


To October 31, 1958

SECRET
LHS (MAIL)

DATE / DATE: March 15, 199

UNIFICATION OF



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EXTERNAL OTT OCT24/58 CONF

TO CANDELNY Y318 OPIMMEDIATE

INFO LDN WASHDC EMBASSYPARIS PRIORITY

BAG CNBRA WLGTN ~~TOKYO~~ FM LDN

REF YOUR TELS 1721 AND 1722 OCT23


KOREA

I AGREE THAT THE USA DRAFT RESOLUTION ON KOREA AS NOW AMENDED DOES
NOT RPT NOT MEET OUR POSITION SUFFICIENTLY TO ENABLE US TO
COSPONSOR IT. .

SIDNEY SMITH

(RCD LDN 250837Z/JEJ)

NO.		INIT.
	✓ AMBASSADOR	JSM
	✓ COUNSELLOR	
	SECRETARY	
	2nd SEC. (P)	
	2nd SEC. (C)	
	A.O.	
	CONSULAR CL.	Hfz
	T. & C.	
	C.N.D. (M.A.)	
	D.N.R.	



FM CANDELNY OCT23/58 CONF
TO EXTERNAL 1722 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO LDN WASHDC EMBASSYPARIS
BAG CNBRA WLGTN TOKYO FM LDN
REF OURTEL 1721 OCT23
KOREA

NO.		INIT.
2	AMBASSADOR	
	1. SEC.	
	2. SEC. (C)	
	3. SEC. (C)	
	4. SEC. (C)	
	CONSULAR CL.	
	T. & C.	
3	D.N.D. (M.A.)	
	D.N.R.	

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FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION:

HAVING RECEIVED THE REPORT OF THE UN COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA,

REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 112(II)NOV14/47, 195(III)DEC12/48, 293(IV)OCT21/49, 376(V)OCT7/50, 811(IX)DEC11/54, 910(X)A NOV29/55, 1010(II)JAN11/57 AND 1180 NOV29/57,

NOTING THE EXCHANGE OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES AND THE UK ON BEHALF OF THE GOVTS OF COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED FORCES TO THE UN COMMAND IN KOREA, IN WHICH THESE GOVTS EXPRESSED THEIR "WISH TO SEE A GENUINE SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH UN RESOLUTIONS", THEIR WILLINGNESS AT ALL TIMES "TO FURTHER THE CONSIDERATION OF MEASURES DESIGNED TO EFFECT REUNIFICATION ON THIS BASIS", AND STATED THAT "IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXISTING RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UN, THE GOVTS CONCERNED ARE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM KOREA WHEN THE CONDITIONS FOR A LASTING SETTLEMENT LAID DOWN BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAVE BEEN FULFILLED",

NOTING FURTHER THAT IN THIS EXCHANGE THE GOVTS CONCERNED, OBSERVING THAT THE GREATER PART OF THE FORCES SENT TO KOREA IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTIONS OF THE UN HAVE ALREADY BEEN WITHDRAWN, WELCOMED THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE CHINESE COMMUNIST TROOPS WERE ALSO TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM NORTHKOREA,


1. CALLS TO THE ATTENTION OF THE COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES CONCERNED THE CONTINUED DETERMINATION OF THE UN TO BRING ABOUT BY PEACEFUL MEANS ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNIFIED, INDEPENDANT AND DEMOCRATIC KOREA UNDER A REP FORM OF GOVT AND THE FULL RESTORATION OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE AREA;

PAGE TWO 1722

2. CALLS UPON THESE AUTHORITIES TO ACCEPT THE ESTABLISHED UN OBJECTIVES IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT IN KOREA BASED ON THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES FOR UNIFICATION SET FORTH BY THE NATIONS PARTICIPATING ON BEHALF OF THE UN IN THE KOREAN POLITICAL CONFERENCE HELD AT GENEVA IN 1954, AND REAFFIRMED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY;
3. URGES THESE AUTHORITIES TO AGREE TO PARTICIPATE AT AN EARLY DATE IN THE HOLDING OF GENUINELY FREE ELECTIONS, ON A BASIS PROPORTIONATE TO POPULATION, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ABOVE-MENTIONED RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY;
4. REQUESTS THE UN COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA TO CONTINUE ITS WORK IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY;
5. REQUESTS THE SEC GEN TO PLACE THE KOREAN QUESTION ON THE PROVISIONAL AGENDA OF THE FOURTEENTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

(RCD LDN 240746Z/EBM)

7-1-1-1



FM C DELNY OCT23/58 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 1721 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO LDN WASHDC EMBASSYPARIS
BAG CNBRA WLGTN ~~TOKYO~~ FM LDN
REF OURTEL 1634 OCT14 AND YOURTEL Y312 OCT15
KOREA

OURTEL 1722 CONTAINS THE TEXT OF THE LATEST REVISION OF THE USA DRAFT RESOLUTION ON KOREA, WHICH WAS CIRCULATED TODAY TO THOSE WHO HAD PARTICIPATED IN PREVIOUS MEETINGS. IT REPRESENTS THE MAXIMUM EXTENT TO WHICH THE USA IS PREPARED TO GO TOWARD MEETING THE CASE FOR FLEXIBILITY WHICH NZ AND WE IN PARTICULAR HAVE BEEN ARGUING.

2. YOU WILL NOTE THAT THE ONLY CHANGE THAT HAS BEEN MADE TO THE MOST IMPORTANT OPERATIVE PARAS IS THE SUBSTITUTION OF THE WORDS "IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ABOVE MENTIONED RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY" FOR THE WORDS "UNDER EFFECTIVE SUPERVISION BY THE UN" IN PARA 3. THE USA DEL ARE ANXIOUS TO KNOW BY MON WHETHER THIS CHANGE IS SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE US TO COSPONSOR THE RESOLUTION. IT WAS CLEAR, IN RESPONSE TO OUR QUESTIONS, THAT THEY WOULD REGARD ANYTHING MORE FORTHCOMING THAN THIS AS A WEAKENING OF THEIR POSITION AND THEREFORE UNACCEPTABLE.

3. THE UK AND AUSTRALIA HAVE ALREADY INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO COSPONSOR, BUT BOTH NZ AND WE HAVE RESERVED OUR POSITION PENDING FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT THE LATEST REVISION DOES NOT RPT NO JUSTIFY BUR MODIFYING THE CONCLUSION NOT RPT NOT COSPONSOR INDICATED IN YOURTEL Y312, AND WE BELIEVE THAT NZ WILL FOLLOW THE SAME COURSE. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION. WE SHALL DEAL SEPARATELY WITH THE QUESTION OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE MIGHT PARTICIPATE IN THE DEBATE ON THIS ITEM.

(RCD LDN 240746Z/EBM)

NO.	INIT.
✓ AMBASSADOR	✓
✓ SEC. LLOR	
✓ SEC.	
✓ EC. (C)	
✓ CONSULAR CL.	
✓ T. & C.	
✓ P.M.D. (M.A.)	
✓ D.N.R.	

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FM CANDELNY OCT14/58 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 1634 PRIORITY
INFO LDN WASHDC EMBASSYPARIS
BAG CNBRA WLGTN ~~TOKYO~~ FM LDN



REF YOURTEL Y310 OCT10

KOREA

AT THE SUGGESTION OF THE USA DEL WE MET AGAIN TODAY TO DISCUSS THE WASHDC REACTION TO THE REVISIONS WE HAD PREVIOUSLY PUT FORWARD TO THE USA DRAFT RESOLUTION ON KOREA. BECAUSE THE DISCUSSION WAS LENGTHY IT WAS AGREED THAT WE SHOULD PUT OVER THE FINAL DRAFTING OF OPERATIVE PARA3 UNTIL ANOTHER TIME. INCONCLUSIVE THOUGH THE DISCUSSION WAS, HOWEVER, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE USA WAS NOT RPT NOT REALLY PREPARED TO ADOPT A MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACH THIS YEAR. ALTHOUGH THEY WERE WILLING TO GO SOME WAY TO MEET OUR POINTS ON THE PREAMBULAR PARAS, THEY MAINTAINED THAT CHANGES TO THE OPERATIVE PARAS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE; IF THEY WERE CONCESSIONS IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO MAKE THEM, AND IF THEY WERE NOT RPT NOT CONCESSIONS IT WOULD BE USELESS TO MAKE THEM.

2. WE REHEARSED BRIEFLY OUR PREVIOUS ARGUMENTS BUT TO NO RPT NO AVAIL. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES WE THINK IT WOULD BE BEST IF WE DID NOT RPT NOT COSPONSOR.

3. WE NEVERTHELESS HAVE IN MIND THE POINT MADE IN PARA2 OF YOURTEL Y310 RE NOTING THAT THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT REMAINS IN EFFECT. ALTHOUGH AGREED WITH THE OTHER COMMONWEALTH DELS, THIS POINT WAS INADVERTENTLY OMITTED FROM THE SUGGESTIONS WE PUT FORWARD AT OUR LAST MEETING, BUT WE INTEND TO BRING IT UP AT THE NEXT MEETING.

(RCD LDN 150735Z/EBM)

NO.		INIT.
2	AMBASSADOR	
1	EMBASSY	
	2nd SEC. (C)	
	EC. (C)	
	A O	
	CONSULAR CL.	
	T. & C.	
	D.N.D. (M.A.)	
	D.N.R.	

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7-1-1-1

FM-EXTERNAL OTT OCT10/58 CONF
TO CANDELNY Y310
INFO LDN WASHDC EMBASSYPARIS
BAG CNBRA WLGTN TOKYO-FM LDN

REF YOURTEL 154 OCT1

KOREA



WE WELCOME THE SUGGESTIONS PUT TO THE USA DEL FOR THE AMENDMENT OF THEIR DRAFT RESOLUTION ON KOREA AND YOUR CONTRIBUTION TO THE NY DISCUSSIONS OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED. WHILE A FAVOURABLE WASHDC REACTION IS PERHAPS IMPROBABLE IT COULD MAKE THE DRAFT A MORE PROGRESSIVE DOCUMENT.

2. YOU WILL RECALL THAT IN OURTEL Y291 SEP23 WE QUESTIONED THE USEFULNESS OF THE USA DEL OMITTING FROM ITS DRAFT THE USUAL OBSERVATION THAT THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT REMAINED IN EFFECT. IN THIS CONNECTION WE WOULD DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO PARA18 OF THE UNCURK REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT THE 13TH SESSION. HERE THE COMMISSION, AFTER STATING THAT THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT REMAINED IN EFFECT, NEVERTHELESS REPORTED NOT UNSYMPATHETICALLY ABOUT THE RESOLUTION ADVOCATING THE DENUNCIATION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT BY THE UN COMMAND WHICH THE ROK HOUSE OF REPS UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED FEB22.

(RCD LDN 111608Z/GAG)

NO.	NAME
2	AMBASSADOR
1	1. SECRETARY
	2nd SEC. GEN.
	2nd SEC. (C)
	A.O.
	CONSULAR CL.
	T. & C.
	D.N.D. (M.A.)
	D.N.R.

Handwritten signature/initials

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(DUPLICATE)

NUMBERED LETTER

CANADIAN EYES ONLY
CONFIDENTIAL

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
CANADA, LONDON, ENGLAND.

Reference: Your Letter Y.408 of March 21, 1958.

Subject: Future Policy Respecting Korea.

Security:.....

No:.....1487.....

Date: August 19, 1958.

Enclosures: One

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No: 10-K1

Ottawa File No.
50396-40



References

We regret the long silence from this mission on the paper enclosed with your letter under reference. In part of course the paper has been by-passed by events. The "one further exchange of messages" with the Chinese has now taken place; and it is doubtful that anyone could claim that meanwhile there has been any advance in United States thinking as to how a political settlement in Korea might be eventually worked out. The latest Note from the "Fifteen" was delivered in Peking on July 2 and perhaps the most notable thing about it is the virtual lack of reaction from the Chinese side. The Chinese may well never have expected to achieve anything from the exchange except the embarrassment of the United States and of its allies who still have forces in Korea. We note in this connection that at a North Korean reception in Peking on August 15, Chou En-lai made the usual remarks about United States refusal to withdraw forces from Korea and U.S.A. obstruction of a peaceful settlement there; but there was no specific reference to the latest note from the "Fifteen".

2. Just before receipt of the Chinese Note of May 6, there was an exchange of telegrams and views about a possible Far East strategic reappraisal in Washington which would significantly affect American views on the need for the continued stationing of United States forces in Korea (telegrams 905 of April 28 from Washington; your Y.153 of May 5; and our 983 of May 14). For the time being at least, this seems to be pretty well a dead issue. It was clear enough during negotiations on the text of the "Fifteen's" reply to the Chinese Note of May 6 that the United States was not going to do anything about troop withdrawals from South Korea unless the Communist side came much further than it has to date in agreeing with the United States on the conditions for elections leading to reunification.

3. At the moment too, there are definite signs of a general toughening in Communist China's foreign policy, which has expressed itself among other ways in recent weeks in sharply increased military activity in the Taiwan Straits. With Chinese propaganda more virulent than ever and frequent references lately in the context of the Middle East crisis to

NO. 1 AMBASSADOR
2 GOV. SECRETARY
3 1st SEC.
2nd SEC. (P)
2nd SEC. (C)
A.O.
CONSULAR CL.
T. & C.
D.N.R. (M.A.)
D.N.R.
File

INIT. B
H.M.
R.

Internal
Circulation

Distribution
to Posts

Washington
Tokyo
Permis New
York

-2-

the liberation of Formosa, the Americans are hardly likely to be moved to consideration of troop withdrawals from South Korea regardless of what withdrawals are made by the Chinese. Indeed United States distrust of Chinese intentions may be expected, if anything, to increase. In the United Kingdom Foreign Office, too, it is thought unlikely that the Americans are giving any serious thought to reunification now. The Foreign Office believe that the Americans would rather concentrate on simply maintaining the status quo, preferring to see a divided Korea in which the Southern and larger half was reliably pro-Western rather than a united Korea which might gradually be enveloped in the Chinese fold.

4. We are inclined to agree that it is not in our interest to involve ourselves too deeply in a commitment to Korean reunification, although we are not sure that concentration on North Korean compliance with the Security Council resolutions of 1950 is the best way to avoid this. As you have suggested in the first draft of your policy paper, this approach might back-fire if the North Koreans suddenly decided to comply with the resolutions, and it could result in further embarrassment to South Korea and the United States. In the eyes of Asian states, committed and uncommitted, it might appear that while the Communists had on the whole responded to the requests of the United Nations, the other side had done nothing on its part to relieve the tension and make reunification possible; the past is often too quickly forgotten. In any case there is certainly nothing to be gained by any further charges against Communist China, particularly now that she can present herself as an aggrieved power who has carried through a unilateral withdrawal of forces from the north without any quid pro quo at all from the other side.

5. How great is our concern with all this? On this point we would agree with the views expressed in Tokyo's letter No. 341 of April 14, namely that the most important thing in Korea is to maintain the peace; and this, we think, is Canada's "vital interest". We should not necessarily assume that reunification is the most desirable thing in itself for some time to come. Any sort of settlement, even one carried through under the supervision of the United Nations, might in the long run be detrimental to Western interests if it threw the door open to subversion throughout Korea.

6. As our Tokyo Embassy has pointed out, the United States has assumed the main responsibility for the defence of the free world in the Far East and is discharging it. Countries like South Korea and South Vietnam have only the U.S.A. to look to, and the latter naturally feels that it cannot move in a way which would upset their position and seriously damage their morale. Unless we are able and willing to assume real responsibilities in the Far East ourselves, it might indeed, as you have pointed out, be unwise for us to go far out of our way to influence too strongly United States views toward a Korean settlement. It seems to us that our best job is being done if we restrain the United States from precipitate action or unnecessarily provocative statements which could really upset the status quo, and if,

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when their policy is reasonable, we for our part give it a reasonable measure of support.

7. Enclosed with this letter are copies of a working paper which the Foreign Office have prepared on the immediate problem of how the Korean question should be dealt with at the next United Nations General Assembly. We understand that this paper, which was passed to us recently by the C.R.O., was sent out about three weeks ago to the British Embassy in Washington, and no doubt to the U.K. mission in New York, with the intention that it serve as a basis for discussions that British officials would be having with the State Department and old Commonwealth representatives on the approach to Korea in the United Nations. While the paper speculates on the prospects of a political settlement in Korea, suggesting for example that perhaps what we should aim at is a "Finland in Asia", the paper reaches the conclusion that the most realistic tactic for the present is to concentrate on the argument:

"that our overriding need is to appear reasonable, rather than intransigent, in order to obtain votes in the United Nations. If by so doing we find ourselves moving gradually towards a settlement, we can go on from there. It does not, in any case, seem at all likely to happen quickly."

8. The U.K. paper then goes on to examine what sort of resolution might be put forward which would be positive in tone without giving anything away. One point which will particularly interest you is the view that a political counterpart to the M.A.C. might be useful. This leads to a re-examination of the suggestion which the United Kingdom put forward during consideration of the first Chinese Note received this year, viz: revival of UNCURK, but in a new form. While saying that ideas on this are only very tentative at this stage, the U.K. paper claims that:

"a resolution which welcomed the Chinese withdrawal and revived UNCURK, rationalized its position and brought it up to date, would not only have a positive tone about it but would also do something to overcome the procedural difficulties with which we are confronted every time the Communists make a propaganda move."

While you may no doubt still consider that the resurrection of UNCURK is not a particularly good idea, you will be interested to note that the U.K. at least seems to consider that some other body than the "Fifteen" is needed to deal with the Korean question.

9. Referring to other points which might come up, the paper makes clear that:

- (1) the U.K. do not want to disturb the N.N.S.C., which is described as ineffective but uncontroversial; and
- (11) whatever tactics are employed in the General Assembly, it seems desirable to make a serious effort to sell the chosen line to Syngman Rhee in advance, as well of course as to those who will be asked to vote for it.

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10. If they have not begun to do so already, U.K. representatives in New York and Washington may be expected to have talks with our officials on the Korean question in the General Assembly in the very near future; when they do, they will be basing their remarks on the attached paper. We are therefore also sending copies to Washington and New York as well as to Tokyo.

(Signed) ARNOLD SMITH

Canada House.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY: KOREA

At the last session of the Assembly support for the resolution on Korea fell away slightly. But voting on the Indian amendment to invite a North Korean representative to attend the Debate, as well as one from the Republic of Korea as proposed in the usual American opening move, seemed to show more definitely that there was a feeling in some quarters that the time for a less rigid approach to the problem had arrived. The Bolivians hinted at a move towards a new compromise formula, but did not, it is understood, follow this up.

2. The State Department were inclined on the last occasion to serve up a strong resolution and to rally our supporters behind it. The draft which they proposed was, however, softened somewhat at the instance chiefly of the New Zealanders and ourselves, we holding the view that the main strength of our position lay in its consistency and that an aggressive line was unnecessary and might harm our cause.

3. We still hold this view, and it guided us in our consideration of the recent Communist moves. But, with the cooling of passions and the inevitable enthusiasms for progress towards a settlement which have manifested themselves here and there, it seems desirable that we should now appear not only to be, or remain, consistent, but also, if possible, to be thinking positively about the future.

4. Much depends, of course, on the general atmosphere in which the debate takes place. If it were immediately preceded by another Hungary, we could probably maintain our position without serious modification. But if it took place in an improved atmosphere between East and West (this hardly seems likely at present, but is still possible) it is perhaps doubtful whether we could. For the purpose of planning we should, we think, assume that the conditions will not be easy, and that the growing tendency to think in terms of compromise which was evident last time may appear again, and may indeed have been strengthened by the Chinese decision to withdraw their troops from North Korea.

5. Against this background we should try to take a line with something in it to appeal to the weaker brethren. The ideal resolution, of course, would be one which would make it difficult for even India to abstain. The Indian position is important, and it would be particularly helpful if we could avoid a repetition of the preliminaries referred to in paragraph 2 above. The desideratum is a resolution which, while making no sacrifice of principle, would at least give the impression that we wanted to make progress. The first point to put to the State Department, therefore, seems to be that we cannot get more support by being firmer, because all who are firm on Korea are with us in any case. Those who are falling away are doing so because they think that we ought to show more flexibility.

6. The State Department are probably no longer thinking in terms of a "break-through" on the Korean question (the last Chinese Note certainly gives us no encouragement to think seriously in terms of progress in the immediate future), and it seems likely that they will be anxious to maintain the status quo rather than to make any real effort in the direction of reunification. We know that the Americans are worried about the effect on the Japanese,

-2-

should there be a settlement and should the United Nations Command withdraw from Korea. (Their objections to any course which might lead to such a withdrawal seem to be political rather than strategic). They may also be anxious lest progress in Korea should make it harder for them to maintain their holding policy towards China. Finally, they may feel that the present set-up in Korea, which ensures that at least a part of the country is under a pro-Western Government, even if they do have to pay most of that Government's bills, is preferable to a situation in which a "unified, independent and democratic" Korea fell gradually but inevitably into the Communist orbit.

7. We could suggest that it may prove impossible to maintain the present position indefinitely; that Syngman Rhee, for all his faults, is the only man who is capable of governing Korea; and that we should do all we can to give him control of the whole country while he is still there to exercise it. He has the enormous advantage of widespread popular respect, and could afford to bargain with the North against the background of his overwhelming population advantage. Economically, he has, of course, much to gain from reunification, and it is certainly possible to argue that what we should aim at is something like the "Finland in Asia" advocated in a recent "Economist" article. As Walter Robertson seems to fear, the Chinese for their part might be willing to accept reasonable conditions for elections. Once these elections had been held however, they might not find it so easy to dominate the peninsula as they had reckoned. We might, meanwhile, have been able to bring out a measure of disagreement between them and the U.S.S.R., who would regard supervised elections as a dangerous precedent for Germany.

8. The present moment does not, however, appear to be opportune to press these larger arguments, and it would probably be more realistic to confine ourselves for the present to the argument that our over-riding need is to appear reasonable, rather than intransigent, in order to obtain votes in the United Nations. If by so doing we find ourselves moving gradually towards a settlement, we can go on from there. It does not, in any case, seem at all likely to happen quickly.

9. If this tactical argument is acceptable, we must be prepared to suggest some ingredients for a resolution which will be positive in tone without giving anything away. We can, of course, suggest that it should welcome the Chinese decision to withdraw their troops and look forward to the completion of this operation. But it will need to say something more than that, and it seems worth considering whether we might not be able to incorporate into the resolution some device which would make it easier for us in future to deal with Communist moves such as the recent Chinese Notes. The "Fifteen" are not a very suitable negotiating body. They are in a difficult constitutional position vis-a-vis the United Nations. They are also in a bad position for refusing to entertain reasonable sounding proposals for international conferences since they sat down at Geneva, and it is comparatively easy for the Communists to make it appear that they ought to be willing to sit down again. For the present we do not want an international conference on Korea, because the Communists have shown no signs of accepting the principles which they rejected at Geneva. We do, however, want to keep the Korean problem under the aegis of the United Nations. The main weakness in our present position is that there is no direct United Nations machinery for talking politically to the Chinese or the North Koreans, such as in the military sphere is provided by the participation of the United Nations Command in the Military Armistice Commission, which seems to provide

-3-

a useful escape valve for hot air. This weakness gives scope for criticism of the kind which appears whenever the Indians ask for North Korean attendance at the General Assembly debate. It is too easy for the Communists to persuade the neutrals that only one party to the dispute is ever heard. A political counterpart to the M.A.C. might therefore be useful. The cause of the weakness described above is, of course, the failure of the Armistice Agreement to provide for future political action or procedure in the event of the breakdown of the conference which it envisaged and which took place at Geneva. It is, of course, a cardinal principle that we must continue to uphold the Armistice Agreement. But there is no reason why we should not help to do this by providing, by means of a largely procedural change, a logical political background for it.

10. This brings us back to a point which was briefly discussed during our consideration of the first Chinese Note received this year, namely the role of UNCURK. UNCURK is not only a pre-armistice machine. It dates from before the Chinese intervention in Korea. While we solemnly debate its reports every year in the General Assembly, we are inclined to regard it as moribund for all other purposes. This is an unsatisfactory situation, particularly since the resolution under which UNCURK was set up is one of the foundation stones of our position. From the objections raised to our original suggestion in February for bringing UNCURK into the picture (New York telegram No. 157 and your telegram no. 465) we appreciate that a proposal merely to revivify the organisation in its present form is unlikely to serve any useful purpose and might even have the opposite effect, but this is not the only possibility. Assuming that we could get the necessary votes, there are various things we might do to UNCURK. We might form a new body altogether. We might enlarge the present one, e.g. to include more (right-minded) non-combatants. We might give it clear authority to keep in touch with the United Nations representatives on the M.A.C., thus putting it indirectly into contact with the North Koreans, and with the Chinese, if they remain on the M.A.C. after the withdrawal of their troops. (Something of this sort might help to take the sting out of the Indian assertion that only one side of the Korean question was adequately heard). We might have its composition altered in such a way as to include at least one country which is diplomatically represented in Peking, thus putting it into a position from which it could take over from the "Fifteen" the unrewarding task of accepting and organising deliberation on any new Chinese Notes, and could do so with the direct authority of the General Assembly. Some of these possibilities may be worth pursuing. But they should certainly be presented only as very tentative ideas at this stage. We might claim that a resolution which welcomed the Chinese withdrawal and revived UNCURK, rationalised its position and brought it up to date, would not only have a positive tone about it but would also do something to overcome the procedural difficulties with which we are confronted every time the Communists make a propaganda move.

11. There are no doubt other points which will come up. One of these is likely to be the future of the N.N.S.C. You will recall that during last year's debate on the Korean question the Swedes said that they might want to withdraw from this body, but that they would give full notice if they decided to do so. We do not want to disturb the N.N.S.C. It is ineffective but for the present uncontroversial.

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12. Another subject which is likely to come up is the attitude of Syngman Rhee and the Government of the R.O.K. Whatever tactics we decide to employ in the General Assembly, it seems desirable to make a serious effort to sell our line to Syngman Rhee in advance, as well as to those whom we shall be asking to vote for it, in order to avoid any of the more stupid or embarrassing interventions of which Ambassador Yang or other representatives of the R.O.K. may be capable. We think it likely that any line on which we were sufficiently firm could be sold to Syngman Rhee, if it was clear to him that all his main supporters were agreed on it.


DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY
TOKYO, JAPAN
FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.
Reference:
Subject: Korean Item on the Agenda of the
Thirteenth Session of the General
Assembly.

Security: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECRET
No: Y-313
Date: August 18, 1958.
Enclosures: 2.
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References

We attach two copies of the article on the Korean question which will be included in the commentary being prepared for the guidance of the Canadian Delegation to the Thirteenth Session of the General Assembly. You will note that while these instructions are essentially unchanged from last year they do permit rather more latitude in behind-the-scenes negotiations for a more positive and conciliatory resolution than the one adopted at the Twelfth Session.

2. We regret that because of the unusually early date set this year for getting the Delegations instructions approved, we have not had the opportunity to seek your views while the attached document was in process of being drafted. However, we would not wish this to inhibit you from making comments on it and would welcome, at your early convenience, any you might like to make.

Internal Circulation

R. E. Corliss
for the UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

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We & he he. You know a lot about this & I have no comment to make. As I helped to draft this commentary article, I'm hardly in a position to comment on it. Ottawa won't expect anything from here anyway. *DM*

THIRTEENTH SESSION

SECRET

THE KOREAN QUESTION

Report of the United Nations Commission on the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (resolutions 376(v) of October 7, 1950 and 1180(xii) of November 29, 1957)

Background

This item is automatically on the agenda as a result of the Assembly's resolution 1180 (xii) of November 29, 1957. The resolution, after noting the report of the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) and reiterating UN objectives in Korea ("the establishment of a united, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government together with the full restoration of international peace and security in the area"), urged that continuing efforts be made to achieve these objectives; called on the "communist authorities concerned" to accept the UN objectives in order to achieve a settlement in Korea; requested UNCURK to continue its work; and asked the Secretary-General to place the Korean item on the provisional agenda for the thirteenth session.* Similar resolutions were adopted at the ninth, tenth and eleventh sessions.

2. Although the discussion of this question at the twelfth session was less acrimonious than in earlier years, no progress was made towards the desired objective of Korean unification. As in the past, the Canadian Delegation maintained the position of flexibility which has consistently characterized our Korean policy in the UN. The Canadian representative last year, speaking on the Korean resolution, expressed regret that the problem was no nearer to solution and advocated once again a flexible and practical approach (See Annex I). He emphasized that the UN could expect prolonged and arduous negotiations which would not always take the exact form that all its members considered ideal but which could - taking into account the realities - lead to a negotiated settlement consistent with

* For details of the development of, and discussion on, this resolution see final report of item 23 of the twelfth session.

- 2 -

fundamental UN objectives. Since resolution 1180(xii) was adopted nothing has happened that would indicate a need to reformulate the basic Canadian position with regard to reunification. On the contrary recent developments in Korea suggest that the position we have taken is a realistic one. During the past six months the Communist Chinese and North Koreans have stepped up their demands for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, ostensibly to create a better climate for discussion of the unification problem; and as evidence of their willingness to meet their own criterion the Communist Chinese have begun to carry out their announced intention of withdrawing all their troops from North Korea by the end of 1958. The United States, (for reasons explained in the Policy Guidance section of these instructions) may consider it necessary to retain UNC forces close to their present strength even after Chinese troops have been withdrawn. Something must therefore be done to counter the propaganda advantage of the Communist side. The only concession that the UN side can appropriately make is on the procedure for holding all-Korean elections.

3. While we consider that in their own interests the United States and their allies on the UNC side should support our proposal for "international supervision acceptable to the UN" (as opposed to direct supervision by the UN), we agree with the United States that any supervisory arrangements must be adequate to ensure genuinely free elections. We think it more defensible to have a showdown in the General Assembly on the genuine impartiality of the supervisory body than on the rather technical question of whether supervision should be by the UN or acceptable to the UN. It would be worthwhile to reassure the United States on our desire to have impartial supervision and to assure them that we are not going to press them to withdraw their forces. The Canadian aim is to preserve our own good name among the Asian countries and to help the Western powers to maintain positions which will not alienate

the majority of those countries.

Report of UNCURK

4. Although not available when this commentary was prepared the report of UNCURK will, if it follows the pattern set in previous years, review Korean domestic and international affairs in a non-controversial manner. Similarly, it will probably also review without comment, the years' developments under the Armistice Agreement. On neither score should the Commission's treatment of affairs or selection of facts call for comment, and the report could simply be taken note of in a general resolution as has been done at previous sessions of the Assembly. However, the latter phase of the report may refer to the UNC's arms "modernization" programme and ^{to} the withdrawal of a certain number of Chinese divisions; and this will no doubt provide the starting-point for what will be the main substance of the debate.

Modernization of UNC Military Equipment

5. The background to this development is fully set out in the commentary for the twelfth session. While we did not disagree in principle with the United States decision last year to replace existing equipment with more modern weapons (including atomic), we urged that this be done in a way that would least threaten the maintenance of the cease-fire in Korea and create a minimum of disturbance in the Far East. However, in spite of our efforts, the United States decision was subsequently announced and carried out in such a way that it has given greater credence to Communist bloc propaganda against United States "aggressive intentions" in Korea.

Exchange of Communications between the Chinese People's Republic and the "Fifteen"

6. The most recent development in the propaganda battle over Korea has been an exchange of statements between the Chinese People's Republic and the United Kingdom acting on behalf of the fifteen governments which contributed forces to the UN Command. On February 7 the Communist Chinese on behalf of

themselves and the North Koreans presented a statement to the Governments concerned on the UN side proposing withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea with a view to promoting the unification of the country. In the same note they stated their intention to undertake negotiations with the North Koreans for the gradual withdrawal of all Chinese troops from North Korea. A reply was sent to the Chinese on April 9 on behalf of the governments concerned. In this letter the Fifteen, after welcoming the announcement that Chinese troops were to be withdrawn from North Korea, requested clarification of certain North Korean statements concerning the procedure to be followed for holding free all-Korean elections. No mention was made of the possibility of the withdrawal of UN forces. On May 7 the Communist Chinese replied to the message of April 9 renewing their demand for the withdrawal of UN forces from South Korea but side-stepping the request for clarification of their proposals for holding elections. On July 2, the Fifteen replied to the second message from the Communist Chinese, expressing their disappointment that the question of the principles on which elections should be held had been brushed aside and explaining why in their opinion further withdrawal of UN forces without any provision for a political settlement was unacceptable. This message concluded with the following undertaking: "The Governments concerned are prepared to withdraw their forces from Korea in accordance with the existing recommendations of the General Assembly of the UN when the conditions for a lasting settlement laid down by the General Assembly have been fulfilled." At the time of preparing this commentary no reply has been received to the second communication from the Fifteen but statements on the radio and in the press from Peking and Pyongyang have continued to denounce the refusal of the governments concerned to consider early and unconditional withdrawal of UN forces from South Korea.

7. Following receipt of the second Communist Chinese

- 5 -

message the United States State Department at first produced a draft reply containing several elements of rigidity which could have presented many difficulties in the General Assembly and might have lost the UN Command side some active support. As a result of intensive negotiations largely among the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada the text (as ultimately conveyed to the Chinese) was produced to which all had contributed something and which both covered over the differences in points of view among the Fifteen and presented a case which - in our opinion at least - could be defended before the General Assembly if necessary.

8. In the meantime the scheduled withdrawal of Chinese troops from North Korea appears to be proceeding. There is therefore little doubt that the Communist bloc delegations at the next session of the Assembly will capitalize on this development in a further attempt to discredit the position taken by the Fifteen.

Chinese and Korean Representation

9. At previous sessions separate proposals have been made to invite representatives of South Korea alone, or North and South Korea together, to attend the discussion of the Korean item. There is also the possibility that arguments will be put forward for the attendance of Communist Chinese representatives.

10. The attendance of South Korea alone has the disadvantage that their statements may be inflammatory and calculated to provoke the Communist side; this could be embarrassing to those governments which believe that the main fabric of the Armistice Agreement should be preserved. On the other hand, Canada has always maintained that the Republic of Korea is the only lawful government in Korea and has consistently supported South Korea for membership in the UN. It would therefore be very difficult for us to oppose any motion inviting South Korea alone to participate.

- 6 -

11. In our view, the attendance of rival Korean delegations would be likely to lead to increased bitterness in the debate and would probably widen the existing gap between the two sides. However, although our first inclination has always been to vote against such a proposal (as, in fact, we did at the twelfth session) we have found it tactically expedient to abstain on two ~~previous~~ occasions (tenth and eleventh sessions). Our purpose in abstaining on both these occasions was partly to indicate our dissatisfaction with continued United States intransigence on the method of achieving reunification and partly as a gesture which might give some satisfaction to countries (such as India and Ceylon) who are inclined to think that all members of the UN side have, under U.S. and ROK pressure, abandoned any serious effort to seek reunification. Since we have no intention of weakening our stand in favour of a flexible approach to the problem of reunification there would seem to be some merit in abstaining on rather than opposing future proposals to invite representatives of both North and South Korea to participate in the debate.

12. As regards any proposal which includes Communist China in the invitation, we should continue to vote against on the grounds that the Communist Chinese are not directly involved in the question of reunification.

Policy Guidance

(a) General

13. This year it will be particularly important for the "fifteen" to maintain a common front on the Korean question in the face of probable increased pressure from Communist and "neutral" countries for the withdrawal of "United States" troops from South Korea. Since it is unlikely that the United States will be willing to reduce the effective strength of the UNC forces as long as any Chinese troops remain in North Korea, it would be unrealistic to expect them to make any concession

- 7 -

★ a their overall defensive position at this time. Moreover, it should be remembered that the continued presence of U.S. troops in Korea provides the necessary insurance against a possible attempt by President Rhee to occupy North Korea by force of arms.

14. However, these factors should not deter the Canadian Delegation - in private talks with friendly delegations - from stressing the need for a resolution this year that will be sufficiently positive and conciliatory in tone to ensure the support of a majority of the uncommitted countries. In our view such a resolution should emphasize the earlier role of the United Nations as an arbitrator in the Korean dispute with correspondingly less emphasis on the later role of "policeman". For example, reference to resolution 498(v) of February 1, 1951 (condemning the Communist Chinese as aggressors) might conveniently be dropped and there might be value in resurrecting the original resolution of November 14, 1947. (This resolution established the "UN Temporary Commission on Korea" and set forth the original UN position on elections and Korean independence. It also states the principle that the Korean question is primarily a matter for the Korean people itself.) Furthermore, in calling for North Korean acceptance of United Nations objectives (the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea, etc.) it would be useful if reference could be made to the willingness of the governments concerned to withdraw their forces from Korea under the circumstances described in the final sentence of the communication from the Fifteen to the Communist Chinese delivered on July 2, 1958.

15. On the question of reunification, the Canadian Delegation should firmly maintain our position in favour of a flexible and practical approach which, as we pointed out in the First Committee last year, may very well involve prolonged and

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and arduous negotiations before a settlement, consistent with fundamental United Nations' objectives, can be reached. The Delegation could indicate privately to friendly delegations (including the U.S. delegation, which may continue to take its traditionally more restrictive position) that we favour a move away from negotiations conducted by the "Fifteen" on behalf of the United Nations and a reversion to the idea of a neutral negotiating body acceptable to both sides and formally approved by the UN General Assembly. (UNCURK having failed to act successfully in this capacity, a new body^{probably} would have to be created. It might take the form of a small group of neutral countries or it might even be an individual negotiator nominated by the UN Secretary-General after necessary consultation.) The first task of this body (which would act under UN "auspices" and not, as the U.S. have been insisting, under UN "supervision") would be to try - through privately held talks - to narrow the existing gap between North and South Korean views on the holding of all-Korean elections. If and when a satisfactory formula was found, the proposed body would exercise its second function of supervising the elections. Its task would be complete following the inaugural meeting of the new National Assembly.

(b) Report of UNCURK

16. If the UNCURK report is similar in nature to the non-controversial reports submitted in previous years, friendly delegations will no doubt favour adoption of the Report without extensive comment. The Soviet Union may take advantage of the situation created by recent events in Korea to propose again, as it did unsuccessfully at the ninth session, that UNCURK be abolished. Although we believe that UNCURK has outlived its usefulness, the Delegation should not vote in favour of such a proposal. The Delegation should have regard for Australian views on this question because of their special interest in UNCURK.

(c) Modernization of Armaments

17. A resolution may be introduced by the Soviet Union or a member of the Communist bloc condemning the action which the

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- 9 -

UNC (in fact, the United States) has taken to strengthen its military position in Korea by introducing more modern equipment (including atomic weapons); this would no doubt be strongly contrasted with the apparent willingness of the Chinese People's Republic to withdraw all its troops from North Korea by the end of this year. The Canadian Delegation should vote against such a resolution but should try to avoid taking part in the debate; while sympathizing with the aims which this United States action is designed to achieve, we do not wish to give active support to the procedure adopted, since we consider that it could have been made less provocative. Our best interests would be served by attempting to confine the scope of the debate on these matters as much as possible. If, however, participation in the debate becomes necessary the Delegation might point out that the action of the UNC was originally undertaken in response to the problem created by the introduction into North Korea of military re-enforcements contrary to the armistice agreement and was therefore defensive rather than offensive in intent, and does not involve the cease-fire provisions. No doubt the United States Delegation will make the further points that the majority of the UNC forces originally sent to Korea have already been withdrawn and that some reduction in the number of ROK divisions has been made in recent months.

(d) Chinese and Korean Representation during the Debate

13. If a proposal is submitted for participation by South Korea, the Canadian Delegation should vote for it; but, in order to avoid encouraging those who might wish to sponsor such a proposal (which might result in statements embarrassing to the governments that support the maintenance of the Armistice Agreement), the Delegation should not speak in favour of the proposal nor reveal that its instructions will permit it to vote in favour. If a motion is made to invite both North and South Korean representatives, the Delegation should abstain; if the motion includes an invitation to Communist China, the Delegation should vote against and support a motion to give priority to a resolution inviting South Korea only.

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THIRTEENTH SESSION

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14. However, these factors should not deter the Canadian Delegation - in private talks with friendly delegations - from stressing the need for a resolution this year that will be sufficiently positive and conciliatory in tone to ensure the support of a majority of the uncommitted countries. In our view such a resolution should emphasize the earlier role of the United Nations as an arbitrator in the Korean dispute with correspondingly less emphasis on the later role of "policeman". For example, reference to resolution 498(v) of February 1, 1951 (condemning the Communist Chinese as aggressors) might conveniently be dropped and there might be value in resurrecting the original resolution of November 14, 1947. (This resolution established the "UN Temporary Commission on Korea" and set forth the original UN position on elections and Korean independence. It also states the principle that the Korean question is primarily a matter for the Korean people itself.) Furthermore, in calling for North Korean acceptance of United Nations objectives (the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea, etc.) it would be useful if reference could be made to the willingness of the governments concerned to withdraw their forces from Korea under the circumstances described in the final sentence of the communication from the Fifteen to the Communist Chinese delivered on July 2, 1958.

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Source: Korea Press, July 28, 1958

Seoul, July 27 -- (KP-UPI) -- President Syngman Rhee of the Republic of Korea said today the Western world is "far too concerned" about a possibility of war in the Middle East. He advised it to fight communism "whatever the cost turns out to be".

The 83-year-old ROK President granted United Press International an exclusive interview on the eve of the fifth anniversary of the Korean armistice, a truce with communism, which Rhee didn't want and which he fought tooth and nail.

He called President Eisenhower a "brave man" for his firm position on the Middle East.

"The free world", Rhee said, "is far too much concerned about the question of whether or not war will break out in the Middle East or may somehow be evaded."

"It is precisely this frame of mind that has permitted the enormous communism victories up to this time. The real point is that the cause of freedom and justice must be maintained-- whatever the cost turns out to be."

Rhee returned Wednesday from a 20-day summer vacation at his summer home in Chinhae in southern Korea and has been busily studying reports on the Mideast situation.

He was asked whether Korea would send troops to the Middle East if requested.

"Our people", the President said, "always stand ready to fight wherever our enemies invade or try to take over a free country. We are committed as we believe our allies should be to destroy communist imperialism, not to patch up some new kind of unworkable truce with it."

Rhee had harsh words for the five year truce in his nation and called the armistice agreement "vastly detrimental" to the world.

"Its greatest effect has been to increase greatly the prestige and to further the success of the communists", he said, while at the same time cutting deeply into the prestige and strategic position of the free nations."

Rhee said it was a "tragedy that the truce was signed," because if the war in Korea had been won southeast Asia and the Middle East would have been more secure.

Rhee also was asked whether he thought the truce would stretch on indefinitely and what the future holds.

"That is exactly the question I keep asking", he replied, "what kind of a future can the free nations expect when the communists not only glory in their past triumph but are encouraged to march on to new ones....we are ready to fight for the liberation of our fellow countrymen in the north at any moment that destiny may determine the necessity for a peaceful solution of the problem of communist imperialism."

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Rhee, who often believes the U.S. foreign policy is not as firm as it should be, said "President Eisenhower has taken a brave stand."

"Now we keep praying that he will not worry about the question of war or peace, but will keep on driving the communists back where they belong."

If this had been done in Korea, he said, "communism would have suffered a shattering blow and we would not have to face the prospect of a global war."

He said that communism's goal of conquering the world would "vanish away like snow melting in the spring as soon as the allies determine that their real business is to safeguard liberty and democracy, not to worry about how to postpone or avoid crises."

Rhee was asked how he would solve the Middle East crisis if it were up to him.

"Fundamentally my view is this", he said, "the free world should decide what it stands for and then stand for it with unflinching courage."

"Let the communists be the ones to worry about consequences. In the whole history of mankind this is the only way in which liberty and democracy have been safeguarded and advanced."

JULY 16/58

7-1-1-1

Spotlight on Asia

By GUY WINT

British commentator on Far Eastern Affairs

Korea and Principle

The reply to China by the 14 countries of the United Nations which fought in the Korean War carries the Korean controversy one stage further and reaffirms their basic principle.

Last April United Nations Governments asked China to clarify the proposals which it had made for withdrawing its own troops and U.N. forces from Korea. What was to follow afterward? Was this to be prelude to a genuine attempt at a Korean settlement?

By itself the Chinese withdrawal can mean very little since Chinese armies moving out of Korea into China move only a very few miles. In terms of modern strategy Chinese troops are fully as effective on the Chinese side of the border as on the Korean side and militarily such a withdrawal means nothing at all.

On the other hand, withdrawal by U.S. forces would be withdrawal across oceans and once they were out of South Korea the country would be at the mercy of the Chinese armies. What safeguard would there be that Korea would be brought by force within the Communist orbit?

Faced with this question the U.N. Governments asked for more information about the Chinese plan. Did it contain more than a fairly obvious trap?

Early in May, the Chinese replied to these enquiries. Their answer could hardly have been more negative. No proposals at all were put forward for a solution to the unhappy Korean problem and China merely insisted that all foreign troops must be withdrawn before any further step was possible.

The U.N. Governments in their latest note point out that the bulk of U.N. forces have already been withdrawn and say that those that remain will be withdrawn upon fulfillment of the conditions for settlement laid down in the resolution of the U.N. General Assembly. These conditions provide for

free elections under U.N. auspices for a unified Korea.

Because of the Chinese refusal to entertain these conditions there has so far been no progress toward agreement. At the Geneva Conference in 1954—the conference when the Indo-China problem was at least temporarily solved—China showed that on Korean matters it repudiated all idea that the U.N. should play a part in settlement. It denied U.N. authority then and it still does so now. The note handed over in May by the Chinese Government tacitly repeats this refusal.

That is why the situation is deadlocked. The Chinese reject the idea of agreement within the framework of international cooperation prescribed by the U.N. Charter. On the other side, the U.N. cannot allow China to gain by propaganda and political maneuvering all that it was denied in Korea by war.

The deadlock is only partial. The atmosphere in Korea has certainly very much improved and the danger of war is less. Large withdrawals of forces have already been made and, as United Nations Governments have made clear in their latest note, the greater part of United Nations forces originally stationed in Korea as result of the assembly resolution have already departed. But part remains. It will stay until the Chinese Government shows willingness to accept the legitimacy of United Nations interest in Korea.

Since Chinese foreign policy has been growing more inflexible, at the moment the outlook is not very bright. Yet this is a matter on which United Nations countries are rightly adamant.

The hope of the world is for an international system regulated by the United Nations. The Korean War was an incident in the attempt to set it up. It was very costly in blood and tears. Those who fought it were fighting for principles of world security and justice. The results of their sacrifice must not be written off or their principle betrayed.

JULY 15/58

7-1-1-1

Withdrawal Of UN Men From Korea Demanded

PANMUNJOM, July 14 (UPI) — The Communists demanded today the withdrawal of all United Nations troops and new weapons from the Republic of Korea and warned that if this is not done, the U.N. Command must bear "ensuing consequences."

The United Nations rejected the demand.

"Our stand is unchanged," said U.N. representative, U.S. Air Force Maj.-Gen. Albert T. Wilson Jr., at a meeting of the Korean Military Armistice Commission.

North Korean Maj.-Gen. Kang Sang Ho lodged what he called the "strongest protest" at the meeting against establishment of "a guided missile command" and a "guided missile base" in South Korea.

"I resolutely demand," he said, "that your side stop immediately the adventurous war policy pursued by your side in South Korea, remove immediately the guided missile base in South Korea and take back immediately from Korea atomic weapons and all new type weapons."

He also demanded the "immediate withdrawal" of U.S. troops in Korea and said this withdrawal was a prerequisite for settlement of the Korean problem.

Wilson told newsmen after the one hour and 18 minute session that the Communist charges were based on "erroneous press reports."

TOKYO

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7-1-1-1

The Department of External Affairs

Ottawa - Canada



July 2, 1958.

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The following is the text of a note of the Government of the People's Republic of China dated May 6, 1958, which was handed to the United Kingdom Chargé d'Affaires in Peking on that date and subsequently transmitted to the Governments of the countries which contributed forces to the United Nations Command in Korea.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China presents its compliments to the office of the British Chargé d'Affaires in China and asks it to communicate the following to the British Government and through the British Government to the Governments of the other countries on the U.N. Command side.

On April 9, the British Government on behalf of the Governments of the countries on the U.N. Command side delivered to the Chinese Government, Note 35, as a reply to the statements made by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Government of the People's Republic of China respectively on February 5 and 7. The Chinese Government in its own name and entrusted by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea hereby replies to the note of the British Government as follows.

The Korean and Chinese Governments, reviewing the situation in the past three months, are glad to note that the proposals of the Korean and Chinese Governments for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question have won the warm support and approval of many countries and peoples.

Particularly, the fact that the Chinese People's volunteers have decided to withdraw completely from Korea by stages and in groups and are carrying out the withdrawal, has opened up a new and practical way for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

However, the Korean and Chinese Governments cannot

but point out with regret that while the peaceloving countries and people throughout the world have expected the USA and the other countries on the U.N. Command side to withdraw also all U.N. forces from Korea, just as the Chinese People's Volunteers are being withdrawn, the U.N. Command side has up to now failed to take any positive measure on the question of the withdrawal of forces. Furthermore, in their reply to the Korean and Chinese statements which took as long as two months, the Governments of the U.S.A. and the other countries of the U.N. Command side have by-passed the question of withdrawal of forces which is the most urgent and practical step in the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, and, for ulterior purposes, have diverged to the question of so-called clarification on the supervision of elections to entangle the issue, although a clear cut attitude on this question was set out by the Korean Government in its statement of February 5. The Korean and Chinese Governments see in this behaviour of the Governments of the countries on the U.N. Command side an obvious attempt to divert the attention of the people of the world to escape from its inevitable responsibility of withdrawal of its forces from Korea and to cover up the scheme of the U.S.A. to prolong its occupation of South Korea, to continue to obstruct the peaceful unification of Korea and to further create tension in the Far East.

The Korean and Chinese Governments deem it necessary once again to call on the Governments of the countries on the U.N. Command side to face squarely the present situation favourable for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question brought about by the initiative of the Chinese People's Volunteers in withdrawing from Korea, as well as their responsibility before the Korean people and the people of the world. Facts are more eloquent than words. If the Governments of the U.S.A. and the other countries on the U.N. Command side are averse to proving themselves to be

- 3 -

persistently obstructing the peaceful unification of Korea and relaxation of tension in the Far East, they should show good faith by the actual withdrawal of their forces. All attempts to find pretexts to evade this will be of no avail.

The Korean and Chinese Governments would like to know when the Government of the U.S.A. and the other countries on the UN Command side intend to withdraw all their forces from South Korea. Whether all U.N. forces would withdraw speedily from Korea will be an evidence of the presence or not of good will on the part of the Governments of the countries on the U.N. Command side for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. The Korean people eagerly desire an early realisation of the peaceful unification of their motherland and the peoples of the world are anxious for relaxation of tension in the Far East and the world. The Korean and Chinese Governments have done much in the past for the fulfilment of these desires, and will continue to make untiring efforts in the future. The Korean and Chinese Governments consistently maintain that only a complete withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea will provide the necessary condition for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, including the question of holding free elections. Provided that the Governments of the U.S.A. and the other countries on the U.N. Command side will clearly decide to withdraw all U.N. forces from South Korea within a definite time limit and put the decision into practice, proposed by the Korean and Chinese Governments, the Korean and Chinese Governments are going to propose a conference with the countries concerned to carry out negotiation on the peaceful settlement of the Korean question following the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea.

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The Department of External Affairs

Ottawa - Canada

July 2, 1958.

The following is the text of a reply to the May 6 note of the People's Republic of China concerning the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea and a future settlement of the Korean question. On July 2, 1958, the reply was presented by the United Kingdom Charge d'Affaires in Peking on behalf of the sixteen nations which contributed forces to the United Nations Command in Korea.

Her Majesty's Charge d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, on instructions from Her Majesty's principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has the honour to refer to the Ministry's note of May 6, 1958, communicated to the Governments of the countries which have contributed forces for the UN force in Korea, who, after consultation, have requested Her Majesty's Government to reply again on their behalf.

The Governments concerned, noting that the greater part of the forces sent to Korea in accordance with resolutions of the UN have already been withdrawn, reiterate that they welcome the announcement by the Government of the People's Republic of China that Chinese troops are also to be withdrawn from North Korea.

The Governments concerned are disappointed, however, that the note handed to Her Majesty's Charge d'Affaires on the sixth of May does not provide the clarification asked for in the note delivered by Her Majesty's Charge d'Affaires on the ninth of April and brushes aside the question of the principles on which elections should be held. The Governments concerned consider that these principles, which were set forth in the note of the ninth of April, lie at the heart of the matter. It was for this reason that they sought the clarification requested in Her Majesty's Charge d'Affaires' note under reference. They cannot agree that the further withdrawal of UN forces without any provision for a proper settlement of the Korean question would be calculated to lead to a reduction of tension in the Far East; indeed they believe that such action would remove one

- 2 -

necessary guarantee which exists against further aggression in Korea pending a final settlement.

The Governments concerned wish to see a genuine settlement of the Korean question in accordance with UN resolutions and are at all times willing to further the consideration of measures designed to effect reunification on this basis. UN forces are in Korea at the instance of the UN. In accordance with the existing recommendations of the General Assembly of the UN, the Governments concerned are prepared to withdraw their forces from Korea when the conditions for a lasting settlement laid down by the General Assembly have been fulfilled.

A copy of this reply is being transmitted to the United Nations.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(FILE COPY)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM:The Canadian Embassy,.....
.....Tokyo, Japan.....

Reference:.....

Subject:....Press Stories on Chinese Withdrawal
.....from Korea.....

Security:....UNCLASSIFIED.....

No:.....650.....

Date: June 30, 1958.....

Enclosures:.....

1 (in duplicate)

Air or Surface Mail: Air.....

Post File No: 7-1-1-1.....

Ottawa File No.

References

The Mainichi of June 25 prints a U.P.I. story that Communist China announced on June 24 that it would begin its second mass withdrawal of "volunteer forces" - a total of 100,000 men - from North Korea on July 11. The U.P.I. story quoted Radio Peking as its source. The Radio Peking announcement said that six Chinese divisions and special units totalling 100,000 men will make up the second group of Chinese troops to be withdrawn from North Korea this year. The withdrawal is to be completed by August 20.

2. We attach a copy of a story which appeared in the Korea Press of June 27 dealing with the same subject in a rather more sensational way by suggesting that some South Korean military observers fear that the North Koreans may be preparing another June 25, 1950 type of attack with the Chinese withdrawal being used as a deceptive move. The Korea Press goes on to mention another point of view, namely that all 330,000 Communist Chinese soldiers will have been withdrawn by the end of 1958.

R. DUDER

Embassy

Internal
Circulation

Distribution
to Posts

RED CHINESE TROOPS WITHDRAW
FROM FRONTLINE POSITIONS

Source: Korea Press, June 27, 1958

Seoul, June 26 -- (KP-UPI) -- All Chinese Communist troops have been recently pulled out of north Korean front-line positions along the 155 mile long demilitarized zone, reliable Republic of Korea military sources said today.

At the same time, the Communists have constructed tunnel positions all along their frontline, the sources said.

The Korean sources noted that these new developments took place just before the eighth anniversary of the start of the Korean War on June 25, 1950.

Some south Korean military observers take these developments as a bad sign. They fear that the north Korean Communists may be preparing another June 25, 1950, type attack and the Chinese are pushed behind the foreground in a deceiving move.

But others point out that the Chinese troops have been gradually withdrawing from north Korea following an announcement earlier this year that all 330,000 Chinese soldiers will have been pulled out by the end of this year.

So far some 80,000 left north Korea in the first phase of the pullout operation. 250,000 other Chinese have yet to be withdrawn in two more phases, but the Reds already have announced plans to withdraw another 100,000.

These south Koreans also point out that the Chinese had occupied a relatively small sector of the Communist frontline when the withdrawal decision was announced.

The observers said they could watch from their outposts Communist soldiers and civilian labourers working on the hills across the no man's land. They said the tunnels are apparently large enough to conceal any artillery pieces and even the tanks.

South Korean frontline commanders presume the Communists are preparing against a possible atomic warfare in the future.

They say the Communists are very much afraid of the presence of U. S. atomic-capable weapons in south Korea.

7-1-1-1

No Allied Pullout From South Korea

Washington, June 25 (AP)—The United States and 15 allies who fought in Korea Tuesday agreed to flatly reject Communist China's call for withdrawal of all UN forces in Korea.

In less than 10 minutes, diplomatic representatives of the 16 nations approved the text of a joint reply which will be transmitted immediately to Peking.

Korean Ambassador You Chan Yang, who attended the meeting, said its shortness was because everyone was in accord.

"I am very glad our allies who fought with us in Korea realize communist trickery and absolutely reject the communist proposal for Allied troop withdrawals," Yang said.

Radio Peking Wednesday, on the anniversary of the opening of the Korean War urged the

US to pull its troops out of Korea.

The Communist Chinese radio heard in Tokyo said the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea is the most important premise to a peaceful solution of the Korean problem.

Meanwhile, North Korea Wednesday invited the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to inspect the scheduled withdrawal of 100,000 Communist Chinese troops through the port of Sinuiju between July 11 and August 20. Pyongyang Radio broadcast the invitation.

JUNE 26/5-V

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Rhee Emphasizes Communist Threat

SEOUL, June 25 (UPI) — President Syngman Rhee said today on the eighth anniversary of the Korean war that Communism is waging its campaign of aggressive conquest throughout the world today just as it did in 1950.

The Korean war which ended in a stalemate did not settle the struggle of the Free World against Communist aggression, the fiery, white haired Korean leader told a giant rally meeting in the Seoul Stadium.

The question, he warned, still faces the Republic of Korea and the Free World today. He urged the world to "awaken to the awful peril of our day."

Rhee's call to his people to face the Communist challenge came at a time when the Reds appear to be gearing up their activities in the Republic of Korea.

7-1-1-1

U.N. Renews Charges on Korea War Anniversary

PANMUNJOM (UPI) — The United Nations Command Wednesday assailed the Communists for the "savage and unprovoked attack" against the Republic of Korea eight years ago.

The United Nations also accused the Communists of "frustrating" all attempts to arrange a political conference to arrange a permanent peace as called for in the Korean armistice agreement.

The attack on the Communists was read at a meeting of the secretariat of the joint UNC-Communist Military Armistice Commission by U.S. Army Col. Frank F. Carr on behalf of the United Nations.

"Eight years ago today," he said, "Communist armies from the northern part of Korea poured across the 38th parallel in a savage and unprovoked attack against the free people of the Republic of Korea.

"In defiance of all existing standards of conduct for civilized nations you initiated a holocaust which resulted in untold suffering for millions of innocent people. This deliberate attack by your armed forces was politically inspired. Its aim was to seize control of all of Korea so that 'reunification' of Korea could be achieved on your terms: that is as a Communist satellite."

There was no immediate reaction from the Communist delegate, who asked for a one-hour recess.

Carr told the Reds that their "wanton act so shocked the conscience of the world that, for the first time in history, a world organization authorized formation of a military force to halt aggression."

Reject Red Bid

WASHINGTON (AP) — The United States and 15 Allies who fought in Korea Tuesday agreed to flatly reject Communist China's call for withdrawal of all U.N. forces in Korea.

In less than 10 minutes, diplomatic representatives of the 16 nations approved the text of a joint reply which will be transmitted immediately to Peiping.

Korean Ambassador You Chan Yang, who attended the meeting, said its shortness was because everyone was in accord.

JUNE 25/58

MAINTENANCE

File

7-1-1-1

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Red China Announces N. Korea Withdrawal

UPI

June 24
Communist China announced Tuesday that it will begin its second mass withdrawal of "volunteer" forces—a total of 100,000 men—from North Korea July 11, Radio Peking reported.

The announcement said that six Chinese "volunteer" divisions and special units totaling 100,000 men will comprise the second group of Chinese to be withdrawn from North Korea this year.

The withdrawal of the second group, it said, will be completed by August 20.

Radio Peking said the announcement was made by the headquarters of the Chinese People's "volunteers" in North Korea.

The first group of Chinese "volunteers" — some 80,000 men — began withdrawing in late February with the pullout completed by the end of April.

7-1-1-1

Statistics Tell Story Of War

The Communist invasion in 1950, which tormented the men, women, and children of this country for three years, wrought vast havoc on human life and property. The War's tragedy is manifest in a few statistical figures:

More than 33,000 Americans were killed and the casualties suffered by the other 15 U.N. allies were not small. Republic of Korea forces suffered nearly 420,000 casualties, including the killed, wounded, and missing. Korea further lost about one million civilians; more than 100,000 boys and girls were orphaned while one million people were rendered homeless. Refugees fled to liberty from the north and those who were forced to abandon their home towns below the 38th Parallel totaled 1,103,265 men and 1,291,653 women, according to Home Affairs figures. Office of Public Information tabulations further show that civilians kidnaped to the north totaled 78,377 men and 6155 women.

Nation Destroyed

Property damages were astronomical. All told, the damages amounted to \$3,032,000,000 in U.S. currency.

According to a recent Reconstruction Ministry tabulation, the damages break down to \$354 million in general industries, \$457 million in public utilities and facilities, \$186 million in educational facilities, \$372 million in medical facilities, \$232 million in transportation, \$36 million in communications, \$512 million in housing, \$102 million in defense facilities (excluding arms), \$271 million in raw materials, \$70 million in livestock, \$22 million in vehicles, and \$400 million in vessels.

Since the Armistice in July, 1953, however, comprehensive efforts have been made for rehabilitation of the war-torn country and for reconstruction of its economy. Thanks to the help of large-scale U.S. and U.N. economic assistance, which amounts to more than one billion dollars, Korea is now restoring its shattered populace and economy to a level where a decent and requited life is possible for everyone.

R. Duden/1/b
File Nos: 7-1-1-1 ←
5-1-3

Tokyo, June 20, 1958..

Dear Ralph,

This afternoon I had an interesting chat with Mr. Ashwin, a young Australian who has been working with Mr. Dunn as a member of U.N.C.U.R.K. Since I know very little about Korea I am passing on to you some of the things he said to me rather than sending them as an official report.

Mr. Ashwin said that the recent Korean note about reunification which was thrown into the correspondence on the reply to the Communist Chinese notes on the withdrawal of their troops was not initiated in the Korean Foreign Office but sent either from the president's office or the State Council. I gather that the Democratic Party and a considerable section of the officials in the Korean Government are not in complete agreement with the official line that elections are to be held merely in North Korea. There is a growing appreciation of the fact that the South Korean economy is not viable without being joined to its natural complement of North Korea. Mr. Ashwin said his personal view was that South Korea just hasn't got an economy without North Korea. The general tenor of his remarks led me to infer that the R.O.K. position might be more negotiable than would appear from public pronouncement.

Mr. Ashwin agreed with me that the Americans would find it difficult to withdraw their troops from South Korea because of that country's importance in the overall Asian strategy. As you know, Japan would also be more than a little perturbed by the prospect of

R. E. Collins, Esquire,
Far Eastern Division,
Department of External Affairs,
Ottawa, Canada.

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American withdrawal from Korea. Our talk on this point led to a discussion of Japan - R.O.K. affairs. We agreed that after a period of relative friendliness there were signs that both sides were reverting to their former rigid position. I had reported on this both briefly and separately before meeting Ashwin.

Mr. Ashwin confirmed my amateur view that, by and large, the recent elections had given some cause for optimism about the gradual development of parliamentary democracy in South Korea. Mr. Ashwin said that there was no evidence of any successor to President Rhee.

I have just seen telegram Y-220 of June 17th about Mr. Fujiyama's plans. Before it arrived I had had a call in to Kondo and I am still waiting to get in touch with him. As far as I can see at the moment the House of Representatives will be in session until July 4th and Mr. Fujiyama will be meeting the Japanese Ambassadors to the U.S., the Soviet Union, West Germany, The Netherlands, Egypt and perhaps others about July 10th in Tokyo. This looks to me like a fairly full commitment for July. I cannot say more until I hear from Kondo but your telegram should certainly make it clear to the Japanese that July is pretty much of a non-starter and that August, as T.S. Eliot might say, is a cruel month. I shall do my best to let you have something definite early next week if I do not succeed in hearing from Kondo today.

I should rather like to make a trip to Korea between now and September but, as you will realize, it will not be easy to get away from Tokyo.

I think Dick Gorham has done a very good job on the elections. I am glad to note that the Department of Fisheries has found our reporting on fisheries of some use.

This letter is tending to get out of hand. Perhaps one of these days we shall hear from you.

Yours sincerely,

R. Duder.

BY CAN

TELEGRAM CONFIDENTIAL



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REF OUR TEL 1339 JUN13

KOREA-REPLY TO THE CHINESE

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A LETTER DATED JUN16 FROM DE LA MARE OF THE

BRITISH EMBASSY WHICH WE HAVE RECEIVED TODAY CONCERNING BRITISH EM-
BASSY-STATE DEPT DISCUSSIONS OF THE DRAFT MSG TO THE CHINESE:

"I HAVE NOT RPT NOT YET RECEIVED THE FINAL WORD OF THE FO ON THE CON-
TROVERSIAL FINAL SENTENCE OF PARA3 OF THE DRAFT REPLY TO THE CHINESE
ON KOREA, BUT EXPECT TO GET IT WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR SO. MEANWHILE TWO
SMALLER POINTS HAVE COME UP ON THE DRAFT AS GIVEN TO ME BY THE STATE
DEPT ON FRI LAST. THE OPENING WORDS OF THE THIRD SENTENCE OF PARA3
READ "IT WAS TO THIS END THAT...". THIS WAS THE ORIGINAL VERSION
PROPOSED, IF I REMEMBER RIGHTLY, BY OURSELVES. THE FO NOW THINK HOWEVER
THAT IN VIEW OF THE CHANGES WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE EARLIER IN THE PARA
THIS WOULD READ BETTER IF AMENDED TO "IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT...".
I HAVE MENTIONED THIS TO HOWARD PARSONS WHO SEEMS DISPOSED TO AGREE.

THE SECOND POINT IS THAT IN THE FOURTH PARA OF THE REPLY THE
ORIGINAL WORDING "...WILLING TO FURTHER THE CONSIDERATION MEASURES
..." HAS BEEN CHANGED BY THE STATE DEPT TO READ "...WILLING TO CONSIDER
MEASURES...". I ASKED HOWARD PARSONS WHY THIS HAD BEEN CHANGED AND HE
TOLD ME THAT THE ORIGINAL VERSION MIGHT GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE
FIFTEEN WERE PREPARED TO CONSIDER AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OUT-
SIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UN. THE PHRASE HAD BEEN AMENDED AT THE INS-
TANCE OF MR WALTER ROBERTSON TO AVOID THE POSSIBILITY OF THIS IMPLI-
CATION. I HAVE AGAIN EXPLAINED TO HOWARD PARSONS THAT WHAT WE HAD IN
MIND WHEN WE PROPOSED THE ORIGINAL WORDING WAS THAT IT IS THE UN,
RATHER THAN THE FIFTEEN, WHO WILL CONSIDER PROPOSALS, AND THAT OUR
WORDING STRESSES THE UN ASPECT OF THE MATTER, ON WHICH THE STATE DEPT
ARE SO KEEN, WHEREAS THE USA AMENDMENT TENDS TO WEAKEN THAT ASPECT.
I HAVE PUT IT TO HOWARD PARSONS THAT THE USA AMENDMENT, WHICH SPEAKS
OF THE GOVTS CONCERNED AS BEING WILLING TO CONSIDER MEASURES ETC.,
MIGHT WELL BE TAKEN BY THE CHINESE AS A HINT THAT AN INTERNATIONAL
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AMBASSADOR	B
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CONFERENCE MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE, AND THAT THEREFORE OUR ORIGINAL VERSION IN FACT MEETS THE AMERICAN VIEWS BETTER THAN THEIR OWN.

HOWARD PARSONS SEEMS RATHER TO AGREE WITH ME AND HE MAY ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE WALTER ROBERTSON THAT THE ORIGINAL WORDING WAS THE BETTER AFTER ALL. IF YOU AGREE THAT IT IS, YOU MIGHT FEEL DISPOSED TO SPEAK TO PARSONS ACCORDINGLY."

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(FILE COPY)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM:The Canadian Embassy,.....
.....Tokyo, Japan,.....

Reference:..Our Letter No..582 of June 12, 1958.

Subject:....Speaker Yi Stresses National.....
.....Unification,.....
.....

Security:...UNCLASSIFIED.....

No:.....603.....

Date:.....June 16, 1958.....

Enclosures:.....--.....

Air or Surface Mail:....Air.....

Post File No:.....2-1-1-1
c.c. 7-1-1

Ottawa File No.	

References

The Seoul Shinmun of June 8 carries the text of the speech by Speaker Yi Ki-Bung at the opening ceremony of the Fourth House of Representatives on June 7th. The following is a translation of the main points of his speech:

"In order to renew our determination to serve the nation in the political field, I would like to stress a few important things on this occasion.

"First, we should achieve national unification. We, the people of Korea, have always been keenly feeling that we cannot survive without the unification of our divided country. It is our most urgent and important task to hold a free election in North Korea to fill the vacancies in our National Assembly which have been reserved for the representatives of our brothers and sisters in North Korea as soon as possible.

"Second, we should concentrate our entire strength on facilitating our economic reconstruction and rehabilitation. Although it is true that the forced and artificial division of the country, because of which the abundant mineral resources and electric power of the northern part of the country and the rich farm lands and manpower of South Korea have been unnaturally separated, has made it very difficult for us to establish a sound self-supporting economy, we should not lessen our efforts to overcome our difficulties and to achieve the rapid reconstruction of our war-devastated country.

"Our country has traditionally been an agricultural country from remote days. However, such unfavorable factors as the backward method of farming, the lack of effective programs to promote the productivity of our land, the failure to control water and the miserable conditions in farm communities have barred our country from becoming a genuinely rich agricultural country. Meanwhile, in urban areas, industries have only been in the initial stage of achieving real maturity. In view of this, we should establish sound and comprehensive programs to ensure the parallel

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development of the nation's agriculture and industries.

"While such key industries as electric power, fertilizer, cement, coal and plate glass enterprises have made remarkable development during the past years with the relatively sufficient funds provided under the US aid program, minor industries, which are still under very poor conditions, require urgent programs positively supported by the Government.

"Third, we should stop the good-for-nothing political strife and uphold political morality, so as to ensure the smooth operation of the nation's politics. Our past experience shows that the political wrangling between the pro-Government and Opposition parties produced no constructive result. Therefore, I would like to urge both the pro-Government and Opposition members of the new National Assembly to fully cooperate ^{with} each other in introducing a bright and healthy atmosphere in politics with conciliatory and generous minds by upholding political morality.

"Fourth, we should strictly distinguish private interests from public affairs and be prepared to sacrifice our own personal interests in the interest of the State and the people. We should always remember that we are the representatives of the people entrusted with the mission to serve their interests, and refrain from seeking concessions or positions only in our own interest.

"I believe that none of the members of the new House of Representatives will recklessly engage in such acts as are unbecoming of a representative of the people, being oblivious of his sacred mission. If the pro-Government and Opposition parties help and encourage each other for a greater cause with patriotism, our beloved Republic will rapidly grow to a powerful and prosperous country in the international family of nations.

"We should also endeavor to correctly realize the domestic and international situation. I think that one of the best ways to ensure the smooth operation of national politics is to grasp the domestic and international situation from a sound and realistic point of view.

"Finally, I would like to ask the positive cooperation of the Judiciary and the Administration with the Legislature in achieving the development of our country."

Embassy.

BY CAN

TELEGRAM

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INIT
AMBASSADOR
MUTTER
BLUER
HALL E.D.
GORHAM
SMITH
CHOQUETTE
MISS CURRIE

FM WASHDC EJUN13/58-CONFID
TO EXTERNAL 1339 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO PERMISNY LDN EMBASSYPARIS OPIMMEDIATE
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG DELHI BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS WLGTN CNBRA KARACHI FM LDN

REF YOUR TEL Y217 JUN12

KOREA:REPLY TO THE CHINESE

DE LA MARE OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY TOLD US THIS MORNING THAT YOUR
OBJECTIONS TO THE UK COUNTERPROPOSAL FOR THE FINAL SENTENCE OF
PARA3 HAD BEEN REPORTED TO THE FO. IN ADDITION, WE
LEARNED FROM THE NZ EMBASSY THAT WLGTN IS NOT RPT NOT TAKEN WITH
THE UK COUNTERPROPOSAL AND WHILE THEY WOULD PREFER TO SEE THE
SENTENCE DELETED, THEY ARE PREPARED TO AGREE TO THE CANADIAN VERSION
OF THE FINAL SENTENCE TOGETHER WITH THE SMALL AMENDMENT RECOMMENDED
BY THE STATE DEPT ("A NECESSARY GUARANTEE AGAINST FURTHER
AGGRESSION").

2. DE LA MARE SAID THAT HE WAS SENDING A FURTHER MSG TO TRY TO
PERSUADE THE FO TO ACCEPT THE DRAFT MSG WITH THE CANADIAN VERSION
OF THE FINAL SENTENCE OF PARA3 AS AMENDED BY THE STATE DEPT.


3. DE LA MARE MENTIONED TWO FURTHER MINOR AMENDMENTS WHICH HAVE
APPEARED IN THE STATE DEPT DRAFT WITH WHICH HE HAS BEEN WORKING.
THE FIRST OF THESE IS IN PARA2 WHERE THE PHRASE "AT THE INSTANCE
OF THE UN" WOULD BE REPLACED BY "IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTIONS OF
THE UN". THIS SUGGESTION WAS IN FACT MADE TO MR WALTER ROBERTSON
DURING OUR INTERVIEW ON MAY 26. WHILE MR ROBERTSON WAS RECEPTIVE TO
THE SUGGESTION, WE HAD NOT RPT NOT HEARD ANYTHING FURTHER OF IT
UNTIL TODAY.

4. THE OTHER MINOR AMENDMENT IS TO THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARA4
WHERE THE LAST CLAUSE ("AND ARE AT ALL TIMES WILLING TO FURTHER
THE CONSIDERATION OF MEASURES DESIGNED TO EFFECT THE REUNIFICATION
ON THIS BASIS") WOULD BE REPLACED BY "AND ARE AT ALL TIMES WILLING
TO CONSIDER MEASURES DESIGNED TO EFFECT REUNIFICATION ON THIS BASIS".

5. WE ASSUME THAT YOU WOULD HAVE NO RPT NO OBJECTION TO THESE MINOR
DRAFTING AMENDMENTS.

6. DE LA MARE SAID TODAY THAT LIKE THE OTHER COMMONWEALTH EMBASSIES,

...2



TELEGRAM

P. TWO1339

THE UK EMBASSY HAD SENT A SIMPLE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT TO THE KOREAN NOTE OF MAY22 AND HAD STATED THAT THE KOREAN OBSERVATIONS WERE BEING TRANSMITTED TO THE UK GOVT. DE LA MARE ADDED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN YESTERDAY WITH THE KOREAN AMBASSADOR AND RECEIVED THE IMPRESSION THAT IN TRANSMITTING THEIR NOTE, THE KOREAN WERE TRYING TO REMIND OTHER GOVTS OF THE KOREAN POSITION AND THAT THEY WOULD NOT RPT NOT NECESSARILY EXPECT ANY DETAILED REPLY.

BY CAN


TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL



NO.	INIT.
1	B
AMBASSADOR	
MUTTER	
OUTER	
HALLS END	
GORHAM	
SMITH	
CHOQUETTE	
MISS CURRIE	

7-1-1-1



FM WASHDC JUN12/58 CONF
TO EXTERNAL 1333 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS PERMISNY OPIMMEDIATE
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG DELHI BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS WLGTN CNBRA FM LDN

REF YOURTEL Y216 JUN11 AND COLLINS-RAE TELECON

KOREA:REPLY TO THE CHINESE

THE BRITISH EMBASSY IS HAVING A HOLIDAY TODAY AND WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO FIND OUT FROM DE LA MARE THE PRESENT STATUS OF HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE STATE DEPT CONCERNING THE FINAL SENTENCE OF PARA3. BOTH THE NZ AND AUSTRALIAN EMBASSIES ARE IN A POSITION TO AGREE TO THE DRAFT IN THE FORM IN WHICH WE HAVE ACCEPTED IT AND SEE NO RPT NO OBSTACLE TO THE MINOR DRAFTING CHANGE WHICH THE STATE DEPT HAS SUGGESTED IN ORDER TO MEET UK OBJECTIONS (SUBSTITUTION OF "A NECESSARY GUARANTEE" FOR "THE ONLY GUARANTEE").

2. WITH RESPECT TO THE SOUTHKOREAN NOTE, WE HAVE ALREADY SENT A SIMPLE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT INDICATING THAT THE CONTENTS OF THE KOREAN MSG WERE BEING TRANSMITTED TO OTTAWA, AS REPORTED IN OUR TEL 1183 MAY28. THE AUSTRALIANS AND NEWZEALANDERS HAVE DONE LIKEWISE AND HAVE HAD NO RPT NO FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM THEIR OWN GOVTS. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES AND IN VIEW OF THE SORT OF REPLY WHICH THE STATE DEPT HAS SENT, YOU MAY CONSIDER IT SATISFACTORY TO LET MATTERS REST AS THEY ARE.

BY CAN

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FM EXTERNAL OTT JUN12/58 CONFD
TO WASHDC Y217 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS PERMISNY
TOKYO DEFERRED
BAG DELHI BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS


~~MOST-IMMEDIATE~~

REF OURTEL Y126 JUN11

KOREA:REPLY TO CHINESE

NO.	1
AMEMBASSADOR	
MUTTER	
DUDER	
HALSTED	
GORHAM	
SMITH	
GHOQUETTE	
MISSOURI	

2 hrs
the



EARNSCLIFFE HAS INFORMED US THAT THE FO STILL OBJECTS TO OUR PROPOSED REDRAFT OF LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 3 ON GROUNDS THAT APART FROM SOUNDING PROVOCATIVE IT IS OPEN TO TWO FURTHER OBJECTIONS-(A)IT COULD BE TAKEN TO IMPLY THAT UN TROOPS ARE BEING RETAINED IN KOREA TO RESTRAIN AGRESSIVE ACTS BY SOUTH AS WELL AS BY NORTH,AND QUOTE WE DO NOT RPT NOT PRESUMABLY WISH TO INVITE COMMENT ON THIS UNQUOTE;
(B)IT IS DOUBTFUL WHETHER STATEMENT THAT WITHDRAWAL WOULD REMOVE THE QUOTE ONLY GUARANTEE UNQUOTE AGAINST FURTHER AGRESSION IS TRUE, SINCE ULTIMATE DETERRENT IS PRESUMABLY FEAR OF NUCLEAR RETALIATION.
2.THE FO HAVE THEREFORE PROPOSED FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVE:QUOTE INDEED THEY BELIEVE THAT SUCH ACTION BEFORE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNIFIED, INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC GOVT OF KOREA WOULD REMOVE A STABILIZING FACTOR AND WOULD IMPEDE RATHER THAN FACILITATE THE PROSPECT OF PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION UNQUOTE.
3.SO FAR AS WE CAN SEE,ONLY REAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THIS AND ORIGINAL STATE DEPT DRAFT IS SUBSTITUTION OF QUOTE WOULD REMOVE A STABILIZING FACTOR UNQUOTE FOR QUOTE WOULD ENDANGER PEACE IN FAREAST UNQUOTE. WHILE THIS IS,OF COURSE,LESS PROVOCATIVE THAN ORIGINAL VERSION,IT IS STILL OPEN TO OUR MAIN OBJECTION(SEE PARA 5 OF Y194 MAY29)IN THAT IT CONTAINS THE SAME LINKAGE OF WITHDRAWAL AND UNIFICATION IN TERMS WHICH MIGHT PROVE DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN AWAY AT A LATER DATE,AND WHICH WE THOUGHT WE HAD SUCCESSFULLY AVOIDED IN THE REPLY AS A WHOLE AS A RESULT OF STATE DEPT'S ACCEPTANCE OF TEXT QUOTED IN YOUR TEL 1268 JUNS.
4.WITH REF TO YOUR UNNUMBERED TEL JUN11 QUOTING STATE DEPT'S COUNTER-PROPOSAL,WE WOULD HAVE NO RPT NO OBJECTION TO FINAL CLAUSE BEING CHANGED TO READ QUOTE...WOULD REMOVE A NECESSARY GUARANTEE AGAINST FURTHER AGRESSION...UNQUOTE.



FM WASHDC JUN11/58 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL .13210PIMMEDIATE
INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS PERMISNY
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG DELHI BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS WLGTN CNBRA KARACHI FM LDN
REF YOUR TEL Y212 JUN11

KOREA:REPLY TO THE CHINESE


WE INFORMED THE STATE DEPT THIS AFTERNOON OF YOUR ACCEPTANCE OF THE
PROPOSED MSG TO THE CHINESE AS SET FORTH IN PARA2 OF OURTEL 1267,
AMENDED AS IN OURTEL 1290.WE WERE INFORMED THAT THE STATE DEPT WAS
STILL DISCUSSING WITH THE UK EMBASSY THE FINAL SENTENCE OF PARA3.

2.YOU HAVE DOUBTLESS LEARNED FROM EARNSCLIFFE THE LATEST FO INSTRUCT-
IONS ON THIS SUBJECT(FO TEL TO UK EMBASSY WASHDC 3547 JUN10 REFERS).

3.DE LA MARE OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY SAID THAT THE STATE DEPT WAS NOT
RPT NOT FAVOURABLY DISPOSED TO THE UK COUNTERPROPOSAL FOR THE FINAL
SENTENCE OF PARA3,REGARDING IT AS TOO WEAK.STATE DEPT,IN ORDER TO GO
SOME WAY TOWARDS MEETING THE UK OBJECTIONS TO OUR SUGGESTED VERSION
OF THE FINAL SENTENCE OF PARA3,HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE FINAL CLAUSE
SHOULD READ"INDEED,THEY BELIEVE THAT SUCH ACTION WOULD REMOVE A NECES-
SARY GUARANTEE AGAINST FURTHER AGGRESSION....".DE LA MARE SAID THAT
HE DID NOT RPT NOT THINK THAT THE FO WOULD MAKE A MAJOR ISSUE OUT
OF THIS SENTENCE,THOUGH HE HAS NOT RPT NOT YET BEEN AUTHORIZED TO
ACCEPT ANYTHING OTHER THAN THE FO COUNTER-PROPOSAL.

