be able to confirm the Canadian Government's acceptance of this invitation. The Department of State will be informed as soon as possible of the names of the Canadian representatives.

The Canadian Government fully appreciates the necessity of keeping secret for the time being the fact that these talks are to take place and that the Canadian Government is to be associated with them. Every attempt will be made to prevent any leak of information in this respect from Canadian sources. I think we must, however, take into account the possibility that the fact of the meetings and of Canadian participation in them might become known to the press. This might result in questions in the House. I must, therefore, reserve the position of the Government with respect to

His Excellency Livingston T. Merchant
Ambassador of the United States of America
100 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Canada

. . . 2

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direct parliamentary questions, since the Government could not deny participation in the meetings if pressed on the point in Parliament. ✓

I take this opportunity to assure you that the Canadian Government welcomes this opportunity for even closer collaboration with the United States and the United Kingdom Governments in the atomic energy field.

Sgd. S. SMITH -

Yours sincerely,

D.L. (1)/JJM/McL

50219-AK-40	
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[Handwritten signature]

SECRET

November 28, 1957

Dear Mr. Crombie,

I refer to our conversation of November 27 and to the aide-memoire given by the Department of State to our Ambassador in Washington on the same date concerning the invitation from the United States and United Kingdom Governments for Canadian representation at the meetings in Washington, beginning on December 3, to consider the areas and types of cooperation which might be undertaken in the atomic energy field.

I am very pleased to be able to confirm the Canadian Government's acceptance of this invitation. The Department of State will be informed as soon as possible of the names of the Canadian representatives.

The Canadian Government fully appreciates the necessity of keeping secret for the time being the fact that these talks are to take place and that the Canadian Government is to be associated with them. Every attempt will be made to prevent any leak of information in this respect from Canadian sources. I think we must, however, take into account the possibility that the fact of the meetings and of Canadian participation in them might become known to the press. This might result in questions in the House. I must, therefore, reserve the position of the Government with respect to direct

G. E. Crombie, Esq., C.M.G.
Acting High Commissioner
Office of the High Commissioner
for the United Kingdom
Earncliffe
Ottawa, Canada

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parliamentary questions, since the Government could not deny participation in the meetings if pressed on the point in Parliament.

I take this opportunity to assure you that the Canadian Government welcomes this opportunity for even closer collaboration with the United States and United Kingdom Governments in the atomic energy field.

Sgd S. Smith

Yours sincerely,

D.L. (1)/JJM/McL

50219-AK-40	
43	52

Confidential
[Signature]

SECRET & PERSONAL

November 28, 1957

Dear General Foulkes,

I attach for your consideration a copy of telegram No. 2527 of November 27 from our Ambassador in Washington, which sets out an invitation from the United States and United Kingdom Governments for Canadian representation at meetings in Washington, beginning on December 3, to consider the areas and types of cooperation which might be undertaken by the three Governments in the atomic energy field.

It was decided earlier today by the Prime Minister, in consultation with your Minister and mine, that Mr. Robertson might attend the first meeting of the Technical Committee as the senior Canadian representative, and that the Department of National Defence should designate technical personnel as required to advise Mr. Robertson. This was recognized to be an interim arrangement which could be reviewed when further information became available to enable a judgement to be made on the nature of permanent Canadian representation.

My Minister has now informed the United States Ambassador and the United Kingdom High Commissioner of the Canadian

General C. Foulkes, CB, CBE, DSO, CD
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff
Department of National Defence
Ottawa, Canada

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Government's acceptance of the invitation. He indicated as well that we would be informing the Department of State as soon as possible of the names of the Canadian representatives at the meetings.

I should be grateful if you could let us have as soon as possible the names of individuals whom the Department of National Defence would wish to send to Washington as Canadian representatives on the sub-groups dealt with in the attached telegram. It is regrettable that we have not been given more time to obtain background information on the kind of subject which will be discussed at the meetings in Washington. The Department of National Defence may therefore wish to provide Canadian representation to these sub-groups on an interim basis until more is known of the nature of the continuing discussions.

The United Kingdom and United States representatives have laid great emphasis on the fact that there should be no publicity concerning Canadian participation in the Committee's work. Assurance has been offered to the United Kingdom and United States Governments that, short of answers to direct questions in the House, the Canadian Government will do all in its power to prevent any leak of information in this respect.

We would hope it would be possible for you to provide us with the names of the Department of National Defence representatives in time for us to inform Mr. Robertson by not later than early Monday, December 2.

Yours sincerely,

JULES LÉGER

Under-Secretary of State for
External Affairs

50219-AK-40

SECRET 43 |

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 28, 1957.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER (IN CABINET)

--- Please see the attached telegram.

Because of the need for an early decision on representation in the Technical Committee, and our uncertainty about the Committee's terms of reference, I am inclined to think that Mr. Norman Robertson might attend the first meeting as the senior Canadian representative, and that the Department of National Defence might be asked to designate technical personnel as required to advise Mr. Robertson. This would be an ~~interim~~ arrangement and could be reviewed when sufficient information is available to enable a judgment to be made on the nature of permanent Canadian representation.

I wonder if it would be possible to clear this with the Prime Minister, Mr. Pearkes and Mr. Bryce before they disperse at the end of today's Cabinet meeting.

J.L.

J.W.Holmes/PS
S E C R E T

November 28, 1957.

*File
J.W.H.*

50217-AK-	410
43	e

MEMORANDUM FOR DEFENCE LIAISON (1) DIVISION

Meeting on Scientific Consultation
in Washington

Mr. Robertson telephoned me late yesterday to say that he had just been called to a very private meeting with Mr. Murphy and Sir Harold Caccia. The purpose of the meeting was to bring Canada into the tripartite fold and invite us to the meeting on Scientific Consultation beginning on Tuesday. I said that I thought Mr. Merchant had already spoken to our Minister on this subject. Mr. Robertson said he understood that there were to be joint representations to us. As today is an American holiday and he was leaving Washington, Mr. Robertson was anxious to inform us before departing. The attached telegram No. 2528 from Washington follows up this conversation.

The point which Mr. Robertson stressed in particular was the absolute necessity of keeping this operation quiet. It would be most embarrassing if it were known that Canada was participating because of the "4th country problem". He had some doubts as to whether it could be kept quiet as Sir William Penney was coming out from England. However, he was most anxious that a leak, if there was one, should not come from Ottawa. I said that we were very well aware of this aspect of the invitation.

J.W.H.
J.W.H.

CC: Mr. Léger

28.11.16/55

O/SSEA/H.B.Robinson/jh

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE COPY

November 28, 1957.

50219-AK-46
58 ✓

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRYCE (IN CABINET)

Please see the attached telegram from Washington, memorandum to the Prime Minister and memorandum to Mr. Smith, re an invitation Canada has received to become the third member, with the United States and the United Kingdom, of a special Technical Committee on co-operation in the atomic energy field. Our first inkling of this invitation came last night when the United States Ambassador and the Acting United Kingdom High Commissioner called on Mr. Smith.

Both the AECCB and NRC should obviously be informed of this development, but we are uncertain whether they need be consulted re interim representation, particularly in view of the importance of securing an immediate Ministerial decision as to representation at the meeting on December 3. Presumably the nature of permanent Canadian representation can only be decided after we know the results of the first meeting.

J.L.

~~Mr. The President~~

Refer: ccos.
secy ltr.

DS33/424
FM WASHDC NOV 27/57 SECRET
TO EXTERNAL 2528 OPIMMEDIATE

FOR HOLMES FROM ROBERTSON

REF MY TEL 2527 NOV 27

File. — 50219-AK-40

low R.B. 12/2/57

50219-AK-40

43 58

HEREWITH IS THE PRESENT ROSTER OF USA REPRESENTATION FOR THE MEETING
ON SCIENTIFIC CONSULTATION WHICH IS TO BEGIN IN WASHDC ON DEC3.

