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PAPERS IN REVERSE ORDER

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA. 91

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
 EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: Canadian Consulate-General,
 Seattle.

Reference:
 Subject: Fisheries: Bristol Bay Red Salmon Run.

Security: UNCLASSIFIED

No: 255

Date: July 21, 1964

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No: 26-1

Ottawa File No.	
25-5-7-2)	9

References

*Mr. Turner
 to info.
 Ref. to
 D/O Fisheries
 Economic Dev.
 Done + file
 July 29/64
 D.J.*

*W. Madson
 check
 25-5-7-2*

Alaskan State Fisheries officials reported July 15 that the Bristol Bay red salmon run is a complete failure this year; they estimated that no more than 10.5 million of the predicted 17.4 million-run would go through the area's river systems.

2. The most important fishing area on Bristol Bay is the Naknek-Kvichak district in which a total of 12.4 million fish had been expected. The run in this area is said to have "absolutely failed", as only 4,331,000 fish had been recorded; of these, 2,156,000 were caught, and 2,175,000 were permitted to go into the streams to spawn. The official who directs fishery-management from Bristol Bay to Prince William Sound said that the peak of the run has passed and there is no doubt about the results.

3. You will recall that last year the Bristol Bay red salmon run totalled only 6.9 million fish and caused very considerable economic hardship to the area.

4. Expected runs in other Bristol Bay districts materialised. They were as follows:

	Catch	Escapement
Nushagak	1,300,000	1,200,000
Egegik	795,000	728,000
Ugashik	350,000	196,000

Internal Circulation

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*J. Douglas Turner
 In* Consulate-General.

P.S. Fisheries experts in Seattle are not surprised at the size of this year's run; they note that the Bristol Bay red salmon run is markedly cyclical and that last year was the expected low point of the cycle. They expect that the run next year should be close to 17 million. They acknowledge that fishermen may consider this year's run a failure but, from the biological and management points of view, do not so consider it.



EXTERNAL AFFAIRS


AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

*Refer to: Dept. of Fisheries (Mr. P. D. Longley)
European Div. (Mr. P. D. Longley)
and file*

TO The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada.

SECURITY Restricted
Sécurité
DATE July 21, 1965.

FROM The Canadian Embassy, Copenhagen, Denmark.



NUMBER 352
Numéro
FILE DOSSIER
OTTAWA 25-5-7-2-SALMON
25-7-ATLANTIC-1
MISSION 933 1313

REFERENCE
Référence
SUBJECT Greenland Salmon Fisheries
Sujet

ENCLOSURES Annexes
1

DISTRIBUTION

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U.S.A. Div. /
E. Hébert / js
Refer to:
Dept. Fisheries
European Div.
Wash. Emb.
Oct. 13/65

During the past few days several items have appeared in the Danish press dealing with the fishing off the coast of Greenland of salmon which had spawned in the waters of other countries, notably Scotland and Eastern Canada. The public debate was touched off by Lord Balfour, a Scottish member of the House of Lords. He said that Danish trawlers off the coast of Greenland were catching large quantities of salmon which migrate to these waters to forage before returning to their home rivers to spawn. This, he claimed, was having the effect of depopulating Scottish salmon fishing streams whose economic value from a tourist viewpoint far exceeded the price of the fish caught.

2. The newspaper accounts have been fair and well-balanced (translations of one editorial and two news stories are attached). They have stated the problem as described by Lord Balfour and have reported his suggestion that Anglo-Danish negotiators should work out the basis of a conservation agreement. A colleague at the British Embassy has told us that he believes the Danes would be prepared to negotiate on the basis of a general conservation agreement. The papers also reported that Canada has voiced concern on this problem at the recent meeting in Halifax of the International Commission on North Atlantic Fisheries.

3. Foreign Ministry officials have not yet been drawn into the discussion, but they guessed that they would become involved when preparations begin for the October meeting of the International Council

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Exploration of the Sea, (see our letter No. 318 of July 15, 1965) to be held in Rome. The Secretary General of the Council has confirmed that this question will appear on the agenda.

4. The only public statement to date was made by Dr. Paul M. Hansen, Director of the Greenland Fishery Research Authority. He rejected the accusation of excessive fishing on the part of the Greenland fishermen and denied that trawlers were used to catch salmon. He stated that "biologically there is no reason to criticize the salmon fisheries off the coasts of Greenland and I very much doubt whether there is reason to fear that salmon fisheries would suffer materially elsewhere from the catches obtained by the relatively few Greenland fishermen." While he was at it, Dr. Hansen threw out an accusation of his own by suggesting that if anyone should be criticized it was "the nations whose trawlers lying off the Greenland fishing limits take in every bit of small cod to the considerable detriment of Greenland fisheries."

5. The Royal Greenland Trading Company has reported that salmon production by Greenland fishermen totalled 1,200 tons in 1964 or 45% of the total Danish salmon catch for that year. About two-thirds of this amount would be for export.



The Embassy

Mr. Hébert *20 file*
+ T.C.
B

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TO
À Mr. *B* Bridle

FROM
De Mr. Hébert

REFERENCE
Référence

SUBJECT
Sujet Greenland Salmon Fisheries

SECURITY
Sécurité

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE

October 1, 1965.

NUMBER
Numéro

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA	
25-5-7-2-SALMON	
MISSION	

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ENCLOSURES
Annexes

DISTRIBUTION

As requested, I telephoned Mr. Olsen of the U.S.A. Embassy here in Ottawa.

2. Mr. Olsen told me that because the Embassy has received several inquiries about the Danish Salmon fishing in Greenland in the past few days, he called Dr. Needler, Department of Fisheries, in order to obtain the Canadian attitude toward these complaints. Dr. Needler mentioned to him that there was a possibility of a Canadian note being sent to the Danish Government with the assistance of our Department.

3. I phoned Dr. Sprules inquiring about the idea of such a note being sent to the Danish Government and he told me that his Department was sending today or Monday, a draft letter for our approval, and for the USSEA's signature, to our Embassy in Copenhagen inquiring about the rumor of such Danish activities. He added that if such rumors were verified, then they will prepare with our assistance a note to the Danish Government.

4. Mr. Olsen of the U.S.A. Embassy is now quite satisfied with these arrangements.

E. Hébert
E. Hébert

File
European Div (Mr. Riddington)
aid
Wash. Emb.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TO The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada.

SECURITY Restricted
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FROM The Canadian Embassy, Copenhagen, Denmark.

DATE October 6, 1965.

REFERENCE Our letter 352 of July 21, 1965.

NUMBER 472
Numéro

SUBJECT Greenland Salmon Fisheries
Sujet

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA	25-5-7-2-SALMON
MISSION	9 35-11 13

ENCLOSURES Annexes

To: Mr Hébert
OCT 13 1965

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Since writing our letter under reference, little has been heard from the Danish authorities about the Greenland salmon fisheries and the charge levelled by Lord Balfour that Danish trawlers off the coast of Greenland were catching large quantities of salmon which was having the effect of depopulating Scottish salmon fishing streams. However, only a few days ago, word appeared in Børsen, an independent and highly respected commercial daily, which published an interview with Doctor Paul Hansen who is Director of the Greenland Fishery Research Authority. In this interview, Doctor Hansen repeated very much the same statement as he made in the interview reported in our letter under reference. We report it to you in the event that it may be of use to our Delegation to the International Council of the Exploration of the Sea, which is being held in Rome.

2. It presumably will be the line Denmark will take at the Conference. We are attaching (for Ottawa and Rome, only) a copy of an article by Erik Erngaard, which appeared in Politiken on September 2. It gives a summary of the controversy and is particularly useful as a summation of the Danish arguments. For Rome we are attaching a copy of our letter 352 of July 21, 1965. In the interview appearing in Børsen, Doctor Hansen claims that scientific circles agree more or less that salmon catches off Greenland are hardly very harmful to the rest of Europe. Protests have been grossly exaggerated and there is no question of Greenland fishermen overfishing. On the contrary, the 1400 tons (this is at variance with the 1200 tons production mentioned in the Royal Greenland Trading Company's 1964 report) were undoubtedly an

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insignificant part of the total stock. Greenland fishermen do not use big trawlers for salmon catches and he added that even if Greenland fishermen had the possibility of making a considerable inroad on the salmon population he could not imagine how, in all fairness, this could be prohibited.

3. Our British and American colleagues here in Copenhagen have been following this question closely and the American Fisheries Attaché, Andrew W. Andersen, left for Rome a couple of days ago as a member of the American Delegation.



The Embassy

"Politiken", Sept. 2, 1965, p. 15.

TRANSLATION.

WHERE IS THE SALMON THAT WAS HERE LAST YEAR

International dispute on the right to the salmon caught by
Greenlanders

By Erik Erngaard

Denmark has become the centre of an international dispute about the right to the 600,000 salmon caught off West Greenland last summer. It is true that a majority was not marked with sender's address, but a number of countries, headed by Great Britain, claim that they are their salmon, and whilst the new salmon season is at present at its peak, Denmark is faced with the demand for Greenlanders immediately to haul their salmon net ashore or at any rate abstain from catching more salmon than last year.

The British, particularly, have made a terrific ado of the matter in the House of Commons and the House of Lords and Her Majesty's Ambassador in Copenhagen has expressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs his Government's deepest concern.

It is claimed that Greenland salmon fishing affects the salmon population in Scotland and thus tourism, which means a good deal to small Scottish localities. The House of Lords seems to be the one most concerned.

The Earl of Dundee, Lord Balfour, Lord Boothby, Lord Hedges, not to mention Lady Tvedesmuir, have been particularly incensed that Greenlanders should stealthily catch salmon by net, not by a nine feet hardy rod with a Silver Dock fly as attempted by any honest British and Scottish angler.

Now "The Times" has come to the assistance of the Lords and demand that the British Government puts pressure on Denmark to prevent a further expansion of the Greenland fisheries, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs answered Sir John Henniker-Major, the British Ambassador, that the matter will be considered, which means that nothing will be done until science has been asked.

And in this field science in Denmark is personified by Dr. Paul Merinus Hansen, head of the Greenland Fisheries Examination authority, an internationally highly esteemed fishery biologist. He will explain the Danish view at an international conference in Rome at the beginning of October, though in advance he makes no secret of his opinion of the British reaction:

- It is, he told "Politiken", ridiculous, and it is pure nonsense when it is alleged that the Greenlanders' salmon fisheries can be detrimental to the salmon population in Scotland. The enormous quantity of salmon found off West Greenland both off the coast and at sea in the Davis Strait, cannot be fished at all. The handful of people who live scattered along the several thousand of kilometers of rugged coastline with numerous indentations of up to a hundred kms or so in depth, will be completely unable to do any harm to the stock.

Apart from the few marked salmon caught we cannot tell whence the Greenland salmon comes but there is nothing to suggest that they are British and Scottish.

On the contrary, it has transpired that of the salmon marked in Scotland and England most of those re-caught have been taken in their own home country about a year later. If Greenlanders took a majority of them they would not return to the river whence they came.

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In this connexion, said Paul Hansen, I must also refer to the Baltic. In this area, very restricted compared with Greenland, the quantity of salmon caught has for years been the same as that caught in Greenland and this has not affected the salmon population in the Baltic. Now then should it in the enormous West Greenland area?

It is true that artificial release is taking place in the Baltic, but we know that only 15% of the fish planted out is caught again by ordinary fisheries.

It is another matter that from a fishery biological point of view the salmon fisheries experienced off Greenland are a world sensation of an extent which we have not seen for a long time.

Dr. Paul Hansen here refers to the confirmation of an old theory advanced by Dr. W.J.L. Lenzies, a Scottish biologist. He assumed that salmon from the USA and Europe met every year somewhere in the North Atlantic for a gigantic feast. It has been known for years that, when about ten cm. in length, salmon fry vanished to sea and returned 16-18 months later to the parental river, and salmon is also known to have grown during these months to a size of 60-70 cm. and a weight of 2-5 kilos, but where it stayed during this period of growth has been unknown to this day.

At present we know that the salmon's venue is West Greenland. Last year a small number of salmon marked in Canada, Eire, USA, Finland, Scotland and Sweden was caught. The two Swedish salmon were particularly remarkable. Through the Carls Archives, Dr. Paul Hansen calculated the shortest distance they must have covered in order to come from the planting out spot of Hydals near Högvaldselven (a river) in Halland's Län to Sukkertoppen, the place where they were caught. The distance they covered in seven months is 2270 nautical miles, a record for salmon and fish generally. If the two Swedish salmon had been able to go together along exactly the same route, it would probably have transpired that the distance covered would have been still longer.

We now know that salmon from many countries meet in Davis Strait, but does the salmon from Greenland always return the long way to its birthplace? That is to say the salmon which avoids the net of Greenlanders. In order to have this question answered and to show some willingness to GB and the other countries, USA, Canada and Eire, biologists from Denmark, Canada and Scotland will be sent to West Greenland next month to catch salmon and mark them. It will then be interesting to see where these salmon are caught again. No one believes that they will all end in GB.

The Greenland Fisheries Examination authority has previously marked salmon in Greenland, but they were purely Greenland salmon from the only existing salmon river, Kapisigdlit (the Salmon Place) in Godthaabs Fiord. The population there was most opposed to the work of the biologists. "You whisper to their gills that they must leave for Scotland and Iceland in order to be caught there," they said.

This year still more salmon are expected to be caught than to date so that Greenland, that losing concern, which torments the Greenland population far more than the Danish exchequer, can come a little closer to the balancing point.

Salmon catches have been increased 700 times in the course of few years. The first proper salmon fisheries started at Narsarsuaq in the Sukkertoppen district in 1959 when 13,000 kilos were caught. During the following years the figure rose rapidly and last year a record catch of 1,4 mill. kilos was landed. That corresponds to the salmon catches in the Baltic and means that Greenland salmon has become a serious competitor of the Bornholm product on the European market.

3./

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Naturally there is no interest in mutual Danish competition abroad, and the Royal Greenland Trading Company has consequently been reserved about the sale. Greenland salmon was not sent on the market until the Bornholm product had been sold, but in the long run it is likely to be necessary to start cooperation. At present Bornholm fishermen complain that the price of salmon has dropped by about 30 per cent this year as purchasers anticipated extensive offers of Greenland salmon in the autumn. Some Bornholm fishermen simply stopped fishing for salmon as it does not pay when prices drop.

All this is of no great concern to the Greenland fishermen at present. Their price has been fixed this year after negotiations with the Government, and foreign allegations to the effect that they are not his salmon he could answer by referring to the classical story about the man who wanted to ban his neighbour from shooting hares that came from his land. The neighbour answered that he was quite prepared to abstain from so doing if only they wore a red band round their neck so that he could see to whom they belonged.

PICTURES SHOW: Salmon frozen under a thin layer of ice.
Dr. Paul Marinus Hansen.

Sept. 2, 1965.

PH

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to Their Excellencies and Messieurs the Chiefs of Mission of the Governments concerned with the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries signed at Washington under date of February 8, 1949 and has the honor to refer to the Department of State's circular note of October 10, 1969 which transmitted the views of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the 1969 proposals for international regulation of fisheries in the Convention area. The Federal Republic of Germany stated that it "regrets not being able to accept for reasons of principle" the proposal respecting international regulation of the salmon fishery in the Convention area outside national fishing limits, and set forth its objections to this proposal in an accompanying aide-memoire.

The Government of the United States, as a Party to the Convention, has carefully reviewed the statements of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany on this matter, and regrets that it does not find them convincing for the reasons set forth below. For those reasons, the United States is hopeful that the Federal Republic of Germany will withdraw its objections to the proposal for international regulation respecting the fishery for Atlantic

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salmon on the high seas in the Convention area and will promptly give notice of its acceptance of the said proposal.

Before discussing the objections raised in the aide-memoire, the United States wishes to reiterate its basic position in support of a ban on high seas fishing for salmon. It is the view of the United States that such fishing is wasteful and contrary to principles of conservation. Salmon can be maintained on the high seas only if the coastal nations maintain the fresh water environment in which salmon spawn in a suitable condition. Not only does this represent a significant expenditure by the coastal nations, but they must often forego alternate uses of these streams to maintain them in a suitable condition for salmon, for example, using them for power or irrigation. If the salmon runs have been depleted, restoration is even more costly. This work will be difficult to continue if coastal countries cannot be assured of some benefits to their domestic fisheries, whether sports or commercial, and without these special efforts by the coastal nations it is doubtful that salmon could survive. Even the best conservation program by the coastal state can be completely nullified by indiscriminate salmon fishing on the high seas, however.

It should be noted, in contrast, that measures taken to conserve other stocks of fish found in the ocean, which do not depend on streams for their survival, and the related scientific investigations of these stocks, are largely of an international collaborative nature. All concerned countries may contribute, and all concerned countries may benefit.

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Fishing on the high seas is applied indiscriminately to various salmon runs which intermingle in the ocean. Thus fish are harvested without regard to the condition of different runs, and excess numbers may be taken from the very runs needing increased protection. The productivity of salmon runs from different rivers varies and individual runs fluctuate from year to year, usually independently of each other. Coastal and stream fisheries can be managed to allow adequate escapement for all runs, but this type of conservation cannot be practiced on the high seas. High seas fishing for salmon is also wasteful because fish are taken before they attain full growth and ocean netting or long-lining often injures or kills fish without capturing them. It has been estimated that the salmon killed in high seas fishing and then lost may equal half the total harvested by this method.

The rapid development of the high seas fisheries for salmon during the past few years, and indications of continued increase, offers grave concern to those interested in the conservation of the species. Already the high seas fisheries take a significant proportion of the relatively small over-all catch of salmon. At the same time, salmon runs in various streams are experiencing difficulties.

Salmon fishing should be restricted to the mouths of the streams and the streams themselves where the catch can be regulated to ensure the proper escapement for each run. This kind of limitation does not have implications for most high seas fishing, since most species found in the high seas do not depend on returning to the stream of origin for spawning

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as does the salmon. This unique aspect of the salmon makes a prohibition on high seas salmon fishing a unique conservation tool which cannot be applied generally to other fisheries. Immediate action is needed which will assure coastal states that their careful efforts to conserve limited salmon resources will not be defeated by lack of conservation in ocean waters.

The aide-memoire referred to above cites four objections to the proposal in question, and goes on to elaborate on each of these objections. The United States finds each of these objections with little merit. Each objection is set forth below and is discussed individually:

"1. The Conventions for the Northeast and Northwest Atlantic Fisheries do not provide for a measure of that kind and therefore offer no legal basis for the ban in question."

The Government of the United States is not a party to the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention, 1959, and accordingly will not comment on this objection with respect to the aforesaid Convention, except to observe that the required majority of Parties to that Convention decided, by their vote during the May 1969 meeting of the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission, that the Convention did provide a legal basis for the proposal adopted by the Commission. The United States observer to the meeting of the Commission made known some of the reasons why the United States generally favors such restrictions on high seas fishing for salmon, and that it felt that any restriction adopted should apply to the entire North Atlantic because of the wide migrations of salmon.

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As for the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, the Government of the United States considers that a legal basis exists for the proposal. Paragraph 1 of Article VIII specifically empowers the Commission to make, among others, proposals:

"(a) establishing open and closed seasons;"

"(b) closing to fishing such portions of a sub-area as the Panel concerned finds to be a spawning area or to be populated by small or immature fish;"

* * * *

"(e) prescribing an over-all catch limit for any species of fish."

The Convention does not require the Commission to specify which of the measures enumerated in the paragraph constitute the basis for a proposal, and in this case the Commission did not. Accordingly, the proposal may be considered to be based on any or all of the three measures quoted above.

The aide-memoire states that the German Government "considers that a total ban on a fishery in the entire Convention area outside national fishery limits for an indefinite period of time goes beyond what can be termed closed season or closed area." The Government of the United States notes, however, that the Convention places no limitations on the duration of a closed season or the size of a closed area. In this case the proposal may be considered to be a closed season under paragraph 1(a) of Article VIII during the entire

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year, since there is no requirement in the Convention that a closed season be for a shorter period. The Convention does not specify that both open and closed seasons must be established for the same species. Moreover, even a state advancing such an interpretation would surely agree that the open season could be only one day. The distinction must, under such circumstances, be considered de minimis.

The fact that the yearly closed season would extend for an indefinite period does not detract from its being a closed season, nor would the situation be altered had the proposal specified a certain number of years. For the most part the procedure of the Commission has been to adopt proposals for indefinite periods, and to alter these proposals at such time as additional evidence is available, although proposals have been directed at a specified season or seasons. It is recalled that the majority of proposals adopted by the Commission to date have been concerned with minimum mesh sizes, that there have been no time periods specified in these proposals, and that they have been altered over the years as necessary. The proposal to prohibit killing adult seals in whelping patches is also without time limit. On the other hand, proposals have been adopted for specific seasons, as in the cases of the 1967 proposal relating to sealing quotas during the 1968 season, and the 1969 proposals relating to haddock and hake fisheries during the 1970, 1971, and 1972 seasons. Thus no special meaning can be attached to the inclusion or omission of a time period in any proposal. Further, except as noted below, any proposal can be considered to be effective, whether or not a

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period is specified, only until such time as the Commission modifies it with the approval of the concerned Governments. It is also noted that, under paragraph 9 of the same Article, a Party to the Convention may terminate its acceptance of any proposal after the expiration of one year from the date on which it becomes effective, such termination becoming effective one year following notice. Accordingly, any proposal which becomes effective for any Party to the Convention can be considered to have a minimum duration of two years unless the proposal itself is for a shorter period, and a maximum duration at the discretion of the Party itself, regardless of any period it might specify.

In the case of salmon, no portion of the Convention area can be considered to be a spawning area since salmon spawn in rivers under national jurisdiction outside the Convention area. However, scientific investigations have shown that small or immature fish may be found throughout the Convention area. Therefore, the proposal might also be considered to be a measure under paragraph 1(b) of Article VIII. The size of a closed area within the Convention area is immaterial; there is no requirement in the Convention that a closed area be limited in size.

The proposal could also be considered to be a measure under paragraph 1(e) of Article VIII, with the over-all catch limit for salmon in the area in question being zero. Again, there is no requirement in the Convention that a catch limit be greater than zero.

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The United States would also call the attention of all Parties to the provisions of paragraph 5 of Article VIII which permit proposals based on the measures enumerated in paragraph 1 of that Article to be made "affecting the Convention area as a whole." In view of this provision, there can be no doubt that any proposal which the Commission is empowered to make may be applicable to as large or as small a portion of the Convention area as the Commission deems necessary to achieve the desired conservation objective.

Such proposals must be designed to keep the stocks of fish which support international fisheries in the Convention area at a level permitting the maximum sustained catch. The salmon fishery supports international fisheries in the Convention area. There is no requirement that, in order for a regulation to apply within the Convention area, the entire fishery must be conducted within that area and be subject exclusively to regulation under the Convention. In the case of salmon, the maximum sustained catch can only be achieved if, in addition to regulation under the Convention, regulation is undertaken under authority other than the Convention authority, and is conducted outside the Convention area in the streams and at their mouths after the various runs have differentiated themselves so as to permit adequate escapement for each run to allow for a "sustained" catch over the years.

The aide-memoire concludes on this objection by stating that "a ban on high seas fishing for salmon in the entire Convention area cannot be regarded as a conservation measure serving the interests of international fisheries. On the contrary, it would reserve salmon stocks to certain countries

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and certain fishing circles and mean, in effect, their nationalization." The Convention requires that proposals be designed to keep the stocks of fish which support international fisheries at a level permitting the maximum sustained catch. It does not specify where or by whom that catch is to be made once a proposal has become effective, nor can it be presumed that after a proposal has become effective the catch ratio amongst the participating nations will be maintained as it was before. No nation is prohibited per se from participating in the salmon fishery by the proposal in question, although the basis for that participation may be altered as a secondary effect. Nor is the fishery reserved to any one country; in fact, it is not reserved to those countries which maintain salmon streams which flow into the Convention area. The United States notes especially that the significant inshore Greenland fishery is maintained. Further, the proposal serves needs and interests of various nations on both sides of the North Atlantic, whether or not they maintain salmon streams and whether or not they participate in the salmon fishery in the ICNAF area, by ensuring that the unique salmon resource will not disappear from the North Atlantic and that it can produce the maximum sustained catch from each salmon run. That the fishery itself, under the proposal, would have to be conducted on a different basis, and outside the scope of the Convention, is not unusual in itself nor is it unusual under international agreements. This does not constitute a valid basis for objecting to it, nor does it constitute a valid basis

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for any Party to the Convention failing to uphold its obligation under Article XII "to take such action as may be necessary to make effective the provisions of this Convention".

