50066-40 (5)

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DATE / DATE
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Department of External Affairs

Subject: COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA JUNE 1, 1961

File No. 50066-40
Volume 5 (FIVE)
From [redacted]
To ~~26 AUGUST 1963~~ 13 SEPT. 1963

Date	Referred To	Returned	Date	Referred To	Returned
197 (2)	Political Situation in Latin America				
10833-40	American Congress for Peace & Democracy				
2-A.B-(5)	Relations between the Soviet Govt & Communist Parties abroad.				
6136-40	Inter American Labour Congress				
5399-40	Labour Conditions & Movements in Latin America				
11875-40	Soviet Union - Latin American relations				

272570

Ref [illegible]/T.C.[illegible]/er

References: Mr. Fick
Mrs. Paris
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff
Joint Intelligence Bureau
All L.A. Posts

ce for 50066-40

:1 HAVANA SEP13/63 CONFD

:) EXTERNAL 208 OPIMMED

:NFO TT WASHDC PERMISNY LDN NATOPARIS PRIORITY FM OTT

:AG MOSCOW FM LDN

REF OURTEL 181 AUG22

:R INCIDENTS AND CHANGING MOOD OF CUBA

CONTINUATION OF EXILE HIT-AND-RUN AIR ATTACKS AND GOVTS MILITANT REACTION IS CREATING ATMOSPHERE OF UNCERTAINTY AND SOME UNEASINESS IN CUBA. THESE INCIDENTS OF WHICH FOUR HAVE BEEN REPORTED SO FAR IN SEP DO NOT RPT NOT APPEAR TO HAVE CONSTITUTED ANY MAJOR SECURITY THREAT OR CAUSED SERIOUS DAMAGE. LAST WEEK TWO TWO-ENGINE AIRCRAFT WERE ALLEGEDLY TWICE DRIVEN AWAY FROM SANTA CLARA AIR BASE BY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE. IN PROCESS AIRCRAFT JETTISONED EXPLOSIVES WHICH KILLED SCHOOL TEACHER AND WOUNDED THREE OF HIS CHILDREN (ALTHOUGH SOME REPORTS FROM LOCAL RESIDENTS SUGGEST INACCURATE FIRING OF CUBANS CAUSED THIS DEATH). TWO JET AIRCRAFT ACCUSED OF PROTECTING THESE PLANES WERE ALSO SIAD TO HAVE BEEN CHASED OFF BY CUBAN AIRFORCE. THEN THIS WEEK RAIDS AGAINST SANTA CLARA, AND SANTIAGO DE CUBA REFINERY WERE SIMILARLY REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN THWARTED. IN ANOTHER INSTANCE INVADING AIRCRAFT DROPPED SEVERAL FIFTY-POUND BOMBS NEAR SUGAR MILL IN NORTH CAMAGUAY ALLEDEDLY ONLY CAUSING DAMAGE TO ADJACENT BUILDING.

2. CUBANS HAVE FOLLOWED USUAL TACK OF HOLDING USA GOVT RESPONSIBLE. THERE HAS ALSO BEEN SOME LOOSE TALK OF RETALIATION. OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF FIRST OF ABOVE ATTACKS STATED CUBA WOULD NOT RPT NOT TOLERATE SUCH QUOTE ACTS OF PIRACY UNQUOTE AND THAT REPETITION OF ATTACKS WOULD GIVE RISE TO SERIOUS INCIDENTS. THREAT HOWEVER, NOT RPT NOT REITERATED IN COMMUNIQUE ON LATER AIR FORAYS. RAIDERS HAVE BEEN ACCUSED OF COMING FROM NORTH AND MAP PUBLISHED IN HOY RATHER POINTEDLY DREW ATTENTION TO PROXIMITY OF BAHAMAS TO ATTACK POINTS. THIS COMMUNIQUE ALSO MADE GENERAL ACCUSATION THAT USA WAS

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NOT RPT NOT ONLY PROTECTING COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS BUT WAS ALLOWING ITS TERRITORY TO BE USED AS BASE OF OPERATION V FOR RAIDERS. OFFICIALS IN(CONVERSATION?)TALK VARIOUSLY OF NICARAGUA AND PUERTORICO AS POINTS OF ORIGIN OF RAIDS.

3. IF GOVT ACCOUNTS ARE TAKEN AT FACE VALUE ALL ATTACKS HAVE BEEN F FAIRLY INEFFECTIVE. (FURTHER REPORT ON THIS ASPECT WILL BE PROVIDED WHEN EMB STAFF MEMBER CURRENTLY TRAVELLING IN SOME OF AFFECTED AREAS RETURNS TO HAVANA). RAIDS HAVE HOWEVER DEMONSTRATED BETTER ORGANIZATION THAN IN PAS WITH SPECIFIC MISSIONS APPAENTLY BEING SELECTED EVEN IF OBJECTIVE NOT RPT NOT ATTAINED. MOREOVER THEY HAVE REVEALED LIMITATIONS OF CUBANS DEFENCES. INTRUDING AIR-CRAFT HAVE APPEARED ALMOST ON THEIR TARGETS WITHOUT PRIOR AWARNING AND WHILE ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE HAS SUCCEEDED IN TURNING THEM BACK, IT HAS FAILED TO BRING ONE PLANE DOWN. CUBAN JETS HAVE APPARENTLY NOT RPT NOT GOT OFF GROUND FAST ENOUGH TO ATTACK PLANES. THIS MILITARY WEAKNESS HAS NOT RPT NOT BEEN LOST ON POPULATION.

4. MOST IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF SUCH ATTACKS IS PSYCHOLOGICAL BLOW DEALT TO STABILITY OF CASTRO REGIME WITH CONSEQUENT BOOST IN OPPOSITION MORALE. DEJECTION IN COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY RANKS OF SOME MONTHS AGO HAS GIVEN WAY TO WAVE OF OPTIMISM THAT MAXIMUM LEADER IS NO RPT NO LONGER NECESSARILY PERM FIXTURE. WHEREAS FIDEL CASTRO COULD SPEAK SOME MONTHS AGO OF COUNTER-REVOLUTION BEING IN STATE OF DECOMPOSTION AND BOAST THAT LIQUIDATION OF REMAINING OUTLAW BANDS WAS IMMINENT, NOW AIR IS FULL OF RUMOURS OF TROUBLE IN PINAR DEL RIO HILLS AND ESCAMBRAY. GRANTING SUCH STORIES ARE HIGHLY EXAGGERATED CHANGED CLIMATE UNDOUBTEDLY PROVIDES ENCOURAGE-MENT OFR FOR COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY ACTION BOTH DIRECTLY AND BY LENDING GREATER CREDIBILITY TO ANIT-GOVT REPORTS. CONVERSELY IT HINDERS TASK OF CONSOLIDATIG REVOLUTION.

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5. OF GREATER POTENTIAL SIGNIFICANCE IS EFFECT ON DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMY. SUCH ATTACKS AND PARTICULARLY MILITANT CUBAN REACTION WHICH BLOWS UP THEIR IMPORTANCE INEVITABLY CREATES FEELING OF INSECURITY IN COUNTRY AND DISTRACT CUBANS FROM DAILY CHORES, NOT RPT NOT THAT MUCH EXCUSE IS OFTEN NEEDEN, PLAYING AT SOLDIERS IS ALWAYS MORE EXHILARATING EXPERIENCE FOR MANY CUBANS IN PRESENT DRAB CONDITIONS OF DAILY LIFE THAN VOLUNTEERING FOR PICKING COFFEE IN RAIN OR CUTTING CANE IN HOT SUN. AT RECENT RECEPTION CHE GUEVARA INDICATED HIS CONCERN ON THIS POINT SAYING HE FEARED ONE CONSEQUENCE OF RAIDS WOULD BE TO DIVERT MUCH NEEDED MANPOWER AND RESOURCES FROM ECONOMIC TO MILITARY SECTOR.

6. ONE MAY WELL STILL QUESTION EXTENT OF GOVT CONCERN. CERTAINLY RAIDS DO NOT RPT NOT THREATEN REGIMES CONTROL OVER COUNTRY AT THIS TIME. EXPLANATION IS, I THINK, TO BE FOUND IN COMBINATION OF MORE FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES. FIRST IS FIDEL CASTROS WOUNDED PRIDE OVER USA UNWILLINGNESS TO RESPOND IN WAY HE HOPED TO HIS PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE OVERTURES FOLLOWING HIS RETURN FROM MOSCOW. HE IS INFURIATED BY CONTINUATION OF OLD AS WELL AS RECENT USA PRESSURES PARTICULARLY AS HE SEES IT IN LIGHT OF RELEASE OF BAY OF PIGS PRISONERS AND AUTHORIZATION FOR DEPARTURE OF USA CITIZENS AND THEIR FAMILIES FROM CUBA. WITH MENTALITY OF VICTOR DEALING WITH VANQUISHED CASTRO IS UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND WHY WASHDC WOULD NOT RPT NOT WELCOME STAND-OFF. INDEED HIS INABILITY SECURE TACIT AMERICAN ACCEPTANCE OF STATUS QUO WHICH HE THOUGHT COULD BE OBTAINED BY LESS ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE AND INDICATION OF DISPOSITION TO DISCUSS, ALBEIT WITHIN CERTAIN LIMITATIONS, SOME FINANCIAL SETTLEMENT FOR NATIONALIZED COMPANIES IS SOURCE OF DEEP CHAGRIN. ALL THIS PROMPTS RESURGENT ANIMOSITY TOWARDS USA AND ACCOUNTS FOR MUCH OF HIS CURRENT SPATE OF BITTER INVECTIVE IN PUBLIC.

7. THERE IS TOO SENSE OF FRUSTRATION OVER IMPOTENCE IN FACE OF

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PRESENT ATTACKS. NO RPT NO READY COUNTERMOVE AS MODE OF RETALIATION IS AT HAND. REPRISALS AGAINST NEARBY FOREIGN TERRITORIES SUCH AS RECENT RAID ON BAHAMAN KEY ONLY BRINGS ON UNPRODUCTIVE ALTERCATIONS WITH OTHER POWERS. ATTEMPT TO SEIZE USA EMB HAS ENCOUNTERED INPENETRABLE ROADBLOCKS WHICH ONLY FORCE CAN RESOLVE, WITH ITS UNDESIRABLE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS IN THIS CASE. AGAIN ANY MORE DIRECT MEASURE AGAINST USA SUCH AS ATTACK ON GUANTANAMO BASE WOULD BE OPEN PROVOCATION TO AMERICANS. AT SAME TIME USSR IS SHOWING SOME RELUCTANCE TO RATTLE ROCKETS MEANINGFULLY OVER THESE PIN PRICKS, HOWEVER DISCOMFORTING TO CASTROS VANITY THEY MAY BE. SITUATION IS VERY DIFFERENT FROM YEAR AGO WHEN THREAT OF USA INVASTIO COULD BE PICTURED BEFORE WORLD AS PLAUSIBLE POSSIBILITY. EVEN BASIS FOR GOOD PROPAGANDA APPROACH TO SECURITY COUNCIL SEEMS LACKING.

8. COMMENTS LET DROP BY SOME CUBAN OFFICIALS FURTHER SUGGEST GROWING SUSPICION IN SOME QUARTERS THAT USSR WHILE NOT RPT NOT DESERTING ITS CARIBBEAN ALLY IS NOT RPT NOT GOING TO BACK IT UP IN ANY FORCEFUL ACT IN THIS PART OF WORLD, AND THAT IF EAST-WEST DETENTE PROCEEDS APACE CUBA MAY END UP BEING NO RPT NO BETTER THAN POOR PENSIONER OF MOSCOW. AS LONG AS CUBANS HAVE NOT RPT NOT STRAIGHTENED OUT PROBLEM OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH AMERICANS THEY ARE NATURALLY FEARFUL OF WHERE IMPROVED USA-USSR RELATIONS MAY LEAVE THEM. RELATED TO THIS IS EXTENT OF DIV BETWEEN USSR AND CHINA WHICH AS IT APPROACHES BREAKING POING REDUCES CUBAN BARGAINING POWER WITH RUSSIANS.

9. SOME OF CUBAS UNBOUNDED SELF-CONFIDENCE ALSO SEEMS TO BE WANING AS DOUBTS ABOUT FUTURE HOVER IN BACKGROUND. ROA FOR EXAMPLE IN MENTIONING TO ME THAT HE WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE ATTENDING UN SESSION THIS YEAR GAVE AS ONE REASON HIS DESIRE TO REMAIN IN CUBA IN CASE EVENTS TOOK UNPLEASANT TURN LATER IN YEAR. BRAZILIAN AMB -

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FOUND DORTICOS RATHER PESSIMISTIC ABOUT FUTURE IN RECENT INTERVIEW. MORE SPECIFIC CONCERN WAS VOICED BY ONE OF VICE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WHO TOLD ME CUBA WAS NOW CONFRONTED BY FORM OF IRREGULAR WARFARE DIRECTED BY USA WHICH CUBAN REGIME FOUND DIFFICULT TO COMBAT EFFECTIVELY APART FROM AIR ATTACKS HE CLAOMED USA AGENTS WERE BEING INFILTRATED INTO COUNTRY IN GREATER NUMBERS.

10. IN SEPARATE MSG I AM COMMENTING ON ANOTHER FACET OF PRESENT SITUATION THAT OF RE-EMPHASIS ON HARDER REVOLUTIONARY LINE IN LATINAMERICA

KIDD

Lr American/T.C.Hammond/mr

References: Mr. Pick
Emb. Paris
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff
Joint Intelligence Bureau
All L.A. Posts
National Defence College
(throygh Liaison Services Section)

FM HAVANA SEP13/63 CONFD

TO EXTERNAL 206 PRIORITY

INFO TT WASHDC PERMISNY LDN NATOPARIS FM OTT 50066-40

BAG MOSCOW FM LDN

GUERILLA WARFARE

SINCE CASTROS HARSH JUL26 SPEECH HIS REGIME HAS GONE OUT OF ITS WAY TO MAKE CLEAR ITS DEDICATION TO PROMOTION OF GUERILLA WARFARE THROUGHOUT LATINAMERICA. CONCEPT OF (GRP CORRUPT) COMMUNIST FINLAND IN CARIBBEAN HAS NO RPT NO APPEAL TO MEN CONVINCED THAT THEY ARE HIGH PRIESTS OF ONWARD RUSHING WORLD EMBRACING REVOLUTIONARY FAITH. CUBAS POSITION IS TO BE PROTECTED BY COMMUNIST CONQUEST OF PEOPLES OF LATINAMERICA.

2. THIS IS IN PART REACTION TO CONTINUED USA PRESSURE. FIDEL CASTRO SAID AT BRAZILIAN RECEPTION THAT THEY KNEW USA PLANS, THEY HAD CAPTURED CIA AGENTS AND CUBANS INTENDED TO REPLY IN KIND. CASTRO AND HIS ASSOCIATES, HOWEVER, HAVE ALWAYS BEEN FASCINATED BY PROSPECTS OF GUERILLA MOVEMENTS IN LATINAMERICA ON CUBAN MODEL. THEIR PRESENT ROLE IS ONE THEY FIND CONGENIAL.

3. PRESS PLAYS UP ANY NEWS OF GUERILLA ACTIVITIES. VENEZUELA REMAINS STAR PERFORMER BUT GUATEMALA, NICARAGUA AND COLOMBIA ARE ALSO RECEIVING REGULAR ATTENTION. NOW CHE GUEVARA, CUBAS CHIEF GUERILLA THEORETICIAN, HAS WRITTEN LEADING ARTICLE IN SEP ISSUE OF REGIMES IDEOLOGICAL MONTHLY QUOTE CUBA SOCIALISTA UNQUOTE IN WHICH HE TREATS GUERILLA WARFARE AS BASIC INSTRUMENT FOR ACHIEVING POWER IN LATINAMERICA. STRUGGLE, HE PREDICTS, WILL BE CONTINENT-WIDE AND MUCH BLOOD WILL BE SPILLED DURING LONG PERIOD OF TIME BUT ANDES ARE DESTINED TO BECOME, IN CASTROS WORDS, SIERRA MAESTRA OF AMERICA.

4. EXISTING GOVTS MUST BE FORCED TO SHOW THEMSELVES IN THEIR TRUE LIGHT AS BRUTAL DICTATORSHIP OF REACTIONARY CLASSES. COMBATANTS SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE CONFUSED BY SUCH BOURGEOIS TRICKS AS ELECTIONS. ONCE GOVTS ARE COMPELLED TO RESORT TO VIOLENCE AND

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SUPPRESSION STRUGGLE WILL DEEPEN SO THAT THERE COULD BE NO RPT NO TURNING BACK UNTIL FINAL VICTORY BY REVOLUTION. IN CONCRETE TERMS THIS PRESUMABLY MEANS THAT IN COUNTRY LIKE VENEZUELA REVOLUTIONARY LEFT SHOULD DESTROY DEMOCRATIC FRAMEWORK OF STATE AND COMPEL MILITARY TO TAKE POWER AS TRANSITIONAL STAGE TOWARDS REVOLUTION. IN ASSESSING CUBAN VIEW WE SHOULD ALWAYS REMEMBER THAT PRESENT REGIME IN CUBA EXPRESSLY REPUDIATES LIBERAL VALUES, AND IS DETERMINED TO DO AS MUCH DAMAGE AS IT CAN TO EXISTING POLITICAL FABRIC OF OTHER LATINAMERICAN COUNTRIES. INDEED, ACCORDING TO GUEVARAS REASONING, DEMOCRATIC GOVTS ARE GREATER MENACE THAN OUTRIGHT DICTATORSHIPS SINCE IT IS HARDER TO AROUSE POPULACE AGAINST THEM.

5. GUEVARA CONSIDERS THAT MOBILIZATION OF FORCES IN HEMISPHERE WILL BE ABSOLUTE, WITH EXPLOITERS BOTH FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC ON ONE SIDE AND EXPLOITED ON OTHER. AS RESULT, IMPERIALISTS AND NATIVE EXPLOITING CLASSES JOINED IN REPRESSIVE ALLIANCE ARE DESTINED SIMULTANEOUSLY TO BE SWEPT AWAY WHEN ARMED VANGUARD OF PEOPLE FINALLY SEIZES POWER.

6. THIS SEEMS TO RUN COUNTER TO POLICY OF COMMUNIST PARTIES IN SUCH LATINAMERICAN COUNTRIES AS BRAZIL OR WORKING WITH QUOTE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE UNQUOTE AGAINST FOREIGN INTERESTS. EARLIER CUBAN LEADERS HAD SAID THAT EACH PARTY OF VANGUARD SHOULD DECIDE FOR ITSELF ON TACTICS BEST SUITED TO LOCAL SITUATION. INDEED THIS MAY HAVE BEEN COMPROMISE AGREED TO BY CASTRO WHEN HE WAS IN USSR. NOW, CHE WRITES THAT ONE CANNOT RPT NOT SEEK POSITION OF PARTY OF PROLETARIAT AS ONE WOULD DEGREE FROM UNIVERSITY. PARTY MUST FUNCTION AS SUCH BEFORE IT CAN CLAIM THIS TITLE.

7. I SUSPECT CUBANS HAVE FOUND THAT MOSCOW STILL FIRMLY CONTROLS PARTY APPARATUS OF MOST LATINAMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES EVEN WHERE, AS IN MEXICO (ACCORDING TO OUR EMB), MOSCOW ORTHODOXY HAS

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BE ACHIEVED AT COST OF EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP OF REVOLUTIONARY LEFT. IF CUBA RECOGNIZES CREDENTIALS OF THESE COMMUNIST PARTIES IT WILL BE TURNING ITS BACK ON ITS OWN ADHERENTS ANXIOUS TO FOLLOW CUBAN LINE OF GUERILLA WARFARE. CUBAS FOLLOWERS IN LATINAMERICA ARE ALSO ATTRACTED BY CHINESE LINE AND AS SUCH REPRESENT DIRECT THREAT TO USSR VITAL INTERESTS WITHIN WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. CUBAN PRESS HAS NOT RPT NOT PUBLISHED TASS DESPATCHES REPORTING SUPPORT FOR MOSCOW AS AGAINST PEKING BY LATINAMERICAN AND OTHER COMMUNIST PARTIES. STAGE, THUS, SEEMS SET FOR FRICTION BETWEEN USSR AND CUBA ON TACTICS AND MAKEUP OF COMMUNIST PARTIES IN HEMISPHERE.

8. IN ANY EVENT CHES ARTICLE AND OTHER INDICATIONS CAN BE TAKEN AS OPEN DECLARATION THAT CUBA INTENDS TO DO ALL WITHIN ITS POWER TO ENCOURAGE GUERILLA WARFARE. IT WOULD SEEM TO BE INVITATION TO CUBAS ENEMIES, WHOSE POWER MAY PROVE TO BE GREATER, TO USE THESE SELF SAME TACTICS AGAINST CUBA.

9. CASTRO NO RPT NO DOUBT PREFERS TO ACCEPT RISKS THAN REMAIN PASSIVE IN FACE OF USA MEASURES AGAINST HIS REGIME. HE AIMS TO CALL TUNE RATHER THAN DANCE TO USA MUSIC. PROMOTING WAR OF SUBVERSION IS MEANS OF HURTING HIS ENEMIES AND (REASSERTING?) INITIATIVE IN STRUGGLE. CUBANS, HOWEVER, RETAIN SOME SENSE OF PRUDENCE: FOR EXAMPLE, LOCAL PROPAGANDA CONTINUES TO SPARE FOR MOST PART LATINAMERICAN COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE MAINTAINED RELATIONS WITH CUBA. ENCOURAGEMENT OF GUERILLA MOVEMENTS IS ONE OF FEW WEAPONS LEFT TO CASTRO AND HE CLEARLY INTENDS TO USE IT. MOREOVER LONG TERM VISTAS OF REVOLUTIONARY TRIUMPH LEND MEANING TO PRESENT SACRIFICES BY CUBAN PEOPLE AND ARE DESIGNED TO MAINTAIN COURAGE AND ENTHUSIASM OF TRUE BELIEVERS IN MARXIST PARADIS TO COME. EARLY SUMMER SEARCH FOR STAND-OFF TRUCE WITH USA ON ESSENTIALLY CUBAN TERMS SEEMS ALREADY TO BE PAST HISTORY AND FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY SEEMS TO BE ENTERING ONCE MORE INTO GRIMMER PHASE

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CENTRAL RESEARCH UNIT

Background Note No. 2,052 26th August 1963

LATIN AMERICA AND COMMUNISM

Two pronouncements on the type of socialist revolution suitable for the Latin Americans have recently been made.

1. Colombia Communist Party

According to Tass (in Russian, 21.8.63.) the Bogota section of the Colombian Communist Party has recently met to study the differences that have arisen between the Chinese and Soviet Communist Parties. The meeting was addressed by the Political Secretary of the Colombian Party's Central Committee, Julberto Vieira, who read a text approved by the Central Committee to his audience. This condemns the Chinese Communist Party position in no uncertain terms, laying stress on unjust Chinese attacks on the programme of the CPSU, described by the Colombians as the greatest document of our time. The Chinese Communist Party letter of 14th June is said to be "aimed at preventing any possibility of an agreement on unity". Its distribution on the eve of the meeting of the Soviet and Chinese parties in Moscow is condemned as an infringement "of the principles of relations of equality between the Communist Parties."

The Colombian C.P. having decided to publish the open letter of the CPSU, "recommends it for careful individual and collective study by Party members and organisations", as "a valuable document ... approved by the Eighth and Ninth Congresses of the CP of Colombia". Having fully endorsed Soviet policies as put forward by the 20th Soviet Party Congress, it warns members of the Colombian CP to beware of Chinese attempts to sow dissension in their ranks:

> "In the face of the splitting activities of some Chinese leaders, the members of the CP of Colombia will consolidate their ranks ... They will prove once more that no one will succeed in undermining their trust in the Soviet Union ..."

2. Cuban View on Revolution

In reply to a series of questions put by Latin American visitors (22.8.63.), Ernesto Guevara, Cuban Minister for Industry, carefully refrained from committing Cuba to a brand-image on revolution in Latin America. On methods of revolutionary struggle to be followed by Latin Americans, Guevara said:

> "Whether the revolution should be brought about by armed struggle or by other means depends on many factors. It will take place in each country according to its objective conditions and its revolutionary vanguard. Generally, the method to be used is

Continued:

"armed struggle; specifically, each country must see the matter from its own point of view. How it will be undertaken depends on the exploiters and exploited."

In elaborating on the question of tactics to be used, Guevara added:

"If the conditions call for it, war is the method to be used. If the conditions do not prevail then it will fail. Each country's revolutionary vanguard must decide; if it is mistaken, then it is no longer a vanguard and must be replaced by other fighters."

This view seems to open the way to any pro-Chinese faction in any Latin American communist party to attempt to replace the orthodox pro-Soviet leadership, provided it sees a chance of doing so successfully. In particular, Guevara stressed that the "case of Venezuela calls for armed struggle, there is no question. In fact, the method to be used and the armed struggle itself is a matter to be decided by the revolutionaries in each country". But, according to Guevara, Latin American "armed struggle can be developed if the necessary conditions prevail". The Cuban Minister clearly meant that it would be in the interests of the communists to exacerbate prevailing conditions until armed struggle became a profitable way of continuing the fight.

In this context his remarks on how Marxism-Leninism took root in Cuba is important. Guevara described it as a gradual process in "the struggle against imperialism", which itself arose from the "battle for liberation" by a "group of revolutionary people". These people found that, unknown to them at the time, they were in fact following in Mao's footsteps:

"We learned about Mao's theories on guerilla warfare after we waged that type of war in Cuba; we found out that there was a great similarity between his theories and our reality".

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this remark is intended as a hint to Latin Americans to look to China as a model for solving some of their problems. It seems that the struggle in Latin America need not be confined to orthodox communist party members. Guevara specifically affirmed that "in Cuba, the Communist Party did not lead the revolution", even if "its influence was felt and its participation was important in the present socialist stage. In Cuba the Communist Party did not properly understand the method of struggle". Again, this seems a veiled attack on the Cuban Communist Party for having been too much of a tool of the Soviet Communist Party. For if the Party did not properly understand the struggle in the early stages, its mistakes were certainly endorsed by the Soviet Union. Yet Guevara was firm about "the need for a Marxist Party

Continued:

in each country" since "socialism will not be created by spontaneous combustion." Significantly, he concluded that the lack of communist parties in "Black Africa" was "the reason a socialist revolution (there) is so difficult". This remark may also be understood as a criticism of Soviet policy, which has advocated co-operation with existing African nationalist parties in preference to setting up communist parties on that continent.

Finally, on the question of holding a Latin American Communist Party Congress, Guevara said that Cuba, though it would participate in such a meeting, would not take the initiative in calling it. For the Cuban "such an event would be of interest, but not fundamental; there are always vehicles for the exchange of opinions and experiences".

In other words, on balance, the Cuban leadership at present prefers to pick the Latin Americans it wishes to deal with, in preference to being faced with the official leadership of the Latin American Communist Parties.

CENTRAL RESEARCH UNIT
ETR/AH

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

Security: Unclassified

No: 364

Date: August 8, 1963

Enclosures: 1

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No. 5066-40

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy
San Jose, Costa Rica

Reference:

Subject: The Role of the Military in Latin America

To: McWea
AUG 21 1963

References

REFER TO:
O/PM (MR. ROBINSON)
O/SSEA (MR. CAMPBELL)
USSEA
MR. RITCHIE
ECONOMIC I
U.S.A. DIVISION
D.L. (2
LIAISON SERVICES
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CCOS (6)
T & C
BANK
FINANCE
JIB
NDC (VIA L.S.)
LATIN AMERICAN/

Internal Circulation

XL

Distribution to Posts

You may appreciate the humour of the attached cartoon from a Panama newspaper. The item was published during a recent conference of Latin American and U.S. military leaders in Panama for the purpose of discussing control of communist infiltration in Latin America.

R.W. Clark.
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

Ext. 182A (Rev. 2/52)

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Subject

Date July 12, 1963 *Publication* El Panamá América

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

J 71

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy
RIO DE JANEIRO

Reference:

Subject: Brazilian Communists and the Differences in the World Communist Movement.

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: 539

Date: July 30th, 1963.

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.	
50066-40	
26	24

References:

NATO - Paris
Permanent W.
FAR EASTERN DIV.
EUROPEAN DIV.

REFER TO:
~~OVPM (MR. ROBINSON)~~
~~O/SSEA (MR. CAMPBELL)~~
~~USSEA~~
MR. RITCHIE
~~ECONOMIC I~~
~~U.S.A. DIVISION~~
D.L. (2)
~~LIAISON SERVICES~~
ALL LATIN AMERICAN POSTS
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~~T.&C.~~
~~BANK~~
~~FINANCE~~
~~JIB~~
NDC (VIA L.S.)
LATIN AMERICAN/

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

Moscow,
Brasília.

Novos Rumos in its issue of July 26th had a special supplement with an article by the Brazilian Communist Party Leader, Luis Carlos Prestes, with the above title. This is followed by the 25 point letter of June 30th from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and by the open letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Party organs of all Communists of the Soviet Union, an indirect reply to the Chinese letter.

2. There was no doubt that Luis Carlos Prestes would come down on the side of Moscow, and he now has.

3. Most of the letter consists in a recapitulation of the story of the last six years since the 1957 Conference in Moscow of Representatives of Communist Labour and Worker's parties of the Socialist countries. And it underlines that Brazilian Communists approved fully the declaration of 1957, which they had actively participated in formulating, and at their national convention of 1960 formally adopted all the theses approved at Moscow.

4. In the same way that there had been a revisionist offensive after the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. and the denunciation of the personality cult, there were divergencies after 1957 in the interpretation of the Moscow declaration. Throughout, Comrade Prestes makes the point that Brazilian Communists approved the attitude taken by Moscow and stood at its side; in the grave crisis of 1962 over Cuba, Brazilian Communists approved the position of the Soviet Comrades who had known how to defend the Cuban revolution and at the same time safeguard world peace.

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Ext. 182A (Rev. 2/52)

NO ENCLOSURES

5. The problems as Prestes sees them arise from a misunderstanding of the change in the situation of world communism. There is now a world socialist system which is a decisive factor in the development of human society; imperialism does not rule as it once did. As a result, war is no more inevitable; the imperialist aggressors can be frustrated in their ends. Peaceful co-existence, competition in peace is the order of the day. Peaceful co-existence is not the opposite of the fight against imperialism nor of the cold war for social progress because by itself it contributes to the conquest of these objectives. In the present conjuncture there is a possibility of peaceful passage to socialism.

6. Applied to Brazil, this process is not opposed to but presupposes a constant struggle which could have to go as far as revolution, a violent one.

7. In the second part of his exposé, Prestes goes over the problems involved since 1957 for the Communist Party of Brazil in maintaining and strengthening its ideological unity, which required a fight on two fronts: against right wing opportunism and revisionism on the one hand, against leftist sectarism and dogmatism on the other.

8. Sectarism and dogmatism have deep and widespread roots in the P.C.B., (Prestes is thinking of his hard core dissidents). Their danger in his view is that they isolate the party from the masses, from the political movements of our day.

9. Revisionism on the other hand paralyzes the revolutionary will of the masses, and disarms the workers in their struggle against imperialists and exploiters.

10. The idea that there could be, even temporarily in the world communist movement, majorities and minorities is a manifestation of revisionism which Prestes energically repudiates, because it would lead to a break in the unity of the movement and to the liquidation of the ideological principles and of the Leninist organization which are at the base of all Marxist-Leninist parties.

11. In practical terms, of tactics, sectarism consists in not recognizing the difference between reactionary forces and bourgeois nationalist ones, and the contradictions between these two groups. By utilizing their antagonism, one can create "favourable conditions to the formation of a government which is a nationalist and democratic", (which is the aim, at this stage of the PCB, I would add).

12. Opportunism consists in identifying the interests and positions of the masses with those of the bourgeois taken as a unified front, and thus falling into the trap of ceasing the struggle against the policy of conciliation with imperialism and the reactionary elements in the bourgeoisie.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA. 169

NUMBERED LETTER

SECRET
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

Security:

No: 465

Date: July 5, 1963

Enclosures: —

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.
50066-40

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

Reference:

Subject: VIII Congress of the Confederação dos Educadores Americanos

References to: JUL 10 1963

REFER TO:
~~O/PM (MR. ROBINSON)~~
~~O/SSI-A (MR. CAMPBELL)~~
~~USSA~~
MR. RITCHIE
~~ECONOMIC~~
~~U.S.A. DIVISION~~
D.L. (2)
~~LIAISON SERVICES~~
ALL LATIN AMERICAN POSTS
~~GCOS (6)~~
~~T.S.C.~~
~~BANK~~
~~FINANCE~~
~~DIB~~
NDC (VIA L.S.)
LATIN AMERICAN

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

Brasilia

As you know, school teachers are one of the principal targets of the Communists in Latin America and elsewhere for that matter. We have little information on how successful they have been as a whole, but it would appear that they met with a set back at the VIII Congress of the Confederação dos Educadores Americanos (CEA) in Rio last week or perhaps more accurately they did not, despite considerable efforts, make the progress they anticipated.

2. Although we have discussed this event with our United States colleagues, the source of most of our information is Mr. Gerald Nason, the Secretary Treasurer of the Canadian Teachers' Federation. He, an Englishman and a Costa Rican were despatched to Rio by the World Confederation of Organizations of Teaching Profession (WCOTP), whose headquarters are in Washington, in response to an invitation from CEA to send official observers to the Congress. WCOTP were pleased to be invited as the Congress provided them with an opportunity to do a little proselytizing among Latin American teachers even if they do not have much hope of persuading CEA to join their organization (Latin America has some priority in WCOTP's programme of work and by way of emphasizing this point they are holding their annual conference in Rio next month). To demonstrate their neutrality CEA also invited observers from FISE, the Communist dominated federation of teachers with headquarters in Prague. They accepted their invitation with even greater enthusiasm and sent a very high level group including the President of FISE, Paul Delanoue (French), the two Executive Secretaries, Romanoff (Russian) and Angel Pizarro (Chilean), Shoeldre, the President of the Union of Educational and Scientific Workers of Czechoslovakia, Lidia Chuprakova (phonetic spelling), President of the Educational and Scientific Workers of the Russian Republic and an executive member of the U.S.S.R. organization, another Russian by the name of Anyur Kaminsky from Patrice Lumumba University, who posed as an interpreter but whom Mr. Nason considered to have a more important function and Mr. Fan Ming (phonetic spelling), president of the national teachers union of Communist China who was accompanied by two or three other Chinese.

3. We gathered from Mr. Nason that the Russians and Czechoslovaks worked more or less behind the scenes although their Chinese colleague, whom they pointedly avoided, managed to get the floor for a two hour harangue on the usual themes. According to the United States Embassy, the Cuban delegation looked to the Russians and Czechoslovaks for virtually all their guidance and made no effort to establish contact with the Cuban Embassy here.

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Ext. 182A (Rev. 2/52)

In Venezuela, the FALN celebrate independence day by intensifying their attack on the political-economic-military system and structure of the Betancourt regime. For the fourth time in a year the partisans blew up an American pipeline: that of the Mene Grande Oil Company near Barcelona in the eastern zone of the country. The explosion caused a fire which burned for many hours and caused damage which the company has so far been unable to repair. In Caracas and in other cities the Liberation Front distributed circulars and traced enormous letters on walls requesting amnesty.

2. The article translated above was surmounted by a photograph showing two FALN partisans with Castro-like beards.

Jules Léger

Embassy

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

J 70

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, ROME, Italy.

Reference:

Subject: COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN SOUTH AMERICA.

Security: UNCLASSIFIED

No: 428

Date: July 10, 1963.

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No. 50066-40

26 | 04

References

Mr. Wood

REFER TO:
~~O/[illegible] ROBINSON~~
~~O/[illegible] MR. CAMPBELL~~
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~~W/[illegible]~~
~~ECONOMIC I~~
~~[illegible] DIVISION~~
D.L. (2)
~~[illegible] SERVICES~~
ALL LATIN AMERICAN POSTS
EXCEPT THOSE LISTED BELOW
CCOS (9)
~~T.S.G.~~
~~BANK~~
~~FINANCE~~
~~JIB~~
NDC (VIA L.S.)
LATIN AMERICAN

July 18/63

Internal Circulation

Done M R
July 24/63

Distribution to Posts

Havana
Caracas
Lima
Santiago
Buenos Aires

The Communist daily newspaper L'Unita from time to time contains reports on "democratic resistance activities" in South American countries. While these are undoubtedly exaggerated they nevertheless may sometimes contain a useful outline of the type of armed subversion that seems to be emanating from Cuba. While you may already have such reports from other sources, we are including below an office translation of a report that appeared in L'Unita with a dateline from Havana July 5:

Cuba and the popular anti-imperialistic movement throughout Latin America celebrated today the 153rd anniversary of the Venezuelan declaration of independence with demonstrations of the warmest solidarity with the Venezuelan people fighting against the dictator Betancourt. In all factories, agricultural agencies and scholastic institutions of Cuba the "committee for the defence of the revolution" organized manifestations, conferences and exhibitions to illustrate the activity of the "armed forces for national liberalization" (FALN) of Venezuela. The agency "Latin Press" received information of similar initiatives in Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chile and Uruguay.

At the centre of this Latin American solidarity day with the armed advance guard of the movement for Venezuelan liberalization was the thought that the continuation of the ideals behind the revolt against colonial Spain, actually over a century and a half ago, by the people of Simon Bolivar, was destined to have historic repercussions throughout the continent, and the role assumed by the FALN in what today is a key country in the great struggle with Yankee imperialism. "Here," according to a manifesto distributed by the FALN in Caracas, "will be decided in large measure the future of the Latin American revolution. If the progressive forces which oppose Betancourt obtain victory by means of armed struggle or by the free vote of the people and are able to establish a democratic and patriotic government, imperialism will suffer a new mortal blow."

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xt. 182A (Rev. 2/52)

13. (It is a narrow road that must be travelled, it must be admitted, between the bourgeois nationalists, who have never come so close to be called, by a communist authority, "useful innocents" to be used while useful, and the other bourgeois, the reactionary ones. In the end all bourgeois will come under the label of reactionary, of that there is little doubt. Meantime the useful ones are making what use they can of the communists, while they serve them, unwittingly or not. They use them for their own limited ends, political and economic; this is commonly called "tiger riding", a very prevalent sport here, enjoyed by a majority of politicians, even many who are not left of centre, for their electoral ends; prominent here are some of the nationalist wealthy, who see in the political movements of the left, the communist and the communist-influenced, allies in getting rid of foreign, mostly but not only U.S., competitors in their business.)

14. Prestes concludes his article by a word of warning to Brazilian communists against the dissidents, the "anti-party group" which publishes "The Working Class". These elements, he points out, exploit the divergencies in the world communist movement; they are stimulated by the broadcasting of some of their editorials by Peking radio, which runs counter to the tradition of friendly relations between the PCB and the Chinese comrades. And finally he appeals for unity here that world unity of the Communists be aided and victory achieved by the Brazilian people against imperialism and feudalism, the road to socialism.

15. Stripped of the jargon, Prestes' letter makes allegiance to Moscow, without reservations on the world communist plane, but it does not damn the Chinese communists; of them, it speaks more in sorrow than in anger; the harsher words are reserved for the Albanians on the one hand, and the Brazilian dissidents on the other.

16. In the national context, his announced policy remains of cooperation, but without a contract with the bourgeois nationalists, and the maintenance of a boil but not to overflow in the pot of the class struggle. He repudiates both extremes: the hardening into unqualified opposition, and reduction of the party to the hard core, eventually going underground; and the softening into collaboration with all bourgeois groups. This is the way the party has acted for some time; Novos Rumos one week remonstrates with the President, threatens to combat him; the next, it commends him and eggs him on. This is not that the Party's influence is such as to make the President fear to see in every issue whether he has well merited or not of his Communist judges. But the Communists, small minority though they are, have more effective ways of showing their displeasure, by using all their resources, their men in key positions to create unrest in the varied groups of the left, and thus elevate the tension; but this they would do in any case. It is these constant fits and starts, to which the Communists contribute, although they are far from the primary motors in them that make for the unsettled,

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uneasy, and ever deteriorating situation in the economic and social situation of Brazil. For what influence they can exercise, - and it should not be exaggerated, as it usually is by our neighbours, - the orthodox PCB have chosen the manner of exercising it which maximizes results, and successes, however limited from their point of view; the harder line, of the dissidents, closer to that of the Cubans, is still the one which has more appeal to the masses.

Jean Chapdelaine

Ambassador.

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Orig dw 4470-40 XC
cc 439-40 XC

FM NATOPARIS JUN12/63 CONFD

TO EXTERNAL 1311

INFO WASHDC LDN EMBPARIS PERMISNY

BAG MOSCOW FM LDN

BAG HAVANA FM OTT

REF YOURTEL S170 JUN7

PAC MTG JUN11-CASTROS VISIT TO USSR

DISCUSSION ON ABOVE SUBJECT WAS LED BY ITALIAN REP WHO WILL CIRCULATE A FULLER STATEMENT ON SUBJECT.HE SAID IN PAC THAT CASTROS TRIP CONFIRMED SOVIET POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COMMITMENTS TO CUBA.IT HAD ENHANCED CASTROS POSITION.IT WAS TOO SOON,HOWEVER,TO PRONOUNCE ON RESULT OF TRIP CONCERNING CASTROS POSITION IN LATIN AMERICA,AND HOW FAR HIS TRIP TO MOSCOW WOULD OFFSET CHINESE INFLUENCE ON HIS THINKING.IN THAT CONNECTION ITALIAN REP SAID THAT RECOURSE TO VIOLENCE IN LATINAMERICA COULD NOT RPT NOT BE CONSIDERED AS IMPLEMENTATION OF CHINESE POLICIES.VIOLENCE WAS ENDEMIC IN LATINAMERICA AND HAD NEVER BEEN DISAVOWED BY MOSCOW.SOVIET ASSURANCES OF MILITARY AID TO CUBA HAD NOT RPT NOT CHANGED ANYTHING IN LATINAMERICA.THESE ASSURANCES HAD NOT RPT NOT TAKEN FORM OF CUBAS ADMISSION INTO WARSAW PACT,NO RPT NO DOUBT WITH A VIEW TO AVOIDING A PROVOCATIVE GESTURE VIS-A-VIS USA.LENGTH OF CASTROS STAY IN MOSCOW INDICATED WEAKNESS OF INTERNAL OPPOSITION TO HIM.ECONOMIC CRISIS REMAINED,HOWEVER,VERY SERIOUS.USSR DID NOT RPT NOT SEEM TO HAVE PROMISED AID OTHER THAN THAT CONCERNING AN INCREASE IN THE SUGAR PRICE.PRINCIPAL POLITICAL OBJECTIVE OF USSR SEEMED TO BE TO ASSURE PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE BETWEEN CUBA AND WESTERN HEMISPHERE INCLUDING USA AND TO BRING TO AN END CUBAS ISOLATION.MODERATION IN TONE VIS-A-VIS USA SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN THIS CONTEXT.THIS ALSO EXPLAINED SOVIET INTEREST IN DENUCLEARIZATION OF LATINAMERICA WHICH COULD START PROCESS OF REINTEGRATING CUBA INTO THE AMERICAN SYSTEM.

