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
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Department of External Affairs

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File No. 50130-AB-40 Vol. ONE

**FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE
SEE NEXT PART OF FILE**

EXTRACT FROM THE MINUTES OF THE 2/52 MEETING OF THE

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

HELD TUESDAY JANUARY 15 1952 FILE: 50030-AB-40

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REDACT A SECRET2/52-6 Other Business(a) SHAPE Emergency Defence Plan
(CC 1645-1)

50030-AB-40

13. The Secretary reported that information had been received that as the US Section, CUSRPG, had no comment on the SHAPE Emergency Defence Plan (SHAPE EDP/52) the Standing Group had been advised officially that the Canada-US Regional Planning Group had no comments.

14. The Committee noted the report of the Secretary.

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CANADA

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Department of National Defence

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

No. CSC 1497-1 (JPC)

NATO - TOP SECRET

ADDRESS REPLY TO.
SECRETARY
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE,
OTTAWA.

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18 JAN 1952

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14 January, 1952

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Joint Planning Committee

Proposed Relationship between SHAPE Major
Subordinate Commanders and National Authorities

Reference: CSC 1497-1 (JPC) dated
20 December, 1950 addressed
to Secretary, COS

1. It is requested that the above referenced
letter be destroyed, together with Enclosure,
and the attached paper be substituted.

*done 24/1/52
JWC*

K.C. Cooper
(K.C. Cooper)
Commander, RCN
Secretary,
Joint Planning Committee.

DISTRIBUTION

Air Commodore Clements
Brigadier Gibson
Captain Storrs
Commander Stowell
Colonel Cook
Wing Commander Hull ✓
Mr. Glazebrook
File

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Department of National Defence

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

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JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

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OTTAWA.


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14 January, 1952

Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff

Proposed Relationship between SHAPE Major
Subordinate Commanders and National Authorities

1. Attached is a report prepared by the Joint Planning Committee for the Chiefs of Staff Committee on a proposed SHAPE directive regarding the relationship between subordinate commanders and national authorities.


(K.C. Cooper)
Commander, RCN
Secretary,
Joint Planning Committee

DISTRIBUTION

Copy No. 1 - 10 - Secretary, COS
11 - Air Commodore Clements
12 - Brigadier Gibson
13 - Captain Storrs
14 - Commander Stowell
15 & 16 - Colonel Cook
17 - Wing Commander Hull
18 - Mr. Glazebrook
19 - File

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CSC 1497-1 (JPC) 18

COPY NO. _____

14 January, 1952.

SHAPE PROPOSED DIRECTIVE TO MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS

REGARDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS AND NATIONAL AUTHORITIES

Report by the Joint Planning Committee

to the

Chiefs of Staff Committee

Reference: SHAPE 452/51 d/8 Sep 51
(Attached as Appendix "A")

1. The Joint Planning Committee has examined the above-referenced proposed SHAPE directive to major Subordinate Commanders concerning the relationship between Subordinate Commanders and National Authorities.

2. The Assistant Canadian National Representative SHAPE has advised that:

"The directive is primarily intended to pertain to relationships with the national authorities of those Countries which lie within the geographical boundaries of Europe; however, there are exceptions to this rule, especially as concerns the US and UK. There might even be a need for a channel of communication to Canadian national authorities on matters pertaining to earmarked forces and logistical support. However, in most instances this channel could be and probably would be through the national commander of the forces assigned to SACEUR or through SHAPE."

3. As the directive is in general terms, and since it is not primarily intended to be applicable to Canada, detailed comments are considered to be unnecessary. Any dealings concerning Canada would be of a minor nature in comparison with those of other countries which lie within the geographical boundaries of the major Subordinate Commanders.

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RECOMMENDATION

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4. The JPC recommend that the Canadian National Representative
SHAPE be informed that:

- (a) The Canadian Chiefs of Staff assume that, on matters concerning Canada, the major Subordinate Commanders would report to SHAPE who would, if necessary, arrange liaison through the Canadian National Representative with Canadian National Authorities.
- (b) As the proposed directive is not considered to be primarily applicable to Canada, it has been noted without further comment.

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OTTAWA, January 11, 1952

Director of Military Intelligence,
Department of National Defence,
O T T A W A.

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I transmit a temporary docket from File 1376-1
concerning the designation of an Acting Assistant Chief of
Staff (Intelligence) at SHAPE.

G. de T. Glazebrook

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Department of National Defence

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

No. CC 1645-1 (JIC)

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

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OTTAWA,

8 Jan 52

Air Commodore Clements
Brigadier Gibson
Captain Storrs
Mr. Glazebrook

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SHAPE Emergency Defence Plan (SHAPE EDP 1/52)

1. Attached for your information is a copy of despatch CJS(11) 403 dated 7 Jan 52 concerning a special meeting of the Coordinating Committee NAORPC on the marginally noted subject. My note dated 4 Jan also refers.

2. Since the signal is classified Cosmic may it be returned, please.

(S.C. Cooper)

Commander, RCH

Secretary

Joint Planning Committee

Attach.

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9 JAN 1952

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PRIORITY

FROM CJSW 072055Z

TO SEC CSC

INFO SEC JPC

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CJSW 403 7 JAN (.)

INTERIM REPORT 70TH MEETING NAOR COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOLLOWS

1. AT A SPECIAL MEETING TODAY COORDINATING COMMITTEE APPROVED A REPORT TO THE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE ON SHAPES EMERGENCY DEFENCE PLAN CJSW 392 REFERS (.)

2. REPORT IS BASED ON PAPER TABLED BY THE US REP AFTER CONSULTATION WITH SACLANT DESIGNATE RECOMMENDING THE ASSIGNMENT TO SACLANT OF FULL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE NORTHERN HALF OF THE NORTH SEA BUT EXCLUDING UK DANISH AND NORWEGIAN COASTAL WATERS AND THE SKAGERRAK AND KATTEGAT X NEITHER THE NORWEGIAN NOR DANISH REPS COULD APPROVE THE EXCLUSION OF THE SKAGERRAK AND KATTEGAT FROM SACLANT COMMAND X THEY FELT THAT AS CINCNORTH HAS INADEQUATE FORCES ALLOCATED TO HIM FOR OPERATIONS IN THIS AREA SUCH READJUSTMENT OF COMMAND BOUNDARIES MIGHT SERIOUSLY EFFECT CONTROL OF THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN NORWAY AND DENMARK X

3. THE COMMITTEE GENERALLY FELT THAT ALTHOUGH THIS WHOLE MATTER WAS A PROBLEM FOR DECISION BY OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS CONCERNED THE ALTERATIONS TO SACEUR'S PLAN PROPOSED BY THE US REP WERE REALISTIC AND HAD BEEN APPROVED IN PRINCIPLE BY BOTH CINCNORTH AND REPS OF SACLANT DESIGNATE X

4. AFTER CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION COMMITTEE AGREED TO RECOMMEND THAT SACLANT BE ALLOCATED FULL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE NORTHERN HALF OF THE NORTH SEA SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING RESERVATIONS:

- (A) OPERATIONAL CONTROL IN THE SKAGERRAK AND KATTEGAT TO BE DECIDED BY SACEUR AND SACLANT (WHEN APPOINTED) X
- (B) FORCES OF SACLANT OPERATING IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF THE LAND CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN EUROPE WOULD CARRY OUT THE TASKS INDICATED BY CINCNORTH TO CINCEASTLANT BUT THE LATTER WOULD RETAIN OPERATIONAL CONTROL X (THIS IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE VIEW OF CINCNORTH AS

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RECORDED IN THE MINUTES OF THE MEETING BETWEEN CINCNORTH AND
REPS OF SACLANT DESIGNATE (NAOR/M 623/51) (.)

5. THE COMMITTEE FURTHER AGREED THAT THE PROMULGATION OF REVISED
SHORT TERM DEFENCE PLAN (DP 1/50) SHOULD NOT BE HELD UP PENDING
FINALIZATION OF THIS PROBLEM X

6. IN VIEW OF URGENT REQUIREMENT FOR THIS REPORT COPY IS BEING
FORWARDED TO THE STANDING GROUP FOR INFORMATION X

RPTNS: CJSW 403 7 JAN 70TH NAOR 1. CJSW 392 x. UK DANISH NORWEGIAN
SKAGERRAK KATTEGAT 3. US 4. (A) NAOR/M 623/51 5. DP 1/50

6.

CCNS NIL

20047/PS/072320Z JAN 52.

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RESTRICTED WITHOUT ENCLOSURE

January 7, 1952.



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Orig. no: 50030-A-40

(Signed) A. E. RITCHIE.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DEPUTIES

D-D(52)1	January 4, 1952	Transportation Problems. (copies 9 - 18)
D-D(52)2	January 3, 1952	Report Presenting to the Council Deputies a Draft Protocol on the Operation of Allied Headquarters. (copies 9 - 18)
D-D(52)3	January 5, 1952	Relations Between NATO and the European Defence Community. (copies 9 - 18)
D-D(52)4	January 4, 1952	Proposed Postponement of the Next Meeting of the Council. (copies 9 - 18)
D-D(52)5	January 5, 1952	European Defence Community. Statement made by French Delegation to Council Deputies on December 18, 1951. (copies 9 - 18)
D-D(52)6	January 4, 1952	Establishment of a NATO Petroleum Planning Committee. (copies 9 - 18)

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CG 1645-1 (JFC)

Mr. Wright
Mr. L...
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1. 5 JAN 1952

Air Commodore Clements
Brigadier Gibson
Captain Storrs
Mr. Glazebrook

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SHAPE Emergency Defence Plan (SHAPE EDP 1/52)

1. I attach a copy of despatch CJS(W) 392 for your information. You will recall that this subject was discussed at the 1/52 meeting of the Committee held yesterday.
2. Since this signal is classified COSMIC may it be returned, please.

no

K.C. Cooper
(K.C. Cooper)
Commander, FCN
Secretary,
Joint Planning Committee.

Attach.

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PRIORITY

FROM SEC CJSW 032058 (THI 041/562)

TO SEC CSC

INFO SEC JPC

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REFERENCE SHAPE EMERGENCY DEFENCE PLAN (SHAPEEDP 1-52) AND OUR LETTER
CJS 363-10 DATED 28 DEC.

2. WORKING GROUP OF THE NAORPG HAVE CONSIDERED THIS PLAN AND NOTE
IT DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH NAOR PLANS EXCEPT IN REGARD TO THE SECTION
OF SHAPE PLAN DEALING WITH THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SACLANT AND CINCNORTH.
SHAPE PLAN SHOWS THIS RELATIONSHIP IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL NOTWITHSTANDING
STANDING GROUP DIRECTION IN SG 140/1 THAT THIS SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY
SACEUR AND SACLANT WHEN APPOINTED.

3. IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT AT PRESENT ADEQUATE PROVISION FOR DEFENCE
OF THE NORTHERN NORTH SEA AREA HAS NOT BEEN MADE EITHER BY SACEUR OR
NAORPG IT IS PROBABLY THAT CO ORDINATING COMMITTEE MAY REQUEST THE
STANDING GROUP TO RECONSIDER THE DIRECTIVE IN SG 740/1 AND EITHER RE
AFFIRM IT OR ALLOCATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS ARZA.

20029/A/PS/041530Z JAN 52

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4th January, 1952.

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Orig. no: 50030-A-40

(Signed) S. F. RAE

North Atlantic Council Deputies

D-D(51)301 (Revise) 3rd Jan. 1952. Draft Agreement Between the Government of the French Republic and SHAPE regarding special conditions applicable for the establishment and operation of allied Headquarters on French territory. (copies 9-18)

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EXTRACT FROM THE MINUTES OF THE 1/52 MEETING OF THE

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

held Thursday, January 3, 1952

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File: 50030-AB

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(d) SHAPE Emergency Defence Plan (EDP 1/52)

26. The Secretary reported that only one copy had been received of SHAPE Emergency Defence Plan (SHAPE EDP 1/52) with the request for comments from CUSRPG as deemed desirable on portions of the plan pertinent to that region, and that another copy of the plan is being studied by the US members of the Regional Planning Committee. The Standing Group had requested CUSRPG comments not later than the 7th of January, 1952.

27. The Committee observed that the SHAPE Emergency Defence Plan was of considerable importance not only to CUSRPG but also from a purely Canadian point of view, and therefore required study by individual service agencies. With only one copy available it was doubtful whether Canadian comments (CUSRPG) could be forwarded by the 7th of January, 1952.

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December 21, 1951

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. GLAZEBROOK

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JPC Meeting No. 256, December 28, 1951

Extension to All NATO Nations of Proposed
Western Union Scheme for Coordination of
Mobilization Arrangements (CCL161-1 JPC).

*Considered
at meeting 1/5/52 JPC
on Jan 3/52*

The attached draft report to the Chiefs of Staff on this proposal seems satisfactory to me. It outlines the problem in general terms and reflects our views that:

- (1) it would be premature to consider the proposal in detail until the final Standing Group paper is received;
- (2) consideration by other government departments will be required when the final Standing Group proposal is received; and
- (3) copies of the attached report and the summary of the Western Union Scheme should go to the Government War Book Committee for information now.

There is a definite relationship between this paper and the SHAPE paper (SG 129/2) on Measures to be taken on and after a Warning of Attack. I suspect that the paper on the "overall alert" problem which the Standing Group Planners say they are working on may include or cover both proposals.

I attach file 50030-AB-40 with the following documents flagged:

- (1) Memorandum dated November 7, 1951 from the Secretary JPC enclosing a summary of the proposed Western Union Scheme.
- (2) My memorandum dated November 15 to Mr. Carter.
- (3) Your reply to the Secretary JPC dated November 26.

J.M. Cook
J.M. Cook.

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Defence Liaison (1) M.H. Wershof/cp

December 20, 1951.

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MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. MacKay
Mr. Davis
Mr. Kirkwood
Mr. Glazebrook
Mr. Cook

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SHARP's Authority to order Troops into Action

Following is an extract from Mr. Davis's report of the meeting in the Minister's Office on December 15, at which the Minister discussed various subjects arising from his visit to Europe:

" General Eisenhower is most anxious to know whether he has the authority to order the troops under his Command into action without reference to national governments. He has in mind, for example, a situation where Danish troops might be attacked and he would wish to order the Canadian Brigade into action. Mr. Pearson thinks that General Eisenhower certainly has the authority now but is against an open discussion or statement on this point.

" This question may come out in discussions of the division of responsibility between Supreme Commanders and national territorial Commanders or in considering other papers on warnings. We should probably look into this point."

This should, I think, be related to the following. On file 50030-AB-40, we are dealing with

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two Standing Group papers, one relating to alerts to be ordered by SHAPE, the other dealing with the coordination of national mobilization arrangements. Both of these papers are being studied by the Joint Planning Staff and have had some consideration in the Joint Planning Committee. We should also keep in mind the memoranda that were sent recently to the Minister and the Prime Minister on file No. 50272-40 on the subject of consultation with Parliament before Canadian forces go into action.

The problems involved are very difficult and complex. I presume that the Minister would agree that they should be studied in the normal way by officials before anything goes up to Cabinet Defence Committee.

I do not think that there is any connection between General Eisenhower's question and the paper dealing with the division of responsibility between supreme commanders and national commanders.

M. H. WERSHOF
Defence Liaison (1).

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CANADA

ADDRESS REPLY TO:
SECRETARY
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE,
OTTAWA.

Department of National Defence

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE
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20 December, 1951

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
Joint Planning Committee

Pre-Mobilization Arrangements

1. My letter dated 7 November 51 requested the services to provide comments on a proposal from SHAPE that command phasing should be broken down into three alerts. Service replies having been received, the Joint Planning Staff have prepared a draft report to the Chiefs of Staff Committee on this subject.

2. A first draft of the JPS report is attached for your information and you will note that in the conclusions the JPS feel that the adoption of a many-phased system of alerts would be the concern of other government departments and that these departments should be consulted before any national comments are made.

3. It is intended to place this item on the agenda for the 256th meeting of the Committee.


(K.C. Cooper)
Commander, RCN
Secretary,
Joint Planning Committee.

DISTRIBUTION

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3 - Captain Storrs
4 - Commander Stowell
5 - Colonel Cook
6 - Wing Commander Hull
7 - Mr. Glazebrook
8 - JPS (External Affairs) ✓
9 - Secretary, JPC
10 - File

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COPY NO. 7

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET CG 1161-1 Vol. 1 (JPC)
REDUT A SECRET 18 December, 1951.

PROPOSED EXTENSION TO ALL NATO NATIONS
OF PROPOSED WESTERN UNION SCHEME FOR
CO-ORDINATION OF MOBILIZATION ARRANGEMENTS.

Report by the Joint Planning Committee
to the
Chiefs of Staff Committee

Introduction

1. Prior to the phasing out of the Western Union, the Five Brussel Treaty Powers conducted a study on an inter-allied basis with a view to defining a scheme for co-ordination of pre-mobilization arrangements which would be acceptable to all five nations^a and applicable when the Five Powers were jointly concerned.
2. With the reorganization of NATO it was considered that any plan for the co-ordination of pre-mobilization arrangements would have to be worked out on a wider basis than that of the Five Powers alone. Accordingly a report on the proposed scheme was forwarded to SHAPE who has recommended that the Standing Group undertake the extension of the planned co-ordination of mobilization arrangements to all NATO countries, and final acceptance by the nations of an agreed and uniform procedure along the lines indicated in the Western region study.
3. The Standing Group has passed the subject to the Standing Group Working Team, following which it will be referred to the Military

^a UK, France, Netherlands,
Belgium, Luxembourg

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Representatives Committee. In order that the guidance which will be required at that time may be provided, CJS(W) has asked that studies be undertaken now to determine the Canadian position with respect to the scheme.

4. It is considered, however, that until the Standing Group's studies have been completed it would be premature to consider the proposal in detail. When the Standing Group's paper has been produced and forwarded for national comments, the proposal should then be examined and the Canadian view forwarded.

Five Power Proposal

5. In the Five Power Mobilization Scheme five phases for the transition from peace to general mobilization were proposed as follows:

- (a) The First Phase which can be inaugurated on a pretext unconnected with war, calls for the alerting of peacetime forces.
- (b) The Second Phase provides for the reinforcement of peacetime forces to a degree necessary to meet the most immediate threats.
- (c) The Third Phase aims to achieve added protection from sudden attack by a deployment of forces, including the initial covering force, in order to permit general mobilization of all the armed forces without hindrance. In addition all preparations for general or partial mobilization of the armed forces are completed in this phase.

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- (d) The Fourth Phase is devised to achieve the high state of preparedness which may have to be maintained during a period of tension against the threat of a major attack. This phase can be omitted in case of a very rapidly deteriorating situation.
- (e) The Fifth Phase is the general mobilization of the armed forces.

SHAPES'S views

6. In SHAPE'S outline Emergency Defence Plan security measures have been divided into three phases: Simple Alert, Reinforced Alert and General Alert. In the Simple Alert stage measures taken will place Active Forces allocated to SACEUR in a state of combat readiness, including some protective and early warning measures. The Reinforced Alert is to be instigated and completed only if there are conclusive indications that an enemy attack is imminent. The measures taken in this stage are to result in the maximum possible preparation to meet an attack. The General Alert stage marks the outbreak of hostilities. In this stage operational plans are fully implemented.

7. SHAPE has commented that when comparing this phasing with that proposed by the Five Powers, a general similarity appears between Simple Alert and first phase, Reinforced Alert and third phase, and General Alert and fifth phase. In SHAPE's view the second phase and fourth phase do not have a clear operational objective; however, if they are put in so as to provide greater flexibility in the phasing of mobilization there appears to be no objection to their inclusion. SHAPE considers though, that if they are included it should be clearly stated that NATO military command phasing would correspond to NATO Government phasing as follows:

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SHAPE and NATO Military Command Phasing

NATO Government Phasing

Simple Alert

First Phase
Second Phase

Reinforced Alert

Third Phase
Fourth Phase

General Alert

Fifth Phase

Preliminary JPC Views

8. Pending the receipt of the Standing Group paper, the JPC has carried out a preliminary examination of the proposed five phase system. The consensus is that the present Canadian two phase system of a Precautionary Stage and Emergency Stage is more flexible than either the five phase system as proposed by the Five Powers or the three phase proposed by SHAPE, and, therefore, has the advantage in that the entire stage, or any part of it, can be implemented while under the five or three phase system there are no discretionary steps but rather specific tasks must be carried out in each degree of alert.

9. However, since the Canadian system is so flexible it should be able to adapt itself to either the five or three stage phasing. A declaration of the Precautionary stage under the Canadian system would, generally speaking, permit the enforcement, concurrently or in succession, of the first, second, third and fourth phases in the Five Power proposal and the Simple and Reinforced Alert stages in the SHAPE proposal.

10. It is considered that SHAPE's three phase system of alerts would meet the requirements. As SHAPE has noted the second and fourth phases under the Five Power proposal do not have a clear military objective. In addition, an interpretation of the action to be taken in each of the phases can be met more readily in the three phase system proposed by SHAPE.

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Conclusion

11. As the adoption of a many phased system of alerts would be of concern to other Government Departments, it is felt that they should be consulted before any National commitments are made. However, it is not considered desirable to take such action until a formal proposal has been received from the Standing Group and examined in detail. Meanwhile, though, it is suggested that a copy of this report and its enclosure be sent to the Government War Book Committee for their information.

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NO. CSC 1497-1 (JPC)

Department of National Defence

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

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ADDRESS REPLY TO:
SECRETARY
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE,
OTTAWA.

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22 DEC 1951

Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff

Proposed Relationship between SHAPE Major Subordinate Commanders and National Authorities.

1. Attached is a report prepared by the JPC on a proposed SHAPE directive regarding the relationship between subordinate commanders and national authorities.

2. In considering this report for submission to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Joint Planning Committee recommended that as the paper applies only to Europe, its contents be noted with the observation that it may be assumed the major sub-commanders would report to SHAPE who would arrange liaison, if necessary, with the Canadian national representatives.

(Signature)
(K.C. Cooper)
Commander, RCN
Secretary,
Joint Planning Committee.

cc: JPC

DISTRIBUTION

- Copy No. 1 - 10 - Secretary, CCS.
11 - Brigadier Gibson
12 - Air Commodore Clements
13 - Captain Storrs
14 - Commander Stowell
15 & 16 - Colonel Cook
17 - Wing Commander Hull
18 - Mr. Glazebrook
19 - File

enclosure destroyed
Jan 24/52 - see CSC 1497-1 (JPC)
Jan 14/52
File

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1/52-5 Pre-Mobilization Arrangements
(CSC 1161-1 (JPC) d/20 Dec 51)

5003d - A.B.

17. In anticipation that the Military Representatives, NATO, will be asked to comment on a study now being prepared by the Standing Group Working Team, on pre-mobilization arrangements as suggested by SHAPE, the Committee had for consideration a first draft on this subject as prepared by the JPS. SHAPE's proposed phasing is for three alerts as compared with the phasing of the five Brussel Treaty Powers which is based on a five-phase scheme. The JPS draft paper points out that since the Canadian system is so flexible, it should be able to adapt itself to either the five or three stage phasing, and suggests that as the adoption of a many-phase system of alerts would be the concern of other government departments, no action should be taken until a formal proposal has been received from the Standing Group and examined in detail.

18. The External Affairs representative suggested that it might be desirable to pass a copy of the draft JPS paper to the Government War Book Committee for their information.

19. After discussion,

THE COMMITTEE:

noted the report of the JPS and directed the Secretary to inform the Secretary, Government War Book, of its contents.

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December 19, 1961.



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(Signed) A. E. RITCHIE.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DEPUTIES

D-D(61)300	December 12, 1961	Agreement on the Status of the Armed Forces of NATO Powers. (copies 9 - 19)
D-D(61)301	December 12, 1961.	Draft Agreement between the Government of the French Republic and SHAPE regarding special conditions re Establishment and operation of Allied Headquarters on French Territory. (copies 9 - 19)

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December 18, 1951

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(Signed) S. F. RAE

STAND 234	December 14, 1951.	Military Matters & Soviet Economic capabilities based on MC33, MC 31. (copies 8 - 10)
STAND 235	December 15, 1951.	Submission of Reports on progress of Infrastructure quarterly. (copies 9 - 11)
TOSHAP 122	December 14, 1951.	Responsibilities & function of Allied Land Forces Northern Europe. (copies 9 - 11)

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December 8, 1981.

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(Signed) S. F. RAE

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING

D-3(81)894

December 6, 1981.

Division of Responsibilities in
Warfare between the National
Territorial Commanders and the Supreme
Commanders and Sub-commands Allied
Commanders. (copies 9 - 18)

D-3(81)895

December 7, 1981.

Relationships between NATO and the
European Defence Community.
(copies 9 - 18)

D-3(81)896

December 7, 1981.

Revision. (copies 9 - 18)

D-3(81)897

December 7, 1981.

Deployment of firms and companies
on contracts involving the disclosure
of classified information.
(copies 9 - 18)

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December 6, 1951.



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(Signed) S. F. RAE

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DEPUTIES

CS-R/6	December 4, 1951.	Summary Record of the Sixth Meeting Held in Rome, November 23, 1951. (copies 12 - 21)
CS-D/17	December 5, 1951.	Resolution on Establishment of a NATO Command in the Channel and Southern North Sea Area. (copies 12 - 21)
CS-D/18	December 5, 1951.	Resolution on Division of Responsi- bilities in Wartime Between the National Territorial Commanders and the Supreme Commanders and Sub- ordinate Allied Commanders (cc 12-21)
CS-D/19	December 5, 1951.	Resolution on Standardization of Small Arms and Small Arms Ammunition. (copies 12 - 21)
CS-D/18 (Final)	December 6, 1951.	Resolution with Respect to the Reports & Statements presented under Items V to VIII of Council Agen- da. (copies 12 - 21)

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EXTRACT FROM THE MINUTES OF THE 253rd MEETING OF THE JOINT

PLANNING COMMITTEE held Tuesday, 13 November 1951

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253-2 Relationship between Subordinate Commanders
and National Authorities
(CSC 1497-1 (JPC) d/30 Nov 51)

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3. In accordance with the direction contained in CSC 1497-1 (JPC) dated 14 November, 1951, the JPS had reviewed a draft paper by SHAPE on the relationship between major subordinate commanders and national authorities. In the preparation of this paper the JPS found it necessary to clarify certain points.

4. The paper now under consideration by the Committee recommended that SHAPE's proposed directive be accepted on the understanding that it is not intended to pertain primarily to relationships with Canadian national authorities and that presumably any dealings which would occur would be on matters pertaining to assigned forces, earmarked forces and logistical support, and also that any dealings with the Canadian national authorities be undertaken through the Canadian national representative, SHAPE.

5. The representative from External Affairs considered that some further clarification was required as it was still not clear to him whether this paper was applicable to Canada. It indicated only national authorities of those countries which lie within the geographical boundaries of Europe. He had no objection to Canada making observations on the paper; however, a firm Canadian policy would not appear desirable at this time.

6. After considerable discussion,

THE COMMITTEE:

recommended to the Chiefs of Staff Committee that as the paper applies only to Europe, it would appear desirable to note its contents, with the observation that it is assumed that the major Sub-Commanders would report to SHAPE who would arrange liaison, if necessary, with the Canadian national representative.

Department of External Affairs

Ottawa, Dec 4/56

Mr. Weisberg

full
one

Please excuse my
absence this morning.
General Boulke's briefing
meeting didn't break up
until after 1030.

Re item ② attached
Gen Amstutz national
rep. Sitape states that
there might be a need
for a channel of communications
between major sub. cdrs. and
Canadian national authorities
on matters pertaining to
earmarked forces and logistical
support. Although there
is no more definite information

Department of External Affairs

Ottawa,

The military members of the
JPS consider it a worthwhile
idea. The proposed directive
specifies that ~~the~~ SACOR
is responsible for dealings
with National Authorities on
all matters of strategy, overall
policy and planning.

In National Rep. at SHAPE
is suggested as the channel
in preference to National
Commanders who would
be, of course, subordinate
officers and therefore according
to ~~the~~ military JPS not ^{the most} desirable
channel.

JMS 000037

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CANADA

ADDRESS REPLY TO.
SECRETARY
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE,
OTTAWA.

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Mr. Blaybrook

Department of National Defence

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

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JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

item 2

30 November, 1951

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1 DEC 1951

Joint Planning Committee

Relationship between Subordinate Commanders
and National Authorities

Reference "A" - CSC 1497-1 (JPC) dated
14 Nov 51.

Reference "B" - Stadacona NMR-1050

1. Reference "A" requested the JPS to review a draft paper prepared by SHAPE on the relationship between subordinate commanders and national authorities. The JPS found it necessary to obtain clarification of the following points before preparing a draft report for consideration of the JPC:

- (a) Whether the directive is intended to pertain to relationships with the national authorities of only those countries which lie within the geographical areas of the major subordinate commanders or if it is meant to pertain to relationships with the national authorities of those countries which lie outside the geographical areas of the major subordinate commanders as well.
- (b) Whether the sentence immediately following para 3(c) of the draft refers to para 3(c) only or to all of para 3.

Reference "B" is a reply to these questions and is attached for information.

2. In the light of reference "B" the JPS have prepared a draft report which is enclosed. It is intended that this be discussed as an agenda item at the 253rd meeting of the Committee.

K.C. Cooper
(K.C. Cooper)
Commander, RCN
Secretary,
Joint Planning Committee.

*JPC agreed
that SHAPE be advised
that the proposed
directive does not
appear to concern Canada.*

Attach. 2

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CSC 1497-1 (JPC)

Copy No. 5

29 November, 1951

SHAPE Proposed Directive to Major Subordinate
Commanders Regarding the Relationship between
Subordinate Commanders and National authorities.

Report by
The Joint Planning Committee
to the
Chief of Staff Committee

1. Initial examination of the proposed directive by the JPS showed that certain ambiguity existed as to whether or not the subject was of any direct interest to Canada. It was not clear whether the directive was intended to pertain to relationships with the National Authorities of only those countries which lie within the geographical area of the major Subordinate Commanders, or whether it referred as well to relationships with the National Authorities of those countries which lie outside the geographical area of the major Subordinate Commanders.

2. This point has now been clarified with the Assistant Canadian National representative SHAPE who advises that: "The directive is primarily intended to pertain to relationships with the National Authorities of those countries which lie within the geographical boundaries of Europe; however, there are exceptions to this rule especially as concerns the US and UK. There might even be a need for a channel of communications to Canadian National Authorities on matters pertaining to Earmarked Forces and logistical support.

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-2-

However, in most instances this channel could be and probably would be through the National Commander of the Forces assigned to SACEUR or through SHAPE. The UK reply includes among the list of national agencies with whom Subordinate Commanders may deal directly, War Office, Admiralty, C & C Home Fleet, C & C Bomber Command, C & C Coastal Command, and C & C Fighter Command, etc."

3. The directive has now been re-examined in the light of the Assistant Canadian National representative's remarks. It appears to be in rather general terms. However, since it is not primarily intended as being applicable to such countries as Canada, an observation on its general aspect is considered to be unnecessary. Presumably dealings with Canadian National authorities would be of a minor nature in comparison with those of other countries which lie within the geographical boundaries of the major Subordinate Commanders and would be mostly on matters pertaining to Assigned Forces, Earmarked Forces and Logistical support.

4. It is recommended that:

- (a) Proposed directive be accepted on the understanding that it is not intended to pertain primarily to relationships with Canadian National authorities, and that presumably any dealings which would occur would be on matters pertaining to Assigned Forces, Earmarked Forces and Logistical support.

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- (b) Within the purpose of the directive,
dealings with the Canadian National
Authorities be carried out through
the Canadian National representative
SHAPE.

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C O P Y

IMPORTANT - TOP SECRET - NOVEMBER 23, 1951

ADDRESSED CSC OTTAWA REPEATED CJS (LONDON) FROM STADAGONA

NMR 1050 (.) Following for CSC from W/C Mitchell.

Para. 1. Reference our NMR 1034 dated 8th November and CSC 98 dated 21 Nov 51 regarding relationship between Subordinate Commanders and National Authorities.

Para 2. The Directive is primarily intended to pertain to relationships with the national authorities of those countries which lie within the geographical boundaries of Europe. However, there are exceptions to this rule, especially as concerns the US and UK. There might even be a need for a channel of communications to Canadian National Authorities "on matters pertaining to earmarked forces, logistical support". However, in most instances this channel could be and probably would be through the national commander of the forces assigned to SACEUR or through SHAPE.

Para 3. The UK reply includes amongst the list of national agencies with whom Subordinate Commanders may deal directly, War Office, Admiralty, C-in-C, Home Fleet, C-in-C, Bomber Command, C-in-C Coastal Command, C-in-C Fighter Command, etc.

Para 4. The sentence immediately following para 3(c) of the draft refers to the whole of para 3. Message ends.

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Junc.

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OTTAWA, 12
November 26, 1951.

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The Secretary,
Joint Planning Committee,
Room 4435, "A" Building,
Department of National Defence,
O T T A W A.

Re - Your CG 1161-1(JPC) of November 7, 1951

EXTENSION TO ALL NATO NATIONS OF PROPOSED WESTERN UNION SCHEME
FOR COORDINATION OF MOBILIZATION ARRANGEMENTS

1. Since the proposal has not been referred to us formally by the Standing Group, I think it would be premature to send any detailed plan to the Chiefs of Staff at this time. Due to the importance of the question, however, it would be desirable to send to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Government War Book Committee, for information, a memorandum setting out in general terms the nature of the proposed scheme, informing them that a detailed proposal will likely be sent to us in due course from the Standing Group. It might also be useful, at this time, to send a copy of your memorandum and enclosure to the Secretary of the Government War Book Committee for his information.

2. As a preliminary view, the coordination of mobilization within NATO would seem to be a logical development and one calculated to strengthen the alliance, even though such arrangements would represent a considerable limitation on the Canadian Government's freedom of action. Although the paper under review is confined mainly to the problem of preliminary measures for armed forces' mobilization, there are a number of civilian aspects. When a formal proposal is received from the Standing Group, the civilian Depart-

- 2 -

ments responsible should be consulted through the Government War Book Committee.

3. With regard to SHAPE's comments given in paragraph (2) of your memorandum, it would appear preferable to adopt either the 3-phase system or the 5-phase system, but not both.

4. In a letter dated July 11, 1951, the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Ottawa informed me that the United Kingdom authorities were discussing methods of examining, under NATO auspices, their general War Book Plans. A copy of this letter was sent on July 18 to the Clerk of the Privy Council who has circulated it to the Departments concerned, including National Defence. It is now understood that the United Kingdom is not taking any initiative pending the outcome of the Standing Group study of the Western Union Plan to which your memorandum refers.

5. As a result of the above letter, preliminary consideration has been given in the Department of External Affairs on the raising of War Book matters in NATO organs. Such aspects as the control of allied ships and aircraft, control of enemy shipping and aircraft, economic warfare, import and export control, navicerts, ships warrants and contraband control would appear suitable for consideration on a NATO basis. Questions such as censorship, civil defence, and treatment of civilians and prisoners of war in enemy hands would not, at first sight, appear suitable, but if the other countries feel strongly we would be willing to have them discussed.

6. With regard to the question of the evacuation of civilians from War Zones (Phase 2 of proposed scheme), we are making adequate plans for evacuating Canadian citizens with the United States and United Kingdom authorities. Military arrangements must be made of course, but we would prefer not to get involved with NATO plans in this field any more than is necessary since Canadian and U.S. citizens are more likely to be evacuated to zones of safety than are Europeans. We should try to avoid any general discussion of the problem which might cause bad feelings.

7. Not all of the questions mentioned in paragraph (5) above are dealt with by the preliminary Western Union paper - but it is possible that they might be discussed during the Standing Group study of the subject.

G. de T. GLAZEBROOK

(G. de T. Glazebrook)

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S E C R E TFile No. 11208-A-40

OTTAWA, November 21, 1951

The Clerk of the Privy Council,
O T T A W A,
Ontario.

ATTENTION: S/L Evans

In my letter of July 18, I transmitted a copy of a letter of July 11 from Mr. Chadwick of the Office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom to Mr. Glazebrook. In this letter Mr. Chadwick explained that the United Kingdom authorities were planning to take up War Book matters in various NATO agencies.

We have now received further information from the United Kingdom authorities on this subject. They point out that the Standing Group is now considering a paper on the co-ordination of mobilization plans by NATO countries, which covers much the same ground as the United Kingdom proposals. The United Kingdom authorities do not, therefore, intend to raise this question either in SHAPE or in the Council Deputies or Standing Group until the outcome of the present Standing Group study is known.

We have, however, received a chart which shows the categories of subjects which the United Kingdom authorities originally intended to raise either in SHAPE (Category I) or in the Council Deputies or Standing Group (Category II). I enclose a copy of this chart for your information.

Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

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WAR BOOK PREPARATIONS IN N.A.T.O. COUNTRIES
WHICH CONCERN THE UNITED KINGDOM OR S.H.A.P.E.

References are to the United Kingdom Government
War Book

	Category I	Category II
Main subject	Measures which directly affect the ability of SHAPE to plan the defence of Western Europe.	Measures which directly affect the security of the United Kingdom.
PRELIMINARY DEFENCE MEASURES (Chapter II)	Certain detailed measures fall under both categories. It has been proposed that the co-ordination of Mobilisation arrangements should be referred in the first instance to SHAPE.	
INTERNAL SECURITY (Chapter III)	Subversive Section or Civil Disturbance (Section 1). Protection of Selected Key Points against Sabotage (Section 5).	
CIVIL DEFENCE (chapter IV)	Local Precautionary Measures (Section 3). General Precautionary Measures (Section 4). Essential Services (Section 5). Building repairs and Salvage (Section 5 (1)). Hospital and Other Medical Services (Section 6). Public Order and Safety (Section 7). Evacuation (Section 8).	
ENEMY SHIPPING AND AIRCRAFT (chapter V)	Enemy Shipping (Section 1) Enemy Aircraft (Section 2).	

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Main Subject	Category I	Category II
CONTROL OF SHIPPING (Chapter VI)	Harbour Traffic Regulations (Section 1).	
	Control of Mercantile Marine (Section 2).	Control of Mercantile Marine (Section 2).
	Wireless in Merchant Ships (Section 3).	Wireless in Merchant Ships (Section 3).
	Security of Mercantile Marine (Section 4).	Security of Mercantile Marine (Section 4).
	Diversion of Shipping (Section 5).	Diversion of Shipping (Section 5).
	Control of Ports and Ships Destinations (Section 6).	Control of Ports and Ships Destinations (Section 6).
	Control of Allied Seamen (Section 8).	Control of Allied Seamen (Section 8).
CONTROL OF CIVIL AVIATION (Chapter VII)	Requisitioning of Aircraft, Aerodromes etc. (Section 2).	Control of Civil Air- craft (Section 1).
	Air Examination Service (Section 3).	Wireless in Civil Air- craft (Section 4).
CENSORSHIP SUSPENSION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND CONTROL OF RADIO TRANSMISSIONS (Chapter IX)	Telecommunications Censor- ship (Section 4).	
	Postal and Travellers Cen- sorship (Section 5).	
	Press Broadcasting and Film Censorship (Section 6).	
	Suspension of Communica- tions (Section 7).	
	Control of Radio Trans- missions as Navigational Aids (Section 8).	Control of Radio Transmissions as Navi- gational Aids (Sec. 8).
	Control of Radio Trans- missions - Security Measures (Section 9).	Measures against Un- licensed Transmissions (Section 10).
CONTROL OF INLAND TRANSPORT (Chapter X)	Railways (Section 1).	
	Road Transport (Sec. 2)	
	Ports (Section 3).	
	Canals (Section 4).	
	Road Communications (Sec. 5).	
	Co-ordination of Transport (Section 6).	

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November 20, 1961.

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(Signed) A. E. RITCHIE

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DEPUTIES

AC/11-R/2

November 18, 1961. - Corrigenda
(copies 9 - 18)

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November 17, 1951

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. COOK

Pre-Mobilization Arrangements

Apparently this subject has not yet been formally referred by the Standing Group to the Canadian authorities but it is still under study by the Standing Group Working Team. Until a proposal is formally sent Canada by the Standing Group it seems premature to refer any detailed plan either to the Chiefs of Staff or to the Government War Book Committee. It would be desirable that this paper should go for study to the J.P.S. and also to the Secretary, Government War Book Committee (S/L Evans on the Privy Council). The ~~problem~~ of a Canadian agreement to concert mobilization with other NATO countries is obviously very important. For this reason it might be desirable to send to the Chiefs of Staff and the Government War Book Committee for information a memorandum setting out in very general terms the nature of this paper and informing them that it is likely that a detailed proposal will be sent us in due course from the Standing Group. It would probably also be desirable to tell Mr. Wilgress in London what is going on.

quest
byes

On the substance of the matter it seems to me that even though an agreement to concert mobilization arrangements would represent a very considerable limitation on the Canadian Government's freedom of action in an emergency, that it is a normal development from recent action in NATO. As theatre commands like SHAPE and SACLANF have been set up and as forces are being assigned to these commands, the co-ordination of mobilization would seem a logical development and one calculated to strengthen the alliance.

Apart from the general decision to coordinate mobilization arrangements, the details of military mobilization coordination are matters for National Defence. I would suggest however, that either the 3-phase system or the 5-phase system should be adopted, but not both. With respect to the civilian aspects of coordination that you list in your paragraph (7), I would suggest that they are measures which should be taken on a NATO basis. At a later stage when the formal proposals are received from the Standing Group, the Departments responsible should, of course, be consulted through the Government War Book Committee.

One rather delicate question, ^{however} is that of the evacuation of allied nationals which is set out under the General Items in Phase 2. It is obvious that military arrangements must be made for the evacuation of these nationals in Europe. This is one place however, where ill will might arise amongst the members of the NATO alliance. The United States and Canada will want to take their nationals back to North America away from the greatest danger. Nearly all of the European civilians will have to stay and face the music. For this reason I think we should attempt to see that this question of the evacuation of civilians does not get involved with NATO plans any more than is necessary. We are making plans for our own people with the Americans and British at present, and I think it undesirable that ~~we should get mixed up any more than necessary in NATO plans.~~

*these plans should be merged into
Nato plans.*


T. Le M. Carter.

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
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OTTAWA

No. D- 3350

November 16 1951

Sir,

I enclose the document (s) listed below.



I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

C. S. A. RITCHIE

The Canadian Ambassador,
Canadian Embassy,
Washington, D.C.

for Secretary of State for External Affairs.

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

SUBJECT

Despatch No. 1609 of 9th November,
1951 from the Canadian Ambassador,
Paris, France."Record of a conversation with
General Eisenhower"

(This Document is The Property of His Majesty's Canadian Government)

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CANADA

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IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE
NO. CSC 1497-1 (JFC)

Department of National Defence

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

NATO - TOP SECRET

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE.

ADDRESS REPLY TO.
SECRETARY
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE,
OTTAWA.

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15 NOV 1951

Mr Glazebrook
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14 November, 1951

Joint Planning Committee

Joint Planning Staff

Relationship between Subordinate Commanders
and National Authorities.