In short, then, the Government of the United States considers that there is adequate legal basis in the Convention for the proposal respecting the fishery for Atlantic salmon, and that substantial arguments have not been advanced which call into doubt this legal basis. The Government of the United States further considers that it was acting pursuant to its legal obligations under the Convention when it supported the proposal in question, and it presumes every other Party to the Convention which supported the proposal, after due consideration of the arguments which were made during and prior to the Commission meeting which adopted the proposal, also considered that it was acting in accordance with its legal obligations under the Convention.

"2. There is no scientific evidence of any threat to salmon stocks or of any serious reduction of catches in home waters as a result of high seas fishery."

The aide-memoire states that "Fishery scientists...have so far said nothing about the necessity of limiting the catch of salmon on the high seas". The ICES/ICNAF Joint Working Party on North Atlantic Salmon was formed for the express purpose of determining the effect of high seas fishing on the catch in home waters. Its latest report (May 1969) (ICES Document C.M. 1969/M:5), which has been presented to both

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ICNAF and ICES, indicates that there is such an effect. Admittedly the estimates of the effect are not precise but limits are given using different mortality rates which were agreed as being reasonable.

The aide-memoire goes on to note that "it is certain that high seas fishing has helped increase total catch, and the estimates of the scientists on the effects of high seas fishery near West Greenland (which is said to be particularly dangerous) vary between a maximum of 1000 tons and a minimum of 400 tons; i.e. a maximum of less than 10 per cent of the total catch of Atlantic salmon (1967: 15,000 tons)." The United States does not disagree with the first part on a short term basis, but the rest of the statement is ambiguous as it presents figures which relate to losses rather than to gains. The estimated losses to home water stocks range from 667 tons to 1667 tons. If an overall average exploitation rate of 0.6 is used for home waters, the average annual losses in home water catches would range between 400 and 1000 tons. Thus the scientists have very clearly indicated an effect of high seas fishing on catches in home waters, although the estimates are not precise. The natural mortality rates of the older fish on the high seas and the exploitation rate in home waters that were used are admittedly estimated but they are reasonable and represent the best judgement of the experts on the working party. The report was approved by the ICNAF Research and Statistics Committee.

The short term increases in over-all salmon catches to date do not demonstrate any long term increase in the

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maximum sustained yield. On the contrary, any actual increase in the total Atlantic salmon catch as a result of the high seas fishery occur only because the coastal states for conservation reasons are not exploiting returns to salmon rivers to the absolute maximum potential. Since this situation cannot practically prevail in the long term, the result of the high seas fishery must inevitably be a decline in the long term sustained yield.

"The decline of salmon catches noticed in Canada and Great Britain in home water remains completely within the margin of fluctuations so far observed, which are to be attributed to different environmental conditions and number of grilse" according to the aide-memoire. Grilse never get to Greenland waters so variations in grilse catch cannot be attributed to fishing in that area. Estimates of tonnage losses apply to older salmon catches, not grilse. The variations in catches of older salmon are indeed within normal limits but the catches would have been higher by the amounts given above in the absence of the Greenland fishery. There are, indeed, considerable fluctuations in catches from year to year. Therefore, changes in a particular year cannot be used to assess the effect of the high seas fishing.

The aide-memoire also states, "Nor does the age and size structure of high seas catches give any cause for concern." This statement is irrelevant to ICNAF since there is only one age group in the high seas fishery off West Greenland.

"The competent scientific bodies have...not yet proposed any measures to regulate the Atlantic salmon fishery", the

-13-

aide-memoire concludes on this point. It is the considered view of the United States that it is not the function of these bodies to propose measures but to present the actual situation and the effect of fishing. It is for the Commission to decide whether the fish should be taken on the high seas or in home waters to achieve the desired conservation objective.

"3. If precautionary protective measures are to be applied, less grave restrictions on fishing should be contemplated as an initial step."

The Government of the United States considers that there is an obligation, under the Convention, for all Parties to the Convention to take necessary conservation measures before any stock of fish found in the high seas is depleted. The United States notes that the purpose of the Convention is to maintain the maximum sustainable catch from the fisheries in the Northwest Atlantic Ocean; action should not be delayed until it is necessary to restore depleted fisheries (Preamble, Article VI, paragraph 1, and Article VIII, paragraph 1). Thus it is not merely useful to regulate certain fisheries "as a precautionary measure in order to preclude the threat of over-fishing", as stated in the aide-memoire, it is the very function of the Commission to do so.

The aide-memoire goes on to state that it is "unjustifiable" to apply the "strictest measures conceivable" since scientists have "not even sounded a warning note in the case of salmon." The United States notes that the proposal in question is not the strictest measure conceivable; that would

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have been to propose a ban on salmon fishing in the entire Convention area, encompassing zones of exclusive national jurisdiction over fisheries, including Greenland fisheries. The United States cannot accept the suggestion that scientists have not sounded a warning note in the case of salmon; many outstanding scientists have expressed grave concern about the status of salmon stocks in the Atlantic. They have noted that unrestricted high seas fishing for a species such as salmon poses grave dangers for the maintenance of the individual salmon runs and for the species as a whole, and have indicated some possible effects of the expanding high seas catches on these runs. Investigations conducted to date have been thoroughly reported to the North-East and Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Commissions and to the International Council for the Exploration of the Seas, and advice of scientists has been received by the national Commissioners of the two Commissions. The responsibility for assessing the scientific investigations and deciding upon the measures to be taken rests with the Commissions, not the scientists. The Commissions have evaluated the scientific investigations presented to them, and have decided that a ban on high seas fishing for salmon is justified and necessary.

The decision to propose a ban on salmon fishing outside national fishing limits was not taken lightly. The Governments which supported the ban, including the United States, realize full well its meaning. No Government, to the knowledge of the United States, is interested in applying more restrictive measures than necessary to achieve the conservation objectives.

-15-

For its part, the Government of the United States examined carefully the possible measures which might be taken before deciding to support the ban, and presumes that other Governments did likewise. The United States reached the conclusion that no other measures would achieve the desired ends; it would have supported a less restrictive measure which would have achieved the desired ends. No other measure was proposed which would have fallen in the latter category, nor is the United States aware of any such measure from its long experience in dealing with conservation of salmon. The suggestions made by the Delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany referred to in the aide-memoire were very vague; no specific proposals were made, nor was any evidence presented which would show that these vague suggestions would have achieved the desired ends.

The Federal Republic refers to the situation in the Baltic Sea as a "good example of a reasonable regulation of salmon fishery on the high seas". The United States considers that the situation is quite different in the Baltic Sea than in the Atlantic. The fishery in the Baltic Sea is sustained primarily by artificial propagation of salmon, harvested by nations which do not contribute to the support of the stock. There is no evidence that the conservation measures practiced in the Baltic contribute anything to the maintenance of the stocks at a level which would permit the maximum sustained yield. Because of the dependence of the Baltic fishery on artificial propagation, the concept of the maximum sustained yield cannot be considered there. Thus such measures are not considered appropriate for ICNAF. In accordance with the provisions of the Convention, the

-16-

salmon conservation measures adopted by the Commission should ensure that an adequate escapement results for each and every salmon run. No way has ever been demonstrated or proposed which will achieve this until the salmon runs have been differentiated at the mouths of the salmon producing streams. The fact that this situation may appear to put the coastal state in a preferential situation regarding the harvest of the excess runs may be related to the necessity of the coastal state maintaining the streams in suitable conditions for salmon runs, and sometimes aiding the runs through their hatchery restoration and propagation programs, not to the conservation proposal as such. Nor is it the basis for the conservation proposal; there is no other way to ensure the continuation of the runs.

Programs such as those in the Baltic for maintaining a fishery involving a small number of nations in an enclosed environment through almost total dependence on artificial propagation of salmon are susceptible to immediate disaster. The entire fishery could be destroyed in a relatively short period if the hatchery program were to be disrupted for any reason. On the other hand, in the vast expanses of the Atlantic, the stocks can be destroyed only by unregulated fishing indiscriminately applied to various runs in the short term; in the long term they can be destroyed through neglect of the streams or their diversion to other economic purposes by the coastal states. The former is a real danger, the latter is difficult to contemplate in view of the investment the coastal

-17-

states have made in their salmon streams and the great interest they have demonstrated in maintaining the runs, unless they are forced to abandon these programs because the high seas catch by foreign nations so reduces the runs that the efforts -- at great cost to the coastal states -- to maintain the runs fail or become uneconomic. The offshore fishery in the Baltic has greatly limited the possibilities in the area for river fisheries in home waters.

The aide-memoire also points out that "salmon grow to their full size not in the rivers but in the international area of the high seas." The United States cannot contest this point, but notes that salmon do not grow at all unless the runs have adequate escapement to the streams, or they are artificially propagated, and unless the streams are maintained in suitable condition, all at considerable cost to the coastal state.

Thus the coastal states are in a position to exterminate the salmon stocks at will by neglecting the stream environment or abandoning their hatchery programs or both. They do not do this, however; on the contrary, they maintain the streams and hatcheries at great expense. The high seas fishing states are also in a position to destroy the fishery; they do not limit themselves, however. The United States recalls that the Commission unanimously adopted a resolution at the 1968 Annual Meeting calling on its Member Governments to "consider urgently the desirability of preventing increase in high seas fishing for salmon by their nationals in the ICNAF Area for the time being". No action has been taken to the knowledge of the United States Government pursuant to this resolution

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by any Party to the Convention which is conducting a high seas salmon fishery in the Convention area, and in fact the high seas fisheries appear to be growing steadily.

The aide-memoire concludes on this point by stating that "Any excess expansion of high seas fishing could, if need be, be counteracted by closed seasons, closed areas and the fixing of catch quotas. But at the present time there is no reason for such measures." Thus the aide-memoire appears to be stating on the one hand that the Federal Republic of Germany is willing to accept measures for the conservation of salmon which are less restrictive than the proposal in question and on the other hand that there are no reasons for adopting any such measures. The Government of the United States finds it difficult to reconcile these points of view, especially since the vast majority of Parties to the Convention have concluded pursuant to their treaty obligations that such a measure as the proposed ban is necessary and proper.

"4. A ban in principle on fishing for salmon on the high seas outside national fishery limits cannot be regarded as a conservation measure but in fact constitutes a reservation of the right to fish salmon to coastal states. Such a ban would encourage tendencies towards nationalization of the resources of the high seas and hence violate the international principle of the freedom of high seas fisheries."

The proposals formulated by the Commission in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Convention must be directed toward species of fish which support international

-19-

fisheries in the Convention area. They must be designed to maintain the maximum sustained catch of those fish. This does not mean, as previously noted, that these measures must ensure that fisheries are maintained as international fisheries; in a few unusual circumstances, the maximum sustained catch may be achieved only by regulating the international fisheries so as to achieve the catch in areas outside the purview of the Convention. This is not contrary to the Convention, which does not require that all measures taken pursuant to its provisions must mean that fishing will be permitted in international waters at all times, as implied in the aide-memoire. The United States notes, in fact, that the Preamble to the Convention refers to the "investigation, protection and conservation of the fisheries of the Northwest Atlantic Ocean, in order to make possible the maintenance of a maximum sustained catch from those fisheries", without reference to whether those fisheries are international or not. The only pertinent restriction here is found in Article VIII, that the fishery in question must be international in nature at the time the proposal is made. This condition has been met with regard to the salmon proposal. That an indirect result of a legitimate conservation proposal pursuant to the Convention would be to restrict the fishery in the future to areas under national jurisdiction is immaterial to the question of acceptance of the proposal as a valid conservation measure within the terms of the Convention. In fact, the limitation of the fishery to areas within national jurisdiction does not

-20-

necessarily mean that it becomes a national fishery; the examples of international fisheries carried out within areas of national jurisdiction around the North Atlantic pursuant to multilateral and bilateral arrangements are too numerous and well known to enumerate here.

The aide-memoire states that the proposed ban would "amount to a far-reaching application of the so-called principle of abstention which, however, has not been recognized as a principle of international law, nor at the most recent conferences on maritime law in Geneva in 1958 and 1960". The United States notes that not once in either Commission did a proponent of the proposal refer to it as an application of the principle of abstention. Whether or not that principle has any application in international law is not material in the case of the proposal in question. In the absence of any alternate proposal which would achieve the desired objectives of conserving each individual salmon run, the proposal was made and accepted as the only reasonable conservation measure which could be taken with regard to the Atlantic salmon in the circumstances.

The aide-memoire also refers to "the principle of freedom of fishing on the high seas and of equal access by all nations to the living resources of the high seas." The United States does not question this principle, in fact it supports it fully. This principle is stated in the 1958 Conventions on the High Seas and on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, to which it, but not the Federal Republic of Germany, is Party. The principle, however, as the United States is sure the Federal Republic will agree, is

-21-

not unlimited; it is restricted by the general obligation of all states to conduct their fisheries in accordance with the principles of conservation and with reasonable regard to the interests of other states. Thus the proposal in no way detracts from the principle of freedom of fishing on the high seas; in fact it supports the principle by ensuring that special fisheries situations will be accommodated by special measures within the principles of conservation and of reasonable regard for the rights of others while the general principle is maintained. If this were not so, states with interests in special fisheries situations might be inclined to take unilateral measures for the protection of those interests which would undermine and destroy the general principle. Neither the United States nor, it is understood, the Federal Republic would favor such a situation.

The aide-memoire goes on to state that "the German Government feels that all countries engaged in fishing on the high seas should participate in international measures of research and regulation as a matter of course, in order to prevent unreasonable exploitation of maritime food resources that will continue to be indispensable." It is for this very reason that the United States supports the proposal respecting salmon fishing on the high seas in the Convention area. The vast majority of Parties to the Convention have found this international regulation necessary, pursuant to their treaty obligations. While the United States can understand how the Federal Republic may not agree in all points with the majority, it cannot understand in view of the oft-stated commitments of the Federal Republic in this field why it cannot accept the decision which has been

-22-

reached through the mechanism provided by the Convention.

As stated in the aide-memoire, "The German Government fears that the reservation of salmon stocks to the coastal states will encourage the tendencies to be observed all over the world of extending exclusive national rights to fisheries and will above all strengthen the views of the advocates of a 200-mile zone." The United States Government fears that the rejection of the proposal for the conservation of Atlantic salmon will increase the pressures throughout the world for the extension of national fisheries jurisdiction. The only effective method of countering such tendencies, which are firmly rejected by the United States, is to demonstrate that international cooperative regulation of the high seas fisheries can be effective, and can take into account special circumstances such as that encountered with respect to the salmon. The proposal was adopted upon the basis of scientific investigations and careful consideration by the Governments concerned. If rejected, and faced with no viable alternative, these Governments must inevitably consider other measures to protect these interests. Even if they do not then act in an extreme fashion, failure of the international cooperative mechanism in such cases will be used by the advocates of extended jurisdiction as another indication that their way is best.

From the point of view of the principle of freedom of the seas, the most important aspect of the salmon proposal is that it was voted internationally by the states fishing in the area concerned. As the need for regulatory measures regarding high seas fisheries increases, it is critical that the responsible international commissions act decisively to meet

-23-

the needs and interests of the states concerned. The adoption of the salmon proposal by ICNAF could be cited with great force as an example of the usefulness and flexibility of international fisheries regulatory machinery from the point of view of coastal as well as distant water fishing states. In the coming years the very preservation of the freedoms of fishing on the high seas may depend upon the ability of the major maritime countries -- of which many are members of ICNAF -- to demonstrate that international regulation of high seas fisheries is equal to the task of providing maximum benefits to the nations of the world.

It is suggested in the aide-memoire that some coastal states may seek to apply a proposal such as the salmon proposal to stocks of fish that spawn in or depend on territorial waters for part of their life cycle. This is out of the question. The salmon must depend on suitable streams for spawning; these streams can only be maintained in a suitable condition by the positive action of the coastal states. No other important species is so dependent on the special action of the coastal state in its fresh water streams. While measures can be taken to preserve the natural environment in territorial waters, no comparable special action by the coastal state can be considered there. The responsibility of the coastal state maintaining salmon streams is vast; the responsibility of the coastal state in its territorial waters is not essentially different from that assumed by all countries in observing principles of conservation. The United States firmly rejects the idea that a ban on high seas fishing can be applied as the only possible conservation measures to

-24-

any species which spawns in or depend on coastal waters, nor does it know of any support for this concept.

The United States is pleased to note that "the German Government is prepared at any time to participate in all measures for the conservation and rational exploitation of salmon stocks in the North Atlantic which are based on scientific findings and are commercially useful, provided that they meet the interests of all salmon-fishing countries." The United States also appreciates that the German Government "agrees that where fishing expenditure may have to be restricted allowance should be made for the special expenditures incurred by individual countries in preserving and building up salmon stocks." The United States fails to reconcile these statements, however, with the stated position of the Federal Republic on the salmon proposal now before us.

The Government of the United States, accordingly, considers that an adequate legal basis exists for the salmon proposal in the Convention, and that the proposal was made properly pursuant to the provisions of the Convention. It also believes that sufficient evidence exists to establish a need for the proposal, even though there may be some disagreement by a few concerning the extent and meaning of the scientific evidence. The United States considers that no other conservation measures which might be adopted will ensure fully adequate protection for the salmon runs in the North Atlantic. Finally, it considers that the proposal in question is compatible with international law and, considering the special circumstances

-25-

of the coastal state action needed to preserve the salmon runs, that the general principle of freedom of fishing is not impaired by the proposal.

Department of State,

Washington, October 27, 1969

C O P Y

25-5-7-2	
7	—

Copy for Dept. of External Affairs, Ottawa. ✓

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UNCLASSIFIED

P O L	TO: MR. HERBERT	Airmail
	
	REGISTRY	

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: BONN, BREMEN, GÖTEBORG, HELSINKI, MOSCOU, STOCKHOLM, WARSAW
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR/BCF: Dir, FF, NN, MKTG, TEXU, RO

AmEmbassy COPENHAGEN

Dec. 16, 1965

Fisheries: Salmon Fishing

CERP D: Dept. CA-4491, Oct. 22; Emb. A-416, Dec. 1, 1965

Anthony Netboy, 2727 Himes Street, Portland, Oregon, who has been conducting research on the Atlantic salmon for publication (Emb. A-416, Dec. 1, 1965) informed the reporting officer the status of his publications on this subject is as follows:

Chapters on the fate of the Atlantic salmon in France and Spain were published in condensed form in the British Salmon and Trout Magazine in the January and May issues. The chapter on the Baltic salmon fisheries will be published in the January 1966 issue. The publisher is the Salmon and Trout Association, Fishmongers Hall, London.

His book on Atlantic salmon is about two-thirds finished and probably will be published first in London by a London publisher. The highlights of the book were published in an article in the October 1965 issue of American Forests.

For the Ambassador:

signed: Andrew W. Anderson

Andrew W. Anderson
Regional Fisheries Attache (Europe)

UNCLASSIFIED

ECON: FISHERIES: AWAnderson:ah 12/16/65 R.C. Dixon

For

Refer to Dept of Fisheries Copenhagen

Done 12/14/66

U.S.A. Division/E. Hebert/mg



CANADA

DEPUTY MINISTER OF FISHERIES
LE SOUS-MINISTRE DES PÊCHERIES

OTTAWA 8

E. Hebert
X

Refer to: Legal Divn.
Dept. of Justice
Washington Embassy

None due 6/6/66

llg

January 26th, 1966.

SALMON

25-5-7-12-
51 1 11

The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Department of External Affairs,
Ottawa, Ontario.

Dear Sir,

This Department is faced with a problem with respect to the opening date for the taking of coho salmon in reciprocal Canada - United States conservation measures off the West Coast and I am writing to request consideration of an approach to the U.S. Federal Government.

Since 1952 there has supposedly been uniformity between the U.S. Pacific Coast states and Canada in the opening date for commercial coho fishing in that fishermen of both countries are bound by regulation which does not permit such fishing prior to June 15th in each year.

The Canadian regulation is quite clear as follows:

Section 68, sub-section 4(a)

"No person, while using commercial fishing gear, shall fish for, take or have in his possession any coho or blueback salmon in any waters from the first day of December in any year to the fourteenth day of June next following, both days inclusive."

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The Fisheries Code of the State of Washington details the coho regulation in this manner:

"Section 75.18.010 Fishery districts. The following fishery districts are hereby created:

- (1) District No. 1, as used in this chapter, shall include the Strait of Juan de Fuca, and the waters of the Pacific Ocean over which the state of Washington has jurisdiction, exclusive of bays, inlets, canals, coves, sounds and estuaries."

Pol

- 2 -

"Sec. 75.18.020 Commercial fishing - Silver Salmon - District No. 1. It shall be unlawful for commercial purposes to fish for or take in the waters of district No. 1, as herein defined, silver salmon (*Oncorhynchus kisutch*) between the first day of November and the fifteenth day of June of the year following, both dates inclusive."

"Sec. 75.18.040 Possession, transportation of silver salmon - District No. 1. It shall be unlawful for commercial purposes for any person to have in his possession or transport through the waters of district No. 1, as herein defined, any fresh silver salmon (*Oncorhynchus kisutch*) taken from said waters or from the waters of the Pacific Ocean during the period from the first day of November and fifteenth day of June of the year following, both dates inclusive."

It will be noted from the foregoing that the Washington regulations have application only to Juan de Fuca Strait and the waters of the Pacific Ocean over which the State has jurisdiction, i.e. out to the U.S. three-mile limit. Under the provisions of Section 75.18.040 it is illegal to transport coho salmon through waters over which the State has jurisdiction if these salmon are taken prior to June 15th. The weakness of this regulation would appear to be contained in the situation that Washington State does not have jurisdiction outside the three-mile limit.

For some time there have been reports that United States trollers, principally from Washington, operating along the west coast of Vancouver Island, have been taking coho a week to ten days prior to the June 15th opening date and landing them a day after the season opens. Based on observations of this Department's protection cruisers our officers have suspected these reports to be true but have not been able to substantiate them since we cannot board U.S. trollers on the High Seas under the pretext of looking for violations of regulations pertaining to salmon. Our officers now have further information to corroborate observations of our patrol vessel captains. At a meeting in our Vancouver office with the executive of the Pacific Trollers Association (a Canadian group) in December, 1965, several of their directors stated that U.S. fishermen openly admitted to them that they take coho before the opening date. This situation is disturbing to Canadian trollers since we vigorously enforce the closed season.


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We feel it is important that some assurance be sought from the U.S. Government to the effect that American trollers will not take coho prior to June 15th in each year. If it is considered that state legislation permits abuse, we would suggest that supplementary federal law might provide the solution.

I would be grateful for your advice on this subject.

Yours very truly,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'S. V. Ozere', written over a horizontal line.

S. V. Ozere,
Assistant Deputy Minister,
(International and Jurisdictional).

U.S.A. Division/J.A.E. Robert/el/mg



EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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Diary
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Circulation

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MEMORANDUM

TO
À
Legal Division

FROM
De
U.S.A. Division

REFERENCE
Référence

SUBJECT
Sujet

SECURITY
Sécurité

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE
February 8, 1966.

NUMBER
Numéro

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA	
	25-5-7-2-SALMON
MISSION	51

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

DISTRIBUTION

Dept. of
Fisheries

Dept. of
Justice

Washington
Embassy



P. A. BRIDLE

U.S.A. Division.

Legal/P. A. Lapointe/rh

*Ref: Dept of Justice
Dept of Fisheries*

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES

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J. W.*

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TO U.S.A. Division (through Mr. Warshof)

SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL
Sécurité

FROM Legal Division
De

DATE February 11, 1966

REFERENCE Your memorandum of February 8, 1966
Référence


NUMBER
Numéro

SUBJECT Opening date for the taking of Coho Salmon off the
Sujet West Coast under "reciprocal" Canada-U.S.A.
conservation measures

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA	
25-5-7-2-SALMON	
MISSION	
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ENCLOSURES
Annexes

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


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- 2 -



[Handwritten Signature]
for Legal Division

U.S.A. Division/J.A.E. Hébert/el

c. Department of Fisheries
Department of Justice
Legal Division
Embassy Washington

File ✓
Diary
Circ.