BEGINS:

USA REPRESENTATION DEC3 MEETING

MATERIALS-FOSTER,FINE,LOPER

WEAPONS-STARBIRD,FINE,LOPER

PROPULSION-FOSTER,DAVIS,LOPER

DELIVERY SYSTEMS-MACAULEY,IRWIN,STARBIRD

RW/CW-MACAULEY,IRWIN,DUNHAM

OTHER FIELDS-MACAULEY,IRWIN, OTHERS FROM DEFENSE AS APPROPRIATE
ROBERTSON

DS37/426
FM WASHDC NOV27/57 SECRET
TO [] ERNAL 2527 OPIMMEDIATE

FOR HOLMES FROM ROBERTSON

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AIDEMEMOIRE INVITING CANADA TO BE REPRESENTED AT SECRET TALKS WITH THE USA AND UK AS TO THE AREAS AND TYPES OF COOPERATION WHICH MIGHT BE UNDERTAKEN IN THE ATOMIC ENERGY FIELD. THIS AIDEMEMOIRE WAS GIVEN TO ME THIS AFTERNOON BY ROBERT MURPHY, DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE, AT A MEETING AT WHICH THE UK AMBASSADOR WAS ALSO PRESENT. I UNDERSTAND SIMILAR COMMUNICATIONS ARE TO BE MADE TO OUR MINISTER, JOINTLY BY THE USA AMBASSADOR AND THE UK HIGH COMMISSIONER IN OTTAWA.

2. GREAT IMPORTANCE IS ATTACHED TO KEEPING THE FACT SECRET THAT THESE TALKS ARE TO TAKE PLACE, PRIMARILY BECAUSE THE OTHER NATO ALLIES WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE UPSET IF THEY THOUGHT THAT THERE WERE ORGANIZED CONSULTATIONS GOING AHEAD BETWEEN THE USA, THE UK AND CANADA, TO WHICH THEY HAD NOT BEEN INVITED. BEGINS:

AS STATED IN THE "DECLARATION OF COMMON PURPOSE" AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE RECENT MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER, THE USA AND THE UK ENVISAGE CLOSE AND FRUITFUL COLLABORATION OF THEIR SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS IN THE ATOMIC ENERGY FIELD. THE PRESIDENT WILL REQUEST THE CONGRESS TO AMEND THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT AS MAY BE NECESSARY AND DESIRABLE TO THIS END.

A TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF USA AND UK EXPERTS IS TO REPORT BY DEC20 AS TO THE AREAS AND TYPES OF COOPERATION WHICH MIGHT BE UNDERTAKEN. ANY SUCH CLOSER COOPERATION WOULD, OF COURSE, BE CONTINGENT ON THE NECESSARY REVISION OF THE USA ATOMIC ENERGY ACT.

THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE IS TO MEET IN WASHDC BEGINNING DEC3. THE UK REPS WILL BE SIR FREDERICK BRUNDRETT, SIR WILLIAM PENNEY, AND DR ROBERT COCKBURN. SUBGROUPS WILL CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING SUBJECTS:

- A. NUCLEAR MATERIALS.
- B. NUCLEAR WARHEADS.
- C. MILITARY PROPULSION AND POWER REACTORS.
- D. DELIVERY SYSTEMS.

01002

*Run See. Secretary Supply
(DM 30 P.)*
*See Sec. House Weapons
Est.*

PAGE TWO 2527

E.CHEMICAL AND RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE.

F.DEFENSE AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES.

G.ANTISUBMARINE DETECTION AND DEFENSE.

H.AIRCRAFT AND AEROENGINES.

I.INFRARED RESEARCH.

J.THERMIONIC VALVE RESEARCH.

THE USA AND THE UK WOULD WELCOME DESIGNATION OF A CANADIAN MEMBER OF THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE.THE UK AND THE USA WOULD ALSO WELCOME A CANADIAN OBSERVER ON THOSE SUBGROUPS CONSIDERING ACTIVITIES OF DIRECT INTEREST TO THE CANADIAN GOVT.

THESE DISCUSSIONS ARE,OF COURSE,INFORMAL AND HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL.IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE ASSOCIATION OF THE CANADIAN GOVT WITH THESE TALKS BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE TIME BEING; THIS COULD BE LOOKED AT AGAIN AFTER THE NATO MEETING.TEXT ENDS
ROBERTSON

SECRET



Office of

The Secretary of State for External Affairs
Canada

Ottawa, November 27, 1957.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

Mr. Smith tried unsuccessfully to reach you by telephone just after 6.00 p.m. to report on a visit he had this afternoon from the United States Ambassador and the Acting United Kingdom High Commissioner.

Messrs. Merchant and Crombie were under instructions to confirm an invitation which was this afternoon conveyed in Washington to our Ambassador that the Canadian Government should become the third member of the Special Committee on Atomic Weapons and Development, which was established at the time of Mr. Macmillan's recent visit to Washington. The Canadian Government is asked to send a representative to Washington to a meeting of the Committee which will take place on December 3.

Mr. Merchant, who did the talking, made two supplementary points:

- (a) in the view of the United Kingdom and United States it was of first importance that there should be no publicity concerning Canada's adherence to the Committee; and
- (b) there were a number of sub-committees branching out from the main committee. Canadian membership of the main committee would also involve attendance at meetings of all the sub-committees except one, which was concerned with advanced weapon design. Canadian attendance at the proceedings of this sub-committee was, Mr. Merchant said, precluded by United States security regulations. In any case, the sub-committee was concerned with a field of work in which Canada was not involved.

The Minister said that, subject to clearance with you, he felt certain that Canada would gladly accept the invitation to join the Special Committee. He also agreed to the importance of avoiding publicity, particularly in view of the

sensitivities of other countries (France, Germany etc.) who are not invited to join the Committee.

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The Minister asked me to say that he was sure you would agree that an affirmative response to the Anglo-American approach would be in keeping with your own desire, expressed most recently at the time of Mr. Macmillan's visit to Ottawa, to co-operate in every way possible with the United States and the United Kingdom.

H.B.R.
H.B.R.

we shall be receiving further and ~~more precise details~~ from our Embassy in Washington. The Minister wanted you to know right away of this invitation

(11)

I think that it is highly desirable that Canada should become a member of this Committee

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Argo
50359-A-40

50219-AK-40
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October 30, 1957.

We have received no information of an agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States to share development in this field. On the 24th of October a joint statement issued by the President of the U.S.A. and the Prime Minister of the U.K. announced the setting up of a study group to "make recommendations in the field of nuclear relationship and co-operation". Although Canada has not yet been invited to join this Anglo-American group, we will continue to share with these countries information obtained through our own research and developments.

Byfile
Sam

50219-AK-40
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HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES

Wednesday, October 30, 1957

P.562

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

STATEMENT AS TO PARTICIPATION OF CANADA
IN ANGLO-AMERICAN GROUP

On the orders of the day:

Hon. G. R. Pearkes (Minister of National Defence): While I am on my feet might I give a reply to a question asked yesterday by the hon. member for Algoma East (Mr. Pearson). The hon. member asked whether Canada is to be included in the agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States, as reported in the press of that day in Washington, to divide the responsibility for development of future atomic weapons and to share information obtained in their separate research and development. I would refer to the joint statement issued on October 26 by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, which states as follows:

The President of the United States will request congress to amend the atomic energy act as may be necessary and desirable to permit the close and fruitful collaboration of scientists and engineers of Great Britain, the United States and other friendly countries.