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2.USA REP SAID THAT THERE WAS NO RPT NO DOUBT THAT IN CONTEXT OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS CASTROS VISIT TO MOSCOW REPRESENTED A MAJOR TACTICAL VICTORY FOR SOVIETS.IT WAS A HIGH CARD FOR SOVIETS TO PLAY WITH CHINESE AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT.ON WHOLE OVERALL SOVIET POLICY WOULD NOT RPT NOT CHANGE AS A RESULT OF VISIT.SOVIETS WERE NOW MORE DEEPLY COMMITTED THAN BEFORE VISIT TO CASTRO REGIME.RELATIONS BETWEEN USSR AND CUBA HAD DEEPENED.SOVIET ECONOMIC AID WOULD CONTINUE AS IN PAST.THERE WAS NO RPT NO MENTION OF INCREASED MILITARY AID BUT USA ASSUMED THAT IT WOULD CONTINUE AT ITS PRESENT LEVEL.THERE WAS PERHAPS LITTLE PURPOSE IN MENTIONING PUBLICLY INCREASED MILITARY AID WHICH COULD ONLY HAVE AROUSED PUBLIC OPINION IN USA.

3.CASTRO CAME BACK CHASTENED AND SOBERED,AS HIS APPERANCE ON TV IN HAVANA JUN4 HAD SHOWN.THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN AN ATTEMPT BY SOVIETS TO MAKE HIM FACE FACTS OF LIFE.THEY MIGHT HAVE CONVINCED HIM TO SETTLE DOWN AND QUIT ACTIVE PURSUANCE OF REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA FOR TIME BEING.COMMUNIQUE SUGGESTED A COMPROMISE BETWEEN SOVIETS AND CASTRO ON THIS POINT.AS A RESULT COMMUNIST PARTIES IN LATINAMERICA MIGHT FOLLOW A VIOLENT OR A NON RPT NON VIOLENT COURSE DEPENDING ON CIRCUMSTANCES.

4.UK REP SAID THAT CASTROS BENEFITS FROM TRIP HAD BEEN FOLLOWING: REAFFIRMATION OF SOVIET COMMITMENTS TO AID CUBA;SOVIET SUPPORT FOR CASTROS FIVE POINTS;INCREASE IN SUGAR PRICE.COMMITMENTS CONCERNING ECONOMIC AID AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN COMMUNIQUE WERE VERY VAGUE BUT THEY MIGHT CONTAIN HIDDEN ELEMENTS.BENEFITS FOR USSR WERE THAT CASTRO HAD ENDORSED MAIN LINES OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY;HE HAD COMMITTED HIMSELF TO SOVIET INTERPRETATION OF TRANSITION FROM CAPITALISM TO SOCIALISM;HE HAD ENDORSED A RESTATEMENT OF SOVIET POLICY OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE.

5.UK REP THEN SAID THAT HIS AUTHORITIES WERE VERY CAUTIOUS ABOUT

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4. A request by a group of Cuban exiles for recognition as delegates might have provided a controversial issue at the beginning of the Congress but for the fact that even the pro-Western delegates did not want them there and by pre-arrangement amongst themselves voted against accepting their credentials. They believed that their presence would allow the Cuban question to dominate the meeting and undermine their efforts to counteract Communist and leftist influence and tactics. In the face of virtually unanimous opposition to their presence, the Cuban exiles quietly retired from the fray and spent their time going from one Rio newspaper to another in search of publicity for their cause.

5. There does not seem to be much doubt that the Communists dominated the proceedings. They, for example, succeeded in electing Henrique Miranda as the secretary-general of the Congress,/a /He is Brazilian Communist who was also secretary-general of the Cuba Solidarity Congress three or four months ago. He virtually ran the meeting despite the presence of a Mexican chairman and four vice-chairmen and was probably chiefly responsible for such tactics as continuing a meeting until 3:00 a.m. one night and commencing it again at 7:00 a.m. the next morning in a largely successful attempt to shake off the pro-Western delegates. The Communists and leftists also monopolized the debates with the result that most of the discussion and many of the resolutions were rehearsals of the usual extreme leftist or Communist line. Little attention was paid to topics normally discussed at professional gatherings of this sort.

6. However, while the pro-Western delegates largely let the Communists and leftists do the talking,they apparently kept them out of the new executive that will run the organization for the next three years. Their principal accomplishment in this respect was to detach Cuba from the seat that it has held for the past three years and to elect as the four members of the executive committee representatives from Uruguay, Peru, Ecuador and Venezuela, three of which are considered pro-Western although the fourth is an unknown quantity. They might have done better in the choice of Mr. Escobar from Chile as Executive Secretary for although he is not known to harbour any markedly leftist views, he is regarded as a weak character susceptible to persuasion. It is possible that FISE, whose publishing house for Latin America is apparently in Chile might try and exert pressure on him.

7. According to the United States Embassy of the eleven delegations at the conference (six countries who are members of CEA were not represented) four could be considered pro-Western (Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru), two neutral (Venezuela and Mexico) and four anti-Western (Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Cuba). The representative of El Salvador, although his fare along with that of the Bolivian delegation was paid by WCOTP, was so inconsistent in his voting record that he could not be categorized. We might add that some of the countries sent both anti and pro-Western delegates (Brazil and Uruguay, for example) and this classification is based on which of the two predominated.

8. Considering the effort, time and talent that the Communists put into the conference, the election results must have been a disappointment. It will be interesting to watch for further developments in the CEA. So far, according to Mr. Nason, it is a rather moribund organization which has had such little spirit that its previous executive committee did not even meet during its three years of office. The Communists, however,obviously believe it has promise and their large turnout at this Congress may have been designed to lay a foundation for the next meeting of CEA which is to take place in Venezuela

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SECRET
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

in 1966. The fact that one of the Executive Secretaries of FISE is a Latin American is significant in this respect.

9. As far as the Brazilian government is concerned, we might add that they contributed $ 20 million to the Congress. This sum, according to Mr. Nason, was originally promised to the WCOTP meeting next month but the organizers of the CEA persuaded the government to hand it over to them instead.

10. Mr. Nason gave us a list of the delegates and a paper containing some of the resolutions which we can send to you if you wish. We have given copies of them to our United States and British colleagues.

Jean Chapdelaine

The Embassy.

MAKING JUDGEMENT ON HOW RELATIONS BETWEEN USSR AND CUBA WOULD EVOLVE.CASTRO HAD BEEN ENHANCED AS A REVOLUTIONARY LEADER IN CUBA AND LATINAMERICA.THIS WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR HIM TO SWALLOW SOVIET POLICIES.EFFECT OF VISIT ON INTERNAL SITUATION WOULD BE MEASURED MAINLY IN ITS ECONOMIC RESULTS AND THESE REMAINED TO BE SEEN.VISIT HAD BEEN A PERSONAL SUCCESS FOR KHRUSHCHEV AS WELL AS IN CONTEXT OF HIS RELATIONS WITH CHINA.KHRUSHCHEVS CONFIDENCE,IF JUDGED BY HIS EBULLIENT MOOD AT KREMLIN RECEPTION,SEEMED TO BE FULLY RESTORED.PRO-SOVIET BIAS OF COMMUNIQUE HAD BEEN REMARKABLE AS CASTRO HAD BEEN HESITATING BETWEEN CHINA AND USSR.IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN WHETHER COMMUNIQUE DID NOT RPT NOT CONCEAL LARGER COMMITMENTS.IT WAS INCONCEIVABLE THAT CASTRO WOULD NOT RPT NOT HAVE EXTRACTED HIGHEST PRICE FOR HIS FULL SUPPORT OF SOVIET LINE.HIDDEN PARTS MIGHT EMERGE LATER IN THE COMING MONTHS.

6.GERMAN REP SAID THAT USSR-CUBA RECONCILIATION MIGHT NOT RPT NOT LAST FOREVER.DAYS THAT CASTRO HAD SPENT AT BLACK SEA FOLLOWING COMMUNIQUE MIGHT INDICATE THAT SOVIETS WERE NOT RPT NOT SURE HOW FAR THEY HAD CONVINCED HIM.MODERATION SHOWN VIS-A-VIS USA MIGHT BE BASED ON SOVIET BELIEF THAT USA WOULD NOT RPT NOT CHANGE STATUS OF CUBA BY FORCE IN NEAR FUTURE.

7.NORWEGIAN REP STRESSED PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF CASTROS VISIT TO USSR.HE SAID THAT CASTRO HAD BEEN A LIVING ILLUSTRATION FOR SOVIET YOUTH OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MYTH THEY LEARNED AT SCHOOL. THERE WERE VERY FEW OF THESE ILLUSTRATIONS IN THE DAILY LIFE OF USSR.CASTRO HAD COME TO USSR AT A TIME WHEN CHINA WAS REPROACHING SOVIETS FOR BETRAYING THE REVOLUTION.VISIT HAD SHOWN THAT MOSCOW WAS STILL SUPPORTING REVOLUTION.

8.WE SPOKE ALONG LINES OF MOSCOW AND HAVANA TELS WHICH YOU HAD DRAWN TO OUR ATTENTION IN REFTEL.

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9. CHAIRMAN CONCLUDED THAT NO RPT NO MAJOR DIVERGENCIES OF VIEW HAD EMERGED FROM THIS EXCHANGE. HE SUGGESTED THAT SECRETARIAT MIGHT TRY TO SUMMARIZE DISCUSSION, PERHAPS FOR AN EVENTUAL PAPER FOR COUNCIL. THIS SUMMARY WOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF PAPER WHICH ITALIANS SAID THEY WOULD CIRCULATE, AND ALSO A PAPER ON SUBJECT WHICH FRENCH EXPECT TO PRODUCE IN NEXT FEW DAYS.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA. *(DUPLICATE)*

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy
San Jose, Costa Rica

Reference: Our Letters No. 122 of March 21 and No. 140 of March 25, 1963

Subject: Controls on Cuban-Based Subversion in Central America

Security: RESTRICTED

No: 190

Date: April 22, 1963

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Courier

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.
~~3-3-2-40~~ 50066-40
96 —

References: ory 6660-A-40

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

At the conclusion of the recent San Jose Conference of the Presidents of the United States and the Central American Isthmus, it was announced that two inter-governmental conferences would take place in Managua within a month's time in order to implement some of the suggestions emanating from the San Jose meeting. The first of these conferences was to be a meeting of the various Ministers of the Interior from Central America and Panama who would discuss possible measures to be adopted for controlling passage to and from Cuba of individuals, money and arms. The other was to be a meeting of the Ministers of Economy who were to present the plans of their various governments for utilizing the funds to be made available by the U.S.A. for economic integration and housing projects in Central America. For a short time following the expulsion from Guatemala of President Ydigoras Fuentes, there was some doubt about whether either of the two conferences could take place but, under urging from the United States, the six countries finally sent their representatives to Managua for the conferences. The meeting of the Ministers of the Interior took place in Managua from April 2 to April 4 and the resolutions adopted by the Ministers are now being placed before their respective governments.

2. One of the major difficulties in the control of travel to and from Cuba was eliminated before the Managua conference began when Mexican immigration authorities reportedly agreed to begin making notations in the passports of all travellers departing for or arriving from Cuba confirming their visit. The previous practice of stamping only a separate document issued by the Cuban authorities, thus leaving no permanent record in the passport of a visit to Cuba, had made it virtually impossible for security officials in other Latin American countries to prove that any individual had visited Cuba. We received an indication of the possible results of the new procedure when Macleans magazine Washington correspondent, Ian Sclanders, informed us, during his recent visit, that he had been refused entry to Guatemala even though he possessed a valid visa, because his passport carried a notation regarding a visit to Cuba.

3. The Ministers were, therefore, faced with finding solutions to problems of control primarily within their own countries. To solve these problems, in addition to the Ministers of the Interior and other officials from five of the isthmian countries, the discussions were attended by Sterling Cottrel, U.S.A. Sub-Secretary of State for the Interior, Nicholas Katzenback, Secretary of Justice, and Major General Victor Krulak from Washington, the last named identified as the Officer in Charge of Anti-Guerrilla and Special Services of the U.S. Armed Forces. Guatemala was represented merely by an observer, the Guatemalan Ambassador in Nicaragua.

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(Ext. 182C(Rev. 2/52)

The agenda was designed "to develop and place in force immediately those common measures which restrict the movement of Central American nationals to and from Cuba and cut also the traffic of propaganda material and funds from Cuba". The Ministers were also to discuss possible assistance from the United States in maintaining vigilance along the coast line of Central America.

4. Although the work sessions were secret, some information regarding the discussions was released later. Among the conclusions reached, the following were reported by newsmen to be the major recommendations:

1) The passports of all countries represented at the conference should be marked as not valid for travel to Cuba. Any permits allowing a visit to Cuba would be marked directly in the passports.

2) Banks in Central America would be requested to assist in halting the transfer of funds from communist countries to organizations or individuals in the countries concerned.

3) Steps should be taken to place tighter control on the possible export of arms from communist countries to the isthmian republics.

4) Further penalties should be imposed for the possession or distribution of communist propaganda.

5) There should be an intensification of inspection procedures by land, sea and air.

6) Each country should establish an intelligence centre which would coordinate security information and arrange for the interchange of such information between countries.

7) The other republics of the OAS should be asked to cooperate in the measures recommended by the conference.

8) Further conferences, similar to the Managua gathering should be scheduled at regular intervals.

5. The Minister of the Interior of the Republic of Panama, in an interview after the conference, brought out two interesting sidelights. At Managua, the U.S. delegation had backed the Central American requests for firmer action on security measures. This was in contrast to what appeared to be a U.S. desire for moderation at the Presidential Conference in San Jose. The Minister added that the effectiveness of the measures proposed at the Managua conference would depend to a large extent on the attitude of Mexico which was the major channel for the entry to Central America of men and finances, if not arms.

6. Comment:

Without access to the working documents of the conference, it is difficult to state whether more concrete suggestions were presented than would be indicated by the eight recommendations mentioned above. If not, it would appear that the main accomplishment of the conference was to state that the countries "are against sin" but without really suggesting ways to eliminate the sin which they oppose. The establishment of an intelligence centre in each country should prove useful, as, at present, in many countries, measures taken against unwanted individuals, including suspected communists, merely consist of dumping them over the border into the closest country. An exchange of information regarding the activities of such individuals may provide a more efficient means of control.

J.-L. DELISLE

Ambassador

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: The UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, HAVANA, Cuba

Reference:

Subject: Brazilian Visitors

Security: Confidential

No: 114

Date: March 6, 1963

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Courier

Post File No:

Ottawa File No. 50066-40

96 | 96

To: Mr Pollock MAR 19 1963

References
Mr. Pick
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Economic
European
Far East
LA+ME
LSS
Comm 2
Consular
Gordon
Nato Paris
Emb Paris
Perm NY
Moscow
Cell + a posts
CC 056
D IB
Cuba
File
A. Pollock

Internal Circulation
Done M.P. Mar 26/63
D. L. (2) Div.
(Done by In-mail Distribution Section)

Distribution to Posts

Carlos Luis Prestes, Secretary-General of the Brazilian Communist Party and Francisco Juliao, leader of the Brazilian Peasant Leagues, have recently been visiting Cuba. They did not arrive together and there is no indication that they are working as a team. The evidence is to the contrary. Juliao told the Associated Press correspondent he had not seen Prestes since his arrival. He explained that he had had differences of opinion with him in the past but, nonetheless, considered him to be an honest man. (The implication that a man with whom you have a difference of opinion is unlikely to be honest is very Latin American.)

2. Juliao arrived via Mexico on February 22 accompanied by four sons together with the son of a Brazilian peasant leader killed last year and the son of a worker in Recife. The six have been granted scholarships by the Cuban Government. Juliao already had two daughters studying here.

3. In the interview with the press, Juliao followed a Cuban line. Revolucion quoted him as saying "we view with satisfaction the fight being waged by the Venezuelan guerrillas. We believe that this is the only path for Latin America ..... There is no other way except an armed struggle .....". He gave as his opinion that the Congress of Continental Solidarity with the Cuban Revolution, due to be held in Brazil this March, should be postponed until April or May. There was a lack of "co-ordination" between the groups which support the Cuban Revolution. A delay would enable a better Congress to be held. He assured the paper that representatives from America, Europe, Asia and Africa would be there including such figures as Bertrand Russell, Jean-Paul Sartre, Salvador Allende, and Lazaro Cardenas. Prestes for his part mentioned in passing that the Congress would be held in March. We do not know the background but are led to wonder whether the Communists have the Congress under control and have no wish to see their influence diluted by bringing in additional non-Communist, Fidelista revolutionary groups.

4. Prestes paid energetic lip service to the Second Declaration of Havana but was circumspect in supporting the substance of Cuban views. He affirmed that Brazil was the only country in Latin America following a policy favourable to Cuba. The Brazilian Communist Party supported the positive aspects of Goulart's foreign policy. The strategic aim of the Brazilian party was to promote an anti-imperialism, anti-

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Ext. 182A (Rev. 2/52)

NO ENCLOSURES

fuedal revolution. For tactical reasons, however, they fought for a national democratic government which would open the way to basic reforms such as the nationalization of monopolies, a radical agrarian reform and the suspension of payments on foreign loans. Prestes referred to the contradictions between the national bourgeoisie and imperialists on the one hand, and, on the other, the national bourgeoisie's fear of socialism and the proletariate. Prestes' thought processes perhaps move on a more sophisticated level than those of Fidel Castro who, at times, seems to think that Communist tactics need consist of no more than pressing the trigger of a gun and starting to fire. The Brazilian Ambassador here told me some time ago that Prestes was known to be critical of Castro's fire-brand tactics.

5. The Second Declaration of Havana accepts the use of democratic machinery to advance Communism ends when available, although the authors of the document are obviously far more attracted by guerrilla warfare. As a result, Prestes was able to express support for the Declaration, without disavowing the policies followed by his own party. After a conversation with Fidel Castro, he told reporters that the Brazilian party had been very active in publicizing the Second Declaration of Havana. This was obviously designed to prove that the Brazilian Communist leaders were not those whom Fidel Castro had in mind when he castigated Latin American revolutionary leaders who had filed away the Declaration without acting upon it. In fact, Castro probably was referring to the Brazilian communists amongst others. The Cuban leaders are wedded to violence and are unlikely to approve of the Brazilian popular front and infiltration tactics. The Cuban press has given notably more publicity to Juliao than to Prestes, particularly since the latter's interview with Fidel Castro.

6. Prestes flew to Cuba from Moscow (he arrived on February 25) and had an interview with Khruschev while there. One wonders whether he carried any message. The recent statements by Khruschev and Malenovski promising Soviet armed support in the case of United States aggression against Cuba, may have made Fidel Castro somewhat more receptive to Soviet guidance. In any event Fidel Castro, when he addressed members of the United Party of the Socialist Revolution from the three Western provinces, stressed Cuba's role as an example; he proclaimed "it is the etheréal waves of ideas which carry the revolutionary virus ..... Cuba is an example, Cuba is an idea. The force of Cuba lies in its revolutionary ideas". This may conceivably indicate some willingness by the Cubans to play down for the time being some of their more inflammatory calls for immediate revolution in Latin America if only for the tactical advantage that this would provide them in their differences with the United States. It is harder for Cuba to be painted as an innocent victim of United States aggression when it is openly calling for a revolution throughout the continent and brandishing Soviet missiles. A temporary toning down of Cuban propaganda would not, however, imply any real change in Cuban views. This is shown, for example, by the fact that they permitted themselves on February 28 another violent and emotional meeting in honour of the guerrilla struggle in Venezuela.

7. It could be that Venezuela has been selected as the test case for Cuban tactics. If they fail there, they may not be copied elsewhere for some time. The Soviet Union might be willing to go part way to meet Cuba in order to prevent any opening for Chinese influence in Latin America.

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The violent, undisciplined, anarchistic, junvenile revolutionaries in Latin American universities who refuse to accept any discipline whether it be from their parents, their university or the Communist Party, have been attracted by Fidel Castro's brand of revolution and could fall under Chinese Communist influence if the Chinese attempt to set up their own client parties in this hemisphere. From this point of view, active Cuban support for the established Communist parties could be of some value to the Russians. The absolute dependence of Cuba upon the Soviet Union for its economic survival represents a powerful instrument for influencing Cuban views providing it is not used in so brutal a way as to sting the Cubans into some act of suicidal rebellion against Soviet tutelage.

George P. Ridel

Ambassador.

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FM WASHDC FEB15/63 UNCLAS

TO EXTERNAL 532 OPIMMED

INFO PERMISNY NATOPARIS EMBPARIS LDN PRIORITY

TT HAVANA PRIORITY FM OTT

PRESIDENTIAL NEWS CONFERENCE FEB14/63--CUBA

SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA

PRES KENNEDY WAS ASKED IF, AS A RESULT OF REPORT TO OAS ON INTERNAL SECURITY QUESTIONS(OURTEL 487 FEB13)HE HAD ANYTHING IN MIND AS TO WHAT LA REPUBLICS COULD AND SHOULD DO COLLECTIVELY TO MEET SUBVERSION THREAT. PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT IN HIS VIEW THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ASPECT OF THE REPORT WAS ITS EMPHASIS ON SUBVERSION IN THE CONTINENT AND SINGLED OUT QUOTE THE MOVEMENT OF MEN AND PERHAPS MONEY AGAINST THE CONSTITUTED GOVTS UNQUOTE. IN PRESIDENTS VIEW THIS WAS QUOTE A MATTER TO WHICH USA GOVT IS GIVING ITS GREATEST ATTENTION... THE QUESTION OF THE LESSENING NOT RPT NOT ONLY OF THE SUBVERSION THAT MAY COME FROM CUBA BUT FROM OTHER PARTS OF THE HEMISPHERE UNQUOTE.

2. ASKED WHETHER ADMIN HAD INFO WHETHER SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA INCLUDED SPECIALISTS IN SABOTAGE AND SUBVERSION TRAINING, PRES KENNEDY REPLIED: QUOTE I AM SURE THAT AMONG THE TECHNICIANS OR MILITARY PEOPLE THERE OR PARA MILITARY, THERE ARE THOSE WHO ARE PARTICIPATING IN THAT KIND OF TRAINING. THAT IS WHY WE ARE ANXIOUS TO STOP THE FLOW IN AND OUT OF THOSE WHO MAY BE THE BENEFICIARIES OF THOSE STUDIES UNQUOTE.

3. PRESIDENT WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE PROBLEM WAS QUOTE TO GET THE COOPERATION OF OTHER LA COUNTRIES IN LIMITING THE FLOW IN AND OUT AT SCHOOLS, COLLEGES WHICH ALSO INCLUDES POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION UNQUOTE. HE MENTIONED THAT APPROX 1200 STUDENTS FROM VARIOUS LA COUNTRIES TRAVELLED TO CUBA LAST YEAR ADDING THAT HE WAS SURE THAT QUOTE A GOOD MANY OF THEM WERE POLITICALLY INDOCTRINATED UNQUOTE AND THAT OTHERS QUOTE OBVIOUSLY WERE GIVEN TRAINING IN MORE DIRECT FORMS OF POLITICAL ACTION UNQUOTE.

...2

4. PRESIDENT COMMENTED THAT THE COMMUNIST THREAT AT THE HEMISPHERE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE REGARDED AS PRIMARILY BASED IN CUBA. THE QUOTE NATIVE UNQUOTE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN VARIOUS LA COUNTRIES WERE ALSO OF CONCERN.

SHIPPING REGS(OURTEL 434 FEB7)

5. PRESIDENT WAS QUERIED ABOUT SHIPPING TO CUBA BY USA ALLIES. HE REPLIED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF SUCH TRAFFIC AND MENTIONED THAT IN JAN THERE WERE ABOUT ONLY TWELVE FREE WORLD VESSELS WHICH WENT TO CUBA. ALSO THAT THERE HAD QUOTE BEEN ABOUT A 90 PERCENT DROP IN FREE WORLD TRADE IN THE LAST TWO YEARS TO CUBA. FREE WORLD TRADE TO CUBA--THAT IS LATIN AMERICA, WESTERN EUROPE AND OURSELVES--WAS ABOUT 800 MILLION TWO YEARS AGO. IT IS DOWN TO ABOUT 90 MILLION. I THINK IT IS GOING TO BE REDUCED FURTHER UNQUOTE.

UN SPECIAL FUND AGRICL PROJECT FOR CUBA

6. PRES KENNEDY STATED IN REPLY TO A QUESTION THAT QUOTE WE ARE NOT RPT NOT GOING TO PUT ANY MONEY INTO THE PROGRAM IN CUBA. THERE ARE NOT RPT NOT ANY USA DOLLARS THAT WILL GO INTO THAT PROGRAM UNQUOTE.

FM WASHDC FEB13/63 CONFD

TO EXTERNAL 487 OPIMMED

INFO PERMISNY EMBPARIS NATOPARIS LDN PRIORITY

BAG MOSCOW FM LDN

BAG HAVANA FM OTT

REF OURTEL 293 JAN25

CUBA-OAS ACTION

PAU PRESS RELEASE DATED FEB11 STATED THAT OAS CONSULTATIVE CTTEE ON SECURITY SET UP AT PUNTA DEL ESTE II HAD SUBMITTED A TECHNICAL STUDY ON SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN LA TO A SPECIAL CTTEE ESTABLISHED TO FORMULATE RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING IMPLEMENTATION OF RESLNS ADOPTED AT PUNTA DEL ESTE II.THE REPORT WAS TABLED FEB11 AT A CLOSED SESSION OF SPECIAL CTTEE.ACCORDING TO PAU RELEASE THE REPORT WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE MADE PUBLIC AT THIS TIME BUT WOULD LATER BE PRESENTED TO OAS COUNCIL.THE TOPICS COVERED THEREIN INCLUDED:(A)COMMUNIST SUBVERSION(B)CUBA AS A BASE FOR SUBVERSION IN THE AMERICAS(C)THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVE PROPAGANDA(D)TRANSFER OF FUNDS DESTINED FOR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS.

2.A UPI STORY IN WASHDC POST FEB13 HAD IT THAT REPORT DIFFERED FROM USA ESTIMATES OF CUBAS SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN LA.IN PARTICULAR UPI STORY CONTENDED THAT REPORT QUOTE CONTRADICTED DEFENSE SEC RS MCNAMARAS RECENT STATEMENT THAT THERE IS NO RPT NO EVIDENCE CUBA IS BEING USED AS A BASE FOR CASTRO COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN THE AREA UNQUOTE.

3.WE ARE NOT RPT NOT AWARE THAT SUCH A STATEMENT WAS EVER MADE BY MCNAMARA.ON THE CONTRARY USA OFFICIALS,INCLUDING DOD SEC,HAVE SAID IN PAST WEEKS THAT WHILE PRESENT MILITARY SET UP IN CUBA DID NOT RPT NOT POSE A THREAT TO EITHER USA OR LA IN MILITARY SENSE,THEY WERE CONCERNED OVER CUBA QUOTE AS A CENTER OF PROPAGANDA AND POSSIBLE SUBVERSION UNQUOTE AS PRES KENNEDY EMPHASIZED IN NEWS CONFERENCE FEB7(OURTEL 460 FEB8).

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4. ACCORDING TO UPI STORY THE REPORT SUGGESTS NEW MEASURES TO CURB CUBAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN LA INCLUDING FURTHER ECONOMIC PRESSURE AND BREAK OF DIPLO RELATIONS BY THOSE LA COUNTRIES STILL ENTERTAINING SUCH LINKS WITH CUBA.

5. ON FEB12 FOLLESTAD OF THE CUBAN DESK CONFIRMED THAT THERE WAS NO RPT NO DIRECT CONTRADICTION BETWEEN OAS REPORT AND ASSESSMENT OF USA AUTHORITIES. HE COMMENTED HOWEVER THAT SO FAR AS HE WAS AWARE EVIDENCE ON WHICH CONSULTATIVE CTTEE BASED ITS FINDINGS WOULD BE THAT WHICH PARTICIPATING GOVTS WERE PREPARED TO RELEASE TO OAS CIRCLES. IN CASE OF USA THERE WOULD OF COURSE BE A GREAT DEAL OF EVIDENCE WHICH USA EXPERT APPOINTED TO CONSULTATIVE CTTEE WOULD NOT RPT NOT HAVE SEEN OR WOULD HAVE RECEIVED ONLY IN GENERALIZED FORM.

6. FOLLESTAD WAS UNCERTAIN WHEN OR IN WHAT SENSE SPECIAL CTTEE WOULD TAKE DECISION ON CONSULTATIVE CTTEE REPORT. HE CONFIRMED, HOWEVER, THAT USA AUTHORITIES WERE ANXIOUS TO SEE OAS TAKE DECISISONS WHICH WOULD INHIBIT TRAVEL TO AND FROM CUBA OF INDIVIDUALS ENGAGED IN SUBVERSIVE TRAINING OR OPERATIONS.

NUMBERED LETTER CANADIAN EYES ONLY

TO: UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, Quito, Ecuador.

Reference: My letter No. 177 of August 16, 1962.

Subject: Guerilla Activities in Latin America: Ecuador

To: Mr Dougan
FEB 6 1963

Security: SECRET

No: 22

Date: January 30, 1963.

Enclosures: --

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No: 1515-E2

Ottawa File No. 3-0066-40

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References

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts
Bogota

I have kept in mind your request that posts forward to you on a continuing basis information concerning guerilla activities. From time to time I have raised the subject with a number of my sources but I have been unable to uncover anything of importance. However, a few days ago I had a conversation with political officers at the United States Embassy and while they were unwilling to give me details they let me know that they have learned that URJE members and communists are collecting arms and ammunition in the "Montañas de Convento" area in the coastal province of Manabi. I am, of course, trying to find out what I can about what is going on in this area but meanwhile I thought you might be interested in this bare piece of information.

2. Yesterday evening the police raided the URJE headquarters in Guayaquil and found twenty molotov cocktails which were confiscated. They arrested 17 Urjistas who were at the headquarters. Fifteen of these were highschool students showing that the Party is living up to its name of "revolutionary youth". Now that the Communist Party has taken over URJE (paragraph 9 of my letter 19 of January 25) the latter may show more skill and determination in terrorist acts than it was previously capable of.

G. C. Langille,
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

Done M.R. Feb. 19/63

Ext. 182A (Rev. 2/52)

NO ENCLOSURES

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FM HAVANA JAN18/63 CONFD

TO EXTERNAL OTT 22 OPIMMED

INFO TT LDN WASHDC NATOPARIS OPIMMED FM OTT

CUBAN SITUATION

KOUZNETSOVS VISIT TO CUBA HAS RECEIVED DISCREET PRESS COVERAGE BUT NO RPT NO INFO HAS BEEN PUBLISHED CONCERNING ITS PURPOSE.HE WAS RECEIVED YESTERDAY BY FIDEL CASTRO.TOP CUBAN FIGURES,WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A SLIGHTLY LIMPING ROGRIGUEZ DID NOT RPT NOT ATTEND THE CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTERS RECEPTION IN HONOUR OF THE SOVIET VICE-MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.ON THE SAME NIGHT CASTRO DELIVERED A REVOLUTIONARY TIRADE TO A CONGRESS OF FELLOW-TRAVELLING AND COMMUNIST WOMEN OF THE AMERICAS,BUT WHICH WAS PROBABLY DIRECTED MORE AT THE RUSSIANS,WHOSE SPECIAL ENVOY HAD JUST ARRIVED, AND THE LATINAMERICAN COMMUNIST MOVEMENT THAT AT THE LADIES PRESENT.

2.CASTRO HAS RECOVERED HIS OVERWHELMING SELF-CONFIDENCE AND IS NOW CALLING HIMSELF UP AS THE MAJOR MARXIST PROPHET OF LATINAMERICA. WITH SEVERE CONTENANCE HE RAPPED THE KNUCKLES OF THOSE,PRESUMABLY LATINAMERICAN COMMUNIST LEADERS,WHO HAD PAID ONLY LIP-SERVICE AT THE CHINESE-FLAVOURED SECOND DECLARATION OF HAVANA.MOST OF LATINAMERICA WAS READY FOR REVOLUTION,AND THE JOB WOULD BE EASIER THAN IT HAD BEEN IN CUBA.THEY MUST GET ON WITH IT.

3.HE SNORTED AT THE NOTION PUT FORWARD BY UNNAMED COMMUNIST THEORETICIANS(PERHAPS IN BRAZIL AS WELL AS IN EASTERNEUROPE) THAT CUBA WAS AN EXAMPLE OF A PEACEFUL TRANSITION FROM CAPITALISM TO MARXIST-STYLE SOCIALISM.BATISTA HAD BEEN OVERTHROWN BY FORCE AND THE STRUGGLE IN SOUTHVIETNAM SHOWED THE PATH WHICH HAD TO BE FOLLOWED.

4.THE THOUGHT THAT PEACE HAD BEEN ACHIEVED IN THE CARIBBEAN, OR THAT KENNEDYS WORD(WHICH HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN GIVEN ANYWAY) COULD BE TRUSTED,WAS CONTEMPTUOUSLY DISMISSED.IT WAS HARD TO

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AVOID THE CONCLUSION THAT THIS WAS INTENDED AS A DIRECT CRITICISM OF KHRUSHCHEVS EFFORTS AS A PEACEMAKER.

5.CASTRO ALSO GRANDLY CALLED FOR BLOC UNITY,WITHOUT SHOWING MUCH EVIDENCE THAT HE UNDERSTOOD WHAT THE PRESENT DISCREPANCIES WERE ABOUT,AND LEAVING THE CLEAR IMPLICATION THAT CUBA WOULD BE A MAJOR FORCE IN SOLVING THIS PROBLEM.IF HE RUNS TRUE TO FORM BLOC UNITY WILL BE DEFINE IN PRACTICE AS THE ACCEPTANCE OF CUBAN IDEAS.

6.THE RUSSIANS HAVE SHOWN GREAT PATIENCE WITH CASTRO BUT ONE DOUBTS THAT THEY WILL WILLINGLY SURRENDER CONTROL OF COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN LATINAMERICA TO FIDEL OR ALLOW COMMUNIST CADRES TO BE DESTROYED BY RECKLESS AND PREMATURE ATTEMPTS AT IMMEDIATE REVOLUTION DESPITE THEIR INITIAL FOREBEARANCE,THE CASTRO EGO MAY AT SOME STAGE HAVE TO BE DISCIPLINED BY HIS RUSSIAN FRIENDS,UNLESS,PERHAPS,THEY CONSIDER THAT HE IS NOT RPT NOT ABLE TO MOVE ON FROM WORDS TO ACTION WITHOUT THEIR SUPPORT

FULFORD°

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, HAVANA, Cuba.

Reference:

Subject: Women of the Americas and Castro's Call for Revolution.

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: 24

Date: January 17, 1963.

Enclosures: 2

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No. 66
50066-40

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To: Mr Pollock
JAN 23 1963

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Without attachments

References
M Ritchie
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European
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all Latin posts
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25.1.63
Done M.R.
Jan 29/63

Distribution to Posts

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A Congress of Women of the Americas was held in Havana from January 11-15. There were 248 non-Cuban delegates, including 19 Canadians (see our letter No. 19 of January 16) and 95 guests from 15 countries outside the hemisphere. Further details, including the names of participating organizations, are given in Appendix "A". The meeting was, as one might expect, designed to use the natural interests of women in education, health, equal rights and world peace as a means of harnessing their idealism to Communist political purposes. The flavour of the exercise is conveyed by the words from one resolution stating "The ferocious exploitation of imperialism is the cause of the backwardness, misery, ignorance and neglect in which live millions and millions of the children of our rich continent."

2. It was also an occasion for Cuba to publicize the measures it has undertaken to improve health standards, extend education and widen job opportunities for women. Cuba was the example which other American countries must follow. The Cuban Revolutionary Government has, of course, real accomplishments to its credit in these fields, particularly in primary education. The favourable frame of mind of the lady visitors and Cuban propaganda could be relied upon to stave off questions which might expose its various failures and the serious shortcomings of even its more successful projects.

3. A typical example of the intellectually dishonest approach of the Congress was to be encountered in the small exhibit staged in the Hotel Habana Libre. Together with examples of folk art from the various American countries were included statistics on illiteracy, wage levels, etc. The card on Canada indicated that it was an economic colony of the United States. It did not reveal, however, the wage levels or illiteracy rate in this particular "colony".

4. The Canadian women who called on the Embassy seemed to be a mixture of straight party-liners and unusually naive followers of the Minifie school. Their participation in the work of the Congress must have been severely limited by their lack of knowledge of Spanish. This may explain why the Mexican and Canadian delegations jointly presented the report of the Third Committee, which dealt with general political questions. The report included a recommendation for bringing the results of the Congress to the attention of hemispheric Governments. For this reason we thought it might be useful for you to have a translation of the newspaper summary of this report (see Appendix "B").

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Ext. 182A (Rev. 2/52)

5. Whether or not the Congress was designed as an instrument for arousing anti-Americanism and attracting leftist ladies into the Communist fold, Fidel Castro in his speech closing the Congress swept aside all ambiguities and issued a clarion call for revolution. After dealing with Cuba's work in fields of interest to women, he moved on in his usual way to general political matters. He obviously felt that a woman's place was not in a decorous "front" organization but in the front line of the struggle. Latin America was ripe for revolution and the masses must be mobilized forthwith.

6. The Maximum Leader was in good form and seems to have regained much of his self-confidence and insolent panache. He spelled out more clearly than in his January 2nd speech Cuba's post-crisis line. Cuba would remain irrevocably a member of the Bloc, but Castro shows every sign of intending to pursue an independent line within the limits of Bloc unity. Above all, Cuba will claim the right to act as mentor for the Latin American revolution. This revolution can be achieved, and soon, providing Latin Americans get out and fight. He has no patience with anyone who challenges this interpretation. The Cubans are probably more sanguine than their veteran Latin American Communist comrades whose job it is to carry out the revolution, accepting the risk of having their cadres destroyed. Moreover, Castro will resent any failure by them to follow his lead and most probably any Soviet intention to maintain its traditional control over the Communist parties in Latin America.

7. Special criticism was reserved for theoreticians who suggested that Cuba was an example of peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism (in the Marxist sense). This was totally false. The Cuban Revolution had been won as a result of heroic armed struggle. Since he was not a dogmatist he would not deny the possibility of a peaceful transition to Communism - somewhere, sometime - but it had not happened yet. He regretted that some comrades had paid lip-service to the Second Declaration of Havana and had then filed it away. Despite specific factors in each country, most Latin American countries presented the objective conditions which made revolution possible. Indeed, it would be easier in many of them than it had been in Cuba.

8. Unfortunately (or fortunately) we do not have access to a full range of Marxist theoretical writing and we are not sure whether Fidel Castro was directing his criticism to theoreticians at home or abroad. We suspect, however, that he had in mind Latin American Communist leaders who are not prepared to follow the Cuban line, the same ones presumably who had pigeon-holed the Second Declaration of Havana. In any case Fidel Castro is not a theoretician but a man of action, who views with a certain disgust persons who build vast intellectual edifices about revolution instead of taking a rifle into their hands. We would be grateful for any articles, which may be available in Ottawa, by Marxist theoreticians which put forward Cuba as an example of a peaceful transition to Communism.

9. Fidel Castro ridiculed the idea that peace had been achieved as a result of the Caribbean crisis. War had been avoided but that was not at all the same thing. He snickered - "We have no faith in Kennedy's word, but the fact is Kennedy has not given his word, and moreover, if he did, he has already withdrawn it." These sneers would seem to be as much directed at Khrushchev the "peacemaker" as at President Kennedy.

10. He once more called for unity within Cuba and within the Communist Bloc as a whole. The emphasis on the former would suggest that no large-scale purge is in sight and that any 26th of July figures who have been promoting such a purge have been rebuffed. (This does not rule out an eventual reshuffling of government figures). He again emphasized that with respect to differences within the Bloc Cuba would not add fuel to the fire. These differences ran against the interests of the world revolutionary movement. In other words, Cuba would not take sides.

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11. Within the emerging Communist "commonwealth" it is perhaps an outdated idea to conceive of a telephone line (real or figurative) running from the Kremlin to the different Bloc leaders. They have all, however, risen to power within the Communist apparatus and are likely to react in fairly similar ways to Moscow's leadership and changes in the Soviet party line. In contrast, Fidel Castro has a quite different background. He said that the Cubans reserve the right to think for themselves. If they do, their thoughts are going to differ from those held elsewhere within the Bloc. The way they think will probably remain closer to the Chinese than to the Russian or Eastern European approach. Apart from views similar to the Chinese about revolution, war and the threat of the United States, the Cuban Government has an ambition to carve out for itself a zone of influence in Latin America like that sought by China in Asia.

12. At first glance one might wonder how Fidel's call to arms fitted in with the emphasis of the good ladies on peace and disarmament. Fidel Castro had no difficulty in reconciling the two. After announcing that "When we speak to Latin Americans and tell them the objective conditions for revolution exist, we are also defending peace", he explained that only by weakening imperialism could its aggressive spirit be tamed. In short, peace is to be achieved through revolution. The women applauded and apparently agreed. It may be, of course, that they will not prove to have the teeth to back up Castro's bark.

13. Needless to say the Congress gave its full support to the World Congress of Women which will be held in Moscow from June 24 to June 29 under the auspices of the Women's International Democratic Federation. It will be interesting to see whether the World Congress will give more emphasis to the dove of peace and less importance to raucous calls for revolution than the regional meeting organized by the women of Cuba.

D. M. Fulford

Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

APPENDIX A

"ALL AMERICA WOMEN'S CONGRESS", held Havana, Cuba, January 11, 12, 13, 1963.