4.WE WOULD WELCOME YOUR COMMENTS.

NO.	
1 AMBASSADOR	IRB
MUTTER	2 R
BUDER	
HALS LEAD	
GORHAM	
SMITH	
CHOQUETTE	
MISS CURRIE	



NO. 2
AMBASSADOR
MUTTER
GLIDER
HALS LEAD
GORHAM
SMITH
CHOQUETTE
MISS CURRIE

File

FM EXTERNAL OTT JUN11/58 CONF
TO WASHDC Y216 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS PERMISNY
TOKYO DEFERRED
BAG DELHI BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS WLGTN CNBRA FM LDN

REF OURTEL Y212 JUN11

KOREA:REPLY TO THE CHINESE

AS YOU WILL BE AWARE FROM PHONE CONVERSATIONS OUR VIEW ON FINAL SENTENCE OF PARA3 IS THAT WE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED NOT RPT NOT TO HAVE IT INCLUDED IN THE DRAFT BUT THAT IF SOMETHING MUST BE INCLUDED OUR REDRAFT OF THIS SENTENCE IS LESS OBJECTIONABLE THAN EITHER STATE DEPT ORIGINAL DRAFT OR AUSTRALIAN PROPOSAL.WE LEARN FROM A TEL FROM BRITISH EMBASSY IN WASHDC TO EARNSCLIFFE THAT DE LA MARE IS RECOMMENDING TO THE FO THAT OBJECTION TO THE REDRAFT OF FINAL SENTENCE OF PARA3 BE DROPPED BECAUSE OF USA CONCESSION OVER SENTENCE2.

2.WE THINK YOU OUGHT TO CONSULT WITH THE OTHER COMMONWEALTH EMBASSIES TO REACH A DECISION AS TO TREATMENT WHICH IS TO BE GIVEN TO THIS DRAFT AT A MEETING OF THE FIFTEEN.FOR EXAMPLE,IF THE EXPRESSION OF DOUBTS AS TO WISDOM OF INCLUDING FINAL SENTENCE OF PARA3 MIGHT LEAD OTHER PARTICIPANTS TO SUGGEST OTHER CHANGES IT MIGHT BE IN OUR GENERAL INTEREST NOT RPT NOT TO RAISE THE POINT AT ALL.THIS IS A QUESTION OF TACTICS WE SHOULD PREFER TO LEAVE YOU TO WORK OUT IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER COMMONWEALTH EMBASSIES.

3.WE SHOULD ALSO LIKE YOU TO CONSULT THE OTHER COMMONWEALTH EMBASSIES ABOUT REPLYING TO SOUTHKOREAN NOTE.WE ARE INCLINED TO FAVOUR A SIMPLE NOTE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT SAYING THAT KOREAN NOTE HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED TO OTT WHERE IT IS BEING GIVEN CAREFUL STUDY.IF THERE APPEARS TO BE NO RPT NO OBJECTION TO SENDING SUCH AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT SOONER IT IS DONE THE LESS NEED THERE IS FOR A MORE SUBSTANTIAL REPLY.

BY CAN

7-1-1-1

TELEGRAM

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~~MOST IMMEDIATE~~



FM EXTERNAL OTT JUN11/58 CONF
TO WASHDC Y212 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS PERMISNY
TOKYO DEFERRED
BAG DELHI BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS ULGTU CNBRA KARACHI FM LDN

REF YOUR TELS1267 AND 1268 JUNG

KOREA:REPLY TO THE CHINESE

I HAVE EXAMINED THE TEXT OF THE PROPOSED REPLY TO THE CHINESE
MSG OF MAY6 WHICH YOU HAVE HELPED TO WORK OUT FOR SUBMISSION
TO THE FIFTEEN FOR APPROVAL.I AGREE THAT THIS TEXT MEETS OUR
REQUIREMENTS AND WOULD WISH YOU TO INFORM THE STATE DEPT OF
CANADIAN APPROVAL OF THIS PROPOSED TEXT AND TO SUPPORT THE PROPO-
SED TEXT AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME IN A MEETING OF THE FIFTEEN
SIDNEY SMITH

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA. (FILE COPY)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM:The Canadian Embassy,.....
.....Tokyo, Japan,.....

Reference:.....

Subject:.....President Rhee Before the.....
.....National Assembly.....

Security:...UNCLASSIFIED.....

No.:582.....

Date:.....June 11, 1958.....

Enclosures:.....--.....

Air or Surface Mail:.....Air.....

Post File No:.....7-1-1-1.....

Ottawa File No. C.C. 7-1-1	

References

The Mainichi of June 8 published a UPI story from Seoul which reported that President Rhee appeared on June 7th before the opening session of the newly elected National Assembly and once again sounded his "march north" call. The President is reported to have said that Korean unification may not be achieved until "we march north and drive out the communists.... We have the arms and if we are resolutely determined to fight our allies will not stop us".

2. President Rhee called on Asian nations "to do everything we can to help Indonesian anti-communist fighters". He also welcomed the return to power of General de Gaulle and hoped the General would drive out all communists from France and establish a democratic anti-communist Government there.

3. The National Assembly re-elected Lee Ki Poong as Speaker, despite abstention by the opposition.

R. DUDER
Embassy.

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to Posts

VOLUME 1

7-1-1-1

A FINLAND IN ASIA: SOLUTION FOR KOREA

Time heals many wounds, but it has not healed the incision that cuts Korea in half.

The general election held in the southern half of the country early in May was the third—two for parliaments, one for the presidency—since the fighting ended nearly five years ago. The South Koreans can congratulate themselves on having developed something more like what veteran democrats would recognize as a free poll and a workable two-party system. But nothing has been achieved in these three elections and five years that promises to alter the basic Korean paradox. The two halves of the country are as apt for fitting together as a plug and a socket; yet they remain unconnected, and each drains strength from the great power that supports it. The onward roll of time has produced neither of the consequences that the free world might once have hoped for: neither the disintegration of the communist regime in the north nor the blossoming in the south of a society so free and prosperous as to entrance other Asian eyes. It becomes increasingly clear that, if the problem is ever to be solved, both sides will have to change their mental image of the future of Korea.

There have been two developments in the past year which are likely to make the present compromise even more unsatisfactory, not less, than it is now. On the whole, last month's elections went well. There was some intimidation in the country villages where the foreign correspondents and United Nations observers did not penetrate; apparently President Rhee's police kept their usual avuncular eye on his interests, and the supervision of polling stations was not always up to democratic standards. But the Koreans behaved better than the Filipinos did in their election last year, and the possible alternative ills—a huge rigged majority for Rhee's Liberal Party, or the chaos and possible army coup that might have followed a Democratic victory—were both avoided.

Nevertheless, the election produced two parties which, though rivals at the polls, cling cosily together on a narrowly conservative policy. The left-wing Progressives, the one party which formerly had something fresh to say about the problem of the north, have now been banned. It is true that during the campaign the Democrats suddenly declared that they would be willing to allow all-Korean elections under UN supervision, whereas the government insists that it will tolerate nothing more than a kind of mass by-election in the north to fill the "vacant seats" in the legislature in Seoul. But it is hard to know how long even this degree of divergence will last. Lately there has even been talk of a merger from members of both parties, including Rhee's

heir apparent, Lee Ki-poong. Even if the South Koreans are developing a two-party system, it is not one that offers a genuine alternative government.

The second development is a new danger to the South Korean economy. It keeps its nose barely above water by virtue of American aid, which in the past two American fiscal years has been running at more than \$300 million a year. In the present year, however, ending next month, the total is substantially lower, and Koreans expect to get little more than \$200 million next year. If it were possible to eli-

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minate the very high proportion of losses caused by graft and the simple disappearance of goods within Korea, two aid dollars might go nearly as far as three used to. But, if not, the South Koreans will be forced to pare down some of their more ambitious plans. A heavy industry, centered on aid-financed iron and steel works, would recede into the dreams of the future. And if South Korea's economy never gets beyond the stage of light industries and consumer goods, its chances of emerging one day into prosperous self-sufficiency are dim. The many thousands of angry (because unemployed) young men are likely to grow angrier still if they suspect they are being educated merely to be turned out on the streets.

This is the context for the recent exchange of notes between the Chinese Government and the 16 nations that fought in Korea. In February, the Chinese announced that they were evacuating their troops and made a vague suggestion that, if the allies did likewise, all-Korean elections might be held under neutral supervision. The allies countered by asking for more details about the kind of elections the communists had in mind; and this month the Chinese avoided the question by repeating their call for an American withdrawal and saying that the elections could be talked about afterward. At this point the observer begins to fear that the discussion is about to be impaled on the familiar barbed-wire semantics of "neutral" and "supervision," and that the Chinese are simply interested in getting the last couple of American divisions off Korean soil—though one might suppose that this prospect, in view of President Rhee's musings about what he would like to do if he had a free hand, might alarm China as much as the rest of the world.

And yet the situation is not yet so obviously hopeless that there is no point in going on with the discussion. It is essential that the Chinese should see the folly of demanding a total evacuation of foreign troops before a real political settlement is reached: leave the two Korean governments by themselves, and they would simply leap at each other's throats. But if the Chinese could be made to realize this, they have already agreed, at least in principle, to the other main requirement: a supervised election for the whole of Korea. The importance of this should not be underestimated. If the Chinese were to stand by what they have said, they would have reconciled themselves to the prospect of an election in which their chances of winning would be virtually nil. The population of the north is a mere fraction of that of the south; and there is no reason to think either that the northerners are unanimously communist or that the southerners have forgotten 1950. As a simple matter of arithmetic, the allies could afford to be a little more generous in their definition of "neutral supervision" than they could consider being if the communists were within jumping distance of a majority.

This is a surprising risk for the Chinese communists to consider, but there is no mystery about their motives. In order to keep the shadow of American nuclear weapons away from their Manchurian doorstep, they may be willing to relax their control over North Korea—hoping that in the long run the whole country will either turn communist or, failing that, simply be a harmless small neighbor. Of course they will try to get rid of the Americans without submitting to elections in return; but it is the allies' business to make them pay the price. China's foreign policy may not always be as rawly immature as it was a few years ago. Peking may be willing to tolerate the existence of an independent, but neutral Korea on its flank much as Russia tolerates the existence of Finland, that other tiny appendix to the communist continent.

Is this concept unacceptable to the West? The comparison with Finland is a close one. Finland, like Korea, has no reason to love its big neighbor. Its independence is tolerated because it presents no threat to the Russians and because they know that subduing it would be an awkward, risky and possibly bloody business. A reunited Korea, with the benefit of a good deal less foreign aid than the two halves now get, could become a tolerably prosperous country by Asian standards. Its parliament might well, like Finland's, include an obstinate minority of communists, but so long as the country was well run they would not necessarily be a dangerous minority.

Of course, such a Korea would always be "at China's mercy" in precisely the same way as Finland depends on Russia's tolerance. One can even foresee it developing the same kind of special trade links with the communist block as Finland has (and, with luck, being tossed the same little privileges that Khrushchev is now offering President Kekkonen) and it would have to be equally careful how it voted in the United Nations. But the point is that Finland stayed genuinely free. The Russians have tacitly admitted that the military and diplomatic disadvantages of changing its status by force outweigh any advantages they might gain. Might it not be worth while to try to win a similar status for Korea?

BY CAN

TELEGRAM

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FM WASHDC JUN9/58 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 1290 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS PERMISNY
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG DELHI BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS WLGTN CNBRA KARACHI FM LDN



REF OURTEL 1267(PARA2)JUN6

KOREA:REPLY TO THE CHINESE

FINAL SENTENCE OF AMENDED DRAFT NOTE SHOULD READ:"IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE EXISTING RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UN,THE
GOVTS CONCERNED ARE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM KOREA
WHEN THE CONDITIONS FOR LASTING SETTLEMENT LAID DOWN BY THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY HAVE BEEN FULFILLED."

BY CAN

TELEGRAM

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FM WASHDC JUN9/58 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 1289 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO LDN PERMISNY EMBASSYPARIS
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG DELHI BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS LEBEIN CNBRSS KARACHI FM LDN

REF OURTEL 1268 JUN6

KOREA:REPLY TO THE CHINESE

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A LET FROM DE LA MARE OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY TO
PARSONS,(DIRECTOR,NORTH ASIAN AFFAIRS)ON THIS SUBJECT DATED JUN7

AND DELIVERED TO THE STATE DEPT TODAY,BEGINS:

IN AN EFFORT TO CLARIFY THE POSITION ON THE DRAFT REPLY TO THE CHINESE
NOTE OF MAY6 ON KOREA,AND TO HASTEN THE DESP OF OUR REPLY,I THINK IT
MIGHT BE USEFUL TO RESTATE THE POSITION OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVT IN THE
UK.

2.IT IS NOW OVER A MONTH SINCE THE CHINESE REPLY WAS RECEIVED.IN OUR
VIEW THE DELAY IN MAKING OUR FURTHER REPLY GREATLY DECREASES WHAT
PUBLICITY AND PROPAGANDA VALUE IT MAY HAVE.WE BELIEVE THAT IF WE ARE
TO EXPECT A GOOD WORLD REACTION TO OUR CASE THE SOONER IT IS DES-
PATCHED THE BETTER.THE LONGER IT IS DELAYED THE MORE IT IS LIKELY TO
BE TREATED WITH SUSPICION AMONG UNCOMMITTED PEOPLES WHO WILL PERHAPS
ALL TOO READILY BELIEVE THAT THE DELAY IS DUE TO OUR"COOKING UP"
SOME TRICKERY.EVEN OUR ALLIES IN THE"FIFTEEN"MAY BEGIN TO WONDER
WHAT IS GOING ON.

3.THERE IS DANGER THAT,IN BECOMING INVOLVED IN INTRICATE DETAILS OF
DRAFTING AND IN CONSIDERATION OF THE SORT OF LONG-TERM SETTLEMENT AT
WHICH WE SHOULD AIM WE MAY LOSE SIGHT OF THE FACT THAT WHAT WE ARE
PRIMARILY ENGAGED ON AT PRESENT IS A PROPAGANDA EXERCISE DESIGNED TO
COUNTER THE EFFECTS ON"NEUTRAL"OPINION OF THE COMMUNIST INSISTENCE ON
TROOP WITHDRAWALS AND TO PREPARE THE GROUND FOR THE NEXT MEETING OF
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.CERTAINLY OUR REPLY SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE
INCONSISTENT WITH ANY PLANS THAT WE MAY WORK OUT FOR A LONG-TERM
SETTLEMENT;NOR DO WE WANT TO APPEAR TO BE ABANDONING ANY OF THE
ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES.THESE REQUIREMENTS POINT TO THE DESIRABILITY OF
PHRASING OUR REPLY IN GENERAL AND UNSPECIFIC TERMS WHILE MAINTAINING
AT THE SAME TIME A POSITIVE TONE,LOOKING FORWARD TO REUNIFICATION
RATHER THAN BACKWARD TO A RECITAL OF OUR PAST GRIEVANCES AGAINST
THE CHINESE.

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4. WITH THESE POINTS IN MIND WE HAVE THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS ON THE DRAFT REPLY AT PRESENT UNDER CONSIDERATION:

(A) WE WOULD STILL MUCH PREFER THE DELETION OF THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA3, EVEN AS AMENDED IN THE LATEST CANADIAN PROPOSAL. THE SENTENCE STILL SEEMS TO US UNNECESSARY AND UNLIKELY TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE GENERAL EFFECT WHICH WE WISH TO MAKE ON NEUTRAL OPINION. THE POINT IS ALREADY IMPLICIT IN THE PRECEDING SENTENCE AND COULD BETTER BE DEVELOPED IN A COMMENT OR IN SPEECHES AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

(B) WE ACCEPT THE REVISED VERSION OF THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA4 AS FOLLOWS: "IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXISTING RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UN, THE GOVTS CONCERNED ARE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM KOREA WHEN THE CONDITIONS FOR A LASTING SETTLEMENT LAID DOWN BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAVE BEEN FULFILLED."

(C) IT IS THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA3 THAT STILL CAUSES US DIFFICULTY. WE STILL THINK THAT OUR ORIGINAL SUGGESTION: "THE GOVTS CONCERNED CONSIDER THAT THIS QUESTION LIES AT THE HEART OF THE MATTER..." IS THE MOST SATISFACTORY VERSION AND ALL THAT IT IS NECESSARY FOR US TO SAY. WE DO NOT THINK THAT WE SHOULD COMMIT OURSELVES IRREVOCABLY NOW AS TO THE EXACT FORM AND MANNER IN WHICH THESE ELECTIONS SHOULD BE HELD. I BELIEVE THAT YOU HAVE ARGUED THAT THE SENTENCE AS AMENDED BY YOU DOES NOT RPT NOT IRREVOCABLY COMMIT US BUT ONLY RESTATES THE VIEW OF THE UN POWERS CONCERNED. WE DOUBT WHETHER THIS WOULD BE THE INTERPRETATION GENERALLY PLACED UPON THE SENTENCE AS REVISED BY YOU. BUT IF THAT INTERPRETATION SHOULD BE PLACED UPON IT THAT ITSELF SEEMS TO US TO DESTROY ALL THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF INSERTING IT. EITHER WE WANT TO SAY QUITE CLEARLY EXACTLY HOW WE WOULD REQUIRE THE ELECTIONS TO BE HELD OR WE DO NOT RPT NOT. IF WE DO NOT RPT NOT, WHICH IS OUR VIEW AND WHICH SEEMS TO BE THE CONCLUSION TO WHICH YOUR ARGUMENT WOULD LEAD, THERE WOULD SEEM TO US TO BE NO RPT NO POINT WHATSOEVER IN MAKING ANY REF AT ALL TO THE MANNER IN WHICH THE ELECTIONS WOULD BE HELD.

5. IT IS ALSO FOR CONSIDERATION WHETHER THE "FIFTEEN" ARE ENTITLED TO LAY DOWN, OR TO APPEAR TO LAY DOWN, PROVISIONS AFFECTING THE DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UN. THIS IS PRESUMABLY THE PREROGATIVE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ITSELF, NOT RPT NOT OF 15

PAGE THREE 1289

MEMBERS OF IT. IT THEREFORE SEEMS TO US THAT THE SENTENCE UNDER CONSIDERATION AS AMENDED BY YOU IS OBJECTIONABLE ON TWO COUNTS:

(A) IT WILL GIVE THE WORLD GENERALLY AND UNCOMMITTED NATIONS IN PARTICULAR THE IMPRESSION THAT THE "FIFTEEN" ARE IRREVOCABLY WEDDED TO THE HOLDING OF ELECTIONS UNDER UN SUPERVISION; AND


(B) IT MAY WELL CAUSE OFFENCE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AS BEING A MANIFESTATION OF UNWARRANTED SUPEREROGATION ON THE PART OF THE "FIFTEEN".

6. THE ABOVE ARE OUR OBJECTIONS TO THE SENTENCE ON TACTICAL GROUNDS. WE HAVE MISGIVINGS ON GENERAL POLITICAL GROUNDS ALSO. WE DO NOT EXPECT, ANY MORE THAN I THINK YOU DO, THAT THE REUNIFICATION OF KOREA IS AN IMMEDIATE POSSIBILITY. THE RECENT NOTE FROM THE GOVT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, ACCEPTING THE PRINCIPLE OF ELECTIONS FOR NORTH KOREA, ONLY, IS BUT ONE INSTANCE OF THE POLITICAL AND OTHER DIFFICULTIES WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE RESOLVED. SOME OF THESE MAY BE RESOLVED ONLY BY THE PASSAGE OF TIME. IT MAY WELL BE THAT WHEN THE TIME COMES THE THEN EXISTING SITUATION MAY MAKE IT MORE ADVANTAGEOUS OR PROFITABLE TO THE FREE WORLD TO PURSUE THE MATTER OF ELECTIONS IN SOME MANNER OTHER THAN DIRECT SUPERVISION BY THE UN. THERE WOULD SEEM TO US TO BE NO ADVANTAGE, AND POSSIBLY CONSIDERABLE HARM, IN COMMITTING OR APPEARING TO COMMIT OURSELVES NOW AS TO THE PRECISE MANNER IN WHICH AN OPERATION IS TO BE CONDUCTED IN WHAT MAY BE THE RELATIVELY DISTANT FUTURE. ENDS

BY CAN

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL



FM WASHDC JUN9/58 CONF
TO EXTERNAL 1288 OPIIMMEDIATE
INFO LDN PERMISNY EMBASSYPARIS
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG DELHI BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS WLGTN CNBRA KARACHI FM LDN

REF OURTEL 1268 JUN6

KOREA:REPLY TO THE CHINESE

WE ARE SENDING TO YOU UNDER SEPARATE MSG THE TEXT OF A LET RE-CAPITULATING THE UK POSITION ON THIS QUESTION WHICH WAS DELIVERED TODAY TO PARSONS,(DIRECTOR,NORTH ASIAN AFFAIRS)FROM DE LA MARE OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY.

2.WE INFORMED DE LA MARE THIS MORNING OF OUR CONVERSATION WITH PARSONS ON FRI.HE SAID HE DID NOT RPT NOT ANTICIPATE ANY DIFFICULTY ABOUT UK ACCEPTANCE OF MR ROBERTSON'S REDRAFT OF THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA3 OF THE DRAFT MSG TO THE CHINESE.DE LA MARE DID NOT RPT NOT ENVISAGE ANY SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES DEVELOPING OVER THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA3,THOUGH YOU WILL NOTE THAT THE UK WOULD STILL PREFER TO SEE THE PARA END WITHOUT THE ADDITION WHICH WE HAVE SUGGESTED.

3.WE HAVE ALSO INFORMED OUR AUSTRALIAN AND NZ COLLEAGUES OF OUR DISCUSSION WITH PARSONS ON FRI.NEITHER ONE FORESAW ANY SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE DRAFT MSG IN ITS LATEST FORM.

BY CAN

TELEGRAM SECRET

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



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REF OURTEL 1222 JUN3

KOREA-REPLY TO THE CHINESE

PARSONS(DIRECTOR,NORTH ASIAN AFFAIRS)CALLED US IN TODAY TO SAY THAT



HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH MR WALTER ROBERTSON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER INTERESTED GOVTS SHOULD DISCUSS NOW THE TYPE OF FORMULA ON SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS WHICH COULD BE USED IN THE NOTE TO THE CHINESE AND SUBSEQUENTLY IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,OR WHETHER THE ISSUE SHOULD BE SET ASIDE FOR THE PRESENT SO THAT THE NOTE TO THE CHINESE COULD BE SENT OFF SOON WITH NONCOMMITTAL LANGUAGE ON THE ELECTIONS SUPERVISION ISSUE.PARSONS SAID THAT HE HAD EXPLAINED OUR PROPOSED SUBSTITUTION FOR THE SECOND SENTENCE IN PARA3 OF THE USA DRAFT NOTE AS NOT RPT NOT CONSTITUTING A DENIAL OF THE USA POSITION BUT SIMPLY AS A FORM OF LANGUAGE WHICH DID NOT RPT NOT RAISE THE ISSUE ON WHICH THERE WAS DISAGREEMENT AMONGST THE FIFTEEN.

2.PARSONS SAID THAT ROBERTSON HAD SUGGESTED A FURTHER REDRAFT OF THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA3 WHICH,IF IT WAS ACCEPTABLE TO US AND OTHER GOVTS ACTIVELY INTERESTED,COULD BE INCORPORATED IN A DRAFT TO BE PUT BEFORE THE FIFTEEN AT AN EARLY DATE,THUS MAKING POSSIBLE THE DESPATCH OF A REPLY TO THE CHINESE.ROBERTSON HAS PROPOSED THAT THE FOLLOWING BE THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA3 OF THE DRAFT NOTE:

"THE GOVTS CONCERNED CONSIDER THAT THESE PRINCIPLES,WHICH WERE SET FORTH IN THE NINTH OF APR NOTE,LIE AT THE HEART OF THE MATTER."

AT THE SAME TIME.PARSONS HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY ROBERTSON TO MAKE CLEAR TO US THAT THE USA COULD NOT RPT NOT AGREE TO ANY FORMULATION OF THE ELECTIONS SUPERVISION ISSUE WHICH WOULD TAKE THE MATTER OUT OF THE UN.

3.WE TOLD PARSONS THAT WE WOULD REFER MR ROBERTSON'S REDRAFT OF OUR SUGGESTED SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA3 TO YOU IMMEDIATELY AND INDICATED THAT IT SEEMED TO BE A REASONABLE SUBSTITUTE FOR OUR SUGGESTION.

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4. PARSONS SAID THAT MR ROBERTSON HAD REGARDED OUR SUGGESTED AMENDMENT TO THE LAST TWO SENTENCES OF PARA3 AS A DISTINCT IMPROVEMENT OVER THE STATE DEPT DRAFT.

5. PARSONS ENVISAGED EARLY CONSULTATIONS ON THE ELECTIONS SUPERVISION ISSUE AFTER THE DESPATCH OF THE MSG TO THE CHINESE PROVIDING AGREEMENT OF THE FIFTEEN ON THE PROPOSED MSG IS REACHED WITHOUT DELAY. HE SAID THAT THE STATE DEPT WOULD BEGIN BY WORKING ON A DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WHICH THEY WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS WITH US PROBABLY WITHIN THE NEXT FORTNIGHT. PARSONS EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE ISSUE WOULD BE SETTLED BY THE MIDDLE OF JUL SO THAT THE MATTER COULD BE DISCUSSED WITH A WIDER GROUP OF GOVTS LATER IN THE SUMMER.

6. WE WOULD APPRECIATE AN EARLY REPLY AS TO THE ACCEPTABILITY OF MR ROBERTSON'S REDRAFT OF THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA3 OF THE DRAFT MSG TO THE CHINESE, AND OF THE NOTE AS A WHOLE INCORPORATING AMENDMENTS WHICH THE STATE DEPT CAN ACCEPT.

7. TEXT OF ORIGINAL STATE DEPT DRAFT MSG AND TEXT OF DRAFT MSG INCORPORATING AMENDMENTS WHICH STATE DEPT IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT ARE BEING SENT IN TEL 1267.


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FM WASHDC JUN6/58 CONFD
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
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KOREA-REPLY TO THE CHINESE

FOR REF PURPOSES ONLY THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE STATE DEPT DRAFT MSG TO THE CHINESE AS IT WAS GIVEN TO US ON MAY22 AND TO WHICH SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENTS REFER: BEGINS:

"HER MAJESTY'S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES PRESENTS HIS COMPLIMENTS TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM HER MAJESTY'S PRINCIPAL SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HAS THE HONOUR TO REFER TO THE MINISTRY'S NOTE OF MAY6/58, COMMUNICATED TO THE GOVTS OF THE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED FORCES FOR THE UN FORCE IN KOREA, WHO, AFTER CONSULTATION, HAVE REQUESTED HER MAJESTY'S GOVT TO REPLY AGAIN ON THEIR BEHALF.



THE GOVTS CONCERNED, NOTING THAT THE GREATER PART OF THE UN FORCES SENT TO KOREA AT THE INSTANCE OF THE UN HAVE ALREADY BEEN WITHDRAWN, REITERATE THAT THEY WELCOME THE ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE GOVT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA THAT CHINESE TROOPS ARE ALSO TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM NORTHKOREA.

THE GOVTS CONCERNED ARE DISAPPOINTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE NOTE HANDED TO HER MAJESTY'S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ON THE SIXTH OF MAY DOES NOT RPT NOT PROVIDE THE CLARIFICATION ASKED FOR IN THE NOTE DELIVERED BY HER MAJESTY'S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ON THE NINTH OF APR AND BRUSHES ASIDE THE QUESTION OF THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH ELECTIONS SHOULD BE HELD. THE GOVTS CONCERNED CONSIDER THAT ELECTIONS HELD UNDER UN SUPERVISION WITH REPRESENTATION IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY PROPORTIONATE TO THE INDIGENOUS POPULATION LIE AT THE HEART OF THE MATTER. IT WAS TO THIS END THAT THEY SOUGHT THE CLARIFICATION REQUESTED IN HER MAJESTY'S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES' NOTE UNDER REF. THEY CANNOT AGREE THAT THE FURTHER WITHDRAWAL OF UN FORCES WITHOUT ANY PROVISION FOR A PROPER SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION WOULD BE CALCULATED TO LEAD TO A REDUCTION OF TENSION IN THE FAREAST. ON THE CONTRARY, SUCH ACTION BEFORE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNIFIED, INDEPENDENT, AND DEMOCRATIC GOVT OF KOREA WOULD ENDANGER PEACE IN THE FAREAST AND

Abstract
TWO 1267
WOULD MXSHCUCT RATHER THAN FACILITATE THE PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF KOREA.

THE GOVTS CONCERNED WISH TO SEE A GENUINE SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH UN RESOLUTIONS AND ARE AT ALL TIMES WILLING TO FURTHER THE CONSIDERATION OF MEASURES DESIGNED TO EFFECT REUNIFICATION ON THIS BASIS. UN FORCES ARE IN KOREA AT THE INSTANCE OF THE UN. AS PROVIDED BY UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 376(V) OF OCT7/50, THE GOVTS CONCERNED ARE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW THESE FORCES WHEN KOREA HAS BEEN UNIFIED IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE UN."ENDS.

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT MSG TO THE CHINESE INCORPORATING THOSE AMENDMENTS WHICH WE HAVE SUGGESTED AND WHICH ARE ACCEPTABLE TO THE STATE DEPT TOGETHER WITH FURTHER CHANGES WHICH THE STATE DEPT. HAS PROPOSED: BEGINS:

"HER MAJESTY'S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES PRESENTS HIS COMPLIMENTS TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM HER MAJESTY'S PRINCIPAL SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HAS THE HONOUR TO REFER TO THE MINISTRY'S NOTE OF MAY6/58, COMMUNICATED TO THE GOVTS OF THE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED FORCES FOR THE UN FORCE IN KOREA, WHO, AFTER CONSULTATION, HAVE REQUESTED HER MAJESTY'S GOVT TO REPLY AGAIN ON THEIR BEHALF.

THE GOVTS CONCERNED, NOTING THAT THE GREATER PART OF THE FORCES SENT TO KOREA AT THE INSTANCE OF THE UN HAVE ALREADY BEEN WITHDRAWN, REITERATE THAT THEY WELCOME THE ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE GOVT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA THAT CHINESE TROOPS ARE ALSO TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM NORTHKOREA.

THE GOVTS CONCERNED ARE DISAPPOINTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE NOTE HANDED TO HER MAJESTY'S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ON THE SIXTH OF MAY DOES NOT PROVIDE THE CLARIFICATION ASKED FOR IN THE NOTE DELIVERED BY HER MAJESTY'S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ON THE NINTH OF APR AND BRUSHES ASIDE THE QUESTION OF THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH ELECTIONS SHOULD BE HELD. THE GOVTS CONCERNED CONSIDER THAT THESE PRINCIPLES, WHICH WERE SET FORTH IN THE NINTH OF APR NOTE, LIE AT THE HEART OF THE MATTER. IT WAS TO THIS END THAT THEY SOUGHT THE CLARIFICATION REQUESTED IN HER MAJESTY'S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES' NOTE UNDER REF. THEY CANNOT RPT NOT AGREE THAT THE FURTHER WITHDRAWAL OF UN FORCES WITHOUT ANY PROVISION FOR A

PAGE THREE 1267

PROPER SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION WOULD BE CALCULATED TO LEAD TO A REDUCTION OF TENSION IN THE FAREAST; INDEED THEY BELIEVE THAT SUCH ACTION WOULD REMOVE THE ONLY GUARANTEE WHICH EXISTS AGAINST FURTHER AGGRESSION IN KOREA PENDING A FINAL SETTLEMENT.

THE GOVTS CONCERNED WISH TO SEE A GENUINE SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH UN RESOLUTIONS AND ARE AT ALL TIMES WILLING TO FURTHER THE CONSIDERATION OF MEASURES DESIGNED TO EFFECT REUNIFICATION ON THIS BASIS. UN FORCES ARE IN KOREA AT THE INSTANCE OF THE UN. THE GOVTS CONCERNED ARE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM KOREA (IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXISTING RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UN) WHEN THE CONDITIONS FOR A LASTING SETTLEMENT LAID DOWN BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAVE BEEN FULFILLED. "ENDS.

BY CAN

TELEGRAM SECRET




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FM WASHDC JUN3/58 SECRET
TO EXTERNAL 1222 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS PERMISNY
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG DELHI BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS

REF YOUR TEL Y205 JUN2

KOREA:REPLY TO THE CHINESE

NO.	INIT.
1	AMHASSADA
2	MUTTER
3	DUDER
4	HIS E D
5	GORHAM
6	SMITH
7	CHOQUETTE
8	MISS CURRIE



AS PARSONS WAS NOT RPT NOT AVAILABLE, WE CALLED THIS AFTERNOON ON LANE

(KOREA DESK OFFICER) AND ENQUIRED ABOUT THE PRESENT STATUS OF STATE
DEPT CONSIDERATION OF THE REPLY TO THE CHINESE. LANE SAID THAT THE
POSITION HAD NOT RPT NOT CHANGED AS OF LAST THURS, ALTHOUGH IT
WAS EXPECTED THAT MR WALTER ROBERTSON WOULD MAKE KNOWN HIS VIEWS
AS TO THE NEXT STEP TO BE TAKEN WITHIN THE NEXT COUPLE OF DAYS.

2. WE REITERATED TO LANE YOUR VIEW THAT IF THERE IS TO BE AN EARLY
REPLY TO THE CHINESE, SOME NONCOMMITTAL FORMULA WOULD BE NECESSARY
FOR THE SENTENCE IN PARA3 REFERRING TO THE QUESTION OF ELECTIONS.
WE ASKED LANE WHETHER IN THE STATE DEPT VIEW THE DESIRABILITY
OF AN EARLY REPLY TO THE CHINESE WOULD OUTWEIGH THE DESIRABILITY
OF SETTLING UPON AN AGREED POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF ELECTIONS
WHICH COULD BE OF USE BOTH IN THE REPLY TO THE CHINESE AND IN
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATES IN THE AUTUMN. LANE GAVE IT AS HIS
PERSONAL OPINION THAT ROBERTSON, WHOSE DECISION IN THIS RESPECT IS
LIKELY TO BE FINAL SO FAR AS THE STATE DEPT IS CONCERNED, WOULD PRO-
BABLY PREFER TO SEE AGREEMENT REACHED AS AMONGST THE FIFTEEN ON THE
ELECTIONS QUESTION NOW, EVEN THOUGH THIS WOULD INVOLVE A DELAY IN THE
DESP OF A REPLY TO THE CHINESE.

EMWITH RESPECT TO THE FINAL SENTENCE OF PARA3, WE LEFT WITH LANE A
REDRAFT OF THE PARA IN WHICH A SEMICOLON WAS PLACED AT THE END OF
THE PENULTIMATE SENTENCE (ENDING "REDUCTION OF TENSION IN THE FAR EAST")
AND THE FOLLOWING ADDED: "INDEED THEY BELIEVE THAT SUCH ACTION WOULD
REMOVE THE ONLY GUARANTEE WHICH EXISTS AGAINST FURTHER AGGRESSION
IN KOREA PENDING A FINAL SETTLEMENT". WE OUTLINED THE
RATIONALE OF THIS AMENDMENT AS GIVEN IN YOUR REF TEL AND EMPHASIZED
THAT WE HAD MUCH IN MIND THE DESIRABILITY OF USING LANGUAGE WHICH
WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THOSE COUNTRIES IN THE UN WHICH MIGHT...2



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BE TEMPTED TO SHIFT THEIR SUPPORTING VOTE TO AN ABSTENTION. LANE WAS AGREEABLY IMPRESSED WITH OUR SUGGESTED AMENDMENT AND UNDERTOOK TO BRING IT TO THE ATTENTION OF ROBERTSON.

4. LANE CONFIRMED THAT THE REWORDING OF THE FINAL SENTENCE IN PARA 4 TO CHANGE THE WORD ORDER OF OUR SUGGESTED AMENDMENT WAS MERELY A DRAFTING CHANGE INTENDED TO IMPROVE THE CONSTRUCTION AND THAT NO RPT NO CHANGE IN MEANING WAS INVOLVED.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(DUPLICATE)

NUMBERED LETTER

THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Security:..... CONFIDENTIAL

No:..... 454

Date:..... June 3, 1958.

Enclosures:.....

Air or Surface Mail:..... Air Bag

Post File No:..... 7-1-1-11


Ottawa File No.	

FROM: Office of the High Commissioner for
Canada, KARACHI.

Reference: Your Y-186 to Washington of May 22
Para. 4

Subject: MESSAGES ON THE EXCHANGES WITH

COMMUNIST CHINA OVER KOREA



References

Refer for action
to;
Washington
London
Permis
Emb. Paris
Tokyo
New Delhi
File
R.L. Rogers

Since we have been able to discover very little interest in Karachi in the current exchanges between the sixteen powers and the Communist Chinese over Korea, we should be glad if you would cut us off the distribution list for telegrams dealing with this subject.

(Sgd) D.M.C.

(For) High Commissioner

Internal
Circulation

NO. INIT.

AMBASSADOR
MUTTER
~~BUTER~~
HARRIS
GORHAM
SMITH
CHOQUETTE
MISS CURRIE

A handwritten signature, possibly "H.C.", written in dark ink.

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FM EXTERNAL OTT JUN2/58 SECRET
TO WASHDC Y205 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS PERMISNY
TOKYO DEFERRED


BAG DELHI BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS WASHINGTON KARACHI FM LDN

REF YOUR TEL1204 MAY30

KOREA:REPLY TO THE CHINESE

NOW THAT WE HAVE SEEN YOUR REF MSGE WE ARE MORE THAN EVER OF THE

NO.	INIT.
WALTER	
RODER	
HALS EAD	
GORHAM	
SMITH	
CHOQUETTE	
MISS CURRIE	



OPINION THAT IF THERE IS TO BE ANY EARLY REPLY TO THE CHINESE SOME
NONCOMMITTAL FORMULA WILL BE NECESSARY FOR PARA3.WE HOPE YOU WILL BE
ABLE TO URGE THIS ON PARSONS BEFORE HE CONSULTS WALTER ROBERTSON
TOMORROW.WE WOULD NOT RPT NOT WISH YOU TO CONVEY THE IMPRESSION THAT
WE DESIRE A SPEEDY REPLY.WE ARE MORE CONCERNED WITH THE CONTENT OF
THE REPLY BUT,OF COURSE,WISH TO BE AS ACCOMMODATING ABOUT SPEED AS
WE CAN FOR THOSE WHO SEEM TO CONSIDER SPEED ESSENTIAL.A HIGH LEVEL
MEETING TO DISCUSS POLICY IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY COULD THEN TAKE
PLACE AT LEISURE AFTER MORE PREPARATION.

2.ON EXAMINING THE THIRD AND FOURTH SENTENCES OF PARA3 OUR FRANK
OPINION IS THAT THE THIRD SENTENCE(ON WHICH ALL SO FAR CONSULTED APPEAR
TO AGREE)COMPLETELY DEFINES OUR POSITION.WE FIND OURSELVES IN SOME
DIFFICULTY TRYING TO REBUT THE SECOND ASSERTION QUOTED IN YOUR
PARA2.THE FIRST ASSERTION OF COURSE COULD BE MET BY ORAL STATEMENT
THAT WE DO NOT RPT NOT HAVE TO PROVE THAT WE ARE NOT RPT NOT
PERSISTENTLY OBSTRUCTING THE PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF KOREA ETC.
UNFORTUNATELY THAT STATEMENT THAT"THE KOREAN AND CHINESE GOVTS
CONSISTENTLY MAINTAIN THAT ONLY A COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN
FORCES FROM KOREA WILL PROVIDE NECESSARY CONDITION FOR A PEACEFUL
SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION,INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF HOLDING
FREE ELECTIONS"IS ALTOGETHER TRUE.AS WE HAVE SAID ON MANY OCCASIONS
THE SETTLEMENT MUST BE A NEGOTIATED ONE AND IT APPEARS TO BE JUST
AS TRUE THAT THE COMMUNIST SIDE IS NOT RPT NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT
ELECTIONS IN THE PRESENCE OF UN FORCES AS THAT WE ARE NOT RPT NOT
PREPARED TO ACCEPT ELECTIONS IN THE PRESENCE OF CHINESE COMMUNIST
FORCES.IF THEREFORE THESE STATEMENTS MUST BE MET WE SHOULD PREFER
TO DO IT BY DELETING THE FINAL SENTENCE OF PARA3IN THE USA DRAFT

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PAGE TWO Y205

AND AMENDING SENTENCE 3 BY ADDING THE FOLLOWING WORDS AFTER "TO A REDUCTION OF TENSION IN THE FAR EAST": "AND, INDEED, WOULD REMOVE THE ONLY GUARANTEE WHICH EXISTS AGAINST FURTHER AGGRESSION IN KOREA PENDING A FINAL SETTLEMENT". WE CANNOT SEE THAT THERE WILL BE MUCH PROPAGANDA VALUE IN ASSERTING IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF UN FORCES WOULD OBSTRUCT RATHER THAN FACILITATE THE PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF KOREA IN THE LIGHT OF THE KNOWN COMMUNIST ATTITUDE ON THIS POINT. THE DRAFT WE HAVE PROPOSED HEREIN DOES NOT RPT NOT ATTEMPT TO MEET THE CHINESE ASSERTION QUOTED IN YOUR PARA2 HEAD ON, BUT RATHER MEETS IT OBLIQUELY BY DRAWING IN A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT ISSUE. WE WOULD HOPE THAT ON THESE GROUNDS IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO PARSONS AS SOMETHING HE COULD PUT UP TO WALTER ROBERTSON. IF YOU CONSIDER IT ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY IN THE LIGHT OF YOUR DISCUSSION WITH PARSONS YOU COULD PROPOSE THE INSERTION OF THE ADDITIONAL WORDS "RATHER THAN FACILITATING THE PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF KOREA", AFTER THE WORD "INDEED" IN OUR PROPOSED AMENDMENT, BUT WE HOPE THIS WILL NOT RPT NOT BE NECESSARY.


3. WE AGREE THAT THE REWORDING OF THE FINAL SENTENCE IN PARA4 PROPOSED BY PARSONS DOES NOT RPT NOT APPEAR TO CHANGE THE SENSE OF OUR ORIGINAL DRAFT. THIS, HOWEVER, MAKES IT ALL THE MORE DIFFICULT FOR US TO UNDERSTAND WHY HE WOULD WANT THE CHANGE MADE. CAN YOU CLARIFY THIS FOR US?

4. THE FACT THAT PARSONS IS WILLING TO DISCUSS THE REPLY WITH WALTER ROBERTSON ON THE BASIS OF ACCEPTING OUR FINAL SENTENCE FOR PARA4 (WITH THE ORDER OF THE WORDS CHANGED) WHILE STANDING FIRM ON UN SUPERVISION WE REGARD AS AN ADDITIONAL PIECE OF EVIDENCE THAT THE STATE DEPT IS INDEED ATTEMPTING TO RETREAT FROM THE POSITION OF APR9 AND PROBABLY HOPE TO HOLD US ALL TO A SIMILAR RETREAT.

Far Eastern/R.L.Rogers/11

CONFIDENTIAL

May 30, 1958.



TOKYO

COMPARISON OF TEXTS OF PROPOSED REPLY TO THE CHINESE REPLY OF MAY 6, 1958

- | | | | |
|------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| (a) Text Proposed by State
Department | (b) Ditto including amend-
ments by Canadian
Embassy | (c) Ditto including amend-
ments by British
Embassy | (d) Ditto including amend-
ments by Australian
Embassy |
|------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|

1. Her Majesty's Charge d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, on instructions from Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has the honour to refer to the Ministry's note of May 6th, 1958, communicated to the Governments of the countries which have contributed forces for the United Nations force in Korea, who, after consultation, have requested Her Majesty's Government to reply again on their behalf.

2. The Governments concerned, noting that the greater part of the forces sent to Korea at the instance of the United Nations have already been withdrawn, reiterate that they welcome the announcement by the Government of the People's Republic of China that Chinese troops are also to be withdrawn from North Korea.

3. The Governments concerned are disappointed, however, that the note handed to Her Majesty's Charge d'Affaires on the sixth of May does not provide the clarification asked for in the note delivered by Her Majesty's Charge d'Affaires on the ninth of April, and brushes aside the question of the principles on which elections should be held.

The Governments concerned consider that elections held under United Nations supervision with representation in the National Assembly proportionate to the indigenous population lie at the heart of the matter.

The Governments concerned consider that the principle of elections lies at the heart of the matter.

The Governments concerned consider that this question lies at the heart of the matter.

The Governments concerned consider that elections under arrangements approved by the United Nations lie at the heart of the matter.

They cannot agree that the further withdrawal of United Nations forces without any provision for a proper settlement of the Korean question would be calculated to lead to a reduction of tension in the Far East.

On the contrary, such action before the estab-

(omit)

NO.	INIT.
1 AMBASSADOR	
MUTTER	
DUBER	
HALS: EAD	
GORHAM	
SMITH	
CHOQUETTE	
MISS CURRIE	

(omit)

The United Nations forces are there to protect the

.../p.2.

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- 2 -

lishment of a unified, independent, and democratic Government of Korea would endanger peace in the Far East and would obstruct rather than facilitate the peaceful unification of Korea.

4. The Governments concerned wish to see a genuine settlement of the Korean question in accordance with United Nations resolutions.

United Nations forces are in Korea at the instance of the United Nations.

As provided by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 376 (V) of October 7th, 1950, the Governments concerned are prepared to withdraw these forces when Korea has been unified in a manner consistent with the objectives of the United Nations.

4. The Governments concerned wish to see a genuine settlement of the Korean question in accordance with United Nations resolutions.

United Nations forces are in Korea at the instance of the United Nations.

The Governments concerned are prepared to withdraw their forces from Korea in accordance with the existing recommendations of the General Assembly of the United Nations when the conditions for a lasting settlement laid down by the General Assembly have been fulfilled.

4. The Governments concerned wish to see a genuine settlement of the Korean question in accordance with United Nations resolutions, and are at all times willing to further the consideration of measures designed to effect reunification on this basis.

(omit)

(can accept either U.S. or Canadian version of final sentence.)

Republic of Korea which is the only part of Korea which has had democratic elections, and which has already once been the victim of aggression.

4. The Governments concerned wish to see a genuine settlement of the Korean question in accordance with United Nations resolutions.

United Nations forces are in Korea at the instance of the United Nations.

As provided by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 376 (V) of October 7th, 1950, the Governments concerned are prepared to withdraw these forces when Korea has been unified in a manner consistent with the objectives of the United Nations.

BY CAN

TELEGRAM

SECRET

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FM WASHDC MAY30/58 SECRET
TO EXTERNAL 1204 PRIORITY
INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS PERMISNY
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS

NO.	INIT.
/ AMBASSADOR	
MUTTER	
DEER	
HALSTEAD	
GORHAM	
SMITH	
THORNTON	
MISS CURRIE	

WLG IN CHINA KARACHI FM LDN Embassy - Ambassador in Canada
TOKYO - 17 May 1958

REF YOUR TEL Y194 MAY29

KOREA:REPLY TO THE CHINESE

PARSONS(DIRECTOR,NORTH ASIAN AFFAIRS)TOLD US YESTERDAY THAT AT THE WORKING LEVEL THE STATE DEPT WAS INCLINED TO FAVOUR ACCEPTANCE OF OUR SUGGESTED AMENDMENT TO THE LAST SENTENCE OF THE FINAL PARA OF THE DRAFT MSG TO THE CHINESE,AND WOULD MAKE A RECOMMENDATION TO THIS EFFECT,PRESUMABLY TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBERTSON.HE SAID THEY WOULD PREFER TO CHANGE THE WORD ORDER IN A MANNER WHICH WOULD NOT RPT NOT ALTER THE SENSE,SO THAT THE SENTENCE WOULD READ:"IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXISTING RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UN THE GOVTS CONCERNED ARE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM KOREA WHEN THE CONDITIONS FOR A LASTING SETTLEMENT LAID DOWN BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAVE BEEN FULFILLED".WE SAID THAT WE DID NOT RPT NOT THINK YOU WOULD OBJECT TO THIS CHANGE.

2.PARSONS WENT ON TO SAY,HOWEVER,THAT AFTER A CAREFUL REEXAMINATION OF THE PROBLEM,THE STATE DEPT REMAINED CONVINCED THAT THE FINAL SENTENCE OF PARA3 OF THE DRAFT MSG SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE DELETED. HE SAID THAT WITHOUT THIS SENTENCE THE DRAFT MSG WOULD NOT RPT NOT ADEQUATELY ANSWER CERTAIN STATEMENTS IN THE CHINESE MSG OF MAY6, EG PARA5:"IF THE GOVTS OF THE USA AND THE OTHER COUNTRIES ON THE UN COMMAND SIDE ARE AVERSE TO PROVING THEMSELVES TO BE PERSISTENTLY OBSTRUCTING THE PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF KOREA AND RELAXATION OF TENSION IN THE FAR EAST,THEY SHOULD SHOW GOOD FAITH BY THE ACTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR FORCES",AND PARA6:"THE KOREAN AND CHINESE GOVTS CONSISTENTLY MAINTAIN THAT ONLY A COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM KOREA WILL PROVIDE THE NECESSARY CONDITION FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION,INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF HOLDING FREE ELECTIONS".PARSONS ADDED THAT WHILE THE STATE DEPT BELIEVED IT NECESSARY TO MAKE THE POINT COVERED IN THE SENTENCE IN QUESTION IN THE STATE DEPT DRAFT,THEY DID NOT RPT NOT REGARD

PAGE TWO 1204

THE LANGUAGE USED AS SACRED. WE SAID THAT SINCE THIS WAS THE CASE AND SINCE OUR MAIN CONCERN ABOUT THE DIRECT LINKAGE OF WITHDRAWAL AND UNIFICATION WOULD BE MET BY THE ACCEPTANCE OF OUR AMENDMENT TO THE FINAL PARA, WE WOULD ASK YOU TO LOOK AT THIS QUESTION AGAIN WITH A VIEW TO SUGGESTING LANGUAGE WHICH YOU WOULD FIND LESS TENDENTIOUS AND MINATORY. PARSONS SAID THAT THE STATE DEPT WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER SOME OTHER WORDING PROVIDING IT DID NOT RPT NOT EMASCULATE THE MEANING.

3. ON THE QUESTION OF THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA 3 OF THE DRAFT MSG CONCERNING ELECTIONS, PARSONS SAID THAT THE WORKING LEVEL OF THE STATE DEPT HAD COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE BEST WAY TO SETTLE THE PROBLEM WOULD BE FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBERTSON TO MEET WITH THE FOUR COMMONWEALTH AMBASSADORS AND TALK THE MATTER THROUGH, WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF ARRIVING AT AN AGREEMENT ON LANGUAGE WHICH COULD BE USED IN THE MSG TO THE CHINESE AND SUBSEQUENTLY AT THE NEXT SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY--PRESUMABLY IN A RESOLUTION. HE SAID HE RECOGNIZED THAT IT MIGHT TAKE SOME TIME TO ARRIVE AT AN AGREEMENT, AND THAT THE DESP OF A FURTHER MSG TO THE CHINESE WOULD BE HELD UP AS A CONSEQUENCE. HE SAID THAT THIS APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM HAD NOT RPT NOT YET BEEN DISCUSSED WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBERTSON, AND THAT HE DID NOT RPT NOT EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO DISCUSS IT WITH HIM UNTIL TUES OF NEXT WEEK AT THE EARLIEST (ROBERTSON IS AWAY); MEANWHILE HE HOPED YOU WOULD CONSIDER THIS SUGGESTION.

4. IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSING THIS METHOD OF DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM, PARSONS SAID HE THOUGHT A SOLUTION WAS POSSIBLE SINCE WE WERE IN AGREEMENT ON THE PRINCIPLES INVOLVED. WE QUESTIONED THIS STATEMENT, AND POINTED OUT THAT THERE WAS A BASIC DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OUR ATTITUDE AND THAT OF THE USA GOING BACK TO THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. OUR OBJECTION TO THE WORDING PROPOSED BY THE USA IN THE PRESENT DRAFT MSG WAS NOT RPT NOT, HOWEVER, MERELY A MATTER OF STICKING TO A POSITION ADOPTED AT GENEVA BUT AROSE ALSO FROM OUR CONVICTION THAT THE USE OF THE USA DRAFT WOULD CONSTITUTE A RETREAT FROM THE APR 9 MSG AND WOULD ADVERSLY AFFECT THE SUPPORT FOR THE POSITION OF THE FIFTEEN WHEN THE MATTER IS NEXT DISCUSSED IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. WE SAID

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THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO MAKE SOME HEADWAY TOWARDS SOLVING THE DIFFICULTY BY THINKING THE PROBLEM THROUGH IN TERMS OF FUTURE SITUATIONS RATHER THAN HISTORIC DIFFERENCES, BUT THIS MIGHT TAKE SOME TIME.

5. PARSONS GAVE US SOME BACKGROUND INFO CONCERNING THE KOREAN NOTE OF MAY 22 (OUR TEL 1183 MAY 28). HE SAID THAT ON APR 3 THE STATE DEPT HAD RECEIVED A SIMILAR NOTE FROM THE KOREANS, AND HAD BEEN ASKED BY THE KOREANS TO CIRCULARIZE THE CONTENTS TO OTHER GOVTS OF THE FIFTEEN. THE STATE DEPT HAD REPLIED TAKING DUE NOTE OF THE CONTENTS OF THE KOREAN NOTE, BUT HAD SUGGESTED THAT IF THE KOREANS WISHED TO PASS THEIR VIEWS TO THE OTHERS OF THE FIFTEEN, THE KOREANS SHOULD DO IT THEMSELVES. PARSONS SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN OBVIOUSLY THE KOREAN DESIRE TO GET THE USA ASSOCIATED WITH THE KOREAN POSITION ON THE HOLDING OF ELECTIONS UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE UN IN NORTH KOREA ONLY; PARTLY BECAUSE THE USA DID NOT WISH TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS POSITION AND PARTLY BECAUSE THEY THOUGHT IT BAD DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE FOR THE STATE DEPT TO ACT AS MESSENGER BOY WHEN OTHER CHANNELS WERE AVAILABLE, THE USA HAD DECLINED THE KOREAN REQUEST TO CIRCULARIZE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE FIFTEEN.

6. WE ASKED PARSONS WHETHER THE STATE DEPT THOUGHT THAT IT WAS DESIRABLE FOR THE FIFTEEN TO FACE UP NOW TO THE POINT MADE IN THE FINAL PARA OF THE KOREAN NOTE, WHICH HAD BEEN GLOSSED OVER IN PREVIOUS STATEMENTS OF THE FIFTEEN. PARSONS SAID THAT THE WORKING LEVEL VIEW WAS THAT THE PROBLEM SHOULD BE BYPASSED AS IT HAD BEEN IN THE PAST.

7. WE ENQUIRED WHETHER THE STATE DEPT DRAFT MSG TO THE CHINESE HAD BEEN CONSIDERED BY MR DULLES. PARSONS SAID THAT IT HAD, AND THAT MR DULLES HAD CONCURRED IN IT AS A BASIS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH OTHER GOVTS CONCERNED. HE ADDED THAT THIS CONCURRENCE APPLIED ONLY TO THE GENERAL LINE OF THE DRAFT MSG, AND THAT FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES THE FINAL DECISION AS TO THE ACTUAL WORDING LAY WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBERTSON.

BY CAN

TELEGRAM

7-1-1-1

SECRET

NO.	INIT.
AMBASSADOR	
MUTTER	
DUTER	
H. L. L. D.	<i>2 Ros</i>
GORHAM	<i>hfe</i>
SMITH	
CHOQUETTE	<i>W</i>
MISS CURRIE	



FM EXTERNAL OTT MAY30/58 SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY
TO DELHI Y201 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO WASHDC LDN EMBASSYPARIS PERMISNY
TOKYO DEFERRED
BAG BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS WLGTN CNBRA KARACHI FM LDN

KOREA:REPLY TO CHINESE

FOR RONNING


WE ARE REPEATING TO YOU TEXT OF TEL1183 MAY28 FROM WASHDC
CONTAINING TEXT OF A SOUTH KOREAN NOTE TO OUR AMBASSADOR IN WASHDC.
YOU WILL SEE IT TAKES A VERY RIGID LINE ON GEOGRAPHICAL EXTENT OF
ELECTIONS IN KOREA AS WELL AS ON QUESTION OF SUPERVISION.WE HAVE
SO FAR NOT RPT NOT BEEN ABLE TO DISCOVER EXACT POSITION ADOPTED BY
SOUTH KOREANS,USA,OURSELVES AND THE SIXTEEN AS A WHOLE,ON QUESTION
OF GEOGRAPHICAL EXTENT AT GENEVA.COULD YOU DESCRIBE THESE POSITIONS
FROM PRESENT RECOLLECTION?

CAN

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

7-1-1-1



FM EXTERNAL OTT MAY30/58 CONFD
TO WASHDC Y199 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS PERMISNY DELHI
TOKYO DEFERRED
BAG BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS WLGTN CNBRA KARACHI FM LDN

REF YOUR TEL 1183 MAY28

KOREA:REPLY TO CHINESE

NO.	INIT.
1	AMBASSADOR
2	MUTTER
3	DUFER
4	HILL
5	GERHAM
6	SMITH
7	CHOCQUETTE
8	MISS CURRIE

WE HAVE GIVEN FURTHER THOUGHT TO OUR POSITION ON DRAFT REPLY TO CHINESE IN LIGHT OF SOUTHKOREAN NOTE. IT SEEMS TO US MERELY TO ADD TO NECESSITY TO REACH SOME NONCOMMITTAL FORMULA FOR ELECTIONS. WE HAVE COMPARED TEXTS OF SECOND SENTENCE OF THIRD PARA OF DRAFT REPLY AS PROPOSED BY USA, YOUR AIDE MEMOIRE TO STATE DEPT, BRITISH EMBASSY, AND AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY. AUSTRALIAN VERSION ("THE GOVTS CONCERNED CONSIDER THAT ELECTIONS UNDER ARRANGEMENTS APPROVED BY THE UN LIE AT THE HEART OF THE MATTER") STATES OUR VIEWS IN CLEAREST POSSIBLE TERMS. DIFFICULTY IS THEY ARE SO CLEAR WE ARE AFRAID THEY WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO USA. WE COULD THEREFORE ACCEPT READILY EITHER VERSION CONTAINED IN YOUR AIDE MEMOIRE OR UK VERSION ("THE GOVTS CONCERNED CONSIDER THAT THIS QUESTION LIES AT THE HEART OF THE MATTER"). IF THE FOUR COMMONWEALTH GOVTS COULD AGREE ON A COMMON VERSION OF THIS SECOND PARA WE WOULD HOPE THAT IN CONJUNCTION WITH NEW SITUATION CREATED BY SOUTHKOREAN NOTE THEY COULD PREVAIL UPON STATE DEPT TO ACCEPT NONCOMMITTAL LANGUAGE FOR THIS SENTENCE. FINAL SENTENCE OF THIRD PARA PRESENTS MORE DIFFICULTY BECAUSE AUSTRALIANS, UNLIKE BRITISH AND OURSELVES, HAVE AN ALTERNATIVE SENTENCE WHICH WE CONSIDER UNDESIRABLE BECAUSE IT WOULD STIR ASHES OF AN OLD CONTROVERSY.

2. IT WOULD APPEAR TO US THAT DEBATE IN UN THIS YEAR NEED NOT RPT NOT DISCUSS THE AREA IN WHICH ELECTIONS ARE TO TAKE PLACE. IF SOUTHKOREANS WANT TO CONTINUE TO RECEIVE UN SUPPORT FOR KOREAN UNIFICATION THEY SHOULD BE ABLE TO RESTRAIN THEMSELVES ENOUGH TO ALLOW THE GEOGRAPHICAL EXTENT OF THE ELECTIONS (WHICH ARE NOT RPT NOT LIKELY TO BE HELD ANYWAY) TO BE PASSED OVER IN SILENCE.

3. WE ARE LOOKING INTO QUESTION OF POSITIONS ASSUMED AT GENEVA IN 1954. PUBLIC DOCUMENTS ARE REMARKABLY UNINFORMATIVE ABOUT QUESTION OF GEOGRAPHICAL EXTENT INTENDED FOR THE ELECTIONS. IF YOU RECEIVE ANY

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INFO ON THIS SUBJECT FROM STATE DEPT IT WOULD HELP OUR SEARCH FOR
CONCRETE INFO AS TO ATTITUDES ASSUMED BY SOUTH KOREANS, THE SIXTEEN
AS A WHOLE, AND CANADIAN DELEGATION. PLEASE REPORT USA VIEWS ON
KOREAN NOTE SOON AS POSSIBLE. IS THERE ANY QUESTION OF A COMMON
REPLY HAVING TO BE SENT TO SOUTH KOREANS?

BY CAN

TELEGRAM


SECRET

7-1-1-1

NO.	INIT.
AMBASSADOR	
MUTTER	
BURER	
HALSTED	
GORHAM	
SMITH	
CHOQUETTE	

MISS GURRIE

FM EXTERNAL OTT MAY29/58 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY
TO WASHDC Y194 EMERGENCY
INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS PERMISNY
TOKYO DEFERRED
BAG BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS WLGTN CNBRA KARACHI FM LDN



REF YOUR TEL 1166 MAY27

KOREA:REPLY TO THE CHINESE

WE ARE INCLINED TO AGREE WITH YOUR RECOMMENDATION IN PARA7.OUR DIFFERENCES WITH WALTER ROBERTSON OVER THE SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS ARE BASED ON A FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE OVER WHETHER A SETTLEMENT IN KOREA SHOULD BE IMPOSED OR NEGOTIATED,BUT WE ARE NOT RPT NOT AT ALL SURE THAT ROBERTSON HIMSELF UNDERSTANDS THE NATURE OF THIS DIFERENCE. THE DEBATE ON THIS ISSUE HAS GROWN STERILE AND TIRESOME,AND WE SHOULD LIKE TO INVESTIGATE THE POSSIBILITY OF FORMULATING OUR POSITION N TERMS OF THE FUTURE RATHER THAN THE PAST.WE ARE NOT RPT NOT QUITE SURE HOW THIS CAN BE DONE BUT AS THERE HAS ALWAYS BEEN SOMETHING QUITE UNREAL ABOUT ROBERTSON'S FANATICAL DEVOTION TO THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN UN SUPERVISION AND NEUTRAL SUPERVISION,WE WOULD HOPE THAT OUR POSITION,STATED IN NEW TERMS,MIGHT SEEM LIKE COMMON SENSE RATHER THAN OUR OLD HERESY.WE SHALL TRY TO CONSIDER THESE POSSIBILITIES ALONG WITH OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE LONG RANGE POSITION IN KOREA.AT THE SAME TIME,OF COURSE,IT IS NOT RPT NOT EASY TO RETREAT FROM OUR POSITION.IT IS NOT RPT NOT ONLY A QUESTION OF SAVING FACE BUT OF MAINTAINING A STAND WHICH HAS ASSUMED CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE IN UN DEBATE AND AFFECTS THE ATTITUDE OF MANY VOTERS IN THE ASSEMBLY.
2.WE LIKE THE WAY YOU HAVE PRESENTED OUR CASE ON SUPERVISION IN THE TEXT OF THE REPLY.THE FACT THAT ROBERTSON IS DISTURBED BY THE APR9 LANGUAGE SUGGESTS TO US THAT HIS INTENT IN TRYING TO HAVE SPECIFIC MENTION MADE OF"UN SUPERVISION",IS TO GET US ALL COMMITTED TO A RETREAT FROM THE APR9 POSITION.WOULD IT NOT RPT NOT STILL BE POSSIBLE TO RECRUIT COMMONWEALTH SUPPORT ON THE BASIS OF THE APPROACH CONTAINED IN THE FINAL SENTENCE OF YOUR PARA8:IE THAT WE ARE NOT RPT NOT SEEKING TO ADD TO OR SUBTRACT FROM THE FLEXIBILITY OF THE POSITION OF THE UNC SIDE AS STATED IN THE NOTE OF APR9?
3.THERE WAS SOME CONFUSION OVER THE CORRECT VERSION OF THE TEXT

TWO Y194

OF THE FINAL PARA OF THE STATE DEPT'S DRAFT REPLY. WE WERE WORKING FROM A VERSION WHICH READ (SOMEWHAT ILLITERATELY): "THE GOVTS CONCERNED WISH TO SEE A GENUINE SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH UN RESOLUTIONS. UN FORCES ARE IN KOREA AT THE INSTANCE OF THE UN AS PROVIDED BY UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 376(V) OF OCT 7, 1950, THE GOVTS CONCERNED ARE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW THESE FORCES WHEN KOREA HAS BEEN UNIFIED IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE UN." WE UNDERSTAND THAT THIS PARA SHOULD HAVE READ, BEGINNING WITH THE SECOND SENTENCE: "UN FORCES ARE IN KOREA AT THE INSTANCE OF THE UN AS PROVIDED BY UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 376(V) OF OCT 7 1950, THE GOVTS CONCERNED ARE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW THESE FORCES WHEN KOREA HAS BEEN UNIFIED IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE UN." THE RESOLUTION OF OCT 7, 1950, CAN BE INTERPRETED TO MEAN THIS OR IT CAN BE INTERPRETED TO MEAN THAT IT MERELY ASSURES THE OTHER SIDE THAT UNC TROOPS WILL NOT RPT NOT REMAIN IN KOREA AFTER UNIFICATION BUT NOT RPT NOT THAT THEY WILL NECESSARILY STAY THERE UNTIL UNIFICATION. IN OTHER WORDS THE STATE DEPT'S TEXT PUTS A MUCH MORE SPECIFIC GLOSS ON THOSE WORDS THAN THEY WOULD ENTIRELY JUSTIFY. HOWEVER, IF THE STATE DEPT ACCEPTS THE IDEA CONTAINED IN YOUR PARA 10, IE THAT IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CAN ALWAYS REVISE ITS RECOMMENDATIONS, AND THAT THE POSITION OF THE UNC SIDE AS EXPRESSED IN THE FINAL PARA OF THE STATE DEPT DRAFT TAKES ACCOUNT OF THIS FACT BY THE REF TO THE RESOLUTION OF OCT 7/50 IN CONNECTION WITH THE LINKING OF WITHDRAWAL AND UNIFICATION, AND IF SOME NON-COMMITTAL PHRASE CAN BE FOUND TO COVER OUR DIFFERENCES OVER UN SUPERVISION AS OPPOSED TO UN AUSPICES WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DROP OUR OBJECTIONS TO THIS FINAL PARA.

4. WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR THE EFFORTS YOU HAVE MADE TO CONVEY OUR VIEWS TO THE STATE DEPT. WE REALIZE THAT OUR PAST WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE OUR VIEWS FOR THE SAKE OF UNITY HAS IN CONSIDERABLE MEASURE REDUCED OUR BARGAINING POWER WHEN WE ARE FACED WITH TEXTS WE DISLIKE. IN THE PRESENT CASE OUR ONLY IMMEDIATE BARGAINING COUNTER WOULD APPEAR TO BE OUR ABILITY TO DELAY THE REPLY TO THE CHINESE. ALTHOUGH WE ARE NOT RPT NOT ENTIRELY CONVINCED THAT THERE IS A GENUINE NEED FOR SPEED, WE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT WANT TO APPEAR MULISH OR OBSTRUCTIVE. WE ARE

...3

PAGE THREE Y194


NOT RPT NOT SURE, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WOULD BE PARTICULAR MERIT IN INFORMING THE STATE DEPT AT THIS STAGE, BEFORE WE HAVE MADE FURTHER EFFORTS TO HAVE AMENDMENTS MADE, THAT WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE MSG FOR THE SAKE OF UNANIMITY. OUR REFUSAL TO COSPONSOR THE RESOLUTION AT THE LAST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY MAY HAVE LEFT SOME DOUBT IN THE STATE DEPT THAT OUR CONCURRENCE OR OUR SUPPORT CAN BE ASSUMED. WE MIGHT THEREFORE BE ABLE TO EXERT SOME MEASURE OF PRESSURE BY LEAVING THE STATE DEPT WITHOUT ANY REASSURANCE ON THIS POINT. WE THINK THERE MIGHT BE SOME HOPE THAT A UNITED COMMONWEALTH FRONT ON SUPERVISION MIGHT INDUCE THE STATE DEPT TO RETURN TO THE LANGUAGE OF APR9. IF, HOWEVER, YOU CONSIDER OUR ASSESSMENT ERRONEOUS, OR IF THERE ARE OTHER FACTORS WHICH YOU CONSIDER OVERRIDING, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO REEXAMINE THIS ASPECT OF THE QUESTION.

5. WE RETAIN OUR DISLIKE OF THE FINAL SENTENCE OF PARA3 OF THE STATE DEPT DRAFT NOT RPT NOT ONLY FOR ITS MINATORY LANGUAGE BUT BECAUSE IT CONTAINS THIS SAME LINKAGE OF WITHDRAWAL AND UNIFICATION AND THAT IN TERMS WHICH MIGHT PROVE DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN AWAY (OR TO SWING THE STATE DEPT FROM) AT A LATER DATE.

6. WE ARE TREATING YOUR REF TEL AND THIS TEL AS FOR CDN EYES ONLY AND SO MARKING ALL OUR COPIES. WE SHALL COMMENT SEPARATELY ON THE PROPOSAL FOR A BASIC REVIEW OF LONG-RANGE OBJECTIVES.

BY CAN

TELEGRAM CONFIDENTIAL



FM WASHDC MAY28/58 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 1183 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS PERMISNY
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS WLGTN CNBRA KARACHI FM LDN

REF OURTEL 1166 MAY27

KOREA:REPLY TO THE CHINESE

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF NOTE DATED MAY22 FROM THE KOREAN AMBASSADOR
TO WHICH A SIMPLE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS BEING SENT:

*EXCELLENCY,

I HAVE THE HONOR TO REFER TO THE RECENT EXCHANGE OF CORRESPONDENCE
BETWEEN THE GOVTS OF THE SIXTEEN COUNTRIES REPRESENTING THE UN
COMMAND AND THE CHINESE COMMUNIST REGIME IN PEKING REGARDING THE
QUESTION OF THE UNIFICATION OF KOREA AND TO PRESENT THE VIEW OF THE
GOVT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

IT IS THE FIRM VIEW OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA THAT ESSENTIAL PRE-
REQUISITES TO THE SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION ARE THE COMPLETE
WITHDRAWAL OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES FROM THE NORTHERN PART OF
KOREA AND THE HOLDING OF ELECTIONS UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE UN IN
THAT PART OF KOREA WHERE NO RPT NO SUCH ELECTIONS HAVE EVER BEEN HELD
DUE TO THE OBSTRUCTION OF THE COMMUNISTS. THE FACT THAT THE CHINESE
COMMUNISTS MAY WITHDRAW FROM NORTHKOREA IS DECEPTIVE BECAUSE THEY WILL
BE POISED JUST NORTH OF THE YALU READY TO ATTACK US AS BEFORE.

IN THIS CONNECTION, IT IS PERTINENT, AS WELL AS IMPORTANT, TO BEAR IN
MIND THE CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE UN FORCES AND THE CHINESE
COMMUNIST FORCES IN KOREA. THE FORMER ARE IN KOREA TO REPEL THE
COMMUNIST AGGRESSION AND TO RESTORE INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY
IN THE AREA, WHICH CANNOT BE ACCOMPLISHED UNLESS, AND UNTIL, THE AGGRES-
SION HAS BEEN LIQUIDATED AND UNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY HAS BEEN
ACHIEVED. THE LATTER ARE THE VERY FORCES WHICH COMMITTED AGGRESSION,
AND THEIR UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL IS THE FIRST INDISPENSABLE STEP
TOWARD THE UNIFICATION OF KOREA.

IT IS ALSO TO BE POINTED OUT THAT THE GOVT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
IS THE LAWFUL GOVT OF KOREA BASED ON ELECTIONS WHICH WERE HELD IN
PURSUANCE OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION (112 II), DATED

NO. INIT.
AMBASSADOR
MUTTER
BUTLER
H.A.S.E.D.
GORHAM
SMITH
CHOQUETTE
MISS CURRIE

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NOV14/47, AND WERE OBSERVED BY THE UN TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON KOREA.

THIS FACT WAS CONFIRMED BY THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION (293 IV), DATED OCT21/49, AND SUCCESSIVE ELECTIONS IN KOREA HAVE BEEN OBSERVED BY THE UN THROUGH ITS COMMISSION ON KOREA. IN VIEW OF THESE HISTORICAL FACTS, IT HAS TO BE CONCLUDED THAT ELECTIONS IN KOREA UNDER UN SUPERVISION MUST MEAN ELECTIONS UNDER UN SUPERVISION IN THE NORTHERN PART OF KOREA WHERE SUCH ELECTIONS HAVE NOT RPT NOT BEEN HELD HERETOFORE.


NO STEPS COULD BE TOLERATED WHICH WOULD DECLARE IN EFFECT NULL AND VOID UN RESPONSIBILITIES AND PREVIOUS ACTIONS BY THE UN IN KOREA, NOR WILL ANY PROPOSAL BE ACCEPTED WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF DESTROYING THE SOVEREIGNTY OF KOREA, WHICH HAS BEEN DULY RECOGNIZED AND SUPPORTED BY THE UN. WITH THESE IN VIEW, THE GOVT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA WILL ACCEPT ELECTIONS UNDER THE UN SUPERVISION ONLY IN THE LIBERATED NORTHERN PART OF KOREA AS A MEASURE FOR UNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY.

ACCEPT, EXCELLENCY, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

(SIGNED) YOUNG CHAN YANG
KOREAN AMBASSADOR"

TELEGRAM

SECRET



NO	INIT.
1 AMBASSADOR	
MUTTER	
BUER	
HALL	
GORHAM	
SMITH	
CHOQUETTE	
MISS CURRIE	

FM WASHDC MAY28/58 SECRET
TO EXTERNAL 1182 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS PERMISNY
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS WLGTH CNBRA KARACHI FM LDN

REF OUR TEL 1166 MAY27

KOREA:REPLY TO THE CHINESE

WE ARE TRANSMITTING TO YOUR UNDER SEPARATE TEL THE TEXT OF A NOTE RECEIVED TODAY FROM THE KOREAN EMBASSY ON THIS SUBJECT. THE KOREAN NOTE RAISES A NEW PROBLEM IN CONNECTION WITH THE SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS IN KOREA WHICH MAY COMPLICATE THE DESPATCH OF THE NEXT MSG FROM THE FIFTEEN TO THE CHINESE GOVT.

2. DE LA MARE OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY TOLD US THAT HE HAD HAD A BRIEF WORD WITH PARSONS (DIRECTOR, NORTH ASIAN AFFAIRS) THIS MORNING CONCERNING THE SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO THE STATE DEPT DRAFT MSG TO THE CHINESE WHICH WE HAVE PUT FORWARD AND WHICH THE UK HAS SUPPORTED. PARSONS EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT WE COULD NOT RPT NOT AT THIS STAGE SWEEP THE QUESTION OF THE TYPE OF SUPERVISION FOR ELECTIONS IN KOREA UNDER THE RUG AND THAT PRIOR TO DESPATCH OF THE MSG OF THE FIFTEEN TO THE CHINESE WE OUGHT TO DETERMINE WHAT WE ARE GOING TO SAY ON THIS SUBJECT IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. DE LA MARE HAD DRAWN ATTENTION TO THE KOREAN EMBASSY NOTE WHICH THE BRITISH EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED AS WELL AS OURSELVES AND SAID THAT IN VIEW OF THE KOREAN REMARKS ABOUT THE SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS IT WAS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT THAT THE FIFTEEN SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE SPECIFIC ON THE QUESTION OF SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS.

BY CAN

NO.

1 AMBASSADOR
MUTTER
DUBER
HALS IEAD
GORHAM
SMITH

TELEGRAM
SECRET

FM WASHDC MAY 27 1950
TO EXTERNAL 1166
INFO LDN EMBASSY PARIS PERMISNY
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS WLGTM

REF OURTEL 1143 MAY 24

KOREA:REPLY TO THE CHINESE

I CALLED YESTERDAY ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBERTSON TO FOLLOW UP THE COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS WHICH WE HAD LEFT WITH THE STATE DEPT LAST FRI. IN OPENING THE DISCUSSION I SAID THAT WE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO ESTABLISH A GOOD BASIS FOR THE UNC CASE WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE PRESENTED AT THE NEXT SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THAT IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT TO DEVISE A COMMUNICATION TO THE CHINESE AT THIS POINT IN WHICH WE COULD RETAIN A DEGREE OF TACTICAL FREEDOM WHICH MIGHT BE USEFUL SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE IF THE PROSPECTS FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IN KOREA SHOULD IMPROVE. I SAID THAT THESE TWO POINTS WERE THE PRINCIPAL RATIONALE FOR THE CHANGES WHICH WE HAD SUGGESTED IN THE DRAFT COMMUNICATION TO THE CHINESE COMMUNIST GOVT.

2. ROBERTSON REVIEWED THE BACKGROUND TO THE PRESENT SITUATION RECALLING THAT THE SIXTEEN PARTICIPANTS IN THE UNC HAD SENT FORCES TO KOREA AS PART OF A POLICE ACTION, BUT THAT DESPITE THIS FACT THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS AT THE POLITICAL CONFERENCE IN GENEVA FOLLOWING THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT HAD INSISTED ON DENOUNCING THE UN SIDE AS BEING AGGRESSORS IN KOREA. THEY HAVE STUCK CONSISTENTLY TO THIS POINT MAINTAINING THAT THE ISSUE IS ONE BETWEEN TWO BELLIGERENT FORCES AND THAT THE UN, AS ONE OF THE BELLIGERENTS, HAD NO RPT NO COMPETENCE TO DEVISE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT FOR KOREA. THEY HAD ARGUED THAT SINCE THE KOREAN ISSUE WAS A DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO SIDES IT WAS NECESSARY TO HAVE IT SETTLED UNDER THE AEGIS OF AN OUTSIDE AGENCY.

3. ROBERTSON WENT ON TO RECALL WITH REGRET THAT DURING THE TRUCE NEGOTIATIONS THE STATE DEPT (UNDER THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION) HAD AGREED TO A DEFINITION OF NEUTRAL COUNTRY AS ANY NATION WHICH HAD NOT RPT NOT PARTICIPATED IN THE FIGHTING. ACCORDINGLY WHEN THE NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION HAD BEEN SET UP THE UN SIDE HAD CHOSEN TWO NEUTRAL STATES, WHILE THE COMMUNIST SIDE HAD CHOSEN TWO SATELLITES. FURTHERMORE, UNDER ITS RULES OF PROCEDURE THE COMMISSION COULD TAKE NO RPT NO ACTION EXCEPT ON THE BASIS OF A UNANIMOUS DECISION AND AS A

PAGE TWO 1166

RE LT THE PURPOSE OF THE NNSC HAD BEEN VITIATED. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS WERE TRYING TO ACHIEVE THE SAME SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO A NEUTRAL COMMISSION FOR THE SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS IN KOREA. IT WAS VITAL THAT THE UNC SIDE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT PERMIT ITSELF TO BE HOODWINKED IN THE SAME MANNER AGAIN; THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION TO SUPERVISE ELECTIONS IN KOREA ON THE BASIS SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE NNSC WOULD AGAIN RESULT IN THE VITIATION OF THE PURPOSE OF THE COMMISSION AND WOULD NO RPT NO DOUBT LEAD ULTIMATELY TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMUNIST CONTROL OVER THE WHOLE OF KOREA.

4. AS THIS BACKGROUND APPEARED TO BE BY WAY OF AN APOLOGIA FOR THE STATE DEPT'S DESIRE TO RETAIN IN THE NEXT MSG TO THE CHINESE COMMUNIST THE REF TO ELECTIONS HELD "UNDER UN SUPERVISION", I RECALLED THAT WHEN THE APR9 COMMUNICATION TO THE CHINESE GOVT HAD BEEN DRAFTED IT HAD TOUCHED UPON THE QUESTION OF SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS IN TWO PLACES: IN THE NARRATIVE PART OF THE NOTE REF HAD BEEN MADE TO ELECTIONS "UNDER UN SUPERVISION", BUT IN THE OPERATIVE PART THE ALLUSION HAD BEEN TO ELECTIONS HELD "UNDER UN AUSPICES". I SAID IT WAS THE CANADIAN VIEW THAT THIS APPROACH TO THE QUESTION WOULD LEAVE THE UNC SIDE IN A STRONGER POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE NEXT DEBATE OF THE QUESTION IN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. I ALSO SAID THAT IT WAS THE CANADIAN VIEW THAT IT WAS WISER NOT RPT NOT TO SPELL OUT TOO PRECISELY THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE UNC SIDE WOULD BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT.

5. ROBERTSON SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN DISTURBED AT THE CHANGE OF LANGUAGE WHICH HAD BEEN INTRODUCED IN THE UNC NOTE TO THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS ON APR9 BECAUSE THE WORDING EMPLOYED IN THE OPERATIVE PART OF THE NOTE MIGHT OPEN THE WAY TO EFFORTS TO REMOVE THE SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM FROM THE UN. UNFORTUNATELY IT WAS NOT RPT NOT ONLY THE DESIRE OF THE COMMUNIST GOVTS TO REMOVE THE ISSUE FROM THE UN; THE INDIANS, FOR THEIR OWN REASONS, WERE ALSO ANXIOUS TO DO SO. ROBERTSON WENT ON TO ARGUE THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO KEEP THE SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE UN AND FOR THIS PURPOSE IT WAS IMPORTANT TO INSIST THAT ELECTIONS SHOULD BE HELD UNDER UN SUPERVISION.

6. THE REMAINDER OF OUR TALK WAS TAKEN UP WITH AN INCONCLUSIVE

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DISCUSSION OF THE USA AND CANADIAN POSITIONS ON THE QUESTION OF SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS IN KOREA. ROBERTSON SAID NOTHING WHICH SUGGESTED THAT THE USA VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT HAVE ALTERED SINCE THE GENEVA CONFERENCE IN 1954.