1. Attached is a copy of SHAPE 452/51 dated 8 September 51 with regard to the marginally noted subject.
2. It had been assumed that further detail and comments would be forthcoming from the Assistant Canadian National Representative, SHAPE. However, information has now been received that SHAPE has requested that national comments be expedited.
3. It would appear that no action is required on para 2 of SHAPE 452/51 at this time, as a second draft will be forwarded after the comments of national authorities have been received.
4. The JPS are requested to review the attached drafts and prepare a report for consideration of the JFC.

K.C. Cooper
(K.C. Cooper)
Commander, RCN
Secretary,
Joint Planning Committee.

DISTRIBUTION

Brigadier Gibson
Air Commodore Clements
Captain Storrs
Commander Stowell
Colonel Cook
Group Captain Hodson
Mr. Glazebrook
JPS - (4 copies)

Mr Cooper
The attachment should find its way to the following, via the JFC, as well as to the Canadian National Representative, SHAPE.

Classification has been requested from our representative at SHAPE on following 2 points.
(1) does proposed directive authorize subordinate commanders to deal with national authorities outside of as well as within the geographical area of command?
(2) Should subordinate commanders inform SHAPE of

All action taken under para 3 of draft directive or sent under para 3 (C)

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED POWERS EUROPE

1, RUE DE PRESBOURG
PARIS (8E) - FRANCE

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103
Paris 19 Sep 51

Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee,
National Defence Headquarters,
Ottawa, Ontario
Canada.

Relationship between Subordinate Commanders &
National Authorities

1. Enclosed find copies #4, 5 & 6 of a SHAPE memo on the a/m subject. For your information and action.
2. Copy #7 has been forwarded to London under cover of our letter of even file dated 19 Sep 51.

(Sgd.) J.F. Mitchell

(J.F. Mitchell) Wing Comdr.
Assistant

Canadian National Representative
SHAPE

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Defence Liaison (1) RA MacKay/cp

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November 13, 1951.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. REID

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Sub. 58 Chron. ... Filed....

General Eisenhower's Visit to Washington

The Washington Embassy reports (WA 3889 - November 2) that one of the matters under discussion during General Eisenhower's visit to Washington was the present rate of defence production in the United States and expected rate of delivery to Europe. New York Times has recently published a letter from Senator Lodge to Senator Johnson, Chairman of the Preparedness Sub-Committee of the Senate, expressing profound concern about the slow rate of delivery of U.S. military supplies to its European allies. (document).

R.A. MacKAY

Defence Liaison (1).

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November 12, 1951

File: 50030-AB-40

MEMORANDUM TO MR. GLAZEBROOK

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PRE-MOBILIZATION ARRANGEMENTS
(CC1161-1 JPC)*6(6)*
JPC meeting # 251

1. The attached paper (Appendix A to WR/FC (51)6) * is a summary of a proposed scheme for coordination of mobilization arrangements of the five Brussel Treaty powers. SHAPE has recommended to Standing Group its extension to all NATO nations with acceptance of agreed and uniform procedures in accordance with the lines of the Western Region Study.

2. In comparing the proposed government phasing in five stages with the three stages of Alert outlined in Annex B to the proposed SHAPE Emergency Defence Plan, SHAPE sees the following similarity:

SHAPE and NATO MILITARY
COMMAND PHASINGPROPOSED NATO GOVERNMENT
PHASING

Simple Alert	- - - - -	First Phase
	- - -	Second Phase
Reinforced Alert	- - - - -	Third Phase
	- - -	Fourth Phase
General Alert	- - - - -	Fifth Phase

SHAPE does not consider that the Western Region's second and fourth phases have any operational objective. If they are put in to provide greater flexibility in phasing of mobilization, SHAPE has no objection to their inclusion on condition that NATO Military Command phasing would correspond to NATO Government

. . . 2

* not attached - in Davis's list.

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phasing as shown above.

3. The subject has been passed to Standing Group Working Team following which, it is anticipated, it will go to the Military Representatives. The Secretary JPC has requested comments, for coordination and preparation of a joint paper to be submitted to JPC and the Chiefs of Staff Committee, on the following two points:

- (a) Canada's position with respect to the mobilization scheme as proposed in Appendix "A" to WR/FC (51)6
- (b) Canada's position with respect to SHAPE's comments given in paragraph (2) above.

4. I have asked Mr. Davis to have a look at the paper and he will, if possible, let us have something in the next day or two.


J.M. Cook.

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Original sent by
airmail
Copy by bag.



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Paris, 10th November 1951.

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14 NOV 1951

SECRET

Dear Mr. Heeney,

I would be grateful if
the two following corrections were made in my
despatch No. 1609 dated 9th November 1951:

Page 3 - line 27.


Delete the word "when" from
the following:

" ... because in those days when there
were no ... "

Page 4 - line 13.

Substitute the word
"opportunities" for "opportunity".

Yours sincerely,


Ambassador

A.D.P. HEENEY Esq.,
Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs,
OTTAWA.
Canada..

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1951 NOV 14 AM 10:41

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
RECEIVED

Ext. 180A

Revised P.M. *Curlew*
USSEK
Sec. Cpl.
Sec. Cabinet
Washington
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Done
Nov. 17/51
H.D.

OTTAWA FILE

No.

Despatch No.

Date..9th. November. 1951.....

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, Paris, France.

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference.....

Subject:.....Record of a conversation with General EISENHOWER.

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14 NOV 1951

Copies Referred

To.....
The Minister.
(in Paris)....
...LONDON.....
.....
.....

No. of Enclosures

One

Post File

No. 2-4-5-13-A

1. General EISENHOWER asked me to luncheon at Rocquencourt where S.H.A.P.E. Headquarters are located. It was a small party. Those attending were a few members of his staff and Mr. Robert BRADLEY, a personal friend and Vice-President of General Motors.

2. The General is an excellent host. If he were not a good talker the atmosphere would be a little strained at the start because obviously his guests, unless they suffer from an egocentric complex, do not care to give a lead themselves. Although with the General there are never any awkward pauses, he leaves the impression sometimes of talking in order to fill the silence. This is not surprising when one considers the number of visitors he receives, at meals and at other times, who it is safe to assume, ask the same questions to which he gives the same replies. I noticed under the hearty manner, a nervous weariness which may be caused by his irksome task of organisation and administration which carries its full share of dissimulation and frustration because there are many things he cannot say or do. A General of his calibre must prefer the command of troops and action. When he compares his present post with the one he held during the war, it must be a terrible anti-climax. Another reason for the weariness may be his stomach with which, I am told, he has had some trouble. This is confirmed by the fact that at luncheon instead of the substantial menu offered us, he had first "consommé", cold or hot I could not say, then a dish which had the appearance and consistency of yogourt with in it what looked like sliced bananas and apples. At the end of the meal he ate "Port Salut" cheese upon which he spread (to my amazement if he has a weak stomach) a great deal of tomato catsup.

3. A summary of some of the subjects discussed is given below.

THE EUROPEAN ARMY

I pointed out that the United States and the United Kingdom were now taking a very keen interest in the European Army and had appointed representatives to the steering committee.

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1951 NOV 12 PM 2:46

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
H. H. H. H. H.

The General said he had told "Winston and Strachey" that in the beginning he did not think much of the European Army but decided later that it appeared to be the only possible way of reconciling two points of view - that of the Germans who insisted on equality of status and that of the French who feared the Germans and required some guarantee that another German national army would not be recreated. Once the decision had been taken to raise a European Army the thing to do was to appoint a responsible Authority and allow it to work out the military problems. It was silly to spend a year or more on minor considerations such as what the size of the military unit should be etc.

I asked of what use the European Army would be without S.H.A.P.E. I raised the point because although I share the view that recourse must be had now to the European Army, I feel that it will serve a purpose only because it will work with and come under the orders of the Supreme Commander of the N.A.T.O. forces. Frankly I believe that when the Russian threat comes to an end, the European army will simply break up into its component parts. General Eisenhower did not give me a direct answer and I can understand his reluctance. He expressed the hope that, by the time the European Army was no longer necessary as a defence against the Russians, an advanced stage of political integration might exist in Europe and because of this the European Army might survive and play a useful part. The European Army and political integration might appear very difficult but let us remember that history had shown that things which appeared impossible had come to pass so why not the European army and political integration? He had been asked once "why don't the United States, Canada and Mexico integrate?". His answer was that Russia was further away.

Mr. D. MacARTHUR who is the United States political adviser to General EISENHOWER and a relative of General MacARTHUR, said that even if we did not believe in the European Army it was our duty to give it a trial: to say the least there was a significant lack of enthusiasm in this remark.

I am convinced that the General does not consider the European Army has much future once the Russian menace disappears.

RE-ARMING GERMANY.

I suggested that the Germans, over the last eighty years, had shown that they were a war-like race. They appeared to possess an instinctive attraction for the uniform and to derive a deep satisfaction from seeing themselves marching towards conquest. General Eisenhower said he did not like the adjective "war-like" but of course there were people who appeared to take more kindly to war than others. My reason for mentioning this German characteristic was fear of the potential military power of the Germans irrespective of what guarantees their integration in the European Army might afford. One of the General's staff however said he knew Bavaria fairly well and the Germans whom he had met there gave evidence of peaceful attributes and disposition. I pointed out also that the Russian people, as distinct from the Regime, had not shown the same hankering

after war-like pursuits but a love rather for the ballet, balalaika and vodka. The General did not demur.

Mr. BRADLEY asked what effect re-arming Germany would have on Russia, the implication of his question being would it be provocative? General EISENHOWER's reply was "well we have to have a policy and we can't be stopped by the fear of what effect this policy will have on the Russians. We will lose the initiative if we always worry about that sort of thing. We have to go on with whatever policy appears good to us even if the Russians dislike the re-arming of Germany".

THE COLLAPSE OF FRANCE

General Eisenhower thought that the main reason for the French collapse in 1940 was the Maginot Line spirit. I concurred and recalled that on a visit to the French Fourth Army in March 1940 just two months before the German invasion, I was struck by signs that the main pre-occupation of the French command at that time was making the troops comfortable in "centres d'accueil" etc. I remembered visiting a division commanded by General DELATTRE de TASSIGNY where the "centres d'accueil" were tastefully decorated and provided with attractive bars where drinks were served etc. I added that there was another reason however, which one should never lose sight of namely the terrible blood letting of the 1914-18 war when one million and a half Frenchmen were killed - the fittest and the most gallant because in those days ~~when~~ there were no casualties from bombs and only the men at the front were killed. Had it not been for the first world war, it would be fair to assume that two thirds of these men would be living now, roughly a million, between the ages of 55 and 70. This was one reason why great leaders in France were scarce now. In addition to the dead, one had to consider the loss through unborn children and the training and formation which those who died would have given to their children and to the children of others. The General agreed.

VARIA ET TRIVIA

a) The hard-working Germans.

Some one commented that the Germans were working very hard. I said this gave me some concern. Wasn't there some way of making them work less? General Eisenhower queried "and make the French work a little more?". I agreed that this would be an ideal arrangement!

b) Electric power and industry.

The General remarked on how extraordinary it was that not so many years ago there was criticism about the great new electric power projects in the United States and now industry was crying for more. I said it was true also of Canada and more particularly of the Province of Ontario. I added that our Prime Minister at the end of September had met the President of the United States and had told him of Ontario's needs for power. Our Prime Minister had intimated that the Canadian Government would be willing to construct

- 4 -

the St. Lawrence seaway as a Canadian project if it were not possible to have the joint development undertaken on the basis of the 1941 agreement.

Mr. BRADLEY was interested in hearing that a reason given now for its construction was the need of more power. He thought this should help in obtaining United States cooperation in the project.

c) Talking too much.

Many people in responsible positions talked too much about what we could and could not do. He severely condemned this practice and referred to Admiral FECHTELER by name. "He could not help thinking of the many opportunities we lose to keep our mouths shut". I commented that the press had even reported Admiral Fechteler as saying that it would be possible for the allies to invade and occupy strategic areas in the Soviet Union if war broke out. The General replied "I rather he did it than I".

(For purposes of reference, I am enclosing a report of Admiral Fechteler's statement which was published in the Paris "Daily Mail" on the 2nd October 1951.)

d) Essentials and details.

When in December 1943 Mr. ROOSEVELT told him that very soon he would be given command of "Overlord" he, the President, spent the rest of the evening talking about the appropriate date on which the announcement should be made and what title he should give him. The General thought that there were many other things much more important which they might have discussed.

e) Conscription.


"Conscription" was necessary in the United States; he added that he knew there were special difficulties about this in Canada.

f) Should the public be told about a Russian bomb ?

During this office as Chief of Staff a Russian bomb was exploded. He was asked whether the public should be told. He replied that he did not see why but the general feeling existed that the people should be informed and by the President at once.

g) Leakages.

At the time when the President, General MARSHALL and he, were the only persons to know that he would be appointed Chief of Staff to succeed General Marshall, the public learned about it from Mr. Drew PEARSON on the radio.


Ambassador

CONTINENTAL DAILY MAIL

October 2, 1951.

Fechteler thinks Allies could invade Russia

Daily Mail Special Correspondent

Washington, Monday.—Admiral Fechteler, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, said today that the U.S. could not be invaded "as long as she controlled the seas," and it would be possible for the Allies to invade and occupy strategic areas in the Soviet Union if war broke out.

He made this statement in an interview with the magazine *United States News and World Report*, in which he said the broad outline of the U.S. Navy at the end of 1952 would be 12 large and fast aircraft-carriers, about 17 smaller carriers, 19 cruisers, four battleships, about 340 destroyers and 100 submarines.

He thought that Russia could not seriously jeopardise the existence of the U.S. by air raids. Russia's estimated 300 modern submarines were the greatest menace, but the U.S. Navy had made marked progress in anti-submarine warfare and the balance was turning in favour of anti-submarine forces.

U.S. Navy's plan

Admiral Fechteler revealed that the U.S. Navy planned to use atomic bombs to destroy enemy submarine bases in the event of war, and in a number of years they would have atomic-powered carriers, carrier-based artillery, atomic submarines and torpedoes.

He estimated the Russian Navy strength at 300 submarines, three-old battleships, about 15 cruisers and 45 to 50 destroyers.

The U.S. Navy, he added, had anticipated the use of Russian submarines in Korea and had an adequate anti-submarine force in the area.

In addition to the ships outlined, Admiral Fechteler said the U.S. Navy would also have an amphibious force to transport and supply two divisions.

He felt certain that if war broke out within the next 20 or 30 years the U.S. and her allies could win it.

PARIS DAILY MAIL

2 Oct 1951

(This Document is The Property of His Majesty's Canadian Government)

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IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

NO. CC 1161-1 (JPC)



CANADA

Department of National Defence

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

COSMIC - TOP SECRET

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

ADDRESS REPLY TO:
SECRETARY
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE,
OTTAWA.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
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7 November, 1951

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Joint Planning Committee

Pre-Mobilization Arrangements

1. Appendix "A" to WR/FC(51)6 attached is a summary of a proposed scheme for co-ordination of mobilization arrangements of the five Brussel Treaty powers. SHAPE has recommended that the Standing Group undertake the extension of the planned co-ordination of mobilization arrangements to all NATO nations, and final acceptance by the nations of agreed and uniform procedures in accordance with the lines indicated in the Western Regions study.

2. In Annex "B" of SHAPE outline Emergency Defence Plans (EDP-51) security measures have been divided into three phases: simple alert, reinforced alert and general alert. (See SG 129/2 forwarded to you our covering letter CC 1645-1 (JPC) dated 6 November 51). SHAPE has commented that when comparing this phasing with that given in Appendix "A" to WR/FC(51)6, a general similarity appears between simple alert and first phase in WR/FC(51)6, reinforced alert and third phase, general alert and fifth phase. In SHAPE's view the second and fourth phases in WR/FC(51)6 do not have a clear operational objective. SHAPE considers that if they are put in so as to provide greater flexibility in the phasing of mobilization, there appears to be no objection to their inclusion, but that it should be clearly stated that NATO military command phasing would correspond to NATO government phasing as follows:

Shape and NATO Military
Command Phasing.

NATO Government Phasing

Simple Alert

First Phase
Second Phase

Reinforced Alert

Third Phase
Fourth Phase

General Alert

Fifth Phase

3. The Standing Group has passed the subject to the Standing Group Working Team for study following which it is anticipated that it will be referred to the military representatives and their staffs. Therefore, it is considered advisable that the following studies be undertaken now to provide the guidance which will be required at that time:

.... /2

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(a) Canada's position with respect to the mobilization scheme as proposed in Appendix "A" to WR/FC(51)6.

(b) Canada's position with respect to SHAPE's comments as set forth in para 2 above.

would seem to be OK Jme.

4. It is requested that you provide the Secretary, Joint Planning Committee, with your comments. These will be passed to the JPS for co-ordination and preparation of a joint paper for consideration by the JPC and subsequent approval by the Chiefs of Staff.



(K.C. Cooper)
Commander, RCN
Secretary,
Joint Planning Committee.

DISTRIBUTION

- Copy No. 1 - Brigadier Gibson
2 - Air Commodore Clements
3 - Captain Storrs
4 - Commander Stowell
5 - Colonel Cook
6 - Group Captain Hodson
7 - Mr. Glazebrook
8 - JPS
9 - File

EXT. 230

ORIGINAL

MESSAGE FORM INCOMING

File No.		
50030-AB-40		
49	50	

Security Classification
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8 NOV 1951

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

System CYPHER - AUTO	No. WA-3923	Date: November 7, 1951.
Priority	Reference: WA-3889 of November 2, 1951.	
Departmental Circulation	Subject: General Eisenhower's Visit to Washington.	
MINISTER UNDR/SEC D/UNDR/SEC A/UNDR/SEC'S.	<p>1. We reviewed with Geoffrey Parsons of the State Department the results of General Eisenhower's visit to Washington in the light of what he told us about the objects of the visit before the General arrived. Parsons observed that he might have given us the impression that some changes in NATO military plans were contemplated. Actually, no changes in NATO plans were considered. General Eisenhower gave the President and other senior United States officials his appraisal of NATO progress, in the course of which the question of deliveries of United States equipment to Europe figured prominently as a serious problem requiring solution. General Eisenhower also sought to inform himself regarding present rates of defence production in the United States and expected rates of delivery to Europe. As General Eisenhower stressed in his final press conference, there is no question of diverting to Europe equipment required by forces in Korea, but of fulfilling existing United States targets.</p> <p>2. The lag in the delivery of military supplies from the United States to forces in Europe is emphasized by a statement released by Senator Lodge to-day, in making public a letter from Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, Chairman of the Preparedness Sub-Committee of the Senate, which is published in full on page 17 of to-day's New York Times. Senator Lodge refers to his "profound concern over discovery that the North Atlantic Treaty forces commanded by General Eisenhower were currently receiving only about one-fifth of the amount of weapons and equipment which they need and which they are supposed to receive". In his letter to Senator Lodge, Senator Johnson says: "The Preparedness Sub-Committee is now examining the many complex aspects of this situation. We intend</p>	
Mr Ritchie. Economic. HAD		
Done: H. H. Date: Nov. 9/51		
References		
Mr Claxton Sec C & S. DND. DDP. Sec Cabinet HAD		
Done: H. H. Date: Nov. 9/51		

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- 2 -

to make sure that we are not jeopardizing our immediate security from Communist aggression by putting into unessential production the manpower, materials, and facilities needed to place our military procurement program on schedule".

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1961 NOV 8 AM 9:44

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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EXT. 97.

MESSAGE FORM

FILE REF.	58	50
580 30-AB-40		

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REBUT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA, LONDON

Message To Be Sent		No. 1966	Date	For Communications Office Use Only
EN CLAIR			November 3, 1951	SENT -- NOV 3 1951
CODE				
CYPHER Auto X				
Degree of Priority				
ORIGINATOR				
Sig. <i>W</i>				
Typed: HFDavis/gl				
Div. Def. Liaison				
Local Tel. 3795				
APPROVED BY				
Sig. <i>ARM</i>				
Typed:				
Is This Message Likely To Be Published				
Yes () No ()				
Internal Distribution:				
U.S.S.E.A. <i>C</i>				
Done <i>11/5/51</i>				
Date				
Copies Referred To:				
Done				
Date				

Following is text of telegram No. WA-3889 dated November 2, 1951 from the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Washington. Text begins:

(Communications: Please repeat ~~text of~~ *Telegram* above mentioned telegram.) *WA 3889 Nov. 2*

Text ends.

Message ends.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1951 NOV 3 04 2:11

EX-1007 12-1953
INSTRUCTIONS
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EXT. 37

MESSAGE FORM

FILE REF

OUTGOING

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TOP SECRET

FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA, LONDON

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

For Communications Office Use Only

SENT NOV 3 1951

November 3, 1951

No. 1966

Message To Be Sent

EN CLAIR

CODE

CYPHER AUTO

X

Degree of Priority

ORIGINATOR

Sig.

Typed: H.D. 11/3/51

Mr. Del. Liaison

Local Tel. 3705

APPROVED BY

Sig.

Typed:

Is This Message

Likely To Be Published

Yes () No ()

Internal Distribution:

U.S.S.E.A.A.

Date:

Date:

Copies Referred To:

Date:

Date:

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SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1951 NOV 3 PM 5:11

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
COMMUNICATIONS

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EXT. 230

COPIES NO. 1 OF 20 COPIES

ORIGINAL

MESSAGE FORM
INCOMING

File No.	
50030-AB-40	
49	50

Security Classification
TOP SECRET

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

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3 NOV 1951

System CYPHER - AUTO	No. WA-3889	Date: November 2, 1951
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Priority IMPORTANT

Departmental Circulation
MINISTER #3
UNDR/SEC #4
D/UNDR/SEC #5
A/UNDR SEC'S #6
Communications #20
HFD #19 #18
Mr Ritchie #7
European #8
Economic #9
✓ (initials)
Done
Date

References
Mr. Claxton #10
Mr. Abbott #11
Short NATO #13, 14, 15, 16
Gen. Hallis #12
Repat London.
WHD
Done
Date
20M-50-P-794

Reference:

Subject: General Eisenhower's visit to Washington.

1. Yesterday morning, Short, White House Press Secretary, issued the following statement on behalf of the President:

QUOTE At the President's suggestion, General Eisenhower will make a brief visit to Washington to discuss NATO and SHAPE matters with the President and other officials. He will leave Paris at 10 p.m. Friday night (Paris time) and spend the week-end with his son and daughter-in-law, Capt. and Mrs. John Eisenhower, at Fort Knox, Ky., and will arrive in Washington early Monday morning for conferences with the President and other officials. He will be here Monday and Tuesday only. UNQUOTE.

2. We sought some clarification from the State Department through Mr. Geoffrey Parsons, Acting Director of the European Regional Office, regarding the objects of General Eisenhower's visit. He said that the visit had been arranged at the President's initiative and, so far as he knew, related to NATO defence problems. Although the matter had been under consideration for about ten days the final decisions concerning General Eisenhower's trip to Washington had probably been taken during Mr. Harriman's visit last week when he assumed the office of Director of the Mutual Security Programme.

3. The NATO problem which is primarily in General Eisenhower's thoughts is how to make the best use of the forces immediately available to him and get them into the field equipped and ready for battle. Parsons recalled that it was known that the Russians had certain substantial forces deployed and available for combat in the Eastern zone of Germany and as an immediate objective he thought that it was General Eisenhower's intention to get a force which would be capable of acting as a counterbalance to these Soviet forces.

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- 2 -

General Eisenhower could count on roughly twenty divisions for this purpose. However, apart from the United States, United Kingdom and Canadian units the state of equipment of the European divisions was far from complete. It was recognized that the responsibility for this state of affairs to a large degree is attributable to tardy deliveries of end items under the mutual security programme from the United States.

4. The primary purpose, therefore, of General Eisenhower's visit to Washington is expected to be the speeding up of deliveries of military equipment for the European divisions under General Eisenhower's command. There was no expectation that there would be any review of goals set in the medium term plan, nor of the priorities already established under the mutual security programme for the allocation of equipment as between Korea and Western Europe.

5. Parsons mentioned that the question of deliveries of equipment to European forces generally, and to the French in particular, had been discussed by Mr. Harriman during his brief visit to Washington last week, and he had similarly expressed concern at the delays which had occurred on the United States side.

6. Various rumours are circulating in Washington concerning the possible significance of General Eisenhower's visit from a domestic political standpoint, including one to the effect that the President may at some time or other offer Eisenhower nomination as Presidential candidate of the democratic party. However, all official comment is evidently intended to discount the possible political significance of the visit and to emphasize the connection of the visit with the General's present NATO responsibilities.

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General Eisenhower could count on roughly twenty divisions for this purpose. However, apart from the United States, United Kingdom and Canada, the state of equipment of the European divisions was far from complete. It was recognized that the responsibility for this state of affairs to a large degree is attributable to early delivery of and from under the manual security programme from the United States.

The primary purpose, therefore, of General Eisenhower's visit to Washington is expected to be the securing of delivery of military equipment for the European divisions under General Eisenhower's command. There was no expectation that there would be any review of his act in the medium term plan, nor of the priorities already established under the manual security programme for the allocation of equipment as between forces and Western Europe.

Various remarks mentioned that the question of delivery of equipment to European forces generally, and to the French in particular, had been discussed by Mr. Harriman during his brief visit to Washington last week, and he had similarly expressed concern at the delays which had occurred on the United States side.


Various remarks are circulating in Washington concerning the possible significance of General Eisenhower's visit from a domestic political standpoint, including on the effect that the President may at some time or other offer Eisenhower nomination as Presidential candidate of the Democratic party. However, all official comment is evidently intended to discount the possible political significance of the visit and to emphasize the connection of the visit with the General's present NATO responsibilities.

1951 NOV 3 AM 9:22
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
COMMUNICATIONS
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Address reply to:

The Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff,
Ottawa



FILE: CG:1561-1 (A/Sec)

CLASS.: CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: 22 Oct 51

CHIEFS OF STAFF SECRETARIAT

MEMORANDUM

Subject:

Call Sign for New Communication Office - SHAPE

Description:

Message CJS(L)M-1182 from Secretary, CJS, London

1. The attached document is referred to:

Chairman, Chiefs of Staff

CAS

CNS

Department of Finance, CGS

Under-Secretary of State CDRB

for External Affairs Deputy Minister

D Sigs (Army) Col. Lockhart

2. It is requested that action be taken by:

3. It is desired that, when no longer required, the document be returned/disposed of as addressees see fit.

(H.S. Rayner)
Commodore, RCN,
Secretary.

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FROM: Secretary CJS London 200958Z

TO: Canadian Embassy Paris

Info: Sec CSC Ottawa
Sec CJS Washington

SPECTRA

CONFIDENTIAL CJS(L)M-1182

Following for Mitchell from Newsome Begins:

1. Foreign Office have advised that call sign for the new communication office in SHAPE will be T9L REPEAT T9L. This communication office will be designated "Canadian Military Representative SHAPE". The telegraphic address will be "CANAPARIS". Please register this short title with the appropriate civil cable companies in Paris. Ends.

20293/JJAB/201632 Z Oct 51

NATO - SECRET.

TELEGRAPH ADDRESS
"UNION" LONDON
TELEPHONE NO. WHITEHALL 9741

OFFICE OF THE
HIGH COMMISSIONER

No. 4193.



CANADA

CANADA HOUSE,
TRAFALGAR SQUARE,
LONDON, S.W.1

RESTRICTED WITHOUT ENCLOSURE

October 10th, 1951.

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To the Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Ottawa.

I transmit herewith three copies of the document(s)
listed below.

50030-AB-40
58 | 50

J.H. Halstead

(For the High Commissioner)

JL3

12 OCT 1951

Documents and date

Subject

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DEPUTIES.

SH 21410 October 4, 1951.

Telegram - Planning Directive for 1952 Infrastructure program Southern Europe.

SH 21411 October 4, 1951.

Telegram - Planning Directive for 1952 Infrastructure program Central Europe.

SH 21412 October 4, 1951.

Telegram - Planning Director for 1952 Infrastructure programme Northern Europe.

Reps
Sec C. 15.
DND
Finance
file
4/11

Done
Oct 17/51
T.K

Mr. P. H. W. 10/10/51
M. H. W. 10/10/51

50030-AB-40
October 8, 1951
Sub. Chron. Filed

TOP SECRET

file

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RESULT A SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY AND THE SECRETARY

Re: High Level Relations between
SHAPE and National Governments

In view of the decision to send the 27th Brigade to Germany, I think that you will be interested in reading the annexed analysis, dated October 4th and prepared by Mr. Cote, of the correspondence since February, 1951, on this particular subject.

M. H. W. 10/10/51
Defence Liaison (1)

9.10.35/05)

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Copy #1

Defence Liaison 1/J.J.M. Cote/bmc

October 4, 1951

P. J. M.

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Analysis of Correspondence on File 50030-AB-40
Concerning
High Level Relations between SHAPE and National Governments

On February 14, 1951, the Under-Secretary wrote a letter to General Foulkes concerning the relationship between the Canadian forces to be sent to Europe and the Supreme Commander (SCAPE). This letter contained two suggestions. The first was that it might be desirable to review the existing NATO documents on this general subject to see whether there were changes (a) in the present terms of reference of the Supreme Commander, and (b) in the relationship between the Deputies, the Standing Group and the Supreme Commander, which we should attempt to have accepted, before the Military Representatives Committee was faced with concrete proposals from the Standing Group concerning the incorporation of national forces in the Integrated Force.

2. Having recalled the difficulties encountered during the last war in connection with the powers of Allied Commanders over Canadian forces, the Under-Secretary made the second suggestion that the Chiefs of Staff Committee should have prepared a paper examining the problem of the relationship of Canadian forces in Europe to the Supreme Commander and setting out the points which, in the Canadian interest, it would be advisable to cover in any agreement between the Canadian Government and SCAPE, as provided for in paragraph 42, page 14 of document C6-D/2 which states that:

"the process, timing and detailed conditions, of the transfer of control for national units to operate immediately under control of the Supreme Commander, and the earmarking of additional forces to be placed under his command in the event of war, should be subject to negotiations between the Standing Group and the Supreme Commander and/or the appropriate national authorities".

3. In his reply to the Under-Secretary, dated February 28th, General Foulkes stated that since Canada had had a voice in the choice of the Supreme Commander and since, further, General Eisenhower himself had made it clear that he is responsible to the twelve governments under NATO for his actions, the position of the Canadian troops allocated to SHAPE would be altogether different from that of the Canadian troops allocated to a foreign or British commander in the last war. General Foulkes recognized, however, that what applied to General Eisenhower would not necessarily apply to any of his subordinate commanders in the field and, for this reason, he thought that the Canadian Government "must reserve the right to be responsible for the general welfare and safe conduct of its troops generally". In General Foulkes' view; this could be taken care of by having ~~this could be taken care of by having~~ this operational responsibility to the Canadian Government written into the terms of reference of the Commander of the Canadian Formation to be allocated to NATO. General Foulkes did not wish that

- 2 -

further restrictions be imposed on the freedom of action of the Supreme Commander, especially in view of General Eisenhower's experience in handling Allied troops.

4. General Foulkes expressed the view that although the question of limitations on the Supreme Commander's controls of Canadian forces is a matter for negotiation by the Canadian Government with the other members of NATO and the Supreme Commander, such limitations "will depend upon political rather than legal considerations". He thought, therefore, that, from the military point of view, a service order from the Chief of Staff concerned to the Commander of the Canadian forces that he will obey the operational orders of the Supreme Commander was all that would be required to place the Canadian forces allocated to SHAPE under the operational control of the Supreme Commander. General Foulkes suggested that there be added a proviso to the effect that the Canadian Formation Commander must bear responsibility to the Canadian Government for "the general welfare and administration of all Canadian troops under his command". In this way, the Canadian Commander would have the right to appeal direct to the Canadian Government if the necessity arose.

5. On March 6th, the Under-Secretary wrote another letter to General Foulkes asking whether he would see fit to request the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington to ascertain informally from the Standing Group if the latter was preparing any draft documents for use under paragraph 42 of document C6-D/2 quoted in the Under-Secretary's letter of February 14th. The Under-Secretary added that if there existed any draft document prepared by the Standing Group it would be useful to know what it was likely to contain.

6. Copies of the three letters described above were sent by the Under-Secretary to Messrs. Wrong, Wilgress and Robertson, under cover of a letter dated March 6th, requesting their comments on that correspondence and suggesting that the Canadian Government may want and need to have control over more than "the general welfare and safe conduct of its troops generally" as recommended by General Foulkes. The Under-Secretary wondered, for instance, whether the Canadian Government should have a right to be consulted on and to veto a hypothetical proposal by the Supreme Commander to move the Canadian Brigade from Western Germany to Western Berlin.

7. On March 14th, Mr. Wilgress replied to the Under-Secretary that he was inclined to agree with the views expressed by General Foulkes in his letter of February 28th referred to above. Mr. Wilgress first recalled that, after having been given ample opportunity to comment on the document dealing with the creation of an integrated force, the establishment of a Supreme Commander and the military reorganization of NATO, neither the Canadian nor any other Government had brought forth any proposed amendments to the terms of reference of the Supreme Commander or to the manner in which the integrated force should operate under his command. The Military Committee paper on this subject (MC 22/5) was approved by the Defence Committee and by the Council in December, 1950.

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8. Mr. Wilgress further recalled that, when they agreed to the terms of reference of the Supreme Commander and to the establishment of an integrated force, the various governments "in fact agreed that the detailed planning and execution of military plans required a high degree of centralization of authority". By virtue of their representation on the Council, the Council Deputies and the Military Representation Committee, it was Mr. Wilgress' view that the governments concerned are in a position to give the political direction on which military plans are based, to approve the NATO military plans, to establish the type of Command organization required to implement these plans, to draw the terms of reference of the Supreme Commanders and to select Supreme Commanders. The Supreme Commander was, therefore, answerable to the NATO agencies from whom he derives his authority, and so long as he applied his terms of reference with impartiality, Mr. Wilgress thought that it would be undesirable to place him in a position where he would have to consult with the various governments on the precise manner of participation of their troops in the execution of agreed military plans.

9. Another point made by Mr. Wilgress was that owing to the difficulties which the Supreme Commander will experience in moulding into an integrated force elements speaking different languages and equipped with different types of military equipment, there will only be a limited number of ways, both in peace and in war, in which the Supreme Commander could group and regroup his forces without impairing their effectiveness.

10. Commenting on the Under-Secretary's query as to whether or not the Canadian Government should, for instance, have the right to be consulted on and to veto a proposal of the Supreme Commander to move the Canadian Brigade from Western Germany to, let us say, Western Berlin, Mr. Wilgress felt that the Supreme Commander would have great difficulty in carrying out the task allotted to him, if each government demanded to be consulted in matters of this sort. It appeared to Mr. Wilgress that, if any or all of the governments placing forces under the Supreme Commander wished to restrict the manner of the employment of those forces, these restrictions should be discussed at the North Atlantic Council. The Standing Group should be informed of their precise nature, as should also the Supreme Commander, who should then be in a position to decide whether he can still perform the task assigned to him. Mr. Wilgress concluded by stating that unless fresh information came to hand, it appeared to him that the Canadian position is protected adequately by our presence on the Council, by the present terms of reference of the Supreme Allied Commander and finally by the wording of the Service Order placing Canadian forces under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. In connection with the terms of reference of the Supreme Commander, Mr. Wilgress referred specifically to the following parts of the approved terms of reference:

"4. The Supreme Commander's peacetime responsibilities include:

- (c) Recommendations to the Standing Group, and to national commanders on deployment of forces, infrastructure, training standards, adequacy of forces, etc., and such other military matters as

prospective

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will affect his ability to discharge his war or peace-time mission."

- "5. (d) Authority to make recommendations direct to national Chiefs of Staff on the peacetime deployment of national forces placed, or to be placed under his control, and on logistic and administrative matters affecting the effectiveness or readiness of these forces."

11. Appended to Mr. Wilgress' letter was a text giving the substance of the reply of the U.K. Government to the Standing Group's request for notification as to the United Kingdom forces to be placed under the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. Mr. Wilgress understood that the United Kingdom intended to interfere as little as possible with the Supreme Commander in the exercise of his command over the U.K. troops.

12. Mr. Wrong's reply to the Under-Secretary was dated March 16th. It contained an account of a conversation which a member of his staff had with Mr. Ridgway Knight of the State Department on this question. It was Mr. Knight's view that paragraphs Nos. 41, 42, 43, and 44 of document C6-D/2 together with the Appendix giving the terms of reference of the Supreme Commander, and especially paragraphs 4 and 5, strictly define the question of the control in peace-time which the Supreme Commander can exercise over the national contributions and also provide for consultation both with the Standing Group and with national governments. The following portion of Mr. Wrong's letter may be quoted in toto:

"His (the Supreme Commander's) basic executive power is 'the organization and training of national units allocated to his command into an effective integrated force' (paragraph 43.a. of the main document and 4.a. of the Appendix). On other issues, such as the deployment of forces, the adequacy of forces, the 'infrastructure' and so on, he can only make recommendations to the Standing Group and National Commanders. He is given authority to communicate with national Chiefs of Staff and with their Defence Ministers or heads of government 'directly as necessary to facilitate the accomplishment of his mission' (paragraph 5.c. of terms of reference). With regard particularly to the peace-time deployment of national forces, he has specific authority 'to make recommendations direct to national Chiefs of Staff' under paragraph 5.d., and this would seem to cover the particular question mentioned in your letter to me about consultation in the event of a plan to move the Canadian Brigade from Western Germany to Western Berlin."

13. As regards paragraph 42 of document C6-D/2 quoted by the Under-Secretary in his letter to General Foulkes, Mr. Wrong says that it is the State Department's understanding that this paragraph refers to the working out of arrangements for the logistic support of national

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contingents, responsibility for which rests under the terms of reference "with the responsible authorities of the nations concerned" (Paragraph 6).

14. Mr. Wrong reported that it is not contemplated in the State Department that broad agreements between national governments and SHAPE are required to supplement the terms of reference for the Supreme Commander, which have already been accepted by the national governments. The view is that the terms of reference provide for adequate consultation with and control by the national governments to the extent necessary in peace-time.

15. The last part of Mr. Wrong's letter is devoted to a discussion of the terms of reference of the Supreme Commander in wartime. The only reference to these appears in paragraph 3 of the terms of reference, which states that the Supreme Commander "will exercise the full powers of a Supreme Commander in the event of war", that these powers will be confined to operations and training and will later be defined in greater detail by the Defence Committee. Mr. Wrong's opinion was that we should rather give attention to this problem of definition of the wartime powers of the Supreme Commander, than seek further definition of the relationship between the Supreme Commander and national governments in peace-time.

16. On April 3, General Foulkes wrote to the Under-Secretary in reply to his letter of March 6. He stated that after informal inquiries from the Chairman of the Standing Group, Lord Tedder, it had been learned that the Standing Group had not yet initiated any action to prepare terms of agreement to be used when forces are placed under SACEUR. Although Lord Tedder did not anticipate the consideration of such a document in the foreseeable future he did suggest, however, that the development of such a format might be facilitated if Canada wished to make a formal inquiry.

17. A further letter was sent to General Foulkes on April 13th by the Under-Secretary, saying that it would be unwise for the Canadian Government to make a formal inquiry of the Standing Group at present. In view of the possibility, however, that this matter might be under consideration by the Defence Departments of the U.K. and the U.S., General Foulkes was asked whether he would consider it desirable for informal inquiries to be made in London, possibly through General Clark, as to whether some thought had been given to this subject in the Ministry of Defence.

18. General Foulkes replied on May 10 that General Clark in London had secured a copy of the paper regarding the transfer of U.K. forces to SACEUR, the gist of which Mr. Wilgress had appended to his letter of March 14th. It appeared that no formal agreement was made between the U.K. and SACEUR but the following conditions, which are quoted from General Foulkes' letter, were agreed upon:

- "(a) In general, forces transferred to the Supreme Commander in peace should be transferred free of any conditions except in so far as his powers are limited by his Terms of Reference. These limitations affect the administration of the forces, which remains the responsibility

- 6 -

of national authorities; they also affect the deployment, adequacy and training standard of forces, on which the Supreme Commander is authorized to make recommendations to the Standing Group and to national authorities.

- "(b) Formations of the U.K. earmarked to come under command of SHAPE in war will not be committed to operations until in the opinion of the British Chiefs of Staff they are battle-worthy.
- "(c) Allowance must be made for military occupation forces to conform to any revision of the occupation statute, and to the cold war tasks required of occupation forces.
- "(d) Care must be taken to ensure that no existing command machinery is superseded until an adequate organization has been established to take its place."

(There the matter rests so far as this correspondence is concerned.)

RESTRICTED WITHOUT ENCLOSURE

Address reply to:

The Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff,
Ottawa.*Mr. Payton*
*DLW***DOWNGRADED TO SECRET** (A/Sec)**RECLASSIFIED TO SECRET** CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET

DATE : 3 October 1951

CHIEFS OF STAFF SECRETARIAT

M E M O R A N D U M

50030-AB-40

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9.19

Subject:

Channels for Transmission of Warning of Attack

Description:

Message CJS(W)53 dated 1 Oct 51 from CJS Washington

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4 OCT 1951

1. The attached document is referred to:

Chairman, Chiefs of Staff

CNS

CAS

CGS

CDRB

✓ Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

2. It is requested that action be taken by:

3. It is desired that, when no longer required, the document
-
- be
- ~~returned~~
- /disposed of as addressees see fit.

H.S. Rayner(H.S. Rayner)
Commodore, RCN,
Secretary,Cc: Deputy Minister
Secretary to the Cabinet

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MEMORANDUM

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~~TOP SECRET~~ A SECRET

2 Oct 51

50076 AB-90
Cap. 58. Sec. 1. P. 1.

JIC

SHAPE Intelligence Conference

- 1 The Intelligence Conference at SHAPE was held as scheduled on 24 and 25 September and was attended by the undersigned.
- 2 On 24 September, after the welcoming ceremony, separate groups convened to discuss naval, army and air order of battle. The procedure followed in each group was that the appropriate members of the SHAPE intelligence staff tabled the OB which they held and general discussion followed regarding the format, content, etc.; then each national delegate in private session with a SHAPE intelligence officer was asked to indicate any pertinent differences in his own estimates. It was clearly understood that sources would not be asked for or given.
- 3 On 25 September a similar procedure was followed in respect of economic intelligence with particular emphasis on transportation.
- 4 The time allowed was too short to permit detailed scrutiny or comparison of the various estimates. Furthermore, the Canadian and some other delegations had not received in advance all of the information regarding the grouping of the OB estimates; in consequence our figures were not comparable with those presented in many cases. These shortcomings can, of course, be remedied in any future conferences.
- 5 It was the feeling of the SHAPE intelligence staff, which seemed to be shared by most national delegations, that similar conferences should be held at least every six months.
- 6 At the conclusion of the conference a private interview was obtained with Major General Airey, Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence. It was explained to him that Canada wished to do all within its power to assist SHAPE; however, since most of our intelligence material originated with UK and US intelligence agencies, it would be in many instances a disservice to SHAPE to furnish Canadian estimates. Therefore, Canada would normally reply to SHAPE requests only when some original intelligence could be provided. Nevertheless, if SHAPE was particularly desirous of receiving a Canadian estimate on any specific subject and our national military representative was so informed, an estimate would be provided. General Airey indicated that this procedure would be satisfactory and that no more formal notification would be required.