Attendance:

Number of Countries Participating	19
Number of Guest Countries Represented	15
Number of Delegates	425
Number of Guests	95
Total number of Women Attending	520
Cuban Women Attending	177
Net Total Foreign Women Attending	343

Breakdown of Delegates, by Occupations:

Workers: factory workers, peasants and employees	110
Professionals	49
House wives	127
Teaching profession	95
Students	20
Writers	4
Journalists	8
Congresswomen	2
City councillors	2
Businesswomen	2
	425

Number of Delegates, by Countries:

1. Argentina	19
2. Bolivia	1
3. Brazil	8
4. Canada	17
5. Colombia	13
6. Costa Rica	8
7. Cuba	177
8. Chile	31
9. Ecuador	4
10. El Salvador	3
11. Guatemala	10
12. Honduras	3
13. Mexico	93
14. Nicaragua	2
15. Panama	2
16. Paraguay	3
17. United States of America	14
18. Uruguay	15
19. Venezuela	2
	425
From Cuba	177
Net Total Women Attending From the Rest of the Continent	248

(Based on figures given in "Hoy" January 13, and "Revolución" January 14, 1963)

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Presidents of Delegations:

1. Argentina	- Fany Edelman
2. Bolivia	- Marta Vallejo
3. Brazil	- Bertina Blum.
4. Canada	- Gilda Murray
5. Chile	- Julieta Bampuzano
6. Colombia	- Lidia de Hurtado
7. Costa Rica	- Luisa González
8. Cuba	- Vilma Espín
9. Ecuador	- Marta Feijóo
10. El Salvador	- Leticia del Valle.
11. Guatemala	- Linda León

12. Honduras - Floresmila Castro
13. Mexico - Clementina Batalla de Bassols
14. Nicaragua - Concepción Palacio
15. Panama - Lidia Eneida de Gil
16. Paraguay - Presentación Lezcano
17. United States of America - Name of president omitted.
18. Uruguay - Julia Arévalo
19. Venezuela - Argelia Laya.

Organizations Represented, by Countries:

Argentina
Women's Inter-Partisan Commission; Argentina Vanguard Socialist Party, Women's Chapter; Co-Ordinating Committee of the Peronist Movement, Women's Chapter; Women's Commission of the Communist Party; Argentine Women's Union; Labour Unions' Group; The 62 Organizations; Labour Unions' Unity and Co-Ordination Movement; Sponsoring Committees for the Congress.

Bolivia
Sponsoring Committee for the Congress.

Brazil
Women's Federation of Sao Paolo; Women's Interchange and Friendship Commission; Women's League of Guanabara State; Sponsoring Committee for the Congress.

Canada
Congress of Canadian Women; La Ligue de Femmes Canadiennes; Fair Deal for Cuba Committee; Workers' Benevolent Association; United Jewish Peoples Order; Ladies' Auxiliary Committee(represented by the Chairman); Russian-Canadian Women's Federation; United Ukranian-Canadian Women's Association; Peace Council Organization.

Colombia
Democratic Women's Union; Political Party of the Left; Barristers' Society of Colombia; Liberal Revolutionary Movement; Sponsoring Committee for the Congress.

Costa Rica
Costa Rican Women's Alliance.

Cuba
Workers' Central Organization of Revolutionary Cuba; Union of the Communist Youth; High-School Students' Union; University Students' Federation; Committees for the Defence of the Revolution; Movement for the Peace and Sovereignty of the Peoples; Cuban Women's Federation.

Chile
Workers' Single Central Organization; Women's Union of Chile; Cuban-Chilean Institute of Culture; Women Workers' Union of the Telephone Company; Israeli Culture Center; Teachers' Labour Union; Professors' Union; National Society of Professors; Bookstores' Labour Union; Sponsoring Committee for the Congress; National Committee of Young Chilean Women.

Ecuador
Women's Union of Guayaquil; Sponsoring Committee for the Congress; University Women's Association.

El Salvador
Salvadorean Women's Fraternity.

Guatemala
"Dolores Bedoya" Women's Organization; Labour's Patriotic Youth.

Honduras
Hondurean Women's Union; White Cross Mothers' Societies.

--- Unite the struggle of the women of America and of all the world for universal and complete disarmament, the definite end of nuclear tests of all kinds, and the prohibition of the manufacture of atomic and hydrogen bombs.

--- Eliminate from government budgets military expenses so that the economic resources of the nations of the world and of the sciences can be devoted to the service of progress and life.

--- Present to the governments of America, through the women's organizations of each country, these resolutions.

Today as never before the people require the full support and solidarity of women. (meaning?)

Only through the united action of women with their people can peace be maintained, aggression prevented, our peoples liberated, happiness achieved for every family, and the supreme ideal made a reality: Children are born to be happy.

Exhort the women of America to mobilize on behalf of the resolutions which have been adopted by this Congress.

APPENDIX B

JOINT REPORT OF MEXICAN CANADIAN DELEGATES TO THE THIRD COMMISSION OF THE ALL AMERICA WOMEN'S CONGRESS

The Third Commission adopted the report presented by the delegations of Mexico and Canada; the following conclusions and resolutions were agreed upon:

--- Promote the ever growing support of women for the struggle of all people for their liberation, for the defense of their sovereignty and for their ability to choose, by the free exercise of self-determination, the government which is best suited for their interests.

--- Promote the fighting struggle: for the liquidation of military pacts and treaties imposed upon submissive governments by United States imperialism, and for the elimination of military bases which constitute a permanent source of provocation and represent an imposition incompatible with their sovereignty.

--- Fight even harder to break the Yankee monopoly over the external trade of the great majority of American countries.

--- Struggle to promote economic, political, and cultural exchanges, on a footing of equality, between American countries and the countries of the entire world.

--- Demand that governments enter into negotiations and find peaceful solutions for all the difficulties which may arise in the field of international relations and, at the same time, combat the maneuvers of Yankee imperialism to create artificial conflicts between our countries with the objective of distracting the attention of the people from their true problems and the causes which give rise to them.

--- Increase the solidarity and active friendship between the peoples and between the women's organizations of the America's and the entire world.

--- Support the brave American women defenders of peace and demonstrate to them and to their people the full support of the women of Latin America for their fighting efforts on behalf of peace and solidarity with Cuba.

Mexico
Mexican Women's Democratic Union; Teachers' Revolutionary Movement; National Liberation Movement's Women's Action Group; University Women's Association; Group of Friends of Rumania; United Front of Mazatlán-Sinaloa Colonies; Civic Committee of Guerrero; University and High-School Teachers; Women's Co-Ordinating Committee; Economists' Committee; National Workers' Union of the Teaching Profession; Revolutionary Labour Federation; General Union of Mexico's Workers and Peasants; Pro-Independence Women's Group of Michoacán; The Mexican Women's Vanguard; Mexican Women Workers' Union; Sponsoring Committee for the Congress.

Nicaragua
Political Party "Revolutionary Mobilization"

Panama
Vanguard for Nation Action; Women's Vanguard.

Paraguay
February Revolutionary Party, Women's Chapter; Women's Union; Women's Movement; FULNA.

United States of America
North-American Association of Friends of Cuba.

Uruguay
Liberation Front of the Left; Eastern Revolutionary Movement; Women's Union; Committee to Help Spanish and Portuguese Political Prisoners; Workers' Central Organization of Uruguay; Sponsoring Committee for the Congress.

Venezuela
National Women's Union of Venezuela; Assistance Federation of Venezuela.

--

Guest Countries Represented:

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Algeria
Bulgaria
China
Corea
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
East Germany
Great Britain
Hungary
Indonesia
Rumania
Spain
U.S.S.R.
Viet Nam

EUROPEAN SERVICE
GENERAL NEWS TALK

Distribution "A"
7.1.63

COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

by Edith Temple Roberts (S)

CORRECTION CORRECTION CORRECTION

Page 2, line 7 onwards:
Please amend to read as follows:

What saddens all those who look for improvements in the lives of the people of Peru and Venezuela is that both countries seem to be plagued with an intransigent military junta. In the case of Peru the junta is temporarily in power; in Venezuela President Betancourt cannot govern without support from at least a section of the Right wing. In its efforts to deal with etc.

END OF CORRECTION

Distribution "A"

C.R.U.Talk No. 2,586

7th January 1963

EUROPEAN SERVICE
GENERAL NEWS TALK

COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN
LATIN AMERICA

By Edith Temple Roberts(S)

The news from Peru of wide-spread arrests to foil a revolutionary plot and the declaration of a state of siege need cause little surprise. For the past three months several reports have spoken of sporadic outbreaks of violence, much of it centred on the valley of La Convención. From there unrest began to spread outwards towards the Andean mining areas and to the North. It has now also affected some of the towns; one report told of the Peruvian police shooting their way into a shoe factory, in Callao, which had been occupied by fifteen hundred (1,500) strikers since last Friday.

In a communiqué, the government of Peru stated that the arrests were made to forestall a communist plot to seize power later this month. Moreover, the Government spoke of large-scale finds of arms and ammunition, together with propaganda material and documents outlining the nature of the conspiracy. That same day the police, in Venezuela, raided an arsenal of a terrorist organisation near Caracas, where several tons of explosives are said to have been discovered. Near San Diego, also in Venezuela, in another raid apparently on a communist hideout, the police discovered military uniforms and a great many files and letters belonging to the Communist Party. In Venezuela, too, this report of further evidence of communist anti-government plotting is only the latest in a chain of similar discoveries. Both Peru and Venezuela, though quite dissimilar in many respects, are of the greatest interest to world communism and to its Latin American version of Fidelism. Dr. Castro's Government is said to have helped the Venezuelan Revolutionary Movement of the Left (MIR) to develop an effective guerilla organisation. Certainly, Havana radio regularly broadcasts appeals to the Venezuelans to rise in order to overthrow the liberal

28 lines...continued

reformist Betancourt Government. In Peru, the National Liberation Front (FLN) was formed to enable the communists to spread their influence. With Cuban help, the peasants - many of them Indians - were encouraged to occupy land on some of the vast Peruvian estates, sometimes supported by arms. Here, too, Havana regularly appeals over the air to the people of Peru to overthrow their regime.

What saddens all those who look for improvements in the lives of the people of Peru and Venezuela is that both countries seem to be saddled with an intransigeant military junta. In its efforts to deal with the danger from the left, the junta in Peru prevented the leader of the APRA Party, Dr. Haya de la Torre, from assuming the Presidency which he had won in the July elections. Like President Betancourt of Venezuela, the APRA leader is a radical social reformer, not a left-wing revolutionary. Given the chance, he might be able to push through the land reform and social changes his country needs so badly. It remains to be seen whether the Peruvian junta will keep its promise to allow free and fair elections next June in Peru. In Venezuela, President Betancourt's position has been steadily eroded by both the left and the right. While the left constantly attacks him for his political moderation, the right has tried to slow down the pace of the social reforms to which his Government is pledged.

In both these countries the chances for successful radical but non-communist reforms are being constantly whittled away as a result of terrorist activities. Moscow may still lay emphasis on peaceful co-existence, but at least some powerful Peruvian and Venezuelan communists seem to prefer the more violent, revolutionary brand of communism inspired from Havana and Peking.

ETR/JCT

27 lines

Total 55 lines

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

DESPATCH

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, Lima, Peru.

Reference: Our letter No. 267 of September 27

Subject: Violence in La Oroya

To: Mr. Wershof
JAN 14 1963

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: 1

Date: January 2, 1963

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail:

Post File No:

Ottawa File No. 50066-40 (85)

96 | 96

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Ref it:
OUSSE (Mr Bo)
Mr Ritchie
Mr Rich
L.A. Div
Economic Div
Consular Div
P 4(2) Div
L.S.S.
Comm. Dist.
Wadsworth
Paris Embassy
All LA Posts
Dept of Labour
J.I.B.
CCOS

Internal Circulation
9
fil
15 Jan 63
Done M.R.
Jan 17/63

Distribution to Posts

As a follow-up to our letter under reference, you might be interested to know that a short while ago the local press published a statement which the Orthodox Bishop of Buenos Aires, Alejo Palipenko, described as a long-time student of communist tactics, allegedly made three months ago, giving "with uncanny exactitude the details of the acts of sabotage on October 28 last when four electric power stations of the Creole Petroleum Company on Lake Maracaibo in Venezuela, a subsidiary of Standard Oil Company in New Jersey, were dynamited." The prediction had appeared in a book by the Bishop entitled "Conspiracíon Comunista en América Latina" published in Buenos Aires on October 21. The Bishop's book also warned that seven mining and petroleum companies in Peru had been selected by communist agents infiltrated within the companies, for acts of terrorism and sabotage. The companies named by the Bishop in this connection were the Cerro de Pasco Corporation, Southern Peru Copper Corporation, Delco Petroleum Corporation, Northern Peru Mining Corporation, and the Andaray Gold Mining Company, all representing United States capital investments. It may have been fairly easy for Bishop Palipenko to make a right guess about Cerro de Pasco, because it is a large-scale U.S. operation and had been the victim of violent strikes on past occasions, but, coincidentally or not, extensive disorders flared up again on December 17 and 18. The other targets listed by the Bishop have been left in peace so far.

2. The Cerro Corporation of New York, of which the Cerro de Pasco Corporation of Peru is a subsidiary, has invested U.S.$100 million in Peru over the past 12 years. It employs some 12,000 Peruvians and foreigners, among whom quite a few mining engineers are Canadian. On December 17 a violent and vandalistic strike was instigated at the La Oroya Metallurgical Center of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation in support of a 20% wage increase, the strikers being unsatisfied with a Government-authorized 8% increase. The strikers were in control of La Oroya for two days, until police and army reinforcements were brought in. The Peruvian and foreign staff members (including some 55 Canadian families) had to be evacuated from Cerro de Pasco, La Oroya, and several other mining centres of the Corporation to safer areas. (We might say in passing that the Embassy kept in close touch with the Cerro de Pasco office in Lima concerning the welfare of Canadian families there, a number of which are registered with the Embassy). The army and police reinforcements despatched from Lima were delayed in controlling the situation in La Oroya by the action of the strikers in rolling down rocks from the hillsides to block road and railway lines of communication. I was told that President Kennedy was so worried by the news of the occurrances that he telephoned personnally to Robert P. Koenig,

...2

Ext. 180A (Rev. 2/52)

President of the Corporation in New York, before the latter flew to Lima to confer with the President of the Junta, General Perez Godoy, on December 18.

3. The Peruvian Government declared the strike illegal, issued an ultimatum to resume work, and several agitators were arrested. The Minister of Government, Brigadier-General Herman Pagador Blondet and other government and company officials, as well as two officers of the United States Embassy, went to La Oroya to witness the extent of damages. In his latest monthly address to the nation (see our despatch No. 355 of December 20), the President of the Junta accused the "labour faction of APRA" for the disorders and "marxismo criollo" (whatever the term means) and gave a clear warning to APRA that unless it behaved properly there might be trouble for that political party at the next election. General Perez Godoy appealed to the labour unions not to dissipate the strength of their organisations in political and ideological controversies, but to make efforts for the legitimate improvement of working conditions within the law.

4. The grim consequences of the "disaster" in La Oroya were enumerated by Mr. Koenig at a press conference in Lima and subsequently by officials of the corporation. In addition to reporting one dead, 18 seriously injured strikers and policemen, a preliminary estimate of material damage to the extent of $4 million of company property (destruction of stores, machinery, buildings, supplies etc.), the company has announced it will not be able to resume normal operations for at least three months, a severe loss in sales, the curtailment of future expansion plans, the dismissal of workers who had not returned to their jobs by December 22 and the possibility that the corporation could not even grant the 8% wage increase.

5. It is safe to say that extremist agitators were responsible for the troubles in La Oroya; not only had at least an 8% wage increase been granted, but workers there are better paid and better housed than by Peruvian-owned mines. Agitators were obviously successful in persuading or intimidating labour leaders and workers to indulge in activities damaging to the workers themselves. Because of this, many responsible persons are quite prepared to believe, although there is no clear supporting evidence, that there exists a plan of terroristic activities aimed at vested interests, both foreign and national, and for this reason are prepared to relate the La Oroya disturbances to strikes and acts of terrorism and vandalism now taking place in several areas of the country. Troubles in the provinces of Junin and renewed guerilla activities in La Convencíon have started up again on the weekend. The activities in La Convencíon reported in our letter under reference have reached the point where the Government has seen fit to impose martial law in the area concerned and even to declare that martial law would be extended to the rest of the country if necessary. Recurring allegedly communist-led strikes of already well-paid bank employees, the difficulties being experienced by the universities of Trujillo and Ica in their struggle with known communist elements, the parallyzing of normal life in the city of Ica, and fairly extensive vandalism on the large Casa Grande sugar plantation are currently considered as following or partly following this plan.

6. It is tempting to say and easy to conclude that there is a master plan governing all these events. But no clear pattern emerges from them. About all that can be safely said is that they are a manifestation of fairly extensive economic and social unrest, not confined to any particular area of the country. While the Government

...3

accuses APRA of joining forces with the communists to foment disorder, the Apristas strongly deny this "calumny" and in turn accuse the Government of tolerating communist action in order to blame it on APRA. APRA also strongly asserts that among the trouble makers in La Oroya were well-known followers of Belaunde's Acción Popular and that, since both the Junta and Belaunde have kept silent on this point, it is clear that both are conniving against APRA.

7. It is argued by some observers that the Junta are not secretly unhappy over the present state of unrest and should it continue a convenient pretext would exist for it to call off the elections promised for next June. While this is perhaps difficult to believe, I would not disagree with the view expressed in Para 3(5) of our letter under reference that the Military Junta appear to consider APRA a greater danger to Peru than communism. They give the impression of attempting to play one off against the other, no doubt in the hope that by such tactics APRA's influence will be weakened. However, such tactics, whether deliberate or not, can only benefit extreme left influences and for this reason there is increasing concern, particularly in business circles, that the Junta, blinded as it is by the traditional hatred of the military for APRA, does not appear aware of where such tactics are leading.

8. At any rate, the Government's apparent lack of desire to deal firmly with those responsible for these events is giving rise to doubts as to its willingness (but not its potential ability) to control what can become a very serious situation. This growing lack of confidence is but one more item in the list of errors of omission and commission for which the Junta is being criticized. One hears rumours of divisions within the Junta as to the best means of dealing with extremist elements, some favouring a harder line, others supporting a policy of attempting to persuade and cajole rather than to act as a military government might be expected to act. If this is true, then only future events will resolve the dispute one way or the other. Meanwhile some people are deriving wry satisfaction from the fact that "los militares" are no doubt finding this country more difficult to govern than perhaps they might have imagined.

Duncan McDowell
The Ambassador.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy
RIO DE JANEIRO

Reference: Letter nº. 480 of Oct. 2, from Buenos Aires

Subject: Guerilla Activities in Latin America.

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: 759

Date: November 8, 1962.

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: AIR

Post File No: 64

Ottawa File No.
50066-40

96 | 96

To: Mr Wangan
NOV 21 1962

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J.I.B.
N.D.C.
T. & C.
Circ. L.A. Div
& File
L.A. Div
A. Polvin
Nov. 23/62

Internal Circulation
Done M.R.
Nov. 27/62

Distribution to Posts

Buenos Aires.

Little news come to Rio of events and developments at the distant border between Brazil and Paraguay. There is a tendency here to leave border relations in the gaucho country to be handled between gauchos, of Uruguay, the Argentine, Paraguay and Rio Grande do Sul.

2. It is a fact that the Argentine province of Misiones separates the Brazilian province of Rio Grande do Sul from Paraguay, and that only Parana and Matto Grosso have a common frontier with that country. Parana is in the military district which is ruled by the Third Army in Rio Grande do Sul; Matto Grosso is in the Second Army district ruled from São Paulo. But frontier between Matto Grosso and Paraguay is not active, it is really the Third Army states which count and their headquarters is Rio Grande do Sul.

3. Brazil is of course so large that administration is very much decentralized. The policy at the center does not necessarily hold strong at the periphery. This is even truer of the civil administration than of the military. On the other hand the military in Rio Grande do Sul tend to fall in with the local politicians and to tailor their own writ under the influence of the local politicians.

4. The fact that a Rio Grande do Sul politician, a friend of Brizola, is now Brazilian Ambassador in Asuncion may well have strengthened the powers at the periphery in comparison with the previous situation where a general was Ambassador to Stroessner.

... 2

NO ENCLOSURES

5. Nevertheless the Army is a more cohesive body in Brazil and at worst I would think that Army policy would still be applied even if/with greater restraint than before.

6. I obtained a fair indication of what Army policy is in regard to Paraguay from a conversation which I had with General Amaury Kruel last spring, when he was Head of the Military Household of President Goulart; he is now the Minister of War, and therefore with greater influence yet than before. General Kruel had just had a quick visit in Asuncion during which he had received a high decoration from the Paraguayan President, General Stroessner. General Kruel was very clear in expressing his views. Stroessner's was a dictatorship, there was no denying, but it was a benevolent one, one which had surprisingly extensive support in the country. The alternative to it, unrestrained democracy, as preached by the opposition in exile, mostly in the Argentine and Uruguay, would make for chaos in the state if this opposition were to prevail. And chaos would mean Fidelismo at short notice. There was a degree of democracy which could be absorbed by a people which was closely related to its historical, spiritual and intellectual development; and Paraguay could only take a very small dose.

7. It was therefore the duty of Brazil to restrain the Paraguayan opposition as expressed through the guerillas of which there were many in Brazil's South. If this was done, Stroessner would be re-elected and maintain law and order in Paraguay; his view was therefore to ensure that the border be guarded and that Paraguayan guerillas be kept at a distance from it inside Brazil, under close supervision.

8. These are no conclusive views. It is however worth pointing out that no reports of any kind have reached Rio of trouble or incidents at the Paraguayan border in recent times. I thought it was worth reporting General Kruel's views as a contribution to the review of the problem discussed by Mr. Bower in his despatch under reference.

Jean Desgrelais

Ambassador.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO: D.L.(2) Division European Div.

FROM: Latin American Division

REFERENCE: Circular Document No. A-9/62

Security SECRET

Date October 11, 1962

File No.		
50066-40		
96	—	—

SUBJECT: Soviet Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries

With reference to the second paragraph on page 16 of the Document above, I wonder whether it is not perhaps a little too strong to state that "Certain areas of Colombia are at present under the complete control of Communist Guerilla elements". From what information we have, we would have written: "In certain areas of Colombia, Guerilla elements have been infiltrated by Communists and in some cases are under the complete control of Communist elements". However, you may have more complete information than we have.

Latin American Division

CIRCULATION

cc. European Div.

Ext. 326 (6/56)

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

DESPATCH

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, Guatemala City, C.A.

Reference: No. 34 - September 6, 1962

Subject: Guerilla Activities in Latin America

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: Ex. 10/1

Date: October 3, 1962

Enclosures: 1

Air or Surface Mail: Diplomatic bag

Post File No: E. 10-1 - E.12-1-3

To: Mr. Johnson

OCT 10 1962

Ottawa File No. 50066-40

References: Mr. Ritchie, Mr. Rick, D.L.(2), U.S.A., Embassies Washington, London, Nato Paris, all L.A. Posts, C.C.O.S.(2), D.M.I., S.I.B., N.D.C., T.&C., Cue L.A. Div., File, A. Pobzeb

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

60

Summary and Conclusions

Currently there are no guerilla bands at large in Guatemala. The group which was active during February and March and headed by Lt. Yon Sosa has disbanded and Yon Sosa is reportedly hiding in Guatemala City. The Communists, following a disastrous attempt at guerilla warfare in March 1962, have revised their tactics and are utilizing more subtle techniques of subversion.

There is limited support among the populace and the army for overt guerilla activity against the regime. The army is more concerned about the possible election of Juan José Arévalo as President than upsetting President Ydigoras; the peasants and farmers, especially in the highlands, believe they have little to gain by secretly supporting guerilla bands that have little chance of success and no uplifting promises to make.

1. Area of operation or concentration

The four centers where pitched battles with guerillas have occured in 1962 are marked with "Xs" on the enclosed map.

Zacapa was the base for Yon Sosa's "13th of November Group" activities during February and March of this year. Yon Sosa was born in this area and his mother still owns land nearby Lake Izabal, thus the group could count on some help from the rural residents. Strategically, the fall of Zacapa to Yon Sosa would have allowed him to blockade both the Atlantic Highway and the IRCA railroad which would have severed Guatemala City's links with the Atlantic port of Puerto Barrios.

The Communists organized a band of 12 - 15 guerillas to coincide with Yon Sosa's uprising and sent them near Salamá. Hoping to capitalize on the confusion caused by Yon Sosa, the Communist group immediately attacked an army outpost but were beaten and all the members were killed, their bodies mutilated and placed on public display in the main plaza of Salamá.

Turning to Chimaltenango, the group that was active here during March was lead by an old rene ade foe of Ydigoras and was dispersed by one shot from an army reconnaissance patrol. The guerillas threw down their guns and fled, possibly thinking of the village square in Salamá.

The foray into Huehuetenango was carried out in late March by 15 - 20 members of the "13th of November Group" who entered the country by the Mexican border. However, the guerillas antagonized some

...2

Ext. 180C (Rev. 2/52)

of the peasants who reported their exact location to the army. The army moved rapidly and all the group are now in jail.

2. Political complexion of leadership

a) Yon Sosa's "13th of November Group" claimed during February that he would accept help from anyone - Cuba included - in his attempts to overthrow Ydigoras. Nevertheless, he is more anti-Ydigoras than pro-communist. His upbringing and education, military career and following give no indication of him having Communist tendencies. In fact, it is difficult to color him with any political hue. Over the past two years his outlook, suggested by a few clandistine speeches, point to a right wing military pose. How far he would go to obtain strong Communist backing is unknown.

b) The group who were killed nearby Salamá were Communists. The Party furnished them with guns and financed their shot-lived activities. One of the members was a member of the Guatemala Central Communist Committee.

3. Degree of preparation for overt activity

a) Planning.

Yon Sosa's activities this spring were well planned but showed lack of awareness of the loyalty of the army. The attacks were timed precisely but few preparations were made in the event of dispersement or retreat.

The Communists sadly overestimated the support of the peasants and underated the army's efficiency and ruthlessness.

b) Training.

The "13th of November Group" is largely made-up of dissident army officers and enlisted men. Their training therefore was of a standard military nature and no evidence of a special guerilla training ground has been found.

About 15 Guatemalan Communists have received military training in Cuba. Some of them have returned to Guatemala and others have remained in Mexico.

c) Organization.

Yon Sosa's group is now completely unorganized. He is reportedly hiding in Guatemala City and the remaining members of his band are either in jail or wandering ineffectually in the Zacapa area near the Honduran border.

To the contrary, the Communists are well organized in Guatemala City and could support a small guerilla band at short notice. However, there is currently no guerilla opposition supported by the Communists.

d) Arms.

The arms recovered from the defeated guerillas were of standard American or European manufacture. There are large stores of arms in Guatemala which is not surprising considering the Communist regime in the early 50's, the revolution in 1954 and the tension since that time.

...3

4) Operations undertaken so far

a) "13th of November Group"

On November 13th, 1960, a group of dissident army officers lead by Lt. Yon Sosa raided the central Army base in Guatemala City, killed two guards and escaped with armaments. After about two weeks of fighting in the Puerto Barrios - Zacapa area, the resistance movement collapsed. Little was heard from the group until February of this year when a daring day-light robbery of the United Fruit offices in Bananera netted Sosa $18,000. Following this, several minor scrimages with loyal troops were held, but Sosa failed to rally the army troops at Zacapa to his side and after a few weeks the movement died. It is estimated that 10 rebels were killed and 12 loyal army personnel.

The drive in Huehuetenango was equally unsuccessful and as seen from the map, the rebels only penetrated a short distance from the Mexican border.

b) Communists.

The unsuccessful venture at Salamá has marked the only Communist guerilla activity for the past few years although they supplied Sosa with some money and medical kits.

5) Participation or connivance of armed forces

A number of army officers admire Yon Sosa for his courage and enterprise in organizing and carrying-out guerilla activity against Ydigoras. However, very few would be willing to join forces with the rebels. For example, the Zacapa army garrison, although in the middle of Yon Sosa guerilla activities, remained loyal throughout the February uprising.

The army claims to fear the victory of Arévalo in the 1963 Presidential elections and are mapping strategy for that eventuality rather than plotting to overthrow Ydigoras.

6) Estimate of likelihood of success

Although the Guatemalan political situation is still unstable, it appears that if the Ydigoras government fell it would be for other reasons than guerilla activity. The Communists would rather concentrate on infiltrating the universities, civil service positions and unions and let someone else do the guerilla fighting. The extreme right-wing prefers to embarrass the Government by bomb-blasts and manifestations in the city rather than choosing rugged guerilla resistance in the hills.

K. D. Taylor

K.D. Taylor
For the Embassy

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Reference: Your telegram XL-83 of October 1, 1962

Subject: Guerilla Activities in Latin America

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: 480

Date: October 2, 1962

Enclosures: one

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

To: Mr Ritchie / Mr Brown
XL OCT 9 1962

Ottawa File No. 50066-40

96 | 96

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Mr Ritchie
Mr Pick
DL(2)
USA
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Wash
London
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all A posts
CCOS(6)
DMI
JIB
NDC
T+C
Cie L A div + file
A. Potvin
2/10/62

Internal Circulation

Done 3c R Oct. 18/62
XD

Distribution to Posts

As far as we have been able to determine there are no guerilla organizations operating within Paraguay. This is the consequence of a rigid security control maintained by the dictatorship of President Stroessner and also of a general satisfaction amongst the populace with the regime.

2. There are, however, a number of groups of exiled Paraguayans operating outside the country, in Argentina and Brazil, which have ambitions to overthrow Stroessner and could become the nucleus of a guerilla band or bands within Paraguay itself. In the recent past, a number of such groups have crossed neighbouring borders into Paraguay but none has fared very well, partly because of Stroessner's security arrangements referred to above and partly because they never were able to get support from the local residents.

3. Up until March 1961, the Argentine Government rather encouraged those groups that were based in this country. General Carlos Toranzo Montero who was then the Commander-in-Chief of the Army in Argentina was strongly anti-Stroessner. His attitude was the result of the link that existed between Stroessner and Perón during the dictatorship era in this country. Toranzo Montero provided malcontents from Paraguay with arms and a number of raiding parties crossed the river into Paraguay and on one or two occasions there was serious fighting which was reported at the time by this office. The Paraguayan government naturally protested to the Argentine authorities, at first meeting with little sympathy. President Frondizi and the UCRI party - particularly that section based in the Province of Missiones where the bulk of the Paraguayan exiles lived - were anti-Stroessner and inclined to look with a blind eye at what the Army Commander-in-Chief was doing. At that particular time there were actually training camps in Argentine territory where Paraguayan malcontents were preparing to invade their homeland.

4. Two things changed the picture rather suddenly. First of all, the success of Castro in Cuba cooled off Argentine enthusiasm to overthrow Stroessner. In the second place, Frondizi made a State visit to Paraguay at which he and Stroessner got along very well and following which all aid to the Paraguayan refugees in the Argentine was withdrawn.

5. Despite Toranzo Montero's early antipathy to Stroessner and his considerable influence in the Argentine group which controlled the Army in this country immediately prior to the recent pocket civil war, the group he represented was so strongly anti-Communist that it would have stamped out any known pockets of Paraguayan guerillas training on Argentine soil. The present Army group is not likely to be very different.



CONFIDENTIAL

6. If Paraguay is to be troubled in the near future by guerillas trained outside its borders and staging an invasion at the appropriate moment, the danger is more apt to come from Brazil than Argentina. Observers of the Paraguayan scene believe that the chances of some Brazilian initiative are greater today than they were a year or two ago. The Brazilian Ambassador in Paraguay in 1961 and 1962 was General Joachim Justino Alves Bastos. He had previously been President of the Circulo Militar in Brazil and was a close friend of Stroessner's with whom he had studied at the Brazilian Military College. He was, however, recently recalled and has been replaced by a politician said to be close to Brizuela, the Governor of the Province of Rio Grande do Sul and a brother-in-law of President Goulart. This group is believed to be anti-Stroessner.

Brizola

7. What happens in Paraguay depends basically on how loyal the army remains to President Stroessner. Should any guerilla group cross the frontier and join up with a disgruntled army faction within the country itself, it is possible that civil war would break out and the dictatorship could be overthrown. In such an event the possibility of a Communist group coming to the surface must be considered good. They are by far the best organized of the various Paraguayan factions in exile. As we have mentioned in previous despatches on this subject, the youth of Paraguay tend to gravitate to the Communist banner simply because the old line parties have failed to shed their differences and unite to do something positive. A well established guerilla band within the country might well attract some of these people.

8. To sum up:

(1) There are no guerillas as such in Paraguay today.
(2) A considerable number of Paraguayan refugees are living in the Argentine and Brazil some of whom are known to be plotting President Stroessner's overthrow.
(3) Whether any of these succeed will depend upon the support given them by the "host" country and upon any assistance they may get from dissident sections of the Paraguayan armed forces.
(4) The likelihood of such groups obtaining assistance from their host governments is greater in the case of Brazil than in the case of Argentina at the present time.
(5) The danger of serious guerilla activities in the country do not appear great at the moment.

Ross Bower

Ambassador.

P.S. In recent weeks the spate of rumours going the rounds included some concerning the activities of anti-Stroessner guerilla bands in the northern frontier provinces of Argentina. These rumours were so persistent that the Government has felt compelled to deny them. This they did this week when the following communique was issued:

"As a result of the firm decision of the Government to avoid activities which might result in political problems in Paraguay,

the Argentine authorities - represented in this case by the Army and Security forces - will intensify their campaign of investigation and repression in the frontier area, with a view to putting into effect preventative measures for acts and events which might lead to the formation of groups or organizations (the purpose of which would be to overthrow the Paraguayan Government) formed by citizens of that country residing in Argentina and who belong to the parties opposing the present authorities. With this in mind, the Military Attaché in Asuncion, Colonel Mario Oscar Carricart, together with high officers of the Gendarmeria Nacional, has been sent to Misiones to inspect the High Parana area to verify the effectiveness of the security measures taken. He was able to verify the appropriateness of these measures and the falseness of the circulating rumours. There are no "guerrilla groups" as we were made to believe. If those groups really existed, they could not have passed unseen by the Gendarmeria forces which keep a strict watch over the High Parana River area."

I am attaching a memorandum which the American Ambassador gave me as a result of an enquiry I made of him about the guerilla situation in Paraguay.

October 4, 1962

M E M O R A N D U M

Over the last several years reports have been received of guerrilla activity by Paraguayan exile groups along the Argentine and Brazilian borders with Paraguay. There have also been reports of the existence of camps, principally in the northeastern part of Argentina, where Paraguayan exiles are trained for guerrilla activity. The activity is apparently being carried on by all the Paraguayan exile organizations, but particularly the Frente Unido de Liberación Nacional (FULNA - United Front of National Liberation) which is Communist-dominated, the 14 of May Movement, and the Movimiento Popular Colorado (MOPOCO - Popular Colorado Movement), the dissident Colorado movement under Epifanio Méndez Fleitas. (Both FULNA and MOPOCO have their headquarters in Montevideo.) According to most recent reports, FULNA and MOPOCO were making joint preparations in areas near the Paraguayan border for a possible invasion of Paraguay. The two democratic groups, the 14 of May Movement and the Liberal Party, are concerned over the possibility that FULNA and MOPOCO may be successful in their invasion attempt and thus be able to dominate any future government of Paraguay. The Brazilian authorities are aware of the preparations and training being carried on by the Paraguayan exiles, particularly FULNA and the 14 of May Movement, in Brazilian areas bordering on Paraguay.

File
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Diary

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

OUTGOING MESSAGE

DATE	FILE		SECURITY
~~SEPT. 28~~ OCT 1 1962	5-0056-40		CONFIDENTIAL
	96	96	

FM: EXTERNAL OTT

NUMBER	PRECEDENCE
XL-84	ROUTINE

TO: GUATEMALA

INFO:

Ref.: GUERILLA ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA

Subject:

RE OUR LETTER OF SEPTEMBER 6 REPORTS NOW URGENTLY NEEDED.

REPLY BY NEXT BAG WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

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EXT. 18 (REV. 12/61)

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

12 File Circulation Diary

OUTGOING MESSAGE

DATE	FILE		SECURITY
~~SEPT. 28~~ OCT 1 1962	5-00 66-40	96 96	CONFIDENTIAL

FM: EXTERNAL OTT

TO:	NUMBER	PRECEDENCE
BUENOS AIRES	XL-83	ROUTINE

INFO:

Ref.:

Subject: GUERILLA ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA

RE OUR LETTER OF JULY 25 REPORTS NOW URGENTLY NEEDED. IT IS ASSUMED YOUR LETTER NO. 386 OF AUGUST 16 WAS NOT MEANT TO COVER EXPECTED REPORT ON PARAGUAY. REPLY BY NEXT BAG WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

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EXT. 18 (REV. 12/61)

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY, LIMA, PERU

Reference: Your Letter No. XL-141 of July 25

Subject: Guerilla Activities in Peru

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: 267

Date: September 27, 1962

Enclosures: 1

Air or Surface Mail:

Post File No: 12.1.6

Ottawa File No. 5-0066-40

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To: Your Russell Potvin
OCT 11 1962

XL

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Mr. Ritchie
Mr. Rick
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London
Nato Paris
All C.A. Posts
C.C.O.S. (2)
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A. Potvin
Done M.F. Oct. 17/62

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Your letter reached this embassy during a period when for many months a public debate has been going on in the press about the threat of so-called guerillas which are alleged to be trained for action in the valley of La Convencion in the upper selva of Peru near the ancient city of Cuzco. The present government junta has on many occasions denied the existence of guerillas in that area, thus rejecting charges voiced by Pedro Beltran's La Prensa that the guerillas already constitute a serious threat in Peru. Our report has been particularly difficult to prepare because of the lack of official and reliable information within the context of this political battle.

2. The events described in this letter do show a certain pattern and would suggest that there exists at present an early stage of organization under which recruiting, financing through bank robberies, arming and training of guerillas is taking place. The absence of military or guerilla offensive in the area mentioned above suggests that the guerillas still do not represent a major threat. It is unfortunate that in order to avoid trouble during its interim regime, the present government junta is doing little to combat this situation. In a sense the former government of President Prado which was supported by the land-owning class, was more aware and willing to take adequate measures against the guerillas. There is certainly a need for this, be it for the Armed Forces of this country to train their regular troops in fighting guerilla elements.

3. This report will be limited to a study of the situation in Peru only. It is hoped that at a later stage a similar study will be done on Bolivia.

(1) Area of Operation or Concentration

Because information on guerillas is still very scanty, it is not possible to determine accurately where and to what extent guerillas are being trained in Peru. During the month of May a small band of Trotskyite Communists raided two banks in Jauja in the Department of Junin, east of Lima, in order to finance and organize guerillas. This raid failed completely and resulted in the death of three of the twenty robbers.

It is known that guerillas are being trained in the area of Arequipa, though again it is not possible to determine how many people are involved or the extent of

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Ext. 182A (Rev. 2/52)

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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DATE	FILE		SECURITY
~~SEPT. 28~~ OCT 1 1962	5-0066-40		CONFIDENTIAL
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FM: EXTERNAL OTT

NUMBER	PRECEDENCE
XL-82	ROUTINE

TO: CARACAS, SANTO DOMINGO, LIMA

INFO:

Ref.:

Subject: GUERILLA ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA

RE OUR LETTER OF JULY 25 REPORTS NOW URGENTLY NEEDED.

REPLY BY NEXT BAG WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

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SIG ANDRÉ POTVIN NAME A. Potvin	Latin American	2-7175	SIG A. J. PICK NAME A. J. Pick

EXT. 18 (REV. 12/61)

their action. Arequipa has not suffered from any sabotage or any guerilla activities.

The area which has been signalled as the most active is the valley of La Convencion which could be described as a 2,000 Km area extending approximately 30 kilometers on either side of the Inca ruins of Machu Picchu in an east-west direction, by 20 kilometers in a northerly direction. This area would embrace part of the upper Urubamba River and its tributaries, the Vilcanota which flows northerly down the Urubamba valley, the Vilcabamba River and the Chaupimayo River. The area wouldalso cover part of the Ocabamba and the Yanatili Rivers. This fairly large area, which has no roads, is connected only with Cuzco by railway as far as Huadquiña.

Briefly this area consists principally of haciendas, the owners of which apparently have not set foot on their land for many years, where the peasants have occupied the land and organized themselves into unions.

(2) Political Complexion of Leadership

While many names of known Communists are mentioned in relation with the events in La Convencion and elsewhere, it is impossible to determine whether they are officially connected with the Communist National Liberation Front (FLN). Some of its party affiliates are known to have taken part in the Jauja robberies. Also in this particular incident the small Revolutionary Workers Party (POR) is known to have endorsed the ideals of Francisco Vallejos, the revolutionary leader who died, shot by the police during the robbery incident.

(3) Degree of Preparation for Overt Activity

(a) Planning

As reported to you in our Letter No. 124 of May 3, attempts to organize guerillas appear to follow close liaison with Cuban Communists. Since 1960 regular pilgrimage of students and labour leaders to Cuba has taken place. Recently nearly 100 young Peruvian students were recruited and flown to Cuba from the Chilean port of Arica for extensive studies in Cuba. It is known that many Peruvians have received training in the handling of small arms during visits paid to Cuba on the occasion of the July 26 celebrations.

In Lima, two banks were robbed by a band of Trotskyite - Communists during the month of April, amounting to approximately S/.2,600,000 ($100,000). Investigation by the official police of Peru (PIP) resulted in the arrest of a number of young people in Cuzco who were found with approximately S/.400,000, guns, blankets, etc. all to be channelled into guerilla activities in La Convencion. So far only approximately S/.700,000 ($30,000) has been recovered from the arrested individuals. From the confessions reported in the press, the mastermind behind this robbery appears to be Hernan Boggio Allende, alias Federico, alias Juan Ocampo Vergara; Boggio is still in jail pending his trial and no doubt the collecting of more concrete proof against him. This

does not seem to have disturbed his cousin, who is the rector of the Engineering University in Lima. There are many names involved in this and other events described in this letter and are listed in appendix for your information.

(b) Training

There is no concrete information available on training of guerillas. The chances are that training may be taking place in Arequipa and La Convencion but it is impossible to determine to what extent and how many people are involved.

