

2922-B-04-301-001/FP-001 vol.3

Vol 2 end

24-11-81

2910-CFP 301-2

2910-CFP 301-2

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TO
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FILE NO. - DOSSIER N°

2922-B-0G-301-001/FP-001

VOLUME

4

MEMORANDUM

FMC 1150-110 (Inf)

30 Oct 85

DCOS CD

BATTLE GP, CBT TM AND INF
DOCTRINE AND BATTLE DRILLS

- Refs:
- A. FMC 1150-110/A17 (DCOS CD) 17 Oct 85
 - B. CTC 1180-1-1 (Tac Div) 30 Aug 85
 - C. CFP 301(2) The Battle Gp in Battle
 - D. CFP 301 Land Fmns in Battle
 - E. CFP 309(1) The Inf Bn in Battle
 - F. CFP 309(3) The Sect and Pl in Battle
 - G. CFP 309(3) Supplement Pl and Sect Comds
Aide Memoire

1. Ref A req comments on ref B. Ref B has been reviewed in conjunction with Inf CFPs and while there is gen agreement with the thrust of ref B some refinements to the recommendations will better serve our needs.

2. As recommended in ref B, a well written all arms pub at battle gp level, ref C, is a nec next logical step from ref D in doctrine production. Further, as at least 90 percent of the content of ref E is common to other arms and as the remaining 10 percent of its content related to inf org, roles and characteristics should be understood by other arms, there will be no reqr for ref E when ref C is pub. The many other CFPs on specific ops will quite adequately adds other higher level inf doctrine reqrs.

3. With ref C adds all arms doctrine, a supplement to it, in the form of a Battle Gp/Cbt Tm Comds Aide Memoire should incl battle gp/cbt tm battle drills, orders formats, etc. Thus, two pubs would quite adequately serve our needs down to cbt tm level. Higher level and tech engr, arty, sigs and CSS CFPs would continue to serve branch doctrine reqrs.

I would reserve judgement on this until we see what the plan for new pub.

② SO2 Doc Coord

This seems to parallel my posn. If it was possible to cancel Ref E that would be a plus but too much technical detail on an inf bn would detract from object of tactics in the new pub.

.../2

DCOS CD COORD
7339

NOV 06 1985

- 2 -

4. The adoption of the course of action presented above would reqr that pure inf doctrine. at pl and sect level continue to be pub as refs F and G. These are being reviewed and will be amended to ensure that they are properly derived from Corps 86 doctrine.


J.A.Y. Sarrazin
LCol
SSO Inf
7461

MEMORANDUM

FMC 1150-1 (ARMY)

1 Nov 85

DCOS CW

STANDARDIZED BATTLE DRILLS

- REFS: A. CTC 1180-1-1 (TAC DIV) 30 AUG 85
B. MINS OF THE 17TH MEETING OF THE
ARMY DOCTRINE AND TACS BOARD HELD AT
FMC/TA 3 OCT 85
C. FMC 1150-1 (CD COORD) DATED 18 OCT 85

1. AS DIR AT REF B, REF A HAS BEEN REVIEWED.
REF C HAS BEEN EXAMINED AS WELL. FOL ARE COMMENTS
ON BOTH DOCS:

A. REF A

(1) PARA 1. PARA 1 REFERS TO COMBINED
ARMS DOCTRINE. THE ARMY GLOSSARY DEFINES
COMBINED AS "BETWEEN TWO OR MORE FORCES OR
AGENCIES OF TWO OR MORE ALLIES ...". THE TERM
ALL ARMS IS PERCEIVED TO BE MORE APPROPRIATE.

(2) PARA 27. THE RECOMMENDATIONS OUTLINED AT PARA 27
ARE SUPPORTED IN THEIR ENTIRETY.

B. REF C

(1) PARA 3. I DO NOT SP PARA 3 COMPLETELY. IT IS
THE LACK OF ARMY WIDE DOCTRINE, ITS DISSEMINATION AND
ITS LACK OF APPLICATION MORESO THAN THE REBT SYSTEM
WHICH ARE THE PROBLEM AREAS. THE IN APPROPRIATE USE OF
CANADIAN DOCTRINE DURING FTXs ON RV 85 AND CPXs
SUCH AS RITE SIMPLE/DOUBLE ARE EXAMPLES AT THE

- 2 -

HIGHER LEVELS. THE LACK OF DOCTRINE IS RFT BY THE SUBJ REVIEW PROCESS AT THIS TIME. THE PRACTICING OF BATTLE DRILLS ONLY DURING PMD COLLECTIVE TAG PDS IS UNDERSTANDABLE SINCE THEY ARE A FUNCTION OF PROGRESSIVE TAG.

(2) PARA 5. I FULLY SP PARA 5.

(3) PARA 6a. SEE PARA 1 A (1) ABOVE WRT THE TERM "COMBINED ARMS"

(4) PARA 7. I SP PARA 7 EXCEPT I STRONGLY CAUTION AGAINST EXPANDING CFP 30 (2) SUP 1 (AIDE MEMOIRE) BEYOND BEING EXACTLY THAT - AN AIDE MEMOIRE. IT SHOULD NOT CONTAIN ANY MAT EXCEPT RAO FORMATS FOR REGS AND ORDERS, OTHER ORDERS FORMATS, THE EST, ETC. CLEARLY A CMD SHOULD NOT BE USING IT TO EXECUTE BATTLE DRILLS FOR EXAMPLE. THE SUPPLEMENT SHOULD BE CONCISE AND POCKET SIZE.

(5) PARA 8. I AGREE IN PART WITH PARA 8. CFPs 305 (U) AND 309 (1) HOWEVER SHOULD REMAIN AS THE SINGLE DOCS FOR ARMOUR AND INF BRANCHES RESPECTIVELY. DUPLICATION BETWEEN THESE CFPs AND CFP 301 (2) SHOULD BE MINIMAL HOWEVER.

ME Joly
LCD
So Amel

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE



MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE

CANADIAN LAND FORCES COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
COLLEGE DE COMMANDEMENT ET D'ETAT-MAJOR DES FORCES TERRESTRES CANADIENNES

SC 2900-1/6

FORT FRONTENAC
KINGSTON, ONTARIO
K7K 2X8

26 Jun 85

National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0K2

Referred to
Transmits DLCD-6

Attention: DLCD-6

2922-B-06-301-001/FR-001
Doc No

CFP 301 LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE

- References:
- A. Meeting CLFCSC Staff/DLCD-6/LCol Connolly 20 Jun 85
 - B. NDHQ 2900-CFP 301 (DLCD 6) 28 May 85
 - C. CLFCSC SC 2900-1/6 (Comdt) 2 May 85
 - D. CLFCSC SC 4649-4 27 Feb 85

1. As discussed at Reference A, enclosed are notes for consideration for Change 1 to CFP 301. These notes include comments on offensive and defensive operations, as well as major additional points that were discussed.
2. The principles and fundamentals for offensive and defensive operations are in the preferred sequence. It should be noted that the College plans to use these notes in preparation for course 8602/8701, pending receipt of Change 1 to CFP 301.
3. From the College point of view, a great deal was achieved at the meeting. The void that was initially identified in CFP 301 will be largely filled with the inclusion of these points, particularly those dealing with principles and fundamentals.
4. It is certainly hoped that resolution of such matters can be achieved in a similar manner in future. It was a most worthwhile and satisfying discussion.

E.B. Beno
Colonel
for Commandant

RB Enclosures: 3

4/15/85
000587


THE OFFENCE

PRINCIPLES OF WAR AND FUNDAMENTALS

1. The following principles of war require special emphasis during the planning and conduct of offensive operations:

- a. Offensive Action. The aim of offensive action is to defeat the enemy's will to resist. This implies manoeuvre, speed, aggressiveness and initiative. The exploitation of success and taking advantage of enemy weaknesses must be paramount in the minds of all commanders.
- b. Concentration of Force. The power to strike any resistance that appears or to bypass that resistance is fundamental to success in offensive operations. The ability to concentrate fire power requires movement, flexibility and communications. Commanders must be able to concentrate forces and fire power at the decisive time and place.
- c. Surprise. Surprise creates success out of all proportion to the force used and must be ruthlessly exploited. All attempts must be directed at disguising the time and place of attack as well as the forces concentrated for that attack.
- d. Security. A firm base is essential for the assembly, preparation and launching of offensive operations. The line of departure must be secure prior to launching an attack and the flanks must be secure to avoid enemy interference. As new ground is gained lines of communications must be protected.
- e. Flexibility. Commanders must be prepared to adapt to changing circumstances. Opportunities must be exploited as they occur. Changes in plans must be made if required to maintain the momentum and keep the enemy off-balance. Flexibility is achieved through simplicity of plans, unity of effort and well balanced forces.

2. In addition to the above principles of war, there are several fundamentals that must be applied in offensive operations. The key to success is seizing and maintaining the initiative. In doing so, a commander maintains momentum, keeps the enemy off balance and prevents him from mounting counter-attacks and re-forming reserves. With this in mind, offensive operations must be planned and conducted using the following fundamentals:

- a. Reconnaissance. There is a continuous need to obtain as much information as possible in the time available. Prior to a deliberate attack there will be time to obtain comprehensive information about the ground and enemy dispositions, while a hasty attack sacrifices this knowledge for speed.
 - b. Intelligence. Knowledge on the enemy and ground is essential. All available resources must be employed to obtain detailed information on enemy dispositions, strengths, intentions and abilities. Seeing the battlefield is essential for commanders at all levels.
- 

- c. Simplicity. Plans must be kept simple. Complex manoeuvres and arrangements must be avoided. A clear concept of operations, supported by a simple plan, gives subordinate commanders an opportunity to use initiative and judgement in response to rapid changes in local situations.
- d. Shock Action. IAW CFP 301 1204.2.
- e. Depth. IAW CFP 301 1203.3.
- f. Balance. IAW CFP 301 1204.4.
- g. Reserves. Reserves are required to meet the unexpected. They may be committed to sway the battle or to exploit unforeseen success. Reserves provide a commander with flexibility and balance.

ADVANCE TO CONTACT

3. You may wish to consider using paragraph 504 of CFP 301(1) as a basis for indicating the changes between advancing to contact and advancing in contact. As we discussed, the overall operation should be termed 'advance to contact' but indicate clearly the changes in the tempo of operations that would occur once the enemy's guard forces are encountered. These changes will include the following:

- a. Speed of advance. Speed will be slower as movement will be by tactical manoeuvre throughout. Also, the deployment of artillery will be paramount to support attacks by the advancing forces.
- b. Use of reconnaissance forces. Reconnaissance forces conducting close reconnaissance for the advance guards will probably be tasked for flank security, and the lead elements will be the combat teams of the advance guards.

4. A diagram to explain the deployment for an advancing force is essential. This should be included in conjunction with paragraph 1207 of CFP 301 or paragraph 504.3 of CFP 301(1). The diagram from CFP 301(1) and ATP 35(A) are attached, with preference to the former.

5. Broad front/narrow front. The terms broad front and narrow front require clarification as discussed, and especially as they relate to the bypass policy. Paragraph 1209.3 needs to be clarified in this respect which includes the comments concerning bypassing. The frontage must be defined in terms of distances between adjacent boundaries or in terms of the number of units forward, or both.

6. Bypass Policy. As mentioned in Annex A to Reference A, paragraph 1209.5 is ambiguous, must include the procedure of picketing a force if bypassed, and a commander's consideration in determining the bypass policy. These points are very well presented in paragraph 506 of CFP 301(1).

7. Grouping. We briefly discussed the doctrine of grouping as it applies to the advance to contact (paragraph 1209.4) and the need to ensure that an advance guard is grouped in such a manner that it has sufficient force to deal with expected opposition and achieve its overall mission without the need of conducting passage(s) of line. The point to be stressed is that in the planning for an advance to contact, the advance guard must be strongly grouped to achieve its objective in depth while still maintaining its momentum. Passage of lines to obtain successive objectives must be avoided.

ATTACK

8. Forms of manoeuvre. A flanking manoeuvre is required as well as a discussion on the level at which various manoeuvres will be performed ie flanking and frontal up to and including brigade, and the penetration, envelopment and turning movement at division and above. This distinction is one of force requirement and depth of objectives. The flanking and frontal attack are more immediate in terms of objectives while the other three are in depth and of greater consequence and planning at the higher levels of command. You may wish to consider paragraph 510 of CFP 301(1) in this change. Diagrams from 301(1) and one locally produced on the turning movement are attached.

DEFENCE

PRINCIPLES OF WAR AND FUNDAMENTALS

1. The following principles of war require special emphasis during the planning and conduct of defensive operations:
 - a. Concentration of Force. The commander must be able to concentrate his force at the enemy's point of main effort. This is achieved by the mobility of a defending force, the flexibility of indirect fire and the bold use of effort in others. As larger forces gather in smaller areas, tactics will tend to become positional. In areas where economy of effort is being used, forces will become more mobile.
 - b. Offensive Action. Commanders at all levels must maintain the offensive spirit in the defence. The defence must not be passive. Troops must be mobile and maintain the ability to strike the enemy. This is especially true of armour. Offensive action includes harassing by tank hunting teams and patrols, domination of no-man's-land between forces and counter-attacks.
 - c. Security. This is the ability to meet an attack from any direction. An attacking force will attempt to achieve surprise by attacking in an unexpected direction and at an unexpected time. Security is achieved by the employment of covering forces, co-ordination at all levels, maintaining surveillance and the ability to concentrate forces.
2. In addition to the above principles, there are several fundamentals that must be applied in defensive operations. These are intelligence, use of terrain, co-ordination, mutual support, depth, manoeuvre, fire power and reserves.
3. Intelligence. The commander must see the battlefield and be aware of the enemy and his intentions. His defence must be based on the best intelligence and information that can be gathered from all sources on the enemy's capabilities. The commander will seldom have complete knowledge of the enemy before his attack begins, so the commander must sustain his efforts to acquire intelligence as the battle develops. He can then employ his fire power and manoeuvre elements at the right time and place.
4. Use of terrain. IAW CFP 301 1305.2. ✓
5. Co-ordination. IAW CFP 301 1305.7. ✓ Recommend that 'or' be deleted in the second line, and insert 'and'.
6. Mutual Support. IAW CFP 301 1305.4.
7. Depth. IAW CFP 301 1305.3.
8. Manoeuvre. IAW CFP 301 1305.5. Recommend that the following sentence be added: It is an essential and integral part of defence planning.
9. Fire Power. IAW CFP 301 1305.6.
10. Reserves. IAW CFP 301 1305.8.

DELAY AND WITHDRAWAL

11. The fundamentals for the delay and withdrawal as presently stated in CFP 301 do not require amendments.

ADDITIONAL POINTS

1. The following major additional points were discussed during the meeting:

- a. Obstacle Crossing. Because of the expected improvements to ATP 35(A) (and subsequently CFO 301) through NATO channels, Chapter 16 was not discussed. The new proposed NATO STANAG 2395 will also be included. This may not be resolved for up to one year.
- b. Headquarters and FSCC. Paragraph 304 does not include the FSCC as an integral part of the headquarters. Although part of the operations center, its importance certainly deserves special mention. Besides, it will keep all gunners happy!
- c. Principles of Fire Planning. DLCD-6 designate will re-examine paragraph 408 with the aim of establishing fundamentals of fire planning. ✓
- d. Fig 4-1 (Corps FSCC). DLCD-6 designate will amend this figure to depict the correct reporting link for the EWCC.
- e. Fire Support. With regard to serial 86 at Reference B, the subject of fire support needs to be re-examined.
- f. Surveillance Planning. The draft chapter on surveillance planning submitted with Reference B was discussed. It was decided that the CLFCSC would prepare a position paper for the March 86 meeting of the ADTB on the subject of surveillance planning.
- g. Tactical Nuclear Operations. Chapter 22 of CFP 301 does not include the concept or planning of tactical nuclear operations in any detail. As discussed, Chapter 7 of CFP 301(1) should be examined for inclusion in CFP 301. This is considered to be an excellent chapter on tactical nuclear operations, and is the sole reference for the subject in the detail required by the College. It should also be included to stipulate the CF policy on this subject. CH 10 CFP 301(2)

ARTY STAFF DUTIES HAS IDENTICAL DATA TO OLD CFP 301(1) CH 7.
CANNOT 301(2) BE USED?

MEMORANDUM

②

Date: SEP 24 1985

TO: DLC06

A: _____

REMOVAL OF CORRESPONDENCE FROM FILE

EXTRACTION DE CORRESPONDENCE DU DOSSIER

Reference: A-AD-D30-001/JS-001, Art. 515

Référence: A-AD-D30-001/JS-001, Art. 515

1. Our records reveal that the following correspondence has been removed from this file/temporary docket:

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CF Rand Command + Staff College
Kingston, Ont.

Reference:
Référence:

SC 2900-1/6.

Date:
Date:

26/6/85

2. It is requested that the above original missing papers be returned or this section informed of the reasons for removal.

2. Nous vous prions de retourner la pièce originale manquante ou nous informer des raisons de l'extraction.

② DDA

DOCUMENT CONTAINS COMMENTS THAT ARE REQUIRED IN THE AMENDMENT OF A CFA. ONCE REWRITE IS COMPLETE THE DOCUMENT IN QUESTION WILL BE PAID. NOTE THAT THE DOCUMENT IS OF LITTLE USE TO OTHER THAN DLC06

DDA
DLC06
25 SEP 85

Melissa Rapense

DDA NDRM 3-333 / GDDN

Tel: 992-3290

PA

2922-B-00-301-001/FP-001

~~2900-CFP-301~~ (DLCD 6)

23 September 1985

National Defence

Défense nationale

National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0K2

Quartier général de la Défense nationale
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0K2

Distribution List

CFP 301 LAND
FORMATIONS IN BATTLE

- References:
- A. Meeting CLFCSC Staff/DLCD 6/DLCD 6
Designate 20 June 1985
 - B. SC 2900-1/6 26 June 1985

1. Enclosed is the draft revision to CFP 301, Chapter 13, Defensive Operations. Changes as discussed have been made.
2. You are requested to review this draft chapter to ensure it will meet the College's teaching needs. Once agreement on this chapter is reached between us it will be given wider staffing for comments.

N.H. Connolly
Lieutenant Colonel
for Director Land Combat Development

Enclosure: 1

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Action (with enclosure)

Information (without enclosure)

External

Internal

Commandant
Canadian Land Forces Command
and Staff College
Fort Frontenac
Kingston, Ontario
K7K 2X8
Attention: SSO

CD Coord

LCol N.H. Connolly, DLCD 6, 996-3954, jmck

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B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

CHAPTER 13

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION

1301. GENERAL

1. Defensive operations are seldom decisive. Normally it is only through the conduct of offensive operations that forces achieve a final victory. There are occasions however, such as in the opening stages of a conflict, when forces must execute defensive operations.

2. Usually defensive operations - the defence, the delay and the withdrawal - are undertaken when the enemy has the general initiative. This chapter discusses the defence, and subsequent chapters deal with the other types of defensive operations. See also Chapter 22 if defensive operations are conducted in a nuclear, biological and chemical environment.

1302. THREAT

1. General. The Warsaw Pact operational concept for offensive operations is outlined in Chapter 1. Such operations are carried out by one or more fronts and normally are supported by naval and air forces, strategic rocket forces, and airborne forces. Fronts and armies do not have fixed organizations, but typically contain the forces shown in Figure 13-1.

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B-GL-301-000/FP-001
 Interim 2

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Note - Only manoeuvre forces are depicted. Fronts and armies also include extensive artillery and engineer resources, as well as other combat support and combat service support forces.

Figure 13-1 Typical Front Organization.

2. Echelons. Normally formations are deployed tactically in echelons. Typical formation echelons are depicted in Table 13-1.

ECHELON	FORMATION		
	FRONT	CAA	MRD
First	2 x CAA	2 x MRD and 1 x Tank Div	2 x MRR
Second	1 x CAA 1 x Tank Army	1 x MRD	1 x MRR and 1 x Tank Regt
Reserve	2 x MRD (+)	1 x Tank Regt(+)	1 x Tank Bn(+)

Table 13-1 Typical Formation Echelons

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B-GL-301-000/FP-001
 Interim 2

3. Objectives. Warsaw Pact doctrine classifies its objectives as immediate, subsequent and final. Typical objectives are depicted in Table 13-2.

Formation	OBJECTIVES		
	Immediate	Subsequent	Final
Front	corps rear area	army group rear area	political(economic infrastructure)
Army	brigade rear area	division rear area	corps rear area
Division	battalion rear area	brigade rear area	divisional rear area

Table 13-2 Typical Formation Objectives

4. Operational Manoeuvre Group (OMG). An OMG is a divisional-size, or possibly army-size, task force, which may be constituted from existing formations within an army or a front. It contains a high proportion of armour and normally also contains air assault formations or units. It is designed to conduct operations deep in enemy rear areas, normally in conjunction with airborne or airmobile forces. Its actions are related to those occurring at the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). Its objectives include nuclear weapon sites, command posts, storage depots and other key installations. It is designed to move quickly at the onset of hostilities to prevent reinforcements from moving forward and to preclude the establishment of a cohesive defence in depth.

5. Front. Depending on its mission, a front may have a zone of action (Z of A) as wide as 300 kms. In the initial stage of an operation, it attempts in sequence to:

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B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

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- a. penetrate forward brigade defence areas;
- b. defeat divisional depth forces and reserves; and
- c. destroy or neutralize corps depth forces and reserves.

Once it secures its immediate objectives, it would likely commit its second echelon armies as an exploitation force to attack strategic reserves at army group level. This would be followed by the taking of its final objectives, which entails seizing key political and economic centres and destroying or capturing forces guarding them. A front commander may form an army-size OMG and use it with airborne forces, up to a division in size, to seize objectives in depth at anytime during the campaign. Smaller airborne forces are used for long range reconnaissance or sabotage missions. A typical front deployment for offensive operations is shown in Figure 13-2.

6. Army. A typical combined arms army (CAA) and tank army have a similar number of artillery fire units; the tank army has more tanks. Usually armies have a Z of A 60 kms to 120 kms wide, although on occasion it may be narrower. An army conducts operations by:

- a. attacking along one or more axes to split the defender into separate or isolated groups, which may be defeated later in detail; or
- b. attacking along converging axes to envelop the defending force and then to destroy it as concurrent attacks, possibly using a division-size OMG, continue in depth.

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B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

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Figure 13-2 Typical Front Deployment - Offensive Operations (not
to scale)

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B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

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Preparatory fire for the attack is co-ordinated and controlled by first echelon armies and is included in the front fire plan. Conventional preparatory fire lasts 30 minutes to one hour or more. Normally if used, nuclear weapons are delivered immediately prior to conventional preparatory fire which would be reduced in time. First echelon armies aim to penetrate forward defence areas, thus splitting or enveloping the defender. Their final objectives are located in proximity to corps rear boundaries. Second echelon armies are then committed to:

- a. defeat pockets of resistance, including forces in large urban areas, providing that first echelon armies have the promise of continued success;
- b. exploit the success of first echelon armies, once they have started to lose their momentum;
- c. resume the attack on a different axis, if first echelon armies are unsuccessful; or
- d. replace first echelon armies, if these have been severely weakened and the attack must be continued on the same axis.

Reserves are employed as economy of force elements. They are employed primarily to deal with rear area and flank threats, and airborne and airmobile forces.

7. Divisions. Motorized rifle divisions (MRDs) are comprised of three motorized rifle regiments (MRRs), one tank regiment and combat support and combat service support elements.

B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

DRAFT

Tank divisions are organized similarly, but with three tank regiments and one MRR. Both types of division have almost the same number of artillery fire units, but the tank division has a greater number of tanks. A division has a Z of A of 20 to 30 kms, although on occasion this width may be reduced to less than 10 kms. Normally a division attacks along two axes in an attempt to achieve a breakthrough. Divisions are assigned immediate objectives 20 to 30 kms in depth, and final objectives 80 to 100 kms in depth. Following receipt of orders, attacks could be mounted in three to five hours. When a penetration of the main defence area (MDA) occurs, it is exploited quickly by second echelon forces in order to maintain momentum. Normally forward regiments and battalions bypass strong points, leaving them to be destroyed by second echelon units.

1303. PURPOSE FOR DEFENCE

A defence is conducted to prevent the enemy from seizing terrain or breaking through into a defence area. It aims to break the enemy's attack, destroy his forces and stop him from accomplishing his aim.

1304. REASONS FOR DEFENCE

1. A defence may be conducted for any of the following reasons:

B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

DRAFT

- a. to weaken the enemy's offensive capability and cause his attack to fail;
- b. to retain a defence area and to prevent the enemy from breaking through;
- c. to gain time to prepare or resume offensive operations;
- d. to contain the enemy in one area, while applying decisive force elsewhere; or
- e. to force the enemy to concentrate, so that he is more vulnerable to fire.

1305. PRINCIPLES OF WAR AND FUNDAMENTALS

1. General. A commander must consider many principles and fundamentals when planning and conducting a defence. They are frequently in conflict with one another and, consequently, a commander must determine the degree to which each will be stressed.

2. Principles of War. The following principles of war require emphasis during the planning and conduct of defensive operations:

- a. Concentration of Force. The commander must be able to concentrate his force at the enemy's point of main effort. Concentration not only implies massing of forces but also massing of fire power. It includes such elements as movement, flexibility and communications.

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B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

- b. Offensive Action. Commanders must maintain the offensive spirit in the defence. This implies manoeuvre, speed and aggressiveness; particular characteristics of armour. Aggressive patrolling and counter attacking are also elements of offensive action.
- c. Security. Security is the ability to meet an attack from any direction. It is achieved by the employment of covering forces, co-ordination and mutual support at all levels, maintenance of surveillance and the ability to concentrate forces.

3. Fundamentals. In addition to the principles of war, there are several fundamentals that must be applied in defensive operations as follows:

- a. Information Gathering. Information on the enemy is vital to the conduct of defensive operations. It must be obtained prior to and during the battle to give commanders the ability to judiciously concentrate their forces and fire power at the correct place and time. Information is gathered from four sources in defensive operations:
 - (1) covering forces;
 - (2) intelligence;
 - (3) patrols; and
 - (4) troops in contact.

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B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

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b. Use of Terrain. The strength of a defence depends to a large extent on the selection and use of terrain. A commander's ability to analyse the terrain, determine the approaches, select vital ground and key terrain, and deploy his forces, frequently determines the outcome of an operation. The selected terrain should allow the approaches to be covered by fire. As well, it should offer the defender concealment and protection, while restricting the enemy's observation and deployment capability. Preferably a defence area contains natural barriers which can be reinforced by man-made obstacles. Terrain is classified as:

- (1) Open Terrain. This terrain is relatively flat and unencumbered by forests, built-up areas, waterways and other natural barriers. It is covered easily by surveillance and can be dominated by fire. Such terrain requires the construction of extensive barriers or the employment of scatterable mines to restrict the movement of enemy forces. These areas are defended best by armoured forces and elements equipped with long range anti-armour weapons.
- (2) Close Terrain. This terrain may have considerable relief and may be broken by forests, built-up areas and other natural barriers. It restricts an attacker's movement and provides

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B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

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good concealment and protection for the defender. Natural obstacles can be improved to further delay the attacker and canalize his movement. These areas are defended best by forces strong in infantry.

A commander must designate his vital ground, ie, that ground which if lost makes the defence untenable. He then identifies the main approaches to his vital ground and the key terrain which dominates or blocks those approaches. From this assessment, he then identifies the key terrain which is to be held and, groups and tasks his subordinate formations accordingly. This process is repeated at each lower level of formation and, leads to co-ordinated dispositions which fit the overall plan. Normally vital ground is relative to the level of command. For example, a brigade commander's vital ground may only be key terrain from the perspective of his divisional commander. Key terrain is ground which offers the holder a marked advantage. In situations where the corps vital ground is in a brigade area, the same ground is vital ground both to the brigade and to the division. Regardless, if the defence within a specified sector is to continue, the vital ground must be held or, if lost, recaptured by forces of a higher formation. A commander selects his vital ground, key terrain and killing zones by:

13-11
DRAFT

000607

B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

DRAFT

- (1) identifying obstacles at the FEBA;
- (2) determining approaches to the FEBA;
- (3) anticipating enemy objectives;
- (4) identifying obstacles in the main defence area (MDA);
- (5) completing approach descriptions; and
- (6) ranking the approaches in terms of their likelihood of use.

Annex A to this Chapter provides a detailed explanation regarding consideration of terrain.

c. Co-ordination. All aspects of the defence require co-ordination, including passage of lines by covering and counter-attack forces, boundaries, liaison, barrier plan, fire support, air defence, airspace control and combat service support. Co-ordination takes place during planning and throughout the conduct of an operation. It is a never-ending task to which a commander and his staff must devote considerable effort. Co-ordination is particularly important during combined operations. Often the enemy seeks to attack along boundaries which may be shared by different nations. A commander achieves and maintains co-ordination by:

- (1) understanding his superior commander's concept of operations;
- (2) understanding the doctrine and procedures of the adjacent ally;

13-12
DRAFT

000608

B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

DRAFT

- (3) selecting boundaries so that they do not increase the co-ordination problem;
- (4) selecting co-ordinating points along the boundary; and
- (5) exchanging information and liaison detachments, and planning for mutual support.

See also Articles 314 and 315.

- d. Mutual Support. This is achieved when the gaps between defended positions are covered by fire - preferably direct fire - so that the attacker cannot assault one position without being subjected to fire from at least one other. The degree of mutual support achieved depends upon the terrain, visibility and range of weapons. Ideally, the frontages that units must defend are related to their ability to provide mutual support. A commander must balance the need for mutual support with the sometimes conflicting requirements of depth, dispersion and mobility, particularly under a nuclear threat. Mutual support increases the strength of the defence and therefore influences the selection of boundaries and the location of battle positions. It also gives another advantage to the defender, since an attacker must disperse his covering fire to neutralize the supporting positions.

B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

DRAFT

e. Depth. Defence in depth causes an attacker to execute successive stages of his operation without detailed reconnaissance. It also helps to surprise an attacker and draw him into committing his next echelon or reserve. It absorbs the attacker's momentum to prevent a breakthrough. It also localizes penetration and facilitates blocking. Finally, it allows a defender time to determine the attacker's main thrust and to counter it. The depth of the defence area should be proportional to the strength, mobility and firepower of the attacker and the frontage to be defended. Depth is obtained by:

- (1) employing protective elements well forward to cover approaches;
- (2) employing long range resources, including electronic warfare elements and tactical air support, to engage targets deep in the area of influence, which are important to the continuity, momentum, sustainability, and command and control of the attacker;
- (3) siting battle positions and obstacles in depth throughout the area; and
- (4) positioning and moving reserves, fire support elements and combat service support units.

f. Manoeuvre. This is the decisive element of a defence. By combining movement with fire, the

DRAFT

B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

DRAFT

defender can make the best use of terrain to inflict high losses on the attacker while avoiding destruction himself. Manoeuvre enables a commander to concentrate sufficient combat power to achieve superiority over the enemy.

- g. Firepower. The effectiveness of the defence is based primarily on the planned fire of all weapons. The fire of manoeuvre units, conventional and nuclear artillery, armed helicopters, tactical air and naval elements must be complementary, co-ordinated and applied at the right time and place. Firepower also assists or enables a commander to concentrate sufficient combat power to achieve superiority over the enemy.
- h. Use of Reserves. Reserves are uncommitted forces which a commander requires to maintain his freedom of action to deal with anticipated and unexpected developments. They provide flexibility and balance. Their main functions are to reinforce, block, counter-attack, replace other units, and protect flanks and rear areas. Once reserves have been committed, a new one must be constituted or obtained. It may be necessary to reconstitute a reserve from those areas least threatened or, from depth forces which are not in contact with the enemy. Although this entails risk, it must be weighed against the

B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

DRAFT

requirement to retain the ability to concentrate
decisive combat power.

1306. CONCEPT

1. To meet the threat, a commander must deploy his force to take best advantage of the terrain in order defeat the enemy. Every defence requires ground to be held. As well, a commander must use movement to concentrate or disperse combat power to meet the demands of the situation. The balance between holding ground and using movement depends upon the mission, the enemy, terrain, time and space, and the forces available. For example, against a highly mobile enemy, greater emphasis must be placed on movement. Conversely, if one's own forces lack armoured protection, greater emphasis must be placed on the holding of ground.

2. A commander must seek to kill the enemy as far forward as possible, causing attrition and weakening him, thus reducing the momentum of his attack. The first echelon of the enemy is then contained and destroyed in detail, while at the same time firepower and other resources are employed to prevent subsequent echelons from reinforcing or otherwise influencing the battle.

3. The stages of a defence occur in sequence, although they may overlap. The stages are:

- a. Covering Force Stage. In this stage, a covering force protects the deployment of friendly forces. It determines the enemy's main axis of advance, imposes delay and inflicts casualties.

DRAFT

B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

DRAFT

- b. Main Defence Stage. In this stage, combat power is concentrated against the enemy's point of main effort. Simultaneously, firepower and other resources are employed against subsequent echelons, which could reinforce the first echelon or otherwise interfere with its destruction in detail.
- c. Countermove Stage. In this stage, depth or reserve forces block enemy penetrations, reinforce friendly forces, counter-attack, or exploit success to defeat the enemy and maintain or restore the integrity of the defence area.

- 4. A defence is characterized by:
 - a. barriers to delay or canalize the enemy;
 - b. employment of guards and screens to cover the main force;
 - c. infantry dug-in and concealed to anchor the defence;
 - d. anti-armour weapons protected by infantry, sited to destroy enemy armour at maximum best range;
 - e. forces in depth to contain penetrations;
 - f. reserve forces to block, reinforce, counter-attack or otherwise initiate offensive action;
 - g. close co-ordinated defensive fire and intensive counterbattery fire;
 - h. interdiction of second echelon and reserve forces, within the area of influence, using air, land and naval resources;

DRAFT

B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

DRAFT

- j. security of rear areas and flanks against deep enemy penetration, including airborne, airmobile, amphibious, and air attack; and
- k. employment of special forces.

SECTION 2 - FORCES AND TASKS

1307. NON-ARMoured AND ARMoured FORCES

1. General. The concept of operations for a defence is influenced by the number of combat forces available and whether these are armoured or non-armoured. The number and type of forces used is influenced by the enemy, terrain and weather. Time is also a factor, as usually non-armoured forces require more time than armoured forces to prepare defensive positions and, unless airmobile, require more time to move between them.

2. Non-Armoured Forces. These forces must conduct a defence from prepared positions and therefore are employed in a relatively static posture. Their battle positions make the best use of obstacles and normally are located where the terrain offers scope to employ the full range of anti-armour weapons at long range. They are particularly suitable for use in close country or built-up areas. Their positions are covered from observed fire for as long as possible, thus enabling them to retain their effectiveness for the maximum period of time. In most cases, they must be supported by armoured and combat support elements.

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B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

DRAFT

3. **Armoured Forces.** Where the majority of the force is armoured, the defence can be conducted with greater flexibility and better use can be made of movement. Operations include defence from selected positions, delaying actions and counter-attacks, all of which can be conducted in defence areas of greater depth and width than it is possible to use when relying on non-armoured forces. Armoured forces have a high degree of protection from enemy fire and, consequently, are capable of moving into action rapidly and effectively even in a nuclear, biological, or chemical environment. This makes them particularly suitable for use as reserves. Armoured forces use defiladed positions to strike the enemy on his flanks, forcing him to canalize so that he may be destroyed by the full weight of the firepower of the defence. In addition, armoured troops can manoeuvre to delay the advance of enemy forces and then change over quickly to a more static posture or to the conduct of offensive actions. Due to their importance in a defence, armoured forces are usually a primary target for enemy air attacks; therefore, normally they have air defence elements grouped with them. Skilful use of cover and concealment can also reduce the air threat considerably.

1308. **ARTILLERY**

1. **Field Artillery.** The long range fire of field artillery provides a commander with an important means of attacking an enemy in depth. Its flexibility enables a commander to influence the

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B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

DRAFT

battle quickly when and where required. In a defence, the tasks of artillery are:

- a. to disrupt enemy preparations for an attack;
- b. to delay approaching armoured forces or to neutralize non-armoured forces;
- c. to provide close support throughout all stages of the defence;
- d. to give support by delivering mines and producing smoke and illumination;
- e. to suppress enemy artillery and, on occasion, air defences;
- f. to provide counterbattery fire;
- g. to neutralize or seal off enemy penetrations and to restrict the movement of enemy reserves; and
- h. to destroy enemy armoured vehicles with precision guided munitions.

2. Air Defence Artillery. This artillery forms part of the theatre air defence system. For further details see CFP 300, The Army, Chapter 13, Air Defence. A commander should establish his priorities for the allotment of air defence elements based on:

- a. the air threat;
- b. which areas or forces are particularly vulnerable to air attack and their importance relative to achieving the mission;
- c. air defence weapons' performance and limitations; and
- d. the terrain and weather.

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DRAFT

B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

Possible priority tasks include protection of:

- a. covering forces, particularly as they pass through choke points along withdrawal routes;
- b. forces earmarked for countermoves;
- c. nuclear delivery means;
- d. troops in forward areas, particularly those occupying vital ground;
- e. critical locations, such as crossing sites, reserved demolition targets, defiles and railway-yards;
- f. command and control facilities; and
- g. combat service support complexes.

1309. ENGINEERS

In the defence, engineers are required primarily for constructing barriers and obstacles in depth, maintaining the mobility of own forces and assisting in the preparation of field fortifications. There are seldom sufficient resources to meet all requirements. A commander must establish priorities based on the enemy, mission, terrain, time, and the number and nature of engineer elements available.

1310. SIGNALS

For details, see Chapter 9, particularly Article 910.

DRAFT

B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

DRAFT

1311. TACTICAL AVIATION

Attack helicopters (AHs) are used during all stages of the defence. Their mobility, flexibility and firepower often make them the most effective means of initially blocking penetrations and securing flanks. They are employed most effectively at long range, firing from ambush positions. Forward arming and refuelling points should be sited so as to reduce helicopter transit time. Other helicopters are employed on their normal support tasks.

1312. TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT

1. Tactical air support is critical to land forces conducting a defence. Counter air operations are designed, in part, to gain and maintain a favourable air situation to the extent that enemy air forces are prevented from interfering effectively with land operations. Air interdiction (AI) assists land forces indirectly by restricting or impeding the movement of enemy forces deep in their own territory. Tactical air transport provides airlift during airborne and airmobile operations, and resupply, aeromedical evacuation and special missions.

2. Offensive air support (OAS) provides battlefield air interdiction (BAI), close air support (CAS) and tactical air reconnaissance (TAR) to land forces. It is more economical and effective to locate and attack enemy forces when they are concentrated in depth preparing for an attack or advancing along lines of communication, than when they are deployed in the

DRAFT

B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

DRAFT

immediate battle area. Even during an enemy attack, it is normally better to employ available aircraft against AI or BAI targets, thereby delaying the movement of reinforcements and supplies, than to use them for CAS. However, CAS does allow a commander to concentrate fire rapidly, although in the defence the timing and extent of such support cannot be determined in advance with any degree of certainty. TAR is particularly important in the early stages of the defence to help determine the strength and direction of the enemy attack. For further information see CFP 300, The Army, Chapter 14, Tactical Air Support of Land Operations.

SECTION 3 - PLANNING AND PREPARATION

1313. ORGANIZATION OF A DEFENSIVE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

1. General. A commander's defensive area of responsibility is shown in Figure 13-3. Normally it includes:

- a. a covering force area (CFA), and
- b. a defence area, which includes a MDA and a rear area.

The CFA and the defence area are separated by the FEBA. However, the responsibility for the conduct of operations changes forward of the FEBA at the handover line.

2. CFA. This area extends from the FEBA to as far forward as forces are deployed. Forces within this area observe, engage, intercept, delay, disorganize and deceive the enemy during his advance to the FEBA.

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B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

DRAFT

3. **Defence Area.** This is the area that a commander must defend in fulfilling his mission. It consists of the MDA and a rear area.

- a. MDA. In this area a commander fights his main defensive battle. The MDA of a formation extends rearward from the FEBA to the rear boundry of its forward subordinate formations, eg, the corps MDA extends back from the FEBA to the rear boundaries of its forward divisions.
- b. Rear Area. Normally it is in this area that a commander locates his reserves. In addition, some long range fire support units and other combat support elements, along with the majority of combat service support units, are located here. A rear area extends back from the rear boundary of subordinate formations to the formation rear boundary, eg, the corps rear area extends back from the rear boundaries of its forward divisions to the corps rear boundary.

4. **Frontage.** The frontage assigned to a formation depends upon the nature of the terrain, enemy, own troops and the time available to prepare the defence. In close terrain, frontages are generally narrower. If the enemy is not expected to attack in strength, then frontages may be wider. The following frontages are guidelines only:

- a. corps 32-80 kms,
- b. division 16-40 kms, and
- c. brigade 8-20 kms.

13-24
DRAFT

B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

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Figure 13-3 Typical Corps Defensive Area of Responsibility
(not to scale)

5. Areas of Interest and Influence. For details see
Article 113.

13-25

DRAFT

000621

B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

DRAFT

1314. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION AND PLAN

1. When starting his estimate of the situation, a commander must determine his aim by analysing his task to ensure that he understands its implications in light of his superior commander's concept of operations. Limitations imposed by the superior commander also influence the aim. This may be the case if the use of nuclear weapons is anticipated or, if action by adjacent formations could create unacceptable gaps, with a resulting loss of cohesion in the overall defence.

2. A commander must next consider the factors. These include:

- a. Enemy. Examination of the enemy includes consideration of his doctrine and details of his capabilities, including nuclear and chemical delivery means, and munitions, in order to determine his most probable course of action.
- b. Ground and Meteorology. For ground, see Article 1305 paragraph 2. The concept of operations must make allowance for meteorological conditions, which may affect the conduct of the defence.
- c. Frontage. If a commander has a wide frontage, he must not allow his combat power to be dissipated in an effort to cover the entire width. Rather, he should place greater reliance on surveillance, firepower, reserves and depth. If nuclear weapons are available to him, he may assign wider frontages than normal to his subordinate formations.

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B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

DRAFT

- d. Assessment of Tasks. A commander must identify and request any additional resources needed to accomplish his tasks. These may be provided from either the higher formation or possibly civilian or host nation sources. Requests should be made as early as possible.
- e. Time and Space. The time required to deploy and prepare defensive positions, the size of the CFA and the length of time the covering force must delay, are just a few of the time and space considerations which affect the plan for defence.
- f. Population. The attitude, mobility, resourcefulness and density of a population may be the most critical environmental factor in a defence plan. It may have a positive or a negative impact on the battle.

3. Having considered the implications of deductions drawn from the above and other factors, together with their inter-relationships, the courses of action and their relative merits should be assessed. A commander should then select the course of action which best achieves his aim. This forms the basis of his concept of operations.

1315. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

In his concept of operations a commander should explain the enemy's likely intentions, probable approaches and where he is most likely to attempt a breakthrough. He should indicate his vital ground and how he plans to delay, conduct the main battle

DRAFT

B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

DRAFT.

and counter-attack. He should cover the contingencies which may occur and how he plans to deal with them. He should also indicate his areas of interest and influence and the area of influence of his subordinate formations. He should strike a balance between being too precise, which may restrict the freedom of action of his subordinates, and being too vague, which could lead to a lack of cohesion in the defence. In all situations, he should encourage his subordinates to exercise their initiative within the framework provided by his concept of operations.

1316. DEFENCE AGAINST ARMOUR

1. Defence against armour is inseparable from the overall plan for the defence, as most combat elements are capable of defeating tanks and other armoured vehicles. Corps anti-armour resources are summarized in Table 13-3. The manoeuvre of these weapons must be co-ordinated to achieve the maximum effect.

2. The anti-armour defence is initiated from the top down by grouping resources. It is then co-ordinated upwards to ensure that a cohesive network of anti-armour fire is achieved. Having made his estimate of the situation, a commander groups or employs his anti-armour resources to meet the threat. For example, at division this includes the grouping of heavy anti-armour weapons (HAWs) and the assigning of priorities to engineer work. Normally the control of AHs, scatterable mines and CAS sorties is retained by a commander to enable him to influence the battle. Once brigades prepare their plans, they are co-ordinated at division and forwarded to corps as the division's plan for defence.

13 28
DRAFT.

000624

B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

DRAFT

Table 13-3 Corps Anti-Armour Resources

13-29

DRAFT

000625

B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

DRAFT

3. The allocation of resources is based on:
 - a. the requirement for weapons in the CFA;
 - b. identification of enemy armoured approaches into the MDA;
 - c. identification of terrain from which weapons can be employed with maximum effectiveness;
 - d. barrier and countermove plans; and
 - e. command and control arrangements, particularly those pertaining to the rearward passage of lines by the covering force and the movement of reserves.

4. The basis of the defence against armour are the medium anti-armour weapons (MAWs) of battle groups and combat teams and, the tank destroyers (TDs) of brigade anti-armour squadrons. TDs are primarily defensive weapons, which are employed forward providing direct fire support to combat teams and battle groups. These two weapon systems are reinforced by the tanks of armoured regiments. Tanks combine mobility with firepower and protection; therefore they are particularly suitable for employment with countermove forces. The MAWs of division anti-armour battalions provide additional strength to the defence. Normally these weapons are grouped with brigades or battle groups. They are sited to fully exploit their range and minimize their inherent vulnerability. MAWs provide a commander with a highly mobile, responsive anti-armour weapon system. MAW squadrons are employed as manoeuvre units in all stages of the operation. It is not normal to group these squadrons below brigade, although it may be

DRAFT

DRAFT

B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

necessary to co-ordinate their manoeuvre with that of battle groups and combat teams.

5. The direct fire of the above weapons is complemented by the indirect fire of artillery. Artillery supports the defence against armour through the destruction of point targets, neutralization and area denial.

6. Engineers contribute to the anti-armour defence by counter-mobility activities such as the construction of barriers, and by assisting in the development of field fortifications. Obstacles are sited to create killing zones for anti-armour weapons.

1317. BARRIER PLAN

1. The barrier plan is a part of the plan for a defence. A commander uses obstacles in conjunction with fire support and manoeuvre:

- a. to reduce the momentum of an attack, thus causing the attacker to concentrate and make himself more vulnerable to fire;
- b. to acquire time to redeploy reserves to meet the developing threat;
- c. to deter an attacker from bypassing or penetrating battle positions; and
- d. to canalize or deflect the attacker.

2. In order to realize their potential, obstacles are covered by direct fire weapons. Indirect fire, controlled by an observer or triggered by surveillance devices, provides minimum coverage.

B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

DRAFT.