FEB 25/66

25-5-7-2
51 | ✓

No. X-55

The Department of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and has the honour to refer to the opening date for the taking of coho salmon off the West Coast under reciprocal U.S.A.-Canada conservation measures.

Since 1952 there has supposedly been uniformity between the United States Pacific Coast State and Canada in the opening date for commercial coho fishing in that fishermen of both countries are bound by regulations which do not permit such fishing prior to June 15 of each year. The Canadian regulation, Section 68, Subsection 4(a) states:

"No person, while using commercial fishing gear, shall fish for, take or have in his possession any coho or blueback salmon in any waters from the first day of December in any year to the fourteenth day of June next following, both days inclusive."

On the other hand, the fisheries code of the State of Washington in Sections 75.18.010 and 75.18.020 applies a similar regulation but only to the United States territorial sea, i.e. within a three-mile limit in the Strait of Juan de Fuca and the waters of the Pacific Ocean over which the State of Washington has jurisdiction, exclusive of bays, inlets, canals, coves, sounds and estuaries

The Washington State code (Section 75.18.040) also prohibits transportation or possession of such salmon in these same territorial waters during the same period. The net result, however, is that, while under the Canadian regulation (which is strictly enforced by fisheries protection officers) Canadian fishermen are not allowed to take any coho salmon off the West Coast in any waters prior to the 15th of June of each year, their United States counterparts without infringing on the State of Washington regulations, may take coho salmon in international waters prior to the 15th of June of each year and then land them legally a day after the season opens.

- 2 -

In the light of the above the Department of External Affairs wishes to know whether the State of Washington has the legal capacity to remedy the situation and, if not, whether the Government of the United States could provide a means of redress.

For convenience of reference the relevant regulations of the Government of Canada and of the State of Washington are reproduced in the Annex I to this Note.

P. A. BRIDLE

Ottawa,

February 25, 1966.

ANNEX I

Extract from the Canadian regulation:

Section 68, Sub-section 4(a)

"No person, while using commercial fishing gear, shall fish for, take or have in his possession any coho or blueback salmon in any waters from the first day of December in any year to the fourteenth day of June next following, both days inclusive."

Extract from the Fisheries Code of the State of Washington:

Section 75.18.010 Fishery districts

"District No. 1, as used in this chapter, shall include the Strait of Juan de Fuca, and the waters of the Pacific Ocean over which the state of Washington has jurisdiction, exclusive of bays, inlets, canals, coves, sounds and estuaries."

Section 75.18.020 Commercial Fishing - Silver Salmon

"District No. 1. It shall be unlawful for commercial purposes to fish for or take in the waters of district No. 1, as herein defined, silver salmon (*Oncorhynchus kisutch*) between the first day of November and the fifteenth day of June of the year following, both dates inclusive."

Section 75.18.040 Possession, transportation of
Silver Salmon

"District No. 1. It shall be unlawful for commercial purposes for any person to have in his possession or transport through the waters of district No. 1, as herein defined, any fresh silver salmon (*Oncorhynchus kisutch*) taken from said waters or from the waters of the Pacific Ocean during the period from the first day of November and fifteenth day of June of the year following, both dates inclusive."

copy for Dept. of External
Affairs, Ottawa, Canada.
from Canadian Embassy,
Copenhagen, Denmark.

COPY

A-728

Unclassified

Airmail

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INFO: AmConGen BREMEN
AmConGen GØTEBORG, STOCKHOLM
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR/BCF:Dir, FF, RO

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MR. EDELSTEIN
MAR 22 1966
REGISTRY

25-5-7-2-SALMON
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AmEmbassy COPENHAGEN Mar. 7, 1966.

Fisheries: Baltic Sea Salmon Conservation Agreement

Dept's CA-7507, Jan.25; and Emb. A-631, Feb.8; A-510, Jan.4, '66
A-335, Nov.3; A-203, Sept.15; A-131, Aug.19, 1965.

One copy of the Danish printed copy of the subject agreement in Danish, German and Swedish is attached as Enclosure No. 1. One copy of the Danish regulations (in Danish) issued on Feb. 23 to make effective on March 1 the provisions of the subject agreement is attached as Enclosure No. 2. Copies of Enclosure 1 and 2 also have been airmailed to W.C. Harrington, M/FW, Department of State and Chief, Branch of Foreign Fisheries, Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, both in Washington.

The subject agreement - Agreement of December 20, 1962 concerning the protection of the salmon resource in the Baltic Sea - was ratified by the deposition of documents in Stockholm by the Government of Denmark, Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany on March 1, 1963, March 15, 1963 and December 29, 1965, respectively.

A free translation of the Danish regulations follows:

Free Translation
Fisheries Ministry's Announcement of Feb. 23, 1966.

Announcement of protection of the salmon resource in the Baltic Sea.

With respect to Section 24 in salt water fisheries law No. 195, May 1965, (A-131, Aug.19, 1965) it is stipulated herewith, in accordance with the provisions in the agreement of December 20, 1962 concluded between the Government of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany and Sweden, as follows:

Section 1. The provisions of this announcement apply in the Baltic Sea, including the Gulf of Bothnia and the Gulf of Finland. This area is bounded in Øresund, the Great Belt and the Little Belt by the following lines:

- a) Falsterbo fyr - Stevns fyr.
- b) Jungshoved - Bøgesund.
- c) Hestehoved fyr - Maddes Klint.
- d) Skalby kirke - Flinthorne Odde.
- e) Kappel kirke - Gulstav.

MAR 21 1966

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- f) Ristingehale - Aerøhale.
- g) Skjoldnæs - Pøls Buk
- h) Chr. d.X's bro ved Sønderborg.

Section 2. In the area described in Section 1 the salmon fishery with nets or hooks may only utilize gear with the measurements listed below:

1. Drift nets shall, everywhere in the gear, have such a mesh size that a flat measuring instrument of the dimensions given below may easily be drawn lengthwise through the diagonally stretched mesh. The measuring instrument shall be 2 millimeters thick, and for nets of natural fiber 165 mm. wide and for nets of synthetic fiber, 157 mm. wide.

Drift nets already in use whose mesh size is less than those given, may, however, continue to be used until March 1, 1967.

2. The span width of fish hooks (the shortest distance between the hook point and the hook shaft) on drift lines and set lines, used to catch salmon, shall measure at least 19 mm. Fish hooks already in use whose span width is less than 19 mm may, however, be used until March 1, 1969.

Section 3. Salmon caught in the waters mentioned in Section 1 which do not measure 60 centimeters (23.62 inches) from the point of the snout to the end point of the tail must not be landed, sold, offered, held on board, kept or forwarded, but shall immediately after catching be set out in the water again.

Section 4. The provisions in Sections 2 and 3 do not apply to salmon caught in connection with the conservation of the resource or scientific objectives. Such salmon, however, may only be brought ashore for scientific purposes.

Section 5. Violation of Sections 2 and 3 in this announcement is punishable in pursuance of the provisions in Section 33 in the saltwater fisheries law No. 195, May 25, 1965.

Section 6. This announcement becomes effective March 1, 1966.

Fisheries Ministry, Feb. 23, 1966.
J. Risgaard Knudsen

/Løkkegaard.

For the Ambassador:

(sgd.) Andrew W. Anderson
Regional Fisheries Attaché (Europe)

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TO
À The Under-Secretary of State for
External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada.

SECURITY
Sécurité Unclassified

FROM
De The Canadian Embassy,
Copenhagen, Denmark.

DATE April 27, 1966.

REFERENCE
Référence Our letter No. 536 of November 3, 1965.

NUMBER
Numéro 161

SUBJECT
Sujet Greenland Salmon

FILE	25-5-7-2-SALMON
OTTAWA	25-5-7 ATLANTIC-1
MISSION	935 48

J-1

TO Miss G. ...

P	MAY - 1966
O	REGISTRY

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

DISTRIBUTION

London
Oslo
Madrid

About a week ago, Doctor Paul Hansen, the Dane who is in charge of marine biological work in Greenland waters, published a report that salmon fisheries off Greenland have no detrimental effect on the fisheries of other countries. The report which we have not read, but of which we have seen a summary, says that despite regular heavy catches in the Baltic detailed examinations of Danish fisheries there have proved that the stock was not materially reduced. The number of Greenland fishermen, Doctor Hansen pointed out, is only about 1500 scattered over almost 9000 kilometres of coastline. Owing to their relatively primitive equipment, their catches are not great.

2. Mr. Allan McKendric, Secretary of the Scottish Salmon and Anglers' Association has pointed out that the catches in Greenland have amounted to about 2000 tons. If Doctor Hansen considers that such catches are not detrimental to the North Atlantic salmon population, Mr. McKendric has suggested that he has been most optimistic.

3. In a news report in Kristeligt Dagblad of April 15, it has been suggested that Denmark is prepared to agree to any British-Canadian wishes for permission to examine the salmon population in Greenland waters this Summer, and that Britain and Canada will be so informed when they meet in Madrid on May 25 and 26 to discuss the question of salmon fisheries.

Refer:
Fisheries
Agriculture
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6/1/66
1966

John Nelson
The Embassy

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P O L	<i>Miss Edelman</i>
	JUL 22 1966
	REGISTRY

J-4

25-5-7-2-SALMON		

No. 20

With reference to the Department of External Affairs Note X-55 dated February 25, 1966 and subsequent conversations between an Embassy Officer and an Officer of the Department of External Affairs regarding the regulations of the State of Washington on the trolling for Coho (Silver) Salmon, the Embassy is informed that the State of Washington has the authority to regulate the fishing activities of citizens of that State on the high seas as well as in territorial waters. However, existing legislation of that State does not empower the fisheries management authorities to so regulate fishing on the high seas, and new legislation would be required.

Embassy of the United States of America,

Ottawa, July 20, 1966

JWB

Circ.
Diary
File

25-5-7-PACIFIC-1
71

File CC 25-5-7-2-SALMON
Ottawa,
August 11, 1966

Dear Mr. Ozere,

We refer to your letter of January 26, 1966 and the subsequent conversation between you and Mr. Lapointe concerning the problem existing with respect to the opening date for the taking of coho salmon in reciprocal Canada-U.S. conservation measures for the West Coast.

You will recall that in our note No. K-55 of February 25, 1966 to the U.S. Embassy we enquired whether the State of Washington has the legal capacity to remedy the existing situation, and if not whether the government of the U.S. could provide a means of redress.

... We have now been informed by the U.S. Embassy (Note No. 20 of July 20, 1966, attached) that the State of Washington does have the authority to regulate the fishing activities of citizens of that State on the High Seas as well as in the territorial waters, but that existing legislation of that State does not empower the fisheries' management authorities to do so.

It seems to us that the question of determining the best way to proceed, in the light of this information, might best be considered in an informal meeting of officials of our two Departments. For this purpose, if you agree, Mr. Gottlieb, Mr. Lapointe, Miss Eidelstein and I would be glad to meet with you, at your convenience.

MR. HICKS

Yours sincerely,

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Mr. S. V. Ozere,
Assistant Deputy Minister,
(International and Jurisdictional),
Department of Fisheries,
Sir Charles Tupper Building,
Riverside Drive,
Ottawa, Ontario

Mr. Curran

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES OCT 25 1966

10. X

TO The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,
OTTAWA, Canada.

SECURITY UNCLASSIFIED
Sécurité

FROM Canadian Consulate General, SEATTLE, Washington.
De

DATE October 6, 1966

REFERENCE
Référence

NUMBER 211
Numéro

SUBJECT Alaska Reporting Service
Sujet

95

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA <i>25-5-7-2-SALMON</i>	
MISSION <i>35 25-3-4</i>	<i>11</i>

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

The attached excerpts from the Alaska Reporting Service

Issue No. 291 may be of interest.

[Handwritten Signature]
Consulate General

DISTRIBUTION

*refer to Economic Div.
(Mr. Donald)*

*refer to Econ. Div.
(Mr. Malone)
& file [initials]*

*Done
13/10/66
[initials]*

X

Department of Fish and Game: Honorable Walter Kirkness, Commissioner

Edward S. Marvich, deputy commissioner of the Department of Fish and Game, reviewed the past salmon fishing season and discussed the shellfish fishery for 1966 before the September 22 meeting of the Greater Juneau Chamber of Commerce.

Mr. Marvich told his audience he was happy to talk on these subjects because he was the bearer of good news.

As of this past Sunday, the canned salmon pack for all of Alaska was over 3.9 million cases. This is the highest pack we have had for the past 17 years, since 1949. This is a far cry from the 1.8 million

cases produced the year before Alaska took over the management of its fish and game," Mr. Marvich stated.

(Note: The state assumed full responsibility for the management of its fish and game resources on January 1, 1960.)

Mr. Marvich continued: "From 1960 through 1966 we have had packs in excess of 3 million cases for five out of the seven years. By comparison, in the seven years prior to 1960, there were six of these when less than 3 million cases of salmon were produced in Alaska. The downward trend from 1936 to 1959, which looks like a ski slope if placed on a graph, has been arrested and reversed."

Mr. Marvich pointed out that "We still have a way to go, when we consider that the all-time high pack for Alaska was well over 8 million cases with many years of production in the 5 million case bracket."

"We have every reason to believe that the salmon runs are being rehabilitated and that we can look forward to a productive, viable resource for harvest in the years ahead. We thank our lucky stars that these fish have the resiliency to bounce back, if afforded the opportunity to do so."

The wholesale value of salmon jumped from 49.1/2 million dollars in 1959 to 107.7 million dollars in 1965, Mr. Marvich told his audience. "And the 1966 value should be even greater."

Area-by-area, Mr. Marvich reported on the salmon catch as follows:

"Western Alaska, including Bristol Bay and the Arctic had a total production of 893 thousand cases of which 738 thousand cases were Bristol Bay red salmon. The area produced a catch of 29 thousand cases of kings, 2 thousand cases of cohos, 94 thousand cases of pinks, and 29.6 thousand cases of chums.

"Central Alaska had a total pack of 1.48 million cases with the pinks predominating with 784 thousand cases; next were the red salmon with 415 thousand cases, followed by chums with 228 thousand cases, cohos with 41 thousand cases, and kings with 5 thousand cases.

"The Copper River sockeye salmon run with a catch of more than 1 million fish was the best since 1954."

Mr. Marvich said, "A unique situation developed in Cook Inlet with a prolonged large run of sockeye salmon still present when pink salmon arrived in abundance and proceeded through the fishery at an unprecedented rate. This continuation caused catches to soar beyond the level where shore facilities could process them."

(Note: When the shore facilities announced the catch was in excess of their processing plants' capacity, Governor Egan authorized five Japanese ships to enter Cook Inlet to receive and freeze the catch. Over one-quarter million salmon were purchased by the Japanese for which the fishermen were paid approximately 150 thousand dollars. (See p. 2, Report No. 288 "Japanese freezer ships")

"I believe this is particularly pertinent since if these fish had not been purchased by the Japanese they could not have been harvested and sold, with the resultant loss of income to the fishermen of the area," Mr. Marvich stated.

Mr. Marvich then reviewed the catch of salmon in Southeastern Alaska.

"The pink salmon pack in Southeastern Alaska of more than 1.1 million cases this year is the largest since 1951 and is eight times greater than the record low of 1960. Equally significant in my opinion has been the fine harvest of early and late run chums. The total chum pack for southeastern amounts to 291 thousand cases, and has been particularly good in the district out of Juneau, including Icy Straits, Catham Straits, Excursion Inlet, Lynn Canal, etc. We had a total pack of about 387 thousand cases in this area of which 123 thousand cases were comprised of chums.

"Of the total salmon pack in Southeastern Alaska, the Ketchikan area produced over half the fish, a total of 796 thousand cases, followed by the Juneau area with 387 thousand cases, Petersburg-Wrangell area with 357 thousand cases, for a total of 1.540 million cases."

Reporting on the shellfish fishery, Mr. Marvich stated:

"In 1960, the king crab production for Alaska amounted to 28-1/2 million pounds with a direct value to the fishermen of 2,286,000 dollars. By comparison, the catch last calendar year was 132 million pounds with a value to the fishermen of more than 12.7 million dollars. Present king crab production trends indicate that the 1966 harvest will exceed that of the record year of 1965. King crab production for the Kodiak and Alaska Peninsula areas, the two major areas of the state, totals 80.6 million pounds as of August 31 of this year compared to 54 million pounds for the same period in 1965.

"Dungeness crab and shrimp landings have increased since 1960 with production in 1965 of nearly 9 million pounds of Dungeness crab for which the fishermen were paid close to 1 million dollars, and 16.8 million pounds of shrimp for which the fishermen were paid 757 thousand dollars. Shrimp production for Kodiak Island, the major producing area, has already exceeded the record 14 million pounds harvested there during the entire year of 1965."

Mr. Marvich thanked the Administration and Legislature "who were farsighted enough to recognize that on-the-spot management was a necessary prerequisite for the conservation and wise use of our fishery resources and provided us with the 'tools' to do the job."

Concluding his remarks, Mr. Marvich said: "We are going to have our ups and downs in the future. We will have instances where Mother Nature will intervene causing low water conditions, freezing out of eggs, scouring of streams, etc. This we cannot control over the many thousands of miles of coastline and streams throughout the length and breadth of Alaska. We can, however, be most optimistic that the long range trend is going to continue upward for the welfare and harvest of the commercial fisheries resources of the state."

STATE OF ALASKA

NOTICE OF STATE BONDED INDEBTEDNESS

Pursuant to the requirements of Section 37.15.015, Alaska Statutes,
 the following notice of Bonded Indebtedness of the State of Alaska is hereby published:

Purpose and Year of Issuance	Bond Anticipation Notes Payable	Amount of Bonds Outstanding July 1, 1966	Cost of Debt Service During F.Y. 1966-67	Cost of Debt Service to Maturity	Year of Maturity
University of Alaska Housing - 1958 A	\$	\$ 1,070,000.00	\$ 67,100.00	\$1,478,150.00	1988
University of Alaska Housing - 1958 B		410,000.00	38,521.25	509,026.25	1978
Military Construction (Armories) 1958 A		25,000.00	8,651.00	26,193.50	1968
Military Construction (Armories) 1958 B		785,000.00	74,700.00	964,156.25	1978
Ferries, Roads & Highway Construction - 1961		11,690,000.00	620,205.00	18,963,972.50	1991
Ferries, Roads & Highway Construction - 1962	4,000,000.00	4,830,000.00	344,400.00	6,456,300.00	1982
University of Alaska Gym & Utilities Construction - 1961		975,000.00	83,530.00	1,274,477.50	1981
University of Alaska Gym & Utilities Construction - 1962		655,000.00	70,162.50	789,912.50	1977
Nome Vocational Education School Construction - 1963		530,000.00	50,465.00	642,260.00	1978
** Nome Vocational Education School Construction - 1964					
Bush Airfield Construction - 1961	440,000.00	150,000.00	29,500.00	164,100.00	1971
Bush Airfield Construction - 1962		175,000.00	30,187.50	194,287.50	1972
** Bush Airfield Construction - 1964					
Hospital Construction - 1962		235,000.00	36,975.00	261,175.00	1972
** Hospital Construction - 1964					
University of Alaska Academic Construction - 1963	1,000,000.00	2,465,000.00	175,670.00	3,291,615.00	1983
** University of Alaska Academic Construction - 1964					
School Construction - 1963	300,000.00	2,515,000.00	182,322.50	3,355,310.00	1983
** School Construction - 1964					
Trunk Airport Construction - 1963	1,525,000.00	1,450,000.00	102,572.50	1,935,537.50	1983
** Trunk Airport Construction - 1964					
Kodiak Aleutian Vocational Education School Construction		1,700,000.00			
Pioneer Home Construction		2,000,000.00			
State Health & Welfare Facilities Construction		5,000,000.00			
Natural Disaster Recovery Fund		12,203,200.00			
Composite 1/8/64 Issue		7,575,000.00	576,532.50	10,372,570.00	1984
TOTAL	\$	\$ 23,168,200.00	\$ 2,491,494.75	\$ 50,679,043.50	

* SEE COMPOSITE ISSUE

- (1) \$19,104,100 worth of bond anticipation notes, First Series, were issued following the 1964 earthquake disaster and the federal government has agreed to purchase these notes if the interest rate on the private market exceeds 3.75 per cent per annum. Current estimates of actual cost of the disaster projects financed from the major portion of the note proceeds indicate that only approximately \$12,000,000 in bonds will be required to be issued during 1967 to redeem the notes. \$9,064,100 worth of bond anticipation notes, Second Series, were also issued following the 1964 earthquake disaster to finance pre-earthquake and post-earthquake authorized capital improvements. It is planned to issue bonds to redeem these notes during 1967. While these notes are not bonded indebtedness, under the provisions of the statute requiring this notice, information concerning them has been included in this notice because of their relationship to future bonded indebtedness and debt service.

State Bond Committee

Legal Notice
Publish October 5, 12, and 19, 1966.

File *CC 25-5-7-100-2*
Dec 25/66



DEPUTY MINISTER OF FISHERIES
LE SOUS-MINISTRE DES PECHERIES

OTTAWA 8

OCT 21 1966
FILE CHARGED OUT
TO: *X*

5-20

October 20, 1966.

File *cc. 25-5-7-100-2* *2-SALMON*

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
Department of External Affairs,
East Block,
Ottawa, Ontario.

<i>25-5-7-100-2-1</i>		
<i>35</i>		<i>1</i>

Dear Sir,

Reference is made to Mr. Hicks' letter of August 11, 1966, concerning the problem existing with respect to the opening date for the taking of coho salmon in reciprocal Canadian-United States conservation measures on the Pacific coast.

Since the U.S. Embassy has advised that the State of Washington has the authority to regulate the fishing activities of its citizens on the High Seas, we would be grateful if the U.S. Department of State were approached and a request made to have the regulation for coho amended. This would involve changing their existing opening date of June 15, which is really a landing date for coho salmon and permits their fishermen to take coho before June 15, to make it a commencement date for the taking of coho. This would then conform with the Canadian regulation.

We do not think a meeting is necessary with you at this time unless you feel some further clarification of the problem is required.

Yours very truly,

S. V. Ozere,
Assistant Deputy Minister.
(International & Jurisdictional)

TO Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,
OTTAWA, Canada

SECURITY
Sécurité

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM Canadian Consulate General, Seattle, Washington
De

DATE

November 4, 1966

REFERENCE
Référence

NUMBER
Numéro

235

SUBJECT Pacific Northwest Fisheries
Sujet

TO: Mr. Currie
F. M. REGISTRY
NOV 8 1966
FILE CHARGED OUT
TO:

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA 25-5-7-2 SALMON	
MISSION 3.5 25-5-7-1	//

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

DISTRIBUTION

Emb. Wash.

Dept. of
Fisheries

The operations of Russian fishing fleets off the Washington and Oregon coasts for the past few months have been a matter of constant concern. They were also undoubtedly a major factor behind the adoption by the United States of the 12-mile fisheries zone. You will recall that the 12-mile bill was introduced by Sen. Magnusson of Washington and Sen. Bartlett of Alaska and was signed by the President on October 15.

2. There have been conflicting reports as to whether the Russians are observing the 12-mile limit and whether they will agree to fish conservation measures. At a meeting in Moscow in July with U.S. officials the Russians reportedly agreed to instruct their fishing fleets not to operate within 12 miles of the Washington-Oregon coast, not to fish for salmon, not to interfere with American fishing and to exchange observers with the American fleets. At the same time the negotiators were said to have agreed to hold further technical meetings in November and December. Aerial surveys in August showed some 86 Russian ships operating off the Pacific coast. According to some reports the ships stayed 13 to 40 miles offshore and were engaged in hake and ocean perch fishing. Other surveillance flights apparently showed the fleet less than 8 miles offshore and with some salmon on board. Gov. Evans of Washington, Gov. Hatfield of Oregon, Sen. Magnusson and fisheries officials have asked the federal government to take action and copies of affidavits from commercial fishermen, photographs and tape recordings have been forwarded to the State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Moscow for use in making representations to the Soviet Government.