(c) Organization

As suggested in section (1) of this letter there is a definite movement to organize peasants into unions which may eventually control a large area in the upper selva of the Cuzco region. It is known that the Peasants Federation of La Convencion, headed by Hugo Blanco, is enjoying the active support of Communist lawyers in Cuzco who are using every means to harrass the authorities and the owners of the land, seeking to prevent the latter from chasing the invaders. The area of La Convencion is known to consist of five or six large haciendas. One of the land owners is Alfredo Romainville, a Peruvian of French descent, whose life has been threatened if he should set foot on his hacienda in the Chaupimayo valley.

(d) Arms Smuggling

Many incidents have been uncovered by the police which suggest that an active ring of arms smuggling is in operation between Bolivia and Peru in order to equip guerillas. During the month of March of this year two individuals were arrested in Huampani, a resort area near Lima, with a load of ammunition and rifles believed to be of Czech origin.

There were other incidents of contraband reported periodically in the newspapers involving Peruvians arrested in the Puno area of Lake Titicaca, who were seeking to bring in arms to La Convencion. From the United States Embassies in Lima and La Paz, it was learned that Czech arms may enter Bolivia in large amounts probably through the tributary rivers of the Amazon, in the Department of Beni, where border control is non-existent. The arms are then smuggled across to Peru in the area of Lake Titicaca and the jungle port of Puerto Maldonado in the eastern department of Madre de Dios. Again it is difficult to know whether the Peruvian police are very efficient in preventing this kind of contraband.

The Minister of Government and Police has made public declarations recently to the effect that security around the principal ports of Peru would be tightened to prevent extensive smuggling of consumer goods which is going on in Peru. The figure of S/.400 million (approximately $16 million worth of goods) has been mentioned as the annual amount of smuggling into Peru; what guarantee is there that no arms are smuggled in at the same time?

..... 4

(4) Operation Undertaken So Far

This question has been answered by the description included in the previous paragraphs. If guerillas should exist in La Convencion in large numbers, there has been no evidence that they wish to control the railway to Cuzco, the power house in Machu Picchu or even the Andean Central Highway from Cuzco to Lima. One can only speculate that such a group would be very small and so far incapable of extending its activities beyond the valley where it is located. If the movement should grow to the extent of controlling the Cuzco area, considerable damage would result to Peru as a whole. Cuzco is a railway terminal between the port of Mollendo on the coast through Arequipa and Puno on Lake Titicaca. The economy of the area would be completely paralyzed if damage was done to these vulnerable connecting channels. No doubt the substantial tourism in Cuzco would be ruined. It is unlikely therefore that guerillas would wish to paralize the economy of Cuzco unless their chances were rapidly growing to extend their activities nearer Lima.

(5) Participation or Connivance of the Armed Forces

Neither word in the above title can really be applied to the Armed Forces in Peru. The real problem exists in the apparent blindness of the present military junta with respect to the potential threat of the situation in La Convencion. This is probably due to their own refusal to consider Communism as the principal danger in Peru. After all, the coup d'etat on July 18 was not staged against Communist influence but against the moderate APRA Party whose domination of the elected congress was virtually assured. "Fraud" served as the military's pretext to take over. The real reason was their traditional emnity and fear of the APRA Party headed by Victor Raul Haya de la Torre.

The junta is anxious to avoid any criticism of military domination and it is doubtful that it will risk justified or unjustified popular opposition by waging an open battle against the agitators in La Convencion. On September 18, the newspapers reported that the Minister of Government despatched 30 detectives to investigate the situation.

A word should be included under this title about the so-called "Nasseristas" who are believed to be a small group of army colonels who wish to set up a Nasser type of military government in Peru. It is believed within the APRA Party that the Nasseristas are a product of Communist influence in the center of high military studies in Lima (CAEM). Although this is not a proved fact it is known that there are a number of Communist professors in the center, among them Sr. Garayar, who is the director of Statistics and has been attached to the center for approximately eight years.

(6) Likelihood of Success

If some general conclusion is possible from this survey, one can state that Peru is still far away from falling under a Cuba type revolution. The present social imbalance in Peru and the absence of a genuine agrarian reform make this country very ripe for Communist influence. More than one half of Peru's eleven million population consists of

..... 5

indigenous and mestizo people who live in a subsistence economy. The cry for social justice and equality is therefore as loud as ever. If this situation does not change within the next few years, peasants' leagues will become more powerful and no doubt will fall under the domination of Communist agitators. When this happens there will be little hope of saving Peru from a violent social revolution. This is not only a personal judgement of mine but the firm conclusion of a number of foreign observers here.

Roger Gilbert

Embassy.

CONFIDENTIAL

List of Incidents and People related to
Guerilla Activities in Peru.

N.B. Reports of these incidents were taken from press sources, and the guilt of the persons involved has not necessarily been substantiated by trial.

Huampani: Expreso, March 19, 1962
Two individuals were arrested for the illegal possession of a substantial amount of arms and ammunition.

Elias Carnero
Alfonso Barrantes Lingan

Satipo, Department of Junin: La Prensa, April 20, 1962
Individuals were apprehended for illegal traffic of arms and alleged intention to organize a guerilla training center.

Guillermo Carnero Hocke
Eduardo Wensjoe Miller
Abdon Mendoza Morales (Paraguayan)
Carlos Miranda

Contraband from Bolivia: La Prensa, March 20, 1962

Individuals arrested by the Policia de Investigation Peruana (P.I.P.) for smuggling of Czech arms:

Edwin Alberto Perez Villarael
Juan Antonio Redecilla Conzalez (Argentine)
Guillermo Carnero Hocke
Victor Rios Oliveros
Jose Moron Vizcarra
Juan Zapata
L. Diaz

Arrest of individuals for traffic of arms: Expreso, May 2, 1962

Eduardo Razuri Brione
Edgardo Sanco Gutierrez
Carlos Araazo Pinto

Miraflores Bank Robbery of Approx. $100,000: Lima, April 1962

Principal Leaders:

Guillermo Carnero Hocke
Hernan Boggio Allende, alias Juan Ocampo Vergara, alias "Federico"
Carlos Howes Beas

Other participants:

Jorge Alejandro Tamayo Flores
Daniel Alberto "Che" Perreyra
Alberto Ruiz Gonzalez
Victor Argote Sanchez
Leoncio Bueno Barrantes
Jose Antonio Arojon
Joel Silva Espino
Jose Velasquez
Raul Terzi
Alberto Fonken
Leoncio Bueno
Martorell Soto (Spaniard)
Brazano

..... 2

Jauja Bank Robbery of approx. $60,000: Expreso, May 30, 1962
(Department of Junin)

Sub/Lt Francisco Vallejos Vidal (killed by gunfire)
Humberto Mayta Mercado "
Jacinto Renteria
(fifteen others arrested)

La Convencion: Guerilla center

Secretary General of Peasants Federation for La Convencion and Lares:

Hugo Blanco

Latin American/A. Potvin/sc

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(FILE COPY)

Please return

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: The Canadian Embassy
Guatemala City, Guatemala

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference:

Subject: Guerilla Activities in Latin America

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: XL-

Date: September 6, 1962

Enclosures: Nil

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No. 50066-40

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References

In Cuba, on January 1, 1959, the Batista regime backed by a well-equipped and well-trained regular army collapsed in the face of guerilla opposition which had been operating for little over two years. Thus the importance of an early appreciation of the true nature of armed insurrections was exemplified by the Cuban case. There is a need for the Department to be kept informed, on a continuing basis, on movements that oppose or might oppose by force of arms any government in the Western Hemisphere.

2. It would be appreciated therefore if you could give us your assessment of the likelihood, nature and extent of guerilla activities in the country or countries to which you are accredited. Some posts have already provided us with very useful material in this regard. This information however usually did not bear on guerilla activities proper.

3. In order to facilitate the preparation of their reports, missions might deal with the subject under the following headings:

(1) Area of operation or concentration

(2) Political complexion of leadership (including party alliances)

(3) Degree of preparation for overt activity
- (a) planning
- (b) training
- (c) organization
- (d) arms

(4) Operations undertaken so far

(5) Participation or connivance of armed forces

(6) Estimate of likelihood of success (sympathy of local population)

4. "Guerilla Activities" should be interpreted broadly to include all cases of the resort to arms by irregular forces of any political affiliation or by armed peasants for whatever reasons. It should be noted that military operations by one state against another or military action by armed forces of a state to change the government do not fall within the purview of this study.

Internal Circulation

D.L. (2)

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Ext. 181B (Rev. 2/52)

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Latin American/A. Potvin/sc

5-0066-40
96

September 6, 1962

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Geoff,

Thank you for your letter of August 21, 1962, concerning the coverage of guerilla activities in Guatemala.

It has now been decided that Mr. Lemieux should be instructed to prepare the report requested in our letter No. XL-209 to you. It will therefore not be necessary for you to travel to Guatemala in this connection or for the mission in Mexico to report on this subject as regards Guatemala.

Yours sincerely,

A. J. PICK

A.J. Pick

Geoffrey A.H. Pearson, Esquire,
The Canadian Embassy,
Melchor Ocampo 463-7,
MEXICO 5, D.F.,

5. It would be appreciated if you could give high priority to this project. As we indicated above, information in this matter would also be welcome on a continuing basis.

A. J. PICK

for A. J. PICK
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

For action:

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, MEXICO CITY.

Reference:

Subject: Guerrilla Activities in Latin America.

To: Mr Robertson
~~AUG~~ SEPT 10 1962

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: 446

Date: September 4, 1962

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Courier

Post File No: 8-1-5

Ottawa File No. 5-0066-40

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Mr. Ritchie
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D.M.V.
J.I.B.
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P. File
Sept. 11/1962
a. Potvin
Done P.R.
Sept. 18/62

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At the present time the likelihood of guerrilla activities in Mexico, i.e., resort to arms by irregular forces or by armed peasants, is small and our report on the subject will be brief. In view of the lack of activity in this field, we do not believe it is necessary to deal with the subject under the headings you suggest.

2. There are no irregular forces in Mexico known to us nor to the United States Embassy, whom we have consulted. The Embassy has received reports from time to time that such forces are operating along the Guatemala boundary in the State of Chiapas but has not received confirmation of such reports. Nor has the Mexican Air Force been able to spot such activity. This would not be surprising, however, as the country is difficult. It is assumed that if there are such guerrillas they are from Guatemala and have taken refuge in Mexico. The Embassy believes it is possible they may be receiving arms from Cuba but again it has no firm evidence. Such arms could be landed at points on the Yucatan coast.

3. The only other reports of suspicious activities which the Embassy has seen, again without confirmation, relate to the landing of arms on the coast of Michoacan, in the west of Mexico, purportedly destined for followers of ex-President Cardenas, who is a native of Michoacan. It should be noted that the only report we have seen of this kind, published in "Novedades" about a month ago was attributed to a priest. Cardenas certainly associates himself with left-wing causes but it is most unlikely, in our view, that he would connive in subversive activities.

4. Otherwise the only likely sources of unrest, possibly leading to violence, are of a local kind, centering around elections to state offices or related to economic grievances. Thus there was some violence last year in the State of San Luis Potosi because of the defeat of a popular candidate for governor. This year it has been reported that the supporters of an agrarian candidate for mayor of the town of Mexicali in Lower California were ready to resort to arms and it appears that troops were deployed on election day.

5. Another possible source of trouble are conditions on the land in some parts of the country. Thus there are some half a million people in the northern states who make their living from selling the produce of the desert cactus, known as ixtle. These people are normally poor, but this year they seem to have

... 2/

Ext. 182A (Rev. 2/52)

NO ENCLOSURES

been reduced to the verge of starvation and there have been reports that they were preparing to march on the capital in order to draw attention to their plight. Again, however, nothing definite has come of it. Finally, there are occasional reports of peasants resorting to the forced occupation of unused land. The most widely-known peasant leader in this category was Ruben Jaramillo, a sort of contemporary Zapata, who operated in Zapata's state of Morelos, south of Mexico City. He was assassinated with his family last April, allegedly by Federal troops although this has not been proved. Incidents of this kind could lead to more wide-spread trouble, such as occurred last September 15th when scattered peasant uprisings, organized by a retired revolutionary general, had to be put down by force. But these are sporadic and unrelated protests. Organized guerrilla activities directed towards the overthrow of the Mexican government do not appear to exist at the present time.

The Embassy

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, Bogotá, Colombia

Reference: Your letter XL-112 of July 25

Subject: Guerrilla Activities in Latin America - Violence in Colombia

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: 259

Date: September 3, 1962

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Courier

Post File No: 15-2

Ottawa File No. 50066-40

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XL | To: Mr Pottier | SEP 11 1962

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Mr. Ritchie
Mr. Rick
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N.D.C.
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Sept. 18/62 & file
A. Pottier

Internal Circulation
Done M.R. Sept. 18/62

Distribution to Posts

It is virtually impossible to give precise answers to the questions you ask about guerrilla activities in Colombia. Although your definition of these activities is very broad, I doubt that most of the rural violence existing in this country could properly fall within the category you delineate. A great deal depends on the definition of the word "guerrilla".

2. Last year approximately 2,500 persons were killed in acts of banditry or terrorism in the Colombian countryside. The statistics recently released for the first half of this year indicate that the rate of killing had markedly decreased. This reduction was attributed to more effective action on the part of the Armed Forces. However, the last few weeks have seen such an intense flare-up of rural violence that the President has found it necessary to ask Congress to give him extraordinary powers in order to put an end to the alarming situation in which many Departments find themselves.

3. The powers which the President has requested are very far-reaching, but the granting of them should not be confused with the establishment of a state of siege. If, as seems almost certain, since only the MRL has expressed opposition, Congress accedes to the President's request, the powers will be in effect until the 19th of July, 1963. The extraordinary powers are being sought under Clause 12 of Article 75 of the Constitution which makes it possible in effect for the President to act as both executive and legislature. His decrees will have the force of law just as though they had been passed by Congress, although they will require the approval of the cabinet (Council of Ministers). On the other hand, under a state of siege, presidential decrees are only valid during the duration of the state of siege, even though the President is given the power to suspend personal liberties, a prerogative which he does not receive under Clause 12 of Article 75. The present arrangement is therefore narrower in scope but longer-lasting in effect.

4. The proposal which Congress has been asked to

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NO ENCLOSURES

approve contains a list specifying the fields in which the President may act without recourse to Congress. These include all penal law and procedures, the organization of the police and Armed Forces, the creation of new municipal districts in order to facilitate administration of areas affected by violence, the establishment of hospital and educational facilities to assist persons suffering from violence, and the taking of other measures designed to provide relief and financial assistance to violence-ridden areas. The President is also to be given the power to appoint and remove officials at will, to raise funds through the sale of bonds and the floating of loans abroad and to take other similar measures designed to enable the government to fight the pestilence of rural violence.

5. Not surprisingly, one of the most popular topics of conversation in Bogotá today is the recent rapid increase in terrorism and banditry. Few people, if any, fully understand this phenomenon and many reasons, some of which are contradictory, are suggested for it. It is clear that the unhealthy social situation existing in the afflicted regions arises originally from the civil war between the two major parties. During that war, the people of these regions became proficient in guerrilla tactics. Their children were reared to the sound of exploding hand grenades, rattling machine guns and the screams of the wounded. These poor assaulted campesinos, who soon lost any concern for human lives other than their own, thought nothing of mass killings and other atrocities. At that time, however, such actions were at least ameliorated by the label of political partisanship, and they were more or less recognized as such by the outside observer. Today's situation is very different. It is no longer a question of Liberals killing Conservatives and vice versa, since many of the victims in isolated attacks are of different parties. While undoubtedly present in many instances, the robbery motive is completely absent in others and, in any event, would not explain the prevalence of dismembering little children before their mothers' eyes. Including President Valencia himself, many people have put forward the view that these attacks are not political, but arise from certain economic conditions, and they have pointed to the apparent increase in attacks at the time of the regular coffee planting as proof of this. In other words, the bandits in a particular region descend upon various coffee fincas, murdering some of the workers and frightening the remainder away. Since the need for workers is greatest at the time of planting, the owners of the coffee plantations are forced to pay the bandits protection money so that their workers can be left in peace. No doubt this greed and other types of banditry are the motives behind many of the incidents, but they fail to explain, for example, a recent attack on a prosperous ranch home near Toro, Valle, in which twenty-eight people, many of them prominent citizens, were horribly massacred without any seeming reason other than minor robbery. Nor do they explain the bombing of a bus

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full of poor peasants of which you may have read in the press, although some people claim that bandits mistook this bus for another containing tourists loaded with Venezuelan merchandise returning to Bogotá from Venezuela. Many of these bandits wear army uniforms complete with insignia. It is therefore difficult for a traveller to know whether he is being detained by people interested in protecting or in murdering him. The present situation in some regions is so serious that the traveller receives the impression of being in a war theatre, since he can see machine gun emplacements, etc., all over the district.

6. The principal questions, of course, are to what extent the violence is co-ordinated, and, to the extent that it is co-ordinated, what purpose has it. The known areas where communism, or pseudo-communism, has been a factor of considerable importance, such as Sumapaz and Viotá, are strangely enough relatively peaceful, although the so-called "Republic of Río Frío" mentioned in your letter DS-19 of February 6, 1962, is located in an area where violence is common. The difference in guerrilla activity and the frequency of acts of violence between the first two areas and Río Frío may arise from the fact that Sumapaz and Viotá have well-established communist organizations and there is little necessity to overawe or cow the local peasantry. Río Frío, on the other hand, is a more recent communist caudillo stronghold, and it may be that the pattern of terrorism is still considered necessary.

7. Symptomatic of the problem we face in attempting to determine the nature of the violence is the conversation which took place at a recent dinner in honour of General Ospina, the head of the Colombian Air Force. The problem of violence was discussed at length and those present were equally divided as to whether it was caused through sheer banditry or communist agitation. General Ospina, who is regarded as a well-informed and sensible man, made some interesting comments. He stated that it was impossible to generalize with regard to the political motivation of the violence since each incident had to be considered on its own merits. He felt that the bus attack was banditry, whereas the other massacre mentioned above had a political end, and, since both Liberals and Conservatives were among the victims, communists were naturally suspect. He used the word bandidos when speaking of the bus attack and the word guerrillas when speaking of the other. General Ospina also stated that the main reason the Army was unable to put an end to the violence sprang from its own internal organization. Apparently considerable time is wasted in report-making whenever an incident occurs, and, because authority to pursue the bandits apparently must come from Bogotá, the field troops are unable to move with sufficient speed. Unless the procedural system is made more flexible and more efficient, Ospina remarked, the addition of more soldiers would be of little value. General Ospina also put forward the view that the only

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means of combating the violence is to arm the populace in the areas where banditry and terrorism are common. In sum, he clearly regarded the solution as a military one, and seemed to be doubtful whether the communists were playing much part in "the trouble". Another reason (and one which General Ospina did not mention) that the Army is having such difficulties is that the residents of the areas affected by violence are reluctant to co-operate with the Armed Forces, partly because of fear of vengeance from the bandits and partly because of their historical distrust of the Army since the period of the civil war.

8. If the above account appears confused, then it adequately represents the current situation in Colombia. It seems impossible to give precise answers to most of the questions posed in your letter under reference, but I shall attempt to set down a few comments regarding each of the points which you raised.

(1) Area of Operation and Concentration - The Departments of Caldas, Huila, Santander, Tolima, and Valle del Cauca.

(2) Political Complexion of Leadership - Originally, all domestic political parties were involved in guerrilla activities, but now it seems probable that such political direction as exists comes from the communists.

(3) Degree of Preparation for Overt Activity - We are unable to answer this question, except to say that there appears to be no over-all bandit or guerrilla organization, yet obviously some of the individual bands are well organized. Their training would appear to be locally effected. Although some have military uniforms, many wear nondescript clothing. Nearly all appear to be well armed with light weapons.

(4) Operations Undertaken So Far - In the sense of organized campaigns and with the exception of the establishment of the regimes of Sumapaz, Viotá and perhaps Río Frío, none.

(5) Participation or Connivance of Armed Forces - The Armed Forces, although inefficient, do not appear to be at all sympathetic to the bandit and/or guerrilla attacks. However, there are rumours that some persons in high places have been hampering the efforts of the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Justice to deal with the problem of violence in some areas.

(6) Estimate of Likelihood of Success - Although it may be some time before the violence is stamped out completely, there seems at this stage to be little likelihood that the continuing acts of terrorism and banditry will develop to a point where the national government is in any way threatened, and with the nation aroused over recent excesses, new legal and military programmes are under way to quell the country's greatest scourge.

J. F. M. Newton
Ambassador

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy
Rio de Janeiro

Reference: Our letter nº 733 of November 30, 1960 and Your letter nº XL-243 of July 25, 1962

Subject: Guerilla Activities - Latin America

Security: SECRET

No: 567

Date: August 23, 1962

Enclosures: none

Air or Surface Mail: air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No. 50066-40

96 | 96

To: Mr West
AUG 29 1962

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Sept 11/1962
A. Potvin
Done M.R.
Sept. 19/62

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

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We assume that your letter was largely prompted by the existence here of the Peasant Leagues. Consequently, we shall first deal with them and then discuss later the particular points that you raised.

2. The Peasant Leagues began in 1955 (four years before Castro came to power) when Francisco Julião successfully helped a group of peasants to win a dispute with their landlords and local authorities in the Northeast state of Pernambuco. Julião, who is a lawyer in his early forties, was at the time and still is a Socialist deputy in the Pernambucan legislature, although he is now running for a seat in the federal Congress. His family were small landowners and he himself owns a small sugar plantation which he has not, incidentally, felt obliged to parcel out amongst the peasants. According to a former American Consul in Recife he has a rather diffident, humble manner in private conversation and while an able speaker on the platform he does not have the magneticism of a Castro. Although he claims that his philosophy is a combination of the teachings of Christ, Gandhi and Lenin, he can be described most simply as a Marxist who looks to Cuba, China and the Soviet Union, in that order, for his political inspiration. He has often visited Cuba where he is well received and has been to China, the Soviet Union and other countries of the Bloc.

3. The Peasant Leagues are largely concentrated in the Northeast, particularly Pariaba and Pernambuco, although they also have a few members in Rio Grande do Sul and states in the West. They are made up of a collection of cell-like groups in various villages or plantations with some sort of organizational superstructure at the state level. Local leaders have a good deal of independent authority, and while they recognize Julião as the national leader, they do not give him unquestioning obedience. Any picture of Julião as the head of thousands of disciplined devoted followers ready to rise up against their landlords at his word is wide of the mark.

4. The Leagues are, of course, extremely leftist in character and regard Castro as their hero. Indeed they only really began to expand after his seizure of power provided the inspiration and the hope that what he was able to do in Cuba they could do in Brazil. They are not under

Ext. 182A (Rev. 2/52)

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy
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Reference: Our letter nº 733 of November 30, 1960 and Your letter nº XL-243 of July 25, 1962

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Ext. 182A (Rev. 2/52)

the direction of the Communist party, and while undoubtedly they maintain contact with each other as brothers of the Left their relations are probably not very warm. The Leagues success amongst the peasants in contrast to the Communist's failure, their willingness to use arms in contrast to the present Communist disavowal of violence (see below) and their general determination to go their own way are obstacles in the way of a closer relationship.

5. Estimates of the numerical strength of the Peasant Leagues vary so much as to be practically meaningless. A year ago the United States authorities quoted a figure of 25,000 and the British 80,000, but even if we take the second estimate as accurate this represents only.32% of the Northeast's total population of 25,000,000, or more meaningfully only.2% of the country's rural population of 39,000,000.

6. Whatever their numbers it is generally agreed that the influence and effectiveness of the Leagues has waned and that they are not the source of concern they once were. There are a number of reasons for this change. Firstly, the security authorities have adopted a more vigilant policy, reinforced their units in the principal areas of League activities, carried out raids for arms and taken measures to frustrate attempts by the Leagues to concentrate their members in particular spots for concerted action. Consequently, the Leagues find it more difficult to operate than previously. Secondly, in some areas at least of the Northeast a more progressive Church is competing effectively for the allegiance of the peasants. In some states, Rio Grande do Norte for example, the Leagues never gained a foothold because the Church moved in ahead of them and set up organizations to help the peasant and labourer improve his lot. In areas in which the Leagues already held sway the Church has established rival organizations or has encouraged the priests to join the Leagues themselves to influence their activities and leadership. Whatever the tactic the Church has played with effect on the peasant's essential conservatism and piety and his inclination to support a traditional institution, provided it can answer his material needs as effectively as any new organization. Finally, the attention focused on the Northeast through SUDENE has given its inhabitants hope even if it has not shown many tangible results as yet. At least, however, the talk of what is to be done has removed for some the feeling of absolute desperation and the flicker of light through the long dark tunnel causes fewer to think of more radical solutions.

7. To deal more specifically with the points you raised, what guerilla activity (if this is the right word) does take place in the Northeast would most likely be under the auspices of the Peasant Leagues. In any case those involved are a badly trained and badly armed lot and seem to be suppressed without too much difficulty. Similar incidents occasionally take place elsewhere in the country in such places as Minas Gerais, Goias, Estado do Rio, and Rio Grande do Sul. Some may be associated with Leagues while others are simply attempts on the part of the locally dispossessed tenantry and labourers to redress a wrong or acquire what they believe they should have. In the rural areas of Rio Grande do Sul for example there are settlements of unemployed who from time to time resort to force, but the police keep a close watch on them and they are not regarded too seriously. It is impossible to say what is the political philosophy of these non-Peasant League groups. Presumably they

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are largely concerned with the grievance at hand, although no doubt very susceptible to leftist and Communist propaganda. There is no indication of any connivance on the part of the armed forces in any of these incidents.

8. Both our British and American colleagues said that there was no concrete evidence of Cuban or Bloc arms being imported into Brazil by the Peasant Leagues or any other organization. The Brazilian authorities in a fairly intensive search of the Northeast a few months ago discovered nothing more alarming than rather old weapons in unexceptional quantities that could have come from anywhere. The American Military Attaché said that from time to time reports were received of arms traffic through Belem, and Recife and of the existence of training camps, but when the Brazilians had been asked to provide definite proof they had been unable to do so. The Attaché said that some of these reports had even arisen from official Brazilian sources and, in his personal view, were designed to encourage more aid. Whether this is true is beside the point; what is significant is that the Americans here (both civilian and military), who are very mindful of the Cuban threat and who would not be inclined to dismiss lightly reports of the import of arms, seem to be satisfied that there is little of this sort of activity. The Attaché did say that there seemed to be evidence of contraband arms shipment from Argentina into Rio Grande do Sul, but he did not regard this movement as particularly ominous as he understood it had existed for a long time past.

9. Perhaps there would be more effective guerilla activity in Brazil if the Brazilian Communist Party favoured such tactics. In fact, however, they forsook in 1956 the concept of the "popular army of liberation" in favour of attempted identification with the respectable Left. According to the British Embassy, their policy in this respect was best demonstrated last autumn when Brizzola and his Guarda Civila seized a weapons factory and distributed a large quantity of arms in Porto Alegre and elsewhere as a means of underlining his support for Goulart. Amongst their recipients were, of course, a number of Communists and some amongst them regarded this windfall as an opportunity to further the revolution by violent means. While the Central Committee was content enough to see some of its followers armed in defense of legality, i.e. to ensure the succession of Goulart, they were not prepared to contemplate the use of violence once this immediate objective had been achieved. Not all members accepted this ruling and this incident contributed to the split in the party in December 1961. But even the dissidents (and they are few in number) have largely confined themselves to political activities and have not so far as is known made much use of the arms which they might have. We might add, however, that few of the arms distributed by Brizzola have been recovered. This could be, of course, a potential source of trouble in itself.

10. Although complacency should not be encouraged in respect to Brazil at the present time guerilla activity appears little or no threat at the moment. Moreover, it is unlikely that it will so become. This is a very underpopulated country; to put it another way Brazil is composed of islands of population indifferently connected to one another for the most part. It

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is difficult for dissident groups to maintain contact with one another and while some may achieve a degree of local success it is difficult for them to co-ordinate their activities over a wide area. Such operations are much easier to carry out in a small country like Cuba. Then, too, the Brazilians are as a people more reluctant to resort to violence, and while their patience is not infinite they have to be pushed further than most before they willingly take up arms. Finally, for all its inadequacies the Brazilian government is cognizant of those political and economic problems which foster such desparate measures as guerilla warfare and is trying, however slowly, to do something about them. The government, and the Army, which is its security arm, are not, as they were in Cuba, a bitterly hated Batista dictatorship. The Army is strong and it has a popular base.

Jean Chapdelaine

Ambassador

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA. *(DUPLICATE)*

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy
Mexico City, D.F.

Reference: Our Letter No. 160 of March 17, 1961

Subject: Latin American Peace Conference.

Security: Restricted

No: 526

Date: August 22, 1961

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No: 9-2-12

Ottawa File No.	
50066-40	
96	—

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R.MacMillan
& file

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The First National Conference for National Sovereignty, Economic Emancipation and Peace, was held in Mexico City on August 4 and 5. This meeting was the national counterpart of the Latin American conference by the same name which was held in this city from March 5 - 8, 1961. Approximately 200 delegates attended.

2. The leftist magazine Politica in its August 1 edition stated that the conference had been called by the "Provisional Committee" (whose address it gave as República del Salvador 30-301, Mexico, D.F.) and would be attended by representatives from the regional committees which had been establish throughout the entire Republic. The magazine further reported that the Conference had the following purposes: to define the objectives set forth for action by the Committee; to determine the characteristics of the national organization; and to agree upon a programme of common action by which to accomplish the objectives set forth by the earlier Latin American Conference.

3. As with the March conference, the name most prevalent in the press was that of former president Lázaro Cardenas, who was Honorary President of the Conference. Press coverage was, however, extremely limited, being confined in the Federal District to four newspapers, of which only the socialist journal, El Popular, gave the conference headline coverage. The others limited themselves for the most part to short quotations of Cardenas' remarks concerning the unlikelihood of world war and the lack of "communist infiltration in Latin America".

4. Cardenas, on the opening night, told the delegates not to become alarmed by war preparations announced by various countries. He apparently based his optimism on the deterrent effects of nuclear weapons. These "would involve the world in a conflagration even more disastrous" than previous wars.

5. On Communist infiltration into Latin America, he said that it did not so much as exist. He stated that charges of Communist infiltration were inventions of imperialist countries "which turn to our countries so as to profit by our riches and cheap labour". The peoples of Latin America should therefore unite to defend themselves against the imperialist forces as without economic

emancipation there could be no political independence. In order to obtain political independence, it is necessary to attain complete land reform, to eliminate private monopolies, and to have financial and technical aid without "prejudicial conditions".

6. Cardenas also spoke in favour of the Castro government stating that all Latin American countries are in accord with "heroic Cuba that was able to repulse the foreign invasion because of the unity of her own people".

7. In contrast to the interest generated by the previous conference this meeting went relatively unnoticed. Our colleagues in the American Embassy simply said that the meeting was "a complete flop". The U.K. Embassy told us that there was no doubt but that the lack of publicity was due to a definite "muffling order" from the Government, similar to that issued to the press prior to the Latin American Conference.

8. We understand that the current edition of Politica contains several pages devoted to the Conference. We shall summarize this material as soon as we receive our copy of the magazine and send it to you by air envelope.

(Sgd.) W.A. Irwin
Ambassador

CANADIAN EMBASSY

AMBASSADE DU CANADA

Melchor Ocampo 463-7,
Mexico 5,D.F.,

August 21,1962.

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Alfred,

I refer to your numbered letter XL-209 of July 25 on guerilla activities in Latin America. As you know there is not much to be said on this subject in regard to Mexico, although we shall be sending you up some comments. Guatemala, however, is quite a different case and we are wondering whether you expect us to report on Guatemala or whether you wish Mr. Lemieux to do so. I note that he does not appear to have received a copy of your letter. In any case it would be difficult from here to send you up-to-date information on the extent and prospects of such activities in Guatemala.

Yours sincerely,

Geoffrey Pearson

Geoffrey A.H. Pearson
First Secretary

Mr. Alfred Pick,
Head of Latin American Division,
Department of External Affairs,
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Reference: Your letter XL-186 of July 25, 1962

Subject: Guerilla activities in Latin America

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: 386

Date: August 16, 1962

Enclosures: —

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

To: Mr West

AUG. 29 1962

Ottawa File No. 50066-40

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Guerilla activities of the kind described in your letter under reference have not so far come to light in Argentina. In order to check our information, we approached both the Foreign Ministry and the War Ministry who confirmed this view.

2. The Peronist versus anti-Peronist struggle now going on, with its many ramifications and divisions in the political, military and labour fields, does not appear to fall within the category of conflict you describe. It is not impossible that Peronist-cum-Communist activity may some day assume this aspect of guerilla warfare, but there is no indication of such a development for the present.

The Embassy.

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& file
Sept. 11/1962
A. Pobrin
Dom M.R.
Sept. 18/62

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, Quito, Ecuador.

Reference: Your letter XL-107 of July 25, 1962.

Subject: Guerilla Activities in Latin America: Ecuador.

XL

To: Mr Brossard
AUG 29 1962

Security: SECRET

No: 177

Date: August 16, 1962.

Enclosures: --

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No: 1515-E2

Ottawa File No.
5-0066-40
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XL

Distribution to Posts
Bogota.

In my telegram no. 49 of August 15 I reported that URJE was receiving substantial sums of money from Cuba through a Canadian bank. It has been apparent for the past few months that the extreme left had suddenly become, if not affluent, at least much better off financially than it had been. I share the opinion of the Minister of Government which I gave in my telegram that some of this money is undoubtedly being used for the purposes of equipment for and the training of guerillas. Secrets are not long kept in Ecuador and it is therefore surprising that word has not got around in informed circles concerning specific areas where guerillas are being trained. I know from a military source that the Army suspects, as I reported, that the Province of Manabi on the coast is the chief centre. A cavalry unit was despatched there last week to be available against guerillas should they be needed.

2. Apart from this, however, I know nothing definite. My sources all assume that training and preparation for future activities is going on but I must stress that apart from the cavalry movement to which I referred nothing definite is known. At the moment, therefore, I am unable to answer all of the specific questions which you ask in your paragraph 3. I will, however, continue to watch this problem and report anything that I learn.

3. Speaking generally, Ecuador is an ideal country geographically for guerilla activities. Communications are, as you know, very poor and the nature of much of the country hinders easy detection. I have reported on the previous "fracaso" at Santo Domingo (see my letter 91 of April 18, 1962). Judging from it and from the political situation in the country, leadership of the guerillas will come from URJE and the communists. (For the positions of these two parties see my letter 114 of May 16, 1962.) With this leadership it is unlikely that the Armed Forces will either participate or connive with guerillas but on the other hand they may not be too effective in detecting training and concentration points or in countering them in the less settled parts of the country should they become active. The political, economic and social situation of the country is such that any guerilla activities could count on the sympathy of a great majority of the rural inhabitants. In some cases this sympathy may be mere indifference because it is hard to find much political awareness in Ecuador once you leave the larger centres.

G.C. Langille,
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

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Ext. 182A (Rev. 2/52)

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA. *(DUPLICATE)*

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Reference: Our despatch No. 360 of August 8, 1962

Subject: Greater emphasis on anti-Communism

Security: Restricted

No: 374

Date: August 14, 1962

Enclosures: —

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.	
50066-40	
96	—

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The Interior Ministry released yesterday three new decrees, two of which were in the nature of amendments to the Political Parties Statute, making it slightly easier for smaller parties to contest elections. Thus the ceiling of registered party membership in any electoral district was reduced from a flat 0.50 percent of literate registered voters to 500 voters or 0.20 percent of the same. Secondly, two sub-sections giving a detailed definition of the term "national" parties, i.e., officially recognized in more than half the electoral districts of the country, is cancelled. Minor amendments of drafting were introduced also in other sections.

2. The most important perhaps of these measures, seemingly designed to repair an oversight, was one ratifying two decrees adopted in 1959 forbidding Communist or Communist Party activities, and those of affiliated groups. To this end, the use of all manner of Communist propaganda, to wit, pictures, symbols, signs, articles, works of art (real or alleged) or other kinds of expression referring to Communism, national or international; the Communist party; any legal or illegal Communist organization; any crypto-Communist movement; any Communist government; or constituting a veiled promotion of any of these, is henceforth prohibited. This includes also all trade marks and commercial denominations, principal or subsidiary, related to the above.

3. Violations may be punished with prison terms ranging from 30 days to 10 years, and fines from 5,000 to one million pesos; loss of employment in the public service or as a political or trade union leader for double the period of the imposed prison sentence, and the closure for 30 days (or indefinitely) of business firms. This rough translation of the text is intended to convey an idea of the all-embracing character of the government's concern over Communist propaganda which, as the decree points out, "is designed to undermine on behalf of foreign doctrines and leadership incompatible with our national traditions and way of life ... the foundations of our free society".

4. Strict application of this decree would practically do away with all relations between Argentina and the Communist countries, save the most formal. Certainly Soviet and other Iron Curtain films would now be banned, as well as artistic performances on television or radio, visits of dance or choral groups, art exhibitions, etc. Commercial Soviet films are shown fairly regularly in theatres, and radio programmes

featuring Soviet, Polish, etc. artistic and other achievements have had some currency. But it remains to be seen how the decree will be implemented.

5. Perhaps these exchanges may continue in a measure provided they are billed as Russian, Polish, etc., and any reference to Communism or Communist achievements is omitted as a saving grace. On the other hand, the decree opens the way to even excluding from the press all mention of Communist news, including Soviet achievements in outer space exploration.

6. This latest ban on direct or indirect Communist publicity is a fair sample of the binding and detailed prohibitions characterizing the political reform decrees which have aroused the opposition of all parties, although few will complain about this latest measure because Communism as such is not popular in Argentina. The thought occurs, however, that it may be (in military calculations) a helpful gesture towards U.S. opinion, designed to balance their past and future sins of commission against the accepted norms of constitutionality.

E. R. BELLEMARE

Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy
San Jose, Costa Rica

Reference: Your Letter XL-191 of July 25, 1962

Subject: Guerilla Activities in Latin America

To: Mr Potvin
~~AUG~~ SEPT 10 1962

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: 409

Date: August 10, 1962

Enclosures: 1

Air or Surface Mail:

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.
50066-40
96 | 96

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Mr. Rick
D.L.(2)
U.S.A.
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Washington
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J.I.B.
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T. & C.
Circ. L.A. Div & file
Sept. 11/1962
A. Potvin
Doug M.R.
Sept. 19/62

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

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Since the opening of this Embassy a year and a half ago, we have not had any report of guerilla activities in any one of the five countries included in the territory of the Embassy. There have been, from time to time, attempts at rebellion against established governments in Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador but those disturbances follow the familiar pattern of plots hatched by political opposition groups or the military in Latin America and carried no resemblance to guerilla warfare. Communist agitation in Central America has so far from what we know not reached the point of guerilla warfare or even local training in guerilla warfare. It is likely, of course, that small groups of communists from one or the other country are receiving training in Cuba although we have no positive information on this.

2. On the subject of countermeasures in the event of guerilla warfare developing in Latin America, you may be interested in the attached news item from Washington in which it is stated that the US Army base in Panama offers a training centre for anti-guerilla warfare. The centre is opened to Latin American contingents who come to the base from various countries for periods of instruction and training. My US colleague told me recently he had just been in Panama and toured the camp in the jungle where anti-guerilla training and jungle survival exercises are conducted. He said there were military detachments from some fifteen or sixteen Latin American countries undergoing training.

3. If we should hear about any sign of guerilla activity developing in any of the five countries for which this Embassy is responsible, we shall not fail to let you know.

Jean-Louis Delisle
Ambassador

Ext. 182A (Rev. 2/52)

NO ENCLOSURES

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Subject

Date Aug 8, 1962 *Publication* La Nación

Guarnición del Canal de Panamá, convertida en fuerza móvil para combatir guerrilleros

WASHINGTON, Agosto 7. (UPI) — Convencido de que la amenaza comunista más inmediata para el Hemisferio proviene de la América Latina, el Departamento de Defensa de los Estados Unidos ha convertido a la guarnición de la Zona de Canal en una fuerza móvil capaz de combatir guerrilleros.

Anteriormente la fuerza que defiende el Canal de Panamá estaba dotada más bien para la guerra convencional.

Voceros del Departamento de Defensa manifestaron, sin embargo, que no se enviarán tropas a ningún país latinoamericano sino a pedido explícito de un gobierno, caso que no se contempla para el futuro inmediato.

Se dio a entender que el Comandante en Jefe en la Zona del Caribe, General Andrew P. O' Meara, deseaba una mayor movilidad en previsión de que resultase necesario, por ejemplo en el caso de que se produjeran alzamientos comunistas en América Latina mientras los Estados Unidos estuviesen en guerra en otras partes del mundo.

Donald Rivard June 8/62 USA Wash 50066-40 96 — G.P.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

A. Potvin

Subject La Ceguera de Nuestros Realistas

Date April 27, 1962 Publication Marcha

LA CEGUERA DE NUESTROS REALISTAS

"Desde hace algún tiempo, acá no asistimos a un solo signo de inquietud social que no se atribuya a penetración y a infiltración comunista. Y eso es calumniar al país La dicha inquietud social responde a motivos profundos, generados de antiguo, agravados por una serie de procesos deformantes. Computar la exteriorización de esa inquietud, y la inquietud misma, al genio hegemónico sovietizante, a la infiltración comunista, es hacer lo inaudito para entregarle la nación al comunismo".

L. P. Bonavita. Crónica General de la Nación.

CUANDO leemos ciertos editoriales de nuestra prensa grande, cuando, al filo del mediodía escuchamos algunas selectas audiciones radiales, cuando nos vemos durante las veinticuatro horas del día asediados por un abigarrado tropel de "slogans" anti-comunistas, no podemos menos que pensar con tristeza que el párrafo final de la frase arriba transcripta de nuestro compañero Bonavita, va en camino de convertirse, a poco que nuestros reaccionarios persistan en su ser y en su hacer, en una desgarrante realidad.

No somos comunistas, ni MARCHA lo es. A esta altura parecería innecesario afirmarlo, pero la dureza de entendederas, o llanamente la falta de buena intención de muchos de quienes en este país detentan los órganos de difusión del pensamiento, hacen que la reiteración de algo que ya es cabalmente conocido por todos, no sea ociosa.

No somos comunistas, pero no estamos en modo alguno dispuestos a sumarnos al euménico coro de nuestros cazadores de brujas; más aún: creemos necesario poner en evidencia todo lo que su prédica contiene de nocivo, todo lo nefasta que esa prédica puede resultar a poco que quienes la financian, sustentan y propalan, logren su objetivo, que no es otro que el de crearle al país un problema artificial, que no es otro que buscarse un cabrón emisario, al cual cargarle todos sus pecados y sacrificarlo en el altar que su propio miedo está levantando, aunque con él, se sacrifiquen, también, valores que deben sernos muy caros.