3. Once a corps commander decides how to conduct his defence, he states his barrier plan in broad terms. Normally this includes the development of a natural obstacle in proximity to the FEBA and obstacles forward in the CFA and in depth. He also indicates the general locations in which he intends to site tactical minefields and other obstacles to assist combat forces in the containment and destruction of the enemy. These obstacles are positioned in relation to the killing zones. A commander outlines his intentions regarding the use of scatterable mines against targets of opportunity and, any use of atomic demolition munitions. The routes, gaps, lanes and crossing sites which must be kept open, and the requirement for reserved demolitions, are also specified.

4. Based on this outline barrier plan, the corps engineer sites the tactical minefields by map study. In doing so, he co-ordinates with other commanders, such as the commander corps artillery (CCA) and the armoured cavalry brigade group commander, who may be affected by their emplacement. The G3 staff forecast requirements and allocate mines to the corps engineer and the divisions.

5. The above process continues successively at lower levels of command. Divisional and brigade commanders, in consultation with their respective engineer commanders, supplement the corps commander's barrier plan by adding additional minefields and other obstacles and by proposing adjustments to the barrier plan in order to meet local tactical requirements. Thus, although the barrier plan is prepared at the highest tactical level, it is

13-32

DRAFT

000628

DRAFT

B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

implemented from the lowest level upwards. In this way, obstacles are sited to support the firepower of defensive positions within the framework of a single cohesive barrier plan. Final co-ordination of the corps barrier plan is done by the corps G3 staff.

1318. DEFENSIVE FIRE PLAN

1. The fire plan for the defence, which normally includes offensive air and possibly naval gunfire support, is a part of the plan for defence. A commander uses fire, in conjunction with manoeuvre, to suppress, neutralize and destroy surface targets. Fire plans are prepared for each stage of the defence. There is a fire plan for the main defence stage and, a continuous fire support programme (CFSP) for each of the covering force and countermove stages. In the countermoves stage, there is a CFSP for each contingency action.

2. In addition to the fire plans corresponding to the stages of the operation, other plans are developed for interdiction, counterbattery and attrition fire. Such fire plans are not related necessarily to any specific stage of the operation. They are directed primarily towards enemy second echelon and follow-on forces operating in the area of influence.

3. Having developed his concept of operations, a corps commander, in consultation with his CCA, allots a portion of his fire support resources to subordinate formations. This part of the battle procedure is repeated at each successive command

DRAFT

B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

DRAFT

level. The fire plans supporting each stage of the defence are initiated at combat team level and are co-ordinated upward. For example, the combat teams in a battle group submit their fire plans to the battle group headquarters. At this level, additional battle group targets are added, overlapping targets are eliminated and other refinements are made. The combat team fire plans form the basis of the battle group fire plan which is then passed upward to brigade. Since weapons generally lack the range to cover the entire corps area of responsibility, final co-ordination is normally done at division and there is no corps fire plan. In most cases, interdiction, counterbattery and attrition fire plans are prepared by division and corps.

1319. PLANS FOR COUNTERMOVES

1. Blocking actions and counter-attacks comprise the countermoves stage of a defence. If forward positions are penetrated, the enemy must be contained by blocking forces and then destroyed by counter-attack. These countermoves must occur before the enemy can consolidate or reinforce his penetration.

2. Blocking forces should be strong in infantry, since they conduct their task by defending battle positions in the path of the penetration. Counter-attack forces must be strong in armour as they fulfil their mission primarily through manoeuvre.

Blocking and counter-attack forces may come from reserves or come from other forces, particularly depth forces, which are not unduly threatened.

DRAFT

B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

DRAFT

3. The aim of any blocking action is to contain a penetration. The aim of a counter-attack is to restore a defensive situation, thus denying the enemy the attainment of his purpose in attacking.

4. As counter-attack forces may be required several times during the conduct of a defence, their task may be limited to restoring the situation by concentrated fire, leaving the mopping up to the forces already in place. Conversely, if key terrain has been lost, the counter-attack force may be ordered to launch a complete attack, including assault and mopping up.

5. A commander's concept of operations normally outlines the plan for countermoves. This information is made available to subordinate commanders as quickly as possible, as many of their plans are affected by the actions of reserves. For example, a subordinate commander of a forward formation must know the counter-attack routes before he starts to lay minefields or carry out demolitions. Similarly, he must know where the counter-attack force plans to have its assembly area and attack position, so that these areas are not occupied. Early dissemination of the superior commander's counter-attack plans eliminates many problems associated with terrain control and forward passages of lines.

6. Counter-attack plans are prepared for all major enemy approaches in accordance with the priorities established by the superior commander. Each approach is evaluated continuously in light of the following assumptions, which become factors in the final estimate of the situation:

DRAFT

B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

DRAFT

- a. The Size and Shape of the Penetration. This must be assumed from the strength of the enemy, disposition of own troops, terrain and the anticipated effectiveness of the defence. Based upon this assumption and the requirements to maintain the cohesion of the defence and secure vital ground, it is possible to determine the maximum allowable penetration that can be accepted. This indicates at which point and from what direction the counter-attack must be launched.
- b. The Strength and Composition of the Enemy. This must be assumed in relation to H-hour. The combat power of the counter-attack force must be sufficient to deal with the enemy. To be successful, an attacker requires a significant advantage in combat power over a defender.
- c. The Capability of Forward Formations to Block. The ability of forward formations to hold terrain, support manoeuvre and possibly secure the line of departure must be considered. If the forward formations are unable to stop or slow the penetration, then it is necessary to adjust the counter-attack plan, possibly by a major redeployment of forces, or by increasing the size of the reserve, or by preparing to fight the enemy in greater depth. The counter-attack force should not be committed until the forward formations have worn down the enemy as much as possible.

13-36

DRAFT

000632

B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

DRAFT

- d. Strength and Location of Counter-Attack Forces. The strength of a reserve must be assessed. If the reserve was committed earlier as part of the covering force or another counter-attack, it will have sustained casualties. Adjustments to the counter-attack plan or the allotment of additional resources may be necessary. Assuming that command and control, fire support and combat service support arrangements have been made, a reserve's reaction time depends upon its location in relation to the penetration, the going, and the degree of warning received. A reserve should be located where it does not become involved in the forward battle, yet it must be close enough to react quickly. A commander must be prepared to adjust the location of his reserves once the enemy's point of main effort has been determined.
- e. Air Situation. The commander should assume an unfavourable air situation and adopt a mixture of active and passive air defence measures. For further details, see CFP 300, The Army, Chapter 13, Air Defence.

7. A commander of a counter-attack force is responsible for the detailed planning and co-ordination with commanders in whose area of responsibility he is likely to operate. These activities must be continued as the battle develops. Final planning occurs once it is possible to identify those areas through which the enemy is attempting to penetrate. Planning includes:

13-37
DRAFT

000633

B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

DRAFT

- a. reconnoitering, recording and preparing, in order of priority, by day and by night:
 - (1) killing zones and objectives,
 - (2) routes in and out,
 - (3) assembly areas, attack positions, lines of departure, assault positions, fire positions and consolidation areas, and
 - (4) obstacles and barriers;
- b. liaising with commanders responsible for areas in which counter-attacks may take place concerning:
 - (1) local intelligence, and information on own troops and their contingency plans,
 - (2) command and control arrangements, and
 - (3) mutual support, including fire support;
- c. rehearsing plans, subject to security requirements;
- d. preparing contingency plans;
- e. completing battle procedure; and
- f. finalizing plans as the situation reveals itself.

1320. REAR AREA SECURITY AND REAR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL PLANS

Planning for rear area security and rear area damage control must take place if the cohesiveness of the defence is to be maintained. For further details, see CFP 300, The Army, Chapter 15, Rear Area Security and Damage Control.

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1321. ELECTRONIC WARFARE PLAN

See Chapter 9 for the development of the EW plan.

SECTION 4 - CONDUCT

1322. GENERAL

1. The battle begins when the corps commander employs BAI, long range artillery, electronic warfare elements and other resources, including special forces, against the enemy located in or advancing through his area of influence. The battle is then fought through its three stages and concludes when the defence area has been successfully defended. Although the stages of the defence are sequential, the transition from one stage to another is seldom distinct and it often occurs at different times and in different areas of the battlefield. For example, one division may still be fighting the covering force action, while another is involved in the main defensive battle.

2. The battle is rarely fought as planned. A commander must adjust his plan to the situation. Every effort must be made to wrest the initiative from the enemy and confront him with new and unusual situations. A commander must create and seize opportunities for unexpected offensive actions that set the attacker back and force him to depart from his plan. These include:

- a. harassing the enemy with sniping, tank hunting teams, fighting patrols and the employment of special forces;

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B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

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- b. limited attacks, including airmobile and airborne operations against enemy forces or installations;
- c. using indirect fire, particularly counterbattery fire, and BAI;
- d. employing scatterable mines; and
- e. reinforcing, blocking and counter-attacking.

1323. COVERING FORCE STAGE

1. **General.** Normally the covering force of a corps or division acts as a guard and conducts a delaying operation. Usually it is only possible to deploy a strong covering force at the start of a defence. Moreover, although this stage of the operation is important, it is often short-lived. The covering force stage must therefore be kept in perspective with the overall battle. A commander must weigh the commitment of resources to the covering force against the requirements of the main defensive battle and countermoves. As the doctrine for this type of operation is the subject of Chapter 14, this article highlights only key aspects of the action.

2. **Tasks.** The delay is an operation in which a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing the enemy's momentum and inflicting maximum damage on the enemy without, in principle, becoming decisively engaged. Within the overall context of a delay, a force, or elements of it, may defend, attack, withdraw, or counter-attack. A commander should know the minimum length of time that he is to delay. If time is not a major factor and early

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B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

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attrition of the enemy is paramount, a commander may be tasked simply to inflict maximum casualties on the enemy. In this case, no specific time limit is assigned except for that which is implied in not becoming decisively engaged. As the covering force is normally required in other stages of the operation, a commander must preserve sufficient combat power for his subsequent task. The percentage of his force that he must preserve is usually implicit in his superior commander's concept of operations. If the commander of the covering force is not clear on this point, he must seek clarification from his superior commander.

3. **Objective.** A covering force strives:

- a. to slow the enemy's advance by inflicting casualties;
- b. to determine the enemy's main point of effort;
- c. to protect the deployment of forces and preparation of positions in the defence area; and
- d. to channel the attacker towards a given area or, to place him in a position which leads to his subsequent destruction.

4. **Decisive Engagement.** If the commander of a covering force is ordered to delay for a specific length of time, he may have to accept decisive engagement in order to achieve his aim. Before this occurs, he must seek the direction of his superior commander.

5. **Provision of Covering Forces.** Generally at corps and division, only one covering force is deployed forward of the FEBA. It may be a single force under the command of the corps

B-GL-301-000/FP-001
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commander or, forward divisional commanders may be ordered to deploy their own covering forces. Normally these forces are guards. As well, forward brigades are usually ordered to deploy a covering force, based on their armoured reconnaissance squadron, forward of the FEBA. These covering forces may be guards or screens.

6. **Disengagement.** The final delay positions are selected to enable the higher formation covering force to disengage with the enemy cleanly before withdrawing into the MDA. Brigade covering forces assist the higher formation covering force in making its disengagement. As the higher formation covering force approaches the FEBA, it may be necessary to increase the intensity of the fire support from forces in the defence area, providing that this does not compromise their positions. The withdrawal of the covering force through the forward positions must be planned and co-ordinated. In most cases, this rearward passage of lines necessitates disengagement at a handover line to avoid disruption of the defence on the FEBA at a critical time. For further details, see Chapter 21.

1324. MAIN DEFENCE STAGE

1. This stage begins as the enemy approaches the FEBA. Generally formations fight to stop the attack well forward; however, they must be prepared to defend in depth should penetration occur. Lanes in barriers, which have been left for the withdrawal of the covering force, must be guarded and arrangements made for closing them.

13-42
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B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

2. The defensive positions at the FEBA are critical as normally these are the best prepared and strongest defended localities due to their proximity to the main barrier. As enemy units approach the FEBA, they are engaged first with indirect fire and then with direct fire beginning with HAWs. As ranges close, the full spectrum of anti-armour fire is employed.

3. Full advantage must be taken of the barrier and the greatest possible damage inflicted on the enemy as he attempts to cross it. The enemy may attempt to secure a bridgehead by linking individual crossings. This must be defeated promptly. The enemy may use helicopter-borne troops to seize crossings. These must be countered by highly mobile forces which can destroy the enemy before he has a chance to assemble and organize.

4. Surveillance must be maintained. Attempted crossings must be met by defensive fire. Engineer crossing or breaching equipments are high priority targets. Fire directed at the entrances and exits of crossing sites slows the enemy's momentum and causes him to concentrate. Scatterable mines may be particularly effective in this regard.

5. As the attack begins to develop, the defending units, if not already deployed, move into their battle positions and engage the enemy. The timing of this deployment is important, particularly in the face of heavy artillery fire and air attack. As the battle progresses, the enemy is slowed due to canalizing and bunching and presents good targets for defensive fire and tactical air. The maximum weight of fire is delivered at this point.

13-43
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B-GL-301-000/FP-001
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6. Should the enemy penetrate the FEBA, units sited in depth block the enemy and create new killing zones. Penetrations must be contained and eliminated. Intense fire is delivered against the enemy in the killing zone and, fire in depth is used to prevent reinforcement by second echelon forces. Once the enemy has been contained, a counter-attack by unit or brigade reserves is launched to complete his destruction. Elements in place may be tasked to mop up. Before committing his reserves, a commander should notify his superior commander.

7. If circumstances preclude a brigade counter-attack or limit its success, the committed reserve assists in containing the enemy. The responsibility to counter-attack then passes to division. This same process of containment, followed by counter-attack, is followed through to corps.

8. In the face of multiple penetrations, there is a tendency to draw back from the FEBA. This tendency must be resisted. By retaining some control on the FEBA and by blocking, a commander creates asymmetry in the enemy penetrations thereby exposing their flanks and leaving them vulnerable to countermoves.

9. A commander must be careful not to become absorbed with the action at the FEBA to the exclusion of the battle in depth. Enemy second echelon and other forces in the area of influence pose a severe threat. They must be interdicted and reduced in strength, particularly by the use of tactical air and long range artillery. A commander must also be concerned with rear area security threats and earmark forces accordingly. The threat to

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rear area security can quickly develop beyond the level at which it can be dealt with by combat service support commanders and their supporting combat forces. If this occurs, a commander has to assume direct responsibility for rear area security and deal with it as part of the main defensive battle.

1325. COUNTERMOVES STAGE

1. **Blocking.** In any deployment for the defence, sub-units which are holding terrain are occupying blocking positions. Since normally the precise location of enemy penetrations cannot be anticipated, these sub-units are tasked to be prepared to defend several blocking positions with alternates, in priority. Usually all positions are picketed. As the battle develops they are ordered to occupy the blocking position which is best sited to contain the penetration. Artillery, AHS and CAS may be used to gain time for blocking forces to move into location. Routes between blocking positions are reconnoitered to ensure redeployment can occur rapidly and under cover. If it is necessary to move depth forces into forward blocking positions, a commander must decide whether to replace the element which was ordered to move or merely to picket the position. This decision is based on his estimate of the threat, the availability of his own troops and the importance of the approach.

2. **Reinforcing.** Elements in danger of being overrun by the enemy may be reinforced rather than withdrawn. Reinforcement is ordered when the force in place is covering an important approach,

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B-GL-301-000/FP-001
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particularly one leading to vital ground. Reinforcement occurs only when it can restore a favourable combat power situation. Reinforcement can be achieved by the addition of more combat troops or increased fire support.

3. Counter-Attacking. A counter-attack force moves from its assembly area, through an attack position and across a line of departure. Initially it does not close with the enemy. Elements take up fire positions, preferably on key terrain, overlooking the killing zone and commence the destruction of the enemy. This direct fire is complemented by fire support provided by artillery, CAS and AHS. The timing of the counter-attack is critical. Every effort should be made to contain the enemy and strike him when he is off-balance. If the counter-attack force is launched too soon, it may be met by an aggressive enemy who is still advancing. If it is launched too late, the enemy may have reinforced his force and consolidated his position. Once the counter-attack force and the containing force have reduced the enemy's combat power, destruction of the enemy in detail begins. This may be the responsibility of the counter-attack force, the force in place, or both. The mopping up could involve infantry and armour elements executing manoeuvre or, more likely, be essentially an infantry task of clearing pockets of resistance and collecting enemy stragglers. Defence of the sector is re-established as quickly as possible. The elements of the counter-attack force should be dispersed rapidly in order to improve their chances of survival and ensure their readiness for subsequent tasks.

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SECTION 5 - COMMAND AND CONTROL

1326. COMMAND

1. General. One of the main problems of a commander when conducting a defence is to overcome the passive, defensive attitude associated with this type of operation. A commander must, by example and force of personality, imbue aggressiveness and initiative in his subordinate commanders and troops. All commanders must carry the fight to the enemy. The principle of offensive action must permeate the operation.

2. Co-ordination. The defence plan must be co-ordinated, not only within the area of responsibility, but also with adjacent formations. Higher headquarters must also be kept informed.

3. Location of a Commander. A commander is either located at the main headquarters, forward with his tactical command post, or visiting subordinate formations. His decision as to where to locate is based on the situation, his access to communications and the extent to which he can influence the battle. Visits, particularly in times of stress, do much to instil confidence and bolster morale. A commander must see and be seen by the troops of his command.

4. Counter-Attack and Blocking Forces. There are three options for the command of these forces. Command may be exercised by:

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B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

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- a. the superior commander, ie, the commander ordering the counter-attack;
- b. the commander of the counter-attack force; or
- c. the commander who is responsible for the terrain and who may be the commander of the blocking forces.

The option selected depends upon the relative strengths of the blocking and counter-attack forces, disposition of the enemy, nature of the terrain, which force can be expected to take the brunt of the fighting, tasks of the two forces and the extent to which counter-attack plans are developed for that area.

5. Communications and Liaison. Co-ordinating points and liaison must be established quickly. In combined operations, it is essential that commanders of temporarily assigned units make personal contact with their superiors as soon as possible. Before contact is made with the enemy, electronic emissions must be kept to a minimum. Forces not in contact with the enemy are on radio silence. Alternative means of communications must be maintained. Because of the threat posed by radio electronic combat support, line, automated data systems and signal dispatch services are the most important means of communication. After enemy contact and the lifting of radio silence, radio communications become of significant importance, but traffic should still be kept to a minimum.

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1327. CONTROL

1. General. Normal control measures are used in the defence. The handover line, boundaries and lines for fire support co-ordination are particularly important.

2. Handover Line. This line is sited just forward of the FEBA and within range of artillery in the MDA. It should follow easily recognizable terrain features. The terrain at the line, or in proximity to it, should be defensible, since it is the last location from which the covering force can attempt to disengage.

3. Boundaries. During the countermoves stage, special attention must be given to boundaries. The introduction of any formation into another formation's area of responsibility requires the immediate adjustment or confirmation of boundaries, or the creation of new boundaries.

4. Lines for Fire Support Co-ordination. These must also be adjusted during countermoves to ensure that gaps between elements are covered and that the unnecessary overlapping of fire does not occur. In combined operations, the exchange of artillery liaison detachments provides a means for enhanced mutual support.

SECTION 6 - COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1328. GENERAL

1. In the defence, it is possible to position stocks and maintenance resources and to establish medical facilities beforehand. It is from these resources that troops are supported

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in the first days of combat. In this way, provision is made for supplies to be available in the event of a surprise enemy attack. Delay in establishing combat service support, due to the length of the lines of communications, may impose on a commander a responsibility to exercise a greater degree of economy than normal until the resupply chain is established.

2. Most combat service support elements are located in their respective administrative areas. They are further to the rear than they would be in offensive operations in order to avoid interference with the movement of combat forces and to obtain a degree of protection through dispersion.

1329. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. Special consideration is given to the following aspects of combat service support:

- a. The high consumption of ammunition, particularly artillery rounds and mines, may necessitate special delivery and dumping programmes. Bulk stocks are delivered as far forward as possible.
- b. Fuel is transported as far forward as practicable by pipeline, rail, road tanker or via inland waterways.
- c. Repairs are effected in situ or well forward, to ensure a rapid return of serviceable equipment to the battle.
- d. Medical evacuation should occur promptly, preferably by air. Medical facilities must be sited far forward

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B-GL-301-000/FP-001
Interim 2

to ensure treatment occurs as soon as possible after
injury.

2. Provision must be made for the co-ordination of combat service support in combined operations.
3. The potential impact of providing combat service support under NBC conditions has to be assessed and catered for.

(1330 to 1399: Not allocated)

2922-B-06-30001/PA-001
~~1150-110/L5~~ (DLCD)

23 September 1985

Commandant
Canadian Land Forces Command
and Staff College
Fort Frontenac
Kingston, Ontario
K7K 2X8

TACTICAL SEMINAR
REVIEW OF CFP 301

- References:
- A. SC 2900-1/6 26 June 1985
 - B. SC 2900-1/6 (COMDT) 9 July 1985
 - C. Meeting DComd and SSO CLFCSC/DLCD 6
29 July 1985
 - D. Discussion Comdt CLFCSC/DLCD 19 Sep 1985

1. Having been appraised of the discussions at References C and D, it appears that most of the initial reservations you had expressed towards CFP 301 have been resolved by our respective staffs. This being the case, it seems to me that the necessity for a January Seminar can now be deferred.

2. The doctrine contained in CFP 301 can therefore be implemented for teaching purposes and monitored by you during the coming year. Areas of controversy should readily become apparent and will enable us to define the need and aim for future tactical seminars.

3. The DLCD doctrine staff will maintain close liaison with your staff during this process, and we will review the situation one year from now.


G.H.J. Lessard
Major-General
Chief Land Doctrine and Operations
for Chief of the Defence Staff

Maj V.M. Caines DLCD Coord 998-0136/mt/0620E/

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PA
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National Defence

Défense nationale

National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0K2

Quartier général de la Défense nationale
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0K2

~~2900 CFP 301~~ (DLCD 6)

16 September 1985

Distribution List

CFP 301 LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE

- References:
- A. Meeting CLFCSC Staff/DLCD 6/DLCD 6 Designate
20 June 1985
 - B. SC 2900-1/6 26 June 1985

1. As a first step in the revision of CFP 301, Chapter 12, Offensive Operations has been reviewed. A draft copy of the revised chapter is enclosed.
2. Every effort was made to include the amendment suggestions as put forward by the CLFCSC at the references. In some cases, however, revision had to be tempered to maintain agreement with ATP 35(A). This was particularly so in amending the "Forms of Manoeuvre".
3. It is requested you review this draft chapter to ensure it will provide a suitable reference for the Colleges teaching needs. Once we have "got it right" between us this chapter could perhaps be used as the basis of discussion for the LFCDSO seminar 15-16 January 1986.

D.M. Dean
for D.M. Dean
Colonel

Director Land Combat Development
for Chief of the Defence Staff

Enclosure: 1

DISTRIBUTION LIST

LCol N.H. Connolly, DLCD 6, 996-3954, jmck

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Attention: SSO

Commandant

CD Coord

Canadian Land Forces Command
and Staff College
Fort Frontenac
Kingston, Ontario, K7K 2X8

Canada

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE



MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE

CANADIAN LAND FORCES COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
COLLEGE DE COMMANDEMENT ET D'ETAT-MAJOR DES FORCES TERRESTRES CANADIENNES

FORT FRONTENAC
KINGSTON, ONTARIO
K7K 2X8

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT

BUREAU DU COMMANDANT

SC 2900-1/6 (Comdt)

9 July 1985

Referred to
Transmis U. CLDO

12 1985

File No 2922-B-06-301-00/FP-00/
Dossier No.

Checked to/Chargé à DLCD-6
3-07-85

Attention: CLDO

National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0K2

TACTICAL SEMINARS -
REVIEW OF CFP 301

- References:
- A. Staff College SC 2900-1/6 (Comdt) 15 October 1984
 - B. LFCDSM Meeting 26 February 1985
 - C. CLFCSC 2900-1/6 2 May 1985
 - D. Meeting Deputy Commandant CLFCSC and SSO with DLCD-6 and Successor 20 June 1985
 - E. NDHQ 3189-1 (CLDO) 24 May 1985
 - F. Telephone Conversation Major-General Lessard/ Brigadier-General Stewart 21 June 1985

BACKGROUND

1. As expressed in references A, B and C, CFP 301 Second Draft does not entirely satisfy the needs of the CLFCSC as a doctrine reference manual. However, I am told that, as a result of the meeting at reference D, many of the previously expressed misgivings will be resolved in the interim version of the manual. I believe these changes, coupled with a higher level review of CFP 301 doctrine, by the LFCDSM, will produce a sound doctrinal reference with a wider base of acceptance.

AIM

2. The aim of this letter is to outline my proposal for the conduct of the tactical seminar review of the CFP 301 doctrine.

TACTICAL SEMINARS

3. As indicated in references E and F the CLFCSC will host the first - two day tactical seminar in January 1986 to review elements of CFP 301. In my opinion it is not possible to effectively review the complete manual in one seminar, therefore, it is proposed that a second session be programmed with an option to hold a third concluding seminar if it is deemed necessary. Each seminar will review one operation of war in detail

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③ A/DLED 6
1. Pls prepare reply
IAEW min ②
2. To DLCD
for 9 Aug.
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PAJ

④ NTF
1. See 1150-110/65
(DLCA) 9
23 Sep 85.
2. PA G/M
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

②
DLCD

1. Go over this
pls. Approach
proposed seminar
OK to me.
We must get
back to them
for planning to proceed
ASP. Prepare reply
accordingly.

30/7/85

1A 000650

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JPD



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including all related matters such as enemy, command and control, communications, fire support, engineer support, tactical aviation, etc. I propose that we conduct the seminars as follows:

- a. Offensive Operations Seminar - January 1986
 - b. Defensive Operations Seminar - January 1987
(to be confirmed)
 - c. General/Concluding Seminar - To be confirmed but not later than June 1987.
4. The following format is proposed for the seminars:
- a. introduction;
 - b. review of opposing Soviet doctrine;
 - c. presentation on Canadian Forces doctrine as in CFP 301;
 - d. development of a tactical scenario as a basis for discussion;
 - e. consideration/discussion (directed at specific controversial points which will be consolidated and coordinated by CLFCSC in conjunction with CLDO); and
 - f. conclusion/recommendations.

5. A proposed program for the offensive operations seminar for January 1986 is at Annex A. The most suitable dates for the College are 15/16 January 1986 with an alternate of 22/23 January.

SUMMARY

6. In summary I propose the following:
- a. Two tactical seminars to be held over a one-year period to review the doctrine in CFP 301. Each seminar to concentrate on one operation of war, with the option of a third seminar if considered necessary.
 - b. The format of the seminar to include doctrine presentation, a tactical scenario and directed discussion.
 - c. The tactical seminar on "offensive operations" to be held 15/16 January 1986 or alternatively 22/23 January 1986.

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- d. The aim of January seminar to be: "To review Canadian Forces doctrine on land formations in battle in offensive operations, as set forward in CFP 301".
- e. January 1986 seminar to be conducted along the lines of Annex A.


CONCLUSION

7. On receipt of your approval of this outline plan, I will prepare appropriate directives for your approval and distribution. The first overall directive to the LFCDSO will explain in outline the aim and methodology of the CFP 301 doctrine review process. Subsequent directives will deal with specific information concerning the offensive and defensive tactical seminars.



R.I. Stewart
Brigadier-General
Commandant

Attachments:

 Annex A Proposed Program Offensive Operations
Tactical Seminar

ANNEX A
TO SC 2900-1/6
DATED 9 JUL 85

CLDO TACTICAL SEMINAR
CFP 301 - OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
JANUARY 1986
PROPOSED PROGRAM

AIM: The aim of the January seminar is: "To review Canadian Forces doctrine on land formations in battle in offensive operations, as set forward in CFP 301".

DAY 1

AM	-	Introduction	CLDO
	-	Offensive Operations General	Comdt/DLCD
	-	Soviet Defensive Doctrine	CLFCSC
	-	Presentation - Advance to Contact and Hasty Attack	DLCD-6 assisted by CLFCSC
	-	Tactical Scenario - Advance to Contact and Hasty Attack	CLFCSC
PM	-	Consideration/Discussion - Advance to Contact and Hasty Attack	CLDO/Comdt
	-	Summary - Advance to Contact and Hasty Attack	CLDO/Comdt

DAY 2

AM	-	Presentation - Deliberate Attack	DLCD-6 assisted by CLFCSC
	-	Presentation - Crossing Obstacles	CLFCSC
	-	Tactical Scenario - Deliberate Attack	CLFCSC
PM	-	Consideration/Discussion - Deliberate Attack	CLDO/Comdt
	-	Summary - Deliberate Attack	CLDO/Comdt
	-	Conclusion/Future Work Program	CLDO

MEMORANDUM

PA
24/6/85
2922-B-0G-301-001/FR-001
3189-1 (DLCD 6)

24 Jun 85

DLCD

REPORT OF VISIT TO CLFCSC
CFP 301 LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE

1. On 20 Jun 85 I visited the CLFCSC to discuss their comments on the Second Draft of CFP 301. The following officers attended the discussions: Col Beno (D Comdt), LCol Crabbe (COS), myself and my successor, LCol Connolly.
2. The discussions were particularly fruitful. Our early concern that the staff of CLFCSC had serious reservations about the quality and content of CFP 301 proved to be unfounded. Generally they are quite satisfied with the manual and consider the doctrine to be sound. A number of relatively minor changes were proposed. These were discussed in detail and in all cases a consensus was reached. In most instances, there was no disagreement in ideas, but rather how to present the ideas in the most effective manner. For example, the college currently teaches that an advance may either be an advance to contact or an advance in contact. The approach in NATO, as expressed in ATP 35(A) which Canada has ratified, is not to make this somewhat artificial distinction, but rather to call the operation an advance to contact and point out that the tempo of the operation will vary in accordance with the situation encountered. CLFCSC agreed with the approach in ATP 35(A) which is also reflected in CFP 301, providing that greater emphasis is placed on how the elements of the advancing formation move in different situations. As you can appreciate this is a point of refinement, rather than substance.
3. At the conclusion of the discussions, Col Beno stated it had been "an excellent day". He also indicated that once the agreed proposals were incorporated as Change 1 to the manual, that CFP 301 would meet the requirements of the college.
4. As this subject was of concern at the last meeting of the CDC Sub-Committee, I recommend that DGLDO and CLDO be advised of the contents of this report. I have already informed the chairman of the ADTB.

OSB
R.E. Acreman
LCol
DLCD 6
6-3954

R.E. Acreman, LCol DLCD 6, 6-3954/mf

TEMPORARY DOCKET / DOSSIER TEMPORAIRE

6-06-85

5164 No. T.D. D.T. 2922-B-06-301-001/FP-001 MAIN FILE NUMBER DOSSIER PRINCIPAL

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5164



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FMC 2910-CFP 301 (CD COORD)

Quartier général de la Force Mobile
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6 June 1985

MAXIMS/SGDLM

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TRADUCTION DE LA PFC B-GL-301-000/FP-003
"LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE (INTERIM 1)"

12 1985
File No 292-B-00-301-001/FP-001
Dossier No
Chargé to/Chargé à DPSCU
13-06-85

Référence: Mémorandum FMC 2910-1 du 8 janvier 1985

1. Nous vous demandons de traduire la publication ci-haut mentionnée. Ce livre fait partie de l'ensemble de doctrine intitulé "Corps 86" (voir référence), et il faut lui accordé une très grande priorité.
2. S'il vous plaît bien vouloir utiliser les marges 10/85 en rédigeant le texte sur les diskettes MICOM. Nous remplacerons celles-ci sur réception.
3. Il y aura une légère modification du NDID numéro sur la traduction, le code deviendra B-GL-301-000/FP-003. Nous vous demandons d'apposer ce code sur chaque page du livre à l'endroit approprié.
4. Aussi, veuillez inclure cette publication dans votre rapport mensuel tel que demandé au renvoi. Prière de communiquer avec l'OEM de la doctrine, Monsieur A. Lajambe, pour de plus amples renseignements.

Pour le Commandant
Officier supérieur de l'état major
Coordinateur du Perfectionnement des méthodes de combat
pour le Lieutenant-colonel W.E. Morton

[Signature] Maj

② STTC2-3

Your info etc.

[Signature]
STTC2
17 Jun 85

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W.E. Morton
for W.E. Morton
Lieutenant-Colonel

Senior Staff Officer Combat Development Coord
for Commander

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6265	36 (Nfld) Svc Bn, St John's	<u>2</u>
TOTAL CFS ST JOHN'S		<u>9</u>

CFB HALIFAX

6259	Atlantic Mil Area, Halifax	<u>5</u>
6263	West NS Mil Dist, Halifax	<u>2</u>
5021	1 Fd Regt, Halifax	<u>2</u>
6199	1 NS Highrs Truro	<u>2</u>
5244	33 Svc Bn, Halifax	<u>2</u>
6267	HQ Cape Breton Mil Dist, Sydney	<u>2</u>
5052	45 Fd Engr Sqn (M), Sydney	<u>1</u>
5109	2 NS Highrs, Sydney	<u>2</u>
6264	35 Svc Bn, Sydney	<u>2</u>
5160	35 Med Coy, Sydney	<u>1</u>
2543	RSS Atlantic, Halifax	<u>6</u>
5104	PL Fus, Halifax	<u>2</u>
TOTAL CFB HALIFAX		<u>29</u>

CFB GREENWOOD

5107	West NSR, Aldershot	<u>2</u>
TOTAL CFB GREENWOOD		<u>2</u>

CFB CORNWALLIS

5028	84 Indep Fd Bty, Yarmouth	<u>1</u>
TOTAL CFB CORNWALLIS		<u>1</u>

TOTAL PAGE 41

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CFB SUMMERSIDE

6260	PEI Mil Dist, Charlottetown	<u>2</u>
5010	PEI Regt, Charlottetown	<u>2</u>
		<u> </u>
		<u> </u>
	TOTAL CFB SUMMERSIDE	<u>4</u>

CFB MONCTON

6262	East NB Mil Dist, Moncton	<u>2</u>
5002	8 CH (M), Moncton	<u>2</u>
5243	32 Svc Bn, Moncton	<u>2</u>
		<u> </u>
		<u> </u>
	TOTAL CFB MONCTON	<u>6</u>

CFB GAGETOWN

2037	HQ CTC, Gagetown	<u>100</u>
1848	2 RCR, Gagetown	<u>15</u>
1775	22 Fd Sqn, Gagetown	<u>5</u>
7717	403 Hel OTS/AGOS, Gagetown	<u>5</u>
0105	CFB Gagetown	<u>5</u>
0456	FMC HQ Det Gagetown	<u>3</u>
0459	C Sqn RCD, Gagetown	<u>5</u>
6261	Mil Dist, Saint John	<u>2</u>
5022	3 Fd Arty Regt, Saint John	<u>2</u>
5105	1 RNBR, Fredericton	<u>2</u>
6266	31 Svc Bn, Saint John	<u>2</u>
		<u> </u>
		<u> </u>
	TOTAL CFB GAGETOWN	<u>146</u>

CFB CHATHAM

7699	3 FITU, Chatham	<u>2</u>
5106	2 RNBR, Bathurst	<u>2</u>
		<u> </u>
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	TOTAL CFB CHATHAM	<u>4</u>

TOTAL PAGE 160

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BFC VALCARTIER

1708	QG 5 GBC, Valcartier	15
1735	5 RALC, Valcartier	15
5246	12 RBC, Valcartier	15
1779	5 RGC, Valcartier	5
1852	2 R22eR, Québec	15
1853	3 R22eR, Valcartier	15
2107	5 Bn S du C, Valcartier	15
2106	5 Amb de C, Valcartier	5
2124	PPM 5 GBC, Valcartier	2
0106	BFC Valcartier	50
0166	EC R22eR, Valcartier	2
2570	430 ETAH, Valcartier	5
6258	QG Mil 3 du Qué, Québec	2
5008	12 RBC (M), Trois-Rivières	2
5023	6 Fd Regt, Lévis	2
5045	62 Fd Regt, Shawinigan	2
5064	10 Genie (M) Québec	1
5087	Voltigeurs, Québec	2
5099	Fus du St-L, Rimouski	2
5100	R de la Chaud, Lévis	2
5242	55 Bn S du C, Québec	2
5161	55 Cie Med, Québec	1
		<u>177</u>

TOTAL BFC VALCARTIER 177

BFC BAGOTVILLE

1780	433 ETAC, Bagotville	2
5115	R du Sag, Chicoutimi	2
7700	434 Sqn, Bagotville	2

TOTAL BFC BAGOTVILLE 6

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	SSO Secur	1
	SSO Plans	1
	Comd Chap (P)	1
	Comd Chap (RC)	1
	COS Ops	1
	COS Adm	1
	DCOS CD	1
	DCOS Log	1
	DCOS Trg	1
	DCOS Ops	1
	DCOS Pers	1
2544	RSS Eastern, Montréal	10
0130	BFC Montréal	10
2536	HQ 10 TAG, St Hubert	10
6255	QG Secteur de l'Est, Montréal	5
6256	QG Dist 1 du Qué, Montréal	2
5011	RCH, Montréal	2
5047	2 Fd Regt, Montréal	2
5050	3 Fd Engr Regt (M), Montréal	2
5086	BW (RHR) Montréal	2
5110	R de Mais, Montréal	2
5130	RMR, Montréal	2

TOTAL PAGE

110

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CFB KINGSTON

1811	1 Cdn Sig Regt, Kingston	<u>20</u>
5090	PWOR, Kingston	<u>2</u>
5096	Brock Rif, Brockville	<u>2</u>

	<u>24</u>
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CFB TRENTON

5091	Hast PER, Belleville	<u>2</u>
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	<u>2</u>
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CFB OTTAWA

1873	450 Tpt Hel Sqn, Ottawa	<u>5</u>
6252	HQ Ottawa Mil Dist, Ottawa	<u>2</u>
5036	30 Fd Regt, Ottawa	<u>2</u>
5062	3 Fd Engr Sqn (M), Ottawa	<u>1</u>
5083	GGFG, Ottawa	<u>2</u>
5098	SD & G Highrs, Cornwall	<u>2</u>
5111	CH of O, Ottawa	<u>2</u>
5239	28 Svc Bn, Ottawa	<u>2</u>
5019	R de Hull, Hull	<u>2</u>

	<u>20</u>
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	<u>46</u>
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CFB PETAWAWA

1702	HQ SSF, Petawawa	15
1764	2 RCHA, Petawawa	15
1756	8 CH, Petawawa	15
1774	2 CER, Petawawa	5
0219	Cdn AB Regt, Petawawa	15
2101	2 Svc Bn, Petawawa	15
2104	2 Fd Amb, Petawawa	5
2123	2 MP Pl, Petawawa	5
2569	427 Tac Hel Sqn, Petawawa	10
0107	CFB Petawawa	50
0167	RCR Battle School, Petawawa	2
5097	L & R Scot R, Pembroke	2

TOTAL CFB PETAWAWA 154

CFB TORONTO

6247	HQ Mil Area Central, Toronto	5
6250	HQ Hamilton Mil Dist, Hamilton	2
5027	11 Fd Regt, Guelph	2
5089	RHLI, Hamilton	2
5092	Linc & Welld R, St Catherines	2
5095	Lorne Scots, Brampton	2
5116	A & SH of C, Hamilton	2
5235	23 Svc Bn, Hamilton	2
5167	23 Med Coy, Hamilton	1
6248	HQ Toronto Mil Dist, Toronto	2
5001	GGHG, Toronto	2
5005	Ont R, Oshawa	2
5006	QY Rang, Toronto	2
5024	7 Tor Regt RCA, Toronto	2
5048	2 Fd Engr Regt (M), Toronto	2
5085	QOR of C, Toronto	2
5088	R Regt C, Toronto	2
7041	48 Highrs, Toronto	2
5132	Tor Scot R, Toronto	2
5237	25 Svc Bn, Toronto	2
5266	25 Med Coy, Toronto	1
2545	RSS Central, Toronto	6
7001	2 AR Wing HQ, Toronto	1
2530	2 RSU, Toronto	1
7004	400 AR Sqn, Toronto	1
7011	411 AR Sqn, Toronto	1

TOTAL CFB TORONTO 53

TOTAL PAGE 207

FORMATION/UNIT

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CFB WINNIPEG

6242	Mil Area, Winnipeg	15
6246	HQ Man Mil Dist, Winnipeg	5
5018	FGH, Winnipeg	2
5249	116 Fd Bty, Kenora	2
5053	21 Fd Engr Sqn (M), Flin Flon	1
5112	R Wpg Rif, Winnipeg	1
5124	Cameron's of C Winnipeg	2
5233	17 Svc Bn, Winnipeg	2
5169	17 Med Coy, Winnipeg	2
6269	Mil Dist, Thunder Bay	1
5117	Lake Sup Scot R, Thunder Bay	2
5147	18 Svc Bn, Thunder Bay	2
5265	18 Med Coy, Thunder Bay	2
2546	RSS, Winnipeg	1
1576	3 RCR Winnipeg	2

TOTAL CFB WINNIPEG 42

CFB PORTAGE

TOTAL CFB PORTAGE

CFB SHILO

1763	3 RCHA, Shilo	15
0118	CFB Shilo	20
0165	RCA Battle School, Shilo	5
5033	26 Fd Regt, Brandon	2

TOTAL CFB SHILO 42

TOTAL PAGE 84

FORMATION/UNIT

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CFB MOOSE JAW

6245	Sask Mil Dist, Regina	2
5014	Sask D, Moose Jaw	2
5026	10 Fd Regt, Regina	2
5119	N Sask R, Saskatoon	2
5120	R Regina Rif, Regina	2
5232	16 Svc Bn, Regina	2
5264	16 Med Coy, Regina	1

TOTAL CFB MOOSE JAW 13

CFB EDMONTON

2695	CABC, Edmonton	5
2568	408 Tac Hel Sqn, Edmonton	5
1893	447 Tpt Hel Sqn, Edmonton	5
5223	HQ Mil Area Prairie Det, Edmonton	5
6244	HQ N Alta Mil Dist, Edmonton	2
5031	20 Fd Regt, Edmonton	2
5057	8 Fd Engr Regt (M), Edmonton	2
5122	L Edmn (4 PPCLI), Edmonton	2
5231	15 Svc Bn, Edmonton	2
5173	15 Med Coy, Edmonton	1

TOTAL CFB EDMONTON 31

CFB CALGARY

1701	HQ 1 CBG, Calgary	15
1755	LdSH(RC), Calgary	15
1849	1 PPCLI, Calgary	15
2100	1 Svc Bn, Calgary	15
2103	1 Fd Amb, Calgary	5
2122	MPP, Calgary	5
0109	CFB Calgary	50
1732	Det CFB Calgary, Wainwright	5
0168	PPCLI Battle School, Wainwright	5
6243	HQ S Alta Mil Dist, Calgary	2
5013	SALH, Medicine Hat	2
5016	KO Calg R, Calgary	2
5251	20 Indep Fd Bty, Lethbridge	1
7064	Calg Highrs, Calgary	2
5230	14 Svc Bn, Calgary	2

TOTAL CFB CALGARY 141

TOTAL PAGE 185

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<u>CFB COLD LAKE</u>	
7700 434 Tac F Sqn, Cold Lake	<u>5</u>
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	<u> </u>
TOTAL CFB COLD LAKE	<u>5</u>
<u>CFB SUFFIELD</u>	
0142 CFB Suffield, Ralston	<u>2</u>
	<u> </u>
	<u> </u>
TOTAL CFB SUFFIELD	<u>2</u>
<u>CFB CHILLIWACK</u>	
1776 1 CER, Chilliwack	<u>5</u>
6238 HQ Mil Area Pacific, Vancouver	<u>5</u>
6239 Mil Dist, Vancouver	<u>2</u>
5012 BCR, Vancouver	<u>2</u>
5029 15 Fd Regt, Vancouver	<u>2</u>
5055 6 Fd Engr Sqn (M), North Vancouver	<u>2</u>
5127 R Westmr R, New Westminster	<u>2</u>
5128 Seaforth of C, Vancouver	<u>2</u>
5229 12 Svc Bn, Vancouver	<u>2</u>
5263 12 Med Coy, Vancouver	<u>1</u>
5017 BCD, Kelowna	<u>2</u>
5056 44 Fd Engr Sqn (M), Trail	<u>1</u>
2903 RSS Pacific, Vancouver	<u>5</u>
	<u> </u>
	<u> </u>
TOTAL CFB CHILLIWACK	<u>33</u>
<u>CFB ESQUIMALT</u>	
1854 3 PPCLI, Esquimalt	<u>15</u>
6240 Mil Dist, Victoria	<u>2</u>
6142 5 (BC) Fd Bty, Victoria	<u>1</u>
5129 C Scot R, Victoria	<u>2</u>
5250 11 Svc Bn, Victoria	<u>2</u>
5262 11 Med Coy, Victoria	<u>1</u>
	<u> </u>
	<u> </u>
TOTAL CFB ESQUIMALT	<u>23</u>
TOTAL PAGE	<u>63</u>

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2591		- CFTDC	<u>2</u>
6067		- CFSPER	
1386	Chilliwack	- CFOCS	<u>10</u>
1773		- CFSME	<u>40</u>
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2612		- CFSAT	
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0047		- RRCM	<u>5</u>
2475	Falconbridge	- AWCCS Det	
1344	Halifax	- CFFS	<u>2</u>
2698		- CFMWS	<u>2</u>
1810	Kingston	- CFSCE	<u>40</u>
2027		- CLFCSC	<u>100</u>
2682		- NDC	<u>10</u>
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2511	Namao	- CFSTS	
2471	North Bay	- AWCCS	
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2010	Penhold	- CFJLS	<u>10</u>
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TOTAL COLLEGES AND SCHOOLS 470

TOTAL PAGE 470

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TOTAL PAGE 65

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| | - CF School of Physical and Education and Recreation |
| Chilliwack | - CF Officer Candidate School |
| | - CF School of Military Engineering |
| Cornwall | - CF Air Traffic Control Training Unit |
| Cornwallis | - CF Recruit School |
| Edmonton | - CF School of Traffic and Movements |
| | - CF School of Aeromedical Training |
| Esquimalt | - CF Fleet School |
| | - CF School of Music |
| | - Royal Roads Military College |
| Falconbridge | - Air Weapons Control and Countermeasures
School Detachment |
| Halifax | - CF Fleet School |
| | - CF Maritime Warfare School |
| Kingston | - CF School of Communications and
Electronics |
| | - Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College |
| | - National Defence College |
| | - Royal Military College of Canada |
| Moose Jaw | - 2 CF Flying Training School |
| Namao | - CF Survival Training School |
| North Bay | - Air Weapons Control and Countermeasures School |
| Ottawa | - CF Language School |
| Penhold | - CF Junior Leaders School |
| Portage la Prairie | - 3 CF Flying Training School |
| Rome, Italy | - NATO Defence College |
| St Jean | - CF Management Development School |
| | - Collège Militaire Royal de Saint-Jean |
| | - 1'École des langues des Forces canadiennes |
| | - 1'École des recrues des Forces canadiennes |
| | - École technique des Forces canadiennes |
| Summerside | - CF Junior Leadership School |
| Toronto | - Canadian Forces College |
| | - CF Command and Staff College |
| | - CF Staff School |
| Valcartier | - École de combat - R22 ^{er} |
| Winnipeg | - CF Air Navigation School |
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SUBJ: CFP 301 LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE (2ND DRAFT)

REF: A. SC 2900-1/6 2 MAY 85

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C. TELECON SSO LAND/DLCD 6 5 JUN 85

1. AS DISCUSSED REF C, DLCD 6 AND DLCD 6 DESIGNATE (LCOL CONNOLLY)

^{WV} ORAL 200JUN TO REVIEW COMMENTS IN REFS A AND B.