3. Most press coverage has dealt only with the fishing operations. The Portland Oregonian on October 4 reported that Vice Adm. Bernard F. Roeder, Commander of the U.S. Navy's First Fleet, said "there is no indication that electronic equipment aboard Russian fishing vessels off Oregon's coast presents a defense threat ... all indications are that the fishing fleet is doing just that - just fishing ... the Russian boats are new to you here in Oregon but they have been in operation for some time in the Aleutians ... there's no evidence their boats or mission have been changed since then".

Refer to
Legal Div
(Mr. Lapointe)
File #
Done
10/11/66
JL

POV

4. There is some question whether the November talks in Moscow will take place as scheduled. It is being speculated that the Soviet Union may try to win concessions in king crab fishing in Alaskan waters before agreeing to anything on trawling operations off the Washington and Oregon coasts. In mid-September the Russians reportedly proposed a December meeting to discuss extension of the 1965 U.S.-Russian king crab agreement and indicated a willingness to discuss questions of mutual interest in Northeast Pacific and Northwest Atlantic fishing. Sen. Magnuson, who visited Moscow early in October, said that in his talks with Soviet officials he was assured the Russians will abide by the 12-mile limit and had no intention of taking salmon. He said they indicated that they would try to get concessions on crab fishing before approving measures to ease the Pacific Northwest fishing situation.

5. While the press has been active in reporting the threat to fishing and fish resources posed by the Russians and to some extent by the Japanese, there has been little editorial comment. Attached are copies of the editorials which have come to our attention.

6. The newspaper reports seems to us to indicate that the fishing industry was concerned more with the destructive effects the Russian fishing methods might have on fish resources than with the fact that it was Russian trawlers who were invading coastal areas. This impression seems to have been borne out in a confidential conversation I had with Sidney Rosenberg, President of New England Fisheries. He said that a Washington official, whom he did not name, was in Seattle last week to discuss the situation with him. Rosenberg had taken the view that with their large investment in ships and equipment, it would not make economic sense for the Russians not to be interested in fish conservation. He thought that the Russians would, if only from a common sense point of view, be willing to negotiate conservation measures and he said they were able scientists who would know the value of conservation. He stressed that he had no answer if the discussions were viewed as political. The Washington official had, he said, taken the line that the Russians were going to be hard to deal with and would probably demand reciprocal concessions.

7. In general Mr. Rosenberg thought that the 12-mile limit would be beneficial for fishing inside the zone but would make no difference outside it. He admitted that the fish industry was worried by the scouring methods being used by the Russians and said that if these affected the runs and spawning inside the 12-mile limit they could be harmful. He reiterated that he thought the Russians were interested in conservation and added that the Japanese were not.

8. As New England Fisheries^{Co.} is one of the largest operating on both the Pacific and Atlantic coasts and as Mr. Rosenberg is thoroughly familiar with the problems involved, I think we can take his views as representative of the industry.


Consulate General

TO: The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,
OTTAWA

SECURITY
Sécurité

TO: UNCLASSIFIED

FROM: Canadian Consulate General,
De: SEATTLE

DATE: November 30, 1967

REFERENCE
Référence

NUMBER
Numéro: 368

5-8

SUBJECT: Commercial Fishing Gear Regulations for Bristol Bay
Sujet

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA	SALMON
25-5-7-1-1	R-
MISSION	25-5-7-1-1 34
34	25-5-7-1

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

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S.A. DIV.	
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cc. to Dept. of Fisheries and file. Encl. Rec. 11/12/67 NB

As a result of this and past years' poor season for red salmon in Bristol Bay, Alaska is proposing a gear licence limitation plan. Under the proposal 1,692 gear licenses will be issued in 1968 and will be distributed to applicants on a "point credit" system.

2. According to the Alaska Department of Fish and Game the 1960-61 average base of 1,642 gear licenses will be used for the issuance of 1968 gear licenses. No more than 1,692 or less than 1,592 gear licenses will be issued in 1968. This number of fishermen was adequate to catch all the fish the canneries could handle in record runs of 1960-61. During the years 1960 through 1967, 33 per cent of the fishermen used set nets and 67 per cent used drift nets. During the same years 69 per cent were resident and 31 per cent non-resident. The 1968 gear licenses will be issued in these same approximate proportions. During the years 1960 through 1967, 11 per cent of the fishermen were 17 years of age and younger and 89 per cent were 18 years of age or older. The 1968 licenses will be issued in the same proportion. The reason for this breakdown is to continue as near as possible the past historical pattern and not unfairly discriminate against the younger fishermen, who hereafter can enter the fishery with a gear license only after reaching age 18. The applicant will be given credit for each year he was licensed during the years 1960 through 1967 in the Bristol Bay Fishery.

3. Representatives of the Seattle Salmon-canning industry anticipate challenges in court if the proposed plan is adopted and in any case they say the plan is unworkable. They point out that it would be possible for one cannery to have all the licensed fishermen under contract leaving the other canneries without the fish they need. Another problem of the canneries could be that of having contracted for a five-year catch from a fisherman who under the new plan was unable to obtain a license.

4. Since between 1960 and 1967 some 31 per cent of licenses were issued to non-residents, Canadian fishermen may be affected if the proposal is adopted.

Handwritten signature: H. J. ...
Consulate General

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TO
À The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,
OTTAWA

FROM
De Canadian Consulate General,
SEATTLE

REFERENCE
Référence Our letter 368 of November 30, 1967.

SUBJECT
Sujet Commercial Fishing Gear Regulations for
Bristol Bay

SECURITY
Sécurité UNCLASSIFIED

DATE December 21, 1967

NUMBER
Numéro 395

5-9

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA 25-5-7-2-SALMON	
MISSION 40 25-5-7-1-1 25-5-7-1	11

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

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Dept. of
Fisheries, Ott

Faced with what may be another "disaster year" on Bristol Bay and generally poor runs in most other sectors of Alaska, the State Board of Fish and Game ordered a state-wide moratorium on the number of salmon net gear licenses that may be issued in 1968. The order, approved by the Board at the conclusion of an 18-day meeting, follows closely along the lines of a proposal submitted by Governor Walter J. Hickel.

2. At the same time, the Board approved a modified version of another administration proposal setting up a point system by which gear licenses would be issued in Bristol Bay, up to a maximum of 2,529 licenses. It also established a sliding scale on the amount of gear each fisherman can use, based on the total number of gear licenses issued and the estimated allowable catch for Bristol Bay in 1968.

3. The statewide moratorium of salmon net gear licenses is the first ever imposed in Alaska, and, as such, is expected to face a court test. While the Board did not work out the final wording of its order, it adopted a general policy statement covering the plan, and instructed the Department of Fish and Game to draft the final regulation. The general policy proposal approved by the Board is as follows:

"1. A person who registered salmon net gear in the state in 1966 or 1967 will be permitted to register salmon net gear in 1968.

"2. The total number of persons registering salmon net gear to any gear registration area during 1968 shall not exceed the number which registered gear in that registration area during 1967 or 1966, whichever number is greater.

"3. Persons desiring to register gear in a given gear registration area shall be allowed to license gear as follows:

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OOD
Add to Fisheries file
John 2

TO: Mr. Scott
FROM: []
DEC 29 1967
FILE: []
TO: []

... 2

- 2 -

- a) Persons who registered gear in that gear registration area during 1967
- b) Persons who registered gear in that gear registration area during 1966
- c) Hardship situations, to be determined by the Commissioner.

"Recognizing that an excessive number of units of gear in some areas during recent years has contributed to serious economic conditions and has created critical problems in resource management because of potential excessive harvest during any open season, it is the purpose of this section to prevent a shift of gear from such emergency to other areas and thereby prevent these same critical conditions from arising elsewhere in the state.

"4. Hardship is defined as the inability to register gear in an area during 1967 or 1966 due to circumstances beyond the control of the applicant, military service, sickness, death of the head of the household and other hardship conditions.

"5. Any person denied gear registration may appeal this determination by completing application Form FG-196 and filing the same with the Commissioner at Juneau, Alaska, not later than May 1, 1968.

"A hearing officer shall be appointed by the Commissioner of Fish and Game and a hearing shall be conducted at a convenient location selected by the department from the area for which gear registration is being sought by the appellant. The hearing shall be commenced not later than 20 days after the receipt of Form FG-196. All parties directly interested shall be notified by mail at least 10 days prior to the hearing date.

"Within 10 days after the hearing, the Commissioner of Fish and Game shall review the recommendations of the hearing officer, and shall render a decision thereon. He shall promptly advise all directly interested parties of his decision by mail."

4. The state-wide moratorium applies only to salmon net fishing gear, and does not affect trollers.

... 3

- 3 -

5. Under the point system established for Bristol Bay, 10 points would be required before any individual fisherman may apply for a gear license in 1968. Credit points would be issued as follows:

- a. 10 points for an applicant who held a gear license registered to Bristol Bay in 1967.
- b. 10 points for an applicant who held a 1966 gear license for an area of Bristol Bay closed in 1967, but who did not register and fish in another section or district of the bay in 1967.
- c. 10 points for any 1968 gear license applicant who held a gear license on Bristol Bay in 1967 and makes application for and received a gear license for Bristol Bay or subsequent years. (Nothing herein shall be construed to mean a licensee must participate in the 1968 fishery to earn his point credit rating.)

6. In addition, beginning with 1968, a person who has held a commercial fishing license on Bristol Bay will receive five points credit for each year he has held such a license should he subsequently apply for a gear license of Bristol Bay.

7. Five points will be deducted, starting with 1968, for every destructive fishing violation in the Bristol Bay commercial fishery, defined as fishing in closed waters or during a closed period, contingent upon court conviction.

8. The Board also set a minimum age limit of 12 on all applicants for gear licenses on Bristol Bay. But in its final action, it rejected an administration proposal that credit points be given to persons receiving welfare aid and to those of native origin.

9. The sliding gear scale to be applied to fishermen on Bristol Bay was based on a proposal submitted to the Board by State Senator Jay S. S. Hammond, R-Naknek. Under that plan, the scale would be based on the total amount of gear registered to the area and the estimated allowable catch. The formula approved by the Board is as follows:

"The Board shall determine by January 1, 1968, the approximate allowable catch ('Optimum Total Catch') for the Bristol Bay area. From this the approximate maximum permissible TOTAL amount of gear shall be determined by the preceding eight-year average catch for each type of gear. Thus, the 'Optimum Number of Gear Units' shall be the 'Optimum Total Catch' divided by the 'Optimum Catch per Unit'.

... 4

- 4 -

"Each gear registrant shall be allowed to fish a full compliment of the type gear for which he is registered if total gear registrations for the area do not exceed the 'Optimum Number of Gear Units'. Should gear registration exceed the 'Optimum Number of Gear Units', the quota of gear allotted each gear registrant shall be reduced proportionately in multiples of 25 fathoms, but to no less than 25 fathoms per registrant."



Consulate General

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TO
A The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,
OTTAWA

SECURITY UNCLASSIFIED
Sécurité

FROM
De Canadian Consulate General,
SEATTLE

DATE January 11, 1967

REFERENCE
Référence Our letter No. 395 of December 21, 1967.

NUMBER 16
Numéro

SUBJECT
Sujet Commercial Fishing Gear Regulations for Bristol Bay

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA 25-5-7-2-SALMON	
MISSION 34 25-5-7-1-1	

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

DISTRIBUTION

We are informed that Governor Walter J. Hickel has stated that the gear limitation formula for commercial salmon fishing adopted by the Alaska Board of Fish and Game "is a step in the right direction, but does not go anywhere far enough." Governor Hickel raised the possibility of a constitutional amendment "to solve the critical problem of too much fishing gear, if the present proposal is not 'beefed up', or if it should be ruled out by the courts.

2. The Governor contended the original gear limitation proposal submitted to the board by the administration "should have been adopted for the good of all Alaskans. "However," Hickel added, "let there be no mistake about this: the state will enforce all new provisions vigorously." "I have some doubts about the effectiveness of what we have to work with now in cutting down on the amount of fishing gear in the water," Hickel said. "It's just unfortunate the board did not go farther."

3. The Governor's comments followed a meeting with Commissioner Urban C. Nelson of the Fish and Game Department in which the fish and game board's gear limitation programme was reviewed.

4. The board, meeting first in Sitka and later in Juneau, concluded its deliberations on December 15, approving the gear limitation proposal on the last day of the meeting.

5. Major differences between the plan approved by the board and the administration proposal are:

- a. A limit of 2,529 on the number of licenses which could be issued for commercial salmon fishing in Bristol Bay in 1968 -- the same number sold in 1967 -- "one of the worst fishing seasons on record," Governor Hickel contends, "because of too many fishermen."

TO: *M. Scott*
FROM: REG. SERV.
JAN 17 1968
FILE CHARGED OUT
TO:

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*Notes to
Fishing
1 AND
Hickel
Robert
Jan. 18*

Jan 24 68/76

- 2 -

The administration proposal had placed a ceiling of 1,642 on the number of Bristol Bay permits which would be allowed, a figure based on the license average in 1960-61, a high yield year.

- b. The administration proposal included provisions which allowed point credits toward licenses both for welfare cases, and for persons of native origin. Both these provisions were eliminated from the proposal finally approved by the board, and the final board version extends credits only for having previously fished.
- c. The board proposal also includes a statewide moratorium limiting the number of licenses to be issued all over Alaska in future to the number issued in 1966-67 -- a provision not included in the administration's program.

6. The fish and game board also approved in the final version of the gear limit proposal, dropping the age limit for commercial fishing license applicants down to 12 from the 18-year limit asked by the administration.

7. After the meeting with Mr. Nelson, the Governor said, "If we lose this gear limitation programme in a court case, we will ask the legislature to take action on a constitutional amendment. "And, if the amendment is adopted, we would expect to go far beyond the gear limitations imposed by the fish and game board."



Consulate General

ACTION COPY

m

5-4-68 1:30 88

THIS TELEX VIA UIC PRINCE RUPERT B C

PLEASE RELAY TO

HON H J ROBICHAUD MINISTER OF FISHERIES OTTAWA AND

DR HA NEEDLER A DEPUTY MINISTER DEPT OF FISHERIES OTTAWA AND

FRANK HOWARD M P OTT

AND HON PAUL MARTIN MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OTTAWA

*Dr. Needler
was phoned
Apr 6/68*

*not seen by Minister
8/4/68
as per*

TELEX AS FOLLOWS

20-5-7-2-SALMON
29 | —

WE CANNOT UNDERSTAND THE DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES COMPLETE LACK OF CONCERN FOR THE ECONOMY AND WELFARE OF THE NORTH COAST FISHERMEN AND THEIR DEPENDANTS THROUGH THE PROPOSED OPENING OF THE SALMON FISHERY IN AREA 5 TO THE BIG BOAT FLEET

THE NORTH COAST DISTRICT COUNCIL, REPRESENTING THE 4,600 RESIDENTS OF THE SEVEN INDIAN COMMUNITIES IN THE NORTH COAST DISTRICT ARE UNALTERABLY OPPOSED TO THIS FISHERY AND URGE YOU RECONSIDER THE DECISION BEING MADE AND SHOW SOME CONCERN FOR THE WHOLE PEOPLES OF THE NORTH COAST WHOSE LIVELIHOOD IS DEPENDANT OF THE NORMAL INSHORE SALMON FISHERY IN THIS AREA.

YOU HAVE ALLOWED THE DESTRUCTION OF THE HERRING FISHERY IS THE SALMON FISHERY TO BE NEXT

THOMAS GREEN

A CHAIRMAN

NORTH COAST DISTRICT COUNCIL

INDIAN AFFAIRS

*Refer to Fisheries
Frank Howard
Lester
Apr 29/68
M.P. 96*

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES



U. S. A. DIV	
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TO The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa

FROM The Canadian Consulate General, Seattle, Washington

REFERENCE Référence

SUBJECT Alaska Sea Otter Transplant

SECURITY Unclassified / Sécurité

DATE August 29, 1968

NUMBER 261 / Numéro

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA	25-5-7-2-SALMON
MISSION	25-5-7-2 28

ENCLOSURES Annexes

DISTRIBUTION

Dr. Sprules, Dept. of Fisheries

According to a recent announcement by Governor Hickel Alaska Department of Fish and Game biologists are transplanting 24 sea otter from Amchitka Island in the Aleutians to new habitats in Klag Bay in Southeastern Alaska. It is planned to move some 250 animals to the Pribilofs, Glacier Bay and Prince of Wales Island. The transplant programme is a cooperative effort between Alaska and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and is being undertaken not only because of sea otter overpopulation in the Amchitka area but to provide assurance that the Amchitka sea otter population will not be harmed by underground nuclear tests scheduled in that area.

Charles Hoodie
 Consulate General

Refer to Economic Policy
File
J.S. Jpt. 11
Refer to AECB
AECCL Jpt 13/18
Disarmament
Mr. Reynolds to see file

TO: *Mr. Sprules*
 FROM REGISTRY
 SEP 10 1968
 FILE CHARGED OUT
 Ye



THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20230

September 19, 1968

cc Mr. J.H. Warren
Mr. J. C. Langley

Handwritten notes and stamps: 25-5-7-1, 25-5-7-1, HDS

His Excellency
A. Edgar Ritchie
Ambassador of Canada
Washington, D. C.

25-5-7-2-SALMON
34

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Continuing our informal and personal discussion,
I get this from one of our friends:

"In Newfoundland there are, I believe, some-
thing under 30 licenses for drift netting. Yet, during
the 1967 season, 65 boats drift netting were observed
by a competent man, sent there to check by one of the
Canadian associations interested in fishing controls."

"In the Miramichi area, especially around
Escuminac, it is reported that there are 125 vessels
fishing."

"Canada should clean all of this up if it is to
expect other nations to cooperate in limiting catches."

No need to acknowledge.

Sincerely,

C. R. Smith
C. R. Smith

30.9.38(us)

1746 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20036,
September 5, 1968.

PERSONAL

Dear Mr. Secretary,

On a purely personal basis I thought you might be interested in the enclosed notes concerning discussions which have been taking place about the problem of the depletion of salmon stocks by fishing on the High Seas which you mentioned to me in your letters of May 29 and July 2. As I spent most of my August holiday in Eastern Canada, I heard a good deal about this whole problem from people keenly interested in fishing on our Atlantic salmon streams.

Best regards,

Yours sincerely,

(SIGNED) A. E. RITCHIE

A. E. Ritchie
Ambassador

The Honourable
C. E. Smith,
Secretary of Commerce,
Washington, D.C.

Serial No. 7125
(B. b. 65)

Proceedings No. 18
Appendix II


ANNUAL MEETING - JUNE 1968

Draft Resolution relating to the Conservation of Atlantic Salmon

(Plenary Agenda Item 20)

The Commission calls the attention of member governments to the serious concern expressed by several delegations who considered that the high seas fishing for salmon should either be prohibited or stabilized at its present level in view of the potential danger which it presents to the Atlantic salmon resources and recommends to member governments that they consider urgently the desirability of preventing increase in high seas fishing for salmon by their nationals in the ICAF Area for the time being, and that high priority be given to studies of the effects of such high seas fishing on the resources.

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR



THE NORTHWEST ATLANTIC FISHERIES

Serial No. 2051
(A.a.4)

11202

ICNAF Comm. Doc. 68/20

ANNUAL MEETING - JUNE 1968

Canadian Proposal

Concerning Conservation Measures for Atlantic Salmon in the Convention Area

284-6-8

The Canadian Delegation continues to view with concern the development of new fisheries for Atlantic salmon both in inshore waters and on the high seas far from the rivers of origin. Although we appreciated the thoughtful consideration given to the Canadian proposal presented at the last Annual Meeting (Comm. Doc. 67/17), we were disappointed that the Commission could not agree to recommend prohibition of fishing for Atlantic salmon on the High Seas in the Convention Area. Since that time we have reviewed the scientific data available on the distribution and composition of Atlantic salmon stocks in the North Atlantic area and have concluded once again that the risk of over-exploiting this valuable resource through intensification of existing fisheries or the development of new fisheries is too great to be ignored by the Commission while awaiting additional scientific data on which to base a final decision.

Many of the special features associated with management of anadromous species such as Atlantic salmon were outlined in Commissioners' Document 67/17 and these are generally recognized by fishery experts of all nations. In our view the most important special feature is the responsibility assumed by those nations having salmon spawning rivers within their territories to ensure that the fresh-water habitat is maintained in a condition which will provide for maximum production of young salmon either by natural or artificial means. This is a costly responsibility essential to maintenance of the resource, and can only be assumed by such nations if concomitant benefits accrue to the national fisheries. The continued high level of production of Atlantic salmon from Canadian rivers shows very clearly that Canada has effectively accepted its responsibilities in this regard.

We realize that more scientific evidence must be gathered bearing on the distant migrations and high seas life of Atlantic salmon before the experts will be able to determine with reasonable accuracy the size and composition of the resource and the effects of the various fisheries on the spawning stocks in order to recommend appropriate conservation measures. It is obvious from the reports of the scientists that it will take some years to complete the necessary investigations and the analysis of data and we are concerned that if the fishing effort continues to increase during this period we may be faced with one more example of effective fisheries management coming too late to provide maximum long-term benefit to the fishermen of our nations.

It is our view that on the basis of the evidence available at this time the Commission should take a prudent approach to the problem immediately and prohibit the development of new fisheries or the extension of existing fisheries. We have taken such action in Canada where the number of commercial salmon licences is strictly limited. It is our firm intention to continue this policy and prohibit further development of the fishery until better scientific data are available.

The Canadian Delegation sincerely hopes that the other members of the Commission will agree that the amount of fishing effort applied to the limited Atlantic salmon resource should not be increased and will institute appropriate measures within their respective administrations to ensure that the Atlantic salmon fisheries in the North Atlantic area are stabilized at the 1967 level until new scientific evidence makes it possible to recommend specific conservation measures to the Contracting Governments.

Ottawa, Canada
May 10, 1968

MESSAGE

EXTERNAL OTT

DATE	FILE/DOSSIER	SECURITY SECURITE
April 17, 1969	25-5-7-2-SALMON	RESTR

APR 17 15 32 '69	NO X-452	PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
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MADRID

FISHERIES (E.B. YOUNG)

26329

REF YOUR TEL 483 APR 15

SUB/SUJ ATLANTIC SALMON

ANY INFORMAL SUPPORT YOU COULD LEND BRIGGS WOULD BE APPRECIATED
 SINCE PROPOSAL TO BAN SALMON FISHING ON HIGH SEAS WILL BE
 SUPPORTED BY CANADA AT ICNAF MEETING.

DISTRIBUTION / LOCALE NO STANDARD

ORIGINATOR/REDACTEUR	DIVISION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/AUTORISE
<i>N. Whittaker</i> N. Whittaker/lk	U.S.A.	2-1738	SIG. <i>K.J. Burbridge</i> K.J. BURBRIDGE



EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

U.S.A. DIV.
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Ottawa, October 2, 1969

25-5-7-2 SALMON
Atlantic-2
led (1)

Mr. K. J. Burbridge
Head, U.S.A. Division
Department of External Affairs
116 Langevin Block
Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario

Dear Ken:

In view of the continuing nature of the problems associated with the salmon fishery in the Atlantic, my Government believes there is a need for current information on the status of salmon stocks and the catch during 1969. While we appreciate that complete statistics may not be available as yet, we are hopeful they will be available shortly at least in a preliminary form. The U.S. proposes to compile this information into a summary, including available data on the U.S. salmon fishery, and supply copies to each cooperating Government. We believe that a timely compilation will be useful for each Government in its continuing efforts to secure acceptance of the proposed ban on high seas salmon fishing.

Consequently, I have been instructed to request statistical information on Canada's 1969 salmon fishing, including catch statistics. If possible, these should be broken down into river, inshore and offshore fisheries. For comparative purposes it would be helpful to have information for 1967 and 1968 as well.

Thanks.