(J C Pratt) Cdr
DMI

(L E Sarantos) Lt-Col
for DMI

(W W Bean) G/C
DAI

WWB/JD

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CANADA

ADDRESS REPLY TO.
SECRETARY
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE.
OTTAWA.

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D.H.T.
Department of National Defence

**CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE**

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE
NO. CSC 1158-1 (JIC)

24 September, 1951.

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26 SEP 1951

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

SHAPE Command and Staff Structure

1. Attached are copies of European Command structure and the SHAPE staff structure. These were prepared for general information by the JIS at the request of the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff.

J.E. Beswick
(J.E. Beswick)
Major,
Secretary.

Encs.

JEB/5459/fp

EUROPEAN COMMAND STRUCTURE

SACEUR

— CINCNORTH - Admiral Sir Patrick Brind (RN)

— COMNAVNORTH - Admiral Sir Patrick Brind (RN)

— COMAIRNORTH - Major General Robert K. Taylor (USAF)

— COMLANDNORWAY - Lieutenant General Wilhelm Hansteen (Norway)

— COMLANDDENMARK - Lieutenant General Ebbe Gortz (Denmark)

— FLAGCENT - Vice Admiral Robert Jaujard (France)

— CINCLANDCENT - General D'Armee Alphonse Juin (France)

— CINCAIRCENT - Lieutenant General Lauris Norstad (USAF)


— CINC SOUTH - Admiral Robert B. Carney (USN)

— COMNAVSOUTH - Admiral Robert B. Carney (USN)

— COMAIRSOUTH - Major General M. Schlatter (USAF)

— COMLANDSOUTH - Lieutenant General De Castiglioni (Italy)

SHAPE STAFF STRUCTURE



- 2 -

ASSISTANT CHIEFS OF STAFF

ACS Personnel and Administration	-	Rear Admiral Ferrante Capponi (Italy)
ACS Intelligence	-	Major General Sir Terrence Airey (UK)
ACS Organization and Training	-	Major General F.W. Festing (UK)
ACS Plans, Policy and Operations	-	Major General Bodet (FAF)
ACS Logistics	-	Major General Edmond H. Leavey (USA)
Adjutant General	-	
Chief of Budget and Finance	-	Comptroller First Class Guillaume LeBigot (Fr. Navy)
Chief Signals Officer	-	Major General Francis H. Lanahan Jr. (USA)

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ORIGINAL

MESSAGE FORM
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File No.		
50030-AB-40		
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Security Classification
SECRET

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, PARIS, FRANCE
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

19 SEP 1951

System
CYFHER - AUTO

No. 374

Date: September 18, 1951.
(Rec'd: September 19, 1951.)

Priority
IMPORTANT

Reference:

Departmental
Circulation

Subject: SHAPE Intelligence Conference.

MINISTER
UNDR/SEC
D/UNDR/SEC
A/UNDR/SEC

Addressed External No. 374, repeated London
No. 171.

Following for Chiefs of Staff, Ottawa, repeated
to General Smith, London, from W/C Mitchell, Begins:

NMR1003

Conference is now extended to three days covering
September 24, 25 and 26 with third day devoted
exclusively to wartime industrial potential of USSR
and Satellites. Members not directly interested in
this subject may leave if desired at end of second
day. Ends.

References

S.C. of S.
Committee

Date JdD

Date Sept. 19/51

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CANADA

ADDRESS REPLY TO:
SECRETARY
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE,
OTTAWA.

Department of National Defence

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE
NO. DSC 1158-1 (JIC)

RESTRICTED11 September, 1951. *File 73*

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12 SEP 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

Terminology - SHAPE
Subordinate Commands

1. On 31 July I reported the proposed adoption of certain short titles which would be used to identify the commanders of Allied Command Europe subordinate commands. In the 7th Periodic Report by SACEUR the adoption of the following is notified:

CINCNORTH	- Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe.
COMNAVNORTH	- Commander Allied Naval Forces Northern Europe
COMAIRNORTH	- Commander Allied Air Forces Northern Europe
COMLANDDENMARK	- Commander Allied Land Forces Denmark
COMLANDNORWAY	- Commander Allied Land Forces Norway
CINCLANDCENT	- Commander-in-Chief Allied Land Forces Central Europe
CINCAIRCENT	- Commander-in-Chief Allied Air Forces Central Europe
FLAGCENT	- Flag Officer Central Europe
CINGSOUTH	- Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe
COMNAVSOUTH	- Commander Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe
COMAIRSOUTH	- Commander Allied Air Forces Southern Europe
COMLANDSOUTH	- Commander Allied Land Forces Southern Europe

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
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2. The proposed change from "army" to "land" in the titles of ground force headquarters is adopted, and the land force commanders are now known as:

"Commander-in-Chief Allied Land Forces Central Europe".

"Commander Allied Land Forces Denmark".

"Commander Allied Land Forces Southern Europe".



(J.E. Beswick)
Major,
Secretary.

JEB/5459/fp

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MESSAGE FORM
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*Copy on
50030-N-40*

File No.
50030-A B-40
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Security Classification
CONFIDENTIAL

20 AUG 1951

FROM: THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, CANADIAN EMBASSY, PARIS, FRANCE
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

System CYPHER - AUTO	No. 317	Date: August 18, 1951. (Rec'd: August 20, 1951.)
Priority	Reference:	
Departmental Circulation	Subject: Documentation of personnel on temporary duty or transfer to SHAPE.	
MIN/SEC UNDER/SEC E/UNDER/SEC M/UNDER/SEC	Addressed Ottawa No. 317, repeated to London No. 157.	
Date	Following for Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, from W.C. Mitchell, Begins:	
Date	Request that personnel on TD or on transfer to SHAPE or subordinate headquarters report to Canadian NMR office SHAPE for documentation. Personnel should have in their possession certificate of security clearance and COSMIC indoctrination unless such information has previously been forwarded to NMR. Ends.	
Reference:	Brigadier Smith (5)	
Date	hm	
Date	August 20/51	
200-50-P-794		

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COMMUNICATIONS
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1951 AUG 20 AM 11:30


EXTRACT FROM THE MINUTES OF THE 503rd MEETING
OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE HELD ON
TUESDAY, 14 AUGUST, 1951, IN THE DEFENCE
COUNCIL ROOM, NO. 2200, "A" BUILDING, NATIONAL
DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS

QUESTIONNAIRES FROM SHAPE - POLICY ON CANADIAN REPLIES (RESTRICTED)

11. The Committee had for consideration a memorandum from the Chairman requesting a decision as to the policy to be adopted in respect of replies to several detailed questionnaires received from SHAPE.

(CSC 5-27-0-4 (A/SEC) and CSC 1072-1 (A/SEC) of 24 July, 1951
and CSC 2-1 (A/SEC) of 13 August, 1951)

TOP SECRET



purely a political matter. It seemed that the SHAPE staffs were attempting studies in fields that did not particularly concern them.

14. The Chairman, Defence Research Board was of the opinion that Canada should not attempt to withhold factual information requested of it by SHAPE.

15. The Acting Chairman was concerned with the implications of the SHAPE request for detailed information on the military training structure in Canada. This was perhaps a prelude to requests for spaces in Canadian schools that we were not prepared to approve. It seemed that SHAPE should receive the same information on all of these matters that had been requested by and submitted to the Standing Group. In the case of requests for data on which firm policy decisions had not been reached, it should be indicated that the plans on which to base such information had not as yet been drawn up. Concerning the SHAPE requests now awaiting reply, the answers should be prepared but cleared with the Committee before despatch.

16. The Committee, after further consideration, agreed:

- (a) that replies to the SHAPE questionnaires on manpower, and training schools should be prepared for clearance by the Chiefs of Staff;
- (b) that in the event that SHAPE requests duplicated those of the Standing Group, SHAPE's attention should be drawn to this duplication; and
- (c) that the Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff, Washington, should request the Standing Group to define in general terms, matters on which data should be collected by the Standing Group, by SHAPE and by SACLANT (when appointed).

EXTRACT FROM THE MINUTES OF THE 503rd MEETING
OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE HELD ON
TUESDAY, 14 AUGUST, 1951, IN THE DEFENCE
COUNCIL ROOM, NO. 2200, "A" BUILDING, NATIONAL
DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS

12. The Chief of the General Staff, with reference to the recommendations contained in the Chairman's letter, agreed that Standing Group should be asked to define in general terms the matters on which data should be collected by the Standing Group, SHAPE and SACLANT, but felt that Canada should support General Eisenhower's Headquarters in every way possible. It would be better for NATO countries to "bend over backwards" to demonstrate their confidence in the common defence effort, than to raise any doubts about questions asked. Where reasonable information was requested, Canada should not as a general rule decline to co-operate with SHAPE.

13. The Deputy Minister of National Defence suggested that with reference to the questions on manpower, it was not within the purview of SHAPE to organize national effort. SACEUR's problem was to organize and command the forces assigned to him and to defend Western Europe. The military potential of NATO countries was available to a large measure in published statistics, but the size of national contributions to NATO was purely a political matter. It seemed that the SHAPE staffs were attempting studies in fields that did not particularly concern them.

14. The Chairman, Defence Research Board was of the opinion that Canada should not attempt to withhold factual information requested of it by SHAPE.

15. The Acting Chairman was concerned with the implications of the SHAPE request for detailed information on the military training structure in Canada. This was perhaps a prelude to requests for spaces in Canadian schools that we were not prepared to approve. It seemed that SHAPE should receive the same information on all of these matters that had been requested by and submitted to the Standing Group. In the case of requests for data on which firm policy decisions had not been reached, it should be indicated that the plans on which to base such information had not as yet been drawn up. Concerning the SHAPE requests now awaiting reply, the answers should be prepared but cleared with the Committee before despatch.

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- (b) that in the event that SHAPE requests duplicated those of the Standing Group, SHAPE's attention should be drawn to this duplication; and
- (c) that the Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff, Washington, should request the Standing Group to define in general terms, matters on which data should be collected by the Standing Group, by SHAPE and by SACLANT (when appointed).

Defence Liaison(1)/D.R.Taylor/tk/bw

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Ottawa, August 13, 1951. *File in*

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY

Item No. 3 on the Agenda for the
503rd Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff,
August 14, 1951.

Questionnaire from SHAPE-Policy on
Canadian Replies

The Chiefs of Staff have received two questionnaires from SHAPE; the first questionnaire requests detailed information on the Canadian military school system, and the second seeks information on the "estimated manpower potential of NATO nations and the estimated proportions present and future which it is planned to employ in the Armed Forces."

In each case, doubt has been expressed whether SHAPE is justified in requesting information of this type. Information on the Canadian Military school system is considered to have only limited bearing on the build-up of forces in Europe, and information concerning manpower potential does not seem necessary for the preparation of military plans for the defence of Western Europe. In any event, Canada has already replied to a questionnaire on manpower circulated by the Standing Group. Although SHAPE was informed that the information "consistent with its function" should be obtained from the Standing Group in Washington, SHAPE has repeated its request, saying that the information given to the Standing Group was not adequate for SHAPE's purposes.

The conclusion has been drawn that there is a lack of co-ordination between SHAPE and the Standing Group at least in the matter of questionnaires, and that the situation may be further confused if, as seems possible, SACLANT (following his appointment) were to issue similar requests direct to national military staffs.

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It is recommended therefore:

- (a) That the Standing Group in Washington be asked to define in general terms the matters on which information should be collected by the Standing Group, by SHAPE, and by SACLANT respectively;
- (b) In the interim:
 - (i) SHAPE should be informed that the information on manpower should be obtained from the Standing Group;
 - (ii) In replying to the questionnaire on Canadian military courses, the only information submitted to SHAPE should be that which has already been offered and tabled with NATO, since this is all that is of direct interest to SHAPE's needs.

.....
The views of Lieutenant-General Simonds on this are contained in the attached letter to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff, and may be summarized as follows:

1. General Simonds concurs in recommendation (a) above;
2. He does not agree with either recommendation under (b). He is of the opinion that Canada should support General Eisenhower's Headquarters in every way possible, and that it would be better for NATO countries to "bend-over backwards" to demonstrate their confidence in the common defence effort than to raise any doubts about their sincerity. General Simonds thinks that where information is requested Canada should not as a general rule decline to co-operate with General Eisenhower.

R.P.R.

Defence Liaison Division(1).

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EXT. 230

ORIGINAL

MESSAGE FORM
INCOMING

File No.	
50030-AB-40	
35	58

Security Classification
CONFIDENTIAL

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Circulate as marked file
EPK

FROM: THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, CANADIAN EMBASSY, PARIS, FRANCE.
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

2 AUG 1951 pm
CYPHER - AUTO

No. 295

Date: August 1, 1951.

Priority
IMPORTANT

Departmental
Circulation

Reference:

Subject: Intelligence conference at SHAPE.

Addressed External No. 295 repeated to
General Clark Dominion London as No. 144.

Following from W.C. Mitchell to Secretary
Chief of Staff Committee, Begins. Your reference
CSC 1563 intelligence conference at SHAPE has been
postponed to 24-25 September 51. Three officers
instead of one invited to attend from Canada if they
can be made available. Advise. Ends.

Done _____
Date _____

References

Brigadier Smith
(5)

*N.B. Wrong address, but Sec COS has
received the five copies*
EPK

Done hm
Date August 1, 1951.

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50030-AB-10	
32	
IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE	
No. CSC 1158-1 (JIC)	
RESTRICTED	

Department of National Defence

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

ADDRESS REPLY TO.

1 AUG 1951
SECRETARY
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE,
OTTAWA.

31 July, 1951.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

Terminology - SHAPE
Subordinate Commands

1. A message has been received from CJS, London indicating the proposed short titles which would be used to identify the commanders of Allied Command Europe subordinate commands. Although these have not as yet been finally adopted, it is thought that the proposed titles may be of some interest to the JIC:

- (a) CINCNORTH, COMNAVNORTH, COMAIRNORTH, COMLANDNORWAY, COMLANDDENMARK, CINCLANDCENT, CINCAIRCENT, FLAGCENT, CINGSOUTH, COMLANDSOUTH, COMAIRSOUTH, COMNAVSOUTH.
- (b) It is further proposed to change "army" to "land" in titles of all ground force headquarters.

J.E. Beswick
(J.E. Beswick)
Major,
Secretary.

JEB/5459/fp

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SECRET

File 42

EXCERPT FROM MINUTES OF THE 284TH MEETING OF THE JIC

HELD JULY 20, 1951.

III. INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR SHAPE

(SECRET)

4. The Committee had for consideration a message from CJS, London notifying that SHAPE had again requested if Canada could provide an officer for employment as a security officer with the SHAPE Intelligence Staff.

(CSC 1376-1 (JIC) of 17 July, 1951)

5. Group Captain Bean stated that it would be useful to fill such a position as this. However, no suitable Air Force officer is available.

6. In the ensuing discussion the following points emerged:

- (a) Canada should, when possible, co-operate by filling as many such requests as possible.
- (b) Canadian representation on NATO staffs is of considerable prestige value.
- (c) The experience that an officer would gain in the NATO security system would be useful to the Canadian security services.
- (d) In general, there is little liaison between the security services of other countries. The filling of this request would enable a Canadian officer to make useful personal contacts.

7. It was agreed, therefore, to recommend that the position of an intelligence security officer at SHAPE be filled by Canada.

50031-AB-40		
Sub. <i>58</i>	Chron. <i>✓</i>	Filed.....

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EXT. 97.

MESSAGE FORM
OUTGOING

FILE REF.	58	✓
50030-AB-40		
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		
SECRET		

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA, LONDON, ENGLAND.

Message To Be Sent		No. 10254	Date	For Communications Office Use Only	
EN CLAIR			July 17, 1951.	JUL 17 1951	
CODE					
CYPHER AUTO					
XX					
Degree of Priority		Reference:			
		Subject: General Eisenhower's Speech of July 3.			
ORIGINATOR		We were most interested in General Eisenhower's			
Sig.		speech delivered on July 3 to the English-Speaking			
Typed CP Kidd/tk		Union. Of particular interest was his advocacy of a			
Div Def. Liaison(1.)		workable European federation. You will, no doubt, have			
Local Tel. 3795		seen the article in the <u>Economist</u> of July 7, entitled			
APPROVED BY		"European Consolidation" which deals with this aspect of the			
Sig.		address.			
Typed:		2. Underlying the speech is one of the main			
Is This Message		difficulties being experienced by the Supreme Commander			
Likely To Be Published		in co-ordinating the defence of Western Europe. At			
Yes () No ()		the present time he is unable to obtain quick and clear			
Internal Distribution:		decisions from a central directing body, and instead has			
U.S.S.E.A.		to deal separately with each NATO country. We have			
Done		been wondering whether this may have implications for			
Date		the future of the Council Deputies. The United States			
Copies Referred To:		has on several occasions indicated to us the important			
Done		position which they consider the Council Deputies should			
Date		hold within the NATO organization. In addition, they			
49-P-274-100M		apparently feel that the U.K. in particular, and France			
		also, do not attach sufficient importance to the work			
		of the Deputies. It is quite possible, therefore,			
		. . . 2			
		000105			

- 2 -

that the General's speech may be the forerunner
of a U.S. move to strengthen the powers of the Council
Deputies. Any comments you may have on this point
or on the speech as a whole would be most welcome.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.


EXTRACT FROM THE MINUTES OF THE 501st MEETING
HELD ON WEDNESDAY, 16 JULY, 1951 IN THE DEFENCE
COUNCIL ROOM, NO. 2200, "A" BUILDING, NATIONAL
DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS

III. SHAPE INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE

(SECRET)

5. The Chairman said that London had recently advised that a conference of national intelligence staffs of NATO countries was being held at SHAPE on 23 and 24 August. The agenda for this meeting was to include coordination of knowledge of the orders of battle of the armed forces of the USSR, the exchange of information on the wartime industrial potential of the USSR and satellites and agenda for future meetings. The Joint Intelligence Committee had indicated that it would be desirable to have Canadian representation at this meeting and had suggested that either the Army or the Air Force provide an officer.

6. It was agreed, after discussion, that an officer should attend the intelligence meeting at SHAPE and that the Chief of the Air Staff and the Chief of the General Staff should decide whether the Army or the Air Force would provide the required officer.



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50030-AB-48
Sub: Chron. / 2 / Filed: 10 July 1951

Address reply to:

The Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff,
Ottawa.

FILE: CSC 1158-1 T.D. 520

CLASS.: RESTRICTED

DATE: 10 July, 1951.

CHIEFS OF STAFF SECRETARIAT

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Channel for Coordination between
National Governments and SHAPE

Description: Staff Memorandum No. 32 of 25 June, 1951,
from Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers
Europe, Paris, France.

1. The attached document is referred to: U.S.S.E.A.

2. It is requested that action be taken by:

3. It is desired that, when no longer required, the document
be returned/disposed of as addressees see fit.

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11 JUL 1951

RGK/4971/aea

(H.S. Rayner)
Commodore, RCN,
Secretary.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE
PARIS, FRANCE

RESTRICTED

25 Jun 51

AG 2072 SEC
STAFF MEMORANDUM
NUMBER 32

CHANNEL FOR COORDINATION BETWEEN
NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS AND SHAPE

1. SACEUR's terms of reference. SACEUR's terms of reference, as approved by the North Atlantic Defense Committee in December 1950, contain the following statement:

"In order that the organization (SHAPE) may function efficiently and smoothly, it must from the start be kept fully in the picture as to the views of the national staffs providing the forces, and these views must always be given full consideration when decisions on operational matters are made. The channel for this coordination should be through liaison officers, accredited to SHAPE as representatives of their national staffs. These representatives would be attached to the headquarters, but would not be part of the integrated working staff sections."

2. Object of this Staff Memorandum. It is highly important that channels and procedures for submitting requests to the National Military representatives, and for receiving from them national views, must be such as to minimize personnel requirements for the National Military Representatives, while maximizing their ability to assist SHAPE and their National Authorities. A definition of responsibilities and procedure is given in the following paragraphs. It is desired that this definition not be considered as rigid but rather as a general guide.

3. Coordination and Contact. a. Coordination between the National Military Representatives and the SHAPE Staff on SHAPE working papers of interest to any nation will normally be limited to the staff level of the Chiefs of Divisions, or higher, in order to preclude misunderstanding of matters under study, but not as yet decided.

b. Contact by Staff Officers of SHAPE with the National Military Representatives shall normally be via the Office of the Executive for National Military Representatives.

c. Arrangements for official visits by members of SHAPE Staff to a NATO COUNTRY shall normally be made through the appropriate Military Representative to SHAPE, via the Office of the Executive for National Military Representatives.

d. The instructions contained herein are in no way intended to prevent direct contact by National Military Representatives with SACEUR, the Deputies, or the Chief of Staff, SHAPE, on any matter which can only be decided at that staff or command level.

4. Responsibilities of the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, other Chiefs of Division and the Headquarters Commandant. The Assistant Chiefs of Staff, other Chiefs of Division and the Headquarters Commandant are responsible that when appropriate, necessary coordination with National Military Representatives is secured prior to submission of staff actions of their Divisions to the Deputy Chiefs of Staff or to more senior SHAPE officers.

...../2

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5. Responsibilities of the National Military Representatives. The National Military Representatives to SHAPE shall be expected to:

- a. Present national points of view to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe on all matters under his cognizance.
- b. Provide information on national military matters and Intelligence information and appreciations needed by SHAPE for the fulfillment of its mission.
- c. Act as the normal channel for the conduct of their respective national affairs with SHAPE, via the Office of the Executive for National Military Representatives.
- d. Present SHAPE points of view to their respective nations.
- e. Arrange for the accreditation of their nationals assigned or attached for duty to SHAPE, or visiting SHAPE on official business, and present certification that such nationals:
 - (1) Have been properly screened by their government for access to classified material in accordance with NATO requirements.
 - (2) Have been fully indoctrinated in the applicable procedures for the safeguarding of COSMIC and other types of classified information.
 - (3) Are authorized by their government to discuss matters involving the disclosure of COSMIC TOP SECRET, COSMIC SECRET, etc., information (indicating specifically the highest security category of information which the national is authorized to receive or discuss.)
- f. Arrange for such administrative and logistic support for personnel of their Nation assigned to SHAPE that is not furnished by SHAPE from its Headquarters Command support structure.
- g. Arrange, on request by the Chief of Public Information, for the screening by their Government of their nationals who apply for accreditation to SHAPE as representatives of publicity media.

6. Responsibilities of the Executive for National Military Representatives The Executive for National Military Representatives, SHAPE, shall:

- a. Act as coordinator for National Military Representatives in their contacts with the SHAPE staff.
- b. Be responsible for the maintenance of accreditation and clearance records of personnel in the Offices of the National Military Representatives.
- c. To keep the National Military Representatives informed of the scheduled conferences and activities of SHAPE in sufficient time to permit observer participation if so desired.
- d. Coordinate appointments between National Military Representatives and various SHAPE Staff Divisions.
- e. Render such advice and assistance to National Military Representatives and to their personnel, as is possible within its capabilities.
(AG 2205 SEC)

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

(SGD) Robert J. Wood
Colonel, U.S. Army
Secretary.

DISTRIBUTION: "A"

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IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE
CSC 1158 1 Vol.2(A/SEC)
NO.



Department of National Defence

CONFIDENTIAL

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS
OTTAWA

21 June, 1951.

Under Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Command over Southern European Area - SACEUR

I attach one copy of message No. 614 and 617 from the
Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff, Washington, concerning the
intention of SACEUR to assume command over Southern European
region.

I also attach copy of message No. 816 from the
Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff, London, concerning movement of
SHAPE Headquarters.

H. S. Rayner
(H. S. Rayner) Lt Col
Commodore, RCN,
Secretary.

RGK:3729:DW
Attachs.

5 0030-AB-40
Sub. <i>SH</i> Chron. <i>SD</i> Filed....

quoting SH 20647 SHAPE 51 of June 17/51

quoting SH 20630 of June 15/51 (NTS)

7970 Top Secret Enclosure
DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

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22 JUN 1951

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ROUTINE

FROM SECRETARY CJS LONDON 180908Z JUNE

TO SECRETARY CSC OTTAWA

SPECTRA

RESTRICTED CJS(L)M-816

MOVEMENT OF SHAPE HEADQUARTERS FROM PARIS TO ROCQUANCOURT WILL
TAKE PLACE BETWEEN 30 JUN 51 AND 8 JUL

51. MILITARY ATTACHE

IN PARIS IS TAKING NECESSARY ACTION ON BEHALF OF CANADA.

RPTNS CJS(L)M-816 SHAPE PARIS TO ROCQUANCOURT 30 JUN 51 8 JUL 51 PARI

CCNS NIL

3 20223/TW/181240Z JUNE 51

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(FILE COPY)

Defence Liaison/G.P. Kidd/tk

RESTRICTED

Ext. 140

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OTTAWA

.....June 20,.....1951.

No. D-2334

Sir,

I enclose the document (s) listed below.

I have the honour to be, Sir, 50030-AB-40
50030-AB-40 50030-AB-40 50030-AB-40

Sir,

The Canadian Ambassador,
WASHINGTON,
D.C.

Your obedient servant,

M. H. WERSHOF

for the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT	SUBJECT
Copy of telegram No. 1499 of June 19, 1951, from the High Commissioner for Canada, London, England.	Command Organization for Southern Europe.

EXT. 230

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ORIGINAL

MESSAGE FORM
INCOMING

File No.		
50030-AB-40		
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Security Classification		
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20 JUN 1951

Refer Long Nulw
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June 20/57
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g.T.R.
file

FROM: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA, LONDON, ENGLAND
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

System CYPHER - AUTO	No. 1499	Date: June 19, 1951.
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Priority

Departmental
Circulation

MINISTER
UNDR/SEC
D/UNDR SEC
A/UNDR SEC'S.
Mr Blouin

Done _____
Date _____

References

Reference:

Subject: Command Organization for Southern Europe.

Following is text of press release issued late yesterday re Command Organization for Allied Forces Southern Europe, announcement by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

Begins:

The following announcement by Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, concerning the Command Organization for Allied Forces Southern Europe, was released by SHAPE for publication at 4 p.m. June 18th, 1951:

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, with the concurrence of the Standing Group of NATO, today announced the Command Organization and some of the principal appointments for the area of Southern Europe which comes within his command. Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, will be Admiral Robert B. Carney, United States Navy, whose United States naval forces had been placed under General Eisenhower's operational command by the President of the United States in January. Admiral Carney will establish his headquarters ashore in Italy and will have an integrated combined staff.

Admiral Carney will also act initially as Commander of the Allied Naval Forces allocated to General Eisenhower in Southern Europe. In that capacity he will have a separate staff. He will exercise command through designated commanders afloat, over United States Sixth Fleet and such other naval forces as may be allocated.

Other major subordinate commanders will be:

- (a) Commander, Allied Army Forces, Southern Europe, General Maurizio Castiglione, Italian Army.

Done _____
Date _____

- 2 -

(b) Commander, Allied Air Forces Southern Europe, Major General David Schlatter, United States Air Forces.

This command structure is designed to enable the Supreme Commander to proceed with his mission in Southern Europe. The arrangements now announced have been determined with due regard to the traditional interests and responsibilities of France, Italy and the United Kingdom in the Mediterranean and have been made without prejudice to any command system which may be evolved by higher authority for the Mediterranean as a whole.

Until this question is decided, Admiral Carney will serve as General Eisenhower's representative in coordinating the activities of forces assigned to him with other NATO and friendly forces in areas adjacent to his command. Ends.

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(b) Commander, Allied Air Forces Southern
Europe, Major General David Schlatter, United States
Air Force.

This command structure is designed to enable
the Supreme Commander to proceed with his mission in
Southern Europe. The arrangements now announced
have been determined with due regard to the
predominant interests and responsibilities of France,
Italy and the United Kingdom in the Mediterranean
and have been made without prejudice to any command
system which may be evolved by higher authority for
the Mediterranean as a whole.

Until this question is decided, Admiral Gurney
will serve as General Eisenhower's representative
in coordinating the activities of forces assigned
to him with other NATO and friendly forces in areas
adjacent to his command. Ends.

1953 JUN 20 AM 9:13

CLEARED
COMMUNICATIONS
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Address reply to:

The Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff,
Ottawa.

FILE:

CC 1299-1 T.D. 423

CLASS.:

COSMIC - TOPSECRET

DATE:

16 June, 1951

CHIEFS OF STAFF SECRETARIAT

MEMORANDUM

Subject:

NATO - Participation of Greece and TurkeyGen. Eisenhower's proposals for command arrangements
for Southern Europe.

Description:

Message CJS(W) 600 of 14 June
from Canadian Joint Staff, Washington.

1. The attached document is referred to:

Minister

Under-Secretary of
State for External Affairs

2. It is requested that action be taken by:

3. It is desired that, when no longer required, the
document be returned/~~disposed of as addressees see fit.~~*H.S. Rayner.*(H.S. Rayner)
Commodore, RCN,
Secretary.

HSR/4971/aea

*(Note - this telegram
does not deal
with Greece
& Turkey
membership)
MW*

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
TO: AMBASSADOR FOR CANADA, PARIS, FRANCE.

FROM: SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

NO. 223
JUNE 11, 1951

IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET



SUBJECT - APPOINTMENT OF R.C.A.F. OFFICER TO CENTRAL EUROPEAN
COMMAND.

FOLLOWING FOR AIR MARSHAL W.A. CURTIS, CHIEF OF THE AIR
STAFF, FROM MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE. BEGINS:

1. WITH REGARD TO YOUR SUGGESTION FOR THE
EMPLOYMENT OF AVM PLANT, I APPRECIATE THE DESIRABILITY OF
THIS BUT I WOULD THINK THAT IT WOULD FURTHER STRETCH THE
RESOURCES IN SENIOR PERSONNEL WHICH WE HAVE BEEN DOING EVERYTHING
POSSIBLE TO MEET IF PLANT WERE TO GO. MY UNDERSTANDING WAS
THAT SHAPE ASKED US FOR OFFICER RANK AIR COMMODORE OR EQUIVALENT
TO DO THIS OR INTELLIGENCE JOB. ~~IF THIS IS THE CASE~~ ASSUME
FROM YOUR SIGNAL THAT SHAPE HAS DECIDED UPGRADE THIS POST AND
IF SHAPE WANTS PLANT IN THAT CAPACITY HE SHOULD BE MADE
AVAILABLE IF SENIOR OFFICER PROBLEM CAN BE SATISFACTORILY
RESOLVED.

2. I KNOW YOUR CONCERN ABOUT AVM MILLER GOING TO
DEFENCE COLLEGE BUT I DON'T SEE HOW THIS CAN BE AVOIDED.

USSEA
Doc: ML 3. AS YOU MAY RECALL, IN PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS I
RAISED THE QUESTION OF HAVING JAMES GO TO TRENTON, SLEMON
TO COME HERE TO DO THE COMBINED JOB OF JAMES AND MILLER AND

- 2 -

PLANT TO GO TO MAINTENANCE. PLANT'S GOING TO PARIS WOULD ALSO APPEAR TO INCREASE DESIRABILITY COMBINING FUNCTIONS AMTS AND AMC IN ACCORDANCE WITH VIEWS PREVIOUSLY PUT FORWARD. YOUR RETURN I THINK SHOULD BE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN VIEW URGENCY OF THIS AND OTHER MATTERS AND ALSO POSSIBILITY MYSELF AND OTHERS HAVING TO BE AWAY PARTICULARLY IF PARLIAMENT ADJOURNS THIS MONTH AS SEEMS LIKELY. ENDS.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

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COPY NO. OF 11 COPIES

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MESSAGE FORM
INCOMING
#9 { Mr. Heger
Mr. G. Heger
to see file
Done June 14/51
T.K.
Brig. #4. Cameron #2+8
Done June 13/51
T.K.

File No.
50030-AB-40
35
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Security Classification
TOP SECRET

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, PARIS
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

11 JUN 1951

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

System
CYPHER - AUTO

No. 223

Date: June 10, 1951.

Priority
IMPORTANT

Departmental
Circulation

MINISTER #3

UNDR/SEC #4

D/UNDR/SEC #5

A/UNDR/SEC'S #6

Communications #11

Reference:

Subject:

Appointment of Canadian RCAF Officer to
Central Europe Command.

Following for Minister of National Defence from
Curtis, Begins:

1. General Norstad commanding all air forces in
Central Europe has on his staff General de Chasse, y,
France in charge of plans; General Leboutte, Belgium
for operations; Air Commodore (to be Air Vice Marshal)
Waite for intelligence. A USA general will be put in
charge of signals.

2. On three occasions Norstad has requested that
Canada make available an RCAF officer to be in charge
of personnel and logistics for his command, reporting
as soon as possible but not later than 1st August. He
stated that it is of the utmost importance to Canada to
have a very capable officer in this position as he will
have considerable dealings with SHAPE and to a lesser
extent with General Eisenhower personally.

3. AVM Plant has the necessary qualifications and
background for such an appointment and I feel

References

copy No. 7 to
Hon. Brooke Claxton

Done tb

Date June 10, 1951

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- 2 -

he is the logical choice. I recommend that you appoint him to fill this vacancy. Slemon, Campbell and Miller would also be suitable but are not considered as readily available as Plant.

4. A senior RCAF officer in this would have many advantages and would ensure that our air division was phased into Western Europe in the most advantageous way. At the same time, because of the high level and international nature of this appointment it would add to Canada's prestige. Ends.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

he is the logical choice. I recommend that you appoint
him to fill this vacancy. Simon, Campbell and Miller
would also be suitable but are not considered as readily
available as Plans.

4. A senior RCAP officer in this would have many
advantages and would ensure that our air division was placed
into Western Europe in the most advantageous way. At the
same time, because of the high level and international nature
of this appointment it would add to Canada's prestige.

1961 JUN 11 AM 9:41
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
COMMUNICATIONS
CLEARED

EXTRACT FROM THE MINUTES OF THE 497th
MEETING OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE
HELD AT 1000 HOURS, FRIDAY, 1 JUNE, 1951.

OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCEDURE


(TOP SECRET)

13. The Committee had for consideration a paper from SHAPE setting forth the operational responsibilities of SACEUR including the re-allocation of forces under his command.

(CSC 1411-1 (A/SEC) of 29 May 51)

14. The Chairman stated that the Chief of the Air Staff and the Chief of the General Staff would discuss this question during their forthcoming visits to Europe.


15. It was agreed to note the paper.



Defence Liaison(1)/D.R.Taylor/bw

CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, May 31, 1951.



*7 sub
subject file
JRT*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY

Item No. 5 on Chiefs of Staff Agenda
for the 497 meeting, June 1, 1951

Operational Planning Procedure

This paper outlines instructions issued by SHAPE to provide Commanders subordinate to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe with common operational planning procedures.

The instructions define, in broad terms, the operational responsibilities of SACEUR and his subordinate Commanders, and the procedures which will be used to implement these responsibilities. The main points may be summarized as follows:

(a) Operational Responsibilities of SACEUR

- (1) In the light of directives issued by the Standing Group to define broad policies and objectives to be achieved.
- (2) To interpret the Standing Group's directives, decide on overall plans of action, and to give broad strategic guidance to subordinate Commanders.
- (3) To allocate forces to subordinate Commanders. In carrying out this responsibility, SACEUR will take into account the national origin of forces as related to the close defence of their respective homelands.
- (4) In wartime, to co-ordinate the direction of operations in the overall area under his authority.

- 2 -

(b) Implementation of Responsibilities

- (1) In general, SACEUR will make decisions after preliminary consultation with Commanders-in-Chief and other subordinate Commanders responsible for the implementation of his decisions.
- (2) All subordinate Commanders are required to co-ordinate their operational plans with adjacent Commanders and to submit these plans to SACEUR for review and any necessary approval. When the adjacent Commanders are outside SACEUR's sphere of responsibility, the initial approach to the commands concerned will be made through SACEUR.
- (3) Pending the issuance of specific instructions, SACEUR subordinate Commanders are authorized to establish liaison with National authorities, in order to obtain information required for operational planning. All direct liaison with National authorities above the level of information or routine activity will be submitted to SACEUR for approval prior to implementation.

RAM

Defence Liaison Division(1)..

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CANADIAN JOINT STAFF
LONDON.

N A T O
SECRET
CJS(L) 332a
30 May 51

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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Transfer of Functions from Regional Planning Groups to SHAPE

W.U.84/51)
W.U.85/51) annexed (one copy only)
W.U.86/51)

(Previous references CJS(L)273 and WR/MC(51)40)

1. The Deputy Chief of Staff Plans and Operations SHAPE has recommended:

- (a) That the Western European Regional Planning Group be disbanded as from 15 Jun 51;
- (b) That the following existing sub-committees be placed on a tri-Regional basis reporting to SHAPE:
 - (i) Inter-Service Signal Division
 - (ii) Long Lines Working Party
 - (iii) Tri-regional Frequency Working Party
 - (iv) Tri-regional Naval Communications Sub-Committee
 - (v) Working Party for the Study of Special Rail Transport in Western Europe.

(Reference W.U.85/51)

2. In document W.U.84/51 entitled "Paragraph 7" Subjects', i.e. paragraph 7 of WR/MC(51)40, the Secretary-General of the Western European Regional Planning Group has listed a number of subjects with which he feels that SHAPE is not entirely competent to deal. It is my frank opinion that this is a case of "special pleading" backed by the "rump" of the Western European Regional Planning Group who do not wish to leave London and return to their own countries for re-posting. When reading W.U.84/51 it is of interest to note that the Secretary-General of the Western European R.P.G. has circulated amongst the European members of the Principal Staff Officers Committee a paper in which it is suggested that the Standing Group set up in London a forward echelon consisting of a number of Working Groups whose task it would be to study for the Standing Group problems of particular interest to the European members of NATO. I was given a draft copy of this paper by General Doorman. This copy, which bears no file reference, date or security grading, is enclosed.

3. There is no need for me to point out the manner in which

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N A T O
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CJS(L) 332a

the problems outlined in the Annexe to W.U.84/51 should be handled. The answer in each case seems quite evident. For example, in paragraph three of the Annexe to W.U.84/51 it is stated that the outstanding problems are:

- (a) The possibility of transferring these functions to an advanced agency of the Standing Group, in Europe;
- (b) The fact that the transfer of these functions to SHAPE would result in SHAPE having two distinct tasks, thus necessitating an adequate organization;
- (c) The fact that Commands, other than SHAPE, might possibly be interested in these problems.

4. With reference to (a) above, if the forces referred to are not under SACEUR or any other international supreme command, then they are national problems. Heretofore the European members of the Western European R.P.G. have reserved the right to deal with their own national military problems. The problems listed in (b) above are those between governments and could be resolved by the North Atlantic Council Deputies. The annexed papers were received only today and there is therefore insufficient time for the Chiefs of Staff Committee to give me their views on the question on setting up additional Standing Group agencies in London to deal with what are termed 'problems peculiar to the European members of NATO'. Personally I strongly favour the proposal made by the Deputy Chief of Staff Plans and Operations but feel that without instructions I can go no further than to say that it seems the best solution to me. Although it would be unfortunate if the Principal Staff Officers Committee were to recommend the establishment of new Standing Group agencies in London or the continuation of certain regional group sub-committees, the Standing Group would be in a position to veto the recommendations.

S.F. Clark

(S.F. Clark) Major-General,
Chairman,
Canadian Joint Staff, London.

~~Def. Lia Dir~~
for attention

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Mr. Heeney

~~DOWNGRADED TO SECRET~~
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TOP SECRET

10 May 51

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Dear Mr. Heeney:

Further to your letter of April 13th I have been in touch with General Clark in London who has secured a copy of a paper regarding the transfer of United Kingdom Forces to SACEUR. It appears that no formal agreement has been made with SACEUR but the following conditions have been agreed to regarding the transfer of forces:

- (a) In general, forces transferred to the Supreme Commander in peace should be transferred free of any conditions except in so far as his powers are limited by his Terms of Reference. These limitations affect the administration of the forces, which remains the responsibility of national authorities; they also affect the deployment, adequacy and training standard of forces, on which the Supreme Commander is authorized to make recommendations to the Standing Group and to national authorities.
- (b) Formations in the UK earmarked to come under command of SHAPE in war will not be committed to operations until in the opinion of the British Chiefs of Staff they are battleworthy.
- (c) Allowance must be made for military occupation forces to conform to any revision of the occupation statute, and to the cold war tasks required of occupation forces.

A.D.P. Heeney, Esq.,
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
East Block,
Ottawa, Canada.

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- (d) Care must be taken to ensure that no existing command machinery is superseded until an adequate organization has been established to take its place.

Yours sincerely,

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Charles. Leach
Lieutenant-General

copy: DW

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FROM CHAIRMAN CJS LONDON 081111Z MAY

TO SECRETARY CSC OTTAWA

SPECTRA

TOPSECRET CJS(L)M-684

BASE FOR U.S. STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND.

YOUR CSC 1451.

JAMAG DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE VERY COMPLETE INFORMATION ON U.S.

NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING AIR BASES FOR USE BY STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND. AM

INFORMED THAT MOST OF THE BASES ARE IN FRANCE OR FRENCH NORTH AFRICA AND

THAT NEGOTIATIONS FOR THESE ARE BEING CONDUCTED BILATERALLY BETWEEN U.S. AND

FRENCH GOVERNMENTS. JAMAG DID NOT APPEAR TO KNOW WHETHER OR NOT THE U.S.


GOVERNMENT WOULD WISH TO HAVE THEIR STRATEGIC AIR BASES IN EUROPE AND NORTH

AFRICA CONSIDERED AS PART OF A NATO INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAMME.

20415/TW/081245Z MAY 51

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Dear

As you know we have had under consideration for some time the question of the relationship of the Canadian forces to be allocated to the Supreme Commander, SHAPE. It is our view that the less complicated the command arrangements the better, bearing in mind that it is our intention to always have Canadian troops under Canadian command but accepting the need for operational control being exercised by other NATO Officers.

However, in document C6-D/2 paragraph 42 states:

"The process, timing and detailed conditions, of the transfer of control for national units to operate immediately under control of the Supreme Commander, and the earmarking of additional forces to be placed under his command in the event of war, should be subject to negotiations between the Standing Group and the Supreme Commander and/or the appropriate National Authorities."

Our interpretation of the foregoing paragraph would be that some kind of negotiations are envisaged between the Standing Group and the Supreme Commander and the appropriate National Authorities.

As a result of an informal enquiry made through the Canadian Joint Staff, Washington, it has been learned from Lord Tedder that the Standing Group have not yet initiated any action to prepare terms of agreement to be used when forces are placed under SACEUR, although he appreciated the need for some such instrument. As we have this matter under consideration at the present time I would like you to make some

Major-General S. F. Clark, CBE, CD,
Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff,
Canada House,
Trafalgar Square,
LONDON, W1, England.