7. INSOFAR AS THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE USA AND CANADIAN VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT ARE BASED ON A FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT APPRECIATION OF THE POSITION OF THE UN AS A RESULT OF HAVING SIGNED AN ARMISTICE WITH THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS AND THE NORTHKOREANS, I AM NOT RPT NOT SURE THAT A DETAILED REEXAMINATION OF OUR DIFFERENCES WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THEIR RESOLUTION. ON THE OTHER HAND IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL IF WE WERE TO RESTATE OUR POSITION ON THIS MATTER IN TERMS DIRECTED TO FUTURE SITUATIONS RATHER THAN IN TERMS OF THE BASIC DIFFERENCES OF OUTLOOK WHICH HAVE BEEN AT THE ROOT OF OUR DIFFICULTIES OVER THIS POINT IN THE PAST. SUCH A REEXAMINATION OF OUR POSITION WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO BE RELATED TO THE PROBLEM OF LONG TERM OBJECTIVES WITH RESPECT TO KOREA AS WELL AS THE SHORTER TERM OBJECTIVES OF MAINTAINING A POSITION WHICH CAN COMMAND BROAD SUPPORT IN THE UN. IF YOU ARE CONSIDERING MAKING A NEW ASSESSMENT OF LONG TERM OBJECTIVES IN KOREA ALONG THE LINES WHICH THE STATE DEPT HAS SUGGESTED WOULD BE DESIRABLE, A RESTATEMENT OF OUR POSITION ON THE SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS IN THE MANNER I HAVE SUGGESTED MIGHT FORM A SUITABLE COMPANION PIECE.

8. THE CHANGES WHICH WE HAVE SUGGESTED IN THE NEXT COMMUNICATION TO THE CHINESE GOVT WERE NOT RPT NOT EXAMINED IN ANY DETAIL DURING MY DISCUSSION WITH ROBERTSON. I WOULD SUGGEST THAT I BE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM THE STATE DEPT THAT WE WILL REEXAMINE THE QUESTION OF SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS, BUT THAT PENDING FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION WITH THE STATE DEPT, WE URGE CONSIDERATION OF THE AMENDMENTS WHICH WE HAVE PROPOSED IN THE COMMUNICATION TO THE CHINESE WHICH AVOID THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US ON THIS POINT WITHOUT ADDING TO OR SUBTRACTING FROM THE FLEXIBILITY OF THE POSITION OF THE UNC SIDE AS STATED IN THE NOTE OF APR 9.

9. IT WOULD ALSO BE MOST DESIRABLE THAT WE SHOULD CLEAR OUR POSITION WITH OUR COMMONWEALTH FRIENDS AND THE STATE DEPT BEFORE A MEETING OF THE FIFTEEN IS HELD. IF WE WERE TO BRING OUR OUR DIFFERENCES WITH

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THE USA IN THAT FORUM THE POSSIBILITY OF LEAKS TO THE PRESS MUST BE EXPECTED. FURTHERMORE, WHILE WE HAVE UK SUPPORT FOR OUR SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS AT THE PRESENT MOMENT, WE DO NOT RPT NOT KNOW HOW FAR THEY ARE LIKELY TO SUSTAIN IT; THE AUSTRALIANS, WHILE PREFERRING MORE FLEXIBLE LANGUAGE ON THE ELECTIONS SUPERVISION QUESTION, HAVE NO RPT NO INTENTION OF MAKING AN ISSUE OUT OF IT, AND IN THE INTERESTS OF GETTING OFF A SPEEDY MSG THE NEW ZEALANDERS HAVE ACCEPTED THE STATE DEPT VERSION ON THIS POINT; THE POSSIBILITY REMAINS, THEREFORE THAT WE MAY FIND OURSELVES ISOLATED FROM THE MAIN BODY OF THE FIFTEEN ON THE QUESTION OF THE SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS. PAST HISTORY WOULD SUGGEST TO THE STATE DEPT THAT ON THIS QUESTION WE HAVE, AFTER MAKING OUR USUAL POINT, ACCEPTED THE USA VIEW ON THIS MATTER FOR THE SAKE OF AGREEMENT, AND THEY MAY NOT RPT NOT BE UNDULY DISTURBED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO INTERPRET "UN SUPERVISION" ACCORDING TO OUR OWN LIGHTS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. IF THEREFORE THE STATE DEPT SHOULD CONTINUE TO INSIST ON THE INCLUSION OF THEIR PHRASE ON UN SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS IN THE MSG TO THE CHINESE, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF YOU COULD LET ME KNOW WHETHER I SHOULD INFORM THEM THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE MSG FOR THE SAKE OF UNANIMITY PROVIDED THE UK ARE PREPARED TO DO LIKEWISE AND PROVIDED IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO EMPLOY OUR OWN MORE FLEXIBLE INTERPRETATION OF THE PHRASE "ELECTIONS HELD UNDER UN SUPERVISION" IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND ELSEWHERE.

10. THE QUESTION OF THE FINAL SENTENCE OF THE STATE DEPT DRAFT AND OUR SUGGESTED AMENDMENT TO IT IS MORE DIFFICULT, SINCE WE HAVE HAD NO RPT NO CLEAR INDICATION OF STATE DEPT VIEWS ON THIS PROBLEM. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF OUR SUGGESTED AMENDMENT MAY BE REGARDED AS A TRIFLE OVER-SUBTLE: IT CAN BE ARGUED AGAINST IT THAT IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CAN ALWAYS REVISE ITS RECOMMENDATIONS, AND THAT THE POSITION OF THE UNC SIDE AS EXPRESSED IN THE FINAL PARA OF THE STATE DEPT DRAFT TAKES ACCOUNT OF THIS FACT BY THE REF TO THE RESOLUTION OF OCT7/50 IN CONNECTION WITH THE LINKING OF WITHDRAWAL AND UNIFICATION.

11. ROBERTSON WAS NOT RPT NOT, INCIDENTALLY, DISTURBED BY THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE USE OF THE PHRASE "UN SUPERVISION" IN THE STATE
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DEPT DRAFT AND THE PHRASE "UN AUSPICES" IN THE OCT 1950 RESOLUTION. HE SAID THAT WHEN THE RESOLUTION WAS DRAFTED IT WAS NOT RPT NOT FORESEEN THAT THE COMMUNISTS WOULD SEEK TO HAVE THE KOREAN QUESTION SETTLED OUTSIDE THE UN AND THAT THE FLEXIBILITY OF THE TERM "UN AUSPICES" COULD BE EMPLOYED TO FURTHER THIS END; IN ANY CASE, IN SUBSEQUENT RESOLUTIONS SINCE THE ARMISTICE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAD CONFIRMED THE IDEA OF UN SUPERVISION STATED IN THE GENEVA DECLARATION OF THE SIXTEEN IN JUN 1954.

12. UNTIL OUR OWN FINAL POSITION IS DETERMINED WE SUGGEST THAT SUBSTANCE OF PARAS 8, 9 & 10 OF THIS MSG IS FOR "CANADIAN EYES ONLY"

AT THIS STAGE

ROBERTSON

BY CAN

TELEGRAM
SECRET

FM WASHDC MAY24/58 SECRET
TO EXTERNAL 1143 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO LDN EQBASSYPARPS PERMISNY
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS WLGTM
MISS GURRIE

REF OUR TEL1139 MAY23

KOREA:REPLY TO THE CHINESE

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MEMO WE LEFT WITH THE STATE DEPT YESTERDAY:

"THE CANADIAN AUTHORITIES ARE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE DRAFT MSG TO THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS UNDER CONSIDERATION IN THE STATE DEPT, ^{and?} IN FAVOUR THE DESP OF A REPLY WHEN A SATISFACTORY TEXT IS AGREED UPON.

2.THERE ARE SOME CHANGES WHICH THE CANADIAN AUTHORITIES WOULD
LIKE TO PROPOSE IN THE DRAFT TEXT NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION.

1) PARA3, SECOND SENTENCE, TO BE AMENDED TO READ AS IN THE DRAFT PROPOSED BY THE UK, IE "THE GOVTS CONCERNED CONSIDER THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF ELECTIONS LIES AT THE HEART OF THE MATTER." THE USE OF THE PHRASE "ELECTIONS UNDER UN SUPERVISION" BY ITSELF WOULD, IN THE CANADIAN VIEW, APPEAR TO BE A RETREAT FROM THE POSITION TAKEN IN OUR FIRST REPLY TO THE CHINESE. THE REVERSION TO THIS POSITION IS NOT RPT NOT LIKELY TO PASS UNNOTICED BY THE UNCOMMITTED COUNTRIES, AND WOULD APPEAR TO BE A STIFFENING UP OF THE ATTITUDE OF THE FIFTEEN. IN VIEW OF THE REPEATED EXPRESSION OF THE CANADIAN VIEW ON THIS SUBJECT, IT WOULD BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE CANADIAN AUTHORITIES TO SUPPORT THE TEXT PROPOSED BY THE STATE DEPT IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE.

2)FINAL SENTENCE OF PARA4,TO BE REPLACED BY THE FOLLOWING:

"THE GOVTS CONCERNED ARE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM KOREA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXISTING RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UN WHEN THE CONDITIONS FOR A LASTING SETTLEMENT LAID DOWN BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAVE BEEN FULFILLED."

IN THE CANADIAN VIEW, THE STATE DEPT DRAFT WOULD SEEM TO COMMIT THE FIFTEEN TO MUCH TOO NARROW A COURSE IN BEING SO SPECIFIC AS TO THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE EFFECTED. IN THE LIGHT OF THE NECESSITY TO SECURE AS MUCH SUPPORT AS POSSIBLE

PAGE TWO 1143

FOR OUR POSITION FROM THE UNCOMMITTED COUNTRIES, IT WOULD IN THE CANADIAN VIEW BE UNWISE FOR THE FIFTEEN TO PRESUME IN THEIR COMMUNICATION TO THE CHINESE THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WILL NEVER WISH TO CHANGE THE CONDITIONS IT LAID DOWN IN 1950 FOR A LASTING SETTLEMENT IN KOREA. THE LANGUAGE WHICH THE CANADIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE SUGGESTED WOULD ANSWER THE ONLY QUESTION CONTAINED IN THE CHINESE MSG IN TERMS WHICH NEUTRALS CAN HARDLY CHALLENGE. MOREOVER IT DOES NOT RPT NOT APPEAR TO REPLACE THE RIGHT OF THE UN TO MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT KOREA, WHICH THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATE DEPT DRAFT MIGHT BE INTERPRETED TO SUGGEST.

3) PARA3N FINAL SENTENCE TO BE DELETED, FOR THE REASONS GIVEN ABOVE, SINCE THIS SENTENCE ALSO LINKS DIRECTLY THE IDEA OF WITHDRAWAL WITH THAT OF UNIFICATION."

2. UN AFFAIRS OFFICER WHO ATTENDED OUR MEETING WITH PARSONS SAID THAT IF STATE DEPT WAS TO CONSIDER OUR PROPOSED REDRAFT OF THE FINAL SENTENCE OF PARA4 THEY WOULD WISH WORDING TO READ "IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY" RATHER THAN "EXISTING INSTRUCTIONS". WE DID NOT RPT NOT OBJECT TO THIS CHANGE.

3. UK COMMENTS WHICH WERE PRESENTED THIS MORNING WERE IN GENERAL SUPPORT OF THE SUGGESTIONS WHICH WE PUT FORWARD.

BY CAN

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHDC MAY23/58 CONF
TO EXTERNAL 1139 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS PERMISNY
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS WLGTN DLEHI KARACHI CNBRA FM LDN

REF YOURTEL Y186 MAY22

KOREA:REPLY TO CHINESE

WE CALLED TODAY ON PARSONS (DIRECTOR, NORTH ASIAN AFFAIRS) AND LEFT WITH HIM A MEMO PUTTING FORWARD YOUR VIEWS. TEXT OF THE MEMO IS CONTAINED IN A SEPARATE TEL.

2. PARSONS SAID THAT THE STATE DEPT DRAFT MSG TO THE CHINESE HAS BEEN SENT TO SECRETARY DULLES, BUT HIS VIEWS ON IT ARE NOT RPT NOT YET KNOWN. THE AUSTRALIANS AND NEWZEALANDERS HAVE INDICATED THEIR READINESS TO ACCEPT THE STATE DEPT DRAFT, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE LAST ^{SEN} F- TENCE OF PARA 3, WHICH THE NEWZEALANDERS WOULD LIKE TO SEE DELETED FOR THE REASONS GIVEN IN OUR 1103 MAY21, AND WHICH THE AUSTRALIANS WOULD LIKE TO SEE REPLACED BY: "UN FORCES ARE THERE TO PROTECT THE ROK WHICH IS THE ONLY PART OF KOREA WHICH HAS HAD DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS AND WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN THE VICTIM OF AGGRESSION". THE UK HAVE NOT RPT NOT MADE THEIR COMMENTS YET BUT WE UNDERSTAND FROM THE UK EMBASSY THAT THEY WILL DO SO TOMORROW MORNING.

3. OUR SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGES IN THE TEXT WERE RECEIVED WITHOUT COMMENT, THOUGH WE DID GO OVER THE RATIONALE OF THE AMENDMENTS AND PARSONS SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE POINT OF OUR PROPOSALS. WE EMPHASIZED PARTICULARLY THAT IN PARA 3 OF THE DRAFT TEXT WE WERE NOT RPT NOT URGING ACCEPTANCE OF OUR OWN FORMULA ON THE SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS, THAT WE RECOGNIZED THAT THERE ^{were?} DIFFERENCES OF OPINION AND WERE THEREFORE ANXIOUS TO HAVE A [^] TEXT WHICH WAS NEITHER MORE NOR LESS FLEXIBLE THAN THE APR 9 MSG TO THE CHINESE AND WHICH WE COULD SUPPORT WITHOUT RESERVATIONS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE. WITH RESPECT TO THE STATE DEPT PHRASEOLOGY PARSONS EMPHASIZED THAT IN THE DEPT'S VIEW THE SENTENCE IN QUESTION DID NOT RPT NOT IMPLY THAT THERE WAS NO RPT NO LATITUDE FOR NEGOTIATION ON THIS POINT, NOR SHOULD IT CARRY THIS IMPLICATION TO US OR ANYONE ELSE.

4. WITH RESPECT TO THE FINAL SENTENCE OF PARA 3 OF THE STATE DEPT

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DRAFT, WE WERE TOLD THAT THE STATE DEPT WISHED TO HAVE IT INCLUDED BECAUSE IT PROVIDED SOME RATIONALE FOR THE PREVIOUS SENTENCE AND FROM A PROPAGANDA POINT OF VIEW WOULD APPEAL TO SOME GOVTS WHOSE SUPPORT WAS DESIRED.

5. PARSONS SAID THAT OUR SUGGESTIONS WOULD BE STUDIED AND COULD BE DISCUSSED FURTHER AT THE INTERVIEW WHICH HAS BEEN ARRANGED WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBERTSON ON MON AFTERNOON.

6. IN CONCLUSION PARSONS SAID THERE WAS A BASIC QUESTION WHICH HAD TO BE FACED PARTICULARLY BY THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH FACE ON THE PACIFIC: IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE PRESENCE OF UNC FORCES IN KOREA IS A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN THE STRATEGIC POSITION OF THE FREEWORLD IN THE FAR EAST, ARE WE READY TO WEAKEN THIS POSITION BY WITHDRAWING OUR FORCES FROM KOREA? IN OTHER WORDS, HOW QUICKLY DO WE WANT TO MOVE TOWARDS CLEANING UP THE KOREAN QUESTION AND HASTENING THE DAY OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNC FORCES? IN THE LIGHT OF THIS QUESTION THE DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY WHICH IS INTRODUCED NOW ON THE KEY QUESTION--THAT OF ELECTIONS--IS OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE. IT IS THEREFORE NECESSARY FOR US TO HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON THIS BASIC QUESTION; TO THIS END PARSONS SAID HE HOPED THAT THE CANADIAN AUTHORITIES CONCERNED WITH STRATEGIC ASSESSMENTS WOULD TURN THEIR ATTENTION TO THE PROBLEM AS THEIR USA COUNTERPARTS ARE DOING.

BY CAN

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL



7-1-1-1

FM EXTERNAL MAY22/58 CONF
 TO WASHDC Y186 EMERGENCY
 INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS PERMISNY
 TOKYO DEFERRED

BAG BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS WLGTN DELHI KARACHI CNBRA

REF YOUR TEL1103 MAY21

KOREA:REPLY TO CHINESE

NO.	INIT.
1	AMBASSADOR
2	MUTTER
3	LESTER
4	HANCOCK
5	GORHAM
6	SMITH
7	CHOQUETTE
8	MISS CURRIE

WE AGREE THAT YOU SHOULD MAKE CANADIAN VIEWS KNOWN TO STATE DEPT TODAY, AND GENERALLY AGREE WITH LINE YOU PROPOSE TO TAKE. WE DO NOT RPT NOT CONSIDER THAT A SPECIFIC UNDERTAKING ON THE PART OF THE USA TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM KOREA IS A BARGAIN AT THE PRICE OF STATING IN SO MANY WORDS THAT THEY WILL NOT RPT NOT BE WITHDRAWN UNTIL KOREA HAS BEEN UNIFIED: WE THINK THAT REDRAFT OF THE FINAL SENTENCE PROPOSED IN YOUR PARA TEN COMPLETELY MEETS OUR POINT AND WOULD WISH YOU TO PRESS IT STRONGLY. WE ASSUME FINAL SENTENCE IN PRESENT DRAFT WOULD BEGIN AFTER "1950".

2. WE CONSIDER A SPECIFIC REF TO RESOLUTION OF OCT7, 1959, TACTICALLY UNWISE FOR REASONS ALREADY STATED. WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO SACRIFICE THIS OBJECTION, HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO PROVIDE ANOTHER ARGUMENT TO BEAT DOWN THE STATE DEPT'S ATTEMPT TO REVERT TO THE USE OF "UNITED NATIONS SUPERVISION". WE ARE NOT RPT NOT IMPRESSED BY THE ARGUMENT THAT THE DRAFT REPLY MERELY STATES THAT THIS IS "AT THE HEART OF THE MATTER": WE THINK THAT IT WOULD APPEAR TO BE A RETREAT FROM THE POSITION TAKEN IN OUR FIRST REPLY TO THE CHINESE AND THAT IT WOULD SEEM TO BE GOING BEYOND THE LIMITS EVEN OF THE RESOLUTION OF OCT7, 1950, MOREOVER, WE SUSPECT THAT THE STATE DEPT MIGHT USE OUR AGREEMENT TO THIS PHRASE NOW AS GROUNDS FOR REFUSING EVER TO CHANGE FROM "UNITED NATIONS SUPERVISION" TO "UNITED NATIONS AUSPICES" AGAIN.

3. WE ARE PREPARED TO MEET THE WISHES OF THOSE WHO WOULD LIKE TO MAKE AN EARLY REPLY TO THE CHINESE IF THE REPLY IS SATISFACTORY, BUT WE DO NOT RPT NOT THINK THAT URGENCY WOULD JUSTIFY AN INADEQUATELY CONSIDERED REPLY.

4. FOR BRUSSELS, HAGUE, ANKARA, ATHENS, WLGTN, DELHI, KARACHI, CNBRA, ONLY PLEASE INDICATE WHETHER YOU ARE INTERESTED IN RECEIVING FURTHER MSGS IN THIS SERIES.

BY CAN

NO.

INT.

AMBASSADOR
MUTTER
CUTLER
H
GURHAM
SMITH
CHOQUETTE
WISS-CURRIE

2/20/58
hfy
an

TELEGRAM
SECRET

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information



7-1-1-1

FM WASHDC MAY 21/58 SECRET
TO EXTERNAL 1104 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO LDN EMBASSY PARIS PERMISNY
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT

BAG BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS WLGTN DELHI KARACHI CNBRA FM LDN

REF YOURTEL Y175 MAY17 & OURTEL 11103 MAY21

KOREA-REPLY TO THE CHINESE

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A LET DATED MAY16 FROM THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY

GIVING COMMENTS OF THE AUSTRALIAN GOVT ON THE KOREAN PROBLEM, BEGINS:

WE HAVE RECEIVED TODAY FROM CANBERRA SOME COMMENTS ON THE KOREAN

PROBLEM. THE FOLLOWING PARAS WILL GIVE YOU AN OUTLINE OF THE PRINCIPAL
POINTS.

REGARDING THE CHINESE NOTE OF MAY6, THE VIEWPOINT IN CANBERRA IS
THAT A REPLY SHOULD GO "REASONABLY SOON" FROM THE SIXTEEN POWERS AND
THAT THE OUTLINE SUGGESTED IN THE UK OFFICE'S TEL 2558 TO WASHDC
PROVIDES A SATISFACTORY STARTING POINT. IT IS CONSIDERED, HOWEVER, THAT
THE REPLY SHOULD MENTION THAT THE BULK OF THE UN FORCES WAS WITHDRAWN
LONG BEFORE THE CHINESE DECISION TO WITHDRAW WAS TAKEN. IT IS AGREED
THAT SOME REF TO TROOP WITHDRAWALS MUST BE MADE. THE VIEW IN CANBERRA,
HOWEVER, IS THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO STATE THAT THE UN WILL BE
READY TO WITHDRAW FORCES, NOT RPT NOT "WHEN A SETTLEMENT HAS BEEN
REACHED" (WHICH MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS GOING BACK ON PARA1(D) OF GA
RESOLUTION 376) BUT AS SOON AS UN' OBJECTIVES (REUNIFICATION AND
RESTORATION OF STABILITY) HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED.

SO FAR AS AUSTRALIA IS CONCERNED, OUR BASIC AIMS IN KOREA REMAIN:-

(A) ADHERENCE TO THE UN' OBJECTIVE OF A UNITED, INDEPENDENT AND
DEMOCRATIC KOREA,

(B) STABILITY IN THE AREA AND, PENDING THE ACHIEVEMENT OF (A), SECURITY
OF THE ROK.

WE HAVE NOT RPT NOT HAD MUCH HOPE THAT THE COMMUNISTS WOULD USE THEIR
COMMUNICATION TO THE SIXTEEN AS A MEANS OF MAKING REAL PROGRESS.

RATHER WE FEEL THAT, ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT RPT NOT ENTIRELY DISCOUNT THE
POSSIBILITY THAT THEY WILL AGREE TO SOME POLITICAL ADVANCE TOWARDS A
SETTLEMENT, THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION AT THE PRESENT
TIME. THEIR TIMING SUGGESTS THAT THEY HAD PLANNED TO PLACE THE UN SIDE
IN THE DILEMMA OF EITHER IGNORING THEIR DEMAND AND POSSIBLY LOSING

SOME SUPPORT, ON INDUCING THE USA AND ITS ALLIES TO REPLY IN A MANNER

PT TWO 1104

WHICH COULD LEAVE THE WAY OPEN FOR THE COMMUNIST SIDE TO TAKE UP A NEW POSITION (FOR EXAMPLE, BY AGREEING TO ACCEPT THE CONDITIONS FOR RE-UNIFICATION LAID DOWN BY THE WEST PROVIDED WE AGREED TO WITHDRAW UN FORCES BEFORE THESE CONDITIONS WERE IMPLEMENTED) AND CREATE A MORE EMBARRASSING AND DIFFICULT SITUATION FOR THE WEST TO HANDLE IN THE UN ASSEMBLY DEBATE. THE OPINION IN CANBERRA IS THAT IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO ASSUME THAT THE COMMUNIST SIDE WILL NOT RPT NOT SHIFT THEIR GROUND, PARTICULARLY AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, AND THUS DERIVE ADVANTAGE FROM THEIR INITIATIVE AND EXAMPLE ON TROOP WITHDRAWALS BY APPEALING TO NEUTRALIST FEELING.

FOR OUR PART, WE VIEW THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF UN FORCES IN KOREA IN THE LIGHT OF THE CONSIDERATION MENTIONED ABOVE OF MAINTAINING STABILITY IN THE AREA AND, PENDING THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A UNIFIED, INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC KOREA, THE SECURITY OF THE ROK. AT THE ASSEMBLY OUR OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO MAINTAIN THE EMPHASIS ON ADHERENCE TO UN'S OBJECTIVES IN KOREA. WITHIN THIS AIM IT IS OUR VIEW THAT WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE BODY THAT MIGHT SUPERVISE ALL KOREAN ELECTIONS. THE PRECEDENT FOR A POLITICAL CONFERENCE (A POINT RAISED IN THE CHINESE REPLY) WAS SET AT GENEVA IN 1954 AND, IN OUR VIEW, IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT THE COMMUNIST POWERS MAY NOT RPT NOT WISH TO MAKE POSITIVE PROGRESS ON A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT (AS AGAINST PURSUING THEIR PROPAGANDA MOTIVE) IN A BODY LIKE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, IN WHICH NEITHER NORTH KOREA NOR COMMUNIST CHINA IS REPRESENTED. NO RPT NO DECISION IS CALLED FOR YET ON THESE POINTS BUT IT WOULD BE AS WELL TO BEAR THEM IN MIND.

WE CONSIDER THAT THE CRUX OF THE PROBLEM AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WILL BE THE TROOP WITHDRAWAL ISSUE. EVEN THOUGH THERE IS A VERY DIFFERENT BASIS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF UN FORCES IN KOREA AS AGAINST THE PRESENCE OF THE CHINESE IN THE NORTH, IT MUST BE ADMITTED THAT UNDISCERNING OPINION, ESPECIALLY AFRO-ASIAN, IS LIKELY TO BE IMPRESSED BY THE COMMUNIST MOVES, TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT WE MAY BE FORCED ON THE DEFENSIVE. WE HAVE CONSIDERED AS A POSSIBLE COUNTER THE POSSIBILITY OF AN OFFER FROM THE UN SIDE TO REDUCE ITS FORCES IN KOREA FURTHER, SAY, BY ONE HALF. WE DO NOT RPT NOT FAVOUR THIS AS THE COMMUNIST SIDE WOULD CONTINUE TO HAMMER AT THIS ISSUE WHATEVER THE NUMBER REMAINING.

THE ISSUE OF TROOPS WITHDRAWAL WILL NEED TO BE RELATED TO THE

PAGE THREE 1104

CIRCUMSTANCES OF AN ALL-KOREAN GOVT AFTER UNIFICATION. SUCH A GOVT MIGHT WISH TO EXECUTE A MUTUAL DEFENCE AGREEMENT WITH THE USA, UNDER WHICH SOME USA FORCES MIGHT BE STATIONED IN KOREA (THEIR PRESENCE IN THE NORTH AND THEIR PROXIMITY TO THE YALU BORDER WOULD INCIDENTALLY BE MATTERS TO BE WATCHED) BUT, IN THE AUSTRALIAN VIEW, WE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT COUNT ON IT BEING POSSIBLE TO GET SUCH AN AGREEMENT AFTER THE UN FORCES HAD WITHDRAWN. IT SEEMS ALMOST CERTAIN THAT THE CHINESE AND RUSSIANS AT ANY UNIFICATION CONFERENCE WOULD STIPULATE THAT THE UNITED KOREAN GOVT SHOULD RENOUNCE THE RIGHT TO MAKE AGREEMENTS PERMITTING FOREIGN FORCES TO BE STATIONED IN KOREA. MOREOVER, WE FEEL THAT THIS WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE A GOOD GROUND FOR THE WEST TO STAND ON IF IT PROVED TO BE THE ONLY ISSUE PREVENTING AGREEMENT ON UNIFICATION. ALTERNATIVELY, SOME GUARANTEE FROM THE USA AND OTHERS (INCLUDING POSSIBLY THE COMMUNIST POWERS) MIGHT BE CALLED FOR. THE WORDING OF THE UN' REPLY MUST, IN OUR VIEW, AVOID BEING OPEN TO INTERPRETATIONS THAT RULE OUT THESE POSSIBILITIES. ENDS

BY CAN

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHDC MAY21/53 CONF
TO EXTERNAL 1103 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS PERMISNY
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS WLGTN

REF YOURTEL Y175 MAY17


KOREA:REPLY TO THE CHINESE

REPS OF OLD COMMONWEALTH EMBASSIES MET THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS. WE HAD A BRIEF WORD WITH DE LA MARE OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY BEFORE HAND AND HE AGREED THAT THE SUGGESTIONS CONTAINED IN YOUR TEL MIGHT BE USEFULLY DISCUSSED WITH THE GROUP AS A WHOLE. THE MEETING HAD BEFORE IT A DRAFT TEXT REPLY PREPARED BY THE STATE DEPT IN THE LIGHT OF THE UK DRAFT CONTAINED IN YOUR TEL Y174 MAY17. THIS DRAFT, WHICH WAS GIVEN TO US BY THE UK EMBASSY AND WHICH YOU HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED DOES NOT RPT NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE FINAL VIEW OF THE STATE DEPT.

2. DE LA MARE OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY SAID THAT HE HAD NOTHING NEW TO ADD TO WHAT YOU ALREADY KNOW CONCERNING UK VIEWS. THE STATE DEPT DRAFT TEXT HAS BEEN CABLED TO THE FO BUT NO RPT NO COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED AS YET.

3. WHITE OF THE NZ EMBASSY OUTLINED POINTS WHICH HE HAD MADE TO PARSONS (DIRECTOR, NORTH ASIAN AFFAIRS) ON MON ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM WELLINGTON. WHITE HAD TOLD PARSONS THAT THE NZ GOVT WAS OF THE VIEW THAT THE FIFTEEN SHOULD CONTINUE TO AIM AT A SETTLEMENT IN KOREA AND THAT A SETTLEMENT MUST BE REACHED BEFORE WITHDRAWAL OF UNC FORCES IS EFFECTED. THE NZ GOVT WAS ALSO OF THE VIEW THAT THE FIFTEEN SHOULD INDICATE CLEARLY A WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW AT THAT TIME; BY DOING SO IT WOULD BE EASIER TO PROBE THE INTENTIONS OF COMMUNIST CHINA AND TO GAIN THE SUPPORT OF ASIAN OPINION. THE NZ GOVT REGARDS THE EFFECT ON ASIAN OPINION OF THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE FIFTEEN AS VERY IMPORTANT AND IN THIS CONNECTION BELIEVES THAT THE NEXT MSG TO THE CHINESE SHOULD BE UNPROVOCATIVE AND DESIGNED TO HAVE THE BEST POSSIBLE IMPACT ON THE UNCOMMITTED COUNTRIES. WHITE ALSO SAID THAT HIS GOVT BELIEVED THAT A REPLY SHOULD BE SENT QUICKLY AND THAT EVEN IF IT WAS NOT RPT NOT PARTICULARLY CONSTRUCTIVE IT MIGHT SERVE TO MAKE THE CHINESE SHOW THEIR HAND MORE CLEARLY. IN THE NZ VIEW THE REPLY OF THE FIFTEEN SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE RIGID AND SHOULD HAVE AN APPEARANCE OF

NO. *93* INIT. *2/10/53*
AMBASSADOR *hplc*
MUTTER
COOPER
HALLS EAD
GORHAM
SMITH
CHOQUETTE
MISS CURRIE *Ro*



M
P/T. TWO 1103

R. REASONABLENESS. IN THIS CONNECTION THE NZ GOVT WOULD FAVOUR A POSITION ON THE SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS SIMILAR TO THAT WHICH CANADA HAS ADVOCATED. IN GENERAL THE NZ AUTHORITIES FAVOURED SOMETHING ALONG THE LINES OF THE DRAFT SUGGESTED BY THE UK.

4. AT HIS INTERVIEW WITH WHITE, PARSONS HAD SAID THAT THE NEXT MSG OF THE FIFTEEN SHOULD PUT THE COMMUNISTS IN A POSITION WHERE IT WOULD BE EMBARRASSING FOR THEM NOT RPT NOT TO MAKE A FURTHER REPLY; ON THE OTHER HAND, THE FIFTEEN SHOULD NOT RPT NOT GO TOO FAR TOWARDS BEGGING THE CHINESE TO MAKE A FURTHER REPLY. PARSONS OBSERVED THAT THE TWO MAJOR PROBLEMS OF A SETTLEMENT FOR KOREA AND THE MAINTENANCE OF THE FREE WORLD DEFENSIVE POSTURE IN THE FAR EAST HAD YET TO BE EQUATED AND UNTIL THIS WAS DONE IT WAS NOT RPT NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE FIFTEEN SHOULD SEEK TO MAKE QUICK PROGRESS ON THE KOREA PROBLEM. PARSONS ADDED THAT THE NEGATIVE NATURE OF THE CHINESE REPLY HAD CONFIRMED THE USA BELIEF THAT PROGRESS TOWARDS THE UNIFICATION OF KOREA WAS UNLIKELY TO BE MADE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. CONSEQUENTLY THE FIFTEEN SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON LAYING THE GROUND WORK FOR THE KOREAN DEBATE IN THE NEXT GENERAL ASSEMBLY. AT THE SAME TIME THE FIFTEEN SHOULD CONTINUE TO STUDY THE PROBLEM OF WHAT THEIR LONG TERM OBJECTIVES IN KOREA SHOULD BE.

5. ON BEING SHOWN THE STATE DEPT DRAFT REPLY WHITE HAD REMARKED TO PARSONS THAT HE DID NOT RPT NOT THINK THE NZ GOVT COULD BE PLEASED WITH THE REF TO UN SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS. PARSONS HAD EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT THE DRAFT DID NOT RPT NOT SAY THAT ELECTIONS SHOULD BE HELD UNDER UN SUPERVISION, BUT RATHER THAT THIS QUESTION LAY AT THE HEART OF THE MATTER. HE SAID THAT THE STATE DEPT DID NOT RPT NOT FEEL THAT THIS WAS THE TIME TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY ON THIS QUESTION AND THAT FLEXIBILITY WOULD BE MORE SUITABLE IF THE COMMUNISTS SHOULD SHOW SIGNS OF TALKING SERIOUSLY ABOUT UNIFICATION IN KOREA AND IF OUR SIDE CONCLUDES THAT UNIFICATION IN KOREA IS IN THE BEST DEFENSIVE INTERESTS OF THE WEST.

6. WHITE SAID THAT HE HAD CABLED THE TEXT OF THE AMERICAN DRAFT MSG TO WELLINGTON ON MON AND HAD TODAY RECEIVED A REPLY INSTRUCTING HIM TO INFORM THE STATE DEPT THAT IN THE INTEREST OF SENDING A MSG QUICKLY THE NZ GOVT WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE STATE DEPT DRAFT. THEIR ONLY COMMENT WAS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARAS OF THE DRAFT
...3

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WAS "SOMEWHAT TENDENTIOUS AND ALMOST THREATENING IN TONE" AND THEY WOULD PREFER TO SEE IT OMITTED.

7. PYMAN OF THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY PRESENTED THE LATEST VIEWS FROM CANBERRA ON THE PROBLEM IN A LETTER WHICH IS BEING REPEATED TO YOU IN A SEPARATE TEL. THESE COMMENTS APPEARED TO BE BASED ON THE OUTLINE OF THE BRITISH DRAFT CONTAINED IN YOUR TEL Y164 MAY14 WITH WHICH THE AUSTRALIANS ARE GENERALLY SATISFIED. PYMAN SAID THAT CANBERRA WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE PLEASED WITH THE SECOND PARA OF THE STATE DEPT DRAFT AS WELL AS WITH THE FINAL SENTENCE OF PARA4 OF THAT DRAFT, BOTH OF WHICH GO SOME WAY TOWARDS MEETING POINTS RAISED IN THE LATEST COMMENTS FROM CANBERRA.

8. WE CIRCULATED A REDRAFT OF THE UK VERSION OF THE MSG GIVEN IN YOUR TEL Y174 WITH THE AMENDMENTS SUGGESTED IN YOUR TEL Y175. ALL THREE OF THE OTHER COMMONWEALTH REPS WERE OF THE VIEW THAT THE MORE GENERAL PHRASEOLOGY SUGGESTED IN YOUR PARA3 CONCERNING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH UNC FORCES WOULD BE WITHDRAWN WAS LESS SATISFACTORY THAN THE STATE DEPT DRAFT. THE OTHER COMMONWEALTH REPS FELT THAT IF INDEED THE STATE DEPT WAS PREPARED TO MAKE A COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW IN AS SPECIFIC TERMS AS THEY DO IN THEIR DRAFT MSG, IT WOULD BE UNDESIRABLE TO SUGGEST TO THEM THE VAGUER FORMULA WHICH YOU HAVE PROPOSED. THE OTHER COMMONWEALTH REPS DID NOT RPT NOT OBJECT TO THE MORE GENERALIZED DESCRIPTION OF THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE MADE AS CONTAINED IN YOUR SUGGESTED AMENDMENT.

9. DE LA MARE OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY SAID HE THOUGHT THAT THE FO WOULD OBJECT TO THE REF TO UN SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS IN THE STATE DEPT DRAFT DESPITE THE EXPLANATION WHICH PARSONS HAD GIVEN ON THIS POINT; THAT THE FO WOULD PROBABLY AGREE WITH NZ'S OBJECTION TO THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA3 OF THE STATE DEPT DRAFT; BUT THAT LIKE YOURSELVES THE FO WOULD OBJECT TO THE DIRECT MENTION TO THE OCT7/50 RESOLUTION. HE SAID THAT THE FO WOULD PROBABLY PREFER TO SEE THE AMERICANS MAKE THE MORE SPECIFIC COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW CONTAINED IN THEIR DRAFT THAN THE MORE GENERALIZED ONE SUGGESTED IN OURS.

10. THE FOREGOING WAS DICTATED BEFORE WE RECEIVED YOUR TEL Y177 MAY21. AS ALL OTHER COMMONWEALTH REPS HAVE CALLED AT THE STATE DEPT WITHIN THE LAST FEW DAYS TO TRANSMIT COMMENTS AT THE DIRECTION OF THEIR

PAGGE FOUR 1103

GOVTS, WE THINK WE SHOULD DO SO WITHOUT DELAY AND WITHOUT WAITING TO BE INVITED TO DO SO. WE WOULD SUGGEST ENTERING A STRONG PLEA AGAINST THE REF TO UN SUPERVISION IN PARA3, PRINCIPALLY ON THE GROUNDS THAT IN THE LIGHT OF THE CANADIAN VIEWS WHICH HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED ON THIS POINT IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN THE PAST, WE WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO MAKE A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE IF THIS PHRASE REMAINS IN, AND EVEN MORE WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO PERSUADE OTHERS TO SPEAK IN SUPPORT OF THIS POSITION. (IT WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE OF MUCH HELP TO POINT OUT THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THIS PHRASE AND THE WORDING OF THE OCT7/50 RESOLUTION IF WE ARE TO URGE THAT THIS RESOLUTION SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO). WE THINK WE SHOULD SUPPORT THE NZ OBJECTION TO THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA3. WE MIGHT THEN SUGGEST THAT THE FOLLOWING BE SUBSTITUTED FOR THE LAST SENTENCE OF THE FINAL PARA OF THE STATE DEPT DRAFT:

"THE GOVTS CONCERNED ARE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM KOREA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXISTING INSTRUCTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UN WHEN THE CONDITIONS FOR A LASTING SETTLEMENT LAID DOWN BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAVE BEEN FULFILLED."

11. THIS WORDING HAS THE MORE SPECIFIC COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAWAL DESIRED BY OTHER COMMONWEALTH GOVTS WITHOUT MENTIONING THE SPECIFIC CONDITIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL AS DID THE STATE DEPT DRAFT. WE HAVE OUTLINED THIS POINT (TOGETHER WITH YOUR OTHER COMMENTS IN Y177) TO PYMAN OF THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY AND DE LA MARA OF THE UK EMBASSY, WHO WERE RECEPTIVE THOUGH UNABLE TO MAKE ANY COMMITMENT AS TO THE REACTIONS OF THEIR GOVTS. WHITE OF THE NZ EMBASSY IS NOT RPT NOT AVAILABLE.

BY CAN

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FM EXTERNAL OTT MAY21/58 CONFID
TO WASHDC Y178 PRIORITY
INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS PERMISNY
TOKYO DEFERRED

DAG BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS WLGTH DELET KARACHI CNBRA FM LDN

REF OUR TEL Y177 MAY21

KOREA:THE CHINESE REPLY

NO. 1 INIT.
MUTTER
BUTLER
HILSLAND
GORHAM
SMITH
CHOQUETTE
MISS CURRIE

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PROPOSED REPLY TO CHINESE AS GIVEN TO BRITISH
EMBASSY, WASHDC, BEGINS:

HER MAJESTY'S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES PRESENTS HIS COMPLIMENTS TO THE
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM HER MAJESTY'S
PRINCIPAL SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HAS THE HONOUR
TO REFER TO THE MINISTRY'S NOTE OF MAY6/58, COMMUNICATED TO THE
GOVTS OF THE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED FORCES FOR THE
UN FORCE IN KOREA, WHO, AFTER CONSULTATION, HAVE REQUESTED HER
MAJESTY'S GOVT TO REPLY AGAIN ON THEIR BEHALF.

2. THE GOVTS CONCERNED, NOTING THAT THE GREATER PART OF THE FORCES
SENT TO KOREA AT THE INSTANCE OF THE UN HAVE ALREADY BEEN WITH-
DRAWN, REITERATE THAT THEY WELCOME THE ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE GOVT
OF PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA THAT CHINESE TROOPS ARE ALSO TO
BE WITHDRAWN FROM NORTHKOREA.

3. THE GOVTS CONCERNED ARE DISAPPOINTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE NOTE
HANDLED TO HER MAJESTY'S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ON MAY6

DOES NOT RPT NOT PROVIDE THE CLARIFICATION ASKED FOR IN THE NOTE
DELIVERED BY HER MAJESTY'S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ON APR9, AND
BRUSHES ASIDE THE QUESTION OF THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH ELECTIONS
SHOULD BE HELD. THE GOVTS CONCERNED CONSIDER THAT ELECTIONS HELD
UNDER UN SUPERVISION WITH REPRESENTATION IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
PROPORTIONATE TO THE INDIGENOUS POPULATION LIE AT THE HEART OF THE
MATTER. THEY CANNOT RPT NOT AGREE THAT THE FURTHER WITHDRAWAL OF
UN FORCES WITHOUT ANY PROVISION FOR A PROPER SETTLEMENT
OF THE KOREAN QUESTION WOULD BE CALCULATED TO LEAD TO A REDUCTION
OF TENSION IN THE FAREAST. ON THE CONTRARY, WITHDRAWAL SUCH
ACTION BEFORE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNIFIED, INDEPENDENT, AND
DEMOCRATIC GOVT OF KOREA WOULD ENDANGER PEACE IN THE FAREAST AND

May 27 1958

...2

PAGE TWO Y176

WOULD OBSTRUCT RATHER THAN FACILITATE THE PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF KOREA.

4. THE GOVTS CONCERNED WISH TO SEE A GENUINE SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH UN RESOLUTIONS. UN FORCES ARE IN KOREA AT THE INSTANCE OF THE UN AS PROVIDED BY UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 376(V) OF OCT 7, 1950. THE GOVTS CONCERNED ARE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW THESE FORCES WHEN KOREA HAS BEEN UNIFIED IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE UN,

BY CAN.

TELEGRAM

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EXTERNAL MAY 21/58 CONF
TO WASHDC Y177 PRIORITY
INFO LDN EMBASSY PARIS PERMISNY
TOKYO DEFERRED
BAG BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS WLGTN DELHI KATHACHI CNBRO FM LDN

NO.	INIT.
1. WASHDC	
2. LDN	
3. BRUSS	
4. HAGUE	
5. ANKARA	
6. ATHENS	
7. WLGTN	
8. DELHI	
9. KATHACHI	
10. CNBRO	
11. FM LDN	
12. GORHAM	
13. SMITH	
14. CHOQUETTE	
15. MISS CURRIE	

REF OUR TEL Y175 MAY 17

KOREA: THE CHINESE REPLY

OUR TEL Y178 CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A PROPOSED REPLY TO THE CHINESE GIVEN THE BRITISH BY THE STATE DEPT. BRITISH EMBASSY HAVE SUGGESTED INSERTION, AFTER SECOND SENTENCE ENDING "AT THE HEART OF THE MATTER" OF A NEW SENTENCE AS FOLLOWS: "IT WAS TO THIS END THAT THEY SOUGHT THE CLARIFICATION REQUESTED IN HER MAJESTY'S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES' NOTE UNDER REF"; IN THE FOURTH PARA AT THE END OF FIRST SENTENCE THEY HAVE PROPOSED INSERTING BEFORE THE FULL STOP THE WORDS "AND ARE AT ALL TIMES WILLING TO FURTHER THE CONSIDERATION OF MEASURES DESIGNED TO EFFECT REUNIFICATION ON THIS BASIS".

2. WE SEE NOTHING TO OBJECT TO, AND SOMETHING TO BE GAINED, IN THE FIRST PROPOSED AMENDMENT. WE COULD SUPPORT THE SECOND PROVIDED THE CONSENSUS IS THAT IT DOES NOT RPT NOT INCREASE THE RISK OF APPEARING TO AGREE TO ANOTHER SPECIAL POLITICAL CONFERENCE ON KOREA.

3. AS YOU WILL SEE, THE STATE DEPT DRAFT DOES NOT RPT NOT DIFFER SUBSTANTIALLY FROM THE BRITISH EMBASSY'S DRAFT EXCEPT IN TWO RESPECTS: (A) IT REINTRODUCES THE WORDS "UNDER UN SUPERVISION" IN RELATION TO KOREAN ELECTIONS AT THE SPECIFIC INSTANCE OF MR WALTER ROBERTSON, AND (B) IT MENTIONS THE RESOLUTION OF OCT 7/50, SPECIFICALLY INSTEAD OF BY REF. WE THINK THAT IT WOULD BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO SUPPORT A RETURN TO THE IDEA OF UN SUPERVISION WHEN SEEKING THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S BLESSING THIS AUTUMN. THE REVERSION IS NOT RPT NOT LIKELY TO PASS UNNOTICED BY THE INDIANS AND, IN VIEW OF THE REPEATED EXPRESSION OF THE CANADIAN GOVTS VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT, WE COULD HARDLY BE EXPECTED TO AGREE TO IT. MOREOVER, WE THINK THAT THE STATE DEPT IS IN SOMETHING OF A LOGICAL IMPASSE IN COMBINING "UN SUPERVISION" WITH THE 1950 RESOLUTION WHICH SPEAKS OF "UN AUSPICES".

4. THE STATE DEPT DRAFT, LIKE THE BRITISH EMBASSY DRAFT, CONTAINS THE IDEA OF REMAINING IN KOREA UNTIL UNIFICATION HAS BEEN ACHIEVED. FOR THE REASONS CONTAINED IN OUR Y175 WE STILL PREFER OUR OWN SUGGESTED ENDING TO THE REPLY.

5. PLEASE INFORM YOUR COMMONWEALTH COLLEAGUES OF THESE VIEWS AND USE THEM AS GUIDANCE IF YOU ARE CONSULTED BY STATE DEPT.


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BY CAN

TELEGRAM

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FM EXTERNAL OTT MAY17/58 CONFD

TO WASHDC Y175 PRIORITY

LDN EMBASSYPARIS NY

TOKYO DEFERRED

BAG BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS WLGTH DELHI KARACHI CNBRA

OUR TEL Y169 OF MAY15

KOREA:THE CHINESE REPLY

OUR TEL Y174 CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A DRAFT REPLY TO THE CHINESE

REPLY OF MAY6 WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN SHOWN TO THE STATE DEPT.IT

IS BASED ON THE OUTLINE FROM LDN CONTAINED IN OUR TEL Y164 OF MAY13

BUT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE DESIRE EXPRESSED TO THE BRITISH BY THE

STATE DEPT FOR MENTION OF THE DIFFERENCE IN STATUS BETWEEN UNC

FORCES AND CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES IN KOREA.THE BRITISH CONCEDE THAT

THIS REF MAY NOT RPT NOT BE SO DIRECT,OR,TO USE MR.HERTER'S WORDS,

"PAINFULLY CLEAR"AS USA MIGHT WANT.THE STATE DEPT IS REPORTED TO BE

SOMEWHAT DOUBTFUL ABOUT THE FINAL SENTENCE,AND INSTEAD OF "WHEN A

SETTLEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED"WOULD WANT SOME MORE DEFINITE WORDING

SUCH AS"WHEN KOREA HAS BEEN RE-UNIFIED IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH

THE RELEVANT UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS".THE STATE DEPT WAS ALSO

REPORTED TO BE IN DOUBT ABOUT ASKING FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION:

THEY WOULD PROBABLY FAVOUR OMITTING THE SECOND HALF OF THE LAST

SENTENCE.IN THE PASSAGE ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES,THE STATE DEPT

WOULD LIKE TO SEE A SPECIFIC REF TO THE RESOLUTION OF OCT7,1950.

AS YOU KNOW,WE DO NOT RPT NOT FAVOUR SO SPECIFIC A REF:WE THINK THAT

THERE WILL BE INCREASING DIFFICULTY IN GETTING THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

TO BLESS RESOLUTIONS WHICH APPEAR INTRANSIGENT AND WE SHOULD NOT RPT

NOT LIKE TO SEE THE SIXTEEN SADDLE THEMSELVES WITH A SPECIFIC REF

TO THIS RESOLUTION.THE FOREIGN OFFICE WOULD LIKE TO SEE(BUT IS NOT

RPT NOT PREPARED TO INSIST UPON)SOMETHING LIKE THE FOLLOWING ADDED

AFTER THE WORDS"UNITED NATIONS"IN THE LAST SENTENCE:"AND ARE AT ALL

TIMES WILLING TO FURTHER THE CONSIDERATION OF MEASURES DESIGNED TO

EFFECT REUNIFICATION ON THIS BASIS.TO THIS END THEY AGAIN SEEK

ETC."WE ARE NOT RPT NOT MUCH TAKEN BY ANYTHING WHICH WOULD SEEM

TO MAKE A FURTHER KOREAN POLITICAL CONFERENCE MORE LIKELY.

2.WE ARE,ON THE WHOLE,PLEASED WITH THE BRITISH DRAFT.ONE FEATURE WE

DO NOT RPT NOT LIKE IS THE WAY IN WHICH WITHDRAWAL IS SPECIFICALLY

RELATED TO REUNIFICATION AND MADE CONDITIONAL UPON IT.IT SEEMS TO

US THAT THE SIXTEEN MIGHT BE COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO MUCH TOO

NARROW A COURSE IN BEING SO SPECIFIC.UNLESS THE SIXTEEN ARE

NO.	LDN	INIT.
	AMBASSADOR	
	MUTTER	
	DOER	
	H.S.E.D.	
	GORHAM	
	SMITH	
	CHOQUETTE	
	MISS CURRIE	

PAGE TWO Y175

PREPARED TO BECOME A MINORITY THEY MAY HAVE TO ABANDON THIS POSITION (ALBEITH WITH CERTAIN SAFEGUARDS). IT IS POSSIBLE TO ENVISAGE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY VOTING TO CONSIDER KOREAN UNIFICATION A MATTER OF PRIMARY INTEREST TO THE KOREANS, AS IT DID IN 1947. WE THEREFORE FAVOUR A MORE GENERAL STATEMENT OF OUR CONDITIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL, BEARING IN MIND THAT, IF WE ARE UNABLE TO COMMAND A TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY AT SOME POINT IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WE ARE NEVERTHELESS UNLIKELY TO COMMAND LESS THAN A BLOCKING THIRD.

3. WE SHOULD THEREFORE LIKE TO SEE THE FINAL SENTENCE REMOVED AND THE FOLLOWING SUBSTITUTED: /THEY ARE, IN FACT, UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE UNITED NATIONS, AT WHOSE BEHEST THEY ARE IN KOREA, TO WITHDRAW FROM KOREA WHEN THE CONDITIONS FOR A LASTING SETTLEMENT LAID DOWN BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAVE BEEN FULFILLED. "THIS LANGUAGE IS AN OBLIQUE REF TO THE RESOLUTION OF OCT 7, 1950, BUT WOULD PERMIT US TO WITHDRAW IN THE FACE OF AN ALTERED DECISION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WITHOUT SUFFERING LOSS OF FACE. IT MEETS THE USA POSITION ABOUT NOT RPT NOT ASKING FOR A FURTHER CHINESE REPLY AND AT THE SAME TIME ANSWERS THE ONLY QUESTION CONTAINED IN IT IN TERMS WHICH NEUTRALS CAN HARDLY CHALLENGE. MOREOVER IT DOES NOT RPT NOT APPEAR TO USURP THE RIGHT OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT KOREA, WHICH THE ORIGINAL LANGUAGE MIGHT BE INTERPRETED TO SUGGEST.

4. IF THIS CHANGE WERE ACCEPTED, THE FIRST PARA OF THE BRITISH DRAFT WOULD BECOME UNNECESSARY. WE GATHER THAT IT WAS INSERTED IN ORDER TO GO HALF WAY TO MEET THE USA POINT ABOUT THE DIFFERENCE IN STATUS BETWEEN THE OPPOSING FORCES. IN THE PROCESS IT INCIDENTALLY COMPLIMENTS THE CHINESE ONCE MORE FOR THEIR DECISION TO WITHDRAW; THIS OUR REDRAFT WOULD AVOID. AS A CONSEQUENTIAL CHANGE "HOWEVER" WOULD NEED TO BE DROPPED FROM THE FIRST LINE OF THE PRESENT PARA TWO.

5. LESS IMPORTANT BUT WORTH CONSIDERING WOULD BE DROPPING "LEAD TO A FURTHER REDUCTION OF TENSION IN THE FAR EAST", WHICH AGAIN SEEMS LIKE A COMPLIMENT TO THE CHINESE, AND SUBSTITUTING "ENSURE INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE AREA" (A STATED UNITED NATIONS OBJECTIVE.

...3TT


PAGE THREE Y175

6. PLEASE DISCUSS THESE SUGGESTIONS WITH YOUR UK (AND IF HE AGREES, COMMONWEALTH) COLLEAGUES. WE SHOULD HAVE TO GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE RAMIFICATIONS OF UNDERTAKING TO SUPPORT A REPLY CONTAINING A FLAT STATEMENT THAT THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND FORCES MUST REMAIN IN KOREA UNTIL KOREA HAS BEEN REUNIFIED.


TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

BY CAN



FM EXTERNAL OTT MAY 17/58 CONF
TO WASHDC Y174 PRIORITY
INFO LDN EMBASSY PARIS PERMISNY
TOKYO DEFERRED
BAG BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS WLGTH DELHI KARACHI CNBRA



REF OUR TEL Y175 MAY 16

KOREA: THE CHINESE REPLY


FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT REPLY PREPARED BY THE BRITISH
EMBASSY, BEGINS:

THE GOVTS CONCERNED, NOTING THAT THE GREATER PART OF THE FORCES SENT TO
KOREA AT THE INSTANCE OF THE UN HAVE ALREADY BEEN WITHDRAWN REAFFIRM
THEIR GRATIFICATION AT THE ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE GOVT OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA THAT CHINESE TROOPS ARE ALSO TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM
NORTH KOREA.

THE GOVTS CONCERNED ARE HOWEVER DISAPPOINTED THAT THE NOTE HANDED TO
HER MAJESTY'S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ON THE 6 OF MAY, BY THE CHINESE VICE
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS DOES NOT RPT NOT ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE THE
CLARIFICATION ASKED FOR IN THE NOTE DELIVERED BY HER MAJESTY'S CHARGE
D'AFFAIRES ON THE 9 OF APR, AND BRUSHES ASIDE THE QUESTION OF THE PRIN-
CIPLES ON WHICH ELECTIONS SHOULD BE HELD. THE GOVTS CONCERNED CONSIDER
THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF ELECTIONS LIES AT THE HEART OF THE MATTER AND
THEY CANNOT AGREE THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF UN FORCES WITHOUT ANY PROVI-
SION FOR A PROPER SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION WOULD BE CALCULA-
TED TO LEAD TO A FURTHER REDUCTION OF TENSION IN THE FAR EAST. THEY
WISH TO SEE A GENUINE SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION ON THE LINES
APPROVED BY THE UN, AND HAVE NO RPT NO WISH TO MAINTAIN FORCES IN KOREA
LONGER THAN IS NECESSARY. THEY ARE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW THESE FORCES
WHEN KOREA HAS BEEN REUNIFIED IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH THE RELEVANT
RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UN, AND THEY AGAIN SEEK THE
CLARIFICATION REQUESTED IN THE NOTE DELIVERED BY HER MAJESTY'S CHARGE
D'AFFAIRES ON THE 9 OF APR. ENDS.


TELEGRAM

SECRET



BY CAN

7-1-1-1



NO.	2	AMBASSADOR	INIT.
		MUTTER	
		DUDER	
		GORHAM	
		SMITH	
		CHOQUETTE	
		MISS CURRIE	

FM EXTERNAL OTT MAY15/58 SECRET
TO WASHDC Y172 PRIORITY
INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS PERMISNY
TOKYO DEFERRED.

BAG BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS WLGTN DELHI KARACHI FM LDN

REF OUR TEL Y169

KOREA:THE CHINESE REPLY

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF CRO TEL 620 TO EARNSCLIFFE(FO TEL 264 TO
WASHDC),BEGINS:

WE AGREE WITH THE CANADIANS THAT CONSIDERATION OF OUR POSITION
AT THE NEXT GENERAL ASSEMBLY IS OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE(SEE PARA2
OF MAY TEL 2558).

2.WE ARE NOT RPT NOT HOWEVER IN FAVOUR OF SPELLING OUT,IN OUR
REPLY TO THE CHINESE,THE DIFFERENCE IN STATUS BETWEEN THE UN AND
CHINESE FORCES IN KOREA.APART FROM THE DESIRABILITY OF KEEPING
OUR REPLY SHORT AND CONCENTRATED AS BEFORE ON THE QUESTION OF
ELECTIONS,"UN COMMITTED OPINION MIGHT WELL FIND ELABORATION OF THIS
POINT STERILE IN THIS CONTEXT.WE THINK THEREFORE THAT IT WOULD BE
BETTER TO"TAKE IT FOR GRANTED"IN OUR REPLY WHILE DRAWING ATTENTION
TO IT IN COMMENT(SEE PARA4(A) OF MY GUIDANCE TEL 89).ON THE OTHER
HAND THE AMERICANS MAY WANT SOME FURTHER REF TO THE UN AUTHORITY
FOR THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF THEIR TROOPS IN KOREA.THIS MIGHT BE
MET BY AMENDING THE BEGINNING OF THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA4
OF MAY TEL 2558 TO READ"IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UN THEY WOULD CONSIDER A WITH-
DRAWAL.....".THE RESOLUTION THAT WE HAVE IN MIND IS THAT OF
OCT7,1950,(RECOMMENDATION(D)).

3.WE ALSO THINK IT BETTER NOT RPT NOT TO TRY TO ARGUE IN DETAIL
THE CASE FOR RETENTION OF UN FORCES UNTIL AFTER ELECTIONS.THE REASONS
ARE IMPLICIT IN THE LINE SUGGESTED IN PARA4 OF MY TEL 2558,
AND AGAIN CAN BE DEVELOPED IN COMMENT.DETAILED ARGUMENT IN REPLY
TO THE CHINESE WOULD TEND TO SUGGEST THAT WE HAVE A CASE TO ANSWER
AND THIS IS WHAT THE CHINESE WANT TO MAKE OUT.MOREOVER A DETAILED
CONSIDERATION OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH UN FORCES MIGHT BE
WITHDRAWN WOULD SEEM TO IMPINGE ON THE PREROGATIVES OF THE

PAGE TWO Y172

GENERAL ASSEMBLY, AND WE DO NOT RPT NOT WANT TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE "FIFTEEN" ARE ARROGATING TO THEMSELVES THE DECISION OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM. THE WORDING PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA4 OF MY TEL 2558 MIGHT BE HELD ALREADY TO GO TOO FAR IN THIS RESPECT AND FOR THIS REASON ALSO WE SHOULD NOW FAVOUR AMENDMENT ON THE LINES SUGGESTED IN PARA2 ABOVE. IN ANY CASE IT WOULD PROBABLY TAKE TIME TO REACH AGREEMENT ON FULLER ARGUMENT AND THERE WOULD NO RPT NO DOUBT BE DRAFTING DIFFICULTIES.

4. WE THINK THEREFORE THAT A QUICK ANSWER ON THE LINES SUGGESTED IN PARA4 OF MY TEL 2558 AMENDED AS NOW SUGGESTED WOULD BE THE BEST COURSE. THIS WOULD BRING OUT THE POSITIVE ELEMENT IN OUR POSITION (OUR DESIRE FOR A SETTLEMENT) OUR STANDING UNDER THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION, AND THE IMPORTANCE OF FREE ELECTIONS PROPERLY SUPERVISED WHILE LEAVING US FREE TO CONSIDER DETAILED ELABORATION BETWEEN NOW AND THE NEXT SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY. WE HOPE THAT THERE WILL NOT RPT NOT BE A DELAY WHILE THE STATE DEPT CONSIDER LONG TERM PLANS AS SUGGESTED IN DE LA MARE'S LET OF MAY9, TO DALTON (NOT RPT NOT TO ALL).

TELEGRAM

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Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

CONFIDENTIAL

NO. INIT.
AMBASSADOR
MUTTER
BLIDER
HARRIS
GORHAM
SMITH
CHOQUETTE
MISS CURRIE

BY CAN

7-1-1-1

7-3-3-4



FM WASHDC MAY7/58 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 986
FM WASHDC MAY7/58 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 986 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS PERMISNY
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS CNBRA WLGTN DELHI KARACHI FM LDN

KOREA-TEXT OF CHINESE REPLY TO NOTE OF THE FIFTEEN

WE ARE SENDING BY SEPARATE TEL THE TEXT OF A NOTE FROM THE VICE
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN
REPLY TO THE UK'S NOTE OF APR9 TRANSMITTING THE STATEMENT OF THE
FIFTEEN.

2.WHEN WE WERE DISCUSSING KOREAN MATTERS WITH PARSONS(DIRECTOR,
NORTH ASIAN AFFAIRS)THIS MORNING HE OUTLINED TO US THE BRIEFING NOTES
WHICH WOULD BE USED BY THE STATE DEPT PRESS OFFICER.TO REPLY TO QUESTIONS
CONCERNING THE CHINESE REPLY.

3.PARSONS SAID THAT IN RESPONSE TO AN ANTICIPATED QUESTION CONCERNING
STATE DEPT VIEWS ON THE CHINESE REPLY,THE PRESS SPOKESMAN WOULD
POINT OUT THAT THIS IS A MATTER OF CONCERN OF ALL GOVTS WHO CONTRI-
BUTED FORCES TO THE UNC IN KOREA AND NOT RPT NOT JUST THE USA.

4.THE PRESS SPOKESMAN WOULD THEN GO ON TO POINT OUT THAT THE
CHINESE COMMUNISTS DO NOT RPT NOT APPEAR TO HAVE ANSWERED ANY OF
THE QUESTIONS ASKED IN THE NOTE OF THE FIFTEEN.HE WOULD ALSO POINT
OUT THAT THE UN IS A PROPER AND COMPETENT BODY TO DEAL WITH THE
KOREAN PROBLEM.FINALLY,HE WOULD DRAW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE UNC
FORCES IN KOREA WHO HAD ENTERED KOREA AT THE INVITATION OF THE
ROK GOVT AND AT THE REQUEST OF THE UN,AND THE CHINESE FORCES WHICH
HAD ENTERED KOREA AS AGGRESSORS AND HAD BEEN BRANDED AS SUCH BY
THE UN.

5.BY WAY OF COMMENT ON THIS WE SAID THAT YOU MIGHT NOT RPT NOT BE
HAPPY ABOUT THE TYPE OF LANGUAGE EMPLOYED IN CONNECTION WITH THE
FINAL POINT MADE:THAT WHILE THERE WAS AN ADVANTAGE IN EMPHASIZING
THE DIFFERENCE IN STATUS BETWEEN THE UNC FORCES ON THE ONE HAND
AND THE CHINESE FORCES ON THE OTHER,THE REF TO THE LATTER AS
AGGRESSORS,WHO HAD BEEN BRANDED AS SUCH BY THE UN,MIGHT
NOT RPT NOT BE A CONSTRUCTIVE REMARK IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

6.PARSONS SAID THAT THE STATE DEPT WAS ON THE SPOT IN THIS

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PAGE TWO 986

SITUATION SINCE THEY DID NOT RPT NOT WISH TO SAY ANYTHING WHICH WOULD BE OBJECTIONABLE TO OTHER GOVTS CONCERNED, BUT AT THE SAME TIME THEY FOUND IT NECESSARY TO COMMENT IN A MANNER WHICH WOULD BE SATISFACTORY DOMESTICALLY. HE AGREED THAT THE CONCLUDING REF TO THE CHINESE FORCES MIGHT BE MODIFIED AND INDICATED THAT THE BRIEFING NOTES WOULD BE REVIEWED WITH THAT THOUGHT IN MIND. WHETHER SUCH A REVIEW WILL LEAD TO A MODIFICATION OF THE LANGUAGE EMPLOYED BY THE PRESS SPOKESMAN REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

TELEGRAM


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BY CAN

SECRET



7-1-1-1
7-3-3-4



FM WASHDC MAY7/58 SECRET
TO EXTERNAL 933 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS PERMISNY
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG BRUXX HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS CNBRA WLGTN DELHI KARACHI

REF YOUR TEL Y153 MAY5

KOREA

NO.	INIT.
2 AMBASSADOR	3 R
1 MUTTER	3 R
1 GORHAM	3 R
SMITH	3 R
CHOQUETTE	3 R
MISS CURRIE	3 R

WE CALLED THIS MORNING ON PARSONS(DIRECTOR,NORTH ASIAN AFFAIRS)

TO ENQUIRE ABOUT THE PRESENT STAGE OF STATE DEPT THINKING.

2.PARSONS BEGAN BY SAYING THAT THE STATE DEPT WAS KEENLY AWARE OF THE NEED TO START EARLY ON PREPARATIONS FOR HANDLING THE KOREAN PROBLEM AT THE NEXT UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY.THIS WOULD REQUIRE CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE ACTIVELY INTERESTED MEMBERS OF THE SIXTEEN AND SOME LOBBYING IN VARIOUS CAPITALS.REFERRING TO THE EARLIER SUGGESTION THAT THE MATTER MIGHT BE TAKEN UP IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL,PARSONS SAID THAT THIS HAD BEEN BASED ON THE EXPECTATION THAT THERE MIGHT BE WIDESPREAD PUBLIC REACTION IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES TO THE CHINESE STATEMENT OF FEB7 AND THE SUBSEQUENT WITHDRAWAL OF CHINESE FORCES. HAD THIS PUBLIC REACTION BEEN STRONG AND WIDESPREAD,THE STATE DEPT WOULD HAVE FELT THE NEED TO TAKE ACTION TO COPE WITH THE SITUATION IN A POSITIVE WAY BY TAKING THE MATTER UP IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.PARSONS SAID,HOWEVER,THAT AS NEAR AS THE STATE DEPT COULD TELL THE CHINESE HAD NOT RPT NOT STIRRED UP MUCH PUBLIC REACTION BY THE FEB SPEECHES,THE STATEMENT TO THE SIXTEEN,ETC EVEN IN COUNTRIES WHICH WERE MOST LIKELY TO BE RESPONSIVE.

3.REFERRING TO OFFICIAL REACTION AS DISTINCT FROM PUBLIC REACTION, PARSONS SAID THAT THE MOST NOTABLE RESPONSE HAD COME FROM THE JAPANESE.AT A MEETING OF THE USA-JAPANESE SECURITY COMMITTEE TWO OR THREE WEEKS AGO,THE QUESTION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF CHINESE TROOPS FROM KOREA,THE INTERPRETATION OF THE COMMUNISTS MOTIVES IN THIS MOVE AND THE ACTION OF THE SIXTEEN IN RESPONSE TO THE CHINESE STATEMENT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH.THE JAPANESE REACTION HAD BEEN STRONG ON TWO POINTS:

- (I)UNC TROOPS SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE WITHDRAWAN FROM KOREA;
- (II)THE JAPANESE HAD STRONGLY ENDORSED THE POSITION THAT THE UN SHOULD SUPERVISE ALL KOREAN ELECTIONS.

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PARSONS SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THIS RESPONSE BECAUSE IT INDICATED THAT THE JAPANESE WOULD PROBABLY BE MORE HELPFUL ON THE KOREAN ISSUE IN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY THAN THEY HAD BEEN IN THE PAST.

4. PARSONS WENT ON TO SAY THAT IN DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SIXTEEN OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS, THE AUSTRALIANS AND SOME WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAD EMPHASIZED THE DESIRABILITY OF UNC FORCES REMAINING IN KOREA. NO GOVT WITH WHICH THE STATE DEPT HAS BEEN IN TOUCH, HE SAID, WISHES TO SEE ANY ACQUIESCENCE IN THE CHINESE DEMAND FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNC TROOPS AND SOME HAVE EXPRESSED STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE VIEW THAT UNC FORCES BE RETAINED IN KOREA. PARSONS PARTICULARLY MENTIONED THAT THE AUSTRALIANS HAD BEEN MOST EMPHATIC ON THIS POINT BOTH FOR KOREAN AND AUSTRALIAN REASONS.


5. WE REFERRED TO EARLIER CONVERSATIONS CONCERNING THE DILEMMA BETWEEN THE REQUIREMENTS OF USA AND FREE WORLD STRATEGY WITH RESPECT TO THE RETENTION OF TROOPS IN KOREA AND THE PUBLICLY SUPPORTED OBJECTIVE OF A UN DEMOCRATIC AND INDEPENDENT KOREA FROM WHICH UNC TROOPS WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHDRAWN. PARSONS SAID FRANKLY THAT THE USA HAD NOT RPT NOT FACED UP TO THIS PROBLEM IN ANY THOROUGH-GOING WAY. HE SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED THE MATTER WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBERTSON WHO EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT WHEN KOREA WAS UNIFIED IT WOULD BE AN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY AND THE USA WOULD THEN BE OBLIGED TO MEET ITS COMMITMENTS BY WITHDRAWING ITS FORCES. PARSONS SAID HE THOUGHT THERE WAS A GENERAL DISPOSITION IN THE USA GOVT TO AGREE THAT THE ATTAINMENT OF KOREAN REUNIFICATION WOULD HAVE TO BE FOLLOWED BY UNC WITHDRAWAL. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THIS WAS A TENTATIVE VIEW BASED ON THE IMPROBABLE HYPOTHESIS THAT UNIFICATION SATISFACTORY TO THE WEST COULD BE ATTAINED. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE FULL STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THIS VIEW HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN THOUGHT THROUGH AND THAT THE QUESTION WAS STILL BEING STUDIED. WE POINTED OUT THAT WHILE IN SOME RESPECTS THE QUESTION MIGHT SEEM ACADEMIC AT THIS STAGE, IT MIGHT HAVE BEARING ON THE SUCCESS OF ANY LOBBYING UNDERTAKEN BY THE UNC GOVTS TO SECURE SUPPORT AT THE NEXT UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. WE ENQUIRED WHEN A REASSESSMENT OF THE POSITION WITH RESPECT TO STRATEGICAL

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REQUIREMENTS ON THE ONE HAND AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES ON THE OTHER MIGHT BE COMPLETED. PARSONS SAID HE HOPED THIS MIGHT BE DONE BY THE BEGINNING OF AUG AND EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THIS WAS A PROBLEM WHICH MIGHT BE THOUGHT THROUGH JOINTLY BY THE VARIOUS GOVTS CONCERNED.


6. REFERRING TO THE MORE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM POSED BY THE CHINESE REPLY, PARSONS SAID THAT WHILE THE NEXT MOVE HAD NOT YET NOT BEEN SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED IN THE STATE DEPT AS YET, HIS OWN PERSONAL OPINION WAS THAT THE CHINESE NOTE SHOULD BE ANSWERED QUICKLY AND THAT THE UNC SIDE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON TWO POINTS: NAMELY THAT THE CHINESE REPLY WAS REALLY NO RPT NO REPLY AT ALL SINCE IT FAILED TO ANSWER THE QUESTIONS PUT IN THE STATEMENT OF THE FIFTEEN AND SECONDLY, THAT THE DIFFERENCE IN STATUS BETWEEN THE CHINESE FORCES IN KOREA ON THE ONE HAND AND THE UNC FORCES ON THE OTHER SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED. HE AGREED THAT AN EARLY REPLY WOULD HAVE THE DISADVANTAGE OF ENABLING THE CHINESE TO RETURN AGAIN AND DEVELOP FURTHER THEIR POINT ABOUT THE FAILURE OF UNC FORCES TO WITHDRAW.

7. PARSONS SAID THAT THE STATE DEPT WOULD APPRECIATE CANADIAN VIEWS ON THE IMMEDIATE QUESTIONS OF WHETHER THE UNC GOVTS SHOULD ANSWER THE CHINESE NOTE, WHAT KIND OF AN ANSWER SHOULD BE RENDERED AND WHAT THE TIMING SHOULD BE. HE SAID ALSO THAT THE STATE DEPT WOULD LIKE TO HAVE OUR VIEWS ON THE BROADER QUESTION OF STRATEGICAL REQUIREMENTS AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. HE THOUGHT THAT GOVTS ACTIVELY CONCERNED WITH THE KOREAN PROBLEM WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT ACTIVELY BETWEEN NOW AND THE NEXT MEETING OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.



TELEGRAM

SECRET



PRIORITY

FM EXTERNAL OTT MAY5/58 SECRET
TO WASHDC Y153 PRIORITY

LDN PRIORITY

INFO EMBASSYPARIS PERMISNY TOKYO PRIORITY

BAG BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS CNBRA WLGTN DELHI KARACHI FM LDN

REF WASHDC TEL 905 APR28

KOREA

FOR WASHDC:WE WERE ENCOURAGED BY WASHDC'S MSG WHICH INDICATES THAT
USA STRATEGIC APPRAISAL REGARDING KOREA MAY HAVE HELPFUL EFFECT
ON EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH THE POLITICAL PROBLEM.WE MUST EXPECT THE
CHINESE TO ADHERE TO THEIR VIEW THAT ONLY THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL
FOREIGN TROOPS CAN PROVIDE CONDITIONS FOR THE HOLDING OF ELECTIONS.
NEVERTHELESS,IF A RELAXATION IN THE USA POSITION WERE NOTED,COMING
AS IT WOULD AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF WITHDRAWAL OF CHINESE FORCES
FROM KOREA,IT MIGHT HELP IN GETTING BOTH SIDES TO THINK IN TERMS OF
THE POSSIBILITY OF A SOLUTION TO THE KOREAN PROBLEM.THIS IN ITSELF
WOULD BE AN IMPROVEMENT.THE CHINESE CANNOT RPT NOT BE EXPECTED TO
DISAVOW THEIR CONTENTION THAT FOREIGN TROOPS MUST WITHDRAW BEFORE
ELECTIONS BUT THEY MUST ALSO BE AWARE OF THE PRACTICAL NECESSITY
TO RESTRAIN RHEE.

2.WHEN THE STATE DEPT MENTION TO YOU THEIR NEW ASSESSMENT,YOU MIGHT
EXPRESS OUR ENCOURAGEMENT AND ASK THEM TO GIVE SUCH FURTHER EXPLANA-
TIONS AS THEY CAN AT THIS TIME,PARTICULARLY AS TO HOW THEY SEE A
"BREAK-THROUGH ON THE KOREAN PROBLEM"DEVELOPING IN VIEW OF THE
CHINESE STAND ON WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS BEFORE ELECTIONS.WE
SHOULD OF COURSE ALSO BE INTERESTED TO KNOW ABOUT THE STRATEGIC
CONCEPT IMPLICIT IN THE USA REAPPRAISAL OF THE NEED TO KEEP THEIR
TROOPS IN KOREA.

3.WE AGREE ABOUT THE NECESSITY TO PREPARE THE WESTERN POSITION ON
KOREA IN ADVANCE OF THE UN ASSEMBLY MEETING.THE NEW USA POSITION
SHOULD MAKE THIS PROCESS EASIER THAN AT FIRST APPEARED LIKELY.

(FOR YOUR OWN INFO,IF THE ELUCIDATIONS GIVEN BY THE STATE DEPT
CONFIRM THE IMPRESSION THAT THE USA IS SERIOUSLY CONTEMPLATING THE
POSSIBILITY OF AN ULTIMATE SOLUTION--HOWEVER FAR REMOVED THIS MIGHT
BE AT PRESENT,AND WE WOULD NOT RPT NOT EXPECT PROGRESS TO BE SWIFT--

PAGE TWO Y153

WE MIGHT LATER BE PREPARED, IF IT SHOULD SEEM HELPFUL, TO TRY TO GET THE INDIANS TO GO ALONG WITH US ON SOME PROPOSAL IN THE UN.

4. WE NOTE THAT THE USA WANTS THE HELP OF A NUCLEUS OF THE SIXTEEN IN PREPARING FOR THE UN DISCUSSION. THIS WOULD SEEM REASONABLE FOR SUCH A SPECIFIC PURPOSE. FOR LONGER TERM NEGOTIATIONS WE HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THE EFFICACY OF THE SIXTEEN. IT MIGHT BE THAT THE QUESTION OF NEGOTIATING PROCEDURES FOR ELECTIONS SHOULD MORE APPROPRIATELY BE REFERRED TO THE UN IN ITS ARBITRAL CAPACITY, EITHER THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR THE ASSEMBLY. GENERALLY IT SEEMS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE ANY PROCEDURES FOR ELECTIONS BEING WORKED OUT WITHOUT THE AUTHORITIES IN CONTROL OF THE TWO PARTS OF KOREA COMING INTO CONTACT IN SOME WAY OR OTHER.

FOR LDN:5. YOU MIGHT TAKE AN OPPORTUNITY TO ACQUAINT THE FO WITH OUR INITIAL REACTION TO THE STATE DEPT REAPPRAISAL AND OBTAIN THE PRELIMINARY VIEWS OF THE FO ON IT.

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PRIORITY

NO.	INIT.
2 AMBASSADOR	
3 PERS	
SMITH	
CHOQUETTE	
MISS CURRIE	

7-1-1-1



FM WASHDC AP29/58 SECRET
TO EXTERNAL 905 PRIORITY
INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS PERMISNY
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS CNBRA WLGTN DELHI KARACHI FM LDN

REF OUR TEL 856 APR22

KOREA

DE LA MARE OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY OUTLINED TODAY TO REPS OF THE OLD COMMONWEALTH EMBASSIES A RECENT CONVERSATION HAD HAD WITH PARSONS(DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS) IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS:

- (A) USA TROOPS COULD NOT RPT NOT BE WITHDRAWN FROM KOREA UNTIL RE-UNIFICATION HAD BEEN ACHIEVED ON TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST.
- (B) BOTH THE STATE DEPT AND THE PENTAGON ARE PREPARED TO HAVE USA TROOPS WITHDRAWN WHEN SUCH REUNIFICATION HAS TAKEN PLACE.
- (C) IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO PERSUADE THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF (B) ABOVE.
- (D) THE USA WANTS THE HELP OF A NUCLEUS OF THE SIXTEEN(PRESUMABLY THE OLD COMMONWEALTH) TO HELP TO PERSUADE MEMBERS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF USA ATTITUDES AS IN (B) ABOVE.
- (E) A CAMPAIGN TO PERSUADE UN MEMBERS OF USA INTENTIONS AS IN (B) ABOVE SHOULD BE PUT ON FOOT IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
- (F) EFFORTS WILL HAVE TO BE MADE TO BUILD UP JAPANESE CONFIDENCE TO CONTEMPLATE ULTIMATE WITHDRAWAL OF USA TROOPS FROM KOREA.

2. DE LA MARE SAID THAT PARSONS WAS MOST DEFINITE IN STATING THAT BOTH THE STATE DEPT AND THE PENTAGON WERE NOW PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE WITHDRAWAL OF USA FORCES FROM KOREA GIVEN THE REUNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY ON TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST. PARSONS EVIDENTLY STATED THAT THE RETENTION OF USA TROOPS IN KOREA IS NOT RPT NOT A COLD WAR OR LONGRANGE STRATEGICAL REQUIREMENT. WE OBSERVED THAT THE CONDITION ATTACHED-THAT REUNIFICATION ON TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST MUST FIRST BE ACHIEVED-WAS A SWEEPING ONE AND THAT THE USA COULD PROBABLY AFFORD TO TAKE THIS ATTITUDE ON THE SAFE ASSUMPTION THAT THE CHINESE AND THE NORTHKOREANS WOULD NEVER ACCEPT ANY REUNIFICATION PLAN WHICH DID NOT RPT NOT INVOLVE THE

PAGE TWO 905

PRIOR WITHDRAWAL OF USA FORCES. DE LA MARE STATED, HOWEVER, THAT BOTH PARSONS AND APPARENTLY WALTER ROBERTSON TOO, WERE NEVERTHELESS THINKING IN TERMS OF A POSSIBLE BREAK THROUGH ON THE KOREAN PROBLEM.

3. IN THIS CONNECTION DE LA MARE OBSERVED THAT THERE COULD BE A NEW STRATEGICAL CONCEPT IMPLICIT IN THE USA ATTITUDE IN THE SENSE THAT GROUND FORCES IN KOREA WERE NO RPT NO LONGER REQUIRED FOR MILITARY STRATEGICAL PURPOSES, BUT ONLY FOR MORALE AND POLITICAL PURPOSES.

DE LA MARE ALSO SAID THAT THE STATE DEPT ANTICIPATES THAT SO FAR AS THE QUESTION OF REUNIFICATION IS CONCERNED, CHINESE TACTICS BETWEEN NOW AND THE CONSIDERATION OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM AT THE NEXT MEETING OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WILL CONCENTRATE ON THE NECESSITY FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF USA FORCES FROM KOREA AS A PRIMARY DESIDERATUM.