2. BOTH OFFRS WILL ARRIVE EVENING 19 JUN. DLCD 6 ETA 1930 HRS.

3. REQUEST R&Q. *YH*

LCOL R.E. ACREMAN, DLCD 6, 6-3954, jmk

LCOL R.E. ACREMAN, DLCD 6

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222-B-0A-301-001/FP-001

~~2900-CFP 301~~ (DLCD 6)

28 May 1985

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CFP 301 LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE (2ND DRAFT)
COMMENTS

References: A. FMC 2910-CFP 301 (DCOS CD) 3 Jan 85
B. SC 2900-1/6 2 May 85

1. Thank you for your comments on CFP 301. As discussed during your recent visit to NDHQ, the publication deadline of the manual precludes the incorporation of all of your comments and recommendations at this time. Those comments requiring only minor changes have been incorporated. Those comments requiring more extensive change and/or discussion will be incorporated as part of Change 1, along with the revisions prompted by the CDC Sub-Committee review of the manual, scheduled for Jan 86.

2. Enclosed please find a copy of Reference B on which I have made marginal notes indicating the disposition of each comment. Although these notes are somewhat cryptic, hopefully they are clear. Attached as Annex A are a few detailed comments on some of the issues that have been raised.

3. It is suggested that once you have had an opportunity to digest the enclosed feedback, it would be useful for me to visit Kingston and discuss some of the issues which are still outstanding. Accordingly, and at your convenience, I am available to visit anytime during the month of June. As I am changing jobs in early July, I would also like to bring LCol Connolly, my successor, to ensure a smooth handover of the work yet to be done. Please recommend a suitable date(s) when this visit could take place.

R.S. Billings
R.S. Billings

Colonel
Director Land Combat Development
for Chief of the Defence Staff

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Attachment:

Annex A - Detailed Comments

Enclosure: 1

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R.E. Acreman, LCol, DLCD 6, 6-3954/mf

Annex A
to 2910-CFP 301 (DLCD 6)
dated 28 May 1985

DETAILED COMMENTS

1. Status of ATP 35(A) NATO Land Forces Tactical Doctrine. Several of the comments made in Reference B appear to question the validity of ATP 35(A). Canada played a key role in the development of this manual. A Canadian was a member of the drafting committee which met in Ottawa to develop the first draft. This draft was staffed by the ADTB, including CLFCSC. As a result of this staffing, Canada had 9 major points and 26 minor points of contention. Subsequently, at the Tactics Working Party in Brussels, all of these points were resolved in Canada's favour. Canada then ratified STANAG 2868, the STANAG which covers ATP 35(A). At about the same time, CDC stated the position that what Canada agreed to internationally, it would abide by nationally. This position was re-affirmed by several meetings of the ADTB. This is not to say that we must follow ATP 35(A) slavishly. On the contrary, if there is a point of doctrine on which we disagree with ATP 35(A), we are at liberty to do so. However, in light of our earlier ratification, we should first attempt to have the manual amended. If this is not successful, we are then obliged to state a reservation in a similar fashion to other countries, which have stated reservations in certain areas. Also, as Reference B correctly points out, to meet a national requirement Canada may expand upon the doctrine found in ATP 35(A), providing that such expansion is in consonance with the general provisions of the manual. All of this is to say, that ATP 35(A) has been accepted by Canada and that we are obliged to use it both in accordance with an international agreement and national direction.

2. Fundamentals/Principles of War. As a result of a CLFCSC initiative to overcome an inconsistency in the use of the expressions "fundamentals" and "principles", the ADTB agreed to reserve the word "principles" for principles of war and to use "fundamentals" for other operational criteria. Thus, doctrine authors should use "principle", in relation to the selection and maintenance of the aim, and "fundamental", in relation to self-sufficiency, as in a fundamental of administration. This decision is reflected in CFP 301. As well, I have avoided restating a principle of war, which applies to all operations, as a fundamental of a specific operation, as I felt that this would be confusing to a reader. However, I take your point that there may be merit in saying, for a specific operation the following principles of war require further emphasis, and then

Annex A
to 2910-CFP 301 (DLCD 6)
dated 28 May 1985

expanding the ideas accordingly. I would appreciate receiving specific suggestions in this regard. I also agree that principles and fundamentals should not change with every edition of our doctrine. However, in some cases, I feel that our fundamentals as expressed in CFP 301(1) are inappropriate. For example, I find it difficult to accept "intelligence" and "reconnaissance" as fundamentals of specific operations, as I feel these are described more accurately as battlefield functions which occur throughout all operations. In this respect, they are similar to fire support, target acquisition, surveillance, mobility, etc. As well, I don't see "speed and violence" as a fundamental specific to offensive operations, but rather I see it as a characteristic of all modern warfare, particularly in a high level conflict.

3. Command and Control. As defined in ABCA, command and control is "the exercise of authority and direction by a designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the force's mission. The functions of command and control are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, 'communications', facilities and procedures which are employed by a commander in planning, directing, co-ordinating and controlling forces in the accomplishment of the mission". By definition, command and control includes communications and for this reason, the latter is not normally used as a heading separate from command and control. It also enables us to avoid the Americanisms of C², C³, C³I and now I believe even C³ ICM, which if I understand correctly means command, control, communications, intelligence countermeasures. The subject of communications is a difficult one in terms of organization. As I have it now, CFP 300 The Army contains a chapter on communications which covers: the threat (to communications), an outline of the system including the means and their strengths and weaknesses, detail on the types of communication commands, and EW in an area of operations. This chapter was included in CFP 300 as communications like air defence, airspace control, etc; operate on a theatre-wide basis. CFP 301 is aimed at the tactical level and to avoid duplication it does not repeat the same material as is in CFP 300. For this reason, CFP 301 restricts communications doctrine primarily to a chapter on EW. The two manuals are meant to be read in conjunction with one another. I agree that the split of material between CFP 300 and 301 is somewhat arbitrary, but this was seen as the best way to handle it. Bearing in mind that there is also a series of signal publications, has any important information been omitted? If

Annex A
to 2910-CFP 301 (DLCD 6)
dated 28 May 1985

there is a better way to handle this subject, it could certainly be incorporated into Change 1. Incidentally, at the suggestion of your Signal DS, a cross reference to CFP 300 was added to the second draft of CFP 301.

4. Diagrams/Figures. Based on several comments received in staffing the first draft of CFP 301, the issue of the use of diagrams and figures was referred to the ADTB. My approach in the first draft was to use diagrams only when necessary for clarity. There was no clear consensus at the ADTB and I was directed by the chairman to exercise my own judgement in this regard. However, based on your comments in Reference B, I will ensure that a greater number of diagrams are used in the future. These will be incorporated in Change 1.

5. Chapter 22, Operations in an NBC Environment. I agree that this chapter requires expansion. CFP 301(1), CLFCSC precis, and the CF and army concepts will be used as the basic references. Once a preliminary draft of the revised chapter has been staffed by DNBCC, it will be forward to members of the ADTB prior to its inclusion in Change 1 of the manual.

6. Expansion of Material. The CLFCSC requirement in this regard is recognized and the doctrine in the areas recommended will be expanded as part of Change 1. In doing so, it will be necessary to ensure that there is no unnecessary overlap with the new manual to be titled "Battle Group in Battle". As well, the proposed rewrite of Chapter 8 which was attached to Reference B will be most helpful in the expansion of the doctrine on security.

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE



MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE

CANADIAN LAND FORCES COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

COLLEGE DE COMMANDEMENT ET D'ÉTAT-MAJOR DES FORCES TERRESTRES CANADIENNES

SC 2900-1/6

FORT FRONTENAC
KINGSTON, ONTARIO
K7K 2X8

2 May 1985

National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0K2

AS/MS/SC/DA 3-00
Referred to
Transmits to DLCD 6

Attention: DLCD 6 ✓

MAY 7 1985

File No 322 B-06-301-001/FP-001
Dossier No.....
Changes to/Change à.....

CFP 301 - LAND FORMATIONS IN
BATTLE - SECOND DRAFT (R)

- Reference:
- A. SC 2900-1/6 (Comdt), 15 October 1984
 - B. B-GL-301-000/FP-001, Second Draft, January 1985
 - C. FMC 2910-CFP 301 (DCOS CD), 3 January 1985
 - D. CFP 301(1) Formations in Battle, December 1980

1.(R) CLFCSC comments on the First Draft of CFP 301 which were submitted at reference A, were not adopted except in the case of several editorial/minor Staff Duties corrections.

2.(R) As previously stated, the current draft will not meet the requirements of this College. Our detailed comments, both on the First Draft and as attached on the Second Draft, illustrate our thinking in this regard.

G.T. Service
G.T. Service
Colonel
for Commandant

Attachments:

- Annex A - General Observations
- Annex B - Comment Sheets
- Annex C - Suggested Chapter 8, Security

RESTRICTED

8 May
000684

ANNEX A
TO SC 2900-1/6 (Comdt)
DATED 2 MAY 85

CFP 301 - SECOND DRAFT

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

1. Although most of the editorial comments submitted on the First Draft of this pamphlet have been incorporated in the Second Draft, comments on the substance of the publication have largely been ignored. As a result the pamphlet is still too general for CLFCSC use as a source document. It appears that the author has intentionally attempted to make our national publication equal in content to ATP-35(A), disregarding our particular requirements based on the size and organization of our army. This is done despite the foreward to ATP-35(A) which states "It is understood and accepted that the land force doctrine of any nation may go beyond and expand on ATP-35(A)".

Noted. Information may be req'd in certain areas - to be considered for change!
As above, this was not the intent - incidentally, I note the foreward to ATP 35(A)

2. If the broadbrush approach to our keystone doctrine manuals is to continue, then the responsible parties must give direction to writers of branch doctrine manuals to pick up the detail that was formerly in the 1980 version of CFP 301(1), Formations in Battle.

Agree. C.F.C.S.C. has directed that a manual titled 'Battle Group in Battle' be produced in '86

3. The pamphlet is too vague to be useful at brigade or division level as it deals with matters which are general in nature and does not treat the specifics of tactics at formation level. Specific charts and diagrams should be included to illustrate and clarify points whenever possible.

As above. More diagrams can be added in change!

4. It is difficult to understand or accept that "fundamentals change with each rewrite of pamphlets. Surely the basics do not change unless a war proves the old principles wrong or the introduction of a new equipment, such as the machine gun in World War I and later the tank, revolutionizes warfare. Such changes to basic concepts would, in turn, cause considerable revision to all of the specific-to-arm manuals since they were originally based on CFP 301(1), Formations in Battle, 1980.

Agree without. In this case, I find it difficult to endorse some of the fundamentals as they are principle. Jobs in battle field functions

5. Again, it is felt that this pamphlet would not be a high quality CLFCSC reference source and it does not approach the detail included in CFP 301(1), 1980. In addition, there are many statements which appear to be factual, but, on analysis, are quite debatable. An example, is page 12-12, Article 12.09, paragraph 5 on the point of a narrow front, with less space available, allowing a commander to pass his depth troops through more often. (See Annex B comments)

See Annex B for comment

6. On the CSS aspects of the pamphlet, there is not much on which to observe since there is not much there.

Noted. What specifically should be added? Please in mind CSS manuals. Current text indicates by JSC 000685
L. B. G. ...
C.F.C.S.C.

ANNEX A
TO SC 2900-1/6
DATED 2 MAY 85

7. It is difficult to quarrel with the accuracy of the contents of Chapter 22, Operations in an NBC environment since it can almost be considered banal. Thus, it is strongly suggested that the contents of Chapter 7 on Tactical Nuclear Operations as written in CFP 301(1), 1980 be retained in CFP 301, Land Formations in Battle. The 1980 pamphlet contents are positive and informative. Of course, an additional section on Chemical Operations would have to be included. Additionally, using the approach of retaining Chapter 7, CFP 301(1), 1980 contents, would guarantee capturing the necessary nuclear doctrine in terms of the Corps Pulse and the attendant Nuclear Packages and Sub-Packages which are part and parcel of operations at brigade, division and corps levels.

Agree. This
chap requires
expansion.
For change!

8. Some specific communications comments on the First Draft, which were not included in the Second Draft, have been repeated at Annex B. The major criticism from a Command, Control and Communications point of view is that CFP 301 should describe the characteristics, limitations and responsibilities of each function to be found in a land formation (CA functions, CSA functions). Although the Combat Support functions are engineers, signals, electronic warfare, aviation and intelligence, there is no chapter to describe the signals function. Such a chapter must be included to describe Signals or Communications Support including roles, tasks, characteristics, limitations, command and control and employment (as is done for engineer support and aviation support).

As discussed
w/ Lt Col Buckner
CFP 300 contains
a chap on
"Comms". It
was placed here
as it is a
theatre-wide
system. (CFP 301
has chap on
EW. What is
missed?)

9. All comments at reference A are still valid, and are further emphasized here for clarity:

a. Article 1204 (Fundamentals). This is still incomplete. The fundamentals of firm base, recce, speed and violence, depth, surprise and reserves are surely still valid. This art has changed in that the key to success is now to maintain "initiative" vice "momentum". These terms have in fact been virtually inter-changed in the second draft, yet the six fundamentals are not included. These must be included here.

As per comment
preceding page
eg, recce is
a battle field
func in all
types of ops
speed and violence
are characteristics
of all types of ops

Forms of manoeuvre
are considered to be
applicable to all
types of offensive
ops. (will discuss)

b. Article 1205 (Forms of Manoeuvre). This article must appear with Section 3, The Attack. These are forms of manoeuvre for the attack, not offensive operations in general. Flanking movement is not included, surely a gross omission. The author has copied these from ATP-35(A), a doctrinal manual primarily for Army and Corps. At brigade level, flanking movements will be the norm, hence must be included. Illustrations are essential.

Development of
"the midline"
effort in an
development is
made as a result
of the enemy's flank
or rear" (See
p 12-8)

in comment, we must either subscribe to ATP 35 (A)
or attempt to change it, or submit a reservation. Your
proposed change is not accepted. A-2

ANNEX A
TO SC 2900-1/6
DATED 2 MAY 85

c. Article 1206 (General - Advance to Contact). This art (or sect) must incl the "tac rules" described in CFP 301(1), 1980, article 505. This is doctrine. These guidelines must appear here. Please see overleaf

d. One must assume from the heading of this sect that there is no longer an advance in contact. This should be clarified with DLCD. Specifically, is the term "advance to contact" now all-encompassing for "the advance". The definition in CFP 303(2) Supplement 3 certainly does not indicate that this is so. Hence, clarification is needed. Is per ATP 356 and RAP 6 (R) Any glossary (including) contain only the RAP 61 definition.

e. Article 1209 (Planning)

(1) Para 3. This must be illustrated similar to fig 5-2 of CFP 301(1), 1980. This should be expanded as well. Agree on diagram. Expansion to be considered for change!

(2) Para 5. This is still wrong. See Ref A.

(3) Para 6. This is very ambiguous, and must be clarified. An illustration is essential, similar to fig 5-1 CFP 301(1), 1980 (corrected). Consider for change!

(4) Para 7. The bypass policy is poorly explained and ambiguous. Picketing is not even mentioned. Considerations for determining the policy (para 6, article 506, CFP 301(1), 1980) are not included - they must be. Article 506 CFP 301(1), 1980 gives a much better explanation of this very important aspect of the advance. Consider for change!

f. Article 1210 (Conduct). Para 6 is confusing. It refers to "protective elms", and then describes how a flank screen would operate. Screens do not "protect". Screens "protect" by providing flank info!

g. Conduct measures are not included in this section on the advance. Para 14, article 506 CFP 301(1), 1980 is recommended for inclusion here. Well discuss. Centre line is not an approved term

h. Section 3 (The Attack). As mentioned the forms of manoeuvre with illustrations should be included in this section, as article 1213. In addition, the "tactical rules" at article 513 CFP 301(1), 1980 must be included. As provided discussed

j. Article 1213 (Types of Attack). Article 511 CFP 301(1) 1980 offers a much better description of the types of attack and should replace this article. The hasty attack description is copied from ATP-35(A). Discuss. What wrong w/ ATP 35(A)

As indicated in feedback to Ref A. I am still not sure what the position of the college is. With a narrow front, a world has more force in depth to deal w/ by passed enemy.

1. "Tactical Rules for the Advancer" These are important ideas. They have been incorporated in the text as for the most part our doctrine as a whole represents a collection of "Tactical Regulations" (w/ the normal qualification)

a. "seize and maintain the initiative" is covered in Art 1201. Note in para 2 of Art 505 in CFP 30.1(1) it also mentions keeping the man foremost, this really refers to the principle of war "selection & maintenance of the aim",

b. "wide base" is covered in the discussion of balance in Art 1204, ie "The initial grouping must insure that the covering force can cover the frontage of the 3 of A. See also Art 1206 and Art 1209.

c. "a well balanced force" - see Art 1204

d. "capture and control by terrain" - see Art 1206

e. "maintain the momentum" - see Art 1204

f. "simplicity of plan" - this idea is not covered in 2nd draft, but has been included now.

2. If for training reasons, you wish to isolate the above ideas, I see no problem in doing so.

ANNEX A
TO SC 2900-1/6
DATED 2 MAY 85

- k. Article 1214 (Concept). Second line. Surely the aim is to kill, destroy, make them die, etc. Surrender and withdraw smacks of timidity, not speed and violence. This line must be changed.
- m. Article 1216 (Planning). Para 2 dealing with estimates is all motherhood. Article 512 of CFP 301(1) 1980 (para 1-7 inclusive) is a much better description. Strongly recommend that this article be changed accordingly.

Agree - line
deleted. See
also Art 1212.

Consider
for change

10. As mentioned previously, this manual in its present form is too vague and ambiguous, and lacks the necessary detail and guidance necessary for studying doctrine. Although the author may be aiming at providing guidance to formation commands, this keystone manual does not provide the necessary doctrinal guidance for officers studying on the Canadian Land Forces Staff Course nor for Directing Staff teaching.

Noted

11. In comparing this manual to ATP-35(A), the NATO document on tactical doctrine, it is obvious that many portions of this second draft have been copied from ATP-35(A). Notwithstanding the fact that ATP-35(A) is designed for brigade level and above, it obviously refers throughout much more to division and corps level operations. Perhaps this is why there appears to be several vague and unclear aspects in this second draft.

What is
wrong w/ ATP35A
It applies
equally to
bde, div, &
corps.

12. Again, it is recommended that the amended Chapter 5 of CFP 301(1), 1980 submitted previously be adopted in lieu of the present Chapter 12 of this manual. If this is not acceptable for whatever reason, then it is strongly recommended that the suggested amendments be incorporated into the manual. As it stands now, Chapter 12 (Offensive Operations) is too inadequate and vague for study purposes on the Canadian Land Forces Staff Course. In summation, it is again strongly recommended that CFP 301(1), 1980 with the necessary amendments, be adopted as the doctrine manual for Land Formations in Battle.

Noted

Agree

As per
C.L.F.O.
direction

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	yes - discussed w/ DIA. These were the only units in Corps' & identified by eqpt.	p.x	Table of Contents for Sect 3 of Chap 6 shows terminology change, deleting word "helicopter". Is this accurate?
2	Agree - fixed	p 1-11, para 1, last sentence	Typographical error. Should read "Pact" vice "Pack".
3	Possible - current text condensed by G2, but could be expanded in change'	p 1-14, art 108 para 3	Because of its impact on us, I think we should elaborate on the Warsaw Pact sustained operations.
4	Agree - fixed	p 1-15, last sentence, para 109.2	Typographical error. Should read "Pact" vice "Pack".
5	Disagree - this is a gen list w/ no intent to list <u>all</u> arty munitions. However, idea added in Art 402	p 1-21, art 113 para 7	Should also add: g. PGMs h. scatterable mines.
6	Agree - this was a problem w/ our approved concept - some minor changes made.	p 1-21, para 9	Para 9 implies a <u>defensive</u> scenario whereas it should be written to apply to the defence or offence.
7	Agree - fixed	p 1-21, art 113 para 9, sub-para e.	Should add the following after tank forces: and Infantry fighting vehicles.
8	CDC decision	Chapter 2	Why is there no PSYOP and no NBC Def Coy in the proposed Corps?
9	Anx A to SC 2900-1/6 d/15 Oct 84 Ser 50	p 2-1 art 202	Comment at ref was not included; should be. <i>Minor changes were made in 2nd draft as discussed w/ Lt Col Lockhart.</i>

ANNEX B
 TO SC 2900-1
 DATED 2 MAY 1985
 000690

B-1

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
10	Art 208 deals w/ corp arty, ie, all the arty in a corps, could be expanded in to change ea level of fmn, but would likely be repetitive - probably best handled in gmr manual. Agree - fixed	Chap 2 Sect 2	Why do we only deal with the artillery at corps level? Should this not include <u>all</u> the artillery within the corps -- ie we should cover division artillery as well as the artillery allotted to support brigades. In para 208 we only cover the functions at corps level. Those at division and brigade are quite different and should be listed as well.
11	Agree - fixed	p 2-7, art 210 para 1.c.	Insert word "resources" after "automatic data processing". Personnel, hardware and software must be provided and maintained.
12	Current text is correct.	p 2-7, art 210 para 1.e.	Is the intent for Signals to provide adm sp and local defence of Corps Main HQ and Corps Rear HQ? Is this function not to be filled by Signals at Div HQ level and below?
13	Agree - fixed	p 2-7, art 210	Mention should be made of other Signals organizations at Corps level. In addition to the Corps Signals Brigade, the "Corps troops" organizations require Signals units to provide their means of command and control, including comms and ADP (Corps Arty, Corps Engrs, Corps Avn, Corps Int, COSCOM, Corps Med Gp, Corps Military Police).
14	Ibid Ser 54	p 3-3, art 302 para 4	Comment at ref was not included; should be. See sub para j "direct commo"
15	Ibid Ser 55	p 3-4, art 303 para 3	Comment at ref was not included; should be. As discussed w/ Lt Col Baker - not appropriate to this list of main functs which is already approved by the CCF
16	To be discussed	page 3-5	Headquarters - should include Fire Support Co-ordination Centre (FSCC).

B-2

ANNEX B
 TO SC 2900-1
 DATED 2 MAY 85
 000691

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
17	Ibid Ser 48 <i>As per previous comment. Cross ref may require to 2nd draft as suggested by Lt Col Blocherat.</i>	Table of Contents	Comment at ref (Chapter on communications systems or support) was not included; should be.
18	"	p 3-29, art 314	This article still fails to address the means of effecting command and control. Some description of the generic types of comms and ADP systems should be included.
19	Disagree - gms of this system + currently block it	p 4-1, para 401.1.b.	There is no such thing as a flash ranging system.
20	Agree - fixed (statement deleted as VLLAD resources are integral to roles)	p 4-9, para 406.9	Disagree that "VLLAD resources are normally allotted 'in support' below division level". I would say normally "under command" below division level.
21	Agree - fixed	p 4-9/4-10, para 406.11	This para is out of sequence. It should be listed before sub-para 10 "Restrictions".
22	Disagree - principles in CFP 306(1) are essentially principles of war. ADTB <i>abstract use of "Fundamentals" for other than principles of war. Current list endorsed by most gms</i>	p 4-11, para 408	It would be much more appropriate to list the principles of fire planning as found in 306(1) Interim rather than these so-called "fundamentals". These are not really "fundamentals", just a series of statements. We have overlooked such aspects as: a. provide fire support to support the commander's plan; b. concentrate fire on the most important targets; c. achieve surprise.

ANNEX B
 TO SC 2900-1
 DATED 2 MAR 1991
 000692

B-3

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
23	Agree - incorporate in change!	p 4-12 Table 4-1	This table should go down to unit level as that is where the detailed fire plan is developed. A pamphlet written for brigade staffs should concern itself with the <u>detailed</u> fire plan.
24	Agree w/ obsn, but correct term (AAP 6-P) is counterbattery	p 4-12 Table 4-1	"CB" is the abbreviation for counter-bombardment, not counter-battery.
25	CFR 121(6) to be amended Agree - fixed	p 4-12 Table 4-1	This table should have arrows going down the left, across the bottom and up the right side indicating the flow of activity in the fire planning process.
26	Why?	p 4-13 para 409.2.b. (2)	Delete "Normally neutralization efforts are supported by a dumping programme".
27	Disagree. Fig is of an FSCC and shows elms which link to it, as opposed to who report to it. See Chap on EW.	p 4-16 Figure 4-1	Why is the EW elm reporting to the FSCC as opposed to reporting to the main Int/Ops cells. Certainly it should not report direct, but instead through an EW LO. If we are going to show this link perhaps we should show links to Ops, Int, Recce, elms, etc.
28	Agree - fixed	p 5-2, para 503.1.d.	Should read "amphibious bridging".
29	Agree - fixed	p 5-2, para 4	Change title to "General Engineering Tasks".

ANNEX B
 TO SC 2900-
 DATED 2 MAY 85
 000693

B-4

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
30	Agree - fixed	p 5-2, para 4h	Change to read "support to area decontamination operations; and".
31	Good point - agree - fixed	p 5-2, para 4	Add a new sub-para j: "denial of materials, equipment, facilities and installations".
32	Disagree - troops in contact are an enemy, ie, they keep sources. See art 706?	p 7-7, art 706 para 1	Should add: troops in Contact.
33	Disagree "actions" taken by a comd to shield... "Actions may be offensive or defensive. Considerable effort was made to group these functions in the best, albeit not a perfect way."	and Table 7-1 p 8-1, Chap 8	Chapter 8 deals with "Security" which is defined in a <u>defensive</u> sense in para 801 (actions taken ... to shield his forces, etc). Yet, reconnaissance and surveillance are not <u>just</u> defensive measures - they are offensive as well. Reconnaissance and surveillance should not therefore be grouped under the "security" blanket.
34	Consider for change!	Chapter 8, Sections 1, 2, and 3	To be replaced with proposed Sections 1 and 2.
35	Discuss - and see if the title of the concept.	Page 8-4, Chap 8, Sect 2 Para 803.2	Why is para 803.2 entitled "Armoured Reconnaissance" since the para does not discuss <u>armoured</u> reconnaissance?
36	Discuss. Why only?	As above	Last sentence should read "particularly artillery and tactical aviation".
37	CDC decision.	p 8-5 para 803.5	Long Range Reconnaissance. Is there a Long Range Reconnaissance Company in the Corps. It should be discussed. If there isn't one, we need it.

B-5

ANNEX B
 TO SC 2900-1
 DATED 2 MAY 85
 000694

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
38	<i>Consider for change!</i>	p 8-7, Sect 3	Section 3, "Surveillance", is not nearly comprehensive enough to be of any use whatsoever. What is the surveillance planning process? What are the elements of a surveillance plan? What aspects of surveillance should be in SOPs? etc.
39	<i>See AAP(6)P. Note "essential" in old term was so mnemonic</i>	p 8-9, art 808 para 1	Why introduce a new term such as PIR (Priority Intelligence Requirements), when we already have one recognizable by all. (EEI - essential elements of information).
40	<i>Agree - fixed</i>	p 8-10, para 810.2	Surely, this is not the only reason for employing deception? Delete in its entirety.
41	<i>Disagree - recon is performed by more than one arm & therefore should be discussed.</i>	Chapter 8	The discussion on reconnaissance regarding fundamentals, types, etc should not be included in this CFP but in the appropriate Corps/Arm CFP.
42	<i>Disagree. Like definitions, symbology must be looked up by those who are unfamiliar with them.</i>	p 9-11, Figure 9-1	A legend is required to explain the symbology used.
43	<i>As per Serial 2 comment</i>	p 9-13, Figure 9-2	Referring back to Ser 12, (Figure 4-1), if we are going to establish a link to the FSCC then the FSCC should be included in the EW Cycle.
44	<i>Agree - fixed</i>	p 11-6, art 1108, last line	Delete "is" insert "are".
45	<i>Agree - entire para was rewritten in response to comments from CFCSC</i>	p 11-10, para 2, line 2	The statement "Items concurred at relatively uniform rates are sent forward routinely" requires explanation, items such as what?

B-6

ANNEX B
 TO SC 2900-1
 DATED 2 MAY 85
 000695

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
46	Agree - rewritten para fixes this problem	p 11-10, para 2, last sentence	This sentence states "In turn, these elements deliver to the requesting units rear echelons, normally let in from adm areas". This may be the case that items get delivered to Bech in a BAA; items also might normally go forward bypassing the unit Bech.
47	Agree - fixed	p 11-10, para 3, line 3	Delete "fwd maint". Insert "fwd repair".
48	Agree - fixed	p 11-10, para 3, line 8	The term "in-location" is used here and on p 13-49 the term "in-situation" is used (para 1.c. line 1). Can we standardize, term used to be "in situ". If this is unacceptable then "as far fwd as possible" is also suitable. <u>Note</u> : The British Army still uses "in situ". "In situ" is also in Concise Oxford Dictionary, 7th Edition, page 519. Also "in-location" is close to the Op relationship "in loc"!
49	Agree - fixed	p 11-11, para 4	This is a vague definition of an ECP - suggest they use the definition in the Army Glossary. It should also be stated <u>who</u> establishes and operates an ECP, unit or 2nd line, or both. An ECP is only estb at 1st Line - not "at all frmn levels". Beyond 1st Line backloading is done through a BLP.
50	Agree - fixed	p 11-11, para 5	First sentence is poorly worded. "Handled in a different manner because of their unique nature", does not sound like Military Writing. Suggest - "There are several exceptions to the normal maint system". The same applies to para 5.c. The repair of telecom eqpt is not "handled" it is "effected", "carried out", "done", or is whatever - but not "handled".

ANNEX B
 TO SC 2900-1
 DATED 2 MAY 8
 000696

B-7

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
51	p 11-13, art 1116 para 1, line 5, line 8, line 10 <i>Agree - fixed</i> <i>Agree - fixed</i>	p 11-13, art 116, para 1, line 5, line 8 line 10 line 12	Delete "from the CSG", it is redundant. <i>Agree - fixed</i> Delete "Parks" insert "Points" (might just as well get the name right!) <u>OFF THE RECORD</u> : This concerns me when authors don't know the correct names for the orgs for which they are writing doctrine!) <i>Agree - fixed (Assumed Corps ignorance)</i> No need for quotation marks on "B" echelon. Delete "Projected CAS rates". Insert "casualty estimates" which is normally accepted terminology.
52	<i>Agree - fixed</i>	p 11-13, para 2.a. line 5	Rather than "Hels are particulary useful for this task" can we go out on a limb and state that "they are the preferred method when aval"!
53	<i>Dis IAW CFP 303(1).</i>	p 11-14, para 2.f.	<u>Postal</u> - there is also a Postal Section in DISGP SVC BN, ST COY, (See CFP 312/2), DISGP in Battle, Interim 1, page 5-5, para 5.
54	<i>Hopefully, yes. Doc is correct in any event.</i>	p 11-14, 11-15	Ref states that finance pers and chaplains are in units. Will in fact unit estb come out in war estb manual with these pers incl?
55	<i>Disagree. to hsp 4 lists looks if only - in the shape dealing w/ specific ops only as one covered to avoid unnecessary repetition.</i>	p 12-10 para 1208.4	Tasks for field artillery include close support, attrition, counter battery, target acquisition and fire support co-ordination.
56		p 12-12, art 1209, para 5	This para does not seem to make much sense. Surely a narrow front does <u>not</u> allow a Comd to pass his depth tps through more often -- there's less space aval. > <i>Discussed - not a question so much of "space", but as to the availability of depth force</i>

ANNEX B
 TO SC 2900-
 DATED 2 MAY 6
 000697

B-8

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
57	Ibid Ser 58	p 12-20, art 1211	Comment at ref was not included; should be. <i>As per discussion w/ Lt Col Lockhart, comd + con incl comms.</i>
58	<i>Disagree. Axis of adv is defined in Army Glossary. center line is not. Why then a word not say "clear the axis of adv"? Why into a new term?</i>	p 12-20, art 1211	The old CFP 301(1) went to considerable effort to define "axis of adv" and centerline, which involved clr the route. This is not covered here - in fact "center line" is not incl at all as a con measure seems odd!
59	<i>See comment Ser 55. There we emphasize what is done in the attack. Sgt acquisition + FS could be implied</i>	p 12-25, para 1215.5	Field Artillery - include target acquisition and fire support co-ordination.
60	<i>Agree - fixed</i>	p 12-26, para 1215	Tactical Air - include "destruction of enemy positions and equipment" as artillery can neutralize but not necessarily destroy.
61	<i>Possibly. consider for change!</i>	p 12-35, para 1216.5.k.	Fire Plan. The fire support paragraph in the Second Draft 301(1) (Dec 80), page 5-40 is much more meaningful and useful.
62	<i>Agree "consolidation" is ASP 35(A) word. I feel it is a better word (more precise) as hopefully a force never becomes "divergent".</i>	p 12-39, para 4	The term "consolidation" seems to be repl for "reorg". Is it? If no, it should be included in the Army Glossary -- it's not.
63	<i>Agree - fixed</i>	p 12-49, para 1, art 1227	The first sentence is poorly worded and not really of much value anyway. If it must be said -- it should not be couched in a negative sense as it is now -- needs to be revised, "CSS units must have sufficient mobility to provide constant sp to off ops, certain mobile elms may require posn well fwd.

ANNEX B
 TO SC 2900-1
 DATED 2 MAY 85
 000698

B-9

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
64	Disagree - we have the "general" initiative. friendly. Policy should stand for "local initiative"	p 13-1, para 1301.2 first sentence	Delete "general". What does it mean?
65	Disagree - offensive action is a principle of war, it could be emphasized as such. Intelligence is not a fundamental, it is a battlefield function which occurs in all types of ops.	p 13-8	What happened to the "fundamentals" of intelligence and offensive action. How can our "fundamentals" change with each re-write of a pamphlet. This will also necessitate changes in such books as 306(1) Interim I page 7-11.
66	Agree - fixed	p 13-15, para 1306.4	Characteristics include: a. the employment of guards and screens, and b. close, co-ordinated defensive fire.
67	Agree - fixed	p 13-17, para 1307.4, third line	"them" should read "then".
68	Agree - fixed	p 13-17, para 1308.1, fourth line	"required" vice "required".
69	Agree - fixed	p 13-25, para 1315, third sentence	Should read "... would deal with them".
70	Agree - fixed	p 13-29, para 1317.2	"barriers" should read "obstacles".
71	Good point. For change!	p 13-36/37 para 1322	NBC Considerations. What about <u>offensive</u> measures and plans.

ANNEX B
 TO SC 2900-1
 DATED 2 MAY 88
 000699

B-10

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
72	<i>Disagree. here we are talking about a coordinated series of obs. re, a barriers</i>	p 13-41, para 1325.1 second sentence, 1325.2 and 1325.3	"obstacles" vice "barriers".
73	<i>Agree. this is what "if not already deployed implies."</i>	p 13-42, para 1325.5	I suggest that units must be in protected, defensible positions at the outset.
74	<i>Considers improvement for change. Agree. fixed</i>	p 14-4, art 1405, para 1, line 7	"Mis-led" is one word -- no hyphen.
75	<i>Agree. fixed</i>	p 14-13, para 1414.2.d.(2)	"barriers" should read "obstacles".
76	<i>Why?</i>	p 14-24, last sentence	This sentence, med sup being left IAW Geneva Convention in place has <u>no</u> place in this book. So what! Delete it. Same thing applies on p 15-14, para 4, second sentence.
77	<i>Agree. fixed</i>	p 15-4, para 1508.1	"demolitions and barriers" should read "obstacles".
78	<i>Agree. fixed</i>	p 15-7, para 1513.1.f.	"barriers" should read "obstacles". Delete "and the use of scatterable mines". Scatterable mines are obstacles.
79	<i>Agree. fixed</i>	p 15-8, para 1513.4	"demolitions" should read "obstacles".

B-11

ANNEX B
 TO SC 2900-1
 DATED 2 MAY 00
 000700

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
80	Ibid Ser 61	p 16-9, Sect 2	Comment at ref was not incl; should be. <i>bound + com incl comme.</i>
81	<i>Agree - fixed</i>	p 16-11, Fig 16-2	The bridge head line should meet the the river at its extremities.
82	<i>Disagree. Throughout the text and IAW ATP 35(A) FS is art, OAS, & NGFS.</i>	p 18-4, para 1805.3	We should separate offensive air support from field artillery support.
83	<i>Agree - incorporate in change 1</i>	p 18-4, para 1805.3	Amend to read: "Airlift capacity may limit the number of fire support elements which can be air deployed, however, it is essential, since the airborne forces have limited protection otherwise, that a high priority be assigned to this close support field artillery. FOO parties and FAC must be integrated with the path finder forces and with all elements of the main body.
84		p 18-5, para 1805.3	What is meant by "launchers"? Do we mean multiple launch rockets?
85	<i>Agree - fixed</i>	Chapter 22	On a number of occasions we employ the abbreviation "NBC" in a paragraph title (eg "Offensive use of NBC Weapons") yet we only mention nuclear and chemical, not biological.
86	<i>Specific pls - para contains only info which is unique to NBCs</i>	p 23-38, para 2321.5	Fire Support. This paragraph is poorly written and virtually meaningless.
87	<i>Ibid Ser 63 Similar to earlier comment of CFP 300 (i.e., what else needs to be said)</i>	General Comments	Neither of the two comments at ref was included. This remains a serious shortfall in this publication.

ANNEX B
 TO SC 2900-
 DATED 2 MAY 8
 000701

B-12

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
88	<i>Noted.</i>	CFP 301	This CFP should be addressing the specifics of the tactical doctrine for the planning and conduct of land operations at formation level. It does not meet this aim. It should be revised accordingly.

ANNEX B
TO SC 2900
DATED 2 MAY 1980
000702

CHAPTER 8

SECURITY

To be considered for change!

SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION

801. GENERAL

1. Security is a condition which results from actions taken by a commander to shield his force against any enemy act or influence. It enables a commander to maintain his freedom of action and to safeguard his force for its mission. Every commander is responsible for the security of his force.
2. Security is achieved through combat surveillance, deception, protective measures and counter-intelligence (CI). These activities encompass a wide range of measures, techniques and procedures, which are designed to deny information to or deceive an enemy. Therefore, it is important that these be co-ordinated, as disclosure of information in one area could compromise efforts in other areas. Moreover, all activities in support of security must complement one another. Their collective effectiveness must be assessed constantly and, if practicable, monitored.
3. The doctrine for rear area security is stated in Chapter 15 of CFP 300, The Army.

SECTION 2 - COMBAT SURVEILLANCE (Terminology)

802. GENERAL

1. The ~~Combat~~ ^{consists of?} Surveillance system (includes) the personnel, equipment, and command and control procedures required to maintain a continuous and systematic 24 hour-a-day, all weather watch -- both air and surface -- over the battle area. Through this watch, the system acquires the information essential in the production of timely and accurate combat intelligence -- the knowledge of the enemy, ^(and the operational environment) (weather and geographical factors) required by a commander ~~in the~~ ^{to} planning and conduct of ~~tactical~~ operations.
2. ~~Combat~~ ^(is carried out in) Surveillance (applies to) all operations of war. However, the agencies and the equipment required for its application will vary depending on the type of operations.

803. TACTICAL FUNCTIONS

surveillance can't
be a sub set of
surveillance

1. The ~~under~~ ^{surveillance} surveillance system encompasses the functions of reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition. It has two purposes. First it provides information from which a ^(what about a minor operation?) ~~major~~ operation can be planned and executed. Second, it provides the information that gives early warning of any changes in the situation that may endanger the force. Reconnaissance protects own troops against surprise. Forces engaged in reconnaissance attempt to discover the type, strength, organization and deployment of an enemy, in addition to his direction and rate of movement. They try to locate troop concentrations, gun positions, nuclear delivery means, command posts, communication centres, barriers, logistic installations, etc. They also reconnoitre ground to determine information such as suitability of routes and axes of advance, crossing sites and battle positions.

Here should
be discussed
para heading
similar to
surv + tgt
acquisition

Essentially
para Art 802.1

2. Surveillance. The purpose of surveillance is to acquire information by maintaining a watch over the battlefield. It is defined as the continuous, day and night, all weather, systematic observation of the battle area, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. Like reconnaissance, surveillance contributes to the production of intelligence and helps to maintain security.

3. Target Acquisition. The purpose of target acquisition is to detect, identify, and locate a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective employment of weapons.

4. The reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition ^{(functions)? See Art heading} ~~aspects~~ of ~~combat~~ ^(not an operation) surveillance ^(fulfilled?) operations are ^(satisfied?) within an integrated concept which is directly related to:

- a. the level of command; and
- b. the information requirement (ie, its nature and intended use).

804. LEVEL OF COMMAND

1. In the ~~operational~~ ^{operational} concept for ~~combat~~ ^{combat} surveillance, ~~the spectrum of~~ ^{the spectrum of} tasks ^{are} is allocated and undertaken in a manner which best satisfies the particular information and target acquisition needs of commanders. The capability requirements of the system are thus related to levels of command -- and, more specifically to the areas of interest and areas of influence of the various levels:

a. Area of Interest. The area of interest of a commander is that concerned with the objectives of current or planned operations and includes the area occupied by the enemy forces which could affect them. This area is related both to enemy deployments and to the time needed by a commander to receive information and react to it. The information provided by the Combat Surveillance system for the area of interest must enable the commander to make accurate and timely estimates of likely enemy actions and to retain or regain the initiative.

Areas of interest and influence are discussed in Chap 1 - perhaps a cross reference would suffice.

b. Area of Influence. The area of influence is the area in which a commander can directly influence operations by the manoeuvre of his forces or by delivery of firepower with the weapon systems normally under his command and control. The ~~combat~~ [^] Surveillance system must provide a target acquisition capability appropriate to the area of influence of each command level.

This is not doctrine - more for discussion for the development of a concept.

2. In order to satisfy the ~~combat~~ surveillance needs of the different levels of command, specific responsibilities are allocated within the operational concept, and collection means are organized and allocated accordingly. Each level of command has, as its primary ~~combat~~ surveillance responsibility, the collection of information pertinent to its area of influence. While the various command levels ~~will~~ also possess a limited capability to gather information in their areas of interest, it is the responsibility of the next higher level to satisfy the ^(majority?) (balance) of these information requirements through collection efforts in its area of influence. The ~~appropriate~~ areas of interest and influence applicable to ^a the ^c Corps for defensive operations are as follows:

This is also covered in Chap 1

why only defensive ops?

	<u>Area of Influence</u>	<u>Area of Interest</u>
Battle Group	<u>Up to 5 km</u>	
Brigade	Up to 15 km	Up to 70 km
Division	Up to 70 km	Up to 150 km
Corps	Up to 150 km	Up to 300 km

Good idea.

ANNEX C
TO SC 2900-1/6
DATED 2 MAY 85

805. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

(Pls see over)

1. In view of the nature of the information required, the activities of the combat surveillance system can be grouped into four general task classifications: area surveillance; reconnaissance in depth; reconnaissance to line-of-sight (LOS); and target acquisition. Because of the scope of use to which information can be applied at the different command levels, there ~~will~~^{is} be considerable overlap between the tasks.

(Pls see over)

2. Area Surveillance. ~~Continuous~~^A Area surveillance gives coarse-grained information on the enemy (coarse-grained is defined as detection, general location and possibly recognition).

It will be used:

- a. to provide up-to-date general information on enemy deployment and activities to enable enemy intentions to be deduced, ~~timely~~ decisions taken, and ~~appropriate~~ reactions executed;
- b. to cue reconnaissance resources with a capability for acquiring fine-grained information (fine-grained being defined as recognition, locations and possibly identification);
- c. to provide security through early warning of enemy activities in gaps, on flanks or in rear areas; and
- d. to assist in planning indirect fire.

3. Reconnaissance in Depth. Reconnaissance in depth provides fine-grained information beyond line of sight (LOS). It will frequently be cued by area surveillance or intelligence deductions and is required:

- a. to identify the composition of enemy forces to enable enemy capabilities and intentions to be confirmed and decisions on allocation of fire to be taken ~~as appropriate~~;
- b. to acquire targets for air and ground-based indirect fire weapon systems; and
- c. to locate specific units or elements.

4. Reconnaissance and (Surveillance to LOS) ^{this is not one of the same classifications?} ~~Reconnaissance~~ reconnaissance and surveillance to LOS satisfies requirements for both combat information and target acquisition.

"Reconnaissance in depth" and "reconnaissance to line of sight" are not parallel constructions. All recon, in effect, is "line of sight". If it is necessary to make a distinction (I don't think it is) one could perhaps refer to "close recon" and "deep recon"; at least these expressions offer a parallel construction.

"Coarse grained" and "fine grained" are jargon and therefore are not suitable as terms. Are such "terms" really required? Why not simply say something like general intelligence + specific intelligence? We should not complicate our doctrine by the introduction of unnecessary terms. Also why can't area surveillance produce fine grained information and why can't reconnaissance in depth produce coarse grained information? I find these ideas unclear

5. Target Acquisition. Target acquisition enables enemy weapon systems and high value assets (eg, HQs and logistics installations) to be engaged and either destroyed or ^{neutralized} suppressed.

? (It) also contributes information as follows:

weak construction →

- a. Target Acquisition for Direct Fire Weapons. Target acquisition for direct fire weapons ^{is} are normally associated with the weapon. These means ~~that~~ also provide combat information on the enemy which has been detected and located.
- b. Target Acquisition for Indirect Fire Weapons. Target acquisition for indirect fire weapons is also used for area surveillance, reconnaissance in depth or reconnaissance to LOS (and vice versa).

806. RESOURCES

1. Within, or available to ^a ~~the~~ ^c Corps, ^(could be more than one) the following resources can be used to maintain combat surveillance:

I believe it is useful to make a distinction between recce + surv means - some on this list do recce, some surv, some both.