Best regards,

Sincerely,
Charles G. Wootton

Charles G. Wootton
Counselor for Economic Affairs

236-2341

To File
1/1/69

R E S T R I C T E D

MOSCOW OCT8/69 NO/NO STANDARD

TO EXTER 3501 PRIORITY

INFO TT WSHDC DE OTT FISHERIES(YOUNG) FORESTRY DE OTT

REF OURTEL 3473 OCT3

NORTHWEST ATLANTIC FISHERIES

SAW DOKUCHAYEV AND ZHELTOV(WHO REPRESENTED USSR AT WSAW) OCT6.

THEY SAID REQUIRED PAPERS HAD CLEARED THEIR MINISTRY AND GONE

TO FOREIGN MINISTRY WEEKS AGO. THEY WERE NOW SIMPLY WAITING TO BE

TOLD BY DEPOSITARY POWER WHEN ALL ACCESSIONS HAD BEEN RECEIVED

BY STATE DEPT. THEN THEY WOULD ISSUE NECESSARY INSTRUCTIONS TO

THEIR FISHING FLEET.

2. ASKED USA EMBASSY SUBSEQUENTLY WHETHER

A) SOVIET RATIFICATION HAD BEEN DEPOSITED IN WSHDC

B) WHETHER OTHER SIGNATORIES HAD RATIFIED JUN AGREEMENT. EMB DID

NOT/NOT KNOW, BUT ON CHECKING WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY OCT7 WERE TOLD

SOVIET EMB IN WSHDC HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO DEPOSIT REQUIRED

INSTRUMENT.

3. IT SEEMS THEREFORE THAT RUSSIANS HAVE EITHER ALREADY TAKEN,

OR ARE ON POINT OF TAKING, INNATL LEGAL ACTION REQUIRED TO CONFIRM

ADHERENCE TO JUN THERE REMAINS QUESTION OF TIMELY ACTION

ON THEIR PART TO ISSUE INTERNAL ADMIN ORDERS TO THEIR FISHING

FLEET. WHETHER THEY WILL TAKE THIS ACTION ON TIME DEPENDS THEY SAY

ON HOW SOON THEY ARE NOTIFIED ALL SIGNATORIES HAVE CONFIRMED

ADHERENCE. THEY WOULD NOT/NOT GIVE CLEAR ANSWER WHEN ASKED BY

...2

25-5-5-
u. 25-5-7-
-J. SALMAN


25-5-5-~~0352~~

25-5-7-ATL-2

PAGE TWO 3501 RESTR NO/NO STANDARD

WHEN DEADLINE THEY WOULD NEED THIS INFO; THEY SIMPLY OBSERVED THE
SOONER THE BETTER. BUT THERE IS NO/NO DISAGREEMENT ON POINTS OF
SUBSTANCE; FISHERIES MINISTRY SEEMS ENTIRELY PREPARED TO CO-
OPERATE.

4. QUESTION OF POSSIBLE BILATERAL FISHERIES AGREEMENT WAS
RAISED. WE ARE REPORTING SEPARATELY ON THIS.



CANADA

~~hep~~
hefaud
Mr Smith

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY BOARD
LE SECRÉTAIRE DU CONSEIL DU TRÉSOR

Ottawa 4, November 3, 1969.

25-5-7-2-SALMON

Mr. J. C. Langley,
Assistant Under-Secretary of
State for External Affairs,
East Block,
Ottawa 4, Ontario.

Dear Jim,

I attach herewith a letter I received from Dan Doheny who is President of the Atlantic Salmon Association. I am sure you will agree that the case he has espoused is a good one, and it would be in the national interest to do what we can to protect the Atlantic salmon fishery.

I hesitate to suggest to Dan that he ought to approach Mitchell Sharp directly because I know that your Minister has many things on his mind. In any event, I am sure that if you put your mind to it, more can be accomplished that way.

I would appreciate it if you could let me have some kind of note back which I could then use as a basis for a reply to Dan.

Yours sincerely,

S. S. Reisman.

Attach.

5.11.31(us) 7.26.11

DOHENY, DAY, MACKENZIE & LAWRENCE

ADVOCATES, BARRISTERS & SOLICITORS

DANIEL O'C. DOHENY, Q.C.
DAVID MACKENZIE
TASS G. GRIVAKES
RAYMOND LEMOYNE
A. R. DEANE NESBITT
DAVID M. DOUBILET

GRANT H. DAY, Q.C.
JOHN E. LAWRENCE
P. ANDRÉ GERVAIS
PETER V. GUNDY
PIERRE G. RIOUX

TELEPHONE: 878-3661
AREA CODE 514
CABLE ADDRESS: "SREEP"

1203 IBM BUILDING
5 PLACE VILLE MARIE
MONTREAL 113, QUEBEC

October 9, 1969


Personal

S.S. Reisman, Esq.,
Secretary of the Treasury Board,
Confederation Building,
Ottawa, Canada.

Dear Simon:-

You once said if we ever needed some help in Ottawa on behalf of the salmon you would be glad to see what you could do.

I have a small problem which I really should be writing to Mitchell Sharp about but I am afraid that with all the more important worries of the Department of External Affairs our salmon problem might be lost in the shuffle. This causes me to wonder whether you could bring it to the attention of some senior civil servant with more chance of success than if I wrote to the Minister. The problem is simply that we would like the Department of External Affairs, through its ambassadors or senior secretaries in Denmark and West Germany, to put a little pressure on the Danish and West German governments in our efforts to curb the taking of salmon on the High Seas. In this connection I enclose a short memorandum setting out the facts.



DOHERTY, DAY, MACKENZIE & LAWRENCE

S.S. Reisman, Esq.

- 2 -

I may say that the U.S. State Department, egged on by John Olin who is apparently a close friend of President Nixon, has done yeoman service through its embassies in Denmark and West Germany. Dr. A.W.H. Needler, Deputy Minister of the Fisheries Department, assured T.B. Fraser, General Manager of The Atlantic Salmon Association, that Canada would exert political pressure on the Danes and Germans but I understand that Canada has not done anything to date.

I am quite willing to write to Mitchell Sharp myself but, as mentioned before, I have great confidence in your ability to put the matter across to someone in External Affairs. However, if this causes you the slightest embarrassment or you think I would be better to write directly to Sharp, please drop me a line to such effect.

I enjoyed our week together immensely and hope our mutual host will have another outing next year and include both of us in it.

With best personal regards,

Sincerely,



DD:LH
Encl.

MEMORANDUM RE THE ATLANTIC SALMON ASSOCIATION

The International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) met in Warsaw on June 6, 1969 and passed the following resolution:

"THAT the Contracting Governments take appropriate action to ensure that the fishing for Atlantic salmon, Salmo salar L., in waters outside national fishing limits be prohibited in the Convention Area."

The vote for this resolution resulted in favourable votes by the United States, Canada, Rumania, Italy, France, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Spain, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United Kingdom. Portugal abstained and Negative votes were cast by Denmark and West Germany.

Therefore, the result of the vote was eleven nations affirmative, two nations negative, with one abstaining. It required an affirmative vote of ten of the 14 nations involved for passage of the resolution. The executive secretary of ICNAF has transmitted the salmon and other conservation proposals of the annual meeting to the United States as the depository government on June 20 and the Department of State circulated the proposals to the member governments on June 23. Under the terms of the ICNAF Convention the salmon proposal must now be accepted positively by all ICNAF member governments before it can enter into force and steps have been taken endeavouring to urge prompt acceptance of all the ICNAF conservation proposals. It is difficult, if not impossible, to forecast the action by the 14 member governments and, of course, it is difficult to forecast the action of the governments of Denmark and West Germany but strenuous efforts will be made to try to induce these two governments to ratify the ICNAF action.

However, under Convention Article VIII of The International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries the salmon ban proposal shall only become effective for all contracting governments four months after the date on which notifications of acceptance shall have been received by the depository government (United States) from all contracting governments participating in the panel for the sub area to which the proposal applies.

- 2 -

This means that all ICNAF countries must accept, before the ban becomes effective. There is, therefore, obvious need to convince Denmark, West Germany and Portugal of the need to accept.

I understand that in the past when a resolution such as the one quoted above has been adopted, even those nations who voted against it, have been prepared to accept it and act accordingly. This time apparently the Danes, egged on by the West Germans, are using every procedural step they can to block the enactment of the resolution and possibly to appeal it. The Portuguese have no interest in Atlantic salmon but are rumoured to have some side agreement with the Danes to remain aloof at the present time from the whole salmon question in return for the Danes not bothering Portugal about smelts or herring, or some other fish in another area in the Atlantic.

The Atlantic Salmon Association has a great deal of back-up material to substantiate our view that unless steps are taken to curb netting of salmon on the High Seas, this important Canadian resource will be in great jeopardy of extinction. Of particular interest in this connection are the following:

1. Press release of Royal Danish Embassy
July 1969.
2. Analysis of the Danish press release
prepared by the Atlantic Salmon Association.
3. Article in Field magazine.
4. Article in The Atlantic Salmon Journal
September issue.

I would be glad to supply you, or anyone else, with copies of the above and any further information required. Furthermore, our General Manager, T.B. Fraser, would be glad to go to Ottawa at any time to discuss this matter.

Incidentally, it was Canada who proposed the Resolution at Warsaw; all the more reason for Canada to press for its enactment.

ROYAL DANISH EMBASSY

File No. 63. Dan. 1/1.

Mr Smith
(referred to)
done by Young
in Fisheries

1 enclosure.

25-5-7-2-SALMON

~~25-5-7-Atl-2~~ *MS*

No. 25.

The Embassy of Denmark presents its compliments to the Department of External Affairs and has the honour to inform the Department that the Government of Denmark - like the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of Sweden - has informed the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission that it objects to the recommendation adopted by a majority vote at the Commissions meeting in London in May of this year for the prohibition of fishery for salmon in the convention area outside national fishery limits. The Danish Government indicated at the same time that it would be prepared to discuss other measures than a total ban.


The Embassy has the honour to inform the Department further that the Government of Denmark does not find itself in a position to accept the recommendation of the same content adopted by the International Commission for the North-West Atlantic Fisheries at Warsaw in June of this year with respect to the North-West Atlantic Ocean. The Government is prepared however to discuss other measures than a total ban.

The Embassy begs to enclose an Aide Mémoire setting forth the reasons for the attitude of the Danish Government.

./.

The Embassy avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of External Affairs the assurances of its highest consideration.

Ottawa, November 14, 1969



11/17/11

C o p y

Aide Mémoire

1. At its Seventh Meeting held in London in May 1969, the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission adopted by a majority vote a Recommendation for the fishery for salmon outside national fishery limits to be prohibited in the Convention Area. At the meeting, Denmark, Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany voted against the Recommendation. In a Note of today's date the ~~Ministry of Foreign Affairs~~ ^{Government} of Denmark has informed the Commission that the Government of Denmark objects to the Recommendation. The Danish Government is, however, prepared to discuss other measures than a total ban, such as stated in paragraph 6 below.

2. This Aide Mémoire explains the reasons for Denmark's objection and for the non-acceptance of the Recommendation of the same content adopted by the International Commission for the North-West Atlantic Fisheries at Warsaw in June 1969 with respect to the North-West Atlantic Ocean.

3. The Danish Government which is no less interested than other countries in maintaining salmon stocks in the North Atlantic, holds the view that the Convention provides no legal basis for a total ban on salmon fishing within the entire Convention Area. The provisions contained in Article 7 (1) (d) regarding the establishment of closed areas were originally formulated at the technical Conference in Rome in 1955 regarding Conserv

- 2 -

of the Living Resources of the High Seas. The proceedings of the Conference leave no doubt that these provisions were intended to deal with limited areas, the extent of which had to be closely related to the objectives aimed at.

If Article 7 (1) (d) were to be applied without such limitation, this would in fact imply that its provisions would permit total prohibition of fishing for a whole species within the entire Convention Area. The meaning of the term "area" seems not to have been discussed when the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention was adopted at the London Conference in 1959. It could not reasonably be assumed that the parties to the Convention should have been prepared to undertake such a far-reaching commitment.

Such an interpretation would also seem to be difficult to reconcile with the provisions of Article 7 (2), under which "measures for regulating the amount of total catch ... or any other kind of measures for the purpose of the conservation of the fish stocks in the Convention Area" have to be "adopted by not less than a two-thirds majority ... and subsequently accepted by all Contracting States".

4. Even if a Recommendation for a total ban on salmon fishing on the high seas within the entire Convention area were presumed to be compatible with the Convention, Denmark would not be able to accept it under the present circumstances because the Recommendation does not - as prescribed by Article 6 (d) and 11 - comply with the requirement that it should be based "as far as practicable on the results of scientific research and investigation".

000953

- 3 -

The requirement that regulatory measures must as far as practicable be based on scientific research is a generally accepted principle which is to be found also in other international conventions, such as the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (paragraph 1 of Article viii), and in the Geneva Convention of April 29, 1958, on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas (Articles 7, 8 and 10).

Under the terms of Article 11 (1) of the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention the Commission shall when possible seek the advice of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) and the co-operation of the Council in carrying out any necessary investigations and, for this purpose, may make such joint arrangements as may be agreed with the ICES or may make such other arrangements as it may think fit.

In accordance with this provision the Joint Working Party of the ICES/ICNAF was set up in 1965 and has since studied the state of stocks of atlantic salmon and the effects of the Greenland fishery; in its latest reports, this Joint Working Party has also dealt with salmon fishing in the North East Atlantic. However, neither the ICES nor the Joint Working Party has proposed a regulation of high-sea fishing. The investigations undertaken by the Joint Working Party have demonstrated that high-sea fishing has helped to increase the total catch without causing a demonstrable decline of any importance in the stock of spawning salmon.

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- 4 -

5. In addition, there are basic considerations against a total ban on high-sea salmon fishing:

Such a ban would reserve saltwater fishing for coastal states having grounds suitable for the breeding and growth of salmon. It would not be consonant with the principles governing international fishery regimes, nor would it seem fair and equitable to give such countries sole rights to the exploitation of salmon stocks.

The salmon spends a big part of its life outside the territorial waters of its country of origin, it feeds partly on the high seas, partly in the territorial waters of other countries (in competition with other species), and it grows from about 25 - 50 grammes to its adult size of 3-10 kilogrammes outside its country of origin. Whether or not salmon is exposed to catching on high seas, only a small proportion of young salmon appears to return to the waters where they were spawned. For this reason, too, it appears reasonable to fish for salmon in international waters when the fish have attained a reasonable size.

If the reasons underlying the proposed ban were applied consistently, countries whose territorial waters serve as breeding grounds for any particular species would hold a special right to utilize stocks of these species, which could have far-reaching consequences for existing international fishery policies.

Fisheries authorities have also drawn attention to the fact that a complete ban would impede the scientific research and investigation required in the Convention. The working party's efforts to make a general assessment of the effects

- 5 -

of high-sea fishing on salmon stocks would be hampered, since tagging and other studies of salmon movements in the ocean would be made impossible and no assessment of the influence of environmental factors on salmon stocks could be made. Without assistance from commercial fishing, the working party's investigations can hardly be carried out on a sufficiently large scale to lead to a true picture of the situation.

6. Some governments take the view that an escalation of salmon fishing would endanger the stock. This view is not shared by the Danish Government who believes that the real danger to the stock is overfishing just before they enter the spawning grounds. The Danish Government is, however, prepared to discuss less far-reaching measures which could be introduced now. In this connection it might be of interest to study the conservation measures taken in pursuance of the Convention on the conservation of salmon stocks in the Baltic Sea, concluded by Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany and Sweden on December 20, 1962. Under these measures, the size of salmon caught and mesh and hook sizes are subject to regulation. Furthermore, questions relating to closed seasons and to a ban on the use of pelagic trawls are at present being considered by the parties to the Baltic Convention.

Denmark would also be prepared to discuss other measures than those taken or envisaged for the Baltic Area, such as the closing of specified areas, etc.

Copenhagen, 7 November, 1969.

Beatty Smith

DOHENY, DAY, MACKENZIE & LAWRENCE

ADVOCATES, BARRISTERS & SOLICITORS

DANIEL O'C. DOHENY, Q.C.
DAVID MACKENZIE
TASS G. GRIVAKES
RAYMOND LEMOYNE
PIERRE G. RIOUX
DAVID M. DOUBILET

GRANT H. DAY, Q.C.
JOHN E. LAWRENCE
P. ANDRÉ GERVAIS
A. R. DEANE NESBITT
JEAN ROGER

TELEPHONE: 878-3661
AREA CODE 514
CABLE ADDRESS: "SREEP"

1203 IBM BUILDING
5 PLACE VILLE MARIE
MONTREAL 113, QUEBEC

November 27, 1969

Mr Smith (GLE)

*Mr Legault told me
he thought Dept did
not yet have attached
document.*

*h
1/12*

J.C. Langley, Esq.,
Assistant Under Secretary,
External Affairs Department,
East Block Wellington Street,
Ottawa, Ontario.

25-5-7-2-SALMON

Dear Mr. Langley:-

I was pleased to hear your assurances on the telephone yesterday that your Department is continuing to take an active interest in the Resolution proposed by Canada, and adopted by the International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries at its meeting in Warsaw held June 6, 1969, with regard to the prohibition of fishing for Atlantic salmon in the Convention area.

You mentioned to me that strong representations had been made to both the West German and Danish Governments in connection with the stand taken by those countries against the Warsaw Resolution. Incidentally, as you no doubt are aware, the Government of Sweden has now joined with Denmark and West Germany in opposing the Resolution.

I gathered from our conversation that

*12/1/69
12/1/69 (Legal)*

1.12.10(us)


DOHENY, DAY, MACKENZIE & LAWRENCE

J.C. Langley, Esq.

- 2 -

consideration was being given to further submissions in writing to the opposing governments. In case you have not received it as yet, I thought you might be interested in the enclosed copy of the reply of the United States State Department to the West German Aide-memoire.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Dan Doheny".

DD:LH

Encl.

Diary
Div.
File ✓

s.23

Mr. Langley

RESTRICTED

FLE


December 1, 1969

Mr. Reisman's letter to you of November 3
Re: International Commission for Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries

~~25-5-7-Atl-2~~

25-5-7-2-SALMON

Fisheries
Dept.
GUS



s.23



J. A. BEESLEY

Legal Division

Subject Card

fill

15 | /

INTERNATIONAL ATLANTIC SALMON FOUNDATION

25-5-2-salmon
~~25-5-7-ATL-1~~

W. M. Carter
Executive Director

cc Mr. Ozere (Fisheries)
Mr. E. Young (Fisheries)
25-5-7-ATL-1
GUS (Mr. Eyrin)

P. O. Box 725
Gaspé, Quebec, Canada

December 16th, 1969.

Mr. R. C. Smith,
Legal Division,
Department of External Affairs,
Ottawa, Ont.

gto

TO: FLE
FROM: ACRD
DEC 23 1969
ATT'N: Mr. Smith

Dear Mr. Smith:

I enjoyed meeting you recently in Ottawa and I was interested to learn of the activities of the Department of External Affairs in regard to the problems created by the increasing highseas fishery on world Atlantic salmon stocks.

It has already been demonstrated by the recapture of tagged fish that a substantial proportion of salmon taken in the fishery originate from rivers in North America, and especially in Canada.

The exploitation rate on salmon has increased steadily since the beginning of the Greenland and the highseas fishery. As yet no accurate and reliable method has been developed to measure the total stocks in the marine area, but reputable scientists from many countries agree that salmon stocks are declining in spite of an increase in total catches.

To permit increasing exploitation on declining stocks of renewable resources is in direct contradiction of a fundamental conservation principle. The history of resource exploitation reveals a number of examples of similar disregard of basic conservation principles, and the results were inevitably disastrous. Many concerned people are determined that this will not be allowed to repeat with Atlantic Salmon resources.

Salmon are of significant economic importance to Canada, and we spend substantial sums trying to maintain maximum natural reproduction capacity in our rivers. In addition, during recent years Canada is spending large amounts of money to expand artificial reproduction facilities for Atlantic salmon, and survivors from this production return to Canadian rivers.

It is illogical that the efforts of Canada and other countries which contribute importantly to Atlantic salmon management, production,

FLE

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
and research, should in part be negated by uncontrolled exploitation of salmon on the highseas, by countries which have few, if any, salmon producing rivers, nor which contribute to the costly programs for river management and hatchery production.

It seems important to us that Canada would play a role of leadership in attempting to bring about a strict control of international exploitation practices, and if we can be of any assistance in providing facts which may assist in these negotiations, we would be pleased to do so.

I am enclosing the copy of the short report prepared by the Atlantic Salmon Research Trust of Britain, as I promised you when we met.

With kind regards.

Yours sincerely,



Wilfred M. Carter.

WMC/pc
Encl.

cc: Francis Goelet.
Sir Hugh MacKenzie.
Dan Doheny.
John Olin.

HIGH SEAS FISHING FOR SALMON - SOME SALIENT FACTS

THE ATLANTIC SALMON RESEARCH TRUST LTD - AUGUST 1969

HIGH SEAS FISHING

This term has been used to refer to fishing in the North Atlantic outside national fishery limits and is carried on by drift nets and/or long lines. Such evidence as exists indicates that the majority of salmon caught are fish that would spend more than one winter at sea before returning to their native rivers, i.e., would return as large salmon NOT as grilse, and that when caught they are feeding hard and are far from the prime condition they would have achieved by the time they returned to their home waters. There are three significant areas where high seas fishing at present takes place :-

(a) The Davis Strait/Greenland fishery

This developed from the Greenland Inshore fishery (see below), becoming significant in 1965 in the Davis Strait off S.W. Greenland when 2 Faroese boats caught 36 metric tons of salmon; in 1966 1 Norwegian boat caught 32 tons and Faroese boats 87 tons, total 119; in 1967 Danish boats joined the Norwegian and Faroese and the catch increased to 305 tons; in 1968 it escalated still further to 548 tons, with 1 Swedish, 2 Faroese, 4 Norwegian and 10 Danish boats operating. As far as can be ascertained the salmon caught are of the same stock as those of the Greenland Inshore fishery, i.e., emanate from British, Canadian and Irish rivers.

(b) The Norwegian Sea

There has been drift-netting for salmon for many years within Norwegian territorial waters but 1962 saw the start, on a small scale, of drift netting and long-lining beyond territorial limits off N. Norway; in 1967 over 20 Danish and Norwegian boats were operating, mainly in an area off the Lofotens; in 1968 there were 20 Danish, 10 Swedish, 1 Faroese and 12 Norwegian boats operating on a full-time basis, with up to 200 additional boats intermittently; their estimated catch was 300-500 metric tons. There is evidence that the great proportion of the catch originate from Norwegian rivers and the 1968 catch is estimated as being equivalent to $\frac{1}{3}$ to $\frac{1}{2}$ of the total annual Norwegian spawning stock.

(c) The Faroes

In the last two years there has been some exploratory long-lining in an area around the Faroes, mainly by Faroese, but some Danish boats; Scottish and Swedish tagged salmon have been reported caught. There is danger that this fishery could develop dramatically.

GREENLAND INSHORE FISHERY

For many years there had been a relatively small salmon fishery along the S.W. coast of Greenland, operated by Greenlanders using fixed types of nets from the shore. Due, it is thought, to some change in the feeding habits of salmon this fishery began in 1961 to make much larger catches and the increase exploded from 127 tons in that year to 1539 in 1964; it fell to 825 tons in 1965 and has continued to fluctuate since with 1251 tons in 1966, 1283 in 1967 and 579 in 1968. Tag returns indicate the fish originate from, and would return to, Canadian, British and Irish rivers. Despite this fact it is generally accepted that as the fishery is within territorial waters its regulation is a matter for the sovereign power, Denmark, alone.

ANNUAL U.K. CATCHES

The table below, shows the annual catch of salmon in the United Kingdom for various years of this decade; the figures are made up from annual returns from rivers and commercial fisheries, representing the overall catch by nets and anglers. No differentiation is made between large salmon (i.e., those that spend 2 or more winters at sea) and grilse (i.e., those that return to their rivers the year following that in which they left as smolts) but it is known that in Scotland in recent years grilse have formed an increasing proportion of the catch, whilst the Spring run of large salmon has been decreasing. Less fresh salmon has passed through Billingsgate Market in the early months (February, March, April) of each year successively since 1963. From 1950-1963 the figures fluctuated in much the same pattern as runs of salmon over the years have varied; since 1963 there has been a sustained, steady decline, with this year's figure being only 50% of the average for 1950-1963.