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AMBASSADOR
MUTTER
~~CHUBER~~
~~HALSTEAD~~
GORHAM
SMITH
CHOQUETTE
MISS CURRIE



file
JH

FM WASHDC APR22/58 RESTD
TO EXTERNAL 856 PRIORITY
INFO LDN EMBASSY PARIS PERMISNY
TOKYO DEFERRED FN OTT

BAG BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS CNBRA WLGTN DELHI KARACHI FM LDN

REF OURTEL 771 APR8

KOREA-CHINESE AND SOVIET COMMENT ON MSG OF THE FIFTEEN

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFO SERVICE DAILY REPORTS NUMBERS 72 FOR APR14
(FAREAST) AND 73 FOR APR15 (USSR AND EAST EUROPE) REPORT PEKING AND
MOSCOW RADIO COMMENTS ON THE MSG OF THE FIFTEEN WHICH WAS DELI-
VERED TO THE CHINESE COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES ON APR8. BOTH THE CHINESE
AND SOVIET BROADCASTS WERE MADE ON APR12.

2. THE CHINESE BROADCAST STATES THAT "IN ESSENCE THE REPLY IS AN
ATTEMPT TO DECEIVE THE PUBLIC ON THE PRETEXT THAT THEY WANT CLARI-
FICATION ON THE QUESTION OF FREE ELECTIONS", AND THAT IT IS "ALSO
AN ATTEMPT TO THROW OFF THEIR INESCAPABLE RESPONSIBILITY TO WITH-
DRAW THE TROOPS OF THE USA AND OTHER COUNTRIES FROM KOREA." THE
BROADCAST THEN DWELLS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S
VOLUNTEERS FROM KOREA AND THE FAILURE OF THE UNC SIDE TO DO LIKE-
WISE. THE PEOPLE'S DAILY COMMENTATOR CONCLUDES: "ONLY THE WITHDRAWAL
OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS FROM THAT COUNTRY CAN PROVIDE THE CONDI-
TIONS FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION INCLUDING
THE QUESTION OF HOLDING FREE GENERAL ELECTIONS. OTHERWISE THE USA
CAN HARDLY SHIRK THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONTINUING TO KEEP KOREA
DIVIDED AND INTENSIFYING TENSION IN THE FAREAST".

3. THE SOVIET COMMENTATOR NOTES WITH APPROVAL THAT THE MSG OF THE
FIFTEEN "CONFIRMS THE NECESSITY OF HOLDING ELECTIONS NOT RPT NOT
ONLY IN NORTHKOREA, BUT ALSO IN BOTH HALVES OF KOREA" AND OBSERVES
THAT THIS IS IN CONTRAST TO THE POSITION OF THE ROK GOVT WHICH HAS
DEMANDED ELECTIONS IN NORTHKOREA ONLY.

4. THE SOVIET BROADCAST THEN REMARKS WITH REGRET THAT THE USA IS
UNWILLING TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM SOUTHKOREA AFTER THE EXAM-
PLE OF THE CHINESE. ON THIS POINT THE COMMENTATOR STATES: "AS LONG AS
FOREIGN TROOPS REMAIN IN THE COUNTRY, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO TALK
OF FREE ELECTIONS, AND THE SUCCESSFUL UNIFICATION OF KOREA ON A
DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATION CANNOT RPT NOT BE HOPED FOR, WHICH IS QUITE
...2

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PAGE TWO 856

OBVIOUS TO ALL. THE GARRISONING OF FOREIGN TROOPS IS THE MAIN OBSTACLE IN THE ROAD OF KOREAN UNIFICATION AND MUTUAL TRUST. ACCORDINGLY, THE KOREAN AND CHINESE SIDE DISPLAYED INITIATIVE IN THE WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS. SINCE THE AMERICAN AND SYNGMAN RHEE SIDE HAVE NOT RPT NOT FOLLOWED THIS ~~BY~~ NOBLE EXAMPLE, THEIR INTENTIONS ARE DOUBTED. THE AMERICAN ACTION OF DEMANDING ELECTIONS UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE UN INSTEAD OF NEUTRAL NATIONS IS ALSO OPEN TO QUESTION."

5. THE SOVIET COMMENTATOR THEN SAYS THAT REPS OF THE STATE DEPT HAVE DECLARED THAT "ELECTIONS UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE UN MEANS ELECTIONS UNDER THE SO-CALLED UN RECONSTRUCTION COMMISSION" (PRESUMABLY UNCURK). THE BROADCAST THEN GOES ON TO ASSERT THAT UNCURK IS AN INAPPROPRIATE BODY FOR THE TASK OF SUPERVISION BECAUSE OF ITS PARTIALITY AND CONCLUDES AS FOLLOWS:

"HOWEVER, THERE IS A POSSIBILITY FOR VIRTUAL SOLUTION OF THE KOREAN ISSUE, SINCE THE KOREAN AND CHINESE SIDE TOOK A SERIES OF IMPORTANT MEASURES, YIELDING TO THE USA AND ITS ALLIES. AT PRESENT, THE ISSUE IS UP TO THESE LATTER COUNTRIES. IF THESE COUNTRIES REJECT THE UNFAIR CONDITION IN WHICH THE ELECTIONS ARE HELD WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF AMERICAN TROOPS AND UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE UN COMMISSION, THE UNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY ON A DEMOCRATIC BASIS WILL BE SUBSTANTIAL AND WILL BE REALIZED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO CONCRETE STEPS BY THE USA AND ITS ALLIES IN THIS DIRECTION, AND ARE HOPING THEY WILL DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY ARE TRYING TO CREATE A DEMOCRATIC, UNIFIED AND INDEPENDENT KOREA IN MORE THAN WORDS ONLY".

6. BOTH THE CHINESE AND SOVIET BROADCASTS APPEAR TO BE MODERATELY WORDED. THE CHINESE BROADCAST CONCENTRATES EXCLUSIVELY ON THE QUESTION OF TROOP WITHDRAWAL WHEREAS THE SOVIET BROADCAST ALSO TAKES UP THE QUESTION OF ELECTION SUPERVISION, THOUGH IT APPEARS DELIBERATELY TO IGNORE THE FLEXIBILITY INTENDED IN THE PHRASE "UNDER UN AUSPICES" IN THE FOURTH PARA OF THE MSG OF THE FIFTEEN.

7. FULL TEXT OF THESE BROADCASTS ARE GOING FORWARD BY BAG TOMORROW.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(FILE COPY)

NUMBERED LETTER

CANADIAN EYES ONLY

SECRET

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY,
TOKYO, JAPAN

Reference: Your letter No. Y-114 of March 21

Subject: Future Policy Respecting Korea

Security: 34/

No: 34/

Date: April 14, 1958

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No: 7-1-1-1

Ottawa File No.

50396-40

References

We have read with interest your draft paper on future policy respecting Korea, and we have tried to examine it in the spirit which you suggest. We entirely agree with your analysis of the Korean situation and the relationship to it of the United Nations. However, when it comes to the problem of future policy, and particularly of Canadian policy, we think the paper falls somewhat short.

2. In our view, the first requirement is to define clearly the interests and objectives of Canadian policy in this part of the world. (This does not seem to have been done in the paper and the result is a certain duality of reasoning.) Surely the supreme Canadian interest in the Far East, as in Europe, is the preservation of peace without the sacrifice of any of the vital interests of the free world. If this is so, then certain other things fall into place. First, it is more important to prevent a renewal of hostilities in Korea than to achieve unification. Second, it is essential to reach common agreement on what the vital interests of the free world are in the Far East, in order to know what can safely be sacrificed for a settlement and what cannot.

3. Our interest in the Far East is admittedly less direct and less important than our interest in Europe. Canada has no commitments for the security of the region, and, indeed, there is no collective security arrangement in the region. The United States has assumed the main responsibility for the defence of the free world here and is discharging it. On the other hand, Canada still has an important commitment for the defence of South Korea, arising out of our subscribing to the Warning Declaration of July 27, 1953, and there is also no doubt that, in this nuclear age, an outbreak of hostilities anywhere in the Western Pacific could involve us in some way or another sooner or later (as we pointed out during the 1954 crisis over Formosa and the off-shore islands). It is clearly in our interest, therefore, to do what we can now to influence United States policy in the Far East, which is by default the policy of the free world, in such a direction as to minimize active Canadian involvement later on.

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4. Because of the size of Canadian involvement at present, Canada is obviously in no position to take a lead in trying directly to urge any particular policy on the United States Government, let alone persuade it that unification should take precedence over strategy. But there are also other countries in a similar position to Canada's, none of which could hope in isolation to persuade the United States Government to take a particular course of action, but which have an important stake, as we do, in the preservation of peace in the Far East without the sacrifice of any vital interests of the free world. There is no forum, such as the North Atlantic Council, in which these common interests can be discussed and coordinated. But if the situation in the Far East is important enough to us -- and we think it is -- why should not Canada discuss her views in confidence with other like-minded countries with the aim of putting common views to the United States?

5. If our reasoning is correct so far, we would suggest that it is a mistake in your paper to dismiss "strategic concepts" involving policy in Korea without examining them, and to assume (apparently without examination) that it would in fact be desirable to subordinate strategic concepts to Korean unification (if only we could persuade the United States Government to do so). In our view, strategic concepts are not necessarily an indivisible whole. They should be looked at critically in the light of the overall situation and adopted, rejected or modified piecemeal. One of the most disturbing aspects of the present situation is that Western policy appears to be based, in part at least, on tacit assumptions concerning strategy and policy that have not been critically examined and are not commonly agreed. As a result, the Western Powers are often forced to rush about, frantically trying to patch up some form of words that will not reveal their divisions when the communists make important proposals.

6. We entirely sympathize and agree with the desire expressed in your paper for gradual Canadian disengagement from the Korean question. We believe, however, that if we disengage before the Western Powers concerned have reached common ground on policy, or at least made a serious attempt to do so, our disengagement will be illusory, and we shall be constantly looking back over our shoulder at this unhappy problem. The most effective disengagement for us would come after agreement has been reached with the other countries concerned on what line Western policy should henceforth take.

7. What we are suggesting is that those best qualified in the Canadian Government should have a thorough look at the strategic concepts valid for Korea and the Far East, and their relationship to political considerations, with a view to producing our own best assessment of what is important and what is not. We should then go to the British, the Australians and the New Zealanders and compare notes, and if we can reach common ground, all or us would then be able to go to the Americans with some hope of effecting a critical re-examination of United States policy in the Far East. The outcome might be to confirm present policy, but by then we would at least understand that policy better and might even agree with it.

- 3 -

8. We are not going to attempt here to make a strategic analysis such as we have suggested, but it seems to us some of the questions that should be asked in this connection are:

- (a) What is the magnitude of the threat of communist military expansion in the Far East?
- (b) Is South Korea a vital and indispensable part of the free world's defences against communist military expansion in the Far East?
- (c) If so, must South Korea form an integral part of the United States nuclear strategy (i.e. would renewed aggression in Korea be met with atomic retaliation)?
- (d) If so, is it necessary to station nuclear weapons in South Korea itself, or can nuclear weapons be successfully deployed from positions outside Korea (e.g. Okinawa or the Seventh Fleet)?
- (e) Moreover, if the nuclear deterrent is available, is it necessary to keep United States ground forces in South Korea?

9. We also miss from your paper an attempt to analyse communist objectives in Korea and, in particular, the motives behind the recent communist moves to withdraw Chinese troops from Korea and to press for reunification. We have already suggested in previous communications that it is the introduction of atomic weapons into South Korea that has prompted these moves. We have noted with interest that both the British and American ambassadors in Seoul came to the same conclusion. If this conclusion is valid, then it should, we think, have an important bearing on our tactics.

10. It is probably not realistic to expect unification in the foreseeable future, but steps short of unification (e.g. de facto relations between North and South Korea, trade and movement of persons) may be feasible. As in the strategic field, however, we feel that here too one of the most pressing needs is to reconcile the differences that divide the ROK and the United States, and the United States and its allies. You might usefully point out in your paper that there are in effect four different positions on the problem of unification and elections:

- (a) The ROK position, that unification must follow the holding of North Korean elections under the auspices of the ROK and the supervision of the United Nations, and that the withdrawal of the United Nations forces cannot take place until unification has been achieved;
- (b) The United States position, that unification must follow the holding of Korean elections (i.e. for the whole of Korea) under United Nations supervision;

- 4 -

- (c) The position of Canada and most of the allies of the United States, that unification must follow the holding of Korean elections in accordance with United Nations principles and under supervisory arrangements acceptable to the United Nations; and,
- (d) The position of the communists, that arrangements for unification must be negotiated between North and South Korea and that elections would then be held in accordance with those arrangements.

11. As for the place of future negotiations on the Korean problem, we agree with your preference for the United Nations General Assembly, out of the possibilities you have considered. However, the General Assembly is in session for only four months out of the year, and we think it is inevitable that resort should be made to the Military Armistice Commission in Korea from time to time for the discussion of matters affecting the Korean problem which are not strictly within the Commission's terms of reference. This is in fact what the communist side has been doing for some time. Whether the proposals they have made in the Commission are mere propaganda or not is beside the point; the United Nations side has not been prepared to consider them in that forum. In our view, this is a mistake. Senior officials of the United Nations Command component of the Military Armistice Commission have themselves said that they regard the Commission as a useful point of contact between the opposing sides which serves as both a safety valve and a sounding board. Yet their own brief and often blunt statements in the Commission and their heavy-handed tactics do nothing to exploit the opportunity the Commission offers, and give the world an unnecessarily uncompromising impression. As a small example, United Nations Command statements seem to abound in such words as "reject"; the word "consider" hardly ever appears.

12. There are probably three main reasons for this situation. First, MAC affairs are run from Washington and UNC MAC is allowed very little discretion. They never initiate any MAC meeting except on direct instructions from Washington and all their statements of any importance are drafted beforehand and cleared with Washington. In cases where they are not prepared for a particular communist proposal the practice seems to be to reject it first and then refer it to Washington. Second, MAC affairs are treated as a military problem and UNC MAC is staffed entirely by the military. The United States Embassy in Seoul has nothing to do with it and we suspect that, at the Washington end, it is the Pentagon that prepares instructions, though undoubtedly the State Department is brought into the picture at some point. This means that UNC MAC has to operate without the benefit of any close or continuous political guidance. And finally, it is a basic assumption of the officers serving on UNC MAC that the Commission is not a place for serious negotiations. They believe the communist intention is not to discuss for the purpose of reaching any workable agreement but only to weaken the free world, and they therefore regard their role as negative and defensive.

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- 5 -

13. This set-up was of course designed for conditions as they existed shortly after the fighting had stopped and MAC was expected to supervise the details of the Armistice. At that time, the problems of a political settlement were to be dealt with in direct negotiations between governments as recommended in Article 4 of the Armistice Agreement. Conditions have gradually changed since then, however, and this temporary military body has now developed into a continuing point of contact in the cold war, and as such, the scene of political and propaganda sorties. Indeed, with the prospect of the communists launching a major political offensive in this part of the world, UNCMAC's composition and mode of operation, which remain essentially what they were, seem hardly adequate to the demands that may be made on it.

14. To sum up, therefore, we consider that your paper should not take so negative a stand on Canadian policy, that it should pay more attention to an analysis of the strategic concepts involved, that Canadian "disengagement" (however desirable in itself) should not precede a re-examination of these concepts with our friends, and that the role of the Military Armistice Commission could fruitfully be reconsidered.

R. DUDER

The Embassy.


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TELEGRAM

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7-1-1-1

APR 15 1958



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FM WASHDC APR8/58 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 775 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS PERMISNY
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS CNBRA WLGTN DELHI KARACHI
PRETORIA FM LDN

REF OUR TEL 771 APR8

CHINESE PROPOSALS ON KOREA

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A LETTER FROM DELAMARE OF THE BRITISH
EMBASSY TO PARSONS OF THE OFFICE OF NORTHASIAN AFFAIRS IN THE
STATE DEPT DATED APR5 ON THIS SUBJECT: BEGINS

AS I TOLD YOU ON THE TELEPHONE THIS MORNING HER MAJESTY'S GOVT
IN THE UK HAVE NOW AGREED TO TRANSMIT TO THE GOVT OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA THE REPLY OF THE GOVTS OF THE COUNTRIES CONCER-
NED TO THE CHINESE STATEMENT OF FEB7/58. THE BODY OF THE NOTE WILL
BE IDENTICAL WITH THE DRAFT ENCLOSED WITH YOUR MEMO OF MAR31
(SUGGESTED REPLY TO CHINESE COMMUNIST STATEMENT OF FEB7/58), WITH
THE SOLE AMENDMENT THAT WHERE THE TERM "CHINESE AUTHORITIES" APPEARS
IN THAT DRAFT IT WILL BE AMENDED TO READ "PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA". IN THE PREAMBLE, WHICH IS THE CONCERN ONLY OF HER MAJESTY'S
GOVT, WE SHALL USE THE TERM "GOVT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA"
SINCE THE STATEMENT HANDED TO HER MAJESTY'S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN
PEKING ON FEB7 WAS HEADED "STATEMENT OF THE GOVT OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, FEB7/58".

THE FULL TEXT OF OUR NOTE WILL THEREFORE BE AS IN THE
APPENDIX TO THIS LETTER.

I CONFIRM THAT HER MAJESTY'S GOVT SEE NO RPT NO OBJECTION TO
THE STATE DEPT MAKING AVAILABLE TO THE REPS IN WASHDC OF ALL
THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED A COPY OF OUR NOTE IN ITS FINAL FORM ON
MON MORNING, APR7, PROVIDED THAT IT IS MADE CLEAR THAT THERE IS AN
EMBARGO ON ITS RELEASE UNTIL 1600 HOURS GMT APR9.

YOU WILL RECALL THAT AT OUR MEETING ON MAR27 IT WAS AGREED THAT
I SHOULD SHOW THE DRAFT, AS IT THEN STOOD, TO THE EMBASSY OF THE
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA HERE AND ENQUIRE WHETHER THEY HAD COMMENTS.

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NO. 125 R. INIT. 12
3 AMBASSADOR
MUTTER
DUBER
3 HALL
GORHAM
SMITH
CHOQUETTE
MISS CURRIE

PAGE TWO 775

I HAVE DONE THIS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY, ON INSTRUCTIONS, HAVE CONVEYED TO THIS EMBASSY THAT AS THE UNION GOVT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR POLICY, DID NOT RPT NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THEY CANNOT ACCEPT ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE REPLY, NOR WOULD IT BE APPROPRIATE FOR THEM TO MAKE ANY COMMENT ON IT. THE POSITION OF THE UNION GOVT DOES NOT RPT NOT APPEAR TO CALL FOR ANY AMENDMENT OF THE TEXT BUT THE FO HAVE SUGGESTED TO THIS EMBASSY THAT IT WOULD BE BEST NOT RPT NOT TO MAKE ANY PUBLIC REF TO THE TERM "THE SIXTEEN" OR, IN COMMENTING ON OUR REPLY TO THE CHINESE, TO USE LANGUAGE WHICH MIGHT MAKE IT NECESSARY FOR THE UNION GOVT PUBLICLY TO DISSOCIATE THEMSELVES FROM THE REPLY OR OTHERWISE TO REVEAL THAT IN FACT ONLY FIFTEEN GOVTS HAD AGREED TO RT.



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FM WASHDC APR8/58 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 771 EMERGENCY
INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS PERMISNY
TT TOKYO FM OTT
BAG BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS CNBRA WLGTN DELHI KARACHI FM LDN
REF YOURTEL Y134 APR8

CHINESE PROPOSALS ON KOREA

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATE DEPT MEMO DATED APR7 TOGETHER WITH A
COPY OF THE UK NOTE AS FINALLY AGREED UPON, WHICH IS BEING DELIVERED
TO THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES IN PEKING:

BEGINS:

"SUBJECT: REPLY TO CHINESE COMMUNIST STATEMENT OF FEB7/58

ATTACHED IS THE FULL TEXT OF THE NOTE WHICH THE BRITISH GOVT
WILL TRANSMIT THROUGH ITS CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN PEIPING EMBODYING
THE AGREED REPLY TO THE CHINESE COMMUNIST STATEMENT OF FEB7/58.

IT IS REQUESTED THAT A COMPLETE EMBARGO ON ITS RELEASE BE OBSERVED
STRICTLY UNTIL 1600 HOURS GREENWICH MEAN TIME (11 AM WASHDC TIME)
APR9/58. "ENDS

BEGINS

"(CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL APR9/58, 01:00 AM, WASHDC TIME)

HER MAJESTY'S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES PRESENTS HIS COMPLIMENTS TO THE
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM HER MAJESTY'S
PRINCIPAL SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HAS THE HONOUR
TO STATE THAT, AS REQUESTED BY THE VICE-MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ON FEB7, THE STATEMENT ON KOREA MADE ON THAT DATE BY THE GOVT OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA HAS BEEN COMMUNICATED TO THE GOVTS
OF THE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED FORCES FOR THE UN FORCE
IN KOREA, WHO, AFTER CONSULTATION, HAVE REQUESTED HER MAJESTY'S
GOVT TO REPLY ON THEIR BEHALF.

THE GOVTS OF THE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED FORCES FOR
THE UN FORCE IN KOREA HAVE NOTED THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE NORTH
KOREAN AUTHORITIES ON FEB5 AND THAT MADE BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA AND COMMUNICATED TO HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S CHARGE
D'AFFAIRES IN PEKING ON FEB7. THEY HAVE GIVEN CAREFUL STUDY TO THESE
STATEMENTS AND TO THE PROPOSALS MADE THEREIN

NO.	INIT.
AMBASSADOR	
MUTTER	
BUDER	
HALSTEAD	
GORHAM	
SMITH	
CHOQUETTE	
MISS CURRIE	

File

PAGE TWO 771

THE GOVTS CONCERNED REAFFIRM THAT THEIR AIM IN KOREA IS TO SEE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNIFIED, INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC KOREA, IN ACCORDANCE WITH RELEVANT UN RESOLUTIONS. TO THIS END, AS THEY HAVE OFTEN STATED, THEY WISH TO SEE FREE ELECTIONS HELD UNDER UN SUPERVISION FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. THEY ARE GLAD TO NOTE THAT THE NORTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ALSO FAVOUR FREE ELECTIONS AND THEY WELCOME THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT CHINESE FORCES ARE TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM NORTHKOREA.

THERE APPEARS, HOWEVER, TO BE SOME DOUBT AS TO THE PRECISE INTERPRETATION TO BE PLACED ON THE NORTH KOREAN PROPOSALS. A VARIETY OF STATEMENTS IS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN MADE, FOR EXAMPLE, BY NORTH KOREAN REPS IN PEKING AND MOSCOW, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE "PURPOSE OF SUPERVISION BY A NEUTRAL NATIONS ORGANIZATION WAS TO SEE THAT ALL POLITICAL PARTIES AND PUBLIC FIGURES IN BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA WOULD HAVE FREEDOM OF ACTION, SPEECH, PUBLICATION, ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION" BUT THAT "SUCH SUPERVISION SHOULD NOT RPT NOT INTERVENE IN THE ELECTIONS". THESE INTERPRETATIONS APPEAR TO CALL FOR SOME CLARIFICATION AND THE GOVTS OF THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED WOULD BE GLAD TO KNOW WHETHER, WHEN THE NORTHKOREAN AUTHORITIES SPEAK OF A "NEUTRAL NATIONS ORGANIZATION" TO SUPERVISE THE ELECTIONS, THEY ACCEPT THAT THESE SHOULD BE HELD UNDER UN AUSPICES AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE ADEQUATE SUPERVISION NOT RPT NOT ONLY OF THE PRELIMINARIES BUT ALSO OF THE ELECTIONS THEMSELVES. THEY WOULD ALSO BE GLAD TO KNOW WHETHER IT IS ACCEPTED THAT REPRESENTATION IN THE NEW NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BE IN PROPORTION TO THE INDIGENOUS (POPULATION)?


IF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA WILL SEEK FROM THE NORTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES CLARIFICATION OF THE POINTS MENTIONED ABOVE WITH SUCH OTHER DETAILS OF THE KOREAN PROPOSALS AS MAY BE RELEVANT, THEY WILL BE GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.

A COPY OF THIS REPLY IS BEING TRANSMITTED TO THE UN."
ENDS.

TELEGRAM

7-1-1-1

CONFIDENTIAL



FM EXTERNAL OTT APR8/58 CONFD
TO WASHDC Y134 EMERGENCY
INFO LDN TOKYO EMBASSYPARIS PERMISNY
BAG BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS CNBRA WLGTN DELHI KARACHI FM LDN

REF YOUR TELS 758 APR3 AND 768 APR5.

CHINESE PROPOSALS ON KOREA.

WE SHOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER THE TERM "PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA" WILL BE USED INSTEAD OF "CHINESE AUTHORITIES" IN PARAS 1
AND 4 OF THE REPLY TO THE CHINESE STATEMENT AND WHETHER THE TERM
"CHINESE AUTHORITIES" WILL BE RETAINED IN PARA 2.

TELEGRAM CONFIDENTIAL

DEFERRED



FM WASHDC APR5/58 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 768 PRIORITY
INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS PERMISNY
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG BRUSS HAGUE ANKARA ATHENS CNBRA WLGTVN DELHI KARACHI FM LDN

REF YOUR TEL 757 APR3

KOREA-CHINESE PROPOSALS

DE LA MARE OF THE UK EMBASSY CALLED US YESTERDAY TO SAY THAT BOTH THE UK CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN PEKING AND THE STATE DEPT HAD AGREED THAT APR9 WOULD BE A SUITABLE DATE FOR TRANSMITTING THE MSG OF THE FIFTEEN TO THE CHINESE. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE FO HAS BEEN INFORMED BY THE UK CHARGE IN PEKING BY 1:00 PM GMT APR9 THAT THE MSG HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED, IT IS INTENDED THAT THE TEXT WILL BE RELEASED IN LONDON AT 4:00 PM GMT APR9. THE FO WILL MAKE THE TEXT OF THE CHINESE STATEMENT OF FEB7 AVAILABLE TO THOSE WHO ASK FOR IT.

2. DE LA MARE ALSO SAID THAT THE FO HAD AGREED TO TRANSMIT THE TEXT ON BEHALF OF THE FIFTEEN. IN KEEPING WITH THE FORMULA FOLLOWED IN THE NOTE OF MAY28/56 CONCERNING THE NNSC, THE TERM "PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA" WILL BE USED INSTEAD OF "CHINESE AUTHORITIES".

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FM WASHDC APR 13/58 UNCLAS
TO EXTERNAL 762
INFO PERMISNY

TT LDM EMBASSY PARIS FM OTT
AIRMAIL TOKYO CNBRA WLGTM FM WASHDC
AIRMAIL BRUSSE KARACHI DELHI ANKARA FM LDM

KOREA-USA POLICY

IN THE COURSE OF A STATEMENT BY MAJOR GENERAL EARLE G WHEELER,
ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS, TO SPECIAL
SUBCOMMITTEE NO 1 OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,

PART OF WHICH WAS A PRESENTATION OF THE PROGRAMMED STATUS OF MAJOR
ARMY UNITS AND WEAPONS AS OF THE END OF FISCAL YEAR 1959, HE SAID:


"IN THE PACIFIC AREA, THE USA MUST CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN AT LEAST
THREE DIVISIONS WITH SUPPORTING TROOPS AS A DEMONSTRATED DETERRENT
FORCE WHICH CAN ASSIST INDIGENOUS FORCES IN THE EVENT OF AGGRESSION.
TWO DIVISIONS WILL REMAIN DEPLOYED IN KOREA. IN HAWAII THERE WILL
BE ONE DIVISION. THE REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN A DETERRENT FORCE IN
THE FAR EAST IS IN NO RPT NO WAY DIMINISHED BY THE ANNOUNCED CHINESE
COMMUNIST INTENTION OF WITHDRAWING THEIR FORCES FROM NORTH
KOREA. THE CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES RETAIN THE CAPABILITY OF RAPID
REENTRY INTO KOREA, OR OF COMMITMENT OF OTHER POSSIBLE AREAS OF
AGGRESSION. THE TWO DIVISIONS NOW IN KOREA MUST CONTINUE TO BE
DEPLOYED IN FORWARD LOCATIONS IN ORDER TO EXERCISE A DETERRENT
EFFECT IN THE FAR EASTERN AREA."

NO.	INIT.
3 AMBASSADOR	<i>BR</i>
MUTTER	
DUBER	
2 HUBBARD	<i>1 R</i>
GORHAM	
SMITH	<i>hfe</i>
CHOQUETTE	
MISS CURRIE	<i>no</i>

TELEGRAM

7-1-1-1

CONFIDENTIAL



FM WASHDC APR3/58 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 758 PRIORITY
INFO PERMINY LDN EMBASSYPARIS
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG BRUSS CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN

REF OURTEL 743 APR2

CHINESE PROPOSALS ON KOREA

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE SUGGESTED MSG TO THE CHINESE AS CIRCULATED BY THE STATE DEPT WITH THE MEMO QUOTED IN OUR REF TEL:

"SUGGESTED TEXT FOR REPLY TO THE STATEMENT BY THE GOVT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

THE GOVTS OF THE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED FORCES FOR THE UN FORCE IN KOREA HAVE NOTED THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE NORTHKOREAN AUTHORITIES ON FEB5 AND THAT MADE BY THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES AND COMMUNICATED TO HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN PEKING ON FEB7. THEY HAVE GIVEN CAREFUL STUDY TO THESE STATEMENTS AND TO THE PROPOSALS MADE THEREIN.

THE GOVTS CONCERNED REAFFIRM THAT THEIR AIM IN KOREA IS TO SEE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNIFIED, INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC KOREA, IN ACCORDANCE WITH RELEVANT UN RESOLUTIONS. TO THIS END, AS THEY HAVE OFTEN STATED, THEY WISH TO SEE FREE ELECTIONS HELD UNDER UN SUPERVISION FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. THEY ARE GLAD TO NOTE THAT THE NORTHKOREAN AND CHINESE AUTHORITIES ALSO FAVOR FREE ELECTIONS AND THEY WELCOME THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT CHINESE FORCES ARE TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM NORTHKOREA.

THERE APPEARS, HOWEVER, TO BE SOME DOUBT AS TO THE PRECISE INTERPRETATION TO BE PLACED ON THE NORTHKOREAN PROPOSALS. A VARIETY OF STATEMENTS IS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN MADE, FOR EXAMPLE, BY NORTH KOREAN REPS IN PEKING AND MOSCOW, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE "PURPOSE OF SUPERVISION BY A NEUTRAL NATIONS ORGANIZATION WAS TO SEE THAT ALL POLITICAL PARTIES AND PUBLIC FIGURES IN BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA WOULD HAVE FREEDOM OF ACTION, SPEECH, PUBLICATION, ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION" BUT THAT "SUCH SUPERVISION SHOULD NOT RPT NOT INTERVENE IN THE ELECTIONS". THESE INTERPRETATIONS APPEAR TO CALL FOR SOME CLARIFICATION AND THE GOVTS OF THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED WOULD B

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NO. *1107* INIT. *R*

3 AMBASSADOR
MUTTER
BLUDER
2 HALSTED
GORHAM
SMITH
CHOQUETTE
MISS CURRIE

File
PS

PAGE TWO 758

GLAD TO KNOW WHETHER, WHEN THE NORTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES SPEAK OF A "NEUTRAL NATIONS ORGANIZATION" TO SUPERVISE THE ELECTIONS, THEY ACCEPT THAT THESE SHOULD BE HELD UNDER UN AUSPICES AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE ADEQUATE SUPERVISION NOT RPT NOT ONLY OF THE PRELIMINARIES BUT ALSO OF THE ELECTIONS THEMSELVES. THEY WOULD ALSO BE GLAD TO KNOW WHETHER IT IS ACCEPTED THAT REPRESENTATION IN THE NEW NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BE IN PROPORTION TO THE INDIGENOUS POPULATION.

IF THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES WILL SEEK FROM THE NORTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES CLARIFICATION OF THE POINTS MENTIONED ABOVE WITH SUCH OTHER DETAILS OF THE KOREAN PROPOSALS AS MAY BE RELEVANT, THEY WILL BE GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.


A COPY OF THIS REPLY IS BEING TRANSMITTED TO THE UN.

MAR31/58"

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL



DEFERRED

FM WASHDC APR3/58-CONF
TO EXTERNAL 757 PRIORITY
INFO PERMISNY LDN EMBASSYPARIS
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG BRUSS CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ANKARA FM LDN

REF OURTEL 743 APR2

CHINESE PROPOSALS ON KOREA

NO.	1	ROSS
3	AMASSADOR	
	MUTTER	
	DOER	
2	HALSTEAD	
	GORHAM	
	SKITH	
	CHOQUETTE	
	MISS CURRIE	

DE LA MARE OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY CALLED US THIS MORNING TO SAY THAT THE FO HAD POINTED OUT THAT IF THE UK EMBASSY IN PEKING IS TO PROCEED IMMEDIATELY WITH THE DELIVERY OF THE STATEMENT OF THE FIFTEEN AND IF IT IS TO BE RELEASED TO THE PRESS IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS, IT WILL COME OUT IN THE MIDST OF EASTER WEEKEND AND WILL NOT RPT NOT GET THE COVERAGE IT DESERVES. SUBJECT TO COMMENTS FROM THE UK CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN PEKING THEREFORE, THE UK EMBASSY HERE IS SUGGESTING TO THE STATE DEPT THAT DELIVERY OF THE MSG BE DELAYED UNTIL APR9. STATE DEPT REACTION IS NOT RPT NOT YET AVAILABLE, BUT WE WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED. WE TOLD DE LA MARE WE WERE CONFIDENT THAT YOU WOULD NOT RPT NOT OBJECT TO THIS DELAY.

2. DE LA MARE ADDED FOR OUR OWN INFO ONLY THAT THE FO HOPED TO USE THE ADDITIONAL INTERVAL WHICH WOULD BECOME AVAILABLE BY THIS ARRANGEMENT TO AUTHORIZE UK HIGH COMMISSIONERS IN DELHI, KARACHI, COLOMBO AND ACCRA TO SHOW THE TEXT OF THE REPLY TO THE GOVTS TO WHICH THEY ARE ACCREDITED AT THEIR DISCRETION PRIOR TO DELIVERY OF THE STATEMENT TO THE CHINESE.

3. DE LA MARE ALSO INFORMED US OF ANOTHER DIFFICULTY WHICH HAD EMERGED IN CONNECTION WITH THE TRANSMISSION OF THE NOTE. AT THE MEETING OF THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE AFTER THE MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN THE UK EMBASSY TOLD THE STATE DEPT (AND ON OTHER OCCASIONS SINCE) THAT THEY WISHED MERELY TO PERFORM A POST OFFICE TASK IN PEKING AND HAND OVER TO THE CHINESE THE STATEMENT OF THE SIXTEEN RATHER THAN PASSING A MSG TO THE CHINESE ON BEHALF OF THE SIXTEEN. YESTERDAY PARSONS (DIRECTOR, NORTHASIAN AFFAIRS) CALLED DE LA MARE IN TO SAY THAT THE STATE DEPT WOULD HAVE TO OBJECT TO THIS PROCEDURE BECAUSE THE TEXT OF THE MSG AS NOW DRAFTED REFERS TO "PEKING" RATHER THAN "PEIPING" AND TO THE "CHINESE AUTHORITIES" RATHER THAN THE "COMMUNIST CHINESE".

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AUTHORITIES".THE STATE DEPT THEREFORE WANTS THE UK CHARGE IN PEKING TO SAY THAT THE UK HAS BEEN ASKED TO TRANSMIT THE REPLY ON BEHALF OF THE SIXTEEN.THE PRELIMINARY REACTION OF THE UK EMBASSY HERE IS THAT IF THE MSG IS TO BE TRANSMITTED IN THAT WAY IT MUST REFER TO"THE GOVT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA"RATHER THAN"THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES",AS THE TERMINOLOGY APPROPRIATE FOR USAGE BY A GOVT IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE PEKING REGIME.THE MATTER IS BEING REFERRED TO THE FO,AND IT IS POSSIBLE,IF ANY FURTHER CHANGE IS TO BE MADE IN THE TEXT OF THE MSG TO MEET EITHER THE UK OR THE STATE DEPT POSITION,THAT THE MATTER MAY HAVE TO BE REFERRED TO THE GOVTS CONCERNED.


TELEGRAM

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CONFIDENTIAL

APR 15 1958

TOKYO - 24



FM WASHDC APR2/58 CONF
TO EXTERNAL 743 PRIORITY
INFO PERMISNY LDN EMBASSYPARIS PRIORITY
TOKYO EFERRED FM OTT
BAG BRUSS CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN

REF YOURTEL Y126 MAR23

CHINESE PROPOSALS ON KOREA

UK EMBASSY INFORMED US MAR29 THAT UK GOVT HAD AGREED TO ACCEPT THE
TEXT OF THE SUGGESTED REPLY TO THE CHINESE AS GIVEN IN OURTEL 658

MAR24 TOGETHER WITH THE AMENDMENT MENTIONED IN OURTEL 672 MAR26, AND

THAT THE STATE DEPT WAS BEING SO INFORMED. ACCORDINLY WE INFORMED
THE STATE DEPT THAT THE TEXT WAS ACCEPTABLE TO YOU.

2. LATE MAR31 THE STATE DEPT BEGAN DISTRIBUTING THIS TEXT TO THE
EMBASSIES OF THE SIXTEEN, TOGETHER WITH THE FOLLOWING MEMO, BEGINS:

FOLLOWING THE MAR4 MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN, THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE, WHICH
WAS APPOINTED AT THAT TIME, INCORPORATED INTO THE TEXT OF THE REPLY
PROPOSED BY THE BRITISH THE VARIOUS SUGGESTIONS MADE FROM THE FLOOR
IN THAT MEETING. THIS SUGGESTED TEXT WAS CIRCULATED TO THE EMBASSIES
OF ALL GOVTS CONCERNED. SOME GOVTS MADE FURTHER SUGGESTIONS, AS A RE-
SULT OF WHICH SOME ADDITIONAL TEXTUAL CHANGES HAVE BEEN MADE. YOU WILL
NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT NONE OF THE CHANGES IS SUBSTANTIVE IN THAT IT
CHANGES THE PURPOSE OR TENOR OF THE DRAFT REPLY. A COPY OF THE
REVISED TEXT IS ATTACHED.

IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE REVISED TEXT IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL THE
VIEWS EXPRESSED BY THE GOVTS CONCERNED. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS OUR DESIRE
TO MOVE AHEAD AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE IN ITS DELIVERY. IN THE ABSENCE
OF ANY COMMENT BY YOUR GOVT BY APR2, 5:30 PM, IT WILL BE ASSUMED THAT
APPROVAL HAS BEEN GIVEN AND THE UK WILL BE REQUESTED TO TRANSMIT
THE REPLY TO THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS THROUGH THE BRITISH CHARGE
D'AFFAIRES IN PEIPING.

IT IS PROPOSED THAT THE TEXT OF THE REPLY BE RELEASED PUBLICLY AS
SOON AS WE HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED BY THE BRITISH THAT IT HAS BEEN
DELIVERED IN PEIPING.

IN THE PAST IN SIMILAR INSTANCES, COMMUNICATION WITH THE SECRETARY
GENERAL OF THE UN HAS BEEN THROUGH THE USA ACTING IN ITS CAPACITY AS

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THE UNIFIED COMMAND. IT IS PROPOSED THAT THIS PROCEDURE BE FOLLOWED
IN THIS CASE. ENDS

3. AS OF 5.15 PM TODAY THE STATE DEPT HAD RECEIVED NOTIFICATIONS OF
ACCEPTANCE FROM THREE GOVTS AND NO RPT NO OTHER COMMENTS. PRESUMABLY
THE UK WILL BE REQUESTED TOMORROW TO PROCEED WITH THE TRANSMISSION OF
THE REPLY TO THE CHINESE; WE WILL CONFIRM THIS TO YOU WHEN WE LEARN
THAT THIS STEP HAS BEEN TAKEN

ROBERTSON

TELEGRAM

7-1-1-1

CONFIDENTIAL

NO.	INIT.
AMBASSADOR	
MUTTER	
BUDER	
HALSTEAD	
GORHAM	
SMITH	
CHOQUETTE	
MISS CURRIE	



FM WASHDC MAR25/58 CONF
TO EXTERNAL 664 PRIORITY
INFO PERMISNY LDN EMBASSYPARIS
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BY BAG BRUSS CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN

REF OUR TEL 657 MAR24

CHINESE PROPOSALS ON KOREQ

WE CALLED ON LANE(KOREA DESK OFFICER)TO ASCERTAIN STATE DEPT VIEWS
ON PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH THE REMAINING STAGES OF THE REPLY
TO THE CHINESE STATEMENT OF FEB7.

2.LANE SAID THAT AFTER AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED WITH THE UK ON THE
SUGGESTED TEXT,THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE A PROFORMA MEETING OF THE
DRAFTING COMMITTEE TO APPROVE THE FINAL VERSION.THE TEXT WOULD
THEN BE TRANSMITTED TO GOVTS OF THE FIFTEEN FOR FINAL APPROVAL.
LANE DID NOT ENVISAGE ANOTHER MEETING OF THE FIFTEEN UNLESS A SERIOUS
DIFFERENCE OF VIEW POINTS SHOULD EMERGE AS A RESULT OF THE EXAMINATION
OF THE FINAL TEXT WHICH HAS BEEN DRAWN UP IN THE LIGHT OF THE VARIOUS
SUGGESTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN ADVANCED BY INTERESTED GOVTS.

3.WE SAID THAT THIS PROGRAMME WOULD PROBABLY BE SATISFACTORY TO YOU
EXCEPT FOR THE PROVISION FOR A FURTHER MEETING OF THE DRAFTING
COMMITTEE.WE SAID THAT YOU HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN VERY HAPPY ABOUT THE
COMPOSITION OF THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE,BUT THAT WE HAD MADE NO RPT
NO COMMENT ON THE MATTER HITHERTO BECAUSE THE COMMITTEE HAD APPEARED
TO HAVE BEEN SET UP AS AN ADHOC GROUP TO COORDINATE THE VARIOUS
SUGGESTIONS ON THE DRAFTING OF THE NOTE TO THE CHINESE WHICH
HAD BEEN PUT FORWARD ORALLY AT THE MEETING OF THE FIFTEEN.WE WON-
DERED,HOWEVER,WHETHER THE INTENTION TO SUBMIT THE REVISED TEXT OF
THE NOTE TO THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE INDICATED THAT THE STATE DEPT
ENVISAGED THAT THIS COMMITTEE WOULD HAVE FURTHER TASKS TO PERFORM
IN THE FUTURE HANDLING OF COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE CHINESE ON
THIS SUBJECT.

4.LANE ASSURED US THAT THERE WAS NO DISPOSITION SO FAR AS HE
WAS AWARE IN THE STATE DEPT TO GIVE ANY CONTINUING EXISTENCE TO THE
ADHOC DRAFTING COMMITTEE THAT HAD BEEN SET UP FOLLOWING THE LAST
MEETING OF THE FIFTEEN.HE SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY COULD SEE

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LITTLE NEED FOR THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE TO MEET IN ORDER TO GIVE A PURELY FORMAL APPROVAL TO THE DRAFT MSG AND UNDERTOOK TO DISCUSS THE POINT FURTHER WITH HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE LIGHT OF OUR COMMENTS. 5. WITH RESPECT TO THE METHOD OF TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE REPLY OF THE FIFTEEN TO THE UN, LANE SAID THAT THE STATE DEPT WAS INCLINED TO FAVOUR THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS TASK BY THE USA IN ITS CAPACITY AS THE UNIFIED COMMAND, THOUGH HE DID NOT RPT NOT TIE THIS IDEA VERY SPECIFICALLY TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF JUL7/50. HE SAID THE STATE DEPT DID NOT RPT NOT WISH TO EMPLOY THE UNC FOR THIS PURPOSE SINCE THE UNC WAS PRIMARILY A MILITARY AGENCY AND IT WAS DESIRABLE TO PLAY DOWN THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF THIS PROBLEM SINCE THIS WOULD TEND TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF UNC TROOPS IN KOREA. THE UNIFIED COMMAND WAS TO BE PREFERRED AS A NONMILITARY SPOKESMAN FOR THE GOVTS CONCERNED. LANE ADDED THAT IF THE UK, AS THE POST OFFICE POWER, WAS ANXIOUS TO TRANSMIT THE MSG TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN, AND IF OTHER GOVTS FAVOURED THIS METHOD, HE DID NOT RPT NOT THINK THAT STATE DEPT WOULD OBJECT.

6. WE ASKED LANE WHETHER THE STATE DEPT HAD GIVEN ANY FURTHER THOUGHT TO THE NEXT STEPS TO BE TAKEN FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF A CHINESE RESPONSE TO THE REPLY OF THE FIFTEEN (REF. OUR TEL 547 MAR11). LANE SAID THAT IN THIS CONNECTION THERE WAS NOW SOMEWHAT LESS DISPOSITION THAN THERE HAD BEEN ORIGINALLY TO THINK IN TERMS OF AN EARLY MOVE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE STATE DEPT CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO GET THE KOREAN REUNIFICATION PROBLEM BACK INTO A UN CONTEXT BUT WERE NOT RPT NOT NOW INCLINED TO THINK THAT THIS WAS AN URGENT PROBLEM. HE THOUGHT THAT THE QUESTION OF THE NEXT STEP WOULD BE DEFERRED UNTIL THE NATURE OF THE CHINESE AND NORTH KOREAN RESPONSE TO THE REPLY OF THE FIFTEEN WAS KNOWN.

7. DE LA MARE OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY CALLED TODAY TO SAY THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A TEL FROM THE FO INDICATING THAT THEY WOULD BE APPROACHING YOU WITH A VIEW TO RESTORING THE EARLIER WORDING OF THE FIRST PART OF PARA3 OF THE SUGGESTED TEXT OMITTING, HOWEVER, THE SENTENCE REFERRING TO PRAVDA AND ISVESTIA. HE MENTIONED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT THE STATE DEPT HAD TOLD THEM THAT THEY

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PAGE THREE 664


WOULD BE CONTENT EITHER WITH OUR VERSION OF THE FIRST PART OF PARA3
OR THE EARLIER VERSION OMITTING THE SENTENCE REFERRING TO PRAVDA
AND ISVESTIA. ON THIS PARTICULAR POINT THE AUSTRALIAN REP, AT
YESTERDAY'S MEETING OF THE OLD COMMONWEALTH REPS, SAID THAT HIS
GOVT PREFERRED OUR VERSION. THE NZ REP HAD NO SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS
ON THIS POINT AND WOULD PROBABLY BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT EITHER VERSION.
WE DID NOT RPT NOT ALLUDE TO THIS QUESTION IN OUR CONVERSATION WITH
LANE AT THE STATE DEPT TODAY.

TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL

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DEFERRED

7-1-1-1

FM WASHDC MAR24/58 APRD 9 1958
TO EXTERNAL 658 PRIORITY
INFO PERMISNY LDN EMBASSY PARIS
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT - TOKYO
BAG BRUSS CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN



REF OURTEL 548 MAR12

CHINESE PROPOSALS ON KOREA

FOLLOWING IS TEXT WHICH STATE DEPT WOULD NOW ACCEPT:

"THE GOVTS OF THE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED FORCES FOR THE UN FORCE IN KOREA HAVE NOTED THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE NORTHKOREAN AUTHORITIES ON FEB5 AND THAT MADE BY THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES AND COMMUNICATED TO HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN PEKING ON FEB7. THEY HAVE GIVEN CAREFUL STUDY TO THESE STATEMENTS AND TO THE PROPOSALS MADE THEREIN.

NO. AMBASSADOR
MUTTER
BUDER
HALSTEAD
GORHAM
SMITH
CHOQUETTE
MISS CURRIE

THE GOVTS CONCERNED REAFFIRM THAT THEIR AIM IN KOREA IS TO SEE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNIFIED, INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC KOREA, IN ACCORDANCE WITH RELEVANT UN RESOLUTIONS. TO THIS END, AS THEY HAVE OFTEN STATED, THEY WISH TO SEE FREE ELECTIONS HELD UNDER UN SUPERVISION FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. THEY ARE GLAD TO NOTE THAT THE NORTHKOREAN AND CHINESE AUTHORITIES ALSO FAVOUR FREE ELECTIONS AND THEY WELCOME THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT CHINESE FORCES ARE TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM NORTHKOREA.

THERE APPEARS, HOWEVER, TO BE SOME DOUBT AS TO THE PRECISE INTERPRETATION TO BE PLACED ON THE NORTHKOREAN PROPOSALS. A VARIETY OF STATEMENTS HAS BEEN REPORTED TO THE EFFECT THAT THE 'PURPOSE OF SUPERVISION BY A NEUTRAL NATIONS ORGANISATION WAS TO SEE THAT ALL POLITICAL PARTIES AND PUBLIC FIGURES IN BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA WOULD HAVE FREEDOM OF ACTION, SPEECH PUBLICATION, ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION' BUT THAT 'SUCH SUPERVISION SHOULD NOT RPT NOT INTERVENE IN THE ELECTIONS'. THESE INTERPRETATIONS APPEAR TO CALL FOR SOME CLARIFICATION AND THE GOVTS OF THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED WOULD BE GLAD TO KNOW WHETHER, WHEN THE NORTHKOREAN AUTHORITIES SPEAK OF A 'NEUTRAL NATIONS ORGANISATION TO SUPERVISE THE ELECTIONS, THEY ACCEPT THAT THESE SHOULD BE HELD UNDER UN AUSPICES AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE ADEQUATE SUPERVISION NOT RPT NOT ONLY OF THE PRELIMINARIES BUT ALSO OF THE ELECTIONS THEMSELVES. THEY WOULD ALSO BE GLAD TO KNOW WHETHER IT IS ACCEPTED THAT REPRESENTATION IN THE NEW NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BE IN PROPORTION

PAGE TWO 658
TO THE INDIGENOUS POPULATION.

IF THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES WILL SEEK FROM THE NORTHKOREAN AUTHORITIES CLARIFICATION OF THE POINTS MENTIONED ABOVE WITH SUCH OTHER DETAILS OF THE KOREAN PROPOSALS AS MAY BE RELEVANT, THEY WILL BE GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.

A COPY OF THIS REPLY IS BEING TRANSMITTED TO THE UN."

TELEGRAM

DEFERRED

CONFIDENTIAL

7-1-1-1

FM WASHDC MAR24/58 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 657. PRIORITY
INFO PERMISNY LDN EMBASSYPARIS
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG BRUSS CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN

REF OURTEL 548 MAR12

CHINESE PROPOSALS ON KOREA


DE LA MARE OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY CALLED A MEETING OF OLD COMMON-WEALTH REPS TODAY TO INFORM US OF THE PRESENT STATUS OF DISCUSSIONS ON THIS SUBJECT. HE SAID THAT THE STATE DEPT CONSIDERATION OF THE VARIOUS SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO THE TEXT OF THE MSG TO BE SENT IN REPLY TO THE CHINESE STATEMENT, AS DRAFTED BY THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE, HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN ADVANCED UNTIL THE RETURN TO WASHDC LAST WEEK OF MR WALTER ROBERTSON TO WHOM THE VARIOUS SUGGESTIONS HAD BEEN REFERRED. THE BRITISH EMBASSY HAD RECEIVED ON MAR22 A REVISED TEXT OF THE REPLY WHICH THE STATE DEPT WOULD NOW BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT. THIS TEXT IS BEING TRANSMITTED TO YOU IN TEL 658.

2. YOU WILL NOTE FROM THIS TEXT THAT THE STATE DEPT IS NOT RPT NOT, PREPARED TO ACCEPT EITHER OF THE ALTERNATIVE AMENDMENTS PROPOSED BY THE UK IN PARA2 OF THE TEXT. ACCORDING TO DE LA MARE, ROBERTSON IS ADAMANT ON THE RETENTION IN THE TEXT OF THE PHRASE "THE UN SUPERVISION" IN PARA2. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE STATE DEPT HAS ACCEPTED OUR PROPOSED VERSION OF THE FIRST PART OF PARA3 AND HAVE ACCEPTED THE UK PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO PARA4.

3. DE LA MARE WAS TOLD BY THE STATE DEPT THAT IF THE UK WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE TEXT GIVEN IN THE ACCOMPANYING TEL, THE STATE DEPT WOULD IMMEDIATELY CALL A MEETING ^(P) THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE IN THE HOPE THAT FULL AGREEMENT ON THE TEXT COULD BE REACHED WITHOUT DELAY.

4. DE LA MARE INDICATED THAT HE AND HIS AMBASSADOR WERE OF THE OPINION THAT THE UK HAD GONE FAR ENOUGH IN ITS ATTEMPT TO GET ITS AMENDMENT TO PARA2 OF THE TEXT ACCEPTED BY THE STATE DEPT, THOUGH HE COULD NOT RPT NOT SAY WHETHER THE FO SHARED THIS VIEW. HE WILL INFORM US AS SOON AS A FURTHER REPLY HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE FO. WE MENTIONED TO DE LA MARE YOUR OBJECTIONS TO THE PRESENT DRAFTING COMMITTEE. HE SAID HE AGREED WITH THEM AND WOULD ENDEAVOUR TO PERSUADE THE STATE DEPT THAT NO RPT NO FURTHER MEETINGS OF THE DRAFTING

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INIT.
AMBASSADOR
MUTTER
BUDER
HALSTEAD
GORHAM
SMITH
CHOQUETTE
MISS CURRIE

PAGE TWO 657
COMMITTEE ARE REQUIRED.

THE FURTHER PROBLEM WHICH MAY REQUIRE AN EXPRESSION OF VIEWS ON OUR PART TO THE STATE DEPT IS THE QUESTION OF HOW THE TEXT OF THE REPLY OF THE FIFTEEN TO THE CHINESE STATEMENT SHOULD BE CONVEYED TO THE UN. THERE APPEAR TO BE FOUR ALTERNATIVE METHODS:

(A) THE UK REP IN NEWYORK SHOULD TRANSMIT THE TEXT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL;

(B) THE TEXT SHOULD BE TRANSMITTED BY THE UN COMMAND;

(C) ALL FIFTEEN GOVTS SHOULD TRANSMIT COPIES OF THE TEXT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL;

(D) THE USA, IN ITS CAPACITY AS THE UNIFIED COMMAND, SHOULD TRANSMIT THE TEXT.

DE LA MARE SAID THAT THE FO AND THE STATE DEPT WERE BOTH OPPOSED TO ALTERNATIVE (B) ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE UN COMMAND WAS CONCERNED PRIMARILY WITH MILITARY MATTERS. THE FO AND THE STATE DEPT ARE ALSO OPPOSED TO ALTERNATIVE (C) ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WAS UNNECESSARILY CLUMSY. THE UK REP IN NEWYORK IS NOT RPT NOT KEEN ON ALTERNATIVE (A), ALTHOUGH DE LA MARE SAID THAT IF THERE WAS A GENERAL DISPOSITION IN FAVOUR OF THIS METHOD HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE FO WOULD NOT RPT NOT OBJECT TO IT. DE LA MARE SAID THAT THE STATE DEPT ITSELF FAVOURS ALTERNATIVE (D) AND HE THOUGHT THE FO WOULD BE DISPOSED TO ACCEPT THIS METHOD. IN FAVOUR OF ALTERNATIVE (D) THE STATE DEPT HAS POINTED TO THE TERMS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF JUL 7/50, PARA 6 WHICH "REQUESTED THE USA TO PROVIDE THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITH REPORTS AS APPROPRIATE ON THE COURSE OF ACTION TAKEN UNDER THE UNIFIED COMMAND". THE STATE DEPT ALSO POINTS TO THE PRECEDENTS ESTABLISHED FOR THE TRANSMISSION OF REPORTS THROUGH THE UNIFIED COMMAND IN THE CASE OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE NNSC TEAMS FROM SOUTH KOREA AND THE SUSPENSION OF OBSERVANCE OF ARTICLE 13 (D).

6. YOUR COMMENTS ON THIS QUESTION OF THE METHOD OF TRANSMITTING A REPLY OF THE FIFTEEN TO THE UN WOULD BE WELCOMED IN CASE OUR VIEWS ARE SOUGHT.

7. IN CONNECTION WITH THIS MATTER DE LA MARE SAID THAT THE STATE DEPT WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE IDEA THAT THE TEXT OF THE CHINESE STATEMENT SHOULD ALSO BE TRANSMITTED TO THE UN ON THE GROUNDS THAT THERE WAS NO RPT NO REASON TO EMPLOY THE DISTRIBUTION FACILITIES OF THE UN TO PUT ABOUT A DOCUMENT CONTAINING SO MUCH ANTI-USA PROPAGANDA.

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
United States Government is prepared to do about a Korean settlement.

3. We have examined the use of the argument that North Korea needs to comply with the Security Council resolutions of 1950, not because we are taken with it, but because the alternatives appear to us to be worse. There are, after all, flaws in this argument: there is a sort of balance between Northern holdings south of the 38th Parallel and Southern holdings north of it; and, more important, the situation along the 38th Parallel has acquired a certain amount of sanctity through the approval of the Armistice Agreement and the passage of time. We should want to think out the implications carefully before suggesting the use of this argument to the United States: there is danger that it might become another shibboleth.

4. You will appreciate that this paper is designed to select certain objectives towards which we can work. Except in broad outline it does not attempt to go into details on the tactics we would employ to achieve our objectives. We should like you to examine this draft in the same spirit, i.e. with concentration on the broader question rather than detail. If, however, you have specific drafting suggestions which you would like to make, they will, of course, be welcome.

5. We are thinking of discussing future policy on Korea with some of our friends when we have our own views in order. There is always the possibility that we shall suddenly be faced with a need to act quickly. It would therefore be of assistance if we could have your observations at an early date.

6. Similar enquiries are being addressed to Washington
London and New York.



for the UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: The Canadian Embassy,
Tokyo, Japan
FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.
Reference:
Subject: Future Policy Respecting Korea.

Secret
Security: Canadian Eyes Only
No: Y-114
Date: March 21, 1958
Enclosures:
Air or Surface Mail:
Post File No: 7-1-1-1

Ottawa File No.

50396-40

References

You will be aware from telegrams sent to you during the current discussions on a reply to the Chinese statement of February 7, that we have felt increasingly uncomfortable in our position in relation to the activities of the United Nations in Korea. We are conscious of the dual position of the United Nations in Korea as an international organization with arbitral functions and as the body which organized resistance to aggression. We are increasingly of the view that the latter function should begin to wither away and the former function assume greater importance. We are also conscious of some of the anomalies of the existence of group of sixteen. We should like to see the sixteen gradually relieved of further responsibility and eventually dissolve.

2. We have prepared a first draft of a paper on our future policy respecting Korea which seeks to explore the alternative courses open to us. This first draft reaches the following conclusions:

- that we cannot be sure that the United States will put strategic considerations ahead of Korean unification although this seems to be the probable outcome of confrontation between the two policies;
- that direct Canadian concern is not sufficient to warrant our putting out a great effort to influence the United States one way or the other although we should make an effort to see that a moderate policy is pursued;
- that our interest lies in dissociating ourselves and our friends from too deep a commitment to Korean unification; we should concentrate on North Korean compliance with the Security Council resolutions of 1950 while avoiding any further charges against Communist China;
- that on the tactical side the least harmful course open to the Western powers would appear to be to carry exploration of Communist intentions through one further exchange of messages with the Chinese (assuming that the Chinese response to our reply leaves room for manoeuvre) and to rely on negotiations in the General Assembly, on the basis of the need for the North Koreans to comply with Security Council resolutions of 1950, in order to give us a breathing space to find out what the

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FIRST DRAFT

March 17, 1958.

FUTURE POLICY RESPECTING KOREA

During discussions with the State Department over the form of reply to the Chinese statement of February 7, concerning the withdrawal of non-Korean troops and the unification of Korea, it became apparent that there was some uncertainty within the United States Government as to the aims it should pursue. On the one hand there was evident a tendency to pursue avowed aims, and to work for a "unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government." On the other hand, there was obvious concern because the success of such a policy would almost certainly involve demands for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea.

2. After the Sixteen³ have sent their reply to the Chinese, it is to be expected that there will be a further statement from the Chinese. The nature of this statement could, of course, be an important factor in determining whether the Sixteen decide that the Chinese are engaged in an obvious propaganda exercise or whether they are genuinely interested in a settlement in Korea. It will be desirable for the Sixteen to have some sort of idea by then of what they are trying to achieve. Basically there are only two broad choices in front of them: unification, even though it involves the probability that U.S. forces would have to be withdrawn from Korea; or maintenance of the present division, exploiting Korean unification for propaganda purposes but avoiding any concessions which might make unification possible.

3. It will probably be safe to assume that the Chinese

* They are really fifteen, because South Africa has effectively dissociated itself from further involvement. The Republic of Korea, however, usually is present at formal meetings of the so-called Sixteen.

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will in fact withdraw their forces from Korea by the end of 1958. Their commitment is so public that they could hardly afford to fail to honour it. When they complete this withdrawal, they will presumably have complied with the demands made of them in the condemnatory resolution of February 1, 1951: they will have ceased hostilities against the United Nations forces (as of July 27, 1953), and they will have withdrawn from Korea. North Korea will then, to all intents and purposes, be a sovereign state, dependent in some respects upon foreign countries, but comparable to a number of other states which are in very closely-knit alliances and facing an openly hostile neighbour (in this case, the Republic of Korea). The countries which vote with the United States in the United Nations may, of course, find it inexpedient to acknowledge this circumstance publicly, but they ought, for the sake of clarity in their own thinking, to be prepared to acknowledge it privately. They ought also to admit privately that there is a functioning government in the northern part of Korea, which receives a sufficient measure of popular support and exercises a sufficient measure of control over its people to ensure its continuing existence. These countries will, however, be faced by the difficulties created by resolutions such as that of December 12, 1948, which found that "there has been established a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea) . . . and that this is the only such Government in Korea."

4. The United Nations has assumed responsibility for three things in relation to Korea: (a) Korean independence and unity; (b) the repelling of aggression in Korea; and (c) Korean relief and rehabilitation. With the liquidation of UNKRA, item (c) will, during 1958 or 1959, cease to be a United Nations concern, unless some fresh responsibilities

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are assumed, an eventuality which, at this date, seems improbable. It is relevant to this paper to consider items (a) and (b) above in some detail.

5. On November 14, 1947, the General Assembly approved a resolution which began, "Inasmuch as the Korean question which is before the General Assembly is primarily a matter for the Korean people itself and concerns its freedom and independence, and Recognizing that this question cannot be correctly and fairly resolved without the participation of representatives of the indigenous population," and went on to arrange to supervise elections for a Korean national assembly. The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) thus created, of which Canada was a member, was not permitted to observe elections in the Soviet zone of occupation, north of the 38th Parallel. The General Assembly on December 12, 1948, passed a resolution (already referred to in paragraph 3 above) which endeavoured to establish the Government of the Republic of Korea as the only legitimate government in Korea, and thereby deprive any regime in North Korea of international legitimacy and recognition. It also appeared to confine its recognition of the authority of the Government of the Republic of Korea to the area south of the 38th Parallel, and set up the United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK) to "lend its good offices to bring about the unification of Korea . . . and seek to facilitate the removal of barriers to economic, social and other friendly intercourse caused by the division of Korea."

6. By 1949 the General Assembly was apparently more concerned with the security of the Republic of Korea, but instructed UNCOK to "Seek to facilitate the removal of barriers to economic, social and other friendly intercourse caused by the division of Korea; and make available its good offices and be prepared to assist, whenever in its judgment a favourable opportunity arises, in bringing about the unification of Korea in accordance with the principles laid down by the General Assembly in the resolution of 14 November 1947." The General Assembly thus retained the interest which it had assumed in Korean unification, but it may be significant that by 1949 unification took precedence after observations designed to care for the security of the Republic, and after encouraging intercourse between the two parts of the country. It might be a fair deduction that, while the General Assembly continued to advocate unification, it recognized that the country was likely to remain divided and was prepared to resign itself to that fact.

7. The outbreak of hostilities on June 25, 1950, created the second interest of the United Nations in Korea: the repelling of aggression. The Security Council was able to function during June and July, 1950, because the U.S.S.R. was boycotting its meetings. In resolutions passed on June 25 and 27, and on July 7 and 31, the Security Council concerned

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itself with repelling aggression and (on July 31) with Korean relief, but refrained from concerning itself with Korean unification.

8. By early fall, the United Nations Command forces under General MacArthur were doing well, and there appeared to be a reasonable prospect that the North Korean forces would be annihilated and North Korea over-run by the U.N.C. forces. On October 7, 1950, the General Assembly passed a resolution which clearly took this situation into account: it recommended that "... All constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections, under the auspices of the United Nations, for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in the sovereign State of Korea." It was in this resolution, which also created the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), that the two objectives of Korean unification and the repelling of aggression by force, were joined together for the first time, taking advantage of what looked like a favourable opportunity. In the General Assembly's resolution of February 1, 1951, in which the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China was condemned as an aggressor (and when the military situation verged on the desperate), an attempt was made to disentangle the two United Nations objectives by affirming "that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea and the achievement of United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means" (underlining supplied).

9. At the sixth session of the General Assembly a resolution was passed on February 5, 1952, deferring consideration of the Korean items on its agenda, "desiring to facilitate to the greatest possible extent the negotiations in Panmunjom and the conclusion of an armistice in Korea," and mentioned neither unification nor the repelling of aggression. It was not, in fact, until the reconvened seventh session of the General Assembly (after the Armistice Agreement had been signed) that mention was again made of unification: the resolution of August 28, 1953, authorizing the Sixteen to attend the political conference foreseen in the Armistice Agreement, "Reaffirms that the objectives of the United Nations remain the achievement by peaceful means of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area." It may be of some significance that the resolution passed immediately thereafter (and also on August 28) "Expresses its satisfaction that the first efforts ... to repel armed aggression ... have been successful."

FUTURE POLICY

10. In retrospect, there appears to be some doubt about the wisdom of the course the General Assembly followed on October 7, 1950, in attempting to take advantage of an anticipated United Nations military victory to achieve a

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political objective, the unification of Korea, which was not the original purpose of United Nations military action. This wedding of purposes has obscured the statement of principle which was enunciated in the opening clause of the first resolution on Korean independence: ". . . the Korean question which is before the General Assembly is primarily a matter for the Korean people itself. . . ." There are arguments which could be considered to militate in favour of a return to this principle:

- (a) The political ambitions of the two Korean governments pose a real obstacle to Korean unification. We know that the Government of the Republic of Korea considers that North Korea should be absorbed by South Korea, preferably by force; failing that, union should take place without any bargaining, by the northern authorities simply accepting the conditions laid down from Seoul. As there is a functioning government in North Korea, with a large number of people who could not afford to entrust themselves to the Government of the Republic without strong safeguards, it must be assumed that union can take place only by negotiation between the two Korean governments, unless---which seems unlikely---the United Nations side is prepared to bring about union by force. There is no way to be certain of North Korean intentions. It may be true, as the State Department seems to believe, that the North Koreans would consent to union only on terms which would ensure communist domination of the country. It could also be that they would consent to union on conditions which secured them from reprisals and allowed them freedom of action in the south in return for free Southern action in the north. They might calculate that well-supervised elections under good guarantees would give them a chance to

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win control by elections either now or within five to ten years.

- (b) Another obstacle is the strategic problem of U.S. forces on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc. Immediately before the outbreak of war in Korea, Korea was omitted from a publicly-stated list of places which were considered vital to U.S. security. Following upon the political manoeuvres in the United States after the outbreak of war and related to the conduct of the war, it became obvious that Korea must from now on be considered as being, in the U.S. view, vital to U.S. security. Additional U.S. forces would not be welcome in Japan, and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find a place to which U.S. troops now in Korea could withdraw and still be within easy reach. It seems apparent that when this question is formally faced (it has not had to be faced as long as Chinese Communist forces were in Korea) the conclusion of the U.S. Government will be that U.S. forces must be kept in Korea. So long as it is clear that these forces will remain, it is difficult to see how the North could agree to union with the South.

11. The position of the Sixteen in the General Assembly may well become very difficult if the view gains currency that a settlement in Korea is being prevented because they are insisting that unification take place on South Korean terms and because they want to convert the United Nations military operation in Korea to serve the strategic purposes either of the United States or of the Western bloc. There appears to be no valid reason why the Sixteen and their friends should suffer loss of influence in the United Nations to serve the intransigence of President Rhee. The strategic consideration is a much more thorny problem. It would be difficult to demonstrate that it is the mere presence of U.S.

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forces in South Korea which maintains the present state of non-belligerence. The very fact that the United States saw fit to require the remaining fifteen to sign the Warning Declaration of July 27, 1953, suggests that in U.S. opinion, as in our own tentative view, it was (and is) the larger considerations of peace and war which prevent a renewal of hostilities in Korea. While, however, some of the Sixteen may question the validity of the strategic arguments which the United States may be expected to put forward, there will undoubtedly be considerable reluctance to leave the United States exposed, without the United Nations umbrella to which, in the past, it has attached importance.

12. For the immediate future there might be virtue in attempting to take the emphasis off Korean unification. The aim would be to concentrate on the cessation of aggression. Once the Chinese have withdrawn from Korea, it would be dangerous to plan on any course of action which would consider Communist China to be still in a state of aggression. The floating vote in the General Assembly has come to be influenced by a number of factors since 1950:

- (a) The Syngman Rhee government has done nothing to win popularity among the uncommitted countries: in fact it has done its level best to alienate India.
- (b) U.S. and Western intransigence about Chinese representation in the United Nations and Chinese recognition has left Communist China as the aggrieved party in the eyes of many Asian states.
- (c) The solidification of Asian opposition (with few exceptions) to the alliance system has reached a point where the suspicion that the Sixteen are more interested in keeping U.S. forces in Korea than in seeing the country united would probably lose the Sixteen considerable support.
- (d) The Chinese have now apparently put themselves in a position where they will have complied with the two

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specific demands made of them in the resolution of February 1, 1951; they have ceased to resist the U.N. forces, have undertaken to withdraw their forces, and have several times offered to confer about Korean unification. Asian opinion will expect some Western gesture comparable to Chinese withdrawal and sets a high value on willingness to discuss an issue. Unwillingness to enter into discussions itself constitutes a black mark against the party refusing.

13. It is suggested that emphasis should be placed upon the need to conform to the original resolutions of June and July, 1950: this would involve/^{North} Korean willingness to surrender the territory it holds south of the 38th Parallel. The South Korean government would be placed in a dilemma if North Korea were to prove willing to return to the status quo ante bellum. On the one hand it desperately wants more territory between Seoul and the North Korean forces; on the other it would make a great outcry about abandoning the people of the area on the east coast which it holds north of the 38th Parallel. Because this area is of comparatively little strategic or economic value, the South Korean government might, after much objecting, be willing to strike a bargain. However, it is likely that this issue could be avoided because, for the obverse of the foregoing reasons, the North Korean government would probably be unwilling to withdraw on the west coast.

14. Concentration on the issue of North Korean compliance with U.N. resolutions is at best a temporary policy: it is not a solution to the problem of unification. It does, however, go to the heart of the reason for the presence of U.S./U.N. forces in Korea. By concentrating on the need for the North Korean regime to conform to the requirements the U.N. laid down in 1950 (with Indian concurrence), and avoiding the issue of Chinese involvement, it brings the United Nations one step closer to assuming its original

position that Korean independence and unification are a matter for the Korean people themselves to settle. By placing their defences on this line, the Sixteen are also given a better chance to work out some solution to the problem posed by the strategic dilemma.

15. This still leaves the fundamental problem of choosing between promoting unification of Korea and maintaining the strategic position. Canadian interest in both these alternatives is indirect. We have agreed that unification is primarily the concern of the Korean people, while also agreeing that the United Nations should want to see Korean unification achieved (with the proviso that it be by peaceful means). If South Korean interest is not sufficient to overcome President Rhee's rigidity on the terms of unification, there does not appear to be any reason why it should become of prime concern to Canada. We might not agree with the U.S. assessment of the strategic need for maintaining U.S. forces in Korea itself. We might, in fact, conclude that domestic U.S. political considerations predominate; but so long as the United States carries the principal burden in this area we should be most reluctant to come into open opposition. We might go so far as to advance arguments to the effect that it is the general balance of political and military forces in the world which restrains the communists from any fresh aggression; we might be on poor ground in advancing similar arguments as affecting President Rhee. Given Japanese reluctance to accommodate U.S. forces in the main islands (the most that could be expected would be that forces still there would not be further reduced), U.S. forces would have to withdraw to considerable distances. Moreover, there is no prospect that U.S. fears could be placated by the conclusion of an alliance, say between Japan, Korea and Nationalist China, or between the first two alone. Indeed, any settlement looking toward unification which would require U.S. forces to be withdrawn would probably also involve the

neutralization of Korea and hence rule out any form of alliance. The prospects of inducing the U.S. Government to subordinate strategic concepts (whether sound or not) to Korean unification appear comparatively slim. On the assumption that the Government of Canada would not wish to take the lead in trying to persuade the U.S. Government that unification should take precedence over strategy, it would appear that concentration on North Korean conformance with the Security Council resolutions would be the best approach to take. At the same time we should try to explore, and if possible and desirable, influence, the development and direction of U.S. thinking.

16. It would be possible for individual countries, like Canada, to attempt to dissociate themselves from Korean problems. This is a very attractive idea at first sight, but suffers from several disadvantages. First, we are on the Security Council for a two-year term, and could easily become involved in consideration of an item affecting Korea. Second, Canada cannot avoid ultimate involvement if hostilities break out once more; other considerations aside, we are committed through the U.N. Charter and even more explicitly through having signed the Warning Declaration of July 27, 1953, which was the price the United States extracted from its allies for agreeing to the Armistice Agreement signed the same day. Third, so far as we know, South African disengagement has not provoked much U.S. reaction, but it appears obvious that because of our good name both inside the United Nations and out, and because of our past prominent part in dealing with the Korean question and of our present involvement in several peace-making activities, Canadian disengagement would at once provoke an outcry from the United States. Finally, although Canada is normally not able to prevent the United States from pursuing some course which we have considered unwise, it has influenced U.S. government thinking, by forcing those responsible for formulating policy to prepare to convince the

Canadian Government: there is evidence to suggest that on more than one occasion the expectation of objection from Canada has persuaded U.S. officials to abandon some extreme courses of action, and to delay others for extended periods. As Canada must become involved in the end product of the handling of the Korean problem, it would seem wise to try to influence the manner of handling.

METHODS OF NEGOTIATION

17. Our Embassy in Washington has suggested three methods of discussing the Korean problem further with the Communist side. These are (and they seem to exhaust the field): (a) a continued exchange of correspondence with Peking on the present model; (b) an international conference of some sort, either summit talks or a renewed Geneva conference; and (c) action in the United Nations either in the General Assembly or in the Security Council. Each of these methods is discussed below.

18. Further correspondence. One objection is that this means provides the communists with a continuing public forum for an exchange of propaganda in which the procedures of the Sixteen are too unwieldy for effective propaganda. One way around this objection might be to tell the Chinese, when replying to their statement of February 7, that future exchanges should be secret, and that publication of any further message from Peking will be regarded as indicating that the communists are more interested in propaganda than in a settlement. A somewhat similar arrangement was attempted in the bilateral Sino-American talks in Geneva (following the Geneva Conference), but restraint broke down when the issues became too contentious. Secondly, it implies readiness to pursue the negotiations to a successful conclusion, and to keep them from breaking down on grounds which might lose the sympathy of the uncommitted countries. The Sixteen should therefore know what they are aiming at and what sort of concessions they might be prepared to make (not to mention

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how far they can carry the Republic of Korea with them) before they proceed very far. Thirdly, this is a very cumbersome method of negotiating; it might not be feasible to go beyond the exploratory stage by this means. This objection could be only partially circumvented by the creation of an inner group within the Sixteen. Possibly the creation of such a group (which has functioned before) is foreseen in the wording proposed for the conclusion to the reply of the Sixteen by the United Kingdom.

19. The major advantages of this method of negotiation are that it is slow and that statements and replies can be carefully considered before they are made. Slowness has its advantages, by allowing parties vitally concerned to become accustomed to ideas from which they would at first recoil; it allows all concerned to get used to the various adjustments which a settlement would entail. Unfortunately the consideration given statements is not always all that it might be.

20. International Conference. Our Embassy in Washington estimates that proposals for the discussion of Korea at the summit, or in a special conference, would find no support in Washington, and that the U.S. authorities would find a good deal of support for avoiding any course of action which might lead to increased pressure for such a forum for consideration of the Korean question. The conference method has its disadvantages. First, it is next to impossible to keep the proceedings of a conference secret, and negotiation, being virtually public, tends to lead to the assumption of rigid positions. Second, the questions arise once more of the countries to be represented at such a conference, and the willingness of some governments to have their representatives sit down with the representatives of other governments. Third, some of the personages who would have to be involved are personally repugnant to one another. An additional drawback which relates to a summit conference is that the negotiations have to exclude the small states which are the ones

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directly concerned, as well as being completely outside the United Nations. Finally, conference-type settlements require rapid decisions (which tend to be negative), thrust new ideas upon the participants without giving them or their governments time to study the ideas fully or to get used to them, and engender considerable heat. From a purely Canadian point of view, there would be considerable disadvantage in being placed once more in a position of having to accept a common position with which we did not entirely agree, or else take the responsibility for shattering the public unity of the Sixteen.

The principal advantages are that a conference permits all the countries concerned (unless it is a summit conference) to be heard, that it helps to break down some of the more unreal aspects of relations between the two blocs (involving questions of recognition), and that it permits of a settlement extending beyond Korea into the field of Sino-American relations. Of course, the United States might not yet be ready for such general negotiations, and might consider this an additional disadvantage.

21. United Nations. Consideration by the United Nations could take place in either the General Assembly or the Security Council. The General Assembly would be the natural forum for the discussion of Korean unification; it might also be a proper forum for the discussion of peace and security in the area. It has always been the General Assembly which concerned itself with unification, and it was the General Assembly which took over the interest in resistance to aggression when, in the fall of 1950, the Security Council was immobilized by the return of the Soviet representative. The advantages of airing Korean problems in the General Assembly would seem to be:

(a) More of the states with an interest in a Korean settlement could participate.

(b) There would be considerable pressure for moderation on both sides because of the need to attract the uncommitted

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states in order to pass a resolution by a two-thirds majority.

- (c) Pressure on individual states like Canada, which might not agree with everything the United States would like to see done, would not be so acute in the General Assembly as it would in the Security Council.

The disadvantages of using the General Assembly would appear to be:

- (i) Some vocal, but not necessarily responsible, states will not only have a great deal to say, but will have votes to cast, and will be influenced by factors (such as bloc-voting) other than those strictly pertaining to Korea or even to a settlement in the Far East.
- (ii) General Assembly resolutions can be passed against the wishes of those vitally interested; yet these resolutions cannot be enforced (e.g., the resolutions of November 14, 1947, and December 12, 1948: the methods for achieving Korean unity and independence commended themselves to a majority of the Assembly but not to the U.S.S.R., which was occupying North Korea, nor, one assumes, to the North Koreans, who have refused to co-operate with UNTCOK, UNCOK, or UNCURK). A Korean settlement can be achieved only by the consent of both parts of Korea, and resolutions reflecting the views of one side only can serve little but propaganda purposes.
- (iii) Neither South Korea, North Korea, nor Communist China is represented in the Assembly. It might prove impossible to proceed with their participation as non-members, especially in the case of the Chinese, who might well refuse an invitation to take part in the proceedings except as full members. At the very least, the United States would have to be ready to see discussion of the substantive question of Chinese representation on a scale not experienced in eight years, and there is room to doubt whether the United States would be prepared

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to see this situation develop. (Incidentally, if Chinese troops have been withdrawn by September, it may not be able to muster enough votes to prevent such a discussion in any case.) A discussion of the problem of Chinese representation would almost certainly develop into the problem of representation of two Chinas, and it could well turn out that Communist China would, following the policy enunciated by Chou En-lai on December 24, 1957, refuse to participate after a clear statement by the United States that Nationalist representation must continue.

- (iv) An over-all settlement involving more than Korea would be difficult to achieve through the procedures of the General Assembly.

22. The Security Council, according to the original intent of the Charter, is the logical place in which to discuss "the full restoration of international peace and security in the area." As this problem was once actively considered by the Security Council, it presumably still remains seized of it, and there would be no procedural difficulties. The advantages of having the Security Council deal with the Korean problem would appear to be:

- (a) The two sides, acting through their agents on the Council, would have to agree to any resolution which the Council might pass. Unreal solutions could not be rammed through by majority vote; on the other hand if the communist position was so unreasonable as to leave the Soviet Union isolated on a vote, the propaganda initiative would lie, presumably, with the Sixteen.
- (b) There would be fewer states involved and fewer opportunities for states with no direct interest but with collateral causes to advance, to play a mischievous part in the proceedings. On the other hand, states vitally concerned, but not members of the Council, could be invited to participate.

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- (c) The meetings of the Security Council, being under the United Nations, would not call for special measures (like the Geneva Conference) and special decisions. Precedents could be employed to help individual countries overcome difficulties arising from positions such as those relating to non-recognition.
- (d) The peace and security aspect of the Korean problem is the aspect on which the mandate of the United Nations is least open to question. It is also the aspect on which we can point with more safety to the shortcomings of the communist side.

The disadvantages appear to be:

- (i) The Security Council has not, in the past, proved to be a useful instrument when the interests of the Great Powers are involved---as they are in this instance.
- (ii) Once positions have been taken which bring the veto into use, negotiations will have been stalemated, passions aroused, and positions taken, which will make further progress difficult or impossible for some time. The circumstances of the use of the veto might not be such as to be helpful to the Sixteen.
- (iii) The issue of Chinese representation would arise in acute form. It is difficult to see the Communist Chinese (through whom the Communist powers have chosen to act) agreeing to appear as observers or guests before a Security Council on which the Nationalists sit. A breakdown of the negotiations over this question would occur on the ground on which the Sixteen would get the least sympathy from the uncommitted countries.
- (iv) The mandate of the Security Council to discuss Korean unification (other than as an extension of the security problem) is not so clear.
- (v) The pressure upon Canada to give the United States full support in the Security Council, whether we agreed with aspects of what the United States is trying to do at

~~SECRET~~
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

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any particular point or not, would be well-nigh irresistible. This would raise the problem involved at the Geneva Conference in even more acute form. Of course, if we conclude that we would be able to resist U.S. pressures when we did not agree with the aims being sought, this consideration becomes an advantage rather than a disadvantage.