- a. reconnaissance elements at Corps, division, brigade and units levels; (do both)
- b. electronic support measures; (recce)
- c. observation posts; (surv)
- d. all types of patrols; (depends on type of pl)
- e. fire controllers and artillery observers parties; (surv)
- f. helicopters; (recce)
- g. locating devices - sound ranging, drones, counter-mortar radars; ?
- h. surveillance devices; (surv)
- j. aerial reconnaissance; and (recce)
- ~~by electronic support measures.~~ (same as b)

2. All units (ground, aviation and air) have information collecting capabilities and responsibilities based on a combination of personnel, training and some of the resources mentioned above, in particular, units in contact with or engaging the enemy conduct ~~combat~~ surveillance, and supply information to the system.

ANNEX C
TO SC 2900-1/6
DATED 2 MAY 85

3. To more ~~fully~~ satisfy the urgent and continuous needs of commanders for information pertinent to their area of influence and interest, specially organized and equipped units are included at each level of command.

a. Battle Group

- (1) Reconnaissance Platoons in Mechanized Infantry Battalions; and
- (2) Reconnaissance Troops in Armoured Regiments.

b. Brigade

- (1) Brigade Reconnaissance Squadrons and
- (2) Target Acquisition Batteries of Close Support Medium Regiments.

c. Division

- (1) Division Armoured Reconnaissance Regiments;
- (2) Target Acquisition Battery of the Division Artillery Brigade;
- (3) Light Observation Helicopter (LOH) Squadrons of the Division Tactical Helicopter Wing; and
- (4) Division Electronic Warfare (EW) Squadrons.

d. Corps

- (1) Corps Armoured Cavalry Brigade Group;
- (2) Target Acquisition Regiment of the Corps Artillery Division;
- (3) Corps EW Regiment;
- (4) LOH Squadrons and EW Aviation Squadron in the Corps Tactical Helicopter Group;
- (5) Corps Special Forces Squadron; and
- (6) Air Reconnaissance provided by Tactical Air Forces.

4. The ~~Combat~~ ^A Surveillance system also includes the many organizations whose surveillance or target acquisition capabilities are more directly related to their organic weapon systems. In particular, the air defence system contributes in this manner at brigade, division and corps levels of command.

ANNEX C
TO SC 2900-1/6
DATED 2 MAY 85

807. POLICY AND EXECUTION

1. ^A ~~The~~ ^C Corps commander establishes the surveillance policy for the ^C Corps area and is responsible for its overall coordination, ensuring that there are no gaps between its divisions or between ~~adjacent formations~~ ^(may not be on a flank and may not be a corps) ~~forming Corps~~ and its own areas. ^A ~~The~~ ^C Corps commander also establishes the policy for the employment and control of active surveillance ^(means?) ~~devices~~ ^{including} ~~and~~ ^(white light is active) white light. This is necessary because the uncontrolled use of these devices ~~and white light~~ could reveal valuable information to the enemy. This policy can be best achieved by a ^A ~~Standing~~ ^C Operating ^A Procedure (SOP) establishing stages of control over active devices and white light. Electronic silence, when imposed, should also be reflected at the different stages of control affected by it.

unless

2. Coordination. At each level of command, ~~coordinated~~ planning, resource tasking, information processing and dissemination are ^{and co-ordinated} ~~actioned~~ centrally, while command and control of the majority of resources remains decentralized.

- a. Tasking. Tasking of combat surveillance resources is a command responsibility^M exercised by commanders or their operation staffs at all command levels; and
- b. Planning, Processing and Dissemination. The capabilities for ~~combat~~ surveillance planning and for the processing and dissemination of information are provided in intelligence staffs and line organizations at brigade, division and corps levels of command. *no line org at lde level*

808. PLANNING

1. General. Planning for surveillance is based primarily on the collection plan prepared in support of ^A ~~the~~ ^C Corps commander's PIRs. Planning is done by the G3 staff who are assisted by the G2 staff. Division and brigade commanders will make their surveillance plan within the framework of the higher commander's ^{policy} ~~plan~~. Their plan will take account of the following:

- a. the need for a separate and centrally controlled surveillance force - this depends on the extent and nature of surveillance tasks, the forces and means available and the co-ordination difficulties which would otherwise be encountered;

ANNEX C
TO SC 2900-1/6
DATED 2 MAY 85

- b. areas such as off-load points, major junctions, crossing sites, assembly areas, enemy axis, own boundaries, and gaps which require particular surveillance;
 - c. information which may be provided by higher or adjacent formations, eg, the higher formation in surveying its area of influence is covering its subordinate formations' areas of interest;
 - d. the use of deception to disguise surveillance activities and hence one's intentions;
 - e. restrictions that are to be placed on active means, particularly illumination and electronic support measures, in order to avoid detection by the enemy;
 - f. allocation of resources.
2. It is only at battle group level that a ^(delete? higher in policy) detailed surveillance plan is prepared and co-ordinated, but the battle group commander can expect direction on:

- a. the important areas over which he must provide surveillance.
 - b. the corps policy for the use of active surveillance devices ~~and wire light~~.
 - c. any additional resources that may be available.
 - d. ^{Co}-ordination between battle groups.
3. Tasking. Surveillance tasks are included in the Surveillance Annex to ^CCorps and ^DDivision Orders. Normally subordinate formations and units receive direction from the tasking paragraph, ^(could be an ops instr. freq 0, etc) ~~in the operation order~~. (See table ___ for the development of the Corps Surveillance Plan.)

809. CONDUCT

1. Although surveillance is maintained throughout the area of responsibility, it may be necessary to increase the degree of surveillance at certain times and at specific locations depending upon the situation. For example, good weather conditions could lead to more intense surveillance of likely enemy drop zones.
2. Surveillance tasks must be adjusted once formations or units have redeployed.

ANNEX C
 TO SC 2900-1/6
 DATED 2 MAY 85

The following diagram illustrates how the ^CCorps ^DSurveillance Plan is developed.

↑

Again, is it a corps policy or a corps plan?

LEVEL	PLANNING (Read Down)	CO-ORDINATION (Read Up)
CORPS	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Develop Corps Surveillance Plan. 2. Establishes policy on use of active surveillance devices and white light. 3. Establishes EW policy. 4. Assign task and resources to divisions. 5. Issue Surveillance Plan as Annex to OPs Order. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Co-ordinate divisions surveillance plans. 2. Co-ordinate division illumination plans (if required). 3. Allot additional resources or change tasking (if required).
DIVISION	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Develop Division Surveillance Plan. 2. Sub-allot tasks and resources to brigades. 3. Prepare patrol task table (if required). 4. Request additional resources (if required). 5. Issue Surveillance Plan as Annex to OPs Order. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Co-ordinate brigades surveillance plans. 2. Co-ordinate brigades illumination plans (if required). 3. Allot additional resources or change tasking (if required). 4. Consolidate division surveillance plan and forward it to Corps.
BRIGADE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Develop Brigade Surveillance Plan. 2. Sub-allot tasks and resources to units. 3. Prepare own patrol task table based on Division tasks. 4. Request additional resources (if required). 5. Include surveillance tasking in the OPs order. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Co-ordinate units surveillance plans. 2. Co-ordinate units illumination plans (if required). 3. Allot additional resources or change tasking (if required). 4. Consolidate brigade surveillance plan and forward it to division.
UNIT	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Develop detailed unit Surveillance Plan. 2. Request additional resources (if required). 3. Prepare <u>illumination plan</u> (if required) <i>(not previously mentioned)</i> 4. Forward unit Surveillance Plan to brigade HQ. 	

This figure (with some underlining) is very useful.

Figure 8-1: DEVELOPMENT OF THE CORPS SURVEILLANCE PLAN

2900-1 B ca 301 w/FP001

PA
2900-1 (DLCD 6)
10 May 1985
w/o encl.

Canadian Forces School of
Military Engineering
Canadian Forces Base Chilliwack
Chilliwack, BC
VOX 2E0

Attention: Maj D.M. Kennedy

REVIEW OF CHAPTER 16
CFP 301 SECOND DRAFT

Reference: CFSME 2900-1 (SME) 4 Mar 85

1. Many thanks for your interest and comments regarding the proposed chapter on the crossing and breaching of obstacles. I have enclosed a copy of the reference on which I have made marginal notes to indicate the disposition of your comments.

2. I do not share your enthusiasm for airmobile insertion as perhaps the best way to seize the intermediate objectives. Certainly, this is a possible option either alone or in conjunction with other assault forces, but it has the following limitations:

- a. a Canadian corps with integral aviation resources is only capable of lifting one battalion;
- b. landing sites in proximity to the obstacle and intermediate objectives would be well covered by the enemy - our doctrine sees airmobile operations being conducted forward of the FLOT only in undefended or lightly defended areas;
- c. airmobile operations take considerable time to mount; and
- d. airmobile operations may be limited or impossible due to inclement weather, aircraft availability or absence of suitable landing zones.

.../2

This is not to say we should rule out airmobile operations altogether, however, we should be careful not to overstress this option. As well, dismounted infantry, supported by amphibians, man portable weapons, artillery, CAS, and attack helicopters are fully capable of conducting a 4 km or even a 10 km assault. Ideally they should be supported by whatever tanks can be got across the obstacle and by tanks on the near side.

3. We are not adopting the "Wasser Zone" concept in which the commander of the crossing zone, normally an engineer, commands all forces within an area the depth of which is much larger than the proposed crossing area. Our approach is a functional one, ie, the assault force commander does the assault; the engineer commander gets the subsequent forces across, the commander of the force in place provides support, the TCO controls traffic and the bridgehead force and break-out forces execute their assigned tasks. The crossing area delimits the area in which the engineer commander exercises his functional responsibility. All elements within this area are "responsive" to the engineer commander. This approach is different from any existing national approach. Hopefully it will be acceptable to all NATO nations and thereby contribute to interoperability. Incidentally, existing doctrine on this subject is replete with specialized terminology. To promote simplicity, we have avoided introducing unnecessary terms. For this reason, it is preferable to use the general English words "force in place" in preference to the special term "bank group".

4. Chapter 16 will appear as a fourth draft in the interim edition of CFP 301. The doctrine in this chapter will be confirmed or adjusted based on staffing of a similar proposal for ATP 35(A). In the mean time, users of CFP 301 are encouraged to exercise the proposed doctrine to provide further validation.

5. Again, many thanks for your observations. Please examine the fourth draft, which will be published in Jun, and offer any comments you deem appropriate.

R.S. Billings
R.S. Billings
Colonel

Director Land Combat Development
for Chief of the Defence Staff

Enclosure: 1

LCol R.E. Acreman, DLCD 6, 6-3954, jmck

PH

2722-B-00-301-001/FP-001

~~3189-1~~ (CLDO)

24 May 1985

Distribution List

CFP 301 LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE

- References: A. LFCDC Meeting 26 February 1985
B. NDHQ 3189-1 (DLCD) 21 March 1985 NOTAL

1. At Reference A, the Commandant CLFCSC indicated that he was not entirely satisfied with the new manual CFP 301 Land Formations in Battle. Based on this concern, I directed that he and DLCD conduct a joint review of the manual to determine what action was necessary to meet the college's requirement.

2. In Reference B, the Commandant CLFCSC and DLCD made the following recommendations:

- a. the new manual be used as a reference text by the students at CLFCSC;
- b. the old manual, CFP 301(1), not be issued to the students, but be used by the DS, in conjunction with the new manual, to produce precis;
- c. the Commandant CLFCSC ensure the unity of doctrine reflected in the precis;
- d. the new manual be reviewed over the next five years at an annual seminar to be chaired by Commander FMC with selected generals participating; and
- e. the ADTB be directed to investigate the requirement for a manual titled "Battle Group in Battle" to more fully meet the needs of the staff college and to eventually reduce the requirement to produce precis.

3. I approve the first three recommendations. While I agree with the requirement to provide a higher level of review of CFP 301, I feel that this is an appropriate task

.../2

for the LFCDS. Accordingly, I propose to conduct a tactical seminar in Jan 86. The Commandant of CLFCSC has agreed to host this meeting in Kingston and to act as the OPI. He is requested to select dates for the seminar and to recommend a work programme to guide the review. This should be submitted for my approval by 15 Jul 85. Depending upon the progress made in the meeting in Jan, it may be necessary to schedule additional seminars. All members of the LFCDS, as well as CD board chairmen, are invited to participate. The Chairman of the ADTB and DLCD 6 are available to assist CLFCSC with any preparations which may be required.

4. The recommendation concerning a new manual titled "Battle Group in Battle" is a sound idea. I see this as a definite requirement to bridge the gap between formation level doctrine and the individual branch manuals. Therefore, I direct the Chairman of the ADTB, with specific assistance from CLFCSC, to have such a manual produced by June 1986.

G.H.S. Lessard
Major-General
Chief Land Doctrine and Operations
for Chief of the Defence Staff

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3189-1 (DLCD)

(1)

21 March 1985

Distribution List

CFP 301 LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE

Reference: A. LFCDSG Meeting 26 February 1985

1. As directed at reference A, I met with the Commandant CLFCSC on 15 March 1985 to discuss the content, style and target audience of CFP 301 Land Formations in Battle. The staff college position is that the old manual, CFP 301(1) Second Draft (Orange Cover) is a better reference for the college than the new manual (White Cover). The ADTB position is that the new manual is superior in terms of meeting the army's overall requirement, particularly from the standpoint of operations.

2. The Commandant and I agreed that the old manual has more detail, particularly at the battle group level, and thus is more suited to use in teaching at the college. We also agreed that both manuals cover the basic doctrine, although the style of each text is different in that the old manual is more expansive, whereas the new manual is more precise and is aimed at a more experienced audience. The Commandant questioned the hypothesis that the manual should be aimed primarily at formation commanders and their staffs as he feels that this group is unlikely to read the text. He argues that the manual should be written primarily for the students and DS at the college as they are the group which makes the most extensive use of it.

3. As the staff college requires a more detailed treatment of the doctrine, particularly at the battle group level, it may be appropriate to produce an additional CFP titled the Battle Group in Battle. This would take time and possibly delay the introduction of Corps '86 doctrine for one to two years. To rewrite the new manual would cause a similar delay. Another possible solution is to have the staff college produce precis, as it does now, in order to provide the necessary detail for their students. The use of precis entails the risk of distorting the unity of doctrine, however this problem is not insurmountable.

(2)

DLCD

I approve recommendations at para 4.

I do not agree with recommendation at para 5.

If the seminar is the way - perhaps there are other ways - I want it should meet under the chairmanship of C. DO

There is no doubt in my mind that we need a manual Battle Group in Battle
25/3/85

(3) NTF
Docs to speak to Gen Stewart at CDE.
JF

- 2 -

4. The Commandant and I agree that the new manual must be usable at the college and that unity of doctrine is imperative. To achieve this, we recommend the following action:

- OK
- a. the new manual be used as a reference text by the students at CLFCSC;
 - b. the old manual not be issued to the students, but be used by the DS, in conjunction with the new manual, to produce precis;
 - c. the Commandant, CLFCSC ensure the unity of doctrine reflected in precis;
 - d. the new manual be reviewed over the next five years at an annual Doctrine and Tactics Seminar.

NO | 5. To amplify the recommendation at subparagraph 4d, the seminar would be held in January of each year. It should be chaired by the Commander FMC with selected army generals participating. Each seminar would examine a specific topic, ie, offensive operations, defensive operations, crossing and breaching of obstacles, etc, in the new manual, with a view to improving its value as a doctrinal reference. The ADTB, together with the staff college, would be responsible for organizing the seminar.

6. If you agree, I recommend that you seek the approval of the Commander FMC for the seminar approach commencing January 1986. Perhaps the Commander could direct this activity in his closing remarks at CDC XI.

YES | 7. Finally, I recommend that the ADTB be directed to investigate the requirement for a manual titled Battle Group in Battle in order to more fully meet the needs of the staff college and eventually reduce the requirement to produce precis.



R.S. Billings
Colonel

Director Land Combat Development
for Chief of the Defence Staff

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DLCD 6

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE



MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE

CANADIAN LAND FORCES COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

COLLEGE DE COMMANDEMENT ET D'ETAT-MAJOR DES FORCES TERRESTRES CANADIENNES

SC ~~2900-1/6~~

FORT FRONTENAC
KINGSTON, ONTARIO
K7K 2X8

03 May 1985

①

National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0K2

Attention: DLCD 6

MISSION OF A COVERING FORCE

Reference: A. DLCD 31136 292115Z Mar 85
B. CFP 301

✓
DLCD 6
PA
FD No 2700-B-00-301-001/FP-001
DLCD-6
7-05-85

1. CLFCSC does not agree with the statement, "A commander is always told the length of time he must delay, never the percentage of his force he must preserve, aside from what is implicit in avoiding decisive engagement". Our disagreement is with the absolute and categorical nature of the statement. In our view, there will be covering force battles where the gaining of time is not the primary purpose of the battle. Therefore, a degree of delay (time) should not, in those cases, form part of the statement of the mission. Equally, a commander may find that the clearest direction he can give subordinate commanders in regard to the degree he intends to fight the delaying battle, is to state the amount of his force which must be preserved. He may believe it necessary to express that limitation in the mission of the covering force.

2. The purpose of a covering force is not only to delay the enemy, but, because of the magnitude of his armour, to impose a high rate of attrition as early as possible in order to weaken him and reduce the momentum of his attack. (Motherhood). Thus it is necessary to meet the enemy well forward with a strong covering force to watch his moves (reporting), to engage him at every opportunity, to kill him (attrition), to cause delay (gain time) and confuse him with respect to our intention (deception). (Grandmotherhood). The commander must resolve one of two questions, "How long must I delay?" or "What price (loss) am I to pay?".

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-2-

3. Where the primary task of the covering force is to gain time, let the mission specify the minimum time of delay to be imposed. However, if the primary task is attrition of enemy armour, let the mission state "To inflict maximum casualties on the enemy ..." with no specific time limit.

4. When the gaining of time is not the primary issue the problem arises as to what the duration of the battle should be. It cannot be expressed in terms of time. It must be expressed in terms of success over the enemy, loss of our troops or the need to retain sufficient force to undertake depth and reserve missions once the main defensive battle begins. The question is how is the commander to express his concept? It is considered remote that he would state a percentage of force limitation in the mission. More likely, it would be included in his concept of operations. Nonetheless, it is unnecessarily rigid and doctrinaire to preclude such a statement in the mission paragraph. Finally, to rely upon the imperative, "avoid decisive engagement" as a solution to the problem is considered inadequate. The term "decisive engagement" does not allow clear and unequivocal use in orders.



G.T. Service
Colonel
for Commandant

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE



MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE

CANADIAN LAND FORCES COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

COLLEGE DE COMMANDEMENT ET D'ETAT-MAJOR DES FORCES TERRESTRES CANADIENNES

SC 2900-1/6

FORT FRONTENAC
KINGSTON, ONTARIO
K7K 2X8

2 May 1985

National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Ontario
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File No. 722-B-06301-01/FP-001
Dossier No.
DLCD 6

CFP 301 - LAND FORMATIONS IN
BATTLE - SECOND DRAFT (R)

- Reference:
- A. SC 2900-1/6 (Comdt), 15 October 1984
 - B. B-GL-301-000/FP-001, Second Draft, January 1985
 - C. FMC 2910-CFP 301 (DCOS CD), 3 January 1985
 - D. CFP 301(1) Formations in Battle, December 1980

1.(R) CLFCSC comments on the First Draft of CFP 301 which were submitted at reference A, were not adopted except in the case of several editorial/minor Staff Duties corrections.

2.(R) As previously stated, the current draft will not meet the requirements of this College. Our detailed comments, both on the First Draft and as attached on the Second Draft, illustrate our thinking in this regard.

② PA
DLCD 6
13 Jul 87

[Signature]
G.T. Service
Colonel
for Commandant

Attachments:

- Annex A - General Observations
- Annex B - Comment Sheets
- Annex C - Suggested Chapter 8, Security

8 May
000723

Melissa

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ANNEX A
TO SC 2900-1/6 (Comdt)
DATED 2 MAY 85

CFP 301 - SECOND DRAFT

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

1. Although most of the editorial comments submitted on the First Draft of this pamphlet have been incorporated in the Second Draft, comments on the substance of the publication have largely been ignored. As a result the pamphlet is still too general for CLFCSC use as a source document. It appears that the author has intentionally attempted to make our national publication equal in content to ATP-35(A), disregarding our particular requirements based on the size and organization of our army. This is done despite the forward to ATP-35(A) which states "It is understood and accepted that the land force doctrine of any nation may go beyond and expand on ATP-35(A)".
2. If the broadbrush approach to our keystone doctrine manuals is to continue, then the responsible parties must give direction to writers of branch doctrine manuals to pick up the detail that was formerly in the 1980 version of CFP 301(1), Formations in Battle.
3. The pamphlet is too vague to be useful at brigade or division level as it deals with matters which are general in nature and does not treat the specifics of tactics at formation level. Specific charts and diagrams should be included to illustrate and clarify points whenever possible.
4. It is difficult to understand or accept that "fundamentals" change with each rewrite of pamphlets. Surely the basics do not change unless a war proves the old principles wrong or the introduction of a new equipment, such as the machine gun in World War I and later the tank, revolutionizes warfare. Such changes to basic concepts would, in turn, cause considerable revision to all of the specific-to-arm manuals since they were originally based on CFP 301(1), Formations in Battle, 1980.
5. Again, it is felt that this pamphlet would not be a high quality CLFCSC reference source and it does not approach the detail included in CFP 301(1), 1980. In addition, there are many statements which appear to be factual, but, on analysis, are quite debatable. An example, is page 12-12, Article 12.09, paragraph 5 on the point of a narrow front, with less space available, allowing a commander to pass his depth troops through more often. (See Annex B comments)
6. On the CSS aspects of the pamphlet, there is not much on which to observe since there is not much there.

ANNEX A
TO SC 2900-1/6
DATED 2 MAY 85

7. It is difficult to quarrel with the accuracy of the contents of Chapter 22, Operations in an NBC environment since it can almost be considered banal. Thus, it is strongly suggested that the contents of Chapter 7 on Tactical Nuclear Operations as written in CFP 301(1), 1980 be retained in CFP 301, Land Formations in Battle. The 1980 pamphlet contents are positive and informative. Of course, an additional section on Chemical Operations would have to be included. Additionally, using the approach of retaining Chapter 7, CFP 301(1), 1980 contents, would guarantee capturing the necessary nuclear doctrine in terms of the Corps Pulse and the attendant Nuclear Packages and Sub-Packages which are part and parcel of operations at brigade, division and corps levels.

8. Some specific communications comments on the First Draft, which were not included in the Second Draft, have been repeated at Annex B. The major criticism from a Command, Control and Communications point of view is that CFP 301 should describe the characteristics, limitations and responsibilities of each function to be found in a land formation (CA functions, CSA functions). Although the Combat Support functions are engineers, signals, electronic warfare, aviation and intelligence, there is no chapter to describe the signals function. Such a chapter must be included to describe Signals or Communications Support including roles, tasks, characteristics, limitations, command and control and employment (as is done for engineer support and aviation support).

9. All comments at reference A are still valid, and are further emphasized here for clarity:

- a. Article 1204 (Fundamentals). This is still incomplete. The fundamentals of firm base, recce, speed and violence, depth, surprise and reserves are surely still valid. This art has changed in that the key to success is now to maintain "initiative" vice "momentum". These terms have in fact been virtually inter-changed in the second draft, yet the six fundamentals are not included. These must be included here.
- b. Article 1205 (Forms of Manoeuvre). This article must appear with Section 3, The Attack. These are forms of manoeuvre for the attack, not offensive operations in general. Flanking movement is not included, surely a gross omission. The author has copied these from ATP-35(A), a doctrinal manual primarily for Army and Corps. At brigade level, flanking movements will be the norm, hence must be included. Illustrations are essential.

ANNEX A
TO SC 2900-1/6
DATED 2 MAY 85

- c. Article 1206 (General - Advance to Contact). This art (or sect) must incl the "tac rules" described in CFP 301(1), 1980, article 505. This is doctrine. These guidelines must appear here.
- d. One must assume from the heading of this sect that there is no longer an advance in contact. This should be clarified with DLCDC. Specifically, is the term "advance to contact" now all-encompassing for "the advance". The definition in CFP 303(2) Supplement 3 certainly does not indicate that this is so. Hence, clarification is needed.
- e. Article 1209 (Planning)
- (1) Para 3. This must be illustrated similar to fig 5-2 of CFP 301(1), 1980. This should be expanded as well.
 - (2) Para 5. This is still wrong. See Ref A.
 - (3) Para 6. This is very ambiguous, and must be clarified. An illustration is essential, similar to fig 5-1 CFP 301(1), 1980 (corrected).
 - (4) Para 7. The bypass policy is poorly explained and ambiguous. Picketing is not even mentioned. Considerations for determining the policy (para 6, article 506, CFP 301(1), 1980) are not included - they must be. Article 506 CFP 301(1), 1980 gives a much better explanation of this very important aspect of the advance.
- f. Article 1210 (Conduct). Para 6 is confusing. It refers to "protective elms", and then describes how a flank screen would operate. Screens do not "protect".
- g. Conduct measures are not included in this section on the advance. Para 14, article 506 CFP 301(1), 1980 is recommended for inclusion here.
- h. Section 3 (The Attack). As mentioned the forms of manoeuvre with illustrations should be included in this section, as article 1213. In addition, the "tactical rules" at article 513 CFP 301(1), 1980 must be included.
- j. Article 1213 (Types of Attack). Article 511 CFP 301(1), 1980 offers a much better description of the types of attack and should replace this article. The hasty attack description is copied from ATP-35(A).

ANNEX A
TO SC 2900-1/6
DATED 2 MAY 85

- k. Article 1214 (Concept). Second line. Surely the aim is to kill, destroy, make them die, etc. Surrender and withdraw smacks of timidity, not speed and violence. This line must be changed.
- m. Article 1216 (Planning). Para 2 dealing with estimates is all motherhood. Article 512 of CFP 301(1), 1980 (para 1-7 inclusive) is a much better description. Strongly recommend that this article be changed accordingly.

10. As mentioned previously, this manual in its present form is too vague and ambiguous, and lacks the necessary detail and guidance necessary for studying doctrine. Although the author may be aiming at providing guidance to formation commands, this keystone manual does not provide the necessary doctrinal guidance for officers studying on the Canadian Land Forces Staff Course nor for Directing Staff teaching.

11. In comparing this manual to ATP-35(A), the NATO document on tactical doctrine, it is obvious that many portions of this second draft have been copied from ATP-35(A). Notwithstanding the fact that ATP-35(A) is designed for brigade level and above, it obviously refers throughout much more to division and corps level operations. Perhaps this is why there appears to be several vague and unclear aspects in this second draft.

12. Again, it is recommended that the amended Chapter 5 of CFP 301(1), 1980 submitted previously be adopted in lieu of the present Chapter 12 of this manual. If this is not acceptable for whatever reason, then it is strongly recommended that the suggested amendments be incorporated into the manual. As it stands now, Chapter 12 (Offensive Operations) is too inadequate and vague for study purposes on the Canadian Land Forces Staff Course. In summation, it is again strongly recommended that CFP 301(1), 1980 with the necessary amendments, be adopted as the doctrine manual for Land Formations in Battle.

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1		p.x	Table of Contents for Sect 3 of Chap 6 shows terminology change, deleting word "helicopter". Is this accurate?
2		p 1-11, para 1, last sentence	Typographical error. Should read "Pact" vice "Pack".
3		p 1-14, art 108 para 3	Because of its impact on us, I think we should elaborate on the Warsaw Pact sustained operations.
4		p 1-15, last sentence, para 109.2	Typographical error. Should read "Pact" vice "Pack".
5		p 1-21, art 113 para 7	Should also add: g. PGMs h. scatterable mines.
6		p 1-21, para 9	Para 9 implies a <u>defensive</u> scenario whereas it should be written to apply to the defence or offence.
7		p 1-21, art 113 para 9, sub-para e.	Should add the following after tank forces: and Infantry fighting vehicles.
8		Chapter 2	Why is there no PSYOP and no NBC Def Coy in the proposed Corps?
9	Anx A to SC 2900-1/6 d/15 Oct 84 Ser 50	p 2-1 art 202	Comment at ref was not included; should be.

B-1

ANNEX B
 TO SC 2900-1
 DATED 2 MAY
 000729

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
10		Chap 2 Sect 2	Why do we only deal with the artillery at corps level? Should this not include <u>all</u> the artillery within the corps -- ie we should cover division artillery as well as the artillery allotted to support brigades. In para 208 we only cover the functions at corps level. Those at division and brigade are quite different and should be listed as well.
11		p 2-7, art 210 para 1.c.	Insert word "resources" after "automatic data processing". Personnel, hardware and software must be provided and maintained
12		p 2-7, art 210 para 1.e.	Is the intent for Signals to provide adm sp and local defence of Corps Main HQ and Corps Rear HQ? Is this function not to be filled by Signals at Div HQ level and below?
13		p 2-7, art 210	Mention should be made of other Signals organizations at Corps level. In addition to the Corps Signals Brigade, the "Corps troops" organizations require Signals units to provide their means of command and control, including comms and ADP (Corps Arty, Corps Engrs, Corps Avn, Corps Int, COSCOM, Corps Med Gp, Corps Military Police).
14	Ibid Ser 54	p 3-3, art 302 para 4	Comment at ref was not included; should be.
15	Ibid Ser 55	p 3-4, art 303 para 3	Comment at ref was not included; should be.
16		page 3-5	Headquarters - should include Fire Support Co-ordination Centre (FSCC).

B-2

ANNEX B
 TO SC 2900-
 DATED 2 MAY
 000730

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
17	Ibid Ser 48	Table of Contents	Comment at ref (Chapter on communications systems or support) was not included; should be.
18		p 3-29, art 314	This article still fails to address the <u>means</u> of effecting command and control. Some description of the generic types of comms and ADP systems should be included.
19		p 4-1, para 401.1.b.	There is no such thing as a flash ranging system.
20		p 4-9, para 406.9	Disagree that "VLLAD resources are normally allotted 'in support' below division level". I would say normally "under command" below division level.
21		p 4-9/4-10, para 406.11	This para is out of sequence. It should be listed before sub-para 10 "Restrictions".
22		p 4-11, para 408	<p>It would be much more appropriate to list the principles of fire planning as found in 306(1) Interim rather than these so-called "fundamentals". These are not really "fundamentals", just a series of statements. We have overlooked such aspects as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. provide fire support to support the commander's plan; b. concentrate fire on the most important targets; c. achieve surprise.

B-3

ANNEX B
 TO SC. 2900-1
 DATED 2 MAY
 000731

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
23		p 4-12 Table 4-1	This table should go down to unit level as that is where the detailed fire plan is developed. A pamphlet written for brigade staffs should concern itself with the <u>detailed</u> fire plan.
24		p 4-12 Table 4-1	"CB" is the abbreviation for counter-bombardment, not counter-battery.
25		p 4-12 Table 4-1	This table should have arrows going down the left, across the bottom and up the right side indicating the flow of activity in the fire planning process.
26		p 4-13 para 409.2.b. (2)	Delete "Normally neutralization efforts are supported by a dumping programme".
27		p 4-16 Figure 4-1	Why is the EW elm reporting to the FSCC as opposed to reporting to the main Int/Ops cells. Certainly it should not report direct, but instead through an EW LO. If we are going to show this link perhaps we should show links to Ops, Int, Recce, elms, etc.
28		p 5-2, para 503.1.d.	Should read "amphibious bridging".
29		p 5-2, para 4	Change title to "General Engineering Tasks".

ANNEX B
 TO SC 2900-1
 DATED 2 MAY
 000732

B-4

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
30		p 5-2, para 4h	Change to read "support to area decontamination operations; and".
31		p 5-2, para 4	Add a new sub-para j: "denial of materials, equipment, facilities and installations".
32		p 7-7, art 706 para 1	Should add: troops in Contact.
33		p 8-1, Chap 8	Chapter 8 deals with "Security" which is defined in a <u>defensive</u> sense in para 801 (actions taken ... to shield his forces, etc). Yet, reconnaissance and surveillance are not <u>just</u> defensive measures - they are offensive as well. Reconnaissance and surveillance should not therefore be grouped under the "security" blanket.
34		Chapter 8, Sections 1, 2, and 3	To be replaced with proposed Sections 1 and 2.
35		Page 8-4, Chap 8, Sect 2 Para 803.2	Why is para 803.2 entitled "Armoured Reconnaissance" since the para does not discuss <u>armoured</u> reconnaissance?
36		As above	Last sentence should read "particularly artillery and tactical aviation".
37		p 8-5 para 803.5	Long Range Reconnaissance. Is there a Long Range Reconnaissance Company in the Corps. It should be discussed. If there isn't one, we need it.

B-5

ANNEX B
 TO SC 2900-1
 DATED 2 MAY
 000733

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
38		p 8-7, Sect 3	Section 3, "Surveillance", is not nearly comprehensive enough to be of any use whatsoever. What is the surveillance planning process? What are the elements of a surveillance plan? What aspects of surveillance should be in SOPs? etc.
39		p 8-9, art 808 para 1	Why introduce a new term such as PIR (Priority Intelligence Requirements), when we already have one recognizable by all. (EEI - essential elements of information).
40		p 8-10, para 810.2	Surely, this is not the only reason for employing deception? Delete in its entirety.
41		Chapter 8	The discussion on reconnaissance regarding fundamentals, types, etc should not be included in this CFP but in the appropriate Corps/Arm CFP.
42		p 9-11, Figure 9-1	A legend is required to explain the symbology used.
43		p 9-13 Figure 9-2	Referring back to Ser 12, (Figure 4-1), if we are going to establish a link to the FSCC then the FSCC should be included in the EW Cycle.
44		p 11-6, art 1108, last line	Delete "is" insert "are".
45		p 11-10, para 2, line 2	The statement "Items concurred at relatively uniform rates are sent forward routinely" requires explanation, items such as what?

ANNEX B
 TO SC 2900-
 DATED 2 MAY
 000734

B-9

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
46		p 11-10, para 2, last sentence	This sentence states "In turn, these elements deliver to the requesting units rear echelons, normally let in from adm areas". This may be the case that items get delivered to Bech in a BAA; items also might normally go forward bypassing the unit Bech.
47		p 11-10, para 3, line 3	Delete "fwd maint". Insert "fwd repair".
48		p 11-10, para 3, line 8	The term "in-location" is used here and on p 13-49 the term "in-situation" is used (para 1.c. line 1). Can we standardize, term used to be "in situ". If this is unacceptable then "as far fwd as possible" is also suitable. <u>Note</u> : The British Army still uses "in situ". "In situ" is also in Concise Oxford Dictionary, 7th Edition, page 519. Also "in-location" is close to the Op relationship "in loc"!
49		p 11-11, para 4	This is a vague definition of an ECP - suggest they use the definition in the Army Glossary. It should also be stated <u>who</u> establishes and operates an ECP, unit or 2nd line, or both. An ECP is only estb at 1st Line - not "at all frmn levels". Beyond 1st Line backloading is done through a BLP.
50		p 11-11, para 5	First sentence is poorly worded. "Handled in a different manner because of their unique nature", does not sound like Military Writing. Suggest - "There are several exceptions to the normal maint system". The same applies to para 5.c. The repair of telecom eqpt is not "handled" it is "effected", "carried out", "done", or is whatever - but not "handled".

B-7

ANNEX B
 TO SC 2900-
 DATED 2 MA
 000735
 35

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
51	p 11-13, art 1116 para 1, line 5, line 8, line 10	p 11-13, art 116, para 1, line 5, line 8 line 10	Delete "from the CSG", it is redundant. Delete "Parks" insert "Points" (might just as well get the name right!) <u>OFF THE RECORD</u> : This concerns me when authors don't know the correct names for the orgs for which they are writing doctrine! No need for quotation marks on "B" echelon.
		line 12	Delete "Projected CAS rates". Insert "casualty estimates" which is normally accepted terminology.
52		p 11-13, para 2.a. line 5	Rather than "Hels are particulary useful for this task" can we go out on a limb and state that "they are the preferred method when aval"!
53		p 11-14, para 2.f.	<u>Postal</u> - there is also a Postal Section in DISGP SVC BN, ST COY, (See CFP 312/2), DISGP in Battle, Interim 1, page 5-5, para 5.
54		p 11-14, 11-15	Ref states that finance pers and chaplains are in units. Will in fact unit estb come out in war estb manual with these pers incl?
55		p 12-10 para 1208.4	Tasks for field artillery include close support, attrition, counter battery, target acquisition and fire support co-ordination.
56		p 12-12, art 1209, para 5	This para does not seem to make much sense. Surely a narrow front does <u>not</u> allow a Comd to pass his depth tps through more often -- there's less space aval.

ANNEX B
 TO SC 2900-
 DATED 2 MA
 000736
 15

B-8

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
57	Ibid Ser 58	p 12-20, art 1211	Comment at ref was not included; should be.
58		p 12-20, art 1211	The old CFP 301(1) went to considerable effort to define "axis of adv" and centerline, which involved clr the route This is not covered here - in fact "center line" is not incl at all as a con measure seems odd!
59		p 12-25, para 1215.5	Field Artillery - include target acquisiton and fire support co-ordination.
60		p 12-26, para 1215	Tactical Air - include "destruction of enemy positions and equipment" as artillery can neutralize but not necessarily destroy.
61		p 12-35, para 1216.5.k.	Fire Plan. The fire support paragraph in the Second Draft 301(1) (Dec 80), page 5-40 is much more meaningful and useful.
62		p 12-39, para 4	The term "consolidation" seems to be repl for "reorg". Is it? If no, it should be included in the Army Glossary -- it's not..
63		p 12-49, para 1, art 1227	The first sentence is poorly worded and not really of much value anyway. If it must be said -- it should not be couched in a negative sense as it is now -- needs to be revised, "CSS units must have sufficient mobility to provide constant sp to off ops, certain mobile elms may require posn well fwd.

ANNEX B
 TO SC 2900-1
 DATED 2 MAY
 000737

B-9

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
64		p 13-1, para 1301.2 first sentence	Delete "general". What does it mean?
65		p 13-8	What happened to the "fundamentals" of intelligence and offensive action. How can our "fundamentals" change with each re-write of a pamphlet. This will also necessitate changes in such books as 306(1) Interim I page 7-11.
66		p 13-15, para 1306.4	Characteristics include: a. the employment of guards and screens, and b. close, co-ordinated defensive fire.
67		p 13-17, para 1307.4, third line	"them" should read "then".
68		p 13-17, para 1308.1, fourth line	"required" vice "requdired".
69		p 13-25, para 1315, third sentence	Should read "... would deal with them".
70		p 13-29, para 1317.2	"barriers" should read "obstacles".
71		p 13-36/37 para 1322	NBC Considerations. What about <u>offensive</u> measures and plans.

B-10

ANNEX B
 FO SC 2900-1
 DATED 2 MAY
 000738

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
72		p 13-41, para 1325.1 second sentence, 1325.2 and 1325.3	"obstacles" vice "barriers".
73		p 13-42, para 1325.5	I suggest that units must be in protected, defensible positions at the outset.
74		p 14-4, art 1405, para 1, line 7	"Mis-led" is one word -- no hyphen.
75		p 14-13, para 1414.2.d.(2)	"barriers" should read "obstacles".
76		p 14-24, last sentence	This sentence, med sup being left IAW Geneva Convention in place has <u>no</u> place in this book. So what! Delete it. Same thing applies on p 15-14, para 4, second sentence.
77		p 15-4, para 1508.1	"demolitions and barriers" should read "obstacles".
78		p 15-7, para 1513.1.f.	"barriers" should read "obstacles". Delete "and the use of scatterable mines". Scatterable mines are obstacles.
79		p 15-8, para 1513.4	"demolitions" should read "obstacles".

ANNEX B
 TO SC 2900-
 DATED 2 MA
 000739

B-11

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
80	Ibid Ser 61	p 16-9, Sect 2	Comment at ref was not incl; should be.
81		p 16-11, Fig 16-2	The bridge head line should meet the the river at its extremities.
82		p 18-4, para 1805.3	We should separate offensive air support from field artillery support.
83		p 18-4, para 1805.3	Amend to read: "Airlift capacity may limit the number of fire support elements which can be air deployed, however, it is essential, since the airborne forces have limited protection otherwise, that a high priority be assigned to this close support field artillery. FOO parties and FAC must be integrated with the path finder forces and with all elements of the main body.
84		p 18-5, para 1805.3	What is meant by "launchers"? Do we mean multiple launch rockets?
85		Chapter 22	On a number of occasions we employ the abbreviation "NBC" in a paragraph title (eg "Offensive use of NBC Weapons") yet we only mention nuclear and chemical, not biological.
86		p 23-38, para 2321.5	Fire Support. This paragraph is poorly written and virtually meaningless.
87	Ibid Ser 63	General Comments	Neither of the two comments at ref was included. This remains a serious shortfall in this publication.

ANNEX B
 TO SC 2900-
 DATED 2 MA
 000740
 15

B-12

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
88		CFP 301	This CFP should be addressing the specifics of the tactical doctrine for the planning and conduct of land operations at formation level. It does not meet this aim. It should be revised accordingly.

B-13

ANNEX B
TO SC 2900-100
DATED 2 MAR 85
000741

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE



MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE

CANADIAN LAND FORCES COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

COLLEGE DE COMMANDEMENT ET D'ETAT-MAJOR DES FORCES TERRESTRES CANADIENNES

SC 2900-1/6

FORT FRONTENAC
KINGSTON, ONTARIO
K7K 2X8

2 May 1985

National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0K2

(i)

ADMNS/SDM 3-02

Referred to
Transmis à

MAY 7 1985

File No. 722-B-DG-301-001/FP-001
Dossier No.

Charged to/Chargé à

Attention: DLCD 6 ✓

CFP 301 - LAND FORMATIONS IN
BATTLE - SECOND DRAFT (R)

- Reference:
- A. SC 2900-1/6 (Comdt), 15 October 1984
 - B. B-GL-301-000/FP-001, Second Draft, January 1985
 - C. FMC 2910-CFP 301 (DCOS CD), 3 January 1985
 - D. CFP 301(1) Formations in Battle, December 1980

1.(R) CLFCSC comments on the First Draft of CFP 301 which were submitted at reference A, were not adopted except in the case of several editorial/minor Staff Duties corrections.

2.(R) As previously stated, the current draft will not meet the requirements of this College. Our detailed comments, both on the First Draft and as attached on the Second Draft, illustrate our thinking in this regard.

[Signature]
G.T. Service
Colonel
for Commandant

Attachments:

- Annex A - General Observations
- Annex B - Comment Sheets
- Annex C - Suggested Chapter 8, Security

(2) NTF

[Handwritten notes]
Returned
21 May FS.
J. G. H. H. H.
DLCD 6
(63954)
G. M. A. L.
000742

ANNEX A
TO SC 2900-1/6 (Comdt)
DATED 2 MAY 85

CFP 301 - SECOND DRAFT

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

1. Although most of the editorial comments submitted on the First Draft of this pamphlet have been incorporated in the Second Draft, comments on the substance of the publication have largely been ignored. As a result the pamphlet is still too general for CLFCSC use as a source document. It appears that the author has intentionally attempted to make our national publication equal in content to ATP-35(A), disregarding our particular requirements based on the size and organization of our army. This is done despite the foreward to ATP-35(A) which states "It is understood and accepted that the land force doctrine of any nation may go beyond and expand on ATP-35(A)".
2. If the broadbrush approach to our keystone doctrine manuals is to continue, then the responsible parties must give direction to writers of branch doctrine manuals to pick up the detail that was formerly in the 1980 version of CFP 301(1), Formations in Battle.
3. The pamphlet is too vague to be useful at brigade or division level as it deals with matters which are general in nature and does not treat the specifics of tactics at formation level. Specific charts and diagrams should be included to illustrate and clarify points whenever possible.
4. It is difficult to understand or accept that "fundamentals" change with each rewrite of pamphlets. Surely the basics do not change unless a war proves the old principles wrong or the introduction of a new equipment, such as the machine gun in World War I and later the tank, revolutionizes warfare. Such changes to basic concepts would, in turn, cause considerable revision to all of the specific-to-arm manuals since they were originally based on CFP 301(1), Formations in Battle, 1980.
5. Again, it is felt that this pamphlet would not be a high quality CLFCSC reference source and it does not approach the detail included in CFP 301(1), 1980. In addition, there are many statements which appear to be factual, but, on analysis, are quite debatable. An example, is page 12-12, Article 12.09, paragraph 5 on the point of a narrow front, with less space available, allowing a commander to pass his depth troops through more often. (See Annex B comments)
6. On the CSS aspects of the pamphlet, there is not much on which to observe since there is not much there.

ANNEX A
TO SC 2900-1/6
DATED 2 MAY 85

7. It is difficult to quarrel with the accuracy of the contents of Chapter 22, Operations in an NBC environment since it can almost be considered banal. Thus, it is strongly suggested that the contents of Chapter 7 on Tactical Nuclear Operations as written in CFP 301(1), 1980 be retained in CFP 301, Land Formations in Battle. The 1980 pamphlet contents are positive and informative. Of course, an additional section on Chemical Operations would have to be included. Additionally, using the approach of retaining Chapter 7, CFP 301(1), 1980 contents, would guarantee capturing the necessary nuclear doctrine in terms of the Corps Pulse and the attendant Nuclear Packages and Sub-Packages which are part and parcel of operations at brigade, division and corps levels.

8. Some specific communications comments on the First Draft, which were not included in the Second Draft, have been repeated at Annex B. The major criticism from a Command, Control and Communications point of view is that CFP 301 should describe the characteristics, limitations and responsibilities of each function to be found in a land formation (CA functions, CSA functions). Although the Combat Support functions are engineers, signals, electronic warfare, aviation and intelligence, there is no chapter to describe the signals function. Such a chapter must be included to describe Signals or Communications Support including roles, tasks, characteristics, limitations, command and control and employment (as is done for engineer support and aviation support).

9. All comments at reference A are still valid, and are further emphasized here for clarity:

- a. Article 1204 (Fundamentals). This is still incomplete. The fundamentals of firm base, recce, speed and violence, depth, surprise and reserves are surely still valid. This art has changed in that the key to success is now to maintain "initiative" vice "momentum". These terms have in fact been virtually inter-changed in the second draft, yet the six fundamentals are not included. These must be included here.
- b. Article 1205 (Forms of Manoeuvre). This article must appear with Section 3, The Attack. These are forms of manoeuvre for the attack, not offensive operations in general. Flanking movement is not included, surely a gross omission. The author has copied these from ATP-35(A), a doctrinal manual primarily for Army and Corps. At brigade level, flanking movements will be the norm, hence must be included. Illustrations are essential.