TOTAL U.K. CATCH (in metric tons)

<u>Year</u>	<u>England & Wales</u>	<u>Scotland</u>	<u>N. Ireland</u>	<u>Total</u>
1961	232	1195	225	1652
1964	307	1914	360	2581
1967	420	2132	425	2977
1968	283	1563	294	2140

REGULATION OF HIGH SEAS FISHERIES

Two international bodies exist to control or regulate all fishing on the high seas of the North Atlantic; they are the North East Atlantic Fishery Commission (N.E.A.F.C.) and the International Commission for North-west Atlantic Fisheries (I.C.N.A.F.). Constituent countries are :-

N.E.A.F.C. (14)

Belgium
Denmark
*Eire
*France
Federal Republic of Germany
*Iceland
Netherlands
*Norway
Poland
Portugal
*Spain
*Sweden
*U.K.
*U.S.S.R.

I.C.N.A.F. (14)

*Canada
Denmark
*France
Federal Republic of Germany
*Iceland
Italy
*Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
*Spain
*U.K.
*U.S.A.
*U.S.S.R.

*Salmon producing countries

The last annual meeting of N.E.A.F.C. took place in London in early May and a proposal by the U.K. that fishing for salmon outside national fishery limits in the Convention area should be prohibited received the required $\frac{2}{3}$ majority and was adopted by 10 votes for, 3 against (Denmark, Sweden, W. Germany) and 1 abstention (Portugal). At the annual meeting of I.C.N.A.F. in Warsaw in early June a Canadian proposal to ban fishing for salmon outside national fishery limits in the North-west Atlantic also received the required $\frac{2}{3}$ majority and was adopted by 11 votes for, 2 against (Denmark and W. Germany) and 1 abstention (Portugal). The present situation is that in the North East Atlantic the constituent Governments have three months within which they may notify objections, in which case they are not bound by the recommendation. Under the North West Atlantic Convention, the recommendation does not become effective until it is accepted by all member Governments; no time limit is stipulated; if some Governments do not accept the recommendation the issue is thrown into the melting pot again; what action will be taken by the U.K. Government in such circumstances is not known.

WEAF

THE U.K. VIEW

The U.K. argument, central to the whole issue of high seas fishing for salmon, is that, as the salmon stocks owe their existence to elaborate and expensive measures taken by the salmon producing countries, those countries have a special claim to reap the harvest which results.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IN APRIL 1969

To throw more light on the problems being presented by high seas fishing for Atlantic Salmon, and its potential danger to future stocks if uncontrolled, The Atlantic Salmon Research Trust convened a 2-day international conference in London in April, 1969; 11 countries participated and it was attended by scientists engaged on research into salmon, conservationists, officials from some of the constituent Governments of I.C.N.A.F. and N.E.A.F.C., and individuals and representatives of agencies and organisations specially concerned in conservation from the salmon producing countries on both sides of the Atlantic. A comprehensive series of papers were read and there was a wide exchange of information and views. At its conclusion the Conference accepted the following resolution :-

"This Conference resolves to recommend to constituent Governments of the International Commission for North-west Atlantic Fisheries and the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission that to conserve salmon stocks in salmon-producing countries around the North Atlantic there should be a complete suspension of all fishing for salmon on the high seas of the North Atlantic Ocean for a period of ten years".

The adoption by N.E.A.F.C. and I.C.N.A.F. of the U.K. and Canadian proposals at their respective subsequent meetings (see above) can in some measure be attributed to the degree to which The Atlantic Salmon Research Trust April Conference succeeded in bringing informed and scientific opinion together in discussion of the potential dangers of uncontrolled high seas fishing.

STATISTICS

When considering statistics the following points should be borne in mind :-

- (a) Statistics of annual catches seldom contain sufficient detail for a direct comparison of like with like (e.g., the overall U.K. annual catch, composed mostly of grilse, should not be set against the Greenland catch, taken virtually entirely from stocks that would be large salmon on their return to home waters.
- (b) Catches given in metric tons are generally arrived at by giving fish caught an arbitrary average weight, in the region of 7-7½ lbs (equivalent to 270-285 salmon to the ton).

Fishmongers' Hall,
London Bridge,
London, E.C.4

25-5-7-2-SALMON
21

also 2557-2

MR BATTLE

I think this probably belongs to USA did. Please contact new hampshire.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM COPEN MAR3/70 NO/NO STANDARD

TO TT EXTER 79 DE LDN

INFO LDN TT FISHERIESOTT DE OTT

BAG OSLO STKHM DE OTT

REF OURTEL 74 FEB27

SALMON FISHING OFF GREENLAND

UK AMBASSADOR SAYS DANISH PM OFFERED PROPOSAL (IN RESPONSE TO

BRIT PM LET) THAT BILATERAL TALKS SHOULD TAKE PLACE WELL BEFORE

MAY MTG ICNAF. AMBASSADOR DOES NOT/NOT KNOW HOW LDN WILL RESPOND

TO THIS. HE SAID SUBJ IS HIGHLY EMOTIONAL ONE IN UK AND COULD

ESCALATE; DANES HOWEVER DO NOT/NOT SO FAR TAKE IT SERIOUSLY

ENOUGH.

2. HOPE YOU AND FISHERIES WILL KEEP ME INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS

IN CDN VIEWS AND PLANS

WERSHOF

File

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Mr. Bigg G.U.S.

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FISHERIESOTT PRIORITY DE OTT
BAG OSLO STKHM DE LDN
REF COPEN TEL 79 MAR3
SALMON FISHING OFF GREENLAND

Mr. Ezrin To File
25-5-7-Atl
also 25-5-7-2
25-5-7-2-SALMON

21	-
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ACCORDING TO DIXON, MINISTRY OF AGRIC FISHERIES AND FOOD, BRITS WILL PROBABLY BE SENDING REPLY TO DANES IN NEXT TWO OR THREE DAYS.

2. IN RESPONDING TO PM WILSONS LET DANES REFERRED NOT/NOT ONLY TO BILATERAL TALK BUT ALSO RPTD THAT THEY HAD CONCRETE PROPOSALS IN MIND FOR ALTERNATIVE MEASURES ON SALMON FISHING BUT DID NOT/NOT SPECIFY WHAT THESE WERE. THUS WHILE EXACT NATURE OF BRITS REPLY HAS NOT/NOT YET BEEN WORKED OUT, DIXON INDICATED THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY TAKE FORM OF SAYING FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WOULD LIKELY BE HELPFUL, BUT BEFORE SUCH EXCHANGE COULD TAKE PLACE IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO KNOW PRECISELY WHAT THESE ALTERNATIVE MEASURES WERE. IN EFFECT THEREFORE BRITS WILL BE REQUESTING FURTHER INFO AND CAREFULLY SKIRTING DANISH PROPOSAL FOR QUOTE BILATERAL UNQUOTE TALKS SINCE THERE ARE OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES INVOLVED.

3. ON BASIS OF ANY ADDITIONAL INFO THEY MAY OBTAIN FROM DANES, BRITS ENVISAGE CONSULTATIONS WITH CDA AND USA IN VERY NEAR FUTURE, PROBABLY WITHIN NEXT TWO WEEKS.

GUS/H. Earle/ent

25-5-5 DEN
41

25-5-7-2-SALMON
UNCLASSIFIED

The Canadian Embassy
COPENHAGEN

Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
OTTAWA

April 1, 1970

GUS-133

Permission for Research Vessel, A. T. Cameron,
to Fish in Greenland Territorial Waters

GEUW
Fisheries
(E. B. Young)

We would be grateful if you would approach the Danish Government for permission for the Canadian research vessel "A. T. Cameron" to carry out experimental fishing for purposes of research on North Atlantic salmon within Danish fishing limits or within the territorial sea off west Greenland during the period August 20 to September 30, 1970. The cruise is to be a combined distribution and tagging programme and will include a ten-day period of combined operations with the Danish research vessel "Adolf Jensen".

R. D. BURBRIDGE

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

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CANADA

OUR FILE NO.
NOTRE DOSSIER NO

YOUR FILE NO.
VOTRE DOSSIER NO

DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES AND FORESTRY
MINISTÈRE DES PÊCHES ET DES FORÊTS

OTTAWA
8,

25-5-7-2 SALMON
41 19

April 10, 1970.

Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Ottawa, Ontario.

Attention: Mr. R.J. Buchan, Far Eastern Division

Dear Sir:

With reference to our telephone conversation yesterday the following is a breakdown of actual money costs and program of salmon management on the Pacific Coast -

Research	\$	922,000
Resource Development (Applied Biology & Engineering)		3,473,000
Regulation & Enforcement		3,150,000
Canada's share for International Pacific Salmon Commission		458,000

These figures are minimal ones which do not take into account all the capital costs involved in research and in regulations and enforcement.

In addition none of the above figures takes into account the cost to Canada of maintenance of watersheds for salmon instead of abandoning them in favour of industrial use, e.g., for power.

Yours very truly,

Wm. M. Sprules
Wm. M. Sprules,
Director,

Office of Fisheries Relations.



CANADA

DEPUTY MINISTER OF FISHERIES AND FORESTRY
LE SOUS-MINISTRE DES PÊCHES ET DES FORÊTS

OTTAWA 8,

BY HAND

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April 10, 1970.

To file
MKS

25-5-5-DEN	
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Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,
O t t a w a .

Dear Sir:

25-5-5-CDA-7 ✓
25-5-7-2-SALMON

Attention: Mr. H.E. Ezrin, U.S.A. Division

Re: Permission for "A.T. CAMERON" to fish in
Greenland Territorial Waters.

This refers to our letter dated March 20 in which we requested that you seek permission from the Government of Denmark for the vessel "A.T. CAMERON" to carry out research operations within Greenland territorial waters.

Dr. A.W. May will be in charge of the cruise of the vessel and the following is an outline of his proposed plans -

"The cruise will consist of two phases. The first will be a distributional investigation to delimit the areas of concentration of salmon in the Davis Strait. Fishing will be by drift nets and some tagging will be done. We shall probably organize a fishing pattern along latitude lines, eg. 62°, 64°, 66°, 68°, and 70°N, and fish several stations along these lines from the Greenland coast extending 50 to 100 miles or more seaward. We would therefore require permission to fish one or two stations close to the coast along each of the above parallels of latitude. This will occupy the period from Aug. 20 to Sept. 15.

The second phase will be a combined operation with the Danish RV "Adolf Jensen", during which we will fish gillnets, and the "Adolf Jensen" will fish

- 2 -


April 10, 1970.

longlines side by side. Both vessels will tag salmon. This will take place during the period September 15 - 25, probably in whatever area the commercial drift-netting is going on at the time. The choice of area will be left largely to the Danish biologists, and may or may not be within the 12-mile fishing limit or territorial sea. Last year, Disko Bay proved to be the best location. If this is the case again, we will need permission to fish inside the baseline.

We would expect to enter Godthaab, Faeringehavn and one or two other ports for fuel, water and other supplies during the course of the cruise. We have always obtained documents related to port entry from the Danish Consulate in St. John's, and would propose to do this again this year."

It may be advantageous in attempting to expedite the application to forward this information to the Government of Denmark.

Yours very truly,

A. W. H. Needler
A. W. H. Needler, 
Deputy Minister.

GFE/RJBuchan/S

cc: File
Diary
Circ.
Mr. Seaborn

25-5-7-2	
41	3/6

SALMON

OTTAWA 2, April 13, 1970.

bcc: Mr. R.E. Collins
FLE
GUS

Dear Mr. Ambassador,

Following your meeting with Mr. R.E. Collins, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs on Thursday last, we requested the federal Department of Fisheries and Forestry to provide us with a more detailed breakdown of the direct costs to the federal government for the programme of salmon management on Canada's Pacific Coast during the fiscal year 1968/9.

Attached is a copy of a letter from the Department of Fisheries and Forestry which provides that information, although you will note that these figures do not include capital costs to the federal government for research, regulation and enforcement of the Pacific Coast salmon fishery.

If you should require any further information related to this question, we will be pleased to be of assistance.

Yours sincerely,

J. BLAIR SEABORN

JBS
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

His Excellency Pil Shik Chin,
Ambassador of the Republic of Korea,
Suite 608,
151 Slater Street,
Ottawa, Ontario.

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Diary
Cir Diary
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07-10-9

UNCLASSIFIED

April 13, 1970

GUS-144

The Canadian Embassy
COPENHAGEN

The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
OTTAWA

Ourtel GUS-135 April 3, 1970

Permission for "A.T. Cameron" to fish
in Greenland Territorial Waters

25-5-5-DEN	
21	

FLE

25-5-7-2-SALMON

The following information has been supplied by our Fisheries Department about the proposed research operations within Greenland territorial waters for the Canadian vessel, A. T. Cameron:

"The cruise will consist of two phases. The first will be a distributional investigation to delimit the areas of concentration of salmon in the Davis Strait. Fishing will be by drift nets and some tagging will be done. We shall probably organize a fishing pattern along latitude lines, eg. 62°, 64°, 66°, 68°, and 70°N, and fish several stations along these lines from the Greenland coast extending 50 to 100 miles or more seaward. We would therefore require permission to fish one or two stations close to the coast along each of the above parallels of latitude. This will occupy the period from Aug. 20 to Sept. 15.

The second phase will be a combined operation with the Danish RV "Adolf Jensen", during which we will fish gillnets, and the "Adolf Jensen" will fish longlines side by side. Both vessels will tag salmon. This will take place during the period September 15 - 25, probably in whatever area the commercial drift-netting is going on at the time. The choice of area will be left largely to the Danish biologists, and may or may not be within the 12-mile fishing limit or territorial sea. Last year, Disko Bay proved to be the best location. If this is the case again, we will need permission to fish inside the baseline.

We would expect to enter Godthaab, Faeringehavn and one or two other ports for fuel, water and other supplies during the course of the cruise. We have always obtained documents related to port entry from the Danish Consulate in St. John's, and would propose to do this again this year."

K. J. BURRIDGE
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

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GUS

UNCLASSIFIED
 FM COPEN MAY22/70
 TO EXTER 216
 INFO FISHERIESOTT WSHDC LDN
 AIRMAIL OSLO BONN STKHM
 REF LDN TEL 1552 MAY12
 ATLANTIC SALMON

~~SECRET~~

25-5-7-Att-1
 21
 plus copy for 25-5-7-2
 25-5-7-2-SALMON

COPEN NEWSPAPER TODAY REPORTS QUOTE AT A MTG IN THE PMS OFFICE
 YESTERDAY ATTENDED BY THE PM, THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
 THE MINISTER OF FISHERIES AND GREENLAND, REPS OF THE DANISH FISHERY
 ORGANIZATIONS WERE INFORMED THAT THE GOVT INTENDED TO NEGOTIATE
 ABOUT SALMON FISHERIES OFF GREENLAND ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES
 APPLYING TO THE COMPROMISE REACHED IN LDN ON SALMON FISHING OFF
 NORTH NORWAY.

MEMBERS OF ICNAF WILL MEET IN CDA ON JUN 21 TO DISCUSS, INTER
 ALIA, SALMON FISHERIES IN GREENLAND WATERS.

THE PM EXPLAINED WHY DENMARK HAD AGREED IN LDN TO A NORWEGIAN
 DEMAND FOR A TEN-MONTH BAN ON SALMON FISHERIES IN THE NORTHEAST
 ATLANTIC (FROM JUL 21-MAY 25) FOR A PERIOD OF 3 YEARS.

BORNHOLM FISHERMEN WHO OPERATE OFF NORWAY FEEL THAT THEIR
 INTERESTS HAVE BEEN DISREGARDED, BRIT AMERICAN AND CDN THREATS TO
 BOYCOTT DANISH AGRICL EXPORTS HAVING BEEN CONSIDERED MORE IMPOR-
 TANT UNQUOTE.

15/5/70 - FLE (R.C. Smith)
 GEUW (G. Mathieu)
 Done on 15/70
 [initials]

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

JAN 28 1971

ATT: [Signature]

TO
À Under Secretary of State for External Affairs.

FROM
De Acting Consul General, New York.
Canadian Consulate General,

REFERENCE
Référence

SUBJECT
Sujet ATLANTIC SALMON EMERGENCY.

SECURITY
Sécurité Unclassified.

DATE 21st January 1971.

NUMBER
Numéro 38.

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA	
25-5-7-2-SALMON.	
MISSION	I.T.C. # 38

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

5

DISTRIBUTION

See below.
in regard
to see
C.W.D.
E.C.
file done
Ed.
Saem
part with
its worth
reading

Last night I responded to an invitation originally tendered to Ambassador Marcel Cadieux, to attend a dinner to publicize the Atlantic Salmon Emergency. The organizers of the event were C.A.S.E. (Committee on the Atlantic Salmon Emergency), and the dinner was hosted and perhaps subsidized by the Electric Companies of New England. There were probably 500 in attendance, mainly sport fishermen and conservationists, together with a large contingent from the press and T.V. coverage by the A.B.C. network. It was said that parts of the proceedings will be shown on A.B.C.'s American Sportsman Show.

2. The programme included Curt Gowdy, prominent sports announcer, as master of ceremonies; Bramwell Fletcher who gave the Committee's report and Bing Crosby who showed a film on salmon fishing in Iceland. The flags of the U.S., Canada, Great Britain, Norway, Spain and Iceland, were on the podium. Denmark's flag was noticeably absent, but the Fisheries Attaché and Vice Consul of the Danish Consulate General in New York, was at our table. He of course knew full well that Denmark would be severely criticized.

3. I am attaching copies of literature handed out as we left the dinner. I think the Position Statement will be of interest to you.

D. S. Armstrong
Acting Consul General.

cc. Dr. A. W. H. Needler, Deputy Minister, Fisheries & Forestry.
R. E. Latimer, Esq., General Director, O.A.R., Dept. I.T. & C.


P.S. The main course was roast beef!

15/28/1

Received
JAN 28 1971
In Legal Division
Department of External Affairs

[Faint, mostly illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the page]

COMMITTEE ON THE ATLANTIC SALMON EMERGENCY



Every importer of Danish products could be affected in the event we have to call for a consumer boycott on all Danish products.

Unless the Danes stop fishing Atlantic salmon on the high seas, threatening the conservation and restoration of this great natural resource, we are determined to use strong economic pressure to make them stop.

The United States, Canada, Russia, Norway, the United Kingdom, Iceland, Ireland, France and Spain are the principal producers of young salmon. These governments and others voted two years ago to ban high seas fishing for Atlantics in the North Atlantic Ocean, to which the salmon migrate before returning to their natal rivers to spawn.

A small band of about 300 Danish fishermen are defying the salmon-producing countries. The Danish government has not agreed to the total ban—

❑ Even over the objections of concerned groups in the originating countries, which spend millions

on Conservation of the Species, through river propagation and management techniques;

❑ Even though Denmark is not a salmon-producing country and therefore makes no contribution to replenishment of stocks;

❑ Even though exhaustion of stocks of salmon will cause severe economic hardships to tens of thousands of commercial and sport fishermen.

That's why we may have to ask every American consumer not to buy the many excellent export products of Denmark.

Here are important actions you can take to help yourselves and the salmon cause:

Write to His Excellency Torben Rønne, Ambassador of Denmark, Royal Danish Embassy, 3200 White Haven St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20008, urging him to help preserve his business and yours.

Ask your suppliers in Denmark to make the urgency clear to the Danish government.

The Committee on the Atlantic Salmon Emergency
Box 164, Hancock, New Hampshire 03449
Telephone: 603-525-3355


Richard A. Buck,
Hancock, New Hampshire
Bing Crosby, Los Angeles
Joseph F. Culliman, 3rd,
New York City
Marshall Field, Chicago
Robert A. Korosec,
Manville, N.J.

Elisha F. Lee, Boston
W. F. Rockwell, Jr., Pittsburgh
Ben Schley, Washington, D.C.
David E. Scoll, New York City
Otto H. Teller, San Francisco
Ted Williams, Boston
Lee Wulff, North Swanzey,
New Hampshire

Special Advisers to the Committee:

Dr. Ira N. Gabrielson, Wildlife
Management Institute
Curt Gowdy, Radio-TV
Sportscaster
Roderick Haig-Brown,
Author and Lecturer
William C. Herrington,
Law of the Sea Institute

Sydney Howe,
Washington, D.C.
Dr. Robert F. Hutton,
American Fisheries Society
Dr. J. L. McHugh, Marine
Sciences Research Center
Grinnel Morris, New York City
R. P. Van Gytenbeek,
Trout Unlimited
Harriet Van Horne, Columnist



COMMITTEE ON THE ATLANTIC SALMON EMERGENCY

BOX 164, HANCOCK, NEW HAMPSHIRE 03449

TELEPHONE: Area Code 603-525-3355

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New York City

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Chicago

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Manville, N. J.

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Marine Sciences Research Center

GRINNELL MORRIS
New York City

R. P. VAN GYTENBEEK
Trout Unlimited

HARRIET VAN HORNE
Columnist

GUIDELINES TO EFFECTIVE ACTION

THE COMMITTEE ON THE ATLANTIC SALMON EMERGENCY

Box 164, Hancock, New Hampshire 03449

JANUARY 20, 1971

1. WRITE TO DANISH OFFICIALS Most Important!

The Honorable Torben Rønne, Ambassador to the United States, Royal Danish Embassy, 3200 White Haven Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20008

The Honorable G. F. K. Harhoff, Consul General, Royal Danish Consulate General, 280 Park Avenue, New York, New York

The Honorable Hilmer Baunsgaart, Prime Minister of Denmark
Parliament Building, Copenhagen, Denmark

Mr. V. Brorson, Department for Export, Slotsholmsgade 10,
1216 Copenhagen K. Denmark

2. WRITE TO YOUR OWN CONGRESSMEN

Ask them to support the House Bill which bans importation of agricultural or food products from any country conducting fishing operations in a manner which diminishes the effectiveness of domestic conservation programs of Atlantic salmon of North American origin. This bill, identified as H.R. 19886 in the 91st Congress, is being introduced under a new number in the 92nd Congress.

Also, ask them to bring pressure on the administration to take action to bring an end to high seas fishing for Atlantic salmon.

3. PUBLIC INFORMATION

Get your local newspaper to write an article on it. CASE will supply you with any necessary facts.

Get your local Clubs interested in acting to save the salmon.

Develop public interest in this problem in as many ways as possible.

THIS IS CONSERVATION IN ITS MOST BASIC SENSE--
THE PRESERVATION OF AN ENDANGERED SPECIES.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Salmon of the Northwest Atlantic Ocean are bred principally in the rivers of the United States (New England), Canada, the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland, and France and Spain. After two or three years in the river, the young salmon "smolt," migrate to the sea, for a rendezvous in the Davis Strait off West Greenland. If they return to the river after one feeding season at sea, they are "grilse," if after two or more years, "salmon." It is these "salmon," about 7 pounds in weight, on the average, that the Danes take.

Since 1965 the number of salmon taken by drift nets, principally by the Danes, in the Northwest Atlantic Ocean has roughly doubled each year. The estimate of fish thus taken in 1969 is 400,000 - almost three million pounds of fish.

MAJOR POINTS FOR LETTERS

1. The taking of immature salmon on their feeding grounds in the Atlantic by nylon drift-net is unjustified, because it can indiscriminately remove fish on the high seas from the runs of the very rivers that might need particular protection.
2. Our federal government, along with the States of New Hampshire, Vermont, Maine, Connecticut and Massachusetts have, and will be, spending millions of dollars to restore this species to our rivers. Salmon therefore are a valuable natural resource of this country.
3. This is a case, at present, of a very small number of Danish fishermen, perhaps 300, on about 35 small trawlers, cashing in at the expense of many thousands of life-long workers. The Danish government has chosen of their own volition to adopt a position of isolation in the face of world opinion.
4. The United States has been a leader in the proper international assemblies and has labored diligently in diplomatic circles to persuade Denmark to take the lead in acting for the common good. The other Atlantic salmon-producing countries are also in favor of the complete ban. International Commissions have been ineffective because they lack authority to control dissenters.
5. Our government has said that conservation and environment are one of our biggest concerns. We must preserve one of God's noblest creatures: the Atlantic salmon. It is one of our most vital natural resources.
Help us save the Atlantic salmon.