23. Summary of methods of negotiation. The advantages of proceeding through the General Assembly appear greater than the advantages of either the idea of a special conference or of proceeding through the Security Council. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the disadvantages appear smaller. The main advantages are the slower pace, the time allowed to the Sixteen to make up their minds what they really want to achieve, and the smaller pressures on both ourselves and the United States. The practice of negotiating by exchanges of statements with Peking could usefully fill the gap between now and September, but procedures on our side have to be so cumbersome that it could probably not be used for more than one more exchange of statements with the Chinese. Our position between now and September, and after the General Assembly meets in September, could be defended if need be by reference to the failure of the North Korean authorities to comply fully with the resolutions of the Security Council requiring them to withdraw from territory south of the 38th Parallel. We should also be able to see how far the United States is ready to go in compromising its avowed aims and its strategic desires. To pursue negotiations to any length at all requires agreement among the Sixteen on a policy. About a year's time can be won to reach agreement, through the device of exploratory written exchanges with the Chinese, followed by concentration upon North Korean compliance with the resolutions of the Security Council. The foregoing is predicated on the assumption that the next Chinese statement will allow room for negotiation. Even if it does not, there might be advantage in adopting the course of

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


SECRET
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

action suggested as a means of preparing for some future
concession from the communist side.

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TELEGRAM

SECRET



FM LDN MAR14/58 SECRET
TO EXTERNAL 515
INFO WASHDC PERMISNY EMBASSYPARIS
TT TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG BRUSS CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN

REF TOKYO TEL 29 MAR7 TO OTT

CHINESE PROPOSALS ON KOREA

DURING OUR CALL AT THE FO ON MAR12 TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF REGIONAL ALLIANCES, WE TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY OF RAISING WITH O'NEILL, SUPERINTENDING UNDER-SECRETARY AT THE FO, SOME OF THE POINTS IN TOKYO'S VERY INTERESTING REF TEL CONCERNING THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOUTHKOREANS TOWARDS THE CHINESE PROPOSAL AND THE PROBABLE DIFFERENCE OF APPROACH BETWEEN THE PENTAGON AND THE STATE DEPT TOWARD POLICY FOR THE AREA. TRENCH, ASSISTANT HEAD OF THE FAR EASTERN DEPT, WAS CALLED IN DURING THIS PART OF THE INTERVIEW.

2. IN THEIR COMMENTS O'NEILL AND TRENCH CONFINED THEMSELVES PRETTY WELL TO REITERATING UK VIEWS, WHICH ARE WELL-KNOWN TO YOU, ON THE IMPORTANCE OF EXPLORING THE CHINESE PROPOSALS AND PLAYING FOR TIME. THE SIGNIFICANT IMPRESSION WHICH WE RECEIVED FROM THIS CONVERSATION WAS THAT THE UK HAVE DEVOTED ALL THEIR RECENT THINKING TO TACTICS IN DEALING WITH THE REPLY TO THE CHINESE PROPOSALS AND HAVE NOT GIVEN MUCH THOUGHT TO THE LARGER PROBLEMS SUCH AS REACTION IN SOUTHKOREA AND THE EFFECT ON THE STRATEGIC CONCEPTS OF USA COMMANDERS IN THE AREA WHICH THE PROPOSALS RAISE. O'NEILL AND TRENCH SAID THAT WE WERE NOT YET REALLY FACED WITH THE DILEMMA MENTIONED IN TOKYO'S TEL, AND THAT THEY WOULD BE INCLINED NOT TO CROSS A BRIDGE LIKE THAT UNTIL THEY COME TO IT.

3. O'NEILL SAID THAT HE WAS NOT SURE EXACTLY WHAT AMERICAN VIEWS WERE ON THE PLACE OF KOREA IN AMERICAN FAR EAST STRATEGIC PLANNING BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT PENTAGON POLICY AT LEAST WAS BOUND TO INCLINE TOWARDS THE NEED FOR USA FORCES REMAINING IN KOREA FOR SOMETIME. HE OBSERVED HOWEVER THAT THE ATTITUDE OF THE STATE DEPT DURING THE DRAFTING OF THE NOTE IN REPLY TO THE CHINESE PROPOSAL DID NOT SUGGEST THAT THE AMERICANS WERE UNWILLING TO CONSIDER DEVELOPMENTS LEADING UP TO THE UNIFICATION OF KOREA AND THE CONSEQUENT

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WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS AND MISSILE BASES; THE AMERICANS COULD AFTER ALL HAVE SUGGESTED A SHORT CURT REPLY TO THE CHINESE SIMPLY TURNING DOWN THEIR PROPOSALS.

4. O'NEILL AND TRENCH ALSO DID NOT RPT NOT THINK THAT THE SOUTH KOREAN ATTITUDE WAS AS RIGID AS OUR TOKYO EMBASSY SUGGESTED, AND OBSERVED THAT THE SOUTH KOREANS HAD, RELATIVE TO PAST PRACTICE, REACTED FAIRLY QUIETLY TO THE CHINESE DEMARCHE, EG SO FAR THERE HAD BEEN NO "SPONTANEOUS" DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE SOUTH.


5. AT THE END OF THIS CONVERSATION WE LEFT A COPY OF TOKYO'S TEL WITH THE FO AND SAID THAT IF THEY CARED TO OFFER ANY FURTHER COMMENTS LATER WE WERE SURE THAT YOU WOULD BE INTERESTED.

TELEGRAM

BY CAN

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CONFIDENTIAL



FM WASHDC MAR12/50 CONF
TO EXTERNAL 563 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO PERMISSY LDM EMBASSYPARIS
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG BRUSS CNRA ULGTH KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDM

REF OURTEL 543 MAR12

CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA

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MUTTER		
HOLSTAD		
GORHAM		
SMITH		
CHOQUETTE		
MISS CURRIE		

DE LA MARE OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY TOLD US THIS AFTERNOON THAT THE STATE DEPT HAS GOT NO RPT NO FURTHER IN ITS CONSIDERATION OF THE PROPOSED UK AMENDMENTS OF THE DRAFT MSG TO THE CHINESE. PARSONS HAD SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE TO REFER THE UK AND OTHER SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO THE FOUR-POWER DRAFTING COMMITTEE WHICH HAD PRODUCED THE DRAFT IN THE FIRST PLACE. DE LA MARE HAD DISCOURAGED THIS IDEA, POINTING OUT THAT THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE HAD NO RPT NO REAL AUTHORITY FOR FURTHER WORK ON THE DRAFT AND THAT NEW RECOMMENDATIONS FROM IT MIGHT NECESSITATE REF OF A NEW TEXT TO GOVTS. PARSONS HAS UNDERTAKEN TO GET IN TOUCH WITH DE LA MARE WHEN THE STATE DEPT EXAMINATION OF THE UK PROPOSED AMENDMENT IS COMPLETE.

2. DE LA MARE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH HIS INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO CONTINUE PRESSING FOR THE PROPOSED UK AMENDMENTS-PARTICULARLY THAT RELATING TO THE DELETION OF THE REF TO UN SUPERVISION IN PARA2-HE HIMSELF, AND HIS AMBASSADOR, WERE OF THE VIEW THAT IF THE STATE DEPT WERE DISINCLINED TO ACCEPT THEM, IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE. IF THE STATE DEPT RESPONSE IS NOT RPT NOT FORTHCOMING, THEREFORE, THE BRITISH EMBASSY MAY SEEK TO PERSUADE THE FO TO DROP THE IDEA OF PRESSING FURTHER FOR THE AMENDMENTS.


3. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, IF YOU AGREE WE ARE NOT RPT NOT INCLINED TO MAKE A FURTHER CALL TO SUPPORT THE UK REPRESENTATIONS, PARTICULARLY IF IT MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO THE REVIVAL OF THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE. AS INDICATED IN PARA4 OF OUR TEL 529 MAR10, WE MAY EXPECT TO BE CALLED IN FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION AND WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO RE-STATE OUR PREFERENCE FOR THE ELIMINATION OF THE REF TO UN SUPERVISION IN PARA2 OF THE DRAFT AT THAT TIME.

TELEGRAM

BY CAN

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DULLES	
HARRIS	
GORHAM	
SMITH	
CHOQUETTE	
MISS CURRIE	



FM WASHDC MAR12/58 CONF
 TO EXTERNAL 548 OPIMMEDIATE
 INFO PERMISNY LDM EMBASSYPARIS
 TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
 BAG BRUSS CNBRA WLGTH KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDM

REF YOURTEL Y92 MAR11

CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA

WE REGRET THAT WE NEGLECTED TO MENTION IN OUR TEL529 MAR10 THAT WE TOLD PARSONS THAT WHILE WE HAD NO RPT NO SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS ON THE POINT, WE WERE CONFIDENT THAT YOU WOULD BE HAPPY TO SEE THE REF TO SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS IN PARA2 OF THE DRAFT NOTE TO THE CHINESE ALTERED TO BRING IT MORE INTO LINE WITH THE EXISTING PARA3 REF, IF NOT RPT NOT OUR OWN PREFERRED VERSION OF PARA3. WE SAID THIS MAINLY TO BACK UP THE AUSTRALIAN AND NZ REPRESENTATIONS ON THIS POINT, AS THEIR MAIN OBJECTIVES WERE, LIKE OURS, TO GET AS MUCH AN APPEARANCE OF REASONABLENESS IN THE DOCUMENT AS POSSIBLE.

2. DE LA MARE OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY TOLD US TODAY THAT HE HAD REPEATED TO PARSONS YESTERDAY THE FO'S DESIRE TO SEE THE REF TO UN SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS OMITTED FROM THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA2 OF THE DRAFT. PARSONS HAD SAID THAT HE ANTICIPATED STRONG OBJECTIONS TO THIS CHANGE, BUT THAT HE WOULD CONSULT FURTHER WITH HIS SENIOR COLLEAGUES ON THE SUBJECT. DE LA MARE WILL TAKE UP THE MATTER AGAIN TODAY WITH PARSONS AND WILL LET US KNOW SUBSEQUENTLY WHAT THE POSITION IS. HE HIMSELF WAS OF THE VIEW THAT THERE MIGHT BE DANGER IN PUSHING THE POINT TOO STRONGLY SINCE THIS MIGHT PROVOKE UNDESIRABLE COUNTER-PROPOSALS BY THE USA. ONE DIFFICULTY IS THAT WHEN THE STATE DEPT IS IN A POSITION TO RECOMMEND A FINAL DRAFT, CLEARANCE WILL HAVE TO BE OBTAINED FROM MR DULLES IN MANILA BY TEL, AND CONSULTATIONS WITH HIM WILL NOT RPT NOT BE POSSIBLE.

3. IF WE ARE TO APPROACH THE STATE DEPT AGAIN ON THE SUBJECT, WE BELIEVE THE BEST WAY TO DO SO WOULD BE TO SUPPORT AS A NEW IDEA THE UK PROPOSAL FOR DELETION OF THE PHRASE OR ITS REPLACEMENT BY THE PHRASE "IN ACCORDANCE WITH THOSE RESOLUTIONS" RATHER THAN TO ADVOCATE THE SUBSTITUTION OF OUR OWN PREFERRED LANGUAGE FOR PARA3 OR THE USE OF THE TERMS "UN AUSPICES".

4. THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY HAS NO RPT NO PRESENT INSTRUCTION TO REITERATE FURTHER TO THE STATE DEPT THEIR PREFERENCE FOR THE

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PAGE TWO 548

"UN AUSPICES" LANGUAGE IN PARA2 OF THE DRAFT OR TO SUPPORT THE UK
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS. WE WILL, HOWEVER, CONTINUE TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH
THEM.

TELEGRAM

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MAR 12

CONFIDENTIAL



FM EXTERNAL MAR12/53- CONFD
TO WASHDC Y99 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO PERMISNY LDN EMBASSYPARIS
TOKYO DEFERRED
BAG BRUSS CHERA ULGT; KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN

REF YOUR TEL 544 MAR11


CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA

OUR TEL Y97 WAS BASED ON THE EXCHANGE OF TELS WHICH UNDERLIES—
THE LET YOU HAVE RECEIVED FROM THE COUNSELLOR OF THE BRITISH
EMBASSY. AS WE HAD ALREADY SENT YOU SOMEWHAT COMPLICATED INSTRUCTIONS
IN OUR TEL Y90 WE WERE NOT RPT NOT PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS TO GO
INTO ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON SUBJECTS WHICH WERE NOT RPT NOT OF
PRIMARY ~~IMPORTANCE~~. CONSIDERING THE NUMBER OF DETAILED AMENDMENTS
WHICH ARE NOW APPARENTLY BEING SUGGESTED HOWEVER, WE THINK WE SHOULD
GIVE YOU AN INDICATION OF OUR VIEWS ON OUTSTANDING POINTS IN CASE
THERE IS ANOTHER MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN.

2. WE DO NOT RPT NOT OBJECT TO THE REMOVAL OF THE WORD "SIXTEEN"
FROM PARA3 OF THE DRAFT REPLY (PARA1 OF THE BRITISH LET). OUR
VIEWS ON "UNDER UN SUPERVISION" ARE WELL KNOWN TO YOU. AS "IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THOSE RESOLUTIONS" IS LESS SPECIFIC THAN "UNDER UN SUPERVISION"
WE SHOULD NATURALLY PREFER IT IF WE MUST HAVE SOMETHING. (PARA2
OF THE BRITISH LET).

3. PARA3 OF THE BRITISH LET REQUIRES NO ADDITIONAL COMMENT.

4. ON BALANCE WE PREFER THE FOURTH PARA OF THE DRAFT REPLY TO REMAIN
AS IT IS. WE DO NOT RPT NOT LIKE "THE GOVTS WILL ARRANGE FOR THEM TO
BE FURTHER CONSIDERED" BECAUSE WE AGREE WITH THE STATE DEPT THAT IT
CONVEYS AN EVASIVE CONNOTATION. A FURTHER BRITISH SUGGESTION IS THAT
WE SHOULD AGREE UPON THE PHRASE "THEY WILL BE GIVEN FURTHER CONSIDER-
ATION". WE HAVE TOLD EARNSCLIFFE THAT WE WOULD NOT RPT NOT OBJECT TO
THIS PHRASEOLOGY BUT THAT WE WOULD NOT RPT NOT SEEK TO HAVE IT INSERTED.



TELEGRAM

BY CAN

SECRET



FM WASHDC MAR11/58 SECRET
 TO EXTERNAL 547 PRIORITY
 INFO PERMISNY EMBASSYPARIS LDN
 TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
 BAG HAGUE BRUSS CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN

REF OUR TEL 434 FEB26

NEXT STEPS ON KOREA

WE WERE RELIEVED, AS I AM SURE YOU WERE, AT WALTER ROBERTSON'S REACTION TO THE UK AND STATE DEPT DRAFT REPLIES TO THE CHINESE NOTE, AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR THE MORE FLEXIBLE UK POSITION WHICH SHOULD SERVE AS AN EFFECTIVE PROBE OF COMMUNIST INTENTIONS. PARSONS (DIRECTOR, NORTHASIAN AFFAIRS) TOLD US YESTERDAY THAT HE HAD BEEN OUT OF TOUCH WITH ROBERTSON (WHO HAD BEEN ILL) DURING THE WEEK PRIOR TO THE MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN AND HAD BEEN UNABLE TO DISCUSS WITH HIM THE FORM OF A REPLY TO THE CHINESE STATEMENT, AND THAT ROBERTSON HAD PARTICULARLY LIKED THE QUESTIONS IN THE UK DRAFT WHEN HE HAD SEEN IT FOR THE FIRST TIME JUST PRIOR TO THE MEETING.

2. AT THE MEETING LAST WEEK THE FIFTEEN (SOUTH AFRICA IS NOT RPT NOT PARTICIPATING IN THE DISCUSSIONS) DID NOT RPT NOT CONSIDER FUTURE STEPS, ALTHOUGH, AS WE REPORTED IN OUR REF TEL, THE STATE DEPT ENVISAGES THE POSSIBILITY OF ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT SOME STAGE BEFORE THE NEXT GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF KOREAN UNIFICATION. AT THE MEETING OF THE FIFTEEN WALTER ROBERTSON CONFINED HIMSELF TO INDICATING THAT FOLLOWING THE EXCHANGE WITH PEKING FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO DETERMINE WHAT ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN IN THE UN.

3. THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION AT LAST WEEK'S MEETING ABOUT THE RE-AFFIRMATION IN THE DRAFT MSG TO THE CHINESE OF THE UN AIM TO SEE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNIFIED, INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC KOREA. THAT THIS OBJECTIVE WAS WRITTEN INTO THE STATE DEPT AS WELL AS THE UK DRAFT MSG SHOULD NOT RPT NOT OBSCURE THE FACT THAT THERE IS AN ELEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY IN THE STATE DEPT ABOUT LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES IN KOREA--AN UNCERTAINTY NO RPT NO DOUBT SHARED BY SOME OTHER GOVTS. SO LONG AS WE ARE ENGAGED IN NOTHING MORE SERIOUS THAN THE PRELIMINARY STAGES OF A PROPAGANDA EXCHANGE WITH THE

NO. LDN
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 MISS CURRIE

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CHINESE, THE EXISTENCE OF THIS UNCERTAINTY ABOUT ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES MAY NOT RPT NOT BE TOO TROUBLESOME. IN THE CONSIDERATION OF FUTURE TACTICS, HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT THE STATE DEPT INCLINES TO THE VIEW THAT THE CHINESE ARE MOST UNLIKELY TO CONSIDER ANY PROCEDURES FOR UNIFICATION OF KOREA WHICH DO NOT RPT NOT ENSURE COMMUNIST DOMINATION OF THE COUNTRY, AND THAT THEIR MAIN PURPOSE IN THEIR APPROACH TO THE UNC GOVTS IS TO EXTRACT THE MAXIMUM PROPAGANDA BENEFIT FROM THE WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR TROOPS FOR REASONS UNRELATED TO THE UNIFICATION OF KOREA. (AS INDICATED IN OUR TEL 529 OF MAR 10, PARSONS DID, HOWEVER, SUGGEST YESTERDAY THAT HE WAS HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS ON THIS POINT). WHILE THE INTENT OF THE DRAFT MSG TO THE CHINESE SO FAR AS THE STATE DEPT IS CONCERNED IS TO PROBE THEIR SINCERITY, TO ESTABLISH A GOOD PROPAGANDA POSITION FOR THE UNC SIDE, AND TO LAY OUT THE BASIS FOR DEVELOPING A GOOD NEGOTIATING POSITION IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT THAT THE CHINESE AND NORTHKOREANS ARE REALLY INTERESTED IN EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF A SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES, THE FACT REMAINS THAT THE STATE DEPT HAS APPARENTLY NOT RPT NOT FACED UP TO THE DILEMMA POSED BY REQUIREMENTS OF USA MILITARY STRATEGY IN THE MAINTENANCE OF USA TROOPS IN SOUTH KOREA AND TRADITIONAL USA SUPPORT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNIFIED, INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC KOREA, WHICH AT SOME STAGE WOULD REQUIRE THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNC TROOPS.

4. WITH RESPECT TO THE NEXT STEP AFTER A REPLY IS RECEIVED FROM THE CHINESE, IT IS IMPORTANT TO BE AS CLEAR AS WE CAN ABOUT THE POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE UNCERTAINTY ABOUT LONG-RANGE OBJECTIVES. THESE ALTERNATIVES SEEM TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

(1) A CONTINUED EXCHANGE BY CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE PEKING GOVT ON THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS RELATING TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT INCLUDING AT SOME STAGE THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES. SUCH A PROCEDURE SUFFERS FROM TWO MAJOR DEFECTS. IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT PROVIDES THE COMMUNISTS WITH A CONTINUING PUBLIC FORUM FOR A PROPAGANDA EXCHANGE IN WHICH THE PROCEDURES OF THE GROUP OF SIXTEEN ARE TOO UNWIELDY FOR EFFECTIVE COUNTERPROPAGANDA. SECONDLY, WHILE THERE IS MUCH TO BE SAID FOR THE KIND OF PROBING ON WHICH WE

P. 2 THREE 547

NOW SEEM TO BE EMBARKED, THIS PROCESS HAS ITS LIMITATIONS, AND A POINT MAY EVENTUALLY BE REACHED, PARTICULARLY IF THE CHINESE ANNOUNCED WITHDRAWAL BECOMES A FACT, AT WHICH MORE DELIBERATE PROCEDURES OF SETTLEMENT WILL HAVE TO BE INVOKED.

(2) THERE IS SOME INDICATION, BOTH IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN REPORTS FROM KOREA AND IN THE TERMS OF THE SUPPORT WHICH HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE CHINESE PROPOSALS BY THE SOVIETS, THAT THE CHINESE AIM TO SEEK REPRESENTATION IN AND DISCUSSION OF ASIAN QUESTIONS AT POSSIBLE SUMMIT TALKS, OR ANOTHER GENEVA-STYLE CONFERENCE. WE NOTE, FOR EXAMPLE, FROM THE TERMS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST BROADCASTS, THAT THE COMMUNIST GOVTS CONCERNED HAVE BEEN CALLING FOR "A CONFERENCE OF INTERESTED COUNTRIES", TO DISCUSS THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION. IT CAN SAFELY BE SAID THAT PROPOSALS FOR THE DISCUSSION OF KOREA AT THE SUMMIT, OR IN A SPECIAL CONFERENCE, WOULD FIND NO RPT NO SUPPORT HERE, AND THE USA AUTHORITIES WOULD FIND A GOOD DEAL OF SUPPORT FOR AVOIDING ANY COURSE OF ACTION WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO INCREASED PRESSURE FOR SUCH A FORUM FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE KOREAN QUESTION.

(3) THIS LEAVES THE UN AS THE MAIN FORUM FOR REEXAMINING THE REQUIREMENTS FOR AN EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT. AS YOUR EARLIER MSGS HAVE SUGGESTED, ASSUMING THE CHINESE WITHDRAWAL IS WELL ON ITS WAY BY THE TIME THE ASSEMBLY MEETS, THE WESTERN POWERS WILL BE AT A SERIOUS DISADVANTAGE UNLESS STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO REVIEW AND REFORMULATE ACCEPTABLE PROPOSITIONS THROUGH UN ACTION PRIOR TO THE NEXT GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THIS IS THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE CONSIDERATION WHICH IS BEING GIVEN AT THE OFFICIAL LEVEL HERE TO A POSSIBLE REQUEST FOR RENEWED STUDY OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE BASIS OF MORE FLEXIBLE WESTERN PROPOSALS. THERE ARE DRAWBACKS TO SUCH A PROCEDURE, INCLUDING THE EXPECTATION OF A SOVIET VETO, THE DIFFICULT QUESTION OF CHINESE REPRESENTATION WHICH WOULD BE INVOLVED, AND THE UNCERTAINTY WHICH MAY EXIST AMONG THE FIFTEEN AND IN THE UN ABOUT LONG-RANGE OBJECTIVES FOR KOREA. AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS SIX YEARS SINCE OUR POSITIONS HAVE BEEN WORKED OUT IN THE UN ON THE REQUIREMENTS FOR POLITICAL UNIFICATION AND FREE ELECTIONS, AND THERE WOULD SEEM TO BE MUCH TO BE SAID FOR A FURTHER

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LOOK AT THE PROBLEM AND FOR RENEWED EFFORTS TO SET THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH A FUTURE SETTLEMENT MIGHT TAKE PLACE.

5. WE HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED YOUR REACTIONS TO THIS PART OF THE STATE DEPT'S PROPOSALS. IN COMING TO A DECISION AS TO WHETHER A COURSE OF ACTION ON THE LINES OF SUBPARA3 ABOVE MERITS SUPPORT, YOU WILL WISH TO BEAR IN MIND THE STATE DEPT'S VIEW THAT THE NORTH KOREANS AND THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS WILL ONLY SUPPORT REUNIFICATION ON TERMS WHICH WOULD LEAD TOWARDS STRENGTHENING COMMUNIST INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE OF THE PENINSULA. THE STATE DEPT'S ATTITUDE, THEREFORE, IS THAT SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION ON THE LINES INDICATED WOULD BE LARGELY AN EFFORT TO REGAIN THE PROPAGANDA INITIATIVE, RATHER THAN AN EFFORT WHICH COULD IN FACT RESULT, ON CONDITIONS ACCEPTABLE TO THE WESTERN POWERS, IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM.

6. THE CONCLUSION SEEMS TO BE THAT FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, THE PARTITION OF KOREA IS A FACT TO WHICH WE SHALL HAVE TO ACCOMMODATE OURSELVES, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME STAKING OUT THE REQUIRED POSITIONS FOR AN EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT. WE SHOULD WELCOME YOUR COMMENTS ON THE FOREGOING AS A BASIS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH THE STATE DEPT.

TELEGRAM

BY CAN

CONFIDENTIAL



FM WASHDC MAR11/58 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 544 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO PERMISNY LDN EMBASSYPARIS
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG BRUSS CNERA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN

REF OUR TEL 529 MAR10

CHINESE PROPOSALS ON KOREA

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A LET FROM THE COUNSELOR OF THE BRITISH
EMBASSY GIVING SOME REACTIONS FROM THE FO ON THE DRAFT REPLY TO
THE CHINESE STATEMENT ON KOREA. THESE REACTIONS WERE GIVEN TO THE
STATE DEPT ON MAR8. BEGINS:

1. THE FIRST PARA OF THE DRAFT REPLY OMITTS THE WORD "SIXTEEN"
BEFORE "COUNTRIES". THIS IS IN ORDER NOT RPT NOT TO CREATE ANY EM-
BARRASSMENT FOR THE SOUTHAFRICANS WHO HAVE CONFIRMED TO THE STATE
DEPT AND TO US THAT THEY DO NOT RPT NOT WISH TO BE INVOLVED IN
THESE NEGOTIATIONS. IT FOLLOWS THAT THE WORD "SIXTEEN" SHOULD ALSO
BE OMITTED FROM THE THIRD PARA IN THE SENTENCE BEGINNING: "THESE
INTERPRETATIONS APPEAR ...".

2. THE FO HAVE SUGGESTED THAT IN THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA 2 THE
WORDS: "UNDER UN SUPERVISION" SEEM UNNECESSARY AND UNDESIRABLE AT
THIS STATE AND THAT THEY STRESS THE SUPERVISION POINT IN TERMS
DIFFERENT FROM THOSE USED IN THE PENULTIMATE SENTENCE OF PARA 3.
THIS PHRASE WAS IN THE DRAFT CIRCULATED BY US AT THE MEETING ON
MAR4: WE PUT IT IN PROVISIONALLY AT MR WALTER ROBERTSON'S REQUEST
AND IT WAS MORE OR LESS A PROVISION UNDER WHICH HE ACCEPTED OUR
DRAFT RATHER THAN THE AMERICAN AS A WORKING PAPER. THE FO NOW SAY
THEY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE PHRASE REMOVED BUT IF THIS IS IM-
POSSIBLE THEY WOULD PREFER THAT IT BE REPLACED BY THE PHRASE:
"IN ACCORDANCE WITH THOSE RESOLUTIONS". "THOSE RESOLUTIONS" ARE OF
COURSE THE RESOLUTIONS REFERRED TO IN THE IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING
SENTENCE. THE STATE DEPT DO NOT RPT NOT APPEAR VERY HAPPY ABOUT
THIS PROPOSED AMENDMENT BUT HAVE PROMISED TO LET ME KNOW FURTHER.

3. THE FO HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THE REF IN PARA 3 OF THE DRAFT TO
ARTICLES IN PRAVDA AND IZVESTIA IS CORRECT, BUT THE STATE DEPT
ARE RATHER IN FAVOUR OF OMITTING THE WHOLE OF THIS SENTENCE, THAT
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CHOQUETTE	
MISS CURRIE	

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IS TO SAY THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA 3 OF THE DRAFT REPLY.

THEIR OBJECTION IS THAT IT HIGHLIGHTS THE QUESTION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES, TO WHICH THEY DO NOT RPT NOT WISH TO ATTRACT UNDUE ATTENTION AT THE MOMENT SINCE IT IS CLEARLY IMPRACTICABLE FOR UN FORCES TO WITHDRAW FROM SOUTHKOREA IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

I UNDERSTAND THAT OTHER GOVTS ALSO DOUBT THE WISDOM OF INCLUDING THIS SENTENCE, ALTHOUGH IN SOME CASES FOR REASONS DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF THE STATE DEPT, AND WE HAVE RECOMMENDED TO THE FO THAT IF THE GENERAL FEELING IS THAT THIS SENTENCE SHOULD BE OMITTED WE SHOULD AGREE TO ITS OMISSION.

4. THE FOURTH PARA OF THE DRAFT REPLY ENDS: "THE GOVTS CONCERNED WILL GIVE THEM CAREFUL CONSIDERATION". THE FO PREFER THIS TO READ: "THE GOVTS WILL ARRANGE FOR THEM TO BE FURTHER CONSIDERED". THEIR REASON IS THAT THIS WOULD NOT RPT NOT COMMIT US TO CONSIDERATION IN ANY PARTICULAR FORUM. THE STATE DEPT ARE IN TWO MINDS ABOUT THIS AND HAVE ASKED WHETHER THE PASSAGE AS IT STANDS DOES NOT RPT NOT SERVE TO EMPHASISE THAT THE UN POWERS ARE ANXIOUS TO TREAT THE NORTHKOREAN PROPOSALS SERIOUSLY. THEY WONDER WHETHER THE AMENDMENT SUGGESTED BY THE FO MIGHT NOT RPT NOT BE CONSIDERED EVASIVE AND OUT OF KEEPING WITH THE GENERAL TENOR OF THE REPLY.

5. THE THIRD PARA OF THE DRAFT REFERS IN TWO INSTANCES TO "THE NORTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR". I UNDERSTAND THAT THE KOREAN EMBASSY HERE HAVE REPRESENTED TO THE STATE DEPT THAT THIS SHOULD BE CHANGED TO READ: "THE NORTHKOREAN REP". THE STATE DEPT ARE ANXIOUS TO COMPLY, NOT RPT NOT ONLY IN ORDER TO GRATIFY THE KOREAN EMBASSY BUT ALSO FOR REASONS OF THEIR OWN. WE HAVE RECOMMENDED TO THE FO THAT THIS AMENDMENT BE AGREED. ENDS.

TELEGRAM

7-1-1-1

BY CAN

CONFIDENTIAL



FM WASHDC MAR11/58 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 543 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO PERMISNY LDN EMBASSYPARIS
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG BRUSS CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN

REF OUR TEL 529 MAR10

CHINESE PROPOSALS ON KOREA

THE BRITISH EMBASSY HERE HAS GIVEN US FO COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT
REPLY TO THE CHINESE STATEMENT ON KOREA WHICH WE ARE PASSING TO
YOU IN A SEPARATE MSG.

2.WE UNDERSTAND AUSTRALIAN COMMENTS HAVE RELATED PRINCIPALLY TO
THE REF TO UN SUPERVISION IN PARA 2 WHICH THE AUSTRALIANS WOULD
LIKE TO SEE ALTERED TO CONFORM WITH THE REF IN PARA 3 TO SUPERVI-
SION UNDER UN AUSPICES.THE NZ EMBASSY HAS MADE COMMENTS ALONG
SIMILAR LINES.

NO.	73
AMBASSADOR	
MAITRE	
SMITH	
HALLEAD	
GOPHAN	
SMITH	
CHOQUETTE	
MISS CURRIE	

Handwritten initials: Hg, RD

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TELEGRAM

BY CAN

7-1-1-1



CONFIDENTIAL

FM EXTERNAL OTT MAR11/58 CONFD
TO WASHDC Y97 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO PERMISNY LDN EMBASSYPARIS
TOKYO DEFERRED
BAG BRUSS CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN

REF OUR TEL Y90 MAR7

CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA

OUR REF MSG WAS SENT TO YOU IN THE EXPECTATION THAT OTHER PARTICIP-
ANTS WOULD NOT RPT NOT WISH TO RISK PROVOKING USA COUNTER-AMEND-
MENTS BY PRODUCING SUBSTANTIAL AMENDMENTS TO THE DRAFT REPLY PROD-
UCED BY THE DRAFTING GROUP. WE WERE PARTICULARLY INFLUENCED BY
YOUR ADVICE (PARA 6 OF YOUR TEL 487 MAR4) IN THIS RESPECT AND BY
COMPARABLE ADVICE WHICH WE KNOW THE UK AMBASSADOR GAVE TO THE FOR-
EIGN OFFICE.

NO. AMBASS/ OR 12
MUTTER
BOSR
11-1-1-1
GORMAN
SMITH
CHOQUETTE
MISS CURRIE

2. WE HAVE NOW LEARNED THAT THE FOREIGN OFFICE INSTRUCTED THE BRITISH
EMBASSY TO ATTEMPT TO REMOVE THE WORDS "UNDER UN SUPERVISION" FROM
THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA 2 OF THE DRAFT. IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE VIEW
THE REF TO UN ^{RESOLUTIONS?} ~~RESULTS~~ IN THE FIRST SENTENCE OF THAT PARA IS ACCEPT-
ABLE BUT IT SEEMS UNNECESSARY AND UNDESIRABLE AT THIS STAGE TO STRESS
THE MANNER OF SUPERVISION IN TERMS DIFFERENT FROM THOSE USED IN THE
PENULTIMATE SENTENCE OF PARA 3 AND CALCULATED TO RESTRICT OUR LATER
FREEDOM OF NEGOTIATION AS WELL AS EMPHASIZING A POINT WHICH IS KNOWN
TO BE DISAGREEABLE TO THE COMMUNIST SIDE. WHEN THE BRITISH EMBASSY
PUT THIS MATTER TO THE STATE DEPT THEY WERE TOLD THAT THE STATE
DEPT DISLIKED THE AMENDMENT AND THAT THE STATE DEPT'S MINIMUM POSITION
WAS THAT THEY WOULD REQUIRE THAT THE ELECTIONS BE SUPERVISED BY AN
ORGANIZATION APPROVED BY THE UN, WITH TERMS OF REF AND DUTIES TO BE
LAID DOWN BY THE UN AND WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY TO REPORT BACK TO
THE UN. THE STATE DEPT ALSO POINTED OUT THAT MR DULLES HAD NOT RPT
NOT YET GIVEN HIS FINAL CONCURRENCE IN THE DRAFT. THE BRITISH
EMBASSY ADDED THAT THIS PHRASE WAS INSERTED IN THE DRAFT AT THE
REQUEST OF MR WALTER ROBERTSON AND WAS THEREFORE PROBABLY MATERIAL
IN GETTING HIM TO ACCEPT THE BRITISH DRAFT AS THE BASIC WORKING
PAPER.

3. THIS PHRASE WAS, OF COURSE, OBJECTIONABLE BUT WE RECONCILED OUR-
SELVES TO IT ON THE FOLLOWING REASONING: WE CONSIDER THAT THE

PAGE TWO Y97

COMMUNISTS HAD STATED THEIR POSITION IN THE CHINESE DECLARATION FEB7.


WE LOOK UPON PARA2 AS A STATEMENT OF WHAT THE UN SIDE WOULD LIKE TO SEE DONE; WE REGARDED PARA3 AS CONTAINING THE OFFER OF A COMPROMISE; IN OTHER WORDS WE VIEW PARA2 AS A STATEMENT OF THE IDEAL AND PARA3 AS A STATEMENT OF THE LENGTHS TO WHICH WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT. NATURALLY, IF THERE IS ANY HOPE AT ALL OF HAVING THESE WORDS REMOVED WE SHOULD LIKE TO SEE THEM GO. WE SHOULD THEREFORE FAVOUR YOUR SUPPORTING ANY FURTHER UK MOVE TO HAVE THESE WORDS DELETED BUT WE WOULD HOPE THAT YOU AND THE UK AND THE AUSTRALIANS (WHO, WE UNDERSTAND, ALSO OBJECT TO THESE WORDS) WOULD CONSULT TOGETHER VERY CAREFULLY TO SATISFY YOURSELVES THAT PRESSING THIS POINT WILL NOT RPT NOT LEAD TO THE INTRODUCTION OF OBJECTIONABLE USA AMENDMENTS. WE THINK THAT IN YOUR CONSULTATIONS WITH THEM YOU SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THE POINT THAT IF THE RESULT OF MR DULLES EXAMINATION OF THE DRAFT IS LIKELY TO BE THE SUGGESTION OF CHANGES BY THE STATE DEPT WHICH WOULD MAKE THIS DRAFT LESS ACCEPTABLE TO US, THEN THERE MIGHT BE SOME ADVANTAGE IN PRESSING THIS AMENDMENT FOR BARGAINING PURPOSES IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THE DRAFT WILL NOT RPT NOT BE LESS ACCEPTABLE TO US THAN IT NOW IS. THE STATEMENT OF THE MINIMUM STATE DEPT POSITION WOULD APPEAR TO MAKE THE DELETION OF THESE WORDS POSSIBLE ALTHOUGH WE RECOGNIZE THAT FOR PURPOSES OF BARGAINING WITH THE COMMUNISTS THE USA MIGHT NOT RPT NOT BE PREPARED TO GO SO FAR AT THIS STAGE.

TELEGRAM

BY CAN

7-1-1-1

CONFIDENTIAL



FM WASHDC MAR10/58 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 529 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO PERMISNY LDN EMBASSYPARIS
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG BRUSS CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN

REF YOUR Y90 MAR7

CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA

WE LEFT WITH PARSONS(DIRECTOR,NORTHASIAN AFFAIRS)A MEMO CONTAINING
OUR SUGGESTION FOR THE REDRAFTING OF THE FIRST PART OF PARA3
OF THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE'S DRAFT MSG TO PEKING,AND THE FORM FOR
THE PENULTIMATE SENTENCE OF PARA3 WHICH WE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED.

2.PARSONS WAS RECEPTIVE TO THE SUGGESTED AMENDMENT TO THE FIRST
PART OF PARA3.HE SAID THAT HIGHER AUTHORITIES IN THE STATE DEPT HAD
ALREADY INDICATED THAT THEY WISHED THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA3
REMOVED.THE ROK EMBASSY HAD ALSO REQUESTED THAT REFS TO THE NORTH
KOREAN"AMBASSADORS"BE REMOVED:PARSONS OBSERVED THAT OUR REVISION
WOULD ELIMINATE THAT PROBLEM ALTOGETHER.HE SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO
DISCUSS THIS PROPOSED AMENDMENT WITH SENIOR OFFICERS IN THE DEPT,
BUT HE PERSONALLY THOUGHT OUR SUGGESTED CHANGE AN IMPROVEMENT.

NO. 12
AMBASSADOR
MUTTER
HASTEN
GOTHAM
SMITH
CHOQUETTE
MISS CURRIE

3.WITH RESPECT TO OUR PREFERRED WORDING OF THE PENULTIMATE SEN-
TENCE OF PARA3,PARSONS REPEATED THE OBSERVATION HE HAD MADE EARLIER
ON THIS POINT,THAT THE STATE DEPT THOUGHT THAT ANY FURTHER SHOW
OF FLEXIBILITY ON THE QUESTION OF SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS SHOULD
COME LATER AFTER THE RESPONSE OF THE CHINESE AND NORTHKOREANS
TO THIS NOTE IS KNOWN.

4.THE STATE DEPT HAS HAD RESPONSES ON THE DRAFT NOTE FROM THE ROK,
THE AUSTRALIANS,THE UK,THE FRENCH(WHO HAD NO RPT NO COMMENTS TO
MAKE)AND OURSELVES.EXCEPT FOR THE NEWZEALANDERS THEY DO NOT RPT
NOT EXPECT TO RECEIVE ANY FURTHER COMMENTS OF SUBSTANCE FROM OTHERS
OF THE SIXTEEN.WHEN ALL SUGGESTIONS HAVE BEEN EXAMINED REPS OF
EACH GOVT WHICH HAS MADE COMMENTS OF SUBSTANCE WILL BE CALLED IN
FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION,FOLLOWING WHICH THERE MAY BE ANOTHER MEETING
OF THE SIXTEEN TO GIVE FINAL BLESSING TO THE RESULTANT REDRAFT.
THE STATE DEPT IS ANXIOUS TO MOVE QUICKLY TO COMPLETE THE PROCESS.

5.AS WE WERE LEAVING,PARSONS SAID HE NOW THOUGHT THAT THE CHINESE

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PAGE TWO 529


WOULD REPLY TO THIS NOTE AND PERHAPS MIGHT GO BEYOND A SIMPLE
PROPAGANDA EFFORT.HIS REASON FOR THINKING SO WAS THAT THE NORTH
KOREANS HAD PERMITTED THE PASSENGERS FROM THE HIGHJACKED AIRCRAFT
TO RETURN TO SOUTHKOREA WITHOUT MAKING THEIR POINT ABOUT DIRECT
NORTH-SOUTH DISCUSSIONS ON THE SUBJECT,AND FURTHER IN TODAY'S
MEETING OF THE MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION HAD AGREED TO RELEASE
THE USA JET PILOT WHO HAD PARACHUTED DOWN IN NORTHKOREA AFTER
HIS PLANE HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN.

TELEGRAM

7-1-1-1

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MAR 14 1958



FM EXTERNAL OTT MAR7/58 CONFD
TO WASHDC Y90 EMERGENCY
INFO PERMISNY LDN EMBASSYPARIS
TOKYO DEFERRED
BAG BRUSS CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN
REF YOUR TEL 498 MAR5

CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA

WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE DRAFT PRODUCED BY THE DRAFTING GROUP IS NOT RPT NOT TO BE CONSIDERED AT A FURTHER MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN BUT THAT GOVTS ARE EXPECTED TO INDICATE THEIR AGREEMENT INDIVIDUALLY. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE MUCH POSSIBILITY OF IMPROVING THE DRAFT. OF COURSE, WE RECOGNIZE THE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN ATTEMPTING TO ACHIEVE PERFECTION, BUT WE CONTINUE TO QUESTION THE WISDOM OF BEING SO SPECIFIC IN NAMING THE SOURCE OF APPARENTLY CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS ON THE COMMUNIST SIDE. WE SHOULD PREFER A GENERALIZATION OF THE FIRST PART OF PARA3 OF THE DRAFT ALONG THE LINES OF THE COMMENTS APPEARING UNDER "SECONDLY" IN PARA3 OF OUR Y86 BUT LEAVE IT TO YOU TO DECIDE WHETHER TO MAKE THIS POINT. THE REF TO IZVESTIA AND PRAVDA APPEAR TO BE PARTICULARLY OPEN TO QUESTION.

NO.	INIT.
AMBASSADOR	B
MITTER	
DOVER	
GORHAM	
SMITH	
CHOQUETTE	
MISS CURRIE	

2. THE FORMULA PROVIDING FOR ELECTIONS UNDER UN AUSPICES IN PARA3 OF THE DRAFT DOES NOT RPT NOT MEET THE POSITION WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY MAINTAINED SINCE THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OF 1954. WE DO NOT RPT NOT WANT TO PROVOKE A CRISIS OVER THIS REPLY BY REFUSING TO ALLOW THE ANSWER TO GO IN THE NAME OF THE SIXTEEN. YOU SHOULD SAY, THEREFORE, THAT IF THE FORMULA APPEARING IN THE PENULTIMATE SENTENCE OF PARA3 OF THE DRAFT COMMENDS ITSELF TO THE REMAINING MEMBERS OF THE SIXTEEN WE SHALL NOT RPT NOT OBJECT TO THE REPLY GOING FORWARD IN THE NAME OF THE SIXTEEN ALTHOUGH IT SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED THAT THE POSITION OF THE CANADIAN GOVT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER MET IF THE PENULTIMATE SENTENCE OF PARA3 OF THE DRAFT REPLY HAD READ AS FOLLOWS: "THESE INTERPRETATIONS APPEAR TO CALL FOR SOME CLARIFICATION AND THE GOVTS OF THE SIXTEEN COUNTRIES CONCERNED WOULD BE GLAD TO KNOW WHETHER, WHEN THE NORTHKOREAN AUTHORITIES SPEAK OF A "NEUTRAL NATIONS ORGANIZATION" TO SUPERVISE

PAGE TWO Y90

THE ELECTIONS THEY AGREE THAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THESE ELECTIONS ACCEPTABLE TO ALL CONCERNED COULD BE WORKED OUT UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UN AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE ADEQUATE SUPERVISION NOT RPT NOT ONLY OF THE PRELIMINARIES BUT ALSO OF THE ELECTIONS THEMSELVES". FOR YOUR OWN INFO THE REASON WHY THIS MORE NEARLY MEETS OUR POSITION IS THAT IT MAKES IT CLEAR THAT SUPERVISION MUST BE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES AND NOT RPT NOT SIMPLY IMPOSED BY THE UN. BY REASON OF PAST USAGE THE EXPRESSION "UNDER UN AUSPICES" BY ITSELF IS CAPABLE OF MEANING IMPOSED BY THE UN WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF THE OTHER SIDE.

LEGER

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTGOING MESSAGE

7-61-1

THE CANADIAN EMBASSY, TOKYO

S E C R E T

RPT WASHDC LONDON OPIMMEDIATE



29

MAR7/58

XX

YOUR TEL Y75 OF FEB28 AND OUR TEL 26 OF MAR4.

OPIMMEDIATE

CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA

WE SHOULD LIKE TO SUPPLEMENT ASSESSMENT GIVEN IN OUR
REF TEL.

J.G.H.Halstead/sg

Military Attache

2. OFFICIAL ROK POSITION ON UNIFICATION AND ELECTIONS, REAFFIRMED SINCE COMMUNIST PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD, IS THAT WAY TO UNIFICATION LIES THROUGH "WITHDRAWAL OF RED CHINESE INVADERS AND THROUGH NORTH KOREAN ELECTIONS UNDER AUSPICES OF ROK AND SUPERVISION OF UN" AND THAT UN FORCES MUST NOT LEAVE UNTIL KOREA "HAS BEEN DEMOCRATICALLY UNIFIED AND ITS BOUNDARIES MADE SECURE". ALSO, THAT THESE OBJECTIVES CAN BE ACHIEVED ONLY BY FORCE (PREFERABLE BUT RULED OUT BY USA) OR BY VOLUNTARY COMMUNIST WITHDRAWAL AND ABANDONMENT OF NORTH KOREAN REGIME (PRESUMABLY AS PART OF SOME SHIFT IN GENERAL BALANCE OF POWER) BUT NOT REPEAT NOT BY NEGOTIATIONS. LATTER ARE RULED OUT, AS BEING NOT ONLY USELESS BUT DANGEROUS, BY BOTH ROK AND LOCAL USA OFFICIALS ON GROUNDS THAT COMMUNISTS REGARD THEM AS WAY NOT OF REACHING AGREEMENT BUT OF PROBING AND EXPLOITING WEAKNESSES OF OPPOSING SIDE.

3. CONSIDERABLE FEAR IN ROK THAT, IF USA TAKES COMMUNIST PROPOSALS SERIOUSLY AND CONSIDERS WITHDRAWING FORCES OR ARRANGEMENTS FOR UNIFICATION WITHOUT SAFEGUARDS MENTIONED

- 2 -

ABOVE, SOUTH KOREANS WILL NOT BE ABLE TO COPE WITH COMMUNIST INTIMIDATION AND SUBVERSION. IN PARTICULAR ROK GOVT FEARS ELECTIONS WITH FREE COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION AND INTENDS TO MAKE COMMUNIST PARTY ILLEGAL IN NORTH "ONCE THAT PART OF OUR COUNTRY IS LIBERATED". INSISTS THAT "ALL KOREAN ELECTIONS ARE NEITHER NECESSARY NOR ACCEPTABLE FOR UNIFICATION" SINCE "THIS HALF OF KOREA ALREADY HAS HAD ITS ELECTIONS".

4. ROK CLEARLY REGARDS UNIFICATION AS ACCESSION OF NORTH KOREA TO SOUTH KOREA ON LATTER'S TERMS. IN VIEW THIS ATTITUDE, THERE SEEMS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF ROK ENTERTAINING "REASONABLE" PROPOSALS FOR ELECTIONS AND UNIFICATION EXCEPT UNDER STRONGEST POSSIBLE USA PRESSURE. ROK HAS DISMISSED RECENT COMMUNIST MOVES AS MERE PROPAGANDA, AS MEANINGLESS AND AS A TRAP, AND HAS STRESSED DANGER OF NEGOTIATIONS AT THIS TIME TO FREE WORLD POSITION IN ASIA. THIS REACTION HAS NATURALLY BEEN STRENGTHENED BY COMMUNIST SEIZURE OF SOUTH KOREAN AIRLINER, WHICH WE SUSPECT WAS SEPARATE OPERATION UNCONNECTED WITH COMMUNIST UNIFICATION PROPOSALS. UNFORTUNATE TIMING OF SEIZURE AND ITS ADVERSE PROPAGANDA EFFECT IN WIDER CONTEXT SEEM TO HAVE PERSUADED COMMUNISTS TO RELEASE MOST OF PASSENGERS WITHOUT INSISTING ON DIRECT CONTACT WITH NORTH KOREAN GOVT.

5. CHINESE ANNOUNCEMENT OF UNILATERAL TROOP WITHDRAWAL HAS NOT BEEN SO EASY TO PLAY DOWN AS UNIFICATION PROPOSALS, BUT PRESIDENT RHEE'S INTERPRETATION (GIVEN IN RECENT PRESS INTERVIEW) IS THAT COMMUNIST HAD PLANNED TO INVADE SOUTH KOREA AGAIN BECAUSE OF POOR CROPS LAST YEAR, THAT THEY WERE FRUSTRATED BY RECENT INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO SOUTH KOREA AND THAT CHINESE ARE NOW FORCED TO WITHDRAW TROOPS BECAUSE "THEY FACE GREAT DIFFICULTIES IN MAINTAINING LARGE FORCE". HE INTENDS TO TAKE "WAIT AND

- 3 -

SEE" ATTITUDE, BY WHICH HE MEANS BEING MORE VIGILANT THAN EVER AGAINST COMMUNIST TRICKERY. IN FACT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS SEEM TO HAVE MADE ROK GOVT MORE UNCOMPROMISING, AS IF COMMUNIST MOVES WERE INTERPRETED AS SIGNS OF WEAKNESS. SINCE CHINESE ANNOUNCEMENTS WERE MADE, RHEE HAS REAFFIRMED NOT ONLY OPPOSITION TO WITHDRAWAL U.S. BUT ALSO TO REDUCTION ROK FORCES AND HAS STRESSED NECESSITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR DEFENCE SOUTH KOREA; ROK NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HAS UNANIMOUSLY CALLED FOR ABROGATION OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT; AND GOVT PRESS HAS SUGGESTED ROK SHOULD MOVE BACK INTO COMMUNIST-OCCUPIED TERRITORY SOUTH OF 38th PARALLEL TO BLOCK COMMUNIST AGGRESSION ROUTE.

6. ROK INTENTIONS THUS REVEALED HAVE SOME POINTS IN COMMON WITH INTENTIONS OF LOCAL USA COMMANDERS, AS WE SEE THEM, AND SOME POINTS IN CONFLICT. BOTH REGARD PROBLEM OF DEALING WITH COMMUNISTS AS PRIMARILY MILITARY; POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS ARE SECONDARY. RELATIONS WITH COMMUNISTS ARE AT BEST ARMED TRUCE; MAIN TASK IS TO STRENGTHEN DEFENCE AGAINST EVER-PRESENT PROSPECT OF ATTACK AND ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT IMPAIR THAT DEFENCE IS UNDESIRABLE. POLITICALLY, TASK IS TO COUNTER COMMUNIST EFFORTS TO WEAKEN FREE WORLD RATHER THAN TO TEST COMMUNIST INTENTIONS OR EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES OF AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, WHEREAS ROK LEADERS LOOK FOR LOCAL COMMUNIST WEAKNESS WHICH THEY MIGHT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF, USA COMMANDERS THINK IT IS BOTH NECESSARY AND DESIRABLE TO STABILIZE FOR INDEFINITE PERIOD PRESENT POSITION IN KOREA, AS PART OF DEFENCE CHAIN IN ASIA, AND CAN SEE NO PROSPECT OF CHANGE EXCEPT AS PART OF SOME LARGER SETTLEMENT WITH COMMUNIST BLOC. THEY UNDOUBTEDLY REGARD INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS NECESSARY SUPPORT FOR STABILIZATION, AND SEEM TO HAVE DISCOUNTED POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL REPERCUSSIONS.

- 4 -

7. IN OUR VIEW, PRESENT COMMUNIST CAMPAIGN IS DIRECTED MAINLY AGAINST INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO SOUTH KOREA (NORTH KOREAN AND CHINESE PROPOSALS FOLLOWED CLOSELY PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF ATOMIC CANNON AND HONEST JOHN MISSILE LAUNCHERS), AS SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN EUROPE FOLLOWED NATO PROPOSALS FOR INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS AND MISSILES INTO WESTERN EUROPE. IT SEEMS TO US THAT GREATEST RISK OF COMMUNIST PROPOSALS IS THAT THEY MAY BE ABLE TO EXPLOIT THOSE ISSUES MOST LIKELY TO DIVIDE ROK AND ^{USA AND} ITS ALLIES. RECONCILIATION OF THESE DIFFERENCES IS THEREFORE MORE IMPORTANT THAN SUBSTANCE OF REPLY TO COMMUNIST PROPOSALS.

8. ONE OF MAIN PROBLEMS HERE IS UNDOUBTEDLY RECONCILIATION OF PENTAGON AND STATE DEPT POLICIES. PENTAGON POLICY IS THAT IT IS STRATEGICALLY ESSENTIAL TO RETAIN USA FORCES IN KOREA FOR FORESEEABLE FUTURE, THAT USA STRATEGY IS INCREASINGLY DEPENDENT ON USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THAT KOREA CANNOT BE EXCLUDED FROM THAT STRATEGY. USA COMMANDERS IN AREA ARE THEREFORE PLANNING ON ASSUMPTION THAT, IF HOSTILITIES BREAK OUT AGAIN IN KOREA, THEY WILL NOT BE CONFINED TO KOREA OR TO USE OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ONLY. THUS USA FACES IN KOREA SIMILAR DILEMMA TO THAT IN EUROPE: HOW TO BALANCE PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENCE AGAINST ALL-OUT WAR AND PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENCE AGAINST LOCAL AGGRESSION AND SUBVERSION, WHEN COMMUNIST POWERS HAVE MILITARY INITIATIVE AND PREPONDERANCE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS.



TELEGRAM

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BY CAN

7-1-1-1

CONFIDENTIAL



FM WASHDC MAR5/58 CONF
TO EXTERNAL 498 PRIORITY
INFO PERMISNY LDN EMBASSYPARIS
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG BRUSS CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FU LDN

REF OUR TEL 487 MAR4

CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA

FOLLOWING IS THE SUGGESTED TEXT FOR REPLY TO THE STATEMENT BY THE
GOVT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AS DRAWN UP BY THE DRAFTING
COMMITTEE WHICH MET AFTER YESTERDAY'S MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN:

BEGINS:

SUGGESTED TEXT FOR REPLY TO THE STATEMENT BY THE GOVT OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA

1. THE GOVTS OF THE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUED FORCES FOR THE UN
FORCE IN KOREA HAVE NOTED THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE NORTHKOREAN
AUTHORITIES ON FEB5 AND THAT MADE BY THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES AND
COMMUNICATED TO HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN PEKING
ON FEB7. THEY HAVE GIVEN CAREFUL STUDY TO THESE STATEMENTS AND TO THE
PROPOSALS MADE THEREIN.

2. THE GOVTS CONCERNED REAFFIRM THAT THEIR AIM IN KOREA IS TO SEE
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNIFIED, INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC KOREA,
IN ACCORDANCE WITH RELEVANT UN RESOLUTIONS. TO THIS END, AS THEY HAVE
OFTEN STATED, THEY WISH TO SEE FREE ELECTIONS HELD UNDER UN SUPER-
VISION FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. THEY ARE GLAD
TO NOTE THAT THE NORTH KOREAN AND CHINESE AUTHORITIES ALSO FAVOR
FREE ELECTIONS AND THEY WELCOME THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT CHINESE FORCES
ARE TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM NORTHKOREA.

3. THERE APPEARS, HOWEVER, TO BE SOME DOUBT AS TO THE PRECISE INTER-
PRETATION TO BE PLACED ON THE NORTHKOREAN PROPOSALS. IN ARTICLES
PUBLISHED ON FEB11/58, IN PRAVDA AND IZVESTIA THE CALL FOR THE WITH-
DRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES IS MERELY "A PRELIMINARY TO A PEACEFUL
SOLUTION OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM BY THE KOREANS THEMSELVES", AND THIS
APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN THE POSITION TAKEN BY MR CHOU EN-LAI IN HIS
REPORT TO THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS ON FEB10. (FOOTNOTE: THE
DRAFTING GROUP HAS BEEN UNABLE TO IDENTIFY THE

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REF ARTICLES IN QUESTION. THEREFORE, UNLESS THE TEXTS CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE SO AS TO ENSURE THAT THE QUOTES ARE ACCURATE, THE DRAFTING GROUP RECOMMENDS THAT THIS SENTENCE BE DELETED.) THE NORTHKOREAN AMBASSADOR IN PEKING IS REPORTED AS HAVING STATED THAT THE "PURPOSE OF SUPERVISION BY A NEUTRAL NATIONS ORGANIZATION WAS TO SEE THAT ALL POLITICAL PARTIES AND PUBLIC FIGURES IN BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA WOULD HAVE FREEDOM OF ACTION, SPEECH, PUBLICATION, ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION" BUT THAT "SUCH SUPERVISION SHOULD NOT RPT NOT INTER- VENE IN THE ELECTIONS". THE NORTHKOREAN AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW IS REPORTED AS HAVING MADE A STATEMENT TO THE SAME EFFECT. THESE INTERPRETATIONS APPEAR TO CALL FOR SOME CLARIFICATION AND THE GOVTS OF THE SIXTEEN COUNTRIES CONCERNED WOULD BE GLAD TO KNOW WHETHER, WHEN THE NORTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES SPEAK OF A "NEUTRAL NATIONS ORGANIZATION" TO SUPER- VISE THE ELECTIONS, THEY ACCEPT THAT THESE SHOULD BE HELD UNDER UN AUSPICES AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE ADEQUATE SUPERVISION NOT ONLY OF THE PRELIMINARIES BUT ALSO OF THE ELECTIONS THEMSELVES. THEY WOULD ALSO BE GLAD TO KNOW WHETHER IT IS ACCEPTED THAT REPRESENTATION IN THE NEW NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BE IN PROPORTION TO THE INDIGENOUS POPULATION.

4. IF THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES WILL SEEK FROM THE NORTHKOREAN AUTHO- RITIES CLARIFICATION OF THE POINTS MENTIONED ABOVE WITH SUCH OTHER DETAILS OF THE KOREAN PROPOSALS AS MAY BE RELEVANT, THE GOVTS CON- CERNED WILL GIVE THEM CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.

5. A COPY OF THIS REPLY IS BEING TRANSMITTED TO THE UN.
ENDS.

TELEGRAM

BY CAN

SECRET

NO.	1-1-1
AMEMBASSADOR	
MATTER	
DOOR	
HALL-HEAD	
GORMAN	
SMITH	
CHOCQUETTE	
MISS CARRIE	



FM EXTERNAL OTT MAR5/58 SECRET
 TO WASHDC Y86 OPIMMEDIATE
 INFO LDN OPIMMEDIATE PERMISNY EMBASSYPARIS
 TOKYO DEFERRED
 BAG BRUSS CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN

REF YOUR TELS 487 & 483 MAR4

CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA

WE ARE VERY MUCH ENCOURAGED BY THE DEVELOPMENTS AT YESTERDAY'S MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN. IT APPEARS TO HOLD OUT A REAL HOPE OF A REPLY TO THE CHINESE WHICH WILL AVOID THE APPEARANCE OF BEING TOO NEGATIVE. WE SHOULD LIKE TO HAVE AT SOME CONVENIENT OPPORTUNITY YOUR ANALYSIS OF WALTER ROBERTSON'S REASONS FOR PREFERRING THE UK DRAFT.

2. WE ARE SOMEWHAT DISTURBED BY THE BASIS ON WHICH THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE WAS CREATED IN THIS PARTICULAR INSTANCE. WILLINGNESS TO MAINTAIN FORCES TO SERVE IN KOREA IS UNQUESTIONABLY IMPORTANT BUT, OF COURSE, IT MUST BE VIEWED IN THE CONTEXT OF PAST AND POSSIBLE FUTURE CONTRIBUTIONS AS WELL. MOREOVER, AS THE BOND WHICH HOLDS THE SIXTEEN TOGETHER IS THEIR UNDERTAKING IN THEIR DECLARATION OF JULY 1953 WE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT LIKE TO SEE AN INNER GROUP FORM WITH SO UNBALANCED AND SO UNREPRESENTATIVE A COMPOSITION. WE WOULD NOT RPT NOT WISH TO PROTEST AGAINST THE UNREPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE PRESENT DRAFTING GROUP BUT WE SHOULD LIKE YOU TO SEEK SOME WAY TO CONVEY TO THE STATE DEPT THAT WE WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE INCLINED TO ACQUIESCE IN THE CONTINUATION OF THIS DRAFTING GROUP ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESENT PRECEDENT. THIS IS SOMETHING YOU NEED NOT RPT NOT TACKLE AT ONCE: IT MIGHT PROFITABLY BE LEFT UNTIL AGREEMENT HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY REACHED ON A REPLY TO THE CHINESE STATEMENT.

3. IF IT IS NOT RPT NOT TOO LATE TO DO SO, WE SHOULD LIKE YOU TO APPROACH THE BRITISH ON WHATEVER LEVEL YOU CONSIDER APPROPRIATE TO SEE WHETHER THE FOLLOWING IDEAS CAN BE SOLD TO THEM TO ADVANCE IN THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE. WE REALIZE THAT THERE IS A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF DIFFICULTY ABOUT ASKING THE BRITISH TO PROPOSE

...2

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~~SECRET~~
PAGE TWO Y86



AMENDMENTS TO THEIR OWN DRAFT, BUT THEY COULD ALWAYS PRESENT SUCH AMENDMENTS, IF THEY AGREED WITH THEM, AS THE FRUIT OF SECOND THOUGHTS. WE WONDER FIRST, WHETHER THE OPERATIVE PARA OF THE PROPOSED REPLY (PARA 3) COULD BE AMENDED TO READ IN THE PENULTIMATE SENTENCE AS FOLLOWS: "THESE INTERPRETATIONS APPEAR TO CALL FOR SOME CLARIFICATIONS AND THE GOVTS OF THE SIXTEEN COUNTRIES CONCERNED WOULD BE GLAD TO KNOW WHETHER, WHEN THE NORTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES SPEAK OF A 'NEUTRAL NATIONS ORGAN' TO SUPERVISE THE ELECTIONS, THEY AGREE THAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THESE ELECTIONS ACCEPTABLE TO ALL CONCERNED COULD BE WORKED OUT UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UN AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE ADEQUATE SUPERVISION NOT RPT NOT ONLY OF THE PRELIMINARIES BUT ALSO OF THE ELECTIONS THEMSELVES." SECONDLY, WE HAVE ALL ALONG THOUGHT THAT THE MULTITUDE OF SPECIFIC REFERENCES IN PARA 3 APPEARS SOMEWHAT PICAYUNE AND CONSEQUENTLY NOT RPT NOT DIGNIFIED. WE WONDER WHETHER THE SAME ENQUIRY COULD NOT RPT NOT BE MADE IN MORE GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS: "THERE APPEARS, HOWEVER, TO BE SOME DOUBT AS TO THE PRECISE INTERPRETATION TO BE PLACED ON THE NORTH KOREAN PROPOSALS. A VARIETY OF STATEMENTS HAS BEEN REPORTED TO THE EFFECT THAT THE 'PURPOSE OF SUPERVISION BY A NEUTRAL NATIONS ORGANIZATION WAS TO SEE THAT ALL POLITICAL PARTIES AND PUBLIC FIGURES IN BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA WOULD HAVE FREEDOM OF ACTION, SPEECH, PUBLICATION, ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION' BUT THAT 'SUCH SUPERVISION SHOULD NOT RPT NOT INTERVENE IN THE ELECTIONS'". WITHOUT MENTION OF PRAVDA OR ISVESTIA THE REPLY MIGHT THEN PROCEED WITH THE AMENDED SENTENCE WE HAVE SUGGESTED ABOVE.

TELEGRAM

BY CAN

7-1-1-1

CONFIDENTIAL



FM WASHDC MAR4/58 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 488 PRIORITY
INFO PERMISNY LDN EMBASSYPARIS
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG BRUSS CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN

REF OURTEL 478 MAR4

CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA


FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE UK DRAFT NOTE TO THE CHINESE WHICH WAS
CIRCULATED TO THE MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN TODAY AND WHICH WILL BE
USED AS A WORKING TEXT BY THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE, BEGINS:

SUGGESTED TEXT FOR REPLY TO THE STATEMENT BY THE GOVT OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

THE GOVTS OF THE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED FORCES FOR THE UN
FORCE IN ~~K~~OREA HAVE NOTED THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE NORTHKOREAN
AUTHORITIES ON FEB5 AND THAT MADE BY THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES AND
COMMUNICATED TO HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN PEKING
ON FEB7. THEY HAVE GIVEN CAREFUL STUDY TO THESE STATEMENTS AND TO THE
PROPOSALS MADE THEREIN.

THE GOVTS CONCERNED REAFFIRM THAT THEIR AIM IN KOREA IS TO SEE THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNIFIED, INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC KOREA. TO THIS
END, AS THEY HAVE OFTEN STATED, THEY WISH TO SEE FREE ELECTIONS HELD
UNDER UN SUPERVISION FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.
THEY ARE GLAD TO NOTE THAT THE NORTHKOREAN AND CHINESE AUTHORITIES
ALSO FAVOUR FREE ELECTIONS AND THEY WELCOME THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT
CHINESE FORCES ARE TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM NORTHKOREA.

THERE APPEARS, HOWEVER, TO BE SOME DOUBT AS TO THE PRECISE INTER-
PRETATION TO BE PLACED ON THE NORTHKOREAN PROPOSALS. THE NORTHKOREAN
AMBASSADOR IN PEKING, FOR EXAMPLE, IS REPORTED AS HAVING STATED THAT
THE "PURPOSE OF SUPERVISION BY A NEUTRAL NATIONS ORGANISATION WAS TO
SEE THAT ALL POLITICAL PARTIES AND PUBLIC FIGURES IN BOTH NORTH
AND SOUTHKOREA WOULD HAVE FREEDOM OF ACTION, SPEECH, PUBLICATION,
ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION" BUT THAT "SUCH SUPERVISION SHOULD NOT IN-
TERVENE IN THE ELECTIONS". THE NORTHKOREAN AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW IS
REPORTED AS STATING THAT THE NEUTRAL BODY SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED
THROUGH TALKS BETWEEN REPS OF BOTH PARTS OF THE COUNTRY BUT "SHOULD
NOT INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE KOREANS". IN ARTICLES



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PUBLISHED IN PRAVDA AND IZVESTIA, A CALL IS MADE FOR "THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES" AS A PRELIMINARY TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM BY THE KOREANS THEMSELVES, AND THIS APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN THE POSITION TAKEN BY MR CHOU EN-LAI IN HIS REPORT TO THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS ON FEB 10. THESE INTERPRETATIONS APPEAR TO CALL FOR SOME CLARIFICATION AND THE GOVTS OF THE SIXTEEN COUNTRIES CONCERNED WOULD BE GLAD TO KNOW WHETHER, WHEN THE NORTHKOREAN AUTHORITIES SPEAK OF A "NEUTRAL NATIONS ORGAN" TO SUPERVISE THE ELECTIONS, THEY ACCEPT THAT THESE SHOULD BE HELD UNDER UN AUSPICES AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE ADEQUATE SUPERVISION NOT ONLY OF THE PRELIMINARIES BUT ALSO OF THE ELECTIONS THEMSELVES. THEY WOULD ALSO BE GLAD TO KNOW WHETHER IT IS ACCEPTED THAT REPRESENTATION IN THE NEW NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BE IN PROPORTION TO THE INDIGENOUS POPULATION.

IF THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES WILL SEEK FROM THE NORTHKOREAN AUTHORITIES CLARIFICATION OF THE POINTS MENTIONED ABOVE WITH SUCH OTHER DETAILS OF THE KOREAN PROPOSALS AS MAY BE RELEVANT, THE GOVTS CONCERNED WILL BE PLEASED TO PASS THESE TO THE UN COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION.
ENDS

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OUTGOING MESSAGE

DUPLICATE

7-1-1-1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

SECRET

MAR 4 1958

26



xx

YOUR TEL NO. Y 75 OF FEB 28

PRIORITY

CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA

W. F. Bull

AMBASSADOR KIM YU TAIK, CHIEF OF KOREAN

MISSION HERE, RETURNED TO TOKYO TODAY FROM SEOUL. HE WAS NOT PARTICULARLY HELPFUL ON QUESTIONS RAISED IN YOUR TELEGRAM. SUGGESTED WASHINGTON WOULD BE BEST PLACE TO FIND OUT ATTITUDE OF SOUTH KOREA TOWARDS ELECTIONS AND UNIFICATION. HE DID SAY THAT UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF CHINESE TROOPS PLUS ADEQUATE GUARANTEES NEITHER CHINESE NOR RUSSIAN TROOPS WOULD INVADE KOREA MIGHT PAVE WAY FOR ELECTIONS AND UNIFICATION. WHEN I SUGGESTED THAT UNIFICATION SHOULD PRECEDE ELECTIONS, KIM MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT SOUTH KOREANS EXPECT NORTH TO HOLD FREE ELECTIONS AND THAT RESULT OF THESE WOULD BE DECISION TO JOIN SOUTH KOREA. AFTER UNIFICATION AND A REASONABLE PERIOD OF SETTLING DOWN IT WOULD BE TIME TO CONSIDER WITHDRAWAL OF UN FORCES.




2. ROSS AND MILLS, WHO IS HERE FROM SEOUL, AGREE THAT ANY CHANGE IN US STRATEGIC INTENTIONS IN KOREA RESULTING FROM REAPPRAISAL OF US GOVERNMENT POLICY THERE WILL NOT BE DETERMINED BY US COMMANDER, KOREA, BUT BY US PACIFIC HEADQUARTERS, HAWAII.

TELEGRAM

BY CAN

7-1-1-1

SECRET



FM WASHDC MAR4/58 SECRET
TO EXTERNAL 487 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO PERMISNY LDN EMBASSYPARIS
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG BRUSS CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN

REF OUR TEL 478 MAR4

CHINESE PROPOSALS ON KOREA

PRIOR TO TODAY'S MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN I CONFERRED WITH THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR WHO HAD ALSO RECEIVED A COPY OF THE STATE DEPT DRAFT NOTE IN REPLY TO THE CHINESE STATEMENT. HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD LEARNED EARLIER TODAY THAT WALTER ROBERTSON (ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS) HAD SEEN THE LATEST VERSION OF THE UK DRAFT REPLY (TEXT IN SEPARATE MSG) TODAY FOR THE FIRST TIME, THAT HE THOUGHT WELL OF IT AND THAT BOTH THE USA DRAFT AND THE UK DRAFT WOULD BE PUT BEFORE TODAY'S MEETING.

2. THIS WAS CONFIRMED BY ROBERTSON HIMSELF WHO CHAIRED THE MEETING AT THE STATE DEPT. HE SAID THAT IF HE HAD TO CHOOSE THE WHOLE OF EITHER THE UK DRAFT OR THE STATE DEPT DRAFT THAT HE HIMSELF WOULD CHOOSE THE FORMER, ALTHOUGH HE PASSED OUT COPIES OF THE USA DRAFT AS GIVEN IN OUR REF TEL DESCRIBING IT AS "JUST A SUGGESTION". HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE INTENDED TO PROPOSE THE SETTING UP OF A DRAFTING COMMITTEE CONSISTING OF THE UK THAILAND TURKEY AND THE USA (THE UK AS THE RECIPIENT OF THE CHINESE NOTE, THE LATTER THREE AS THOSE COUNTRIES WITH TROOPS STILL IN KOREA) TO WORK OUT A FINAL DRAFT IN THE LIGHT OF THE MEETING'S DISCUSSION WHICH WOULD THEN BE PASSED TO GOVTS FOR CONSIDERATION. HE ALSO ADDED THAT WHEN A FURTHER REPLY WAS RECEIVED FROM THE CHINESE, ANOTHER MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN MIGHT BE REQUIRED TO DECIDE WHAT PROCEDURES TO FOLLOW IN THE UN.

3. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION FROM THE NZ AMBASSADOR, ROBERTSON CONFIRMED THAT THERE WAS NOTHING IN THE UK DRAFT TO WHICH THE USA WOULD TAKE EXCEPTION. I ENQUIRED WHETHER THE LAST PARA OF THE UK DRAFT WAS A NECESSARY PART OF THE PRESENTATION. THE NZ AMBASSADOR AGREED THAT IT WAS NOT AND STATED A PREFERENCE FOR THE LAST PARA OF THE USA DRAFT WHICH PROVIDED FOR THE REPORTING OF THE EXCHANGE TO THE UN. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THIS EXPRESSION OF VIEWS HAS EFFECTIVELY DISPOSED OF THE IDEA OF BRINGING UNCURK INTO THE PICTURE.

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4. SOME DISCUSSION OF THE REF TO UN SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS IN PARA 2 OF THE UK DRAFT FOLLOWED. THE AUSTRALIAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES SAID THAT WHILE HIS GOVT STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE IDEA OF ADEQUATE UN SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS, THEY THOUGHT IT DESIRABLE NOT TO GIVE TOO MUCH THE IMPRESSION THAT THE UNC SIDE WAS INSISTING ON TERMS KNOWN TO BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE OTHER SIDE. ROBERTSON RECALLED THE FACT THAT THE DECLARATION OF THE SIXTEEN IN GENEVA IN 1954 HAD EMPLOYED THIS TERM AND THAT SUBSEQUENTLY UN RESOLUTIONS HAD CONFIRMED THE GENERAL STAND TAKEN BY THE UNC SIDE AT GENEVA. HE EMPHASIZED THAT IT WOULD BE MOST UNDESIRABLE TO BEGIN AN EXCHANGE WITH THE COMMUNISTS WHICH WOULD IMPLY OR SUGGEST THAT THE UN DID NOT HAVE COMPETENCE TO DEAL WITH THE KOREAN PROBLEM. I INTERVENED TO RECALL THAT THE CANADIAN GOVT HAD ALWAYS TAKEN A MORE FLEXIBLE VIEW OF THE SUPERVISION QUESTION AND SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO DISTINGUISH THE NARRATIVE PART OF THE UK DRAFT IN PARA 2 AND THE OPERATIVE PART IN PARA 3 WHERE THE FORMULA "UN AUSPICES" IS EMPLOYED. THE NZ AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT AUSTRALIAN AND CANADIAN RESERVATIONS WERE MET BY THE DIFFERENT CONTEXTS IN WHICH THE UN SUPERVISION QUESTION IS REFERRED TO. THE NZ AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THE TERMS OF THE UK NOTE WERE PROVOCATIVE AND THE PHILIPPINES AMBASSADOR SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO PRESERVE THE LANGUAGE IN STRICT CONFORMITY WITH PREVIOUS UN RESOLUTIONS.

5. THE PHILIPPINES AMBASSADOR THEN OBTAINED GENERAL AGREEMENT TO THE IDEA THAT THE REPLY TO THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS SHOULD CONTAIN THE QUESTIONS IN THE UK DRAFT SEEKING FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF THE CHINESE POSITION AND IT WAS AGREED THAT THE UK DRAFT SHOULD BE USED AS THE WORKING PAPER BY THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE.

6. AS A CONSEQUENCE OF TODAY'S MEETING THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THAT THERE WILL NOT BE SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN THE UK DRAFT APART FROM THE DELETIONS OF THE FINAL PARA AND THE SUBSTITUTION FOR IT OF THE FINAL PARA OF THE USA DRAFT. IT WAS CLEAR FROM THE WAY ROBERTSON SPOKE THAT THE USA WAS NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANY QUALIFICATION OF THE REF TO UN SUPERVISION IN PARA 2 OF THE UK DRAFT, AND NO ONE BUT THE AUSTRALIANS AND OURSELVES MADE ANY OBJECTION TO THE WORDING PROPOSED.

IN VIEW OF THIS AND SINCE IN OTHER RESPECTS THE UK DRAFT IS FROM OUR

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POINT OF VIEW VASTLY BETTER THAN THE STATE DEPT DRAFT, I SAW NO ADVANTAGE IN PRESSING OUR RESERVATIONS, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE PHRASE "UN AUSPICES" IS USED IN THE OPERATIVE PARA



ROBERTSON

BY CAN

7-1-1-1

SECRET

TELEGRAM



FM WASHDC MAR4/58 SECRET
TO EXTERNAL 478 EMERGENCY
INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS PERMISNY
TT BRUSS FM OTT
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN

CHINESE PROPOSALS ON KOREA

WE HAVE OBTAINED THIS MORNING FROM THE STATE DEPT THE TEXT OF A SUGGESTED REPLY BY THE SIXTEEN TO THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS WHICH WILL BE DISCUSSED AT THIS AFTERNOON'S MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN. THE STATE DEPT HAS REQUESTED THE FACT THAT THIS TEXT HAS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO US PRIOR TO THE MEETING BE NOT RPT NOT REVEALED TO OTHER GOVTS EXCEPT THE UK WHO HAS ALSO RECEIVED A COPY.

2. RAE WILL CALL HOLMES AT 2:30 PM THIS AFTERNOON FOR ANY FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE 4:30 PM MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN TODAY. BEGINS

SUGGESTED TEXT FOR REPLY TO THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS

HER MAJESTY'S GOVT HAS TRANSMITTED TO THE OTHER GOVTS OF THE UN
COMMAND THE STATEMENT DELIVERED TO HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S CHARGE
D'AFFAIRES ON FEB7.AFTER GIVING CAREFUL STUDY TO THIS STATEMENT AND
ALSO TO THAT MADE BY THE NORTHKOREAN AUTHORITIES ON FEB5,THE GOVTS
OF THE UN COMMAND,AFTER CONSULTATION,HAVE REQUESTED HER MAJESTY'S
GOVT TO REPLY ON THEIR BEHALF.

THE GOVTS OF THE UN COMMAND ARE PLEASED TO OBSERVE THAT THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA HAS NOW STATED ITS INTENTION TO WITHDRAW ITS
TROOPS WHICH HAVE BEEN ILLEGALLY OCCUPYING THE NORTHERN PORTION OF THE
KOREAN PENINSULA SINCE OCT 1950, AS IT HAD BEEN CALLED UPON TO DO BY
ONE PART OF THE UN RESOLUTION OF FEB1/51.

THE GOVTS CONCERNED REAFFIRM THAT THEIR AIM IN KOREA IS TO SEE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNIFIED, INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC KOREA IN ACCORDANCE WITH RELEVANT UN RESOLUTIONS. IN VIEW OF THE ANNOUNCED INTENTION TO WITHDRAW CHINESE FORCES FROM NORTHKOREA AND THE EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR FREE ELECTIONS ON THE PART OF THE NORTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, IT IS HOPED THAT THE COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES CONCERNED WILL NOW CEASE TO IMPEDE THE REALIZATION OF THE OBJECTIVES SET FORTH IN THE UN RESOLUTION OF ...2

000540

PAGE TWO 478

OCT7/50, AND OTHER RESOLUTIONS CALLING FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT BY PEACE-

BY MEANS OF A UNIFIED, INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC KOREA UNDER A

REP FORM OF GOVT, TO BE INITIATED BY PLANNING AND HOLDING FREE ELECTIONS

UNDER UN SUPERVISION, AND THE FULL RESTORATION OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE.


AND SECURITY IN THE AREA.

THE GOVTS OF THE UN COMMAND WILL GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE
RESPONSE TO THIS STATEMENT AND ARE TRANSMITTING A COPY OF THIS STATE-
MENT TO THE UN. ENDS

- 2 -

3. IF US FORCES ARE WITHDRAWN FROM KOREA, ROK FORCES MUST BE GIVEN CAPABILITY TO RESIST ANY AGGRESSION FROM THE NORTH WHICH MIGHT INCLUDE CHINESE FORCES. WITH THIS CAPABILITY IN ROK HANDS AND WITHOUT US CONTROL THERE IS DANGER OF SOUTH KOREA "MARCHING NORTH" WHICH, AS YOU KNOW, RHEE HAS REPEATEDLY MAINTAINED IS ONLY WAY UNIFICATION CAN BE ACHIEVED.

4. YOUR TEL NO. Y 73 NOT YET RECEIVED.




TELEGRAM

BY CAN

7-1-1-1

SECRET



FM EXTERNAL OTT MAR3/58 SECRET
TO NEW DELHI Y81 PRIORITY
TOKYO DEFERRED
INFO WASHDC LDN EMBASSYPARIS PERMISNY
BAG CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI BRUSS ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN

CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA


WHILE WE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT LIKE YOU TO MAKE A SPECIAL VISIT
TO INDIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO ELICIT THIS INFO WE
SHOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO HAVE YOUR ASSESSMENT OF INDIAN VIEWS
ON THE SITUATION RESULTING FROM THE CHINESE ANNOUNCEMENT OF
INTENTION TO WITHDRAW TROOPS FROM NORTH KOREA.

YOU WILL BE AWARE FROM THE NUMEROUS TELEGRAMS WE HAVE REFERRED
TO YOU, OF OUR CONCERN WITH INDIAN OPINION. IT WOULD HELP IF
WE COULD BE KEPT ABREAST BY TEL OF INDIAN THINKING ON THIS
SUBJECT.