ANNEX A

TO SC 2900-1/6

DATED 2 MAY 85

- c. Article 1206 (General - Advance to Contact). This art (or sect) must incl the "tac rules" described in CFP 301(1), 1980, article 505. This is doctrine. These guidelines must appear here.
- d. One must assume from the heading of this sect that there is no longer an advance in contact. This should be clarified with DLCD. Specifically, is the term "advance to contact" now all-encompassing for "the advance". The definition in CFP 303(2) Supplement 3 certainly does not indicate that this is so. Hence, clarification is needed.
- e. Article 1209 (Planning)
 - (1) Para 3. This must be illustrated similar to fig 5-2 of CFP 301(1), 1980. This should be expanded as well.
 - (2) Para 5. This is still wrong. See Ref A.
 - (3) Para 6. This is very ambiguous, and must be clarified. An illustration is essential, similar to fig 5-1 CFP 301(1), 1980 (corrected).
 - (4) Para 7. The bypass policy is poorly explained and ambiguous. Picketting is not even mentioned. Considerations for determining the policy (para 6, article 506, CFP 301(1), 1980) are not included - they must be. Article 506 CFP 301(1), 1980 gives a much better explanation of this very important aspect of the advance.
- f. Article 1210 (Conduct). Para 6 is confusing. It refers to "protective elms", and then describes how a flank screen would operate. Screens do not "protect".
- g. Conduct measures are not included in this section on the advance. Para 14, article 506 CFP 301(1), 1980 is recommended for inclusion here.
- h. Section 3 (The Attack). As mentioned the forms of manoeuvre with illustrations should be included in this section, as article 1213. In addition, the "tactical rules" at article 513 CFP 301(1), 1980 must be included.
- j. Article 1213 (Types of Attack). Article 511 CFP 301(1), 1980 offers a much better description of the types of attack and should replace this article. The hasty attack description is copied from ATP-35(A).

ANNEX A
TO SC 2900-1/6
DATED 2 MAY 85

- k. Article 1214 (Concept). Second line. Surely the aim is to kill, destroy, make them die, etc. Surrender and withdraw smacks of timidity, not speed and violence. This line must be changed.
- m. Article 1216 (Planning). Para 2 dealing with estimates is all motherhood. Article 512 of CFP 301(1), 1980 (para 1-7 inclusive) is a much better description. Strongly recommend that this article be changed accordingly.

10. As mentioned previously, this manual in its present form is too vague and ambiguous, and lacks the necessary detail and guidance necessary for studying doctrine. Although the author may be aiming at providing guidance to formation commands, this keystone manual does not provide the necessary doctrinal guidance for officers studying on the Canadian Land Forces Staff Course nor for Directing Staff teaching.

11. In comparing this manual to ATP-35(A), the NATO document on tactical doctrine, it is obvious that many portions of this second draft have been copied from ATP-35(A). Notwithstanding the fact that ATP-35(A) is designed for brigade level and above, it obviously refers throughout much more to division and corps level operations. Perhaps this is why there appears to be several vague and unclear aspects in this second draft.

12. Again, it is recommended that the amended Chapter 5 of CFP 301(1), 1980 submitted previously be adopted in lieu of the present Chapter 12 of this manual. If this is not acceptable for whatever reason, then it is strongly recommended that the suggested amendments be incorporated into the manual. As it stands now, Chapter 12 (Offensive Operations) is too inadequate and vague for study purposes on the Canadian Land Forces Staff Course. In summation, it is again strongly recommended that CFP 301(1), 1980 with the necessary amendments, be adopted as the doctrine manual for Land Formations in Battle.

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1		p.x	Table of Contents for Sect 3 of Chap 6 shows terminology change, deleting word "helicopter". Is this accurate?
2		p 1-11, para 1, last sentence	Typographical error. Should read "Pact" vice "Pack".
3		p 1-14, art 108 para 3	Because of its impact on us, I think we should elaborate on the Warsaw Pact sustained operations.
4		p 1-15, last sentence, para 109.2	Typographical error. Should read "Pact" vice "Pack".
5		p 1-21, art 113 para 7	Should also add: g. PGMs h. scatterable mines.
6		p 1-21, para 9	Para 9 implies a <u>defensive</u> scenario whereas it should be written to apply to the defence or offence.
7		p 1-21, art 113 para 9, sub-para e.	Should add the following after tank forces: and Infantry fighting vehicles.
8		Chapter 2	Why is there no PSYOP and no NBC Def Coy in the proposed Corps?
9	Anx A to SC 2900-1/6 d/15 Oct 84 Ser 50	p 2-1 art 202	Comment at ref was not included; should be.

B-1

ANNEX B
TO SC 2900-
DATED 2 MA
000747

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
10		Chap 2 Sect 2	Why do we only deal with the artillery at corps level? Should this not include <u>all</u> the artillery within the corps -- ie we should cover division artillery as well as the artillery allotted to support brigades. In para 208 we only cover the functions at corps level. Those at division and brigade are quite different and should be listed as well.
11		p 2-7, art 210 para 1.c.	Insert word "resources" after "automatic data processing". Personnel, hardware and software must be provided and maintained
12		p 2-7, art 210 para 1.e.	Is the intent for Signals to provide adm sp and local defence of Corps Main HQ and Corps Rear HQ? Is this function not to be filled by Signals at Div HQ level and below?
13		p 2-7, art 210	Mention should be made of other Signals organizations at Corps level. In addition to the Corps Signals Brigade, the "Corps troops" organizations require Signals units to provide their means of command and control, including comms and ADP (Corps Arty, Corps Engrs, Corps Avn, Corps Int, COSCOM, Corps Med Gp, Corps Military Police).
14	Ibid Ser 54	p 3-3, art 302 para 4	Comment at ref was not included; should be.
15	Ibid Ser 55	p 3-4, art 303 para 3	Comment at ref was not included; should be.
16		page 3-5	Headquarters - should include Fire Support Co-ordination Centre (FSCC).

B-2

ANNEX B
TO SC 2900-1
DATED 2 MAY 5
000748

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
17	Ibid Ser 48	Table of Contents	Comment at ref (Chapter on communications systems or support) was not included; should be.
18		p 3-29, art 314	This article still fails to address the <u>means</u> of effecting command and control. Some description of the generic types of comms and ADP systems should be included.
19		p 4-1, para 401.1.b.	There is no such thing as a flash ranging system.
20		p 4-9, para 406.9	Disagree that "VLLAD resources are normally allotted 'in support' below division level". I would say normally "under command" below division level.
21		p 4-9/4-10, para 406.11	This para is out of sequence. It should be listed before sub-para 10 "Restrictions".
22		p 4-11, para 408	<p>It would be much more appropriate to list the principles of fire planning as found in 306(1) Interim rather than these so-called "fundamentals". These are not really "fundamentals", just a series of statements. We have overlooked such aspects as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. provide fire support to support the commander's plan; b. concentrate fire on the most important targets; c. achieve surprise.

B-3

ANNEX B
TO SC 2900-
DATED 2 M/ 8
000749

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
23		p 4-12 Table 4-1	This table should go down to unit level as that is where the detailed fire plan is developed. A pamphlet written for brigade staffs should concern itself with the <u>detailed</u> fire plan.
24		p 4-12 Table 4-1	"CB" is the abbreviation for counter-bombardment, not counter-battery.
25		p 4-12 Table 4-1	This table should have arrows going down the left, across the bottom and up the right side indicating the flow of activity in the fire planning process.
26		p 4-13 para 409.2.b. (2)	Delete "Normally neutralization efforts are supported by a dumping programme".
27		p 4-16 Figure 4-1	Why is the EW elm reporting to the FSCC as opposed to reporting to the main Int/Ops cells. Certainly it should not report direct, but instead through an EW LO. If we are going to show this link perhaps we should show links to Ops, Int, Recce, elms, etc.
28		p 5-2, para 503.1.d.	Should read "amphibious bridging".
29		p 5-2, para 4	Change title to "General Engineering Tasks".

ANNEX B
 TO SC 2900-
 DATED 2 MAY
 000750

B-4

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
30		p 5-2, para 4h	Change to read "support to area decontamination operations; and".
31		p 5-2, para 4	Add a new sub-para j: "denial of materials, equipment, facilities and installations".
32		p 7-7, art 706 para 1	Should add: troops in Contact.
33		p 8-1, Chap 8	Chapter 8 deals with "Security" which is defined in a <u>defensive</u> sense in para 801 (actions taken ... to shield his forces, etc). Yet, reconnaissance and surveillance are not <u>just</u> defensive measures - they are offensive as well. Reconnaissance and surveillance should not therefore be grouped under the "security" blanket.
34		Chapter 8, Sections 1, 2, and 3	To be replaced with proposed Sections 1 and 2.
35		Page 8-4, Chap 8, Sect 2 Para 803.2	Why is para 803.2 entitled "Armoured Reconnaissance" since the para does not discuss <u>armoured</u> reconnaissance?
36		As above	Last sentence should read "particularly artillery and tactical aviation".
37		p 8-5 para 803.5	Long Range Reconnaissance. Is there a Long Range Reconnaissance Company in the Corps. It should be discussed. If there isn't one, we need it.

B-5

ANNEX B
 TO SC 2900-
 DATED 2 MAY 1985
 000751

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
38		p 8-7, Sect 3	Section 3, "Surveillance", is not nearly comprehensive enough to be of any use whatsoever. What is the surveillance planning process? What are the elements of a surveillance plan? What aspects of surveillance should be in SOPs? etc.
39		p 8-9, art 808 para 1	Why introduce a new term such as PIR (Priority Intelligence Requirements), when we already have one recognizable by all. (EEI - essential elements of information).
40		p 8-10, para 810.2	Surely, this is not the only reason for employing deception? Delete in its entirety.
41		Chapter 8	The discussion on reconnaissance regarding fundamentals, types, etc should not be included in this CFP but in the appropriate Corps/Arm CFP.
42		p 9-11, Figure 9-1	A legend is required to explain the symbology used.
43		p 9-13 Figure 9-2	Referring back to Ser 12, (Figure 4-1), if we are going to establish a link to the FSCC then the FSCC should be included in the EW Cycle.
44		p 11-6, art 1108, last line	Delete "is" insert "are".
45		p 11-10, para 2, line 2	The statement "Items concurred at relatively uniform rates are sent forward routinely" requires explanation, items such as what?

ANNEX B
 TO SC 2900-000
 DATED 2 MAY 000752

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
46		p 11-10, para 2, last sentence	This sentence states "In turn, these elements deliver to the requesting units rear echelons, normally let in from adm areas". This may be the case that items get delivered to Bech in a BAA; items also might normally go forward bypassing the unit Bech.
47		p 11-10, para 3, line 3	Delete "fwd maint". Insert "fwd repair".
48		p 11-10, para 3, line 8	The term "in-location" is used here and on p 13-49 the term "in-situation" is used (para 1.c. line 1). Can we standardize, term used to be "in situ". If this is unacceptable then "as far fwd as possible" is also suitable. <u>Note:</u> The British Army still uses "in situ". "In situ" is also in Concise Oxford Dictionary, 7th Edition, page 519. Also "in-location" is close to the Op relationship "in loc"!
49		p 11-11, para 4	This is a vague definition of an ECP - suggest they use the definition in the Army Glossary. It should also be stated <u>who</u> establishes and operates an ECP, unit or 2nd line, or both. An ECP is only estb at 1st Line - not "at all frmn levels". Beyond 1st Line backloading is done through a BLP.
50		p 11-11, para 5	First sentence is poorly worded. "Handled in a different manner because of their unique nature", does not sound like Military Writing. Suggest - "There are several exceptions to the normal maint system". The same applies to para 5.c. The repair of telecom eqpt is not "handled" it is "effected", "carried out", "done", or is whatever - but not "handled".

B-7

ANNEX B
 TO SC 2900
 DATED 2 MAR 1983
 000753

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
51	p 11-13, art 1116 para 1, line 5, line 8, line 10	p 11-13, art 116, para 1, line 5, line 8 line 10 line 12	Delete "from the CSG", it is redundant. Delete "Parks" insert "Points" (might just as well get the name right!) <u>OFF THE RECORD</u> : This concerns me when authors don't know the correct names for the orgs for which they are writing doctrine!) No need for quotation marks on "B" echelon. Delete "Projected CAS rates". Insert "casualty estimates" which is normally accepted terminology.
52		p 11-13, para 2.a. line 5	Rather than "Hels are particulary useful for this task" can we go out on a limb and state that "they are the preferred method when aval"!
53		p 11-14, para 2.f.	<u>Postal</u> - there is also a Postal Section in DISGP SVC BN, ST COY, (See CFP 312/2), DISGP in Battle, Interim 1, page 5-5, para 5.
54		p 11-14, 11-15	Ref states that finance pers and chaplains are in units. Will in fact unit estb come out in war estb manual with these pers incl?
55		p 12-10 para 1208.4	Tasks for field artillery include close support, attrition, counter battery, target acquisition and fire support co-ordination.
56		p 12-12, art 1209, para 5	This para does not seem to make much sense. Surely a narrow front does <u>not</u> allow a Comd to pass his depth tps through more often -- there's less space aval.

ANNEX B
 TO SC 2900
 DATED 2 MARCH
 000754
 8 6

B-8

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
57	Ibid Ser 58	p 12-20, art 1211	Comment at ref was not included; should be.
58		p 12-20, art 1211	The old CFP 301(1) went to considerable effort to define "axis of adv" and centerline, which involved clr the route This is not covered here - in fact "center line" is not incl at all as a con measure seems odd!
59		p 12-25, para 1215.5	Field Artillery - include target acquisiton and fire support co-ordination.
60		p 12-26, para 1215	Tactical Air - include "destruction of enemy positions and equipment" as artillery can neutralize but not necessarily destroy.
61		p 12-35, para 1216.5.k.	Fire Plan. The fire support paragraph in the Second Draft 301(1) (Dec 80), page 5-40 is much more meaningful and useful.
62		p 12-39, para 4	The term "consolidation" seems to be repl for "reorg". Is it? If no, it should be included in the Army Glossary -- it's not..
63		p 12-49, para 1, art 1227	The first sentence is poorly worded and not really of much value anyway. If it must be said -- it should not be couched in a negative sense as it is now -- needs to be revised, "CSS units must have sufficient mobility to provide constant sp to off ops, certain mobile elms may require posn well fwd.

ANNEX B
 FO SC 2900-
 DATED 2 MAY
 000755

B-9

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
64		p 13-1, para 1301.2 first sentence	Delete "general". What does it mean?
65		p 13-8	What happened to the "fundamentals" of intelligence and offensive action. How can our "fundamentals" change with each re-write of a pamphlet. This will also necessitate changes in such books as 306(1) Interim I page 7-11.
66		p 13-15, para 1306.4	Characteristics include: a. the employment of guards and screens, and b. close, co-ordinated defensive fire.
67		p 13-17, para 1307.4, third line	"them" should read "then".
68		p 13-17, para 1308.1, fourth line	"required" vice "requdired".
69		p 13-25, para 1315, third sentence	Should read "... would deal with them".
70		p 13-29, para 1317.2	"barriers" should read "obstacles".
71		p 13-36/37 para 1322	NBC Considerations. What about <u>offensive</u> measures and plans.

B-10

ANNEX B
 TO SC 2900-
 DATED 2 MA 15
 000756

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
72		p 13-41, para 1325.1 second sentence, 1325.2 and 1325.3	"obstacles" vice "barriers".
73		p 13-42, para 1325.5	I suggest that units must be in protected, defensible positions at the outset.
74		p 14-4, art 1405, para 1, line 7	"Mis-led" is one word -- no hyphen.
75		p 14-13, para 1414.2.d.(2)	"barriers" should read "obstacles".
76		p 14-24, last sentence	This sentence, med sup being left IAW Geneva Convention in place has <u>no</u> place in this book. So what! Delete it. Same thing applies on p 15-14, para 4, second sentence.
77		p 15-4, para 1508.1	"demolitions and barriers" should read "obstacles".
78		p 15-7, para 1513.1.f.	"barriers" should read "obstacles". Delete "and the use of scatterable mines". Scatterable mines are obstacles.
79		p 15-8, para 1513.4	"demolitions" should read "obstacles".

B-11

ANNEX B
 TO SC 2900
 DATED 2 M.
 000757

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
80	Ibid Ser 61	p 16-9, Sect 2	Comment at ref was not incl; should be.
81		p 16-11, Fig 16-2	The bridge head line should meet the the river at its extremities.
82		p 18-4, para 1805.3	We should separate offensive air support from field artillery support.
83		p 18-4, para 1805.3	Amend to read: "Airlift capacity may limit the number of fire support elements which can be air deployed, however, it is essential, since the airborne forces have limited protection otherwise, that a high priority be assigned to this close support field artillery. FOO parties and FAC must be integrated with the path finder forces and with all elements of the main body.
84		p 18-5, para 1805.3	What is meant by "launchers"? Do we mean multiple launch rockets?
85		Chapter 22	On a number of occasions we employ the abbreviation "NBC" in a paragraph title (eg "Offensive use of NBC Weapons") yet we only mention nuclear and chemical, not biological.
86		p 23-38, para 2321.5	Fire Support. This paragraph is poorly written and virtually meaningless.
87	Ibid Ser 63	General Comments	Neither of the two comments at ref was included. This remains a serious shortfall in this publication.

ANNEX B
 TO SC 2900
 DATED 2 M 85
 000758

B-12

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT	COMMENTS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
88		CFP 301	This CFP should be addressing the specifics of the tactical doctrine for the planning and conduct of land operations at formation level. It does not meet this aim. It should be revised accordingly.

B-13

ANNEX B
TO SC 2900
DATED 2 N 000759
/6
8

CHAPTER 8

SECURITY

SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION

801. GENERAL

1. Security is a condition which results from actions taken by a commander to shield his force against any enemy act or influence. It enables a commander to maintain his freedom of action and to safeguard his force for its mission. Every commander is responsible for the security of his force.
2. Security is achieved through combat surveillance, deception, protective measures and counter-intelligence (CI). These activities encompass a wide range of measures, techniques and procedures, which are designed to deny information to or deceive an enemy. Therefore, it is important that these be co-ordinated, as disclosure of information in one area could compromise efforts in other areas. Moreover, all activities in support of security must complement one another. Their collective effectiveness must be assessed constantly and, if practicable, monitored.
3. The doctrine for rear area security is stated in Chapter 15 of CFP 300, The Army.

SECTION 2 - COMBAT SURVEILLANCE

802. GENERAL

1. The Combat Surveillance system includes the personnel, equipment, and command and control procedures required to maintain a continuous and systematic 24 hour-a-day, all weather watch -- both air and surface -- over the battle area. Through this watch, the system acquires the information essential in the production of timely and accurate combat intelligence -- the knowledge of the enemy, weather and geographical factors required by a commander in the planning and conduct of tactical operations.
2. Combat Surveillance applies to all operations of war. However, the agencies and the equipment required for its application will vary depending on the type of operations.

803. TACTICAL FUNCTIONS

1. The Combat Surveillance system encompasses the functions of reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition. It has two purposes. First it provides information from which a major operation can be planned and executed. Second, it provides the information that gives early warning of any changes in the situation that may endanger the force. Reconnaissance protects own troops against surprise. Forces engaged in reconnaissance attempt to discover the type, strength, organization and deployment of an enemy, in addition to his direction and rate of movement. They try to locate troop concentrations, gun positions, nuclear delivery means, command posts, communication centres, barriers, logistic installations, etc. They also reconnoitre ground to determine information such as suitability of routes and axes of advance, crossing sites and battle positions.

2. Surveillance. The purpose of surveillance is to acquire information by maintaining a watch over the battlefield. It is defined as the continuous, day and night, all weather, systematic observation of the battle area, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. Like reconnaissance, surveillance contributes to the production of intelligence and helps to maintain security.

3. Target Acquisition. The purpose of target acquisition is to detect, identify, and locate a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective employment of weapons.

4. The reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition aspects of Combat Surveillance operations are satisfied within an integrated concept which is directly related to:

- a. the level of command; and
- b. the information requirement (ie, its nature and intended use).

804. LEVEL OF COMMAND

1. In the operational concept for Combat Surveillance, the spectrum of tasks is allocated and undertaken in a manner which best satisfies the particular information and target acquisition needs of commanders. The capability requirements of the system are thus related to levels of command -- and, more specifically to the areas of interest and areas of influence of the various levels:

ANNEX C
TO SC 2900-1/6
DATED 2 MAY 85

a. Area of Interest. The area of interest of a commander is that concerned with the objectives of current or planned operations and includes the area occupied by the enemy forces which could affect them. This area is related both to enemy deployments and to the time needed by a commander to receive information and react to it. The information provided by the Combat Surveillance system for the area of interest must enable the commander to make accurate and timely estimates of likely enemy actions and to retain or regain the initiative.

b. Area of Influence. The area of influence is the area in which a commander can directly influence operations by the manoeuvre of his forces or by delivery of firepower with the weapon systems normally under his command and control. The Combat Surveillance system must provide a target acquisition capability appropriate to the area of influence of each command level.

2. In order to satisfy the combat surveillance needs of the different levels of command, specific responsibilities are allocated within the operational concept, and collection means are organized and allocated accordingly. Each level of command has, as its primary combat surveillance responsibility, the collection of information pertinent to its area of influence. While the various command levels will also possess a limited capability to gather information in their areas of interest, it is the responsibility of the next higher level to satisfy the balance of these information requirements through collection efforts in its area of influence. The appropriate areas of interest and influence applicable to the Corps for defensive operations are as follows:

	<u>Area of Influence</u>	<u>Area of Interest</u>
Battle Group	Up to 5 km	
Brigade	Up to 15 km	Up to 70 km
Division	Up to 70 km	Up to 150 km
Corps	Up to 150 km	Up to 300 km

ANNEX C
TO SC 2900-1/6
DATED 2 MAY 85

805. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

1. In view of the nature of the information required, the activities of the combat surveillance system can be grouped into four general task classifications: area surveillance; reconnaissance in depth; reconnaissance to line-of-sight (LOS); and target acquisition. Because of the scope of use to which information can be applied at the different command levels, there will be considerable overlap between the tasks.

2. Area Surveillance. Continuous area surveillance gives coarse-grained information on the enemy (coarse-grained is defined as detection, general location and possibly recognition).

It will be used:

- a. to provide up-to-date general information on enemy deployment and activities to enable enemy intentions to be deduced, timely decisions taken, and appropriate reactions executed;
- b. to cue reconnaissance resources with a capability for acquiring fine-grained information (fine-grained being defined as recognition, locations and possibly identification);
- c. to provide security through early warning of enemy activities in gaps, on flanks or in rear areas; and
- d. to assist in planning indirect fire.

3. Reconnaissance in Depth. Reconnaissance in depth provides fine-grained information beyond line of sight (LOS). It will frequently be cued by area surveillance or intelligence deductions and is required:

- a. to identify the composition of enemy forces to enable enemy capabilities and intentions to be confirmed and decisions on allocation of fire to be taken as appropriate;
- b. to acquire targets for air and ground-based indirect fire weapon systems; and
- c. to locate specific units or elements.

4. Reconnaissance and Surveillance to LOS. Detailed reconnaissance and surveillance to LOS satisfies requirements for both combat information and target acquisition.

5. Target Acquisition. Target acquisition enables enemy weapon systems and high value assets (eg, HQs and logistics installations) to be engaged and either destroyed or suppressed. It also contributes information as follows:

- a. Target Acquisition for Direct Fire Weapons. Target acquisition for direct fire weapons are normally associated with the weapon. These means will also provide combat information on the enemy which has been detected and located.
- b. Target Acquisition for Indirect Fire Weapons. Target acquisition for indirect fire weapons is also used for area surveillance, reconnaissance in depth or reconnaissance to LOS (and vice versa).

806. RESOURCES

1. Within, or available to the Corps, the following resources can be used to maintain combat surveillance:

- a. reconnaissance elements at Corps, division, brigade and units levels;
- b. electronic support measures;
- c. observation posts;
- d. all types of patrols;
- e. fire controllers and artillery observers parties;
- f. helicopters;
- g. locating devices - sound ranging, drones, counter-mortar radars;
- h. surveillance devices;
- j. aerial reconnaissance; and
- k. electronic support measures.

2. All units (ground, aviation and air) have information collecting capabilities and responsibilities based on a combination of personnel, training and some of the resources mentioned above, in particular, units in contact with or engaging the enemy conduct combat surveillance, and supply information to the system.

ANNEX C
TO SC 2900-1/6
DATED 2 MAY 85

3. To more fully satisfy the urgent and continuous needs of commanders for information pertinent to their area of influence and interest, specially organized and equipped units are included at each level of command.

a. Battle Group

- (1) Reconnaissance Platoons in Mechanized Infantry Battalions; and
- (2) Reconnaissance Troops in Armoured Regiments.

b. Brigade

- (1) Brigade Reconnaissance Squadrons and
- (2) Target Acquisition Batteries of Close Support Medium Regiments.

c. Division

- (1) Division Armoured Reconnaissance Regiments;
- (2) Target Acquisition Battery of the Division Artillery Brigade;
- (3) Light Observation Helicopter (LOH) Squadrons of the Division Tactical Helicopter Wing; and
- (4) Division Electronic Warfare (EW) Squadrons.

d. Corps

- (1) Corps Armoured Cavalry Brigade Group;
- (2) Target Acquisition Regiment of the Corps Artillery Division;
- (3) Corps EW Regiment;
- (4) LOH Squadrons and EW Aviation Squadron in the Corps Tactical Helicopter Group;
- (5) Corps Special Forces Squadron; and
- (6) Air Reconnaissance provided by Tactical Air Forces.

4. The Combat Surveillance system also includes the many organizations whose surveillance or target acquisition capabilities are more directly related to their organic weapon systems. In particular, the air defence system contributes in this manner at brigade, division and corps levels of command.

807. POLICY AND EXECUTION

1. The Corps commander establishes the surveillance policy for the Corps area and is responsible for its overall coordination, ensuring that there are no gaps between its divisions or between flanking Corps and its own areas. The Corps commander also establishes the policy for the employment and control of active surveillance devices and white light. This is necessary because the uncontrolled use of these devices and white light could reveal valuable information to the enemy. This policy can be best achieved by a Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) establishing stages of control over active devices and white light. Electronic silence, when imposed, should also be reflected at the different stages of control affected by it.

2. Coordination. At each level of command, coordinated planning resource tasking, information processing and dissemination are actioned centrally, while command and control of the majority of resources remains decentralized.

- a. Tasking. Tasking of combat surveillance resources is a command responsibilities exercised by commanders or their operation staffs at all command levels; and
- b. Planning, Processing and Dissemination. The capabilities for combat surveillance planning and for the processing and dissemination of information are provided in intelligence staffs and line organizations at brigade, division and corps levels of command.

808. PLANNING

1. General. Planning for surveillance is based primarily on the collection plan prepared in support of the Corps commander's PIRs. Planning is done by the G3 staff who are assisted by the G2 staff. Division and brigade commanders will make their surveillance plan within the framework of the higher commander's plan. Their plan will take account of the following:

- a. the need for a separate and centrally controlled surveillance force - this depends on the extent and nature of surveillance tasks, the forces and means available and the co-ordination difficulties which would otherwise be encountered;

ANNEX C
TO SC 2900-1/6
DATED 2 MAY 85

- b. areas such as off-load points, major junctions, crossing sites, assembly areas, enemy axis, own boundaries, and gaps which require particular surveillance;
 - c. information which may be provided by higher or adjacent formations, eg, the higher formation in surveying its area of influence is covering its subordinate formations' areas of interest;
 - d. the use of deception to disguise surveillance activities and hence one's intentions;
 - e. restrictions that are to be placed on active means, particularly illumination and electronic support measures, in order to avoid detection by the enemy;
 - f. allocation of resources.
2. It is only at battle group level that a detailed surveillance plan is prepared and co-ordinated, but the battle group commander can expect direction on:
- a. the important areas over which he must provide surveillance.
 - b. the corps policy for the use of active surveillance devices and white light.
 - c. any additional resources that may be available.
 - d. Co-ordination between battle groups.

3. Tasking. Surveillance tasks are included in the Surveillance Annex to Corps and Division Orders. Normally subordinate formations and units receive direction from the tasking paragraph of the operation order. (See table ____ for the development of the Corps Surveillance Plan.

809. CONDUCT

1. Although surveillance is maintained throughout the area of responsibility, it may be necessary to increase the degree of surveillance at certain times and at specific locations depending upon the situation. For example, good weather conditions could lead to more intense surveillance of likely enemy drop zones.
2. Surveillance tasks must be adjusted once formations or units have redeployed.

The following diagram illustrates how the Corps Surveillance Plan is developed.

LEVEL	PLANNING	CO-ORDINATION
CORPS	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Develop Corps Surveillance Plan. 2. Establishes policy on use of active surveillance devices and white light. 3. Establishes EW policy. 4. Assign task and resources to divisions. 5. Issue Surveillance Plan as Annex to OPs Order. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Co-ordinate divisions surveillance plans. 2. Co-ordinate division illumination plans (if required). 3. Allot additional resources or change tasking (if required).
DIVISION	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Develop Division Surveillance Plan. 2. Sub-allot tasks and resources to brigades. 3. Prepare patrol task table (if required). 4. Request additional resources (if required). 5. Issue Surveillance Plan as Annex to OPs Order. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Co-ordinate brigades surveillance plans. 2. Co-ordinate brigades illumination plans (if required). 3. Allot additional resources or change tasking (if required). 4. Consolidate division surveillance plan and forward it to Corps.
BRIGADE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Develop Brigade Surveillance Plan. 2. Sub-allot tasks and resources to units. 3. Prepare own patrol task table based on Division tasks. 4. Request additional resources (if required). 5. Include surveillance tasking in the OPs order. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Co-ordinate units surveillance plans. 2. Co-ordinate units illumination plans (if required). 3. Allot additional resources or change tasking (if required). 4. Consolidate brigade surveillance plan and forward it to division.
UNIT	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Develop detailed unit Surveillance Plan. 2. Request additional resources (if required). 3. Prepare illumination plan (if required) 4. Forward unit Surveillance Plan to brigade HQ. 	

Figure 8-1: DEVELOPMENT OF THE CORPS SURVEILLANCE PLAN

57

2922-B-02-501-001/1-001

2910-2 (DLCD 6)

2 April 1985

PA

Attention: DLS
Canadian Forces Command
and Staff College
215 Yonge Blvde
Toronto, Ontario
M5M 3H9

CFP 301 LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE
COMMENTS ON SECOND DRAFT

Reference: CFCSC 2910-2 (DLS) 21 February 1985

1. Enclosed please find your comments on the second draft of CFP 301. These comments were well considered and I thank you and your staff for taking the time to improve the quality of this manual.
2. Disposition of the comments is indicated in the marginal notes. In handling these comments, I may have missed some important ideas. Because of this, and in view of the extent of the suggestions which have been made, it may be worthwhile for me to visit Toronto and discuss specific points with the DS concerned. If, having reviewed my notes, you feel this is a good idea, I am available to visit anytime after 17 Apr 85. In order to meet the publication date of the book, the visit would have to take place prior to 3 May.
3. Again, thank you for your helpful ideas. If you have any questions, or you would like me to visit, please give me a call (596-3954).

R. S. Billings
R.S. Billings
Colonel
Director Land Combat Development
for Chief of the Defence Staff

Enclosure: 1 (w/o encl)

LCol R.E. Acreman, DLCD 6, 6-3954, jmck

A handwritten mark or signature consisting of a single, continuous, stylized stroke that forms a loop and ends with a short horizontal line.

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DLCD 31136

NDHQ OTTAWA

FMCHQ ST HUBERT//DCOS CD/SSO CD COORD/SSO ARTY/SSO ARMD/

SSO FD ENGR/SSO SIGS/SSO INT/SSO INF/SSO CBT SVC SP/

SSO PERS MAN/SSO MET/SSO AIR PD&R/SO STDZN/SO2 MED O&A/

SO2 DOC COORD/SO DOC PROD/SO3 DOC COORD//

CFCSO TORONTO//SSO LAND PLANS//

CLFCSC KINGSTON//SSO//

HQ 4 CMBG LAHR//SSO OPS//

CTC GAGETOWN//SSO TACS//

UNCLAS DLCD 31136

SUBJ: MISSION OF A COVERING FORCE (GUARD) OR A FORCE CONDUCTING
A DELAY

REF: A. CFP 301 LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE (2ND DRAFT)

B. CFP 301(1) LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE (2ND DRAFT)

C. ATP 35(A) LAND FORCE TACTICAL DOCTRINE

D. US-FM 100-5 - OPERATIONS

E. FRG-100/000 - TACTICAL REGULATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

F. UK WO 70633 - LAND OPERATION

1. REF A, WHICH WAS BASED LARGELY ON REF B, STATES IN PART THAT A
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COMMANDER TASKED TO CONDUCT A DELAYING OPERATION MUST BE TOLD QUOTE THE LENGTH OF TIME THAT HE MUST DELAY OR, THE PERCENTAGE OF HIS FORCE THAT HE MUST PRESERVE UNQUOTE. SEE ARTICLE 1414. REF B HAS THE SAME IDEA, BUT USES THE WORDS QUOTE OR THE DEGREE OF RISK HE IS TO ACCEPT UNQUOTE. SEE ARTICLE 609.

2. CFCSC COMMENTS CHALLENGE THIS IDEA IN EITHER FORM OF EXPRESSION. ALTHOUGH NOT A FORMAL COLLEGE POSITION, AT LEAST SOME OF THEIR DS ARGUE THAT A COMMANDER WOULD ONLY BE TOLD THE LENGTH OF TIME THAT HE IS TO DELAY, NEVER THE PERCENTAGE OF HIS FORCE THAT HE IS TO PRESERVE. EXAMPLE, DELAY UNTIL YOU ARE ONLY 70 PERCENT EFFECTIVE. ARGUMENT IS BASED PRIMARILY ON THE PURPOSE OF A DELAY, IN PART, TO TRADE SPACE FOR TIME BY SLOWING THE ENEMY'S MOMENTUM AND INFLECTING MAXIMUM DAMAGE ON HIM, WITHOUT, IN PRINCIPLE, BECOMING DECISIVELY ENGAGED.

3. REFS C THROUGH F SUPPORT THIS ARGUMENT. NOTE THAT REF C STATES QUOTE THE TWO ESSENTIAL TIMINGS IN ANY DELAYING OPERATIONS ARE:

A. (NOT DIRECTLY RELEVANT).

B. THE LENGTH OF THE DELAY TO BE IMPOSED. THIS WILL BE INCORPOR-

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ATED INTO THE MISSION GIVEN TO THE COMMANDER UNQUOTE. SEE ARTICLE 0407.

4. CERTAINLY, A SUPERIOR COMMANDER WOULD BEAR IN MIND THE PERCENTAGE OF CASUALTIES (DEGREE OF RISK) LIKELY TO BE INCURRED WHEN ORDERING THE LENGTH OF TIME TO DELAY, PARTICULARLY IF HE HAS SUBSEQUENT TASKS IN MIND FOR THE DELAYING FORCE. THIS IS NOT AT ISSUE. HOWEVER, WOULD HE INCLUDE THIS IN HIS MISSION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO ORDERING THE TIME THAT THE FORCE WOULD DELAY? IT WOULD APPEAR NOT.

5. NOTE THAT CANADA AND HER NATO ALLIES HAVE ENDORSED THE PERTINENT DOCTRINE WITHOUT RESERVATION AND THAT THE US, UK, AND FRG MANUALS REFLECT THIS POINTING TO THEIR RESPECTIVE NATIONAL KEYSTONE MANUALS, IE, A COMMANDER IS ALWAYS TOLD THE LENGTH OF TIME HE MUST DELAY, NEVER THE PERCENTAGE OF HIS FORCE HE MUST PRESERVE, ASIDE FROM WHAT IS IMPLICIT IN AVOIDING DECISIVE ENGAGEMENT.

6. THE PUBLICATION DATE OF REF A AS APPROVED DOCTRINE (JUN 85) PRECLUDES THE REFERRAL OF THIS ISSUE TO THE ADTB. ACCORDINGLY MEMBERS ARE REQUESTED TO ENDORSE THE POSITION TAKEN IN PARA 5.

7. A REPLY IS REQUIRED NLT 30 APR 85.

DLCD 4

LCOL R.E. ACREMAN/DLCD6,6-3954,jmck

LCOL R.E. ACREMAN, DLCD 6

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2922-B-00-301-001/FP-001

3189-T (DLCD)

21 March 1985

Distribution List

CFP 301 LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE

Reference: A. LFCDSO Meeting 26 February 1985

1. As directed at reference A, I met with the Commandant CLFCSC on 15 March 1985 to discuss the content, style and target audience of CFP 301 Land Formations in Battle. The staff college position is that the old manual, CFP 301(1) Second Draft (Orange Cover) is a better reference for the college than the new manual (White Cover). The ADTB position is that the new manual is superior in terms of meeting the army's overall requirement, particularly from the standpoint of operations.

2. The Commandant and I agreed that the old manual has more detail, particularly at the battle group level, and thus is more suited to use in teaching at the college. We also agreed that both manuals cover the basic doctrine, although the style of each text is different in that the old manual is more expansive, whereas the new manual is more precise and is aimed at a more experienced audience. The Commandant questioned the hypothesis that the manual should be aimed primarily at formation commanders and their staffs as he feels that this group is unlikely to read the text. He argues that the manual should be written primarily for the students and DS at the college as they are the group which makes the most extensive use of it.

3. As the staff college requires a more detailed treatment of the doctrine, particularly at the battle group level, it may be appropriate to produce an additional CFP titled the Battle Group in Battle. This would take time and possibly delay the introduction of Corps '86 doctrine for one to two years. To rewrite the new manual would cause a similar delay. Another possible solution is to have the staff college produce precis, as it does now, in order to provide the necessary detail for their students. The use of precis entails the risk of distorting the unity of doctrine, however this problem is not insurmountable.

.../2

- 2 -

4. The Commandant and I agree that the new manual must be usable at the college and that unity of doctrine is imperative. To achieve this, we recommend the following action:

- a. the new manual be used as a reference text by the students at CLFCSC;
- b. the old manual not be issued to the students, but be used by the DS, in conjunction with the new manual, to produce precis;
- c. the Commandant, CLFCSC ensure the unity of doctrine reflected in precis;
- d. the new manual be reviewed over the next five years at an annual Doctrine and Tactics Seminar.

5. To amplify the recommendation at subparagraph 4d, the seminar would be held in January of each year. It should be chaired by the Commander FMC with selected army generals participating. Each seminar would examine a specific topic, ie, offensive operations, defensive operations, crossing and breaching of obstacles, etc, in the new manual, with a view to improving its value as a doctrinal reference. The ADTB, together with the staff college, would be responsible for organizing the seminar.

6. If you agree, I recommend that you seek the approval of the Commander FMC for the seminar approach commencing January 1986. Perhaps the Commander could direct this activity in his closing remarks at CDC XI.

7. Finally, I recommend that the ADTB be directed to investigate the requirement for a manual titled Battle Group in Battle in order to more fully meet the needs of the staff college and eventually reduce the requirement to produce precis.



R.S. Billings
Colonel

Director Land Combat Development
for Chief of the Defence Staff

DISTRIBUTION LIST (page 3)

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- 3 -

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Action

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Commandant CLFCSC
HQ FMC (Attn: D COS CD)

Internal

DLCD 6

R.E. Acreman, LCol, DLCD 6, 6-3954/mf

2922-B0A-301-001/FP-001

3189-1 (DLCD)

12 March 1985

Commandant
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Canadian Forces Base Kingston
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CFP 301 LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE

1. As discussed at the CD Sub-Committee 26 February 1985, I have read in detail the Offensive Chapters in both the old and the new CFP 301(1). I have also skimmed the other chapters. There is no doubt that the old edition has more helpful hints, more motherhood statements, tries to cover all aspects from Combat Team to Division level but in essence it has the core subjects as does the new edition. The new edition is written to highlight the accepted NATO and Canadian doctrine and it does not amplify that doctrine. The question then seems to be - should the doctrine be amplified? If so, where?

2. The assumption that the new CFP 301(1) was written for the experienced Commander and Staff at formation level is valid. NATO recognizes the need to have a common doctrine base and so does Canada. This manual attempts to set that base line. I have certainly noted a need to have a Canadian doctrine manual for our Formation Commanders to use individually and collectively. This same manual will be used as the start point for writing Corps/Branch manuals.

3. It remains then to determine whether there is a gap between Corps/Branch manuals and Formations in Battle. The obvious manual would be Battle Group in Battle. Certainly the British have such a manual and we have used it in the past at Staff College and CTC. Alternatively both CTC and the Staff College can produce precis to assist their students with the "how to do it", "rules to follow", "Do's and Don'ts", diagrams and examples. Formations in Battle gives the Canadian accepted doctrine and can be used, by experienced teachers to expand for teaching purposes.

4. My investigation of how your previous comments were staffed indicated that they were tabled at the ADTB 17-18 October 1984 at which the Staff College was represented. LCol Acreman also had discussions with the SSO and a few DS during a visit to the College. The comments to amend the old chapter on offence is not really practical at this

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stage. I do believe there is room to make substantive comments and amend the new edition.

5. I will be in Kingston on Friday 15 March at which time I would like to discuss the following proposals:

- a. Staff College accepts the style of the new manual and recommends specific amendments.
- b. Staff College produces precis based on the new edition.
- c. Staff College advises on the need for a Battle Group in Battle manual and whether the College could undertake to write the manual.



R.S. Billings
Colonel
Director Land Combat Development
for Chief of the Defence Staff

R.S. Billings, Col/DLCD/sr



Mobile Command Force mobile

FMC 2910-CFP 301 (Doc Coord)

Mobile Command Headquarters
St Hubert Quebec
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19 February 1985

National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0K2

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D. DLCD 6

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Attention: DLCD 6

2902-B-0G-301-001/FR-001
DLCD 6
(4.2.85)

COMMENTS - CFP 301 SECOND DRAFT

Reference: FMC 2910-CFP 301 (DCOS CD) 3 January 85

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1. As requested at ref, the subj manual has been received and detailed comments provided at Annex A.
2. In general terms, the manual is well written and serves its purpose (as confirmed during the last meeting of the ADTB), with only a few exceptions as noted below:
 - a. I feel that Chapter 16 is far too general in nature. This general approach is fine for defensive operations and other offensive operations since the battle is really won or lost at the battle group/combat team levels, and most of the detailed tactical planning is done at these lower levels. Formation commanders can adopt the broad brush approach (eg envelopment here or turning movement there) and leave the details to their staffs and subordinate commanders. With crossing operations however, the intricate planning is done at formation level, while subordinate commanders are left with planning details which are really quite similar to those for normal offensive operations (eg the assault force commander focuses on capturing the intermediate objectives, and the main body commander is concerned with capturing the final objectives). It appears that, in an effort to combine both crossing and breaching operations under one general heading, the author has based his general doctrine on water crossing doctrine and made it sufficiently vague to be able to apply it to both crossing and breaching operations. In the process, much of the detail needed to guide a commander in planning one or the other type of

repts draft by this approach:

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Comments incorporated. Feedback provided. .../2

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


-2-

operation has been omitted. In fact it is questionable whether a commander could even begin to plan a minefield breaching operation based on the doctrine presented. Specific comments and recommendations are included at Annex A, Serials 46 - 59.

- b. The title of Chapter 22 "Operations in an NBC environment" would lead one to believe that this chapter deals with "fighting" in an NBC environment when, in fact, the chapter deals strictly with defence against NBC weapons and nuclear/chemical fire planning. Either the scope should be expanded to deal with considerations related to defensive and offensive operations in an NBC environment, or the title should be changed.
3. The delay in providing these comments is regretted.