Desconfiamos y somos enemigos de un anti-comunismo que solo busca emponzoñar a la opinión, inyectando en nuestro pueblo — que hasta el momento ha sido esencialmente tolerante y ha sabido cobijar en su seno las mayores discrepancias, sin que la convivencia pacífica, e incluso cordial, se viera afectada — el tósigo del odio, enemigo de la razón.

Desconfiamos y somos enemigos de un anti-comunismo que es el fruto bastardo del terror que sienten las clases dirigentes a perder los privilegios de que ahora disfrutan, porque creemos con Laski que "el miedo conduce a la intolerancia, la cual está destinada, alcanzando a cierto nivel, a conducir a la represión", y sentimos que ahora debemos estar particularmente alertas, porque el país sin darse cuenta, está siendo paulatinamente llevado a ese ominoso nivel, y las voces que claman por la represión cada vez se hacen más fuertes, más audaces. Hace pocos días, uno de los grandes maestres de nuestra prensa, al cual en los veinte años largos que hace que leemos periódicos no lo hemos visto nunca deslizar la más nimia frase que pudiera siquiera rozar la susceptibilidad del Departamento de Estado, diario que ha logrado —no sabemos cómo— rodearse de una aureola de seriedad y ponderación, dio cauce libre a ese anhelo represivo, diciendo: "Que se comprenda el peligro y se actúe con energía en el magisterio y fuera de él, para que la traición contra la Patria que significa ser y actuar como comunista surja, con toda su verdad y trascendencia". Hélos ya, pues, reclamando el castigo del delito de opinión; hélos ya, pues, sin rubor, renegando de los más elementales principios de la democracia, que forman parte, como ellos mismos lo reconocen, de nuestro propio estilo de vida.

Entre nosotros —y la afirmación la creemos válida para toda Latinoamérica, de la cual, nos guste o no, formamos parte, con la cual está comprometido nuestro destino— en el momento actual el comunismo no es problema. Podrá serlo en la medida en que nuestras oligarquías sigan confundiendo su propia estolida ceguera con realismo, y vivan convencidas —como decía el recordado maestro Laski— de "que han celebrado el pacto final con la historia".

Esa actitud retardataria de los grupos dirigentes latinoamericanos contrasta, incluso, con la que ha asumido el propio gobierno de los Estados Unidos, que ha demostrado una visión mucho más clara y real de los problemas latinoamericanos, advirtiendo a través de la formulación del plan de la Alianza para el progreso, que al fin ha comprendido que sin una transformación profunda de las estructuras de estos países, toda ayuda que se les brinde no hará más que acrecentar los privilegios de las clases poseedoras. En su oportunidad dijimos que la tal Alianza era una alianza imposible. Al cabo de poco más de nueve meses, los hechos nos están dando la razón. Hoy vemos a casi todos estos gobiernos puestos a argumentar con toda su huera facundia de doctores latinoamericanos, para convencer al gobierno yanqui de que primero son necesarios los dólares y que después, después, habrá tiempo para efectuar las reformas.

El gobierno de Kennedy —con todas sus limitaciones que, en su hora señaló MARCHA— ha visto lo que nuestros camarlengos no quieren ver: que el problema del comunismo, en Latinoamérica, es, en verdad, el problema del subdesarrollo, de las desigualdades irritantes, del analfabetismo, del mono-cultivo y de la mono-producción, de la miseria en que vegetan irredentas las clases desposeídas. Que mientras las oligarquías no sean despojadas de sus privilegios — y no sería muy advertido quien esperara que los resignaran voluntariamente—; que mientras no estemos en condiciones de liberarnos de la opresión imperialista; que mientras los gobiernos sean dóciles ordenanzas de las clases que detentan el poder económico; que mientras los ejércitos sean —como en la Argentina— ejércitos de ocupación de su propio país; que mientras todo eso suceda, se estarán creando las condiciones objetivas necesarias para que el comunismo se transforme efectivamente, en un problema.

Por ahora no lo es, y para demostrarlo creemos que alcanza con recordar tres cosas:

Primero, que casi todas las dictaduras abiertas o encubiertas que en el correr de este siglo ensombrecieron a Latinoamérica no solo no fueron comunistas, sino que, por lo general contaron con el beneplácito y la ayuda del Departamento de Estado.

Segundo, que el comunismo en la mayoría de estos países carece de significación real, y que los distintos P. Comunistas nacionales no han sido capaces de dar nacimiento a ningún movimiento popular de importancia en Latinoamérica.

Tercero, que la esperanzada expectativa que despertó la revolución cubana — que es, al fin de cuentas, lo que hace temblar a nuestros reaccionarios — se debió no a su condición de régimen comunista, sino a su caracter de movimiento popular y anti-imperialista, que representó una "salida" auténtica a un estado de cosas que no era exclusivo de Cuba, sino que se reproducía, con variantes poco significativas, a lo largo y a lo ancho de todo el Continente. Esto se comprueba fácilmente si se observa que fue, precisamente a partir del momento en que Fidel Castro hizo profesión de fe marxista-leninista, que el apoyo popular a la revolución cubana se hizo menos intenso, más tibio.

Si esas tres observaciones que anotamos son exactas — y estamos seguros de que lo son — no resulta difícil deducir que el peligro del comunismo no es tal y que por lo tanto, hay que rastrear otras intenciones en los gritos con que se pretende alertarnos contra él. Un hilo conductor capaz de llevarnos hasta el nudo mismo de esas intenciones está, creemos, en un párrafo del editorial del mismo diario a que nos referíamos más arriba. En él se dice: "Cualquier "partido triunfante el 25 de noviembre de 1962 tendrá que "aplicar la ley para defender nuestro estilo de vida con "libertad y buscando el aumento del bienestar para el ma-"yor número, y uno de sus capítulos iniciales será el de "implantar la verdadera libertad del trabajo mediante la "democratización de los sindicatos donde tienen que gober-"nar sus verdaderas mayorías mediante representación pro-"porcional y voto secreto. La limitación de la iniciativa "privada y la extensión del estatismo favorece los planes "comunistas".

Vale decir: libre empresa y reglamentación sindical. O, en otras palabras, mantener y consolidar el status quo ante, es decir, la situación que hizo posible y necesaria la revolución cubana, que hizo posible y necesario el triunfo peronista del 18 de marzo, que hizo nacer y crecer a Juliao como líder de las masas campesinas del Noreste brasileño.

Pretender mantener y consolidar el status quo ante es una vana pretensión de aferrarse a todo lo que en Latinoamérica hay de ruinoso, de carcomido, de provecto, de caduco. De mantenerlo vigente a todo riesgo, contra los vientos renovadores de la historia. De mantenerlo vigente mirando hacia atrás. De mantenerlo vigente apostándolo todo a un anti-comunismo de feria, poblado de los gritos de los chamarileros que pregonan sus gastadas, vetustas mercancías y ante los cuales es imperativo rehusarse. Frente a ese anticomunismo es preciso que Latinoamérica reivindique su derecho a pensar por sí misma y a intentar, por lo menos, la posibilidad de aventurarse por una senda propia e inédita.

S. D.

and purposes of pro-Communist movements which were directed at evicting all western influence to make room for the Soviet penetration. "After all," he stated, "Aluminio del Uruguay is a small enterprise which cannot hope to exert exclusive control over the local market." He said he had had occasion to impress on political leaders the dangers which lie in the leftist attacks.

F. X. Houde
Chargé D'Affaires a.i.

F. X. Houde,
Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA. *(DUPLICATE)*

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, Montevideo, Uruguay.

Reference: My Letter No. 194 of May 22/62

Subject: Labour Trouble at Aluminio del Uruguay.

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: 216

Date: June 5, 1962.

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No. 50066-40

96

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Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

Buenos Aires

Developments since I last reported confirm my earlier assessment that the metal union leaders would not spare efforts to make life difficult to the management of Aluminio del Uruguay now that the general strike in the metal industry is over. The Canadian Manager of the plant, Mr. Tafelmacher, has been the target of vicious attacks by the Communist press. Posters have been pasted in the area where Mr. Tafelmacher lives, blaming him for the difficulties at the plant, while a demonstration was staged by some strikers right in front of his house. Fortunately, no violence has taken place so far. This possibility, however, should not be ruled out because tempers are running high. Leftist university students have taken an interest in the strike, and have already staged a demonstration of solidarity with the union.

2. At the same time there are signs that the resolution tabled in the Chamber of Deputies by a left-wing Colorado member, which blamed Aluminio del Uruguay, will not make much headway. No further discussion has taken place on the resolution, and Mr. Tafelmacher assures me that the leaders of the two main political formations (the Blancos and the Colorados) have promised him that the resolution will not be passed.

3. Mr. Clarke, an official of Aluminum Limited, Montreal, has been visiting in Montevideo during the last week or so. He asked for my advice as to whether the strike might prove damaging for the company, implying that perhaps he had some doubts as to whether the subsidiary would be able to or should maintain its position in the face of the union. I pointed out that that was, of course, a decision for the company to make, and suggested that if the company could hold out until the forthcoming election in November, the issue would probably lose much of its public interest afterwards. I got the impression that on the whole the Aluminum Limited authorities were prepared to back up their Manager in Montevideo, if only to avoid a serious loss of face.

4. On the occasion of Mr. Clarke's visit, I also met the President of the subsidiary company, Mr. Raffo, a Uruguayan, who told me that the strike had taught him a lesson. "Like many Uruguayans," he said, "I was not loathe to resent the predominance of American investment and capital in Latin America." The attitude of all organized labour towards his company in labelling the latter as a Yankee-Canadian imperialist enterprise had opened his eyes to the aims

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(Ext. 182C(Rev. 2/52)

that the left wing delegations had broken up the conference in protest over several developments. According to Adelante, Costa Rica had denied visas to observers from Cuban student groups, that, thanks to the "North American military imposition", arriving student groups had been subject to indignities at the San Jose airport and that "because of pressures exercised by Yankee imperialism over the Congress" it had deterioriated into a "Congress against the Cuban revolution and the liberation of Latin America". The left wing influence among students in Guatemala, El Salvador, Panama and Nicaragua had been public knowledge even before the Congress. The surprising feature of the split at the conference was that student groups from Mexico and Honduras were apparently less radical than this group. We have been unable to ascertain whether or not the Mexican delegation, in fact, was truly representative of student opinion in that country. It will be interesting to see the stand adopted by these countries at the forthcoming conference in Canada.

Jean-Louis Delisle
Ambassador

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy
San Jose, Costa Rica

Reference:

Subject: Communist Influence Among University Students

To: Mr Anderson
JUL 10 1962

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: 306

Date: June 8, 1962

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Courier

Post File No:

Ottawa File No. 50066-40

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11 July 62
Done M.R.
July 14/62

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

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It is fairly generally known that student organizations in the underdeveloped Latin American countries are often centres for communist activity. A recent conference in San Jose provided some indication of communist influence in some of the student organizations in Central America. On May 26, the Third Congress of Central American University Students was opened in San Jose. Attending were delegations from all the Central American countries and Mexico, observers from students' groups in the United States and Chile and representatives from the Coordinating Secretariat for International Student Conferences of Leiden, Netherlands and of the International Union of Students from Prague, Czechoslovakia. (Although the information provided in your Circular Document Consular No. 19/62 of May 16 appears to indicate that the Coordinating Secretariat is part of the International Union of Students, the local press treated representatives from the two bodies as being separate entities.) They are. DA

2. The Congress was apparently designed to be a forerunner to the 10th International Student Conference to be held at Laval University from June 27 to July 8. Among topics to be discussed were student welfare, unification of Central American universities, student exchanges, student dormitories, university reform, human rights, student sports, university autonomy and freedom of study.

3. According to newspaper reports, the student discussions deteriorated rapidly into political questions. The local press described the International Union of Students as being a communist organization TRUE and blamed part of the conference difficulties on the activities of this group. The conference passed a resolution condemning the Alliance for Progress as an instrument for colonialism and attempted to defend the 1956 Soviet intervention in Hungary. The delegation from Panama was apparently the leader in introducing left wing resolutions and was supported by the delegations from Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala. When the more moderate delegations presented a resolution condemning the Cuban revolution, the conference broke down and the delegations returned to their countries without completing the scheduled programme.

4. The leader of the Costa Rican delegation to the conference published a report in a local newspaper stating that the International Union of Students had not been invited to attend by the conference organizers but had been the guest of the Coordinating Secretariat which, according to him, was the organization to which the Costa Rican Federation of University Students belonged. He stated that the moderate delegations had left the conference when their resolution regarding the Cuban revolution had been defeated. However, the local communist newspaper stated

...2

Ext. 182A (Rev. 2/52)

3. - cont'd.

We assume that this last limitation would not exclude consideration of the cooperation by the armed forces or part of them with guerrillas or irregulars.

4. ~~However,~~ We realize that the preparation of these summaries will take some time, and we should appreciate it if the project, which was launched two months ago, could be given a high priority.

Defence Liaison (2) Division

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM **D.L.**(2)/C.F.W. Hooper/ib

TO: LATIN AMERICAN DIVISION

FROM: Defence Liaison (2) Division

REFERENCE:

Security CONFIDENTIAL

Date June 22, 1962

File No. 40

SUBJECT: Guerrilla Activities in Latin America - JIC Paper.

The Joint Intelligence Staff has been given the task of preparing a paper on guerrilla activities in Latin America and has encountered some difficulty in orientation. The original idea had been for the JIS to prepare the paper from its sources and from some material which we had supplied, which paper would then have been submitted to you for your comments. This does not now seem possible.

2. We attach a copy of the draft terms of reference for this paper for your information. What we should like to have from you now to assist the JIS is a paper dealing with the situation in each Latin American country giving either a "nil" return or a brief summary of the guerrilla activities from sources available to you. "Guerrilla activities" should be interpreted broadly to include all cases of the resort to armed force by guerrilla forces of any political affiliation or by armed peasants for whatever reasons. This subject might be dealt with for each country under the following headings:

(1) Area of operation or concentration.

(2) Political complexion of leadership (including party alliances).

(3) Degree of preparation for overt activity
- (a) planning
- (b) training
- (c) organization
- (d) arms.

(4) Operations undertaken so far.

(5) Participation or connivance of armed forces.

(6) Estimate of likelihood of success (sympathy of local population).

3. You will note that it is not the intention of the paper to consider military operations by one state against another, or military action by the armed forces of a state to change the government.

... /2

CIRCULATION

Ext. 326A (6/56)

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA. ***(DUPLICATE)***

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy,
Ciudad Trujillo, Dominican Republic.

Reference: Our letter No.106 of June 8, 1961.

Subject: Communism in the Dominican Republic.

File 50066-40

Security: Confidential

No: 121

Date: July 3, 1961

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.	
50066-40	
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Mr. Ritchie
Mr. Beaulne
D.L.(2)
U.S.A. Div.
Washington
All L.A. Posts
C.C.O.S. (6 copies)
Circ. L.A. Div.
& file
A. Potvin

In paragraph 2 of our letter under reference it was suggested that the Movimiento Popular Dominicano was securely in the hands of Trujillo's stooges. This letter is intended to qualify that statement. Although the party was thoroughly infiltrated by members of the secret police (Servicio Intelligensia Militar), we have recently been informed on good authority that the Director of the Movimiento, Maximo Lopez Molina, has communist associations. In all probability, his activities remain rigidly circumscribed.

(Sgd.) J.W. Graham
for The Embassy.

Internal Circulation

LATIN AMERICAN DIVISION
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Distribution to Posts

(Ext. 182C(Rev. 2/52)

Translation

LATIN AMERICA - UNIONS CONFERENCE

On August 31 and September 1 and 2, 1962, the Latin American Workers Unions Conference will take place in Santiago de Chile. Central unions in this continent have been invited to participate.

The notice is signed by the Chilean Central Union, the Cuban Workers Confederation the Bolivian Central Union, the Uruguayan Central Union, the Workers Confederation from Ecuador, and the Permanent Committee of Union Organizations from the State of Guanabara, Brazil. The following agenda has been prepared:

1. The Analysis and prospects of the Latin American workers' situation in the development of their struggles to obtain better living and working conditions, the extension of social security and of union liberties.
2. The workers and the struggle for economic and social emancipation, democratic rights, national independence and sovereignty, peace and the defense of the Cuban revolution.
3. Organic unity of Latin American workers to struggle for their common interests.

The reasons for having called to this conference are strictly of the present. "Under present conditions, when most governments are applying the same austerity measures - say the inviting unions - such as freezing of wages, mass discharges, and persecution of union activities, it is indispensable and urgent to coordinate the fight of all Latin American workers, to develop mutual solidarity and, through this process, to open a road to unity of thought and of action, with a view to unite all Latin American workers into one strong central union."

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA. *(DUPLICATE)*

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.
THE CANADIAN EMBASSY

FROM: BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA

Reference:

Subject: Communist Labour Rally

Security: Unclassified

No: 305

Date: July 3, 1962

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No. 50066-40

96 ✓

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You may be interested in the attached translation of an article which appeared in the May 29 edition of "NUESTRA PALABRA" the official Argentine Communist Party organ.

2. Please keep us informed of the Santiago proceedings.

R. P. BOWER
Ambassador

Internal Circulation

Santiago de Chile

Distribution to Posts

(Ext. 182C(Rev. 2/52)

The following are the "provisional members" of the National Executive Committee of the Brazilian Communist Party who petitioned the Superior Electoral Tribunal on July 4, 1962 to legalize the Brazilian Communist Party:

Luís Carlos Prestes
Ramiro Luchesi
Joaquim Câmara Ferreira
Ivan Ramos Ribeiro
Astrogildo Pereira
Agostinho Dias de Oliveira
Hermógenes da Silva Fernandes
Álvaro Soares Ventura

Jornal do Brasil, July 5, 1962

their legalization. To improve their chances of acceptance by the Tribunal the Communists changed their name from the Communist Party of Brazil to the Brazilian Communist Party, a fine distinction presumably designed to give them a more nationalist gloss, and altered their statutes to bring them in line with the tenets prescribed by the constitution for political parties (such as a belief in the multi-party system and a respect for the rights of man). Their sails trimmed in this fashion they set out in August, petition in hand, to collect the required signatures.

5. It would be difficult for us to predict the outcome if the Tribunal considers the case purely on its legal merits. It would appear that technically the Communists have complied with the letter of the Constitution but, on the other hand, the Tribunal may look at the question in broader terms and recognize that there has been no substantive change in the party. If, however, the case is tried on political grounds, that is if the Tribunal bows to political pressure as it has done on occasion in the past, we do not think that the chances are good of the Communists winning recognition. The Right would actively oppose this step out of fear that it would strengthen the Communists at the polls while the Left, particularly the President and the PTB, would probably not favour it really out of fear that the Right would accuse them of bringing this development about and would therefore cite it as one more instance of the regime's leftist proclivities. Of course, the Left and others would argue that if Brazil is to be truly democratic it should be magnanimous enough to recognize political heresies and deal with them in the open, but they might think that they would have trouble making this argument stick.

6. Moreover, aside from whatever damage the Right could inflict, the PTB and the Left would gain little themselves from this step. The Communists are already a politically active and vigorous lot even if they are illegal and can be, if they and the others concerned so wish, as much use to potential allies in their present condition as they could if legalized. Indeed they can be of more use for, if they were permitted to run under their own colours, they could take away votes from the PTB and other left-wing candidates. While there is a good deal of room on the Left in Brazil, those that are there now presumably do not wish to share their chosen ground with any more people than they have to. Finally, to grant legalization to the Communists is to remove a carrot that has been enticingly held before them on previous occasions. To change the metaphor it might be considered wiser to hold this trump card for use on another occasion.

Jean CHAPDELAINE

Ambassador

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA. *(DUPLICATE)*

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy
Rio de Janeiro

Reference:

Subject: The Brazilian Communist Party.

Security: SECRET

No: 456

Date: July 18, 1962

Enclosures: one

Air or Surface Mail: air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.
50066-40
96

References

org 2348-40

In order that it may participate under its own banner in the forthcoming elections the Brazilian Communist Party has petitioned the Superior Electoral Tribunal for legal recognition as a political party. The petition carried 53,367 signatures from twenty states, about three thousand more than the fifty thousand from five states required by law before a party can campaign in its own name. Attached is a list of the members of the Executive Committee who forwarded the petition.

2. The Brazilian Communist Party has had a checkered history in so far as its legality is concerned. It was banned about 1937 but re-introduced to society in 1945 by President Vargas in the hope that it would support his candidate in the elections of that year. It was banned again in 1947 by President Dutra around the time he broke off relations with the Soviet Union and after it had enjoyed an uncomfortable success in the congressional elections of 1947. (It polled 800,000 votes, elected two Senators and fourteen Deputies to Congress and nearly seventy members to state legislatures.) Communist offices throughout the country were closed and all the elected communist representatives expelled. Later, warrants were issued for the arrest of the leader, Luís Carlos Prestes, and twenty of his lieutenants although little was done to carry them out.

Internal Circulation

3. While the party was initially hurt by the ban it gradually improved its position throughout the 1950's. By the presidential elections of 1955 it was thought, if erroneously as matters turned out, that it could command the allegiance of 500,000 voters and the PTB apparently went out of its way to enlist Communist support for the Kubitschek-Goulart ticket. By March 1958 the warrants of arrest were rescinded and in the congressional elections later that year leading Communists were invited to address meetings in support of some PTB candidates.

Distribution to Posts

São Paulo

4. Early in 1961 the party decided that the political climate had improved sufficiently for it to make a major effort to seek legalization. Relations with the Soviet Union were being resumed and President Quadros himself in the election of the previous year had indicated (even though the Communists supported his opponent) that he would not oppose

. . . 2

5. It would be appreciated if you could give high priority to this project. As we indicated above, information in this matter would also be welcome on a continuing basis.

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

For action:

✓Havana	XL- 203
Santo Domingo	XL- 82
✓ Bogota	XL- 112
✓ Quito	XL- 107
Lima	XL- 141
✓ San José	XL- 191
✓Mexico	XL- 209
✓Buenos Aires	xl- 186
✓Rio de Janeiro	XL- 243
Caracas	XL- 154

Latin American/A.Potvin/sc

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(FILE COPY)
Please return

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference:

Subject: Guerilla Activities in Latin America

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: XL-

Date: July 25, 1962

Enclosures: Nil

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No. 50066-40 ~~6665-40~~

96 | 96

References

In Cuba, on January 1, 1959, the Batista regime backed by a well-equipped and well-trained regular army collapsed in the face of guerilla opposition which had been operating for little over two years. Thus the importanceof an early appreciation of the true nature of armed insurrection s was exemplified by the Cuban case. There is a need for the Department to be kept informed, on a continuing basis, on movements that oppose or might oppose by force of arms any government in the Western Hemisphere.

2. It would be appreciated therefore if you could give us your assessment of the likelihood, nature and extent of guerilla activities in the country or countries to which you are accredited. Some posts have already provided us with very useful material in this regard. This information however usually did not bear on guerilla activities proper.

3. In order to facilitate the preparation of their reports, missions might deal with the subject under the following headings:

(1) Area of operation or concentration

(2) Political complexion of leadership (including party alliances)

(3) Degree of preparation for overt activity
- (a) planning
- (b) training
- (c) organization
- (d) arms

(4) Operations undertaken so far

(5) Participation or connivance of armed forces

(6) Estimate of likelihood of success (sympathy of local population)

4. "Guerilla Activities" should be interpreted broadly to include all cases of the resort to arms by irregular forces of any political affiliation or by armed peasants for whatever reasons. It should be noted that military operations by one state against another or military action by armed forces of a state to change the government does not fall within the purview of this study.

Internal Circulation

D.L. (2)

Distribution to Posts

~~Quebec~~ - 154
Montevideo
Santiago
Port-au-Prince
Washington
London
NATO Paris

...2

Ext. 181B (Rev. 2/52)

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA. *(DUPLICATE)*

DESPATCH

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, Santo Domingo, D.R.

Reference: Our Telegram 51 of July 23, 1962

Subject: Dominican Complaints before the OAS

Security: Confidential

No:

Date: August 3, 1962

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Courier

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.	
50056-40	
96	-

References

OAS 3139-40

On July 30 the Dominican Foreign Minister, Bonilla Atiles requested a session of the OAS Council to consider "the existence of a situation which threatened to subvert order within the Dominican Republic through the activities of international communism ..." The request received little attention or elaboration locally and thus far no editorial comment. It may have been prompted in part by the communist organized general strike of July 26 (our despatch 188 dated August 2) together with the frequency of communist fomented street disorders and scattered reports of arms shipments.

2. This complaint is the latest development in a recent surge of Dominican diplomatic activity. On July 22 the Foreign Minister announced his support for the Venezuelan proposal to convene a conference to censure and possibly apply collective sanctions on the Peruvian military junta. He suggested Santo Domingo as the seat of the conference. Shortly afterwards the Foreign Minister called the attention of the OAS to Cuban radio broadcasts whose exhortations to the Dominican people to overthrow their government "constituted unwarranted interference in Dominican internal affairs."

3. The efforts of the Dominican Foreign Minister to invoke the apparatus and the authority of the OAS to censure both communist activity and military coups stems from a lively fear of these dangers within the Dominican Republic. Bonilla Atiles has been a favourite target of the far left and he is believed to be more intensely preoccupied with communist and military threats than most other members of the government. He is thus evidently willing to condone extensions of OAS authority beyond the usual criteria for non intervention.

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

Washington

JOHN W. GRAHAM

Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

Ext. 180C (Rev. 2/52)

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

TO: S.S.E.A., Ottawa
Ontario.

FROM: Canadian Embassy,
Washington, D.C.

The documents described below are for your information.

Despatching Authority: Jacques Asselin/sm

Security: UNCLAS

Date: MARCH 23/62

Air or Surface: Courier

No. of enclosures: 1

Attention: Latin American Div.

Copies	Description	Also referred to:
1	OAS Press release E-399/62 OAS ELECTS THE 7 MEMBERS OF A SPECIAL GROUP TO ADVISE ON HEMISPHERICAL SECURITY. Ref: Our tel 825 of March 16/62. on 9671-40	50066-40 31 31 xref. 9671-40 XL To: ~~Mr. Brossard~~ MAR 27 1962 Refer DL(2) CCOS Don March 28/62

XL

Ext. 250 (Rev. 10/51) *(Instruction on Reverse Side)*

INSTRUCTIONS

1. This form may be used in sending material for informational purposes from the Department to posts abroad and vice versa.

2. This form should *NOT* be used to cover documents requiring action.

3. The name of the person responsible for authorizing the despatch of the material should be shown opposite the words "Despatching Authority". This may be done by signature, name stamp or by any other suitable means.

4. The form should bear the security classification of the material it covers.

5. The column for "Copies" should indicate the number of copies of each document transmitted. The space for "No. of Enclosures" should show the total number of copies of all documents covered by the transmittal slip. This will facilitate checking on despatch and receipt of mail.

ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

PRESS RELEASE

PAN AMERICAN UNION WASHINGTON 6, D. C. . EXecutive 3-8450

FOR RELEASE

E-399/62

IMMEDIATELY

March 21, 1962.

THE OAS ELECTS THE SEVEN MEMBERS OF A SPECIAL GROUP TO ADVISE ON HEMISPHERICAL SECURITY

WASHINGTON, D.C. (PAU) -- The Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) today selected the seven members of a Special Consultative Committee on Security against the Subversive Action of International Communism.

The members are: Lieut. Col.Francisco Marcelo Ramírez, Argentina; Prof. Canuto Mendes de Almeida, Brazil; Lic. (Lawyer) Manuel Campos Jiménez, Costa Rica; Lieut. Col. Joaquín Zaldívar, El Salvador; General Thomas White, the United States; General Julio Doig Sánchez, Peru; and Lieut. Col. Julio César Vadora Rosier, Uruguay.

The selection was made from a list of candidates submitted to the Council by the Governments of the Member States.

The creation of the group was recommended in Resolution II of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Americas held in Punta del Este, Uruguay, January this year. The Committee will advise the member Governments which may require and request such assistance.

These reports however will not be published without obtaining express authorization from that state.

The Committee shall submit to the Council of the OAS, no later than May 1, 1962, an initial general report, with recommendations on measures which should be taken.

*****

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cy 2444-48
c. 7296-40

FM WASHDC MAR15/62 UNCLAS

TO EXTERNAL 811 PRIORITY

INF BAG HAVANA FM OTT

CUBA AND THE HEMISPHERE

THE FOLLOWING EXCHANGE TOOK PLACE AT PRESIDENTIAL NEWS CONFERENCE MAR14 ON ABOVE SUBJECT. BEGINS:

MR PRESIDENT, MANY LATINAMERICANS ARE WONDERING WHETHER THE RECENT EXPULSION OF CUBA FROM THE OAS AND THE TRADE RESTRICTIONS BY USA WILL HELP FREE CUBA OF COMMUNISM. COULD YOU TELL US WHAT POSITIVE ACTION USA COULD TAKE TO MAKE CUBA LESS DEPENDENT ON THE COMMUNIST BLOC?

A.-WELL, WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO WORK WITH THE HEMISPHERE TO ISOLATE THE EXPANSION OF COMMUNISM IN THE HEMISPHERE.

AND THAT HAS OCCUPIED A GOOD DEAL OF OUR ATTENTION, AND IT WAS THE PURPOSE OF THE MTG AT PUNTADELESTE, AND I BELIEVE THAT THAT PURPOSE WAS ACHIEVED IN THAT THE NATIONS OF THE HEMISPHERE UNANIMOUSLY, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CUBA, WENT ON RECORD AS CONSIDERING COMMUNISM ALIEN TO THE HEMISPHERE.

NOW-WE HAVE ALSO CARRIED OUT CERTAIN TRADE ACTIONS INDICATING OUR POSITION IN REGARD TO CUBA AND WE ARE CONTINUING TO CONSIDER WHAT CAN USEFULLY BE DONE TO EXPAND FREEDOM IN THIS HEMISPHERE.

ENDS.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Security Confidential

50066-40		
96	✓	—

Type of Document Ltr No. 60 Date 13 Feb 62

From Montevideo

To L. A. Dei

Subject: Relations between Uruguay & Cuba

Original on File No. 1499-40

Copies on File No. 1499-0-40

Other Cross Reference Sheets on ✓

Prepared by Donald Hessen

Ext. 308

THE SHADOW OVER SOUTH AMERICA

Can Castro Win A Continent?

By
GERALD CLARK

Gerald Clark, regular contributor to WEEK-END magazine, had been touring South America for several months. In the first of a series of articles which will appear periodically in The Telegram, he tells of the impact of Castroism on Latin America.

WHAT is the impact of Fidel Castro on South America? How penetrating is Communism? These are the two obvious questions relating to the continent.

Before making an extensive tour of that part of the world I had anticipated running into cohesive, highly influential Communist parties. With one or two exceptions this was the case, and Communism indirectly remains the most serious issue in South America.

"A window of hope has been opened with Fidelism," said a Bolivian cabinet minister.

"It is not that Latin American people know what is going on in Cuba. It is that they are tired and have no hope, and so will turn to anything that offers hope, even the unkown.

"For humble people, democracy is meaningless if it is not accompanied by prosperity."

This is a fair and realistic analysis.

Wherever I went I found basically the same story: Those people who are aware of the executions that have taken place in Cuba—especially intellectuals and students—have lost their enthusiasm for Castro as an individual; but their support for the Cuban revolution remains undiminished.

Solves Problems

In Santiago, a Chilean said: "So far, the Cuban revolution is the only positive road that has been found in Latin American.

"I don't relate this to Castro's demagoguery, because this is a vague thing, but to the fact that he has solved desperate, pressing problems."

Few of the South Americans with whom I spoke—and these included statesmen and political leaders—believe that the Cuban revolution was Communist-inspired at the start.

Nor is much attention paid to Castro's claim that he had "always" been a Marxist-Leninist.

Enrique Zileri, co-owner and editor of Caretas, a forthnightly magazine in Lima, assumes Castro was simply making an appeal to the Russians for more aid.

Another Peruvian editor, Jose Encinas of "Expreso," thinks that Castro was setting the stage in case he wants to pull out of the Organization of American States—in other words, to make nonsense out of any OAS embargo in Cuba.

In Rio de Janeiro, a prominent author and editor, Antonio Callado, told me how astonished he is every time he discusses Cuba with Americans.

"We simply don't see red the way the United States does with every mention of Castro's name—maybe because Brazilians better understand the conditions that led to the Cuban revolution," said Callado.

Propaganda War

"The other day, at lunch with a New York publisher, I was asked: 'But aren't you afraid of Castro and his infiltration?' 'What infiltration?' I replied.

"Castro hasn't the resources or the strength to infiltrate us. If anything happens in Brazil it will be because of a Brazilian version of Castro and Brazil's own problems—not because of Fidel's influence."

This is not to say that Cuba and Soviet-bloc countries are quiescent in South America. Some of the countries that have broken relations with Castro argue that he was spreading subversive propaganda.

Moreover, Uruguay, which prides itself in being "the little Switzerland of South America," recently took the unprecedented step of instructing the Russians to cut down the size of their embassy.

In a country of only 2,500,000 people the Soviet Union maintained a huge establishment, with 37 members.

Four thousand pounds of literature entered Uruguay each week through diplomatic bags, free from customs inspection.

Few Red Votes

In Argentina, western diplomats attending a wine festival in a remote area were shocked to see how effusively local teachers greeted envoys from Soviet-bloc countries.

in Argentina, in 1958, the Communists gained less than one per cent. of the votes.

In Brazil, a nation of 70,000,000, military intelligence authorities place the party membership at under 40,000.

On top of this, Brazilian Communists, an outlawed group, are divided among themselves.

Take It Easy

Brazil's Communists manage, however, to scrawl slogans on walls and to win prominent positions in trade unions. Does this mean that Brazilians are being duped? Not, I think, in the way that North Americans usually reckon.

"The Communists know how to fight for our interests," was a typical comment.

What about the built-in, long-range danger of such leadership? "We'll worry about that another time. At the moment our worry is hunger."

Oddly enough, in those countries where they are still legal (Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia, Venezuela and Chile's Communist party, told me frankly, "Our biggest advances are among the peasants. Remember, our peasants are not a desperate people who want to achieve something by revolution. They are cautious and prefer a disciplined approach."

Chile's Communists, who number 60,000, tour the countryside and speak of "orderly and disciplined" distribution of land.

But they do not speak of gunfire; this is a curious departure from the history of other countries — notably China and Cuba — where peasants were actively recruited into revolutionary armies.

But times change. Chile's example may be a portent for other Latin American countries. Chilean Communists have formed a coalition "Popular Front" with the Socialists.

Present indications are that the Popular Front could well win the next general election, scheduled for 1963.

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The Communist diplomats had obviously been in contact with them on previous occasions.

Internal Communist parties themselves have few active followers in many cases in South America.

In the last presidential election in Argentina, in 1958, the Communists gained less than one per cent. of the votes.

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What about the built-in, long-range danger of such leadership? "We'll worry about that another time. At the moment our worry is hunger."

Oddly enough, in those countries where they are still legal (Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia, Venezuela and Ecuador) the Communists do not preach violent revolution.

They work on the assumption that if living conditions deteriorate they will be able to take over quite lawfully.

Orlando Millas, secretary of Chile's Communist party, told me frankly, "Our biggest advances are among the peasants. Remember, our peasants are not a desperate people who want to achieve something by revolution. They are cautious and prefer a disciplined approach."

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Distribution "X"

CENTRAL RESEARCH UNIT

Background Note No. 1,783 23rd January 1962

LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES
AND SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

The Communist parties of Latin America are remaining faithful to Moscow, even if small pro-Chinese factions exist in some instances. Until the 22nd Soviet Party Congress Latin American communists took little notice of Sino-Soviet differences. The discussions at the Congress, and the eventual break in diplomatic relations between Moscow and Tirana were featured in the newspapers of Latin America; after their return and report to their parties, several national communist parties on the continent issued resolutions critical of Albania, but not necessarily of China.

Argentina: A resolution of Nov. 28 praised the Soviet Communist Party, criticised the "anti-party" group, condemned the Albanians and remained silent on China. On Jan. 6-7 at a Central Committee meeting the Party Secretary, Victor Codovilla, spoke of the "strange and incomprehensible solidarity" of the Chinese with the Albanians.

Mexico: A December resolution omitted every reference to China but criticised Albanian behaviour as prejudicing communist unity.

Colombia: The Party weekly, "Voz de la Democracia", printed a full summary of a Khrushchev speech containing condemnation of Albania's deviations.

Brazil: Moscow Radio quoted a resolution on Jan.6, 1962, which stressed that the Albanians had violated agreements jointly taken by the world communist movement, and that their policy served the interests of imperialism.

Central America: Nothing is known of their attitudes, but, in general, the Albanian issue would be of little interest to them since they take their cue from Cuba.

Cuba: The Communist newspaper "Hoy" printed an interview on Dec.1 with Blas Roca, the Party Secretary, on his return from Moscow. This implied that the Party supported the Soviet line over Albania, but it did not explicitly acknowledge any Albanian or Chinese threat to communist unity. "Hostile acts" by the Albanian communists, so Blas Roca is reported as saying, had "led to a situation in which the socialist camp appears to be split". Refusing to commit his

Continued:

party, he continued: "The Chinese may differ... from the Soviet Union, but these differences, which arise inevitably from differing circumstances, do not touch on fundamental truths"; the unity of the socialist camp, for which the 1960 Moscow Declaration provided a guarantee, was fundamental. "Hoy" reported on Nov.30 the Cuban government's message to the Albanian government on the 18th anniversary of the country's liberation. It is worth noting here that Cuba is the only Latin American country maintaining diplomatic relations with China.

Uruguay and Paraguay: Both parties have taken an interest in Sino-Soviet differences. The strongest criticism comes from the Paraguay party, reprinted in the Uruguay communist paper "El Popular" of Dec. 28. A week earlier, the Uruguay Party Secretary, Rodney Arismendi, condemned the Chinese view that open criticism of the Albanian Party at the 22nd Soviet Party Congress and later in the party press was a mistake.

The communists in Paraguay were more outspoken and at much greater length. Their declaration, reprinted in Uruguay, expressed "total and indignant disagreement" with Albanian policy on the ground that this might divide the socialist camp. Here are some typical extracts from this declaration, signed by Oscar Creydt and Obdulio Barthe:

The declaration says that the Albanians "in an insistent, systematic and completely deliberate way (used) the anti-Soviet propaganda of the class enemies to enhance the echo of their slanders against the USSR". Hoxha is accused of pursuing a policy "deliberatel directed to feeding the 'psychological warfare' which the imperialists carry out against the Soviet Union". Moreover, "in Latin America Hoxha's anti-Soviet slanders are already forming an integral part of the furious anti-communist and anti-Soviet campaign... to create a climate for a new aggression against Cuba".

Hoxha is depicted as an insignificant creature too small for his boots, playing a "lying part" which is "precisely what the insidious North American propaganda... needs, their real aim being to divert public attention from the colonial and semi-colonial oppression in various continents...". Hoxha is described as a defeatist; Cuba is held up to him as an example.

After detailed criticism of the Albanian post-22nd Soviet Party Congress line, the declaration deals with the 1960 Moscow agreement. There "the delegation of the Chinese Communist Party promised solemnly to carry out the agreements expressed in the Declaration of the 81 Communist Parties and to defend the unity of the communist movement against any act which might harm the future. We took part in the general joy aroused by the Chinese Communist Party's promise. For this very reason we have been grieved that the Chinese comrades allowed the Albanian leaders to attack the USSR while present, to boast openly of the Chinese People's Republic's support in its struggle against the USSR, without rectifying this extremely grave and bold assertion".

Continued:

The Declaration roundly hopes that "the comrades of the Chinese Communist Party... observing the prejudicial result which their position in relation to the schismatic activities of Hoxha's group has produced, will correct this erroneous position in accordance with the 1960 agreements".

CENTRAL RESEARCH UNIT

File 50066-40
96

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA

The Soviet Union appears to be exploiting opportunities to extend its influence in Latin America, particularly through offers of aid and trade to governments faced with mounting economic difficulties. It may be well to try to view in perspective the extent and scope of Soviet penetration in Latin America. The following are personal views on this question.

Until now, Soviet attempts do not appear to have been too successful, except in the case of Cuba, which has rapidly developed closer economic and ideological links with communist states. While export and import trade between these states and Latin America has risen from 282 million dollars in 1959 to 544 million dollars in 1960 commercial exchanges with Cuba account for almost 90 per cent of this increase. Apart from Cuba, only Argentina and Brazil have accepted substantial credits from Eastern European countries.

Although the Soviet Union is limited in its diplomatic contacts by the fact that it has only four missions in Latin America, (in Mexico City, Montevideo, Buenos Aires and Havana) it can count on the assistance of missions from other Eastern European countries. During the last year, it has also enlisted the cooperation of Cuban representatives in various Latin American capitals whose activities in this regard have aroused criticism and, in some instances, have provided grounds for the rupture of relations.

Given their small numbers and the clandestine character of their operations in many areas, Latin American communists have proved to be rather effective auxiliaries of the USSR. Communist parties are outlawed in all Central American republics and in Brazil, Peru and Paraguay; in countries where they are allowed, their share of votes

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in recent general elections has been usually very low, averaging less than four per cent. The total membership of communist parties in Latin America is estimated at 250,000. Nevertheless, communists have succeeded in securing important posts in labour unions and have inspired, when they have not actually led, a large proportion of strikes. They are also active in student associations, which usually play a turbulent part in national politics, in peasant organizations and in guerilla bands harassing military and police forces in some Andean regions.

At the same time, individuals and groups intent on removing social and economic inequalities and irritated by the apparent reluctance of local rulers to take prompt action to this end are tempted to ally themselves with better organized and more dynamic marxist elements in the hope of achieving power and carrying out the improvements which they regard as indispensable. Until now, communist parties in Latin America have not sought power for themselves but have preferred to back nationalist leaders in order to promote the adoption of policies designed to reduce or destroy the traditional ascendency of western democracies.

Should the marxist experiment in Cuba succeed, and thereby give plausibility to the contention that communism is the most effective instrument for realizing rapid social and economic progress in retarded areas, it may encourage alliances between communist parties and reform movements stirring in many parts of Central and South America. Such alliances, while they may not result necessarily in the creation of Soviet satellites, could lead to the establishment of regimes hostile to the western democracies. It should perhaps be kept in mind that neither Soviet agents nor the Cuban communist party were decisive factors in the estrangement of Cuba from some of its American neighbours and in the communist orientation of Cuban policies.