BY CAN

TELEGRAM

SECRET



FM EXTERNAL OTT MAR3/58 SECRET
 TO WASHDC Y80 OPIIMMEDIATE
 INFO PERMISNY LDN EMBASSYPARIS
 TOKYO DEFERRED
 BAG BRUSS CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN
 REF OUR Y79 FEB28

CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA

TWO TELS SHOWN TO US BY AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE FROM EXTERNAL CNBRA TO AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY WASHDC INDICATE THAT THE AUSTRALIAN POSITION IS VERY CLOSE TO OUR OWN. WITH THE QUALIFICATION THAT THE AUSTRALIANS WOULD WISH TO DO ABSOLUTELY NOTHING WHICH MIGHT INTERFERE IN ANY WAY WITH USA STRATEGY OVER SUMMIT TALKS OR WITH THEIR STRATEGIC INTENTIONS, EXTERNAL CNBRA'S ASSESSMENT IS THAT: "THE CHINESE DECISION TO WITHDRAW TROOPS UNILATERALLY AND UNCONDITIONALLY OBLIGES US TO EXAMINE CAREFULLY BOTH THE COMMUNIST PROPOSALS FOR RE-UNIFICATION AND THE POSITION NOW CONFRONTING THE UN FORCES IN KOREA". THEY CONSIDER THAT THE FACT THAT THE CHINESE GAVE THE UK ADVANCE INFO OF THEIR INTENTION TO WITHDRAW FROM KOREA, SEEMS TO INDICATE THAT THIS MOVE IS PART OF WELL THOUGHT OUT PLAN WHICH CANNOT BE DISMISSED AS A MERE PROPAGANDA GAMBIT. WE ARE INCLINED TO AGREE AND OUR VIEW IS REINFORCED BY THE REMARK WHICH PARSONS OF THE STATE DEPT MADE TO THE BRITISH TO THE EFFECT THAT THE EXPECTED CHINESE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN HAD FAILED TO DEVELOP.




2. WE THEREFORE HOPE THAT THE PROMISING DEVELOPMENTS WHICH PARSON'S STATEMENT TO YOU APPEARS TO INDICATE WILL, IN FACT, TAKE SHAPE. IN REVIEWING OUR MESSAGES TO YOU WE ARE CONSIDERABLY ATTRACTED BY THE FORMULA THE AUSTRALIANS ARE USING ABOUT SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS IN KOREA. THEY AGREE WITH US THAT IN VIEW OF UNCURK'S PAST HISTORY AND COMPOSITION IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE COMMUNIST SIDE WOULD EVER AGREE THAT IT SHOULD EXERCISE A SUPERVISORY ROLE OVER ELECTIONS. THEY HAVE SUGGESTED THE FORMULA "FREE ELECTIONS UNDER A FORM OF INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION APPROVED BY THE UN". THIS, OF COURSE, IS ENTIRELY IN AGREEMENT WITH OUR OWN POSITION AND WE SHOULD BE VERY HAPPY TO SEE THIS FORMULA ACCEPTED.

TELEGRAM

BY CAN

7-1-1-1

SECRET



FM WASHDC FEB28/58 SECRET
TO EXTERNAL 466 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO LDN PRIORITY EMBASSYPARIS PERMISNY
TT BRUSS FM OTT
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN

REF YOUR TEL Y73 FEB28

CHINESE PROPOSALS ON KOREA

WE CALLED THIS AFTERNOON ON PARSONS (DIRECTOR, OFFICE NORTHASIAN AFFAIRS) AND OUTLINED TO HIM THE MAIN POINTS OF YOUR TEL Y70 AND YOUR REF TEL. WITH RESPECT TO THE SUGGESTION THAT THE REPLY OF THE SIXTEEN TO THE CHINESE STATEMENT BE COUCHED IN TERMS OF AN ENQUIRY, PARSONS SAID THAT THE STATE DEPT WAS MUCH BOTHERED WITH THIS IDEA WHICH HAS, OF COURSE, BEEN PUT FORWARD IN THE UK DRAFT. PARSONS SAID THAT THE FEELING OF THE STATE DEPT WAS THAT IF THE SIXTEEN WERE TO INCLUDE IN THE REPLY TO THE CHINESE SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT SPECIFIC POINTS IN THEIR ORIGINAL STATEMENT, WE WOULD BE INVITING A PROPAGANDA RETURN OF A KIND WHICH MIGHT PUT THE UNC SIDE AT A SERIOUS DISADVANTAGE. ANYTHING IN THE NATURE OF A REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION AS TO CHINESE IDEAS ON THE PROCEDURE FOR UNIFICATION OR THE HOLDING OF ELECTIONS WOULD GIVE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY TO SET FORTH IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL DEMANDS WHICH MIGHT APPEAR REASONABLE BUT WHICH WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE UNC SIDE TO ACCEPT. IN MORE SPECIFIC TERMS, PARSONS SAID THAT IF WE WERE TO INVITE THE CHINESE TO PROVIDE MORE INFO CONCERNING THEIR WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES THEY WOULD RESPOND IN TERMS WHICH WOULD EMPHASIZE THE FACT THAT THE UNC FORCES WERE NOT, RPT NOT, BEING WITHDRAWN. IF WE WERE TO ASK THE CHINESE TO CLARIFY THEIR REF TO THE HOLDING OF ELECTIONS, WE WOULD RUN THE RISK OF INVITING THEM TO PUT FORWARD SOME KIND OF PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FOR VARIATIONS IN THE SIZE OF CONSTITUENCIES TO COMPENSATE FOR THE POPULATION DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA. IN THIS CONNECTION PARSONS RECALLED THAT IN 1956 INDIA HAD PUT FORWARD A PROPOSAL FOR A CONSTITUENCY BREAK DOWN WHICH WOULD BE BASED ON LAND AREA AS WELL AS POPULATION AS A MEANS OF GIVING THE NORTH KOREANS A PROPORTIONATELY HIGHER NUMBER OF SEATS

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IN THE ASSEMBLY TO BE ELECTED. PARSONS SAID THAT IT WOULD BE VERY AWKWARD IF THE CHINESE WERE TO COME FORWARD WITH SOME SOLUTION OF THE KIND ADVOCATED BY INDIA.

2. PARSONS EXPLAINED THAT MR DULLES' APPROVAL HAD NOT YET BEEN OBTAINED FOR THE SORT OF DRAFT REPLY TO THE CHINESE STATEMENT AS OUTLINED IN PARA 3 OF OUR TEL 434 FEB 26. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE STATE DEPT'S DRAFT HAD BEEN PREPARED ON THE THEORY THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO INVITE A TOTAL RESPONSE FROM THE CHINESE RATHER THAN PARTICULAR CLARIFICATIONS OF SPECIFIC QUESTIONS. HE SAID THAT THE MSG, AS NOW DRAFTED, WOULD START OFF BY RECOGNIZING AND EXPRESSING SATISFACTION AT THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE INTENDED WITHDRAWAL OF CHINESE TROOPS FROM NORTH KOREA, WHICH THEY HAD BEEN ASKED TO DO IN THE UN RESOLUTION OF FEB 1/51. HE SAID THE WORDING OF THIS SECTION WOULD BE IMPORTANT SINCE IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE NOT, RPT NOT, TO IMPLY THAT BY WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR TROOPS THE CHINESE WOULD HAVE DONE ALL THAT THE UN WOULD EXPECT THEM TO DO. THE NOTE WOULD THEN GO ON TO SAY THAT IT IS NOW THE HOPE OF THE UNC SIDE THAT THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS ARE PREPARED TO WORK TOWARDS AN AGREEMENT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNIFIED INDEPENDENT DEMOCRATIC KOREA IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE AREA BY THE HOLDING OF FREE ELECTIONS UNDER UN AUSPICES AS INDICATED IN UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION OF OCT 7/50. THE NOTE WOULD CONCLUDE WITH A STATEMENT THAT IT WOULD SEEK SOME RESPONSE FROM THE CHINESE SIDE.

3. PARSONS WENT ON TO EXPLAIN THAT THE STATE DEPT WAS KEEN ON RETAINING THE REF TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION OF OCT 7/50. THIS RESOLUTION, HE SAID, WAS A COMPREHENSIVE ONE WHICH SPELT OUT IN DETAIL THE MISSION OF THE UN FORCES IN KOREA, ESTABLISHED UNCURK, AND DEFINED IN SOME DETAIL IN THE UN OBJECTIVES FOR KOREA. IN SHORT, ALL THE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS WHICH WOULD REQUIRE CLARIFICATION IF A SETTLEMENT WAS TO BE WORKED OUT, WERE COMPREHENDED IN THE RESOLUTION. BY REFERRING TO THIS RESOLUTION, PARSONS SAID, WE WOULD BE PROVIDING A BASIS FOR THE CHINESE TO COME FORWARD WITH MORE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ON UNIFICATION PROCEDURES IF THEY SINCERELY

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DESIRED THAT OBJECTIVE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE RISK OF RECEIVING A DETAILED PROPAGANDA RESPONSE WOULD BE MINIMIZED. THE STATE DEPT'S CONCEPTION OF THE UNC REPLY AS A WHOLE WAS THAT IT SHOULD BE DESIGNED TO TEST COMMUNIST SINCERITY, TO SHOW THAT THE UNC SIDE WAS ANXIOUS TO WORK TOWARD A SOLUTION AND TO SEEK A FURTHER RESPONSE FROM THE CHINESE. TO THIS END IT WAS THE STATE DEPT VIEW THAT IT WOULD NOT BE DESIRABLE TO GO INTO TOO MUCH DETAIL OR TO SHOW TOO GREAT A DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY OR WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE IN THE INITIAL EXCHANGE.

4. PARSONS SAID THAT THE STATE DEPT APPROACH TO THIS PROBLEM HAD BEEN BASED FIRST ON THE CONVICTION THAT THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS WILL NOT AGREE TO ANY PROCEDURES FOR THE UNIFICATION OF KOREA WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE UNC SIDE AND SECONDLY, IF THEY SHOULD, ON THE OTHER HAND, SURPRISE US AND SHOW A GENUINE DESIRE TO NEGOTIATE, ON THE NEED TO FRAME A RESPONSE WHICH WOULD CONTAIN ELEMENTS THAT WILL ENSURE THAT WE WILL GET THE KIND OF UNIFIED KOREA WHICH WE WANT TO SEE AND AT THE SAME TIME PROTECT THE FREE WORLD'S INTERESTS IN THE AREA. FURTHERMORE THE USA WAS DETERMINED TO HANG ON TO THE PRINCIPLE OF THE COMPETENCE OF THE UN AND TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE UNIFICATION OF KOREA.

5. PARSONS ASKED WHETHER IT WAS THE CANADIAN VIEW THAT THERE WAS ANY PROSPECT THAT THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS WOULD AGREE TO ANY SETTLEMENT FOR KOREA WHICH WAS NOT ON THEIR OWN TERMS. WE SAID THAT WE WERE NOT SURE OF YOUR THINKING ON THIS FUNDAMENTAL POINT, BUT THAT FOR PURPOSES OF ENSURING THE SUPPORT OF THE UNCOMMITTED COUNTRIES, YOU FELT IT WAS NECESSARY TO APPROACH THE PROBLEM OF A RESPONSE TO THE CHINESE STATEMENT IN THE MANNER WHICH WOULD GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT WE THOUGHT A SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES WAS POSSIBLE. WE WENT ON TO SAY THAT WE APPRECIATED THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION POSED A REAL DILEMMA SINCE AN HONEST SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION WHICH WOULD LEAD TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DEMOCRATIC, UNIFIED AND INDEPENDENT KOREA COULD AT SOME STAGE COME INTO CONFLICT WITH THE NEED TO MAINTAIN THE FREE WORLD'S STRATEGIC POSITION IN THE

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FAREAST. PARSONS SAID THAT THE STATE DEPT WAS VERY KEENLY AWARE OF THIS DILEMMA. HE ADDED THAT NONE OF THE OTHER GOVTS WITH WHICH THE USA HAD BEEN CONSULTING ON THE PROBLEM HAD SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO WITHDRAW UNC FORCES FROM KOREA AND SOME HAD URGED IN STRONG TERMS THAT TROOPS BE KEPT THERE. HE ADDED IN PASSING THAT THE PENTAGON WAS STRONGLY OF THE VIEW THAT UNC FORCES SHOULD REMAIN IN KOREA. WHILE STATE DEPT WAS VERY MUCH OF THE OPINION THAT THE CHINESE WERE REALLY ONLY ENGAGED IN PROPAGANDA EXERCISES, AND WERE CAPITALIZING ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR TROOPS WHICH WAS BEING CARRIED OUT FOR REASONS UNKNOWN TO US, NEVERTHELESS, BECAUSE OF THE NECESSITY TO MAINTAIN THE SUPPORT OF THE UNCOMMITTED NATIONS AND BECAUSE EVENTS IN LAOS MIGHT SUGGEST A SHIFT IN COMMUNIST STRATEGY, IT WAS NECESSARY TO PROBE FOR A FURTHER CHINESE RESPONSE AND TEST THE SINCERITY OF THEIR FIRST APPROACH.

6. PARSONS SAID HE WOULD TRY TO LET US HAVE A TEXT OF THE USA DRAFT REPLY TO THE CHINESE BEFORE THE MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN, WHICH MAY BE HELD ON TUES RATHER THAN MON. HE SAID HE HOPED THE MEETING WOULD BE A SHORT ONE AND THAT ANY DIFFERENCES OVER THE TEXT MIGHT BE IRONED OUT IN SEPARATE CONSULTATIONS EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER THE MEETING.

7. WE ARE REPEATING IN TEL 467 THE TEXT OF A LET FEB28 FROM DE LA MARE OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY WHICH OUTLINES THE LATEST POSITION AS FAR AS LIKELY UK TACTICS ARE CONCERNED. IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING INFO, WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY FURTHER GUIDANCE BY FIRST THING MON MORNING.


TELEGRAM

BY CAN

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
CONFIDENTIAL

FM EXTERNAL OTT FEB28/58 CONFD
TO WASHDC Y79
INFO LDN PERMISNY EMBASSYPARIS
TOKYO DEFERRED



CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA

THE BRITISH APPEAR TO HAVE GONE PART WAY TO MEET OUR VIEW ON MENTIONING UNCURK IN THE REPLY TO THE CHINESE. THEIR REASONS FOR WISHING TO HAVE UNCURK MENTIONED ARE BRIEFLY: (A) "UNCURK, ... WHOSE REPORTS FORM THE BASIS OF THE ANNUAL DISCUSSION OF THE KOREAN QUESTION AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, IS PROPERLY CONSTITUTED BY THE UN TO WORK ON THE REUNIFICATION WHEREAS THE SIXTEEN AS SUCH ARE NOT RPT NOT". (B) "UNCURK HAS BECOME MORIBUND BECAUSE GIVEN THE COMMUNIST ATTITUDE IT HAS BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO MAKE PROGRESS. NOW THAT OSTENSIBLY FRESH PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN MADE, IT SEEMS QUITE APPROPRIATE TO OFFER TO REFER THEM TO UNCURK". (C) "IT WOULD ALSO AVOID IMPLYING ANY POSSIBLE GOVERNMENTAL STANDING TO THE NORTHKOREANS". (D) "PURPOSE OF OUR SUGGESTION OF REF TO UNCURK WAS OF COURSE TO STEER MATTERS INTO UN CHANNEL BY A BODY WHICH IS NOT RPT NOT ONLY CONSTITUTIONALLY APPROPRIATE, BUT MIGHT BE BETTER ABLE THAN, SAY, SECURITY COUNCIL TO GIVE UNOBTRUSIVE CONSIDERATION TO ANY SERIOUS COMMUNIST PROPOSALS AND PERHAPS TO WORK TOWARDS SOME SORT OF COMPROMISE WHICH COULD THEN BE ENDORSED BY UN".



2. WE DO NOT RPT NOT OF COURSE AGREE WITH POINT (A) ABOVE. IT IS OUR VIEW (WHATEVER WE MAY THINK ABOUT PROCEDURES WITHIN THE SIXTEEN) THAT RESOLUTION 711 (VII), IMPLEMENTATION OF PARA 60 OF THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, NOT RPT NOT ONLY CONSTITUTES THE SIXTEEN AS A NEGOTIATING BODY BUT GIVES THEM A CONTINUING DUTY TO KEEP THE UN INFORMED. IN ADDITION, WE CONSIDER THAT UNCURK IS NOT RPT NOT AS REP AS THE SIXTEEN AND ARE OF THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT UNCURK HAS, SINCE ITS INCEPTION, BEEN COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE COMMUNIST POWERS. THIS VIEW IS SHARED BY THE AUSTRALIANS.



3. THE UK HAS NOW, IN AN INSTRUCTION TO ITS EMBASSY IN WASHDC, AGREED THAT TO "INTRODUCE A SPECIFIC REF TO THE COMMISSION IN OUR FIRST REPLY MIGHT BE UNNECESSARILY PROVOCATIVE". THE INSTRUCTION HOWEVER ... 2

PAGE TWO Y79

CONTINUES AS FOLLOWS:"TO AVOID THIS OBJECTION WHILE MAINTAINING OUR OWN FREEDOM OF MANOEUVRE WE MIGHT THEREFORE OMIT SPECIFIC REF TO COMMISSION AND SAY SIMPLY THAT IF CHINESE WILL SEEK FROM NORTH-KOREANS CLARIFICATION OF AMBIGUITIES IN LATTER'S PROPOSALS WITH SUCH OTHER DETAILS AS MAY BE RELEVANT,THE GOVTS CONCERNED WILL BE PLEASED TO ARRANGE FOR THESE TO BE FURTHER CONSIDERED.THIS WOULD LEAVE US FREE TO PURSUE CONSIDERATION IN WHATEVER WAY SEEMED BEST IN LIGHT OF COMMUNIST REPLY.IT STILL SEEMS TO US,FOR REASONS SUGGESTED IN PRECEDING PARA,THAT REF THEN TO UNCURK MIGHT HAVE SOME MERIT SINCE IT WOULD GIVE UN COVER FOR SUCH NEGOTIATION AS MIGHT ENSUE,AND THERE WOULD PRESUMABLY BE NO RPT NO REASON WHY COMMISSION SHOULD NOT RPT NOT REQUEST ONE OR MORE COUNTRIES LIKELY TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO COMMUNISTS TO PURSUE ENQUIRIES OR NEGOTIATIONS ON ITS BEHALF."



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CONFIDENTIAL

FM EXTERNAL OTT FEB28/58 CONFID
 TO PERMISNY Y78 PRIORITY
 INFO LDN WASHDC EMBASSYPARIS
 TOKYO DEFERRED
 EAG BRUSS CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN

CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA

THE DIFFICULTIES OVER ELECTIONS IN KOREA LEADING TOWARDS UNIFICATION ARE OF TWO SORTS. ON THE UN COMMAND SIDE, AND PARTICULARLY IN RELATION TO THE SOUTH KOREANS, THERE IS ROOM TO DOUBT THE STRENGTH OF THE URGE TO AGREE TO A PROCESS WHICH COULD LEAD TO ELECTIONS ON A BASIS SATISFACTORY TO ALL CONCERNED AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF USA FORCES IN THE COURSE OF TIME. ONE MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO DRAW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE WITHDRAWAL OF USA FORCES PER SE AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF USA FORCES AS UN FORCES. THEIR PRESENCE AS STRAIGHT USA FORCES MIGHT BE JUSTIFIABLE FOR A LONGER PERIOD THAN THEIR PRESENCE AS UN FORCES. BUT IT SEEMS PROBABLE THAT ANY SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE COMMUNIST SIDE WOULD PROBABLY INVOLVE NEUTRALIZATION OF KOREA AND CONSEQUENTLY THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES REGARDLESS OF THE GUISE UNDER WHICH THEY APPEAR. THE PROBLEM ON THE UN SIDE IS ONE WHICH WE ARE NOW EXPLORING THROUGH WASHDC.

2. THE PROBLEM AS IT CONCERNS THE COMMUNIST SIDE IS TO FIND A FORMULA WHICH WILL BE ACCEPTABLE, YET PROVIDE FOR SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS UNDER UN AUSPICES. EARNSCLIFFE HAS SHOWN US AN INTERESTING TEL FROM THE UK DELEGATION IN NY DISCUSSING PROCEDURES UNDER WHICH ARRANGEMENTS FOR FREE ELECTIONS ACCEPTABLE TO ALL CONCERNED COULD BE WORKED OUT UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UN. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO HAVE YOUR VIEWS ON UK DELEGATION'S SUGGESTIONS.

3. OPERATIVE PARAS OF UK DELEGATION'S TEL READ AS FOLLOWS:

I BELIEVE THAT UN OPINION AS A WHOLE WILL EXPECT US TO TAKE THE CHINESE-NORTH KOREAN PROPOSALS SERIOUSLY. IF WE DO NOT RPT NOT APPEAR TO DO SO BY FURTHER PROBING OR BY GENUINE COUNTER PROPOSALS OF OUR OWN, WE MUST EXPECT TROUBLE WHEN THE ITEM IS DISCUSSED AT THE NEXT GENERAL ASSEMBLY. I DO NOT RPT NOT SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD RELAX OUR
 ...2

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CAREFUL SCRUTINY OF COMMUNIST PROPOSALS OR SACRIFICE ANY ESSENTIALS OF OUR POSITION BUT ONLY THAT WE SHOULD APPEAR TO BE FORTHCOMING.

2. THE MOST HOPEFUL LINE OF PROGRESS SEEMS THAT SUGGESTED IN PARA 1 OF YOUR TEL 963 TO WASHDC. WE MIGHT SUGGEST TO THE COMMUNISTS THAT WE SHOULD SEEK TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH THEM ON THE COUNTRIES WHICH WOULD SERVE ON A COMMISSION TO SUPERVISE THE ELECTIONS, AND THAT THE COMMISSION WOULD THEN BE IN SOME WAY BROUGHT INTO BEING BY THE UN, PERHAPS BY MEANS OF A RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THIS PROCEDURE WOULD SURELY BE HARD FOR THE COMMUNISTS TO REJECT BUT WOULD PRESERVE OUR ESSENTIAL POSITION. THE HELP OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL COULD IF NECESSARY BE ENLISTED TO BRING ABOUT AGREEMENT ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSION.

3. A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT BE USEFUL TO HELP PROGRESS ALONG THESE LINES. IT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO PUTTING PUBLIC PRESSURE ON THE COMMUNISTS TO REACH A SETTLEMENT. BUT THIS WOULD ONLY BE TRUE IF IT WERE A SERIOUS MEETING, DESIGNED EITHER TO LEAD INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE COMMUNISTS ON THE UNIFICATION OF KOREA, OR TO ENDORSE PROGRESS ALREADY MADE IN EACH NEGOTIATIONS. A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL DESIGNED MERELY TO PUT THE RUSSIANS AND CHINESE IN THE WRONG AT WHICH THE USA INFLEXIBLY MAINTAINED THE DOCTRINE THAT THE UN ITSELF MUST DIRECTLY SUPERVISE KOREAN ELECTIONS, WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE LIKELY TO SUCCEED. APART FROM ANY DOUBTS WE OURSELVES MIGHT HAVE THE CANADIANS, SWEDEN AND JAPANESE WOULD PROBABLY BE UNHAPPY AT SUCH AN APPROACH AND UNWILLING TO GIVE IT A SIMPLE ENFORCEMENT. SOME ATTEMPT MIGHT BE MADE BY ONE OR OTHER OF THESE TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND THE USA POSITION. I CONCLUDE THEREFORE THAT IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE BOTH FOR THE UN ITSELF, AND FOR THE PROSPECTS OF A SETTLEMENT IF THE USA AND HER ALLIES CAME TO THE COUNCIL WITHOUT PLANS OF THEIR OWN FOR BRIDGING THAT GAP.

TELEGRAM

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SECRET



FM EXTERNAL OTT FEB28/58 SECRET
TO TOKYO Y75 PRIORITY
INFP WASHDC LDN

CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA

WE HAVE BEEN DOING OUR BEST TO KEEP YOU INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS
IN RELATION TO CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA. WE SHALL BE REPEATING TO
YOU BY DEFERRED SERVICE THE TEXT OF WASHDC TEL 450 OF FEB27 CON-
TAINING AN ASSESSMENT BY THE UK AMBASSADOR IN SEOUL. AS YOU WILL SEE
FROM OUR TEL Y73 WE SHARE THE DOUBTS OF THE UK AMBASSADOR AS TO
ULTIMATE USA INTENTIONS. IT WOULD HELP US TO HAVE YOUR ASSESSMENT
TOGETHER WITH THAT OF THE LIAISON OFFICER IN SEOUL ON THE KNOWN OR
EXPECTED ATTITUDE OF THE SOUTHKOREANS TOWARDS REASONABLE PROPOSALS
FOR ELECTIONS AND UNIFICATION. IT WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL TO HAVE
YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE STRATEGIC INTENTIONS OF THE USA COMMANDERS
IN THE AREA AND OF THE SOUTHKOREANS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CHINESE
PROPOSAL.

*not
received*

NO.	INIT.
1	AMBASSADOR
	MUTTER
2	DUPON
3	HALESTED
	GORHAM
	SMITH
	CHOQUETTE
	MISS CURRIE

Tel. sent March 4
PD



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TELEGRAM

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FM EXTERNAL OTT FEB28/58 SECRET
TO WASHDC Y73 EMERGENCY
INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS BRUSS PERMISNY
TOKYO DEFERRED
BAG CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN

REF YOUR TEL 434 FEB26

CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA

WE ARE GRATIFIED BY THE INCREASED FLEXIBILITY OF APPROACH IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT WHICH PARSONS' CONVERSATION WITH YOU APPEARS TO INDICATE, ESPECIALLY IN THE GLOSS ON THE DRAFT REPLY TO THE CHINESE CONTAINED IN PARA 5 OF YOUR TEL. MUCH OF COURSE WILL DEPEND ON THE WORDING OF THE USA DRAFT REPLY AND WE THEREFORE WOULD NOT RPT NOT LIKE TO COMMIT OURSELVES IN ADVANCE TO REFRAIN FROM MAKING SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS OR FROM DIFFERING WITH IT IN SOME RESPECTS IN THE MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN UNLESS WE HAVE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXAMINE THE TEXT AND TO REACH AGREEMENT ON IT.

2. LIKE THE BRITISH AS MENTIONED IN YOUR TEL 437, WE ARE INCLINED TO THE VIEW THAT THERE IS TOO MUCH MENTION OF UN RESOLUTIONS IN THE OUTLINE USA NOTE. WE WOULD PREFER TO SEE THE SAME POINTS MADE WITHOUT SO MUCH EMPHASIS ON THE TWO RESOLUTIONS WHICH MUST BE PARTICULARLY REPUGNANT TO THE OTHER SIDE. THE BRITISH DRAFT IS PHRASED IN TERMS OF AN ENQUIRY; PRESUMABLY THE DRAFT OUTLINED IN YOUR TEL 434 WILL BE DESIGNED AS AN ENQUIRY ALSO ALTHOUGH THIS IS NOT RPT NOT TOO CLEAR. IF IT IS IN THE FORM OF AN ENQUIRY, THE EMPHASIS ON THE UN RESOLUTIONS NEED NOT RPT NOT BE SO APPARENT.

3. AS WE SAID IN OUR TEL Y70, WE WOULD HOPE THAT EMPHASIS ON THE MECHANICS OF PROPER SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS WILL NOT RPT NOT BE MADE THE MAIN BASIS OF THE UNC SIDES CASE AGAINST THE COMMUNIST SIDE. WE SHOULD LIKE TO SEE A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF PLAYING FOR TIME, POSSIBLY THROUGH EXPLORATION OF COMMUNIST INTENTIONS. PERHAPS IN ADDITION TO WELCOMING THE ANNOUNCED WITHDRAWAL OF COMMUNIST CHINESE TROOPS OUR REPLY COULD WELCOME THE CHINESE DESIRE TO SEE FREE ELECTIONS HELD AND EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THESE ELECTIONS ACCEPTABLE TO ALL CONCERNED COULD BE WORKED OUT UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

4. WE APPRECIATE THE STRATEGIC DILEMMA WHICH FACES THE UNITED

NO.	AMBASSADOR	INIT
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PAGE TWO Y73


STATES. WE FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO BE SURE OF THE REAL INTENTIONS OR DESIRES OF THE USA GOVERNMENT OVER KOREA. THE GENERAL STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS ADVANCED IN PARAS ONE AND TWO OF YOUR TEL 434 DO NOT RPT NOT HARMONIZE PARTICULARLY WELL WITH PARAS FIVE AND SIX. WE WONDER WHICH AIM IS PREPONDERANT IN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AT THE PRESENT TIME; THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A UNIFIED INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC KOREA OR THE MAINTENANCE OF USA TROOPS IN KOREA EVEN IF IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO FRUSTRATE ATTEMPTS AT A SETTLEMENT IN ORDER TO KEEP THEM THERE. YOUR REPORT OF AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND RESERVATIONS OVER A SETTLEMENT WHICH MIGHT ULTIMATELY LEAD TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF USA FORCES FROM KOREA MAY BE AN INDICATION OF THE WAY THINKING IS LIKELY TO GO.

TELEGRAM

SECRET

BY CAN

FM WASHDC FEB27/58 SECRET
TO EXTERNAL 450 PRIORITY
INFO FM OTT FEB28 LDN
TT TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT




CHINESE PROPOSALS ON KOREA

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A TEL DATED FEB24 FROM THE UK EMBASSY

IN SEOUL WHICH HAS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO US BY THE BRITISH
EMBASSY HERE AND WHICH YOU MAY NOT RPT NOT HAVE RECEIVED FROM
EARNESCLIFFE.BEGINS:

COMMUNIST PROPOSALS. KOREA.



MY USA COLLEAGUE AND I MET TODAY IN AN ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE WHAT
THE CHINESE ARE REALLY AFTER.DOWLING OPENED BY SAYING HE HAD"BEGGED"
THE STATE DEPT TO GIVE EARNEST CONSIDERATION TO THE PROPOSALS
BECAUSE IT WAS OBVIOUS NOW THAT SOME POWERFUL MOTIVE IS BEHIND THEM.

2.WE HAD DISCUSSION AS TO WHAT THAT MOTIVE COULD BE.WE AGREED THAT
THE PROPOSALS COULD NOT RPT NOT BE EXPLAINED AWAY AS A PRELUDE TO
SUMMIT TALKS NOR AS DUE TO WEARINESS WITH THE STATUS QUO.WE TOOK
NEXT THE TENTATIVE VIEWS OF CATHOLIC MISSIONARY,AS PASSED TO ME
YESTERDAY BY BISHOP QUINLAN APOSTOLIC REGENT,THAT UNREST IN CERTAIN
PROVINCES ALLOTTED THE MAINTENANCE OF THESE PARTICULAR ARMIES,
HAD REACHED DANGER POINT.I DID NOT RPT NOT THINK WE COULD BE
SATISFIED WITH THAT AND NEITHER DID DOWLING.ALSO IF IT WERE
QUESTION OF FINANCE WE THOUGHT THAT MOVE WOULD BE RATHER TOWARDS
SCALING DOWN THAN ABANDONING DISPOSITION.

3.WE THEN TRIED TO VIEW IT AS BID FOR UN MEMBERSHIP BUT WE FAILED
TO SEE HOW THE CHINESE COULD HOPE TO ACHIEVE THAT OBJECTIVE BY
PRESENT METHODS.ADMITTEDLY THIS WOULD BUILD UP THEIR CASE BUT
WITHOUT ENSURING SUCCESS.AT BEST IT COULD BE CONTRIBUTORY FACTOR.

4.WE CAME LASTLY TO ONE FACTOR KNOWN TO BE NEW IN THE SITUATION
NAMELY THE GROWING INEQUALITY OF ARMS IN THIS REGION.WE NOTED THAT
MATADOR HAD BEEN INSTALLED IN FORMOSA;THAT WEAPONS OF ATOMIC
CAPABILITY HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED INTO KOREA;AND A RECENT DECLARATION
FROM WASHINGTON HERALDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF IRBM BASED IN THE FAR
EAST.MAY IT NOT RPT NOT BE REASONABLE TO THINK THIS HAS SERIOUSLY
UPSET THE CHINESE.

5.IF SO THEY MAY GO TO CONSIDERABLE LENGTHS TO CHECK THE
ADVANCE OF THESE BASES.

6.IF PEKING INDICATED TO MOSCOW THAT IT WOULD BE READY TO GIVE...2

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UP KOREA ALTOGETHER TO THAT END WE THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE THAT MOSCOW MIGHT ITSELF HAVE NO RPT NO OBJECTION TO RELAXING ITS HOLD. HOWEVER, RUSSIAN AIM HAS BEEN TO DENY THE PENINSULA TO SOMEBODY ELSE RATHER THAN TO OCCUPY IT.

7. THE CHINESE KNOW THAT IF OWN FORCES RETIRE UN FORCES WILL NOT RPT NOT FOLLOW SUIT AUTOMATICALLY. SO WHAT COMES AFTER THAT IN THEIR THINKING.

8. IF THERE IS ANYTHING IN PARAS 4, 5, 6 ABOVE THE CRUCIAL MOMENT WILL THEN HAVE ARRIVED, FOR THE CHINESE WILL BE FACED WITH THE ALTERNATIVE OF EITHER PROCEEDING TOWARDS UNIFICATION ON TERMS RESEMBLING OURS RATHER THAN THEIR OWN, OR OF SUSPENDING EVERYTHING AND RESTING CONTENT WITH AN IMPRESSIVE SCORE ON THE FIELD OF PROPAGANDA.

accelerate? ?
9. THAT WILL FEDERATE MOMENT AT WHICH AMERICA WILL HAVE TO PROVE WHETHER THEY ARE HERE TO PLANT FORWARD BASES OR TO BRING ABOUT KOREAN UNIFICATION.


10. IT WILL BE ALSO FOR SYNGMAN RHEE MOMENT OF TEST. HIS ATTITUDE TO DATE HAS BEEN THAT HE PRESIDES ALREADY OVER GOVT OF THE WHOLE COUNTRY. BUT IF OFFER OF FREE COUNTRY-WIDE ELECTIONS WERE HELD OUT, CHANCES ARE THAT HE WOULD NOT RPT NOT SPURN IT AND THUS SHATTER HIS OWN DREAM OF UNIFICATION.

11. IN CONCLUSION WE AGREED THAT FREE ELECTIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE WOULD RESULT IN A COMMUNIST DEFEAT, BUT THAT AFTER A PERIOD OF CONFUSED LEADERSHIP AND DISILLUSIONMENT COMMUNIST VICTORY WOULD BE PROBABLE.

12. MY COLLEAGUES WILL NO RPT NO DOUBT HAVE ADDRESSED STATE DEPT ON THE ABOVE LINES. ENDS



TELEGRAM

SECRET



BY CAN

7-1-1-1



FM EXTERNAL OTT FEB27/58 SECRET
TO WASHDC Y72 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS BRUSS PERMISNY TOKYO DEFERRED
BAG CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN

REF OUR TEL Y70 FEB26

CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA

WE QUOTE BELOW THE REVISED BRITISH TEXT OF A SUGGESTED REPLY TO THE CHINESE PROPOSAL OF FEB7 ON KOREA. AS IT SEEMS PROBABLE FROM YOUR TEL 434 FEB26 THAT THIS DRAFT WILL NOT RPT NOT BE USED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT, WE ARE REFRAINING FROM SUGGESTING ADDITIONAL AMENDMENTS TO IT. TEXT OF REVISED BRITISH DRAFT BEGINS;

(A) "THE GOVTS OF THE SIXTEEN COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED FORCES FOR THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN KOREA HAVE NOTED THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE NORTHKOREAN AUTHORITIES ON FEB5 AND THAT MADE BY THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES AND COMMUNICATED TO H.B.M. CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN PEKING ON FEB7. THEY HAVE GIVEN CAREFUL STUDY TO THESE STATEMENTS AND TO THE PROPOSALS MADE THEREIN. THE GOVTS CONCERNED REAFFIRM THAT THEIR AIM IN KOREA IS TO SEE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNIFIED, INDEPENDENT, AND DEMOCRATIC KOREA. TO THIS END, AS THEY HAVE OFTEN STATED, THEY WISH TO SEE FREE ELECTIONS HELD FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. THEY ARE GLAD TO NOTE THAT THE NORTHKOREAN AND CHINESE AUTHORITIES ALSO FAVOUR FREE ELECTIONS, AND THEY WELCOME THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT CHINESE FORCES ARE TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM NORTHKOREA.

(B) "THERE APPEARS HOWEVER TO BE SOME DOUBT AS TO THE PRECISE INTERPRETATION TO BE PLACED ON THE NORTHKOREAN PROPOSALS. THE NORTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR IN PEKING, FOR EXAMPLE, IS REPORTED AS HAVING STATED THAT THE "PURPOSE OF THE SUPERVISION BY A NEUTRAL NATIONS ORGANISATION WAS TO SEE THAT ALL POLITICAL PARTIES AND PUBLIC FIGURES IN BOTH NORTH AND SOUTHKOREA WOULD HAVE FREEDOM OF ACTION, SPEECH, PUBLICATION, ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION", BUT THAT "SUCH SUPERVISION SHOULD NOT RPT NOT INTERVENE IN THE ELECTIONS". THE NORTHKOREAN AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW IS REPORTED AS STATING THAT THE NEUTRAL BODY SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED THROUGH TALKS BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF BOTH PARTS OF THE COUNTRY BUT "SHOULD NOT RPT NOT INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE KOREANS". IN ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN PRAVDA AND IZVESTIA ON THE OTHER HAND,

PAGE TWO Y72

A CALL IS MADE FOR THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES AS A PRELIMINARY TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM BY THE KOREANS THEMSELVES, AND THIS APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN THE POSITION TAKEN BY MR. CHOU EN LAI IN HIS REPORT TO THE NATIONAL PEOPLES CONGRESS ON FEB 10. THESE INTERPRETATIONS APPEAR TO CALL FOR SOME CLARIFICATION AND THE GOVTS OF THE SIXTEEN COUNTRIES CONCERNED WOULD BE GLAD TO KNOW WHETHER, WHEN THE NORTHKOREAN AUTHORITIES SPEAK OF A "NEUTRAL NATIONS ORGANIZATION" TO SUPERVISE THE ELECTIONS, THEY ACCEPT THAT THESE SHOULD BE HELD UNDER UNITED NATIONS AUSPICES, AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE ADEQUATE SUPERVISION, NOT RPT NOT ONLY OF THE PRELIMINARIES BUT ALSO OF THE ELECTIONS THEMSELVES. THEY WOULD ALSO BE GLAD TO KNOW WHETHER IT IS NOW ACCEPTED THAT REPRESENTATION IN THE NEW NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BE IN PROPORTION TO THE INDIGENOUS POPULATION.

(C) "IF THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES WILL SEEK FROM THE NORTHKOREAN AUTHORITIES CLARIFICATION OF THE POINTS MENTIONED ABOVE, WITH SUCH OTHER DETAILS OF THE KOREAN PROPOSALS AS MAY BE RELEVANT, THE GOVTS CONCERNED WILL BE PLEASED TO PASS THESE TO THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION." ENDS.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(DUPLICATE)

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, MOSCOW

Reference: Our Telegram No. 65 of February 27

Subject: KOREA

Security: RESTRICTED

No: 274

Date: February 27, 1958

Enclosures: 1

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.

7-1-1-1

References

Mr. Holmes
Mr. Collins
F.E. Circ.
DMI
DMOP
Washington
London
Paris Emb.
Permis NY
Tokyo
Brussels
Canberra
Wellington
Karachi
New Delhi
Athens
Ankara.

I enclose the text, in Russian, of a statement of the Soviet Government concerning a statement made by the Government of North Korea on February 5 for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and the peaceful unification of the country. I also enclose DRSP translation.


2. This statement was published on February 21 and sent to us under cover of a note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated February 25.

(Sgd.) David M. Johnson

Ambassador.

Internal
Circulation

Distribution
to Posts



Friday, Feb. 21, 1958.

STATEMENT BY GOVERNMENT OF USSR

The Government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic made a statement on February 5 concerning the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and the peaceful unification of the country. The statement proposes the simultaneous withdrawal of all foreign troops from South and North Korea, including Chinese people's volunteers, the holding after the withdrawal of the foreign troops of free all-Korean elections under the supervision of a body made up of representatives of neutral countries, consultations on principles of equality about economic and cultural ties between the two parts of Korea, and the reduction to a minimum of the armed forces of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and South Korea in the nearest future.

The Government of the People's Republic of China responded to this call at once. On February 7 it declared that all foreign troops should leave Korea within definite periods and expressed its willingness to discuss with the Government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic the question of withdrawing Chinese people's volunteers from Korea. It has also raised the question about the Governments of the United States and other countries, whose troops are still in South Korea taking similar measures for the purpose of withdrawing their troops as well.

The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic in their joint statement of February 19 announced that Chinese people's volunteers, having agreed with this proposal of the Chinese Government, have decided fully to withdraw from Korea in stages before the end of 1958. The first stage of the withdrawal will be completed before April 30, 1958.

The Government of the USSR attaches great significance to this initiative of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of China, regarding that it is one of the most important measures designed to relax international tension, strengthen confidence among states and consolidate peace.

Thanks to the efforts of the Korean and the Chinese peoples to settle the Korean problem peacefully which were supported by the Soviet Union and many other peaceloving states, the bloodshed in Korea was stopped in July 1953 and an armistice agreement was signed. To this day this Agreement plays an important part in the maintenance of peace in the Korean Peninsula. A large share of the credit for ensuring the armistice goes to the Neutral Nations Commission for the supervision of the armistice in Korea made up of representatives of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, and Switzerland.

Nevertheless, the situation in Korea cannot but arouse apprehension. In spite of a number of constructive proposals and efforts on the part of the Government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic aimed at a peaceful settlement of the Korean issue, as a result of the resistance to this on the part of the South Korean authorities, supported by the United States, the country has not been united as yet. The refusal of the United States in the summer of 1957 to abide by the important provision of the Armistice Agreement which limited the import of arms into Korea, the equipping of the South Korean army with the most up-to-date weapons and the conversion of South Korea into an atomic base does not facilitate in the least a peaceful settlement of the Korean issue. Moreover,

- 2 -

they aggravate the situation in Korea, a development which, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, can be desired by no government which actually strives to ease world tension, in the Far East included.

The Soviet Government, as hitherto, is convinced that the Korean issue cannot be solved by foreign intervention in Korea's affairs. The problem of restoring Korean national unity can be solved only by the Koreans themselves, through a gradual rapprochement of the two parts of Korea.

The proposal of the Government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic about the peaceful unification of the country and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and the statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China on this issue open new avenues for the solution of the Korean problem in the interests of peace in Korea and the elimination of a hotbed of war in that area.

These proposals are in accord with the growing desire of the peoples to ease international tension and create an atmosphere of confidence and peaceful co-operation among states.

Why should not the United States and other countries maintaining troops in South Korea support the proposals of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of China if they sincerely desire to promote the peaceful unification of Korea and the strengthening of peace in the Far East? There can be no doubt that the withdrawal of all foreign troops would calm the atmosphere in Korea, facilitate the establishment of the necessary contacts between the two parts of Korea and thus help to create the prerequisites for the gradual unification of the country and also to ease tension in the Far East.

In this connection particular significance is assumed by the proposal again advanced by the Korean People's Democratic Republic to hold respective talks between the Korean People's Democratic Republic and South Korea on a basis of equality, including the problem of establishing economic and cultural ties between the North and the South. The Soviet Government believes that this proposal of the Government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic can serve as a sound basis for the establishment and development of ties between both parts of Korea.

Rapprochement between North and South Korea would be facilitated and the preservation of peace in Korea ensured if both governments were to conclude a peace pact and undertake not to resort to force in settling controversial issues, if an agreement were reached on a substantial reduction of the armed forces of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and South Korea, and if they were to declare that they would prevent the deployment of nuclear and rocket weapons on their territories.

Bearing in mind that Korea has been divided for more than 12 years now and that the necessary confidence in the relations between the two parts of Korea does not exist, it would be expedient, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, to call a conference of the states concerned to discuss measures conducing to a rapprochement between the two parts of Korea.


The Soviet Government fully supports the measures of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of China and hopes that the Governments of the United States and other states, whose troops are stationed in South Korea

- 3 -

will regard the proposals of the governments of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of China with due attention, will withdraw their troops from South Korea and thereby promote a further improvement of the situation in the Far East, the strengthening of peace in Korea and the creation of premises for the restoration of Korea's national unity on a peaceful and democratic basis. (All papers. In full.)

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL



FM WASHDC FEB26/58 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 438. OPIMMEDIATE
INFO PERMISNY EMBASSYPARIS LDN
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG HAGUE BRUSS CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA

REF OURTEL 437 FEB26

CHINESE PROPOSALS ON KOREA


FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF THE NZ GOVT'S COMMENTS ON THE RECENT CHINESE /
NORTHKOREAN PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE REUNIFICATION OF KOREA, BEGINS:
THE SUCCESSION OF CHINESE-NORTHKOREAN STATEMENTS CULMINATING IN THE
PROPOSAL TO WITHDRAW VOLUNTEERS BY THE END OF 1958 HAS, LIKE THE
STREAM OF BULGANIN LETTERS, PLACED THE WEST AT A PROPAGANDA DISAD-
VANTAGE. IN OUR VIEW THIS MUST BE QUICKLY COUNTERED. THESE PROPOSALS
MAY REPRESENT THE OPENING SHOTS IN A CHINESE CAMPAIGN FOR A FAR
EASTERN SUMMIT CONFERENCE FOR WHICH THERE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE WIDE
SUPPORT IN ASIA.

THE SUGGESTED WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS WILL HAVE A WIDE APPEAL TO THE
ASIANS AND COULD BE REGARDED AS THE FIRST REAL STEP BY THE COMMUNISTS
TO EXPIATE THE KOREAN AGGRESSION (USA REP IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
SUGGESTED SUCH A MOVE TO THE COMMUNISTS AS A TEST OF THEIR SINCERITY
LAST YEAR). THE FACT THAT CHINESE HAVE 16 DIVISIONS IN NORTHKOREA
AGAINST TWO AMERICAN DIVISIONS IN SOUTHKOREA WILL BE DELIBERATELY
OBSCURED BY COMMUNIST PROPAGANDISTS.

WE FEEL THAT THE 16 SHOULD REGARD THIS COMMUNIST INITIATIVE WITH
CAUTION AND WITHOUT REBUFFING IT SHOULD SEEK IN THEIR REPLY TO EX-
PLORE IN A NON-COMMITTAL WAY THE GENUINENESS OF THE ELECTIONS OFFER
AS POSSIBLY OFFERING THE MOST FRUITFUL LINE OF APPROACH.

WE HAVE SEEN DRAFT UK REPLY AND NOTED VARYING INTERPRETATIONS
PLACED ON OFFER BY NORTHKOREAN SPOKESMEN IN MOSCOW AND PEKING. WE WOULD
NOT DISAGREE THAT THIS DRAFT MIGHT PROVIDE USEFUL BASIS FOR DISCUSSION
AT MEETING OF 16.


WE WOULD AGREE WITH AMERICANS THAT AGREEMENT ON ELECTIONS HELD
UNDER UN AUSPICES (NOT NECESSARILY UN SUPERVISION) SHOULD BE REACHED
BEFORE THE UN SIDE IS PREPARED TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM SOUTH
KOREA. WE ALSO CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT TO INSIST THAT ANY SOLUTION MUST
BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE UN. ENDS



TELEGRAM

7-1-1-1 BY CAN

CONFIDENTIAL



FM WASHDC FEB26/58 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 437 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO PERMISNY EMBASSYPARIS LDN
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG HAGUE BRUSS CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN

CHINESE PROPOSALS ON KOREA

THE NZ EMBASSY CALLED ANOTHER MEETING OF REPS OF OLD COMMONWEALTH EMBASSIES TODAY TO DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT FURTHER. THE NEWZEALANDERS MADE AVAILABLE A BRIEF SUMMARY OF NZ VIEWS ON THE CHINESE STATEMENT CONCERNING THE REUNIFICATION OF KOREA WHICH IS BEING TRANSMITTED IN A SEPARATE MSG.

2. THE UK REP SAID THAT THE FO THOUGHT THAT USA PROPOSALS FOR A REPLY TO THE CHINESE BY THE SIXTEEN TENDED SOMEWHAT TO OVER-EMPHASIZE PAST UN RESOLUTIONS ON KOREA. THE FO FEARED THAT THROUGH SUCH EMPHASIS THE REJECTION OF THE REPLY OF THE SIXTEEN BY THE CHINESE IS HIGHLY PROBABLE. IN THIS CONNECTION THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN PEKING HAS REPORTED THAT AN EDITORIAL IN THE PEKING PEOPLE'S DAILY OF FEB22 FLATLY REJECTED THE IDEA THAT THE UN SHOULD HAVE ANY PART IN SOLVING THE KOREAN QUESTION. THE UN, THE EDITORIAL SAID, HAD LOST ALL CAPACITY AND MORAL FORCE TO BRING ABOUT THE SOLUTION OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM.

3. EARNSCLIFFE MAY HAVE ALREADY PASSED TO YOU THE UK EXPLANATION OF WHY THEY HAD SUGGESTED THE EMPLOYMENT OF UNCURK IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE CHINESE. BRIEFLY THEIR REASONING IS THAT UNCURK'S ANNUAL REPORTS HAVE FOR SOME TIME FORMED THE BASIS OF THE REGULAR CONSIDERATION OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM IN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY; THAT UNLIKE THE SIXTEEN IT HAS BEEN PROPERLY CONSTITUTED BY THE UN AND REGULARLY ENJOINED TO WORK FOR THE REUNIFICATION OF KOREA; THAT UNCURK HAS BEEN MORIBUND PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE OF THE INTRANSIGENT COMMUNIST POSITION WITH RESPECT TO UN PROPOSAL CONCERNING REUNIFICATION OF KOREA; AND THAT THE PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE UNCURK IN THE INITIAL EXCHANGES ON THE CHINESE STATEMENT WAS A MEANS OF KEEPPING THE NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN A UN FRAMEWORK WITHOUT TOO MUCH EMPHASIS ON UN RESOLUTIONS ON KOREA. THE FO HAS ALSO EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT UNCURK NEED ONLY BE AN OPENING GAMBIT AND THAT THERE WOULD BE NO OBJECTION TO SHIFTING THE NEGOTIATIONS TO SOME OTHER BODY AT A LATER DATE IF THIS

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PROVED DESIRABLE.

4.ON THE QUESTION OF THE TYPE OF SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS IN KOREA,THE FO IS NOT INCLINED TO GO AS FAR IN THE DIRECTION OF FLEXIBILITY AS WE HAVE SUGGESTED IN THE FIRST COMMUNICATION IN REPLY TO THE CHINESE.SUCH A COMPROMISE COULD BE CONSIDERED LATER IF THE CHINESE SEEM GENUINELY ANXIOUS TO NEGOTIATE.

5.IN A BROADER DISCUSSION OF THE CHINESE INITIATIVE,OTHER COMMON-WEALTH REPS EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT IT MIGHT BE ONE FACET OF A NEW TACK IN COMMUNIST STRATEGY IN THE FAREAST,ONE EXAMPLE OF WHICH IS THE SETTLEMENT RECENTLY NEGOTIATED IN LAOS.THE REASONS FOR THIS CHANGE IN STRATEGY WERE NOT CLEAR,BUT THE LONG TERM IMPLICATIONS WERE DISTURBING SINCE THEY COULD LEAD TO A SITUATION WHERE IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF THE USA FORCES IN KOREA.BOTH THE AUSTRALIAN AND NZ REPS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THIS SINCE THERE WOULD BE NOWHERE ELSE IN THE NORTHASIAN AREA TO WHICH USA FORCES COULD BE SAFELY MOVED,AND THEIR CONTINUED PRESENCE IN KOREA COULD PROVE MORE AND MORE EMBARRASSING IF THE CHINESE AND NORTHKOREANS WERE ABLE TO ADOPT AN APPARENTLY FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE UNIFICATION OF KOREA ON TERMS NOT TOO FAR REMOVED FROM THOSE TRADITIONALLY PROPOSED BY THE UN.

6.APPARENTLY AT ONE STAGE PARSONS IN THE STATE DEPT HAD MENTIONED TO THE UK COUNSELLOR THAT THE STATE DEPT MIGHT DISCUSS WITH THE PENTAGON THE POSSIBILITY THAT IN THE LONG RUN THE USA MIGHT HAVE TO ACCEPT THE VIEW THAT A REUNIFIED KOREA SHOULD BE NEUTRALIZED AND DEMILITARIZED.THIS IDEA WAS NOT MENTIONED TO US TODAY,NOR TO THE AUSTRALIANS YESTERDAY,HOWEVER,AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE PENTAGON HAS INFORMED THE STATE DEPT THAT IT IS STRATEGICALLY ESSENTIAL TO RETAIN USA FORCES IN KOREA FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

TELEGRAM

NO. 73 BY CAN
AMBASSADOR
MUTTER
DEPUTY
HALSTED
GORDON
SMITH
CHOUETTE
MISS CURRIE

SECRET

EMBASSY - AMSTERDAM
MAR 5 1958
TOKYO - AMSTERDAM

CANADIAN EMBASSY
COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

FM WASHDC FEB26/58 SECRET
TO EXTERNAL 434 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO PERMISNY EMBASSYPARIS LDN
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG HAGUE BRUSS CNBRA WLGTN KARACH DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN

CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA
HOWARD PARSONS, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS, CALLED US IN THIS MORNING TO EXCHANGE VIEWS IN ADVANCE OF THE PROJECTED MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN WHICH MAY TAKE PLACE THIS WEEK IF THE MEMBERS OF THE GROUP ARE READY FOR DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE CHINESE PROPOSALS ON KOREA BY THAT TIME. THE STATE DEPT HAS BEEN CONSULTING SIMILARLY WITH A LIMITED NUMBER OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SIXTEEN. PARSONS THOUGHT WE WOULD BE INTERESTED TO HAVE THE STATE DEPT'S OWN ANALYSIS OF THE NORTHKOREAN AND COMMUNIST CHINESE INITIATIVE. IN THE VIEW OF THE STATE DEPT, AFTER A CAREFUL ANALYSIS OF THE CHINESE PROPOSALS IN THE LIGHT OF EARLIER PROPOSALS, THE CONCLUSION HAD BEEN REACHED THAT THERE WAS LITERALLY NOTHING NEW IN THE NORTHKOREAN STATEMENT OF FEB5 AND IN THE NOTE FROM PEKING OF FEB7. THE POSITIONS TAKEN MARKED NO ADVANCE ON THE COMMUNIST POSITIONS OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OF 1954. THE ONLY REALLY NEW ELEMENT TO BE DISCERNED WAS THE CHINESE STATEMENT OF THEIR INTENTION TO ARRANGE FOR THE UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL BY THE END OF THE YEAR OF THEIR FORCES IN NORTHKOREA, WHICH WAS ANNOUNCED JOINTLY BY CHOU-EN LAI AND KIM IL SUNG FROM PYONGYANG.

2. IN THE ASSESSMENT OF THE STATE DEPT, THE MOTIVATION BEHIND THE CHINESE PROPOSALS INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:

(1) FROM A STRATEGIC POINT OF VIEW, THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS WOULD SUFFER LITTLE OR NO RELATIVE DISADVANTAGE THROUGH THE WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR FORCES BEYOND THE YALU RIVER AS PART OF A WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM THE TWO KOREAS (FOR REASONS SIMILAR TO THOSE OUTLINED IN THE PROPOSED LINE TO BE TAKEN WITH THE PRESS SET FORTH IN YOUR MSG Y63 FEB19). PARSONS ADDED THAT THEIR ESTIMATE WAS THAT THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS HAVE BEEN CONVINCED THAT THE UN WOULD NOT START A WAR AGAINST NORTHKOREA, AND THAT THEY HAVE ALSO CONCLUDED THAT THE DANGER OF SYNGMAN RHEE UNDERTAKING OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IS SLIGHT. THEIR PROPOSALS, THEREFORE, HAVE THE OBJECTIVE OF PLACING PRESSURE ON UN FORCES TO VACATE SOUTHKOREA ON HIGHLY DISADVANTAGEOUS STRATEGIC TERMS.

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(I) PARSONS EMPHASIZED THAT UN FORCES IN KOREA (WHICH WERE PREPONENTLY USA FORCES) REPRESENTED AN EXCEEDINGLY IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE WHOLE OF THE ASIAN DEFENCE CHAIN RANGING FROM KOREA TO NZ, AND THAT ANY WEAKENING OF THIS STRATEGIC CHAIN WOULD BE FELT THROUGHOUT THE AREA. IF THE UN FORCES COULD BE REMOVED FROM KOREA, AND IF THIS COULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY A REDUCTION OF INDIGENOUS FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA, THE COMMUNISTS MAY HAVE CALCULATED THAT THEIR PROPOSALS WOULD UNDERCUT THE WHOLE SYSTEM OF USA ASSISTANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, WITH A RESULTANT DECREASE IN THE INTEREST OF CONGRESS IN THE AREA. THE REDUCTION OF SUCH ASSISTANCE WOULD RENDER SOUTH KOREA MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO INFILTRATION AND SUBVERSION.

(III) THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS HAD BEEN LONG PRESSING FOR EQUALITY OF TREATMENT FOR THE TWO KOREAS. IN THIS CONTEXT, PARSONS REFERRED TO THE CONCLUSION OF TRADE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN NORTH KOREA AND SUCH COUNTRIES AS INDIA BURMA INDONESIA EGYPT AND SYRIA, WHICH HAD THE OBJECTIVE OF STRENGTHENING THE CLAIMS OF NORTH KOREA TO RECOGNITION. (PARSONS ADDED THAT IT WAS ALSO THEIR CONCLUSION THAT THE RECENT AIRCRAFT INCIDENT WAS PART OF THE SAME CAMPAIGN AIMED AT FORCING DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA). SUPPORT OF THE NORTH KOREAN PROPOSALS BY COMMUNIST CHINA THE USSR EAST GERMANY AND NORTH VIETNAM INDICATED THE COMMON PATTERN AND THE CONCERTED ACTION OF THE COMMUNIST POWERS TO PUT THE USA ON THE DEFENSIVE. PARSONS DREW ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS IN THEIR SUPPORT OF THE CHINESE ^{COM} COMMUNISTS AND NORTH KOREANS HAD ADDED A FURTHER ELEMENT TO THE PROPOSALS PROVIDING FOR THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF KOREA ON THE PARALLEL OF THE RAPACKI PLAN PROPOSALS AFFECTING CENTRAL EUROPE.

3. IN REPLY, WE BASED OUR "OFFICIAL LEVEL" ASSESSMENT PRIMARILY ON YOUR TELS Y58 FEB 14 AND Y64 FEB 20, POINTING OUT THAT IN OUR VIEW THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN INTENTION TO BRING ABOUT THE UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES FROM NORTH KOREA MADE IT ALL THE MORE NECESSARY TO ENSURE AGAINST CREATING THE IMPRESSION OF REJECTING THE CHINESE PROPOSALS WITHOUT CAREFUL ANALYSIS. PARSONS REPLIED THAT THE STATE DEPT HELD A SIMILAR VIEW AND FELT IT IMPORTANT IN REPLYING TO THE CHINESE COMMUNIST NOTE TO ANSWER THE STATEMENT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO PLACE THE EMPHASIS ON THE NECESSITY FOR AN ADEQUATE AND

PAGE THREE 434

EFFECTIVELY SUPERVISED POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF KOREAN REUNIFICATION AS A NECESSARY STEP REQUIRED BEFORE THE WITHDRAWAL OF UN FORCES. WE UNDERSTAND THAT AT THE MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN, THE USA WILL OUTLINE THE TERMS OF A DRAFT NOTE TO BE GIVEN IN REPLY TO PEKING BY THE UK GOVT ON BEHALF OF THE SIXTEEN, WHICH WOULD CONTAIN THE FOLLOWING MAIN POINTS: THE NOTE WOULD WELCOME THE WITHDRAWAL OF CHINESE TROOPS, POINTING OUT THAT THIS WAS IN ACCORD WITH WORLD OPINION AS EXPRESSED IN 1951 BY THE UN. THE NOTE WOULD ALSO EXPRESS THE EARNEST HOPE THAT THE INTENDED ACTION OF THE CHINESE GOVT PROVIDES AN INDICATION OF FURTHER STEPS WHICH CAN NOW BE TAKEN TO BRING ABOUT THE UNIFICATION BY FREE ELECTIONS IN KOREA. THE NOTE WOULD MAKE REF TO THE ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION OF OCT7/50, AND WOULD INDICATE THE PREPAREDNESS OF THE SIXTEEN TO SEEK THROUGH UN ACTION TO PROCEED WITH FREE ELECTIONS "UNDER UN AUSPICES".

4. PARSONS SAID THAT HE REGRETTED THAT HE WAS UNABLE TO GIVE US AN ADVANCE COPY OF THE TEXT OF THE PROPOSED REPLY, SINCE IT HAD NOT BEEN CLEARED AT HIGHER LEVELS, BUT HE INDICATED THAT IT WOULD BE ON THE FOREGOING GENERAL LINES.

5. IN COMMENTING ON THE PROPOSED NOTE, PARSONS SAID THAT THE STATE DEPT HAD CONCLUDED THAT THE KOREAN QUESTION SHOULD BE BROUGHT BACK INTO A UN PERSPECTIVE, AND THEY ENVISAGED AT A LATER STAGE, CONSULTATIONS IN THE FIRST PLACE WITH THE FOUR OLD COMMONWEALTH GOVTS AND SUBSEQUENTLY WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SIXTEEN, ON THE APPROPRIATENESS OF FOLLOW-UP ACTION IN THE UN WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FOR A REFORMULATION OF PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS DEALING WITH THE KOREAN PROBLEM. HE SAID THAT AT THE WORKING LEVEL IN THE STATE DEPT THEY WERE HOPING TO PREPARE A DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD RELATE TO THE PROBLEM OF ELECTIONS IN KOREA AND WHICH WOULD HAVE AS ITS OBJECTIVE BRINGING ABOUT A SOLUTION TO KOREA ON THE AUSTRIAN MODEL. SUCH A DRAFT RESOLUTION, (WHICH HE EMPHASIZED WAS STILL IN THE PREPARATORY STAGE OF CONSIDERATION AND WHICH HAS NOT RECEIVED HIGHER APPROVAL), WOULD BE BASED UPON THE ASSUMPTIONS THAT UNCURK IS NOT, RPT NOT, A SATISFACTORY SUPERVISORY BODY FOR THE ELECTIONS, AND THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO MOVE TOWARDS SOME OTHER FORMULA FOR SUPERVISION, UNDER UN AUSPICES. PARSONS SAID THAT WHILE THE STATE DEPT WOULD NOT WELCOME

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PAC FOUR 434

A BODY ON THE LINES OF THE NNSC, IT WOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE UP A MORE FLEXIBLE POSITION THAN IN THE PAST TO OBTAIN THE PARTICIPATION IN SUCH SUPERVISION OF GENUINELY NEUTRAL COUNTRIES. HE EMPHASIZED FURTHER THAT WHILE THE SUPERVISORY ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE UNDER UN AUSPICES, IT WOULD CLEARLY HAVE TO BE ACCEPTABLE (OR REGARDED BY REASONABLE PEOPLE AS ACCEPTABLE) TO THE COMMUNISTS. SUCH A DRAFT RESOLUTION MIGHT ALSO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT ONCE UNIFICATION HAD BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT ON TERMS SATISFACTORY TO THE UN, THE WITHDRAWAL OF UN FORCES FROM KOREA WOULD BECOME PRACTICABLE.

6. PARSONS SAID THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO BE PRECISE ABOUT A SUBSEQUENT REF TO THE UN, BUT HE THOUGHT THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD BE THE APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR A RENEWAL OF THE DISCUSSION, EVEN THOUGH HE ANTICIPATED A SOVIET VETO OF THE PROCEEDINGS. A SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM AND THE INTRODUCTION OF A NEW AND MORE FLEXIBLE RESOLUTION WHICH THE STATE DEPT HOPED WOULD RECEIVE WIDE SUPPORT, WOULD STRENGTHEN THE HANDS OF THE SIXTEEN IN THE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. PARSONS EMPHASIZED HOWEVER THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO RPT NO DECISION TAKEN BY THE USA GOVT TO TAKE THE MATTER TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, NOR DID THEY HAVE ANY FIXED IDEAS AT THE OFFICIAL LEVEL ON THE TIMETABLE OF SUCH A REF. IN REPLY TO OUR QUESTION, PARSONS SAID THAT THEY HAD NO ILLUSIONS THAT THERE WAS IN FACT MUCH CHANCE OF THE ACCEPTANCE OF SUCH A SET OF PROPOSALS BY THE COMMUNIST SIDE, PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THEIR ASSESSMENT THAT UNIFICATION OF KOREA EXCEPT ON TERMS AGREEABLE TO THE COMMUNISTS WOULD BE REJECTED BY THE OTHER SIDE. AT THE SAME TIME IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE STATE DEPT HAS SET ITS FACE FIRMLY AGAINST ANY REPETITION OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OF 1954, AND CONSIDERS THAT THE ONLY POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK IN WHICH NEW AND MORE FLEXIBLE PROPOSALS CAN BE DEVELOPED LIES IN THE FORUM OF THE UN.

7. OUR COMMENTS THIS MORNING RELATED PRIMARILY TO THE NATURE OF THE REPLY TO THE FIRST PHASE OF THE CHINESE NOTE. IN COMMENTING WE FIXED OUR ATTENTION PRIMARILY ON THE USE OF THE PHRASE "UNDER UN AUSPICES", WHICH WE UNDERSTAND WILL BE CONTAINED IN THE PROPOSED REPLY TO BE PLACED BEFORE THE SIXTEEN. HERE WE BASED OURSELVES ON YOUR TEL Y55 FEB13, AND REPEATED THE ARGUMENTS WHICH WE HAVE ALREADY MADE

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PRIVATELY TO THE BRITISH EMBASSY. PARSONS SHOWED HIMSELF WELL AWARE OF THE TRADITIONAL CANADIAN POSITION ON THIS SCORE, AND EMPHASIZED THAT THE VIEW AT THE OFFICIAL LEVEL IN THE STATE DEPT ON THIS POINT WAS NOT FAR IN FACT FROM OUR OWN. AT THE SAME TIME, HE THOUGHT THAT THERE WOULD BE VERY GREAT DIFFICULTIES IN ACCEPTING THE FORMULA OF SOME PHRASE SUCH AS "FAIR TO ALL CONCERNED AND ACCEPTABLE TO THE UN" WHICH WE HAVE ALREADY BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN THE FIRST REPLY TO THE CHINESE, AND HE SAW LITTLE PROSPECT OF THE STATE DEPT MODIFYING ITS POSITION ON THIS POINT. THE PRINCIPAL REASON HE GAVE WAS THAT BECAUSE OF THE CHARACTER OF THE ACCUSATIONS MADE BY THE COMMUNIST SIDE ABOUT THE UN EFFORT AND ACTIVITIES IN KOREA, THEY DID NOT WISH TO ACQUIESCE IN ANY WEAKENING OF THE POSITION IN THEIR FORMAL REPLY. HE EMPHASIZED HOWEVER THAT AT THE LATER UN STAGE ENVISAGED THEY WOULD IN FACT SEEK TO PROVIDE FOR MORE FLEXIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE PROCEDURES, AND WOULD NOT FEEL BOUND TO EARLIER UN RESOLUTIONS ON THIS POINT. PARSONS THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE IF WE FACED A CONFRONTATION ON THIS ISSUE, AND HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO ACCEPT THE FORMULA OF ELECTIONS PROCEEDING "UNDER UN AUSPICES", IN THE FIRST REPLY LEAVING ANY VARIANT OF THIS FOR LATER ELABORATION.

8. IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, WE TOLD PARSONS THAT WHILE WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO ATTEND A MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN AT ANY TIME CALLED BY THE STATE DEPT, IT MIGHT BE PREFERABLE TO CLEAR AWAY THROUGH DIRECT CONSULTATION AS MANY OUTSTANDING POINTS OF POSSIBLE DIFFERENCE IN OUR APPROACH AS POSSIBLE, AND WE EXPECT TO HEAR FROM HIM LATER TODAY WHETHER THE STATE DEPT WILL REFRAIN FROM CALLING THE MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN UNTIL EARLY NEXT WEEK. MEANWHILE, YOUR VIEWS AND COMMENTS AT THE EARLIEST DATE WOULD BE MUCH APPRECIATED.

9. PARSONS ASKED US TO INFORM YOU OF TWO RELATED MATTERS. ALTHOUGH THE CASE OF THE MISSING AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN TAKEN UP DIRECTLY IN THE MAC, THE STATE DEPT HAS SUPPLEMENTED THIS BY A PRIVATE APPROACH TO THE USSR REQUESTING THEM TO PASS ON A COMMUNICATION TO PEKING IN PRETTY STRONG TERMS REQUESTING THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE TWO AMERICANS ON THE AIRCRAFT. IN ADDITION, PARSONS SAID THAT IN VIEW OF OUR

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CONCERN WITH THE STRATEGIC PICTURE IN THE PACIFIC GENERALLY, WE

SHOULD KNOW THAT THE JAPANESE FO HAS RECENTLY SPOKEN TO THE USA
AMBASSADOR IN TOKYO EXPRESSING CONCERN OVER THE IMPLICATIONS OF ANY
WITHDRAWAL OF USA FORCES FROM SOUTHKOREA AT THIS TIME.

10. FINALLY, WE SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE VIEWS SET FORTH IN
PARAS 5 AND 6 ARE NOT, RPT NOT, TO BE DEVELOPED AT THE FORTHCOMING
MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN, BUT ARE AT THIS STAGE FOR OUR OWN INFO
ONLY. THE MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN WILL CONFINE ITSELF TO CONSIDERATION
OF THE PROPOSED NOTE OF REPLY DEALT WITH IN PARA 3, ALTHOUGH PARSONS
SAID THAT THE STATE DEPT SPOKESMAN (MR WALTER ROBERTSON, INCIDENTALLY,
IS SUFFERING A BOUT OF PNEUMONIA) WILL INDICATE THAT THE USA INTENDS
TO FOLLOW UP THIS MATTER IN THE UN AT A LATER STAGE IN CONSULTATION
WITH THE SIXTEEN.

TELEGRAM

BY CAN

CONFIDENTIAL



NO	INIT. B
AMBASSADOR	
INSTR. BUREAU	
HALSTED	
GORDHAM	
SMITH	
CHOQUETTE	
MISS CURRAN	

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FM EMBASSYPARIS FEB26/58 CONT
TO EXTERNAL 235
INFO NATOPARIS LDN WASHDC PERMISNY
TT TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT

KOREA-CHINESE PROPOSALS.

AS OF YESTERDAY, FAREASTERN DIV AT QUAL WAS INCLINED TO LOOK AT CHINESE PROPOSALS AS BEING ESSENTIALLY A PROPAGANDA MOVE WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT BE PART OF COMMUNIST DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE WHICH BEGAN WITH BULGANIN LETS LAST DEC.


2. BAYLE, HEAD OF DIV, WAS IMPRESSED BY SWIFTNESS OF VARIOUS MOVES OF CHINESE AND NORTHKOREANS (NOT TO MENTION SOVIET BLOC) DURING FORTNIGHT WHICH BEGAN ON FEB 5. NORTHKOREAN DECLARATION OF THAT DATE WAS QUICKLY FOLLOWED BY PEKING'S SUPPORT ON THE 7TH AND 10TH. CHOU-EN-LAI FLEW TO PYONG-YANG ON 14TH, AND A JOINT DECLARATION OF BOTH STATES CONCERNING WITHDRAWAL OF CHINESE FORCES WAS ISSUED ON 19TH. SOVIET SUPPORT CAME ON FOLLOWING DAY AND WAS ACTUALLY PRECEDED BY BULGARIAN STATEMENT ON FEB 15. ALL OF WHICH SMACKS OF A CLOSELY COORDINATED AND CAREFULLY PREPARED MANOEUVRE DESTINED TO EMBARRASS THE WEST WERE IT ONLY BY VIRTUE OF THE SURPRISE ELEMENT INVOLVED.

3. IN SUPPORT OF THIS INTERPRETATION, BAYLE POINTED OUT THAT THERE WAS NOTHING BASICALLY NEW IN CHINESE PROPOSALS. THE ACCENT PLACED ON WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS WAS HIGHLY REMINISCENT OF PRESSURE IN SAME SENSE EXERCISED BY USSR IN CENTRAL EUROPE. RESEMBLANCE WAS OF COURSE EMPHASIZED BY SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR A DE-NUCLEARIZED ZONE IN KOREA. IT WAS NOT ALTOGETHER CLEAR HOWEVER, WHETHER USSR PARTICIPATED IN FAREASTERN OFFENSIVE FROM THE BEGINNING. IT WAS CONCEIVABLE THAT FOR REASONS OF ITS OWN, PEKING WAS ALSO ANXIOUS TO REACH SOME KIND OF MODUS-VIVENDI IN FAREAST AND THAT IT HAD TAKEN THE INITIATIVE WITH A VIEW TO FORCING MOSCOW (AND THE WEST) TO ADMIT CHINA TO THE SUMMIT MEETING, OR AT ANY RATE TO OPENING THE WAY FOR A SECOND SUMMIT MEETING ON FAREASTERN AFFAIRS. THIS DID NOT MEAN OF COURSE, THAT PEKING WAS PREPARED TO BUDGE FROM ITS PRESENT POSITION. CHINESE MAY HAVE SET THEIR MINDS ON WITHDRAWING THEIR FORCES FROM KOREA AND THEY HAVE CONSEQUENTLY DECIDED THAT THEY SHOULD AT LEAST GET SOME PROPAGANDA BENEFIT FROM THE OPERATION.

BY CAN

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TELEGRAM



SECRET



FM EXTERNAL OTT FEB26/58 SECRET
TO WASHDC Y71 OPIMMEDIATE
LDN EMBASSYPARIS PRUSS PRIORITY
INFO PFF ISNY TOKYO DEFERRED
BAG CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN

REF OURTEL Y70 FEB26

CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA

OUR TEL Y70 CONTAINS THE TEXT OF THE OBSERVATIONS WE WERE SENDING
YOU TO BE MADE IN YOUR PRIVATE MEETING WITH THE STATE DEPT BEFORE
THE MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN. IN VIEW OF THE INFO RECEIVED BY PHONE
LATE THIS AFTERNOON THAT A MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN MAY BE CALLED FOR
TOMORROW WE ARE SENDING THESE VIEWS TO YOU WITHOUT HAVING SEEN YOUR
REPORT OF TODAY'S MEETING IN CASE TIME WOULD NOT RPT NOT PERMIT
US TO SEND ORDERLY VIEWS BEFORE THE MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN.

NO.	AMBASSADOR	INIT.
	MUTTER	13
	BLISS	
	HALLSTED	
	GORHAM	
	SMITH	
	CHOQUETTE	
	MISS CURRIE	

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SECRET


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FM EXTERNAL OTT FEB26/58 SECRET
TO WASHDC Y70 OPIMMEDIATE
LDN EMBASSYPARIS BRUSS PRIORITY
INFO PERMISNY TOKYO DEFERRED
BAG CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI



REF YOURTEL 406 FEB21,ETC

CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA

IN CONSIDERING THE SITUATION WHICH HAS ARISEN AS A RESULT OF THE CHINESE STATEMENT TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN PEKING AND THE SUBSEQUENT ANNOUNCEMENT THAT CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES WILL BE WITHDRAWN FROM NORTH KOREA BEFORE THE END OF 1958, WE HAVE BEEN FORCED TO ASK OURSELVES WHETHER ANY USEFUL PURPOSE IS SERVED BY OFFERING VIEWS TO THE STATE DEPT. THE TACTIC OF FORMULATING A RIGID USA POSITION AND THEN CALLING IN THE SIXTEEN TO HEAR THE PRACTICALLY UNALTERABLE USA DECISION IS ONE WHICH WE FIND INCREASINGLY UNPALATABLE AND UNDIGNIFIED. WE ARE NOT RPT NOT YET READY TO SUGGEST THAT A PROTEST AGAINST THIS TACTIC SHOULD BE MADE, BUT WE SHOULD LIKE YOU AT A SUITABLE OPPORTUNITY TO CONVEY THE IDEA THAT WE ARE DISSATISFIED WITH THIS PRACTICE AND THAT IT LEADS US TO QUESTION THE USEFULNESS OF FURTHER MEETINGS OF THE SIXTEEN AND THE CONTINUATION OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES. YOU COULD ADD THAT WE COULD NOT RPT NOT RECOMMEND TO MINISTERS THAT THE CANADIAN GOVT GIVE PUBLIC SUPPORT TO POSITIONS WHICH IT HAS NOT RPT NOT HAD A PROPER OPPORTUNITY TO INFLUENCE AND WHICH, ON OCCASION, ARE IN CONFLICT WITH ITS POLICIES.

2. OUR MISGIVINGS OVER THE USA APPROACH, AS WE SEE IT DEVELOPING, APPLY NOT RPT NOT SO MUCH TO THE RESULTS WHICH ARE BEING SOUGHT AS TO THE WAY IN WHICH THEY ARE BEING SOUGHT. WE SHOULD LIKE YOU TO PRESENT OUR VIEWS AS BEING ON THE OFFICIAL LEVEL AND AS EXPRESSIONS OF OPINION: WE ARE NOT RPT NOT PLANNING TO ENTER INTO EXTENSIVE CONTROVERSY WITH THE USA OVER KOREA OR TO TAKE A PROMINENT PART IN THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE SIXTEEN, UNLESS CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES FORCE US TO.

3. WE HAVE STARTED BY EXAMINING THE POSITION IN WHICH THE COUNTRIES WHICH FAVOURED RESISTANCE TO NORTH KOREAN AGGRESSION ARE LIKELY TO FIND THEMSELVES WHEN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY MEETS THIS AUTUMN. BY THEN THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS WILL PRESUMABLY HAVE THEIR WITHDRAWAL WELL UNDER WAY: THEY MAY, IF THEY ARE ASTUTE, HAVE COMPLETED IT. THE

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COMMUNIST SIDE WILL THEN HAVE TAKEN AN IMPRESSIVE CONCRETE STEP, WHEREAS THE UNC SIDE WILL BE ASKING FOR STILL FURTHER CONCESSIONS BY THE COMMUNIST SIDE.

4. LOOKING FOR OUR AUTHORITY TO ASK FOR MORE, THERE IS SOME ROOM TO DOUBT WHETHER IT WILL BE SUFFICIENT TO CONVINCE THE UNCOMMITTED (ON WHOSE VOTES WE MAY HAVE TO RELY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE ASSEMBLY) THAT OUR CASE IS REASONABLE. WE ARE AWARE THAT THERE IS A STRONG TENDENCY TO RELY UPON THE MORALITY OR THE JUSTICE OF THE UNC POSITION, BUT OUR FEAR IS THAT THIS ASPECT WILL CARRY LESS WEIGHT WITH THE UNCOMMITTED THAN AN APPEARANCE OF REASONABLENESS. THERE ARE, AFTER ALL, CHINKS IN OUR ARMOUR AS SEEN THROUGH ASIAN EYES: THERE IS THE WELL-KNOWN INTRANSIGENCE OF SYNGMAN RHEE AND HIS OBVIOUS UNWILLINGNESS TO TRY TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT IN KOREA ON REALISTIC TERMS; AND WHEN IT COMES TO ACCOUNTING FOR MISSING AND ABDUCTED PERSONNEL, THERE IS ON OUR SIDE THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS BY THE SOUTH KOREANS IN 1952. WE MENTION THESE POINTS, NOT RPT NOT BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THEY REDUCE THE UNC POSITION TO EQUALITY WITH THE COMMUNIST POSITION, BUT BECAUSE WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO SEE THE PROBLEM THROUGH UNCOMMITTED ASIAN EYES. IN ADDITION, WE THINK THE SIXTEEN WOULD BE WISE NOT RPT NOT TO LAY THEMSELVES OPEN TO THE CHARGE OF ASKING THE CHINESE TO ORDER THE NORTH KOREANS TO ACCEPT THE UNC'S CONDITIONS FOR ELECTIONS AND UNIFICATION. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT RPT NOT RECOGNIZE THE NORTH KOREAN GOVT, IT IS A FACT THAT IT EXISTS, AND THERE IS ROOM TO BELIEVE THAT THE USSR AND COMMUNIST CHINA WOULD FEEL OBLIGED TO MAINTAIN THAT THEY ARE NOT RPT NOT IN A POSITION TO DICTATE TO A SOVEREIGN GOVT.

5. WE THEREFORE THINK THAT THE USA WOULD BE WISE TO ADOPT AN APPROACH WHICH THE REMAINDER OF THE SIXTEEN AND OTHER RESPECTABLE MEMBERS OF THE UN WILL NOT RPT NOT FIND TOO DIFFICULT TO DEFEND. WE DO NOT RPT NOT EXPECT UNC FORCES TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM SOUTH KOREA FOR SOME TIME TO COME. WE AGREE THAT THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN UNC AND CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES: THE FORMER ARE THERE FOR UNC PURPOSES AND IN RESPONSE TO UN RESOLUTIONS, WHEREAS THE LATTER WERE INVITED OR ALLOWED INTO KOREA BY AN ENTITY WHICH WAS ITSELF GUILTY OF AGGRESSION. WE AGREE THAT THIS REMOVES ANY URGENCY FROM THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNC FORCES.

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PAGE THREE Y70

IN ADDITION WE CONCEDE THE FORCE OF THE FAMILIAR ARGUMENTS ABOUT RELATIVE DISTANCES OF WITHDRAWAL, THE USA TREATY WITH THE ROK, AND THE NEED TO CONTROL SYNGMAN RHEE. WE THINK THAT IN PUBLIC THE ARGUMENT COULD BE MADE THAT THE UN SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE PRECIPITATE ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE VESTIGIAL UNC FORCES UNTIL IT HAD HAD TIME TO OBSERVE THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE NORTH KOREAN REGIME, WHICH WILL STILL BE IN OCCUPATION OF SOME SOUTH KOREAN TERRITORY.