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informal enquiries and advise whether the Ministry of Defence have given any thought to this subject and whether they have any draft papers which may be of help to us here.

Yours sincerely,


Lieutenant-General

Copy to:

Mr. A.D.P. Heeney. ✓

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COPY NO. 1 OF TWO COPIES

~~TOP SECRET~~ - TOP SECRET

April 13, 1951.

Mr. W. S. L.
~~DOWNGRADED TO SECRET~~
~~REDACTED~~

Mr. Foulkes
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY

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Sub. ... Filed ...

Sent 14.4.51

Attached for your signature, if you approve, is a reply to a letter of April 3, from General Foulkes. At our request General Foulkes has had informal enquiries made as to whether the Standing Group is undertaking preparation of a document to define the relationship between the Standing Group and/or SHAPE on the one hand and each National Government on the other. General Foulkes' letter reported that no such action is contemplated at present, and suggested that the Standing Group might be led to take the matter up if Canada were to make a formal enquiry.

In our draft reply we have suggested that a formal enquiry might be unwise at the present time, since we thought that it would be undesirable to precipitate the issue without having some indication of the probable outcome. Therefore it seemed useful to suggest that informal enquiries might be made in London as to U. K. intentions in the matter.

RAF

Defence Liaison Division (1)

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DOWNGRADED TO SECRET - TOP SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET April 13, 1951.

Dear General Foulkes:

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Your letter of April 3 referred to the question of a possible draft document, for use under paragraph 42 of Document C6-D/2, setting out an understanding between the Standing Group and/or SHAPE on the one hand, and each National Government on the other, and reported that it is not expected that the Standing Group will take action on this matter in the foreseeable future.

I am inclined to think that it would be unwise for the Canadian Government to make a formal enquiry to the Standing Group at present. In spite of Lord Tedder's assurance that no action is being taken by the Standing Group as such, however, I consider it likely that thought is being given to the subject within the Defence Departments of the United Kingdom and the United States. Perhaps you would consider it desirable for informal enquiries to be made in London (possibly by General Clark) as to whether preliminary thought has been given to this subject in the Ministry of Defence.

Lieutenant-General Charles Foulkes,
CB, CBE, DSO,
Chairman, Canadian Chiefs of Staff,
National Defence Headquarters,
O t t a w a, Ontario.

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In suggesting that we enquire further, I am aware that the subject is not one of immediate urgency for us, but I consider that the ultimate arrangement will be of importance to Canada both in the military and in the political sense. For this reason, it seems to me worthwhile to get any indication we can now of the direction in which the wind is likely to blow.

Your sincerely,

(SGD.) A. D. P. HEENEY

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

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OTTAWA FILE
No. 50030-AB-40

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Despatch No. 254

Date. 7th April, 1951

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

FROM: The Canadian Ambassador, The Hague, Netherlands.

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference.....

Subject: Lack of a Dutch Commander at S.H.A.P.E.

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Copies Referred

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No. of Enclosures

None

Post File

No.....

1. There has been some adverse comment in Dutch newspapers recently concerning the absence of a single Dutch representative on General Eisenhower's staff. The Conservative Nieuwe Haagsche Courant, for example, asks whether this is due to the fact that Holland does not have any suitable candidates, or whether this must be due to Eisenhower's criticism on the former Cabinet's military policy. The long duration of the Netherlands Cabinet crisis cannot have made a favourable impression in the United States.

2. From enquiries made by the Military Attaché at this Embassy it appears that these newspaper articles were inspired by the military correspondents and were not introduced by the Managing Editors. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs have said that they are not dissatisfied that S.H.A.P.E. does not include a Dutch commander.

3. It is understood that the Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower attempted to ascertain Dutch reaction to the non-inclusion of a senior Dutch officer before General Eisenhower announced the senior appointments. The Chief of Staff was informed that providing the other smaller powers such as Belgium and Luxembourg were not given senior appointments the Dutch would not be upset.

4. It should be noted that Major-General T.E.E.H. Mathon was recently appointed to S.H.A.P.E. in the capacity of Head of the Netherlands Liaison Group.

Finian J. Murphy

AMBASSADOR.

D

OTTAWA FILE
No.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

Despatch No.
Date: 10 April 1951

FROM: The Canadian Ambassador, The Hague, Netherlands.
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference:
Subject: Lack of a Dutch Commander at B.H.L.A.

1. There has been some adverse comment in Dutch newspapers recently concerning the absence of a single Dutch representative on General Lisenhower's staff. The Conservative Nieuws Beeldsche Courant, for example, asks whether this is due to the fact that Holland does not have any suitable candidates, or whether this must be due to Lisenhower's criticism of the former Cabinet's military policy. The long duration of the Netherlands Cabinet crisis cannot have made a favourable impression in the United States.
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4. It should be noted that Major-General T.E.B.H. Bosh was recently appointed to B.H.L.A. in the capacity of Head of the Netherlands Mission Group.

[Signature]
AMBASSADOR

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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The System of Command established within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

*Presented by the Minister of Defence to Parliament
by Command of His Majesty
April, 1951*

LONDON
HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
SIXPENCE NET

Cmd. 8214

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THE SYSTEM OF COMMAND ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION

I.—INTRODUCTION

1. The purpose of this White Paper is to describe in a convenient summary form the command system as at present developed within the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty and to explain how it has been fitted into the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation as a whole. The White Paper does not attempt to deal with the political, financial, production and supply aspects of N.A.T.O.

2. A White Paper on Collective Defence Under the Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties was presented to Parliament in February 1950 (Cmd. 7883). Since then N.A.T.O. has got into its stride and, under the spur of the changing world situation, it has completed what may be termed the purely planning stage of its military development. In order to build up an effective defence organisation, the next step has been to create a system of command and at the same time to strengthen the existing military organisation so as to ensure that the instructions and guidance of the North Atlantic Powers can be speedily and effectively implemented and that quick decisions can be taken on North Atlantic military problems in general.

3. So far, only the framework of a command system has been created and in one important area, the Mediterranean, the framework is still incomplete. The foundations have, however, been laid and, so far as the higher military direction of N.A.T.O. as a whole is concerned, it has been possible to devise a system which not only gives the Twelve Powers the opportunity to participate in the solution of the particular problems with which they are concerned, but also ensures that the responsibility for carrying out the decisions rests in the hands of a body which is smaller and, therefore, able to act more rapidly. N.A.T.O., like any other organisation in the free world, is developing all the time and it would be surprising if some of the twelve free and independent States of which it is composed did not come forward from time to time with proposals for further alteration and improvement. As it stands, however, it is no exaggeration to say that N.A.T.O. represents an achievement in peace-time military co-operation among free and independent nations for which there is no precedent in the world's history.

II.—THE HIGHER MILITARY DIRECTION OF N.A.T.O.

The Defence Committee

4. Ministerial authority in the defence field is exercised, under the political guidance of the North Atlantic Council of Foreign Ministers, by the Defence Committee, which consists of the Defence Ministers of the Twelve Powers. Three meetings of the Defence Committee were held last year: at The Hague in April, at Washington in October and at Brussels in December. Apart from these formal meetings, however, ministerial authority on military matters is being exercised all the time since North Atlantic Treaty problems are constantly being submitted to individual Ministers of Defence by the Chiefs of Staff of the Twelve Powers. Moreover, the Deputies of the North Atlantic Council, who are responsible for giving political guidance to N.A.T.O., are in constant session.

The meeting of the Defence Committee in Brussels in December was followed by a joint meeting with the North Atlantic Council and, as so many defence problems raise political issues, which fall, to some extent, outside the defence field, these joint sessions may well become more frequent in the future. The Chair at the Defence Committee meetings at The Hague and Washington was taken by the United States Secretary for Defence; it has now passed to Belgium.

The Military Committee and the Standing Group

6. Under the general supervision of the Defence Committee, the Military Committee, which consists of the Chiefs of Staff of the Twelve Powers, remains the supreme military authority in N.A.T.O. One Chief of Staff of each of the Twelve Powers normally attends the Military Committee meetings. Meetings of the Military Committee preceded each meeting of the Defence Committee held last year and the approval of the Chiefs of Staff of the Twelve Powers was there given to the various matters subsequently submitted to the Defence Committee. It has always been accepted, however, that military decisions on N.A.T.O. problems could not wait for periodic sessions of the Military Committee and the Standing Group was, therefore, constituted, with its headquarters in Washington, to act as a permanent executive agency of the Military Committee. The Standing Group, which consists of the Chiefs of Staff of France, the United States and the United Kingdom working through their permanent representatives in Washington, would within the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty exercise in war functions similar to those exercised by the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the last war. As the executive authority in the military field in peace-time of twelve free and independent States, the Standing Group has a task which differs considerably from that of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and is in many respects more difficult. It should be emphasised that the Standing Group remains technically an organ of the Military Committee and, just as any of the Chiefs of Staff of the Twelve Powers is entitled to attend the meetings of the Military Committee, so any of the Chiefs of Staff of France, the United States and the United Kingdom are entitled themselves to represent their country at meetings of the Standing Group and, in fact, have done so.

7. The permanent representatives of the Chiefs of Staff on the Standing Group are:—

Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder: *United Kingdom.*

Vice-Admiral Jerauld Wright: *United States.*

Lieutenant-General Paul Ely: *France.*

Lord Tedder's term of office expires this month and he will then be succeeded by Air Chief Marshal Sir William Elliot.

8. The need for a small compact body such as the Standing Group which can give quick decisions on military problems, has been accepted by all the N.A.T.O. countries. This authority was confirmed and strengthened at the meetings of the North Atlantic Council and the Defence Committee held at Brussels in December when the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe was appointed and a North Atlantic Treaty Command Organisation for Europe was established. It was there recognised that the Standing Group should be responsible for higher strategic direction throughout the North Atlantic Treaty area and that it should be authorised to issue instructions and guidance on military matters to the various N.A.T.O. commands. The Standing Group is provided with a staff comprising a number of international Working Teams which consist of officers from the armed forces of France, the United States and the United Kingdom.

Military Representatives Committee

9. As a consequence of these developments it was fully recognised that effective means must be devised to ensure that the views of the countries which are not members of the Standing Group should be fully represented. It is the Defence Committee, at its meeting in Brussels in December, authorised the establishment of a Military Representatives Committee which is a permanent body with its headquarters in Washington directly representing the Chiefs of Staff of all the North Atlantic Treaty Powers and thus making frequent meetings of the Military Committee unnecessary. The Standing Group works in the closest collaboration with the Military Representatives Committee and in policy and planning matters consults the Representatives of the member nations concerned. The staffs of the Military Representatives co-operate with the Working Teams of the Standing Group in matters which concern them.

A chart of the higher military organisation of N.A.T.O. is at Appendix A.

III.—THE COMMAND SYSTEM

Regional Planning Groups

10. The preliminary planning work was carried out by the five Regional Planning Groups into which N.A.T.O. had been divided composed as follows:—

<i>Regional Planning Group</i>	<i>Composition</i>
Western European ...	Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom.
Northern European ...	Denmark, Norway, United Kingdom.
Southern European—Western Mediterranean ...	France, Italy, United Kingdom.
North Atlantic Ocean ...	Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, United States of America.
Canadian—United States ...	Canada, United States of America.

Canada and the United States were represented by observers in the three European Regional Groups.

11. The grouping of the Twelve Powers in these five Regional Groups was effective for preliminary planning purposes. When this work had been completed it was plain that a command organisation was required which would not only co-ordinate the preliminary planning work undertaken by the Regions but would also have executive authority to train and weld together forces of the various Powers and to direct military operations should necessity arise.

Western Union Commanders-in-Chief Committee

12. A nucleus land, air and naval command, with Field-Marshal Montgomery as permanent military chairman, had been established in Western Union as long ago as October 1948 and much work, which will be of great value to the North Atlantic command organisation, was carried out by the Western Union Commanders-in-Chief. They were, however, only a planning organisation, and had no executive authority. Moreover, they were concerned only with the five countries of Western Union. A more comprehensive command system had to be created to cover the far wider area of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (S.H.A.P.E.)

13. The problem of creating a comprehensive command system for the North Atlantic area was first considered at ministerial level at the Defence Committee held in Washington in October 1950. It was again considered at the meeting of Defence Ministers held in Brussels in December. The Twelve Powers were fully in agreement as to the kind of command system that was required for Europe and they had no doubts whatever about the officer who should be asked to assume the appointment of Supreme Allied Commander Europe. At a joint session of the North Atlantic Council and the North Atlantic Defence Committee, held in Brussels on the 19th December, 1950, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had been made available for that purpose by the President of the United States, was appointed Supreme Allied Commander Europe. It was also decided that General Eisenhower should establish his headquarters in Europe and should be assisted by an international staff drawn from the North Atlantic Treaty countries which contributed forces to his command. General Eisenhower assumed command as from midnight 1st–2nd April, 1951, and the appropriate forces were transferred to his command with effect from that date.

14. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (S.H.A.P.E.) is responsible, under the general direction of the Standing Group, for the defence of the allied countries of continental Europe against invasion and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe would, in time of war, control all land, sea and air operations to this end. Internal security and defence of coastal waters remain the direct responsibility of the national authorities concerned but the Supreme Commander would have full authority to carry out such operations in these areas as he considered necessary for the defence of Western Europe.

15. In peace-time the functions of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe may be defined as follows:—

- The organisation and training of the various units of the armed forces of the North Atlantic countries which have been allotted to his command so as to ensure that they are knit together into one unified force.
- The preparation of defence plans.
- Making recommendations to the Standing Group about such matters as the adequacy and training of his forces and indeed on any military questions which affect his ability to carry out his responsibilities in peace or war.

16. The Supreme Commander ordinarily receives his directions from the Standing Group but, following General Eisenhower's example during the last war, he has the right of direct access to the Chiefs of Staff of any of the Twelve Powers and, in exceptional circumstances, to Defence Ministers and Heads of Governments. In addition, all the North Atlantic countries maintain military liaison officers at S.H.A.P.E. who are responsible for day-to-day liaison with the Chiefs of Staff of the North Atlantic countries. The Supreme Commander obtains his political guidance through the Standing Group from the Council Deputies.

The Supreme Allied Commander's Deputies

17. General Eisenhower has appointed Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Field-Marshal Montgomery would assume the functions of Supreme Commander in the absence, for any reason, of General Eisenhower and, as his Deputy, he

Mediterranean command to the British command in the Middle East. Moreover, the association of Greece and Turkey with North Atlantic planning in the Mediterranean area affects the Mediterranean Command problem also.

Appointments Within S.H.A.P.E.

22. The Chief of Staff at S.H.A.P.E. is Lieutenant-General A. M. Gruenther (U.S.A.). Under him there are three Deputy Chiefs of Staff—

Plans, Policy and Operations: Air Vice-Marshal E. C. Hudleston (United Kingdom).

Administration: General de Corps d'Armée Marcel M. Carpentier (France).

National Affairs: Colonel Anthony J. D. Biddle (U.S.A.).

There are also five Assistant Chiefs of Staff—

Plans and Operations: General P. L. Bodet (France).

Intelligence: Major General Sir Terence Airey (United Kingdom).

Organisation and Training: Major-General Festing (United Kingdom).

Logistics: Major-General E. H. Leavey (U.S.A.).

Personnel and Administration: Rear-Admiral Ferrante Capponi (Italy).

The Future of the European Regional Planning Groups and of the Western Union Commanders-in-Chief

23. On the day that the Supreme Allied Commander Europe assumed his command he was authorised by the five Brussels Treaty Powers to take over the responsibilities of the Commanders-in-Chief Committee and the staff and facilities of the land, sea and air commands of Western Union were placed at his disposal. The three European Regional Planning Groups of N.A.T.O. have been requested by General Eisenhower to continue their work until their powers and functions have been absorbed by S.H.A.P.E. and its subordinate Commands or by subordinate agencies of the Standing Group.

Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic

24. The proposal to appoint a single Supreme Commander for the North Atlantic Ocean was fully discussed not only by the United Kingdom and the United States but by representatives of the other North Atlantic Powers concerned. It was unanimously agreed that the Supreme Commander should be an American officer and that his Deputy should be British. The appointment of a Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (S.A.C.A.) was approved in principle at the North Atlantic Defence Committee held in Washington in October last and, at the joint session of the Council and Defence Committee held in Brussels in December, it was agreed that the Supreme Commander Atlantic should be appointed as soon as possible after the Supreme Commander Europe. The formal nomination by the United States Government of an American officer for appointment as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic is now awaited; His Majesty's Government have already selected a British Admiral for appointment as Deputy Supreme Commander.

25. The Supreme Commander Atlantic's command covers broadly the North Atlantic Ocean but excludes British and European coastal waters and the English Channel. The exact limits of the Atlantic command and of Admiral Brind's responsibilities under S.H.A.P.E. for Northern Europe have not yet been finally settled. The Atlantic command will include an Eastern and a Western area. The Eastern area, which is obviously the more vital so far as this country is concerned will be under the command of a British Admiral in association with Coastal Command of the Royal Air Force.

has a special responsibility for the training and organisation of the forces allotted to S.H.A.P.E. He is thus able to continue the work that he has tried out as Chairman of the Western Union Commanders-in-Chief Committee. General Eisenhower also has a Deputy (Air), Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Saunders, R.A.F., and a Deputy (Navy), Admiral André Lemonnier of the French Navy.

18. General Eisenhower's command has been divided into three subordinate commands, a central, a northern and a southern sector. The precise boundaries of these subordinate commands have not yet been settled but, broadly speaking, they correspond to the areas of the three European Regional Planning Groups.

The Central Sector

19. Of the three areas of command, it is plain that the central sector, which comprises the land mass of Western Europe, is the most important and General Eisenhower will retain a measure of personal command in this sector. Under him there will be:—

Commander-in-Chief Allied Land Forces: General A. Juin (France).

Commander-in-Chief Allied Air Forces: Lieut.-General L. Norstad (U.S.A.).

Flag Officer Central Europe: Vice-Admiral Robert Jaujard (France).

General Juin will not take up his appointment immediately. It is understood that he will remain as Resident-General in Morocco for the present and, in the meantime, General Guillaume, who commands the French forces in Germany, is taking General Juin's place.

The Northern Sector

20. The command arrangements in Northern Europe must differ, to some extent, from that in the central sector. Important features of the defence of the North European area would be sea power and sea-borne air power and the decision here has therefore been to appoint an Admiral as Commander-in-Chief with overall responsibility to S.H.A.P.E. for the whole area and with land and air commanders under him. The appointments that have been made are as follows:—

Commander-in-Chief: Admiral Sir Patrick Brind (United Kingdom).

Commander, Land Forces, Norway: Lieut.-General Wilhelm Von Tangen Hansteen (Norway).

Commander, Land Forces, Denmark: Lieut.-General Ebbe Götz (Denmark).

Commander, Allied Air Forces: Major-General Robert Taylor (U.S.A.).

The Southern Sector

21. No command appointments have yet been made in the southern sector but the intention is that the land forces should be commanded by an Italian General. Special command problems arise, however, since the North Atlantic Treaty covers only the western part of the Mediterranean area and the Eastern Mediterranean lies outside it. Obviously the Mediterranean area, as a whole, has certain common defence problems of which account must be taken from the command point of view. Special problems, also, arise over Trieste, the control of the communications between France and her North African Colonies and the relation of the

This British Admiral will be the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, an appointment at present held by Admiral Sir Philip Vian. The Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern area would, in time of war, exercise command not only over British forces but also those of other North Atlantic Treaty Powers contributing naval forces in support of the Eastern Atlantic area. The area of the Western Atlantic will be under the command of an American Admiral and he will likewise control all other N.A.T.O. forces employed in support of that area.

26. In war time the S.A.C.A. would exercise under the general direction of the Standing Group the normal powers of a Supreme Commander. He will not in time of peace command any of the naval and air forces of this country that would be allocated to him in time of war, nor those of the other North Atlantic Treaty Powers except when specifically placed at his disposal for the purposes of carrying out combined training exercises.

Reasons for the Appointment of a Supreme Commander Atlantic

27. The reasons for the appointment of a Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic may be broadly stated as follows:—

- (a) A single unified command for the whole North Atlantic Ocean is regarded as essential by the Chiefs of Staff of the various North Atlantic Powers. As the Prime Minister said in the House of Commons on 26th February last—

“The outstanding lesson of the Battle of the Atlantic in the late war was that the Atlantic is one battlefield in which the mobile threat represented by the submarine must be matched by an equally flexible system of defence.”

The advantages of speed and flexibility which will be gained by the appointment of a Supreme Commander could not be secured by retaining separate commands for the Eastern and Western Atlantic co-ordinated by the Standing Group which, while it is responsible for the higher military direction of the whole North Atlantic Treaty Area, is not designed itself to fight a Battle of the Atlantic.

- (b) The Atlantic is not only of vital importance to this country but is also the life-line of Allied forces operating in Europe. The North Atlantic countries which will contribute forces or bases for the defence of the Atlantic Ocean will be the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Denmark, Portugal and Iceland. In view of the large number of nations involved, it seems clear that the co-ordination of operational matters by a committee is quite out of the question and that an overall Commander is needed to co-ordinate their efforts.

- (c) In peace there is an equal need to have an Allied Supreme Commander responsible for the development of plans and the conduct of combined training exercise of those forces which would be placed under his command in war.

The Appointment of an American Officer as Supreme Commander Atlantic

28. In deciding upon the nationality of the Supreme Commander a number of factors had to be taken into consideration. The defence of the North Atlantic Ocean or of any part of it cannot be undertaken by one country alone; its defence can only be secured by all the North Atlantic Powers concerned acting in close concert and accepting some sacrifices for the common advantage. While the defence of the Eastern Atlantic is obviously of vital interest to this country, the defence of the Western Atlantic

is of the greatest concern to the United States. Again, some account must be taken of the size of the naval and air forces which the various North Atlantic Powers would be able to provide for the defence of the North Atlantic Ocean. Our own contribution will be a great one, not only in the number of ships that we can make available, but also in the skill and experience of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force in such matters as convoy organisation and anti-submarine warfare. The overall resources of the United States Navy are, however, far greater than our own and only by a large deployment of these resources can we hope to fight successfully another Battle of the Atlantic.

29. His Majesty's Government are satisfied that for the following reasons British interests and, in particular, the defence of these Islands will be fully safeguarded:—

- (a) The Supreme Commander Atlantic will take his orders from the Standing Group on which the British Chiefs of Staff are fully represented.
- (b) The Deputy Supreme Commander Atlantic will be British.
- (c) The command in the Eastern Atlantic will be held by a British Admiral.
- (d) The command of our Home Waters will be the direct responsibility of another British Admiral under the authority of the British Chiefs of Staff.
- (e) The Supreme Commander at Headquarters will have available a British Liaison Officer to represent directly to him the views of the British Chiefs of Staff on day-to-day problems.

30. A chart of the system of command in N.A.T.O. is contained in Appendix B.

IV.—CONCLUSIONS


31. The framework of an organisation for carrying out the instructions of the Governments and the Chiefs of Staff of the Twelve Powers and of a command system for the North Atlantic Treaty area has thus been created. It is important to recognise that it is no more than a framework. So far as the higher military direction of N.A.T.O. is concerned, the exercise by the Standing Group of an authority similar to that exercised by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the last war has been accepted. There will no doubt be further constitutional developments within N.A.T.O. Part of the command structure has been built up but a number of other command problems remain for decision especially the command in the Mediterranean.

32. The interests of the United Kingdom are fully represented throughout N.A.T.O. and in the various command appointments that have so far been made, but it would be quite wrong to consider the North Atlantic Treaty from a purely national standpoint. The Treaty is a bold and novel conception for the preservation of peace or, if need be, for the defence of the western world. As members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, we must make some sacrifices in pooling our resources and our experience for the common good, but we can rightly expect to derive great benefit from our membership of this vigorous alliance of free peoples.

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
APPENDIX A

THE HIGHER MILITARY ORGANISATION OF N.A.T.O.



APPENDIX B

THE SYSTEM OF COMMAND IN N.A.T.O.



Mr. Mackay
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50030 AB-4 April 3rd, 1951.

Dear Mr. Heeney: *✓*

I would refer to your letter of 6th March, in which you asked me whether I could ascertain informally if the Standing Group were either preparing or considering the preparation of any draft documents for use under paragraph 42 of document C6-D/2 regarding the setting out of an understanding between the Standing Group and/or SHAPE on the one hand, and each National Government on the other.

It has been ascertained informally from the Chairman, Lord Tedder, that the Standing Group have not yet initiated any action to prepare terms of agreement to be used when Forces are placed under SACEUR, although he appreciated the need for some such instrument. However, in view of the work presently before the Standing Group, Lord Tedder did not anticipate that the consideration of such a document would be started within the foreseeable future but he did indicate that if Canada wished to make a formal enquiry, it would perhaps facilitate the development of such a format.

Yours sincerely,

Charles Gueber
Lieutenant-General

A.D.P. Heeney, Esq.,
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
East Block,
Ottawa, Canada.



CANADA

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IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

NO. CC 1158-1 Vol 1

Department of National Defence


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CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS
OTTAWA

28 March, 1951.

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
O t t a w a.



Assumption by General Eisenhower of command
of forces allocated to him - 1 April, 1951

1. I attach for your information copy of message CJS(W) 304 dated 27 March, 1951, from Washington concerning the above-noted subject, and copy of message CSC 559 dated 28 March, 1951, in reply thereto.

2. ~~As these are Gosmic papers it is requested that they be returned to this office when they have served their purpose.~~

H.S. Rayner

(H.S. Rayner)
Commodore, RCN,
Secretary.

Encs.
HSR/4971/dt

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

MESSAGE FORM

FOR CLASSIFIED MESSAGES ONLY

INDICATE DEGREE OF PRIORITY	FOR MESSAGE CENTRE USE ONLY		MARK X TO INDICATE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
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INFORMATION ADDRESSEE/S	CHAIRMAN CANADIAN JOINT STAFF LONDON		

ORIGINATOR'S NO.

CSC 559

PARA ONE

REFERENCE CJS(W) 304 DATED 27 MARCH (.) THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS
REPLY TO COSMIC MESSAGE STAND 67 (.)

PARA TWO

STAND 67 PARAGRAPH 3 (A) NIL FORCES (.) (B) NOT APPLICABLE (.)

PARA THREE

MAJOR GENERAL CLARK TO PASS TO SHAPE (.)

ORIGINATOR

(H S RAYNER) COMMODORE RCN
SECRETARY CSC

TELEPHONE

4971

DATE - TIME GROUP

28 MAR 51 1620

Z

FILE NO.

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COPY No. 7

CANADIAN JOINT STAFF

1700 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., N. W.
WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

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CJS 302-14

28 Mar 51

Secretary
Chiefs of Staff Committee
Room 4444 "A" Building
Department of National Defence
Ottawa, Ontario

Terms of Reference for the Supreme
Allied Commander Atlantic

1 Attached are eight (8) copies of DC 24/7 dated 26 Mar 51, with an Enclosure which is a report by the Standing Group to the Defence Committee on the above subject.

2 The Enclosure to DC 24/7 is the revised Terms of Reference for SACLANT as agreed to at the 8th meeting of the Military Representatives Committee on 26 Mar 51, which was reported to you in our message CJSW 299 dated 27 Mar 51.

3 These Terms of Reference are now transmitted to the Defence Committee for consideration and approval at their next meeting.

[Signature]
(Hugh Campbell)
Air Vice Marshal
Chairman
Canadian Joint Staff

att

M/S

A75

2
THIRD ADD LEAD NATO XX GENERAL.

THE HEADQUARTERS ANNOUNCEMENTS SAID THAT EISENHOWER WOULD ASK THE FIVE-POWER BRUSSELS TREATY ORGANIZATION TO TRANSFER TO HIS SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BRUSSELS PACT DEFENCE ORGANIZATION

N

WHICH FIELD MARSHAL MONTGOMERY

HAS BEEN COMMANDING AT FONTAINEBLEAU.


THE ANNOUNCEMENT SAID WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENCE WILL BE ORGANIZED AROUND THREE GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS: THE NORTHERN, CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN SECTORS, WHOSE BOUNDARIES HAVE NOT YET BEEN PRECISELY OUTLINED.

THE CENTRAL SECTOR PROBABLY WILL COVER ONLY FRANCE AND THE LOW COUNTRY

THE APPOINTMENT OF MONTGOMERY AS EISENHOWER'S DEPUTY HAD BEEN EXPECTED. IN THE JOB, THE FAMED "MONTY" WHO WON GLORY IN BRITAIN'S SECOND WORLD WAR CAMPAIGN IN NORTH AFRICA, WILL BE IN CHARGE OF TRAINING, EQUIPPING AND PREPARING NATIONAL FORCES ALLOTTED TO EISENHOWER.

GEN. JUINS APPOINTMENT AS CENTRAL SECTOR GROUND FORCES CHIEF BECOMES EFFECTIVE ONLY WHEN HIS DUTIES AS RESIDENT-GENERAL OF MOROCCO ARE TERMINATED. IN THE MEANTIME, LT.-GEN. AUSTUSTIC GUILLAUME, COMMANDER OF FRENCH FORCES IN GERMANY, WILL FILL JUINS SPOT, PLANNING OVER-ALL DEFENCE OF THE CENTRAL AREA OF WESTERN EUROPE.

D9 51A



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FILE NO. CSC 1158-1 TD-193

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

Office of the Secretary,
National Defence Headquarters,
Ottawa, Ontario.

Date: 20 March 1951

Memorandum To: Chairman, Chiefs of Staff,

CAS

CNS

CCS

Subject:

Shape Command Structure

The following document concerning the above-named subject is forwarded for your information and retention, please.

Memo - S.G.121 - d/16 Mar 51 from Secretaries to the
Standing Group, and also
Message from Supreme Allied Commander dated
Mar 51

Cc to External Affairs.

CHN/3729/mck

(H.S. Rayner)

Commodore, RCN,

Secretary.

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A44

BULLETIN LEAD NATO
PARIS, MARCH 20-(AP)-GEN. DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER TODAY NAMED
FIELD MARSHAL VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY AS HIS DEPUTY COMMANDER IN THE
ATLANTIC PACT ARMY.
MORE D809A

A49

95

~~PARIS--FIRST ADD LEAD NATO XX ARMY.~~
EISENHOWER ALSO APPOINTED EIGHT OTHER HIGH RANKING OFFICERS
TO HIS STAFF.
HE CHOSE AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR HUGH SAUNDERS OF THE R.A.F. AIR
FORCE AS HIS AIR DEPUTY.
A SENIOR NAVAL OFFICER MAY BE NAMED LATER "IF THE NEED BECOMES
APPARENT," A HEADQUARTERS SPOKESMAN SAID.
THE FRENCH CABINET ANNOUNCED, MEANWHILE, THAT GEN. ALPHONSE JUIN,
COMMANDER OF FRANCE'S ARMED FORCES, HAS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO
EISENHOWER TO SERVE AS GROUND TROOPS COMMANDER IN THE ATLANTIC PACT
ARMY. JUIN, 62, IS INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF FRENCH ARMED FORCES, A
POST CREATED AFTER EISENHOWER'S SURVEY TOUR OF PACT MEMBERS. JUIN
ALSO IS RESIDENT-GENERAL OF MOROCCO.
THE FRENCH CABINET ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT VICE ADMIRAL ROBERT JAUJARD
WAS NAMED TO THE EISENHOWER STAFF.
(NO PICKUP) D820A

A59

PARIS--SECOND ADD LEAD NATO XX STAFF.
EISENHOWER ANNOUNCED THAT JUIN'S TITLE WOULD BE COMMANDER
IN CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMY FORCES IN THE CENTRAL SECTOR OF EUROPE,
AND JAUJARD WILL BE NAVAL FLAG OFFICER, CENTRAL SECTOR, EUROPE.
OTHER APPOINTMENTS INCLUDED LT.-GEN. LAURIS NORSTAD, COMMANDER OF
THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE IN EUROPE AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE
ALLIED AIR FORCES.
ADMIRAL SIR PATRICK BRIND, OF THE ROYAL NAVY, COMMANDER IN
CHIEF NORTHERN EUROPE.
LT.-GEN. WILHELM VON TANGEN-HANSTEEN, NORWEGIAN ARMY
CHIEF OF STAFF, AS COMMANDER OF ALLIED ARMY FORCES, NORWAY.
LT.-GEN. EBBE GOERTZ, OF DENMARK, COMMANDER OF ALLIED FORCES,
DENMARK.
MAJ.-GEN. ROBERT K. TAYLOR, OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE, AS COMMANDER
ALLIED AIR FORCES, NORTHERN EUROPE.
EISENHOWER ANNOUNCED HE WOULD APPOINT SEVEN AREA COMMANDERS AT A
LATER DATE.
COMMAND OF THE LAND FORCES, SOUTHERN EUROPE, WILL BE ASSIGNED TO
AN ITALIAN GENERAL.
D851A

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FILE NO. CSC 1158-1

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

NATO - TOP SECRET

Office of the Secretary,
National Defence Headquarters,
Ottawa, Ontario.

Date: 19 March, 1951.

Memorandum To: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Subject: SHAPE - Command Structure

The following document concerning the above-named subject is forwarded for your information and retention, please.

Message CJS(W)274 of 17 March from Washington.

→ quoting SHA PTO 2 (SH 20202)

H. S. Rayner

(H.S. Rayner)
Commodore, RCN,
Secretary.

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
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20 MAR 1951

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Washington, D.C.,
March 16, 1951.

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Dear Mr. Heeney:

Your letter of March 6th requested my views on the relationship between the Canadian Government and the Supreme Commander with respect to the control over the Canadian forces to be placed in the integrated force. As Air Vice Marshal Campbell is away on leave, I have not discussed with the Joint Staff matters dealt with in your exchange of correspondence with General Foulkes. I have, however, asked Mr. Ignatieff to take up the general issue with Mr. Ridgway Knight, who has taken Mr. Douglas MacArthur's place in the State Department. This letter is based on Mr. Ignatieff's report of his discussion with Mr. Knight. ^P As you point out, the basic document governing the making of national contributions is D.C. 24/3 of December 18th, which later became Council Document C. 6-9/2 without any change of substance. In this document the relevant paragraphs are Nos. 41, 42, 43, and 44, together with the Appendix giving the terms of reference of the Supreme Commander, and especially Paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Appendix which deal with his powers in peace. In Mr. Knight's view, these passages taken together strictly define the extent of the control in peacetime which the Supreme Commander can exercise over the national contributions and provide for consultation both with the Standing Group and with national governments. (His basic executive power is "the organization and training of national units allocated to his command into an effective integrated force" (Paragraph 43.a. of the main document and 4.a. of the Appendix). On other issues, such as the deployment of forces, the adequacy of forces, the "infrastructure" and so on, he can/

A. D. P. Heeney, Esq.,
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Ottawa, Canada.

-2-

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he can only make recommendations to the Standing Group and National Commanders. He is given authority to communicate with national Chiefs of Staff and with their Defence Ministers or heads of government "directly as necessary to facilitate the accomplishment of his mission" (Paragraph 5.c. of terms of reference). With regard particularly to the peacetime deployment of national forces, he has specific authority "to make recommendations direct to national Chiefs of Staff" under Paragraph 5.d., and this would seem to cover the particular question mentioned in your letter to me about consultation in the event of a plan to move the Canadian Brigade from Western Germany to Western Berlin. //

It is the State Department's understanding that Paragraph 42 of the main document, which you quote in your letter of February 14th to General Foulkes, refers to the working out of arrangements for the logistic support of national contingents, responsibility for which rests under the terms of reference "with the responsible authorities of the nations concerned" (Paragraph 6). Paragraph 42 thus relates to the development of details about supply, transfer of forces, transportation, etc.

In general, it is contemplated here that no broad agreement between national governments and SHAPE is needed to supplement the terms of reference for the Supreme Commander which have already been accepted by the national governments. It is thought that the terms of reference provide for consultation with and control by the national governments to the full extent necessary in peacetime. Terms of reference for the Supreme Commander in the event of war have still to be worked out and these will, of course, have to be submitted to national governments for discussion and approval before they can come into effect. Paragraph 3 of the terms of reference seems to be all that has now been accepted for application in wartime; this declares that the Supreme Commander "will exercise the full powers of a Supreme Commander in the event of war", that these powers will be confined to operations and training, and that they will later be defined in greater detail by the Defence Committee. I think that we should give attention/

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attention to this problem of defining the wartime powers in greater detail rather than to seeking a further definition of the relationship between the Supreme Commander and national governments in time of peace.

Yours sincerely,



CSC 1158-1 (JIC)

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JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS
OTTAWA

16 March, 1951.

D.M.I.
D.A.I.
D.N.I.
J.I.B.H.A. MacKay, Esq.,
Dept. of External Affairs.50030-AB-40
38 50This Material for SHAPE

1. Reference CJS(L)M-532 attached.
2. Your assistance in the compilation of a list of newspapers, periodicals, etc., as requested, would be appreciated, please.

J.E. Bestwick
(J.E. Bestwick)
Major,
Secretary.

Enc.(1)

TM/7321/fp

*Major Bestwick is asking for
further information
/my*

C O P Y

RESTRICTED

FROM CHAIRMAN CJS LONDON 131450Z
TO SECRETARY CSC OTTAWA

SPECTRA

RESTRICTED. CJS(L)M-532

REFERENCE MATERIAL FOR SHAPE

THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION OF SHAPE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE A LIST
OF NEWSPAPERS, PERIODICALS, ALSO UNCLASSIFIED MILITARY
PERIODICALS, WHICH, IN YOUR OPINION, WOULD BE OF USE TO THEM.
THE LIST SHOULD CONTAIN THE NAME AND ADDRESS OF THE PUBLISHER
AND THE COST OF SUBSCRIPTION. PLEASE FORWARD

20131/SA/151610Z MARCH 1951.

Canadian?

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IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

NO. CSC 5-25-4 (A/SEC)

Department of National Defence


CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS
OTTAWA

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16 March, 1951

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.



Liaison between SHAPE and National Authorities -
Charter

1. I wish to reply to your letter of 1 March, 1951 in which you raised the possibility that the Canadian Government might, at some stage, decide that the staff of the Canadian Military Representative to SHAPE should include a civilian political adviser from the Department of External Affairs.

2. This matter was considered by the Chiefs of Staff at their 486th meeting on the 8 March, 1951 and it was pointed out that the Canadian Military Representative, Major General Clark, only attended meetings of SHAPE when matters of sufficient importance came up for discussion; the day-to-day liaison was being handled by the Canadian Military Attache in Paris. On matters requiring a military decision Major General Clark obtained the views of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and transmitted them to SHAPE, on matters requiring a political decision the Canadian High Commissioner in London would be consulted and it was not considered desirable to change the present working arrangements.

3. It was, therefore, the decision of the committee that Major General Clark would not, at this time, raise the issue with SHAPE of the inclusion of a political officer on the staff of the Canadian Military Representative.

*we didn't suggest
he should
RAH*

H. S. Rayner

(H.S. Rayner)
Commodore, RCN,
Secretary.

RGK/3729/sjp

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*Mr. [unclear]
Mr. [unclear]
To [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]*

EXTRACT from Minutes of the 487th meeting
Chiefs of Staff Committee,
Wednesday, March 14, 1951.

50030 AB-40
Sub 8, Caren. [unclear]

IV. APPOINTMENTS TO SHAPE AND SACLANT

(SECRET)

12. The Chairman, referring to a message which had been received from the Chairman of the Canadian Joint, Staff, London, stated that the question of appointments of officers to the staff of SHAPE had been discussed with General Eisenhower and those for SACLANT had been discussed with the Chief of the Naval Staff.

As a result of these discussions it had been agreed that Canada would not seek any senior appointments on the staffs at either of the Supreme Headquarters unless the Supreme Commanders requested that senior Canadian officers be made available for their staffs.

It had been thought preferable for senior Canadian officers to be given command appointments such as that envisaged for the Canadian Atlantic sub-area of the North Atlantic Ocean Region and in this particular case it had been agreed that a senior Canadian Naval officer would be given the appointment.

13. It was agreed that as Canada possessed relatively few senior officers it was considered wise not to seek senior staff appointments in the Supreme Allied Command Headquarters, Europe and Atlantic.



M.H. Murray
I have only given

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OFFICE OF THE
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA,

and file
Murray

CANADA HOUSE,

LONDON, S.W.1.

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50030-AB-40
Sub. 58
SD
... FILED ...

14th March, 1951.

Dear Mr. Heeney,

In reply to your letter of March 6th, 1951, I would first of all state that I am inclined to agree with the views expressed by General Foulkes in his reply to your letter of February 14th. The Canadian Government was given ample opportunity to scrutinize and comment on the documents dealing with the creation of an integrated European defence force, the establishment of a Supreme Headquarters in Europe and the re-organization of the NATO military structure. At its meeting in London, 12th December, the Military Committee, after amending in a number of particulars its paper on this subject - MC22/5 - approved it and submitted it for the approval of the North Atlantic Defence Committee, on the understanding that the arrangements in Part I would be subject to modification at a later date in the light of the views expressed by the Belgian, Canadian and Portuguese representatives. As you no doubt recall, the amendments proposed by the Belgian and Portuguese representatives dealt with the composition, status and relationship between the Military Committee, Military Representatives Committee and Standing Group. The Canadian amendment proposed that the Council Deputies should receive advice on defence matters from the Military Representatives Committee rather than exclusively from the Standing Group. None of the proposed amendments suggested any changes in the terms of reference for the Supreme Commander or in the manner in which the integrated force would operate under his command. The North Atlantic Defence Committee approved the paper on this subject - DC-24/3(Final) and the North Atlantic Council approved document C6-D/2 dealing with the same subject. Mr. Claxton along with other Defence Ministers wrote a letter to the Chairman of the Council agreeing to the appointment of General Eisenhower.

The extent to which the Canadian Government should retain control over the forces which it has allocated to the Supreme Commander and the precise nature of such control are matters to which we, of course, must give careful consideration. When agreeing to the terms of reference of the Supreme Commander and to the establishment of an integrated force, the various governments involved in fact agreed that the detailed planning and execution of military plans required a high degree of centralization of authority. The governments concerned being represented on the North Atlantic Council, North Atlantic Council Deputies, and on the Military Representatives Committee are in a position: to give the political direction on which military plans are based, to approve the military plans prepared by the military agencies of NATO, to establish the type of command organization

A.D.P. Heeney, Esquire,
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
Ottawa, Canada.

-2-

necessary to carry out agreed military plans, to establish the terms of reference under which the Supreme Commanders operate and to select the Supreme Commanders under whose control their forces will operate. Should a Supreme Commander contravene his terms of reference or exercise his command in such a way as to be disadvantageous to some or all of the forces under his command, he would be answerable to the NATO agencies from which he derived his authority. So long as a Supreme Commander operates within his terms of reference and in an impartial manner to the various national forces under his command, it would seem to me undesirable to place him in the position of having to consult with the various governments on the precise manner in which their forces would be employed in carrying out approved military plans.