The example of the Cuban revolution has already alerted Latin American governments against the danger of postponing overdue

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revisions in land tenure, taxation, education, housing and public health. In the eyes of nationalist and socialist elements, it has also underscored the inadequacy of private interprise, both foreign and domestic, to ensure social advancement and the necessary measure of control of local authorities over the development of national resources. Whether Dr. Castro survives or is overthrown, it is probable that solutions on the Cuban model will become more appealing if urgent steps are not taken to remedy the basic economic and social problems of Latin America.

Whatever the outcome of the Cuban revolution, many of the changes introduced by the present regime cannot be reversed except by the decision of the Cuban people themselves without interference from outside. The Organization of American States, which is a regional agency within the United Nations designed to deal with problems of the Western Hemisphere would appear to be the appropriate forum to discuss ways and means of responding to the challenge posed by Cuban policies. It is to be hoped, however, that no collective action would be attempted unless it carried the judgement of the leading Latin American countries.

The Alliance for Progress, outlined last March by President Kennedy and formally accepted last August at a special meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council is a positive and enlightened attempt at countering the Soviet threat of expansion in the Western Hemisphere. It recognizes the need for substantial outside help to Latin American countries (the bulk of which is to be generously provided by United States public and private contributions) and for self-help on the part of Latin American governments. Many difficulties of Latin America result from social inequalities, inadequate education facilities and maladministration. They constitute a human problem, rather than a purely economic one, and it is doubtful that it can be solved by material aid only. A display of understanding and willingness

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to adjust to new developments may be the most important contribution of outside powers. Diplomatic support, for example, is less important for western democracies than the internal strength of friendly governments who sometimes cannot afford to take positions in international affairs that might seriously weaken the political base on which they operate. On the other hand, it is not sure that the ruling groups in many republics will be willing to introduce the far-reaching reforms envisaged as a necessary condition of progress which would inevitably eliminate most of the privileges they now enjoy. It may be that such reforms can only be carried out by left-wing political groups, in some cases through revolution. Policy adjustments could be required if Latin American governments implementing drastic social and political changes are to be prevented from seeking support in Eastern Europe or Communist China. Western democracies may thus have to accept and live with states adopting radically different political structures and committed to the nationalization of foreign investments or to non-alignment in world affairs.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Security: Confidential

50066-40		
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Type of Document: Ltr No. 12 Date: 15-Jan 62

From: Montevideo Uruguay

To: L.A. Div.

Subject: Labour trouble at Aluminio del Uruguay

Original on File No. 5397-B-40

Copies on File No. 1082-A-40

Other Cross Reference Sheets on: ✓

Prepared by: Donald Fleming

Ext. 308

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, HAVANA, Cuba

Reference: ~~Your Letter No. XL-203 of July 25, 1962~~

Subject: Guerrilla Activities in ~~Latin America~~ Cuba

Security: SECRET

No: 430

Date: August 31, 1962

Enclosures: ✓

Air or Surface Mail: Courier

Post File No: 12-2-3

Ottawa File No.	
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96	96

XL | To: Mr. Patten | ~~AUG~~ SEPT 10 1962

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Dept. Sept. 18/62

Distribution to Posts

The information we can provide you on guerrilla activities in Cuba is limited. The press puts a veil of silence over the activities of Castro's opponents unless the regime has some success to report. Such direct reports as one is able to obtain on trips outside of Havana are meagre. The rumours that float through Havana generally originate from anti-government sources and are highly unreliable. All that we know for sure is that some guerrilla activities have and are taking place. 57

2. Castro's success in overthrowing Batista has naturally served as an inspriation to his own enemies. The circumstances, however, are not the same. Batista had succeeded in alienating Cuban opinion until the point was reached where his own army was unwilling to fight. Until the very end Batista had more than enough military power to deal with the Castro insurgents if his troops had had any stomach for battle or if he had faith in himself or his leadership. Batista himself was defending no cause other than personal power, and his fortune abroad assured him material well being in exile. Batista's police were ruthless but he did not have instruments for controlling the public such as are available to Castro through the Committee for the Defence of the Revolution, and other mass organizations. Moreover, the Castro government's experience in guerrilla fighting is of help in controlling anti-Castro guerrillas. In short Castro's success against Batista is no proof that the same tactics would be successful against Castro.

3. To some degree geography favours guerrillas in Cuba. It is a long narrow island so that there is an extensive sea-coast in relation to its total area and with potential sources of supply nearby, it must be relatively easy to bring in men and supplies. The wide distribution of arms amongst a semi-trained militia is also a potential source of weapons. While Cuba has a central highway, the road system in the countryside is poor and farm dwellings are scattered which is helpful for guerrilla operations. The most favourable terrain for guerrilla activities would seem to be the mountainous or hilly districts in Oriente, (Sierra Maestra and near Baracoa), Las Villas (Escambray range) and Pinar del Rio (Sierra del Rosario and Sierra de los Organos).

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Ext. 182A (Rev. 2/52)

4. With the scanty information at our disposal we will deal with guerrilla activities under the headings which you have suggested.

5. Area of operation or concentration - There are reliable reports of guerrilla activities in the Sierra de los Organos in Pinar del Rio, the Escambray mountains in Las Villas and in the mountains to the south of Baracoa. There are also some indications of activities in the Cienega de Zapata and along the north coast of Las Villas Province. The government has recently reported successes against two small groups in Havana and Camaguey Provinces (translations of press reports are attached). The number of persons in the guerrilla groups is not thought to be large. We have heard the figure of 50 in Sierra de los Organos and 100 in the Escambray. It might be recalled, however, that Castro's force was equally small to begin with. Even at the moment of his final victory he is thought to have had less than 1,000 men.

6. Political complexion of leadership - We know nothing of the political complexion of the leaders of the various groups other than they are opposed to Castro and Communism. The group in Sierra de los Organos calls itself the FLN (Frente de Liberacion Nacional) and is said to receive support of food, medicine and information from professional and middle-class people in the province. The group in Escambray is reportedly under the command of Valdo Ramirez, a former officer of Castro. He is said to be a charismatic individual of the same stamp as his former leader and rumour has it that he was refused assistance by the United States because they did not want to back a second Castro. There seems to be a certain distrust within Cuba of the multitudinous exile factions which proliferate in Miami and elsewhere. This same feeling is likely to develop amongst any guerrillas on the island, whether or not sent in from abroad.

7. Degree of preparation for overt activity - We know nothing concrete of the planning, training, organization and arms of the guerrilla forces here. The group in the Escambray seems to be recruited locally while the group in the Sierra de los Organos may have been sent in from the outside. Any Castro officers who have defected of course would have received valuable training when fighting Batista. It would be possible for a group to conduct guerrilla activities in Cuba without any aid from American sources but the exile groups have clearly shown that they look to the United States for help. If the U.S. itself decides to lend active assistance, one can be sure that the planning, training, organization and arms would be of the very best that the U.S. could provide. If untrained Cubans were to be used, this could mean a delay of at least a year from the time an operation was first planned until it was put into effect; professional guerrillas cannot be trained overnight. It may be that the CIA is willing to offer certain minimum support to any group which is working against Castro but that major U.S. backing would only be given to an operation that looked as though it could succeed which might well mean that the men would have been trained, the arms supplied and the security precautions vetted by United States authorities. The Cuban Government claims from time to time to have seized sabotage kits and communications equipment supplied by the CIA. We would not discount the possibility that there may be some truth in these charges.

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8. Operations undertaken so far - We have the impression that the chief efforts of the guerrilla groups have been devoted to keeping themselves in existence. There have been occasional reports of the killing of militiamen (these in particular have increased of late), the burning of buses, and attacks against trains. At the present time there is no sign of major activities being undertaken against the regime. There are indications that Castro's opponents have been told to remain quiet. Whether this is because they are too weak to expose themselves, or because some plan is brewing, is not clear.

9. Participation or connivance of armed forces - We have no reliable information on how efficiently the Cuban armed forces are devoting themselves to tracking down guerrillas. Counter-revolutionaries claim that Castro's soldiers have little heart for exposing their lives to hunt down fellow Cubans, particularly with some of the early members of the Rebel Army fighting against them. On the other hand the Cuban army appears to be well disciplined and we believe that troops could be relied upon to obey orders when dealing with small bands. We are not sure, however, whether or not their morale would hold up if faced with a major and prolonged campaign against guerrillas and the necessity of taking reprisals against their own people.

10. Estimate of likelihood of success - There seems no doubt that the guerrillas can count on at least some sympathy amongst the local population. The remaining middle sized farm owners, rural shopkeepers and professional men would almost certainly co-operate, to some degree. This means incidentally that there is a military reason for hastening collectivization. In the offensive taken against the Escambray mountains over a year ago, when Castro enjoyed more popularity than he does now, the government found it necessary to move some peasants out of the area. We ourselves believe that well over half the population is now to one degree or another opposed to the regime. We are not sure however how many persons would be willing to risk their lives providing aid to guerrillas. The majority of the population might choose to sit it out. Counter-revolutionaries are usually stronger on talk than action. Certainly many of Castro's opponents have preferred to fight him from Miami rather than work against him from within their own country. [We would rather doubt that a guerrilla campaign would be successful unless it enjoyed major support from the United States but nevertheless had a first class leader or leaders who did not appear to be creatures of the CIA (Cuban deGaulles are needed).]

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11. The scale of guerrilla activities may not be at this stage a major threat to the Government, which seems confident that it can deal with anything except a direct U.S. attack. The Government may be right, but if Cuba's economy continues to decline, the government's popularity to fall and the morale of its remaining supporters to weaken, the situation could change. If President Kennedy has ruled out a direct attack, but U.S. policy continues on the basis that Castro and Soviet influence must be eliminated from Cuba, guerrilla warfare might provide the best hope of achieving this end. I am doubtful, however, that it is a very bright hope at this time. Success depends upon too many imponderables including the sympathy and support of the population, the calibre of leadership, the availability of regular supplies and the reactions of government and army morale to a prolonged guerrilla campaign. There is also the fact that support from abroad could reach a scale where it would amount to direct intervention in the eyes of the outside world.

George P. Kidd
Ambassador.

HOY August 22, 1962

ASSASSIN OF MILITIA MEN KILLED IN CAMAGUEY.

Manuel López López "the mad man", leader of a band of worms.

Last Monday a combined group from the National Army and the National Revolutionary Militia had a fight with the counter-revolutionary band of Manuel López López, "the mad man", at the village of Tamarindo, district of Florencia, in Moron, province of Camaguey. The assassin who was killed acted as captain of the group under the orders of the bandit Arnoldo Martínez Andrade.

Manuel López López who initially was with the group of Martínez Andrade and then later formed his own group lived in Chambas, the area in which he carried out his evil deeds.

López López was connected with the counter-revolutionary organization M.R. and among with the principal criminal acts of this band can be listed the following:

The 29th of June at 7:30 p.m. they assaulted the bus No. 18 that was going from Moron to Yaguajay, killing the militiamen Ardelio Molina Sanchez and Adalberto Cifuentes Jimenez and then burning the bus.

On the 22nd of December of last year at 6:40 p.m. they attacked train No. 2 at Kilometer 70 when it was travelling from Chambas to Caibarien. In this case they all wore olive green clothes and carried rifles and machine guns.

The 8th of May of this year they fired a train near Chambas.

In killing this bandit, one of the most repulsive collaborators of the CIA and the internal reaction, the Revolutionary forces had delivered a heavy blow to the enemy of the people.

HOY August 31, 1962

SIX ASSASSINS CAPTURED IN MATANZAS WERE PUBLICLY SENTENCED TO DEATH

They were responsible for assassinating four militiamen. The head of the band is Filiberto Coto Gomez, known as the "the piper".

The public trial of Filiberto Coto Gomez, known as the "the piper", took place last night at the Casino of Guines, province of Havana. He was caught by a detachment of the revolutionary armed forces in the zone of the river Negro, Hato de Jicarita, district of Bolondron, province of Matanzas, together with three members of his gang, one of them a former soldier of the tyranny (Batista). He had led a band of criminals in this zone, which assassinated workers and carried out numerous criminal acts. They were caught with the help of workers and peasants in this district, when they tried to hide while being pursued by patrols of the army of the Occident.

Found in the possession of the criminals were two U.S. sub-machine guns with ammunition, one German sub-machine gun 9mm. and a Czech sub-machine gun No. 23 also 9 mm. After being captured, they revealed the names of those who had helped them in their criminal acts by providing them with food, clothes and ammunition. As a result two of their principal collaborators were arrested, the shop-keeper Jose Aguntin Caballero Chavez, a former Batista soldier, and Juan Luis Cruz Mederos. They, like all the others in this criminal group, admitted their collaboration with the band of assassins headed by Coto Gomez. Among their criminal acts were:

The burning of a bus and of a revolutionary militia station. They also assassinated workers, like the unarmed militiaman, Simon Rodriguez Rodriguez, who was caught by surprise and shot in a cowardly and cruel act by automatic rifles; like the revolutionary, Chiche Rodriguez, whom the Piper and his follower Perez Izquierdo killed with a machine gun in his own house in the presence of his family; like the old militia man, Porfirio Acosta, a worker in the sugar mill Osvaldo Sanchez, who was assassinated by Martin Blanco Martinez and Justo Hernandez Aleman, when he was on the night guard at the turbine of the mill; and the militiaman Humberto Hernandez Piloto who was machine gunned in his own house at night by Coto Gomez and Hernandez Aleman in the presence of his family, including

his elderly and sick mother. The trial was witnessed by thousands of inhabitants of Guines and its surrounding area, who filled the Casino to capacity. Among the witnesses before the revolutionary court was the father of one of the victims, Humberto Hernandez Piloto, a peasant who described in dramatic form the crime committed against his son and identified one of the assassins. The widow of the negro militiaman and sugar worker, Porfirio Acosta, and the mother of 10 sons was present; this revolutionary woman said that now more then ever she and her sons were totally loyal to the Revolution and prepared to shed their blood in its defense.

In his conclusions the presecute attorney of the revolutionary court asked for death before the firing squad for the six criminals. After considering the case the court informed the accused who were lined up before the judges, that they had been sentenced to death. The sentence was carried out in the early hours of this morning.

File 50066-40 96 Arc

Confidential

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Y. Beaulne

FROM: Mr. A.R. MacMillan

REFERENCE: Nil

SUBJECT: NATO Experts Committee on Communist Infiltration in Latin America.

A recent United States initiative recommended the establishment of an ad hoc Nato Experts Committee on "Communist Infiltration in Latin America". A decision has been taken to support this proposal. Consequently, up-to-date information must be gleaned from the Embassies in Latin America in order that the Canadian representative at such a meeting may make a significant contribution. Canadian representation would be considerably enhanced were the information to consist of something other than the standard facts and figures on the activities of the personnel of Communist bloc Embassies in Latin America and of the local card-carrying Communists which conceivably could preoccupy the committee's attention. It would seem desirable, if possible, rather to focus the committee's attention on the political, economic, social and intellectual conditions in Latin America which make the region susceptible to Marxist and socialist ideas as attractive remedial measures.

2. If the study of this problem by the committee is intended as a preparatory measure to forstall the establishment of totalitarian Communist governments in Latin America then we must first clearly distinguish between totalitarian Communism in all its unacceptable regressive aspects and those socialist movements which may justifiably emerge in partnership with free enterprise as the valid solution to the economic and social condition of Latin America generally. We can hardly decry the application of socialist measures in Latin America nor deny their possible validity in view of the fact that many of the member countries of this council have themselves successfully applied socialist measures in various degrees. However, when application of such measures requires undue social coercion or accommodates the political aims of the Communist powers, in effect be comes a vehicle for Soviet and Chinese penetration, then a situation exists with which we must effectively deal. Consideration of the problem of how best to do so demands a very realistic appraisal of the situation in Latin America.

3. It is essential then that the forces which encourage Communist infiltration be determined and that the vehicles of that penetration be identified.

4. It seems to me that basically two forces make for Communist Infiltration in Latin America. The first is the aggressive drive of the Communist nations to export their social and political systems to as many nations as possible. This primary force would be relatively impotent in Latin America were it not for the existence of the more passively-natured second force which is the tragic condition of extreme economic, social and political need in most of the Latin American countries. This condition of distress generates a search for effective solutions in which the validity of many economic and social theories, including socialist and Marxist ones, will be tested.

5. What then are the main vehicles of infiltration. Once again it appears that essentially there are two. The first and most obvious of course is the activity of the Communist agent and of the local Communist Party member. The second and, for our purposes, perhaps the more

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significant, is the sometimes disorganized and often frustrated attempt by the sincere reformer to improve extremely adverse conditions by forcing the application of those socialist, Marxist and other measures which he considers will be effective in relieving the poverty surrounding him. In this connection perhaps it should be kept in mind that Cuba became Socialist and moved into the Communist orbit through little or no effort on the part of the Cuban Communist Party of Soviet agents.

6. The point of greatest danger for the Western nations, it seems to me, is the point at which the prominent local reformers begin casting about for effective means of bettering their condition. When, for obvious reasons, he receives no accommodation from priviliged minority which in most cases completely controls the society in which he lives and which very often represents uncontrolled free enterprise capitalism in its most ruthless form then he is likely to turn to foreign sources for support. Here is where our greatest opportunity lies and that is by identifying ourselves with those conscientious leaders who are seeking social redress on behalf of many millions of people. If such leaders do not receive significant aid from western nations in attaining these objectives then they will probably turn to an all-too-willing Communist power for moral and material support and in the process become captive. The alternative is a resort to open revolution which creates the chaotic political climate in which Communist objectives are most effectively achieved. Failing an adequate response on the part of Western nations, the above alternative courses open to the Latin American reformer present opportunities for the establishment of totalitarian Communist governments.

A.R. MacMillan

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, CARACAS, VENEZUELA.

Reference: YOUR LETTER NO. XL 154 OF JULY 25 AND YOUR TELEGRAM NO. XL 82 OF OCT. 1/62.

~~Subject~~:

Subject: GUERILLA ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA.

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: 421

Date: OCTOBER 3, 1962

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: COURIER

Post File No: 10.1.2 & 10.1.8

Ottawa File No. 50066-40

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XL | To M Potvin | OCT 11 1962

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A. Potvin 12/10/62
Internal Circulation

XL

Distribution to Posts

The following is a summary of information supplied from this mission in recent months on guerilla activities.

I. Area of Operation or Concentration

Guerilla bands operating in the Andean states and more heavily concentrated in the mountainous regions of Falcón, Sucre, Yaracuy, Mérida, Portuguesa, Guanare and Trujillo have proved rather ineffective as a result of difficult survival and supply conditions, hostility of local peasants and workers and successful counteraction of Army and National Guard search parties. Their numbers are unofficially estimated to vary between 1,000 and 1,200.

Urban guerillas organized and trained on the model of the commandos in the Second World War constitute a much more serious threat. I have no way of knowing how many there are. A campaign of sabotage, vandalism, robbery and murder in the Caracas area and in the larger cities of Maracaibo, Valencia and Barquisimeto has been growing in intensity during the last few weeks. The inability of the police to cope with the hit-and-run tactics of these well-armed, well-drilled and well-led groups has encouraged common criminals to join the fray and brought about a climate of anxiety, insecurity and fear likely to erode faith in the value of democratic institutions and the stability of the present elected government.

II. Political Complexion of Leadership

It is a generally accepted fact, based on credible proof, that the mountain and urban guerillas are inspired and led by members of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (a marxist splinter group of President Betancourt's Accion Democratica Party) in close alliance with the Communist Party. They are also aided by the Fidelist wing of the Union Republicana Democratica, one of whose spokesmen, Fabricio Ojeda, resigned recently from his seat in the Chamber of Deputies after being expelled from the party and is reported to be leading a band in the State of Falcón. After members of the MIR and Communist Parties openly supported the Carúpano revolt last May, the activities of these two political groups were prohibited by decree although their representatives in Congress continue to enjoy parliamentary immunity.

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Ext. 182A (Rev. 2/52)

NO ENCLOSURES

III. Preparation for Overt Activity

a) Planning

According to statements of National Defence authorities, the mountain guerillas are now trying to re-group and co-ordinate their activities but constitute a nuisance more than a real danger. A few training camps have been captured during the last six months and units of the Army and the National Guard comprising some 1,200 men were dispatched two weeks ago to Guanare and Portuguesa to disperse a concentration of guerillas in that area. According to documentary evidence produced by the Minister of the Interior, a large-scale plan for combined action by mountain and urban guerillas was foiled last August following the capture of extremist leaders. It would appear at this time that the mountain guerillas will be playing a supporting and secondary role in the widespread attacks projected by the urban guerillas during the forthcoming electoral period and for which the current raids are probably a mere rehearsal.

b) Training and Organization

The urban guerillas have shown in many instances a precision which can come only from meticulous preparation. The assault yesterday by 25 men on El Hatillo, in the State of Miranda, is an example of the effectiveness of their training. They entered the town at noon in eight automobiles, broke into the police station, disarmed the policemen and took all available weapons, seized the mayor's office, the telephone and telegraph stations, threw incendiary bombs in the headquarters of the Christian Democrat and Accion Democratic Parties, painted slogans on the walls of various buildings and escaped unscathed half an hour later. Such coups are obviously meant as practice.

Urban bands are recruited principally among high-school and university students. A typical band comprises half a dozen minors without police records commanded by an experienced fighter (a seasoned criminal, a former policeman or a defector from the Armed Forces).

It is a fair assumption that most of the arms in the hands of the guerillas were distributed at the time of the overthrow of Pérez Jiménez or were stolen during the last three years. Although it is possible that some weapons were smuggled in from Cuba, the Venezuelan authorities have never claimed, to my knowledge, that any considerable quantity of clandestine arms had been obtained from outside. Aside from weapons, the urban guerillas seem to plan their raids to gather money, communication equipment, uniforms, vehicles and medicaments.

IV. Operations Undertaken So Far

The mountain guerillas have undertaken few actions of any consequence except to reinforce the besieged marines in Puerto Cabello during the abortive June revolt, probably in order to gather arms and other supplies rather than to rescue the insurgents. The urban guerillas are now engaged in a co-ordinated programme of attacks in the main cities and towns.

V. Connivance of Armed Forces

The insurrections of Carúpano in May and of Puerto Cabello in June involved principally marine battalions led by officers in sympathy with the MIR and Communist Parties, which co-operated actively with the rebels. However, the Armed

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Forces on the whole are committed to the support of democratic government and there is no reason to believe that they will not remain loyal to President Betancourt.

VI. Sympathy of Local Population

The vast majority of farmers and workers are undoubtedly against the guerillas and have helped to round up bands on many occasions. The implementation of reforms in land tenure and cultivation, and the hopes raised in the countryside by these programmes have allayed the danger of a peasant revolt. The situation is no longer explosive. The guerillas have little support outside a minority of students and intellectuals, and the marxist followers of the MIR and Communist Parties.

2. Despite the material progress achieved in the last three years of constitutional government, it should not be assumed that the success of the current experiment in democracy is assured. The absence of family life and morality among a large sector of the population, the lack of houses, educational and medical facilities, nutritional deficiencies and unemployment still provide a favourable terrain for communist propaganda and subversion.

Yvon Beaulne.

Latin American Division/A. Potvin/mt

50066-40
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Defence Liaison (2) Division

CONFIDENTIAL

October 1, 1962

Latin American Division

Guerilla Activities in Latin America

Reports on guerilla activities have been received so far from our missions in Buenos Aires, Bogota, Havana, Mexico, Quito, Rio and San José (copies of which have already been sent to you). Among the reports to come - urgently requested by a telegram of September 28 — are those for Venezuela and Paraguay, two of the areas where guerilla activities may have more significance.

2. It is perhaps possible, however, to see from the material already on hand that guerilla activities considered as an organized and coherent form of political opposition would not appear to represent a serious threat to most of the present governments in Latin American countries. This judgment should of course be qualified by adding that it appears so for the time being only and provided the various Armed Forces continue to uphold the national constitutions (as in Colombia and Brazil) and not join guerilla movements as was feared for a while the Navy might do in Venezuela.

3. One of the problems of course when trying to foresee where a repetition of the successful guerilla operations of the Cuban "26 of July" movement may take place next, is that there is in reality no country in Latin America which can compare to 1958 Cuba: small in size, medium in population, enjoying a relatively high standard of living and ruled by a dictatorship. The conjuncture of these diverse factors is not to be found in any other country of the Latin American area.

4. Venezuela of course is comparable to the Cuba of 1958 in size, population and standard of living. However, democratic President Betancourt is strongest in the countryside, weakest in the capital, just the reverse of Batista. What support Batista did have came mainly from the Havana organized workers.

5. Paraguay has a dictatorship which has many of the Batista features. But the country is poor, the population small and with a large proportion of "passive" uneducated Indian and Mestizo elements.

6. A comparison with most of the small Central American countries would also show a lack in some of the ingredients which made the Cuban Revolution possible.

Mr. Ritchie
OUSSEA

7. Our conclusion therefore is that the Cuba of 1962 is the only country resembling the Cuba of 1958. The day may not be far when the loss of "campesino" support may cost Castro power by permitting guerilla activities to develop dangerously in the countryside. But here again, the situation in Cuba today is not quite that of

1958 Cuba. Batista had no system of control which could compare to the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution, nor a fanatically endoctrinated Revolutionary Army and Militia.

8. The above comments are being sent to you with the understanding that they are subject to review in the light of more information from our missions and that more time would be required for a considered opinion on the question.

A. J. PICK

Latin American Division

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, Santo Domingo, D.R.

Reference: Our Letter 110 of April 24, 1962, Your Letter XL-82 of July 25, 1962 and Your Telegram of October 4, 1962

Sub: Guerilla Activities - Dominican Republic

Security: Confidential

No: 239

Date: October 9, 1962

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Courier

Post File No:

Ottawa File No. 50066-40

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XL | Mr Dougan OCT 19 1962

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Nov 1/62

Distribution to Posts

In our letter 110 of April 24, we reported local concern that a guerilla campaign might be opened by left wing extremist groups. The factors which prompted these fears were the following: disillusion in some sectors with the Council of State; considerable unemployment and some privation in many areas; an awareness that it was most unlikely that a combination of extremist left wing parties could command a plurality at the polls; reports of clandestine arms shipments and vague rumours of imminent guerilla activity. To these were added the less tangible incentives of Castro's success, the example of guerilla activity in Ecuador, Venezuela and Colombia and the appeal of irregular military operations to Latin youth. 63

2. In the intervening period there have been no reports of guerilla activities in the Dominican Republic and the likelihood of such activities taking place in the near future has diminished. The factors leading to this assessment were discussed with an American colleague.

3. The principal reason for the declining danger of guerilla activities appears to be the decision of the hard core communist elements not to embark on such operations but to confine their efforts to proselytizing; to attempting to control labour and peasant organizations; and to infiltrating the government and the major political parties. The disciplined Dominican communists (Partido Socialista Popular) recognize that the circumstances are not propitious for guerilla operations. This position has been confirmed by a Party resolution published recently in their weekly news sheet El Popular. Of the circumstances which weigh against guerilla operations, the most important would be the lack of sympathy from the Dominican peasants. Extreme left wing support is confined almost exclusively to the larger towns and it is believed that few inroads have been made on the conservative minded peasants. The extreme left also lack a sufficiently dramatic issue with which to enlist wider public sympathy.

4. In April we advised you of reports of small arms shipments and caches. However, our U.S. colleague says that they have not had confirmation of the arrival of arms on a significant scale. There are large numbers of pistols and some light sub-machine guns in the hands of private persons in the Republic but these are not suitable for sustained guerilla warfare.

Ext. 182A (Rev. 2/52)

NO ENCLOSURES

5. Viewed in strictly topographical terms, the Republic is well suited for guerilla operations. Three ranges of mountains cross the island, one stretching its complete length. Near the Haitian frontier the central range extends to a breadth of 100 kilometers. Large areas of the interior are sparsely inhabited and inaccessible even to jeeps. Nevertheless, successful guerilla activity in a remote area would require the cooperation of the local peasants. The anti-Trujillo invasion launched from Cuba in June, 1959 consisted of about 220 men, largely Dominican exiles. They landed at three points, two by sea and the other from an aircraft in a mountainous area. With the assistance of the peasants, the Trujillo forces wiped out or captured most of the invaders within two weeks.

6. Although resort to guerilla activity appears unlikely at the present time, the Dominican political situation remains fluid and with the first free elections in 32 years scheduled for December, it is just conceivable that left wing extremists might seize a political crisis to open guerilla activities. Also, the hard core communists have been thus far unable to enforce discipline or unity over the various branches of the extreme left wing movement. It is thus possible that Castro oriented youths might set out on an armed expedition without full extremist support and probably with little chance of survival. It is more probable that in the immediate future violence by the extreme left will be confined to acts of terroism and intimidation in the capital and large towns.

7. The U.S. Military Advisory and Assistance Group mission's programme for the Dominican Armed Forces includes "counter insurgency" training. However, thus far this training has not been provided in the Dominican Republic. Several months ago a New York Times report that MAAG was providing such training generated some heat in left wing quarters and denials by both MAAG and the government. At the moment there is reason to believe that the Armed Forces are loyal to the government and would act against any extremist guerilla operations.

8. I regret the delay in despatching this letter.

Jean W. Graham
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

50066-40

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cc/082-A-40

AMENDED COPY

FM MVIDEO JAN10/62 CONFD

TO EXTERNAL 2 OPIMMED

LABOUR TROUBLE AT ALUMINIO DEL URUGUAY

AS A RESULT OF RECENT DISMISSALS OF COMMUNIST LABOUR UNION LEADERS BY ALUMINIO DEL URUGUAY A LOCAL SUBSIDIARY OF ALUMINUM LIMITED FACTORY WAS OCCUPIED YESTERDAY BY WORKERS.COMPANY IS TAKING LEGAL ACTION TO EVICT THEM BUT A GENERAL STRIKE AT PLANT AS WELL AS SYMPATHY STRIKES THROUGHOUT METAL INDUSTRY WILL PROBABLY FOLLOW.THIS APPEARS TO BE PART OF A CAMPAIGN OF STRIKES AND LABOUR MANIFESTATIONS WAGED BY COMMUNIST ELEMENTS AGAINST GOVT AND FORTHCOMING(OAS?)CONFERENCE.

2.YESTERDAY AN OFFICIAL FROM COMMUNIST-CONTROLLED METAL WORKERS UNION REQUESTED APPOINTMENT TOGETHER WITH SOME OF THE DISMISSED LEADERS TO DISCUSS SITUATION ON GROUNDS THAT COMPANY WAS A CDN AFFILIATE.I CONSULTED WITH AMBASSADOR AND CDN MANAGER TAFELMACHER WHO AGREED THAT I COULD NOT RPT NOT REFUSE TO RECEIVE DEL.INTERVIEW TOOK PLACE THIS MORNING.DELS INQUIRED WHETHER I COULD INTERVENE UNOFFICIALLY WITH COMPANYS MANAGEMENT.THEY STRESSED THAT IF THERE WERE A GENERAL STRIKE IN METAL INDUSTRY CDN PRESTIGE MIGHT SUFFER AS OWNERSHIP OF COMPANY BY CDN INTERESTS WOULD BE EMPHASIZED.(COMMUNIST NEWSPAPER QUOTE EL POPULAR UNQUOTE ALREADY REFERS TO COMPANY AS QUOTE IMPERIALIST ENTERPRISE UNQUOTE CONTROLLED BY QUOTE CDN AND YANKEE CAPITAL UNQUOTE.)I MADE CLEAR TO DELS THAT ALTHOUGH I HAD AGREED TO LISTEN TO THEM THE EMB COULD NOT RPT NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN WHAT APPEARED TO BE A STRICTLY INTERNAL URUGUAYAN MATTER.

3.SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION THAT YOU AGREE WITH ACTION TAKEN AND FOR ANY FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS(GROUP CORRUPT)AND/OR COMMENTS YOU MAY WISH TO PROVIDE.FULL DETAILS FOLLOW BY AIR BAG

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50066-40
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org 5397-B-40
cc 1082-A-40

FM MVIDEO(JAN2/62)CONFD

TO EXTERNAL 2 OPIMMED

LABOUR TROUBLE AT ALUMINIO DEL URUGUAY

AS A RESULT OF RECENT DISMISSALS OF COMMUNIST LABOUR UNION LEADERS BY ALUMINIO DEL URUGUAY A LOCAL SUBSIDIARY OF ALUMINUM LIMITED FACTORY WAS OCCUPIED YESTERDAY BY WORKERS.COMPANY IS TAKING LEGAL ACTION TO EVICT THEM BUT A GENERAL STRIKE AT PLANT AS WELL AS SYMPATHY STRIKES THROUGHOUT METAL INDUSTRY WILL PROBABLY FOLLOW.THIS APPEARS TO BE PART OF A CAMPAIGN OF STRIKES AND LABOUR MANIFESTATIONS WAGED BY COMMUNIST ELEMENTS AGAINST GOVT AND FORTHCOMING(OAS?)CONFERENCE.

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3.SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION THAT YOU AGREE WITH ACTION TAKEN AND FOR ANY FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS(GROUP CORRUPT)AND/ORCOMMENTS YOU MAY WISH TO PROVIDE.FULL DETAILS FOLLOW BY AIR BAG

HOUDE

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY MEXICO CITY

Reference: OUR LETTER NO.716 OF NOVEMBER 30.

Subject: SOVIET BLOC ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO.

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: 744

Date: DECEMBER 14,1961

Enclosures: ONE

Air or Surface Mail: AIR

Post File No: 9-4-2

Ottawa File No. 50066-40

References

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

As a supplement to our letter under reference you may be interested in the attached copy of the last few paragraphs of a despatch from the British Embassy on Soviet bloc cultural and propaganda activities in Mexico which was made available to us by the British Embassy. The despatch was sent on September 27 last.

2. We would agree with the conclusion that the cultural efforts of the countries concerned (the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslavakia) have probably paid off in Mexico although it is very difficult to judge their ultimate affects. To give one example, both the Soviet Army Choir and Louis Armstrong performed in the same auditorium within a period of several weeks and from our observation the audience which the former attracted was considerably larger, although Louis Armstrong certainly stimulated more enthusiasm. We would also agree, however, that the significance of Soviet bloc activities in Mexico should not be exaggerated. Practically every political speech these days warns against "foreign ideologies" but this is directed to small numbers of students and intellectuals. The mass of the people are deeply religious and strongly nationalist. Much of the admiration for things Russian or for Communism that does exist can be explained at least in part as one means of resisting American influence and asserting Mexico's independence.

E. F. W. Peacock
The Embassy

DEC 18 1961

Form 182A (Rev. 2/52)

with whom the visitors came in contact have left-wing views or at least are not unsympathetic to these. The cultural efforts of the United States,moreover,are far from impressive, quite apart from the prejudice with which they are regarded, and those of the Europeans,with the possible exception of the French who are prepared to spend large sums on their cultural institutions, so often give the impression of having been designed for countries of secondary importance. Even if cultural displays can only have a limited impact they can be effective in counteracting unfavourable images throughout a much wider section of the population than the audiences which actually see them.

17. Evidently the bloc's efforts in all these fields must be watched closely. Side by side with the increasing Americanisation of life in Mexico,especially the life of the young,exist both a poltical prejudice against the Americans and what has been well described as a cultural antipathy to them. The young and intellectually curious in this country might well be influenced by British culture,ways of life and language, but the United Kingdom has evidently neither the resources nor the will to offer these on the scale required. A number could turn to the Soviet bloc, which appears to have both resources and will in abundance. The long-term effect,however,on this people of Indian and European traditions should not as yet at least be exaggerated. The Mexicans have a long history of resistance to foreign pressures and to the infiltration of foreign ideas, and there are strong counter-pressures at work with the backing of the Catholic Church. And if the efforts of the bloc continue to increase the Mexican Government may well begin to moderate the warmth of their welcome.

14. It is clear from the above that the bloc has been making a considerable effort. The question remains as to the impact which this is having in the commercial, political and cultural fields. Commercially the answer is clear: the impact has so far been practically nil. In spite of Mr. Mikoyan's pains, Soviet exports have only risen from 0.17 per cent of the total exports to Mexico in 1958 to 0.22 per cent in 1960. Mexican trade with the Soviet bloc, apart from China, has shown a negligible rise from 0.09 per cent of total Mexican trade in 1955 to 0.189 per cent in 1960. There has been much talk of closer commercial relations and greater exchanges whenever a mission from the bloc has come to Mexico, but so far the results have in practice been infinitesimal.

15. Politically, the results have been little better. The Mexicans are naturally effusive and will always play up to visitors both from a sense of hospitality and because they much want them to take away a good impression of Mexico and its people. Goodwill visits keep a country on the map and can have an impact if the Mexicans are particularly interested at the time in relations with that country. Missions from the United States, for instance, or from European countries which may help Mexico to become less dependent on the United States in some way can arouse interest. But in general the impact of visits of this kind is very small. The first visitors, who showed that the Russians were human beings like any other and were neither sub-human apes nor nine feet high, probably had some effect but this soon wore off. Members of subsequent Soviet missions have on the whole been stiff, dull and humourless and have bored their hosts without arousing any sympathy. Yuri Gagarin might, of course, have proved the exception, but perhaps fortunately he stayed in Cuba.

16. Culturally, however, the position is somewhat different. Not only have the ballet, folk dances and choirs themselves been popular as well as of a high standard, but many of those

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA. (DUPLICATE)

NUMBERED LETTER

UNCLASSIFIED

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I., CANADIAN EMBASSY, CARACAS, VENEZUELA.

Reference: OUR LETTERS NO. 478 OF NOV. 30, 1961 AND NO. 498 OF DECEMBER 11, 1961.

Subject: EXTREME LEFTIST ACTIVITY: COUNTER-MEASURES.

Security: .....

No: 508

Date: DEC. 13, 1961

Enclosures: .....

Air or Surface Mail: REG. MAIL

Post File No: 10.1.2

Ottawa File No. 50066-40

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References

ory 3397-40

The appearance of an extreme leftist group calling itself "Los Activistas" (The Activists) is causing something of a local sensation. Last week the group scattered handbills, signed simply "Los Activistas", announcing a campaign to kill a policeman a day. Since then the deaths of seven policemen have been reported. Two of them were killed in a bank robbery, which does not appear to be connected with this new terrorist gang's activities. However, the Activists apparently may take "credit" for the other deaths.

2. One Caracas policeman was shot down in cold blood in broad daylight by a youth, described by bystanders as being only about 15 years old. A Barcelona policeman was also shot in the back by a group of six assailants on Monday. Three others were killed during an armed assault on Sunday on a police office and jail at Urachiche, a village near San Felipe, capital of the state of Yaracuy. The press reports a survivor of this latter fight as believing the attackers came from Caracas, judging by their dress and manner of speaking. Nevertheless, the arrest of 40 known members of the Communist party in Urachiche and the neighbouring villages of Chivacoa and Caminare were announced yesterday.

Internal Circulation

3. A similar assault was made on Sunday night against the police station at San Antonio, a mountain hamlet some 20 kilometers south of Caracas, by a gang reported by the authorities to have numbered about 20 and to have been armed with machine guns and revolvers. There were no casualties. National Guardsmen pursued this group and captured 13 of them. The names of four, described officially as "communist and MIR politicians" were withheld from publication.

4. Last week, because of persistent minor outbreaks of violence by extreme leftist students, the state-operated high schools were declared closed until after the new year. Nevertheless, isolated demonstrations by relatively small groups of students have continued and several cars and buses have been burned. A 17-year-old student was shot in the head and killed and another wounded when police broke up one of these demonstrations on Monday. The demonstrators had been shouting "down with Kennedy" and other anti-American slogans and had burned an American flag.

Distribution to Posts

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Ext. 182C (Rev. 2 /52)

5. The Federation of University Student Centres of the Central University issued a communique yesterday declaring President Kennedy "persona non grata" and making a "patriotic appeal to students and Venezuelans to show their repudiation..." of United States intervention in the internal affairs of Latin American countries during Mr. Kennedy's visit to Venezuela next Saturday. The statement also assailed the acceptance by "the puppet government of President Romulo Betancourt" of assistance under the "Food for Peace" programme, which it describes as an attempt to undermine the economies of Latin American countries.

6. The several headquarters of the Communist party and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left remain occupied by police, a situation which has been sharply criticized by the major opposition party, the Republican Democratic Union (URD). A statement by the URD National Directorate demands the "revocation" of the measures taken by the government which it said could not be judged by the "simple appearance" but as a "first step directed towards the illegalization in the long run, or the reduction to impotence, of all political opposition forces" and the establishment of a "monopartidista" totalitarian regime under which it would be impossible to conduct a "free and democratic debate" prior to the next elections. "We know", the statement added, "that the measure which is taken today against the MIR and the Communist party may be taken and will be taken against URD or against any other opposition current, on any pretext, every time the government groups see themselves menaced in their control of power or in their ambition to continue in office, by the democratic and revolutionary upsurge of the opposition movement".

7. The Minister of Defence announced yesterday that the movement of additional units of the armed forces to reinforce the Caracas garrisons would begin today with the purpose of guaranteeing security in the metropolitan area during the visit of the United States' President. "As military men we will cooperate with calm firmness in the planning and execution of the measures", he said, "Our decision is to preserve by all possible means the national honour and dignity involved on this occasion in guaranteeing the personal security of President and Mrs. Kennedy".

8. A steady stream of transport aircraft has been landing troops all day today on the airfield of La Carlotta, immediately in front of the building in which our Chancery offices are located. Others, presumably are being brought in by motor transport.

A. D. ROSS

Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA. *(DUPLICATE)*

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Chargé d'affaires, a.i., Santiago, Chile.

Reference: None

Subject: Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chilean Communist Party.

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: 436

Date: December 12, 1961.

Enclosures: One

Air or Surface Mail: Courier

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.	
50066-40	
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References

ory 2346-40

On Friday, December 1st, the Central Committee of the Chilean Communist Party concluded a 3-day plenum held to consider the developments at the XXIInd Congress of the CPSU and to discuss the convocation of, and arrangements for, the XIIth National Congress of the Chilean Party early next year.

2. The major event of the meeting was a report by Luis Corvalan, the Secretary-General of the Party, on the XXIInd Congress in Moscow which he attended as leader of the Chilean Delegation. (The text, as reprinted in the communist newspaper EL SIGLO is attached). The Plenum was brought to a close with the Central Committee unanimously resolving to:

"1) Approve the report of the delegation which attended the XXIInd Congress of the CPSU and the Secretary-General's report to the Central Committee on the Congress;

2) to adopt as its own, the theses set out at the XXIInd Congress of the CPSU which constitute a valuable contribution to Marxist-Leninism and;

3) to re-affirm definitively the fidelity of the Communist Party of Chile to the principles of proletarian internationalism and its adhesion to the ideological and political unity of the workers and the communist movement and to the agreements reached at the Moscow Conferences in 1957 and 1960."