6. OUR VIEWS ON THE SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS ARE WELL KNOWN (CF. OUR TEL Y55 FEB13), AND YOU SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE RESERVE OUR RIGHT TO STATE OUR INTERPRETATION OF ANY AGREED TEXT ON THIS SUBJECT, AS WE HAVE IN THE PAST. WE DO NOT RPT NOT QUARREL WITH THE NEED FOR GENUINELY IMPARTIAL SUPERVISION (AND, INCIDENTALLY, WE THINK THAT FOR PRESENTATIONAL REASONS THERE COULD WELL BE FEWER STATEMENTS COMPARING "NEUTRAL" WITH UN SUPERVISION, AS THOUGH THE UN IS INCAPABLE OF NEUTRALITY IN THE SENSE OF IMPARTIALITY) BUT WITH THE IDEA THAT THE OTHER SIDE COULD BE EXPECTED TO ACCEPT A CONDITION WHICH WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO A CONFESSION OF GUILT AND DEFEAT. WE KNOW THAT THE INDIANS DO NOT RPT NOT SYMPATHIZE WITH THE USA POSITION ON THIS QUESTION AND WE ARE CONCERNED (ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THE FREQUENCY WITH WHICH THE STATE DEPT SPOKESMAN REFERS TO THE PRESSURE OF WORLD OPINION AND THE OVERWHELMING UN MAJORITY OF FEB 1/51) THAT THOSE OF US WHO HAVE SUPPORTED UN ACTION IN KOREA MAY NEED AS MANY VOTES AS WE CAN MUSTER FROM THE UNCOMMITTED COUNTRIES IF THERE IS A TRIAL OF STRENGTH OVER KOREA.

7. WE INCLINE TO THE BELIEF THAT EMPHASIS SHOULD BE PLACED, NOT RPT NOT ON THE NEED FOR THE OTHER SIDE TO ACCEPT ELECTIONS "UNDER UN SUPERVISION," BUT ON THE NEED TO ENSURE GENERAL CONDITIONS IN WHICH GENUINELY FREE ELECTIONS CAN BE HELD. NO RPT NO AMOUNT OF "UN SUPERVISION" IS GOING TO CONVINCE ANTI-COMMUNIST NORTH KOREANS (IF ANY CAN BE FOUND) THAT THEY CAN SAFELY RUN IN ELECTIONS, SUPPLEMENTARY OR OTHERWISE, UNLESS THEY CAN BE SURE THAT THERE WILL BE NO RPT NO REPRISALS AFTER THE UN SUPERVISORS HAVE DEPARTED. WOULD IT NOT RPT NOT BE A MORE PROFITABLE TACTIC FROM THE UNC POINT OF VIEW TO EMPHASIZE THE NEED FOR TIME, FOLLOWING UPON THE COMPLETION OF CHINESE COMMUNIST WITHDRAWAL, TO ASSESS THE SITUATION IN NORTH KOREA AND TO EXPLORE COMMUNIST

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PAGE FOUR Y70

INTENTIONS?(THIS HAS THE ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGE OF SERVING TO STAVE OFF THE DAY WHEN IT IS GOING TO BECOME APPARENT THAT THE PRESENT ROK GOVT IS NOT RPT NOT INTERESTED IN A UNITED, INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC UNLESS IT IS IN A FORM IMPOSED UPON THE NORTH.)

8. FOR THESE PURPOSES, WE ARE PREPARED TO SEE SOMETHING LIKE THE BRITISH REVISED DRAFT REPLY SENT TO PEKING. IT HAS THE VIRTUE OF PLAYING FOR TIME. OBJECTION MIGHT BE RAISED TO ENTERING INTO CORRESPONDENCE OF THIS NATURE, BUT IN OUR VIEW THE EXCHANGE COULD BE CONDUCTED IN A LEISURELY FASHION, AND WOULD BE A SMALLER EVIL THAN A RENEWED POLITICAL CONFERENCE OR HAVING TO TURN DOWN A REQUEST FOR A CONFERENCE. (WE HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE WAY MANY ASIANS TAKE WILLINGNESS TO CONFER AS A VIRTUE IN ITSELF, AND REGISTER A BLACK MARK AGAINST A PARTY REFUSING TO TALK.) IT MIGHT SERVE TO GET US PAST THE THIRTEENTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WITHOUT TOO MUCH LOSS IN PROPAGANDA.


9. WE ARE SENDING A SEPARATE TEL CONTAINING THE REVISED TEXT OF THE BRITISH DRAFT REPLY TO THE CHINESE, TOGETHER WITH SOME FURTHER AMENDMENTS WHICH WE CONSIDER DESIRABLE.

10. LDN: PLEASE DISCUSS WITH FOREIGN OFFICE.

11. PARIS, BRUSS: PLEASE DISCUSS WITH QUAI/BELGIAN FO BUT OMIT REFERENCES TO THE BRITISH DRAFT AND SPEAK IN TERMS OF "A REPLY TO PEKING WHICH WOULD SEEK CLARIFICATION OF AMBIGUITIES IN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST AND OTHER STATEMENTS".

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FM BRUSS FEB25/58 SECRET
TO EXTERNAL 92 PRIORITY
INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS NATOPARIS
TT WASHDC PERMISNY FM OTT



REF OUR TEL 88 FEB21

CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA

THIS MORNING DE CART, CHINESE DESK OFFICER AT FOREIGN MINISTRY TOLD US THAT BELGIAN POSITION REGARDING THE NEW CHINESE PROPOSAL HAD NOW BEEN CLEARED WITH THE MINISTER BY DELVAUX DE FENFFE, DIRECTEUR DE LA POLITIQUE. INSTRUCTIONS TO BELGIAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHDC WILL BE LARGELY ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED IN PARA2 OF OUR REF TEL. INSTRUCTIONS WILL EMPHASIZE THAT BELGIUM DOES NOT RPT NOT WISH TO PLAY A LEADING ROLE IN THIS QUESTION AND THEIR AMBASSADOR WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO ASSUME A FLEXIBLE POSITION AND NOT RPT NOT HAMPER IN ANY WAY THE FREEDOM OF OPERATION OF THOSE POWERS LIKE THE USA AND THE UK AND CANADA WHO HAVE A MORE SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST IN THE PACIFIC.

2. BELGIAN FO TEND TO REGARD CHINESE PROPOSAL AS INSPIRED BY THE SOVIET AS PART OF THE LATTER'S OVERALL PLAN TO REDUCE EFFECTIVENESS OF USA BASES WHICH NOW CIRCLE THE COMMUNIST WORLD. FOR THIS REASON THEY FEEL THAT THE CHINESE PROPOSAL HAS BEEN TIMED VERY CAREFULLY TO COINCIDE WITH THE SUGGESTION REGARDING A DENUCLEARIZED ZONE IN EUROPE.

3. DE CART TOLD US THAT IT WAS VIEW OF DELVAUX WHO WAS CONSIDERED AN AUTHORITY IN BELGIAN FO ON CHINA, THAT REF IN PARA3 OF CHINESE NOTE TO THEIR WARNING TO USA IN 1950 DOES NOT RPT NOT NECESSARILY CONSTITUTE A THREAT OF IMPENDING MILITARY ACTION. IN DELVAUX'S VIEW THIS IS MERELY AN EFFORT BY THE CHINESE TO WRITE DOWN HISTORY IN THE MANNER IN WHICH THEY WOULD LIKE IT TO BE INTERPRETED.



NO.	1
1	AMBASSADOR
2	MUTTER
3	DUDEK
4	HALESTAD
5	GORNHAM
6	SMITH
7	CHOQUETTE
8	WISS CURRIE

TELEGRAM

BY CAN

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SECRET



FM EXTERNAL OTT FEB25/58 SECRET
TO BRUSS Y68 PRIORITY
INFO WASHDC PERMISNY LDN EMBASSYPARIS
TOKYO DERERRED
BAG CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA HAGUE FM LDN

REF YOUR TEL 88 FEB21

CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA

WE ARE PLEASED TO FIND THAT WE AND THE BELGIAN FOREIGN OFFICE SEEM TO BE THINKING ALONG THE SAME LINES STILL. WE ARE PREPARING SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE PRESENT STATE OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM FOR THE GUIDANCE OF OUR EMBASSY IN WASHDC IN TALKS WITH THE STATE DEPT BEFORE THE MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN WHICH MAY TAKE PLACE LATER THIS WEEK. WE SHALL BE HAPPY TO HAVE YOU PASS THOSE OBSERVATIONS TO THE BELGIANS.

2. WE HAVE BEEN STRUCK BY THE MANNER IN WHICH THE BELGIANS APPEAR TO ASSUME THAT THERE WILL BE AN ATTEMPT TO EXPLORE CHINESE INTENTIONS. WE HOPE THAT THIS WILL PROVE TO BE TRUE AND THAT WE SHALL NOT BE FACED WITH A RIGID POSITION DESIGNED MERELY TO CHECKMATE THE NORTH KOREANS, CHINESE COMMUNISTS AND RUSSIANS, RATHER THAN TO SEE WHETHER GENUINE ADVANCES CAN BE MADE. THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE SO FAR SUGGESTS THAT EXPONENTS OF BOTH THESE APPROACHES MAY BE ACTIVE IN THE STATE DEPT BUT WE HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING WHICH WILL CARRY THE GREATER WEIGHT WITH MR DULLES.


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TELEGRAM

BY CAN

7-1-1-1

CONFIDENTIAL



FM WASHDC FEB21/58 CONF
TO EXTERNAL 406 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO PERMISNY EMBASSYPARIS LDN
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG HAGUE BRUSS CNBRA WLGTH KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN

REF YOUR TEL Y6 FEB19

CHINESE PROPOSALS ON KOREA

YOU HAVE DOUBTLESS HEARD FROM EARNSCLIFFE THAT THE UK HAVE REVISED THEIR SUGGESTED TEXT FOR A REPLY BY THE SIXTEEN TO THE CHINESE STATEMENT ON KOREA. AS YOUR COMMENTS ON THE ORIGINAL UK DRAFT WERE STILL RELEVANT, HOWEVER, WE PASSED THEM TO THE BRITISH EMBASSY TODAY.

2. THE UK EMBASSY HERE AGREED WITH YOUR COMMENT IN YOUR PARA 2 CONCERNING THE WORDING OF THE FOURTH SENTENCE OF PARA 3 OF THE UK DRAFT MSG.

3. IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR SECOND POINT (YOUR PARA 3) CONCERNING THE NATURE OF SUPERVISION REQUIRED FOR KOREA ELECTIONS, WE HAVE LEARNED FROM THE UK AND THE AUSTRALIANS THAT THE STATE DEPT IS ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO ANY FORMULA WHICH FALLS SHORT OF UN SUPERVISION. THIS POINT OF VIEW IS REFLECTED IN PARA 3 OF THE USA PRESS BRIEFING TEXT (OURTEL 391 FEB20) AND IN THE FURTHER COMMENTS MADE BY PRESS OFFICER LINCOLN WHITE (OURTEL 390 FEB20). YOU WILL HAVE NOTED FROM THE PRESS REPORT OF THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, FEB15, THAT A WEEK AGO PRESS OFFICER LINCOLN WHITE SAID "IF THE COMMUNIST SIDE IS PREPARED TO SEEK SUCH SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS IN KOREA AS WOULD GUARANTEE THEIR FREEDOM, THEN PERHAPS PROGRESS CAN BE MADE." IT IS CLEAR THAT THE PUBLIC POSITION OF THE USA HAS STIFFENED CONSIDERABLY IN THE INTERVENING WEEK AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE USA HAS COMMITTED ITSELF PUBLICLY TO UN SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS TO PREVENT ANY SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF THIS POINT WHEN THE SIXTEEN MEET. THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY WHO DISCUSSED THIS POINT WITH THE STATE DEPT EARLIER THIS WEEK SAID THAT THE DEPT HAD STATED BLUNTLY THAT USA WAS CARRYING THE MAIN BURDEN IN KOREA, THAT IT WAS DETERMINED THAT SUPERVISION OF ANY ELECTIONS HELD IN KOREA BE UNDER THE UN, AND THAT THEY HAD NO INTENTION OF BACKING DOWN FROM THIS POSITION.

4. THE UK EMBASSY HAD NO COMMENT TO MAKE ON YOUR OBSERVATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE BRINGING OF UNCURK INTO THE NEGOTIATING PICTURE, BUT

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PAGE TWO 406

UNDERTOOK TO REPORT OUR VIEWS TO THE FO.

5. THE UK EMBASSY WAS PREPARED TO AGREE THAT YOUR COMMENT IN PARA 5 CONCERNING REPRESENTATION IN THE ALL KOREA NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WAS WELL TAKEN, THOUGH THEY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE RECORD CHECKED.

6. DE LA MARE, OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY, TO WHOM YOUR COMMENTS WERE CONVEYED, SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN INFORMED BY PARSONS (DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NORTH ASIAN AFFAIRS AT THE STATE DEPT) THAT THE STATE DEPT REGARDED THE PROPOSED UK TEXT AS GENERALLY SPEAKING ALONG THE RIGHT LINES. THE STATE DEPT IS NOT, HOWEVER, IN A POSITION TO CALL A MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN YET, AS THEY STILL HAVE TO RESOLVE SOME FAIRLY DEEP DIVISIONS WITHIN THE DEPT AND TO CLEAR THE USA POSITION WITH MR DULLES. ONE GROUP WITHIN THE STATE DEPT IS SAID TO HOLD THE VIEW THAT NO, REPEAT NO, REPLY WHATEVER SHOULD BE SENT TO THE CHINESE STATEMENT. IT IS BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT THIS GROUP IS GIVING WAY TO THOSE WHO MAINTAIN A COUNTER-POSITION, NAMELY THAT THE SIXTEEN SHOULD REPLY AND SHOULD ALSO TAKE FURTHER DEFINITE ACTION TO WREST THE PROPAGANDA INITIATIVE AWAY FROM THE CHINESE. ONE IDEA UNDER CONSIDERATION IN THE STATE DEPT IS THAT THE SIXTEEN SHOULD REFER THE MATTER TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND ASK THE COUNCIL TO PRONOUNCE IN FAVOUR OF UN SUPERVISION OF KOREAN ELECTIONS. WHILE IT IS CONCEDED THAT THE USSR AT LEAST WOULD OPPOSE SUCH A RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, IT IS THOUGHT THAT THIS MANOEUVRE MIGHT SHIFT THE PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE TO THE UN SIDE AND AWAY FROM THE CHINESE.

7. WE GATHER FROM DE LA MARE THAT THIS LATTER SUGGESTION IS, AT THE PRESENT, ONLY BEING KICKED AROUND IN THE STATE DEPT AND IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER IT WILL BE PROPOSED TO SECRETARY DULLES, OR WHETHER HE WILL ACCEPT IT.

8. WE UNDERSTAND FROM THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY THAT THEIR PRESENT VIEW IS THAT THE CHINESE PROPOSAL DESERVES SOME EXPLORATION AND THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN A FLAT REJECTION. THIS ATTITUDE, HOWEVER, IS SUBJECT TO ALTERATION IF THE USA WISHES TO CHOK OFF ANY FURTHER PURSUIT OF THE MATTER FOR REASONS OF STRATEGY OR FOR PURPOSES RELATING TO SUMMIT MEETING PROPOSALS; IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, AUSTRALIA WOULD NOT WISH TO MAKE DIFFICULTIES FOR THE USA.

9. OUR OWN IMPRESSION IS THAT BY THE TIME THE USA IS READY TO SUMMON
...3


PAGE THREE 406

A MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN, THEY WILL HAVE ADOPTED A FAIRLY RIGID POSITION FROM WHICH THEY WILL NOT BE WILLING TO SHIFT IN VIEW OF THE PREPONDERANCE OF THEIR INTEREST IN KOREA AND THAT IF WE HAVE ANY VIEWS TO REGISTER IT MIGHT BE WELL TO DO SO BEFORE THE USA POSITION HAS FURTHER SOLIDIFIED.

7-1-1-1

DS36/519

FM BRUSS FEB21/58 SECRET
TC XTERNAL 88 PRIORITY
INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS NATOPAR
TT PERMISNY WASHDC FM OTT



NO.	1
2	AMBASSADOR
3	MUTTER
4	DUDER
5	HALSTEAD
6	GORMAN
7	SMITH
8	CHOQUETTE
9	MISS CURRIE

REF WASHDC'S TEL 364 FEB18

CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA

THIS MORNING WE WERE TOLD BY DE CART WHO IS IN CHARGE OF CHINESE SECTION AT FOREIGN MINISTRY THAT INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE BELGIAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHDC ON THE NEW CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA HAD NOT RPT NOT YET BEEN APPROVED. HOWEVER DE CART GAVE US SOME IDEA OF THE THINKING AT THE OFFICIAL LEVEL.

2. THE BELGIAN REP IS UNLIKELY TO PLAY A VERY LEADING PART IN THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE SIXTEEN IN WASHDC. THEY ARE INCLINED TO AGREE WITH THE SUGGESTION WHICH HAS BEEN PUT FORWARD BY LDN BY THE BRITISH THAT BEFORE ANY ATTEMPT IS MADE TO FRAME A COUNTER-PROPOSAL A SERIES OF QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO THE CHINESE GOVT ASKING FOR CLARIFICATION AND ENLARGEMENT OF SOME OF THE POINTS RAISED IN THEIR STATEMENT. TO ASSIST IN DOING THIS THE BELGIANS FEEL THAT THE LATEST CHINESE STATEMENT SHOULD BE COMPARED WITH EARLIER DECLARATIONS TO SEE WHETHER OR NOT RPT NOT THERE ARE ANY TRULY NEW POINTS WHICH HAVE EMERGED.

3. THE BELGIAN FO DO NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE CHINESE MAY HAVE SOMETHING MORE THAN A PROPAGANDA MOVE IN MIND. THEY HAVE NO RPT NO SPECIFIC REASON FOR BELIEVING THAT THE CHINESE ARE SERIOUS BUT DE CART REMINDED US OF THE PRECEDENT OF THE EVENTUAL CONCLUSION OF THE AUSTRIAN PEACE TREATY, AFTER THE SITUATION THERE HAD ASSUMED A SOMEWHAT HOPELESS OUTLOOK. IF THERE ARE GOING TO BE ANY SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CHINESE, THE BELGIAN FO FEELS THAT PROFITING FROM OUR EXPERIENCES AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) WE SHOULD STRESS THE QUESTION OF SUPERVISION OF FREE ELECTIONS RATHER THAN THE WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS AT THIS STAGE. IN THIS CONNECTION DE CART MENTIONED THAT PERHAPS SOME OF THE WORK UNDERTAKEN BY UNCURK WOULD PROVIDE US WITH SOME TALKING POINTS FOR THE CHINESE WHICH MIGHT GIVE SOME IDEA AS TO WHETHER OR NOT RPT NOT THEY ARE


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SERIOUS ABOUT FREE ELECTIONS. DE CART SAID IT MIGHT ALSO BE A MISTAKE TO INSIST ON UN SUPERVISION OF THE ELECTIONS. AT THE TIME OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE MR SPAAK HAD SUGGESTED THAT IF THE GOOD OFFICES OF OTHER COUNTRIES WERE TO BE EMPLOYED IN THE SUPERVISION OF THE ELECTIONS THE SELECTION OF THE TEAM MUST BE ONE WHICH IS AGREEABLE TO BOTH PARTIES. ACCORDING TO DE CART CHOU-EN-LAI HAD PICKED UP MR SPAAK'S POINT AFTERWARDS AND INDICATED HIS AGREEMENT. DE CART ALSO FELT THAT IN ANY AGREEMENT ON ELECTIONS A TIME LIMIT FOR VOTING SHOULD BE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED.

(B) BEFORE ANY CONFERENCE WITH THE CHINESE THE WEST SHOULD TRY TO WORK OUT A MORE TRULY UNIFIED APPROACH THAN WAS THE CASE AT THE EARLIER GENEVA CONFERENCE. DE CART ALSO SUGGESTED THAT WE MIGHT HAVE TO BE SOMEWHAT MORE FLEXIBLE NOW THAN WE HAVE BEEN IN EARLIER NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT WE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT IMPUTE TO THE UN'S RESOLUTIONS A SENSE OF INVIOABILITY AND CATHOLICISM. IF WE GO INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH OUR HANDS COMPLETELY TIED BY EARLIER DECISIONS OF THE UN IT MAY NOT RPT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO MAKE MUCH PROGRESS.

4. THE ABOVE REPRESENT THE PRELIMINARY THINKING AT THE OFFICIAL LEVEL AT THE FO. DE CART PROMISED TO GET IN TOUCH WITH US AGAIN NEXT WEEK WHEN THE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THEIR AMBASSADOR IN WASHDC HAVE BEEN APPROVED.



7-1-1-1

NO.	AMBASSADOR	INIT.
	MUTTER	B
	D	
	HALE	
	G	
	MISS CURRIE	

FM WASHDC FEB20/58 UNCLAS
TO EXTERNAL 391 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO PERMISNY
TT EMBASSYPARIS LDN FM OTT
AIRMAIL HAGUE BRUSS KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN
AIRMAIL TOKYO CNBRA WLGTN FM WASHDC

REF YOUR TEL Y64 FEB20

WITHDRAWAL OF CHINESE TROOPS FROM KOREA

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE STATEMENT USED BY STATE DEPT PRESS
OFFICER YESTERDAY IN BRIEFING CORRESPONDENTS ON THE USA REACTION
TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF WITHDRAWAL OF CHINESE FORCES FROM KOREA
BEGINS

1.CHINESE COMMUNIST TROOP WITHDRAWAL

SEVEN YEARS AGO ON FEB1/51 THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY VOTED BY THE
OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF 44 TO 7 A RESOLUTION CONDEMNING THE
CHINESE COMMUNISTS AS AGGRESSORS FOR THEIR INTERVENTION IN KOREA
AND CALLED UPON THEM TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS.SEVEN YEARS IS AN
EXCESSIVELY LONG TIME FOR ANY COUNTRY TO IGNORE THE PRESSURE
OF WORLD OPINION.

2.WITHDRAWAL OF UN FORCES

UN FORCES INCLUDING THOSE OF THE USA WERE SENT TO KOREA PURSUANT
TO UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS FOLLOWING AN APPEAL
OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA FOR ASSISTANCE IN REPELLING THE COMMUNIST
AGGRESSION.THUS UN FORCES ARE THERE BY INVITATION WHILE THE CHINESE
COMMUNIST FORCES ARE THERE IN DEFIANCE OF THE UN AND OF WORLD
OPINION.OVER 80 PERCENT OF THE UN FORCES HAVE ALREADY BEEN
WITHDRAWN SINCE THE ARMISTICE WAS SIGNED AND CHINESE COMMUNIST
TROOPS NOW OUTNUMBER UN FORCES FIVE TO SIX TIMES.

3.UNIFICATION

THE COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES CONCERNED HAVE FINALLY ACCEDED TO THE
PRESSURE OF WORLD OPINION IN ANNOUNCING THEIR INTENTION TO
WITHDRAW THE CHINESE COMMUNIST TROOPS FROM NORTHKOREA.ONCE
WITHDRAWAL HAS BEEN COMPLETED,WE HOPE THAT THEY WILL AGREE TO THE
FURTHER STEPS REPEATEDLY SET FORTH BY UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
RESOLUTIONS FOR THE PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF A DEMOCRATIC KOREA.
THE FIRST STEP WOULD BE TO AGREE TO GENUINELY FREE ELECTIONS

...2

PAGE TWO 391

UNDER UN SUPERVISION WHICH WAS VOTED OVERWHELMINGLY BY THE UN AS FAR BACK AS 1947. THESE PROPOSALS HAVE REPEATEDLY BEEN SET FORTH / AND ENDORSED IN THE UN.

4. CHINESE COMMUNIST STATEMENT OF FEB 7


THE CHINESE COMMUNIST STATEMENT OF FEB 7 WHICH SUPPORTS THE NORTHKOREAN STATEMENT OF FEB 5 HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED TO THE USA GOVT AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SIXTEEN BY THE BRITISH GOVT. I HAVE NOTHING TO SAY ON THIS AT THIS TIME. WE WILL CONTINUE OF COURSE TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH REPS OF THE SIXTEEN. ENDS

TO: **2** **3** **4** **5** **6** **7** **8** **9** **10** **11** **12** **13** **14** **15** **16** **17** **18** **19** **20** **21** **22** **23** **24** **25** **26** **27** **28** **29** **30** **31** **32** **33** **34** **35** **36** **37** **38** **39** **40** **41** **42** **43** **44** **45** **46** **47** **48** **49** **50** **51** **52** **53** **54** **55** **56** **57** **58** **59** **60** **61** **62** **63** **64** **65** **66** **67** **68** **69** **70** **71** **72** **73** **74** **75** **76** **77** **78** **79** **80** **81** **82** **83** **84** **85** **86** **87** **88** **89** **90** **91** **92** **93** **94** **95** **96** **97** **98** **99** **100** **101** **102** **103** **104** **105** **106** **107** **108** **109** **110** **111** **112** **113** **114** **115** **116** **117** **118** **119** **120** **121** **122** **123** **124** **125** **126** **127** **128** **129** **130** **131** **132** **133** **134** **135** **136** **137** **138** **139** **140** **141** **142** **143** **144** **145** **146** **147** **148** **149** **150** **151** **152** **153** **154** **155** **156** **157** **158** **159** **160** **161** **162** **163** **164** **165** **166** **167** **168** **169** **170** **171** **172** **173** **174** **175** **176** **177** **178** **179** **180** **181** **182** **183** **184** **185** **186** **187** **188** **189** **190** **191** **192** **193** **194** **195** **196** **197** **198** **199** **200** **201** **202** **203** **204** **205** **206** **207** **208** **209** **210** **211** **212** **213** **214** **215** **216** **217** **218** **219** **220** **221** **222** **223** **224** **225** **226** **227** **228** **229** **230** **231** **232** **233** **234** **235** **236** **237** **238** **239** **240** **241** **242** **243** **244** **245** **246** **247** **248** **249** **250** **251** **252** **253** **254** **255** **256** **257** **258** **259** **260** **261** **262** **263** **264** **265** **266** **267** **268** **269** **270** **271** **272** **273** **274** **275** **276** **277** **278** **279** **280** **281** **282** **283** **284** **285** **286** **287** **288** **289** **290** **291** **292** **293** **294** **295** **296** **297** **298** **299** **300** **301** **302** **303** **304** **305** **306** **307** **308** **309** **310** **311** **312** **313** **314** **315** **316** **317** **318** **319** **320** **321** **322** **323** **324** **325** **326** **327** **328** **329** **330** **331** **332** **333** **334** **335** **336** **337** **338** **339** **340** **341** **342** **343** **344** **345** **346** **347** **348** **349** **350** **351** **352** **353** **354** **355** **356** **357** **358** **359** **360** **361** **362** **363** **364** **365** **366** **367** **368** **369** **370** **371** **372** **373** **374** **375** **376** **377** **378** **379** **380** **381** **382** **383** **384** **385** **386** **387** **388** **389** **390** **391** **392** **393** **394** **395** **396** **397** **398** **399** **400** **401** **402** **403** **404** **405** **406** **407** **408** **409** **410** **411** **412** **413** **414** **415** **416** **417** **418** **419** **420** **421** **422** **423** **424** **425** **426** **427** **428** **429** **430** **431** **432** **433** **434** **435** **436** **437** **438** **439** **440** **441** **442** **443** **444** **445** **446** **447** **448** **449** **450** **451** **452** **453** **454** **455** **456** **457** **458** **459** **460** **461** **462** **463** **464** **465** **466** **467** **4**

TELEGRAM

7-1-1-1

CONFIDENTIAL



FM EXTERNAL OTT FEB20/58 CONFD
 TO WASHDC Y66 OPIMMEDIATE
 PERMISNY EMBASSYPARIS TOKYO LDN
 BAG HAGUE BRUSS CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN

REF OUR TEL Y61 FEB19

CHINESE PROPOSALS ON KOREA

PLEASE AMEND SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA5 OF TEL Y61 TO READ

"WE THINK THAT A SEARCH OF THE RECORD WILL SHOW THAT THIS WAS
 NOT RPT NOT WHAT THE COMMUNIST SIDE DEMANDED AT GENEVA AND
 AGAIN IN 1956" INSTEAD OF "AT GENEVA IN 1956".

NO.	INIT.
AMBASSADOR MUTER DUBER LHM GORHAM SMITH CHOQUETTE MISS CURRIE	

FM EXTERNAL OTT FEB20/58 CONF
TO WASHDC Y64 OPIMMEDIATE
1 SSYPARIS LDN OPIMMEDIATE
1 NO PERMISNY
BAG TOKYO HAGUE BRUSS CNBRA WLGTH KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN
REF OUR TEL Y63 FEB19

WITHDRAWAL OF CHINESE TROOPS FROM KOREA

IT IS OUR VIEW ON THE OFFICIAL LEVEL THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE CHINESE AND THE NORTH KOREANS HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT UPON THE WITHDRAWAL OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES FROM NORTH KOREA WITHOUT SUCH WITHDRAWAL BEING CONDITIONAL UPON PRIOR, SIMULTANEOUS OR SUBSEQUENT WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS FROM SOUTH KOREA, IS A RADICAL CHANGE WHICH WILL REQUIRE THE SIXTEEN GOVTS TO RETHINK THEIR POSITION. OUR REF TEL CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT WHICH WE HAVE RECOMMENDED TO THE MINISTER TO USE IN DEALING WITH ENQUIRIES AND WHICH IN OUR VIEW FOLLOWS THE PATTERN WHICH THE SIXTEEN ARE ALMOST BOUND TO FOLLOW IN COPING WITH THIS NEW SITUATION.

2. WE HAVE ONLY TODAY SEEN IN THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR FOR FEB15 A STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO LINCOLN WHITE, THE STATE DEPT'S SPOKESMAN. WE ARE FRANKLY NOT RPT NOT IMPRESSED BY IT BECAUSE IT IS TOO NEGATIVE IN TONE. WE WOULD HOPE THAT ANY FURTHER STATEMENTS WHICH MIGHT BE MADE IN THE LIGHT OF A NEW SITUATION COULD BE OF A WAIT-AND-SEE NATURE RATHER THAN SUGGESTING REJECTION IN ADVANCE.

3. WE ARE LABOURING UNDER A SEVERE PROPAGANDA DIFFICULTY, ESPECIALLY IN THE LIGHT OF MR JUDD'S REMARKS AT THE UN IN THE LAST SESSION. HERE THE CHINESE APPEAR TO BE OFFERING EXACTLY THE GESTURE WHICH WAS ASKED OF THEM AS PROOF OF THEIR SINCERITY. THERE ARE OBVIOUS REASONS WHY WE WOULD NOT RPT NOT EXPECT THE USA TO AGREE TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM KOREA, AMONG THEM BEING THEIR TREATY WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, THE DIFFERENCE IN DISTANCE THROUGH WHICH TROOPS WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHDRAWN AND THE NECESSITY TO KEEP CONTROL OVER SYNGMAN RHEE. TO OUR MIND, THE ONLY WAY AROUND THIS DIFFICULTY IS TO WELCOME THE WITHDRAWAL OF CHINESE TROOPS

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NO. [illegible]	

PAGE TWO Y64

AS APPEARING TO HOLD OUT THE HOPE OF A CHANGE OF HEART ON THE PART OF THE CHINESE AND TO EXPLAIN FRANKLY THE DIFFICULTY ABOUT THE RELATIVE DISTANCE OF WITHDRAWAL WHICH ALSO ENTERS INTO THE CASE IN EUROPE. IT APPEARS TO US THAT CAUTION IN A CASE LIKE THIS IS PERFECTLY RESPECTABLE AND CAN BE EXPLAINED TO PEOPLE LIKE THE INDIANS, BUT A CONTINUED FLATLY NEGATIVE ATTITUDE WILL BE VERY HARD TO DEFEND.

(RECD LDN 201831Z)MD

UNITED STATES INFORMATION SERVICE
WIRELESS BULLETIN
AMERICAN EMBASSY TOKYO JAPAN

Vol. 7 -- No. 35

DATE: February 20, 1958

American Embassy Annex

Tel. 48-7141 Ext. 447

U.S. ASKS COMPLETE COMPLIANCE WITH U.N. RESOLUTION ON KOREA

Washington, Feb. 19 -- The State Department said today that the United States would welcome withdrawal of Chinese communist troops from Korea.

But a State Department spokesman added that the United States would like to see the communists go further and comply fully with the seven-year-old United Nations resolution on the peaceful reunification of Korea.

The State Department comment arose from a Hong Kong press report that the Chinese communists were willing to withdraw from North Korea. Asked to comment on this report, State Department press officer Lincoln White made the following verbal statement:

"I would like to remind you that seven years ago, February 1, 1951, the United Nations General Assembly voted by an overwhelming majority of 44 to 7 a resolution condemning Chinese communists as aggressors for their intervention in Korea and called upon them to withdraw their troops forthwith.

"Seven years, it seems to us, is an excessively long time for any country to ignore pressure of world opinion.

"United Nations forces, on the other hand, including those of the United States, were sent to Korea pursuant to the United Nations Security Council resolutions following an appeal of the Republic of Korea for assistance in repelling communist aggression. United Nations forces therefore are in Korea at the invitation of the United Nations and the Republic of Korea while Chinese communist forces are there in defiance of the United Nations and world public opinion. Over 80 percent of the United Nations forces have already been withdrawn since the armistice was signed and Chinese communist troops outnumber the United Nations forces five to six times.

"If this withdrawal is executed as was stated, this would be welcome. Once the withdrawal is completed, we hope the Chinese communists will go further to agree to further steps repeatedly set forth by the United Nations General Assembly resolution for peaceful unification of democratic Korea. The first step here would be to agree to genuinely free elections under United Nations supervision which was voted overwhelmingly by the United Nations in 1947."

Asked if his statement meant that no consideration was being given by the State Department to withdrawal of United States forces in Korea, White replied that Secretary of State Dulles at his last news conference stated that U.S. forces had been reduced by 80 percent and no thought has been given to further reduction of U.S. forces in Korea.

White said that was still the U.S. position.

White did not know whether the State Department would reply directly to the Chinese communist note.

In reply to questions, White said it was not clear whether the Chinese communist note had requested United Nations supervised elections. He noted that the Chinese communists had referred to elections supervised by neutral nations.

White declined to speculate on the U.S. position on any given proposal the Chinese communists might make. But he added this:

"Our opinion would be influenced by the other 16 countries to a large degree."

He noted that the Chinese communist forces, even if withdrawn, would be a few hundred miles from the demilitarized zone, while the forces of the United Nations, if withdrawn, would be a considerable distance from the Republic of Korea.

NOTE: See separate USIS press release for text of President Eisenhower's message to Congress on Mutual Security.

- 2 -

FIRST COMPETITIVE U.S. ATOMIC POWER PLANT SEEN SOON

Washington, Feb. 19 -- U.S. Atomic Energy Commission chairman Lewis Strauss told a joint congressional committee today America's first nuclear power reactor to produce commercial electrical energy at a cost which will be competitive with conventional fuels appears to be on the horizon.

Appearing before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Strauss read a telegram from the president of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company of California, the largest public utility on the west coast, saying a contract has been let to build a 60,000 kilowatt reactor believed capable of producing power at a competitive cost with other fuels.

Strauss, first witness as the committee began its annual review of the growth and state of the atomic energy industry, said the telegram had arrived after he had prepared a formal statement in which he said:

"It is our hope that in another five years we will be able to begin design and construction of large nuclear power plants which will produce economic nuclear power in a large part of Japan, Western Europe and elsewhere. To arrive at commercially competitive nuclear power in the United States will require a longer time, owing to the lower price and great availability here of conventional fuels."

The west coast utility said the plant, which it proposes to build without government financial assistance, would be completed before the end of 1962.

Strauss and other members of the AEC presented highly optimistic reports on the rapid progress being made in the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

AEC commissioner John F. Floberg reminded the committee that during 1957 research reactors built by the United States had been placed in operation in Japan, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, Germany and The Netherlands and that a seventh became operative January 10, 1958, at Frankfort, Germany.

Counting two additional power reactors which he said are on order, a total of 25 reactors built by the United States were reported to be operating or to have been contracted for by foreign countries.

AEC commissioner W.F. Libby gave the joint committee another optimistic report on the widening use of radioisotopes throughout the world for medical, agricultural and industrial purposes.

He said there had been a steadily rising private industrial activity in producing and processing radioisotopes and putting them to work. The AEC staff, he added, estimated that the use of such isotopes in industrial processes already are saving industry more than \$500 million annually.

Similarly substantial benefits are flowing from the use of radioisotopes in medicine and agriculture. He said 1,900 organizations are using them for medical purposes and that "rich rewards" are being realized from plant and animal studies.

MURPHY RESTATES U.S. STAND ON SUMMIT

Washington, Feb. 19 -- Deputy Undersecretary of State, Robert D. Murphy, today restated America's position that adequate preparation through diplomatic channels must precede the convening of any summit conference.

An improperly prepared summit meeting could end in failure, he warned, with resultant increased tensions and disillusionment and "the risk that incidents might follow."

Murphy spoke extemporaneously before the National Council of Jewish Women.

The State Department official deplored widespread Soviet propaganda charges that the U.S. is opposed to a summit meeting.

The fact is, he said, that the United States has always been willing, and is willing now, to negotiate with the Soviet Union. But the U.S. must and does insist that careful spadework through diplomatic channels be undertaken to determine whether a summit meeting would have real prospects for success, he added.

the United States has set up to help newly developing countries.
Chairman for the conference is Eric Johnston, president of the American Motion Picture Association. He called the conference under a request from President Eisenhower that leading citizens be invited to explore means of getting more information about the Mutual Security Program across to the American public.

7-1-1-1

File

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U.S. REITERATES U.N. MUST SUPERVISE FREE ALL-KOREA ELECTIONS

Washington, Feb. 20 -- The United States reiterated today that free and unfettered elections under United Nations supervision are a prerequisite to withdrawal of United Nations forces from the Republic of Korea.

At the same time, a State Department spokesman said the United States would not support such elections held under the auspices of "neutral" nations as proposed in the Chinese communist communication forwarded to the State Department Sunday by the British charge in Peiping.

Press Officer Lincoln White reviewed the U.S. position today, particularly with reference to the Chinese communist proposal for elections to be held under "neutral" nations supervision.

White noted that the Chinese communist communication was a summary of a statement made February 5 by North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung. White said that the Sung statement referred to the unification of Korea and said that after withdrawal of all foreign troops elections should be held under the auspices of neutral nations for the unification of the country.

White repeated that the answer was "no" to the "neutral" nations proposal. He stated that such elections must be held under United Nations supervision.

He pointed out, as he had done Wednesday, that there have been resolutions adopted by the United Nations that Korea should be unified "by free and unfettered elections under United Nations supervision."

"If the Chinese communists are withdrawing as they say they are going to do and as they were instructed to do by the United Nations as far back as 1951, then we welcome it," said White. "That would at least comply with the 1951 resolution. The 1947 resolution says this election should take place under United Nations auspices."

Obviously, the satellite has not encountered meteorites large enough to put it out of commission, the scientist said, although there is strong evidence that the density of small meteorites is greater near the earth's surface than in outer space. Astronomers have estimated that there is a possibility of collision with a particle one-hundredth of an inch in diameter in the first three months. Such a particle, Dr. Richter said, could punch a hole through five inches of steel.

JONES CONFIRMED AS U.S. AMBASSADOR TO INDONESIA

Washington, Feb. 20 -- Howard P. Jones of Maryland was confirmed by the Senate today as ambassador to Indonesia.

Jones has been Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs since 1955. He succeeds John M. Allison, who has been recalled to Washington for reassignment.

U.S. ASSIGNS FIRST UNIT OF FASTEST, HIGHEST-FLYING FIGHTER PLANE

Washington, Feb. 20 -- The first operational unit of America's fastest and highest flying fighter plane -- the F-104A Starfighter -- was assigned today to Hamilton Air Force Base, California.

The ultrasonic aircraft -- reported capable of flying at more than twice the speed of sound -- has been assigned to the Air Defense Command to help safeguard the nation against air attack. Deliveries will be made to other air defense bases soon, the Air Force said.

The Starfighter will be assigned later this year to the Air Force Tactical Command which operates composite global striking forces around the world.


The F-104A is described by its manufacturer -- Lockheed Aircraft Corporation -- as "the missile with a man in it." The Air Force calls it the most adaptable fighter aircraft in existence.

TELEGRAM

7-1-1-1

CONFIDENTIAL

FEB 20 1958



FM EXTERNAL OTT FEB19/58 CONFD
TO WASHDC Y63 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO PERMISNY EMBASSYPARIS TOKYO LDN
BAG HAGUE BRUSS CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN

REF OUR TEL Y61 FEB19

CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA; PUBLIC STATEMENT

IN VIEW OF INTEREST OF PRESS IN CHINESE PROPOSAL WE HAVE SUGGESTED
MINISTER SHOULD USE FOLLOWING FORMULA IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS WHICH
MAY BE PUT TO HIM:

"IF THE RADIO REPORTS OF AN AGREEMENT FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF CHINESE
COMMUNIST FORCES FROM NORTHKOREA ARE CONFIRMED, THIS WOULD BE A
HIGHLY DESIRABLE DEVELOPMENT. EXPERIENCE WILL SHOW WHETHER IT
INDICATES A DESIRE ON THE PART OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS TO
ALLOW THE KOREANS TO SETTLE THEIR OWN AFFAIRS. WE HAVE, OF COURSE,
TO BEAR IN MIND THAT IT IS COMPARATIVELY EASY FOR THE CHINESE
TO REINTRODUCE THEIR FORCES INTO NORTHKOREA ACROSS THE YALU RIVER,
WHEREAS IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO RETURN NEW UN FORCES TO
SOUTHKOREA ACROSS THE PACIFIC OCEAN. I THINK THEREFORE, THAT THE
GOVTS CONCERNED ON THE UN SIDE WOULD WANT TO WATCH DEVELOPMENTS
IN NORTHKOREA CAREFULLY BEFORE DECIDING ON ANY COURSE OF ACTION
OF THEIR OWN."

2. IT WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR YOU TO USE THE SAME FORMULA IN DEALING
WITH ENQUIRIES.

TELEGRAM

7-1-1-1

CONFIDENTIAL

FM EXTERNAL OTT FEB19/58 CONFD
 TO WASHDC Y61 OPIMMEDIATE
 PERMISNY EMBASSYPARIS TOKYO LDN
 INFO BAG HAGUE BRUSS CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS
 ANKARA FM LDN

REF YOUR TELS 357 & 358 FEB17

CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA


WE HAVE PERUSED TEXTS OF THE BRITISH TELS CONTAINED IN YOUR
 REF TELS. IN OUR Y58 WE PUT FORWARD SOME PRELIMINARY VIEWS AND
 SUGGESTED ONE POSSIBLE FORM THE REPLY TO CHINESE MIGHT TAKE.
 REPLY SUGGESTED BY BRITISH (YOUR REF TEL 357) TAKES A SOMEWHAT
 DIFFERENT APPROACH. BOTH THESE APPROACHES APPEAR TO BE OUTDATED
 BY REPORTED AGREEMENT BETWEEN CHINESE AND NORTH KOREANS TO
 WITHDRAW CHINESE COMMUNIST TROOPS WITHOUT WAITING FOR UNC TO
 AGREE TO WITHDRAW NON-KOREAN TROOPS FROM SOUTH KOREA. HOWEVER,
 BECAUSE FOREIGN OFFICE ANALYSIS AND DRAFT REPLY REVEALED SOME
 SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEIR POSITION AND OURS, WE SHOULD
 LIKE FOLLOWING COMMENTS TO BE PASSED ON TO BRITISH EMBASSY.

2. FIRST, WE HAVE A LINGUISTIC OBJECTION TO THE WORDING OF THE FOURTH
 SENTENCE OF PARA THREE OF YOUR TEL 357. THE PHRASE "ON THE OTHER
 (...HAND...?) DOES NOT RPT NOT APPEAR APPROPRIATE; FOR THE REF TO
 ARTICLES IN PRAVDA AND ISVESTIA AND TO CHOU EN-LAI'S REPORT DO NOT
 RPT NOT APPEAR TO US TO POINT UP AN OPPOSITE OR CONTRASTING IDEA TO
 THE IDEAS REFERRED TO IN THE THIRD SENTENCE.

3. SECOND, IN PARA THREE OF THE BRITISH TEXT IT IS PROPOSED TO ASK
 WHETHER THE NORTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES NOW ACCEPT THE HOLDING OF
 ELECTIONS "UNDER UN AUSPICES". AS YOU WILL BE AWARE, OUR ATTITUDE
 ON THE NATURE OF THE SUPERVISION REQUIRED FOR KOREAN ELECTIONS
 HAS BEEN FLEXIBLE, AND WE WOULD THEREFORE BE INCLINED TO FAVOUR,
 IN ANY REPLY TO THE CHINESE NOTE, SOME MORE GENERAL PHRASE SUCH AS
 "FAIR TO ALL CONCERNED AND ACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED NATIONS"

OVER THE PHRASE USED IN THE BRITISH TEXT. OUR DIFFICULTY, AS YOU
 KNOW IS TO TRY TO DRAW THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE UN AS THE BODY
 WHICH CARRIED ON RESISTANCE TO AGGRESSION KOREA AND THE UN AS THE
 INSTRUMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION.

...2




PAGE TWO Y61

4. THIRD, WE ARE SUPRISED AND PUZZLED BY THE SUGGESTION IN THE FINAL PARA OF THE BRITISH TEXT THAT THE SIXTEEN SHOULD PASS THE INFO REQUESTED OF THE COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES TO UNCURK. AS YOU KNOW, UNCURK IS MORIBUND. IT HAS BEEN OF LITTLE EFFECT OR IMPORTANCE SINCE ITS INCEPTION, AND IT IS MOST UNLIKELY TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE COMMUNIST SIDE AS A NEGOTIATING ORGAN. MOREOVER, WE THINK THAT THE SIXTEEN MIGHT WELL BE CONSIDERED TO BE A MORE REPRESENTATIVE FORUM FOR CONSIDERING COMMUNIST PROPOSALS INVOLVING THE LIQUIDATION OF THE KOREAN CRISIS. FOR THESE REASONS WE WOULD HESITATE TO SEE UNCURK ASSUME AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS QUESTION, AND WOULD, IN FACT, QUESTION WHETHER IT SHOULD ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS AT ALL.

5. FINALLY WE WOULD DRAW ATTENTION TO THE SENTENCE IN PARA 1 OF THE FO TEL QUOTED IN YOUR 358 "THEY DO NOT RPT NOT, FOR EXAMPLE, INSIST THAT REPRESENTATION IN THE NEW ALL-KOREA NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BE EQUALLY DIVIDED BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA INSTEAD OF, AS WE CONSIDER, IN PROPORTION TO THE POPULATION...." WE THINK THAT A SEARCH OF THE RECORD WILL SHOW THAT THIS WAS NOT RPT NOT WHAT THE COMMUNIST SIDE DEMANDED AT GENEVA IN 1956. THEY DID DEMAND EQUAL REPRESENTATION ON THE BODY WHICH WOULD PREPARE FOR AND OVERSEE THE ELECTIONS. WHILE THIS MIGHT AMOUNT TO GIVING THE NORTH KOREANS UNDUE INFLUENCE, IT IS NOT RPT NOT QUITE THE SAME AS SUGGESTING THAT THEY WERE SEEKING EQUAL REPRESENTATION IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

6. WE HOPE TO SEND YOU SOME THOUGHTS ON THE NEW SITUATION LATER TODAY.

TELEGRAM
SECRET

FM WASHDC FEB18/58 SECRET
TO EXTERNAL 364 PRIORITY
INFO LDN PERMISNY EMBASSYPARIS
TT BRUSS FM OTT
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG CNBRA WLGTH KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA FM LDN

REF YOUR TEL Y58 FEB14

CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA

AUSTRALIAN NZ FRENCH AND BELGIAN EMBASSIES HAVE SO FAR RECEIVED NO COMMENTS ON THE CHINESE STATEMENT FROM THEIR HOME GOVTS. THE DUTCH EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED WORD THAT THE DUTCH FO DOES NOT THINK THE CHINESE STATEMENT HAS MUCH IN IT OF SUBSTANCE THAT IS NEW AND HAVE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE SIXTEEN GOVTS SHOULD ADHERE TO THE PRINCIPLES LAID DOWN IN THE JUN 1954 DECLARATION. THE EMBASSY HAS REASONABLY FLEXIBLE INSTRUCTIONS, HOWEVER; THEY FAVOUR A MEETING AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER SOME FORM OF REPLY TO THE CHINESE WHICH WOULD LEAVE THE WAY OPEN FOR FURTHER EXCHANGES WITH THE CHINESE IF THE OPPORTUNITY DEVELOPS.

2. WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF TWO STRAWS IN THE WIND WHICH MAY INDICATE THAT THE CHINESE MAY HAVE SOMETHING MORE THAN A PROPAGANDA MOVE IN MIND IN THEIR PROPOSALS. THE BRITISH EMBASSY INFORMED US TODAY THAT AT A DINNER GIVEN BY THE UK CHARGE D'AFFAIRES WITHIN THE LAST FEW DAYS A MEMBER OF THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTRY WHO IS HEAD OF THE DIVISION DEALING WITH KOREAN MATTERS TOLD THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES THAT CHOU EN-LAI HAD GONE TO NORTHKOREA (ACCOMPANIED BY THE NEW FOREIGN MINISTER, CHEN YI) TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF CHINESE TROOPS FROM NORTHKOREA.

3. WE HAVE HEARD VIA THE FRENCH EMBASSY TODAY THAT THE STATE DEPT THINKS THAT THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS MAY ATTEMPT TO USE THE RECENT INCIDENT INVOLVING THE DETENTION OF A ROK AIRCRAFT IN NORTHKOREA AS A MEANS OF FORCING DIRECT CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH KOREANS, AND THAT THEY MIGHT ENDEAVOUR TO EXTEND THE AREA OF CONSULTATIONS TO COVER MORE IMPORTANT ISSUES THAN THE AIRCRAFT INCIDENT. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN PRESS REPORTS INDICATING THAT WHEN THE MATTER WAS RAISED AT A MEETING OF THE SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY ARMISTICE

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COMMISSION AT PANMUNJOM THE COMMUNISTS REJECTED A REQUEST FOR A MEETING OF THE COMMISSION ON THE SUBJECT ON THE GROUNDS THAT SINCE A CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT IS INVOLVED THE MATTER DOES NOT COME UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMISSION.

4. AS TO THE USA PUBLIC REACTION TO THIS INCIDENT, THE AP TICKER REPORTS STATE DEPT PRESS OFFICER WHITE AS ACCUSING THE NORTHKOREANS OF "INTERNATIONAL HIGHJACKING". AFTER REMARKING THAT THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE COMMUNISTS ON THIS OCCASION "DEMONSTRATES AGAIN THE ABSENCE OF GOOD FAITH OR SINCERITY WHICH ARE NEEDED IF ANY PROGRESS IS TO BE MADE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM", WHITE SAID:


"IN THIS ATTEMPT THEY ARE USING THIS COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT AND 34 PASSENGERS AND CREW MEMBERS TO CREATE TENSION AND TO BLACKMAIL THE GOVT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UN COMMAND FOR SELFISH POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. IT COMES SIGNIFICANTLY AT A TIME WHEN THE NORTH KOREAN REGIME AND ITS CHINESE COMMUNIST SUPPORTERS ARE PROCLAIMING PEACEFUL INTENTIONS AND A DESIRE FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN PROBLEMS."

5. FROM THE FOREGOING IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE ATTITUDE OF THE USA ON THE CHINESE NOTE WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THE AIRCRAFT INCIDENT.

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHDC FEB17/58 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 358 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO LDN PERMISNY EMBASSYPARIS
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS HAGUE ANKARA FM LDN



REF YOUR TEL Y58 FEB14

CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA UK VIEWS

THE BRITISH EMBASSY HERE HAS MADE AVAILABLE TO US THE FOLLOWING
TEXT OF A TEL ON THIS SUBJECT DATED FEB15 FROM THE FO TO THE UK
EMBASSY IN WASHDC BEGINS:

THE PROPOSALS NOW PUT FORWARD BY THE NORTH KOREANS AND ENDORSED
BY THE CHINESE ARE SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME AS THOSE PUT FORWARD
BY THE COMMUNISTS AT GENEVA IN 1954. ON THE FACE OF IT THEIR
PRESENTATION APPEARS TO BE A LITTLE MORE FLEXIBLE. THEY DO NOT, FOR
EXAMPLE, INSIST THAT REPRESENTATION IN THE NEW ALL-KOREA NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY SHALL BE EQUALLY DIVIDED BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA
INSTEAD OF, AS WE CONSIDER, IN PROPORTION TO THE POPULATION, AND
THEY ARE PUT FORWARD WITH THE USUAL SHOW OF SPECIOUS REASONABLENESS
WHICH IS SUPPORTED BY THE CHINESE STATEMENT THAT THEY, FOR THEIR
PART, ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS WITH THE NORTH KOREANS THE WITH-
DRAWAL OF THE CHINESE VOLUNTEERS. (YOU WILL RECALL, IN THIS CONNECTION,
THAT AT THE RECENT SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THE USA REP
IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE SAID THAT, IF THE COMMUNISTS REALLY SOUGHT
A SETTLEMENT IN KOREA, THEY COULD SHOW THEIR SINCERITY BY, INTER
ALIA, WITHDRAWING CHINESE COMMUNIST TROOPS FROM NORTH KOREA)

2 AMBASSADOR
MUTTER
CORHAM
SMITH
GROCHETTE
MISS CURRIE

2. ON THE OTHER HAND, GLOSSES ARE ALREADY BEING PUT UPON THE
PROPOSALS WHICH INDICATE THAT THE COMMUNISTS STILL PROPOSE AN
INTERPRETATION OF THEM WHICH WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO US. THE
NORTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR AT PEKING AT A PRESS CONFERENCE IS
REPORTED BY THE NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY AS SAYING, INTER ALIA, THAT
THE "PURPOSE OF SUPERVISION BY A NEUTRAL NATIONS ORGANIZATION OF
THE ELECTIONS FOLLOWING THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS WAS TO SEE
THAT ALL ALL POLITICAL PARTIES AND PUBLIC FIGURES IN BOTH NORTH
AND SOUTH KOREA WOULD HAVE FREEDOM OF ACTION, SPEECH, PUBLICATION,
ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION" BUT THAT "SUCH SUPERVISION SHOULD NOT
INTERVENE IN THE ELECTIONS" (IE, PRESUMABLY THAT THE ELECTIONS

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THEMSELVES SHOULD NOT BE SUPERVISED). THE NORTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW, ALSO GIVING A PRESS CONFERENCE, IS REPORTED AS SAYING THAT THE NEUTRAL BODY SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED THROUGH TALKS BETWEEN REPS OF BOTH PARTS OF THE COUNTRY BUT "SHOULD NOT INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE KOREANS". PRAVDA AND IZVESTIA IN ARTICLES PUBLISHED ON FEB 11 SUPPORTING THE NORTHKOREAN STATEMENT CALL FOR THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES "AS A PRELIMINARY TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM BY THE KOREANS THEMSELVES" AND THIS APPEARS TO BE THE POSITION TAKEN BY CHOU EN-LAI IN HIS REPORT TO THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS ON FEB 10.

3. IT DOES NOT LOOK, THEREFORE, AS IF THE COMMUNISTS ARE REALLY PREPARED TO MOVE FROM THEIR PREVIOUS POSITION WHICH LED TO DEADLOCK AT GENEVA, AND IT IS NOT IMMEDIATELY CLEAR WHY THEY HAVE REOPENED THE MATTER AT THIS TIME. IT MAY BE THAT IT IS NOTHING MORE THAN A PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE DESIGNED TO SUPPORT THE GENERAL COMMUNIST LINE IN PREPARATION FOR A SUMMIT CONFERENCE. OR THE COMMUNISTS MAY BE LOOKING TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FAR EAST TO TAKE PLACE WITH OR AFTER A SUMMIT CONFERENCE. (A JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED ON FEB 8 BY THE (NORTH) KOREAN COMMITTEE FOR ASIAN SOLIDARITY AND A JAPANESE "FRIENDSHIP MISSION" CALLS FOR A CONFERENCE OF HEADS OF GOVTS TO BE HELD "IMMEDIATELY AND THE SETTING UP OF AN "ASIA COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM"). OR THEY MAY BE GENUINELY WORRIED BY THE REEQUIPMENT OF AMERICAN FORCES IN KOREA AND ANXIOUS TO SEE WHETHER IT WOULD NOT AFTER ALL BE POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN THEIR REMOVAL. OR THEY MAY HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE AGREEMENT REACHED IN LAOS TO BELIEVE THAT SOME PROGRESS CAN BE MADE IN KOREA ON TERMS NOT TOO DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THEMSELVES. OR THEY MAY BE ANXIOUS THEMSELVES TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS FROM NORTHKOREA. THE MOTIVE MAY BE A COMBINATION OF ANY OR ALL OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS.

4. WHILE, THEREFORE, WE HAVE PERHAPS IN THE FIRST PLACE TO VIEW THE PRESENT PROPOSALS AND SUCH REPLY TO THEM AS WE MAY MAKE AS A PROPAGANDA EXERCISE, WE SHOULD NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT

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PAGE THREE 358

THE COMMUNISTS MAY INTEND THEM AS A FIRST MOVE TOWARDS SOME SERIOUS NEGOTIATION IN THE LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS OVER A SUMMIT CONFERENCE.

WE SHOULD TRY, THEREFORE, TO DEVISE AN ANSWER WHICH WOULD BE IN LINE WITH THE UN PRINCIPLES ON WHICH WE STAND, BUT KEEP THE DOOR OPEN IN CASE THE COMMUNISTS SHOULD REALLY MEAN BUSINESS. TO THIS END WE CAN MAKE SOME PLAY WITH THE EQUIVOCAL STATEMENTS MENTIONED IN PARA2 ABOVE. WE SHOULD AVOID A FLAT REJECTION, WHICH WOULD BE BOTH TACTICALLY INADVISABLE AND FROM A PROPAGANDA POINT OF VIEW LIKELY TO ALIENATE THOSE, SUCH AS THE INDIANS AND OTHER "UNCOMMITTED" COUNTRIES TO WHOM THE PROPOSALS MAY APPEAR NOT UNREASONABLE.

5. THE COURSE THAT I WOULD FAVOUR WOULD, THEREFORE, BE THAT THE SIXTEEN SHOULD AGREE ON A JOINT REPLY TO THE CHINESE, TO BE DELIVERED THROUGH HER MAJESTY'S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AT PEKING, ON THE LINES OF THE TEXT SUGGESTED IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TEL. SOMETHING ON THESE LINES WOULD, I THINK, MEET THE REQUIREMENTS SUGGESTED IN PARA4 ABOVE AND WOULD PUT THE BALL BACK IN THE COMMUNIST COURT. PLEASE DISCUSS WITH THE STATE DEPT. AND URGE THEM TO SUPPORT SOMETHING ON THESE LINES, ADDING THAT IT SEEMS IMPORTANT THAT ALL THE SIXTEEN SHOULD HAVE AN AGREED LINE AND ACT IN CONCERT. WE CANNOT EXPECT THE SOUTHKOREANS TO AGREE, SINCE THEY HAVE APPARENTLY ALREADY REJECTED THE COMMUNIST PROPOSALS, BUT WE AND/OR THE AMERICANS SHOULD KEEP THEM INFORMED OF THE REPLY RETURNED AND THE REASONS FOR IT.

6. MY IDEA WOULD BE THAT OUR REPLY SHOULD BE PUBLISHED BY THE SIXTEEN IMMEDIATELY AFTER DELIVERY TO THE CHINESE. ENDS.

BY CAN

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

7-1-1-1

FM WASHDC FEB17/58 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 357 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO LDN PERMISNY EMBASSYPARIS
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
BAG CNBRA WLGTH KARACHI DELHI ATHENS HAGUE ANKARA FM LDN
REF YOUR TEL Y58 FEB14



CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA-UK VIEWS

FOLLOWING IS A SUGGESTED TEXT FOR A REPLY TO THE CHINESE WHICH
WAS DRAFTED IN THE FO AND MADE AVAILABLE TO US BY THE BRITISH
EMBASSY HERE: BEGINS:

THE GOVTS OF THE SIXTEEN COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED
FORCES FOR THE UN FORCE IN KOREA HAVE NOTED THE STATEMENT MADE BY
THE NORTHKOREAN AUTHORITIES ON FEB5 AND THAT MADE BY THE CHINESE
AUTHORITIES AND COMMUNICATED TO HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S CHARGE
D'AFFAIRES IN PEKING ON FEB7. THEY HAVE GIVEN CAREFUL STUDY TO THESE
STATEMENTS AND TO THE PROPOSALS MADE THEREIN.

THE GOVTS CONCERNED REAFFIRM THAT THEIR AIM IN KOREA IS TO SEE
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNIFIED, INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC KOREA.
TO THIS END, AS THEY HAVE OFTEN STATED, THEY WISH TO SEE FREE ELECTIONS
HELD FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. THEY ARE GLAD TO
NOTE THAT THE NORTH KOREAN AND CHINESE AUTHORITIES ALSO FAVOUR FREE
ELECTIONS AND THEY WELCOME THE CHINESE SUGGESTION THAT THEY WOULD
BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS WITH THE NORTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES THE
QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL OF CHINESE FORCES FROM NORTHKOREA.

THERE APPEARS, HOWEVER, TO BE SOME DOUBT AS TO THE PRECISE INTER-
PRETATION TO BE PLACED ON THE NORTH KOREAN PROPOSALS. THE NORTH
KOREAN AMBASSADOR IN PEKING, FOR EXAMPLE, IS REPORTED AS HAVING
STATED THAT THE "PURPOSE OF SUPERVISION BY A NEUTRAL NATIONS OR-
GANISATION WAS TO SEE THAT ALL POLITICAL PARTIES AND PUBLIC
FIGURES IN BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA WOULD HAVE FREEDOM OF
ACTION, SPEECH, PUBLICATION, ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION" BUT THAT

"SUCH SUPERVISION SHOULD NOT INTERVENE IN THE ELECTIONS". THE NORTH
KOREAN AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW IS REPORTED AS STATING THAT THE NEUTRAL
BODY SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED THROUGH TALKS BETWEEN REPS OF BOTH
PARTS OF THE COUNTRY BUT "SHOULD NOT INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL

INIT. 13
AMBASSADOR
MUTTER
RUSSEL
GORHAM
SMITH
CHOCQUETTE
MISS CURRIE

PAGE TWO 357


AFFAIRS OF THE KOREANS". IN ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN PRAVDA AND ISVESTIA, ON THE OTHER HAND, A CALL IS MADE FOR "THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES" AS A PRELIMINARY TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM BY THE KOREANS THEMSELVES, AND THIS APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN THE POSITION TAKEN BY MR CHOU EN-LAI IN HIS REPORT TO THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS ON FEB 10. THESE INTERPRETATIONS APPEAR TO CALL FOR SOME CLARIFICATION AND THE GOVTS OF THE SIXTEEN COUNTRIES CONCERNED WOULD BE GLAD TO KNOW WHETHER, WHEN THE NORTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES SPEAK OF A "NEUTRAL NATIONS ORGAN" TO SUPERVISE THE ELECTIONS, THEY ACCEPT THAT THESE SHOULD BE HELD UNDER UN AUSPICES AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE ADEQUATE SUPERVISION NOT ONLY OF THE PRELIMINARIES BUT ALSO OF THE ELECTIONS THEMSELVES. THEY WOULD ALSO BE GLAD TO KNOW WHETHER IT IS NOW ACCEPTED THAT REPRESENTATION IN THE NEW NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BE IN PROPORTION TO THE INDIGENOUS POPULATION.

THE GOVTS CONCERNED HAVE NOTED THAT, IN HIS REPORT TO THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS, MR CHOU EN-LAI STATED THAT THE CHINESE GOVT WERE PREPARED TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO PROMOTE THE REALISATION OF THE PROPOSALS MADE BY THE NORTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES. IF, THEREFORE, THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES WILL SEEK FROM THE NORTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES CLARIFICATION OF THE POINTS MENTIONED ABOVE WITH SUCH OTHER DETAILS OF THE KOREAN PROPOSALS AS MAY BE RELEVANT, THE GOVTS CONCERNED WILL BE PLEASED TO PASS THESE TO THE UN COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION. ENDS.

TELEGRAM

7-1-1-1

SECRET



FM EXTERNAL OTT FEB14/58 SECRET
TO WASHDC Y58 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO LDN PRIORITY
PERMISNY EMBASSYPARIS TOKYO HAGUE BRUSS
BAG CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS HAGUE ANKARA FM LDN

REF YOUR TEL 308 OUR TEL Y54

CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA

WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE TEXT OF THE CHINESE PROPOSAL AND HAVE
FORMED SOME PRELIMINARY VIEWS AT THE OFFICIAL LEVEL.

NO.	INIT.
2 AMBASSADOR	B
MUTTER	
1 HALSTEAD	
GORHAM	
SMITH	
CHOQUETTE	
MISS CURRIE	

2. FIRST, THERE DO NOT RPT NOT APPEAR TO BE ANY NEW PROPOSALS IN
THE CHINESE NOTE. THE PHRASES "UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A NEUTRAL
NATIONS ORGANIZATION" AND "ON AN EQUAL FOOTING", ARE FAMILIAR ONES
USED IN THE PAST, AND THE PROPOSAL FOR "NATIONWIDE ELECTIONS" IS ALSO
FAMILIAR AND IS KNOWN TO BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE ROK GOVT.

3. SECOND, THE LANGUAGE OF THE CURRENT NOTE SEEMS TO BE MORE IMMO-
DERATE THAN THAT USED IN APR 1956 WHEN THE CHINESE MADE, THROUGH
THE SAME CHANNELS, A PROPOSAL INVOLVING ELECTIONS AND WITHDRAWAL OF
TROOPS. THE REFS IN PARAS THREE AND FOUR IN BELLIGERENT TONES TO
THE USA SEEM TO INDICATE THAT THE CHINESE STATEMENT WAS NOT RPT NOT
INTENDED AS A SERIOUS BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION BUT FOR PROPAGANDA ONLY.

4. IT STRIKES US THAT THE REF IN PARA THREE OF THE NOTE TO THE CHINESE
WARNING TO THE USA IN 1950, AND IN PARA FIVE TO "THE INCREASINGLY
SERIOUS THREAT TO PEACE IN KOREA", COULD BE OF SIGNIFICANCE,

ALTHOUGH WE HOPE IT IS NOT RPT NOT INTENDED TO BE, AS WAS THE 1950
WARNING, A THREAT OF IMPENDING MILITARY ACTION. NO RPT NO SUCH WAR-
NING WAS INCLUDED IN THE 1956 NOTE, AND WE SHOULD BE INTERESTED IN
HEARING YOUR VIEWS AND THOSE OF REPS OF OTHER NATIONS CONCERNED
WHOM YOU MAY CONTACT AS TO THE REASONS FOR ITS INCLUSION THIS TIME.

5. WE NOTED WITH INTEREST THE BRITISH VIEW WHICH WE SET OUT IN OUR
TEL Y53, THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO RPT NO OUTRIGHT REJECTION OF THE
CHINESE PROPOSAL, BUT WOULD APPRECIATE HEARING FROM YOU WHETHER
BRITISH REPS TAKE THIS TO MEAN ONLY THAT REJECTION SHOULD BE DELA-
YED, OR THAT A COUNTER PROPOSAL SHOULD BE MADE TO THE CHINESE.

IN THE CASE OF A DELAYED REJECTION, WE SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THAT THE
VIEWS EXPRESSED BY THE BRITISH AS SET OUT IN OUR REF TEL MAY

PAGE TWO Y58

DIFFER FROM OURS, ALSO STATED IN THAT TEL, ON THE QUESTION OF SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS, AND THAT THE EXPECTED JOINT STATEMENT OF REJECTION WILL NEED TO BE PHRASED TO TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT.

6. IF THE BRITISH FEEL THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME COUNTER PROPOSAL, WE SHOULD BE INTERESTED IN HEARING THE VIEWS OF THE BRITISH AND OTHERS AS TO WHAT FORM IT SHOULD TAKE. IT HAS OCCURRED TO US THAT ONE WAY TO TRY TO FREE OURSELVES FROM THE PROPAGANDA DISADVANTAGE UNDER WHICH THE COMMUNIST SIDE IS ABLE TO PLACE US WOULD BE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH THE ROK, TO THE EFFECT THAT UN TROOPS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM KOREA AFTER CHINESE TROOPS HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN AND FREE ELECTIONS HAD BEEN HELD. WE ARE, OF COURSE, AWARE THAT IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT OF ROK ACCEPTANCE OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT THERE WOULD ARISE THE DANGER OF FREEING SYNGMAN RHEE FROM THE PRESENT MEASURE OF US CONTROL, BUT THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT, IN VIEW OF THE SMALL LIKELIHOOD OF ACTION BEING TAKEN BY THE CHINESE TO BRING INTO FORCE THE CLAUSES PROVIDING FOR WITHDRAWAL, THE ADVANTAGES OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT MIGHT WELL OUTWEIGH ITS DANGERS. AFTER SUCH AN AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED A REPLY COULD BE SENT TO THE CHINESE TRANSMITTING A COPY OF IT.

7. YOU WILL APPRECIATE THAT THESE ARE MERELY PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS WHICH HAVE NOT YET NOT BEEN PURSUED VERY FAR OR CONSIDERED ABOVE THE DIVISIONAL LEVEL. WE SHOULD LIKE TO HAVE AN IDEA OF THE ATTITUDE OF OTHER PARTICIPATING GOVTS BEFORE CARRYING OUR THOUGHTS FURTHER.

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL OTT FEB13/58 CONF
TO WASHDC Y55 PRIORITY
LDN PRIORITY

INFO PERMISNY EMBASSYPARIS TOKYO
BAG CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS HAGUE ANKARA FM LDN

REF OUR TEL Y53

CHINESE PROPOSAL ON KOREA


PURPOSE OF OUR REF TEL WAS TO PASS TO YOU INFO RECEIVED HERE ON
BRITISH POSITION. ON RE-READING IT WE NOTE THAT IT MIGHT POSSIBLY
APPEAR THAT WE WERE IN AGREEMENT WITH BRITISH STATEMENTS WE REPORTED.
YOU WILL REMEMBER THAT THE CANADIAN POSITION HAS BEEN FLEXIBLE,
AND WE WOULD NOT RPT NOT WISH OUR REF TEL TO BE INTERPRETED AS
CONSTITUTING SUPPORT FOR THE BRITISH REMARKS CONCERNING SUPERVISION
OF ELECTIONS "BY THE UN OR UNDER UN AUSPICES."

2. THE CANADIAN POSITION ON SUPERVISION WAS STATED TO THE FIRST
COMMITTEE ON NOV12/55 BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CANADIAN DELEGATION
TO THE TENTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AS FOLLOWS: "AN ESSENTIAL
PART OF ANY POSSIBLE SOLUTION WOULD BE TO MAKE PROVISIONS FOR IMPAR-
TIAL INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION. AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE IN 1954 A
NUMBER OF PROPOSALS FOR INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION WERE PRODUCED BY
THE UN SIDE WHICH MIGHT HAVE RESULTED IN ARRANGEMENTS FA(...CRPT...) TO ALL
CONCERNED. THE CANADIAN GOVT AT GENEVA AND SUBSEQUENTLY HAS ADOPTED
A FLEXIBLE ATTITUDE ON THE EXACT NATURE OF THESE PROVISIONS. WHAT
WE DO INSIST UPON IS THAT THEY BE FAIR AND FOOLPROOF. THEY MUST, OF
COURSE, BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE UN BECAUSE, HAVING MADE SUCH GREAT SACRI-
FICES TO DEFEND KOREA FROM AGGRESSION, THE UN COULD NOT RPT NOT SIT
IDLY BY AND ALLOW AGGRESSION TO TRIUMPH BY POLITICAL MANOEUVRE.

"WE WOULD NOT RPT NOT WISH, HOWEVER, TO ASSUME THE POSITION THAT THE
LAST WORD ON THIS SUBJECT WAS SAID AT GENEVA IN 1954. WE ARE NOT RPT
NOT PREPARED TO REPUDIATE IN ANY WAY THE POSITION WHICH WE TOOK AT
GENEVA AND WHICH WAS COVERED IN THE REPORT OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE
TO LAST YEAR'S SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY. HOWEVER, IF ANY OF THOSE CON-
CERNED WISH TO EXPLORE OTHER AVENUES TOWARDS A UNIFICATION PROCEDURE
THAT WOULD PROVE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PARTIES, THEN WE BELIEVE THAT THESE

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CHOQUETTE	
MISS CURRIE	



PAGE TWO Y55
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WITH AN OPEN MIND."

3.WE HOPE TO BE ABLE TO SEND YOU OUR PRELIMINARY REACTION TO THE
CHINESE STATEMENT LATER TODAY.THIS WILL,OF COURSE,BE ON THE OFFICIAL
LEVEL ONLY FOR THE TIME BEING.

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

FEB 13 1958



FM EXTERNAL OTT FEB12/58 CONF
TO WASHDC Y53 PRIORITY
PERMISNY LDN EMBASSYPARIS TOKYO
BAG CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS HAGUE ANKARA FM LDN

REF YOUR TEL 299 FEB10

PROPOSAL FOR KOREAN UNIFICATION

BRITISH TELS RECEIVED HERE INDICATE THAT DULLES IS NOT REPEAT NOT IN FAVOUR OF MEETING OF SIXTEEN AT THIS TIME FOR PURPOSE OF DISTRIBUTING TEXT OF CHINESE PROPOSAL, SO BRITISH WILL COMMUNICATE IT TO THE SIXTEEN BUT NOT REPEAT NOT TO REPUBLIC OF KOREA. BRITISH EMBASSY IS INSTRUCTED TO SUGGEST THAT ALL GOVTS CONCERNED WILL WISH TO EXAMINE THE STATEMENT CLOSELY, AND TO PROPOSE THAT A MEETING BE HELD WHEN THEY HAVE DONE SO TO EXCHANGE VIEWS AND DETERMINE ACTION.

2. FO SUGGESTS ANY DOWNRIGHT REJECTION OF CHINESE PROPOSAL SHOULD BE AVOIDED AT LEAST UNTIL IT CAN BE DETERMINED WHETHER ANY PROSPECT OF PROGRESS IS OFFERED. THEY FURTHER SUGGEST THAT, EVEN IF PROSPECTS APPEAR NO REPEAT NO BETTER THAN USUAL, IT MIGHT BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO MAKE THE POINT THAT A KOREAN SOLUTION COULD BE BROUGHT CLOSER IF THE COMMUNIST SIDE WERE TO SUBSTITUTE IN THEIR PROPOSALS SUPERVISION BY THE UN OR UNDER UN AUSPICES FOR THE SUPERVISION BY "NEUTRAL NATIONS" REPORTEDLY SUGGESTED BY KIM IL

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SUNG. THE BRITISH ADD THAT ALTHOUGH THIS MIGHT NOT REPEAT NOT BE READILY ACCEPTABLE TO ROK, "NEITHER WOULD ANY OTHER HINT OF PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION," AND IT WOULD AT LEAST TEST THE COMMUNISTS' INTENTIONS AND BE BETTER FROM A PROPAGANDA POINT OF VIEW THAN A FLAT REJECTION.

3. IN A SUBSEQUENT TEL FO REITERATES TO WASHDC THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING COMMENTS BY INDIVIDUAL NATIONS CONCERNED ON SUBSTANCE OF COMMUNIST PROPOSAL, AND INSTRUCTS US REPS TO MAKE THIS POINT TO STATE DEPT AS MATTER OF URGENCY, URGING ALSO THAT OTHER FOURTEEN BE SPOKEN TO IN THIS VEIN, EITHER AT A LOW LEVEL MEETING TO AVOID ATTRACTING ATTENTION OR IN ANY OTHER CONVENIENT WAY.


4. WE HAVE NOT REPEAT NOT YET SEEN THE TEXT OF THE CHINESE STATEMENT AND WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING IT WHEN BRITISH EMBASSY PASSES IT ON TO YOU.

TELEGRAM

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CONFIDENTIAL



FM WASHDC FEB11/58 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 30 PRIORITY
INFO PERMISNY LDN EMBASSYPARIS
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT
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REF OUR TEL 299 FEB10

KOREA

THE BRITISH EMBASSY INFORMED US THIS MORNING THAT THE STATE DEPT DID NOT WISH TO CALL A MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN TO DISTRIBUTE THE TEXT OF THE CHINESE STATEMENT ON KOREA AND ACCORDINGLY THE BRITISH EMBASSY IS DISTRIBUTING IT DIRECT TO THE EMBASSIES OF THE GOVTS CONCERNED. A MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN WILL PRESUMABLY BE HELD SOMETIME SOON TO DISCUSS THE NATURE OF A REPLY.

2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY'S NOTE TOGETHER WITH THE TEXT OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST STATEMENT WHICH IT COVERS: BEGINS:

HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR FOR THE UK PRESENTS HIS COMPLIMENTS TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE AMBASSADOR OF CANADA AND HAS THE HONOUR TO TRANSMIT TO HIM THE ENCLOSED STATEMENT RECEIVED FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN PEKING. HER MAJESTY'S GOVT HAVE BEEN REQUESTED BY THE GOVT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO COMMUNICATE THIS STATEMENT TO ALL GOVTS REPRESENTED IN THE UN MILITARY FORCE IN KOREA.

IN ANSWER TO PRESS ENQUIRIES HER MAJESTY'S GOVT ARE CONFIRMING THAT THEY HAVE RECEIVED THIS STATEMENT, THAT THEY ARE TRANSMITTING IT TO THE POWERS CONCERNED, AND THAT IT IS UNDER STUDY. NO COMMENT OF SUBSTANCE IS BEING MADE UPON IT UNTIL IT HAS BEEN CAREFULLY EXAMINED. HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR HAS THE HONOUR TO SUGGEST THAT, AFTER THE GOVTS CONCERNED HAVE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO STUDY THE CHINESE STATEMENT, A MEETING MIGHT BE HELD TO DISCUSS IT. STATEMENT OF THE GOVT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, DATED FEB7/58

ON FEB5 THE GOVT OF THE KOREAN DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC ISSUED A STATEMENT ON THE QUESTION OF PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF KOREA, PROPOSING THAT ALL FOREIGN FORCES BE WITHDRAWN FROM

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NORTH AND SOUTHKOREA SIMULTANEOUSLY, THAT WITHIN A DEFINITE PERIOD FOLLOWING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES NATIONWIDE FREE ELECTIONS BE HELD UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A NEUTRAL NATIONS ORGANIZATION, THAT CONSULTATIONS BE HELD BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA, ON AN EQUAL FOOTING, ON THE ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL INTERCOURSE BETWEEN THEM, THE HOLDING OF NATIONWIDE ELECTIONS AND OTHER PROBLEMS, AND THAT THE ARMED FORCES OF NORTH AND SOUTHKOREA BE REDUCED TO THE MINIMUM WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME.

THIS IS ANOTHER MAJOR EFFORT MADE BY THE GOVT OF THE KOREAN DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION. THESE PROPOSALS NOT ONLY ARE IN FULL ACCORD WITH THE EAGER DESIRES OF ALL KOREAN PEOPLE FOR THE PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF THEIR MOTHERLAND, BUT ALSO WILL OPEN UP A NEW, PRACTICABLE AVENUE FOR EASING THE TENSION IN THE FUTURE.

THE CHINESE GOVT FULLY ENDORSES AND SUPPORTS THIS IMPORTANT PEACE PROPOSAL MADE BY THE GOVT OF THE KOREAN DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC. THE CHINESE GOVT AND PEOPLE, STARTING FROM THE FUNDAMENTAL POSITION THAT THE KOREAN QUESTION SHOULD BE SETTLED BY THE KOREAN PEOPLE THEMSELVES, HAVE CONSISTENTLY OPPOSED FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN KOREAN AFFAIRS, AND FIRMLY HELD THAT ALL FOREIGN FORCES SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM KOREA. AT THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE KOREAN WAR, THE CHINESE GOVT AND PEOPLE MAINTAINED THAT THE USA AGGRESSION FORCES SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM KOREA IMMEDIATELY. IT WAS ONLY WHEN THE WARNING SERVED BY THE CHINESE GOVT AND PEOPLE HAD BEEN SPURNED BY THE USA, AND WHEN THE USA FORCES HAD NOT ONLY INVADDED THE KOREAN DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, BUT AT THE SAME TIME OCCUPIED CHINA'S TAIWAN AND SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZED THE SECURITY OF CHINA, THAT THE CHINESE PEOPLE ORGANIZED THEIR VOLUNTEERS TO PROCEED TO KOREA TO RESIST USA AGGRESSION TOGETHER WITH THE KOREAN PEOPLE.

DURING THE KOREAN ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS, AND AFTER THE REALISATION OF THE ARMISTICE, THE GOVTS OF CHINA AND THE KOREAN DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC AGAIN PROPOSED CONTINUOUSLY THAT ALL FOREIGN FORCES SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM NORTH AND SOUTHKOREA SIMULTANEOUSLY, AND MAINTAINED THAT THIS WAS THE PRIMARY CONDITION FOR THE HOLDING OF FREE ELECTIONS THROUGHOUT KOREA AND THE

PAGE THREE 308

REALIZATION OF THE PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF KOREA. THE USA, HOWEVER, NOT ONLY REJECTED ALL ALONG THIS REASONABLE PROPOSAL OF THE CHINESE AND KOREAN SIDE, BUT VIOLATED THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AGAIN AND AGAIN, AND RECENTLY EVEN OPENLY INTRODUCED ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO SOUTHKOREA, THUS FURTHER CONVERTING SOUTHKOREA INTO ITS COLONY AND ATOMIC BASE.