#

POSITION STATEMENT
ON
HIGH SEAS FISHING FOR ATLANTIC SALMON
BY
THE COMMITTEE ON THE ATLANTIC SALMON EMERGENCY

JANUARY 20, 1971

The causes of the present plight of the Atlantic salmon have been well documented, and so this analysis will merely highlight history, then direct attention to the present dilemma.

A major ocean feeding ground of the salmon in the Northwest Atlantic was discovered in the early 1960's in the Davis Strait, off West Greenland. Since 1964, the Danes have spearheaded a steep escalation which roughly doubled the take each year -- to an estimated total of about 400,000 fish in 1969. Denmark agreed, in 1970, under a one-year compromise amendment expiring this coming June, to peg the catch in 1971 at the 1969 level. This compromise has succeeded, like most compromises, in making every party equally unhappy.

If no action is taken at ICNAF (International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries) this May, there will be nothing to prevent a resumption of the escalation.

The principal argument that always appears in every Danish release on the subject of high seas fishing for Atlantics is that the Atlantic salmon is not in danger of extinction. This Committee agrees that the fish might not be threatened with complete extinction, as long as men have the money and desire to rear them artificially. But the Danes miss--or choose to overlook--the important point. It is that indiscriminate high seas fishing can so deplete stocks as to completely exhaust the value of the resource for commercial or sport fishing.

It is the position of the United States, and all the salmon-producing countries, and of this Committee, (and of every other fish-oriented organization that has examined the problem), that high seas fishing for Atlantic salmon is never justified. The conservation of anadromous fish, like the salmon, shad and striped bass (those born in a river, that go to sea, and then return to spawn), requires completely different management techniques from those of pelagic species, such as the haddock, cod and flounder (those spending their whole life at sea). Thus, the United States' basic position against a high seas harvest of Atlantic salmon rests, not on politics, economics or philosophy, all of which are important, but principally on biology.

High seas fishing for Atlantic salmon is contrary to sound principles of conservation, because it takes indiscriminately from the various runs which, though shoaling together, intermingle in the ocean. Thus, fish are harvested without regard to the condition of different river runs, and excess numbers may be taken from the very runs needing special protection. The taking of salmon, by all logic, should be restricted to the mouths of the streams, and the streams themselves, where the catch can be regulated to insure the proper escapement for each run.

Also, high seas fishing for salmon is wasteful, because fish are taken before they attain full growth; a fish of seven pounds is obviously less valuable than one weighing a great deal more some months later.

There are other reasons why high seas operations are unjustified. Tens of thousands of persons are either directly or indirectly employed in commercial or sport fishing in the countries that rim the North Atlantic Ocean. They will suffer severe financial hardship, and in many cases a total loss of livelihood, should basic stocks be seriously depleted. All this is being threatened by 300 Danish fishermen in a small number of trawlers. A small number of Norwegians also joined them.

This Committee also wishes to point out that the coastal states of origin of the fish have a tremendous financial stake in what can be a healthy, expanding fishery. In the United States alone, the federal government, and the States of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts and Connecticut, as well as industry, have invested, and plan to continue to do so, millions of dollars in building fishways, hatcheries, devices to cool thermal effluents from atomic energy plants, all as a part of the Atlantic salmon restoration program.

If high seas fishing is unjustified and not to be condoned, why cannot Denmark, and any others, be brought before the bar of world opinion? Simply because there is no Law of the Sea as regards Atlantic salmon. The only organization that can be appealed to is ICNAF (The International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries). But even ICNAF has no authority to control dissenters. The effect of its constitution is that it would require a 100% agreement by all signatory governments, before a complete ban could be effective. So Denmark violates no International law when she risks the exhaustion of a resource produced and sustained by other countries.

What will the governments themselves do -- unilaterally, independent of ICNAF? What pressures will they bring? Not enough - in our opinion.

This whole dilemma is enmeshed in a net of political complexities which could prove to be as devastating as the actual nets which the Danes set in the Davis Strait. Let's circumnavigate, so to speak, those countries that rim the North Atlantic Ocean, viewing their political postures as respects their degree of determination to persuade Denmark to stop this plunder.

Spain, Portugal and France do not appear to have an important enough stake in this controversy to warrant action.

And now we come to the United Kingdom, and Ireland. As the second largest importer of Danish goods, England could bring decisive economic pressure. She has a surplus of dairy products, which could be used in part to manufacture cheeses. She could turn to Ireland for hams and bacon. Yet such ventures are not likely to be approved by a government which, along with Denmark, seeks to enter the Common Market. Also, England and Denmark are members of GATT (The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) which, in effect, prohibits signatory countries from discriminating in the level of customs duties against the products from another member State.

Next around the shore comes Norway, the largest importer of Danish goods. The official position of the Norwegian government is support for a total ban. Yet there have been differences of opinion within this government. The Ministry of Agriculture, which regulates the rivers, and thus the farms which lease out the valuable fishing rights, obviously wants a total ban. Yet the Ministry of Fisheries, which is responsible for fishing offshore and in international waters, has permitted Norwegian trawlers on the high seas. So Norway is saying, in effect, that, until we can get a total ban, if other nations are taking salmon off the mouths of Norwegian rivers, Norway should be allowed to take them, too.

Now over to Canada. Canada has consistently opposed high seas fishing for Atlantics, yet has condoned practices which are not in accord with principles of sound management. Canada permits, in Miramichi Bay and off Port aux Basques, drift net fisheries which in principle are no different from high seas netting; these areas are migration routes, and thus they can take indiscriminately and could pick up fish from any river, perhaps one in dire need of protection. There are many other problems, that need not be covered here, because they have national, rather than international, implications.

The United States comes to the council table with relatively clean hands. Commercial netting is not permitted for Atlantic salmon. Our Committee does not oppose the commercial netting of salmon. We take the position that the resource should be restored to abundance, and then we can worry about a proper balance between rods and nets, on the basis of the greatest value to society.

The United States is heavily committed financially to restorations in rivers in Maine, and for the two once great salmon rivers - the Connecticut and the Merrimac. Pollution abatement has a long way to go. But progress has been made in salmon rivers -- witness the fact that for the first time in many years, 70 salmon were taken in 1969 in the once famous Bangor Salmon Pool, on the Penobscot, and 140 in 1970. A tribute to pollution abatement by government and industry.

But for any assessment of the chance to forceful governmental action by our country to convince the Danes, one has to take a hard look at historical precedent.

The United States is beset on all shores by complex fisheries problems. Russian trawlers, last Fall, in the Pacific under cover of night reportedly conducted salmon netting operations inside the 12-mile limit. Foreign ships have the right of free passage, but not of fishing, within this contiguous zone, the 9-mile stretch outside the 3-mile limit. Our tuna boats were seized off South America by countries claiming a 200 mile limit. The Lithuanian Defector Incident off Martha's Vineyard might not have occurred had a United States Cutter not been tied alongside a Soviet vessel in a fisheries dispute with the Russians over fishing rights off our East Coast.

Our point? If our government is having such difficulties protecting a multimillion dollar national fishing industry, how far can we expect that they can go to save the Atlantic salmon, with no commercial investment at all at stake?

Further, the United States also is signatory to GATT, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the spirit of this agreement means that our government would not sanction a Formal Boycott.

We wish to pause here for a moment and emphasize strongly that United States governmental officials and diplomats have labored diligently and skillfully, within their authority, to bring about the total ban. We have watched them operate, and we admire their integrity and dedication. The difficulty stems, in our opinion, from an absence of adequate international machinery to control the situation.

Summing up our North Atlantic cruise, does a common vein run through the body politic of the salmon-producing countries? Our answer has to be, sadly, "yes" -- the possible exhaustion of Atlantic salmon stocks is not of paramount importance today, among fisheries problems. And fisheries problems are not high on the list of national problems.

No analysis of the salmon problem could fail to unearth the underlying weakness of the whole Law of the Sea structure. It is the fashion today to prophesy that Mariculture, and Aquaculture are to rescue us from the inadequacy of world food resources. The plight of the Atlantic salmon is but one grim reminder that fences have to be erected, and jurisdictions have to be established, lest the most aggressive and bold nations continue to reap a harvest disproportionate to their contribution to conservation.

In our opinion, only economic and political pressure on the part of ourselves as Americans will persuade the Danes to stop this plunder.

The Committee on the Atlantic Salmon Emergency has not yet issued, as official policy, a Formal Declaration for Boycott against any country that does not agree to a total ban. But our position today is that we have it under active and serious consideration. As to timing? The situation requires almost day-to-day surveillance. Yet our eyes most naturally look forward to May, 1971 -- this summer -- the date of the 1971 ICNAF meeting -- as a possible Date of Determination -- the D-Day, so to speak, for a Formal Boycott, in the event that before that time the Danes do not agree to the total ban.

And what is our program in the meanwhile? Any campaign, in order to be effective, requires careful planning and adequate stocking of material. So CASE is today, and will be in the immediate future, in the Pre-Boycott Stage, broadening the groundwork and building public awareness, so the campaign will roll when, and if, launched.

Our program is four-fold. First, we will intensify our coverage of newspapers, magazines, Radio and TV. We will reach out to the average citizen, and the housewife, and continue our releases to the sports section columns and sport magazines.

Secondly, we are commencing now an advertising effort in trade magazines, to be beamed to Importers. We have no desire to see the American businessman with unsold goods on his shelves. So we give adequate advance notice. We'll go next to the supermarket magazines and finally to Danish newspapers.

The third area of coverage will be in the political arena. We will work for legislative action, particularly on House Bill H.R. 19886, to be reintroduced under a new number in the 1971 Session by Representative Thomas Pelly of Washington. This bill calls for a ban on the importation of any agricultural and other food products from any country conducting fishing operations in a manner, or in such circumstances, which diminishes the effectiveness of domestic conservation programs of Atlantic salmon of North American origin. Even if this bill would have to be amended to cover fish products only, it could be very effective. Denmark exports about 25 million pounds of fish products annually to the United States, with a value of about 10 million dollars, a substantial sum in their smaller economy.

Fourth, this Committee will continue our close coordination with the United States government in their efforts to secure the total ban, acting in concert, whenever consistent with our policy.

And now what can each of us as individuals do?

First, it is most important to write letters of protest to Danish officials, it being their responsibility to report to their citizens. Their names and addresses are set forth in copies of our "Guidelines to Effective Action" which is available on request.

Second, please support the House Bill; the "Guidelines" Program tells you how to do it.

Third, write your own Senators and Congressmen, urging the government to take the necessary action to bring an end to this unjustified plunder of the most valuable fish that swims. This key action could usher in an era of enlightened management of high sea's resources for the benefit of mankind.

Also, there's no reason to line the pockets of people whose government supports an over-exploitation of a valuable national resource of the salmon-producing countries. We can get in practice, so to speak, for a possible all-out Formal Boycott by starting our own personal and informal family "Don't Buy Danish" campaign. And we can tell this story to our friends, including food, fur, furniture and appliance people.

Most importantly, every American can help in this international crusade to preserve a valuable natural resource. Roderick Haig-Brown, a Special Adviser to this committee, has written:

"All fishermen, all who have ever admired the grace of a salmon's form, wondered at the mystery of his journey, delighted in his endurance or lifted their hearts with his leaps, have a direct responsibility in this. It is a responsibility to speak, write or act, not simply to stand by while another of the world's wonders is destroyed by the willful stupidity of man. It is a chance, now, to make a declaration for the salmon's future and, in doing so, to declare also for the quality of man's future in the world."

#

11771AR

CONFIDENTIAL

MINISTER OF FISHERIES AND FORESTRY



MINISTRE DES PÊCHES ET DES FORÊTS

*fil 25-5-7-2 Salmon
cc 37-16-1 DK
February 1, 1971. R*

The Honourable Jean-Luc Pepin, P.C., M.P.
Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce,
Parliament Buildings,
Ottawa, Ontario.

25-5-7-2-SALMON
26

cc 37-16-1-DEN

Dear Jean-Luc:

Re: Trade Relations with Denmark

I would like your officials in Industry, Trade and Commerce to focus on the fact that Denmark - virtually alone among the North Atlantic nations - is insisting on taking salmon on the high seas. This practice must be discouraged. If it continues it will result in the annihilation of this fish.

Our main problem is that Denmark is not, itself, a source of salmon. Its small salmon streams were dammed up, polluted or overfished many years ago. Today its commercial fishermen therefore depend on high sea stocks originating in other countries - other countries notably Canada and, to a lesser extent, Norway and Scotland.

At successive meetings of the North Atlantic Fisheries Commission motions have been made and supported by the majority of nations for an all out ban on high seas fishing. Denmark supported by West Germany has insisted on its freedom to fish as when and where it wants to. It has been outnumbered twelve to two on numerous occasions. And West Germany's support is essentially one of principle favouring "freedom of the high seas to fish", not an endorsement of high seas raiding of salmon.

If Canada is to restock its rivers by building

The Honourable Jean-Luc Pepin, P.C., M.P. February 1, 1971.

hatcheries and artificial spawning grounds this high seas raiding has got to stop. Good conservation practice has to become universal and the rewards have to go largely to fishermen in countries which are prepared to invest in new facilities.

As things stand now Canada has little incentive to clean up its rivers and to replenish dwindling salmon stocks. The Danes are the culprits. They are now being singled out by societies and agencies in many countries. The CASE (Committee on the Atlantic Salmon Emergency) movement in the United States is only one example of this.

Eighteen months ago the then Prime Minister of Great Britain made an official appeal to the Government of Denmark in this connection. We have told Denmark privately and in the forum provided by the North Atlantic Fisheries Commission that Canada, too, was opposed to its raiding practices. However I think the time has now come for us to make a much bigger issue of this matter.

I am therefore preparing a paper for Cabinet hopefully, for your endorsement. Among other things it will advocate a boycott of Danish goods offered for sale in Canada.

No doubt your department will be alarmed at our approach. However I am much more concerned with the future of our eastern Canadian river ecology and the plight of our commercial fishermen than I am with bureaucratic niceties. The politics are all in favour of Canada taking a firm stand on this front. I am sure that the great majority of fishing nations will also side with us, in this case.

I would like, of course, to get your department's views on this matter. A joint departmental approach to this problem with a view to its solution in the next year or two will be most helpful.

Yours sincerely,

Original Signed by

Original Signé par

JACK DAVIS

Jack Davis.

RECEIVED

FEB 8 1971

DEPUTY MINISTER OF
FISHERIES & FORESTRY

SKIP THE DANISH

(Excerpt taken from the latest issue of Sports Illustrated)

The MC was Curt Gody, and the speakers included Ted Williams and Bing Crosby. The occasion at New York's Waldorf Astoria last week was not another mid-winter sports dinner, but a concerned gathering of the Committee on the Atlantic Salmon Emergency.

CASE is out to stop Danish commercial fishermen from taking Atlantic salmon feeding at sea off west Greenland. Every salmon country in the world, including the U.S., takes the position that high seas fishing for salmon cannot be justified because the catch cannot be regulated to protect home rivers. The Danes have gone on fishing.

Now CASE has drawn up a timetable to make the Danes listen. CASE is considering a formal boycott of Danish goods if the Danes don't agree to stop at an international meeting this May. (ICNAF meets in May in Halifax).

CASE is taking up ads in trade magazines to warn importers of the possible boycott. "We have no desire to see the American businessman with unsold goods on his shelves," said Bramwell Fletcher, who delivered the timetable. "So we will give adequate advance notice. We will go next to the supermarket magazines and finally to Danish newspapers." (In Congress, representative Thomas Pelly of Washington is reintroducing a bill that calls for a ban on the importation of any food product from any country hurting the conservation of North American Atlantic salmon).

In a way, the boycott already has begun. Ted Williams told the dinner guests he was shopping the other day when he picked up a canned ham. It was labelled "imported from Denmark". Said Williams, "I dropped it like a hot potato".

Div.
Diary
/File

MEMORANDUM

Mr. J. A. Beasley (PLP)

UNCLASSIFIED

Mr. T. C. Bacon (FLO)

February 12, 1971.

25-57-2-SALMON
11 1

Pacific Salmon Fisheries: USA/Canada Catch Sharing Arrangements

A meeting was held in the office of Dr. Needler on February 2nd to discuss the overall relationship between Canada and the USA with respect to Pacific salmon. The following attended this meeting:

Mr. Lee, FLO
Mr. Legault,
FLO

Dr. A.W.H. Needler
Mr. C. R. Levelton
Mr. B. Young
Mr. T. C. Bacon
Mr. R. J. Buchan
Dr. R. R. Logie
Mr. I.S. Todd
Mr. M. Shepherd

The Problem

According to the Canadian assessment, there is an imbalance in favour of the USA with respect to salmon interceptions off the west coast and this imbalance is to be the subject of discussion at a meeting in Vancouver, of approximately one week's duration, at the end of April this year.

Fishing Areas

The salmon fishery is concentrated in three main areas:

(a) in the Straits of Juan de Fuca and the Gulf for sockeye salmon which spawn in the Fraser River and pink salmon which primarily spawn in Washington State. This latter fishery has been developed in the USA in recent years through improved methods of artificial fertilization and hatcheries, etc. Canada has not but apparently could adopt similar methods for improving the yield of pink salmon. These fisheries all involve the use of nets;

(b) in the high seas off the coast of Vancouver Island. In this case the species are the chinook and the coho, and the interception is done by trolling. About one-quarter of these fish come from USA spawning grounds. The Americans are increasing the coho production

- 2 -

again through artificial means which have not yet been duplicated by Canada;

(c) in the north where it is mainly a pink salmon fisheries using nets on inshore fisheries. The bulk of this catch goes to the Americans.

Canadian Objectives

At present the overall imbalance is \$2 million in salmon production annually in favour of the USA. While this figure applies to all three areas mentioned above, you will note on the attached chart that the biggest gap is in the southern waters fishery which in fact almost coincides with the 2 million figure. At present the fisheries in this area are governed by the Fraser River Treaty which provides that the catch be divided equally. If Canada's share could be increased to 75 per cent this would correct the problem. It seems unlikely the USA would agree to this and would probably argue that their contributions to the Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission (i.e. one-half of the Commission's costs) entitled them to a 50 per cent share of the fish involved. On the other hand, Canada could argue that in addition to its contributions to PSFC the maintenance of the Fraser River salmon fishery costs Canada directly and indirectly about \$10 million per year. Thus it could be argued that the share in the catch should be pro rated to the share of the cost in the management of this resource.

Alternatively, Canada could seek to improve its share of the catch in the northern waters. A test case was conducted in the Browning Strait to try to do this but without much success. This involved using nets which is contrary to the usual practice under the "surflines agreements". According to Dr. Needler, Canada unilaterally revoked this agreement in view of the USA practice of using nets anywhere up to three miles from land, which in some cases was beyond "the surflines". However, to increase the pink salmon catch through the use of nets in the north would require, according to the Department of Fisheries and Forestry, extending the fishery into the Dixon Entrance and Hecate Strait. Thus far the Americans have not fished south of the A-B Line, but Dr. Needler contends that if Canada started fishing with nets in the Entrance this would provoke the Americans to do the same. He claims, therefore, that in order for Canada to correct the imbalance in catch through increasing interceptions in the north, would require as a pre-condition settlement of the "status of the A-B Line".

Law of the Sea Problems

(a) Canada is opposed to high seas fisheries of an anadromous species but actually it does this off the west coast of Vancouver Island. In the forthcoming negotiations, the USA might well draw this to our attention; and

(b) The status of the A-B Line which Dr. Needler suggests the Department of External Affairs should seek to settle.

B. Linn
for T. C. Bacon

F10/T.C. Bacon/bq

Div.
Diary
JF

cc: Dr. W. H. Sprules,
Fisheries & Forestry

OTTAWA, February 15, 1971.

BEST ORIGINAL AVAILABLE
MEILLEUR ORIGINAL

25-5-7-2-PAC N.

25-5-7-2-SALMON.

Dear Mr. Hutchinson:

On behalf of the Secretary of State for External Affairs I am replying to your letter of December 1, 1970, which referred to a resolution adopted by your Commission concerning the problem of (conservation of salmon) in high seas areas of intermingling. The resolution has been brought to the attention of the appropriate officials at the Department of Fisheries and Forestry, and I understand it will be implemented by regulations governing Canadian fishing operations in the area of concern.

Yours sincerely,

EDWARD G. LEE

E. G. Lee,
Director,
Legal Operations Division.

Mr. Samuel J. Hutchinson,
Executive Director,
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission,
6640 Northwest Marine Drive,
Vancouver 8, B.C.

MEMORANDUM
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA



NOTE DE SERVICE
GOUVERNEMENT DU CANADA

FROM
DE

Chief,
Western Europe Division.

TO
À

File.

SUBJECT
SUJET

Denmark

OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE
YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE
DATE February 18, 1971.
REFER REPLY TO ENVOYER LA RÉPONSE À

Handwritten: 25-5.7-2 - Salmon

Handwritten: 24

This is with reference to letter of February 24th from the Honourable Jack Davis to our Minister on the subject of over fishing by Danish fishermen for Atlantic salmon against the wishes of Canada and other countries. Mr. Davis is preparing a paper for Cabinet recommending strong action to force or persuade the Government of Denmark to stop its fishermen from this practice on the grounds that the Atlantic salmon will be destroyed in short order and The Canadian Government sees no purpose in building hatcheries and artificial spawning grounds in Canadian rivers along the Atlantic unless the Danes co-operate.

Mr. Davis does not indicate the entire range of his proposals except to say that among other things he will advocate the boycott of Danish goods offered for sale in Canada.

Our Minister has acknowledged Mr. Davis' letter and agreed that the matter warrants close consideration. He has suggested that Departmental officials discuss the problem.

We have been searching for some trade gimmick which will attract or push the Danes to see things our way but so far have not come up with anything.

We do have a problem with the Danes on rainbow trout marketed here. Apparently, the U.S. has imposed restrictions on this fish when from artificial ponds on the grounds that the fish are subject to salmonid disease and therefore shipments must be accompanied by a Danish pathologist certification. The Danes either have not been able to meet this regulation or will not. Canada decided to implement a similar regulation against the Danes. The Department of Fisheries is responsible for this regulation - and if there is any bargaining power, they will of course know all about it; certainly, the Danes are very anxious to have the Canadian market for their exports.

...2

- 2 -

As regards Danish cheese imported into Canada, we have not affected this trade to any extent by our recent cheese import restrictions, since practically all Danish cheese is in consumer packages. I suppose in an extreme case we could restrict their imports but it would be a ~~discriminatory~~ step and could start a series of retaliations.

Bing Crosby was on the David Frost show on February 16th during which he expressed his great concern over the threatened destruction by the Danes of the entire Atlantic salmon, and said that he and a group of his friends were trying to influence public opinion in Denmark and bring pressure on the Danish Government to block this ~~fishing~~ activity. In view of the existence of this extremely powerful world lobby, it would almost seem that all that was necessary for the Canadian Government to do is to send a formal and friendly note to the Danish Government, and give it publicity in Denmark and elsewhere so that the world lobby can build up on it.

Our Department has, of course, a definite interest in supporting the Minister of Fisheries in stimulating the production and sale of Canadian fish and to the extent that the Danish activities threaten to destroy the Atlantic salmon, then we must support a formal approach to the Danish Government on the matter. However, since the fish are indeed caught in open seas, we would prefer to see the issue kept outside of the trade field. Probably, without our stating it, the Danes will appreciate that they have an excellent market for their exports in Canada; usually they sell twice as much to Canada as we sell to Denmark (in 1969 Canadian imports from Denmark were valued at \$32 million).

BSS:nd

B. S. Shapiro.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



5.3.

AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TO
A The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,
OTTAWA

FROM
De The Canadian Embassy, TOKYO

REFERENCE
Référence

SUBJECT
Sujet R.O.K. Salmon Fishing in the North Pacific

TO: FLO
FROM: [unclear]
MAR 2 1971
ATTN: Mr. Bauer

SECURITY RESTRICTED
Sécurité

DATE February 23, 1971

NUMBER 112
Numéro

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA	
25-5-7-2	
MISSION	11 46

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

DISTRIBUTION

During a recent visit to Seoul we were invited to the U.S.A. Embassy to discuss the problem of Republic of Korea salmon fishing in the North Pacific. The Americans noted that they had again received assurances from the Korean Foreign Ministry that no boats would be going to the North Pacific for salmon this year. However, while this official pronouncement was helpful, there was no firm evidence to indicate that the boats already equipped for salmon fishing did not intend to make the trip again, or that the boats intended for bottom fish would not be taking salmon.

2. They then went on to say that they would welcome any assistance our Embassy could give in making representations to the Koreans. We pointed out that we had raised the subject repeatedly with both the R.O.K. Foreign Ministry and the Korean Embassy in Tokyo, as a supplement to the representations made in Ottawa. The U.S. Embassy officials indicated that they had not been aware of Canada's activity but added that what they had in mind was the utility of including us in representations made in Seoul. In line with their rather ambivalent attitude on the subject the Japanese would not assist, and thus far, the Americans had always met the Koreans alone. This, they felt, had placed them in a disadvantageous position where it could be implied by the press that the wealthy and powerful U.S.A. was alone in berating weak and under-developed Korea. They asked whether it would be possible at some future stage, for us to come to Seoul and join them in protests to the Koreans.

3. On the same theme they mentioned that as a counter to present Korean claims to salmon on the high seas they were providing financial and technical assistance directed at creation of a domestic salmon resource. It was assumed that once the Koreans were responsible for perpetuation of their own salmon stocks, and aware of the problems and costs involved, it would be easier to end the threat they posed to the stocks of other countries. They then asked whether Canada, given its considerable scientific and practical experience with salmon conservation might also be in a position to assist the R.O.K.s in their attempt to create an indigenous salmon resource. They thought such aid might prove a useful but not too costly counter to present Korean claims.

4. We would appreciate your guidance as to whether, if invited, we should participate in future joint representations with the Americans in Seoul. We would also value any comments you may wish to make on the possibility of Canadian assistance to Korea in the field of salmon technology.

FLP

11/4/3

[Signature]
Embassy.

GFE
ECL
ECD (Mr. Jenkins, please forward copy to
appropriate person in CIDA)

Div
Diary
J File

s.23


March 16, 1971.

CONFIDENTIAL

ACK L

25-5-7-2-SALMON
11 146

Dear Dr. Sprules:



Yours sincerely,

EDWARD G. LEE

E. G. Lee,
Director,
Legal Operations Division.

Dr. W. M. Sprules,
Director, International Fisheries Branch,
Fisheries Service,
Department of Fisheries and Forestry,
Sir Charles Tupper Building,
Riverside Drive,
Ottawa, Ontario.

ECL/P.D.LEE/jgg

FILE ✓
DIARY(3)
GEO
FLO

OTTAWA, March 22, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

25-5-7-2-SALMON

24

19

The Deputy Minister,
Department of Fisheries & Forestry,
Sir Charles Tupper Building,
Riverside Drive,
Ottawa, Ontario.
Attn: Dr. W.M. Sprules

The Deputy Minister,
Dept. of Industry, Trade & Commerce,
112 Kent Street,
Tower "B" Place de Ville,
Ottawa, Ontario.
Attn: Mr. A.E.A. Lane

Atlantic Salmon - Canada/Denmark Trade Relations

We have received a copy of the February 1 letter from Mr. Davis to Mr. Popin, and the latter's reply of February 5. Like the Departments of Fisheries and Forestry and Industry, Trade and Commerce, we are concerned about the situation regarding salmon in the Atlantic Fishery and fully agree that it requires close and careful consultations among officials of our three departments. To this end an interdepartmental meeting might be desirable, during which we would be interested in seeing any background studies or papers that may have been prepared in recent months on the current position and forecast for the Atlantic Fishery.

In any event, we would propose seeking immediately the views of our Embassy in Copenhagen on current Danish attitudes, in order that they might be available if possible for such a meeting, and would propose the attached draft telegram, subject to any comments you may wish to telephone to our Commercial Policy Division (Mr. Lee, 2-2038) by March 24.

J.R. ROY

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

MESSAGE

FILE COPY

FM/DE	PLACE	DEPARTMENT	ORIG. NO.	DATE	FILE/DOSSIER	SECURITY SÉCURITÉ
	LIEU	MINISTÈRE	N° D'ORIG.		25-5-7-2-SAL(mon)	
	OTT	EXT	ECL-535	24/3/71	24	CONFID
TO/A	COPENHAGEN					PRECEDENCE
INFO	F&FOTT, IT&COTT, FINANCEOTT, PCOTT, WASHDC, CONGENY					MAR 25
						02 37 71
DISTR.	GEO FLO					

37-16-1-DEN. ✓

REF

SUB/SUJ

ATLANTIC SALMON - CANADA/DENMARK TRADE RELATIONS

AS YOU KNOW, DANES HAVE PERSISTED IN TAKING SALMON ON HIGH SEAS DESPITE REPEATED EFFORTS BY CANADA AND OTHERS IN N.E. ATLANTIC FISHERIES CONVENTION MTGS. FEELING IS GROWING IN CANADA (AND ALSO IN USA E.G. CTTEE ON ATLANTIC SALMON EMERGENCY WITH MANY PROMINENT SUPPORTERS) AND FOR YOUR INFO PROPOSALS TO BOYCOTT DANISH GOODS HAVE BEEN PUT FORWARD.

2. IN THESE CIRCS, FOR YOUR OWN INFO WE ARE ACTIVELY CONSIDERING THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THIS MATTER AND FALLOUT IT COULD HAVE ON CANADA/DENMARK RELATIONS MORE GENERALLY. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR OWN CONSIDERED ASSESSMENT OF LIKELY DANISH POLICY AND ACTIONS OVER THE COMING MONTHS IN THIS REGARD AND ANY IDEAS YOU MAY BE ABLE TO PROPOSE ON MEANS WHICH COULD BE ADOPTED TO ENCOURAGE DEVELOPMENT OF A MORE HELPFUL ATTITUDE AT AN EARLY DATE IN LIGHT OF IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THIS MATTER.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG. <i>P.D. Lee</i> P.D. LEE/me	ECL	22088	SIG. <i>J. R. Roy</i> J. R. ROY

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



GEO/D.R.T.Fraser/id
AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

25-5-7-2-SALMON
26 — Muller

TO
A ECL

FROM
De GEO

REFERENCE
Référence Your Memorandum of March 22, 1971

SUBJECT
Sujet Atlantic Salmon: Canadian-Danish Trade Relations

I presume this is purpose of your exercise - he neglects what must be great benefit through Commerce

SECURITY
Sécurité

DATE March 25, 1971

NUMBER
Numéro

FILE DOSSIER
OTTAWA 20-1-2-Den 37-16-2-Den
25-5-7-2-Salmon; 37-16-1-Den
MISSION

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

DISTRIBUTION

PDH

FLO

While we agree with the Minister of Fisheries and Forestry that something must be done to curb Danish salmon fishing on the high seas, we are concerned at his open advocacy of a trade embargo on Danish goods as the best way of achieving his ends. As you are aware Mr. Davis has made his proposal for economic sanctions in a recent statement as well as in his letter of February 1st to the Minister of IT & C. Mr. Davis does not seem to have considered the very serious effect such an embargo could have on other aspects of our relations with Denmark or on our commercial policy generally.

2. There are probably less dramatic means of persuading the Danes to limit their high seas catches of salmon. As a possibility, we would suggest that a démarche should be made at the highest political level in Denmark, preferably with the Prime Minister, if not, with the Foreign Minister, pointing out the harmful consequences the Danish stand could have on our relations. As far as we know, the subject has up until now been discussed only between the two departments of fisheries. It is time that it should be brought into the political field so it can be put in its proper place in the total spectrum of our relations. Only if such a démarche did not work, could practical measures of an economic character, or better the threat of them, be resorted to.

We would also suggest that the Minister of IT & C might, during his coming visit to the FRG seek to persuade the Germans to withdraw their support for unrestricted fishing on the high seas. This would leave the Danes completely alone. As you are aware, the German stand is one of principle only. We consider it might now be possible to persuade them to change it because of the harmful effects of Danish overfishing.

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-2-

We would hope that in any discussion of these matters with the Department of Fisheries and Forestry you would emphasize that their objective of the conservation of our fisheries, as well as any other aspects of our policy of ensuring a harmonious natural environment, while important, cannot be pursued abroad in total isolation from the other major themes of our foreign policy without harming these other equally valid interests. As a result, we would appreciate it if the Department would consult with us before undertaking any steps with major implications for our foreign policy. As you are aware, the Department of Fisheries and Forestry has on several occasions recently issued statements or introduced regulations without any consultation. In certain cases this has needlessly harmed other aspects of our foreign policy. A recent example has been the introduction without sufficient warning of the restriction imposed on trawlers of 65 feet in length. The manner in which this was done has needlessly complicated our relations with France and other European countries. Such actions by Fisheries are ill-advised even from their own point of view, and do not make it easier for the Canadian government to have necessary changes in our fishing regulations accepted by foreign countries.



Western European Division

MIN Div
PDM Diary
PARL SEC ✓File
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PAG

"Return to FLO DS"

CONFIDENTIAL

March 25, 1971.

ACRL
25-5-7-2-SALMON
11

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

Korean High Seas Salmon Fishery

Attached is a report of an interdepartmental working group which considered on March 23rd various problems arising from the Korean high seas salmon fishery, and which proposed that representations be made in Seoul by Canada, in concert with the USA and Japan, to seek the abstention by Korea of salmon fishing operations on the high seas. At the last meeting of the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission the three governments agreed to take measures, in the interests of conservation, to deter non-member countries from fishing on the high seas for salmon stocks of member countries.

Representations to the Koreans would be coupled with an offer to consider Korean requests for technical assistance (possibly for the development of an indigenous Korean salmon resource) which stems from a recent Korean proposal that they receive assistance as a means of setting off the economic loss which their fishing industry would sustain as a result of their abstention from high seas salmon fishing. It is our understanding from CIDA that if a well-formulated proposal for technical assistance should be made by Korea, which was supported on the basis of development criteria, then there would be no objection to considering such a request.

Do you agree that we should consult with the USA and Japan on the possibility of tripartite representations to the Koreans along the above lines? If you approve, instructions will be sent to Tokyo and Washington for this purpose after we have received the concurrence of the Minister of Fisheries and Forestry.

A. E. RITCHIE

A. E. R.

Mr. B. Hunter, ECL
Mr. P. T. Barwell, CIDA
Dr. W. M. Sprules, FANDF, with compliment slip: "As I explained yesterday, we are putting the attached report up to our Minister for approval to approach the Japanese and Americans on a tripartite approach in Seoul. Could you do the same with your Minister?"

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF INTERDEPARTMENTAL MEETING ON THE PROBLEM
OF THE KOREAN HIGH SEAS SALMON FISHERY
March 23, 1971

Attached is a list of the representatives from the Departments of External Affairs, Fisheries and Forestry and the Canadian International Agency who attended this meeting, which was convened by the Legal Operations Division, Department of External Affairs.

Background

Canada has made representations to Korea to abstain from fishing on the high seas for salmon which spawn in North America. The Koreans have responded by requesting technical assistance to offset any economic loss the Korean fishing industry may sustain through the imposition of such a ban and to help in justifying such action politically in Korea. In Canada's aid dealings with Korea we have tried to equate Canadian aid projects with the salmon problem. However, we have been reluctant to react directly to this Korean request since the provision of aid should be rationalized on the desirability of the particular project, in development terms, and not provided as a result of thinly-veiled coercion. Nevertheless, (according to the CIDA representative at the meeting) if a well-formulated and feasible request for assistance were produced by Korea, in particular related to the development of their fishing industry, it would be consistent with Canadian aid policy if the kind of assistance required was something Canada was in a position to provide.

Canada has been approached by the United States to make joint representations in Seoul for a Korean ban on high seas salmon fishing (see the attached letter 112 dated February 23, 1971 from Tokyo). The United States has also enquired whether Canada would be willing to offer the Koreans scientific and practical assistance for the development of an indigenous salmon resource. It is suggested that the development of such a resource might induce the Koreans to be more "conservation-minded", and thereby reduce the likelihood of their persisting in high seas salmon fishing.

Discussion

It was suggested that in consultation with the United States, Canada might make further representations to the Koreans and couple this with an offer to consider specific requests for assistance possibly related to the fishing industry.

The representative from the Department of Fisheries and Forestry pointed out that under provisions of the International North Pacific Fisheries Agreement if a non-member country should, through its fishing activities, frustrate the objectives of the Agreement, then member states could opt out of obligations imposed by the Agreement. In effect, if the Koreans maintained their high seas salmon fishery, this could provide an opening for the Japanese to terminate their undertaking to abstain from such fishing operations. The representative of the Department of Fisheries and Forestry, therefore, thought it desirable to include the Japanese in any further representations to

the Koreans both on their salmon fishery and on the question of aid. He added that a Canadian proposal for such a tripartite approach to the problem could be based upon the resolution of the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission of November last year whereby member governments were requested to "take more appropriate measures to deter the operations of fishing for salmon...of...non-member countries" (see attached).

Another important consideration to be kept in mind in making representations to the Koreans is that the denial of the fishing of North American salmon would not prohibit them from fishing for other species in high seas areas along the lines of the fishery now carried out by the Japanese and the USSR. Thus their high seas fishing fleet would not be completely immobilized by a ban on fishing for salmon.

Conclusion

It was agreed that a possible course of action would be for Canada to:

- (a) consult with the USA and Japan and to propose that tripartite representations be made to the Koreans seeking their agreement to ban their high seas salmon fisheries; and that
- (b) these representations should be coupled with an offer to entertain requests for technical assistance from Korea for the general development of its fishing industry which might include scientific and technical advice and aid for the development of an indigenous Korean salmon resource. (The USA is already providing such assistance in this respect.)

It was also agreed that authorization should be sought from the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of Fisheries and Forestry to consult with the USA and Japan on this matter.

DEPARTMENTAL REPRESENTATIVES AT MARCH 23, 1971, MEETING
ON KOREAN HIGH SEAS SALMON FISHERY

<u>External Affairs:</u>	Mr. J. A. Harrington	Director, Pacific and South Asia Division
	Mr. T. C. Bacon	Environmental Law Section, Legal Operations Division
	Mr. B. Hunter	Commercial Policy Division
<u>Fisheries and Forestry:</u>	Dr. W. M. Sprules	Director, International Fisheries Branch
<u>Canadian International Development Agency:</u>	Mr. P. T. Barwell	Planning Division

TO
À
The Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs (ECL), OTTAWA

Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
Document disclosed pursuant to the Access to Information Act

FROM
De
The Canadian Embassy, COPENHAGEN

DATE
March 30, 1971

REFERENCE
Référence
Your telegram ECL-535, March 24

NUMBER
Numéro
83

SUBJECT
Sujet
Atlantic Salmon - Canada/Denmark
Trade Relations

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA	
25-5-7-2-SA-1	1
MISSION	
26-25-5-7-ATL	19

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cc 37-16-1 DK

ECL
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M. J. 2

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

DISTRIBUTION
Washington, D.C.
Con.Gen., N.Y.
D/I., T.&C.,
Ottawa.
D/Finance,
Ottawa.
D/F. & F.,
Ottawa.

geo ext

Following receipt of your telegram I had talks with the British Ambassador; the Fisheries Attaché of the U.S. Embassy; and with senior officials of the Foreign Ministry and Fisheries Ministry. When asking to meet the Danish officials (Mr. Adamsen of the MFA and Mr. Løkkegaard of Fisheries), I put it simply on the basis that I wished to bring myself up to date on the subject. Before responding to your request for my own thoughts, I will summarize my three conversations.

Comments of the British Ambassador, Copenhagen

2. Until shortly before the 1970 ICNAF meeting the U.K., like Canada, favoured a complete ban on high seas fishing. However, unlike Canada, the U.K. is not concerned with salmon fishing in the Pacific and therefore is not concerned with the possible relationship between the regime in the Atlantic and the regime in the Pacific.

3. There were two main reasons why the U.K. welcomed the Danish proposal which was adopted by a majority at the 1970 ICNAF. One, there was (and is) no possibility (at least in the foreseeable future) of persuading Denmark to accept a complete ban. Second, the Danish proposal went a long way towards restricting, or at least preventing escalation of, the catch of salmon taken by Danish (including Faroese and Greenland) fishermen. The Danish proposal, as adopted by the 1970 ICNAF, applies up to the 3-mile limit, whereas a high seas ban would apply only up to the 12-mile limit. On the coasts of Greenland there is considerable salmon fishing between the 3- and 12-mile lines, and the U.K. considered it very valuable to have a restriction on catch that applies up to the 3-mile line.

4. The U.K. also considered valuable the Danish offer (and the ICNAF decision) to limit the season to four months (August 1 - November 30), although the U.K. would prefer a shorter season. Limitation of season helps to discourage investment in salmon fishing vessels.

...2

ECL

- 2 -

5. Already the ICNAF decision has discouraged Danes from planning to build more salmon-fishing vessels and in fact the Danish Government plans to help financially owners of existing vessels to convert them to shrimping.

6. In the Ambassador's confidential personal opinion, the U.K. will hope to see the 1970 decision renewed at the 1971 ICNAF - hopefully with an even shorter season for 1972.

Comments of Mr. Sandberg, Fisheries Attaché,
U.S. Embassy, Copenhagen

7. The U.S. position, like Canada's, continues to be that high-seas fishing should be banned. If an immediate complete ban is impossible for Denmark, the U.S. wants a commitment to phase out such fishing over a reasonable period of years, ending in a complete ban.

8. Like Canada, the U.S. must worry about the effect that the practice of high-seas fishing in the Atlantic may have on U.S. policy in the Pacific. Apart from this point, the pressures in the U.S. to try to stop Atlantic high-seas fishing comes only from sports fishermen, as commercial fishing of salmon is banned in the U.S.

9. At the 1970 ICNAF the U.S. decided to vote for the Danish "compromise" for one year only (1971), because the Danish proposal would, it was thought, at least halt the alarming escalation of Danish high-seas fishing. The U.S. insisted on this proposal being accepted for only one year, in order to be free to argue for something better at the 1971 ICNAF.

10. There is evidence that the acceptance of the Danish proposal by ICNAF will result in a curtailment of the catch in 1971 - and that in fact it contributed to a curtailment in 1970. Danish fishing firms are reluctant to increase their investment in salmon vessels when they see what looks like a movement by the Danish Government in the direction of curtailment of the salmon fishing industry.

11. Ambassador McKernan, fisheries adviser in the U.S. State Department, was recently in Copenhagen to discuss the problem with the Danes. Although Sandberg gave no details of the discussion (which could no doubt be obtained at the State Department) he got the impression that the Danes will try to come up, at the 1971 ICNAF meeting, with additional proposals for restrictions to be enforced in 1972 - although falling far short of a ban or of a commitment to an eventual ban.

12. As for the non-governmental sportsmen's committee in the U.S. and its proposals to boycott Danish goods, Sandberg understands that U.S. Government officials have publicly deprecated any idea of a trade boycott.

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- 3 -

Comments of Mr. Adamsen (Foreign Ministry) and
Mr. Løkkegaard (Fisheries Ministry)

13. The Danish proposal in 1970 and the ICNAF decision were not based on scientific or other plausible evidence that high-seas fishing of salmon threatened the survival of the species. Until now no such evidence exists. However, in making its 1970 proposal, Denmark did in effect agree that the continuance of uncontrolled high-seas fishing involved some risks and that therefore escalation should be halted (at least for some time).

14. Although the 1970 decision did not govern the 1970 season, the 1970 catch off Greenland was in fact slightly less than in 1969. Also, the gross tonnage of "South Danish" vessels (all Denmark except Greenland and the Faroes) decreased from 2000 tons in 1969 to 1634 in 1970. One reason for the decrease is that no one wanted to increase investment in salmon fishing in the "shadow" of the 1970 ICNAF restrictions.

15. The Danish Government has recently established a new loan guarantee fund (of 3 million kroner) to help owners of South Danish salmon vessels who wish to adapt their boats to other kinds of fishing. This will probably lead to a further tonnage reduction of 300 in the 1971 season.

16. The Government has tabled a Bill in Parliament to impose a special tax on salmon caught - this tax to be used for the cost of planting smolt in Danish waters (hopefully to make some contribution to the stock of salmon in the ocean).

17. The Government has also decided to increase the funds available for practical (non-scientific) research into the Danish fishing industry - in order to help the industry to develop lucrative activity in other species.

18. Mr. Adamsen mentioned the likely effect on fishing in Greenland territorial waters (12 miles) if Denmark succeeds in joining the Common Market. Denmark hopes and confidently expects in that event to get agreement that fishing within Greenland's 12 miles should be reserved for Greenland fishermen. This would exclude not only Common Market vessels but also other Danish fishing vessels from the 12-mile zone and would further discourage investment in salmon fishing by non-Greenland Danish fishermen.

19. Danish fishermen generally are bitterly critical of the Government for its 1970 ICNAF decision. The fishing industry feel that the Government acted spinelessly in giving in to unproven complaints by other countries (U.K., U.S.A. and Canada).

...4

- 4 -

20. Messrs. Adamsen and Løkkegaard gave me no encouragement whatever to think that Denmark will offer (or will be willing to accept) at the 1971 ICNAF additional restrictions for the 1972 season. They assumed, however, subject to Government decision, that Denmark would be willing to renew the 1970 decision to apply to the 1972 season. They felt that such a renewal would not only ensure that the halt in escalation would continue for 1972, but it would also give more time for the scientific research carried on by ICES/ICNAF to produce meaningful results.

21. On the last point they called attention to the enclosed statement made by Fisheries Minister Normann on January 27, 1971, in which he said:

"I take it for granted that Danish salmon fishing on the high seas will immediately be brought to a halt if irrefutable scientific evidence shows that this would be necessary to avoid extinction of the species."

Comments by Canadian Ambassador

22. I see no possibility this year of Denmark accepting a ban (either immediate or on a phasing-out basis) on high seas fishing of salmon. Apart from other Danish arguments against such a ban, it would be political suicide for the Government to accept even the principle of a ban before the new restrictive rules (decided in 1970) have been tried out for the 1971 season.

23. Having been posted here since 1967, perhaps I am too ready to give the friendly Danes the benefit of the doubt. I think they are honest when they contend that the harm done by high-seas fishing - either to the survival of the species or to the catch in Canada and the U.K. - has not yet been proven.


24. Threats of a trade boycott, such as those made by a non-governmental committee in the U.S., are strongly resented by all branches of Danish opinion. If such threats were to be made by a government, they would be regarded in Denmark as a very unfair kind of bullying. The least that Danes expect of friendly countries in ICNAF is that the restrictions decided upon in 1970 should be given a fair trial in 1971.

25. Although, as reported above, the Danish officials I spoke to seemed to rule out the possibility of Denmark carrying the 1970 restrictions a few steps further at the 1971 ICNAF, it may be that a concerted effort by Canada, the U.S. and the U.K., well in advance

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of the ICNAF meeting opening on May 31, might succeed in pushing Denmark a little further on the restrictive road.

26. I hope that either the Canadian Government or the Danish Government will take the initiative in arranging a meeting between the two Ministers of Fisheries but, if I may say so, I think it should, if possible, be held before the end of April or, at the latest, early May.



Ambassador.

A. Lee

25-5-7-2 - SALMON
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IF AFTER READING IT YOU THINK IT MIGHT BE USEFUL AND APPROPRIATE FOR ME TO TALK WITH FISHERIES MINISTER NORMANN(WHOM I KNOW WELL) PLS INSTRUCT.

2.CP NEWS SAYS MINISTER DAVIS EXPECTS TO TALK SALMON TO DANISH OFFICIALS EARLY MAY.PLS ADVISE WHERE THIS TALK MAY TAKE PLACE AND KEEP US INFORMED.

3.IF THERE IS IN OTT A MEMO ANALYSING CDN SALMON INDUSTRY AND IMPACT OF HIGH SEAS FISHING PLS SEND COPY

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