Internal Circulation

3. Although the Chinese Communists exert some influence on the Chilean Party, particularly through the Chilean-Chinese Cultural Institute which sponsors a flourishing cultural programme here, the Secretary-General's report on the XXIInd Congress and the Central Committee's unanimous approval of the ideological position sponsored by the CPSU at the Congress leave no doubt that the Chilean Communist Party remains a supporter of the orthodox Soviet line.

Distribution to Posts

4. The more relevant of Mr. Corvalan's remarks, in terms of Chile's domestic political scene, were those which re-affirmed the Chilean Communist Party's adherence to its "popular front" line. This tactical approach he justified on the grounds that Chile is now passing through a democratic, national, anti-

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(Ext.182C(Rev.2/52)

imperialist and anti-monopolist phase which cannot, for the moment, be harnessed by the Party and converted directly into a Socialist revolution. Lifting his terminology directly out of the current Soviet line on nationalist movements in underdeveloped nations, (as opposed to the Chinese approach) Corvalan emphasized to the Central Committee that the Chilean situation today must not be regarded as a classic bourgeois democratic movement but as a "nationalist popular movement of a new type". Since its return to legality three years ago, after ten years in limbo, the Chilean Communist Party has displayed a cautious, parliamentary approach, and has been, by a considerable margin, the most conservative element in "FRAP" the popular front coalition of left-wing partics. In addition to reflecting the Chilean Party's close adherence to the Moscow line, there are sound practical considerations which underly this conservative attitude - the main ones being that it is both the best organized and fastest growing party in FRAP and that, therefore, time would appear to be working in its favour. The apparent ease with which the Cuban Communist Party captured the Cuban National Revolution in less than 2 years, has, undoubtedly, also contributed to the Chilean Party's decision to play a waiting, parliamentary game for the time being.

L. HOUZER

Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.

FM HAVANA DEC4/61 CONFD

TO EXTERNAL 345 OPIMMED

CASTRO AND COMMUNISM

IN A FIVE-HOUR SPEECH ON THE SOON TO BE FORMED UNITED PARTY OF REVOLUTION CASTRO STATED BLUNTLY HIS UNQUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE OF MARXIST DOCTRINE AND PROCLAIMED THAT HE IS AND ALWAYS WILL BE A MARXIST-LENINIST.THE NEW REVOLUTIONARY PARTY IS TO BE AN ELITE GROUP OF TRAINED REVOLUTIONARIES WHO WILL CONTROL NATION THROUGH TRADE UNIONS,WOMENS,YOUTHS AND PEASANT ORGANIZATIONS,AND OTHER MASS ORGANIZATIONS.INITIALLY THE PARTY WILL CONSIST OF MEMBERS OF COMMUNIST PARTY AND PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH CASTROS REVOLUTION. CUBA WILL BENEFIT FROM CONTRIBUTIONS SOVIET EXPERIENCE HAS MADE TO LIVING SCIENCE OF MARXIST-LENINISM.CASTRO ALSO SAID ONE-MAN RULE IS TO END AND CUBA WILL BE GOVERNED BY COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP,THUS ENABLING IT TO AVOID DANGEROUS CULT OF PERSONALITY. CASTRO INSISTED THAT THERE IS NO RPT NO HALF WAY HOUSE BETWEEN COMMUNISM AND CAPITALISM,THAT ANY THIRD POSITION REPRESENTED COMPLICITY WITH IMPERIALISM.

2.CASTRO TRIED TO PUSH HIS MARXIST-LENINIST BELIEF AS FAR BACK INTO PAST AS POSSIBLE,ALTHOUGH HE DID ADMIT ONCE HOLDING UNJUSTIFIED SUSPICION OF COMMUNIST PARTY AS SECTARIAN.HE CLAIMED THAT HE HID HIS TRUE COLOUR IN ORDER TO GAIN WIDER SUPPORT.WE SUSPECT THAT CASTRO IS DECEIVING HIMSELF AS TO DEGREE OF HIS EARLIER COMMUNIST LEANINGS.IT IS MORE LIKELY THAT MARXIST ELEMENT IN HIS THOUGHTS INCREASED UNDER PRESSURE OF HIS DESIRE TO BE MOST REVOLUTIONARY OF ALL(NO RPT NO ENEMIES ON LEFT)AND HIS NEED TO MAINTAIN IN FACE OF OLD-LINE CUBAN COMMUNISTS HIS LEADERSHIP OF REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT WHICH IS NOW FIRMLY SET ON A MARXIST-LENINIST COURSE.THE COMMUNISTS APPEAR READY TO ACCEPT CASTRO AS A CONVERT BUT IT IS NOT RPT NOT CLEAR THEY REALLY WANT HIM AS THEIR BISHOP.

3.CASTRO REMAINS SYMBOL OF REVOLUTION.MOREOVER UNITY OF REVOLUTION-

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-ARY MOVEMENT COULD NOT RPT NOT FOR THE PRESENT BE MAINTAINED WITHOUT HIM, AND HIS LIEUTENANTS STILL OCCUPY MOST KEY POSTS. NEVER-THELESS HE MAY FIND HIMSELF GRADUALLY EASED FROM A POSITION OF POWER IF HE CANNOT RPT NOT EXERCISE IDEOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP OF NEW MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY.

4. THE SPEECH WOULD THUS SEEM TO RESULT WHOLLY FROM SUCH INTERNAL CONSIDERATIONS AND WAS MADE WITHOUT REGARD FOR DAMAGING EFFECTS IN LATINAMERICA AT A TIME WHEN CUBAN PROBLEM IS BEFORE OAS

KIDD

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY, MEXICO CITY

Reference: YOUR LETTER NO.DS322 OF OCTOBER 11.

Subject: RECENT TRENDS IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT.

Security: SECRET

No: 716

Date: NOVEMBER 30,1961.

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: AIR

Post File No: 9-4-2

Ottawa File No. 50066-40 ~~50028-V-4-10~~

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References

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DEC 7 1961

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

We were grateful to receive the copy of the Joint Intelligence Committee paper entitled "Recent Trends in the International Communist Movement". To some extent we operate in a vacuum where such subjects are concerned and anything you can send us fills a very real need. Our U.K. and U.S.colleagues are well briefed on international communist activities and in the case of the U.K.we know that some of the information they receive is passed on to the Mexican Foreign Ministry with apparently useful results. As you know the U.K.puts out a good deal of background material on Communist activities, most of which is unclassified. We recall in particular the regular U.K.studies of Communist front organizations, a publication which we would find of great value if it were possible to make copies available to us.

2. We agree with the conclusions of the study under reference as they effect Latin America, particularly the conclusion stated in paragraph 3 that "a major effort has been made by the world communist movement to extend the influence of communists and communist parties in the neutral and less-developed countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America through the tactic of supporting, in " a united front", those "bourgeois nationalist" leaders who are estimated to be amenable to Communist influence". Indeed the Mexican Communist Party (Partido Communista Mexicana) has virtually disappeared from view although it remains perfectly legal. Its newspaper, La Voz de Mexico, which is published irregularly appears to have little influence. The British Embassy estimates the membership of the party to be somewhere between four and five thousand (our letter No.362 of June 27,1960 provides information on the Mexican Communist party).

3. We would guess that the Communists are now operating through a recently formed political movement which calls itself the National Liberation Movement (our letter No.562 of September 7,1961 refers). This organization enjoys the support of the magazine Politica, certainly the most substantial organ of left wing opinion in Mexico. In recent months Politica has become more and more like a Communist party paper - it published the complete text of the re cpsa programme - although the N.L.M.itself has taken pains to identify itself with the Mexican Revolution which it accuses the present government of betraying. Ex-President Cardenas has given his patronage to the movement and it

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NO ENCLOSURES

is obviously through him that it hopes to gain popular support. Cardenas, as far as we know, is not a Communist.

4. Before the formation of the N.L.M. last August the main political "front" organization in Mexico was the Partido Popular Socialista, led by Lombardo Toledano. It did badly in the July elections and only this week its paper, El Popular, ceased publication. Toledano is almost certainly a Communist. But he has kept away from the N.L.M, whether out of spite or by design we don't know. Perhaps he is too identified with the by now discredited P.P.S.

5. We would guess that thus far Communist influence as expressed through the N.L.M. has not reached significant proportions. The trade unions remain under government control for the most part and there is little evidence of strong Communist infiltration into farmers' and peasants' organizations. On the other hand students, intellectuals and teachers are a potential source of unrest. They are by and large pro-Cuban and anti-American. We are told that this point of view finds a number of supporters in the middle and lower ranks of the civil service and is not unknown at the top.

6. We do not know too much about the activities of the Soviet and Cuban Embassies here except that the government has taken steps to prevent the mis-use of diplomatic bag facilities for propaganda purposes which would suggest that both Embassies, and probably the Czech Embassy as well, have been active in this field. The Soviet Embassy produces a great deal of information material but the Cuban Embassy appears to publish only a monthly bulletin. It runs a cultural institute which is quite active, however.

7. We have not been able to detect any effects in Mexico of the Russian-Chinese quarrel on the tactics to be followed in under-developed countries. The formation of the N.L.M. would appear to be a perfect example of how to implement Soviet doctrine on this subject. Mexico is theoretically model territory - traditional suspicion and dislike of the U.S and close proximity to Cuba for whose revolution there is instinctive admiration. On the other hand the Mexican left has always been stifled by the dominating influence of the Party of Revolutionary Institutions which with its progenitors has governed Mexico for forty years. At one time the Left may have hoped to take over the P.R.I. from within. Now it has apparently decided that the Cuban example provides sufficient impetus to help it break down the P.R.I. from without. Nobody yet is ready to admit this possibility. But it cannot be ruled out.

W.A. Irwin

Ambassador

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA. (DUPLICATE)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY, CARACAS, VENEZUELA.

Reference: PARAGRAPH 13 OF MY DESPATCH 462 NOV.22/61.

Subject: GOVERNMENT REACTION TO THE ACTIVITIES OF EXTREME LEFTISTS.

Security: UNCLASSIFIED

No: 478

Date: NOVEMBER 30, 1961

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: REG. AIR

Post File No:

Ottawa File No. 50066-40

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References

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

Stirred into activity by the Venezuelan government's action in severing diplomatic and consular relations with Cuba, extreme leftist elements have continued to agitate and to demonstrate their displeasure with the Betancourt administration.

2. The authorities have reacted firmly, and on November 28, following disturbances at a cemetery, police closed indefinitely the several Caracas headquarters buildings of both the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV) and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and the government announced the "suspension" of the new left wing tabloid newspaper "Clarin" for "subversive" activity and the use of phrases "insulting" to the government. (We had reported prematurely the demise of "Clarin" in our letter No. 456 of November 16, 1961, when it turned out that only copies of the previous day's issue had been confiscated and the editors detained for questioning at that time.) The Managing Director of "Clarin", Dr. Leonardo Montiel Ortega, has been arrested.

3. The leftist demonstrations, which were on a relatively small scale, marked the first anniversary of the partial suspension of constitutional guarantees and took the form of a march by students dressed in mourning clothes, to lay a wreath at the statue of Simon Bolivar in Plaza Bolivar. Subsequently a larger crowd of students and adults, including Fabricio Ojeda of the Democratic Republican Union (URD), Alcides Rodriguez, a Communist Municipal Councillor, and leftist leaders of the Federation of University Student Centres (FCU), paraded to the cemetery to honour the "martyrs" in the fight for the restoration of the guarantees. One of the "martyrs" is Livia Gouverneur, a Communist student who was mysteriously shot in the back during the attacks early this month by pro-Castro extremists on the houses being used to receive Cuban exiles.

4. The leaders of the crowd at the cemetery stressed to the police authorities present that it was a peaceful gathering and there would be no violence. However, the police sent for reinforcements and violence did in fact erupt as the group left the cemetery. On this occasion, police were equipped with the long Venezuelan machetes, the flats of which they used to good effect in dispersing the demonstrators.

5. During the police action in "occupying" the extreme leftist party offices, authorities report that a grenade was thrown by the occupants of the PCV headquarters in the district of Santa Rosalia and gunfire exchanged, which resulted in the death of two policemen and the wounding of several others. Another policeman was killed during the suppression of a demonstration in Catia.

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Ext. 182C (Rev. 2 /52)

6. There were further isolated outbreaks of student and teenagers violence yesterday, mainly along Avenida Sucre, which is the main route to the port of La Guaira and the international airport at Maiquetia, and in the Catia area. Several buses and cars were burned by the demonstrators. Outbreaks flared up again today in the same area, and this afternoon rumours are circulating that a number of persons were killed, the total ranging from two to seven. Tanks or armoured cars also are said to have been utilized today to keep this major traffic artery open.

7. On November 27, shortly after take-off, five teenaged youths commandeered at gun-point an AVENSA DC-6 airliner scheduled to fly from Maiquetia to Maracaibo and forced the pilot to make several passes over Caracas, while they showered the city with leaflets, and then to fly to Curacao, where the youths were taken into custody by Netherlands Antilles' authorities. The youths, identified officially as German Bracamonte, Antonio Paiva Reinoso, Rubín Basilio Palma Delgado, Efrain Enrique León Ascanio and José Rafael Bosque Figueroa, told the passengers that their act in seizing the aircraft was the signal for the beginning of "Operation Livia Gouverneur", a campaign against the government's "repressions". After a Venezuelan Foreign Ministry spokesman was quoted by the press as saying the return of the five extremists would be sought from the Dutch authorities, it was subsequently announced that the Foreign Ministry would cooperate with Curacao authorities in prosecuting them under new Netherlands Antilles' law which could result in jail sentences of up to ten years.

8. The extremist-controlled FCU denied having any part in the "hijacking" or that the youngsters concerned were FCU militants, but hailed the escapade enthusiastically.

9. To date government officials and police authorities decline to state for how long the extremist parties' offices will be "occupied" or to give the names or numbers of persons arrested. "El Mundo" this afternoon estimates that some 300 persons have been detained.

A. D. ROSS

Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

(3)

ACCESS SECTION / SECTION DE L'ACCES

DOCUMENT REMOVED FROM FILE / DOCUMENT RETIRE DU DOSSIER

RG 25 Acc 90-91/008 Vol 178 File/Dossier 50066-40 pt5

Description of document/Description du document

US/NATO paper

No. of Pages/Nbre de pages 19 Date 8/11/61

Access to Information Act/Reason for Removal

Loi sur l'acces a l'information/Retrait en vertu de

Exemption/Exception 13(1)

Review Officer/Agent(e) d'examen DEA/lb

ACCESS SECTION / SECTION DE L'ACCES

DOCUMENT REMOVED FROM FILE / DOCUMENT RETIRE DU DOSSIER

RG 25 Acc 90-91/008 Vol 178 File/Dossier 50066-40 pt5

Description of document/Description du document

NATO Paris Telegram 1875

No. of Pages/Nbre de pages 2 Date 18/7/61

Access to Information Act/Reason for Removal

Loi sur l'acces a l'information/Retrait en vertu de

Exemption/Exception 13(1)

Review Officer/Agent(e) d'examen DEA/lb

ACCESS SECTION / SECTION DE L'ACCES

DOCUMENT REMOVED FROM FILE / DOCUMENT RETIRE DU DOSSIER

RG 25 Acc 90-91/008 Vol 178 File/Dossier 50066-40 pt5

Description of document/Description du document

DL (1) memo.

No. of Pages/Nbre de pages 2 Date 18/7/61

Access to Information Act/Reason for Removal

Loi sur l'acces a l'information/Retrait en vertu de

Exemption/Exception 13(1)

Review Officer/Agent(e) d'examen DEA/lb

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ETAT EXTERNAL

OTTAWA

95 PRESIDENT'S SPEECH IN MAJOR ADDRESS LAST NIGHT PRESIDENT BALAGUER ANNOUNCED TERMINATION OF ERA OF TRUJILLO PROJECTED ABOLITION OF THE PARTIDO DOMINICANO AND THE TRANSFER OF ITS PROPERTIES TO THE STATE VIRTUAL SUPPERESSION OF SECRET POLICE INSTITUTION OF NECESUARY (BUT UNSPECIFIED) ECONOMIC REFORMS AND RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF

DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION THE PRESIDENT SPOKE OF CONSULTATION WITH THE UCN AND PRO WITH A VIEW TO ADOPTING A SATISFACTORY FORMULA FOR GOVERNMENT HE ATTRIBUTED THE DEFEAT OF THE RECENT ATTEMPTED REVERSION TO DICTATORSHIP TO CALM AMINTAINED BY POPULATION AND TO THE LOYALTY AND CIVIC SPIRIT OF THE

MAJORITY OF THE ARMED FORCES 2 HE DESCRIBED MANY OF YESTERDAY'S DISORDERS AS COMMUNIST INSPIRED AND COMMENDED RESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOUR OF UCN PRD AND A MODERATE FRACTION OF THE 14TH OF JUN 3 IN REGARD TO ROLES OF USS FLEET HE SAID THAT THEIR ARRIVAL WAS UNEXPECTED BUT SALUTORY AND THAT

THE DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT DID NOT REQUEST "THE PRESENCE OF US SHIPS BUT HAS NOT PROTESTED NEIGTHER PROPOSES TO PROTEST BECAUSE IT CONSIDERS THAT THEIR PRESENCE IS HELPFUL FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND THE CARIBBEAN AREA AGAINST COMMUNIS AND CUBAN INFILTRATION DESIGNED TO SUBVERT NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS" HE DECLARED THAT THESE SHIPS AT NO TIME ENTERED TERRITORIAL WATERS

DOMCAN

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA. *(DUPLICATE)*

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, Ciudad Trujillo, Dominican Republic.

Reference: Our letters 106 of June 8 and 121 of July 3, 1961.

Subject: Newspaper Libertad of the Movimiento Popular Dominicano.

Security: Confidential

No: 164

Date: September 12, 1961

Enclosures: 1

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No. 50066-40

98

References

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

Org 3493

The Movimiento Popular Dominicano, generally regarded as a Castro or communist oriented party, has published two issues of its newspaper Libertad. A copy of the first issue is attached.

2. The leading article is an attack on members of the Union Civica Nacional and the 14th of June party who are alleged to have called upon the United States to intervene in the Dominican Republic "to safeguard their riches, their wicked interests, their mansions with swimming pools and other privileges" of the bourgeoisie. (The UCN have categorically denied this allegation although some UCN members privately expressed the view that they believe intervention is the only means of dislodging the Trujillos). In its editorial the newspaper professes to be non-communist however in some respects it resembles a communist tract. The poor are told that a beneficial change is only possible through revolution. Other sections are devoted to reviling the American menace to Dominican sovereignty and the well being of the Dominican under-privileged.

3. The Movimiento Popular Dominicano, organized in Havana in 1956, was established in Ciudad Trujillo in July 1960 at the invitation of Trujillo who apparently hoped that a threat of communism within the country would be a useful lever in his efforts to restore American support. During this time several issues of a mimeographed Libertad were produced. It would now appear that Ramfis and possibly other elements in the government are deliberately encouraging the publication of Libertad for the same purpose. The allegation is more plausible when it is recalled that the government promulgated a decree in July outlawing all communist activity and "parties, societies or associations dedicated to or propagating communist or anarchist doctrines through whatever means such as meetings and publications". Given the terms of this decree (our letter 151 of August 11) and the nature of Libertad's articles, its publication could have been prevented, and probably without unduly antagonizing the other opposition parties. Some Dominicans are convinced that Ramfis underwrites some of the costs of publishing Libertad.

4. Following the burning of Radio Caribe which the government blamed on the MPD but has been unable or

(Ext. 182C(Rev. 2/52)

unwilling to follow up with effective prosecution the party's overt activities appear to have been confined to the publication of Libertad.

W. B. McCULLOUGH
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

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cc 12797-40

FM LDN AUG28/61 CONFD

TO EXTERNAL 3111 PRIORITY

BAS HAVANA FM OTT

CUBA

PROFESSOR COHEN, WHILE ENROUTE TO LDN LAST WEEK, ENCOUNTERED QUAISON-SACKEY, HEAD OF GHANA MISSION TO UN. IN COURSE OF CONVERSATION HE MADE EXTREMELY FLATTERING REFS TO FIDEL CASTRO SUGGESTING THAT HE IS THE GARABALDI OF HIS PEOPLE. QUAISON-SACKEY SAID THAT IN ORDER TO PREVENT CASTROS ELIMINATION BY THE EXTREME LEFT IN CUBA HE MUST BE GIVEN SUPPORT; OTHERWISE THE COMMUNISTS ARE LIKELY EVENTUALLY TO ACHIEVE OPEN POLITICAL CONTROL WHICH THEY PRESENTLY DO NOT RPT NOT HAVE AND IN HIS OPINION WILL NOT RPT NOT HAVE SO LONG AS CASTRO REMAINS THE EFFECTIVE LEADER

ROGERS

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA. *(DUPLICATE)*

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy
Mexico City, D.F.

Reference: Our Letter No.160 of March 17, 1961

Subject: Latin American Peace Conference.

Security: Restricted

No: 526

Date: August 22, 1961

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No: 9-2-12

Ottawa File No.	
50066-40	
96	✓

References

OY 6729-40

The First National Conference for National Sovereignty, Economic Emancipation and Peace, was held in Mexico City on August 4 and 5. This meeting was the national counterpart of the Latin American conference by the same name which was held in this city from March 5 - 8, 1961. Approximately 200 delegates attended.

2. The leftist magazine Politica in its August 1 edition stated that the conference had been called by the "Provisional Committee" (whose address it gave as República del Salvador 30-301, Mexico, D.F.) and would be attended by representatives from the regional committees which had been established throughout the entire Republic. The magazine further reported that the Conference had the following purposes: to define the objectives set forth for action by the Committee; to determine the characteristics of the national organization; and to agree upon a programme of common action by which to accomplish the objectives set forth by the earlier Latin American Conference.

Internal Circulation

3. As with the March conference, the name most prevalent in the press was that of former president Lázaro Cardenas, who was Honorary President of the Conference. Press coverage was, however, extremely limited, being confined in the Federal District to four newspapers, of which only the socialist journal, El Popular, gave the conference headline coverage. The others limited themselves for the most part to short quotations of Cardenas' remarks concerning the unlikelihood of world war and the lack of "communist infiltration in Latin America".

4. Cardenas, on the opening night, told the delegates not to become alarmed by war preparations announced by various countries. He apparently based his optimism on the deterrent effects of nuclear weapons. These "would involve the world in a conflagration even more disastrous" than previous wars.

Distribution to Posts

5. On Communist infiltration into Latin America, he said that it does not so much as exist. He stated that charges of Communist infiltration are inventions of imperialist countries "which turn to our countries so as to profit by our riches and cheap labour". The peoples of Latin America should therefore unite to defend themselves against the imperialist forces as without economic

(Ext. 182C(Rev. 2/52)

/2.

emancipation there could be no political independence. In order to obtain political independence, it is necessary to attain complete land reform, to eliminate private monopolies, and to have financial and technical aid without "prejudicial conditions".

6. Cardenas also spoke in favour of the Castro government stating that all Latin American countries are in accord with "heroic Cuba that was able to repulse the foreign invasion because of the unity of her own people".

7. In contrast to the interest generated by the previous conference this meeting went relatively unnoticed. Our colleagues in the American Embassy simply said that the meeting was "a complete flop". The U.K. Embassy told us that there was no doubt but that the lack of publicity was due to a definite "muffling order" from the Government, similar to that issued to the press prior to the Latin American Conference.

8. We understand that the current edition of Politica contains several pages devoted to the Conference. We shall summarize this material as soon as we receive our copy of the magazine and send it to you by air envelope.

W. A. IRWIN

Ambassador

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Security Confidential

50066-40		
96	—	—

Type of Document Letter No. 215 Date 26 July 61

From Lima Peru

To L.A. Div

Subject: Bolivian background: Political Economic & Social

Original on File No. 3881-40

Copies on File No. 5443-40

Other Cross Reference Sheets on ✓

Prepared by Don Henson

Ext. 308

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Security Confidential

50066-40		
96	—	—

Type of Document Letter No. 182 Date 14 July 61

From Bogota, Colombia

To Latin American Div

Subject: Visit of Cedric Stevenson to Latin America - Colombia

Original on File No. 2002-40

Copies on File No. 7296-A-40

Other Cross Reference Sheets on 2002-A-40

Prepared by W. Stevenson

Ext. 308

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Security Confidential

50066-40		
96	—	—

Type of Document Letter No. 178 Date 5 July 61

From Lewis Perry

To Walter Cameron Alex

Subject: Policy on Cuba

Original on File No. 3756-40

Copies on File No. 2002-40

Other Cross Reference Sheets on ✓

Prepared by M. Hunter

Ext. 308

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA. *(DUPLICATE)*

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, Ciudad Trujillo, Dominican Republic.

Reference: Our letter No.106 of June 8, 1961.

Subject: Communism in the Dominican Republic.

Security: Confidential

No: 121

Date: July 3, 1961

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.	
57066-40	
56	✓

OT 3493-40

References

In paragraph 2 of our letter under reference it was suggested that the Movimiento Popular Dominicano was securely in the hands of Trujillo's stooges. This letter is intended to qualify that statement. Although the party was thoroughly infiltrated by members of the secret police (Servicio Intelligensia Militar), we have recently been informed on good authority that the Director of the Movimiento, Maximo Lopez Molina, has communist associations. In all probability, his activities remain rigidly circumscribed.

JOHN W. GRAHAM
The Embassy.

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

(Ext. 182C(Rev. 2/52)

50066-40
31

FM WASHDC JUN28/61 UNCLAS

TO EXTERNAL 2077 PRIORITY

INFO AIRMAIL MEXICO LIMA SANTIAGO BAIRES MVIDEO SAOPAULO RIO PORTAUPRINCE TRUJILLO CARACAS PORTOFSPAIN BOGOTA QUITO SANJOSE GUATEMALA FM WASHDC

orig. on 2002-40

BAG HAVANA FM OTT

AMBASSADOR STEVENSONS LATINAMERICAN TOUR

AMBASSADOR STEVENSON ADDRESSED A LUNCHEON GATHERING AT THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB ON MON JUN26. FOLLOWING ARE THE HIGHLIGHTS OF HIS SPEECH, THE FULL TEXT OF WHICH IS BEING FORWARDED BY BAG.

2. THE OBJECTIVE OF HIS TRIP, STEVENSON SAID QUOTE WAS TO CONSULT ON THE PLANNING FOR THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS MEETING PRESENTLY TO TAKE PLACE IN URUGUAY NEXT MONTH, AND TO CONSIDER ALL THE WAYS AND MEANS OF IMPROVING COOPERATION BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTHAMERICA UNQUOTE.

3. WHILE STEVENSON FOUND THAT QUOTE ALMOST EVERY COUNTRY UNQUOTE HE VISITED WAS UNDER DEMOCRATIC CONTROL, SOME OF THE REGIMES THEREIN WERE UNDER QUOTE SEVERE STRAINS UNQUOTE ENDANGERING POLITICAL STABILITY. IN THIS CONNECTION HE MENTIONED THAT COMMUNISM AND CASTROISM HAD MADE GAINS SINCE HIS LAST TRIP TO LATINAMERICA SOME FIFTEEN MONTHS AGO. HE VOICED THE HOPE THAT HIS MISSION HAD DEMONSTRATED QUOTE THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF RECREATING CONFIDENCE IN A COLLECTIVE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEMS OF COMMUNIST SUBVERSION AND OF INDIRECT AGGRESSION IF THE INTERAMERICAN SYSTEM HAS ANY HOPE OF SURVIVAL UNQUOTE.

4. LEFTIST PENETRATION HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY ACTIVE AMONG UNIVERSITY STUDENTS PROFESSORS SCHOOL TEACHERS AND LABOUR UNIONS, HE REPORTED.

5. QUOTE THR PROCLAIMED GOALS OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION UNQUOTE ATTRACTED QUOTE VERY WIDESPREAD POPULAR SYMPATHY UNQUOTE STEVENSON FOUND AND THE PEOPLE SHOWED QUOTE LITTLE APPRECIATION OF THE SOVIETIZATION OF THE CUBAN REGIME UNQUOTE. THERE SEEMED TO BE A GOOD DEAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE TRUE CHARACTER OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CUBA.

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6. STEVENSON REITERATED USA ADMINS STAND VIS A VIS CASTRO IN SAYING THAT THE CUBAN PROBLEM WAS NOT RPT NOT A BILATERAL ONE BETWEEN CUBA AND USA BUT QUOTE ONE OF CONCERN TO ALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS, AFFECTING LATINAMERICA EVEN MORE THAN USA UNQUOTE THE FORMER BEING EXPOSED TO INDIRECT AGGRESSION.

7. ON THE ABORTIVE INVASION OF APR LAST STEVENSON SAID THAT IT DID NOT RPT NOT QUOTE ENHANCE LATINAMERICAN OPINION ABOUT USA UNQUOTE BECAUSE THE PRINCIPLE OF NON INTERVENTION QUOTE IS STILL A CARDINAL ARTICLE OF FAITH THROUGHOUT OUR GOOD NEIGHBORHOOD UNQUOTE.

8. ON THE MATTER OF COLLECTIVE ACTION AGAINST CUBA, STEVENSON REPORTED THAT IT WAS QUOTE GENERALLY AND STRONGLY FELT THAT NO RPT NO COLLECTIVE ACTION COULD BE OFFICIALLY CONSIDERED UNTIL THE ECONOMIC CONFERENCE (IN URUGUAY) WAS CONCLUDED AND HAD DEMONSTRATED ITS SUCCESS AS A MAJOR STEP TOWARD ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOP-MENT UNQUOTE. AS TO THE POSSIBILITY OF COLLECTIVE ACTION AFTER THE IA-ECOSOC MEETING, STEVENSON SAID THAT IT WAS QUOTE QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THERE WILL BE STRONG LEADERSHIP IN LATINAMERICA TO DEAL WITH THIS NEW FORM OF OUTSIDE INTERVENTION UNDER THE RIO PACT IN THE TREATIES CONSTITUTING THE SYSTEM OF THE AMERICAS UNQUOTE. TO BE MEANINGFUL HOWEVER, SUCH ACTION WOULD HAVE TO HAVE THE SUPPORT OF ARGENTINA BRAZIL AND MEXICO, THE AMBASSADOR ADDED.

9. AS REGARDS THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS, STEVENSON REPORTED THAT HE QUOTE ENCOUNTERED A UNANIMOUS AND INTENSE INTEREST UNQUOTE IN IT. HE POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WAS QUOTE NO RPT NO CLEAR OR UNIFORM DEFINITION UNQUOTE AS TO WHAT WOULD MAKE A SUCCESS OF IT. HE SINGLED OUT COLOMBIA CHILE BRAZIL AND QUOTE PERHAPS VENEZUELA UNQUOTE AS BEING WELL IN ADVANCE OF THEIR SISTER NATIONS QUOTE IN TERMS OF TECHNICAL WORK ON LONG TERM PROGRAMMING FOR NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT UNQUOTE.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, Montevideo, Uruguay.

Reference:

Subject: Call on Colombian Ambassador, Sr. José Joaquín Gori.

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: 128

Date: June 28, 1961.

Enclosures: -

Air or Surface Mail: Courier

Post File No:

XL | To: Mr. Hest | JUL 19 1961

Ottawa File No. 50066-40

96 | 96

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References
CAN. EMBASSY - WASH
COMMONWEALTH EUROPEAN DIST. (1 Sr.)
REFER TO: INV.

O/~~RM (MR. ROBINSON)~~
O/SSEA (MR. CAMPBELL)
USSEA
MR. RITCHIE
~~ECONOMIC~~
U.S.A. DIVISION
D.L. (2
LIAISON SERVICES
ALL LATIN AMERICAN POSTS
CCOS (6)
~~Trade~~
~~BANK~~
~~FINANCE~~
JIB
~~NDC (VIA L.O.)~~
LATIN AMERICAN/

File
Gori Invest
Aug 2/61

Internal Circulation
Donald

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Distribution to Posts
BUENOS AIRES

I called today on the Colombian Ambassador, Sr. José Joaquín Gori, who before his appointment to Montevideo a few months ago was the Director General of the Foreign Ministry in Bogota. Sr. Gori is a short and tiny man who at first gives the impression of being rather unobtrusive and self-retiring. In the course of our conversation, however, he soon gave signs of great mental alertness. He is perfectly fluent in English and most of our conversation was carried out in that language.

2. The main political problem discussed was Cuba. In Sr. Gori's view, Castro is definitely not a communist. "Castro", he said, "is but Castro", a sort of paranoiac with exaggerated political ambitions who could not really become a stooge of international Communism. He recognized that Castro had been accepting Soviet economic and military aid but only because he had no alternative sources of supply and because such aid was offered to him so lavishly. However, he thought that Castro was proving to be more of a liability than an asset to the Soviets and that the latter were already becoming nervous about his unstability and unreliability. He was sure that the Russians would never start a war over Cuba and that they would never make available to Castro military or other secrets. He recognized that Castro was a headache for the United States and the whole of Latin America but that the best way of dealing with him was "to bide our time" until the bluff is called off. Latin American people, he said, are too much independently-minded to ever become communist in the sense that the Soviets would like them to become.

3. I thought that Sr. Gori's remarks on Cuba might be of interest to you since he gave me every indication that he was strongly anti-Communist. He made no bones about his feelings about the communist dictatorship in Russia and the suffering which the communist regime has imposed on the Russian people. He even went so far as to question the authenticity of the recent Russian achievement in launching a man into outer space. He felt quite convinced that the Russians had not in fact been successful in their attempt and that this was merely another of their propaganda efforts to outdo the Americans!

F.X. Houde

F.X. Houde,
Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.

Ext. 182A (Rev. 2/52)

NO ENCLOSURES

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA. *(DUPLICATE)*

NUMBERED LETTER

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: CANADIAN EMBASSY
CIUDAD TRUJILLO

Reference: Our tel. 32 of June 8 and our let. 106 of June 8

Subject: The return of Dominican exiles

Security:
No: 119
Date: June 28, 1961
Enclosures:
Air or Surface Mail:
Post File No:

Ottawa File No.
50066-40
31 ✓

References

Orig. on 3493-40

In statements made shortly after the assassination, both President Balaguer and General Trujillo Jr. gave assurances that Dominican exiles would be permitted to return insofar as this was consistent with public order. In reply to a question at a press conference on June 13th, President Balaguer elaborated that exiles would be entitled to the full constitutional guarantees of the Republic as long as "they did not attempt to foment communist revolution nor act as agents for foreign governments". Thus far, to our knowledge, no Dominican exiles have arrived to test the value of these assurances. Dominican exiles are widely scattered and their organization splintered into small groups of widely varying political complexion. Under present circumstances, it is unlikely that the Dominican government would welcome them in any significant numbers.

2. On June 15th, the New York Times reported that in conformity with this policy the government had issued invitations to Juan Bosch, Nicolas Silfa and Angel Miolan "to return from exile to organize a campaign for the election (1962)" and to set up opposition newspapers. Over the weekend we had been informed that the three had arrived in the capital. However, an officer of the U.S. Consulate has told us that they are presently in San Juan, Puerto Rico, negotiating with the Dominican Consul - presumably the terms of their admission and scope of permissible activities. There are conflicting reports about their political associations, i.e. are, were, are not, communist. An Argentine colleague (Consul) told us that Silfa was a member of the communist party organized in the Dominican Republic in 1942 and subsequently took part in the abortive invasion at Luperon in 1949. Our U.S. informant says that they are not presently regarded as dangerous by the State Department. If and when they come we expect that they will find themselves on a very short leash.

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

The Embassy

(Ext. 182C(Rev. 2/52)

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, Bogotá

Reference:

Subject: Communist Controlled Areas in Colombia

XL To: Mr. Fulford JUL 3 1961

Security: Confidential

No: 163

Date: June 26, 1961

Enclosures: none

Air or Surface Mail: air

Post File No: 15-12

Ottawa File No. 50066-40 ~~3456-40~~

31 | 31

References

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

XL

I received a visit last week from a leading businessman of the Cali area (Mr. A.E.B. Lawrence, who is also the Honorary British Consul in Cali) who informed me that the authorities in that area are quite disturbed by the development of a third Communist controlled zone in the country. (The others are a small section around Viotá, about 40 miles southwest of the capital, and a larger one in the Sumapaz area, lying about 100 miles south of Bogotá.)

2. This new and larger area controlled by the Communists stretches down the central mountain range from approximately Nogales to east of Popayan. It comprises an area of about 150 miles long by 70 miles wide. Just recently the Governor of the important Valle province paid a visit to the town of Miranda, which is at the mid-point of this area, and was astounded to be received by the Communist leaders of the area, surrounded by an honour guard with uniforms, rifles, etc. So far, this group of Communists has not been very militant, but it appears that they are trying to establish a bridgehead between the southern part of their territory and the River Naya, which flows through the coastal mountain range, on the border between the Valle and Cauca provinces, to the Pacific Ocean. Mr. Lawrence and the Colombian officials of the Valle area feel that, if this bridgehead is established, the Communists will then be able to receive shipments of arms and other supplies through the many unofficial landing spots at the Naya River mouth.

3. It would appear that there may be a pattern developing for the establishment of Communist controlled areas in the Andes all down the west coast of South America. There are, for example, reports of Peasant Leagues becoming better organized in large areas of Chile; discontent and manifestations in Peru; a small force of Communists were recently captured in the mountains of Ecuador while undergoing training; and

now the Communists have gained control of a relatively large section of Colombia. Could it be that the day is approaching when, at a given signal, these Andean forces will sweep down from the mountains and try to overthrow, individually or or all at one time, all the Latin republics bordering the Pacific?

John H. Bailey
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Security Confidential

50066-40		
96	-	—

Type of Document: Letter No. 106 Date: 8 June 61

From: Cirilo Trujillo

To: Inter American Div

Subject: Alleged agreement between Castro + Trujillo - Communism in the Dominican Republic

Original on File No. 10228-40

Copies on File No. 3493-40

Other Cross Reference Sheets on —

Prepared by: Don Hewer

Ext. 308

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA. (DUPLICATE)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY MEXICO CITY.D.F.

Reference:

Subject: Our Letter No.327 of June 1,1961 Guatemalan Complaint against Possible Invasion from Mexico.

Security: UNCLASSIFIED

No: 331

Date: JUNE 5,1961

Enclosures: 1

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.	
55066-40	
96	—

References

cy 10499-40
cy 2226-F-40

Attached is an office translation of an unofficial text of a Note delivered by the Guatemalan Ambassador, Umberto Garcia Galvez to Manuel Tello, the Mexican Foreign Minister on June 2.

2. The Note states that the Guatemalan Government has received information to the effect that troops are being trained on Mexican soil for an invasion of Guatemala. The Note specifies the land is owned by ex-President Cardenas and further states that Raul Castro has been in Mexico and in contact with the troops in question.

3. The Note goes on to say that ex-President Arbenz in a radio broadcast from Havana on May 30 announced that an invasion of Guatemala was imminent. This is taken as confirmation that the troops are being trained under the patronage of Fidel Castro. The Guatemalan Government requests the Mexican authorities to take the necessary steps to halt activities which could endanger relations between the two countries.

W. A. IRWIN

Ambassador.

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

(Ext. 182C(Rev. 2/52)

Guatemala's Note to the Mexican Government.

"My Government is extremely worried because it has received information, which has been confirmed by the press, that on land owned by ex-President General Lázaro Cárdenas, men are being trained for an invasion of Guatemalan territory, with the purpose of undermining public order.

"It is known that these men are being trained in the same places and in the same way in which the Cuban "guerrillas" of the Sierra Maestra were trained and which carried Fidel Castro to power.

"The situation is even more serious with the news that Mr. Raúl Castro, head of the Cuban Armed forces, came to Mexican territory to get in touch with the troops that are being trained on lands owned by General Cárdenas to invade Guatemala.

"Furthermore, ex-President Arbenz spoke over the radio from Havana on May 30th, announcing that an invasion by land and air of Guatemalan territory would soon take place. This further confirms the information of this Government that on the Mexican-Guatemalan border mercenary invasion troops are being trained under the patronage of dictator Fidel Castro, ex-President Cárdenas and Guatemalan communists.

"The Government of my country wishes to maintain the best relations with the illustrious Government of Mexico and for this reason presents these facts to Your Excellency, so that the Mexican authorities may take the necessary steps to halt such activities which may endanger the friendly relations existing between our two countries.

"My government is sure that the Mexican Government will give this matter due consideration because of the consequences that may arise".

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA. (DUPLICATE)

DESPATCH

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Ambassador, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Reference:

Subject: Frondizi on Communism and the O.A.S. - Comment by his adviser on foreign affairs.

cf. 3134-40
cf 7296-40
cf 3422-40
cf 6605-A-40

CONFIDENTIAL

Security:

No: 301

Date: June 5, 1961

Enclosures: Air

Air or Surface Mail:

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.	
50066-40	
96	✓

References

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

On May 31st I took the opportunity of a luncheon conversation with the President's adviser on foreign affairs, Ambassador Adolfo Scilingo, to seek information on Frondizi's views regarding Cuba and the importance that topic assumed in his recent, and continuing, consultations with other South American Presidents.

2. I was also curious to know what Scilingo might have to say about newspaper stories of a rift between him and Frondizi, in which his resignation had been forecast. Summarized below are the essential points developed by Scilingo in the course of our talk.

CONCERNING CUBA AND COMMUNISM

3. In numerous references, Scilingo made it plain that President Frondizi, the government and the Armed Forces, were keenly aware of the danger which the Communist bridgehead in Cuba posed for all Latin American governments. "In Cuba, after all, we have seen how a Latin American nation can turn Communist overnight". While this development had awakened apprehension throughout the hemisphere, it varied in degree from one country to another. The continent was divided, for a variety of reasons, on the attitude to be adopted vis-à-vis Castro and his government.

4. There was no doubt whatever in the Argentine government's mind that this attitude should be one of firm opposition. There were no really effective means whereby Latin America could defend itself at present against the spread of Castroism, and Soviet penetration. The oft-quoted principle of non-intervention, which Argentina had defended and would continue to maintain, only partly applied in the case of Cuba since the Cuban revolution involved more than the self-determination of a people, posing as it did a serious threat of ideological aggression and subversion for the Americas.