The Supreme Allied Commander Europe will have under his command military forces from some ten or eleven nations, speaking seven or eight different languages, with assorted types of military equipment, and he will be required to mould these into an effective integrated force with which to carry out the mission he has been assigned. The very nature of problems such as language, type of equipment, locating in peacetime national forces as close as possible to their own territories will make the Supreme Commander's task very difficult. Both in peace and in the event of hostilities, there will be a limited number of ways in which the Supreme Commander could group and regroup his forces without seriously reducing their overall effectiveness. Referring now to the matter which you raised in paragraph three of your letter, should each government demand to be consulted by the Supreme Commander before he regroups his forces within the area in which he is authorized to operate, I feel that he would have great difficulty in carrying out the task which these governments have given to him. If, for example, Western Berlin is in the area for which the Supreme Commander is responsible and if it is an area in which North Atlantic Treaty forces are permitted to be stationed, I think it would be unwise for individual governments to prohibit the Supreme Commander from employing their forces there. To carry the example to the extreme - if the North Atlantic Council makes the Supreme Commander responsible for the security of a certain area, his task would become impossible if each of the twelve governments prohibited him from employing their forces in the defence of this area. It would therefore seem evident that if any or all of the governments placing forces under the Supreme Commander wish to restrict the manner in which their forces can be employed in carrying out agreed military plans, these restrictions should be discussed at the North Atlantic Council and the Standing Group informed of their precise nature. The Standing Group would then advise the Supreme Commander of the various restrictions in the employment of his force. He, in turn, would then be in a position to say whether or not he could carry out the task assigned to him.

From information which I have received,

.../3

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-3-

I understand that the United Kingdom intends to interfere as little as possible with the Supreme Commander in the exercise of his command over the United Kingdom troops. At Appendix A is given the substance of a telegram from the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff replying to the Standing Group's request for notification of what forces the United Kingdom intends to place under the Supreme Commander. My staff was permitted to copy out the main points of the telegram but not given a copy of it.

Unless information should subsequently come to hand to alter my views, it would appear to me that the Canadian position is protected adequately by our position on the Council, the present terms of reference of the Supreme Allied Commander, and finally by the wording of the Service Order placing our forces under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. The parts of the terms of reference to which I specifically refer are:

"4. The Supreme Commander's peacetime responsibilities include:

(c) Recommendations, to the Standing Group, and to national commanders on deployment of forces, infrastructure, training standards, adequacy of forces, etc., and such other military matters as will affect his ability to discharge his war or peace-time mission."

"5.(d) Authority to make recommendations direct to national Chiefs of Staff on the peacetime deployment of national forces placed, or to be placed under his control, and on logistic and administrative matters affecting the effectiveness or readiness of these forces."

yours sincerely,
W. G. Gress

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REDUIT A SECRET

APPENDIX A

March 1951.

SUBSTANCE OF TELEGRAM DEF-641, DATED 27 FEBRUARY, 1951, FROM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE TO B.J.S.M., IN REPLY TO THE STANDING GROUP'S REQUEST FOR NOTIFICATION AS TO UNITED KINGDOM FORCES TO BE PLACED UNDER SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE.

1. This telegram sets out:
 - (a) The United Kingdom forces which would be placed almost immediately under command of SHAPE
 - (b) The United Kingdom forces to be transferred to SHAPE in the event of hostilities.
2. The forces listed under (a) were those now in Germany, plus one armoured division in training in the United Kingdom. The telegram indicated that the general conditions of transfer shall be limited to those agreed to in D.C.24/3(Final), together with the following specific conditions:
 - (a) The Occupation Forces in Germany to remain available to the United Kingdom High Commissioner for aid to the Civil Power
 - (b) Although United Kingdom troops in Austria and Trieste are shown under Section (b) of the telegram (i.e. to come under command of SHAPE only in the event of war), their commander will be instructed to prepare military plans as directed by SHAPE
 - (c) The Supreme Commander will be given facilities to inspect the training of forces earmarked for SHAPE on the outbreak of war but the land forces in the United Kingdom so earmarked will not be committed to operations without prior approval of the United Kingdom authorities concerned
 - (d) In war, the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff retain the right to direct certain elements of Bomber Command to the following tasks as and when they consider it necessary:
 - (i) Sea mining in connection with the defence of sea communications
 - (ii) Attack on enemy air bases from which the United Kingdom is threatened.

Mr. R. L. Mackay
Mr. Mackay
file RLM

Defence Liaison(1)/J. George/bw

Ottawa, March 14, 1951.

58030-AB-40
58

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY *n*

Canadian Military Liaison With SHAPE

You may have seen General Eisenhower's announcement of March 13th of Colonel Biddle's appointment as Deputy Chief of Staff for National Affairs -- which will mean that he will be in charge of handling relations between General Eisenhower and the National Military Representatives attached to SHAPE.

Press reports mention that Lt.-Colonel A. L. Brady and Wing Commander G. F. Jacobsen have been appointed as "Canada's Staff Officers". This is not quite correct as these Officers will be serving as integrated members of SHAPE's staff, rather than as National Liaison Representatives.

General Clark continues to be the Canadian Liaison Representative with SHAPE, but he is normally represented by Colonel Charlebois, a Canadian Military Attache in Paris.

Brigadier Moncel is, of course, acting as Canada's Military Adviser in Paris for the duration of the European Army Conference, when he will return to the Canadian Joint Staff in London.

Returned to London with my concurrence

RPM.

Defence Liaison Division(1).

original on 50030-A-40

FROM: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA, LONDON, ENGLAND
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

CYPHER - AUTO

SECRET

NO. 633

LONDON, March 14, 1951.
(Rec'd: March 15, 1951.)

Secret. Council Deputies March 13th, SHAPE
information staff.

Before proceeding with the main item on yesterday's agenda on NATO re-organization, Spofford made a brief statement concerning plans for the SHAPE information staff, prefacing his remarks with the comment that there had been a good deal of misunderstanding about the scope and nature of the proposed SHAPE information programme.

2. As a basis for his remarks he relied on the record of a recent meeting between General Gruenther and SHAPE national liaison officers in which Gruenther had referred to the misconceptions which prevailed concerning the SHAPE information programme. As Spofford outlined it, the intention is to limit the SHAPE information programme to (1) a conventional public relations programme, and (2) a SHAPE troop programme for NATO forces which would provide a link between the Supreme Commander and the troops in the interests of morale. It was, however, not envisaged that SHAPE would undertake any psychological warfare operations or would in any sense compete with the NATO Information Service and the national information programmes.

3. The SHAPE information programme itself is still in a formative state and no budget has yet been drawn up.

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- 2 -

Of the present ceiling of 200 SHAPE officers, present plans call for 14 officers in the public relations section. Of these, the majority deal with current press enquiries. Spofford emphasized that in any further developments of the SHAPE information programme the effort would be made to maintain the closest coordination with the NATO Information Service.

HIGH COMMISSIONER

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FROM: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA, LONDON, ENGLAND
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA


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RESTRICTED

Original
50030 AB-46

NO. 635

LONDON, March 14, 1951.
(Rec'd: March 15, 1951).



Restricted. Reference my immediately preceding telegram. Times leading editorial today entitled "Atlantic Partners" after commenting that the title of Colonel Biddle's appointment as "Deputy Chief of Staff for National Affairs" is cumbersome and, indeed, misleading, goes on to point out that the appointment (for which Colonel Biddle is well qualified) would be seriously misunderstood if it were thought that he was to provide the only, or indeed the principal, military link between SHAPE and the governments that will have troops under the Supreme Command.

2. After outlining the "formidable organization of NATO" the editorial refers to the fact that on the military side, as the other committees meet only from time to time and the Standing Group is in permanent session General Eisenhower and the other Supreme Commanders are responsible in the first place to the Standing Group. The editorial then proceeds as follows:
Quote:

Perhaps it works more effectively in practice than it would seem capable of doing in theory. Even so, as the small Standing Group is in fact the decisive body in the whole organization - and as its importance will

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- 2 -

grow as other Supreme Commanders are appointed - the question arises, first, whether it should not be slightly enlarged to make it more representative, and then, if that were done, whether some of the other machinery for ensuring joint responsibility could not usefully be very much simplified. The risk of making the Standing Group too unwieldy would have to be guarded against, but there is much to be said for including in the group a representative of the northern countries, and perhaps another, making six members in all.

Responsibility would, of course, rest all the time with the member governments. Nevertheless, once the central authority of the Standing Group was made more obvious, the whole question of the appointment of Supreme Commanders would be seen in better proportion. It would be plainer to everybody that a Supreme Commander was acting under common authority for the common cause, whether he was an American Admiral in the Atlantic theatre or a British Admiral in the Mediterranean. Nothing can really simplify so vast an organization, which has to have provision for the continual interplay and adjustment of national policies and attitudes; but there are many ways in which it can be made - as it must be made, if it is to work and be understood and accepted - less awkward and less abstruse than it is at present. Its purpose is to make it much easier, not very much harder, to defend the west. Every step towards a simpler efficiency should be taken in these formative weeks before the organization becomes too huge and too hard set. Unquote.

HIGH COMMISSIONER

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Sub. ... Filed...

March 9th, 1951.

Dear

As you know we have had under consideration for some time the question of the relationship of the Canadian forces to be allocated to the Supreme Commander, SHAPE. It is our view that the less complicated the command arrangements the better, bearing in mind that it is our intention to always have Canadian troops under Canadian command but accepting the need for operational control being exercised by other NATO officers.

However, in document C6-D/2 paragraph 42 states:

"The process, timing and detailed conditions, of the transfer of control for national units to operate immediately under control of the Supreme Commander, and the earmarking of additional forces to be placed under his command in the event of war, should be subject to negotiations between the Standing Group and the Supreme Commander and/or the appropriate National Authorities."

Our interpretation of the foregoing paragraph would be that some kind of negotiations are envisaged between the Standing Group and the Supreme Commander and the appropriate National Authorities. Could you make some informal enquiries with the Standing Group as to whether they have in preparation a model or provisional terms of agreement to be used for this purpose, and if so could you obtain a copy so that we may have an opportunity of examining what the Standing Group has in mind to ensure that our legislation and plans are in accordance with what may be required.

Air Vice Marshal H. L. Campbell, CBE, CD,
Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff,
1700 Massachusetts Ave., N. W.,
WASHINGTON, 6, D. C.

Copy to: Mr. A. D. P. Heeney ✓

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- 2 -

For the present I would suggest that this matter remain on an informal basis as it may be sometime before Canadian troops are placed under command of the Standing Group.

Yours sincerely,

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Charles F. J. J. J.
Lieutenant-General

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Chron. Filed.

EXTRACT from Minutes of 486th meeting of the
Chiefs of Staff Committee,
Thursday, 8 March, 1951.

II.

LIAISON BETWEEN SHAPE AND NATIONAL AUTHORITIES
CHARTER
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REDUIT À SECRET

8. The Committee had for consideration a letter from the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs notifying the possibility that the Canadian Government might decide at some later stage that the staff of the Canadian Military Representative to SHAPE should include a political officer from the Department of External Affairs.

(CSC 5-25-4 of 5 March, 1951)

9. The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs stated that it was not the intention of his Department to request that a political officer be included on the staff of the Canadian Military Representative to SHAPE at this time, however, the Department of External Affairs was desirous that no decision be taken which would prevent such an officer being attached to the Military Representative's staff should the future situation warrant.

10. The Chairman pointed out that General Clark only attended meetings of SHAPE when matters of sufficient importance came up for discussion; day-to-day matters were normally dealt with by Colonel Charlebois, the Canadian Military Attache in Paris. On matters requiring a military decision General Clark would obtain the views of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and transmit these views to SHAPE. On matters requiring a political decision the Canadian High Commissioner in London would be consulted. It was considered that

an additional link was not necessary at this time and that it was not desirable to change the present working arrangements.

11. It was agreed, after further discussion, that possibility of including, at some future time, a political officer on the staff of the Canadian Military Representative to SHAPE should not be raised by General Clark with SHAPE at this time.

*Wershoi
+ subject file
C.H.H.*
CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, March 7, 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HEENEY

Item No. 2 on Agenda of Chiefs of Staff Committee for March 8th, 1951

Re: Liaison Between SHAPE and National Authorities -- Charter

On March 1 we wrote CSC, with reference to the draft charter, that the Canadian Government might at some stage decide that the staff of the Canadian Military Representative to SHAPE should include a civilian political officer. We suggested therefore that, when General Gruenther is given the Canadian comments on this document, he be asked to agree that the charter does not exclude the possibility of including political officers in liaison missions.

2. Secretary CSC has circulated your letter and said that this subject will be discussed by the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Commodore Rayner explained over the telephone that the Chairman realized that External Affairs was not at present proposing that there should be a political officer on the staff of the Canadian Military Representative. However, the Chairman thought that the Committee should be consulted before even a mention of the remote possibility was conveyed to General Gruenther. It is clear from Commodore Rayner's remarks that the Chairman is opposed to the whole idea.

3. If the Chiefs of Staff are strongly opposed to the mentioning of the subject at present to SHAPE, it will be open to this Department to revive the question at some later date. I suggest that what should be avoided at the meeting of Chiefs this week is any substantive

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- 2 -

decision against there being a political officer on the staff of the liaison mission. If an adverse substantive decision were recorded, it might prove difficult to obtain its reversal at some future time. In any case there is no reason why any substantive decision should now be made -- no one has yet proposed that there should be a political officer in the mission.

4. Commodore Rayner states that the sending of instructions to CJS, London, to accept the draft charter, is being delayed pending the discussion this Thursday.

5. The annexed telegram, No. 558 of March 5 from Canada House, has just arrived. We are sending to CSC and to the Secretary to the Cabinet a copy of paragraph 1 of this telegram but not of the other paragraphs. Paragraph 2 of the telegram is obviously based on a misunderstanding of our enquiry. We had no thought that the political officers in the national liaison missions might form a political committee. Nor did we think that a political officer in a mission would offer advice to the Supreme Commander. The function of the political officer would be to assist the head of his own mission, i.e., the Canadian Military Representative to SHAPE.

6. It is to be hoped that the Chiefs of Staff Committee this week will not get into a substantive discussion of whether there ought to be a political officer on the staff of the Canadian mission. However, if the Chiefs insist on a substantive discussion, you might consider pointing out that there is a difference between the problems of such a mission in time of peace and its problems during war. There are precedents for having political officers on the staffs of military missions. One of the most prominent examples is provided by the set-up of the occupation machinery in Germany after the war. When we know more later on


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- 3 -

about the functioning of SHAPE and the duties of the Canadian Military Representative to SHAPE, it may be found that our Military Representative could make excellent use of a political officer.

RAM

Defence Liaison Division.



SECRET

Ottawa, March 7, 1951.

file
MW

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE 50030-AB-40

Re Problem of High Level Relations
with SHAPE -- Information Regarding
Similar Problems During the Last War.

A great deal of material regarding the last war is contained in the enclosure to a letter of March 6, 1951, from Colonel Stacey, Historical Section, Department of National Defence, to Mr. MacKay. The enclosure to this letter is a draft history of the relations between Canada and the Combined Chiefs of Staff from 1941 - 45. This in turn will be a part of the narrative on the subject "The Relationship of Canada to the Higher Direction of the War".

Defence Liaison Division.

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CONFIDENTIAL

50030-AB-40	
Sub. 58	File

Ottawa, March 6, 1951.

*File
M. Ward*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

Re: Liaison Between SHAPE and National
Authorities - Charter

.... Supplementing my memorandum to you
of March 1, I enclose telegram No. 558 of March 5
from Canada House.

You will note that the Foreign Office
has no thought of including a political adviser
in the national liaison staff at SHAPE.

Paragraph 2 of the telegram from
Canada House is obviously based on a misunder-
standing of our enquiry. We had no idea that the
political officers in the different liaison
missions might form a political committee. Nor
was it our idea that these political officers
would offer any advice to the Supreme Commander.
If there were a political officer in a liaison
mission, his function would be to assist the
head of his mission, i.e., the National Military
Representative to SHAPE.

We are not giving any circulation to
paragraph 2 of the enclosed telegram.

Dr.

7-3-31/SS
6-3-43/SS

000175

See by Minister

Mar 9

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DOWNGRADED TO SECRET, March 6, 1951

REDUIT A SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

Re Relationship between the Canadian Forces
to be Allocated to SHAPE and the Supreme
Commander

3

I think that you might be interested
in the enclosed correspondence:

- (a) My letter of February 14 to General Foulkes,
- (b) His reply of February 28,
- (c) My letter of March 6.

Document C6-D/2, referred to in the correspondence, was a detailed report by the Military Committee on "The Creation of an Integrated European Defence Force, the Establishment of a Supreme Headquarters in Europe and the Re-organization of the NATO Military Structure". I do not think that you have seen this most important and lengthy document, which was approved by the Council at Brussels in December 1950. If you wish, I will send it to you with a commentary; one was prepared for you before the Brussels Council but, as Mr. Claxton went in your place, it was given to him.

I am obtaining the views of Messrs. N. A. Robertson, Wrong and Wilgress, before recommending a further approach to General Foulkes. It does seem to me that the Canadian Government may want and need to have control over more than the "general welfare and safeconduct of its troops generally", which is General Foulkes' phrase. For example, should the Canadian Government have the right (a) to be consulted on, and (b) to veto, a proposal by the Supreme Commander to move the Canadian brigade from Western Germany to, say, Western Berlin?

A.D.P.H.
A.D.P.H.

CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, March 6, 1951.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY

Re: Liaison Between SHAPE and National
Authorities - Charter

.....
Annexed for your signature is a
self-explanatory memorandum for the Minister.
A separate memorandum is being sent to you
in connection with the item on the agenda for
Chiefs of Staff Committee this week.

*Sent to
minister
7.3.51*

RAM.

Defence Liaison Division.

also letter to Chief.

RAM

6.3.43(us)

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Sub. 58	Chron. Filed.

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March 6, 1951.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY

Re Relationship between the Canadian
 Forces to be Allocated to SHAPE and
 the Supreme Commander

.....
 Annexed for your signature are letters
 to General Foulkes and Messrs. Robertson, Wrong
 and Wilgress, and a memorandum for the Minister.
 I do not think that General Foulkes' letter of
 February 28 disposes satisfactorily of the points
 raised in your letter of February 14th. However,
 it would be useful to have the views of Messrs.
 Robertson, Wrong and Wilgress, and to test the
 re-action of the Minister, before renewing the
 discussion with General Foulkes.

perhaps

RAM.

Defence Liaison Division.

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REDUIT A SECRET

Ottawa, March 6, 1951.

50030-AB-40
58 50

Dear Mr. Wilgress,

Enclosed is a copy of the following correspondence regarding the relationship between the Canadian forces to be allocated to SHAPE and the Supreme Commander:

- (a) My letter of February 14 to General Foulkes,
- (b) His reply of February 28,
- (c) My letter of March 6.

Document C6-D/2, referred to in the correspondence was a detailed report by the Military Committee on "The Creation of an Integrated European Defence Force, the Establishment of a Supreme Headquarters in Europe and the Re-organization of the NATO Military Structure". This basic document was approved by the North Atlantic Council in December 1950 and is no doubt on your files.

I should be grateful for your personal views on the questions raised in the enclosed correspondence. Although thinking in this Department has by no means crystallized, it does seem to me that the Canadian Government may want and need to have control over more than the "general welfare and safeconduct of its troops generally", which is General Foulkes' phrase. For example, should the Canadian Government have the right (a) to be consulted on, and (b) to veto, a proposal by the Supreme Commander to move the Canadian brigade from Western Germany to, say, Western Berlin?

Yours sincerely,

(SGD.) A. D. P. HEENEY

L. D. Wilgress, Esquire,
Canadian High Commissioner
in the United Kingdom,
London, England.

(A.D.P. Heeney)
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

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58 1000. 54 Filed....

~~SECRET~~ - TOP SECRET

Ottawa, March 6, 1951.

Dear Mr. Wrong,

Enclosed is a copy of the following correspondence regarding the relationship between the Canadian forces to be allocated to SHAPE and the Supreme Commander:

- (a) My letter of February 14 to General Foulkes,
- (b) His reply of February 28,
- (c) My letter of March 6.

Document C6-D/2, referred to in the correspondence, was a detailed report by the Military Committee on "The Creation of an Integrated European Defence Force, the Establishment of a Supreme Headquarters in Europe and the Re-organization of the NATO Military Structure". This basic document was approved by the North Atlantic Council in December 1950 and is no doubt on your files.

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Yours sincerely,

(SGD.) A. D. P. HEENEY

(A.D.P.Heeney)

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

H. H. Wrong, Esquire,
Canadian Ambassador,
Washington, D.C.

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REDUIT A SECRET

50030-AB-46
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~~TOP SECRET~~ TOP SECRET

Ottawa, March 6, 1951.

Dear Mr. Robertson,

Enclosed is a copy of the following correspondence regarding the relationship between the Canadian forces to be allocated to SHAPE and the Supreme Commander:

- (a) My letter of February 14 to General Foulkes,
- (b) His reply of February 28,
- (c) My letter of March 6.

Document C6-D/2, referred to in the correspondence, was a detailed report by the Military Committee on "The Creation of an Integrated European Defence Force, the Establishment of a Supreme Headquarters in Europe and the Re-organization of the NATO Military Structure". This basic document was approved by the North Atlantic Council in December 1950 and is no doubt on your files.

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Yours sincerely,

N. A. Robertson, Esquire,
Secretary to the Cabinet,
Office of the Privy Council,
East Block, Ottawa.

(Sgd.) A. D. P. HEENEY

(A.D.P. Heeney)
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

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*Reference
to all*

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REDUIT A SECRET

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Ottawa, March 6, 1951.

*copy # 2 - The Min.
copy # 3 - Mr. Robertson
copy # 4 - Mr. Wrony
" # 5 - Mr. Wiegand*

*40030-AB-4
58 50*

Dear General Foulkes,

I wish to thank you for your letter of February 28 regarding the relationship between the Canadian Forces to be allocated to SHAPE and the Supreme Commander.

Your views will be carefully studied in this Department and I may have some further observations to send to you later on.

In the meantime, however, I wonder if you would consider it desirable to ask CJS (Washington) to ascertain informally from Standing Group whether the latter is preparing any draft documents for use under paragraph 42 of document C6-D/2, which states:

"The process, timing and detailed conditions, of the transfer of control for national units to operate immediately under control of the Supreme Commander, and the earmarking of additional forces to be placed under his command in the event of war, should be subject to negotiations between the Standing Group and the Supreme Commander and/or the appropriate National Authorities".

Lt.-General Charles Foulkes, CB, CBE, DSO,
Permanent Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee,
Department of National Defence,
Ottawa, Ontario.

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I infer from this paragraph that there will be some written understanding between Standing Group and/or SHAPE on the one hand and each national Government on the other. It is possible that Standing Group is drafting a model agreement to be used for this purpose and, if so, it would be helpful to know what it is likely to contain.

Yours sincerely,

(SGD.) A. D. P. HEENEY

(A.D.P.Heeney)

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

MADE IN CANADA

Defence Liaison (1) / M.H. Wershoi / MR

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Your File: CSC 5-25-4


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CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, March 6, 1951.

Copy referred
to: Sec. of the
Cabinet.

The Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee,
Room 4444 "A" Building,
Department of National Defence,
Ottawa, Ontario.



Re Liaison between SHAPE and National
Authorities - Charter

We have received the following information
from Canada House:

"It has been ascertained from the Foreign Office and confirmed from the Ministry of Defence that there is no, repeat no, intention of including a political adviser from the Foreign Office on the national liaison staff at SHAPE. However, Shuckburgh in the Foreign Office revealed that they have been giving thought to general problem of continuing political direction for which there was a feeling that the present Deputies' Standing Group machinery was too cumbersome. They have been wondering on official level whether it might not become desirable for deputies to have their own direct representation at SHAPE".

C. S. A. RITCHIE

for
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

ORIGINAL

FROM: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA, LONDON, ENGLAND
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

CYPHER - AUTO

NO. 558

CONFIDENTIAL

50030-AB-100
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NOT sent.

LONDON March 5, 1951.

MINISTER
UNDR/SEC
D/UNDR SEC
A/UNDR SEC'S.

Washington (letter)

Rale
NW

CS

Confidential. Your telegram No. 388 of March

1. Liaison between SHAPE and national authorities.

1. It has been ascertained from the Foreign Office and confirmed from the Ministry of Defence that there is no, repeat no, intention of including a political adviser from the Foreign Office on the national liaison staff at SHAPE. However, Shuckburgh in the Foreign Office revealed that they have been giving thought to general problem of continuing political direction for which there was a feeling that the present Deputies' Standing Group machinery was too cumbersome. They have been wondering on official level whether it might not become desirable for deputies to have their own direct representation at SHAPE.]

2. My own view is that it would be most undesirable to have political officers attached to national liaison missions at SHAPE, no matter what their role might be. If the twelve officers formed a political committee their coordinated advice would be either inconsistent with deputies' views (which would be chaotic) or identical (which would be needless duplication). If the twelve officers gave separate advice the Supreme Commander would be put in an impossible position. If, on the other hand, their task

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6 MAR 1951

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were to give political advice to the heads of the national liaison missions they would seem to be superfluous since, in the case of Canada, for example, instructions from the Chiefs of Staff to liaison mission would have been drawn up in consultation with External Affairs.

3. The need for continuing political direction to SHAPE is, however, of vital importance and will be one of major responsibilities of the Council Deputies. Experience will show whether this direction should in all cases be channelled through the Standing Group or whether, for some cases involving no, repeat no, strategic decisions, it would be desirable to have direct representation from the deputies at SHAPE

HIGH COMMISSIONER

SEEN
L.B. PEARSON

MAR - 3 1951

CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, March 1, 1951.

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Ent. 58 Chron. ... Filed...

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Meady

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

Re: Liaison Between SHAPE and National Authorities

1. The Chiefs of Staff Committee has received from CJS, London, a draft charter of liaison arrangements, circulated by General Gruenther. The principal provision reads:

"The channel for co-ordination between the respective national Governments and SHAPE is the following:

"For the respective Governments, National military representatives to SHAPE, provided by each NATO country which furnishes armed forces for the defence of Western Europe. These national military representatives will be attached to, but will not be an organic part of, SHAPE."

2. We asked Washington whether there was any thought of including political officers in these liaison missions and the State Department said "no". A similar enquiry is going to Canada House.

3. The question of political officers in liaison missions is separate from the question of a political adviser for SCAPE, and is also separate from the question of high-level political relations between SCAPE and Standing Group on the one hand and national governments on the other. (I have asked Chiefs of Staff Committee to consider the last question).

.... 4. Annexed is a copy of a letter I am sending to Secretary, CSC.

Dr.

A.D.P.H.

2-3-33(SS) A/D.P.
1-2-45/46

Referred to:

Sec. of the Cabinet

with enclosure


Done Mich 2 MW

Your File: CSC 5.25.3

CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, March 1, 1951.

The Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee,
Room 4444 "A" Building,
Department of National Defence,
Ottawa, Ontario.



Liaison between SHAPE and National
Authorities - Charter

With reference to your letter of February 19 to the Chiefs of Staff, a copy of which you sent me, I have only one comment to offer.

2. It is possible that the Canadian Government might decide at some stage, not necessarily at the outset, that the staff of the Canadian Military Representative to SHAPE (i.e., the liaison mission) should include a civilian political officer from the Department of External Affairs.

3. The draft "charter" does not mention such a possibility, nor does it expressly exclude the idea.

4. It seems to me that it would be desirable to ask General Gruenther to agree that the charter does not exclude the possibility of including political officers in liaison missions. If he agrees, it would not mean that a government would be free to appoint a political officer without consulting SHAPE - but at least there would be no necessity to amend the Charter.

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....

5. We asked the Canadian Embassy in Washington and Canada House whether this point has been considered by the State Department and Foreign Office. Enclosed are 12 copies of WA-733 of February 27 from Washington, stating that the State Department is not thinking of having political officers. I will send you the reply from Canada House when it comes.

6. The question of political officers in liaison missions is separate from the question of a political adviser for SCAPE, and is also separate from the question of high-level political relations between SCAPE and Standing Group on the one hand and national governments on the other. (On February 14 I wrote the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee suggesting that the Committee consider the last question).

7. I should be interested to receive in due course a copy of the comments given to General Gruenther by CJS, London.

A.D.P. HEENEY

(A.D.P. Heeney)
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

FILE COPY

Ext. 140

OTTAWA

CONFIDENTIAL

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19

No. 101

I enclose the document (s) listed below.

Sir,

The Canadian High Commissioner
in the United Kingdom,
London, for

Secretary of State for External Affairs.

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

SUBJECT

Teletype WA-733 of February 27
from Washington.

Liaison between SHAPE and national authorities.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

EXT. 97.

MESSAGE FORM

FILE REF.	41	50
50030-AB-40		

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

THE CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, LONDON

TO:

Message To Be Sent

EN CLAIR

CODE

CYPHER

X

Degree of Priority

ORIGINATOR

Sig.

M.H. Wershof/mr

Typed:

Div. Def. Liaison

Local Tel. 7921

APPROVED BY

Sig.

Typed:

Is This Message

Likely To Be Published

Yes () No ()

Internal Distribution:

W.S.S.E.H. ✓

M. George ✓

Done

Date

Copies Referred To:

No. 388

Date

March 1, 1951

For Communications Office Use Only

SENT - MAR - 1 1951

Please see message CJS (1) M-473 from Canadian Joint Staff, London, to Chiefs of Staff Committee, regarding liaison between SHAPE and national authorities.

2. Could you ascertain informally from Foreign Office whether there is any thought of including in the U.K. Liaison Mission a political officer from the Foreign Office. This idea has nothing to do with the possibility that the Supreme Commander himself may have a Political Adviser. Your views also would be appreciated.

3. State Department is not repeat not proposing to include political officers in liaison missions. Copy of teletype 733 of February 27 from Washington is going to you by bag.

Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Done

Date

49-P-274-100M

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BEST AVAILABLE COPY

EXT. ST.

FILE REF.	20000-AB-40
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MESSAGE FORM

OUTGOING

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	CONFIDENTIAL
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FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA
THE CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, LONDON

TO

For Communications Office Use Only

SENT MAR - 1 1951

Date March 1, 1951

No. 388

Message To Be Sent

IN CHAIR

CODE

CYPHER

Degree of Priority

ORIGINATOR

Site

M.H. Wershowitz

Typed

Det. Liaison

Div

Local Tel. 7921

APPROVED BY

Site

Typed

Is This Message

Likely To Be Published

Yes () No ()

Internal Distribution

Done

Date

Copies Retained For

Done

Date

000192

CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, March 1, 1951.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARYRe: Liaison Between SHAPE and National
Authorities

....
Annexed is a telegram from CJS, London, quoting a draft "charter" on this subject proposed by General Gruenther, who desires early agreement. Secretary, CSC, has circulated it for comments. The main clause states:

"The channel for co-ordination between the respective national Governments and SHAPE is the following:

"For the respective Governments, National military representatives to SHAPE, provided by each NATO country which furnishes armed forces for the defence of Western Europe. These national military representatives will be attached to, but will not be an organic part of, SHAPE."

2. We asked Washington whether there was any thought of including political officers in these liaison missions and the State Department said "no". (WA-733 of February 27 annexed). A similar enquiry is going to Canada House.

....

3. The question of political officers in liaison missions is separate from the question of a political adviser for SCAPE, and is also separate from the question of high-level political relations between SCAPE and Standing Group on the one hand and national governments on the other. (You have asked Chiefs of Staff Committee to consider the last question).

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However, the three questions are inter-related. If the Canadian Government does not eventually attain a satisfactory high-level liaison with General Eisenhower, a political officer in our liaison mission at SHAPE might be particularly valuable.

4. Annexed for your signature is a letter to Secretary, CSC, and a memorandum to the Minister. (A copy of the letter to CSC will be referred to the Secretary to the Cabinet).

RAM

Defence Liaison Division(1).

②
*Sent to
Minister
2.3.51*

FROM CHAIRMAN CJS LONDON 161833Z

TO SECRETARY CSC OTTAWA

SPECTRA

CONFIDENTIAL CJS(L) M-473

LIAISON BETWEEN SHAPE AND NATIONAL AUTHORITIES - CHARTER

1. THE CHANNEL FOR COORDINATION BETWEEN THE RESPECTIVE NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS AND SHAPE IS THE FOLLOWING:

a. For the respective Governments, National military representatives to SHAPE, provided by each ^{NATO} country which furnishes armed forces for the defence of Western Europe. These national military representatives will be attached to, but will not be an organic part of, SHAPE.

b. For SHAPE: The Deputy Chief of Staff for national affairs (with assistants and a message center office).

2. The National Military representatives to SHAPE shall be expected to:

a. Represent their respective nations at SHAPE.

b. Present national points of views to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe on all matters under his cognizance.

c. Provide information on military matters, including intelligence information, and appreciations needed by SHAPE, for the fulfillment of its mission.

d. Act as the normal line for the conduct of affairs with SHAPE.

e. Present SHAPE point of view to their respective nations.

f. Serve as observers at conferences as necessary or when requested.

g. Present all pertinent incoming material to SHAPE in coordination with the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for national affairs.

h. Arrange for the accreditation of their nationals assigned or attached for duty to SHAPE, or visiting SHAPE on official business, and clarify that such nationals:

1) Have been properly screened by their government for access to classified materials in accordance with the requirements of

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2) Have been fully indoctrinated in the applicable procedures for the safeguarding of cosmic and other types of classified information and

3) Are authorized by their government to discuss matters involving the disclosure of cosmic top secret, cosmic secret, etc. information. (Indicate specifically the highest security category of information which the national is authorized to receive or discuss).

i. Supervise and execute all national arrangements for administration and logistic support for personnel of their nation assigned to SHAPE that is not furnished by SHAPE from within its organic structure.

j. Furnish personnel to offices of the national military representatives to SHAPE, in numbers commensurate with the mission envisaged by those nations.

3. a. Contact with national military representatives to SHAPE by staff officers of SHAPE shall normally be cleared in coordination with the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for national affairs.

b. Arrangements for official visits by members of SHAPE staff to a NATO country shall be made through the appropriate military representative to SHAPE.

4. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for National Affairs, SHAPE shall:

a. Act as coordinator for national military representatives to SHAPE in their contacts with the integral SHAPE staff:

b. Operate the message center and will be responsible for the maintenance of accreditation and clearance records of its own personnel and of personnel in the offices of the national military representatives to SHAPE.

c. Keep the national military representatives to SHAPE informed of the scheduled conferences and activities of SHAPE in sufficient time to permit observer participation if so desired.

d. Coordinate appointments between national military representatives to SHAPE and various SHAPE staff sections.

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e. Render such advice and assistance to national military representatives to SHAPE and their personnel, as is possible within its capabilities.

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TOP SECRET -

February 28th, 1951

Dear Mr. Heeney:

DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

I would refer to your letter of the 14th of February, regarding the relationship between the Canadian Forces to be allocated to SHAPE and the Supreme Commander.

At the outset, I feel I should make the point that the allocation of Canadian troops to SHAPE is in a much different category than the allocation of troops under a foreign commander or British commander as was done in the last war. In the present case, the Canadian Government has been able to voice its opinion on who the Supreme Commander should be and his terms of reference. Further, General Eisenhower, himself, has made it quite clear that he realizes that he is responsible for his actions to the 12 governments under NATO. I realize that although this holds good for the Supreme Commander, the same argument would not apply to any of his subordinate commanders in the field under which the Canadian formation may be fighting and because of this, I think that the Canadian Government must reserve the right to be responsible for the general welfare and safeconduct of its troops generally. However, as no body of Canadian troops will be allocated to NATO without a senior Canadian officer in command, this should be taken care of by having this operational responsibility to the Canadian Government written into the terms of reference of the Canadian formation commander. Beyond this safeguard, I do not think we should go any further because I feel that the Supreme Commander in charge of operations should have as free a hand as possible regarding the troops under his command. Further, with regard

A.D.P. Heeney, Esq.,
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
East Block,
Ottawa, Canada.

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~~TOP SECRET - COSMIC~~

to General Eisenhower's experience in handling allied troops, I certainly would have complete confidence in his knowledge of how far he can go in dealing with allied troops under his command.

Although the question of what limitations are to be put on the Supreme Commander in respect with employment of and powers in relation to the Canadian force is a matter to be negotiated by the government with the other members of NATO and the Supreme Commander, I feel that such limitations will depend upon political rather than legal considerations. Therefore, from the military point of view, when the time comes for the Canadian Government to direct the Canadian Forces allocated to SHAPE to become under the operational control of the Supreme Commander, I feel all that is required to implement this direction is a service order from the Chief of Staff concerned to the Commander of the Canadian Force that he will obey the Operational Orders of the Supreme Commander. The only proviso being that the Canadian Formation Commander must be held responsible to the Canadian Government for the general welfare and administration of all Canadian troops under his command. He would, therefore, have the right to appeal direct to the Canadian Government if he considered at any time that the demands made on him and his troops were beyond doubt improper, and remedial action had been refused.

Yours sincerely,



ORIGINAL

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

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IMPORTANT

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WA - 733

MINISTER
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A/UNDR SEC'S.

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, February 27, 1951.

Refer by
beg to
Canada House
March 1
AM

Sent to
CSC &
Sec to Cabinet by letter
March 1

Confidential. Following for Heeney. Begins:

Reference your EX-429 of February 26th. Liaison between SHAPE and national authorities.

1. From an informal talk with Ridgway Knight (who has replaced Douglas MacArthur at the State Department), we have learned that the State Department do not (repeat not) propose to include a political officer in the missions to be established for purposes of liaison with SHAPE.

2. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff have received a request from General Eisenhower to appoint a national military representative to be attached to SHAPE and are considering the appointment, for this purpose, of one of their senior military representatives now in Europe, such as Generals Handy, Norstad or Kibler.

3. Douglas MacArthur's move to Paris was due to a personal request made by General Eisenhower to have some individual at the United States Embassy in Paris to whom he could turn in connection with SHAPE arrangements. As a result, MacArthur was appointed Counsellor of Embassy in Paris. There is no plan to attach him to the national military representative to SHAPE.

4. We also gathered from the State Department that General Eisenhower is anxious to proceed very slowly in the building up of national liaison missions attached to SHAPE. The purpose of

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these missions, we gather, is to emphasize the multi-national character of SHAPE, but the function of these missions is, as yet, far from clear.

5. Another point which you will no doubt bear in mind is the possibility that the Council Deputies will be moved to Paris. At present the hold-up, as I have reported elsewhere, is mainly due to United Kingdom objections on which private consultations are taking place with United States representatives. Another consideration we gather, is the attitude of General Eisenhower himself. Although, officially, he has taken the line that his views must not be taken as the determining factor, he has made it clear in private, that he is not really in favour of having all the NATO bodies concentrated in Paris. What he is aiming at, I understand, is to establish an effective team in his headquarters, unencumbered, as far as possible, with relationships with other bodies. He had rather hoped to be able to locate his headquarters in some place removed from Paris, but requirements for effective communications led him finally to agree, somewhat reluctantly, to Versailles. The United States attitude, therefore, has, of necessity, been rather less positively in favour of moving NATO bodies to Paris since General Eisenhower indicated his private views. Nonetheless, we are told that, considering the substantial difficulties which would arise if an attempt were made to move OEEC from Paris to London, the United States authorities are prepared to go ahead with a plan to concentrate NATO and OEEC bodies in Paris if agreement is reached in private with the United Kingdom which would dispose of the latter's objections. Ends.

CANADIAN AMBASSADOR

EXT. 97.

MESSAGE FORM
OUTGOING

FILE REF.	141	SD
50030-AB-40		

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON, D.C.


Message To Be Sent EN CLAIR CODE CYPHER <i>Auth</i> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	No. <i>Ex-429</i>	Date <i>February 24, 1951</i>	Foreign Communications Office Use Only SECRET FEB 26 1951
Degree of Priority			
ORIGINATOR Sig. <i>M.H. Wershof</i> Typed: <i>elb</i> Div. <i>Def. Liaison</i> Local Tel. <i>7921</i>	Following from Heeney, Begins: Liaison between SHAPE and National authorities. Chiefs of Staff Committee has received from Canadian Joint Staff, London, a draft charter (circulated by General Gruenther) of liaison arrangements. 2. The principal provision reads: "THE CHANNEL FOR COORDINATION BETWEEN THE RESPECTIVE NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS AND SHAPE IS THE FOLLOWING: For the respective Governments, National military representatives to SHAPE, provided by each NATO country which furnishes armed forces for the defence of Western Europe. These national military representatives will be attached to, but will not be an organic part of, SHAPE." 3. In considering this draft (on which early comments are required) we are wondering whether there is any thought in Washington that the mission of each national military representative might include a political officer from the national Foreign Office. (This thought has nothing to do with the possibility that the Supreme Commander himself may have a Political Adviser). 2 . . .		
APPROVED BY Sig. <i>[Signature]</i> Typed:			
Is This Message Likely To Be Published Yes () No ()			
Internal Distribution: <i>U.S.S.E.A</i> <i>Mr. George</i>			
Done <i>[Signature]</i> Date <i>Feb 29/51</i>			
Copies Referred To:			
Done Date			

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

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4. We are not repeat not making any proposal at present. Could you however find out informally from State Department what they think of the idea of political officers in national liaison missions? (See your WA585 of February 14 re Douglas MacArthur's move to Paris).
5. An early reply would be appreciated.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.



Copy No. 1 of Four Copies

SECRET

Ottawa, February 24, 1951.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY

Re: Phasing Out of the European Regional Planning Groups and Assumption of Their Tasks by the Standing Group and SHAPE

When the Council of NAT decided to establish SHAPE it also decided (1) that SHAPE should take over from the European Regional Planning Groups all operational planning functions, (2) that in general non-operational planning functions of the Regional Groups should be taken over by the Standing Group, and (3) that the Regional Planning Groups should be abolished. These decisions also apply to the North Atlantic Ocean Region when a Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic is appointed.

2. A Working Party, representing the Standing Group and SHAPE Advance Planning Group, have prepared a report on "Phasing out of the European Regional Planning Groups and assumption of their tasks by the Standing Group and SHAPE". The Military Representatives Committee has sent this report to all NAT countries and has requested that national comments on the paper reach the Military Representatives Committee by March 1.

3. The Chiefs of Staff Committee has sent a copy of the paper to the Department of External Affairs, and has asked for comments immediately in preparation for placing this subject on the agenda of the Chiefs of Staff Committee for Wednesday, February 28.

4. The letter from Secretary, CSC states that, although the report on the future of the European RPGs is not of direct concern to Canada, this report may become a model for use in the case of the North Atlantic Ocean Region, and ultimately in the case of the Canada-U.S.

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Region. Therefore, Canada should examine the report carefully with those possibilities in mind.