*Discussed
no approval
for.*



M. Gauthier
Major
SO 2 Doctrine Coordination

ANNEX A
 TO FMC 2910-CFP-301 (DOC COORD)
 DATED 19 FEBRUARY 1985

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1	AAP-6 (P)	1-23 para 114 2.b.	Delete "joint"; insert "combined" - the idea being described is "multi-national" rather than "multi-service"	Agree	
2		2-6 para 209 1.c.	Delete "safe"; insert "potable". The latter is used in all engr pubs as well as in Chapt 5 of this pub.	Agree	
3		3-1 301.1 line 4	Add "... and CFP 303(3) Comd and Con of Land Forces".	Agree	
4	CFP 303(3)	3-1 301.2 last sentence	Delete "... Command, or as it is more frequently referred to, ". the term "Command and Control" is not synonymous with "command". The differences between "command", "control", and "command and control" are clr described in CFP 303(3).	Disagree - see CFP 303(3) Dual Guide	
5		3-6 304.2 last sentence	Add "and CFP 303(3)"	Agree	

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6	DCDS Instr 6/84	3-24 311	The NATO op relationships described in this para are not used uniquely for combined ops. Our own air force uses this same comd and con terminology rather than that described in previous paras. There may be a reqr to note the applicability of this terminology in joint ops.	<i>Agree</i>	
7		5-2 503	The tasks listed here should be consistent with thoses listed in CFP 319. Those used in CFP 319 are more detailed, and thus more useful to the reader, particularly if he is not an engineer.	<i>Disagree. CFP 319 should be in consonance, but may expand.</i>	
8		5-2 503 l.e.	Delete "repair"; insert "maintenance". When associated with construction, the latter is more appropriate as it implies preventive as well as reactive measures.	<i>Agree</i>	

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9	ATP 35-A	5-2 503. 3.a.	After "construction" add "or assistance in construction". Due to scarcity of resources this assistance may be limited to advice.	Agree/ could be applied	
10	ATP 35-A	5-2 503. 3.b.	Should read "assistance in preparing positions". The prep of positions is an all-arms responsibility. Engr eqpt may be used to assist in constructing individual pits, shelters, etc within a posn.	to maintain all tasks, Agree.	
10A		5-8 5-10	Wording of this para could lead to confusion. The more common terms used are "area responsibility" and " <u>functional</u> responsibility".	Agree	
11		8-9 808. 2.b.	Many of the terms used are confusing ie, what are off-load points? do we mean <u>potential</u> assembly areas? gaps - between defended localities, in minefields, or water gaps? This sub-para does not fit in well with the other ideas presented. Perhaps this list of important surveillance	Agree	

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12		8-9 808. 2.e.	targets should be incl as a separate para. Delete ",particularly illumination and electronic support measures,". These are no more important than target acquisition radar, grd surveillance radar, or IR sensors. The term "active means" is sufficiently self-explanatory.	Agree - changed to "such as"	
13		10-2 1002. 2. and 3.	Based on the definition of tac mov, it is difficult to perceive of a sit where mov by rail or waterway would fit into this category. These will be used as tpt systems primarily for adm mov. Both paras should be deleted.	Disagree	
14		10-7 1007. 2	Add "density". Tactically, the vehicle density is just as important, if not much more so, than the rate of march.	Agree	

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15		10-8 1010. 3	Additional important planning factors are: a. ground - particularly in identifying waiting areas. b. obstructions to movement such as narrow bridges, restricted turning areas, etc. (ask any bridgelayer operator).	Agree	
16		1010 gen	Should add a para on engr. Planning must allow for routine route maint as well as clr of obs or obstructions as necessary.	Believe this is now covered in the above	
17		11-5 1108	This para should have appeared first in Chapt 3 and then been reiterated in subsequent chapters. The principle of affiliation is not unique to the combat support services!	It is in Chap 3 from repetition acceptable	

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18	AAP-6 (P)	12-33 1214. 4 line 3	Add "rehearsals". In principle, rehearsals are a key elm of battle procedure for any offensive op. They should be omitted by exception only.	Agree See also 1216 4.b.	
19		12-33 1216. 5.f. line 1	For the sake of consistency, replace "wide" with "broad".	Agree	
20		12-42 1218. 4.e. line 2	Delete "co-ordination points"; insert "co-ordinating points"	Agree	
21		13-15 1306. 4.c.	What is "maximum best" range? Perhaps "maximum effective range" would be more appropriate.	Disagree	
22		13-15 para 1307	Sub-para 2 deals only with "unarmoured" forces, while sub-paras 3, 4 and 5 deal only with armoured forces. Since these are two distinct entities, they should be covered under separate headings in separate paras. Additionally,	Non-armoured } armoured } not only by } Agree } per ATP 35(A)	

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23	AAP-6	13-16 1307. 2.	since we are clearly referring to dismtd infantry in discussing "unarmoured" forces, the heading of the initial para should be "DISMOUNTED INFANTRY". Delete "barriers"; insert "obstacles".	Agree	
24		13-18 1309 line 2	1. delete "obstacles and barriers"; insert "barriers and obstacles in depth". 2. delete "improving and"; it is redundant	Agree Why? Agree	
25		13-20 1313. 1.b.	Delete "MDA"; insert "main defence area (MDA)"	See p 13.10.	
26		13-22 1314. 1.	This is a very indirect way of saying that the comd must correctly identify the aim. This should be stated in more specific terms.	Agree	

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27		13-23 1314. 2.	1. "Factors" in relation to the estimate of the situation are normally dealt with under some of the following headings: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Enemy (rather than "threat") b. Own Troops (rather than "disposition") c. Ground (rather than "terrain" and "frontage") d. Met (rather than "weather") e. Time and Space f. Assessment of Tasks (rather than "resources") 2. In fact, much of the discussion contained in this para deals with the formulation of the plan rather than a description of the factors	- agree - deleted Agree Agree Agree Agree	

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28		13-24 1314, 3. line 4	to be considered (sub para 2b, d, e, g) prior to formulating the plan. Delete "mission"; insert "aim" - in the context of the estimate of the situation.	Agree. agree	
29		13-26, 27	Without being able to quote a specific ref, I was under the impression "HAW" "MAW" and "PAW" were to be dropped in favor of "LRAAW", "MRAAW", and "SRAAW"	Disagree Sub w/ current term because of impact on other manuals	
30		13-29 1317. 2.	Delete "barriers"; insert "obstacles". It is the individual obstacle which will be covered by dir fire wps not the barrier.	Agree	
31		13-29 1317. 3. line 6 line 7 line 11	1. After "tac minefids" insert "and other obstacles". 2. Delete "minefields"; insert "obstacles". 3. After "routes", insert "gaps".	Agree Agree Agree	

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32		13-32 1319	Sub-para 1316.3. d. refers to a "countermove plan" whereas this heading is entitled "Blocking and Counter-Attack Plans". There will always be a reqr for a counter-attack plan, but is there such a thing as a "blocking plan" or for that matter a "countermove plan"?	<i>Agree parted for</i>	
33		13-32 1319. 2.	In describing the composition of C-attack forces, some mention should be made of the involvement of armoured engrs to assist in mobility tasks.	<i>See Art 1309 would be appropriate here.</i>	
34		para 1324	In describing the covering force stage of the defence, the author has dealt exclusively with delaying operations and the "guard" role. Some mention should be made of the role of a "screen" and where this fits into the covering force stage since both the bde recce sqn and elms of the div recce regt are more	<i>Agree</i>	

ANNEX A
 TO FMC 2910-CFP-301 (DOC COORP)
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35		13-42 1325. 4. last sentence	suited to the recce role than the delaying role. Add "Scatterable mines may be particularly effective in this regard".	Agree	
36		14-3 1325. 4. 2nd sentence	1. Delete "barriers", insert "obstacles". 2. After "enemy", add "or slow him down"	? ref. agree	
37		14-6 para 1407	1. See serial 22	agree	
38		14-8 para 1409. 1.	The first sentence is misleading. In the delay, engrs will seldom have time to prepare "barriers". It is also doubtful that they will have the capacity to lay minefds to any great extent because there simply will not be sufficient time to undertake the dumping ops necessary to sp the laying of minefds. The emphasis will be on route denial,	Doubt quite ATP 35(A)	

ANNEX A
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39		14-8 1409. 2.	atk ditches, and other minor obs which can be created based on the stores, eqpt, and ammo readily avail. Scatterable mines will be particularly useful in this type of op. 1. Delete "barriers", insert "obstacles". 2. Mention should be made of the control of dmls in delaying ops - it is particularly important in this kind of op.	ATP 35(A) Agree	
40		14-11 para 1414. 2.	The sub-paras of this para do not follow logically from the first sentence ie "task", "strength and composition", "grouping", "selection of delay posns", "manoeuvre", "dml con", etc are elements of the <u>plan</u> which are developed based on consideration of many factors such as ground, time and space etc (see Serial 27) Additionally, sub-para	Agree - discussed	

ANNEX A
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41		14-13 1414.2.d.(2)	2a "Task" deals with the selection of the aim and associated limitations. The "aim" should be dealt with separately from the factors to be considered as a result of the aim. Delete "barriers"; insert "obstacles".	Agree	
42		14-13 1414. 2.f. line 4	Delete "ensure that the planning for"; insert "establish a policy for". This will normally be dealt with in the OpO under Coord Instrs and will be in the form of a policy rather than a plan.	Agree Agree difficult	
43		14-15 para 1415	First sentence is redundant. Combine first and second sentences by deleting "... outline his plan. He should ...".	Agree	
44		15-4 1508	1. In sub-para a, tasks should be described in terms of their relative location/associated force. Engrs		

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45		16-3 1602. 3. line 2	will prep dmls and barriers on the <u>intermediate positions</u> . Tasks in the MDA will normally be limited to rte denial, closing lanes and gaps, and assisting in the destruction of eqpt. Delete "anti-armour" ditch; insert "anti-tk" ditch, the physical characteristics of these ditches are designed based on the physical dimensions of a tank and not the armour characteristics of the tank.	Agree Disagree	
46		16-5 1603. 3.	This should read "A <u>deliberate</u> crossing operation is done in four stages:...", as most hasty crossing ops will not incl the latter two stages described.	Disagree	
47		16-9 Figure 16-1	The term "crossing formation" referred to in the note at Fig 16-1 and the term "Formation HQ" at Fig 16-1 may lead to confusion since many formations may be involved	Agree note amended otherwise not seen as a problem	

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48		16-10 1607. 1. line 3	in the op (eg for a div-level op). Perhaps the term "Crossing Force" could be used to describe the over-all force responsible for conducting the crossing op. Delete "Formation" and replace with less confusing term (see Serial 47) - there may well be several formation comds involved in the op.	Agree "overall coord"	
49		16-10 1607. 4.a.	The description provided for "vehicle scales" is very vague - specifically "those which must cross the obstacle initially, and those which can cross later". Based on this description, it is unclr as to exactly what purpose these scales serve in relation to the vehicle priority tables. Perhaps examples of each should be incl as anxs to the chapter.	CFP 303(2) purpose	

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50		1608. 5.	The responsibilities of each of the crossing site and breaching site comds have been described without first describing those of the crossing area cmd. What do "controlling the crossing area" and "moving forces across the obs" consist of? What are the crossing area cmd's responsibilities in terms of traffic control or control of mov through the area, and tactical control over each of the forces moving through his area (if any)?	<i>I believe this is now clear.</i>	
51		16-15 1610. 2.	1. One of the essential characteristics of a brhd is the reqr for sufficient space to provide a base for subsequent operations. Therefore, at sub-para c add "of the break-out force". 2. The meaning of sub-para d is unclr.	<i>Agree with now Street</i> <i>Agree - sub para amended previously</i>	

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52		16-17 1610. 6. line 1	Amend to read " <u>The number, location, and type of crossing sites...</u> ".	<i>loc + type of crossing sites that req</i>	
53		Sections 3 and 4 General	1. In discussing both the planning and the execution of crossing ops, many significant differences between water crossing ops and minefd breaching ops have been omitted as a result of the author's attempt to deal with both types of op under a common heading. Even in ATP-35(A) which is by design more general than CFP 301, the "planning considerations" and "execution" sections examine these two types of crossing operations separately (see sub-paras 1006 d&e and 1007 a and c). In fact, the standard phases or stages used in CFP 301 (recce, aslt, build-up, consolidation) are not applied to minefd breaching ops in ATP 35(A). If this chapter is to be of any value to planners at bde and higher	<i>Examine</i>	

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54		1611	<p>levels, it must deal specifically with each of the two types of crossing operations.</p> <p>In this para, the author has failed to deal with many important planning considerations related to the build-up and consolidation stages, having examined only the "crossing" aspects of these stages. <u>Some mention should be made of the expansion of the brhd beyond the final obj's to the final brhd line, control measures, co-ord reqrs, mov of break-out force across the obs and into assy areas, atk posns etc.</u> It may suffice to mention these aspects in gen terms and relate them to previous discussion in Chapt 12.</p>	<p>Wrong</p> <p>E. J. J. J.</p>	
55		16-18 1612. 1.	<p>"A comd must keep the engr comd informed of his intention and plans - From these,..." would lead one to think that the comd devs his plan</p>		

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56		1614. 1.	<p>in isolation from his arms advisers. Suggest re-wording as fols:</p> <p>"A comd must ensure that his engr adviser is intimately involved in the planning process in the earliest stages of battle procedure. Based on his estimate of the sit, the engr will advise on the resources aval, etc..."</p> <p>Begin first sentence with "once the home bank has been secured and cleared of obstacles by the force in place..."</p>	<p>Agree -</p> <p>Agree w/wording</p>	
57		16-20 1614. 4. line 3	<p>After "engineers begin", insert "<u>preliminary</u> preparations". The whole purpose of the aslt phase is to clr en direct fire wpns and observation from within range of crossing sites to allow engr work to begin. Bridging resources are far too scarce to begin construction until the aslt stage is complete.</p>	<p>Agree</p>	

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58		1614. 5.	See serial 53. Does breaching of lanes by explosive or mechanical means take part prior to the aslt or after the aslt (as part of the build-up)? Both the aslt stage and the build-up stage need to be described in more specific terms as they relate to each of crossing ops and breaching ops.	<i>Examine serial 53</i>	
59		16-21 1616 line 3	Delete "elements of" or amend to read "assault elements of".	<i>Agree</i>	
60		1901. 1. line 2	Delete "combined"; insert "joint" - the idea being described is multi-service as opposed to multi-national.	<i>Both</i>	
61		2003. 1. line 6	Delete "arms". If the senior officer present happens to be from the combat support services and is of a higher rank than the senior arms officer present, the former	<i>Agree</i>	

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62		21-2 2102. 4.	will certainly not subordinate himself to the latter!! Delete "plan"	<i>Disagree?</i>	
63		22-8 2207. 3.e.	Delete "safe"; insert "potable"	<i>Agree</i>	
64		2208	Since this Chapter is entitled "Ops in an NBC environment", one would expect this particular para to deal with planning considerations related to offensive ops in an NBC environment. Instead, this entire section deals only with nuclear fire planning considerations and those aspects of conventional fire planning related to the use of chemical wps (good staff for a gunner!). Suggest that either the title of this Chapter be changed, or the scope be expanded to deal with offensive ops in an NBC environment (as opposed to the	<i>Disagree</i>	

ANNEX A
 TO FMC 2910-CFP-301 (DOC COOR
 DATED 19 FEBRUARY 1985

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
65		A-1 para 3 last sentence	offensive use of NBC wpns and defence against NBC wpns respectively. Delete "see STANAG 2017". STANAGS are on limited distr. This particular STANAG should be amplified in CFP 303(2). Insert "refer to CFP 303(2) for additional details".	<i>agree</i>	
66		A-1/A-2 Para 4	Descriptions of "preliminary dml tgts" and "reserved dml tgts" are not consistent with AAP 6. These should be quoted directly to avoid misinterpretation.	<i>Do show now int.</i>	
67		A-4 Para 8.c. last line	Delete "on the proforma in STANAG 2017". Insert "on form CF 913/914 - refer to CFP 303(2)".	<i>Agree</i>	

② BF 25 JUL

MEMORANDUM

2922-B-06-301-001/FP-001

2910-CFP 301 (DNBCC)

14 Feb 85

① DLCD 6

DNBCC COMMENTS ON SECOND DRAFT
B-GL-301-000/FP-001

Ref: FMC 2910-CFP 301 (DCOS CD) 3 Jan 85

1. The following comments are offered as per request at ref:

- a. 1322.3 The information in this para was taken from ATP 35. This publication has been revised requiring this para to be revised also. The suggested wording is as follows:

"When the use of NBC weapons is imminent a commander increases NBC defence measures and activates NBC defence elements by:

Agree

- a. Ensuring ...;
- b. Assessing ... and preparing ...;
- c. Assessing ... and adjusting ...;
- d. Confirming ..."

- b. Chapter 22 This chapter contains many inaccuracies which must be corrected. Apart from the inaccuracies, statements made indicating not only a capability but a policy for use of NBC weapons by the WP would require classification. The following changes are suggested:

③ PA
AMR
DLCD 6
13 Jul 87

② NTF
*Comments incorporated
Feedback provided - phone 9 Apr 85 .../12
1 Apr 85*

- 2 -

- (1) 2202.3 "The Soviet Union is a signatory of the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. However, as an industrialized nation, the USSR has the potential to produce such weapons."
agree in part
- (2) 2202.4 "The Soviets are also party to the Geneva protocol of 1925, with the reservation to retain the right to retaliate in kind if CW weapons are used against them. Persistent agents are used to ..."
agree
- (3) 2203.2 Line 6 insert "immediate and" after "casualties from ..."
agree
- (4) 2203.2 Line 9 after "transient" insert "radiation effects on"
Add an "s" to "electronic"
Delete "effects"
Insert "(TREE)". *unnecessary*
- (5) 2203.3 Line 1 delete "are" insert "can be".
- (6) 2204.2 "Nuclear weapons are neither possessed by Canada nor are they, in any foreseeable circumstances, to be acquired for delivery by the CF. Should deterrence fail, enemy and/or allied nations might employ nuclear weapons."
- (7) 2204.3 Insert after "1972." "Canada never has had and does not now possess any biological weapons (or toxin based weapons), and will not develop, produce, acquire, stockpile or use such weapons."
~~insert~~
agree

.../3

- 3 -

- (8) 2204.4 "Canada has renounced the use of chemical weapons in war, and the right to develop, produce, acquire, or stockpile such weapons for use in warfare, unless these weapons should be used against the military forces or the civil population of Canada or its allies."
agree
- (9) 2208.1 Line 2 delete "is subject to strict political and military control". Insert "will be a political decision".
agree with
- (10) 2208. Based on the policy statement at 1b(1), is this information really necessary? The policy statement is a direct quote from NDHQ Instruction P13 (Issue 2) CF Policy - Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Defence dated 7 Jan 85. The information as it pertains to nuclear weapons in 2208 appears superfluous.
check
- (11) 2212.1 Line 2 after "command". Insert "Once selected employment or general release is approved, ..."
agree

2. Should further discussion or information be required regarding comments in para 1, please contact Maj K.F. Donovan, DNBCC 4, 6-6198 or Maj T.J.I. Burnie, DNBCC 6, 6-5600.


W.R. Johnston
LCol
DNBCC
2-6160

PA

MEMORANDUM

2922-B-00-301-001 / FP-001
~~2910-CFP-301 (DNBCC)~~

14 Feb 85

DLCD 6

DNBCC COMMENTS ON SECOND DRAFT
B-GL-301-000/FP-001

Ref: FMC 2910-CFP 301 (DCOS CD) 3 Jan 85

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.../2

- 2 -

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.../3

- 3 -

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2. Should further discussion or information be required regarding comments in para 1, please contact Maj K.F. Donovan, DNBCC 4, 6-6198 or Maj T.J.I. Burnie, DNBCC 6, 6-5600.

W.R. W.R. Johnston
LCol
DNBCC
2-6160

Maj K.F. Donovan/DNBCC 4/6-6198/pc

Distr: DNBCC ORIG CIRC FILE



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2910-1 (Tac Div)

Combat Training Centre
Canadian Forces Base Gagetown
Oromocto, New Brunswick
EOG 2P0

12 February 1985

Administratum 3-30
Entered till
DLCDB

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CFP 301 LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE
COMMENTS - SECOND DRAFT

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Checked by/Checked L. DLCDB
(4-2-85)

Reference: A. FMC 2910-CFP 301 (DCOS CD) 3 January 1985

1. The subject document has been scrutinized by the schools and several staff agencies of CTC. Attached are the accumulated comments of those units, divided as follows:

- a. Annex A - General Comments;
- b. Annex B - Comments of Content and Editorial; and
- c. Annex C - Proposed Paragraph Amendments.

2. Feedback on these comments should be directed to S02 Tac Coord, Autovon 622-8012.

② BF 25 Feb
E.S.G.

J.H.G. Brassard
J.H.G. Brassard
Lieutenant Colonel
for Commander Combat Training Centre

③ PA
[Signature]
DLCDB
13 Jul 87

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ANNEX A
TO CTC 2910-1 (TAC DIV)
DATED 12 FEB 85

CFP 301 - SECOND DRAFT

GENERAL COMMENTS

1. This annex contains general comments about the subject document.

2. The publication should be classified RESTRICTED.

Disagree - Why is sufficient as per CFP 301

3. Chapter 11 - Combat Service Support is considered suitable.

4. Unfortunately in its attempt to be succinct without being specific it falls short in explaining how a formation conducts itself in operations. The addition of diagrams with an explanation of how brigades and divisions might be deployed in the offence and defence would greatly assist the reader in understanding the concepts.

Examined Disagree, not required for level of audience

5. It is regretted that the time available prevented a more comprehensive review of the subject.

6. There is a considerable difference in the principles/fundamentals of various operations given in this document as compared to previous ones, to the extent that some "traditional" fundamentals no longer appear. In defence for example "All Round Defence". Perhaps a note to explain why would set most minds at ease. In the same vein, are the principles given here going to be transposed directly and verbatim into revised corps manuals ie 309(1) and 305(1)? At the levels for which those manuals are designed, "Use of Terrain" (for example) is a given, where all round defence, concealment and other traditional terms are more appropriate for the lower level soldier trying to hang his hat on a set of principles.

Examined Disagree Principles of War followed by "fundamentals" which are unique to a specific type of op all round defence is a component of security - remember look at the W/ forms (not CTS)

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ANNEX B
 TO CTC 2910-1 (Tac Div)
 DATED 12 Feb 85

CFP 301 - SECOND DRAFT
COMMENTS OF CONTENT AND EDITORIAL

SER	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REP	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1		Pg 5-2	Pg lists tasks of engineers. Use of the four functions as detailed in CFP 319 Section 4 with associated tasks would be clearer.	Disagree - current brgs as per ATT 35(A) + CFP 300.	✓
2		Pg 1-22	The Cdn op concept suggests three areas of battle. The Comd's ability to fight the deep battle should be clarified. Discussion on pg 13-41 and 13-42 indicate the FEBA battle will be based on a continuous barrier. This must preclude most land based forces from conducting the deep battle. Only the air force can attack in depth in the situation.	Discuss ? ✓ Disagree	
3		Pg 15-3	The stages of wdr are clearer stated as: - redeployment - no - thinning out - yes ✓ - disengagement - same ✓ protective and delay actions - same Based on these key words the stages can be explained.	Examine / Agree in part - As is	
4		Pg 1-5 Art 109 Para 2	Delete Warsaw Pact. Insert Warsaw Pact	Agree ✓	
5		Pg 1-19 Art 113 Para 3 Line 14	Between commander and must insert "at any level".	Agree ✓	

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ANNEX B
 TO CTC 2910-1 (Tac Div)
 DATED 12 Feb 85

CFP 301 - SECOND DRAFT
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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
6		Pg 1-20 Art 113 Para 7	Too much focus on Corps, generalize to demonstrate it is applicable at all (fmn) levels.	Agree w/insert, ensure fix to say "thus, for example"	
7		Pg 1-14 Art 108 Para 2	After 15-30 km insert "per day".	Agree.	
8		Pg 1-19 Art 113 Para 3	Corps Comds plan is used as example. Therefore to be general (SIC) after thus delete his insert "a commanders" and in the next sentence after comd insert "at any level".	Agree.	
9		Pg 1-23 Art 114 Para 2.e.	After versatile insert "and compatible".	Agree	
10		Pg 2-3 Art 204 Para 1.c. add	Displace "in offensive operations" and in defensive operations" respectively to end of sub-para.	Agree	
11		Pg 2-4 Art 205 Para 1.c. and d.	Displace "in offensive ops" and in defensive ops to end of sub-para.	Agree	
12		Pg 2-4 Art 206 Para 1.a.	Displace "in offensive ops" and in defensive ops to end of sub-para.	Agree	
13		Pg 2-5 Art 207 Para 1.b.	Displace "in offensive ops" and in defensive ops to end of sub-para.	Agree	

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
14		Pg 207 Art 209	Engr tasks should include airfield maintenance and maintenance of routes.	Disagree w/ DREF	
15		Pg 3-3 Art 303 Para 4	The problem of "real estate" management should be included.	Disagree - discuss	
16		Pg 3-20 Art 308 Para 14.b.	Delete "later" - redundant	Agree	
17		Pg 3-23 Art 310 Para 2,3,4	Is the use of the term "less" ie under cmd less daily maintenance invalid?	See para 4 "under cmd" for adm less... worth a comment	
18		Pg 4-1 Art 401 Para 1.a.	Use of the term "troop safety" in lieu of "safety" would be more specific and dispel the peace time phenomenon of safety officers!	Agree	
19		Pg 4-2 Art 402 Para 1.a.	Delete "and" after conventional insert ",,".	Agree	
20		Pg 4-4 Art 403 Para 1	After "than one formation" insert "or unit".	Agree (not really nec in view of scope)	
21		Pg 4-15 Art 410 Para 2.a.	Before fire support resources insert "all".	Disagree - superfluous	
22		Pg 7-7 Art 706 Para 1	Add "templating".	Disagree - discuss CFP 301/1	eth. ✓

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ANNEX B
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23		Pg 6-7 Art 609 Para 4 Sentences 2 and 3	Another excuse/reason to have more pilots!!	<i>irrelevant</i>	
24		Pg 12-1 Art 1202 Para 2	Destroy, erode etc would be more easily recognized and read if sub-paragraphed.	<i>Agree</i>	
25		Pg 4-17 Art 411 Para 1	Add "Coordination of the Use of Air Space". Although explained elsewhere it is still a control method.	<i>Disagree - not as "surface" coord measure</i>	
26		Pg 6-1 Art 602	Forward air controlling should be included as a task.	<i>Disagree "adjustment" obs of fire</i>	
27		Pg 6-5 Art 607 Para 3	Why repeat all the detail. The matrix in Chapter 3 should suffice.	<i>Agree in part, however ea ship should stand alone - no change</i>	
28		Pg 13-8,9,10	The term "Key" implies overall importance. Therefore suggest using term Key Terrain divided into Vital ground and ground of tactical importance.	<i>Disagree - text uses "key terrain" & vital ground</i>	<i>NATO agreed terms</i>
29		Pg 13-17 Art 1308 Para 1 Line 4	Required - spelling	<i>Agree</i>	
30		Pg 4-1 Art 401 Para 1.b.	RPVs and Drones should be specifically mentioned.	<i>Agree</i>	

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ANNEX B
 TO CTC 2910-1 (Tac Div)
 DATED 12 Feb 85

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31		Paras 206 & 207	These paras describe mechanized and cavalry brigade groups respectively. Para 206 refers to infantry and armoured units while 207 refers to infantry <u>battalions</u> and armoured <u>regiments</u> . Terminology for both should be consistent.	Agree	
32		Pg 4-10 Para 11	Second sentence should be changed to read "placed 'under command', 'in support' or 'in location'".	Agree	
33		Pg 13-18 Para 3.c.	Deleting "including" and inserting "particularly" would better describe what is intended.	Agree	
34		Para 409.2.b.	Description of Destruction and Neutralization as levels of damage in a fire plan are not pertinent to this fmn level level publication. This sub para should be deleted.	Discuss? ✓	
35		Para 602.2.b.	Adjustment of arty fire is a major aviation task but should follow current sub para e. in the list to put it in appropriate place with respect to other tasks.	Agree	
36		Para 610.1	Same comment re aviation task as above but here sub para b and c should be reversed.	Agree	

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ANNEX B
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37		Para 1318	CFSP for covering forces and counter-moves - Suggestion that the generic term fire plan would be more appropriate.	<i>Discuss, not fused</i>	
38		Pg 4-5, 404.2	"A separate but partially co-located HQ" is extremely poor wording and must be re-written as follows - "At corps and division the Artillery Commanders headquarters exercises command and control of fire support resources. The artillery headquarters for formations is split but all key elements of that headquarters are represented in the Fire Support Coordination Centre formed as part of the Formation Main Headquarters."	<i>Agree</i>	
39		Pg 4-5, 404.2	Poorly worded particularly brigade aspects.	<i>Discuss in light of above fix.</i>	
40		Pg 13-7 Para 11 last sentence	Delete "again".	<i>Agree</i>	

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ANNEX B
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 DATED 12 Feb 85

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41		Table 4-1	Table is very sketchy and adds little to what is being said. It should either be expanded to be more comprehensive and show the up/down flow or be deleted in its entirety in which case para 409.1 pg 4-11 would have to be expanded. Suggested amendment at Annex C.	Agree in part -> arrows added to show sequence of activity. Detail in handouts to old pub. discuss	
42		Page 13-40 Para 1324.7 and 8.	The description of the covering force battle needs amplification. The author's silence on the role of the brigade recce sqn in the defence implies that it has no role.	Agree	
43		Page 2-9 Para 213.1.d	One of COSCOM's functions is to co-ordinate rear area security. In the remainder of the book there is no mention of DISGP's rear area security responsibilities. Who is the rear area security commander at Div and Bde? Who is responsible for estb the controlling HQs?	Disagree - see reference chap which provides cross reference to CFP 300 chp 1/5	
44		Page 12-32 Para 1216.5.d.	The expression "vertical envelopment" is a euphemism that should be avoided.	Inclined to agree, however this is AF 35(A) expression & it is one which is generally understood	

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ANNEX B
 TO CTC 2910-1 (Tac Div)
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45		Page 12-3 Para 1203.9	"A withdrawal is undertaken to disengage from an assault by a superior enemy." This sentence appears in the "THREAT" section, and is slightly misleading. Throughout the book enemy and Warsaw Pact are synonymous. In this one incident "enemy", it is assumed, means us. Clarification required.	Agree	
46		Chap 13, Sect 2	<u>Forces and Tasks</u> . Why not a section on Infantry to define tasks in the defence.	Disagree. See Annex 1 then Annex 2 need be included	Forces / only unique material
47		Art 106	<u>Echeloning</u> . Add a sentence to the effect. "This process is described (defined) as echeloning".	Disagree. incorrect discusses echelons.	next article
48		Chap 1	<u>Rear Area Threat</u> . WP capabilities to attack rear areas bear mentioning, e.g. special forces, airborne and heliborne capabilities.	Disagree. OMCs, Airborne / Airmobile forces are incl. see p 1-13, detailed threat provided in	RAS chapter CFP 300
49		Art 113.1 Line 3	Add "surveillance and "before" weapons systems".	?	
50		113, 7.d.	Special forces are not avail to the Corps (See 2012) - delete.	Disagree. note "minimally"	
51		Art 113.10	For clarity add "the enemy's" before "uncommitted forces ...".	Agree	

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ANNEX B
 TO CTC 2910-1 (Tac Div)
 DATED /2 Feb 85

CFP 301 - SECOND DRAFT
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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
52		113, 7.f.	Delete last phase - manoeuvre forces are integral to the defence e.g. Counter attack, blocking. See 1305.	Disagree. We are talking about attacking forces in the area of influence	
53		113, 8.	Delete last phase - Corps fire power includes the corps reserves, it is to be applied as the situation developed.	?	
54		114, A.1	First sentence - delete "are normally" insert "will be".	Disagree - existing text is broader	
55		Art 114.2	For clarity reword first sentence to read "To improve inter-operability, formations should when operating with allied force".	Agree	
56		Chap 2	Corps troops are mentioned but not divisional troops. Divisional troops such as the Recce Regt, Div Arty, Engr Regt, etc should be added. Divisional and brigade service support services as discussed in Chapter 11.	Discuss.	
57		203	Should describe an Armd and Inf Brigade. Main difference between them and the Bde Gps.	See CFP 300 Chap 5	
58		304.1	Delete first sentence.	Disagree - This part of the chap has already been approved	

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ANNEX B
 TO CTC 2910-1 (Tac Div)
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CFP 301 - SECOND DRAFT
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59		305.1	Second sentence wrong. An inf bde comd who has commanded an inf bn doesn't have three inf advisors. He may ask their advice, but they are not advisors.	Discuss - Agree	
60		307.2.c.	Delete last sentence - not applicable to all ops.	Reference?	
61		Art 308	Change Title to "Detailed Battle Procedure" for clarity.	Agreed	
62		Chap 3, Sect 4	Has not Canada accepted the NATO approved term of "Task Organization" to replace grouping?	Disagree - not a NATO approved term Both expressions used within NATO	
63		506.1 c. & d.	Confusing is a Brigade under comd of a Brigade Gp? Explain in article 203.	Discuss. This should not be confusing?	
64		802.3.b.	Second sentence wrong - delete.	Discuss	
65		Art 812	The discussion of deception is limited to active tactical means. What about other types such as electronic deception, use of dummies, etc. A much broader discussion is merited.	Disagree. Electronic deception is discussed in EW chap. See P 15-13 for mention of dummies. This section discusses the form generally accepted for deception - specific deception techniques are not initially addressed	

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ANNEX B
 TO CTC 2910-1 (Tac Div)
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CFP 301 - SECOND DRAFT
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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
66		Chap 10	This chapter is too important to be taken so lightly. Main points are: a. Title - Delete "Road". b. 1002.4 First sentence wrong. For the move of a mech bde, rail is faster when moving overland. → c. 1004.6. A TC HQ is more than that. It has staff off, etc. It is a big HQ. Much more detail req. d. 1006.2. See c. above. → e. 1010.9. Second sentence. Not quite right. Recovery must be placed at critical points e.g. bridges/gaps to move broken down or cas vehs clear off the rd ASP.	Disagree. As per ATP 35(A) - as stated - this is the most important means of movement (not manœuvre) in the CZ. → one must read in context. Assumption a force can be moved by air, air is the fastest way to do it. normally added Agree, but details would be provided in lower level manual - it does say other elms. as above - additional line added. Agree.	
67		1209.6	Are not the correct terms for divisional and brigade "covering forces" guard and screen respectively. Only at corps can a properly balanced "covering force" be constituted. Divisions and brigades are unlikely to possess the resources to undertake "covering force" actions.	Disagree. See Ann Glossary for definition.	
68		1319.3	Should be included in para 1.	I think I see the point, but current org preferred.	

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ANNEX B
 TO CTC 2910-1 (Tac Div)
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SER	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REP	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
69		Art 1212	Reword first sentence to read "The primary purpose of an attack is <u>either</u> to destroy the enemy's capability to resist or to seize ground". Selection and <u>maintenance</u> of a single aim should be followed here.	<i>Disagree - suggest for two purposes - on original Agree - point</i>	<i>good</i>
70		1316.4	Requires rewriting from a formation perspective MAWs, combat tems and TDs are elements of brigades. Better, I think to say "The basis of the defence against armour is to deploy formations having en anti-armour weapons in depth astride likely armoured approaches with reserves well positioned to deal with break throughs, on penetrations. A description of the TD's role is in appropriation of a manual or formations.	<i>Agree generally w/ above but detail me in this area to give complete picture</i>	
71		1319.4	Delete last sentence. If vital ground is lost so is the battle. Action is req by higher fmn to restore the sit.	<i>Agree</i>	
72		1323.1 Line 3	Insert "located in or" before "advancing".	<i>Agree</i>	
73		1324.4 Lines 9 and 10	Delete "the degree of risk" insert "the percentage of casualties".	<i>Agree ✓</i>	
74		1324.8 Line 4	Delete "guard", insert "screen".	<i>Disagree - refers to AD RB.</i>	

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ANNEX B
 TO CTC 2910-1 (Tac Div)
 DATED 12 Feb 85

CFP 301 - SECOND DRAFT
COMMENTS OF CONTENT AND EDITORIAL

SER	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REP	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
75		1325	The MDA battle may not be the "Decisive Defensive Battle". Suggest Art 1325 be renamed "Main Defensive Battle Stage".	Disagree. As per Art 35 (A)	
76		1326.9 Line 5	"abraded" is a poor choice of words suggest attrited or some other more accurate term.	Agree	
77		1325.9 Last sentence	A single, subordinate commander should be appointed to command the rear area at each successive level. A formation commander who attempts to assume this responsibility personally is in danger of "taking his eye off the ball".	He is! See CFP 300 blob 13. The "ball" may very well be in his rear court.	
78		1328.2	A poor definition. This may be better described as the "break-clean line" at which point the CF disengages and the MDA formation(s) assume responsibility for the battle.	Disagree. It is not a definition. Handover line is correct term - see army glossary	
79		1328.2 First sentence	Surely boundaries should be clearly defined during all stages of the defensive battle.	Agree.	
80		T414.2.c.	Has not the term "Task Organization" replaced "grouping"?	No.	

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ANNEX B
 TO CTC 2910-1 (Tac Div)
 DATED 12 Feb 85

CFP 301 - SECOND DRAFT
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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
81		1401.1 First sentence	I find it hard to imagine an offensive operation when the delay might be applicable. Surely in such a case the operation has become defensive in nature, particularly if 1401.2 is true. Recommend deletion of "offensive or outer".	Disagree. As per ATP 35(A) + current doc - a separate operation or an action conducted in conjunction with other ops	
82		1513.2 Title and last line and 1514.	"Evacuation" may be a poor choice of words. Suggest "Thinning Out" or "Preliminary Moves" as the paragraph heading.	Will examine in light of earlier comment	Inclined to agree
83		2306.2	Last sentence not necessarily true - delete. Limitations are well explained in fol paras.	Discussed w/ Winters	Disagree
84		2306	Need a para on cbt requirements, in particular the need for a lot of ammo.	Disagree - not unique to build-up areas	
85		2308	Req explanation why conduct ops in forest incl general concept. (In general war, a corps only moves through a forest to attack a worthwhile target/objective.)	Agree - excellent point	✓
86		2311.3	First sentence, delete "normally".	Agree	

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 - B-14 -

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ANNEX B
 TO CTC 2910-1 (Tac Div)
 DATED 12 Feb 85

CFP 301 - SECOND DRAFT
COMMENTS OF CONTENT AND EDITORIAL

SER	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REP	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
87		2312.3	First sentence is wrong. The sighting of these weapons may be difficult, but, they are essential.	<i>Disagree - a unique reference</i>	<i>reference</i>
88		2312?	Second last sentence wrong. These problems do not reduce wpn effectiveness it is however, more difficult to use them.	<i>Check reference? Agree - good point</i>	
89		Section 5 - Mountains	Should include an article describing operations and requirements during winter (by snow).	<i>Disagree - combination of environments are virtually infinite</i>	
90		Section 6 - Pges 23-25	1. Section needs an explanation why a would be deployed in the artic and a concept of ops. (Con, resupply, deployment, etc).	<i>Disagree - not relevant to doctrine. This refers to joint policy, op plans, etc. This is a given for both sides</i>	
91			2. Section requires a combat support article.	<i>Disagree - specifies reqd. - cbt sp or air sp?</i>	
92		Sect 7 P. 23-31	1. See my 1319.4. 2. Req Cbt Sp article.	<i>?</i> <i>It is covered in 2318</i>	
93		Sect 9 P. 23-41	1. Should include possible fmn deployment, e.g. defend beaches and prevent any landing or allow en to land then destroy him.	<i>Disagree. See 2325 4. b.</i>	

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ANNEX B
 TO CTC 2910-1 (Tac Div)
 DATED 12 Feb 85

CFP 301 - SECOND DRAFT
COMMENTS OF CONTENT AND EDITORIAL

SER	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REP	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
94		Arts 802, 806 907.2 909, 910 1002, 1005, 1010, 1115, 1209.6, 1209.8, 10 & 11 1210, 1211, 1214, 1215, 1216.5, 1305, 1308, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1326, 1408, 1414, 1513, 1601, 1602, 1603, 1607, 1610, 1614, 1705, 1706, 1707, 1718, 1801, 1805, 1806, 1904, 1908, 2004, 2004.6, 2117, 2205, 2213, 2307, 2309, 2310, 2312, 2313, 2325, 2316, 2319, 2325, and Annex A	<u>Paragraph and Sup-paragraph Headings.</u> While their use is not mandatory IAW CFP 121 (3) Art 128, they are useful in locating information. However, when they are used in particular article they should be used throughout. The reference articles do not use headings throughout.	Disagree - one para heading can apply to more than one para. No success with NOSP.	
95		Art 1001, 1008, 1220 , 1413, 1508, 1603.3 , 1703, 1709, 1803, 1804.2, 1816, <u>1097.3 and 4</u> , 2001, 2323,	<u>Paragraph Numbering.</u> Inconsistent use of paragraph numbering when only one paragraph is used in an article. Referenced articles are incorrectly numbered.	Disagree - when you have sub paras you use para 1, if not, no para numbers in a one para article	Several headings were moved.

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ANNEX B
 TO CTC 2910-1 (Tac Div)
 DATED 12 Feb 85

CFP 301 - SECOND DRAFT
COMMENTS OF CONTENT AND EDITORIAL

SER	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REP	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
96		Art 301.2 Line 3	<u>Punctuation.</u> Delete ";" and ";"	Agree	
97		Art 314.2	<u>Punctuation.</u> Incorrect subordination replace "," with ";" in 2. a. and b.	Agree	
98		Art 1216.5 K (p. 12-35) Second line	Delete "movement", insert "manoeuvre".	Disagree Manoeuvre = free mov ∴ superfluous	
99		Art 1216.5 c.	Delete "See Chap 23", insert "See Art 2302".	Agree	

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ANNEX C
 TO CTC 2910-1 (TAC DIV)
 DATED 12 FEB 85

CFP 301 - SECOND DRAFT

PROPOSED PARAGRAPH AMENDMENTS

1. This Annex provides proposed (whole) paragraph amendments.

2. 409. THE FIRE PLANNING PROCESS

a. General. Orders are issued and resources allotted down through the artillery chain of command to initiate the fire planning process in support of the Corps commanders tactical plan. The fire plans which result are then staffed up the artillery chain of command for coordination, addition of higher formation tasks and, ultimately, for approval and issue by the ~~superior~~ ^{artillery} commander. See Table 4-1.

no!
Disagree

LEVEL	PLANNING (Flows down)	CO-ORDINATION (Flows up)
CORPS (CCA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> a. develops Corps plan <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> b. assigns tasks and resources to <u>Divisions & Imps Imps</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> c. develops counter-battery (CB) plan (by exception, SEE Note 1). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. co-ordinates division plans b. issues detailed Corps fire plan(s) (SEE Not 1 and 2)
DIVISION (CDA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> a. develop division "outline plan. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> b. sub-allots tasks and resources to brigades 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. co-ordinates brigade plans b. issues detailed division fire plan(s) which usually include preparation fire CB, covering fir and defensive fire

good!

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- 2 -

BRIGADE (Unit COs)	✓ a. develops brigade plan ✓ b. sub-allots tasks and resources to units c. develops detailed counter mortar plan	a. co-ordinates battle group plans b. forwards them to division
-----------------------	--	--

- Note - 1. On those occasions when the Corps frontage can be covered at the Corps level and the CCA has retained CB resources under his control.
2. When detailed coordination at Corps level is feasible and Corps Commander has retained control of some resources.

Table 4-1 A Fire Planning Process

3. 1305: Para 4 & 5

4. A commander must identify his vital ground, i.e. that ground which is lost makes the defence untenable. He then identifies the enemy approaches to his vital ground and the key terrain which dominates or blocks these approaches. From his estimate he will determine which key terrains must be held and task subordinate formations accordingly. This process is repeated at each level of formation and unit.

1st sentence m change

5. Normally, some troops are deployed on the vital ground; however, this is not obligatory. But it is essential that the approaches to the vital ground be well defended. If the enemy is successful in one area, he must be blocked by all available combat power including the deployment of reserve forces or redeployment of uncommitted troops in blocking positions. If the enemy is partially successful. Then counter attack forces should be deployed to re-establish the situation. It thus stands to reason that blocking positions should be unoccupied key terrain, that once occupied, reinforce the defence. And that counter attack objectives should be the forward areas of occupied key terrain. When a commander has used all his resources and still the loss of his vital ground is threatened, he must advise his superior who in turn may deploy his reserves to re-establish the situation.

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- 3 -

4. 1319.2

2. Forces

- a. Grouping of blocking forces should be according to enemy force that can be deployed against the areas to be occupied. If there is time to prepare the blocking position, more infantry can be deployed at a saving of armd resources. Counter attack forces must be strong in armour as they fulfill their mission primarily through manoeuvre and shock action. Still, some infantry must be planned for occupied lost positions.

- b. Normally only at Corps there are sufficient troops to have an uncommitted reserve with only blocking or counter attack tasks. At Div and Bde, the depth units/fmns will occupy either their vital ground or the lost position leading to it. They will be; however, tasked with counter penetration and counter attack tasks. The strength of these forces are dependent on the situation. Normally, a bde should earmark a cbt team based on a tk sqn; a div, a battle group based on an Armd Regt.



Mobile Command Force mobile

FMC 2910-CFP 301 (Arty)

Mobile Command Headquarters
St Hubert, Que
J3Y 5T5

Handwritten notes: *Handed to [unclear] 2400*
Received by [unclear] 2400

25 January 1985

JAN 30 1985

2402-B-00-301-001/FP-001

IS No
Doc No.....

National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0K2

Attention: Director Land Combat Development 6

CFP 301 LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE
SECOND DRAFT - ARTILLERY SECTION COMMENTS

Reference: FMC 2910-CFP 301 (DCOS CD) 3 January 1985

Please find attached the Artillery Section comments
on this draft as requested at the reference.

N.H. Connolly
Lieutenant-Colonel
Senior Staff Officer Artillery
for Commander

Attachment:

Annex A - Comments

② NTF

Comments incorporated. Feedback provided

Handwritten notes: *He did*
18 Mar 85
639571

Melissa

[Faint, mostly illegible text in the main body of the document]

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ANNEX A TO
 FMC 2910-CFP 301 (ARTY)
 DATED 25 JAN 85

COMMENT SHEET

SSO ARTY COMMENTS CFP 301 SECOND DRAFT

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1		pg 4-5 Art 404 para 2 last sentence	Change " <u>regimental commander</u> " to " <u>commanding officer</u> ". This is the more appropriate title.	Agree	
2		pg 4-7 Art 405 para 5	Add " <u>as specified in orders</u> " after CDA. The statement, as worded, may not be strictly true. Reversion to command may not always be required in every plan.	Agree	
3		pg 4-10 Art 406 para 10b	Delete "... <u>effort or an allocation of ammunition</u> ". Insert - " <u>support</u> " as the phrase " <u>allotment of support</u> " describes the intent of this statement.	Agree	
4		Pg 4-10 Art 406 para 11 first sentence	Delete term " <u>combat arms</u> ". Air defence elements are part of the artillery which is a combat arm. The term is therefore redundant. AD	Agree	

ANNEX A TO
 FMC 2910-CFP 301 (ARTY)
 DATED 25 JAN 85

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
6 contd			DISMOUNTED inf from tanks with conventional munition or scatterable mines.		
		pg 13-17 Art 1308 1d	Suggest that the present sub-para be changed to read " <u>provide close support throughout all stages of the defence.</u> " This is a more precise description of the tasks currently listed in the sub-para.	Agree.	
		pg 13-18 Art 1308 1f	Suggest this be changed to read " <u>provide counter battery fire</u> ".	Agree	
7		Art 1308 para 3	Words " <u>protection of</u> " could be included after "tasks include". This would clarify this para	Agree.	
8		1318 para 3	Sixth sentence: "now become" should be replaced with		

ANNEX A TO
 FMC 2910-CFP 301 (ARTY)
 DATED 25 JAN 85

COMMENT SHEET

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
8 contd			" <u>form the basis of</u> ". Combat team fire plans are not merely consolidated to form the battle group fire plan. The co-ordination process will involve the deletion and addition of targets.	Agree	
9		1318 para 3	<u>Last sentence.</u> Interdiction and attrition tasks are not separate fire plans. These targets are added to the Div fire plan and are part of the Div target list.	Discuss Agree	
10		Pg 13-41 Art 1325 para 2 second sentence	"... from artillery" should be deleted from this sentence. All indirect fire resources will be used at this stage of the battle.	Agree -	
11		pg 14-7 Art 1408 para 3	Observers must be allotted to all elements of the delaying force, including reserves and guards. The nature of delay	Discuss Disagree as before	

ANNEX A TO
 FMC 2910-CFP 301 (ARTY)
 DATED 25 JAN 85

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
11 contd			battle will mitigate against regrouping once it has begun.		
12		pg 16-7, 16-8 Art 1604 para 2	<p>a. The movement of artillery will be based on all of the normal factors of range, arcs, ground etc.</p> <p>b. If a bridgehead has any depth it will probably be necessary for guns to cross the obstacle to support the breakout.</p> <p>c. Suggest that this sentence be changed as follows:</p> <p><u>Some mortars should accompany the assault force to provide immediate indirect fire support.</u> <u>The movement plan for artillery will be based on the requirement to support the breakout and subsequent advance</u></p>	<p><i>Discuss</i></p> <p><i>Revised text ok</i></p>	

ANNEX A TO
 FMC 2910-CFP 301 (ARTY)
 DATED 25 JAN 85

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
13		pg 16-7 Art 1604 para 4	Engineer equipment preparation and holding areas should be added to the list of Air Defence tasks.	<i>Discuss, Disagree</i>	
14		pg 18-5 Art 1805 Paras 3 and 4	Despite the limitations of Airborne forces heavy mortars, light guns and man portable air defence systems <u>must</u> accompany the airborne force. This should be specified in this section.	<i>Discuss) Agree</i>	
15		pg 19-9 Art 1908 para 1, last sentence	This depends on the size of the raid and its duration. If the possibility of an interruption of air/naval fire sp exists, artillery and mortars must accompany the raiding force. This is especially so if the raiding force is large - bn plus.	<i>Discuss Agree</i>	

MEMORANDUM

2982-B-0A-301-001/FP/col
~~2800=1~~ (DLOTR)


24 Jan 85

DLCD 6

CFB 301 LAND FORMATIONS (SECOND DRAFT)
IN BATTLE - REVIEW

Ref: 2910-CFP 301 (DCOS CD) dated 3 Jan 85

1. Subject draft has been reviewed as requested at ref. This draft represents a significant improvement over the first draft and makes a valuable contribution to Canadian doctrine. Specific comments are at Annex A.