I assume when the hon. member speaks of an agreement it is to this statement that he refers. It will be noted that the President is to request congress to make amendments to allow the collaboration of scientists and engineers from not only Great Britain and the United States but also other friendly countries. We are sure that both the United States and the United Kingdom regard Canada as a friendly country, and therefore we would be included in any arrangements which might be made under these amendments.

Ref
SM

HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES

50219-AK-40

Tuesday, October 29, 1957

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P.506

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

**INQUIRY AS TO PARTICIPATION OF CANADA IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN GROUP**

On the orders of the day:

Hon. L. B. Pearson (Algoma East): I should like to direct a question to the Minister of National Defence, as to whether Canada is to be included in the agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States, as reported in the press today from Washington, to divide the responsibility for developing future atomic weapons, and to share the information obtained in their separate research and development?

Hon. G. R. Pearkes (Minister of National Defence): I shall be pleased to take that question as notice.

Receivable History on 50219-AK-40
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TO EXTERNAL 2270 EMERGENCY
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REF OUR TEL 2260 OCT24

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER MACMILLAN

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE PRESIDENT
AND THE PRIME MINISTER AT THE CONCLUSION OF THEIR CONVERSATIONS AND
WHICH HAS JUST BEEN ISSUED BY THE WHITE HOUSE: BEGINS:

DECLARATION OF COMMON PURPOSE

THE PRESIDENT OF THE USA AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE UK, AT THE
END OF THREE DAYS OF MEETINGS AT WHICH THEY WERE ASSISTED BY THE
SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND OTHER ADVISERS,
ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

I.

WE HAVE MET TOGETHER AS TRUSTED FRIENDS OF MANY YEARS WHO HAVE
COME TO HEAD THE GOVTS OF OUR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES. THESE TWO
COUNTRIES HAVE CLOSE AND HISTORIC TIES, JUST AS EACH HAS INTI-
MATE AND UNBREAKABLE TIES WITH OTHER FREE COUNTRIES.

RECOGNIZING THAT ONLY IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST PEACE CAN
THE DEEPEST ASPIRATIONS OF FREE PEOPLES BE REALIZED, THE GUIDING
PURPOSE OF OUR DELIBERATIONS HAS BEEN THE DETERMINATION OF HOW BEST
TO UTILIZE THE MORAL, INTELLECTUAL AND MATERIAL STRENGTH OF OUR TWO
NATIONS IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OUR FULL SHARE OF THOSE TASKS THAT
WILL MORE SURELY AND PROMPTLY BRING ABOUT CONDITIONS IN WHICH PEACE
CAN PROSPER. ONE OF THESE TASKS IS TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE SECURITY
FOR THE FREE WORLD.

THE FREE NATIONS POSSESS VAST ASSETS, BOTH MATERIAL AND MORAL.
THESE IN THE AGGREGATE ARE FAR GREATER THAN THOSE OF THE COMMUNIST
WORLD. WE DO NOT IGNORE THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET RULERS CAN ACHIEVE
FORMIDABLE MATERIAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS BY CONCENTRATING UPON SELECTED
DEVELOPMENTS AND SCIENTIFIC APPLICATIONS, AND BY YOKING THEIR PEOPLE
TO THIS EFFORT. DESPOTISMS HAVE OFTEN BEEN ABLE TO PRODUCE SPECTACU-
LAR MONUMENTS. BUT THE PRICE HAS BEEN HEAVY. FOR ALL PEOPLES YEARN
FOR INTELLECTUAL AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM, THE MORE SO IF FROM THEIR
BONDAGE THEY SEE OTHERS MANIFEST THE GLORY OF FREEDOM. EVEN DESPOTS
ARE FORCED TO PERMIT FREEDOM TO GROW BY AN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS,

PAGE TWO 2270

OR IN TIME THERE WILL BE VIOLENT REVOLUTION. THIS PRINCIPLE IS INEXORABLE IN ITS OPERATION. ALREADY IT HAS BEGUN TO BE NOTICE-ABLE EVEN WITHIN THE SOVIET ORBIT. IF THE FREE NATIONS ARE STEADFAST, AND IF THEY UTILIZE THEIR RESOURCES IN HARMONIOUS COOPERATION THE TOTALITARIAN MENACE THAT NOW CONFRONTS THEM WILL IN GOOD TIME RECEDE.

IN ORDER, HOWEVER, THAT FREEDOM MAY BE SECURE AND SHOW ITS GOOD FRUITS, IT IS NECESSARY FIRST THAT THE COLLECTIVE MILITARY STRENGTH OF THE FREE NATIONS SHOULD BE ADEQUATE TO MEET THE THREAT AGAINST THEM. AT THE SAME TIME, THE AGGREGATE OF THE FREE WORLD'S MILITARY EXPENDITURE MUST BE KEPT WITHIN LIMITS COMPATIBLE WITH INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM. OTHERWISE WE RISK LOSING THE VERY LIBERTIES WHICH WE SEEK TO DEFEND.

THESE IDEAS HAVE BEEN THE CENTRAL THEME OF OUR CONVERSATIONS WHICH, IN PART, WERE PARTICIPATED IN BY MR SPAAN THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO.

IN APPLICATION OF THESE IDEAS, AND AS AN EXAMPLE WHICH WE BELIEVE CAN AND SHOULD SPREAD AMONG THE NATIONS OF THE FREE WORLD, WE REACHED THE FOLLOWING UNDERSTANDING:

II

1. THE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH THE NATIONS OF THE FREE WORLD HAVE MADE FOR COLLECTIVE DEFENSE AND MUTUAL HELP ARE BASED ON THE RECOGNITION THAT THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY IS NOW OUT OF DATE. THE COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD ARE INTERDEPENDENT AND ONLY IN GENUINE PARTNERSHIP, BY COMBINING THEIR RESOURCES AND SHARING TASKS IN MANY FIELDS, CAN PROGRESS AND SAFETY BE FOUND. FOR OUR PART, WE HAVE AGREED THAT OUR TWO COUNTRIES WILL HENCEFORTH ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS PRINCIPLE.

2. OUR REPS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL WILL URGE AN ENLARGED ATLANTIC EFFORT IN SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN SUPPORT OF GREATER COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE EXPANSION OF CURRENT ACTIVITIES OF THE TASK FORCE WORKING IN THIS FIELD UNDER THE COUNCIL'S DECISION OF LAST DEC.

3. THE PRESIDENT OF THE USA WILL REQUEST THE CONGRESS TO

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PAGE THREE 2270

AMEND THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT AS MAY BE NECESSARY AND DESIRABLE TO PERMIT OF CLOSE AND FRUITFUL COLLABORATION OF SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS OF GREAT BRITAIN, THE USA, AND OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES.

4. THE DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS MADE BY THE WESTERN REPS ON THE DISARMAMENT SUBCOMMITTEE IN LONDON AND APPROVED BY ALL MEMBERS OF NATO ARE A SOUND AND FAIR BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD REDUCE THE THREAT OF WAR AND THE BURDEN OF ARMAMENTS. THE INDEFINITE ACCUMULATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE INDISCRIMINATE SPREADING OF THE CAPACITY TO PRODUCE THEM SHOULD BE PREVENTED. EFFECTIVE AND RELIABLE INSPECTION MUST BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF INITIAL STEPS IN THE CONTROL AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS.

5. IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH DISARMAMENT AS WE ARE SEEKING, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY NOW DEPENDS, NOT MERELY ON LOCAL DEFENSIVE SHIELDS, BUT UPON REINFORCING THEM WITH THE DETERRENT AND RETALIATORY POWER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SO LONG AS THE THREAT OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM PERSISTS, THE FREE NATIONS MUST BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE FOR THEIR OWN SECURITY. BECAUSE THE FREEWORLD MEASURES ARE PURELY DEFENSIVE AND FOR SECURITY AGAINST OUTSIDE THREAT, THE PERIOD FOR WHICH THEY MUST BE MAINTAINED CANNOT BE FORESEEN. IT IS NOT WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF EACH NATION ACTING ALONE TO MAKE ITSELF FULLY SECURE. ONLY COLLECTIVE MEASURES WILL SUFFICE. THESE SHOULD PREFERABLY BE FOUND BY IMPLEMENTING THE PROVISIONS OF THE UN CHARTER FOR FORCES AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT IF THE USSR PERSISTS IN NULLIFYING THESE PROVISIONS BY VETO, THERE MUST OTHERWISE BE DEVELOPED A GREATER SENSE OF COMMUNITY SECURITY. THE FRAMEWORK FOR THIS EXISTS IN COLLECTIVE DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS NOW PARTICIPATED IN BY NEARLY 50 FREE NATIONS, AS AUTHORIZED BY THE CHARTER. ALL MEMBERS OF THIS COMMUNITY, AND OTHER FREE NATIONS WHICH SO DESIRE, SHOULD POSSESS MORE KNOWLEDGE OF THE TOTAL CAPABILITIES OF SECURITY THAT ARE IN BEING AND IN PROSPECT. THERE SHOULD ALSO BE PROVIDED GREATER OPPORTUNITY TO ASSURE THAT THIS POWER WILL IN FACT BE AVAILABLE IN CASE OF NEED FOR THEIR COMMON SECURITY, AND THAT IT WILL NOT BE MISUSED BY ANY NATION FOR PURPOSES OTHER THAN INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE SELFDEFENCE, AS AUTHORIZED BY THE CHARTER OF THE UN.

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PAGE FOUR 2270

FOR OUR PART WE REGARD OUR POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS POWER AS A TRUST FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE FREE WORLD.

6.OUR TWO COUNTRIES PLAN TO DISCUSS THESE IDEAS WITH ALL OF THEIR SECURITY PARTNERS.SO FAR AS THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE IS CONCERNED, THE DEC MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MAY,PERHAPS,BE GIVEN A SPECIAL CHARACTER IN THIS RESPECT.THIS HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE SECRETARYGENERAL OF NATO M SPAAK.

7.IN ADDITION TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY,THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY,THE BAGHDAD PACT AND OTHER SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS CONSTITUTE A STRONG BULWARK AGAINST AGGRESSION IN THE VARIOUS TREATY AREAS.THERE ARE ALSO VITALLY IMPORTANT RELATIONSHIPS OF A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT CHARACTER.THERE IS THE COMMONWEALTH;AND IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES.THERE ARE INDIVIDUAL MUTUAL DEFENSE AGREEMENTS TO WHICH THE USA IS A PARTY.

8.WE RECOGNIZE THAT OUR COLLECTIVE SECURITY EFFORTS MUST BE SUPPORTED AND REINFORCED BY COOPERATIVE ECONOMIC ACTION.THE PRESENT OFFERS A CHALLENGING OPPORTUNITY FOR IMPROVEMENT OF TRADING CONDITIONS AND THE EXPANSION OF TRADE THROUGHOUT THE FREE WORLD. IT IS ENCOURAGING THAT PLANS ARE DEVELOPING FOR A EUROPEAN FREE TRADE AREA IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET.WE RECOGNIZE THAT ESPECIALLY IN THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES THERE SHOULD BE A STEADY AND SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN STANDARDS OF LIVING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

9.WE TOOK NOTE OF SPECIFIC FACTORS IN THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE IN WHICH WE ARE ENGAGED.IN PARTICULAR,WE WERE IN FULL AGREEMENT THAT: SOVIET THREATS DIRECTED AGAINST TURKEY GIVE SOLEMN SIGNIFICANCE TO THE OBLIGATION,UNDER ARTICLE 5 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, TO CONSIDER AN ARMED ATTACK AGAINST ANY MEMBER OF THE ALLIANCE AS AN ATTACK AGAINST ALL;

THE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY BY FREE ELECTIONS IS ESSENTIAL. AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OF 1955 MESSRS KHRUSHCHEV AND BULGANIN AGREED TO THIS WITH US AND OUR FRENCH ALLIES.CONTINUED REPUDIATION

...5

PAGE FIVE 2270
OF THAT AGREEMENT AND CONTINUED SUPPRESSION OF FREEDOM IN EASTERN
EUROPE UNDERMINE INTERNATIONAL CONFIDENCE AND PERPETUATE AN INJUS-
TICE, A FOLLY AND A DANGER.

III.

THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER BELIEVE THAT THE UNDER-
STAANDINGS THEY HAVE REACHED WILL BE INCREASINGLY EFFECTIVE AS THEY
BECOME MORE WIDESPREAD BETWEEN THE FREE NATIONS. BY COORDINATING THE
STRENGTH OF ALL FREE PEOPLES, SAFETY CAN BE ASSURED, THE DANGER OF
COMMUNIST DESPOTISM WILL IN DUE COURSE BE DISSIPATED, AND A JUST AND
LASTING PEACE WILL BE ACHIEVED. ENDS.

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JOINT STATEMENT ON ANGLO AMERICAN CONFERENCE

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A JOINT STATEMENT ON ANGLO AMERICAN WHITE
HOUSE CONFERENCE RELEASED TODAY BY PRESS SECRETARY HAGERTY
AND PETER HOPE OF NEWS DEPT OF FO: BEGINS:

AT THE MEETING THIS MORNING THE PRESIDENT, THE PRIME MINISTER,
THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE FOREIGN SECRETARY REPORTED BRIEFLY
THE GENERAL SENSE OF THEIR PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS OF LAST NIGHT.

ALL FOUR STRESSED THE FACT THAT THIS MEETING WAS BEING HELD
TO STUDY WAYS IN WHICH OUR TWO COUNTRIES CAN BE OF GREATER SERVICE
TO THE FREE WORLD, AND TOWARDS THAT END HOW OUR JOINT RESOURCES
CAN BE POOLED AND UTILIZED TO MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY.

IN THIS CONNECTION, AT THIS MORNING'S MEETING THE PRESIDENT AND
THE PRIME MINISTER SET UP TWO STUDY GROUPS. THESE ARE:

1. A GROUP HEADED BY LEWIS L STRAUSS, CHAIRMAN OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY
COMMISSION AND SIR EDWIN PLOWDEN, CHAIRMAN OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY
AUTHORITY.

2. A GROUP HEADED BY SIR RICHARD POWELL, PERMANENT SECRETARY OF THE
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND DONALD QUARLES, DEPUTY SECRETARY, DEPT
OF DEFENSE.

THE STRAUSS-PLOWDEN GROUP WAS ASSIGNED THE DUTIES OF MAKING
RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIP AND COOPERATION.

THE POWELL-QUARLES GROUP WAS ASKED TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS IN
THE FIELD OF MILITARY DEFENSE, PARTICULARLY THOSE PROBLEMS DEALING
WITH MISSILES AND ROCKETRY.

UNDER THE DIRECTIVE OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER IT
WAS EMPHASIZED THAT THE WORK OF THESE TWO GROUPS SHOULD BE GUIDED
BY THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLE OF THE MEETING--NAMESLY, HOW OUR TWO
COUNTRIES CAN BE OF GREATER SERVICE TO THE FREE WORLD. ENDS.