5. United States policy, of course, had been inept from the outset of the conflict with Cuba, and especially unfortunate in the phase which began with the rupturing of diplomatic relations over a technicality (in which the Latin Americans could hardly support them), and ended so lamentably in the abortive invasion attempt last month. In the first place, if they had chosen their grounds for a break with greater wisdom they might have gained substantial Latin American backing; in the second place, a better prepared and successful invasion would have presented Latin America with a fait accompli which the majority of countries would have been relieved to accept.

Ext. 180C (Rev. 2/52)

6. But all this was now beside the point. One had to go on from here, and it was undeniable that both Castro and Communism had gained from this interlude of U.S. ineptness and Latin American inertia. Without compounding the follies of the past, an attempt had to be made not only to contain Communism by political measures but also to eliminate the economic and social conditions so favourable to its spread. The United States had a primary authority and responsibility in both these endeavours and seemed ready to shoulder it, but Latin America also had a key role to play in the defense and betterment of the American way of life. This was the essence of President Frondizi's thought and conviction on the subject, and the basis of his appeal for Latin American support of U.S. efforts, as for an effective Latin American partnership in this continental undertaking. It would be folly to try to deny the United States in this region a responsibility and leadership which are acknowledged by more powerful nations in richer and better developed areas. These attitudes of the past were hardly consonant with current needs.

ON FRONDIZI'S TRAVELS

7. This then was the background of facts and ideas that impelled President Frondizi to begin, some months ago, a series of consultations with Argentina's South American neighbours, which he intends to pursue. So far, he has seen the Presidents of Brazil, Uruguay and Bolivia, and he intends shortly to visit those of Paraguay and Chile. This exercise has already earned him serious criticism at home from people who believe he is lowering Argentina's prestige by gadding about in this fashion, like a travelling salesman. Among these critics is General Aramburu, former interim President and expected candidate to the Presidency in 1964, who sent Frondizi a lecturing letter on the subject.

8. The circumstances of the meeting with Quadros seem to be at the origin of this storm in a teacup. It appears that the President of Brazil wrote to Frondizi saying he would like to meet with him within three weeks if possible, and suggested that Frondizi come to Brazil since it would be difficult for him (Quadros) to obtain Congressional approval to leave the country. Argentine pride considers it demeaning for Frondizi to have been so accommodating to Quadros. His critics say he should have declined the suggestion, countering that he was busy and would be glad to welcome Quadros in Buenos Aires as soon as he could come there.

9. President Frondizi, however, is made of sterner stuff, and no stickler over protocol when he has a serious objective in mind. He is always ready even to court some unpopularity to achieve his ends, his rejoinder being: "They may not realize it today, but later on they'll see I was right". The purpose in this case is to stimulate throughout Latin America greater awareness of the political danger which confronts it from Cuba, and of the opportunities which the situation offers in respect of economic and social development. He was particularly concerned to try to keep Brazil on the track at this juncture, at least to prevent any ill-considered moves. Argentina had heard rumours of "Brazilian initiatives, in concert with Mexico" to try to patch up the U.S.-Cuban conflict without impairing Castro's domination. Both these countries were too soft toward Castro in the opinion of many Argentines for whom the problem would be to "help the Cuban people by eliminating Castro". The talks were not too successful in that respect, the Brazilians having subsequently interpreted in their own way the terms of the joint declaration made by the Presidents at the end of the meeting in Uruguayana.

10. Scilingo added that in this matter of Cuba the President had the full and energetic backing of the Armed Forces for once, and that Argentina had been the first to raise the question of unseating Cuba in the Inter-American Defence Board. He also revealed that Argentina was on the point of breaking off relations with Cuba last year when Raúl Roá made his insulting and vulgar attack against Frondizi at the U.N., but that they were dissuaded from taking this step by the United States.

CONCERNING THE O.A.S.

11. Connected with all this in Argentina's view is the ineffectiveness of the O.A.S. in coping with situations of that kind. The executive and administrative personnel of the Organization are unsuited for such a job, and the O.A.S. itself, which is the natural and only proper venue for settling American problems, would have to be tightened in the sense of a closer partnership of all members to replace the old system of attempted political domination by one big power resisted by all the rest. Canada's entrance would do much to raise the Organization's moral tone and practical approach, by providing a balancing factor which has been lacking all along. Argentina would be most pleased at Canada's joining.

PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT

12. In the first part of the conversation, he had given the impression of sharing Aramburu's viewpoint on the President's Latin American consultations, and this may not be unrelated to their reported falling out. He admitted that he and Frondizi had quarrelled: "You know, the President and I often disagree about this and that...", but indicated that he was not resigning. Scilingo did not pursue the subject but I noticed that his manner throughout had seemed slightly embarrassed, so it seems probable that the newspaper report was well founded. He seemed in good spirits, however, and it is possible that he may have found a way to weather the storm.

COMMENT

13. I believe there was a good bit of window dressing in Scilingo's remarks, particularly in the build-up he gave the President which at one or two points had overtones of hero-worship. This is hardly consonant with the character of an Argentine as old and experienced as he is. I suspect that the paramount problem in his mind at this time, that is, patching up his quarrel with Frondizi, may have (consciously or unconsciously) influenced the tone of his remarks. However, I think his account of the President's views and purposes is probably correct, and that these represent the would-be statesman side of Frondizi's complex and fluid personality.

14. As to Scilingo's remark that there exist at present no effective, organized means of combatting Communist penetration in Latin America, this is probably true in practice because of the functional weakness of the O.A.S. There are, however, plenty of O.A.S. resolutions on the subject, the most recent (and strongest) being that of the Caracas Conference of 1954, under which a Foreign Ministers' meeting may be called to deal with any attempt by international Communism to subvert the political institutions of an American country, thereby threatening the sovereignty and political independence of the American States and jeopardizing the peace of America.

R. P. BOWER

Ambassador

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Security Confidential

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Type of Document Letter No. 236 Date 5 June 61

From Caracas

To Latin American Div.

Subject: Dominican Republic - Venezuelan Position

Original on File No. 5916-40

Copies on File No. 3397-40

Other Cross Reference Sheets on —

Prepared by Don Hume

Ext. 308

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA. *(DUPLICATE)*

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Ambassador, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Reference:

Subject: Argentina's foreign policy: On Communism and Cuba

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: 289

Date: May 29, 1961

Enclosures: One

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No. 50066-40 X

96 ✓

References

OY 3134-40
OY 12797-40

'Argentina is following a Western-Christian line and remains definitely opposed to Communism. At the same time, it is reluctant to take any 'interventionist' steps in regard to Cuba.' Such is, in summary, the Government's foreign policy line as announced in an official communique, following the Cabinet meeting on Thursday, May 18. This meeting, the first since the recent reorganization of the Cabinet, was important because of the range of key problems, both domestic and international, that were discussed. For the first time, the substance of Cabinet discussion was released to the press because, said the President, "the social repercussion of the new economic measures made such a communication indispensable between the Chief Executive and the people".

Internal Circulation

Foreign Affairs Review

Both President Frondizi and the new Foreign Minister, Mugica, spoke on various aspects of Argentina's foreign policy, Mr. Mugica's review reportedly covering some 20 pages. Ambassador Mario Amadeo, who attended the meeting, reviewed Argentina's stand on major problems under discussion at the United Nations, and spoke of the impression caused by this country's decisions at the U.N. Attached is a copy of the communique summarizing the remarks made by Messrs. Mugica and Amadeo. Following the meeting, a complete text was circulated confidentially to the Ministries where it was the subject of extensive and careful consideration in some departments, notably the Armed Forces.

Divided Continent

Of cardinal importance and emphasis in this review was the Cuban question, following the failure of the "foreign-based" invasion last month. According to press information, both Frondizi and Mugica said that, on the basis of diplomatic reports, it appeared that important American nations - chiefly Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela - would balk at any proposal to break off relations with Castro's government, or any suggestion that a sterner Pan-American attitude should be taken against Cuba. It was considered also that even if a general break with Castro could be achieved, the net result would still be of doubtful value.

Distribution to Posts

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Frondizi is said to have told the meeting that President Quadros of Brazil, with whom he talked "very frankly" last month, was walking a slippery tightrope due to domestic troubles, and would be reluctant to take a firm stand against Castro. His (Frondizi's) advisers were of the opinion that a 'wait and see' attitude was the wisest course for the present, some of them holding the view that time would work against Castro "because people in Cuba and Latin America generally are authentically anti-Communist and truly democratic". Neither Frondizi nor Mugica, it was indicated, had commented about Cuba's alleged Communist ties, nor on the charge that Castro is trying to export his revolution to other American countries.

Press Reaction

To La Prensa and Dr. Gainza Paz, who recall from bitter experience the evils of totalitarianism, seeking refuge in generalizations in order to avoid giving forthright opinion and leadership about "the establishment in Cuba of a Communist bastion which threatens the America's political organization and independence", was pusillanimous and unworthy of democratic government. Everyone knew that the problem of Cuba had been the chief topic of the Minister's review of foreign policy, although one could not guess this from a communique replete with evasive platitudes about Argentina's respect for treaty obligations, continental solidarity, Christian ethics and Western traditions. On its responsibility, the government could either sympathize with Castro and his kind of social revolution, or oppose them, maintaining at least an unequivocal position. But the one thing it could not do without weakening the nation's authority in America and the rest of the world, was to gloss over the Cuban problem, burying it under academic statements which could only encourage Cuba's subversive efforts and the Soviet Union's obvious campaign to destroy the inter-American defensive system. It was a pity, said La Prensa that the government's clear and purposeful approach, evident in that part of the release dealing with domestic problems, had given way to mere double talk on a no less essential problem of external policy.

Comment

It is said that President Frondizi is personally less reluctant to adopt a firm stand on the Cuban question than he is of going it alone, at least without the support of a majority of Latin American countries. Uruguay is said to be in favour of such a move, and Frondizi undoubtedly pursued his consultations on the subject during his official three-day visit to La Paz last week. A further inhibiting factor may be the President's desire to avoid domestic political agitation which, although not unmanageable in itself, might be expected to add to the difficulties of his economic rehabilitation programme.

At any rate, this view is generally shared by our diplomatic colleagues, and was advanced in guarded terms by a Foreign Ministry official with whom we talked last Wednesday, as an explanation of the government's announced policy regarding Cuba and Communism. The widely accepted suggestion that the Argentine President stands against Castro appears designed to sweeten U.S.-Argentine relations. On the other hand, the government's new policy statement is likely to disturb neither pro-Castro opinion at home nor opponents of 'intervention' in the rest of Latin America. President Frondizi, it would seem, may be walking a tightrope of his own.

for Ambassador

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Security Confidential

50066-40		
96	-	—

Type of Document Document No. 8 Date 19 May 61

From NATO

To Latin American Div through NATO Reg.

Subject: Tactique des Partis Communistes en Amérique Latine

Original on File No. —

Copies on File No. —

Other Cross Reference Sheets on —

Prepared by Don Hemer

Ext. 308

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA. *(DUPLICATE)*

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, Bogotá

Reference: Our Letter No. 107 of April 19, 1961

Subject: Movimiento Obrero Estudiantil Campesino

Security: Confidential

No: 136

Date: May 25, 1961

Enclosures: none

Air or Surface Mail: air

Post File No: 10-10

Ottawa File No. 50066-40 X

96 –

References

OG 3456-40

You will recall that this group, commonly known as MOEC, is a type of anarchist organization which participated in the pro-Castro demonstrations of last April 17. Recently its founder, Antonio M. Larrota, was found dead in a bandit infested region of the Department of Cauca. Apparently he had gone to this region to bring together and if possible reorganize two rival guerilla bands. His body, strangely enough, was clothed in an army uniform. His death led on May 17 to a demonstration held by his supporters in the Plaza Bolivar in Bogotá. About two hundred persons were present and the usual anti-Yankee and anti-oligarchy slogans were chanted. There was no violence.

2. However, on the night of May 18 a bomb was thrown at the home of Ospina Perez, wounding the two police guards on duty. The sequence of events is such that most observers believe that the bomb throwing was the work of MOEC.

3. Larrota himself is reported to have had his differences with the Communists, although he was an ardent supporter of Castro's revolution. It is too early to judge whether his passing will have any effect on the relations between MOEC and the Communist party.

Internal Circulation

Jean Morin
Ambassador

Distribution to Posts

(Ext. 182C(Rev. 2/52)

page 5

C. HARDY

CONFIDENTIAL

page 4 to 11

File Pocket

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SINO-SOVIET PENETRATION IN LATIN AMERICA

(United States Contribution to the
Report by the NATO Expert Working Group)

November 8, 1961

CONFIDENTIAL

ABSTRACT

Soviet near-term objectives are to weaken Latin American bonds with the United States and simultaneously to strengthen area ties with the communist bloc. Soviet ability to achieve these goals revolves around success in a three-pronged strategy: to increase bloc access to the area through conventional government-to-government relations; to promote closer alignment of communist and leftist-nationalist forces; and to consolidate and strengthen the Cuban regime as a model for other Latin American countries. Through the increasing effectiveness of its instruments of penetration, official and unofficial, the Soviets now have much greater capabilities than at any previous time. With a wide variety of opportunities in the many countries, they are able to achieve propaganda effects and political pressures that were previously far beyond their range.

Soviet success in producing discords and divisions is greatest on the burning issues of how to attain economic development and social justice, and there is a widening audience for their appeal to revolutionary action. Through Cuba, the Soviets have gone far to overcome their cultural and geographic remoteness from Latin America, as well as to present a model for the revolutionary left in the area.

SINO-SOVIET PENETRATION IN LATIN AMERICA

I. Sino-Soviet Relations with Latin America

A. Sino-Soviet Strategy in Latin America

The Soviet Union is pursuing a three-pronged strategy in Latin America: first, it is endeavoring to augment its influence through establishment of political and economic relations with as many countries as possible; second, it is encouraging local communist parties to seek close alignment with leftist-nationalist forces and work for domestic and international policies desired by the USSR; and, third, it is seeking to consolidate and enhance the Castro regime in Cuba as a model capable of exerting an attractive force throughout Latin America. Moscow's near-term goals are discrediting Western institutions the weakening of Latin American ties with the rest of the Western World ~~United States~~ and a concomitant strengthening of their relations with the communist bloc.

In Cuba, a most important Soviet objective *per se* is to maintain and strengthen communist gains. In addition, the Soviets hope that the nationalist façade of the Castro regime will serve as an example that will encourage formation in other Latin American countries of "national democratic states" -- in brief, governments which are anti-US and pro-Soviet in international affairs, and domestically amenable to local communist influence. To this end, Moscow is providing the Castro regime with strong political support and the necessary economic assistance to maintain a viable and growing economy. Over the short run, the USSR will probably counsel the Cuban Communists to consolidate their hold, but to move less rapidly than they have done so far in implementing a communist-type domestic program in order to avoid adverse reactions in other Latin American countries.

In international affairs the Soviets will probably continue to urge, as they appear to have done in the past, some moderation in the

Cuban regime's extremist position. The Soviets will do this for two reasons: they do not want the Cuban Government to precipitate a situation -- particularly involving the United States -- where Moscow would be faced with living up to commitments it was unable or unwilling to fulfill. Hence, the emphasis in Soviet-Cuban statements about achieving the return of the Guantánamo base to Cuba by peaceful means. Also, with the same end in view, the Soviet they do not want Cuban extremism to alienate important circles and public opinion elsewhere in Latin America. This has probably been a major factor in Soviet coyness about Cuba's affiliation with the communist bloc.

Soviet strategy for local communist parties in underdeveloped countries has been set forth in the "national democratic state" concept, and it appears particularly applicable for communist forces in Latin America. As an immediate tactic, communist parties ~~will be~~ are urged to form coalitions with leftist-nationalist forces struggling for a change in the status quo. The aim of these ~~se~~ tactics ~~are designed~~ is ~~to multiply forces pressuring a given Latin American government in the direction desired by Moscow, and~~ eventually to establish a "national democratic state" through the replacement of the existing government by a national front government with strong communist influence and a pro-Soviet orientation in international affairs. At the same time, it is hoped that through such tactics the local communists can achieve respectability and build up their political forces for a future test of strength.

Finally, but not least in importance, the Soviet Union is seeking to enhance its direct presence in Latin America through the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Latin American governments, trade and aid offers, and extensive programs of cultural exchange. Moscow can be expected generally to pursue these policies wherever the opportunities crop up; but it is selective in the

economic assistance field to the extent of directing liberal offers to countries where the political payoff appears most promising. While the Soviet Union will attempt to establish close political relations, Soviet policy will probably be characterized by opportunism. The USSR will thus try to exploit and become involved in regional rivalries, such as the Ecuador-Peruvian border dispute.

Communist China has the same ultimate objective in advancing the cause of communism in Latin America as does the Soviet Union. But here, as elsewhere, Peiping very likely disagrees with Moscow over the best ~~strategy~~ tactics to be used. In particular, the Chinese Communists seem inclined toward a more aggressive course of action than the Soviet Union (including armed struggle), and less tolerant of non-communist governments. ~~Although Communist China has achieved successes in Latin America with its "people's diplomacy" tactics and enjoys the sympathy of leftist-nationalist forces there as a kindred spirit,~~ Nevertheless it seems that the policies of the Soviet Union -- the power at the moment with much greater political and economic capabilities -- will predominate at least for the foreseeable future. ~~Also, both communist powers apparently recognize that open rivalry between them in Latin America would damage their mutual cause.~~

B. Latin American Vulnerabilities

The situation in Latin America offers Soviet strategists many of the opportunities they seek outside the bloc. Societies are strained by class tensions. The economies, even where they have experienced rapid growth, are seriously unbalanced. In the postwar period there has been a rapid extension of political participation and a luxuriant growth of party organizations and pressure groups. Because of tensions in the area, this quickened political life leads immediately to more political conflict rather than to a

broadening of the base of authority and better mechanisms for compromise. Politics may often become a matter of organizaing resentments rather than seeking agreement on national issues. In consequence, nationalist policies provide the major unifying platform. With growing popular pressures, moreover, political organizers tend to combine a strong leftist orientation with ultranationalist appeals.

Many political leaders play down the costs of achieving rapid economic growth; promise impossible feats of economic development; and blame their failures as well as the existing situation on rapacious capitalism and foreign investors. Leaders of the revolutionary left point to Castro's Cuba as proof that a shortcut to development is possible through social revolution. Increasing numbers of people are persuaded that development can be speedy and painless following such a revolution and the expropriation of propertied classes and foreign capital.

Under the threat of a Castro-type social revolution, some important propertied interests react by transferring assets to foreign safe havens. The social and political instability of the area reduces interest in foreign private investment at a time when this source of capital is counted upon to play an increasing role under the Alliance for Progress. Thus the growing boldness of the extreme left is helping to produce withdrawal or paralysis among the dominant groups.

C. Media of Operation

Communist Party and Allied Organizations -- The communist apparatus in Latin America has made significant progress since the meeting of Latin American Communist Parties following the 21st CPSU Congress in Moscow in 1959. Communst organizations now show a

higher degree of self-confidence and optimism than at any time since World War II.

Official communist parties (which are organized in all Latin American countries, except the Dominican Republic and Haiti) have probably not increased substantially in overall membership, which has remained at about 250,000 members in recent years. While a few more communist parties have achieved legality and several are playing a larger role in national politics, the mass votes in the Latin American countries still go to non-communist parties.

The progress experienced by the communist organizations appears in better linkage with the international communist apparatus and in the improved atmosphere for operations in many countries. The establishment of Cuba as an appendage of the Sino-Soviet bloc provides a regional headquarters well-equipped with hotels and bourgeois tourist comforts. Here Latin American communists meet with European and Asian communists and with like-minded leftists and "neutralists" from many countries of the world, as well as with official bloc representatives. The communists of Latin America have also traveled more frequently to the bloc, notably to Moscow conferences held annually in the past three years.

On the national scene the communists are enjoying their greatest success since World War II in finding political allies. Until recently they were able to make ad hoc alliances on specific issues with influential non-communists, but never continuously over a broad front. Now, with the demonstrated ability of the Castro regime to maintain power and to receive necessary support from the Sino-Soviet bloc, many indigenous leftist and nationalist groups are ready to make common cause with the communists based on the Cuban or "national liberation" issue. Their willingness to work with the

communists is permitting the latter to effect new and wider penetration of political parties, the press, student and professional organizations and, to a lesser degree, the trade union movement. Despite Castro's obvious involvement with the Cuban Communist Party and reliance on bloc support, he can in fact appeal to Latin American leftists and ultra-nationalists as one of them and as a worthy leader of their cause. Many Latin Americans, especially among the intellectuals, do not equate Castroism with communism. Moreover, it is widely asserted with good reason that Castro was forced to turn to the bloc in early 1960 because of US refusal of aid and for protection against alleged US aggressive designs.

Even if allied to extremist opposition groups, the communists may be treated tolerantly by the authorities as long as they refrain from direct attack on the government. Thus the communists were allowed to operate freely in Venezuela until they joined forces with extremist groups in November 1960 to stir up mob action.

The communists and their pro-Castro allies seem to have less success in widening their penetration of urban trade unions than among nationalist and leftist politicians and student and intellectual groups. The international communist labor front, WFTU, has been seeking to establish a new regional labor movement on the basis of solidarity with Cuba, but despite a number of meetings in various Latin American capitals, the movement has not yet made much headway. Earlier hopes that leftwing labor movements could be unified under communist auspices on the basis of strong nationalist and pro-Cuban sentiment have been disappointed with the growing alienation of many non-communist labor leaders from the Cuban revolution and suspicion of communist objectives.

is to replace it with an organization not so obviously led from Moscow. Mexico's CTAL (communist-led) from and the idea of

In Venezuela, Chile, Brazil, Argentina and several other countries, the communists if anything have become increasingly isolated from the non-communists, partly because of clumsy maneuvers to impose their policy line or to gain control of a united labor movement and partly because of the initiative of the non-communists themselves to isolate the communists.

true

In rural areas, the communists have stepped up operations and are active in trying to organize new and take over established organizations. Here they have advantages in the poverty, pressure for land, and newly-roused hopes for change that make the rural population vulnerable to irresponsible leadership. However the authorities may also be especially touchy in this area and in many countries they hasten to put up defenses against communist penetration.

still unimportant

One of the most potent appeals of the communist apparatus to extremist opposition groups is as a source of financing and other material support. This aid can now be provided to selected communist-penetrated groups via Cuba without directly involving the Soviets. While spokesmen of the Castro regime -- and also of the Chinese Communists -- may voice support for guerrilla action in Latin America, the Soviets can stand aloof and deny responsibility for communist-supported subversive operations in the area.

Propaganda operations -- The communist propaganda network has grown substantially in the past several years. The official party press in the area is probably no larger, but communist sympathizers in many non-communist press organs are now bolder in slanting the news. Communist broadcasting has expanded through shortwave broadcasts by the bloc. Sino-Soviet bloc radio broadcasts to Latin America increased from 104 hours per week at the beginning of 1959 to 181 hours as of June 30, 1961.

this also happens in USA

interesting initiative Russians broadcast to Argentina + Bolivia in guaraní

largely discredited and not used by responsible newspapers

The Prensa Latina news agency, which is sponsored by the Cuban Government and is now active in eight other Latin American countries, is part of the world-wide bloc network. The recent inauguration of a powerful short-wave station in Cuba enables the Castro regime to broadcast its propaganda to every corner of the hemisphere. Moreover, the Cuban foreign service is engaged increasingly in espionage activities and in the dissemination of large quantities of bloc and Cuban propaganda shipped through diplomatic channels. now restrained by government action in many countries.

Person-to-person propaganda between the bloc and Latin America has shown its greatest expansion through Cuba-bloc exchanges, now in the thousands. Travel from other Latin American countries to the bloc is probably considerably more than the one thousand persons noted in 1960. In addition, large numbers of Latin Americans either are travelling to Cuba or are being visited in Latin America by Cuban representatives. Latin American student enrollment in bloc universities totalled approximately 500 in 1960-61, including about 240 Cubans, and 40-odd each from Bolivia and Mexico. According to a bloc radio report, 1,700 Cubans had started their studies at universities in the bloc in September 1961.

Bloc official operations -- The bloc has official access to Latin America through diplomatic representation, trade ties, economic aid, and sponsored cultural exchange. Relations at this level with Latin America have increased sharply in the past two years, with some significant entries effected outside of Cuba. The status and respectability of bloc official groups has improved because of increasing evidences of bloc economic and military power in the world at large. Bloc official access is also favored by the continuing economic difficulties of the area and by a tendency of some governments to view bloc offers as a means to increase foreign aid from other sources. (resulting from USA myth in the adequacy of private enterprise and refusal until this year to grant funds to governments)

During 1960-61 the bloc regained diplomatic representation in Venezuela, Cuba, and Ecuador, and bloc countries were well on the way to significant expansion in Brazil. There are 32 Sino-Soviet bloc resident diplomatic missions in 8 Latin American countries and half a dozen more are scheduled to open in the near future. (See table 1.) Czechoslovakia and Poland maintain more missions in Latin America than any other bloc countries. Only Cuba has extended diplomatic recognition to Communist China and the Asian satellites. The East German trade mission in Havana has many of the attributes of a diplomatic mission, but Cuba, like all other Latin American countries, has refrained from extending diplomatic recognition to the East German government. The USSR's diplomatic missions -- in Argentina, Cuba, Mexico, and Uruguay -- are staffed out of all proportion to the small missions these countries have in Moscow. Reflecting a cooling in bloc relations in the River Plate area, Argentina recently forced bloc governments to reduce the number of their diplomats in Buenos Aires by about half. In early October the Uruguayan Foreign Office notified the Soviet Legation of the government's decision to impose

remarkable that except for Cuba these are the most responsible democracies and less affected by Soviet propaganda.

restrictions on the number and movement of legation personnel.

The great expansion during 1960-61 of bloc economic aid to Latin American countries and of trade between the two areas took place primarily in Cuba. The bloc share of Cuba's total trade is now estimated at 75% by value, as compared with 5-10% in Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil. Overall bloc-Latin American trade totalled about $500 million in 1960. Bloc economic development credits of $357 million extended to the area during 1960-61 (see table 2) have gone entirely to Cuba, although substantial trade credits are available to Brazil under agreements signed in early 1961 which are still to be ratified. Trade missions between the two areas have multiplied in number, again with the largest component between the bloc and Cuba. A permanent 7-man Soviet trade delegation arrived in Brazil during July 1961.

Official exchange of persons between the two areas was overwhelmingly with Cuba during 1961 and included many high-level officials on both sides. In the rest of Latin America the bloc dispatched a variety of missions and individuals, including travelling goodwill missions to several countries, officials sent to discuss relations in trade and diplomatic fields or to attend conferences, and cultural groups. Of special interest were a Czech official mission headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Jiri Hajek, a Communist Chinese mission headed by the President of the Council for Development of Foreign Trade, a Soviet delegation headed by Secretary of the Supreme Presidium Georgadze, and a North Korean delegation headed by Vice Premier Yi Chu-you.

Reflecting the growing importance of Brazil in the bloc offensive and receptivity of the Quadros regime, all of these missions visited Brazil. In addition the Polish Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki, arrived

in Brazil on October 16, 1961 for a five-day official visit. Talks of the bloc missions with Latin American government officials ranged over the whole field of relations, but closely related possibilities of expanding markets in the bloc to establishment of diplomatic ties.

While the Soviets have a wider entrée in Latin America at the official level, continued access still depends on the convenience of the host governments, and, outside Cuba, the missions exist more or less on sufferance. Argentina and Uruguay, formerly the main bloc trading partners in Latin America, are now curbing bloc diplomatic activities. The status of the Soviet trade delegation to Brazil is carefully defined and, if a Soviet mission is established, its size may be limited. Bloc "goodwill" missions in some cases have found their way barred at the last moment as governments reconsidered the net advantage, but the missions have maintained discreet silence in the face of rebuffs and difficulties.

Latin American delegations to the bloc have increased in number and importance in the past two years. Aside from several Cuban missions, the Brazilian delegations sent by President Quadros during 1961 were the most significant for the development of relations. A Brazilian presidential confidant headed a diplomatic and economic mission to the satellites of eastern Europe. A Brazilian trade mission visited Moscow, and a mission headed by then Vice-President Goulart travelled to Communist China. From Ecuador, despite official disapproval voted by the Cabinet, a legislative mission headed by the then Vice President in his capacity as Senate president, visited the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

D. Bloc Progress

The Sino-Soviet bloc made substantial net gains in Latin America during 1960-61, both in concrete achievements and in terms of setting

the stage for further operations. Its main visible success was in establishing close ties with Cuba through traditional governmental channels. Heavy bloc expenditures in Cuba -- supply of credits, purchase of unneeded sugar, provision of capital equipment, raw materials, and consumer goods -- sustained the economy during reorientation to the bloc. Bloc subventions also bought a base for expansion of unconventional operations into other countries.

Since early 1961 the area's leading country, Brazil, has shown increased receptivity to Soviet offers. Because of its economic development Brazil is in a position to follow more independent foreign and domestic policies. Any situation which weakens western influence in Brazil increases the prospects for the spread of neutralism in Latin America. In the long run the example set by Brazil will be much more influential in Latin America than that set by Cuba.

it should be realized by USA that national governments cannot afford to appear as lackeys of USA

Situation in Cuba -- The Castro government has been effective, with the assistance of the communist party, not much in imposing an authoritarian regime in Cuba. The upper class has been destroyed as an effective political and economic force. The middle class, Castro's major source of strength during his struggle for power, has suffered from deteriorating economic conditions and the increasingly tight controls imposed by the government, and now provides a principal source of opposition to the Castro regime.

Attitudes of the working class and peasantry toward the regime reflect the extent to which Castro has fulfilled his promises, the degree of hope remaining for the realization of as yet unfulfilled promises, and the extent of psychological identification with the revolution. It is that part of the newly awakened lower class which has already received positive benefits from the revolution, or still hopes for future improvement in conditions, that now provides the mass

support for the Castro regime. This group of perhaps 25% to 30% of the total population probably constitutes the poorest segment of the Cuban lower class.

By no means all of the Cuban lower class, however, can be considered to favor the Castro regime. The failure of the government to carry out many of its earlier promises has led to increasing disappointment and dissatisfaction. This does not mean, however, that there has been an equal increase in willingness to act against the regime. The reaction can probably best be characterized as one of increasing apathy, marked by absenteeism, indifferent performance on the job, etc. A slowly but steadily increasing part of the lower class has probably reached a point at which it will neither act for nor against the regime. This sentiment is much the same as that encountered by Castro in 1956 when he landed in Oriente Province and began his guerrilla activities against Batista. Perhaps Castro's strongest appeal for continued support is through convincing the lower class that any government which replaces his will seek to return to the status quo ante.

While Castro has been able to maintain production of export crops, most other sectors of the economy have stagnated or declined. The value of foreign trade has fallen and consumption levels are down for a majority of Cubans. On balance, there has been a deterioration of Cuba's physical plant, especially in transportation and other economic overhead, but also in manufacturing. The transition to "socialism" has destroyed the institutions for private capital formation and neither state capital formation nor bloc investment has yet provided the resources needed for economic progress.

Success during 1961 in increasing sugar production, which directly provides about 25 percent of Cuba's national income, is the brightest

aspect of the economy. In this year two-thirds of Cuban sugar is being sold to the Soviet bloc in return for sufficient food, raw materials, and machinery to keep the economy viable. There are serious shortages of spare parts, raw materials and some consumer goods, including foodstuffs. Luxury goods are non-existent. Agricultural and industrial diversification efforts, though featured in propaganda, are slow in getting under way. Farm production for domestic consumption has not even begun to compensate in quantity and quality for previous heavy foodstuffs imports. Moreover, price and distribution problems are impeding the supply of domestic foods to the urban areas.

Economic prospects remain dismal through 1962. Better food supplies will depend on good weather and greatly improved management both in state farms and in distribution. The manufacturing sector will begin to inch ahead as new managers gain experience, but sugar production, according to Cuban estimates, will be down 20% from the 1961 level.

While economic improvement depends on many factors, it can be accelerated if Cuba is able to sell substantial quantities of sugar for convertible exchange. This income pays for imports of goods, especially foods and spare parts, not available from the bloc. Sales to the free world also give Cuba some flexibility in dealing with the Soviets.

perhaps this should be encouraged.

Despite the value to the Soviets of the Cuban example of successful protest against the established order, Cuba is not an unmixed blessing to the USSR. The need to assist Castro in coping with economic difficulties is both imperative and of indefinite duration.

Politically, Cuban exuberance can be a source of embarrassment

to the USSR. For example, the Cuban call for armed subversion in the other countries of Latin America is not strictly in accord with current Soviet doctrine. Moreover, the Soviets undoubtedly understand that an excess of Cuban zeal in promoting adventures in Latin America could result not only in heightening the alertness of these countries but conceivably could drive them collectively to eliminate the Castro regime.

Finally, there is attached a Department of State study entitled "The Castro Regime in Cuba" which was circulated to each NATO delegation in October 1961. This study provides more detailed information on the communist domination of the Cuban Government and the threat to Latin American states by the Castro regime's proclaimed intention to promote "national liberation" movements in the Western Hemisphere.

This is the reason for Khrushchev's recent reticence (Moscow Party Congress) on Cuban which he described as a "natural democracy"

Table 1. Bloc Diplomatic (D), Consulate General (CG) and Trade (T) Representation in Latin America, October 1961

	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Cuba	Ecuador	Mexico	Uruguay	Venezuela
Albania						D				
Bulgaria	D		D			D			D	
Communist China						D				
Czechoslovakia	D	D	D	T	CG	D	D	D	D	T
East Germany	T		T		T	T			T	
Hungary	D		D			D			T	
North Korea						D				
North Vietnam						D				
Poland	D		D			D		D	D	D
Rumania	D		D			D			D	
USSR	D		T			D		D	D	

Table 2. Bloc Aid to Latin America through Medium and Long-term Development Credits, 1955-1961

Recipient	Bloc country	Late extended	Type	Project	(Millions of U.S. dollars) Extended	Obligated	Drawn
Argentina	Czechoslovakia	July 1955	Credit	Coal-washing plant, Rio Turbio	1.3	1.3	1.3
($103.7 million)		March 1959	Credit	Cement plant, San Luis Province	2.4	2.4	2.4
	USSR	Oct. 1958	Credit	Petroleum equipment	100.0	32.0*	15.0*
Brazil	Czechoslovakia	1959	Credit	Machinery & equipment for cement plant, Para	1.5	1.5	1.5
($3.5 million)	Poland	Dec. 1956	Credit	Two 5,000-DWT freighters	2.0	2.0	2.0
Cuba	Bulgaria	Jan. 1961	Credit	Industrial machinery and equipment	5.0		
($357 million)	Communist China	Nov. 1960	Credit	Industrial machinery and equipment	60.0		
	Czechoslovakia	June 1960	Credit	Consumer durables plant and light manufacturing plants.	20.0		
		Oct. 1960	Credit	Mineral development	20.0		
	East Germany	Jan. 1961	Credit	Industrial machinery and equipment	10.0		
	Hungary	Sept. 1960	Credit	Telephone equipment ($10 million)	15.0	10.0	
	Poland	Jan. 1961	Credit	Shipbuilding and Repair Facilities	12.0		
	Rumania	Jan. 1961	Credit	Industrial machinery and equipment	15.0		

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TO EXTERNAL 1875 PRIORITY

INFO LDN WASHDC

EXPERTS CTTEE-LATINAMERICA

WOLF OF THE USA DEL APPROACHED US PRIVATELY TODAY TO TAKE A SOUNDING AS TO WHAT THE CDN GOVT ATTITUDE WOULD BE ON THE POSSIBILITY OF THE CONVENING OF AN EXPERTS CTTEE ON QUOTE COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN LATIN AMERICA UNQUOTE.

2.WOLF EXPLAINED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES WERE GIVING QUOTE FAVOURABLE CONSIDERATION UNQUOTE TO MAKING SUCH A PROPOSAL IN THE COUNCIL IN THE NOT RPT NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE.HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SOUND OUT A NUMBER OF DELS AS TO WHAT THEIR REACTION WOULD BE.THESE DELS INCLUDE,IN ADDITION TO OURSELVES,UK,FRANCE,ITALY,PORTUGAL AND GERMANY.

3.THE TENTATIVE THINKING IN WASHDC WAS TO PROPOSE A CTTEE WITH THE LIMITED TERMS OF REF INDICATED BY THE TITLE MENTIONED ABOVE.THEY WOULD ASSUME THAT EXPERTS WOULD BE BROUGHT FROM NATIONAL CAPITALS TO PARTICIPATE IN DISCUSSIONS IN MUCH THE SAME WAY AS WAS THE CASE WITH RESPECT TO EXPERTS MEETING ON THE MIDEAST AND THE FAREAST.THEIR PRELIMINARY THINKING WAS THAT A REPORT SHOULD BE MADE BY THE EXPERTS DIRECTLY TO COUNCIL.THE REPORT,HOWEVER,WOULD BE FOR BACKGROUND INFO WHICH MIGHT BE USEFUL TO INDIVIDUAL GOVTS.WOLF SAID THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO RPT NO INDICATION IN HIS INSTRUCTIONS THAT WASHDC WAS INTERESTED IN DEVELOPING A REPORT FOR QUOTE NATO ACTION UNQUOTE.THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF A CTTEE OF EXPERTS IN WASHDC MIND SEEMS TO BE TWOFOLD:

(A)TO PROVIDE MORE INFO FOR GOVTS LESS DIRECTLY CONCERNED WITH LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENTS:

(B)TO SEEK THE UNDERSTANDING OF EUROPEAN GOVTS WITH RESPECT TO USA POLICY TOWARDS LATINAMERICA.IN THIS LATTER CONTEXT THE STATE DEPT WAS NOT RPT NOT UNAWARE THAT CERTAIN EUROPEAN GOVTS HAD

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CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION AND INFLUENCE TO LATINAMERICA WHICH WERE DIFFERENT FROM OR PERHAPS BETTER THAN THOSE OPEN TO THE USA.

4.WE SAID THAT WE COULD NOT RPT NOT WITHOUT SEEKING YOUR COMMENTS GIVE ANY FIRM INDICATION OF CDN VIEWS.OUR INITIAL REACTION,HOWEVER,WAS THAT YOU WERE NOT RPT NOT LIKELY TO OPPOSE DISCUSSION OF LATINAMERICAN DEVELOPMENTS IN AN EXPERTS GROUP SO LONG AS THE CONDITIONS SET BY MR GREEN AT OSLO WERE MET,IE,THAT THE CTTEE WAS OPENENDED;THAT SPECIAL CARE BE TAKEN TO KEEP ITS DELIBERATIONS SECRET AND THAT PARTICIPATION IN A CTTEE DEALING WITH SUBJECTS LYING OUTSIDE TREATY AREA WOULD NOT RPT NOT COMMIT GOVTS IN ANY SENSE TO AGREED COURSES OF ACTION.

5.WOLF SAID HE WAS SURE THAT THESE CONDITIONS WOULD BE FULLY SUPPORTED IN USA THINKING.USA AUTHORITIES WERE PARTICULARLY CONSCIOUS OF THE SENSITIVITIES OF THE LATINAMERICANS AND WOULD BE PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS TO KEEP DISCUSSIONS SUCH AS THOSE PROPOSED HIGHLY CONFD.HE EMPHASIZED AGAIN THAT THERE WAS NO RPT NO INDICATION IN HIS INSTRUCTIONS THAT WASHDC WAS SEEKING TO DEVELOP A COMMON QUOTE NATO POLICY UNQUOTE WITH RESPECT TO LATINAMERICA.

6.PRIOR TO HIS MEETING WITH USA WOLF HAD ONLY SPOKEN TO THE UK DEL WHO WERE NOW SEEKING LDNS VIEWS.THE TENTATIVE REACTION OF THE UK DEL ITSELF WAS THAT LDN WOUWD NOT RPT NOT OPPOSE SUCH A USA PROPOSAL. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO HAVE YOUR PRELIMINARY REACTION FOR DISCUSSION PRIVATELY WITH THE USA DEL.WOLF SAID IT WOULD BE MOST USEFUL IF HE COULD HAVE SOME FURTHER INDICATION OF OUR VIEWS WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK.IF NO RPT NO STRONG OPPOSITION DEVELOPS TO THE PROPOSAL THE AMERICANS WOULD LIKE TO GET THE MACHINERY IN MOTION FOR A MEETING OF EXPERTS SOME TIME IN THE FALL.

D.L.(1)Division/R.P.Cameron/ss

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO: LATIN AMERICAN DIVISION

FROM: DEFENCE LIAISON (1) DIVISION

REFERENCE:

Security CONFIDENTIAL

Date July 18/61

File No. 50066-40

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SUBJECT: NATO EXPERTS COMMITTEE - LATIN AMERICA

file
RW

1. As you will see from the attached telegram the United States Delegation has inquired informally about the possibility of convening an experts committee on "Communist infiltration in Latin America" to provide more information for governments less directly concerned with Latin American developments and to seek the understanding of European Governments with respect to USA policy towards Latin America.

2. In considering this suggestion the following points are worth bearing in mind:-

(1) It was agreed at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Oslo last May that the Communist threat, which led to the formation of NATO, is "now not only military but also has world-wide political, economic, scientific and psychological aspects".

(2) Ministers approved in principle a United States proposal for special committees to deal with particular problems or areas on an ad hoc basis. As defined by Mr. Rusk, with Canadian support, it was agreed that such committees should be open-ended, secret in character, and should meet when there seemed to be a valid reason for convening such discussions. It was understood that such ad hoc committees would be in addition to, but distinct from, the committees of experts (e.g. on Eastern Europe, Far East, Middle East and Africa) which normally meet a few months prior to Ministerial meetings to prepare background papers for the consideration of Ministers. Although the USA suggestion is not clearly defined it would

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not appear that they have in mind a committee which would meet regularly like the other area committees, i.e. twice a year, but rather one which would meet at a particular time for a particular purpose.

With this background we would favour supporting the USA suggestion on the understanding that (i) membership in the committee is open to all members (ii) that special care will be taken to keep its deliberations secret (iii) that the purpose of the committee is for the exchange of information for background purposes only (iv) that it would be regarded as example of the ad hoc committees proposed at the Oslo and that it would not be in the same category as the other expert committees which meet normally twice a year.

We would be grateful for an indication of your views as soon as possible. If you agree, we would propose to send the telegram in reply to the Delegation for the Minister's signature.

W.H. Barton

DEFENCE LIAISON (1) DIVISION