5. The report has been studied in Defence Liaison (1), and those paragraphs which relate to intelligence and security have been examined by Mr. Glazebrook. We do not see anything in the report which needs to be changed from the Canadian point of view. However, we should reserve our position with respect to the North Atlantic Ocean and the North American Groups. Annexed for your signature is a letter to Secretary CSC to this effect.

6. Paragraph 7 of the report is of special interest. It is pointed out that the RPGs do many things which necessitate liaison with national authorities. The staff of SHAPE will be international in character and its individual members cannot represent their national interests nor be responsible for liaison with their own national authorities. However, there will be national liaison officers accredited to SHAPE who could be responsible for making the necessary arrangements with national ministries. Also, though some of the functions of the RPGs would be more appropriate to the Standing Group and Military Representatives Committee than to SHAPE, it would not be feasible for the bodies in Washington to look after day-to-day work in Europe. Therefore the practical solution is to transfer these functions to SHAPE, questions only being referred to the Standing Group when it is found impossible to resolve conflicting interests.

RAM

Defence Liaison(1).

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
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Your File: CSC 1162-1(CS)

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

Ottawa, February 24, 1951.

The Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee,
Room 4444 "A" Building,
Department of National Defence,
Ottawa, Ontario.



Phasing out of the European Regional Planning
Groups and Assumption of the Tasks by the
Standing Group and SHAPE

With reference to your letter of February 22,
we have examined the report of the Working Party and
particularly the paragraphs mentioned in paragraph 7 of
your letter.

2. We have no criticisms to offer. On the
other hand, it may well be that some of the recommendations
in the report would not be acceptable if the report were
dealing with North Atlantic Ocean Region instead of with
Europe. For example, in paragraph 7 it is stated that
certain functions should be transferred to SHAPE and not
to the Standing Group and Military Representatives Com-
mittee for the reason that the functions require detailed
work to be done on a day-to-day basis in Europe, which
would not be feasible for the Standing Group or Military
Representatives Committee. If and when the time comes
to abolish the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning
Group, it is possible that the reasoning in paragraph 7
will not be entirely appropriate. As for the Canada-U.S.
Regions, in the event of a Supreme Command structure being
proposed for it at some future time, the considerations
applicable to the functions now exercised by the Canada-
U.S. R.P.G. will be quite different from those applicable
to Europe. However, it seems to me that we will not be

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prejudiced in our consideration of any future reports on the North Atlantic Ocean Region and the Canada-U.S. Region by acquiescing in the present report on the European RPGs.

3. With reference to paragraph 8 of your letter, I suggest that it would be sufficient if, instead of making a "reservation", Canada told the Military Representatives Committee that our comments on the present report (S.G.103/2) did not exclude the possibility that we might have different views when the time comes to consider similar reports relating to the North Atlantic Ocean and the Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Groups.

(A.D.P.Heeney)
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY



Confidential without
Department of National Defence

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

NO. CSC 1158-1

50030 AB-40
58-50

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS
OTTAWA

NATO - CONFIDENTIAL

21 Feb 51

Refer
Done Feb 23 BW
H. Robertson
Allen
Economic
After

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Provision of Budget for SHAPE

1. The following document (4 copies) concerning the above mentioned subject is forwarded for your information:

CJS 311-2 of 16 Feb 51 from Chairman
Canadian Joint Staff Washington and
its enclosure (S.G. 98/2 (Final) dated
13 Feb 51)

2. It is understood that this subject will be considered at an early date by the Panel on the Economic Aspects of Defence Questions.

H.S. Rayner

(H.S. Rayner)
Commodore RCN
Secretary

GHN/3729/hd

Copies to

Deputy Minister

Deputy Minister of Finance

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

CANADIAN JOINT STAFF

1700 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., N. W.
WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

CJS 311-2

16 Feb 51

Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee,
Room 4444, "A" Building,
Department of National Defence,
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.

Provision of Budget for SHAPE

1 Reference is made to CJS 118/15 dated 16 Jan 51.

2 Please find enclosed eight (8) copies of S.G. 98/2 dated 12 Feb 51, a report by the International Ad Hoc Budget Committee which has been circulated for consideration by the Standing Group. The International Ad Hoc Budget Committee, in submitting their report to the Standing Group, emphasized that time was of the essence for the development and implementation of an international budget and accounting system for SHAPE, and has recommended that the Standing Group arrange for interim financial contributions to SHAPE as a matter of great urgency. The International Ad Hoc Budget Committee considers that the international budget will include costs of civilian personnel, accommodations, communications, transpotations, supplies and stores, and hospitality, and that the following costs should be borne by the nation providing personnel, goods or services from which the cost arises:

- (a) personnel support, i.e., military pay, subsistence, etc.,
- (b) provision of existing unoccupied government owned structures.

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
- 2 -

3 The attached paper sets forth a budget and accounting procedure which provides that the Ministers of Defence will examine and give approval to the SHAPE budget which will then be passed to the Council of Deputies for consolidation with other NATO requirements.

4 It is the view of the U.S. that the scale of contributions for the SHAPE budget might be based upon a division of NATO governments into three classes; the largest members - perhaps the U.S., U.K., France, Italy and Canada - might pay the same percentage; the other group of countries - perhaps Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Portugal - might each pay a small portion; Iceland and Luxembourg as a third group paying an even smaller percentage. The U.K. delegation has reserved comment on this U.S. view.

5 The attached report considers that SHAPE shall appoint a dispersing officer to administer immediate requirements and that an interim arrangement shall be put into effect which would continue until a long range plan for sharing SHAPE expenses is put into effect.

6 This paper was tabled at yesterday's meeting of the Military Representatives Committee and then referred to the Council of Deputies, this NATO organization being the appropriate body to issue policy guidance on the bearing of the budget for SHAPE. It would, therefore, be appreciated if you would draw it to the attention of External Affairs.



(Hugh Campbell)
Air Vice Marshal
Chairman
Canadian Joint Staff

Encl. 8


W/K

Defence Liaison/D. H. W. Kirkwood/elb

Ottawa, February 21, 1951

CONFIDENTIALMEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY

The attached article, dated February 16, 1951, by a Herald Tribune staff writer, reports the progress in providing a staff for SHAPE. It is interesting that, while Washington officials appear to favour a lavishly extravagant establishment, General Eisenhower through General Gruenther expresses quite Canadian sentiments about keeping the staff to a minimum!


Defence Liaison Division (1)

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CANADA

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

CSC 5.25.3

No.

Vol. 1

Department of National Defence

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL

19 February, 1951.

21429
Feb 26
Washington

C.G.S.
C.A.S.
C.N.S.
C.D.R.B.

50030-AB-40	
Sub. 50	Chron. 50
Filed.....	

Liaison between SHAPE and National Authorities - Charter

File
Washington

1. Attached is a copy of message CJS(1) M-473 from the Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff, London, which sets out the draft charter for liaison arrangements between SHAPE and the representatives of the national governments.
2. As General Gruenther is most anxious to obtain agreement on this charter as soon as possible, it would be appreciated if you could forward your comment or concurrence at the earliest convenient moment.
3. For your information, General Clark has submitted the following comment in respect of paragraph 2 (I):

"I think this sub-paragraph should be clarified either to indicate what administrative arrangements and logistic support are provided by SHAPE or what administrative arrangements and logistic support should be supplied by the national military representatives. Countries would then know what administrative and logistic arrangements they would have to make. This could be done by re-drafting the paragraph or giving the information in an appendix."

H. S. Rayner

Information copies to:
Minister
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff
Deputy Minister
Secretary to the Cabinet
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.

(H. S. Rayner)
Commodore, RCN,
Secretary.

FROM CHAIRMAN CJB LONDON 161833Z

TO SECRETARY CJC OTTAWA

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SPECTRA

CONFIDENTIAL CJB(L) N-473

LIAISON BETWEEN SHAPE AND NATIONAL AUTHORITIES - CHAIRMAN.

1. THE CHANNEL FOR COORDINATION BETWEEN THE RESPECTIVE NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS AND SHAPE IS THE FOLLOWING:

A. FOR THE RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS: NATIONAL MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES TO SHAPE, PROVIDED BY EACH NATO COUNTRY WHICH FURNISHES ARMED FORCES FOR THE DEFENCE OF WESTERN EUROPE. THESE NATIONAL MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES WILL BE ATTACHED TO, BUT WILL NOT BE AN ORGANIC PART OF, SHAPE.

B. FOR SHAPE: THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR NATIONAL AFFAIRS (WITH ASSISTANTS AND A MESSAGE CENTER OFFICE).

2. THE NATIONAL MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES TO SHAPE SHALL BE EXPECTED TO:

A. REPRESENT THEIR RESPECTIVE NATIONS AT SHAPE.

B. PRESENT NATIONAL POINTS OF VIEW TO THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE ON ALL MATTERS UNDER HIS COGNIZANCE.

C. PROVIDE INFORMATION ON MILITARY MATTERS, INCLUDING INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION, AND APPRECIATIONS REQUESTED BY SHAPE, FOR THE FULFILLMENT OF ITS MISSION.

D. ACT AS THE NORMAL LINK FOR THE CONDUCT OF AFFAIRS WITH SHAPE

E. PRESENT SHAPE POINT OF VIEW TO THEIR RESPECTIVE NATIONS.

F. SERVE AS OBSERVERS AT CONFERENCES AS NECESSARY OR WHEN REQUESTED.

G. PRESENT ALL PERTINENT INCOMING MATERIAL TO SHAPE IN COORDINATION WITH THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR NATIONAL AFFAIRS

H. ARRANGE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THEIR NATIONALS ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED FOR DUTY TO SHAPE, OR VISITING SHAPE ON OFFICIAL BUSINESS, AND CLARIFY THAT SUCH NATIONALS:

1) HAVE BEEN PROPERLY SCREENED BY THEIR GOVERNMENT FOR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED MATERIALS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF DC 2/1 UND

2) HAVE BEEN FULLY INDOCTRINATED IN THE APPLICABLE PROCEDURES FOR THE SAFEGUARDING OF COSMIC AND OTHER TYPES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND

3) ARE AUTHORIZED BY THEIR GOVERNMENT TO DISCUSS MATTERS INVOLVING THE DISCLOSURE OF COSMIC TOP SECRET, COSMIC SECRET, ETC. INFORMATION. (INDICATE SPECIFICALLY THE HIGHEST SECURITY CATEGORY OF INFORMATION WHICH THE NATIONAL IS AUTHORIZED TO RECEIVE OR DISCUSS).

I. SUPERVISE AND EXECUTE ALL NATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTIC

- 2 -

SUPPORT FOR PERSONNEL OF THEIR NATION ASSIGNED TO SHAPE THAT IS NOT FURNISHED BY SHAPE FROM WITHIN ITS ORGANIC STRUCTURE.

J. FURNISH PERSONNEL TO OFFICES OF THE NATIONAL MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES TO SHAPE, IN NUMBERS COMMENSURATE WITH THE MISSION ENVIAGED BY THOSE NATIONS.

3. A. CONTACT WITH NATIONAL MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES TO SHAPE BY STAFF OFFICERS OF SHAPE SHALL NORMALLY BE CLEARED IN COORDINATION WITH THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR NATIONAL AFFAIRS.

B. ARRANGEMENTS FOR OFFICIAL VISITS BY MEMBERS OF SHAPE STAFF TO A NATO COUNTRY SHALL BE MADE THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE TO SHAPE.

4. THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR NATIONAL AFFAIRS, SHAPE SHALL:

A. ACT AS COORDINATOR FOR NATIONAL MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES TO SHAPE IN THEIR CONTACTS WITH THE INTEGRAL SHAPE STAFF;

B. OPERATE THE MESSAGE CENTER AND WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF ACCREDITATION AND CLEARANCE RECORDS OF ITS OWN PERSONNEL AND OF PERSONNEL A IN THE OFFICES OF THE NATIONAL MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES TO SHAPE.

C. KEEP THE NATIONAL MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES TO SHAPE INFORMED OF THE SCHEDULED CONFERENCES AND ACTIVITIES OF SHAPE IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO PERMIT OBSERVER PARTICIPATION IF SO DESIRED.

D. COORDINATE APPOINTMENTS BETWEEN NATIONAL MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES TO SHAPE AND VARIOUS SHAPE STAFF SECTIONS.

E. RENDER SUCH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE TO NATIONAL MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES TO SHAPE AND THEIR PERSONNEL, AS IS POSSIBLE WITHIN ITS CAPABILITIES.

2209/TB/1713458 FEB 51

FROM CHAIRMAN CJS LONDON 161833Z

TO SECRETARY CSC OTTAWA

SPECTRA

CONFIDENTIAL CJS(L) M-473

LIAISON BETWEEN SHAPE AND NATIONAL AUTHORITIES - CHARTER

2. THE CHANNEL FOR COORDINATION BETWEEN THE RESPECTIVE NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS AND SHAPE IS THE FOLLOWING:

A. For the respective Governments, National military representatives to SHAPE, provided by each ^{NATO} country which furnishes armed forces for the defence of Western Europe. These national military representatives will be attached to, but will not be an organic part of, SHAPE.

b. For SHAPE: The Deputy Chief of Staff for national affairs (with assistants and a message center office).

2. The National Military representatives to SHAPE shall be expected to:

a. Represent their respective nations at SHAPE.

b. Present national points of views to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe on all matters under his cognizance.

c. Provide information on military matters, including intelligence information, and appreciations needed by SHAPE, for the fulfillment of its mission.

d. Act as the normal line for the conduct of affairs with SHAPE.

e. Present SHAPE point of view to their respective nations.

f. Serve as observers at conferences as necessary or when requested.

g. Present all pertinent incoming material to SHAPE in coordination with the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for national affairs.

h. Arrange for the accreditation of their nationals assigned or attached for duty to SHAPE, or visiting SHAPE on official business, and clarify that such nationals:

1) Have been properly screened by their government for access to classified materials in accordance with the requirements of

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- 2 -

2) Have been fully indoctrinated in the applicable procedures for the safeguarding of cosmic and other types of classified information and

3) Are authorized by their government to discuss matters involving the disclosure of cosmic top secret, cosmic secret, etc. information. (Indicate specifically the highest security category of information which the national is authorized to receive or discuss).

1. Supervise and execute all national arrangements for administration and logistic support for personnel of their nation assigned to SHAPE that is not furnished by SHAPE from within its organic structure.

j. Furnish personnel to offices of the national military representatives to SHAPE, in numbers commensurate with the mission envisaged by those nations.

3. a. Contact with national military representatives to SHAPE by staff officers of SHAPE shall normally be cleared in coordination with the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for national affairs.

b. Arrangements for official visits by members of SHAPE staff to a NATO country shall be made through the appropriate military representative to SHAPE.

4. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for National Affairs, SHAPE shall:

a. Act as coordinator for national military representatives to SHAPE in their contacts with the integral SHAPE staff:

b. Operate the message center and will be responsible for the maintenance of accreditation and clearance records of its own personnel and of personnel in the offices of the national military representatives to SHAPE.

c. Keep the national military representatives to SHAPE informed of the scheduled conferences and activities of SHAPE in sufficient time to permit observer participation if so desired.

d. Coordinate appointments between national military representatives to SHAPE and various SHAPE staff sections.

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- 3 -

e. Render such advice and assistance to national military representatives to SHAPE and their personnel, as is possible within its capabilities.

2209/TS/171345Z FEB 51

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Subject.....

NATO

Date.....

FEB 16 1951

Publication.....

N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE

SHAPE Staff Rounding Into Working Order

200 Expected to Take Over
Operational Control of
Atlantic Force in March

By Walter Kerr

From the Herald Tribune Bureau

Copyright, 1951, New York Herald Tribune Inc.

PARIS, Feb. 15.—Lt. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, chief of staff to General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, said here today that Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) probably will be ready to assume operational control of the North Atlantic defense force by the middle of next month. By that time, he estimated, the opening phase should be ended and an integrated staff of 200 officers ready for work.

This staff will include, in addition Gen. Gruenther, two deputy chiefs of staff and five assistant chiefs of staff, in charge, respectively, of personnel, intelligence, organization and training, plans and operations, and logistics. Only the logistics section will be directed by an American.

The fact that a separate section will handle organization and training emphasizes the character of the assignment cut out for SHAPE. Normally these functions are dealt with by the same officers who are concerned with plans and operations, but SHAPE must help to create as well as direct the armed forces put at its disposal.

Staff Cut From 600 to 200

Gen. Gruenther said that the advance group, which is now at the Hotel Astoria in Paris, consists of seventy-nine American officers and forty-three officers from other Allied countries, not counting twenty non-American officers on liaison duty. They recommended a final staff of more than 600, but this figure was cut to 200.

"One section," Gen. Gruenther said, "asked for eighty-five officers. I accepted twenty, and the screams could have been heard way down at the Place de la Concorde."

He told a press conference that Brig. Gen. Charles T. Lanham, public information officer, will head a division of just nine officers. "Washington," Gen. Lanham said later, "estimated that it would take 150 to get this going."

It was Gen. Eisenhower's belief, according to Gen. Gruenther, that the staff should be as small as possible. It was recognized that 200 officers in all might not be enough, but for the time being they preferred to err on the short side rather than on the long side.

Gen. Gruenther opened the conference with a fluent if grammatically inaccurate explanation in French which expressed his regret at not yet being able to speak French. All American officers, including himself, he said are studying it, and he thought he would be able to get along "apres

peut-etre cinq mois" (perhaps after five months).

Confidence in Europe

All members of the SHAPE command, he went on in English, are approaching their task with the same confidence in the rejuvenation of European spirit that Gen. Eisenhower spoke about in his report to Congress on Feb. 1. Gen. Gruenther noted that Allied military appropriations today are four times what they were last June.

In the search for the site of a permanent headquarters, he said, eighteen French cities had been surveyed and the Versailles area is now under consideration. It is planned to build there temporary structures which can be added to as the situation requires. Most officers and their wives will be expected to find accommodations in Paris.

Gen. Gruenther said other questions will be answered after Gen. Eisenhower returns to Paris next week, among them the post to which Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery and Gen. Alphonse

Juin will be named, and the number of regional commands that will operate under SHAPE. It has been reported that Field Marshal Montgomery will be named deputy supreme commander and Gen. Juin commander of the central group.

Officers of the various nationalities (all twelve members of the Atlantic pact are represented except Luxembourg, Iceland and Portugal) are mixing well together in the advance group, he said. He reported that 600 American active and reserve officers in the United States have applied for service here, among the reservists being many men holding highly paid civilian positions.

Good public
relations work!

COSMIC - TOP SECRET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

(Note: As this is a Cosmic paper it is requested that it be returned when it has served your purpose)

FILE NO. CSC 5-27-0-4 TD 46

(A/SEC)

RESTRICTED WITHOUT ENCLOSURE


Office of the Secretary,
National Defence Headquarters,
Ottawa, Ontario.

Date: 15 February, 1951.

C.G.S.
C.A.S.
C.N.S.

Memorandum To: C.D.R.B.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUT A SECRET



Subject:

Transfer of control of national forces allocated
to SHAPE - message Stand 51 from Standing Group

The following document concerning the above named
subject is forwarded for your information and retention, please.

Copy of memorandum dated 14 Feb 51 from the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff
Committee to the Minister of National Defence forwarding text of message
CJS 173 dated 13 Feb 51 from Washington.

Copy to: Deputy Minister
Under-Secretary of State for
External Affairs.

(H.S. Rayner)
Commodore, RCN,
Secretary.

COSMIC TOP SECRET

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FILE COPY

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DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, February 14, 1951.

Dear General Foulkes:

In view of the probability of some Canadian forces being sent to Europe within the next few months, I wonder if consideration should not be given to the problem of the relationship between these Canadian forces and the Supreme Command (SCAPE)?

I realize that a good deal of work has already been done on this subject in NATO and that we have a number of documents (notably C6-D/2 of December 16, 1950) setting forth the terms of reference of SCAPE and the functions of SHAPE, in peace and war. Although the documents I have mentioned was approved by the Brussels Council, I suppose that there are still many details, and even points of principle, that may have to be changed to meet General Eisenhower's wishes. Now that General Eisenhower has completed his European tour, the Standing Group will, I suppose, be raising with the Military Representatives Committee a number of further problems that will have to be ironed out before national forces are incorporated in the Atlantic integrated force. Before the Military Representatives Committee is faced with concrete proposals from the Standing Group, it might be desirable to review the existing NATO documents, which have come from the Standing Group and the Deputies, to

Lt.-General Charles Foulkes, CB, CBE, DSO,
Permanent Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee,
Department of National Defence,
Ottawa, Ontario.

../2

- 2 -

see whether there are changes

- (a) in the present terms of reference of the Supreme Commander, and
- (b) in the relationship between the Deputies, the Standing Group, and the Supreme Commander,

which we should attempt to have accepted.

The question of the legal status of national forces of one North Atlantic country serving in the territory of another is, at present, being studied by the Legal Division of our Department as a separate problem, and the Judge Advocate General is being consulted on the terms of a draft North Atlantic agreement tabled in the Deputies by the United States Government. The draft agreement does not deal with questions of relations with the high command, but only with technical legal matters, such as powers of courts martial and tax exemptions.

The principal problem which I am inclined to think should be examined is the question of the type of agreement which it would be appropriate for the Canadian Government to make with the Standing Group and/or the Supreme Commander when committing Canadian forces to his command. In paragraph 42, page 14, of document C6-D/2, it is stated that,

"The process, timing and detailed conditions, of the transfer of control for national units to operate immediately under control of the Supreme Commander, and the earmarking of additional forces to be placed under his command in the event of war, should be subject to negotiations between the Standing Group and the Supreme Commander and/or the appropriate National Authorities".

While many of the problems which will be raised in these negotiations will be purely military, there will be others of a political or governmental character. The experience of the last war suggests that difficulties arising out of any uncertainties as to the powers of allied

.../3

- 3 -

commanders over Canadian forces, often have to be resolved at a governmental level. It is for this reason that I suggest that, if you agree, the Chiefs of Staff Committee should have prepared a paper examining the problem and setting out the points which, in the Canadian interest, it would be advisable to cover in any agreement between the Canadian Government and SCAPE. I think you will agree that, while the Government's experience during the last war was generally happy, certain misunderstandings might have been avoided had Allied Commanders been quite clear as to their authority over the use and disposition of Canadian forces committed to their command.

Yours sincerely,

(SGD.) A. D. P. HEENEY

A.D.P. Heeney,
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

Copy No. 1 of 4 Copies

Defence Liaison/J.George/bw

~~TOP SECRET~~ - TOP SECRET

February 12, 1951.

5-0030-AB-40
58
I have signed
the letter to Foulkes
No use sending me
- letter we can send on
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY

Definition of Supreme Commander's
Authority over any Canadian Forces
Committed to his Command

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

The problems of North Atlantic reorganization with which we have been dealing have resolved themselves into two principal categories:

- (a) civil-military relationships (i.e., between Deputies and the Standing Group);
- (b) military relationships (i.e., between governments and national forces on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander and the Standing Group on the other).

While the problem of civil-military relationships now being discussed in the Deputies is, I think, primarily one for our Department to tackle, a further problem is going to arise shortly on which we should probably be seeking the views of National Defence. Although your knowledge and recollection of such matters is much more complete than ours, I believe that during the last war there were occasions when the Canadian Government felt it necessary to intervene with the U.K. Government concerning the use and disposition of Canadian forces, and points of friction also arose between Canadian and British Commanders. Unless relationships are clearly established between the Canadian Government and SHAPE, we may run into troubles of this kind. We are therefore suggesting, in a letter attached for your consideration to General Foulkes, that the Chiefs of Staff Committee have a paper prepared defining the type of agreement between the Canadian Government and the Supreme Commander that would be satisfactory from the Canadian point of view. We would expect that the Joint Planning Staff would prepare such a paper and that Mr. Côté, as the Department's member on the J.P.S., would have any views of our Department incorporated in the paper.

- 2 -

This task will be related to, but will not overlap, Legal Division's current study of a draft North Atlantic agreement on the legal status of armed forces. This draft agreement, by the way, does not deal with questions of relations with the high command, but only with technical-legal matters such as powers of courts martial, and tax exemptions.

I should like also to draw your attention to Colonel Turcot's report from Paris, attached, on the proposed organization and command structure of SHAPE. It seems clear from Colonel Turcot's report that, in both organization and numbers, SHAPE will be predominantly a United States organization, although probably not so overwhelmingly as the advance planning staff now in Paris, which has a total of 157 officers, of whom 114 are United States officers. This is a further reason for taking a good look at our relationship with SHAPE before Canadian troops are sent to Europe.



Defence Liaison Division.

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Copy No. 1 of 4 Copies

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, February 10, 1951
~~DOWN~~ ~~SECRET~~

REDUIT A SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

General Eisenhower's Report
to the
Military Representatives Committee

50030-AB-40

58. Check. Filed....

General Foulkes has sent us a long telegram from A/V/M Campbell on this subject. General Eisenhower made observations on each country he had visited, but as you have already heard what he had to say about other countries when he reported to the Cabinet, I am only quoting what he had to say about Canada and our manpower policy, together with short quotes on the need for equipment, and on his general strategic plans.

Visit to Ottawa

The General said he had enjoyed his visit tremendously and was very pleased to meet old friends again. He saw his first Communist of the trip in Ottawa and knew he was a Communist because he had a big placard on him. He pointed out that Canada was the only country in NATO without compulsory service, but that she was doing everything possible she could do on the present basis. He spoke of the Canadian activity on production and of switching to US equipment. He also spoke of Canada's activity in transferring valuable types of equipment to other areas. He mentioned the fact that we were anxious to fill our factories but that there were problems and specified the long negotiation still in progress with reference to the transfer to the U.K. of F.86's. He stated that he had gone through Canadian plans generally and that they were logical as long as a voluntary basis was to be used.

.. / 2

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12-2-27(55) R.A.V.L.P.
10.2.35 (20)

- 2 -

Equipment

The cry everywhere was for equipment for use in training and to get units into being. For this reason he has stressed the equipment aspect in his talks in Washington. He is most anxious that all production capacity should be filled and mentioned capacity standing idle both in Italy and in the Netherlands.

Strategy

(sic)

The General replied that he felt the defence of Western Europe was a three element task with sea/air flanks and land/air centre. The flanks he said a sea command and felt that the existence of strong forces in the Mediterranean and off behind Norway would have "a hell of a deterrent effect". He saw his task as being the arrangement for tactical and strategic co-operation of these three. Political and other considerations would come in. One headquarters had to command. The task could not be done by committee. He found no one to argue on this concept though he was not certain he had sold the U.K. home fleet.



A. D. P. H.

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Ext. 181B

FILE COPY

OTTAWA FILE	
No.	50030-A B-4
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SEARCHED	INDEXED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
SECRET	

Letter No. D-703

Date..... February 10, 1951.

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London

Reference..... Our Telegram No. 184 of February 10, 1951.

Subject:..... Standing Group's proposals for an
international budget for SHAPE.

As explained in our telegram under reference,
we are enclosing one copy of a letter of February 5
from the Director of the International Economic
Relations Division of the Department of Finance
to the Deputy Minister of National Defence.

JAMES GEORGE

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Copies Referred

To.....
.....
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.....
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No. of Enclosures

..... 1

Post File

No.....

Defence Liaison/J.George/bw

CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, February 6, 1951.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY

Canadian Appointments to SHAPE

According to the Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, National Defence plan to send two officers to SHAPE. They will be integrated, probably in the Training and Operations Sections. One will probably be a Lieutenant-Colonel and the other a Wing Commander. Most other countries participating in SHAPE have already made three or four appointments. No doubt the matter will be discussed in the Chiefs of Staff Committee shortly.

Defence Liaison Division.

SECRET

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CJS(L) 30)13B
CJS(L) 270


CANADIAN JOINT STAFF, LONDON

Canada House,
London, S.W.1.

26 Jan 51

The Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee,
'A' Building,
Department of National Defence,
Army Headquarters,
Ottawa, Canada.

SHAPE




1. The following information has been received from Lt-col G.A. Turcot, Canadian Representative at SHAPE Advance Planning Group:-

- (a) Diagram of proposed organization for the Supreme Headquarters tentatively approved by General Eisenhower during his short stay in Paris - attached as Appendix 'A';
- (b) Diagram showing the Command structure under SHAPE approved by General Eisenhower and already reported by telegram No. CJS(L) M.402 - attached as Appendix 'B';
- (c) Table showing breakdown of all allied officers at SHAPE Advance Planning Group as of 24 Jan 51 - attached as Appendix 'C'.

S.F. Clark

(S.F. Clark) Major-General
Chairman
Canadian Joint Staff London

Encl:

SECRETORGANIZATION - SHAPE

Note 1. Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

Note 2. Probably from UK

Note 3. General Gruenther

Note 4. One of these appointments to be provided by the French and one by the British.

Adjutant
General


Headquarters
Commandant

- Note 1. Supreme Allied Commander Europe.
- Note 2. Probably from UK
- Note 3. General Gruenther
- Note 4. One of these appointments to be provided by the French and one by the British.
- Note 5. Colonel Anthony D. Biddle to be promoted to the rank of General. (Exact rank not known)
- Note 6. General Gruenther to decide which country to provide.
- Note 7. Public Information Office.
- Note 8. At present composed of officers from the US, UK, France and Italy.
- Note 9. Strength of Headquarters to be 200 officers integral to SHAPE plus National Military Representatives (approximately 45)

APPENDIX 'B'

SECRET

COMMAND STRUCTURE
SHAPE



RESTRICTED

SHAPE ADVANCE PLANNING GROUP

Breakdown of Officers

	Col			Capt Navy	Total Cols or Equiv.			Lt-Col Army	Lt-Col Air	Comdr Navy	Total Lt- Cols or Equiv.			Major Army	Major Air	Lt-Comdr Navy	Total Majors or Equiv.
	Army	Air															
U.S.	19	4	3		26	22	5		2		29	15				15	
U.K.	3	1			4	2	2				4	2				2	
FRANCE	4	1			5							4				4	
NETHERLANDS		1			1	1			1		2	1	2			3	
ITALY												2				2	
DENMARK	1				1				1		1	3				3	
NORWAY									1		1	1	1			2	
BELGIUM						1					1						
CANADA						1					1						
TOTAL	27	7	3		37	27	7		5		39	28	3			31	

Capt Army 19

Capt Air

Lieut Navy

2 1

21

1

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It-Comdr Navy
Total Majors or Equiv.

	15
	2
	4
	3
	2
	3
	2
	31

Appendix 'C'

Total Offrs not above

Sub-

Capt Army Capt Air Capt Navy Total Capts Lieut Army Lieut Air Sub- Lieut Navy Total Lieuts Army 2/Lts Air Navy 2/Lts Total Col

19				19	17	1		18	3			3	110	4 (i)	114
													10	1 (ii)	11
2	1			3									12		12
													6		6
					1			1					3	1 (iii)	4
													5		5
													3		3
													1		1
													1		1
21	1			22	18	1		19	3			3	151	6	157

(i)

General Dwight D. Eisenhower
Lt.General A.M.Gruenther
Brig.Gen.Cortlandt Van R.Schuyler (Deputy Chief of Staff until return of Gen. Gruenther)
Maj.Gen.Howard Mc.C.Snyder (Assignment not known)

(ii)

Brigadier P.H.de Havilland (UK Representative)

(iii)

Brigadier-General Fernando Moech. (Italy Representative)

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Copy No. 1 of 3 Copies

Defence Liaison/J.George/bw

TOP SECRET - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Ottawa, January 26, 1951.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY

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NATO Military Reorganization and
General Eisenhower's Terms of Reference

For some time we have realized that the Minister should see the papers approved by the Brussels meeting of the North Atlantic Council on this subject, and the commentaries prepared for the Minister before the Council. When the Government ask Parliament to approve the sending of the balance of the Canadian Army Special Force to Europe to be placed under General Eisenhower's command, questions may be asked as to General Eisenhower's powers, and the organization in which the Canadian forces will be placed. The attached memorandum was drafted before the Minister left for New York and rather than waiting for his return, you may wish to send it to Mr. LePan to hold for the Minister.

Defence Liaison Division.

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January 25, 1951

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

Terms of Reference of General Eisenhower's
Command and Reorganization of NATO Military
Structure Following his Appointment

Before the North Atlantic Council met in Brussels, we had prepared for you a commentary on the draft terms of reference for General Eisenhower and the plans for re-organizing the military structure of NATO following his appointment, as these subjects were to be considered by the Council.

2. Because Mr. Claxton took your place at the Council, you did not see the documents on this important subject, which has far-reaching implications not only for the Canadian forces that may be committed to General Eisenhower's Command, but also for the relationship of Canada (and other North Atlantic countries which are not members of the Standing Group) to the higher strategic direction of a war.

3. The "higher political direction", which, as you will recall, the North Atlantic Council decided at its September session in New York should be exercised by the Council Deputies when the Council is not in session, has been watered down in the terms of reference as approved by the Brussels Council, to "political guidance" for the Supreme Commander. If the Standing Group disagree with the political guidance which the Deputies wish to be transmitted to the Supreme Commander, the Standing Group have been given the right to modify the Deputies' political guidance or hold it up until a meeting has been called of either the Defence Committee or the Council to settle the dispute. In other words, the Standing Group have a kind of veto on any political guidance that does not come from a ministerial body. The Deputies will not have direct access (other than through informal personal contacts) to the Supreme Commander, and their views must all be

- 2 -

channelled through the Standing Group. Although the Standing Group has, under pressure from Canadian and other representatives, established a Military Representatives Committee for the purpose of facilitating consultation with accredited military representatives of non-member countries, I do not think the Canadian Government should count too heavily on being able to make its views effective on strategic matters through either the Deputies or the Military Representatives Committee. The writing on the wall is already clear that if there should be a war, the higher strategic direction would be determined principally by the U.S. Chiefs in co-operation with the U.K. Chiefs and to a lesser extent with the French Chiefs. We should have to rely, as during the last war, more upon informal and personal contacts with the U.S. and U.K. Governments at the top political and military levels.

4. In this connection, you may also wish to look at a memorandum on Canada's relation with SHAEF during the last war. This memorandum was also prepared for the Brussels meeting.



A.D.P.H.

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CANADIAN JOINT STAFF
LONDON.

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CJS(L)269
24 Jan 51

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Shackay
Wendoff
H. Kirkwood

SHAPE Advanced Planning Group

1. The following information on assignment of officers to planning sections has been received from Col. Turcot:

INTELLIGENCE

G/C Whitehead	Air	U.K.
Capt. Goussault	Army	France
Cdr. Van Dulm	Navy	Netherlands
Maj. Heyerdahl	Army	Norway

ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING

Maj. de la Hitte	Army	France
Maj. Burgess	Army	U.K.
Maj. Rothuizen	Army	Netherlands
Maj. Bierrum	Army	Denmark
Maj. Ryg	Air	Norway

PLANS AND OPERATIONS

Maj. Lazzi-Gazzini	Army	Italy
Col. Mesnet	Army	France
Cdr. Kjeholt	Navy	Norway
Col. Reynierse	Air	Netherlands
Col. Chamier	Army	U.K.
Col. Marias	Air	France

LOGISTICS

W/C Twedde	Air	U.K.
Col. Ailleret	Army	France
Maj. van Marle	Army	Netherlands
Maj. Jensen	Army	Denmark

SIGNALS.

Col. Schotte	Army	France
Maj. Martinet	Army	France
Capt. Mangin	Air	France

(1 Col and 1 Maj from United Kingdom)

PERSONNEL

Maj. Oele	Air	Netherlands
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(1 Maj from United Kingdom)

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CJS(L)269

SECRETARIAT

Col. Price
Maj. Murero

Army
Army

U.K:
Italy

S. F. Clark

(S.F. Clark) Major-General.

(This Document is The Property of His Majesty's Canadian Government)

Mr. Glazebrook
in writing
on this
copy



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CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE
JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS,
OTTAWA, 18 Jan 51

Joint Planning Committee

Brussels Meeting on Western Defence
(Telegram A. No. 1 Saving)

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1. Attached herewith is a copy of a document concerning the marginally noted subject which is for your information and retention.

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18 JAN 1951

K.C. Cooper
(K.C. Cooper)

Commander, RCN
Secretary,
Joint Planning Committee

DISTRIBUTION

Copy No. Brigadier Gibson
 Commodore Bidwell
 Air Commodore Godwin
 Captain Piers
 Colonel Cook
 Group Captain Hodson
 Mr. Glazebrook
 File

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OUTWARD SAVING TELEGRAM FROM
COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE

(BY AIR MAIL)

TO:	AUSTRALIA	(GOVT.)
	NEW ZEALAND	"
	SOUTH AFRICA	"
	INDIA	"
	PAKISTAN	"
	CEYLON	"

RPTD: CANADA

(DATED 2nd January, 1951)

PRIORITY

A. No. 1 SAVING SECRET

BRUSSELS MEETINGS ON WESTERN DEFENCE

On December 18th, 19th and 20th meetings were held in Brussels of the North Atlantic Defence Committee, the North Atlantic Council and the Brussels Treaty Consultative Council. There was also a tripartite meeting between Mr. Acheson, Mr. Schuman and Mr. Bevin.

2. The North Atlantic Defence Ministers first met alone and later attended the meetings of the Council. From the meetings of these two North Atlantic Treaty bodies two major decisions emerged:-

(1) It was finally agreed to establish an Integrated Force for the defence of Western Europe with a Supreme Headquarters Atlantic Powers Europe (S.H.A.P.E.) under General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander, and to urge Governments to take immediate steps to make their national contributions to the Force.

(11) Agreement was reached on the conditions of a German contribution to the defence of Western Europe and it was left to the three Occupying Powers to discuss the question with the German Federal Government.

3. Important decisions were also taken with the general aim of simplifying the North Atlantic Treaty structure:-

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(i) When S.H.A.P.E. and the Integrated Force are established the present structure of Regional Planning Groups will disappear. Their work will be handed over either to the Standing Group or to S.H.A.P.E. (which will be directly responsible to the Standing Group). At the same time arrangements will be made for associating the non-Standing Group powers more closely with the work of the Standing Group through a Committee of Military Representatives meeting in Washington.

(ii) The Military Production and Supply Board will be replaced by a Defence Production Board, whose tasks are more closely defined and which has been specifically charged with co-ordinating and integrating national production programmes. The new Board will have under it an international staff headed by a Director, who will sit on the Board and be responsible for the continuing work of the organisation. The new international staff will replace the existing Permanent Working Staff of the Military Production and Supply Board.

(iii) On the basis of certain Canadian proposals for the amalgamation of the three North Atlantic ministerial committees (i.e. Foreign Defence and Finance Ministers) the Council Deputies were instructed to examine whether the present structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation required modification.

4. The question of Germany's contribution to Western defence was subsequently considered at a tripartite meeting between Mr. Acheson, Mr. Schuman and Mr. Bevin. It was agreed that no written documents should be handed to the Germans and no questions put which required the answers 'yes' or 'no'. The High Commissioners would merely discuss the matter with the Chancellor on the basis of the Council's report. It was also agreed that these discussions would certainly raise the broader question of Occupation

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controls, and that these would have to give way progressively to contractual arrangements. Accordingly, preliminary discussions with the Germans will shortly take place to enable the High Commissioners to make recommendations to their Governments on the broad outline of these new arrangements and the difficulties that will have to be overcome. Thus all outstanding problems including defence will be explored. The general aim will be to arrive at a mutually satisfactory arrangement between the Western Powers and Germany without either undue delay or undue haste.

5. The Three Foreign Ministers also agreed on the terms of their reply (now published) to the Soviet Government's proposal for a four-Power meeting.

6. The Brussels Treaty Consultative Council took two main decisions:-

(i) They instructed the Permanent Commission, in consultation with the Military Committee, to study how the Western Union Defence Organisation should be re-organised in the light of the establishment of a North Atlantic integrated force for the defence of Western Europe.

(ii) They stressed the importance of the present Western Union infra-structure programme being completed as rapidly as possible, and agreed that the Chairman should send a letter to each of the five Governments with the Council's recommendation to this effect.

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Le 12 janvier 1951

Général EISENHOWER
Commandant en Chef de
l'Armée Atlantique.

Monsieur le Commandant en Chef,

J'ai l'honneur de vous soumettre un plan pour le REARMEMENT DE l'EUROPE.

Les opérations de Corée ont démontré que les Armées alliées ont besoin d'un complément d'armement afin de redresser la situation en leur faveur.

Cet armement complémentaire sera de plus en plus nécessaire à mesure que le champ de bataille s'étendra "en surface" INDOCHINE, IRAN, TURQUIE, YOUGOSLAVIE, etc...

L'artillerie lourde, en 1915, s'est démontrée impuissante pour détruire les fils de fer et les tranchées (Voir "Enigme de la Guerre").

Il fallait une artillerie nouvelle, à trajectoire courbe, précise, mobile, tirant des projectiles lourds; la précision est obtenue par la combustion de la poudre à régime constant.

Cet armement a fait ses preuves dans la guerre de 1914-1918; il s'impose aujourd'hui. (Voir "Enigme de la Guerre").

Les Chinois, avec de simples armements d'infanterie et de mauvais mortiers, arrivent à être les maîtres du champ de bataille; pour leur reprendre cette maîtrise, il faut être "en avance en tactique et en stratégie"; il faut choisir la forme de combats que l'on imposera à l'adversaire (V.rapp. adressé à POINCARÉ, Président du Conseil, à la suite de la mort du Général BUAT.)

Pour que la FRANCE et l'EUROPE aient la sécurité, il faut qu'elles disposent d'un armement susceptible :

- d'arrêter les blindés,
- de lutter instantanément contre les parachutistes,
- de détruire les fils de fer et les tranchées,
- d'assurer la supériorité sur les engins d'infanterie ennemie.

Le programme d'armement complémentaire que je vous sou mets comporte:

- pour la FRANCE, 200.000 canons ARCHER (description "Enigme de la Guerre") qui seraient répartis uniformément dans toute la France, suivant un quadrillage dont les mailles seraient d'env. 2 kms.

Une partie de ces canons serait montée sur des engins mobiles (Jeep par exemple.- Sur tout le territoire seraient établis des abris avec des plates-formes pour les canons.

- pour l'EUROPE, 500.000 canons ARCHER.

Cette fabrication est possible dans un délai de deux mois, ainsi que celle des munitions. Le canon ARCHER tire toutes sortes de munitions, depuis la grenade jusqu'à des projectiles de 35 kgs.

En 1917, le Comité de Guerre ayant donné ordre de construire 2.000 canons et "leur utilisation sur le front suivant la méthode de l'inventeur" j'ai pu réaliser cette fabrication en 2 mois.

300 de ces canons -utilisés avec la tactique appropriée, sous les ordres du Général BUAT - arrêterent la suprême offensive allemande du 15 au 17 juillet.- L'utilisation fut faite suivant les principes de la

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"fortification en surface" dans la 4^{me} Armée.- Des dizaines de milliers d'Allemands restèrent devant ces canons, alors qu'il ne fut pas relevé un seul mort parmi les servants.