J.E.L. Gollner
Col
DLOTR
2-3718

Attachment: Annex A - Comment Sheet

ANNEX A
 TO FMC 2910-CFP-301 (COS CD)
 DATED 24 JAN 85

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1	DLOTR	P 18-11, Sect 4 para 1813	This para should be expanded to ensure understanding. Dropping onto an objective held by the en is a very risky operation and if organized resistance is expected tantamount to failure. Dropping onto the objective should be the last option. Much better to land re-group/consolidate and then move to the objective.		



Mobile Command Force mobile

FMC 2910-CFP-301 (CSS)

Mobile Command Headquarters
St Hubert, Que
J3Y 5T5

18 January 1985
Referred to Transmits à DHC 26

JAN 22 1985
2902-B-66-301-001/FP-001
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Distribution List

CFP 301, LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE
SECOND DRAFT - CSS COMMENTS

Reference: FMC 2910-CFP 301 (DCOS CD) 3 January 1985

1. Enclosed are the Cbt Svc Sp comments requested in the reference.
2. This publication was reviewed from a Cbt Svc Sp view point and it was found that Chapter 11 (Combat Service Support) requires minor revision. The remainder of the manual is well-written and appears to be close to "interim" status.
3. Any queries relating to the comments provided should be addressed to Major (ED) Malinowski, SO2 Adm CD, local 7236.

D.J. Wilson
D.J. Wilson
Lieutenant-Colonel

Senior Staff Officer Combat Service Support
for Commander

ND

Enclosure: 1

DISTRIBUTION LIST

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② NTF

copy made - For incorporation in CFP 301

20 Jan 85

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DCOS CD
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ANNEX A
 TO FMC 2910-CFP-301 (CSS)
 DATED 18 JAN 85

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1	S02 Adm CD (CSS study for the Land Combat System 1986-1995-Part two Stage one, Volume IV - page 1-4 para 110)	page 11-2, art 1102, sub-paras 1.a.-d.	<p>Amend as follows:</p> <p>a. <u>first line support</u> - the process whereby a unit provides support to itself;</p> <p>b. <u>second line support</u> - the process whereby a combat service support unit provides support to a unit;</p> <p>c. <u>third line support</u> - the process whereby one combat support unit provides another combat services support unit with back-up supplies and/or services; and</p> <p>d. <u>fourth line support</u> - the process whereby third line combat service support units are provided with back-up supplies and/or services from theatre or national level organizations.</p> <p>Reason: Provides clear definition consistent with the reference. The COSCOM provides third line support to the corps and second line to corps troops. Similarly, the DISGP provides second line support to the brigades and division troops. Therefore, rewording is required for clarity</p>		

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
2.	S02 Adm CD	page 11-5, art 1106, para 4.	and consistency. Add the following sentence to the end of the paragraph. "It provides military police services to the brigade group". <u>Reason:</u> Consistent with para 3 of art 1105 (MP Coy). It explains the function of the military police platoon.		
3.	S02 Adm CD	pare 11-8, Figure 11-1	Under Personnel Administration (Personnel Management sub-functions) include: Reports and Returns; and Personnel Evaluations; Under the (Personnel Services sub-functions) include: Amenities; Welfare; Honours and Awards; Service Investigations; Discipline; Redress of Grievances; Ceremonial; and Leave. <u>Reason:</u> Completeness and accuracy.		
4.	S02 Adm CD	page 11-10, art 1115, para 2 (Supply)	This paragraph is incorrect. All items of supplies are demanded. The flow of items consumed at relatively uniform rates may be forwarded to a combat service support organization to hold as an accessible supply. It is doubted that supplies will be		

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
			<p>"pushed" to units. Unit lift capability is normally limited to its basic load requirements. Therefore, they demand to replenish that basic load. Quantities required beyond basic load holdings normally involve "dumping" excess supplies on the ground. Service support accounting procedures, whether manual or automated, are fed by the unit demand process. Faster than normal consumption by units is catered to by for "Supplementary" and emergency demand process.</p>		

MEMORANDUM

2922 - B-01-301-000/FP-001 (DMEP) 06
17 Jan 85

DLCD 6

CFP 301-1
LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE - COMMENTS

1. The following observations are made after a review of subject publication:

- a. The term "assault force" should be replaced with "assault group" or "assault elements". Article 1604 indicates a formation is organized into three forces in place, bridgehead and breakout. The assault force within the bridgehead force is confusing.
- b. The breakout force should not be mentioned as the breakout operation is separate from the crossing operation.
- c. The use of "assault stage" rather than "initial crossing" as given in para 1006.d.(2)(b) of ATP 35(A) is questioned.
- d. The use of "Vehicle Scales" rather than "Equipment" or "Assault Scales" would seem to ignore the requirement to identify weapons and equipment which must cross the obstacle initially.
- e. Section 3 - Planning and Preparation should be reorganized. The Assault Stage article should include the following:
 - (1) selection of intermediate objectives;
 - (2) selection of the crossing area;
 - (3) deception.
- f. The Buildup and Consolidation Stage article should include the following:
 - (1) selection of a bridgehead;
 - (2) crossing means.

Possibly "assault elements"
Disagree Assault force for consistency
Disagree. Essential for the continuation of the overall operation.
Disagree. consistency with other steps.
Agree "Equipment scales"
yes, will be checked & question of perspective

.../2

② PA

 DLCD 6
 13 Jun 87

- 2 -

2. Chap 19 and Chap 23, Sect 9. The division of responsibility for underwater obs (clr and emplacing) i.e. cbt divers or ships/cbr divers, must be determined. It may be sufficient just to say ". . . must be decided by the Amph Force Comd".

14-10 "Wetlands"
30 Bathymetry
31 incorporated

3. Detailed comments are attached as Annex A.


J.F. Murphy
LCol
DMEF
2-8385

Attachment:

Annex A - Detailed Comments on CFP 301

Annex A
 to B-GL-301-000/FP-001 (DMEP)
 dated 17 Jan 85

DETAILED COMMENTS

	<u>Ser</u>	<u>Art</u>	<u>Para</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
Agree	1	209	2c(1)	9	Change "safe" to "potable".
Agree	2	Table 3-1	Under Brigade		Delete "Engr" from OC Fd Engr Sqn.
Agree	3	504	4	4	Add "or supervision" at end of last sentence.
Agree	4	506	1d	2	Delete "Engineer" from Engineer Squadron.
Disagree agree	5	506	2	5	Change "advice" to "information".
Agree	6	507	2	5	Delete "engineer".
Agree	7	507	2	8	Delete "engineer".
Agree	8	507	2	9	Delete "engineer".
Agree	9	507	4	5	Delete "engineer".
Agree	10	507	6	1	Delete "engineer".
Agree	11	508	3	3	Delete "engineer".
Agree	12	1103		11	Delete "War Establishments" and insert "Corps '86 Establishments".
Disagree note	13	1203	7	5	Delete "fire sacks" and insert "fire pockets".
Disagree Hans	14	1318	3	14	Is "attrition" fire the proper term or is it "harrassing" fire?

	<u>Ser</u>	<u>Art</u>	<u>Para</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
Agree	15	1414	2d(2)	1	Delete "barriers" and insert "obstacles".
Agree	16	1601	2	8	Add "delay" after "losses".
Agree	17	1601	3	1	Add "detect" after "capability to".
Agree	18	1601	3	4	Change last sentence to "In spite of these advances, crossing and breaching operations are still very difficult against a determined opponent".
Agree	19	1602	1	7	Make two sentences. One on air attacks and one on weapons such as nuclear, chemical or scatterable mines which could be delivered by a variety of means.
Agree	20	1602	4	6	Rephrase this sentence to something like "Warsaw Pact forces make limited use of large minefields due to the time and large logistic effort required. As well, large minefields place unacceptable restrictions on the manoeuver flexibility of their own forces".
Agree	21	1604	1	1 & 4	Line one states that "normally" the crossing formation will have a force in place and then line 4 states the force in place "may" be from the crossing formation. This should be stated more clearly.
Disagree disputed	22	1604	1a	6	Delete "and its near side" as "defence of the obstacle" includes the "near side".
Agree	23	1604	1b	10	Add "including the seizure of objectives on the bridgehead line" after "build-up".
Agree	24	1605	1		The second sentence states the crossing area organization operates the crossing sites of the assault force but sentence three states that the organization does not operate until the completion of the assault stage.

	<u>Ser</u>	<u>Art</u>	<u>Para</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
<i>Agree</i>	25	1607	7	1	Spelling error; its "breaching" vice "breeching".
<i>Disagree</i>	26	1607	8	5	After "assault" add "and/or" bridgehead force.
<i>Agree</i>	27	1610	4		Add "cover from observation" as a feature.
<i>Agree</i>	28	1610	6	2	Rewrite the first sentence as it is not clear. Suggest ". . . greater than that required for the assault group. This is required because if one of the initial sites is closed, the time required to establish a replacement site seriously effect the success of the operation.
<i>Agree</i>	29	1610	6	6	Add "availability of routes into and out of the crossing area".
<i>Agree</i>	30	1611	1	4	Add "(See figure 16-2)".
<i>Agree</i>	31	1611	2	1	Change to "The use of various means . . . gives . . . makes . . .?"
<i>Agree</i> Disagree	32	1611	2b		Add "electronic, such as vehicle signature duplications" as a means of breaching.
<i>Agree</i>	33	1611	3		Change ending to ". . . reuse and is replaced with permanent or line of communication equipment as soon as possible".
<i>Disagree</i>	34	1613	1	4	Delete the "s" on the end of bridgeheads.
<i>Agree</i>	35	1614	3	3	Change to "Support is provided . . . includes direct and indirect fire, the protection of crossing sites . . .".
<i>Agree</i>	36	1614	5	5	Add "electronic".
<i>Agree</i>	37	1805	5	3	Insert "or improve" between construct and landing.

	<u>Ser</u>	<u>Art</u>	<u>Para</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
<i>Agree, 30 follow same?</i>	38	1908	2	6	Old CFP 319 says engineer divers were to clear obstacles to the 3 fathom line; as opposed to "up to the water line". This discrepancy should be checked.
<i>Agree</i>	39	2205	2	4	Chemical mines may be "emplaced by any arm"?
<i>Agree</i>	40	2325	5b		What divers do this? No navy ones available. Amph should be the same i.e. cbt divers to 3 fathom or so depth. See also Art 1908.2.
<i>Agree?</i>	41	Annex A	4a		Definition is incorrect; see AAP-6.
<i>Agree?</i>	42	Annex A	7	6	STANAGs are not promulgated below NDHQ/FMC; therefore it should state <u>where</u> promulgated.
<i>Agree?</i>	43	Annex A	8		Reserved demolitions "must" be guarded or "should" be guarded?
<i>Agree</i>	44	Annex A	c & d		Orders are issued on DND forms 913 and 914.
<i>Deleted</i>	45	Annex A	9	2	Delete "gap" and insert "lane".

2722-B-CG-301-001/FP-001

MEMORANDUM

~~E-GL-301-000/FP-001 (DMEP)~~

17 Jan 85

DLCD 6

CFP 301-1

LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE - COMMENTS


1. The following observations are made after a review of subject publication:
- a. The term "assault force" should be replaced with "assault group" or "assault elements". Article 1604 indicates a formation is organized into three forces in place, bridgehead and breakout. The assault force within the bridgehead force is confusing.
 - b. The breakout force should not be mentioned as the breakout operation is separate from the crossing operation.
 - c. The use of "assault stage" rather than "initial crossing" as given in para 1006.d.(2)(b) of ATP 35(A) is questioned.
 - d. The use of "Vehicle Scales" rather than "Equipment" or "Assault Scales" would seem to ignore the requirement to identify weapons and equipment which must cross the obstacle initially.
 - e. Section 3 - Planning and Preparation should be reorganized. The Assault Stage article should include the following:
 - (1) selection of intermediate objectives;
 - (2) selection of the crossing area;
 - (3) deception.
 - f. The Buildup and Consolidation Stage article should include the following:
 - (1) selection of a bridgehead;
 - (2) crossing means.

.../2

- 2 -

2. Chap 19 and Chap 23, Sect 9. The division of responsibility for underwater obs (clr and emplacing) i.e. cbt divers or ships/cbr divers, must be determined. It may be sufficient just to say ". . . must be decided by the Amph Force Comd".

3. Detailed comments are attached as Annex A.


J.F. Murphy
LCol
DMEP
2-8385

Attachment:

Annex A - Detailed Comments on CFP 301

JF Murphy LCol/DMEP/2-8385/bew

Annex A
to B-GL-301-000/FP-001 (DMEP)
dated 17 Jan 85

DETAILED COMMENTS

<u>Ser</u>	<u>Art</u>	<u>Para</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
1	209	2c(1)	9	Change "safe" to "potable".
2	Table 3-1	Under Brigade		Delete "Engr" from OC Fd Engr Sqn.
3	504	4	4	Add "or supervision" at end of last sentence.
4	506	1d	2	Delete "Engineer" from Engineer Squadron.
5	506	2	5	Change "advice" to "information".
6	507	2	5	Delete "engineer".
7	507	2	8	Delete "engineer".
8	507	2	9	Delete "engineer".
9	507	4	5	Delete "engineer".
10	507	6	1	Delete "engineer".
11	508	3	3	Delete "engineer".
12	1103		11	Delete "War Establishments" and insert "Corps '86 Establishments".
13	1203	7	5	Delete "fire sacks" and insert "fire pockets".
14	1318	3	14	Is "attrition" fire the proper term or is it "harrassing" fire?

A-1

.../A-2

<u>Ser</u>	<u>Art</u>	<u>Para</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
15	1414	2d(2)	1	Delete "barriers" and insert "obstacles".
16	1601	2	8	Add "delay" after "losses".
17	1601	3	1	Add "detect" after "capability to".
18	1601	3	4	Change last sentence to "In spite of these advances, crossing and breaching operations are still very difficult against a determined opponent".
19	1602	1	7	Make two sentences. One on air attacks and one on weapons such as nuclear, chemical or scatterable mines which could be delivered by a variety of means.
20	1602	4	6	Rephrase this sentence to something like "Warsaw Pact forces make limited use of large minefields due to the time and large logistic effort required. As well, large minefields place unacceptable restrictions on the manoeuver flexibility of their own forces".
21	1604	1	1 & 4	Line one states that "normally" the crossing formation will have a force in place and then line 4 states the force in place "may" be from the crossing formation. This should be stated more clearly.
22	1604	1a	6	Delete "and its near side" as "defence of the obstacle" includes the "near side".
23	1604	1b	10	Add "including the seizure of objectives on the bridgehead line" after "build-up".
24	1605	1		The second sentence states the crossing area organization operates the crossing sites of the assault force but sentence three states that the organization does not operate until the completion of the assault stage.

<u>Ser</u>	<u>Art</u>	<u>Para</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
25	1607	7	1	Spelling error; its "breaching" vice "breeching".
26	1607	8	5	After "assault" add "and/or" bridgehead force.
27	1610	4		Add "cover from observation" as a feature.
28	1610	6	2	Rewrite the first sentence as it is not clear. Suggest ". . . greater than that required for the assault group. This is required because if one of the initial sites is closed, the time required to establish a replacement site seriously effect the success of the operation.
29	1610	6	6	Add "availability of routes into and out of the crossing area".
30	1611	1	4	Add "(See figure 16-2)".
31	1611	2	1	Change to "The use of various means . . . gives . . . makes . . .?"
32	1611	2b		Add "electronic, such as vehicle signature duplications" as a means of breaching.
33	1611	3		Change ending to ". . . reuse and is replaced with permanent or line of communication equipment as soon as possible".
34	1613	1	4	Delete the "s" on the end of bridgeheads.
35	1614	3	3	Change to "Support is provided . . . includes direct and indirect fire, the protection of crossing sites . . .".
36	1614	5	5	Add "electronic".
37	1805	5	3	Insert "or improve" between construct and landing.

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38	1908	2	6	Old CFP 319 says engineer divers were to clear obstacles to the 3 fathom line; as opposed to "up to the water line". This discrepancy should be checked.
39	2205	2	4	Chemical mines may be "emplaced by any arm"?
40	2325	5b		What divers do this? No navy ones available. Amph should be the same i.e. cbt divers to 3 fathom or so depth. See also Art 1908.2.
41	Annex A	4a		Definition is incorrect; see AAP-6.
42	Annex A	7	6	STANAGs are not promulgated below NDHQ/FMC; therefore it should state <u>where</u> promulgated.
43	Annex A	8		Reserved demolitions "must" be guarded or "should" be guarded?
44	Annex A	c & d		Orders are issued on DND forms 913 and 914.
45	Annex A	9	2	Delete "gap" and insert "lane".

MEMORANDUM

2922-B-06-301-001/FP-001.
~~2910-CFP-301~~ (D Secur P & D)

14 Jan 85

D Secur P & D

CFP 301 LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE
SECOND DRAFT

- Refs:
- A. FMC 2910-CFP 301 (DCOS CD) d/3 Jan 85
 - B. FMC 2910-CFP 301 (DCOS CD) d/30 Jun 84
 - C. Telecon Majs Cannons, D Secur P & D 2/Plante,
FMC S02 MP Fd Ops 091400 Jan 85
 - D. Conversation Majs Cannons/Andrew 10 Jan 85

1. I have read the subject publication (Ref A). It is an omnibus book with its thrust directed to battle. Thus very little space is devoted to MP or the Security aspects of the "Army".
2. Areas of interest to the Branch are underlined and noted with yellow flags.
3. We have a copy of the First Draft (Ref B) which arrived during the summer. Comments were requested, but none submitted from either D Secur or FMC S02 MP Fd Ops (Refs C & D).
4. Examination of Refs A and B indicates that some functions of the MP Bn have been modified. Specifically:
 - a. Chap 2 Article 215 para 1 subpara a -
This has been changed from "Provides traffic control" to "Assist in the provision of traffic control".
 - b. Chap 2 Article 215 para 1 subpara c -
This has been changed from "Conducts criminal investigations" to "Conducts investigations".

.../2

These changes were apparently done without the input of the Security Branch. Whilst I have no difficulty with the deletion of the word criminal at para 4b above, as it enhances our scope of activity, the rewording of para 4a above is something else. It intimates that our primary function is other than traffic control, for which the Security Branch is largely responsible. It is true that in certain ops the actual control of traffic may rest upon the Recce Sqn or other similar org simply because it is far beyond the MP resources, and that the traffic plan is developed by the responsible HQ with considerable MP input. However normally it is an MP responsibility to control traffic. The term "assist in" relegates it to a secondary function.

5. Para 215 1d has as our function "execute police duties". I suggest that this is too restrictive and should be changed to "executes military police duties". An addition to these functions should be made to show security functions, including but not restricted to VIP Security, Aircraft Security, and the Security of Airfields, Ports and Special Weapons.

6. At Chap 11 article 1104 para 3 the services provided by MP Bn include security and restricted investigations to "conduct of criminal investigations". Both Chap 2 and 11 as regard the MP Bn should be the same as that suggested previously. This incongruity is again reflected in Chap 11, article 1116 para 2 subpara d.

7. The line diagram Chap 11, Fig 11-1 at page 11-8 indicates that MP are under Personal Administration within the CSS System. PW are dealt with at Art 1116 para 2 subpara k separate from MP activities which are dealt with at subpara d. As it is acknowledged that MP have responsibility for the custody and administration of POW, it is redundant to separate the functions here. I believe POW should be, if necessary, a sub-subpara under subpara d., Military Police. Separating this function can only serve to cause confusion.

8. Attached is a reply for your signature.

CANNONS

A.L. Cannons

Maj

D Secur P & D 2

2-5548

MEMORANDUM

2910-CFP 301 (D Secur P & D)

Jan 85

DLCD 6

CFP 301 LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE
SECOND DRAFT

Ref: FMC 2910-CFP 301 (DCOS CD) d/3 Jan 85

1. D Secur has reviewed with interest the subject publication. It is encouraging to read of our doctrine and to see that we are "getting it together".
2. Attached are comments on areas of concern to the Security Branch as it applies to MP in the Field.
3. We look forward to the Third and Final Draft.

*OSB
Col Keith*

R.T. Hall
Col
D Secur
2-8556

Attachment

ANNEX A
 TO FMC 2910-CFP-301 (SOS CD)
 DATED

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1	CFP 315 (4) Ch 1, Article 112	Page 2-10, Art 215 Para 1	Sub para a should be reworded to Provide traffic control. As it now stands the inference is that TC is not an important aspect of the MP function. Although other sources may also be engaged in TC this function is paramount with MP.		
2	CFP 315(4) Ch 1 Article 112	Page 2-10, Art 215 Para 1	Execute police duties, should read Execute military police duties. MP have duties and responsibilities outside of strict police duties, ie; a disciplinary function. As it is now written, it is too restrictive.		
3	CFP 315(4) Ch 1 Article 112	Page 2-10 Art 215 Para 1	Add to the list of functions h. Security including VIP and special weapons, and physical security at installations.		
4	CFP 315(4) Page 5-27, Ch 5 Art 542	Page 10-11 Art 1011 para 4	This article details priorities of traffic at intersections for MP.		
5	CFP 315(4) Ch1 Article 112	Page 11-3 Art 1103 para 3	The duties in this para should be the same as that at Page 2-10 Art 215 para 1 and the suggested revision.		

ANNEX A
 TO FMC 2910-CFP-301 (SOS CD)
 DATED

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE NO	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
6	CFP 315(4) Ch 1 Article 112 and Ch 9	Page 11-8 Figure 11-1 and Page 11-13 Article 1116 para 2 subpara 2d and 2k.	As PW are an MP responsibility sub-para 2k should be incorporated into sub-para 2d. It should be made clear that MP provide escorts but the bulk of the escorts will be drawn from other units.		

MEMORANDUM

2922-BOG-301-001/FP-001

PR

→ 2910-I (DCEOT)

14 Jan 85

DLCD 6

LAND FORMATIONS IN
BATTLE (SECOND DRAFT)

Ref: FMC 2910-CFP 301 (DCOS CD) 3 Jan 85

Signals comments, requested at ref, are attached.



R.R.C. Samis
LCol
DCEOT
5-8538

Attachment

ANNEX A - COMMENT SHEET

ANNEX A
 TO 2910-1 (DCEOT)
 DATED 14 Jan 85

COMMENT SHEET 1

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (PAGE, ART, ETC.,)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1	CORPS SIGNALS	PAGE 2-7 PARA 210C	ADD "AND MAINTAIN" BETWEEN "PROVIDE AND "AUTOMATIC"		
2	ADVANCE TO CONTACT	PAGE 12-20 PARA 1211	PENULTIMATE SENTENCE, ADD "LINE WHERE PRACTICAL" BETWEEN EG, AND "DESPATCH RIDERS"		
3	DEFENSIVE	PAGE 13-19 PARA 1310	WHILST EW IS THE PURVIEW OF SIGNALS AND IT PLAYS A MAJOR ROLE IN DEFENCE, IT IS NOT THE ONLY ASPECT OF SIGNALS. RADIO SILENCE WILL BE IMPOSED WHENEVER POSSIBLE TO AVOID DETECTION BY REC. THIS IN TURN NECESSITATES THE EXTENSIVE USE OF LINE, ADS AND SDS. IF WE HAVE AIR SUPERIORITY, THE COMMANDER MIGHT EVEN CONSIDER ELECTRONIC SILENCE.		
4	COMMAND & CONTROL	PAGE 13-47 PARA 1327.6	DELETE "RADIO RELAY COMMUNICATIONS" AND INSERT "ADS/SDS": UNLESS HIGHLY DIRECTIONAL ANTENNAS ARE USED, AND MINIMUM POWER, RR CAN BE INTERCEPTED EVEN AT 90° TO THE LINE OF SHOT.		

.../A-2

ANNEX A
 TO 2910-1 (DCEOT)
 DATED 14 Jan 85

COMMENT SHEET 1

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (PAGE, ART, ETC.,)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
5	SIGNALS	PAGE 14-8 PARA 1410	SEE COMMENTS AT SRL 3 ABOVE; CNR WILL BE THE PRIMARY MODE OF COMMUNICATIONS DURING THE DELAY, COUPLED WITH RADIO SILENCE UNTIL THE ENEMY IS ENGAGED. PRE-ARRANGED CODEWORDS REPORT LINES ETC WILL ALLOW COMMANDERS TO SPEEDILY DISENGAGE.		
6	NBC EFFECTS	PAGE 22-3 PARA 2203.2	LAST TWO SENTENCES ARE TOO SIMPLISTIC: A GROUND BURST WILL ONLY HAVE AN EMP RANGE OF ABOUT 5-7 KM, AN AIRBURST NIL BUT AN IONOSPHERIC BURST WILL DESTROY ELECTRONIC, ELECTRIC AND ELECTROMECHANICAL EQUIPMENT FOR THOUSANDS OF KM, DEPENDENT UPON SIZE, UNLESS ADEQUATELY PROTECTED. BECAUSE OF ITS FREQUENCY, RADAR IS LESS SUSCEPTIBLE THAN CNR AND RR. TREE, EMANATING FROM RESIDUAL FALL OUT, CAN DESTROY COMPUTER MEMORIES AND SENSITIVE ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS!		
7	JUNGLE COMMAND AND CONTROL	PAGE 23-34 PARA 2318.7	ONE OF THE MAJOR PROBLEMS IN JUNGLES IS THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF VHF CNR, EXCEPT FOR VERY SHORT RANGES, UNLESS THE ANTENNAS CAN BE RAISED ABOVE THE JUNGLE CANOPY. LOW BAND HF WORKS WELL BUT LINE IS VERY USEFUL WHEN LAID BY HELICOPTER ACROSS THE CANOPY.		

2922-B-00-301-001/FP-091A

MEMORANDUM


2900-1 (D ARMD) *1/27/84*

31 Oct 84

CFPD/Customer Service

REQUEST FOR PUBLICATIONS
EXCHANGE OFFICER AUSTRALIAN ARMOUR SCHOOL

1. The terms of reference for the Canadian Forces Exchange Officer at the Australian Armour School have been expanded this year so that he is now required to instruct and write on armour tactics. In addition, when he returns to Canada he is normally at that stage of his career when he must shortly attend the Combat Team Commanders' and Squadron Commanders' Courses. It is therefore essential that he remain current on Canadian tactics, procedures and training.
2. It is requested that the Exchange Officer be issued the publications listed in ~~Reference~~ A. These will be a one time issue and follow-up amendments will be required. He is located at the Australian Armour Centre, MILPO PUCKAPUNYAL, Victoria 3662, Australia. His UIC is 6022.
3. DLCD/D Armd (plate number All7) will sponsor this request and is willing to arrange shipment to Puckapunyal.
4. Questions or comments concerning this request may be directed to SO Armour 2-2, Maj W.H. Logan or Armour RSM, CWO J.L. Perron at 992-7257. Any assistance would be greatly appreciated.


W.H. Logan
Maj
SO Armour 2-2
2-7257

Maj W.H. Logan, 2-7257/mr

Annex A
to 2900-1 (D Armd)
dated Oct 84

AUSTRALIAN ARMoured SCHOOL PUBLICATION REQUEST

CFP 301	Land Formations in Battle
B-GL-303-001/AF-001	War Establishments and Staff Data
B-GL-305-001/FT-001	Armour, Vol 1, The Armour Regiment in Battle
B-OL-305-002/FT-001	Armour, Vol 2, The Reconnaissance Squadron in Battle
B-OL-305-003/FT-001	Armour, Vol 3, Tank Troop Leader's Manual
B-OL-305-004/FT-001	Armour, Vol 4, Reconnaissance Troop Leader's Manual
CFP 305(5)	Recce Regiment in Battle
B-GL-305-007/MS-001	Armour, Vol 7, User Manual Cougar, Part 1, Chassis
C-30-731-000/MB-000	Leopard C1 Operator's Manual for Main Battle Tank Hull and Suspension (Book 1 of 2)
C-71-269-000/MB-000	Leopard C1 Operator's Manual for Turret (Book 1 of 2 (Interim))
CFP 305(7) Part 2	CougarArmaments
B-GL-305-009/PT-001	Armour, Vol 9, Theory of Armoured Gunnery, Part 1, General
B-GL-305-009/PT-002 Part 2	TheoryLeopard Application of Fire
B-GL-305-009/PT#--3	Armour, Vol 9, Theory of Armoured Gunnery, Part 3, Cougar, Application of Fire
B-GL-305-013/PT-001	Armour, Vol 13, Armour Open Range Practices

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE



MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE

**CANADIAN LAND FORCES COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
COLLEGE DE COMMANDEMENT ET D'ÉTAT-MAJOR DES FORCES TERRESTRES CANADIENNES**

FORT FRONTENAC
KINGSTON, ONTARIO
K7K 2X8

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT

BUREAU DU COMMANDANT

SC 2900-1/6 (Comdt)

15 October 1984

ALMMS/SSDUN 3-3-2

Referred to
Transmis b. *DLC D 6*

National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0K2

OCT 18 1984

①
Attention: DLCD 6

File No *2922-B-00-301-001/FP00*
Dossier No.....

CFP 301(1) LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE - FIRST DRAFT

Charged to/Chargé à.....

- References:
- A. B-GL-301-000/FP-001, First Draft, June 1984
 - B. FMC 2910-CFP 301 (DCOS CD), 30 June 1984
 - C. CFP 301(1) Formations in Battle, December 1980

1. The attached comments on reference A are substantially of the same nature referred to in recent conversations between DLCD 6 and Deputy Commandant CLFCSC. While the current draft, subject to mainly editorial changes, may well serve formation commanders and staffs, it will not fully meet the requirements of this College. It is hoped that our detailed comments will illustrate our thinking in that regard.

2. Specific observations are at Annex A. Annex B makes the point, in regard to a specific chapter, that reference A is too general, and in some cases, vague, to serve as a document from which to teach doctrine. Hence our preference for an amended version of reference B, along the lines of our submission.

R.I. Stewart
Brigadier-General
Commandant

Attachments:

Annex A Comment Sheet

Annex B Review of CFP 301(1) - First Draft - June 84

Appendix 1 Chapter 12

② NTF

Comments incorporated

*JL KLH
DLCD 6
(5-0892)*

S. W. B.

National Defence / Défense nationale

CANADIAN FORCES
COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE



COLLÈGE DE COMMANDEMENT
ET D'ÉTAT-MAJOR
DES FORCES CANADIENNES

215 YONGE BLVD., TORONTO, ONT. M5M 3H9

2910-2 (DLS)

3 October 1984

National Defence Headquarters
101 Colonel By Drive
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0K2

Referred to
Transmits to... *D.L.C.D.G.*

①

Attention: CLDO/DLCD 6

OCT 5 1984
2922-B-06-301-001/FP-001
RIS No
Buzzer No.....

REVIEW OF CFP 301 (FIRST DRAFT)
FORMATIONS IN BATTLE

Reference: FMC 2910 (DCOS CD) 30 Jun 84

1. Comments on the first draft of CFP 301 are attached. While there are a relatively large number of comments, the majority of them are minor. Overall I believe that this draft is a well-written document.
2. One area which requires improvement is the lack of consistency in writing style between major sections of the manual. It is obvious that numerous authors played a part and a concerted editorial effort is required to develop the finished product.
3. Minor staff duties is another related area which requires attention. There are errors in punctuation and format throughout the text and these should be resolved before the pamphlet is published. Particular errors which were noted are:

- a. Paragraph Headings. It appears to be a common, but quite incorrect, practise to use paragraph headings as group headings. In many cases a lead paragraph is given an underlined heading and several subsequent paragraphs - directly related to the first - are without headings and are not subordinate. If a paragraph heading is used it must only relate to that one paragraph. If more than one paragraph is necessary then they should be grouped together under an appropriate group heading. If one paragraph is given a heading then, for consistency, all subsequent should have a heading until the next group heading is necessary. This avoids the inevitable confusion which is apparent at present. For examples, see Art 1517 for a correct grouping of paragraphs, and Art 807 for a typical incorrect grouping, in particular paragraphs 2, 7, 8 and 9.

R.B.

Canada

② Secretary

copy pls.

10 Oct 84

*J.G. Lal
DLCD 6
(5-0846)*

.../2

③ NTF
comment incorporated

*J.G. Lal
11 Oct 84
000873
(5-0846)*

-2-

- b. Punctuation. Punctuation could be improved throughout but particularly the punctuation of sub-paragraphs. This is generally inconsistent throughout the manual with respect to the use of the comma and semi-colon. For examples, see Art 108, paragraph 2 for correct use and Art 606, paragraph 1; Art 607, paragraph 1; and Art 803, paragraph 1, for incorrect use.

4. I am encouraged to see the progress which is being made. We are looking forward at the College to replacing the CSC series with approved Canadian Land Forces doctrine and the publication of an interim edition of CFP 301 will be another major step in that direction.


J.M.G. Baril
Colonel

Director Land Studies

Enclosure: 1

MEMORANDUM

PA

2922-B-OG-301-001/FP-001 (DMEP)

21 Sep 84

DLCD 6

CFP 301(1) LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE
FIRST DRAFT COMMENTS

Ref: A. FMC 2910-CFP 301 (DCOS CD) 30 Jun 84

1. Comments on the draft manual are attached.
2. These comments are in addition to those forwarded by SSO Fd Engr on 31 Aug with which I concur.

J.F. Murphy LCol
J.F. Murphy
LCol
DMEP
2-8385

Attachment:

Annex A - Detailed Comments on CFP 301(1)

JF Murphy LCol/DMEP/2-8385/bew

Annex A
to 2922-B-0G-301-001/FP-001 (DMEP)
21 Sep 84

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
1		2-6, 209.1.e	Add "terrain analysis teams".		
2		4-15, Fig 4-2	Although coordination between Arty and Engrs will take place wrt scatterable mines, it is not considered necessary to have a full LO det at the FSCC. This coordination will be done on an as required basis from the CCE/CDE Ln Det at Corps and Div main respectively with the Corps/Div FSCC.		
3		5-3, 504.4	Delete "Armoured Engineers Equipment". These are held at Div level as well as in an independant CMBG.		
4		13-3, Table 13-1	The location of the tank forces in the first echelon of the front and CAA should be verified. They are at second echelon at Div level to exploit a breakthrough. Maybe the same should be true at front and CAA levels.		

.../2

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
5		13-5, Fig 13-2	The width (frontage) of the secondary attack axis should be depicted <u>wider</u> than the main attack axis <u>if</u> the same size force is used on each i.e. Army. This would then portray the concentration of force necessary on the main attack axis.		
6		13-8, 1309 14-7, 1409 15-4, 1508	In the heading delete "combat". It is not descriptive of all the engineer tasks being done, e.g. Armd Engr, Amph Engr, Constr Engrs working in the combat zone. "Engineers" fills the whole bill.		
7		Chap 13, 13-14 1306.3 & elsewhere	These sub-para headings do not appear to be the proper form/ title of the stages of the defence. Suggest they be written: a. Covering Force <u>stage</u> , b. Main Defensive <u>stage</u> , c. Counter-move <u>stage</u> , (or words to that effect). Then use that terminology throughout the chapter.		

.../3

Annex A

- 3 -

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
		13-37, 1324.1 14-7, 1409.2 14-12, 1413.2f 20-6, 2004.6g	Delete "gaps" insert lanes. In the context of each, "lanes" is correct terminology.		
		16-1, 1601.1 & throughout chapter	Delete "man-made" insert "artificial". The meaning of artificial (in Oxford) is - not natural. This is the correct connotation for use with obstacles i.e. natural and not natural.		

PA
292-BOG-301-001/FP-001

~~B-GL-301-000/FP-001~~ (DLOT)
(First Draft)

31 August 1984

Mobile Command Headquarters
St-Hubert, Que
J3Y 5T5

Attention: DCOS CD

LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE
DLOT COMMENTS

References: A. B-GL-301-000/FP-001 (First Draft)
Land Formations in Battle
B. FMC 2910-CFP 301 (DCOS CD) dated
30 June 1984

Reference A has been reviewed IAW Reference B.
DLOT comments are attached at Annex A.

J.E.L. Gollner
J.E.L. Gollner
Colonel

Director Land Operations and Training
for Chief of the Defence Staff

Attachment:

Annex A - DLOT comments

LCol L.W. Bentley/DLOT 2/6-4102/sr

ANNEX A
TO B-GL-301-000/FP-001
(First Draft)
DATED 3/ AUG 84

LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE
DLOT COMMENTS

Ref: B-GL-301-000/FP-001 (First Draft) Land Formations
in Battle dated 30 Jun 84

1. Ref has been reviewed. Comments are divided into
two parts:

- a. General Comments; and
- b. Specific Comments by page and para.

2. General Comments

- a. The document requires a careful rewrite in order to tighten up the language. Some chapters are worse than others but many contain wordy constructions, redundant statements and often lack precision. For example, chapter 17 contains the statement "Generally, the mounting stage of the airmobile operation is uneventful" (chapter 17, 1714, p. 17-11). This is at best misleading at worst meaningless. Again "Normally the aircraft fly low and fast taking advantage of cover offered by terrain relief" (chapter 17, 1715, para 1, p. 17-11); a blinding glimpse of the obvious. As this is a first draft undoubtedly the authors expect to polish the document before final issue.
- b. The document opens with "The Canadian Operational Concept" (Sect 3) and describes this as "... the concurrent engagement of all echelons of the enemy forces ...". This is amplified by "central to the concept is the ability to detect and engage an enemy in depth, thus diminishing this ability to influence the close-in battle with second echelon or reserve forces. This overall concept has undoubtedly been influenced by the new US doctrine embodied in FM 100-5 (operations) and

ANNEX A
TO B-GL-301-001/FP-001
(First Draft)
DATED AUG 84

and its derivative in NATO terms of the so-called air/land battle concept. The concept of taking the battle to the enemy throughout his depth, within the capabilities of the formations in question is valid. However, that theme is not adequately developed in the succeeding chapters. This is particularly true in the chapter on defence where only passing mention is made of the concept followed by detailed discussion of a more static defensive concept centred on the Main Defensive Area (MDA). We should not get as carried away with this concept as the US Army has to date; however, in keeping with the direction taken in chapter 1 sect 3 the rest of the document should address more carefully (and more imaginatively?) how the concept will be implemented. In summary, the full implications of the battle have not been adequately addressed.

3. Specific Comments

- a. Chap 1, Sec 3, 113 para 7. Should read "Between the 96 hour/300 km extent of a Corps area of interest" vice "96 hour/150 km".
- b. Chap 3, Sect 4, 312, para 2a and 2b. This is wrong. In NATO practise both op comd and op con are delegated. For example Operational Command of CAST is passed from CFE to SACEUR to CINCNORTH to COMMON and ultimately, when the force is operationally ready, to Comd 6 (NO) DIV. In the case of the AMF(L) Operational Command is always retained by SACEUR; however, operational control is successively delegated through the NATO chain of command to either Comd 6 (NO) DIV (N-1) or COMLANDZEALAND (N-2). I In addition there are two other NATO command and control relationships which although less common are used. These are Tactical Command and Tactical Control; both should be included. Each of these are defined in the NATO Glossary of Terms and the reader should be referred to this document in the text for detailed definitions.

ANNEX A

TO B-GL-301-001/FP-001
(First Draft)
DATED AUG 84

- c. Chap 4, Sect 1, 402, para 1b.(2), p. 4-2.
This again raises the issue of "battle in depth: Insufficient attention is paid to the requirement to integrate the air with the land battle. A major problem in NATO with developing the air/land battle is the fact that air assets are centralized at Army Group level whereas the concept itself requires the battle to be conducted at Corps level and below. This implies integration and detailed co-ordination of all aspects of the battle at the appropriate level. This para does not make the point nearly strongly enough and in fact is probably misleading. My point here reflects the earlier one made to the effect that there is a disconnect between the theme in Chap 1 and the rest of the document.
- d. Chap 6, Sect 3, 612, para 2, p. 6-9. The statement that UTH squadrons are capable of operating anywhere in the corps area of responsibility and as far forward as the "FLOT", is contradicted by 613 para 2a. This latter para implies that airmobile operations will take place forward of the FLOT. The restriction of airmobile ops to the FLOT is too rigid. Battle in depth implies that operations may be conducted, or at least supported, by airmobile operations on occasion. At any rate under most current scenarios the battle field will be very fluid and often no fixed line, known as the FLOT will be identifiable. It would be better, I think to "paint the picture" a bit here and then carefully outline the requirement for a successful airmobile ops.
- e. Chap 13, Sect 1, 1302, para 3, p. 13-2. OMG's should receive more attention either here or preferably in chap 1. In particular how these formations relate to the overall battle, who controls them and how they are constituted.
- f. Chap 13, Sect 3, 1318, para 1 to 4, p. 13-29.
The treatment of the counter-attack here is valid but too restricted. In spirit it reflects a defensive attitude lacking aggression and again does not adequately take into consideration the implications of the battle in

ANNEX A
TO B-GL-301-001/FP-001
(First Draft)
DATED AUG 84

depth. A major consideration throughout the defensive battle in the requirement to regain the initiative, once this is achieved it must be retained. Some counter attacks may be designed solely to "restore a defensive situation"; however, ideally they may well be intended change the whole face of battle either on their own or in support of higher headquarters' future plans.

 National Défense
Defence nationale

2910-1 (Tac Div)

Tactics Division
Combat Training Centre
Canadian Forces Base Gagetown
Oromocto, New Brunswick
EOG 2PO

31 August 1984

National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0K2

①
Attention: DLCD-6

NDRMS/SCDDN 3-3-2

Referred to
Transmis à DLCD 6

SEP 4 1984

File No 2910-B-0G-301-001/FP-001
Dossier No.....

Charged to/Chargé à.....

CFP 301 - LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE
FIRST DRAFT - COMMENTS


Reference: FMC 2910-CFP 301 (DCOS CD) dated 30 June 1984

1. Despite the date of Reference, the single copy that originally we were sent, did not arrive until mid August. This prevented us from circulating it to the Schools at CTC to obtain their comments, as they are absent on block leave until 04 September 1984.

2. Therefore, Tactics Division has carried out a cursory review of the whole manual and a detailed review of Chapters 12 and 13 on offensive and defensive operations. Our general comments are attached at Annex A and detailed comments numbering over three hundred, relating to these two chapters only, are attached at Annex B, in the format requested in Reference.

3. We have subsequently received a further 12 copies of the manual, which we will circulate to the Schools for their comments. These, along with our detailed comments on the remaining chapters, will be forwarded as soon as possible.


J. H. G. Brassard
Lieutenant-Colonel
for Acting Commander

 Attachments: 2

- Annex A - CFP 301 - First Draft - General Comments
- Annex B - CFP 301 - First Draft - Detailed Comments

② NTE
copy made. comments to be incorporated
J. H. G. Brassard
DLCD 6
(000884)
19 Sep 84

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ANNEX A
TO 2910-1 (Tac Div)
DATED AUG 84

CFP 301 - FIRST DRAFT - GENERAL COMMENTS

INTRODUCTION

1. As a keystone manual, CFP 301, Land Formations in Battle should be able to be read, with at least similar ease, by all officers from Lieutenant to General in rank. It was felt that in its present form, this draft did not meet that criteria.

SIMPLICITY

2. CFP 300, Section 2, lists and explains ten principles of war. The main operations of war, when dealt with in CFP 301, were all prefaced by a list of fundamentals applicable to that particular operation. Some of these fundamentals were repeats of the principles of war, others were different. It is suggested that the idea of a separate set of fundamentals applicable to each operation of war, be dispensed with and in its place be inserted a brief explanation of how the ten principles of war apply to that particular operation, placing emphasis on those principles, where it is deemed necessary for each different operation.

USE OF ENGLISH

3. The English used often did little to assist the reader in understanding the subject matter. Areas of particular concern were:
- a. the frequent use of unnecessarily long and complicated sentences;
 - b. the frequent omission of the comma and the rare use of the semi-colon;
 - c. the repetitive use of nouns as adjectives, where correct adjectives already exist; and,
 - d. the introduction of specialist terms e.g. FEBA, killing zone, but without explanation of their meaning or application, nor direction to the reader of where else in the manual, an explanation could be found.

LAYOUT

4. Section 3 of Chapter 1 deals with the Canadian Operational Concept. This concept does not embrace all operations of war but is centered upon the defence. Therefore it should not be in the introduction to the book, but rather in the introduction to the defence chapter, Chapter 13.

CONTENT

5. The conduct of a defensive operation against the Warsaw Pact forces, in the manner laid out in the section on the main defence battle (article 1324), would ensure the total annihilation of our forces. Firstly, the content of the whole chapter needs to be reviewed in the light of the Army Tactics and Doctrine Bulletins,

Numbers 2 and 7. Secondly, the good threat summary in Chapter 1 and at the beginning of Chapter 13 needs to be borne firmly in mind alongside the following quote, while this review is taking place:

"The enemy will always regard water obstacles as convenient natural barriers increasing his defence potential considerably. Therefore to ensure a highly dynamic action the personnel must be taught to approach a water obstacle swiftly and on a broad front, to negotiate it from the move without reducing the speed. Advance, to use all available resources needed to make the forced crossing and, finally, to continue the attack without halting on the opposite bank."

--- Voenly Vestnik, P. 44
Jul 84

6. We must be able to apply our defensive doctrine to any piece of ground, with or without an obstacle involved, and know that we stand a reasonable chance of success. Chapter 13, at present, by being totally wedded to the FEBA, linear type defence, does not provide us with the doctrine we need to be able to achieve this.

ANNEX B
 TO 2910-1 (Tac Div)
 DATED AUG 84

CFP 301 - FIRST DRAFT - DETAILED COMMENTS

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1		Page 12-1, Art 1202, para 1 a. line 1 b. line 4	<u>OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS</u> Insert ',' between 'operations' and 'which' Delete all after 'covered' as it is obvious.		
2		Page 12-1, Art 1202, para 3	Substitute 'separate' for 'discrete' as the latter is an unusual word.		
3		Page 12-1, Art 1202, para 3, line 3	Delete 'with' insert 'in'.		