2. ACCORDING TO AP HAGERTY, IN REPLYING TO QUESTIONS, THOUGHT THE
ADVISERS WOULD REPORT TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT

PAGE TWO 2260

BEFORE THE ROUND OF TALKS ENDS TOMORROW AND THAT THE REPORT WOULD BE REFLECTED IN THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE. HE IS ALSO REPORTED BY AP TO HAVE ADDED THAT WHETHER THE EXPERT GROUPS CONTINUE TO WORK AFTER THE PRESENT DISCUSSIONS END WILL DEPEND ON FURTHER DECISIONS BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT. QUESTIONED ABOUT THE FACT THAT PRESIDENT EISENHOWER WOULD BE LIMITED IN WHAT HE COULD DO TO INCREASE USA-BRITISH COOPERATION IN ATOMIC RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT UNLESS USA LAW IS CHANGED, HAGERTY SAID "BOTH THE BRITISH AND OURSELVES" REALIZE LEGISLATION IN THIS FIELD WOULD BE NEEDED AND THE FACT HAS BEEN FULLY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES

Tuesday, October 22, 1957

P.240

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

**PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF SCIENTIFIC
INFORMATION**

On the orders of the day:

Mr. H. R. Argue (Assiniboia): Mr. Speaker, I have a question not related to the statement of the Minister of Trade and Commerce. I should like to direct the question to the Prime Minister. Can he tell us whether, as a result of his discussion with President Eisenhower, steps are being taken to exchange scientific information, and whether it is contemplated to undertake any joint scientific projects?

Right Hon. J. G. Diefenbaker (Prime Minister): I want to thank my hon. friend for having given me notice of this question. I will say this. This week end, when the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom visits Ottawa, one of the matters for consideration will no doubt be the exchange of scientific information. I am one of those who believe there is a necessity, having regard to the scientific advances being made today, for the free world to unite to the greatest degree possible in a spirit of co-operation to pool scientific information so that the free world will maintain its superiority in that direction. After I have the opportunity of discussing this matter with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom I will say more. At this time I can say no less.



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USA PROPOSALS RE CLOSER INTEGRATION OF ATOMIC CAPABILITIES IN
DEFENCE OF NORTHAMERICA

AS THE STATE DEPT HAD INFORMALLY INDICATED IN ADVANCE TO US,
MR JOHN JONES, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS,
CALLED ME TO THE DEPT TODAY FOR THE PURPOSE OF OUTLINING USA
PROPOSALS FOR THE CLOSER INTEGRATION OF ATOMIC CAPABILITIES IN
DEFENCE OF NORTHAMERICA. GENERAL LOPER, CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY
COMMITTEE TO THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, WAS PRESENT, AS WERE
REPS OF THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR ATOMIC ENERGY
MATTERS IN THE STATE DEPT, AND OFFICIALS FROM THE CANADIAN DESK.
JONES EXPLAINED THAT HE WAS RECEIVING ME IN THE ABSENCE OF BURKE
ELBRICK, WHO HAS LEFT FOR THE NATO MEETINGS. HE BEGAN BY REFERRING
TO EARLIER DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN MR ELBRICK AND MY PREDECESSOR ON
SEP19/56, WHEN THE STATE DEPT OUTLINED ITS PLANS FOR AN AGREEMENT
GOVERNING THE USE BY USAF OF THE MB-1 AIR TO AIR ROCKET. THIS
PARTICULAR AGREEMENT WAS NOW IN EFFECT AS A RESULT OF FORMAL EX-
CHANGES OF NOTES BETWEEN THE TWO GOVTS. JONES SAID THAT THE EARLIER
MEETING CONSTITUTED THE FIRST STEP IN THE STUDY OF MEANS BY WHICH
SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE TO INCORPORATE ATOMIC
WEAPONS INTO COMMON AIR DEFENCE OF THE NORTHAMERICAN CONTINENT.
THE MB-1 AGREEMENT WHICH HAD BEEN CONCLUDED ON FEB19/57, HAD BEEN
RENEWED ON JUN28 LAST TO BE EFFECTIVE UNTIL JUL1/58.

2. THE USA AUTHORITIES NOW WISHED TO BEGIN EXPLORATIONS IN THE
FIRST INSTANCE IN USA-CANADIAN MILITARY CHANNELS OF WAYS AND MEANS
OF BRINGING ABOUT A CLOSER INTEGRATION OF ATOMIC CAPABILITIES IN
CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENCE. (THIS INTENTION WAS REFERRED TO IN THE
MOST RECENT USA NOTE CONCERNING MB-1 ROCKET OVERFLIGHT ARRANGEMENTS.)
THE MATTERS THEY WOULD LIKE TO TAKE UP IN THESE TALKS WOULD INCLUDE:-

(A) WAYS AND MEANS UNDER THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF SUPPLYING MB-1
ROCKETS TO RCAF INTERCEPTORS; (B) THE PROVISION OF ATOMIC WAR^{HE}HEADS
TO ANY BOMARC UNITS THAT MAY BE ESTABLISHED IN CANADA; (C) POSSIBLE
CANADIAN REQUIREMENTS FOR NIKE-HERCULES TYPE WEAPONS WITH

PAGE TWO 2630
ATOMIC WARHEADS.

3. THESE PROPOSED TALKS WOULD ALSO INCLUDE PLANS FOR STORAGE OF MB-1 ROCKETS FOR EMPLOYMENT BY USAF INTERCEPTORS AT GOOSE BAY AND CERTAIN OTHER POINTS IN CANADA. THE USA NAVY IS PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CANADIAN NAVY CONCERNING AN ITEM OF MORE URGENCY, NAMELY, THE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR ANTI-SUBMARINE DEVICES AT THE LEASED BASE IN ARGENTIA.

4. JONES INDICATED THAT BEFORE ANY STEPS ARE TAKEN TO INITIATE THE PROPOSED DISCUSSIONS THROUGH MILITARY CHANNELS, THE VIEWS AND COMMENTS OF THE CANADIAN GOVT WERE BEING SOUGHT IN ADVANCE.

5. AS A SEPARATE MATTER, THE STATE DEPT WISHED TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF THE STORAGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT GOOSE BAY FOR SAC, IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THE OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND. THE USA REQUEST ON THIS ASPECT WAS SET FORTH IN AN AIDE MEMOIRE, THE TEXT OF WHICH IS CONTAINED IN MY TEL 2631. JONES EXPLAINED THAT THE QUESTION OF THE ARRANGEMENT FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT GOOSE BAY WAS BEING TAKEN UP WITH US DIRECTLY WITHOUT PRIOR MILITARY CONSULTATION PRIMARILY FOR THE REASON THAT LONG STANDING (XYZ) PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN IN EFFECT WITH CANADA COVERING THE CLEARANCE OF SAC PLANES CARRYING ATOMIC WEAPONS.

6. ON ALL THE FOREGOING MATTERS IT WAS MADE CLEAR THAT THE USA AUTHORITIES LOOKED FOR AN EXPRESSION OF THE VIEWS OF THE CANADIAN GOVT BEFORE ANY EXPLORATIONS THROUGH MILITARY CHANNELS ARE BEGUN. I TOLD JONES IN REPLY THAT THESE PROPOSALS WOULD BE BROUGHT TO YOUR ATTENTION AT ONCE, BUT INDICATED THAT IN VIEW OF THE FORTHCOMING NATO MEETING, AND THE ABSENCE OF MINIST^ERS FROM OTTAWA, THERE MIGHT BE SOME DELAY IN OBTAINING YOUR VIEWS.