La 6^{me} Armée, à gauche, qui avait reçu également des canons dont le Commandant, le Général BERTHELOT n'avait pas voulu se servir, recula de 80 kilomètres.

Si les Allemands avaient réussi leur 7^{me} offensive, REIMS et PARIS seraient tombés, et les Allemands auraient gagné la guerre.

En 1944, les Services qui étaient sous votre commandement dans le Corps Expéditionnaire Américain, avaient retenu cette arme et je devais partir à Washington. Le Major Wetherill fut envoyé pour préparer mon voyage, mais, à Washington il lui fut déclaré que l'on n'avait pas besoin d'une nouvelle arme. Les U.S.A. disposaient de la bombe atomique; en 1950, on s'aperçoit que la bombe atomique est insuffisante (Voir lettre du Col. Walter T. GORTON, du 2 nov. 1944).

5^{me} COLONNE : l'armement "en surface" ne serait pas possible si la 5^{me} Colonne continuait à subsister. Pour la supprimer, il faut supprimer les causes de mécontentement; c'est pourquoi le programme militaire à caractère défensif que je vous soumetts, doit se compléter par une stratégie offensive basée sur l'exploitation du Progrès. Il faut arriver à faire bénéficier la classe ouvrière de logements modernes, de l'automobile et de tous les progrès rendus possibles par la science (ci-joint l'exemplaire du journal "Le Fédériste").

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Les mêmes principes ont été présentés en 1915 dans l'Armée Française; il fallut 3 ans pour les faire adopter partiellement. En 1917, le Comité de Guerre avait ordonné de comparer, le même jour, sur deux étendues de front voisins, la méthode et le canon ARCHER avec accompagnement d'infanterie et la méthode de l'Etat-Major, basée sur l'artillerie lourde et la guerre d'usure. Ce fut érasant.

Je demande aujourd'hui la même comparaison entre une méthode de guerre qui est une synthèse des forces industrielles, sociales, économiques et morales du Pays et la méthode de guerre officielle, dont l'insuffisance s'est démontrée en Corée et en Indochine.

Cette doctrine de la sécurité fut approuvée par les Généraux Percin, Buat, par le Maréchal Foch (lettre jointe), par Clemenceau, Poincaré, Painlevé.

J'ai l'honneur, Monsieur le Commandant en Chef, de vous demander de faire étudier mon projet et je me mets à la disposition de vos services pour tous renseignements complémentaires.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Commandant en Chef, l'expression de ma haute considération.

J. ARCHER.

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La FAUSSE ROUTE qui conduit à la Guerre

Les Américains croient avoir un armement moderne, et cependant ils sont battus par les Chinois.

Quel est l'armement le plus moderne ? Celui des vainqueurs ou celui des vaincus ?

L'impuissance de l'armement Américain sera encore aggravée quand le champ de bataille s'étendra en surface : Indochine, Malaisie, Iran, Turquie, Yougoslavie, etc ...

L'erreur de l'armement actuel est analogue à l'erreur de l'artillerie lourde en 1915 devant les fils de fer et les tranchées. Il fallait 8 jours et 8 nuits de bombardement pour détruire une ligne; il suffisait de 8 heures pour la reconstruire 500 mètres plus loin.

La destruction d'un mètre de tranchée revenait à 40.000 Frs or; le rétablissement d'une ligne identique revenait à 20 Frs.

Les offensives étaient faites sur 500 mètres ou 1 km. en mobilisant l'industrie du monde entier

Cela dura 4 ans, coûta à la France 2.000.000 de morts, 2.000.000 de grands blessés et malades, c.à.d. 10 % de la population totale, 20 % de la population mâle, 50 % de la population entre 18 et 40 ans.

La guerre, c'est avant tout une bataille d'infanterie; si l'Amérique se trouve battue en Corée, elle perdra son prestige. Les peuples ne peuvent compter sur un vaincu pour les protéger. L'Alliance Atlantique se désagrègera, l'Amérique s'épuisera dans la construction d'un armement impuissant.

Pendant tout le temps du réarmement, 3, 5, 10 ans, l'U.R.S.S. jouira d'une supériorité lui permettant de déclarer la guerre quand elle voudra et de la gagner.....

La fausse route prise dans l'armement, la tactique, la stratégie, en somme dans la Direction de la guerre, met en jeu la civilisation occidentale.

Le réarmement, tel qu'il est compris actuellement, opéré au préjudice du relèvement économique, augmentera le mécontentement et facilitera le recrutement de la 5me colonne, c'est-à-dire fera le jeu du communisme.

La route dans laquelle l'Amérique s'est engagée et engage l'Europe est la route la plus rapide pour aboutir à la guerre et à la défaite.

IL FAUT CHANGER DE DIRECTION

16/1/1951.

Renseignements : l'Ing. ARCHER 162 rue Perronet NEUILLY S/SEINE.

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LA BONNE ROUTE

..... qui conduit à la Paix.

Il faut d'abord définir la forme des combats qui permettra d'imposer sa volonté à l'ennemi en cas d'agression. Il faut être "en avance en tactique et en stratégie" dans l'évolution rationnelle de la guerre, celle-ci s'étendant de plus en plus "en surface".

Il faut un armement défensif efficace et bon marché pour ne pas écraser les peuples avant même la déclaration de guerre. Un armement défensif doit permettre de résister à l'infanterie ennemie, à ses mortiers, aux blindés qui l'accompagnent, et aux parachutistes.

Cet armement existe et il a fait ses preuves. Il peut être réalisé en 3 mois, il est basé sur la doctrine de l'accompagnement de l'infanterie, c'est-à-dire la mise à disposition de l'infanterie de tous les moyens qui lui sont nécessaires pour surmonter les obstacles qu'elle rencontre dans les combats.

Cet armement bon marché et rapidement réalisable, c'est le canon ARCHER, qui tire toutes sortes de projectiles, depuis la grenade jusqu'aux projectiles de 35 kgs.

La précision est obtenue par la combustion de la poudre à régime constant.

Il détruit les fils de fer et les tranchées en moins de 10 minutes sur des centaines de kilomètres.

Il fut adopté malgré l'opposition acharnée du Haut-Commandement Français, attaché à la guerre d'usure et à l'artillerie lourde. Au Comité de Guerre, Clemenceau traita Pétain comme un gamin et lui dit : "Archer a raison. Et il faudra les utiliser suivant la méthode de l'inventeur". Pétain capitula : "Oui, Monsieur le Président, dans les meilleures conditions possible".

En 1918, deux mois ont suffi à construire 2.000 canons, et 300 brisèrent la 7^{me} et suprême offensive Allemande du 15 au 17 juillet 1918.

Ils furent détruits en 1918 pour des raisons inavouables.

La doctrine de la sécurité de l'ing. Archer fut reprise par le Général Buat en 1923, le Maréchal Foch en 1928, Painlevé en 1929, les hommes de la Paix; mais fut combattue par Gamelin, Weygand, Daladier, les hommes de la guerre et de la défaite.

En 1944, les services d'artillerie du Corps Expéditionnaire Américain en Europe l'avaient retenu, et le présentèrent à Washington. Mais il fut répondu que la bombe atomique servait désormais à tout !!!...

En 1950, il faut reviser cette opinion.

Il faut, en 3 mois, construire 200.000 canons pour couvrir la France, et 500.000 pour couvrir l'Europe. Avec cet armement, il faut une tactique appropriée.

Avec les économies ainsi réalisées, il sera possible de construire des logements, des autos, d'établir la prospérité pour tous, ainsi seront supprimées les causes de mécontentement et par conséquent la 5^{me} Colonne.

Comme en 1915/1918, les événements, plus forts que les hommes, obligeront à appliquer cette doctrine.....

LE PROGRAMME FEDERISTE

SON BUT : Construire la PAIX, c'est-à-dire la collaboration des peuples, leur travail en commun pour un but commun.

SA METHODE : La méthode scientifique.

L'ANALYSE poussée jusqu'à ses plus extrêmes conséquences permet d'aboutir à une synthèse, c'est-à-dire à un programme.

Il n'y a pas de problèmes insolubles, s'ils sont posés d'une façon objective.

Pour que la collaboration des peuples soit possible et efficace, il faut en remplir les conditions nécessaires et suffisantes.

Il faut un terrain sur lequel les peuples puissent travailler en commun pour un but commun; il suffira alors que la Société des Peuples ait une constitution rationnelle pour pouvoir exploiter ce terrain.

LE TERRAIN : Condition nécessaire.

Comme terrain de collaboration, il faut éliminer le déplacement des frontières et le partage des matières premières. Il n'y a là que sources nouvelles de guerre.

Le terrain sur lequel les peuples pourront travailler en commun pour un but commun est nécessairement un terrain neutre, un terrain sur lequel il n'y ait pas de droits acquis, un terrain qui n'appartienne à personne ou plutôt qui appartienne à l'humanité toute entière; ce sont les fruits du génie humain, les grandes inventions, les grandes nouveautés, les grandes découvertes de notre époque que pour la première fois dans l'histoire du monde, il faut utiliser pour faire la PAIX, alors que jusqu'à maintenant elles ont été utilisées pour faire la guerre.

Les possibilités de progrès n'ont jamais été aussi grandes : toutes les techniques sont en faillite.

Dans l'électricité, le trust vend 3 francs à la campagne le KWH produit à 10 centimes à la centrale. Le progrès c'est le réseau « maillé » qui permet de la distribuer à 30 centimes.

Dans l'automobile et l'aviation, 90 % des calories du pétrole sont gaspillées dans l'atmosphère, ce ne peut être le dernier mot de la science, ni le dernier stade de la civilisation de se battre pour le pétrole dans ces conditions ; le progrès réside dans les procédés nouveaux récupérant les calories perdues dans les moteurs à explosion.

Les chemins de fer ne sont que des procédés archaïques. L'on n'en fait plus de nouveaux tellement la construction en coûte cher; pour faire marcher les anciens, il faut des milliards chaque année. Le progrès, c'est la voie fédérative : moyen de locomotion nouveau, coûtant 40 fois moins cher à établir que les voies de chemins de fer, pouvant s'installer dans les moindres villages, et permettant de faire 300 kilomètres à l'heure pour 1 centime le kilomètre.

« L'artillerie actuelle à trajectoire droite des armes rayées est un suicide », écrivait le Général PERCIN, Inspecteur Général de l'Artillerie française.

Le progrès, c'est une artillerie nouvelle, précise, à trajectoire courbe obtenue par la combustion de la poudre à régime constant; détruisant l'obstacle 100 fois plus vite, avec 100 fois moins de munitions.

La tactique et la stratégie recherchent la guerre-éclair et aboutissent à la guerre éternelle. Il faut une tactique nouvelle basée sur un armement nouveau.

Dans la construction, on bâtit avec des bons de commission au lieu de bâtir avec des briques. On couvre les immeubles avec des feuilles d'impôts au lieu de les couvrir avec des ardoises et on s'étonne que le bâtiment soit en crise.

La « science » de l'économie politique, c'est l'art de mourir de faim à côté des veaux gras.

Le « Droit » régalien basé sur l'or, sous lequel nous vivons, est le triomphe de l'injustice. Un droit nouveau basé sur le travail s'impose.

Pour la monnaie, le moins que l'on puisse dire est que la place à prendre pour une bonne monnaie basée sur une définition scientifique de l'unité de valeur, une monnaie à pouvoir d'achat constant : l'EUROPA.

Le régime capitaliste aboutit à la guerre, il est basé sur le prix de vente dans lequel sont intégrés tous les vices du régime : impôts, taxes, agios, intérêts, commissions, profits, bénéfices, intermédiaires, etc. Le progrès c'est le régime économique fédériste basé sur le prix de revient, dans lequel les échanges sont faits d'après la valeur intrinsèque des produits.

Dans l'exploitation des découvertes et inventions, le système des brevets n'est que la protection des Gouvernements, lesquels ont bien plus besoin d'être protégés que de chercher à protéger les autres. Un brevet n'a jamais empêché le monde entier de prendre les inventions françaises et de les exploiter contre la France et pour la guerre. Exemple : l'automobile et l'aviation.

Le progrès c'est dans chaque profession la corporation inter-

nationale qui exploitera dans le monde entier les inventions françaises pour la PAIX au profit de la France.

Les travailleurs seront organisés dans leur progression au lieu d'être massés derrière les frontières avec des mitrailleuses.

Voilà la grande transformation économique et sociale qui fera régner la PAIX dans le monde.

LA SOCIÉTÉ DES PEUPLES : Condition suffisante.

Pour exploiter le progrès, terrain de collaboration des peuples, il faut une direction unique, il faut une véritable Société des Peuples et non pas un monstre sans tête, comme le fut la Société des Nations et avant elle la Sainte Alliance.

Il faut constituer une Société entre les Peuples de la même façon que s'est constituée la France : Société de Provinces, ou les Etats-Unis d'Amérique, Société d'Etats.

Quelque soit son ampleur, la Société des Peuples est une Société humaine comme les autres; il lui faut respecter les lois de la sociologie pour être un être vivant et fécond; il lui faut une tête.

La France peut jouer le rôle de tête, si elle sait en remplir les conditions.

Pour qu'un peuple puisse être la Tête, pour qu'il inspire confiance aux autres peuples, il faut qu'il ait confiance en lui-même; donc nécessité de résoudre le problème de sa sécurité : sécurité militaire et sécurité économique.

Pour la France, le problème national se pose à la base du problème international.

Il ne suffit pas pour être la Tête, qu'un peuple soit fort militairement et économiquement. Il faut encore, comme dans toutes les Sociétés humaines, qu'il FASSE PREUVE DE DÉVOUEMENT à la chose commune. Le peuple tête doit faire preuve de générosité et apporter des idées directrices susceptibles d'orienter la nouvelle Société.

LA FRANCE : Tête de l'Humanité.

Comment la France peut-elle résoudre les deux grands problèmes de sa sécurité militaire et de sa sécurité économique ?

Disons tout d'abord, qu'il suffit que les solutions aient un caractère provisoire, qu'elles soient efficaces pendant la durée des transformations politiques qui doivent s'opérer dans le monde; quand l'unité du monde sera réalisée, les problèmes ne se poseront plus pour la France isolée.

SÉCURITÉ MILITAIRE :

Elle ne peut être obtenue par les méthodes appliquées pendant ou après la guerre; guerre d'usure, guerre de masse.

Faire une armée de 20 millions d'hommes, de femmes et d'enfants, c'est reconnaître notre infériorité devant une Nation qui peut avoir une armée double.

Rechercher la sécurité dans la masse d'armement n'est pas une solution en face d'une Nation qui a des moyens matériels beaucoup plus puissants.

Comme dans le combat de David contre Goliath, la solution ne peut s'obtenir que dans l'IDÉE, « EN AVANCE » en tactique et en stratégie.

Le Généralissime BUAT et le Maréchal FOCH, avant leur mort, avaient approuvé cette doctrine de la sécurité.

Nous avons actuellement cette supériorité de « l'Idée » Comme les Fédéristes l'ont eue pendant la guerre 1914-18 avec le canon d'infanterie et comme ils l'ont actuellement avec l'artillerie à trajectoire courbe, précise, obtenue par la combustion de la poudre à régime constant : cette artillerie résolvant tous les problèmes du champ de bataille :

Suppression des fils de fer et tranchées; Destruction de chars de combat; Arrêt des avions; Absorption des gaz asphyxiants etc, etc.

Mais une idée peut être dépassée par une idée meilleure, et la sécurité, basée sur cette idée, n'a qu'un caractère PROVISoire; c'est pourquoi il faut utiliser le répit, qui nous est donné, pour faire les transformations politiques qui s'imposent dans le monde. Le problème militaire ne se posera plus alors du point de vue national, pas plus qu'il ne se pose entre les provinces.

SECURITE ECONOMIQUE

La PAIX comporte la suppression des frontières militaires mais aussi celle des frontières douanières.

Pour supprimer ces frontières, il faut créer une situation économique telle que la FRANCE AIT INTÉRÊT A SUPPRIMER LES FRONTIÈRES.

C'est une question de PRIX DE REVIENT dans la PRODUCTION. Il faut éliminer toutes les charges que le régime capitaliste intègre dans le prix de revient; impôts, taxes, profits intermédiaires, agios, intérêts, bénéfices, commissions,

font passer un objet de 40 francs à la production à 100 francs à la consommation.

Le régime économique, fédériste, basé sur les échanges d'après le prix de revient, apporte la solution.

DEVOUEMENT A LA CHOSE COMMUNE :

La France doit apporter aux Peuples désorientés et découragés la lumière de la PAIX. Elle leur doit d'établir un programme de salut commun : Chaque peuple trouvera dans les grandes nouveautés qu'elle apporte une source de prospérité inimaginable.

Quand toutes les techniques sont en faillite dans le monde entier, elle doit apporter par la méthode cartésienne, spécifiquement française, la solution de ce problème humain. Elle démontrera que le désordre vient de ce que dans chaque problème, chaque technicien a à choisir entre une infinité de solutions; il choisit naturellement celle qui convient le mieux à ses conceptions personnelles ou sert le mieux des intérêts particuliers. Mais comme les solutions adoptées dans une branche ne sont pas harmonisées avec les solutions adoptées par la branche voisine, tout le monde vit dans l'anarchie.

La France démontrera qu'il n'y a pas de solutions pour des problèmes isolés, mais seulement dans un programme d'ensemble. Un technicien n'a pas le droit de choisir arbitrairement sa solution, celle-ci doit nécessairement satisfaire à une condition supérieure d'harmonie avec un programme d'ensemble, issu lui-même de la synthèse des forces matérielles et morales qui conduisent l'humanité vers son but, vers son unité, vers la PAIX.

Qu'un prophète surgisse aujourd'hui et précise l'état de progrès dans lequel l'humanité doit vivre demain et définisse la civilisation nouvelle, les armes tomberaient toutes seules. Mais, faute de prophète, si par la méthode scientifique nous arrivons à découvrir les facteurs, qui déterminent les civilisations, nous aurons des chances de voir clair dans la civilisation future elle-même.

LA CIVILISATION DE DEMAIN :

Quels sont les facteurs déterminants des civilisations ? Ces facteurs sont de trois ordres :

1° **La force motrice** : Au XX^e siècle, l'électricité doit jouer pour les campagnes un rôle plus grand que celui tenu par la vapeur au XIX^e siècle. Cependant, la vapeur a déterminé la civilisation. Elle créa le capitalisme et son antithèse : le communisme. Après la concentration et ses excès, la dispersion de la force motrice s'impose par l'électricité.

2° **Les moyens de locomotion** : Une civilisation est faite pour s'étendre. L'humanité n'eut jamais autant besoin de moyens de locomotion qu'aujourd'hui. C'est le moment d'utiliser les calories gaspillées dans l'automobile et de créer un moyen nouveau : la voie fédérative.

Coûtant 40 fois moins cher à installer que les chemins de fer, elle pourra s'installer dans les moindres villages.

3° **La monnaie** : Quand nous avons changé de civilisation après la féodalité, quand le roi de France substitua le droit régalien au droit féodal, la première chose qu'il fit fut d'enlever aux seigneurs, barons, ducs, qui se battaient de château à château, le droit de battre monnaie. Du même coup, il leur a enlevé le droit et la possibilité de faire la guerre.

Le problème se pose aujourd'hui de la même façon dans le cadre plus vaste de l'Europe et du monde.

Dans la civilisation de demain, il faudra faire intervenir un facteur nouveau : une méthode pour exploiter les inventions, les découvertes, en un mot, le progrès, en créant dans chaque profession les corporations internationales. Les hommes seront organisés dans les professions au lieu d'être massés derrière les frontières, avec fusils et mitrailleuses.

La mise en application de ces progrès techniques ouvrira à l'humanité la plus belle ère qu'elle ait jamais vécue. Les Américains pourront faire 50 millions d'automobiles au lieu de 5 millions. La Chine, la Russie, l'Afrique, seront ouvertes à la civilisation par des moyens de locomotion nouveaux, par la voie fédérative. Les paysans, grâce à l'électricité, qui permettra tous les travaux, y compris le labourage électrique, verront leur condition transformée. Disposant des mêmes moyens de locomotion, il n'y aura plus de différence entre eux et les citadins.

Tous les travailleurs auront de l'argent grâce à la monnaie-travail : l'Europa qui permettra de financer la production et les échanges, quel que soit leur développement.

Aujourd'hui que toutes les fortunes vont tomber à zéro; que tout ce qui est basé sur le papier va se volatiliser, que les immeubles anciens n'auront aucune valeur à côté des immeubles modernes, que les fermes elles-mêmes ne pourront plus payer les impôts de la guerre, les réparations et la main d'œuvre et exigeront de leurs propriétaires, chaque année, un nouveau capital, que rentes et prêts à intérêt seront supprimés, il faudra pour tous s'orienter dans les activités nouvelles, refaire sa vie dans le progrès; le Programme fédériste ouvre à tous un

horizon nouveau.

La France, enfin, à la tête du progrès et sachant exploiter ses inventions n'aura plus besoin de payer d'impôts et par-dessus tout ce sera la Paix assurée pour plusieurs siècles.

Même s'il s'agissait là d'un rêve, il faudrait tenter de le réaliser, car il vaut mieux pour l'humanité vivre dans ce rêve que de mourir dans le cauchemar actuel.

LA CONSTITUTION DE L'ÉTAT FRANÇAIS :

Pour remplir ce rôle magnifique de tête de la Société des Peuples, la France doit, par ses propres moyens, résoudre le problème de sa sécurité économique et de sa sécurité militaire. Sa constitution doit être établie en fonction du rôle qu'elle doit jouer dans le monde.

Et cela pose le principe de la réforme administrative et gouvernementale. Nous l'avons vu, tous les problèmes aboutissent nécessairement à des réalisations techniques. Or, dans tous les domaines, les techniciens agissent au gré de leurs conceptions, personnelles ou d'intérêts particuliers; il est nécessaire d'harmoniser entre elles toutes les réformes suivant un programme d'ensemble.

La fonction principale de l'Etat Français sera de se tenir à la tête du progrès, et il devra s'organiser intérieurement de manière à pouvoir exploiter le progrès dans le monde entier pour la construction de la PAIX.

La réforme administrative et gouvernementale comporte donc une première analyse des besoins et des possibilités. Ceux-ci définis par le but à atteindre : la PAIX. Puis, faire un grand effort de synthèse, d'harmonie, ce qui aboutit à un PROGRAMME. Il est possible alors au Chef du Gouvernement de se retourner vers les techniciens et d'exiger d'eux, qu'ils apportent toute leur science, toutes leurs capacités, pour aider à la réalisation de ce programme.

La France doit être organisée pour être le bureau d'études et de direction du monde entier.

LA CONSTITUTION DE L'ÉTAT FRANÇAIS doit être établie suivant les mêmes principes que la constitution nécessaire à la Société des Peuples.

L'organisation scientifique du Parlement comportera : une chambre PROFESSIONNELLE particulièrement désignée pour faire l'analyse des problèmes et une chambre politique dont le rôle sera de faire l'harmonie, c'est-à-dire la synthèse entre les réformes proposées par les Corporations.

Les corporations nationales devront être ouvertes pour devenir des Corporations Internationales.

La France, ainsi, ayant résolu tous ses problèmes nationaux, ayant un idéal international, pourra être véritablement la REINE DE LA PAIX.

LES RÉALISATIONS :

Dans toutes les branches, des réalisations sont commencées. Le canon ARCHER brisa la dernière offensive allemande du 15 au 18 juillet 1918

Une tactique et une doctrine nouvelle de la sécurité furent acceptées par le Général BUAT et le Maréchal FOCH.

L'énoncé des principes de ce programme, la Paix sans violence, a provoqué pendant la guerre actuelle, dans l'armée allemande, des discussions. Pour la première fois, l'infaillibilité du haut-commandement fut mise en doute. Ce fut le germe qui, grâce aux événements, amena la scission entre les politiques et la Wehrmacht. C'était le talon d'Achille du colosse allemand. L'histoire dira, si dans la désagrégation du Reich, l'efficacité n'en fut pas plus grande que celle des armes.

Dans l'électricité, le réseau « maillé » de Cizely a fait ses preuves depuis 20 ans.

Une automobile consommant 5 fois moins de calories est construite, sa mise au point peut être poursuivie.

La voie fédérative a reçu une démonstration par la voiture à hélice. Dans la construction, des réalisations sont commencées et des projets sont en cours.

Dans le système d'échanges, la coopérative agricole du fédérage réalise les échanges au prix de revient.

La monnaie EUROPA est en fonctionnement sur une petite échelle.

La corporation internationale de l'automobile est constituée avec le concours des plus hautes autorités techniques de l'automobile. Plusieurs autres corporations sont en projet.

LES OPPOSITIONS :

Ce programme continuera à subir les oppositions des trusts, des monopoles, de la finance, de tous ceux qui, ne sachant pas résoudre les problèmes par leur intelligence, font appel à la violence.

Devant tant d'opposition, il faudra, pour faire éclater la vérité, là aussi un dévouement à la base.

Pour se documenter et pour participer à la réalisation du programme, s'adresser aux Bureaux de l'Ingénieur ARCHER 162, rue Perronet, Neuilly-sur-Seine.

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Ext. 140

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OTTAWA

D file

January 4, 1951

No.

500 30 AB-4
18 154

Sir,

I enclose the document (s) listed below.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

A.D.P. HEENEY

for the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

SUBJECT

Letter No. 3340 of Dec 27, 1950
from WashingtonAppointment of General Eisenhower as
Supreme Commander in Europe

Sent to the following:

LONDON - No. X-57 ✓✓ROME - No. X-7 ✓✓PARIS - No. X-15 ✓✓OSLO - No. X-2 ✓✓BONN - No. X-10 ✓✓COPENHAGEN - No. X-3 ✓✓BRUSSELS No. X-3 ✓✓The Hague - No. X-5 ✓✓

FILE NO CSC 5-11-17-14

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

~~TOP SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS,
OTTAWA, ONTARIO.

DATE:

3 January, 1951.

MEMORANDUM TO:

Minister
Deputy Minister
CCS
CAS
CIS
CMB

~~TOP SECRET~~
No 500 304 B4
S. 500 304 B4
S. 500 304 B4

SUBJECT:

Visit to Canada of General Eisenhower

The following document concerning the above mentioned subject is forwarded for your information and retention, please.

Message CJS 540 of 2 January from Washington.

C.C. Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.

(C.L. Annis)
Group Captain,
Acting Secretary.

ARMY MESSAGE

(INCOMING)

TOP
SECRET

PLACE FROM

DATE & TIME

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WASHINGTON, D C. 022020Z JAN 51

*****P R I O R I T Y*****

FROM CJS(W)

TO C S C OTTAWA

INFO CJS(L)

CJS 540

~~SECRET~~ TOPSECRET

DO NOT
REDUCTION A SECRET

REF OUR CJS 924 30 DEC. PARA 4(B).

IN DISCUSSION WITH GENERAL GRUENTHER HE

ADVISED ME THAT THE TWO DRAFT SCHEDULES PREPARED FOR GENERAL

EISENHOWER'S CONCURRENCE SHOWED HIM VISITING CANADA ON 20 JANUARY

IN ONE INSTANCE AND 27 JANUARY IN THE OTHER.

45/031444Z JANUARY 1951/SA.

NOTE: THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN DISPATCHED IN CIPHER AND MUST NOT BE PUBLISHED OR DISTRIBUTED
OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, OR HEADQUARTERS OR RETRANSMITTED WITHOUT BEING PARAPHRASED.

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FILE NO CSC 5-27-36

TOP SECRET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS,
OTTAWA, ONTARIO.

DATE: 3 January, 1951.

C.G.S.
C.A.S.
C.N.S.
C.D.R.B.

MEMORANDUM TO:

File No. 50130E-10
Sub 50130E-10. Filed...


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REDUIT A SECRET

SUBJECT: NATO SHAPE Headquarters - Canadian Liaison Officer

The following document concerning the above mentioned subject is forwarded for your information and retention, please.

Message CJS 539 of 2 January from Washington.


(C.L. Annis)
Group Captain,
Acting Secretary.

Infor. copy to:

Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
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ARMY MESSAGE

(INCOMING)

PLACE FROM

DATE & TIME

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WASHINGTON DC

022015 JAN 51

***** P R I O R I T Y *****

FROM:

CJS(W)

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TO:

CJS LONDON

INFO

C S C OTTAWA

CJS 539

~~SECRET~~ TOPSECRET

REF OUR CJS 924 30 DEC AND GS 321 30 DEC 50.
FOR CLARK FROM CAMPBELL.

PASSED FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO STANDING GROUP

TODAY.

QUOTE..

SUBJECT CANADIAN LIAISON OFFICER TO SHAPE.

PARA ONE IN LINE WITH GENERAL GRUENTHER'S

REQUEST AT THE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES MEETING ON FRIDAY LAST THAT
THE MEMBER NATIONS PROVIDE A TEMPORARY LIAISON OFFICER TO SHAPE
HEADQUARTERS ON OR AFTER FOUR JANUARY PENDING THE APPOINTMENT OF A
PERMANENT LIAISON OFFICER I HAVE BEEN ADVISED THAT THE CANDIAN
CHIEFS OF STAFF DIRECTED GENERAL CLARK CHAIRMAN OF CANADIAN JOINT
STAFF (LONDON) TO HAVE AN OFFICER REPORT TO SHAPE HEADQUARTERS ON
FOUR JANUARY. THE NAME OF THIS PRO TEM OFFICER WILL BE ADVISED LATER

....UNQUOTE

PARA TWO

WOULD YOU PLEASE ADVISE THE NAME OF THE OFFICER

031546 TW JAN 50

NOTE: THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN DISPATCHED IN CIPHER AND MUST NOT BE PUBLISHED OR DISTRIBUTED
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Requise

50030 AB-46
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OTTAWA FILE

No.

Letter No. 3340

Date.. December 27, 1950.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL.

FROM: The Canadian Ambassador, Washington, D.C.

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference.....

Subject: Appointment of General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander in Europe.

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JAN 2 1951

Copies Referred

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No. of Enclosures

None

Post File

No.....

1. We have not made an attempt at this Embassy to analyze the public comment following the designation of General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander. The General's reputation is so high that, so far as I am aware, scarcely a breath of criticism has been directed against his qualifications. His designation coincides with former President Hoover's speech on December 20th, about which we shall be submitting a separate report. General Eisenhower is still favoured strongly by many Republicans as their candidate for the Presidency in 1952. It is curious to find that Mr. Hoover is pleading for a policy which would make General Eisenhower's task impossible, just as he is about to take up his task.

2. It is known that Lieutenant General Gruenther will become General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff at SHAPE. I need say little of his qualifications, as he is well known to many in Ottawa. It is considered probable that he will become Chief of Staff of the Army. Lieutenant General Norstad is about to leave to take command of the United States Air Forces in Europe, and he is considered to be a probable Chief of Staff of the Air Force at some future date. General Norstad has told me that he will initially establish his headquarters at Wiesbaden but that he expects to move to the headquarters selected by General Eisenhower when the requisite communications network has been set up there. I take it that this means that he is likely to be appointed to command the Air Forces in the integrated force.

3. One could hardly ask for better military appointments than those of these three men. In addition to their superior military qualifications, all have had substantial experience of a politico-strategic nature and have displayed skill and understanding in inter-governmental negotiations.

W. L. Murray

Refer to
Nat. Defence
Chief of Staff Committee
Privy Council
London
Paris
Bonn
Brussels
Rome
Oslo
Copenhagen
The Hague

X To See
Defence Liaison
Under Secretary
Mr. Norman
+ file
J. M. A. P. E.

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
Sixième Session

Bruxelles, 19 décembre 1950.

Le Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord ayant pris conformément à la recommandation du Comité de Défense, les dispositions nécessaires pour l'établissement sous un Commandant Suprême de la force unifiée pour la défense de l'Europe, et ayant demandé au Président des Etats-Unis d'Amérique de désigner un officier américain pour remplir les fonctions de Commandant Suprême, le Président des Etats-Unis d'Amérique ayant désigné le Général Dwight D. Eisenhower, le Conseil déclare en conséquence que le Général d'Armée Dwight D. Eisenhower est nommé Commandant Suprême avec toutes les fonctions et pouvoirs spécifiés au document sur les forces qui seront affectées à ce commandement.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Sixth Session

Brussels, 19th December, 1950.

The North Atlantic Council having made provision, in accordance with the recommendation of the Defence Committee, for the Integrated Force for the defence of Europe under a Supreme Commander, and having requested the President of the United States to designate an officer of the United States to fill the position of Supreme Commander, and the President of the United States having designated General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Council therefore declares that General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower is appointed the Supreme Commander, with the powers and functions specified in over the forces to be assigned to his command.

BELGIQUE
BELGIUM
CANADA
CANADA
DANEMARK
DENMARK
ETATS-UNIS
UNITED STATES

FRANCE
FRANCE
ISLANDE
ICELAND
ITALIE
ITALY
LUXEMBOURG
LUXEMBOURG

NORVEGE
NORWAY
PAYS-BAS
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FROM: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY, BRUSSELS

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

~~DOCUMENT D T. SECRET~~
~~REDUIT A SECRET~~

SAVINGSGRAM NO. 208

TOP SECRET

IMPORTANT

Brussels, December 19, 1950.

Following from Heeney, Begins:

My immediately preceding messages re North Atlantic Council and Defence Committee meeting December 18.

1. There was a fuller discussion of the next report from the Defence Committee dealing with the creation of an Integrated Force and the appointment of a Supreme Commander.

2. As at the morning session, the French tried to get a closer definition of the legal position of the Supreme Commander's authority - who would nominate him and how other senior officers of his staff would be appointed, and when.

3. Mr. Acheson explained, a little coyly, that if the Council wished to make a recommendation to the President, even suggesting the name of an officer if they so wished, the President would, he believed, act without delay.

4. There followed some manoeuvring between the British, French and ourselves as to who would then move the formal resolution, but as Mr. Acheson had invited Mr. Claxton, in view of his helpful intervention yesterday morning in the Defence Committee, to move the resolution, he did so in terms that were quickly agreed to, after appropriate eulogies to Eisenhower from all sides.

5. The Defence Committee's report on the creation of the Integrated Force Eisenhower is to command and the reorganization of the military side of NATO, was also approved after de Greef had accepted a modification of the original Belgian proposal concerning the Chairmanship of the Military Committee. It was agreed that as a provisional measure the Chairman of the Military Representatives Committee (which is to be formed in Washington

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Page 2.

of the accredited representatives meeting with members of the Standing Group) should be the Chairman of the Standing Group; it was also agreed that Part One of the Defence Committee's report (dealing with Higher Military Direction) should be referred to the Deputies for further study in the course of their examination of both the military and political structure of NATO; it was, however, agreed that paragraph eleven of Part One, giving the Standing Group control over the Supreme Commander, should be approved so that there would be no delay in working out the terms of General Eisenhower's relationship with the Standing Group.

6. President Truman's designation of Eisenhower will be formally approved by the Council today. Consideration will probably then be given to Schuman's suggestion that, in order to safeguard the constitutional and legal formalities of certain countries, the Ministers of the twelve countries should by letter indicate their government's authority for Eisenhower's command over their national contingents.

7. Text of Mr. Claxton's resolution inviting President Truman to designate General Eisenhower is contained in my immediately following message.

Ends.

CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION.

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FROM: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY, BRUSSELS.

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

SAVINGSGRAM NO. 209

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET
Brussels, December 19, 1950.

Following from Heeney, Begins:

My immediately preceding message.

1. Following is text of Mr. Claxton's resolution re appointment of General Eisenhower. Text begins:

The Council having agreed with the recommendation of the Defence Committee, that a Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, should be appointed as soon as possible as an essential action in proceeding with the prompt establishment of an effective NATO Defence Force in Europe;

Recognizing that the ultimate success of such a force lies in its sound initiation and that, for this reason, the selection of the first Supreme Commander is a question of the utmost importance;

Reposing the greatest faith in General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower as a commander of incomparable prestige, proven ability and highest order of leadership;

Unanimously recommends to

The President of the United States that he designate General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower as the first Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

Text ends. Message ends.

CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION.

FROM: CANADIAN EMBASSY, BRUSSELS

TO: SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

SAVINGSGRAM NO. 210

SECRET

19th December 1958

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
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Following from Heeney, Begins:

My immediately preceding messages re North Atlantic meetings

December 18th.

1. The Defence Committee approved the re-organization of the Military Production and Supply Board as recommended by the Council Deputies in document D/D205. The Committee instructed the Chairman of the Council Deputies to convene an early meeting of the new Defence Production Board and to proceed quickly with the re-organization.
2. The discussion which preceded this decision was confined to two points, both of which had come up in earlier stages of drafting. These related to the Chairmanship of the Defence Production Board and the relationship of the Board to other NAT Agencies.
3. On the first point the Belgian representative proposed that the Director should be appointed Chairman of the Board, a sort of "Supreme Commander of Production". This you will recall was the view expressed by Beaupré in the group of experts, but it was not then generally accepted and the report provided that the election of Chairman should be left to the Board, it being understood that the Director was eligible. Although supported by the U.S. representative, the Belgian proposal was not acceptable to the U.K. and Dutch Defence Ministers and it was accordingly agreed that the matter should be left open for the Board to decide.
4. The Italian representative, while agreeing that the Board should continue to be responsible to the Defence Committee put forward the suggestion that when that Committee was not in session the Board should report to the Military Representatives Committee in Washington rather than to the Council Deputies as provided in D/D205. The U.K. and Canadian representatives opposed this as an illogical and impractical arrangement and as the Italian representative had no support for his proposal, he withdrew it.
5. The U.S. representative mentioned in the course of the discussion that the U.S. proposed to appoint Mr. W.L. Batt as their Board member.

CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION.

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FROM: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY, BRUSSELS
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

SAVINGSGRAM NO. 211

CONFIDENTIAL

Brussels, December 19th, 1950.

Following from Heeney begins.

My immediate preceding messages re North Atlantic Meetings.

Following is text of statement made by Mr. Claxton this morning December 19th in course of survey on world situation and the adequacy of present defence effort. Text begins.

The statement which we have heard today from the Secretary of State of the United States cannot fail to have made a deep impression upon us all. Mr. Acheson has put before us in sober serious and even sombre terms his estimate of the gravity of the international situation and referred to the additional far-reaching decisions which the United States Government has taken to put their country on a footing of preparedness. As representing the only other North American Country among us perhaps I should indicate what the position of Canada is.

The increasing threat of aggression from the Communist world has been the source of gravest preoccupation to the Canadian Government, as it has been to all the Governments represented here today. The Canadian Government has taken substantial additional steps subsequent to Korea and we are pressing on with the further steps which we should take to meet these emergencies.

Our planning and thinking have been vitally affected by events in Korea and by the demonstration that the Soviet Government and its allies will not shrink from aggression even when such action involves the risk of a world war. This, we think, is the main lesson of Korea.

The second lesson is that it is a cardinal point of Soviet policy to involve western nations in long-drawn-out hostilities in Asia, so that our capacity for defending the west may be weakened. The Canadian Government believe that Europe must take first place in the conception of the global strategy of the free nations. We believe that the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty is the heart and the centre of any effective

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resistance to Soviet aggression. It was for this reason that the Canadian Government felt that my colleague, Mr. Pearson, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, should accept appointment to the Korean Cease-Fire Commission even though that would prevent him from being here in Brussels. It is essential to North Atlantic defence to stop, if at all possible, the drain of military resources to the Far East.

The Canadian Government believe that it is essential that we should all press forward at a much accelerated speed to attain the goal of security which we have set ourselves in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Military preparedness to meet aggression is our first and most pressing aim. At the same time, we have to take account of the political and economic factors which condition the ultimate success of our undertaking. Political planning must go hand in hand with military planning if we are to achieve solid results. The difficulties we have encountered over German participation in the defence of the West have demonstrated that military planning must be closely related to political considerations.

Canada, for its part, is ready to take its share in the added responsibilities which arise for us all out of this latest phase in our struggle to maintain peace by restraining the aggressive and imperialistic forces of international Communism. We have made progress with the medium term plan conceived before the recent grave deterioration of the position in the Far East. In view of the need for intensifying and accelerating the rearmament programme of NATO, we shall have to re-examine our present programme in the light of the new time table required by the new circumstances. Indeed there will have to be collective re-examination of the whole NATO programme and not merely of the share of any one country.

In establishing the character of the Canadian contribution to the Integrated Force it will be essential for the Canadian Government to determine, in concert with the United States, what our part is to be in the joint defence of the North American Continent since one part of our programme is inevitably affected by the other.

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Acceleration of the NATO military programme raises in acute form the question of intensifying our joint defence production efforts in NATO. We in Canada are likewise concerned at the slow progress being made in the coordination of the productive efforts of NATO. The creation yesterday of the Defence Production Board should help to accelerate this. In view of the time lags involved, we feel strongly that the acceleration of military production is an essential part of the acceleration of the military programme. There is obviously no point in speeding up the creation of our forces in being unless the supply of arms is also adequate. Much more rapid progress than hitherto will have to be made in such matters as standardization and in procedures for the placing and coordinating of orders.

In summary I know I can speak for the Canadian Government when I say that we are anxious to do and we shall not fail to do our part in accelerating the creation of effective deterrent strength.

Text ends. Message ends.

CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

FROM: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY, BRUSSELS

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

SAVINGSGRAM NO. 212

CONFIDENTIAL

Brussels, December 19th, 1950

Following from Heeney begins.

Following is text of Canadian Resolutions on re-organization of NATO which was approved this afternoon, December 19th under Item 4, Deputies' Progress Report. Text begins.

The Council

Having noted that the Council Deputies have considered the proposals put forward by the Canadian Government for the re-organisation of the top structure of NATO and the development of the North Atlantic Council into a "Council of Governments", and being in agreement that simplification of the NATO structure in the interests of the effectiveness of its operation should be sought by all appropriate means.

Affirms:

Its adherence to the objectives of simplifying the structure of NATO and promoting further the effectiveness of the operations of all of its agencies:

Requests:

The Council Deputies and the other NATO agencies concerned to study the Canadian and any other proposals designed to achieve the foregoing objectives, and to make recommendations or take appropriate action as speedily as possible.

Text ends. Message ends.

CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION.

*Top Secret without
M.C. Enclosure*

**COSMIC
TOP SECRET**

*H. Henry
This may be relevant
for Chiefs tomorrow*

Ottawa, December 13, 1950.

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

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Re Item No. 4 on the Agenda of the North
Atlantic Council

North Atlantic Military Re-organization;
Creation of an Integrated Force and the
Appointment of a Supreme Commander
(Document No. M.C.22/5)

1. As you know, the Defence Committee adjourned its last session in Washington without reaching agreement as to how the Germans would contribute to Western defence. For this reason no final decisions were taken as to the establishment of an integrated force in Western Europe and the appointment of a Supreme Commander. Various papers were, however, prepared for the Defence Committee and have since been welded by the Standing Group into one inclusive paper for the consideration of the Military Committee and the Defence Committee. If approved, the paper would go to the Council as the Defence Committee's reply to the Council's resolution (C-5-D/11) asking the Defence Committee for their recommendations as to how the integrated force should be set up and as to what consequential changes would have to be made in the military structure.