AS POINTED OUT IN THE STATEMENT BY THE GOVT OF THE KOREAN DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, THE CONTINUED OCCUPATION OF SOUTHKOREA BY USA FORCES IS THE BASIC CAUSE FOR THE INDEFINITE PUTTING-OFF OF THE PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF KOREA AND FOR THE INCREASINGLY SERIOUS THREAT TO PEACE IN KOREA. THE CHINESE PEOPLE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN CONCERNED ABOUT PEACE IN KOREA. THE CHINESE GOVT HAS NEVER SPARED ITS EFFORTS IN PROMOTING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION. NOW, WHEN THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PEOPLES OF ASIA AND THE WORLD FOR PEACE HAVE RISEN TO UNPRECEDENTED HEIGHTS AND THERE ARE GREATER POSSIBILITIES FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, THE CHINESE GOVT HOLDS THAT THE KOREAN SITUATION SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DETERIORATE FURTHER. IN ORDER TO BREAK THE DEAD-LOCK ON THE KOREAN QUESTION AND RELAX TENSION IN THE FAREAST, THE CHINESE GOVT DEEMS THAT ALL FOREIGN FORCES SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM KOREA WITHIN A SET PERIOD OF TIME; AND THE CHINESE GOVT IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS WITH THE GOVT OF THE KOREAN DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC ON THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS FROM KOREA.

THE CHINESE GOVT ASKS THE GOVTS OF THE USA, AND OF OTHER COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE UN FORCES, ALSO TO TAKE MEASURES TO WITHDRAW FROM SOUTHKOREA, USA AND ALL OTHER FOREIGN FORCES. THE CHINESE GOVT HOPES THAT ALL COUNTRIES CONCERNED ABOUT PEACE IN THE FAREAST AND THE WORLD WOULD TAKE POSITIVE STEPS TO URGE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM KOREA SO AS TO CREATE A FAVOURABLE CONDITION FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION AND THE SAFE-GUARDING OF PEACE IN THE FAREAST AND THE WORLD. ENDS

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

TELEGRAM

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

BY CAN

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CONFIDENTIAL



FM WASHDC FEB10/58 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 299 PRIORITY
INFO PERMISNY LDN EMBASSYPARIS
TOKYO DEFERREED FM OTT
BAG CNBRA WLGTN KARACHI DELHI ATHENS ANKARA HAGUE FM LDN
KOREA

THE BRITISH EMBASSY INFORMED US THIS MORNING THAT THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS HAD ASKED THEM TO PASS THE TEXT OF A NOTE TO THE SIXTEEN GOVTS WHICH HAD PARTICIPATED IN THE KOREAN OPERATIONS IN WHICH THE CHINESE PROPOSE THAT ALL FOREIGN TROOPS BE WITHDRAWN FROM BOTH HALVES OF KOREA, THAT THE GOVTS OF THE TWO PARTS OF KOREA SHOULD CONFER TOGETHER ABOUT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CULTURAL AND ECONOMICAL LINKS IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, AND THAT IN DUE COURSE NATIONWIDE ELECTIONS BE HELD THROUGHOUT KOREA UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF NEUTRAL POWERS.

2. THE BRITISH EMBASSY HERE HAS ENQUIRED OF THE STATE DEPT WHETHER THE USA WOULD LIKE TO CALL A MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN IN ORDER TO PASS OUT COPIES OF THE CHINESE NOTE. IF NO MEETING IS HELD AT THIS TIME THE BRITISH EMBASSY WILL MAKE COPIES AVAILABLE TO EMBASSIES CONCERNED HERE.

3. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE CHINESE HAVE ALREADY PASSED THE TEXT OF THEIR NOTE TO THE PRESS.

4. HOWEVER, WHEN THE NOTE IS DELIVERED IT WILL BE NECESSARY AT SOME STAGE FOR THE SIXTEEN TO MEET AND REACH AN AGREEMENT ON AN APPROPRIATE REPLY TO THE CHINESE NOTE.

5. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE MAIN POINTS OF THE CHINESE NOTE WERE COVERED IN A SPEECH BY KIM-IL SUNG ON FEB5.

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Appendix "B" to the
232nd Weekly Report d/25/2/58

C O P Y

File 7-1-1-1

Distr. GENERAL
NNSC Doc. 497/PV 356
11 February 1958
Original: KOREAN

February 6, 1958

To: Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

I have the honour to send to your Commission the copies of the statement issued by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on February 5, 1958 concerning the measures that should be taken without delay for the peaceful unification of Korea under the present situation.

Kang Sang Ho
Major General
Korean People's Army
Senior Member
Korean People's Army and
Chinese People's Volunteers side
Military Armistice Commission

Distr. GENERAL
NNSC Doc. 497/PV 356
11 February 1958
Original: KOREAN

STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Pyongyang, February 5, 1958

More than twelve years have already passed since the liberation of Korea from the yoke of the colonial rule of the Japanese imperialists. And it is already more than four years since the signing of the Armistice Agreement which put an end to the disastrous three-year war imposed upon the Korean people by the U.S. imperialist aggressors and the Syngman Rheeites.

However, Korea has not yet been unified and the Korean people are still undergoing misfortunes because of the division of the country.

The entire Korean people ardently desire to eliminate the artificial barrier between the North and South at the earliest date and unify the fatherland peacefully.

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea proceeding from the unanimous desire of the entire Korean people, has already advanced more than once a number of reasonable proposals for the promotion of the peaceful unification of the country and has been striving for their realization.

However, the United States and the South Korean authorities, peremptorily turning down the fair proposals of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, are opposing the peaceful unification of Korea and advocating "unification by force". The South Korean authorities ruthlessly suppress and persecute the people, political parties and politicians on the charge of the "violation of the state policy", if they show even the slightest indication of being in favour of peaceful unification.

The U.S. side and the South Korean authorities are increasing tension in Korea by systematically wrecking the Armistice Agreement. Arbitrarily rejecting the observance of the most important provisions of the Armistice Agreement which prohibits armaments reinforcement in Korea, they are engrossed in introducing new types of weapons into South Korea and building up an atomic base there.

Today in South Korea under the occupation of the U.S. imperialists, even the smallest democratic freedom and rights are not allowed to the people, the economy has been subordinated to the United States and the national industry and medium and small enterprises are going headlong to ruin. The rural economy has also been devastated, and an increasing number of peasant households are running out of provisions and leaving their land year after year. South Korea, which once was an area exporting provisions, has become an area of famine, which imports millions of suk of rice every year from foreign countries.

As a result, today millions of unemployed are wandering about the streets in South Korea and living conditions of the popular masses are becoming all the more miserable.

The longer the unification of Korea is delayed, the greater will be the sufferings of the South Korean people and the national misfortunes of the entire Korean people.

Owing to the division of the country for more than twelve years, the concerted development of the national economy and national culture of our country is being completely hampered. Even the concerted development of the national language which has been loved for generations is being menaced.

It is impossible for the relatives and friends separated in the North and South even to hear from each other, much less see each other. This extremely unreasonable state must not continue any longer.

The main cause of the delay of the peaceful unification of the country, the increasing danger to peace in Korea and the aggravation of the wretched situation in South Korea lies in the continued occupation of South Korea by the U.S. army.

Recently, in particular, the U.S. army and the South Korean army staged a large-scale atomic war manoeuvre near the Military Demarcation Line. The U.S. army commanders as well as Syngman Rhee and other South Korean bellicose elements take no pains to conceal the fact that they are making preparations for a new war against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and are openly bearing that they have introduced atomic weapons into South Korea. Thus peace in Korea is facing a grave danger.

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea deems it its sacred duty to take once again, at this critical juncture, appropriate measures for removing the threat to peace, easing the tense situation and promoting the peaceful unification of the country.

The Korean question can never be solved by means of armed invasion as the U.S. imperialists and Syngman Rheeites are plotting. It must be and can be solved only by peaceful means, that is, by means of negotiations and talks.

Considering that the question of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and that of the peaceful unification of Korea are already ripe issues which must be solved without delay, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea declares that the following measures should be immediately taken:

1. For easing the tense situation in Korea and solving the Korean question peacefully the U.S. army and all other foreign troops including the Chinese People's Volunteers should be simultaneously withdrawn from North and South Korea. For this purpose all the countries which have dispatched their troops to Korea should at once take appropriate steps for immediately withdrawing their troops from Korea. The occupation of South Korea by the U.S. army cannot be justified under any pretext, and the U.S. army has no ground whatsoever for remaining in South Korea.
2. Within a definite period after the complete withdrawal of all the foreign troops from North and South Korea, all-Korea free elections should be held. These elections may be conducted under the observation of a neutral nations organ. The democratic

rights and the expression of free will of the people must be ensured in the elections.

For this, the free activities of all the political parties and social organizations as well as of political and social figures in North and South Korea and the freedom of speech, the press, assembly and association should be legally granted everywhere in North and South Korea.

Such suppression of the activities of political parties and the freedom of speech as that exercised in South Korea at present should be strictly prohibited.

3. For the discussion of questions pertaining to economic and cultural exchange between the North and South and to the all-Korea elections, negotiations between the North and South based on equality should be realized at an early date.

Free postal communication and free travel of peaceful inhabitants between the North and South should be permitted.

To begin this, the North and South may mutually designate definite spots and conduct economic intercourse between the North and South at these spots.

For the concerted development of national culture including the national language, contacts and joint activities of scholars, men of culture and arts and sportsmen of North and South Korea should be undertaken.

4. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has already reduced the numerical strength of its army by 80,000. The armies of North and South Korea should be respectively reduced to the minimum in the near future.

By responding without delay to this fair proposal of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the reduction of armaments of the North and South, the South Korean authorities should ease the tension between the North and South and lighten the onerous burden of military expenses which the South Korean people pay for the maintenance of the expanded "ROK army".

Under the present situation in which the destiny of the fatherland and the nation is gravely menaced, all the Korean people with national conscience, regardless of their political views and social status, must firmly rally under the banner of the peaceful unification of the fatherland and must win the unification and independence of the fatherland and safeguard national honour by courageously struggling for the implementation of the fatherland unification program of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

This is the supreme national task set before each Korean today.

Firmly convinced that the realization of the above measures will greatly conduce to the peaceful unification of Korea and to the preservation of peace in the Far East, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea expects that the governments and the people of all countries concerned about the maintenance of peace in Korea and the peaceful solution of the Korean question will pay due attention to this statement.

Appendix "C" to the
232nd Weekly Report d/25/2/58

C O P Y

Distr. GENERAL
NNSC Doc.498/PV 356
11 February 1958
Original: CHINESE

February 8, 1958

To: Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

I have the honour to send to your Commission the copies of the statement issued by the Government of the People's Republic of China on February 7, 1958 in connection with the statement of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea dated February, 1958 concerning the measures that should be taken without delay for the peaceful unification of Korea under the present situation.

Kang Sang Ho
Major General
Korean People's Army
Senior Member
Korean People's Army and
Chinese People's Volunteers side
Military Armistice Commission

Distr. GENERAL
NNSC Doc. 498
11 February 1958
Original: CHINESE

STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

February 7, 1958

On February 5, 1958 the Government of the Korean Democratic People's Republic issued a statement on the question of peaceful unification of Korea, proposing that all foreign forces be withdrawn from North and South Korea simultaneously, that within a definite period following the withdrawal of all foreign forces nation-wide free elections be held under the supervision of a neutral nations organization, that consultations be held between North and South Korea on an equal footing on the economic and cultural intercourse between them, the holding of nation-wide elections and other problems, and that the armed forces of North and South Korea be reduced to the minimum within a short period of time. This is another major effort made by the Government of the Korean Democratic People's Republic for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. These proposals not only are in full accord with the eager desire of all Korean people for the peaceful unification of their motherland, but also will open up a new practicable avenue for easing the tension in the Far East. The Chinese Government fully endorses and supports this important peace proposal made by the Government of the Korean Democratic People's Republic.

The Chinese Government and people, starting from the fundamental position that the Korean question should be settled by the Korean people themselves, have consistently opposed foreign interference in Korean affairs, and firmly held that all foreign forces should be withdrawn from Korea. At the very beginning of the Korean war, the Chinese Government and people maintained that the United States aggression forces should be withdrawn from Korea immediately. It was only when the warning served by the Chinese Government and people had been spurned by the United States, and when the United States forces had not only invaded the Korean Democratic People's Republic but at the same time occupied China's Taiwan and seriously jeopardized the security of China that the Chinese people organized their volunteers to proceed to Korea to resist United States aggression together with the Korean people. During the Korean Armistice negotiations and after the realization of the Armistice, the Government of China and the Korean Democratic People's Republic again proposed continuously that all foreign forces should be withdrawn from North and South Korea simultaneously, and maintained that this was the primary condition for the holding of free elections throughout Korea and the realization of the peaceful unification of Korea. The United States, however, not only rejected all along this reasonable proposal of the Chinese and Korean side, but violated the Korean Armistice Agreement again and again, and recently even openly introduced atomic weapons into South Korea thus further converting South Korea into its colony and atomic base. As pointed out in the statement by the Government of the Korean Democratic People's Republic, the continued occupation of South Korea by United States forces is the basic

cause for the indefinite putting-off of the peaceful unification of Korea and for the increasingly serious threat to peace in Korea.

The Chinese people have always been concerned about peace in Korea. The Chinese Government has never spared its efforts in promoting a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Now when the aspirations of the peoples of Asia and the world for peace have risen to unprecedented heights and there are greater possibilities for peaceful settlement of major international issues, the Chinese Government holds that the Korean situation should not be allowed to deteriorate further. In order to break the deadlock on the Korean question, promote a peaceful settlement of the Korean question and relax tension in the Far East, the Chinese Government deems that all foreign forces should be withdrawn from Korea within a set period of time, and the Chinese Government is prepared to discuss with the Government of the Korean Democratic People's Republic on the question of withdrawal of the Chinese People's Volunteers from Korea. The Chinese Government asks the Governments of the United States and of other countries participating in the United Nations forces also to take measures to withdraw from South Korea United States and all other foreign forces. The Chinese Government hopes that all countries concerned about peace in the Far East and the world would take positive steps to urge the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea so as to create a favourable condition for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question and the safeguarding of peace in the Far East and the world.



CANADA

file 7-1-1-1
Department of National Defence

NO. 1111
9 Jan 58

Dear Ken:

I am not attempting to use much of this rather "hot" news in any of my reports. as I am really unable to interpret much of what is happening. Certainly everyone ^(at least in my UN circle) feels that things politically here are getting close to being out of hand and Hugh's enclosed report reflects those misgivings.

I hope you feel the security of our means of dispatch is adequate.

Ken Brown.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Security: ~~RESTRICTED~~

No: 1038

Date: October 21, 1957

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail:

Post File No:

FROM: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY

.....
.....

Reference: Our letter 380 of July 23, 1956 and our

Subject: Letter 688 of July 24, 1957

.....
.....

Ottawa File No.

7-1-1-1

References

In an editorial of October 16, Pravda has re-stated the Soviet position on Korean reunification through agreement between the North and South Koreans themselves. Commending the North Korean government for its continued efforts to establish normal cultural and economic cooperation between the North and the South as a first step towards peaceful reunification, it gives the substance of a letter of October 7 from the North Korean Minister of Home and Foreign Trade to the South Korean Minister of Commerce and Industry proposing an extended trade. The letter further suggests preliminary negotiations in December on the organizing of a common market and concludes that the only way for Koreans to get together is to have "American troops withdrawn from our territory and our country peacefully united."

2. The editorial goes on to describe how, in violation of the truce agreement, the U.S.A. has "turned the South into its military base", moved the "so-called headquarters of 'U.N. forces'" from Tokyo to Seoul, is importing into South Korea different types of weapons en masse, and so on. A vivid picture is then painted of the "brutal occupation régime" set up by American troops, with the conclusion that, to cover up these truce violations and atrocities, the U.S.A. is trying to have the "Korean question" discussed at the U.N. General Assembly without the participation of representatives from North Korea.

3. The IRSP translation is enclosed.

Internal
Circulation

Distribution
to Posts

New York (Perma)
Prague
Warsaw
Belgrade
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DAVID M. JOHNSON

The Embassy.

NO. INIT.

AMBASSADOR
MUTTER
/ DYDER
2 HALSTEAD 3R
GORHAM
SMITH
CHOQUETTE
MISS CURRIE

UNCLASSIFIED

October 9, 1957.

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE: 7-1-1-1 ✓
7-3-1
7-3-3-4

Subject: Briefing on the United Nations Command
Military Armistice Commission

The idea of a free and independent Korea was first expressed on December 1, 1943 at the Cairo Conference. In the Potsdam Declaration on July 26, 1945, the U.S., U.K. and China re-affirmed their pledge that "in due course Korea shall become free and independent". In its declaration of war on Japan on August 8, 1945, the U.S.S.R. adhered to the Potsdam Declaration.

2. When the Japanese forces in Korea surrendered in September 1945, the 38th Parallel was established as a temporary demarcation line between the U.S. and Soviet forces for the purpose of accepting the surrender. The U.S.S.R. then converted this temporary line into a firm boundary between the two zones of occupation and curtailed normal movement and contact between the two zones.

3. On December 27, 1945, the U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R. announced in Moscow an agreement to establish a trusteeship over Korea and to form a Korean provisional government under the supervision of a joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission. This joint commission met during January and February of 1946 but failed to reach agreement on economic and administrative integration of the occupied zones. They met again from March to May 1946 and from May to October 1947 but failed to agree on vital matters affecting the future of a unified Korea.

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- 2 -

4. At the request of the U.S., the Korean problem was placed on the agenda of the U.N. General Assembly in September 1947. Two months later the General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the creation of a provisional government by all the Korean people through free and secret elections, the subsequent withdrawal of all foreign troops, and the formation of a United Nations temporary commission on Korea to observe the elections and to consult with the elected representatives and the government. The U.S.S.R. opposed this resolution and refused to cooperate with the U.N. temporary commission.

5. The commission convened in Seoul in January 1948. In May free elections were held throughout South Korea and were certified as valid by adoption of a resolution by the commission. The government of the Republic of Korea was inaugurated on August 15, 1948. In response to this the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was established north of the 38th Parallel in September. Soviet armed forces left North Korea by December 1948 and the Allied armed forces withdrew from South Korea by June 1949.

6. North Korean forces first invaded South Korea in the Ongjin Peninsula in June 1949 and the border was not restored until July. The Ongjin Peninsula was invaded once more in August, *the invasion was* after a heavy artillery and infantry attack on the City of Kaesong, but ~~were~~ repulsed. In September heavy guerilla warfare occurred along the 38th Parallel. The frontier was then quiet until May, 1950, when the North Koreans made a heavy artillery assault on Kaesong. On June 25 the North Korean forces launched a general invasion of the Republic of Korea.

7. The ROK and US forces defending South Korea were driven back to the Pusan perimeter, but after re-organizing and launching an amphibious landing at Inchon in September 1950, the UN Command was able to launch a counter-offensive which drove the Communists to the Yalu. The remnants of the North Korean Army were then joined by the Chinese People's Volunteers and pushed the UN forces south of Seoul. The UN forces then began a new counter-offensive which pushed the Communists back to the present demarcation line.

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- 3 -

8. At that point Jacob Malik, Soviet representative to the UN, announced that the North Koreans were amenable to a cease-fire settlement. Consequently the UNC established a base camp at Panmunjom in July 1951 and negotiations began on an Armistice Agreement. The principal items on the agenda of these negotiations, which lasted for two years, were as follows:

- (a) MDL (Military Demarcation Line) and DMZ (Demilitarized Zone);
- (b) method of supervising the AA (Armistice Agreement);
- (c) handling of prisoners of war; and
- (d) recommendation to the governments concerned relative to a final settlement of the Korean problem.

9. With respect to item (a), the North Koreans originally wanted the 38th Parallel as the MDL but finally agreed to the UNC proposal that the MDL should be the line of contact at the time the AA was signed. The DMZ extends along the MDL for 2000 meters on either side.

10. With respect to item (b) there was lengthy disagreement on such questions as photo reconnaissance, rehabilitation of airfields, conduct of inspection teams, relinquishing of island strongholds, establishment of a single supervising agency for the Armistice, and inclusion of USSR as a neutral nation.

11. With respect to item (c) considerable delay was caused by the initial refusal of the Communists to agree to the processing of non-repatriated prisoners.

12. On July 27, 1953, the AA was signed by the Commander-in-Chief of the UNC and the Commanders of KPA/CPV (Korean People's Army/Chinese People's Volunteers). The KPA/CPV forces are bound by the terms of the AA because their commanders are signatories. The ROK forces are not bound by the AA in any way as their commanders did not sign the Agreement. The AA stated that the commanders of each side would:

- (a) stop all fighting;
- (b) withdraw military forces and supplies from the DMZ;
- (c) cease the introduction into Korea of personnel and materiel reinforcements;

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- 4 -

- (d) submit to the NNSC (Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission) and to the other side, reports of all arrivals and departures of personnel and of combat materiel; *military*
- (e) cooperate in observing both the letter and the spirit of the AA; and
- (f) negotiate violations of the AA and see that personnel responsible for violations were appropriately punished.

13. The MAC (Military Armistice Commission) was established under the AA to supervise the implementation of the AA and to settle through negotiations reported violations. The MAC is composed of ten senior officers, five on each side, three being of General or flag rank and the remaining two being of Colonel or equivalent rank. All meetings of MAC are held in the joint security area near Panmunjom.

14. UNCMAC is the UN Command component of the Military Armistice Commission. It came into being in June 1953, five weeks before the signing of the AA. The senior member of UNCMAC changes every six months, the Air Force representative being followed by a Naval or Marine Corps representative, who is in turn succeeded by an Army representative. At the present time the members of UNCMAC are: Major General Deichelmann, USAF (Senior Member); Brigadier General Kyser, USA; Brigadier General Binney USMC; Brigadier General Ahn, ROKA; and Brigadier Barlow (Commonwealth Forces).

15. THE UNCMAC is organized along the following lines:

- (a) Operations Division - consists of two branches:
 - (i) Operations Branch - handles operational matters requiring co-ordination with headquarters or other UNC agencies, including the JOTS; and
 - (ii) Plans Branch - conducts research and investigations on current issues before the MAC and prepares statements and proposals for presentation to the other side (Chief of the Plans Branch is also Assistant Secretary of UNCMAC);

- 5 -

- (b) Logistics and Liaison Division - responsible for co-ordinating the logistical requirements of UNC and NNSC, for providing liaison between the Swiss and Swedish members of NNSC and the other UNC agencies, and for monitoring UNC reports on combat personnel and materiel;
- (c) Public Information Officer - identical to PIO;
- (d) Personnel and Administration Division; and
- (e) Advisory Group - consists of representatives of six of the 16 nations participating in the Korean conflict (Ethiopia and France, whose representatives are with their respective units in the Far East; and ROK, Canada, U.S., and British Commonwealth/Australia, whose representatives are resident members at base camp).

16. Another agency created by the AA is the Secretariat, to which each side appoints a secretary and assistant secretary. The Secretariat also acts as a negotiating agency on problems not considered of sufficient importance to require a meeting of MAC.

17. The AA also provided the MAC with a number of JOTS (Joint Observer Teams) to help in implementing the Agreement with respect to the DMZ and the Han River Estuary, and the teams have no function or authority outside the DMZ. The MAC or the senior member of either side has authority to despatch these teams. There were originally ten teams, each composed of one senior member and two assistant members from each side, with additional language and secretarial personnel. The first responsibility of these JOTS was to construct the markers which showed where the MDL and the "safe lanes" through the mine fields in the DMZ were. The JOTS now maintain these markers and also exchange the remains of deceased personnel recovered in the DMZ and investigate alleged violations of the DMZ.

18. There are now only five JOTS (four on land and one in the Han River Estuary) and the senior members reside at base camp. When a violation is reported or alleged in the DMZ, the

- 6 -

JOT personnel of UNC proceed as quickly as possible to the scene to conduct a unilateral investigation in order to examine the material evidence and question available witnesses before meeting with the Communists. Based upon these preliminary findings, the JOT senior member recommends to the senior member of UNCMAC whether a meeting of a full JOT should be called. If a proposal for a meeting is made and accepted by the KPA/CPV, a location on the MDL is designated as a meeting place and both components of the JOT proceed to the scene of the incident. At that time all material evidence is jointly inspected and witnesses of both sides are formally examined and cross-examined.

19. In the Han River the DML does not run through the centre of the estuary. Civil shipping of both sides are permitted to use the whole estuary, with the sole restriction that the shipping of one side must not approach closer than 100 meters from the high water mark in the territory of the other side.

20. The NNRC (Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission) consisted of representatives from Sweden and Switzerland (nominated by UNC) and Poland and Czechoslovakia (nominated by the Communists). The senior officer of the Indian Custodial Forces was chairman of the NNRC and was responsible for physically processing the prisoners of both sides who refused repatriation. From September 1953 to January 1954 the NNRC supervised "explanations" by the Communists designed to persuade prisoners from North Korea to return. In that time the Communists "explained" to only 3,000 out of an available 23,000 prisoners, and the non-repatriated prisoners (about 22,000) reverted to UNC control and were immediately released as civilians. The NNRC was dissolved in February 1954.


21. The Committee for the Return of Displaced Civilians was established by the AA to handle civilians who desired to return to either side. The Committee met for one exchange in March 1954, and though it is still in existence, it has had nothing to do since then.

22. The NNSC was established under paragraph 37 of the AA and is composed of Sweden and Switzerland (nominated by the UNC) and Czechoslovakia and Poland (nominated by the Communists).

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Its purpose is to assure that neither side violates the AA restrictions with respect to the introduction of combat personnel and materiel. It was to employ inspection teams at specified ports of entry which would examine and report to the MAC any violations. The operation of these teams was curtailed as a result of the action taken at the 70th meeting of MAC on May 31, 1956, when the UNC provisionally suspended operation of NNSC in the territory under control of the UNC.

23. In addition to the teams at the ports of entry, the AA provided for MITS (Mobile Inspection Teams) for special investigations of incidents outside the DMZ. The MAC, or the senior member of either side, is entitled to ask the NNSC for an investigation by a MIT if thought necessary. In practice the MITS have not been effective: only ten have been despatched since 1953 for five inspections on each side; eight resulted in the Czech and Pole filing reports opposed to the reports of the Swiss and Swede; the other two investigations filed joint reports but they contained in fact unilateral findings.


J. G. H. Halstead.

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL



7-1-1-1

FM WASHDC SEP12/57 CONFD
TO EXTERNAL 1932 PRIORITY
INFO PERMISNY PRIORITY LDN NATOPARIS
BAG CNBRA WLGTN DELHI FM LDN
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT

REF YOUR TEL Y391 SEP11

KOREAN ITEM UNGA

1	AMBASSADOR	INIT.
2	DEPUTY	13
3	HALSTEAD	for action
	GORHAM	
	SMITH	
	CHOQUETTE	
	MISS CURRIE	
4	col. Ross	file



WE SPOKE TO NES OF THE KOREAN DESK TODAY ALONG THE LINES OF PARA3 OF YOUR TEL Y391. NES SAID THAT THE WORDING OF THE RESOLUTION WHICH THE USA DELEGATION MIGHT PROPOSE HAD NOT YET BEEN DECIDED UPON. THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE BUREAU OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS WITH RESPECT TO THE CONTENT OF THE SPEECH, HOWEVER, WAS THAT IT SHOULD GIVE A TRUTHFUL AND FRANK PICTURE OF THE STRONG COMMUNIST MILITARY POSITION IN NORTHKOREA AND THE MANNER IN WHICH THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN VIOLATED IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS MILITARY POSITION. NES SAID THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT THAT THE USA DELEGATION WOULD ENUNCIATE ANY STRONGER POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF REUNIFICATION AND INDEED REUNIFICATION WOULD HARDLY FIGURE AT ALL IN THE USA STATEMENT AS NOW CONTEMPLATED. TO THE EXTENT THAT THE TOUGH LINE IS ADOPTED, IT WILL BE CONFINED SOLELY TO FOCUSING ATTENTION ON COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. THIS TO SOME EXTENT THEREFORE MEETS YOUR CONCERN THAT THE USA WILL FORCE ^H _A THE PACE ON THE REUNIFICATION AT THE COMING SESSION.

2. ON THE MATTER OF TACTICS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NES SAID THAT AS HAD BEEN THE CASE IN PREVIOUS YEARS, THE USA DELEGATION WOULD ENDEAVOUR TO BE WELL UP ON THE LIST OF SPEAKERS IN COMMITTEE ONE. IT WAS NOT EXPECTED THAT THE USA STATEMENT WOULD MAKE ANY SPECIFIC REF TO THE ARMAMENT REPLACEMENT PROGRAMME BUT IN FOCUSING ATTENTION ON THE COMMUNIST MILITARY BUILD UP, THE SPEECH WOULD IN EFFECT BE AN APOLOGIA FOR THE UNC ACTION IN LAYING ON THIS PROGRAMME.

3. IN SO FAR AS REUNIFICATION IS CONCERNED, NES SAID THE MAIN CONCERN OF THE STATE DEPT WAS TO ENSURE THAT ^O _A KREAN REUNIFICATION REMAINS A UN PROBLEM AND THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE SHIFTED INTO ANY OTHER FORUM SUCH AS A BIG POWER ^O _A CNFERENCE.

PAGE TWO 1932

4. WE MENTIONED TO NES YOUR APPREHENSIONS CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ROK PARTICIPANT IN THE KOREAN DISCUSSIONS IN NEWYORK MIGHT TAKE TOO EXTREME A LINE. NES SAID THAT ONE OF THE TASKS ASSIGNED TO THE USA DELEGATION IN THEIR BRIEF ON THE KOREAN ITEM WAS TO PERSUADE ~~THE~~ DELEGATION TO KEEP THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THE DISCUSSION MODERATE AND REASONABLE IN TONE. HE SAID THAT AMBASSADOR YANG WOULD BE THE ROK REP AGAIN THIS YEAR AND ^{RE}CALLED THAT LAST YEAR HE HAD BEEN EVEN MORE MODERATE THAN SOME OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SIXTEEN.

5. WE WILL BEAR YOUR VIEWS IN MIND IN OUR FURTHER CONTACTS WITH THE DEPT ON THE KOREAN ITEM.

CHARGE D'AFFAIRES

TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL

7-1-1-1

FM EXTERNAL OTT SEP11/57 CONFID
TO WASHDC Y391 PRIORITY
PERMISNY PRIORITY
INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS TOKYO DEFERRED
BAG CNBRA WLGTN DELHI FM LDN

REF YOUR TEL 1887 SEP6

KOREAN ITEM UNGA

NO.	INIT.
1	AMBASSADOR
2	NEWTON
4	HALESTAD
	GORHAM
	SMITH
	CHOQUETTE
	MISS CURRIE



File 11

IN THE PREPARATION OF THE COMMENTARY ON THE KOREAN ITEM FOR USE BY THE CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE TWELFTH SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY, WE HAVE REITERATED THE DESIRABILITY OF MAINTAINING THE SAME FLEXIBLE POSITION IN OUR APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF KOREAN REUNIFICATION WHICH HAS CHARACTERIZED CANADIAN POLICY AT GENEVA AND SUBSEQUENTLY. WE WERE, THEREFORE, DISTURBED BY THE POSSIBILITY, DESCRIBED IN YOUR ACCOUNT OF YOUR INTERVIEW WITH NES OF THE STATE DEPT, THAT THE USA RESOLUTION MIGHT BE CAST IN TERMS WHICH WE WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT OR IMPOSSIBLE TO SUPPORT WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING THE FREEDOM OF APPROACH WE HAVE MANAGED TO MAINTAIN UNTIL NOW.

2. WE AGREE WITH THE SUGGESTION THAT FOR THE PRESENT THE SAFEST MOVE IS TO WORK FOR CONTINUANCE OF THE STATUS QUO AND WE WOULD THEREFORE REGRET ANY STIFFENING OF THE USA ATTITUDE AS A POSSIBLE RESULT OF ADVERSE DEVELOPMENTS AT THE ASSEMBLY WITH REGARD TO THE HUNGARIAN ITEM. INCREASED INTRANSIGENCE, NO LESS THAN GREATER RELAXATION, IN THE UN POSITION MIGHT LEAD TO QUOTE AGGRESSIVE POLICIES UNQUOTE ON THE PART OF THE ROK GOVT, WHICH HAS BEEN MAKING WARLIKE NOISES LATELY AS A RESULT OF THE ANNOUNCED INTENTION TO IMPORT NEW EQUIPMENT FOR UNC FORCES IN KOREA. SIMILARLY WE ARE NOT CONVINCED THAT THERE IS ANY VIRTUE IN ATTEMPTING TO RETURN KOREA TO A POSITION OF NOTORIETY. WE FIND IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT THE STATE DEPT REALLY BELIEVES THERE WILL BE ANY PUBLIC CONFESSION OF GUILT OR FORMAL QUOTE PURGING UNQUOTE OF THEIR AGGRESSION BY THE COMMUNIST PARTIES; THIS HOWEVER WOULD SEEM TO BE THE IMPLICATION OF QUOTE THE COMMUNISTS HAD NEVER TAKEN STEPS TO RECTIFY THEIR AGGRESSION IN KOREA UNQUOTE. OUR REACTION ON THE OFFICIAL LEVEL IS THEREFORE THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO REVIVE CONTENTION OVER KOREA IS NOT IN THE INTERESTS OF THE KOREANS OR OF THE WEST.

PAGE TWO Y391

3. ALTHOUGH THE FOREGOING REMARKS ARE FOR YOUR INFO ONLY, WE THINK IT MIGHT BE WISE TO POINT OUT TO THE STATE DEPT THAT WHILE WE AGREE WITH THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE NECESSITY TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO FOR THE TIME BEING, WE WOULD HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE ADVISABILITY OF ATTEMPTING TO DO SO AT THE PRESENT TIME BY MEANS OF MORE FORCEFUL TACTICS IN THE ASSEMBLY. THE UNC'S ANNOUNCED ARMAMENT REPLACEMENT PROGRAMME WILL BE DISCUSSED, NO DOUBT WITH HEAT, IN THE SAME CONTEXT AS KOREAN REUNIFICATION, AND OUR PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE IS THAT THE USA WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY ENOUGH IN MAKING THE FORMER PALATABLE TO THE AFRO-ASIANS WITHOUT ADOPTING A MORE RIGID POSTURE ON THE LATTER. INDEED, IT IS ALMOST A CERTAINTY THAT IF A STRONGER POSITION IS ENUNCIATED REGARDING REUNIFICATION, IT WILL BE INTERPRETED IN MANY QUARTERS AS SIMPLY CONFIRMING THE CHARGES WHICH WILL BE LAID AGAINST THE USA IN CONNECTION WITH MODERNIZATION OF ARMAMENTS. FOR THIS REASON, WE HOPE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR THE USA TO MAINTAIN A MODERATE POSITION IN FRAMING ITS KOREAN RESOLUTION IN THE INTERESTS OF NOT ALIENATING DELEGATIONS WHOSE SUPPORT CANNOT BE WON BY TOUGHNESS. SINCE THE EXACT WORDING OF THE RESOLUTION HAS NOT BEEN DECIDED UPON, WE BELIEVE THAT AN INFORMAL PRESENTATION NOW OF VIEWS ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED ABOVE MIGHT HAVE SOME RESTRAINING EFFECT.

4. WE ASSUME THAT, AS SOON AS USA THINKING AND TACTICS HAVE CRYSTALLIZED INTO A DRAFT RESOLUTION, AND THIS IS MADE AVAILABLE EITHER TO YOU OR TO OUR DELEGATION IN NEWYORK, IT WILL BE REFERRED TO OTTAWA AS A MATTER OF URGENCY. PERSONAL OR PRELIMINARY COMMENTS MIGHT BE MADE ALONG THE FOREGOING LINES WHEN THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IS MADE AVAILABLE TO YOU.

5. WITH REGARD TO ROK PARTICIPATION IN COMMITTEE DISCUSSIONS ON THE KOREAN ITEM, WE ASSUME THAT THE USA PROPOSAL WILL BE CARRIED. HOWEVER, WE HAVE BEEN CONCERNED WITH THE TRUCULENT STATEMENTS EMANATING FROM SEOUL FOLLOWING THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF UNC'S INTENTION TO MODERNIZE ARMAMENTS, AND WE ARE APPREHENSIVE ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ROK PARTICIPANT IN NEWYORK ADOPTING A LINE WHICH WOULD ALIENATE SUPPORT AND EMBARRASS FRIENDLY DELEGATIONS. YOU MAY BE ABLE TO RAISE THIS ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM IN GENERAL TERMS WITH APPROPRIATE STATE DEPT OFFICIALS IN AN ATTEMPT TO

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PAGE THREE Y391

ASSESS FOR US WHETHER ANYTHING CAN BE DONE TO CONVINCE THE
KOREANS OF THE NEED FOR MODERATION IN THE COMMITTEE.AFTER ALL,
QUOTE AGGRESSIVE POLICIES UNQUOTE WILL BE LIKELY TO MAKE KOREA'S
FRIENDS DOUBT THE WISDOM OF CONTINUING THEIR SUPPORT.IF IT APPEARS
THAT THE USA IS AWARE OF THIS PROBLEM,WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR
ANY INDICATION YOU MAY BE ABLE TO OBTAIN OF USA WILLINGNESS TO
EXERT PRESSURE TO ACHIEVE THE DESIRED END.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(FILE COPY)

DESPATCH

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.,
CANADIAN EMBASSY, TOKYO

Your telegram No. Y-295 of July 19 and
Reference: OUR telegram No. 93 of July 23.

Subject: Korea: Rhee Press Conference of
July 19, 1957

Security:.....

No:..... 539

Date:..... July 30, 1957

Enclosures:..... 2

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:..... 7-1-1-1

Ottawa File No.

References

An issue of the Korean Republic containing the official account of the press conference discussed in the telegrams under reference has now reached us and is, in part, appended. The published report contains a collection of interesting opinions attributed to Dr. Rhee on a variety of subjects, but it seems evident that the questions and answers here reproduced are restricted to the written questions and answers originally prepared for the conference. If, as indicated by the Tokyo CBS correspondent, Dr. Rhee subsequently consented to answer certain impromptu questions supplementary to those in the accompanying text, it would seem that the confusing AFP account which inspired your query was based on off-the-cuff presidential answers to supplementary questions based on the material given in answer to questions 4 and 12 of the accompanying text.

2. Dr. Rhee's formal replies reflect his views on an assortment of issues of both current and continuing importance. He reiterates his refusal to consider any Communist invitation to a political conference on unification in the answer to question 4, and, without suggesting in the official printed text that he would agree to U.N. withdrawal from South Korea, demands that the North Koreans evict the Chinese troops from the northern part of the peninsula.

3. In the answers to questions 7 and 8, the President reveals the renewed bitterness against Japan which has once again stymied an ROK-Japanese agreement at a juncture when such a development seemed possible for the first time in years. (I shall be reporting on this subject separately.) He re-emphasizes his aversion to the inclusion of Japan in any type of north Pacific defence alliance because of what he insists is her persistent wooing of Communist nations.

4. In the answer to question 11, he asserts his refusal to believe that the United States will not modernize the armaments of the ROK forces. "To do otherwise might be suicidal." The "excellent morale" of the ROK forces would suffer if they were to be given only "scrap-heap weapons."

5. The question regarding Dr. Rhee's willingness to participate in an international conference with the Communists regarding unification inspired an editorial in

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- 2 -

the Korea Republic which appeared three days after the press conference, and which we append to this letter. This editorial offers two solutions to the problem of Korean unification. Withdrawal of the Chinese and Russians from North Korea would permit "the restoration of one Korea" since, the editorial optimistically assumes, "the people of the north are . . . just as opposed to Communism as we are." After unification, but not before, the United Nations forces would "withdraw voluntarily, never to return as long as the Chinese stayed on their own side of the Yalu River." As regards these forces, "it would not even be necessary to ask them to leave." The only other way to unification is to "drive the alien invaders out of the north."

6. The editorial reference to the possible withdrawal of U.N. forces from South Korea after a hypothetical unification based on the departure of the Chinese from North Korea seems to give some clue to what Dr. Rhee may have said on the subject three days previous, the reporting of which prompted your telegram under reference.

T. E. M. NEWTON

The Charge d'Affaires a.i.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTGOING MESSAGE

DUPLICATE

- 7 - 1 - 1 - 1

THE CANADIAN EMBASSY, TOKYO

CONFIDENTIAL

93

JUL 23/57

RX

YOUR TEL Y-295 OF JUL 19



OPIMMEDIATE

KOREA: RHEE PRESS CONFERENCE

T.F.M. NEWTON

T. F. M. NEWTON

REPORT YOU MENTION ORIGINATED THROUGH
QUESTIONS POSED BY GROUP OF AMERICAN TELEVISION AND
RADIO CORRESPONDENTS WHO ARE TOURING FAR EAST AND
MANAGED INTERVIEW WITH SYNGMAN RHEE WHILE IN SEOUL.
THEY ARE NOW IN OKINAWA BEFORE RETURNING THROUGH TOKYO.
SINCE UP STORY IN "ENGLISH MAINICHT" WAS ONLY VERSION
PUBLISHED HERE AND "KOREAN REPUBLIC" HAS NOT YET ARRIVED,
EVALUATION DIFFICULT. HAVE TALKED TO PIERPONT OF CBS
WHOSE JUNIOR WAS AT CONFERENCE AND LEARN THAT STATEMENT
WAS MADE AT END OF CONFERENCE WHEN, AFTER HANDOUTS OF
WRITTEN ANSWERS TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS, PRESIDENT AGREED
TO ANSWER A FEW VERBAL QUESTIONS WHICH PROVED TRICKY.
PIERPONT SUGGESTS THAT INTERPRETATION OF REMARKS
SHOULD BE THAT SINCE DR. RHEE KNEW CHINESE WOULD NEVER
LEAVE NORTH KOREA HE WAS SAFE IN SAYING THAT IF THEY
DID IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR UN TROOPS TO WITHDRAW AND
LEAVE SOUTH TO SOUTH KOREANS, AN OBJECTIVE WHICH THE
PRESIDENT HAS ALWAYS HOPED/TO ATTAIN.

. . . 2

- 2 -

2. FOLLOW UP IN TODAY'S KOREA PRESS SURVEY REPORTS PRESIDENT'S VIEWS ON UNIFICATION AND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES HAVE UNDERGONE NO CHANGE, THAT IN ANSWER TO QUESTION REGARDING PROPOSAL FOR POLITICAL CONFERENCE ON REUNIFICATION OF KOREA DR. RHEE SAID HE PAID NO HEED TO SUCH PROPOSALS AS THAT RECENTLY MADE BY KIM IL SUNG AND WHEN HE INDICATED HE WOULD NOT REFUSE TO ATTEND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE HE MEANT ONE SUPPORTED BY US AND OTHER FREE WORLD NATIONS. PRESIDENTIAL ATTITUDE INDICATED THAT IF CHINESE EVER DID PULL OUT OF NORTH KOREA, LATTER WOULD SURRENDER TO ROK AND UNIFICATION OF ROK TYPE WOULD THUS BE ACHIEVED. WILL FORWARD FURTHER DETAILS WHEN AVAILABLE.

NEWTON.

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

7-1-1-1



FM EXTERNAL OTT JUL19/57 CONFD
TO TOKYO Y295 OPIMMEDIATE
INFO LDN WASHDC PERMISNY

L'AGENCE FRENCH PRESS TODAY REPORTS THAT PRESIDENT RHEE HAS DECLARED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO UNIFY THE COUNTRY IF THE UNC AND PA/CPV FORCES WERE WITHDRAWN TO OUR KNOWLEDGE THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THAT THE ROK PRESIDENT HAS EVEN SUGGESTED THE POSSIBILITY OF A UNC WITHDRAWAL AND THIS STATEMENT IS SURPRISING ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF ROK REACTION TO RECENT ARMAMENT MODERNIZATION PROGRAMME BY UNC. AT TIME OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF THIS UNC PROGRAMME THE KPA/CPV PROPOSED FURTHER CONFERENCE LOOKING TO KOREAN UNIFICATION AND WE WONDER WHETHER THIS STATEMENT BY RHEE MAY BE BASED ON ONE CONCRETE COMMUNIST OFFER.

2. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COMMENTS AND ANY AVAILABLE FURTHER DETAILS.

NO.	INIT.
	AMBASSADOR
3	NEWTON <i>on</i>
1	HALSTEAD
	GORHAM
	SMITH
2	CHOQUETTE <i>97</i>
	MISS CURRIE

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(FILE COPY)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy,
Tokyo, Japan

Reference:

Subject: Dr. Rhee's Year-end Messages

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: 52

Date: January 17, 1957

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.

210-7-20
7-1-1-1

References

Although State Department's Walter Robertson flat-footedly stated in Seoul on December 19 that the United States was opposed to scrapping the Korean armistice agreement since, as he said, "We don't want to go back to fighting," neither Dr. Rhee nor the ROK delegation to U.N. seem to have been pleased by such bluntness. (The Korean Republic, in fact, stated that "Robertson surely must have been misquoted".) Dr. Rhee spent a busy month of December issuing public messages and chose as his Christmas theme greetings to all "the fighting men of the United Nations Forces on Korean soil and off our shores as well as in the skies above us." In offering similar greetings to "civilian personnel in Korea whose homes and loved ones are in distant lands", the President struck a favourite theme of the uncertainties of peace in the republic, declaring that:

"The uncertainty of life in the Republic of Korea, under the shadow of a tremendous military buildup only a few miles north of our capital city of Seoul, does not make for peace of mind.

"Our brothers in Northern Korea who resisted Communism have been put to death, exiled, or imprisoned by the thousands in accordance with typical Communist practice. The tragedy of Hungary is simply a repetition of the tragedy of northern Korea.

"When our Allies realize this, their understanding of our impatience for the liberation of our countrymen may increase their sympathy and perhaps influence their policies that they may coincide more closely with the idealism expressed in the Charter of the United Nations."

2. It was natural that some other day than that of "Peace on earth, goodwill toward men" should be chosen for sterner pronouncements. Lacking the fire-eating quality of many previous utterances, the President's New Year's message nevertheless managed to satisfy his need for periodic repetition of the "march north" theme.

3. Teeing off from the upset in Hungary, Dr. Rhee stated:

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Internal
Circulation

Distribution
to Posts

-2-

"Excited and encouraged by the Hungarian revolution, our people gathered in every city, country or province to participate in demonstrations urging a march northward for unification, and to urge compatriots in the north to rise up against the Communist oppressors.

"I cannot, however, advise the north Koreans to revolt until we are able to exert force to assist and rescue them, they are so hopelessly enslaved by their rulers. I choose silence because I cannot find it in my heart to urge them to rise up only to be massacred by the bestial Communists.

"However, I fervently believe there will come a day when, with our armed forces in the vanguard, we will march north and be united with our beloved brethren. So, let our compatriots in the north wait, with patience and hope, for the day of liberation, which I pray may be soon."

T. F. M. NEWTON

The Embassy.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(DUPLICATE)

NUMBERED LETTER

Doherty

TO:.....The Canadian Legation,.....
.....Stockholm, Sweden.....

Security:.....UNCLASSIFIED.....

No:.....Y-385.....

Date:.....December 19, 1955.....

Enclosures:.....One.....

Air or Surface Mail:.....Air.....

Post File No:.....*285-7*.....

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference:.....

Subject:...Canadian Statement at the United.....
.....Nations on the Korean Question.....

Ottawa File No.

7-1-1-1

References



You might be interested to learn that Mr. Martin's statement to the Political Committee of the Tenth General Assembly during the debate on Korea has been well received by the Swedish delegation, who have gone out of their way to tell us so. A recent letter from Mr. Gunnar Jarring to Mr. Matthews contained the following complementary words:

"I have been impressed during my stay here in the United Nations by the voice your country plays in the Assembly. Your statement on the Korean question was (also) excellent, moderate, quiet, and to the point. We Swedes appreciated it very much."

Internal
Circulation

2. Although we intend to reproduce and distribute the statement referred to in either the Statements and Speeches, or Supplementary Papers series, this has not yet been done, so a copy of it is enclosed for your information.

A.R. Menzies

Distribution
to Posts

Tokyo
Berne
Washington

for the

NO.	INIT.
1	AMBRASER DOR
2	NEWSON <i>m</i>
3	RETTE
	ROBERTSON
4	BERTRAM

4 file

THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

The Korean Question

Statement
by the Hon. Paul Martin,
Chairman of the Canadian Delegation
in the First Committee
November 14, 1955

Mr. Chairman,

The position of my Delegation on the resolution proposed by the United States and on the whole question of a Korean political settlement may be stated briefly. We are prepared to support the United States draft resolution because it states clearly and in moderate terms views which we share on this subject. We note and support the report of UNCURK. We are anxious that the Armistice Agreement should remain in effect, and we are anxious that continuing efforts should be made by all concerned to promote the unification of Korea.

We are naturally disappointed that more progress has not been made towards unification in the last year, and we deeply regret the prolonged division of a country which has suffered so much in the past. While we are disappointed, however, we are neither surprised nor dismayed. After so desperate a conflict, time is necessary to heal passions and restore confidence. While we hope that a solution can be found at the earliest possible moment, we consider it necessary to recognize that quick solutions cannot be expected.

If we are to promote a settlement, then we should refrain from recriminations in this debate. However, I do feel it necessary to make clear, particularly in the light of subsequent things which I have to say, that my delegation has no doubt as to where the principal

- 2 -

responsibility for delay lies. Other delegates have blamed the refusal of North Korea to consider seriously the proposals for settlement put forward at the Geneva Conference. In our view, however, the difficulty can be traced not merely to the attitude of the North Korean authorities. It lies in their system of government. The basic fact which we must look squarely in the face is that so long as totalitarian communist principles obtain in undiluted form, it is extremely difficult to arrange free elections as the essential act in the formation of a truly representative government. We would hesitate to say that it is impossible to unify by free elections countries in which one part is under Communist domination, because to do so would be to adopt a hopeless position with serious implications for other countries as well. We still hope that such arrangements can be made, but we do not think it advisable to ignore the difficulties that arise from the nature of these situations and to establish positions which do not take into consideration the realities which unhappily exist.

An essential part of any possible solution would be to make provisions for impartial international supervision. At the Geneva Conference in 1954 a number of proposals for international supervision were produced by the United Nations side which might have resulted in arrangements fair to all concerned. The Canadian Government at Geneva and subsequently has adopted a flexible attitude on the exact nature of these provision. What we do insist upon is that they be fair and foolproof. They must, of course, be acceptable to the United Nations because, having made such great sacrifices to defend

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- 3 -

Korea from aggression, the United Nations could not sit idly by and allow aggression to triumph by political manoeuvre.

We do not wish, however, to assume the position that the last word on this subject was said at Geneva in 1954. We are not prepared to repudiate in any way the position which we took at Geneva and which was covered in the report of the Geneva Conference to last year's session of the Assembly. However, if any of those concerned wish to explore other avenues towards a unification procedure that would prove acceptable to the parties, then we believe that these should be considered with an open mind.

We have been impressed during this debate with the pleas made by representatives of India and Yugoslavia, among others, for what may be called a revised approach to this question on the part of the United Nations. We are not sure whether the approach they ask for is new; it does not seem to us very different from the attitude we have consistently adopted. As the representative of India has indicated, there may well be a distinction between the attitude which we rightly adopted to the two parties in Korea during the period before aggression had been repelled and the attitude we should adopt in the present stage. We would not wish there to be any doubt in anyone's mind as to where we stand on the subject of responsibility for the Korean War. During discussion of that aggression we repudiated strongly any suggestion of equality between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the authorities in North Korea. When we came to the question of a peaceful settlement, however, the situation

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- 4 -

is somewhat different. We cannot ignore or forget the past and we would not want to do so. We are, however, dealing with a situation in reality, not in theory. The fact of the matter is that unification of Korea can be achieved only by negotiations of some sort among those who are in a position to bring it about. This fact the United Nations accepted from the moment negotiations for an armistice commenced. It was confirmed by our participation in the Geneva Conference with all parties concerned. We certainly did not believe that by doing so we were condoning aggression. We believed that we were starting on the long and infinitely complex programme of solving disputes and settling controversies which is the primary obligation of the United Nations.

There may in many minds seem to be a conflict between conceptions of the United Nations as the organizer of the armed defence of Korea and that of the United Nations as a peacemaker. We are inclined to think that the prestige of the United Nations would be more seriously damaged by maintaining too intransigent a position than by taking up its role as advocate and promoter of peaceful settlements. The United Nations refused by military means to impose unification on Korea and it cannot presume to do so now by peaceful means. This being the case, we must recognize therefore that it is our duty to attempt to assist in any measures to promote mutual understanding. That our sympathies remain with the victim of the aggression rather than with the aggressor is inevitable. It need not follow, however, that because we chose unquestioningly to support one side in 1950 we are forever bound to support all the positions subsequently

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- 5 -

adopted by that side. In our view we must beware of the blind alleys into which too rigid conceptions of our mission would lead us.

It is solely in the hope of assisting in the clarification of the role of the United Nations at this stage that I have made these observations. We are under no illusion that the time is ripe to urge immediate negotiations on the parties in Korea, and we do not therefore believe that any useful purpose would be served by a discussion here and now on the terms of a settlement. We earnestly hope, however, that the time will come before long when the United Nations will be able to make use with the requisite imagination of the diverse resources at its command to assist in bringing about the unification of Korea which has been its aim since this subject was first placed on our agenda in 1947.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

NUMBERED LETTER

THE CANADIAN EMBASSY, TOKYO, JAPAN.....

Security:.....CONFIDENTIAL.....*retained by Mr Davis for his "China" files*

No:.....Y- 780

Date:.....December 15-55.....

Enclosures:.....

Air or Surface Mail:.....

Post File No:.....*240-7*

Ottawa File No.

7-1-1-1

References

Internal Circulation

NO 1
AMBASSADOR
NEWTON
HALSTEAD
RETTIE
ROBERTSON
BERTRAND

Distribution to Posts

The following is the answer to your question:

2. At the end of World War 2, it was intended that the unification of Korea would be brought about by bilateral agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States, the two powers which had occupied the country. When they failed to agree, the United States referred the matter to the United Nations, and a resolution was passed on November 14, 1947 which, inter alia, established the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea. Canada voted in favour of this resolution.

3. This was the Commission on which, as you rightly recall, the late Dr. Patterson served. It received no co-operation from the authorities in North Korea, so on February 6, 1948 it decided to seek new instructions from the Interim Committee of the General Assembly. The questions put to the Interim Committee by the Commission were as follows:

I. Is it open to or incumbent upon the Commission under the terms of the General Assembly Resolutions of November 14, 1947 and in the light of developments on the situation with respect to Korea since that date, to implement the programme as outlined in Resolution II in that part of Korea which is occupied by the armed forces of the United States of America?


II. If not, (a) should the Commission observe the election of Korean representatives to take part in the consideration of the Korean question as outlined in Resolution I of November 14, 1947 provided that it has determined that elections can be held in a free atmosphere and (b) should the Commission consider such other measures as may be possible and advisable with a view to the attainment of its objectives?

4. The United States introduced a resolution in the Interim Committee to the effect that the first question above should be answered in the affirmative, thereby leaving no need for an answer to the second. We opposed this on the grounds that the Commission could not violate

- 2 -

its original terms of reference and that the Interim Committee was not competent to change them. We said that while we strongly supported the objective of a free and democratic Korea and thought that the policy of the USSR ought to be condemned, we doubted the wisdom of asking the Korean Commission to take further action. The voting, however, was heavily in favour of the United States plan - in fact only Canada and Australia voted against it.

5. I suppose it is a moot point whether Canada has held the right view throughout. Some would argue that it is better to have established a government in South Korea with a pro-Western alignment - even Mr. Rhee's government - than to have established no government at all, and to have left a political vacuum which the Communists might have filled. On the other hand, it is true that certain doubts which we had in 1948 are still part of our Korean policy today. Specifically, we still doubt that the unification of Korea can be achieved solely by exerting the moral authority of the United Nations, or by the United Nations taking the role of promoter of South Korean interests only.



UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.
T.C.Davis/rp

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM:THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, TOKYO,.....
.....JAPAN.....

Reference:.....

Subject:.....Unification of Korea.....
.....
.....

Security:....CONFIDENTIAL.....

No:.....1188.....

Date:.....November 23, 1955.....

Enclosures:.....

Air or Surface Mail:....Air.....

Post File No:.....210-7-1.....

Ottawa File No.

7-1-1-1

References

I think I already made the following request
but I am unable to locate a copy of any communication
I have sent.

2. Back in about 1948, the United Nations created
a commission of some kind, charged with the duty of
trying to bring about the unification of Korea through
free elections. As I remember it, Canada opposed this
on the ground that we did not feel that the time was
ripe for any success to such an approach. However,
the resolution was adopted. Canada was asked to
nominate a member thereto and the late George Pat-
terson, then with me in Nanking, China, was nominated
and he went to Korea. The commission approached
the North Korean authorities and we were turned down
flat. At that time Canada suggested that nothing
further should be done. As I remember it, the
United States suggested that if ~~the~~ elections could
not be held throughout all Korea that they should
be held under the auspices of the same commission
in South Korea. This was done.

3. If I am right, then it is plainly evident
that Canada had the right view throughout.

4. I would be glad if somebody could spare a
few minutes to go through the file and tell me
whether or not my facts are correct.

T. C. DAVIS

Ambassador.

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Circulation

Distribution
to Posts

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA. NEWTON/1bm COPY)

NUMBERED LETTER

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR
TOKYO, JAPAN

Reference:.....

Subject:.....

Security:.....

No:.....

Date: December 7, 1954

Enclosures:.....

AIR
Air or Surface Mail:.....

Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.

7-1-1-1

References

Further to our Despatch No. 1278 of December 2, we have had access to a despatch from the British Minister to Seoul discussing the current Korean reaction to the "reported" Anglo-Canadian plan for unification through elections supervised by a mixed commission.

2. Mr. Graham gave a digest of his conversation on the matter with Chaeng Taek-sang, an Edinburgh-educated former Korean Prime Minister, who is still an independent Assemblyman. Chaeng, who is described as being well-versed in world affairs, stated that a "free election" in either North or South Korea was an impossibility. He indicated that while the local police, North or South, remain in power, no election can possibly be free, no matter how many neutrals supervise the actual voting.

3. In fact, Chaeng stated, to Mr. Graham's surprise, that the Republic of Korea could not afford to allow nation-wide elections under any form of supervision, U.N. or otherwise, because in his opinion the Communists would win in South Korea too. The Communist election campaign would play up the corruption in the South Korean government, and, since little is known about the North by the voting public, would probably be able to take advantage of discontent merely by advocating the legal defeat of the present government of South Korea.

4. Graham stated that Chaeng "has no more belief in the unification of Korea except as a by-product of a third world war than I have. It could not come out of elections, and he was very positive that President Rhee would never attempt to 'march north' alone."

5. The argument on the U.N. Geneva Report evidently had its effect on the wording of the recent U.S.-Korea Agreement. This economic and military agreement between the United States and the Republic of Korea was signed in Seoul on November 17 substantially on American terms; with Syngman Rhee giving way on various matters such as hwan exchange and procurement of supplies. Graham states:

"It is not certain why the President suddenly decided to give way. The most likely explanations are the impending decision on Korea in the United Nations General Assembly and his desire to secure the early passage of the Constitutional Amendment Bill. The press has made little attempt to disguise the American victory. It has even discounted an American

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Circulation

Distribution
to Posts

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concession on which the government in order to save their 'face' had laid great emphasis, whereby a Korean undertaking to seek unification 'by peaceful means' was amended to read 'co-operate with the United States in its efforts to unify Korea, including possible efforts through the United Nations to achieve this objective.'
(underlining mine)

6. The position of the ROK government, of course, in all this, is that the ROK government wishes to achieve the unification of Korea either by peaceful or non-peaceful means, wishes elections only in the north and only then under a form of U.N. supervision which it specifically designates as supervision by UNCURK.

T. C. DAVIS

AMBASSADOR.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA
Newton/bm (FILE COPY)

DESPATCH

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR
TOKYO, JAPAN

Reference: Korean Protests re U.N. Geneva
Subject: Report.

Security:.....

No: 1278

Date: December 2, 1954

Enclosures:.....

Air or Surface Mail: AIR
210-7-20

Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.

7-1-1-1

References

Although neither Mr. Newton nor I has yet been able to visit Korea, it is obvious from outcries in the Korean press which have reached us during the past two weeks that the report to the United Nations on the Geneva Conference (Report of the Fifteen) has created considerable turmoil in turmoil-ridden Seoul. In repeated references, Britain and Canada are unpleasantly mentioned as prime movers in an attempt to appease the Communist nations by suggesting unification of North and South Korea under mixed commission auspices.

2. On November 11, the Korean House of Representatives, by a unanimous standing vote, passed a resolution which must represent a new high in wishful thinking. The resolution stated that "As a means to unify the nation..... the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea should be extended to North Korea through a special election after the Chinese Communists withdraw." (underlining mine).

3. The November 12 issue of The Korean Republic, the English language organ of Syngman Rhee, stated in a front page article summarizing a statement by the Korean President:

"Britain and Canada are reported to be proposing to the United Nations a plan which would call for Korean unification elections under a so-called mixed Commission consisting of the Republic of Korea, a Communist nation and a neutral.....

"The Chief Executive then went on to reject foreign interference or discussion 'without prior consultation with the ROK'.

"Newspapers, political parties and social organizations were warned that they should be careful not to violate national laws by responding to the appeals of the instigators of co-existence with Communism."

4. On Saturday, November 13, the journal's front-page headline ran: "Pyun /Prime Minister/ Denounces Korean Report by U.N. Allies" and quoted Pyun as saying that the report is "not factual in that it has reintroduced certain phrases which were cut out of the Declaration by the sixteen after prolonged and exhaustive deliberation."

Internal
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to Posts

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It continued:

"The Prime Minister pointed out that the report avoids the term 'under the United Nations supervision'....and instead uses such phrases as 'under appropriate supervision', 'adequately and impartially supervised' and 'impartially supervised', all designed to cancel the present UNCURK and cloak in (sic) a Communist-desired supervision set-up in its place.

"Again the report has revived the phrase 'by peaceful means' which was expunged with great deliberation from the posterior part of the Declaration by the Sixteen as contradictory and irrelevant after the failure of the Geneva Conference to achieve Korean unification by peaceful means.

"This is to fall in with the Communist main objective at Geneva to sanctify the Armistice and eliminate American military action in Korea for all future. Those governments that have foisted their own designs on the matter want to add, it is clear, Korea to Manchuria as the Communist sanctuary." (underlining mine)

5. The issue of November 16, while suggesting that Prime Minister Pyun might present Korea's case at U.N., stated in a front-page article:

"At the present U.N. session, Britain and Canada have led a movement of the U.N. Korean Allies to formulate a new unification bid to the Communists. Britain and Canada have suggested the acceptability of a mixed commission to supervise Korean elections.

"Such a commission would resemble that which currently is turning all of Vietnam over to the Communists." (underlining mine)

6. An editorial in the same paper on November 18 entitled "Our Case for Liberty" stated that "some of the nations that helped us, led by Britain and Canada are intent upon getting a 'peaceful' Korean settlement at any price -- including the sacrifice of this Republic.... If we are to be sold out, better that we yield our own souls to the devil, and thus assure ourselves of at least a modicum of privilege and immunity. Let the appeasers sell their own birthright for a mess of porridge, if they like, and permit us to decide our own fate."

7. By November 19 the machinery of protest was in high gear. The Republic described a mass rally in Seoul of "more than 50,000 Seoul citizens" in "a protest against the British-Canadian proposal for all-Korean elections under supervision of a mixed Commission." The rally is described as adopting messages for despatch to Syngman Rhee, President Eisenhower and U.N. Secretary-General Dag ~~Hammarskjöld~~ ^{Hammarskjöld}. Like all good mass rallies, this one, according to the article, subsequently "surged into the streets.....in a gigantic city-wide demonstration."

-3-

8. The drums continue to beat. On Tuesday, November 23, the entire back page of the Republic was covered with an announcement signed "Federation of Patriotic Organizations" and headed "There can be no compromise with Freedom", which denounced the supervisory commission plan "reportedly sponsored by Britain and Canada" and concluded

"We advocate a general election in north Korea under the supervision of the United Nations, approving the sovereign right of the Republic of Korea, as specifically provided when U.N.-sponsored elections were held in the Republic of Korea in the past. Communist activity is apparent in Third-Force efforts to 'solve' the problem of divided Korea by compromise."

9. A Korea Press despatch quoted by U.P. states that on Sunday, November 28, "About 20,000 members of the Korean Militia Corps demonstrated against (the) unification formula" in Seoul Public Stadium, and later paraded down the main streets of the city.

10. The strong ROK delegation has departed for New York breathing fire, and determined to inject some of it into the coming Korean deliberations at U.N. We have quoted at length in this report so as to provide you with evidence of the extent of this clearly organized Korean protest on the chance that it may be of use to our U.N. delegation during the coming Korean discussions and to reveal that, although not quite as uncomfortably as that of Britain, the name of Canada is being invidiously spotlighted, perhaps for the first time, in the Korean press and public statements as the author of a reprehensible form of appeasement.

T. C. DAVIS

AMBASSADOR.

INCOMING MESSAGE

COPY

FROM:

THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR CANADA, LONDON

Security Classification

CONFIDENTIAL

File No.

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

~~2-7-20~~
7-1-1-1

Priority

System

No. 1444

Date November 22, 1954.

CYPHER - AUTO

Departmental
Circulation

MINISTER
UNDER/SEC

D/UNDER/SEC

A/UNDER/SEC

POL.COOR.SECT.

U.N.DIV.

Reference

NOV 29 1954

Subject

Korea.

Walter Graham reported on November 19 that a

large demonstration was held in Seoul on the previous day to protest against an alleged Anglo-Canadian plan to achieve unification of Korea by nation-wide elections under "appropriate supervision". The Foreign Office has replied that there is no truth whatever in reports of the alleged plan and suggests that they are based on the differences which arose between the Canadians and Americans over the report of the 15 and have been propagated by the Koreans for their own ends.

2. Foreign Office could not give out the full story but has told the press that no such plan exists and that Her Majesty's Government's position is based on the report of the 15.

References

INCOMING MESSAGE

COPY

FROM: THE CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE KOREAN
POLITICAL CONFERENCE, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND



TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification

SECRET

File No.

210

7-1-1-1

Priority

System
CYPHER-SIMPLEX

No. 10

Date April 28, 1954.

Departmental
Circulation

MINISTER
UNDER/SEC
D/UNDER/SEC
A/UNDER/SEC'S
POL/CO-ORD 'N
SECTION

Reference:

Subject: Korea.

The first of what are intended as regular, possibly daily, sessions of deputies of the sixteen was held this morning (April 27). Kural, as our Secretary-General, opened the meeting but Alexis Johnson took over on the assumption that these meetings were to be a continuation of the Washington sessions.

2. Johnson began with a lengthy exposition of American aims and intentions on the Korean question. It was a rigid statement of views already known to you. Our policy must be based on the position that we were not making a fresh start on Korea but were merely seeking to complete the process of reunification already undertaken by the United Nations. Unless the Communists were willing to give up their position on North Korea the conference was bound to fail. He emphasized the importance of the united front while recognizing that there might be differences of emphasis and minor differences of tactics among us.

3. In a somewhat formal session of this kind with the ROK present, it was difficult to have anything like a frank discussion of the issues. Neither we nor the Australians and New Zealanders are very happy about the American approach which seems to be based on the assumption that we are victors and leaves no room for manoeuvres at all. Allen of the United Kingdom tactfully expressed agreement with the fundamental aims of the Americans, but emphasized the importance of our putting forward proposals which the world would recognize as reasonable, and the Communists will have difficulty rejecting. Watt of Australia and Lacoste of France spoke of the importance of not always speaking with the same voice in meetings, even though we maintained a basic unity.

4. The rest of the meeting was devoted to a discussion of tactics for the afternoon's meeting, in particular of plans for frustrating Molotov's knavish tricks which, as it turned out, he didn't ply.

Done

Date

References

Done

Date

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Ext. 180 C

Mr. McLaughlin
to see
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OTTAWA FILE

No.

Despatch No. 316

Date February 8, 1952

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: Chairman, Canadian Delegation, Paris.

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference:

Subject: ... Interim Report on Korean Items on the Agenda of the Sixth Session of the General Assembly (a) "The problem of the Independence of Korea: Report of United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea" (Item 17), (b) "Relief and Rehabilitation of Korea: Report of the United Nations Agent General for Korean Reconstruction. (Item 27).

1. Attached herewith is Interim Report, in quadruplicate, on Item 17, "The problem of the Independence of Korea: Report of United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea" and Item 27 "Relief and Rehabilitation of Korea: Report of the United Nations Agent General for Korean Reconstruction.

(Sgd.) D.M. Johnson

Chairman, Canadian Delegation.

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No. of Enclosures

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Post File

No. 210-7 ✓

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERIM REPORT ON KOREAN ITEMS ON THE AGENDA OF THE SIXTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (a) "The problem of the Independence of Korea: Report of UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA" (ITEM 17); (b) "Relief and REHABILITATION OF KOREA: REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS AGENT GENERAL FOR KOREAN RECONSTRUCTION. (Item 27)).

1. A report on the Sixth Session's consideration of the problem of Korea cannot be final in character since the only resolution adopted with respect to Korea was a procedural resolution deferring consideration of the two main Korean items until the conclusion of an armistice in Korea or until other developments in Korea made consideration of items desirable. It was stated in the discussion on the procedural resolution and noted in the Rapporteur's report (A/2114) that postponement of consideration of item 27 would also involve postponement of the consideration of Chapter VII, Section 1 of the report of the Economic and Social Council.

2. Soviet bloc spokesmen gave Korea a good deal of attention in their statements on every item of the First Committee's agenda proving to their satisfaction that United Nations action in Korea was directed wholly by the United States in pursuit of its policy of aggressive imperialism in the Far East. On a number of occasions Mr. Vyshinsky argued that no progress could be made towards the easing of international tensions until a settlement had been reached in Korea. The first definite Soviet move, however, was made during the Committee's discussion of the Collective Measures item. The Soviet delegation introduced a resolution on January 3 which would have had the General Assembly abolish the Collective Measures Committee and recommend that the Security Council call a periodic meeting without delay to consider the question of measures liable to remove existing international tension and "to examine at the periodic meeting in the first place the measures which the Security Council should take to help to bring to a successful conclusion the negotiations taking place in Korea for the cessation of hostilities."

3. The United States delegation immediately put itself on record as being "decidedly and unqualifiedly adverse to the Soviet proposal." At a press conference on January 4 a spokesman for the United States delegation said that his delegation felt that the proposal was a diversionary operation to conceal Soviet efforts to "prevent, stifle and frustrate the Assembly's action in the field of collective security and on the Korean problem".

4. Immediately after the vote was completed on the Collective Measures item on January 9 the United States delegate in the First Committee formally moved that consideration of Item 17 be postponed with the understanding that if an armistice were concluded or if other developments in Korea should require the matter to be considered, the Committee would take up the questions regarding Korea which fell within its province. He argued that settlement of the military questions then under negotiation at Panmunjom could not be facilitated by re-opening the debate on political problems which had been before the United Nations since 1947. His view was supported by a large number of delegations who spoke in favour of his proposal including the delegations of the United Kingdom, Syria, Peru, the Philippines, Australia and France.

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5. The Communist bloc offered strong opposition to the proposal. Mr. Vyshinsky charged that the United States found it inconvenient to discuss the independence of Korea since such a discussion could only reveal that the purpose of United States intervention in Korea was the furtherance of United States predominance in the Far East. He also argued that the United States feared that a settlement in Korea could cause a letdown in the defence effort of the United States, an effort which was geared to the waging of an aggressive world war. So vehement were the attacks of Soviet bloc spokesmen that the Committee was left in little doubt as to the harm which would be done to the armistice negotiations by discussion of the Korean problem in the First Committee.

6. The proposal to postpone consideration of item 17 was therefore accepted by a vote of 47 in favour (including Canada) with 6 against (the Soviet bloc and Chile) and 3 abstentions.

7. Late in the session, on January 28, France, the United Kingdom and the United States tabled a draft resolution (A/C 1/713) the text of which is attached. This draft resolution was considered at a joint meeting of the First, Second and Third Committees on February 2. Under the terms of the resolution the General Assembly would: (a) decide that upon notification by the Unified Command to the Security Council of the conclusion of an armistice in Korea the Secretary-General should convene a special session of the General Assembly at the permanent headquarters in New York to consider items 17 and 27; or (b) that when other developments in Korea made consideration of the Korean items desirable the Secretary-General, acting in accordance with Article 20 of the Charter, should convene a special session or an emergency special session in New York; (c) request the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds to undertake negotiations regarding voluntary contributions to the program of UNKRA.

8. At the joint meeting on February 2 the Soviet bloc initiated a long procedural debate challenging the competency of the joint meeting to consider the resolution. Mr. Malik of the Soviet Union formally proposed that the work of the First Committee of the General Assembly should be continued and that the First Committee should begin without delay a study of Item 17. This proposal was defeated by a vote of 5 in favour, 52 against (including Canada) and one abstention (Yemen). The tripartite proposal was adopted by a vote of 51 in favour (including Canada) 5 against (the Soviet bloc) and 2 abstentions (Chile and Yemen). Throughout the course of the debate violent attacks were made by the Soviet bloc on United States motives in Korea and Mr. Malik ended the debate with a declaration that full responsibility for future events in Korea and the Far East would lie on the United States Government as a result of its unwillingness to facilitate the conclusion of an armistice in Korea by discussion of the Korean problem at this session of the General Assembly.

9. Canadian support for the tripartite resolution was noted in a brief statement to the joint meeting by Mr. Garson on February 2. He argued that the good sense of the resolution was obvious and that its purpose was simply to avoid adding further difficulties to the work of the military negotiators in Panmunjom. He suggested that the references to Korea in the First Committee by the Soviet bloc could leave no reasonable doubt that consideration of the

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Korean items at this time could only make more difficult the task of the United Nations negotiators in Korea. He pointed out that the resolution provided evidence of the willingness of its sponsors to consider the Korean items only when something constructive could be achieved by that consideration. In his remarks with reference to the second main subject of the resolution he pointed out that the Canadian Government had given its full support to UNKRA by pledging and paying 7½ million dollars toward the relief program. He expressed the hope that all member states would cooperate in providing the outstanding balance needed to make up the 250 million dollar program which had been tentatively approved for the first period of UNKRA'S operation.

10. The resolution came before the plenary session on February 5 and was adopted by exactly the same vote as had been recorded in the First Committee.

11. In contrast with the previous session where the subject of Korea had dominated the discussions, the Sixth Session did little to assist in the solution of this important problem. Such a finding cannot be attributed to any deed of omission on the part of representatives at the Sixth Session but was rather a natural outcome of the lack of agreement in Korea upon the terms of a military armistice. Without an armistice it did not appear realistic to attempt to reach agreement on the terms of a political settlement. The overwhelming vote with which the proposal for deferment of consideration of the Korean items was accepted was not the result of pressure tactics by the larger delegations but was rather the acceptance by practically all the representatives of the non-Communist world that such a deferment made sense. The sincere desire on the part of the United States for an armistice in Korea was made clear throughout the committee discussions. In this connection it is significant that India departed from the position of abstention which it had adopted on so many important items before the Assembly to vote in favour of deferment of the Korean items. The impression of sincerity left by United States spokesmen at the session might be listed as an important contribution to the eventual success in the solution of the Korean problem since heretofore a number of countries have seriously questioned this sincerity.

12. Apart from the debate in the committee the Korean question was considered at a number of meetings of Commonwealth delegations where an opportunity was provided to hear the views of all the Commonwealth countries, not only on the immediate action which might be taken in the United Nations, but also on the plans for post-armistice action by the United Nations. It was possible through these channels to clear away some of the differences of opinion which existed especially with respect to the post-armistice period. While it would be a mistake to regard the results of these meetings as vitally important their usefulness cannot be denied. Together with the consultations which went on throughout the session between capitals, the informal meetings in Paris served to keep Commonwealth representatives fully informed in the hope that major differences of policy might be avoided. Direct consultation with the United States delegation was not as fruitful as we would have hoped for although the United States delegation did consult Mr. Pearson before his departure from Paris on the general outline of the tentative United States plan for the post-armistice period.

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13. The substance of the problems facing members of the United Nations with respect to relief and rehabilitation of Korea and the activities of the Korean Reconstruction Agency were dealt with mainly in the Advisory Committee to the Agent General for UNKRA and a separate report is being prepared on our work in that Committee.

Paris, February 7, 1952.

UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY

GENERAL

A/C.1/713
A/C.2&3/104
26 January 1952

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Dual Distribution

Sixth session
Items 17 and 27

THE PROBLEM OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF KOREA: REPORT OF THE
UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND
REHABILITATION OF KOREA

RELIEF AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA: REPORT OF THE
UNITED NATIONS AGENT GENERAL FOR KOREAN RECONSTRUCTION

France, United Kingdom and United States of America:
draft resolution

The General Assembly,

Desiring to facilitate to the greatest possible extent the
negotiations in Pan-munjom and the conclusion of an armistice in
Korea, and

Wishing to avoid premature consideration of items 17 and 27
of the agenda of the present session,

I.

Decides that (a) upon notification by the Unified Command to
the Security Council of the conclusion of an armistice in Korea,
the Secretary-General shall convene a special session of the
General Assembly at the permanent Headquarters of the United
Nations to consider the above-mentioned items, or (b) when other
developments in Korea make desirable consideration of the above-
mentioned items, the Secretary-General, acting in accordance with
Article 20 of the Charter and with the rules of procedure of the
General Assembly, shall convene a special session or an emergency
special session of the General Assembly at the permanent Head-
quarters of the United Nations.

II.

Requests the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds
established by the resolution adopted at the 352nd meeting of the

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General Assembly on 7 December 1951^{1/} to undertake negotiations regarding voluntary contributions to the programme of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency for relief and rehabilitation of Korea.

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No.

Despatch No. 254

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Date March 14, 1951

SECRET

FROM: The Head of the Canadian Liaison Mission, Tokyo, Japan.
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference:

Subject: ... Views of President Syngman Rhee of Korea

I had an opportunity yesterday to read a despatch dated February 18, 1951, written by James Plimsoll, Australian Representative on the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, reporting a conversation that he had had that day with President Syngman Rhee of the Republic of Korea. As I was able to make some notes, I can give you a fairly accurate summary of the despatch.

Crossing of 38th Parallel

2. President Rhee was much troubled by current discussion in the press about the United Nations stopping at the 38th Parallel. He said that Koreans would not accept any decision to stop at the 38th Parallel. He said that they could defend their country only if they held its natural boundary at the Yalu River. He asked if the United Nations Commission might report to the General Assembly the deep-felt wish of the Korean people for the unification of Korea. Dr. Rhee did not wish to go against the policies of the United Nations but he said that he and the people of Korea were in mortal fear that the United Nations would make a peace in the Far East at the expense of Korea. He asked if the Australian Member could arrange for a Korean representative to take part in the work of the Collective Measures Committee.

Japanese Rearmament

3. President Rhee said that the Korean Government and people feared Japanese rearmament. He recognized that, if the United States intended to rearm Japan, there was little or nothing Korea could do about it. Except for a few periods of acute hostility (1921 and 1941), Americans had been generally partial to the Japanese. President

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Rhee recalled that it was President Theodore Roosevelt who had given the Japanese a free hand in Korea. The United States was the first country to recognize Japanese intervention in Korea. Koreans remembered this fact.

4. President Rhee went on to talk at some length about the pro-Japanese attitude of most of the U.S. army officers who had come to Korea from Japan. Mr. Plimsoll observed parenthetically that it was a fact that U.S. officers consistently underrated the Koreans. President Rhee suggested that some American officers went so far as to hope for a Korean defeat so as to get Japanese soldiers assigned to Korea. He suggested it was for this reason that the Americans had not always supported ROK army units as stoutly as they might have done. Mr. Plimsoll would not accept these anti-American statements of President Rhee and pointed out that the ROK army had consistently received as much assistance from the Americans as the latter could afford to give. He referred parenthetically here to the recent retreat of the ROK 8th Division which had little U.S. artillery and tank support because it was not considered to face any serious opposition.

5. President Rhee observed that neither Lieutenant General Ridgway nor General Collins had served in Japan. For this reason, they were not prejudiced against Korea in Japan's favour. There had been an improvement under General Ridgway's régime and he thought the latter must be receiving his instructions direct from General Collins in Washington rather than from Tokyo. President Rhee did not attribute any anti-Korean feelings to General MacArthur but to those about him. He hoped that Korea would be given equal treatment with Japan in the matter of rearmament assistance by the United States for only in this way could Korean-Japanese relations be kept on a healthy basis.

Pacific Pact

6. President Rhee informed Mr. Plimsoll that recently Chiang Kai-shek had sent an emissary to him asking him to take the initiative once more in the matter of forming a Pacific pact. Dr. Rhee said that he had decided against taking such initiative as he considered that this might give the impression in some quarters that he considered the United Nations effort in Korea insufficient and that he thought that a Pacific pact might further strengthen the military effort

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now being put forward by the United Nations in Korea. President Rhee said that he thought it would be a good idea if Australia would take the initiative in pressing for a Pacific pact. He was comforted by the thought that Australia had some of the same concern that he did with regard to Japan's potential menace in the future. Dr. Rhee observed that it would not be possible for the United States to take the initiative in forming a Pacific pact as there were already signs that congressional opinion considered that U.S. military commitments had been over-extended by the Administration.

7. President Rhee had formerly thought of a Pacific pact embracing all the non-Communist countries in the Pacific. He was now reconciled to the fact that all Pacific countries would not join. He mentioned Indonesia as an example of a country which would certainly not join a Pacific pact at this stage. President Rhee suggested that membership in a Pacific pact should include the United States, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Nationalist China and the Republic of Korea. He did not rule out the possibility of Japan joining in such a security arrangement at a later date.

8. President Rhee recalled conversations which he had had with President Quirino of the Philippines and President Chiang Kai-shek in 1949. At that time, President Quirino had opposed the inclusion of Australia in any Pacific pact as he considered that Australia's discriminatory immigration policy demonstrated a basic unwillingness on her part to enter into genuine fraternal relations with the countries of Asia. President Chiang had gone even further to say that he thought all countries of the British Commonwealth should be excluded from the pact arrangement as their relations with the countries of Southeast Asia were such as to make them quite incompatible. President Rhee said that he had opposed both of them by saying that he thought that all countries who wished to join the pact to resist the spread of Communism should be welcome, regardless of minor differences that might exist between them.

A. R. Menzies,
Head of the Canadian Liaison
Mission in Japan.