7. I RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE PRESENTATION OF ~~THE~~ THESE PROPOSALS TO ANY PROPOSALS WHICH MAY BE MADE AT THE FORTHCOMING NATO SESSIONS. JONES RECOGNIZED THE CLEAR RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO, AND SAID THAT THE PROPOSALS PRESENTED TO US TODAY MIGHT HAVE TO BE MODIFIED IN SOME RESPECTS AS A RESULT OF THE NATO DISCUSSIONS, AND THAT CONVERSELY, THEY MIGHT TO SOME EXTENT AFFECT THE PROPOSALS TO BE MADE IN THE NATO CONTEXT. THE STATE DEPT HAD CONCLUDED, HOWEVER, THAT THESE PROPOSALS SHOULD BE BROUGHT ^{TO} YOUR _{hour}

PAGE THREE 2630

ATTENTION BEFORE THE NATO MEETING PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THE LONG HIS Y OF CLOSE COOPERATION IN DEFENCE MATTERS, AND OUR COMMON RESPONSIBILITIES IN JOINT DEFENCE.

8. THE QUESTION WAS RAISED AS TO WHETHER THE PROPOSED PROVISION OF THE MB-1ROCKET TO THE RCAF COULD BE ARRANGED WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS OF THE PRESENT ATOMIC ENERGY LEGISLATION. GENERAL LOPER REPLIED TO THIS, POINTING OUT THAT THE LIMITATIONS OF PRESENT LEGISLATION REQUIRED USA CUSTODY, BUT THAT THIS WAS ONE OF THE DETAILED MATTERS WHICH IT WAS HOPED TO EXPLORE FURTHER IN THE MILITARY DISCUSSIONS ENVISAGED. PRESUMABLY SIMILAR PROBLEMS WOULD HAVE TO BE EXAMINED IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROPOSED PROVISION OF ATOMIC WARHEADS TO ANY BOMARC UNITS THAT MIGHT BE ESTABLISHED IN CANADA, AND TO THE POSSIBLE PROVISION FOR CANADIAN REQUIREMENTS OF NIKE-HERCULES WEAPONS WITH ATOMIC WARHEADS.

9. IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE PROPOSALS, AND THEIR POLITICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA, I DREW ATTENTION TO MY UNDERSTANDING THAT WHEN THE QUESTION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF STORAGE FOR NON-NUCLEAR COMPONENTS AT GOOSE BAY HAD COME UP SOME YEARS AGO, UNDER THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIONS IN BOTH COUNTRIES, WE HAD BEEN INFORMED OF THE INTERNAL CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD GOVERN THE REACHING OF A DECISION BY THE PRESIDENT TO AUTHORIZE THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. MY UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT WHILE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF DECISION FOR THEIR USE LAY ULTIMATELY IN THE HANDS OF THE PRESIDENT, THERE HAD BEEN SET UP A DIRECT CHAIN OF PRIOR CONSULTATION IN WHICH THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS INCLUDED WHICH HAD TO BE FOLLOWED BEFORE A FINAL DECISION WITH RESPECT TO USE WAS TAKEN. I ASKED IF THESE ARRANGEMENTS WERE PRESENTLY IN FORCE. GENERAL LOPER SAID THAT UNDER EXISTING LEGISLATION AND THE RULES OF PROCEDURE, THE PRESIDENT HAD THE FINAL AUTHORITY, AND THAT HE ASSUMED THAT THE DECISION AS TO WHOM HE SHOULD CONSULT WOULD BE HIS. (I FEEL THAT THIS MATTER OF INTERNAL USA PROCEDURE THOUGH TECHNICALLY A DOMESTIC ONE IS IN FACT OF VERY GREAT AND DIRECT CONCERN TO A COUNTRY ASSOCIATED AS CLOSELY WITH USA DEFENCE AS CANADA IS).

10. IN REPLY TO A FURTHER QUESTION ON MY PART, JONES AND GENERAL 000429

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LOPE" BOTH CONFIRMED THAT THE ARRANGEMENT REQUESTED IN THE AIDE MEMOIRE FOR THE STORAGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT GOOSE BAY WAS SIMILAR TO AN ARRANGEMENT ALREADY CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE USA AND THE UK GOVT. ON THIS POINT MY UNDERSTANDING IS THAT THE NEW ELEMENT IS THAT WHILE ARRANGEMENTS ARE PRESENTLY IN EFFECT FOR THE STORAGE OF THE NON-NUCLEAR COMPONENTS AT GOOSE BAY FOR SAC, THE PRESENT REQUEST RELATES TO A REQUEST FOR THE STORAGE OF THE NUCLEAR COMPONENTS.

11. WE ARE NOT PROPOSING ANY DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MSG. YOU WILL PRESUMABLY, HOWEVER, REPEAT IT TO THE MINISTER AT NATOPARIS, WHERE HE CAN DISCUSS IT WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND GENERAL PEARKS ROBERTSON.

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM:The Canadian Embassy,.....
.....Washington, D.C.....

Reference:..Our Letter No..1701 of December 12, 1957

Subject:....Tripartite Atomic Energy Consultation

Security:.....SECRET.....

No:.....1187.....

Date:.....July 28, 1958.....

Enclosures:.....(Two).....

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We have now received from the Secretary of the Atomic Energy Commission under date of July 21, Summary Notes On the Plenary Meeting of the U.S.-UK.-Canadian Representatives of December 6, 1957 (of which two copies are attached) relating to the tripartite technical discussions held. The delay in transmitting these notes or minutes of this meeting was presumably due to the need for clearance of the final text with those concerned, but even so, it is difficult to see why it would take six months to appear.

AUG 1 1958

L. H. Rae
The Embassy

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SUMMARY NOTES ON PLENARY MEETING OF THE U.S. -U.K. -
CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVES

The Pentagon
December 6, 1957

UNITED KINGDOM

Sir Harold Caccia, Ambassador to the U.S.
Sir Frederick Brundrett, Ministry of Defense
Sir William Penney, U.K. Atomic Energy Authority
Mr. John Roper, British Embassy

CANADA*

Mr. Saul F. Rae, Minister to the U.S.
Dr. John J. Green
Maj. Gen. H. A. Sparling

UNITED STATES

Department of Defense

Mr. Donald A. Quarles, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Mr. John B. Macauley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (R&E)
Maj. Gen. Herbert B. Loper, Assistant to the Secretary
of Defense (AE)
Mr. John N. Irwin, II, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)
Brig. Gen. John S. Guthrie, USA, ISA
Col. Delmar L. Crowson, USAF, OSD
Rear Adm. John T. Hayward, USN, OPNAV*
Rear Adm. Rawson Bennett, Chief Naval Research*
Col. William M. Summers, USA*
Mr. John E. Jackson, OSD
Comd. J. T. Law, USN, OPNAV*

Department of State

Mr. Philip J. Farley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (AE)
Mr. Raymond F. Courtney

Atomic Energy Commission

Mr. Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman
Mr. R. W. Cook
Adm. Paul F. Foster
Brig. Gen. Alfred D. Starbird
Mr. W. B. McCool
Capt. Edward E. Conrad

* Not present for discussion of Reports of Subcommittees "A", "B"
and "C".

This material contains information affecting the
national defense of the United States within the
meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C.,
Sec. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation
of which in any manner to an unauthorized person
is prohibited by law.

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In opening the meeting Mr. Strauss suggested that the reports of Subcommittees "D" through "J" be considered first in order that the reports for Subcommittees "A", "B" and "C" could be considered when Mr. Quarles would be present. General Loper suggested that Mr. Macauley present these reports and said that it would not be necessary for the Canadian members to remain for discussion of reports "A", "B" and "C".

Mr. Macauley explained that all reports before the meeting were in draft form and requested that all copies be returned for review and final issuance.

1. Report of Subcommittee "D" - Delivery Systems

The conferees had no comments on this report and it was approved without discussion.