2. The attached paper, M.C.22/5, is one of the most important NATO documents we have received. It is, however, lengthy and inclined to be repetitive, and it is hoped that this covering note, with the side-linings on the document itself, will save you a little time. As with many military papers, it is perhaps easier to start at the end; the conclusions are summarized in

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paragraph 46 on pages 19 and 20.

3. The following points are of special interest from the Canadian point of view:

(a) Although the Standing Group accept the decision of the Council that the Deputies should provide the higher political direction of the integrated force, they make it clear that they do not want a direct link between the Deputies and SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters, Atlantic Powers in Europe). They want to retain control over all instructions going to SHAPE in order to be able to place their own interpretation upon political guidance from the Council or the Deputies, and they wish to reserve the right to refer back to the Defence Committee and Military Committee should political guidance from the Deputies not be to their liking. (General Bradley, we have heard, does not want to take orders from Brigadier Spofford!)

(b) At present, the Deputies and the Standing Group must go through the form of communicating to each other through the Chairman of the Defence Committee. The Standing Group propose that a direct channel with the Deputies should be established. Although presumably they would have no objection to the Deputies continuing their present informal practice of bringing military advisers to meetings whenever the agenda makes it desirable, the Standing Group do not want any sort of military advisory group established with the Deputies in London.

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- 3 -

(c) The Standing Group would like to establish in London a Liaison Secretariat which would not have power to give decisions in the name of the Standing Group but would be able to act as the channel between the Standing Group and the NATO bodies in London.

(d) The Standing Group recognize that with their increased power will go the responsibility for consulting more closely with the representatives of the non-members than they have in the past, despite their terms of reference and General Bradley's specific assurances that non-members would be fully consulted. They therefore propose that matters which are considered to require concerted NATO agreement or which affect any individual nation directly will be discussed with representatives of non-members of the Standing Group. An exception is made, however, in regard to matters related to the higher strategic direction of NATO forces; these matters are specifically excluded from the field of consultation with non-members. To make consultation with non-members more effective, the Standing Group propose that they should meet regularly with the accredited representatives in Washington; these meetings of the Standing Group and accredited representatives would be given a new name - the Military Representatives Committee. Its terms of reference are spelled out in paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of the attached document which were drafted with the assistance of Canadian representatives.

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(e) With the establishment of SHAPE, it will be necessary to merge the three European regions into one and transfer to SHAPE planning functions at present exercised by the three European planning groups and by the Brussels Treaty Organization. Theatre commands will have to be organized under SHAPE to cover Western and Southern Europe; the question of whether Northern Europe should be under SHAPE or independent is left open. The Canada-U.S. and the North Atlantic Ocean Regions would continue to come under the Standing Group, as at present, and SHAPE would have no control over either.

(f) The Supreme Commander will be responsible only to SHAPE - not to any other NATO body, nor to national Governments. Governments could, however, appoint liaison officers to SHAPE as representatives of their national staffs and SHAPE would be authorized to deal directly with national Ministers of Defence and Chiefs of Staff on such matters as the standards of training of national forces to be committed to the integrated force.

(g) The proposed principles in accordance with which the Standing Group consider that North Atlantic governments should make firm commitments for contributing national units to SHAPE are spelled out in paragraph 39 on Page 15. National forces contributed to the integrated force, would have to measure up to the standards of training required by the Supreme Commander. National Governments would continue to be responsible for supplying their forces committed to SHAPE.

4. In this memorandum, we have not attempted to criticize the Standing Group's paper from the point

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of view of the Canadian scheme for the establishment of a Council of Governments. (See commentary on Item 5: Deputies' Progress Report). It would be quite easy, however, to fit the proposed military structure into a NATO structure re-organized as we have suggested.

The Military Representatives Committee would simply take the place of the present Military Committee and the Defence Committee would be incorporated in the Council of Governments. We think, however, that it is preferable for the discussion of the Canadian proposals for the re-organization of the Council to be kept separate at this stage from the Standing Group's proposals for re-organizing the military structure.

5. On the whole the Standing Group's paper appears reasonably satisfactory from the Canadian point of view. Without going into too much detail, there are, however, some criticisms that might be advanced for consideration:

(a) The most important point, perhaps, is whether the Deputies will, in fact, have sufficient authority in giving that very imprecise commodity, "political guidance," to the Standing Group for SHAPE. If SHAPE is going to be answerable only to the Standing Group, there will obviously be a danger of the Standing Group, in fact, placing its own interpretation on the political guidance it receives from the Council and the Deputies. This danger is bound to be increased by the present geographical distribution of NATO agencies between London and Washington. We should be under no illusions that, if the proposed structure and terms of reference are accepted, the "higher political direction" of a war would stem from the Deputies.

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yes
It would probably, in fact, revert to the three Governments represented on the Standing Group rather than come through the twelve-power machinery set up in London. We would be back in much the same position as we were with the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the last war. Indeed, there are indications that the Combined Chiefs of Staff is being revived.

(b) If this is likely to be the case in war, it is all the more important that a satisfactory working relationship should be established in peacetime between the Standing Group and accredited representatives of non-members. Our military representatives have already done all they can to improve their status and feel that the proposed terms of reference, though not ideal, are probably as good as we can get. The trouble in the past has not been with the terms of reference but with the Standing Group's practice, and there is probably very little more that we can do in advance to improve the relationship beyond insisting, as we have repeatedly, on being consulted by the Standing Group whenever matters of direct interest to Canada are being considered. It is perhaps better to rely chiefly on our good personal contacts and on the private assurances which Canadian representatives have been given by U.S. and U.K. authorities that they will keep us informed and consult us on all major questions. For it goes without saying that the higher strategy of a war could not be run by a committee of twelve. In our rather more favoured

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circumstances, then, we may accept the inevitable and need not press too strongly Iceland's and Portugal's case for a say in the higher strategic direction. On the other hand, we cannot very well oppose the arguments of the non-members - arguments that, in our view, have been strengthened by the heavy-handed way in which the Standing Group's latest revision of their paper spells out, in quite unnecessary detail, all the contingencies in which they will not consult non-members.

(c) The proposal to establish in London a Standing Group Liaison Secretariat may be questioned. Provided a direct channel of communication is established between the Deputies and the Standing Group, a "post office" for the Standing Group in London may not materially improve liaison. Instead of creating a new body it might be better for each member of the Standing Group to rely on its normal military representation in London.

(d) If the Standing Group are going to be in a position virtually to reject or accept political guidance from the Deputies, as they see fit, it is necessary to question the relationship proposed between the Supreme Commander and national Governments (see (g) above). If the Supreme Commander is empowered to deal directly with national Governments, they would also deal with him, and he may find himself subject to the sort of pressure that General Eisenhower experienced in SHAEF. We believe this relationship will only work if the subjects on which the Supreme Commander may deal directly with national Governments are confined strictly to training standards and questions relating to the timing and

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and conditions of committing national units to his command. Germany, however, is a special case, which we have examined in commenting on the Dutch suggestion of a NATO High Commissioner (See commentary on Item 3).

6. There is one over-riding factor which makes us reluctant, in spite of the misgivings expressed above, to propose many changes. Our contribution to the integrated force is going to be small, and we suggest that we should therefore intervene only on points we consider essential.

RESTRICTED WITHOUT ENCLOSURE

FILE NO. CSC

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

COSMIC TOP SECRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS,
OTTAWA, ONTARIO.

DATE:

8 Dec 50

MEMORANDUM TO: Secretary J.I.C.
Secretary J.I.C.
Dept. of External Affairs
Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff, London.

SUBJECT:

The creation of an integrated EDP, Establishment of a Supreme
HQ in Europe, & Organization of the NATO Military Structure

The following document concerning the above mentioned
subject is forwarded for your information and retention.

SO 70/16 d/28-11-50

Encl.

(J.D.B. Smith) Brigadier,
Secretary.
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE.

[Signature]

Top Secret without enclosure
COSMIC TOP SECRET

Ottawa, November 27, 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

North Atlantic Military Organization;
Creation of an integrated force and the
Appointment of a Supreme Commander.

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SG ✓

date?
As you know, the Defence Committee adjourned its last session in Washington without reaching agreement as to how the Germans would contribute to Western defence. For this reason no final decisions were taken as to the establishment of an integrated force in Western Europe and the appointment of a Supreme Commander. Various papers were, however, prepared for the Defence Committee and have since been welded into one inclusive paper for the consideration of the Defence Committee when it meets again, probably in London on December 11. If approved, the paper would go to the Council as the Defence Committee's reply to the Council's resolution (C-5-D/11) asking the Defence Committee for their recommendations as to how the integrated force should be set up and as to what consequential changes would have to be made in the military structure.

The attached paper, SG 70/11, is as repetitive and verbose as most Standing Group documents, and it is hoped that this covering note, and the side-linings on the document itself, will save you a little time. As with many military papers, it is perhaps easier to start at the end: the conclusions are summarized on Page 46, paragraphs 19 and 20.

The following points should also be drawn to your attention:

- (a) Although the Standing Group accept the decision of the Council that the Deputies should provide the higher political direction of the integrated force, they make it clear that they do not want a direct link between the Deputies and SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters; Atlantic Powers

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in Europe). They want to be the channel and they, therefore, would like a direct channel established between the Deputies and the Standing Group. (Communications must now go through the Chairman of the Defence Committee).

(b) On strategic matters, the Standing Group want to be the only body in continuing session giving advice to the Deputies. They do not want any sort of military advisory group established with the Deputies in London, although presumably they would have no objection to the Deputies continuing their present informal practice of bringing military advisers to meetings whenever the agenda makes it desirable.

(c) The Standing Group would like to establish in London a Liaison Secretariat which would not have power to give decisions in the name of the Standing Group but would be able to act as the channel between the Standing Group and the NATO bodies in London.

(d) The Standing Group want to retain control over all instructions going to SHAPE. They want to be in the position of being able to place their own interpretation upon political guidance from the Council or the Deputies, and they wish to reserve the right to refer back to the Defence Committee and Military Committee should political guidance from the Deputies not be to their liking. (General Bradley, we have heard does not want to take orders from Brigadier Spofford).

(e) Recognizing that their more important role makes it more than ever necessary to maintain closer relations with the representatives of non-members, the Standing Group propose that matters which are considered to require concerted NATO agreement or which affect any individual nation

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directly will be discussed with representatives of non-members. For this purpose there shall be regular meetings of the Standing Group and accredited representatives in Washington, and these meetings will be given a new name - the body will be called the Military Representatives Committee. The terms of reference are spelled out in Paragraph 11 of the attached document which was drafted with the assistance of Canadian representatives.

(f) With the establishment of SHAPE, it would be necessary to merge the three European regions into one and transfer to SHAPE planning functions at present exercised by the three planning groups and by the Brussels Treaty Organization. Theatre commands would have to be organized under SHAPE to cover Western and Southern Europe; the question of whether Northern Europe should be under SHAPE or independent is left open. The Canadian-U.S. and the North Atlantic Ocean regions would continue to come under the Standing Group, as at present, and SHAPE would have no control over the Ocean region.

(g) As regards the terms of reference under which SHAPE would operate in peace and war, there may be room for some confusion. Although the Standing Group would be the sole NATO body directing SHAPE, National Governments would appoint liaison officers to SHAPE as representatives to their National staffs and SHAPE would be authorized to deal directly with National Ministers of Defence and Chiefs of Staff on such matters as the standards of training of National forces to be committed to the integrated force. If ~~SHAPE~~ can deal directly with National Governments, they can also deal with him and he may find himself subject to the sort of pressures that General Eisenhower found embarrassing in SHAPE.

*the Supreme
Commander*

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You will also be interested in reading paragraphs 39 on Page 13 dealing with the proposal in accordance with which the Military Committee consider that NATO Governments should make firm commitments of contributing National units to SHAPE.

Apart from this last point, and the doubtful utility of a Standing Group liaison secretariat in London, the Military Committee's draft appears reasonably satisfactory from our point of view. The relationship contemplated between the Standing Group and the accredited members of non-members is not ideal but is probably as good as we can get. The most important point, perhaps, is whether the Deputies will, in fact, have sufficient authority in giving that very imprecise commodity, "political guidance", to the Standing Group for SHAPE, but the disadvantages of SHAPE reporting to both the Standing Group and the Deputies are so apparent that it may be better to see how the terms of reference, as drafted, work in practice before suggesting amendments of substance. If, however, you think that changes should be made, we should take the opportunity to introduce them during the meetings of the Military Committee and Defence Committee in London next month.

In this memorandum, we have not attempted to criticize the Standing Group's paper from the point of view of our scheme for the establishment of a Council of Governments, which would, of course, do away with the Defence Committee and probably the Military Committee. However, it would be quite easy to fit the proposed military structure into a NATO structure reorganized as we have suggested. The Military Representatives Committee would simply take the place of the present Military Committee and the Defence Committee would be incorporated in the Council of Governments. We think, however, that it is preferable for the discussion of our proposals for the re-organizing of the Council to remain in the Deputies and not to introduce it in the Military Committee and Defence Committee except in the general terms used by Mr. Claxton at the last session of the Defence Committee.

A.D.P.H.

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FILE NO. CSC 5-27-72

COSMIC TOP SECRET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS,
OTTAWA, ONTARIO.

File No 50030-AB-46

Sub. 50030-50 Filed.....

DATE

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MEMORANDUM TO:

Secretary J.I.C.
Secretary J.P.C.
Dept. of External Affairs
Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff, London.

SUBJECT:

Creation of an integrated European Defence force, establishment of a supreme headquarters in Europe and the re-organization of the NATO Military structure

The following document concerning the above mentioned subject is forwarded for your information and retention.

SG/70/11 d/23-11-50 and
CJS Letter 100/15 d/23-11-50

Encl.

(J.D.B. Smith) Brigadier,
Secretary,
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE.

Conclusions of S. G. 70/11 - November 1950

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46. The proposals in this report can be summarised as follows:

a. The existing Northern, Western and Southern European, and North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Organisations should cease to exist, when their functions have been absorbed by commands established now or at a later date, and by the Standing Group.

b. The following Integrated Allied Commands should be established;

(1) Supreme Allied Commander Europe (now) with subordinate commands to be determined after receipt of his recommendations.

(2) CINC Allied Naval Forces Mediterranean (at a later date).

(3) Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (at a later date).

c. The several commands, or planning headquarters, as they become established, should be charged with the development of operational plans and the training and organisation of the forces allocated by nations to the integrated Allied Forces for the common defence of the areas.

d. These commands should be directly under the Standing Group.

e. As agreed by the North Atlantic Council the Standing Group shall be responsible for higher strategic direction in areas in which combined North Atlantic Treaty forces are operating. As such, it will be the superior military body to which Supreme Commander, SHAPE, and other major NATO Commanders who may be appointed later will be responsible. It will also determine the military requirements of the integrated forces.

f. The Military Committee should establish a Military Representatives Committee. This Committee should be a permanent body and should be located in Washington, D.C. The Chairman of the Standing Group should be the Chairman of the Military Representatives Committee.

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The Military Representatives should be endowed by their national Chiefs of Staff with the necessary delegated authority to deal with matters which would in the past have come before the Military Committee, except those which because of their nature must continue to receive full Military Committee approval.

g. The Standing Group should receive from the North Atlantic Council Deputies guidance as regards political considerations which affect strategic decisions.

h. A channel for direct liaison between the North Atlantic Council Deputies and the Standing Group should be established.

i. The Standing Group should undertake at appropriate times those functions which are at present carried out by Regional Planning Groups and which are not appropriate to the commands to be established. For this purpose the existing Standing Group sub-structure of Advisory and Technical Committees should be expanded and certain of them will have to permit of representation by all signatory powers.

j. A small Standing Group Liaison Secretariat should be established in London for liaison with the Council Deputies, the MPSB, and the DFEC, and such Standing Group Committees as are located there.

k. The Defence Committee should suggest to the Western Union Defence Organisation that it review, as soon as possible, its status in the light of the establishment of overall North Atlantic Treaty Command Organisation.

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RESULT A SECRET****TOP SECRET**Canada's Relations with SHAEF

During the summer of 1942 there occurred an exchange of correspondence* in which the relationship of Canadian armed forces to United Kingdom and other Commonwealth forces was worked out in some detail. These negotiations took place while British forces were still dangerously extended, before United States participation in European operations was of any significance, and at a time when the substantial Canadian force was the outstanding military unit in Britain. In these circumstances, Canada appears in the negotiations as a real if junior partner, able to insist on having her own way in certain lesser matters and able to reserve for her commanders, subject to British leadership in strategic planning, a very real measure of independent control over their own troops.

A year later, however, the scene had changed. British forces had increased considerably, United States forces were entering the European theatre in important numbers, and the overall scale of allied operations had vastly expanded. This change is admirably illustrated by the introductory section (paragraphs 1 to 8) of a report from Washington submitted on March 31, 1943, by General Pope and appended to this note, ~~as an appendix~~. By the time of this report, and for reasons excellently outlined by General Pope, the general direction of the war, subject always to the decisions of the President and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, has been entrusted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The latter body was in fact making the decisions, not only on strategic planning but even on the detailed arrangements for the use of Canadian and other troops.

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* See unnumbered file "Canadian Army in Europe", the enclosures to Despatch No. A150 of August 25, 1942, and telegram No. 2202 of September 24.

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This fact is illustrated by the development of "Operation Torch", the invasion of North Africa. There is little material on the planning of this operation available in the Department, but it has been learned from Col. Stacey that National Defence has a good deal of information on the subject. It would appear that neither the Canadian Government nor its military authorities had any knowledge of the project until months after the major decisions were taken. While it is true that Canadian troops were not used in this operation, the failure of the Combined Chiefs of Staff even to indicate that such a project was under way gives a good indication of the distance between Canadian authorities and the centre of strategic planning.

By this time Canada's only remaining means of attempting to influence major decisions was to appeal on the highest political level for a special hearing. Such an appeal, in connection with the use of Canadian troops in the Mediterranean campaigns of 1943, is illustrated by a group of telegrams sent in the autumn of that year.* These telegrams indicate that our best means of access to the Combined Chiefs of Staff was by way of Mr. Churchill's ear, and that this was attentive only when, as in the case mentioned, our representations happened to fall in with the accepted general plan.

As 1943 drew to an end plans for the invasion of Europe were taking shape, and it became evident that at long last the main Canadian force would be committed to a major action. The Canadian Government naturally felt concern at the prospect, and very properly undertook to do what it could to ensure that Canadian military authorities should be able to approve the

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* Churchill to King, September 19, 1943.
Ralston (approved King) to Churchill, October 2, 1943.
Churchill to King, October 12, 1943.
See file 41 (s).

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plans. The actual operation was to be carried out under the supreme command of General Eisenhower, whose headquarters (SHAEF) would be responsible for all details concerning the disposition and assignments of the troops participating. SHAEF had of course been established under the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and was being directed by the latter body in which Canada had little or no influence. Accordingly the War Committee decided to establish a Joint Staff Mission in London, with the dual function of maintaining contact between the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff Committee, and of acting as a link between the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and SHAEF. A message outlining this proposal was sent early in March, 1944, to President Roosevelt and to Mr. Churchill.

Mr. Churchill did not at first reply, but unofficial British reaction was sympathetic. Mr. Roosevelt acknowledged the message, indicating that he had submitted it to his Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration. On April 8 the President transmitted the opinion of his Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which he himself concurred. The Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed themselves in part as follows:

"Although the establishment of a Canadian Joint Staff Mission in London is a question for decision by the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada, military implications involved make it necessary that, should such a Mission be established, the appropriate channel of communications between the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and the Supreme Commands must be through the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and not directly through the Mission to the Supreme Commands, as proposed by the Canadian Prime Minister."

Ten days later Mr. Churchill sent a message, by implication repudiating the bluntness of the previous paragraph

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yet supporting its argument to the full. There was nothing the Canadian Government could do but accept the fact that control of its forces had now passed entirely out of its hands. A minor difference subsequently arose concerning release of the news that Canadian troops in Italy had been brought up to join the main body in the Lowlands, and on this subject of course military expediency properly won out. Except in this last connection, relations between Canada and SHAEF were polite, formal, and distant; there was in fact nothing for them to talk to each other about.

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

APPENDIX.

Report from Washington, March 31,
1943, by General Pope.

(Taken from "Extra Copies" folder
of file 22 (s), "Planning of War")

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~~MOST SECRET~~CANADIAN JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON

File No. 1-3-1

2nd Copy of Copy No. 5.

Enc. to Apr. 7/43

WASHINGTON REPORT

(31 Mar. 1943)

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET1. INTRODUCTORY

To the members of a Dominions' Military Mission the task of making an informed appreciation of the general war situation at any particular time, is by no means an easy one. Full and accurate information is hard to come by if, indeed, it is not impossible to do so. Subject always to the decisions of the President and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the general direction of the war has been entrusted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, that is to say, to the Joint United States Chiefs of Staff and to the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff. This responsibility the Combined Chiefs of Staff have never shown much desire to share with the military representatives of the lesser United Nations.

2. The reason for this is not far to seek. It is but a truism to say that, in the last analysis, the measure of a country's influence in international affairs is but a function of its military strength. And the United Kingdom, no less than the United States, is never unconscious of the predominant strength of its armed forces when compared to those of the Dominions, China, Holland and the other nations. Actually, from time to time the military representatives of these latter Powers are invited to sit with Combined Chiefs of Staff. On these infrequent occasions, the situation in the several theatres of operations is broadly described. Again, when an item of business particularly affects one or other of these countries, its military representatives are permitted to join in the discussion. But this is largely a formality and consists of little else than of affording the representatives of the country in question an opportunity of expressing their assent to a conclusion or a recommendation that has previously been worked out, usually with their collaboration, in subordinate committee. Subject to these exceptions, the Combined Chiefs of Staff keep the direction of the war entirely within their own hands. The recent conference on anti-submarine operations in the North Atlantic was a meeting of Service Headquarters, outside the orbit of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as such.

3. There is another reason for the non-inclusion of the military representatives of the lesser United Nations in the deliberations of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. While the political heads of the United Kingdom and the United States never weary of reiterating their complete accord as to the objects they are determined to achieve, there can be no doubt that their respective military advisers are not of one mind as to the sequence of the steps to be taken, nor as to the relative weight of the operations to be put in hand. The United States Navy has for generations had its eyes glued to the Pacific. It is adamant in its refusal to divert from that ocean any appreciable measure of naval force. In no less degree the United States Army has a burning desire to annihilate the Japanese. They, however, appear loyally to have accepted the decision that the defeat of Germany must be given first priority. With this latter view the British entirely agree, but not with the timing proposed by their United States colleagues.

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4. The greater bulk of the British Empire is composed of lands fringing the Indian Ocean, the main arterial highroad to which passes through the Mediterranean. The British therefore have a great and instinctive concern for the security of their positions all the way from Gibraltar to Singapore. They did not need to be reminded, during the summer of 1942, that the loss of the Middle East might well lengthen the course of the war by as much as from 5 to 10 years. The Americans, on the other hand, did not seem to be unduly perturbed until the loss of Egypt appeared imminent and when this threat had lessened, even if only to a moderate degree, they transferred their attention elsewhere. To the m the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean do not commend themselves as areas of primary importance.

5. In the light of the foregoing it will be apparent that agreement between the "Big Two" is not always easy to obtain. Differing as they do in their views as to the relative values of the several theatres of operations, either actual or potential, it naturally follows that it is only by the exercise of pressure from the top that they manage to achieve unanimity in respect of questions of major importance. If an over-all unity of command is not a matter of practical politics the next best thing, namely, joint direction by the two leading Powers, is the only alternative. The possible psychological advantage that would accrue from the inclusion of the representatives of the lesser nations would be more than outweighed by the retardatory effect of such a step on the pace of the central machinery of direction. Decisions would be made more difficult and, as has been intimated, these are difficult enough to reach as it is. A due sense of proportion, it is felt, will show that the general participation of Dominions' representatives and of the other United Nations in the work of the Combined Chiefs of Staff is hardly a tenable proposition.

6. In these circumstances, the role of the members of the Dominions' Military Missions is somewhat delicate. They do not directly contribute to solution of major problems decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. They have no place at the periodic conferences, such as Casablanca, where the important decisions are really taken. They are not advised as to these decisions. They are not officially informed as to operations planned or set in motion. On the other hand, however, they have access to the daily situation reports. They see the minutes and a fair number of the reports produced by the working committees. Consequently, if they are not apprised of future events, they are nevertheless in a position to keep fairly well abreast of the current situation.

7. The work of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, however, is not all carried out in formal committee. Much work is conducted more or less off the record. The Dominions' Military Missions have been provided with desks in the offices of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It is there that they meet daily to read the papers made available to them and, of greater importance, to exchange information not only amongst themselves but also with their British and United States colleagues. Thus it is, that Australia and New Zealand, being under United States strategic direction, the representatives have established close and useful contacts with the staffs of the United States Army and Navy, respectively. So far as Canada is concerned, her military representatives enjoy a not unenviable position. Her armed forces at sea and abroad serve, in the words of the Visiting Forces Act, in combination with the corresponding forces of the United Kingdom. This makes an effective point of liaison with the British Joint Staff Mission. On the other hand, a mutual responsibility for joint continental defence has enabled them to establish close relationships with both the War and Navy Departments.

8. Much useful work, therefore, is possible by means of informal discussion. If we are precluded from asking direct questions it is not necessary for us to remain completely in the dark. Security is never absolute and what with a phrase here and a word there, together with what we are officially told, not only can the general picture of the moment be built up but also an intelligent forecast can be made of things that are to come. It is with such a background that the following observations on the probable trend of events in the major theatres of operations are submitted.

9. SOUTH PACIFIC

On the 21st March, there was concluded in Washington a conference of senior United States staff officers from the Central, South and South West Pacific. The object of the Conference was to concert a general plan for the conduct of the war in those areas, not only further to improve the present position, but also to bring about the ultimate defeat of Japan. The decisions reached have of course been made known to very few. A surmise is, however, possible.

10. It is believed that both the United States Army and Navy staffs are of opinion that the crisis in the South Pacific has now been passed. The Japanese have suffered very severe losses in men, materiel and shipping. Their shortage in shipping is believed to be particularly acute, while the fighting power of both their ground and air personnel is by no means as high as it was a year or even six months ago. While, therefore, in accordance with the broad strategic direction that the defeat of Germany is to be given first priority it is understood that it has been decided to embark on a forward policy in the South and South West Pacific. It would appear that the plans call for the strengthening of the positions on Guadalcanal, where the number of air fields is to be increased several fold and also in New Guinea where operations are contemplated against Salamaua and Lae and possibly as far to the North West as Wewak. Air fields may also be established on several of the islands lying between Guadalcanal and New Guinea. From this line of bases landing operations are projected against both New Ireland and New Britain, with the object of pinching out Rabaul. From Rabaul it is believed, despite the President's recent statement to the contrary, that the next objective will be Truk for the capture of which the establishment of a base in the Marshall group would be an essential preliminary. From Truk the general conception appears to be based on the conclusion that the Burma Road, when re-opened, can never be made capable of sustaining major operations against Japan. For this a port in South China is held to be an essential and the way thereto apparently has been mapped out from Truk via N.E. Borneo and the Northern portion of the Phillipines. This of course is a very long-term plan. Indeed, it would not appear to be expected that the Japanese can be driven out of Truk until some time in 1943.

11. WESTERN EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN.

So far as Western Europe and the Mediterranean are concerned it would appear that the British Joint Staff Mission and the Joint United States Chiefs of Staff are still poles apart. It will be recalled that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, seeing no virtue in the North African operation, were opposed and still are opposed in spirit to the venture. That the operations begun in October-November of last year (and which now appear to have reached the last phase) probably saved the Middle East and all that this implies, does not seem to have induced them to concede that the cause of the United Nations has thereby been very materially advanced. The United States Army would probably maintain that having agreed to a plan they did not like, they are loyally abiding by their agreement. The United States Navy may possibly look upon it as simply having created another convoy line to protect. Both are familiar with the problems of the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. These they fully understand. But when it comes to the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean it seems to be impossible to make them agree that these areas

are of really vital importance - if only to deny them to the enemy.

12. So far as the United States Army is concerned, their grievance is that the North African venture has gravely retarded the day when they may come to grips with the main German Armies. To do this it will be necessary to launch an offensive from the United Kingdom across the narrow waters of the North Sea or the English Channel, or both, against the shores of Western Europe. In their view only such an operation will bring about the final defeat of Germany. With this broad appreciation the British do not appear to disagree. But with the timing proposed they are by no means prepared to assent. They hold that prematurely to initiate a truly continental operation would have no result other than to dissipate that reserve of force they have so laboriously built up since the time of Dunkirk. They hold, and possibly rightly so, German strength in great respect and consequently they feel that during the coming season major emphasis should be placed on the air bombardment of German-held Western Europe.

13. On the other hand, it seems clear that at Casablanca a decision was taken to carry out landing operations against the shores of France and possibly Belgium. Whether or not it was decided to embark on an all-out offensive, or to merely effect a lodgement on the Continent such as by cutting off the Cherbourg Peninsula, has not been definitely established. It is thought, however, that the decision had to do with the more limited operation. It should, however, here be recorded that rumour has it that there was talk of a pincers movement from Northern France and the so-called soft under-belly of Europe - a course which, it is thought, considerations of time and space and available forces will convincingly show to be out of the question during 1943, provided always that the German defensive power and will to resist do not in the meantime very seriously deteriorate.

14. The plan, however, appears to have been postulated on a serious mis-appreciation of the shipping position. It was held that the United States land forces in the United Kingdom would be materially increased during the first quarter of this year. This it has been found quite impossible to achieve. Moreover, the plans for the second quarter appear to have been restricted to the reinforcement of the United States Air Corps in the United Kingdom to the end that the acceleration of the scale of air attack against Germany and German-occupied Europe may be continued without check or stint. It would appear then as if in respect of the theatre of operations, logic and circumstances have made it possible for the British view to prevail. In this connection the thought occurs if it might be possible that the United States might not be displeased if the British (and Canadians) could be induced at heavy cost to undertake the chore of cracking the crust of German opposition in Western Europe and thus provide them with the subsequent easier and more glorious role of mopping up.

15. THE MEDITERRANEAN.

The North African campaign now appears to be drawing to a fully satisfactory conclusion. But within the limits of what may be practicable the enemy must be allowed no rest. Indeed, there seems to be reason to believe that further action to this end is already under way, the nature of which should become fully known within the next six weeks. In this connection Sicily seems to be the objective most frequently mentioned. Subsequently the Dodecanese and Crete may well come in for attention.

16. BURMA

The United Nations have never wavered in their intention to undertake, as opportunity offered and conditions made it possible, such operations as might be necessary to re-open the Burma Road. It is believed that it had generally been planned to re-take Burma from the Japanese at the end of the monsoon season towards the latter part of this year. The only factor that may prevent the achievement of this purpose as planned is the difficulty in respect of shipping. It may not be possible to concentrate the required men and materiel within the time available.

17. SHIPPING

The gravity of the shipping situation has been so often stated that the words used to describe it at times appear to have lost their force. The Battle of the Atlantic has reached a phase the seriousness of which it would almost be impossible to exaggerate. Some black weeks still lie ahead. A ray of hope lies in the fact that at long last an appreciable number of new escort vessels will shortly come into commission which, together with new technical equipment, may materially alleviate the situation. As a member of the British Joint Staff Mission recently put it, the shortage of shipping never made it impossible to carry out a planned operation during the whole course of the last war. It is doing so today.

MAP:LD

31st March, 1943

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COPY NO.....


FROM: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA, LONDON, ENGLAND
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET
TOP SECRET

IMPORTANT

CYPHER - AUTO

NO. 1940



LONDON, October 11, 1950.

Original in 50030-E-1-40

Top Secret. Following for Secretary Chiefs of Staff Committee from Chairman Canadian Joint Staff London, Begins:
CJS(L)M-259.

1. The United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff have sent to Tedder a paper outlining their views on the re-organization of NATO in Europe. Following is a summary of the Chiefs of Staff paper.

Appointment of Supreme Commander:

2. Consider it essential that the Supreme Commander SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Atlantic Pact Europe) should be appointed immediately in order to give drive and impetus to organization and training of an effective force. The North Atlantic Council have, however, agreed to the appointment of a Chief of Staff immediately, pending the appointment of a Supreme Commander.

Powers of Supreme Commander SHAPE:

3. Supreme Commander should be responsible for planning the defence of the whole of the Western European Theatre including Western Germany, Italy and Scandinavia. Portugal is not included because her proposed contribution to NATO was subject to so many conditions as to make it unacceptable at present.

4. In the event of war before Western Germany can be defended, Scandinavia would have to become a separate command responsible directly to the Standing Group.

5. The Western Mediterranean, which is part of NATO, should not be the responsibility of SHAPE but should be a separate command directly under the Standing Group. (Understand the

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French view at planning level is that Algeria should also come under SHAPE, but "We consider that the whole of French North Africa should be regarded as a national responsibility directly under the French Chiefs of Staff.")

Powers of Supreme Commander in Peacetime:

6. (a) The right of direct approach to national Chiefs of Staff and Defence Ministers
- (b) The right to press national authorities to speed up provision of forces allotted to Supreme Command
- (c) The right to recommend organization and deployment of forces allotted to Supreme Command
- (d) Direct control over the higher training of all national forces allotted to the Supreme Command and the right to inspect and to make recommendations concerning all training of these forces
- (e) The right to inspect the training of forces earmarked for the Supreme Command on the outbreak of war
- (f) The right to represent to the Standing Group failures by any particular country to meet its commitments.

Powers of Supreme Commander in War:

7. In war the Supreme Commander should exercise full operational control over all forces under SHAPE.

National Service:

8. National Service must remain the ultimate responsibility of national authorities.

Powers of a Chief of Staff Before a Supreme Commander is

Appointed:

9. Immediate appointment of Supreme Commander is desirable. However interim appointment of a Chief of Staff would be workable provided he was an officer of highest calibre.

Powers of Chief of Staff:

10. (a) Same as in paragraph 6(a) above.
- (b) Same as in paragraph 6(b) above.
- (c) Same as in paragraph 6(c) above.

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- (d) The right to inspect all forms of training of national forces which, in war, would be placed under SHAPE and to make the necessary recommendations to national authorities and the Standing Group.
- (e) The right to organize and direct joint exercises in conjunction with the Commanders in Chief.
- (f) The authority to bring to the notice of the Standing Group failure by any particular country to meet its commitments.

11. Even with these powers the appointment of a Chief of Staff would have the following disadvantages:

- (a) He could not issue orders without reference to the Standing Group.
- (b) He would not have the same control over training as the Supreme Commander.
- (c) His rank and personal authority would not carry the weight with national authorities and subordinate Commanders in Chief necessary to impart the required impetus and drive to the re-organization of European defence.

Provision of Forces for SHAPE:

12. NATO countries should make firm commitments for national units to operate immediately under the control of the Supreme Commander and for additional forces to be placed under his command in the event of war provided that:

- (a) National authorities retain the right to change over units and formations stationed in Europe and under the Supreme Commander, provided the size and quality of national contributions are not altered.
- (b) Forces earmarked to go under Supreme Commander in war may be changed over provided size and quality remain basically unchanged.

Status of Standing Group after SHAPE is Formed:

13. The Supreme Commander or Chief of Staff will be directly responsible to the Standing Group. The Standing Group would become the organization responsible for the higher military direction of NATO.

Increased Powers of Standing Group:

14. With its increased powers, the Standing Group would be permitted to approve military plans without reference to the Military Committee provided these plans were approved at some stage by the countries to which they refer.

15. The Standing Group would establish in London a liaison section to keep contact with the deputies and the financial and supply organizations. This liaison section of the Standing Group should also be responsible for some of the technical and other committees which will have to be set up in London, viz. the standardization agency recommended in S.G. 29/3.

Measures to ensure and improve necessary close working relationship between the Standing Group and non-member Governments:

16. Countries not represented on the Standing Group would continue to express their views through accredited representatives and these representatives should be allowed to sit in with the Standing Group more often. As a result most of the functions of the Military Committee could be taken over by the Standing Group. This will increase the status of accredited representatives and provide non-member Governments with more frequent opportunities "to attend meetings of the equivalent of the Military Committee than has, up to the present, been possible." NATO countries contributing to the integrated force should, if they desire, attach representatives to the Supreme Headquarters. This would be in addition to any officers from these countries serving on the staff of SHAPE.

Distribution of functions of existing Regional Planning Groups

17. The European regional planning groups should cease to exist and their present tasks, which are as follows, re-allocated.

- (a) Preparation of plans for (total defence?) of regions.
- (b) Co-ordination of plans with other regional planning groups.
- (c) Recommendations to national Governments on the

provision of forces and giving guidance on the composition of national forces.

- (d) Making recommendations to national Governments for the provision of logistical support and backing for the forces allocated.
- (e) Co-ordinating the work of service advisory committees of standardization of equipment, harmonization of procedure and infrastructure.

18. SHAPE would assume responsibilities from (a) to (d) inclusive and the Standing Group for (e).

Effect of SHAPE on N.A.O.R.P.G.:

19. The re-organization of the N.A.O.R.P.G. to provide it with a suitable command organization is likely to take some time.

20. The Western European Regional Planning Group Naval Advisory Committee is responsible for the preparation of naval plans for Western Europe and it would be impracticable for SHAPE to take over this work. It is therefore considered that a naval planning agency should be set up in London to undertake the planning of all naval matters in Western Europe which are not the direct concern of SHAPE or the Supreme Commander Atlantic. This agency should be responsible to the Standing Group. "This work, we consider, can be undertaken by the present Naval Advisory Committee."

European Command Organization:

21. At planning level, United States, United Kingdom and France agree that for command purposes Europe should be divided into three areas - Western Europe, Italy and Scandinavia.

22. The Command systems for Italy and Scandinavia would be similar. Directly responsible to the Supreme Commander SHAPE there would be a Commander in Chief, who would be the Land Force Commander, with subordinate Air and Naval Commanders in Chief.

United States Views on Command Organization:

23. The United States may wish the Supreme Commander to have

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the additional appointment of Land Forces Commander in Chief Western Europe. The advantages of this system would be:

(a) An American, instead of a Frenchman, would have direct control of the Western European land theatre and although this would be desirable, the Chiefs of Staff have always accepted the concept of a French Land Force Commander in Chief provided the Supreme Commander was British or American.

(b) In peace, the Supreme Commander would have the power to influence the organization, deployment and training of the Western European land forces more directly than if his instructions had to be transmitted through a French Commander in Chief Land Forces.

United Kingdom views on command organization:

24. The Supreme Commander should not assume direct responsibility for any particular service. The area covered by the Western European theatre, the diversity of nationalities and the political problems inherent in the defence of Europe would make the task of the Supreme Commander more difficult than General Eisenhower's in 1944. Further, during the initial period, the responsibilities of the Supreme Commander may have to be borne by a Chief of Staff.

25. Under the American system, there would be no French representative on the Commanders in Chief level or above and France would be unlikely to agree to this unless it was given the appointment of Deputy Supreme Commander. "We consider that since there would be no overall Air Commander in Chief, the Deputy Supreme Commander should be an airman; no suitable French airman is likely to be forthcoming and since in the near future the British air forces in Europe are likely to be considerably greater than the French, we consider it important that the Deputy Supreme Commander should be a British airman."

26. We see no reason to alter our view that a Supreme Commander should be a separate appointment and consider the advantages of the American system are heavily outweighed by the disadvantages.

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United Kingdom proposal for command organization:

27. (a) Standing Group:

Location - Washington, with Liaison Section in London.

Increased powers - see paragraphs 14 and 15. Representatives accredited would participate more than heretofore in the work of the Standing Group. See paragraph 16.

(b) SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Atlantic Pact Europe):

Supreme Allied Commander (United States)

Deputy Supreme Commander (United Kingdom)

Chief of Staff (United States)

Representatives of National Chiefs of Staff attached as desired (see paragraph 16).

Powers of Supreme Commander in peacetime and in war - see paragraphs 6 and 7.

Commander in Chief Land Forces Western Europe (French)

Commander in Chief Air Forces Western Europe
(nationality not stated)

Flag Officer Western Europe (French)

(c) Command organization Scandinavia - responsible to Supreme Command:

Commander in Chief Scandinavia (is also Commander in Chief Land Forces, with under command Commander in Chief Air Scandinavia and Commander in Chief Navy Scandinavia)

(d) Command organization Italy - responsible to Supreme Command:

Commander in Chief Italy (Italian; also Commander in Chief Land Forces, with under command Commander in Chief Air (Italian) and Commander in Chief Navy (Italian)).

(e) Location of Supreme Headquarters:

Headquarters of Supreme Commander should be located in France and full use made of existing Western Union Headquarters at Fontainebleau. Reasons:

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- (i) Headquarters could be set up immediately;
- (ii) Communications and other facilities available there;
- (iii) Economy in that new headquarters would not be required;
- (iv) Moving the only integrated headquarters in Europe from Fontainebleau would have adverse affect on morale of European countries.

Organization of Supreme Headquarters:

28. The internal organization of Supreme Headquarters will depend upon whether or not the Supreme Commander was in addition Land Force Commander, i.e. United Kingdom versus United States concept.

29. If the American system (paragraph 23) were adopted, the Supreme Headquarters would in addition become the Land Forces Headquarters for Western Europe and the headquarters of the naval and air Commanders in Chief would not be an integral part of it. The staff of SHAPE would be inter-service and would be organized in G.1, G.2, G.3 and G.4 branches and would be responsible only to the Supreme Commander. The air and naval Commanders in Chief would thus have no influence except through liaison over the views presented to the Supreme Commander by his staff.

United Kingdom proposal for staff organization:

30. Under the Supreme Commander there would be, "three service Commanders in Chief, each of which would have an integrated staff, the whole forming Supreme Headquarters. The Supreme Commander would be served by a small personal staff for functions such as operations, personnel, training and supply. Certain other functions such as planning, intelligence, signals and movements should be undertaken by the combined staffs formed from two or more services, which would have a dual responsibility collective to the Supreme Commander and individual to the respective service Commanders in Chief. In this way the views of the service Commanders in Chief would be directly represented to the Supreme Commander."

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Summary of Chiefs of Staff paper ends.)

31. Diagrams showing the United Kingdom proposals are being forwarded by bag.

32. It is believed the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff will try to persuade the United States to appoint a Supreme Commander immediately the organization of SHAPE is approved. They believe that the United States may make a condition that the provision by them of a Supreme Commander and additional forces for Western Europe will depend upon the agreement to employ at an early date German formations under the Supreme Command and the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff are worried that this point of view should be pressed too hard on the French and in the event of their refusal to accept it that early American participation on a large scale in the defence of Western Europe lost.

33. It is believed that Lord Tedder will attempt in advance of the meetings in Washington to obtain United States agreement to the interim appointment of F.M. Montgomery as Supreme Commander. Ends.

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HIGH COMMISSIONER