2. Report of Subcommittee "E" - Biological Warfare, Chemical Warfare and Radiological Defense

During presentation of this report by Mr. Macauley, Mr. Strauss noted that the term "Radiological Warfare" had been changed to "Radiological Defense" during Subcommittee discussions. Sir Frederick Brundrett explained that this was because no great amount of work had been done on offensive capabilities in this field and the discussions had concentrated on aspects of radiological defense.

Mr. Quarles commented that there has always been extensive cooperation in these fields and he hoped this would continue.

The conferees approved the Subcommittee report.

3. Report of Subcommittee "F" - Defense Against Ballistic Missiles

After presentation of the report by Mr. Macauley, Mr. Quarles remarked that, subject to Congressional approval, the U.S. would

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proceed immediately to establish an early warning radar system for defense against ballistic missiles. He said that the U.S. believes this matter is urgent and that design time is being shortened in order to get equipment in place.

Sir Frederick Brundrett said that this problem had been discussed at length in the Subcommittee meetings and that although the U.K. thought geographical differences would affect joint defense planning in this area, the U.K. intended to inform the U.S. and Canada of her proposed program in order to obtain the benefit of their advice. Mr. Quarles said that while he recognized geographical differences would of course affect joint plans, he believed it essential that there be coordination. One site the U.S. is considering is in Scotland; therefore, it was apparent that U.S. plans must be coordinated with U.K. planning. Sir Frederick Brundrett agreed but said that he thought it should be recognized that political decisions could affect joint plans for defensive measures.

Mr. Quarles asked whether there had been discussions of the use of high altitude radar, and Sir Frederick Brundrett replied that there had been full discussions of current developments in this field.

The conferees then approved the report of the Subcommittee.

4. Report of Subcommittee "G" - Anti-Submarine Defense

After presentation of the Subcommittee report by Mr. Macauley, Sir Frederick Brundrett remarked that two U.K. representatives would arrive in Washington on December 8 in order to facilitate joint discussions in this field.

The Subcommittee report was approved.

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5. Report of Subcommittee "H" - Aircraft and Aero-Engines

In presenting the report of the Subcommittee, Mr. Macauley agreed with Dr. Green's suggestion that the Canadair Argus aircraft (CP107) should be included in the equipment listed in subparagraph a.

Mr. Quarles commented that it should be recognized that timing and program coordination in this field is difficult and that all sides must be aware of this if material advantages are to be properly shared. Mr. Macauley remarked that while this is a very complex program, he thought that joint efforts must proceed.

The conferees then approved the Subcommittee report.

6. Report of Subcommittee "I" and "J" - Electron Tubes and Infra Red

The conferees had no comments on this report and it was approved without discussion.

General Discussion

Mr. Rae said that on behalf of the Canadian representatives he wished to express their appreciation for the invitation to join in the U.S.-U.K. discussions looking to joint efforts in research and technology. Much had been accomplished in the current discussions and he was hopeful that much more could be done.

Mr. Strauss said he was sure he expressed the hope of both the U.K. and U.S. representatives in saying that participation of the Canadian Government in the programs under Items "A", "B", and "C" would be deferred for only a short time.

Mr. Rae said he believed the record should reflect Canadian participation in Subcommittee "C" discussion.

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7. Report of Ad Hoc Committee on Collaboration in the Nuclear Intelligence Areas

The report of this group was not discussed by the conferees at the Plenary Meeting. However, the report was subsequently agreed upon by the UK and the Department of Defense representatives and distributed as an additional report on the technical discussions. Further action within the respective governments to accommodate the recommendations should be considered.

Statement for the Press

Mr. Strauss said there might be some advantage in preparing a press statement which could be released in response to inquiries about the current meeting. Ambassador Caccia said he thought that there should be agreement on a statement which would be released only in response to press inquiries. Mr. Strauss suggested a statement to the effect that there has been one of a series of continuing technical discussions related to the statement of October 25, 1957, by Prime Minister Macmillan and President Eisenhower.

Mr. Rae said there were perhaps some disadvantages in mentioning Canada's participation, and Mr. Quarles commented that while the U.S. and U.K. were of course anxious to identify their common interests with Canada, there was the problem of possible NATO reaction to identification of Canadian participation, and political considerations might require de-emphasizing such a reference in the statement.

Mr. Rae said that he would wish to review with Ambassador Robertson any draft public announcement regarding these discussions. Mr. Quarles suggested that in order to avoid possible comments about U.S., U.K. and Canadian discussions being

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held just prior to the NATO meeting in Paris, it might be desirable to relate Canadian participation only to those technical discussions on defense of the North American continent. The Canadian and United Kingdom members agreed that this was desirable.

After discussion, a draft statement was approved for further coordination by the Department of State and British and Canadian Embassies. (See Appendix "A")

At this point Mr. Rae, Dr. Green and General Sparling left the meeting.

General Discussion

Mr. Strauss said that he hoped the U.K. representatives realized the problems under which the U.S. was working in these discussions because of the uncertainty of legislative action on amendments to the Atomic Energy Act. He added that he, Mr. Quarles and others had been engaged in numerous discussions urging amendment of the Atomic Energy Act to permit closer U.S.-U.K. cooperation, but that it was not certain what the results of these efforts would be.

Ambassador Caccia said that the U.K. was aware of U.S. problems in this regard, but remarked that it would be helpful if they could have some indication of content of the proposed amendments and the timing with respect to the amendments. He said that it was necessary for the U.K. to proceed with the construction of further diffusion plant capacity to meet their requirements for special nuclear materials unless the U.S. could supply their needs for such materials.

Mr. Strauss replied that the U.S. recognized the need for an early U.K. decision on this matter and said that the Administration would press for early legislative action. However,

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he pointed out that historically, Congress tends to defer important matters of this nature until the latter part of the Congressional term. He added that the U.S. is anxious to be of assistance to the U.K. and that he would discuss with Ambassador Caccia what representations could be made by the U.K. to expedite a decision on the part of the U.S.

Mr. Strauss said he understood that in Subcommittee discussions a great deal of concern had been expressed about the financial impact of the proposed programs. He said he believed the program of cooperation should be divided into military and civilian assistance and that insofar as the military undertakings were concerned, he did not think financial arrangements would be any problem. With regard to the commercial programs, however, there would be some difficulties.

8. Report of Subcommittee "C" - Nuclear Propulsion

In presenting the report of the Subcommittee, Mr. Strauss said that while the matter of exchange of nuclear propulsion information between U.K. and U.S. private contractors is a complicated problem, he was sure that with goodwill on both sides it could be solved.

The conferees approved the report of the Subcommittee.

9. Report of Subcommittee "A" - Nuclear Materials

In response to a question from Mr. Quarles concerning the U.K. purchase of enriched uranium (See paragraph 2), Sir William Penney said that if the U.K. is to purchase enriched uranium from the U.S., such purchases would be accompanied by large amounts of natural uranium and that the problem here was that the U.K. has already made commitments into the 1960's for adequate supplies of natural uranium.

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Mr. Cook said that with respect to U.S. processing of United Kingdom natural uranium, it was not clear in the present Atomic Energy Act whether this can be done. Mr. Strauss said that an amendment would be requested to clarify this and other questions that might arise.

The Subcommittee report was then approved by the conferees.

10. Report of Subcommittee "B" - Nuclear Warheads

After presentation of the report and the U.K. statement, Mr. Strauss said that it should be recognized that with respect to the U.K. statement, the U.S. cannot make commitments but is on notice as to what the U.K. considers desirable.

The Subcommittee report was then approved by the conferees.

December 20 Report to Prime Minister Macmillan and President Eisenhower

Mr. Strauss suggested that it would be desirable for Sir Edwin Plowden, Sir Richard Powell, Mr. Quarles and himself to meet in Paris during the NATO Conference to discuss the December 20 report. Mr. Quarles agreed that this was desirable, and the U.K. representatives expressed their agreement with this proposal.

Ambassador Caccia asked what arrangements would now be made for continuing discussions by the principal group, and Mr. Strauss suggested that this be discussed by the U.S. and U.K. representatives during the NATO meetings in Paris.

At this point Mr. Strauss and Sir Harold Caccia left the meeting.

General Discussion

Sir William Penney commented that the U.K. representatives believed a great deal of work had been accomplished in a very short period of time and that they appreciated the participation of Mr. Quarles, Mr. Strauss and their colleagues in discussions of matters of joint interest in the defense field.

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Mr. Quarles said he was pleased with the accomplishments of these meetings and that while the restrictions of U.S. law caused some problems, he thought that a great deal of progress had been made. With respect to a U.K. decision on gaseous diffusion plant capacity, he asked whether the U.K. had sufficient assurance of U.S. assistance not to move ahead on such a development. Sir William Penney replied that since the U.K. had been informed that it is not possible at this time for the U.S. to give definitive assurances, the U.K. must make a decision on this matter very soon. Sir Frederick Brundrett commented that this was a serious problem for the U.K. and that a decision could be deferred no longer.

Mr. Roper referred to Mr. Strauss' earlier remarks on this subject and said that he understood that the matter would be taken up in discussions between Mr. Strauss and Ambassador Caccia leading to representations to the U.S. Government. Mr. Quarles remarked that this was the appropriate procedure and said that the U.S. was anxious to assist the U.K. in this regard.

Mr. Quarles asked whether it was necessary to discuss Appendix "A" of the report of Subcommittee "A" on Nuclear Material, and General Loper commented that it was only necessary to note in this connection that there was a dollar gap resulting from the net difference in sales of U-235 to the U.K. and sales of plutonium to the U.S.

Sir Frederick Brundrett said he believed this concluded a productive series of meetings in which all participants had discussed joint planning in the spirit of the October 25, 1957, statement by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan. A great deal of progress had been made, and he was hopeful that these discussions could be continued as fruitfully as they had begun.

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APPENDIX "A"

STATEMENT TO BE USED IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS WHICH
MAY BE RAISED REGARDING MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON
BETWEEN U.S. AND U.K. REPRESENTATIVES


Representatives of the departments and agencies concerned with the technical defense subjects discussed at the meeting in October between the President and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom have been meeting in Washington. The conversations at the working level will continue.

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NORAD--USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

WE MET TODAY WITH DALE, ACTING DIRECTOR OF BNA OFFICE OF STATE DEPT, AND JIM PARKER CONCERNING THE RAYMOND STORY WITH RESPECT TO NORAD. DALE CONFIRMED THAT AFTER EXHAUSTIVE INQUIRIES, AND AS HE HAD INDICATED EARLIER, RAYMOND HAD SUBSTANTIALLY MISQUOTED GENERAL PARTRIDGE. IN PARTICULAR HE STATED EMPHATICALLY THAT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE POSITION WAS THAT NO RPT NO ADVANCE AUTHORIZATION HAD BEEN GIVEN BY THE PRESIDENT TO CINCNORAD GOVERNING THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE STATEMENT PREPARED FOR MR QUARLES WAS NOT RPT NOT IN THE EVENT USED SINCE THERE WERE NO RPT NO QUESTIONS ON THIS POINT, BUT YOU MAY HAVE NOTICED THAT IN THE GENERAL REPORTS OF QUARLES' PRESS CONFERENCE, HE MADE REF TO THE NEED FOR CAUTION IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS MADE BY USA COMMANDERS IN THE FAREAST(AND ELSEWHERE).

2. DALE WAS AWARE OF THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN PROCEEDING PRIMARILY BETWEEN THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES RELATING TO THE POSSIBLE ACQUISITION AND STORAGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CANADA, AND OF THE FACT THAT THIS GENERAL SUBJECT HAS BEEN UNDER STUDY IN OTT FOR SOME TIME(SEE OURTEL 2630 DEC12/57). HE SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT OUR CONSIDERATION OF THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED WITH RESPECT TO CUSTODY, AUTHORIZATION AS TO USE, SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS AND THE LIKE, WOULD BE FURTHERED BY REF TO THE PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH THE USA HAS WORKED OUT BILATERALLY WITH THE UK GOVT OVER A PERIOD OF YEARS AND MOST RECENTLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE IRBM AGREEMENT. HE SAID, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE CUSTODIAL ARRANGEMENTS IN BEING IN THE UK WERE BASED UPON THE FORMULA MADE NECESSARY BY EXISTING USA LEGISLATION AND REFLECTED IN THE NATO DISCUSSIONS OF LAST DEC WITH REF TO THE REQUIREMENT FOR USA CUSTODY OF THE WARHEADS. SO FAR AS AUTHORIZATION OF USE IS CONCERNED, HOWEVER, ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE COVERING THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE USE BY USAF AIRCRAFT OPERATED FROM UK BASES OF ATOMIC WEAPONS ON THE JOINT RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER. A SIMILAR SYSTEM OF JOINT RESPONSIBILITY WAS OPERATIVE IN CONNECTION WITH UK AIRCRAFT ARMED WITH USA NUCLEAR WEAPONS. DALE BELIEVED THAT SUCH ARRANGEMENTS WHICH HAD BEEN

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DEVELOPED EMPIRICALLY OVER A PERIOD OF YEARS WOULD BE RELEVANT TO ANY CANADIAN CONSIDERATION OF SIMILAR OR RELATED PROBLEMS. DALE FURTHER INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD BE READY TO ORGANIZE A MEETING WITH US TO PROVIDE FURTHER INFO ON THESE EXISTING BILATERAL USA-UK ARRANGEMENTS.

3. IN OUR OWN VIEW, THERE IS A GOOD DEAL TO BE SAID FOR TAKING UP THROUGH THE STATE DEPT THE SPECIFIC KINDS OF QUESTIONS WHICH ARE RAISED FOR EXAMPLE IN THE DEPT'S LET OF OCT7 TO GENERAL FOULKES WHICH ARRIVED BEFORE OUR MEETING TODAY WITH DALE. EG MATTERS RELATED TO CUSTODY, USE, AND CONTROLS ON QUANTITIES THAT MAY BE STORED. ON THE BASIS OF THE PROBLEMS POSED IN THIS LETTER, WE SUGGEST THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO PREPARE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS WHICH WE COULD THEN PUT TO THE MEETING HERE WHICH DALE VOLUNTEERED TO ARRANGE. WE THINK IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO PROCEED BY SPECIFIC QUESTIONS RATHER THAN TO SEEK GENERAL INFO ABOUT UK-USA ARRANGEMENTS, SOME OF WHICH MAY NOT RPT NOT BE DIRECTLY RELATED TO OUR OWN PROBLEMS. ANY DISCUSSIONS OF THIS KIND SHOULD, OF COURSE, PROCEED IN PARALLEL WITH INQUIRIES WHICH WE UNDERSTAND ARE BEING MADE AT THE PENTAGON THROUGH THE JOINT STAFF HERE. IF YOU AGREE WITH THE FOREGOING, WE SHALL BE GLAD TO RECEIVE AN INDICATION OF THE QUESTIONS WHICH YOU MIGHT LIKE US TO EXPLORE THROUGH STATE DEPT CHANNELS.

4. WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO HAVE COPY OF DRAFT MEMO TO CABINET DEFENCE COMMITTEE REFERRED TO IN PARA 1 YOUR LET OCT7.