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
4		Page 12-3, Art 1203, para 3.b. line 17	It is presumed that contaminate in this context relates to the use of nuclear or chemical munition. It requires more explanation, therefore, we suggest inserting after 'flanks;' 'and by the use of nuclear or chemical munitions, contaminate Selected areas or create obstacles to enemy movement.'		
5		Page 12-4, Art 1203, para 4.a. line 14 b. line 15	Greater clarity would be achieved by substituting "the latter" for "they" Insert ', ' between 'area' and 'they'.		
6	ATP 35(A) Dry 2 Mar 1983 Land Force Tactical Doctrine (Revised) Page 5-2	Page 12-6, Art 1204	Although the article heading is FUNDAMENTALS, it is not clear whether the fundamental(s) is the 'maintenance of momentum' or 'shock action, depth and balance'. Depth is the only fundamental common to the source. It is suggested that Art 1204 be rewritten as an explanation of the most pertinent of the principles of war for offensive operations. If necessary, a list of any additional points worthy of consideration can be added at the end.		

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
7		Page 12-8 and 12-9, Art 1205 para 4 and 5	The explanation of the position of the objective for the envelopment (para 4) and for the turning movement (para 5) in relation to the range of direct fire weapons, is unclear. Whose direct fire weapons are the objectives within/beyond the range of?		
8		Page 12-10, Art 1207, line 6	An advance to contact ends, when the covering force is unable to penetrate the enemy's positions. The operation then becomes an advance in contact, with the covering force moving from in front of the main force to its flanks or rear. This does not necessarily involve the entire formation. It is still possible for the advance to continue, led by the advance guard, with the main body not deployed but moving from waiting area to waiting area.		
9		Page 12-12, Art 1209, para 6.a.	Delete 'frontage' insert 'front'		
10		Page 12-12, Art 1209, para 6.a. (1) line 5	Insert ',' between 'ground' and 'such'		

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
11		Page 12-13, Art 1209, para 6.a. (2) line 6	A screen force should only use artillery to assist in extracting itself from a difficult situation where there is no other alternative. If the artillery is to be used to engage targets of opportunity, then the force is not a screen but a guard.		
12		Page 12-14, Art 1209, para 6.d.	Delete 'division' and insert 'divisional' the four times it is used in this sub-paragraph.		
13		Page 12-14, Art 1209, para 6.f., line 1	Insert 'the' between 'of' and 'advance'.		
14		Page 12-15, Art 1209, para 6.h., line 6	Delete 'subject' insert 'subjected'.		
15		Page 12-17, Art 1209, para 9, a. line 2 b. line 3 c. line 6	Delete '-' and insert 'this is called a'. Delete 'of' insert 'for'. Insert after 'fire' 'The guns are		

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
15 (CONTD)		c. line 6 (contd)	automatically adjusted onto new targets as the advance progresses and the latter come within range".		
16		Page 12-17, Art 1209, para 10, line 5	Insert after 'movement' ' 'of the covering force'. Delete 'with' and commence the new sentence with 'Other!.		
17		Page 12-17, Art 1209, para 11, line 2	Delete 'and'.		
18		Page 12-18, Art 1210, para 7, line 3	Delete "advance guard actions" insert "actions involving the advance guard"		
19		Page 12-18, Art 1210, para 7, line 4	Insert ',' between 'behind' and 'that'		
20		Page 12-19, Art 1211, para 1, line 1. a. b. c.	Insert ',' between 'Commanders' and 'with' Delete 'CP' insert 'CPS' Insert ',' between 'CPS' and 'must'.		

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
21		Ibid, para 2, line 3	Delete 'zone' insert 'zones'.		
22		Page 12-20, Art 1211, para 3, line 9	Surprise is not listed on page 12-6 as a factor, so therefore its non-existence cannot be construed as the loss of a factor. It is suggested that the sentence is changed to read: "As a general rule, radio silence should not be lifted for the whole force until the commander deems that it is to his advantage to do so; this will probably not occur until surprise is lost."		
23		Page 12-20, Art 1211, para 3, line 11	This sentence is a non-sequitur in its present form. Amend all after 'liaison' as follows: "detachments; helicopters, with their rapid redeployment ability, can be of great assistance here."		
24		Page 12-20, Art 1212, line 1	This sentence should read: "The primary purpose of an attack is to destroy the enemy's ability to resist." By definition there can only be one primary anything. Additionally seizing ground does not necessarily involve attacking it. If		

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
24 (CONTD)			it is unoccupied then we need only occupy it, in order to have 'seized it'.		
25		Ibid line 2	Delete 'discrete' insert 'separate'.		
26		Ibid line 4	This sentence does not make sense. If the subject of the sentence is 'a commander', the verb 'decides' and the compliment "to attack the opposing force," then the whole sentence should read as follows: "A commander may decide to attack the opposing force, for reconnaissance purposes, to deceive the enemy, to relieve pressure on friendly forces, or to seize the initiative in a meeting engagement.		
27		Page 12-21, Art 1213, para 2, line 3	Delete 'and' insert ';'.		
28		Page 12-21, Art 1213, para 3 a. line 2 b. line 3	Insert ',' between 'preparation' and 'including'. Insert ',' between 'forces' and 'than'.		

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
29		Page 12-21, Art 1214, para 1, line 4	Insert ',' between 'depth' and 'to'		
30		Ibid para 2, line 1	Insert ',' between 'attacks' and 'including'.		
31		Ibid para 3 line 2	Delete 'discrete' insert 'separate'.		
32		Page 12-22, Art 1214, para 6	How does the commander maintain pressure on the enemy? It is suggested that the following sentence be added on after "withdrawing". "This can be achieved by deploying forces to resume the advance as soon as the assault stage is over; or deploying forces to act as cut offs, astride the enemy's route of withdrawal."		
33		Page 12-23, Art 1215, para 2, line 2	Delete 'and' insert 'or'		
34		Ibid, Line 3	Insert 'support' between 'fire' and 'to'		
35		Ibid, Line 4 et seq	After 'assaulting infantry' the sentence becomes very muddled. It is		

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
35 (CONTD)			suggested that line 4 starts with a new sentence as follows: "They are able to neutralize or destroy the enemy at selected break-in points and on the objective. They can mask enemy observation by the use of smoke. They can protect the flanks and deal with enemy counter moves."		
36		Page 12-23, Art 1215, para 3, line 2	Delete 'of' insert 'for'.		
37		Page 12-23, Art 1215, para 5, line 2 et seq	The whole sentence to too long and is clumsy. It should be split into two or three sentences in the style of serial 35 above.		
38		Ibid line 4	Delete 'to' insert 'for'		
39		Page 12-24, Art 1215, para 6, Line 1	Insert ',' between 'stage' and 'air'.		
40		Ibid line 5 et seq	This sentence does not say what it means. It should be rewritten as follows: "Air defence artillery can also be used to provide protection, for troops during their consolidation		

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
40 (CONTD)			on key terrain, or for elements conducting exploitation.		
41		Page 12-24, Art 1215, para 7, line 1	Delete 'attack' insert 'attacking'.		
42		Page 12-24, Art 1215, para 8, lines 2 and 4	Delete 'and' insert 'or'.		
43		Ibid para 9, line 2 Ibid line 4	Insert ',' between 'depth' and 'including' Delete 'and' insert 'or'.		
44		Ibid para 10, line 2	Delete both 'and' and insert 'or' both times		
45		Page 12-25, Art 1216, para 1, line 2	Delete 'zone' insert 'zones'.		
46		Ibid line 4	Insert ',' between 'weapons' and 'including'.		
47		Ibid para 2 Line 6 a. b.	Delete 'affect' insert "affects the". Delete 'form' insert 'forms'.		

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
48		Ibid para 4 a. line 2 b. line 3	Insert 'to' before 'permit'. Insert 'to' before 'enhance'.		
49		Page 12-26, Art 1216, para 4.b., line 3	Insert 'the' before 'assembly'.		
50		Ibid para 4.c. line 2 a. b.	Delete 'considering' insert 'having considered the need for'. Insert 'the' before 'location'.		
51		Ibid line 4	Insert 'their' after 'to'.		
52		Ibid line 5	Insert 'the' before 'assault'		
53		Page 12-27, Art 1216, para 4.g. line 5	Delete 'to them' insert 'for the infiltration force,'.		
54		Page 12-28, Art 1216, para 4.j., line 1	Insert 'the' before 'assault'		
55		Ibid para 5.a. line 7	Insert 'the' between 'of' and 'fire'.		

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
56		Ibid para 5.b. line 1	Insert 'The' before 'Assault'		
57		Ibid line 5	Delete 'timing' insert 'time'		
58		Page 12-29, Art 1216, para 5.e. line 4	After 'security' insert '.', and commence the new sentence with 'However'		
59		Ibid line 7	Insert ', ' after 'features'		
60		Ibid line 10	Insert 'Deception' before 'planning'		
61		Ibid line 11-13	Delete the remainder of the sentence after 'fire' and insert ", or deliberate vehicle movement in other areas which further serves to confuse the enemy".		
62		Ibid line 14	Insert ', ' after 'illumination'		
63		Page 12-30, Art 1216, para 5.d. line 10.	Insert 'their' after 'enemy in'		
64		Ibid line 4	Insert ', ' after 'positions'		
65		Ibid line 5	Delete 'to permit' insert so permitting		

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
66		Ibid para 5.e. line 3	Insert ',' after 'front'.		
67		Ibid para 5.f. line 6	Insert 'the' before 'flanks'.		
68		Ibid line 7	Insert 'the' before 'combat'.		
69		Ibid para 5.g. line 7	Insert ',' after 'up'.		
70		Ibid para 5.j. (1) line 2 and 3	By definition battle groups consist of armour and infantry, therefore delete from "of" to "infantry" inclusive		
71		Ibid para 5.j.(3) line 3	Insert ',' after 'power'.		
72		Ibid line 4	Insert 'the' after 'as'.		
73		Ibid para 5.j. (4) line 5	Delete 'perform' insert 'provide'.		
74		Ibid para 5.k. line 2	Delete from 'movement to for', Insert "plans for movement and deception".		
75		Ibid line 3	Insert after 'contact', 'is made'		

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
76		Ibid line 5	Insert after 'reinforcing', 'the intended objective'.		
77		Ibid line 18 a. b.	Delete 'that' insert 'of' Delete 'must' insert 'needing to'.		
78		Ibid para 5.m. line 3	Delete 'by' insert 'from the'.		
79		Ibid para 5.n. line 3	Insert 'the original' after 'until'		
80		Ibid line 4	Insert ',' after 'troops'.		
81		Ibid line 5	Insert 'may' after 'objectives'.		
82		Ibid line 7	Insert 'additionally' after 'which'		
83		Ibid 5.p.	Delete all after "exploitation". Insert ". This permits him to continue operations, without risk of exposing his flanks, when he is ready, using the particular troops to lead that he wants.		
84		Page 12-34, Art 1217, para 1, line 2	Insert 'is' after 'attack'.		

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
85		Ibid line 3 a. b.	Insert ',' after 'assaults' Delete 'or' insert 'and'.		
86		Ibid line 7 and 8 a. b. c.	Delete 'resulting' insert 'arising', Delete 'attempting' insert 'attempts', Delete 'a plan' insert 'the plan'.		
87		Ibid para 2 line 4 et seq	Insert 'the' before 'Main', before 'assembly' and before 'final'.		
88		Ibid line 6 and 7	Insert 'the' before 'assembly' and 'attack'.		
89		Ibid para 3.a. line 2	Delete 'and the' insert '. The'		
90		Ibid line 5	Delete "preferably some tanks" and insert "Only exceptionally will tanks not"		
91		Page 12-35, Art 1217, para 3.c. line 4	Insert 'Tanks and' before 'Demolition'		
92		Ibid line 5	Delete 'Tanks' insert 'Those tanks not supporting the infantry onto the objective;'		

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
93		Ibid para 3.e. line 2 et seq.	a. Insert ',' after 'taken' b. Delete all after "begins immediately and insert the following: "This consists of deploying protective elements to include air defence and anti-armour weapons and perhaps even laying protective minefields. It involves the infantry digging in, probably forward and to the flanks, of the former enemy position. The defensive fire plan must be completed and guns and mortars redeployed accordingly. Finally, the administrative arrangements must be handled including replenishment of combat supplies especially ammunition, the evacuation of casualties and prisoners and the hasty burial of the dead.		
94		Ibid para 4 line 1	Insert ',' after 'quickly'.		
95		Ibid line 2	Delete "respite to the enemy" insert "the enemy respite".		
96		Page 12-36 Art 1218 para 1, line 1	Delete 'CP' and insert 'CPs'		

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
97		Ibid line 2	Insert ', ' after 'forward'		
98		Ibid para 2	H Hour should be included as a control measure and explained.		
99		Ibid para 2.a.	Delete 'for' insert "in order to carry out"		
100		Ibid, para 2.b.	Insert 'the' after 'into'		
101		Page 12-37, Art 1218, para 3.a. line 1.	Insert ', ' after 'movement'.		
102		Ibid line 3.	Insert 'the' before 'use'.		
103		Page 12-38, Art 1219, para 1 line 1	Insert 'that is' before 'attempting'.		
104		Ibid para 2 line 3	Insert 'and' after 'disarray'.		
105		Ibid line 8.	Insert 'pointers.' after 'significant'		
106		Page 12-38, Art 1220, line 2	Delete 'establishing' insert 're-establishing'		
107		Ibid line 5	Delete "withdrawing enemy" insert "enemy's withdrawal"		
108		Page 12-39, Art 1221, para 1	Insert ', ' between 'terrain' and 'South', 'sites' and 'with', and 'enemy' and 'while'.		

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
109		Ibid para 3 line 1	Delete 'as' insert ', since'		
110		Ibid line 3	a. Delete 'particularly' insert 'and' b. Insert 'can' before 'also' c. Delete 'do' insert 'carry out'		
111		Ibid para 5 line 6	Insert 'the' after 'with'		
112		Page 12-43, Art 1227 para 1 line 1 and 2	a. Delete 'to support' insert 'the provision of support to' b. Insert ', ' after 'units'.		
113		Ibid para 2 line 1	Insert ', ' after 'required'		
114		Ibid para 3 line 4	Insert 'an' before 'operating'		
115	International Defence Review No. 9, 1982, page 1181	Page 13-2, Art 1302, para 3, line 1	<u>DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS</u> An OMG, according to source, can be up to Army size; therefore "formation-size task force" is too limiting.		
116	Serial 115 article complete	Ibid line 4	This sentence is not understood. The OMG's actions relate to the objectives of the level of command that has deployed it. Its actions are not related to a FEBA.		

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
117		Ibid para 4 line 7	Insert ',' before 'minimized'		
118		Ibid para, 6 line 2 a. b.	After 'forces' insert 'of' Delete 'division-size' insert "a division in size".		
119		Ibid para 8.b. line 3	Delete 'division-size' insert "divisional-sized"		
120		Ibid para 10, line 1	Insert ',' after 'areas'		
121		Ibid para 13, line 2	Delete 'division' insert 'divisional'		
122		Ibid line 4	Insert 'objectives' after 'intermediate'		
123		Page 13-7, Art 1303, line 2 a. b.	Delete 'defence' insert 'defensive' Delete 'enemy' insert 'enemy's'		
124		Art 1304, para 1.b. line 1	Delete 'defence' insert 'defensive'		
125		Page 13-7, Art 1305	The question of fundamentals has been raised in Annex A of this letter. Notwithstanding that there seems to be		

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
125 (CONTD)			too many fundamentals listed here. The distinction between one and another is vague e.g. 'Concentration of Combat Power' and 'Firepower'.		
126		Ibid para 6 line 3	Delete 'defence' insert 'defended'.		
127		Ibid para 6.a. and 6.b.	Delete the last sentence of both these paragraphs. Open terrain is not best defended by armoured forces, but rather by all-arms units with a bias towards armour and long range anti-armour weapons. The corollary is true with close terrain.		
128		Ibid para 7 line 3	Delete 'defence' insert 'defended'		
129		Ibid para 8 line 4	Delete 'division' insert 'divisional'		
130		Ibid para 9.a. et seq	The term FEBA is introduced but not explained. This invalidates the whole paragraph on how to select vital ground and key terrain. The same applies to a lesser extent to MDA.		
131		Ibid para 10 line 4	Insert after 'momentum' 'in order to try'.		
132		Ibid para 11 line 1 a. b.	Delete 'defence' insert 'defended' Delete 'is' insert 'should be'		
133		Ibid para 11.b. line 3	Insert ',' after 'influence'		

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
134		Ibid, para 11.d.	This sub-para is not clear; how do you position and move reserves, etc. to achieve depth, since depth forces and reserves should not be the same.		
135		Ibid para 12, line 3	Delete 'subject' insert 'subjected'		
136		Ibid line 7	Insert ', ' after 'depth'		
137		Ibid para 13, line 2	What 'areas'?		
138		Ibid line 3	Insert ', ' after 'defender'		
139		Ibid para 14	Combat power needs a proper description before the question of its concentration is addressed.		
140		Ibid para 15	Manoeuvre is a means to an end, not the end in itself. It is of use in redeployment, in concentration and then in achieving subsequent dispersion before the enemy can attack the concentration. Manoeuvre on its own is ineffective.		

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF.	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
141		Ibid para 16	While firepower is adequately explained, it is not differentiated from Combat power.		
142		Ibid para 18	Does 'combined' mean 'all arms', 'land and air elements', 'land, sea and air elements', or 'different nationalities'?		
143		Ibid para 18.d.	Delete 'astride' insert 'along'		
144		Ibid para 20 line 1	Delete 'constitute' insert 'reconstitute' otherwise it appears that a reserve need not be set aside until battle has been joined.		
145		Ibid line 2	The use of depth forces as reserves is inherently wrong.		
146		Page 13-13, Art 1306, para 1, line 1	This sentence does not make sense. Delete it and insert "To meet the threat a commander must deploy his force in keeping with the ground, so as to defeat the enemy."		

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
147		Ibid line 2	There should be an explanation of why ground needs to be held, i.e. because it is vital ground, it provides good fire positions, it covers ones own redeployment routes, etc.		
148		Ibid para 2	A commander should not seek to kill the enemy as far forward as possible; rather he should seek to kill the enemy on ground of his choosing, where he can produce an overwhelming weight of firepower.		
149		Ibid para 3.b.	Combat power should not be concentrated at the point of the enemy's main effort. This is fighting the enemy at his strongest point, where he is prepared to take casualties. Instead combat power should be concentrated against the enemy's line of main effort.		
150		Ibid para 3.c.	Maintenance or restoration of the defence area is not important. It is the destruction of the enemy that is. Delete all after 'exploit' and insert "unforseen success and so achieve the the destruction of the enemy within the defensive area".		

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
151		Ibid para 4 line 1	Insert 'may' between 'these' and 'include'.		
152		Ibid para 4.a.	Barriers cannot stop an enemy.		
153		Ibid para 4.c.	By implication, this sub-para sees anti-armour weapons being fired at their maximum effective range. This involves a wrong use of infantry, since they are capable of being engaged beyond the range of their own weapons. It is a wrong use of anti-armour weapons as well, since they are engaging the enemy on his strongest aspect, i.e. frontal armour.		
154		Page 13-15, Art 1307, para 2 line 5	Delete 'at maximum range'.		
155		Ibid para 3 a. line 2 b. line 4 c. line 5	Delete 'and better' to 'made of' insert 'through the greater use of' Delete 'defence' insert 'defensive' Delete "in a defence with" insert "it is possible to use when relying on"		

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
150		Ibid para 4 a. line 4 to 6 b. line 6 to 8	Striking the enemy in the flank will not canalize his effort. It will cause him either to halt and mount an attack on the firer, or call in neutralizing fire from artillery and continue on his original axis. Delete from "forcing him" to "the defence". This is a poorly worded sentence delete and insert "The inherent flexibility of armour allows the troops to be used to manoeuvre into positions to delay the enemy, then immediately to be switched to a static task elsewhere or used to lead a counter offensive".		
157		Ibid para 5 line 2	Insert 'should' between 'they' and 'have'.		
158		Page 13-16, Art 1308, para 1, line 1 a. b.	Insert 'ability' after 'range' Insert 'with' after 'commander'.		
159		Ibid 1.c.	As WP infantry move in armoured vehicles, this sub-para is nonsense in its present form.		

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
160		Ibid, para 1.f.	Delete 'occasion' insert 'occasions'		
161		Page 13-18, Art 1310	Mention should be made of their ability, albeit limited, to destroy enemy AHs.		
162		Page 13-19, Art 1312, para 1 line 1 and 2	Insert ',' after 'responsibility' and after '13-3'.		
163		Ibid para 1.b.	Delete 'defence' insert 'defensive'		
164		Ibid para 2	FEBA needs a proper explanation, it is glossed over.		
165		Ibid para 3 line 3	Delete 'defence' insert 'defensive'		
166		Ibid para 4	Delete 'defence' insert 'defensive'		
167		Page 13-21 Art 1313 para 1, line 3	Delete 'defence' insert 'defensive'		
168		Ibid line 3 and 4	Limitations should not of themselves determine the plan, rather they should influence the manner in which the plan is implimented.		
169		Ibid para 2.b.	The section on dispositions is not understood. It seems as though our		

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
169 (CONTD)			own forces are already emplaced before the commander has formed his plan.		
170		Ibid para 2.f.	Insert 'the' before 'defence'		
171		Ibid para 2.g. line 7	Delete 'defence' insert 'defensive'		
172		Ibid para 3 line 3	Delete 'apparent' insert 'analysed'		
173		Page 13-22, Art 1314, para 1, 1st sentence	Either delete 'a' insert 'the' throughout or delete 'the' and insert 'a' throughout.		
174		Ibid para 2, line 1	Insert ', ' after operations.		
175		Ibid line 3	Insert 'more likely to' before 'breakthrough'		
176		Ibid line 9	Delete 'defence' insert 'defensive'		
177		Page 13-23, Art 1315	Having said that anti-armour defence is inseparable from defence as a whole, the author then spends 6 paras separating it.		
178		Page 13-23, Art 1315, para 1, line 1	a. Insert after 'the', 'overall' b. Insert after 'for', 'the'		
179		Ibid line 2	Insert ', ' after 'defence'		

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
180		Ibid line 4	Delete 'manoeuvre' insert 'fire' (To achieve a reasonable chance of a hit a weapon should not fire as it is being moved).		
181	CFP 303(1) Chap 4 Annex F, Appendix 2 CFP 303(1) Chap 4 Annex F, Appendix 1	Page 13-24, Table 13-2 a. b. c. d. e.	Insert (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) at the head of each column under the titles. Serial 4 col (e) states 2 pl per coy; Reference states 3 pl per coy. Serial 5 col (c) 3000 m plus gives only a 30% change of a hit in optimum conditions. In otherwords 70% of the ammunition is wasted. Serial 8 col (e) states 16 in anti-armour pl, Reference states 8. Serial 10 col (c), 1000 m for a PAW seems very optimistic. The RAP round for the 84mm is only good to 650 m and that is at least 2 years away.		
182		Page 13-24, Art 1315, para 2 a. b.	Of course defence is initiated from the top, so are all operations of war. Delete 'anti-armour' throughout this paragraph.		

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
183		Ibid para 3	Delete 'anti-armour' throughout this paragraph.		
184		Ibid para 4	Insert ',' after: a. 'Weapon' line 4 b. '(HAW)' line 8 c. 'Battalion' line 9		
185		Ibid para 5 line 1	Insert ',' after 'weapon'		
186		Ibid line 2	Delete 'support' insert 'supports'.		
187		Ibid line 3	Delete ',' after 'targets' insert 'and'		
188		Ibid para 6 line 2	Insert ',' after 'activities'		
189		Ibid line 4	This is the first time killing zones have been mentioned. They need a detailed explanation of what they are and how they are sited. Their introduction in the last sentence of this article on Defence against Armour, cannot be right.		
190		Page 13-27, Art 1316, para 3, line 2	Defensive solutions will not always be able to hide behind well developed obstacles. The Soviets know we rely		

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
190 (CONTD)			on them, and they train extensively to breach them. Therefore delete 'Normally this includes' insert 'this could include'.		
191		Ibid line 7	'Killing zones' see serial 189		
192		Ibid para 5 line 2	Delete 'Division' insert 'Divisional'		
193		Ibid line 3	Insert ',' after 'commanders'		
194		Ibid line 4	a. Insert ';' after 'obstacles' b. Insert 'by' after the second 'and'		
195		Page 13-28, Art 1317, para 3 line 2 and 3	Delete from "allot" to "formations" and insert "allocates a portion of his fire support resources to his subordinate formations, contingent with his perception of their requirement."		
196		Ibid line 6 and 7	Insert ',' after 'teams' and after the first 'group'		
197		Ibid line 11	Insert ',' after 'division'		
198		Page 13-29, Art 1318, para 1, line 2	Insert ',' after 'penetrated'		

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
199		Ibid para 2	<p>a. It is not agreed that blocking forces should comprise of predominantly infantry force. If this were so then either the blocking force would need to pre-prepare several blocking options, which is hardly realistic and even if successful risks their compromise by enemy reconnaissance; or the block would need to be occupied before the enemy penetration was identified. It is suggested that in a fluid battle, the blocking force will need to be predominantly armoured.</p> <p>b. Again we return to the point about armour and manoeuvre; manoeuvre is the method of moving firepower from one place to another on the battlefield. Counter attack forces achieve their mission by either wresting the piece of ground required back from the enemy and this means effectively occupying it, or by so saturating the area with fire, that the enemy is unable to profit by his gain.</p> <p>In view of a. and b. above, this paragraph needs reworking.</p>		

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
200		Ibid para 3 line 4 and 5	Connect serial 199. There is more to counter attacking than this sentence deals with. In the light of this and paragraph 4 delete this sentence.		
201		Ibid para 4 line 6 et seq	Delete all after 'attack' and insert ", which would include an assault, with its direct and indirect fire plans, carried through to the reorganization phase".		
202		Ibid para 5	Insert ', ' after a. 'operations' line 1 b. 'possible' line 3 c. 'routes' line 5 d. 'area' line 7		
203		Ibid line 8	Delete 'otherwise'		
204		Ibid line 9	a. Delete 'plan' insert 'plans' b. Delete 'eliminates' insert 'will eliminate'		
205		Ibid para 6. a. line 2 (1) (2)	Delete 'continously' insert 'continuously' Insert 'the' before 'light'		

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
205 (CONTD)		b. line 3 (1) (2)	Insert ',' after 'assumptions' Insert ',' after 'factors'		
206		Ibid para 6.a. line 3 et seq	These two sentences are very awkward. Delete completely and insert "Based upon this assumption and with the further two assumptions that the cohesion of the defence is still intact and that vital ground is still held, it is possible to establish the maximum acceptable penetration. This will identify the point of the counter attack and the direction from which it should be launched."		
207		Ibid para 6.c. a. line 2 b. line 3 c. line 4 (1) (2) d. line 7 (1) (2) (3) e. line 8 f. line 10	Insert after 'penetration' 'must be assessed.' Delete 'and their' insert 'Their' Insert 'possibly' after 'and' Delete 'assessed' insert 'considered' Delete the first ',' after 'plan' Insert ',' after 'possibly' Insert 'by' after 'forces,' Insert 'by' after 'or' Delete 'that' insert 'when'		

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
208		Ibid para 6.d. a. line 8 b. line 12	Insert 'the' after 'and' Insert 'be able to' after 'enough to'		
209		Ibid para 7 a. line 1 b. line 2 c. line 3	Insert 'The' before 'Commanders' Delete 'commanders' insert 'the commanders of troops' Insert ', ' after 'process'		
210		Ibid para 7.f.	Add new sub-para after f: "g. the indirect fire plan and illumination plan for night time contingency"		
211		Page 13-33, Art 1321, para 1 a. line 3 b. line 5	Insert 'a need for' after 'power or' Delete 'reation' insert 'reaction'		
212		Ibid para 3.c.	Insert 'attack' after 'NBC'		
213		Ibid para 3.d.	It is suggested that 'avoid' is too optimistic. Delete 'avoid' insert 'reduce the effect of'.		

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
214		Page 13-34, Art 1322, para 1 a. line 2 b. line 3 c. line 5 d. line 7 e. line 9	Insert ',' after 'resources.' Insert ',' after 'forces' Delete 'defence' insert 'defended' Delete 'and often occurs' insert 'often occurring' Insert ', ' after 'action'		
215		Ibid para 2	Delete 'to the situation' insert 'as it develops'		
216		Page 13-35, Art 1323, para 2 a. line 4 b. line 5	Insert 'the' after 'kept in' Insert ', ' after 'force'		
217		Ibid para 4 line 7	It is important that the ultimate cost of delay is appreciated. Delete 'delay.' insert 'delay, knowing that he may loose much of the covering force in the battle to gain this time'		
218		Ibid para 7 lines 3, 6 and 9	Delete 'division' insert 'divisional''		

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
219		Ibid para 7	After the section on provision of covering forces, there should be a brief summary of how delay is achieved covering the following points: a. depriving the enemy of intelligence by the destruction of his recce elements. b. destruction of his leading companies, so that time is gained by his having to substitute them with forces further back in the order of battle. c. etc.		
220		Ibid para 8 a. line 7	Delete 'area.' insert 'area, but this must not be at the risk of compromising the main defensive positions'		
221		b. line 8 c. line 9	Insert ',' after 'cases' Insert ',' after 'line'		
222		Page 13-37, Art 1324 a.	The whole section on the decisive defensive battle is dangerously suspect.		

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
222 (CONTD)		b. para 1 c. para 2 d. para 4 (1) (2)	<p>Sentence two is not understood. Is it envisaged that companies behind the FEBA obstacle, will fire across it to try and kill the enemy. If this is so then only the 4 company MAW are likely to reach, thus wasting the remainder, and even those will not kill tanks. Thus the fire positions will be telegraphed to the enemy who will use his excellent artillery to suppress them or smoke them.</p> <p>See serial 149 and 222 a. above. In order to reach the enemy, the weapon systems will be deployed linearly. By doing this you are engaging the enemy at his strongest point, and you are unable to reach his weaknesses behind. This cannot be the way to defend and still have any hope of success.</p> <p>The reader is being told to maintain surveillance. It should be explained how this is going to be achieved in view of the WPs excellent use of sustained smoke screens.</p> <p>line 4 delete 'slow' insert 'slows'</p>		

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
222 (CONTD)		e. para 5 f. para 8	<p>Deploying or redeploying under hostile artillery and air attack, which will include armed helicopters, will probably result in few troops reaching the new position who are alive to fight. The enemy can read a map, he will have assessed the likely battle positions covering the FEBA obstacle and he will be using maximum artillery to negate the effect of the troops located there.</p> <p>By retaining companies at the FEBA they will become surrounded by the enemy, as the multiple penetrations flow to the main and alternate axes. Blocked on one side by an obstacle the companies are easily fixed by the enemy and subsequently destroyed by 2nd Echelon forces.</p>		
223		Page 13-39, Art 1325, para 1	<p>Connect serial 199 above. In view of the earlier comment, it is not realistic to expect a company blocking force to predig 3 or more positions. However, it is feasible for an armoured based force to pre-recce two or three positions.</p>		

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
224		Page 18-40, Art 1325, para 4	In the absence of a clear cut description of what a killing zone is, it is difficult to follow this paragraph. However, a counter attack requires re-possession of the lost territory and that is not achieved by stopping between the line of departure and the objective. Nor will success be achieved by engaging the enemy at maximum effective range, since 70% of tank ammunition will miss.		
225		Ibid para 6, line 4	Delete 'armour' insert 'armoured'		
226		Ibid para 7 line 3	Delete 'surviveability' insert 'chances of survival'		
227		Page 1341, Art 1326, para 2 line 3	Insert ',' after 'locate'		
228		Ibid para 3 a. line 2 b. line 9 (1)	"in concert" with whom? Delete from "when" to "concert" inclusive. Insert ',' after 'selected'		

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
228 (CONTD)		(2)	This sentence is over 50 words long and needs replacing with two or three short clear sentences.....		
229		Page 13-42, Art 1327, para 3 line 3	Insert ', ' after 'responsibility'		
230		Page 13-43, Art 1328, para 1	Insert ', ' after: a. 'defence' line 1 b. 'resources' line 3 c. 'support' line 5 d. 'communications' line 6 e. 'commanders' line 6 f. 'economics' line 7		
231		Ibid para 2	Insert ', ' after a. 'elements' line 1 b. 'operations' line 3		
232		Page 13-44, Art 1329, para 1.c. a. b.	Delete 'in-situation' insert 'in-situ,' Insert ', ' after 'well forward'		

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
233		Page 13A-1 para 1	a. Insert ', ' after: (1) 'responsibility' line 2 (2) 'efforts' line 5 (3) 'resources' line 8 b. Line 4 delete 'might' insert 'may' c. Line 9 insert 'his' after 'extent of' para 2.a. a. Line 1 insert ', ' after FEBA b. Line 3 delete 'it' insert 'them' para 2.f. line 3 a. Line 3 insert 'with' after 'defender' b. Line 5 delete 'precludes him' insert 'so prevents the latter'		

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MEMORANDUM

PA
292-B-0A-301-001/FP-001

~~2910-CFP 301~~ (DSRO 2)


15 Aug 84

DLCD 6

CFP 301 LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE

Ref: FMC 2910-CFP 301 (DCOS CD) 30 Jun 84

As requested by reference attached are the comments from DGSS.



R.C. Paddock
LCo1
DSRO 2
6-8264

Attachments:

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ANNEX A
 TO 2910-CFP 301 (DSRO 2)
 DATED 15 AUG 84

COMMENT SHEET

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1.	CSS STUDY VOL IV Chapter 7 Page 1-3 Para 108 k	Page 2-8 Para 213 1. c.	The COSCOM does not hold ten days of combat supplies. They hold 6 days plus a reserve which has yet to be identified. The entire Corps holds 10 days (See also Annex F to Chap 7 to CSS Study Vol IV for distribution of combat supplies).		
2.		Page 3-19 Para 310 3 & 4	It has been suggested at various times that "at priority call" could and would be used within the administrative system especially by the maintainers. For example, when they want to allocate recovery resources for specific tasks. This point was brought up during the staffing of the Command and Control and Study 7th Draft B-GL-303-00... FP ZO and was not accepted. It is a fact of life and will happen and it should be included in this manual.		
3.		Chapter 12 Para 1227 3	It is felt that the sentence "Every dump requires a security force and operating element" is too restrictive and from a logisticans point of view unnecessary. The circumstances which lead to a dump being required will		

ANNEX A
TO 2910-CFP 301 (DSRO 2)
DATED 15 AUG 84

COMMENT SHEET

- 2 -

SERIAL	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,)	COMMENTS	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR	DECISION
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
			also dictate whether a security force and operating element is required. Without going into the numerous scenarios which could effect the composition of a dump could this sentence not read "Dumps may require security forces and operating elements".		



Air Command
10 Tactical Air Group

Commandement Aérien
10e Groupement Aérien Tactique

2910-1 (SO Doc)

Headquarters
10 Tactical Air Group
St Hubert, Quebec
J3Y 5T5

9 August 1984

National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0K2

①
Attention: DLCD-6

NRMS/SGDDM 3-3-2

Referred to
Transmits à DLCD 6

AUG 10 1984

File No 292-B-00-301-001/FP-001

Dossier No.....

Charged to/Chargé à.....

CFP 301 LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE -
FIRST DRAFT

Reference: FMC 2910-CFP 301 (DCOS CD) dated 30 Jun 84

CFP 301 has been reviewed and only comment is:

- p. 10-4 fig. 10-1: Delete - Corps AVN BDE
- Insert - Corps AVN Group.

[Handwritten Signature]

for L.T.C. East
Lieutenant-Colonel
Senior Staff Officer Plans & Doctrine
for Commander

② NTF

actioned
JG h lwl
21 Aug 84
DCOS 6
(5-0892)

47-
R. Wilson

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE



MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE

CANADIAN LAND FORCES COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
COLLEGE DE COMMANDEMENT ET D'ETAT-MAJOR DES FORCES TERRESTRES CANADIENNES

② File
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Major
DLCD 4-2
15 Sep.

SC 2900-1
FORT FRONTENAC
KINGSTON, ONTARIO
K7K 2X8

ADRS/RCO 332
Refer DLCD 4
Transmitted 2 September 1982

SEP 10 1982

Distribution List

File No
Dossier No. 2922-B-06-301-001/FP-001

COVERING FORCES IN THE DEFENCE

Charged to/Chargé à

- ①
- References:
- A. CLFCSC SC 2900-1 dated 27 April 1982 - ANNEX A
 - B. 2910-CFP 301(1) (DLCD 4) dated 27 May 1982 *on file*
 - C. FMC 1150-110/A7 TD 2090 Minutes of 9th Meeting ADTB
 - D. Canadian Army Doctrine Bulletin No 1 Doctrine Paper No 1 dated September 1980
 - E. CFP 301(1) Second Draft Formations in Battle December 1980 Paragraph 609

1. The joint CFCSC/CLFCSC paper at Reference A was withdrawn from discussion at the ninth ADTB meeting, for further consideration by the Secretariat and D COS CD.
2. The main areas of concern seem to be:
 - a. The actions and responsibilities of the withdrawing covering force and the in-place force in relation to effecting a clean break at the handover line.
 - b. Whether it may be necessary and/or feasible to alter command and control relationships in the event that a clean break is not achieved.

RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CLEAN BREAK

3. Reference C, paragraph 4b, states that Reference A is in conflict with current doctrine regarding responsibilities at the handover line. In fact, CFP 301(1) paragraphs 609.7 and 609.8 clearly state that the withdrawing covering force should select its final delaying positions "to enable the covering force to make a clean separation before withdrawing into the main defence area". Forward brigades will deploy "screens", sited "with a view to assisting in the clean separation of the covering force in case this has not been achieved prior to its arrival".

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JW

MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

CANADIAN LAND FORCES COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

COLLEGE DE COMMANDEMENT ET D'ÉTAT-MAJOR DES FORCES TERRESTRES CANADIENNES

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FORM PROFORMA

MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE

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Page 181

-2-

4. The comments in Reference B indicate a belief that the receiving brigade is fully responsible for guaranteeing a clean break. This interpretation is impractical. The forward brigade commander's primary responsibility is the defence of his sector. If he is given full responsibility for stopping an enemy main force a few kilometres from the FEBA, he will be forced to commit too high a proportion of his reserves and depth forces forward of the FEBA.

5. If the doctrine as stated in CFP 301(1) is applied, the withdrawing covering force should be able to force the enemy to pause to organize an attack on the final delaying positions. During that pause, the covering force withdraws across the handover line. That is what is meant by "creating the conditions for its own clean break" as stated in paragraph 13 of Reference A.

6. The in-place force from the forward brigade then picks up the enemy as the enemy resumes his advance. Their task is to define enemy main axes, and inflict sufficient delay to allow the covering force to withdraw across the main obstacle and enter the FEBA. If we assume a battle group withdrawing into a forward brigade sector, this should not take much more than an hour.

7. The composition of the brigade covering force must remain a tactical decision by the brigade commander. It will probably always require some fighting capability, therefore it seems better to describe it as a "guard", as in Doctrine Paper Number 1, rather than a "screen". The important thing is that its responsibilities and tasks vis a vis the withdrawing covering force be clearly defined.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

8. The second main area of concern expressed in References B and D concerns command and control problems in the event that the withdrawing corps or divisional covering force does not achieve a clean break. This problem cannot be as lightly dismissed as Reference B would have it. CFP 301(1) and UK doctrinal manuals refer to the problem, but make no specific suggestions for dealing with it. Some US references state that elements of the withdrawing force may come under "control" of the forward formation/units in such an eventuality.

9. While it is highly unlikely that the problem would occur across a division front, it is very possible that it will occur on a particular forward brigade front. For example, all or part of a withdrawing battle group may be in a running fight at the handover line and unable to break clean. If the additional combat power of the forward brigade guard is unable to force the enemy to stop and deploy, extrication of both covering forces becomes a problem. If the withdrawing force runs for the FEBA, leaving the forward brigade guard to fight the enemy alone, it is most probable that the enemy will break through and catch the withdrawing force bunched up at the choke points on the obstacle. Surely it would be preferable, and indeed necessary, for the total combat power of the

.../3

withdrawing and in-place covering forces to be combined to conduct an orderly withdrawal in contact across the FEBA. One commander must control this battle. Since the battle will now be taking place within the area of responsibility of the forward brigade or division (between the handover line and the FEBA) that commander in turn should be under some degree of control by the forward brigade or division commander, who can provide and coordinate all forms of fire support to the withdrawing forces.

10. The commander of the "combined" covering forces should be commander of the larger unit involved. In most cases this will be the unit of the withdrawing covering force. The required changes of command and control relationship would then be:

- a. Forward brigade guard switches from under command of brigade to under command of withdrawing battle group - becoming, for the operation, a sub-unit of the withdrawing battle group.
- b. Withdrawing battle group switches from under command of the covering force commander to under command of the forward brigade commander until withdrawal across the FEBA.
- c. If the problem is occurring astride the boundaries of the forward brigades it may be necessary to place the withdrawing covering force under command of the forward division.

11. If these changes are not made, coordination of fire support and movement will be very cumbersome, at a time when response must be rapid. These changes in command relationship are not complicated; they merely involve changing frequencies and they will simplify coordination. Note that paragraph 10 above alters the wording of paragraph 16c of Reference A, and should resolve the objection to the use of the term "operational control". Note, however, that the term is used in CFP 301(1), paragraph 827, in relation to rearward passage of lines.

12. There is no intention of suggesting that the forward formation would "order elements of the withdrawing force to deploy to support his defensive operation" as stated in Reference B, paragraph 2e. In any case, this could be prevented by qualifying the grouping statement - for example, "under command until withdrawal across the obstacle".

NOMENCLATURE

13. The final point raised in Reference B, paragraph 2g(2), concerns the nomenclature of the brigade covering force. It is most definitely a covering force (AAP-6; CFP 301(1), paragraphs 605.4b, 605.5a). The UK uses the term "covering troops" to describe covering forces at this level, but this term does not seem satisfactory in that it can still result in

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confusion. The brigade covering force may be a screen or guard, but in most cases it will probably be a guard. Perhaps use of the term "brigade guard" would solve the problem.

14. It is requested that this problem be addressed, and the doctrine approved in time for incorporation in the revised edition of CFP 301(1) Formations in Battle.


J.R. MacPherson
Lieutenant-Colonel
for Commandant

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Action

Information

Headquarters Mobile Command (Attn: Secretary ADTB)	National Defence Headquarters (Attn: DLCD 4) ✓ CFSC Toronto (Attn: SSO Land Studies)
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PA → 2922-B-06-301-001/PP 001

2910-CFP 301(1) (DLCD 4)

27 May 1982

Distribution List

DOCTRINE FOR THE CONDUCT OF
COVERING FORCE/DELAY OPERATIONS

Reference: CLFCSC SC 2900-1 of 27 April

1. The Reference requests approval of a revision of the doctrine for covering force operations. The proposal is drafted as a text revision to CFP 301(1).
2. In its consideration of the proposal the ADTB Secretariat is invited to consider the following DLCD 4 observations:
 - a. General Arrangement. The author of the capstone doctrine manuals, LCol Acreman, is currently preparing a total revision of CFP 301(1). In doing so he will quite properly decide upon the arrangement of the manual. One question which must be resolved in this is discussion of the delay as a discreet operation vis-a-vis the covering force battle as a part of the defence. Although there is a requirement for some overlap in this matter, it seems unlikely that the covering force discussion need be as lengthy as the reference if the delay is fully discussed as a separate operation. A more complete discussion of the delay will probably be necessary to maintain consonance with ATP 35(A). As a consequence the CLFCSC/CFSC proposal should be considered an offering of ideas rather than a word for word text amendment.
 - b. Double Covering Force. Paragraph 4 of Annex A to the Reference discusses a situation where the corps commander may determine a requirement to employ both corps and division covering forces in what amounts to a "layered" arrangement in the covering force area. The "layering" produces serious command and control problems which more than outweigh any possible advantages. It is suggested that as a matter of doctrine it should instead be maintained that between the FLOT and the line of separation/handover line there is a single commander who commands or controls all forces assigned to the covering force.

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- 2 -

- c. Co-ordination of Divisional Covering Forces. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Annex A discuss at some length the employment of divisional covering forces as an alternative to the use of a corps force. It is proposed that the discussion should be extended to include the important idea that although the divisional forces are provided from division resources and fight within assigned lateral division boundaries, the corps commander will still coordinate the operation to ensure cohesion between the divisions.
- d. Command and Control During Passage of Lines. At paragraph 3 of the covering letter and paragraph 16 of Annex A the proposal addresses the question of the command relationships between the in-place force and the withdrawing covering force during the passage of lines. It suggests that a normal relationship is for the moving force to come "under command for movement". This is a logical approach which is in consonance with ATP 35(A) (Reference Draft, page 4-23). The proposal goes on to state that under other conditions the moving force may be placed under "operational control" of the in-place force. This arrangement is not in consonance with ATP 35(A) nor is it obviously necessary. The only advantage of establishing this relationship would presumably be to the in-place commander who could then order elements of the withdrawing force to deploy to support his defence operation. The feasibility of this is doubted because:
- (1) Use of the withdrawing units would constitute a last minute adjustment of the grouping of the defending force, which would occur just as what should be a well prepared and co-ordinated operation is beginning.
 - (2) Not only are the withdrawing units likely to be significantly below full operational capability, but these units will normally already have been tasked for their next mission by the higher commander. In other words, they are not available for retasking at the time of the passage of lines.
- e. Use of the Line of Separation/Handover Line. The proposal treats the line of separation in a manner which is not entirely consistent with the concept of this control feature as this is outlined in CFP 301(1) and ATP 35(A) (Second Draft 301(1) page 8-33 and the Reference Draft of ATP 35(A) page 4-20). More specifically, the line is the point at which the commander of the in-place

- 3 -

force assumes responsibility for the conduct of operations. As the covering force units withdraw across the line they will break contact with the enemy. Whether the break is "clean" or not is unimportant. The point is that the withdrawing units must disengage. It is therefore necessary that the in-position force establish sufficient combat power at the line to assume control of the battle and delay the enemy until the covering force has withdrawn into the main position. With the foregoing in mind it is difficult to accept the following assertions of the reference.

- (1) Forces Committed. At paragraph 16c of Annex A, the proposal states that the forces deployed at the line of separation will probably not be able to delay strong enemy forces. This approach should not be accepted; the receiving force must commit sufficient combat power to hold the enemy at this line until the covering force has withdrawn into the main position.
 - (2) Command and Control. In the same paragraph the proposal suggests that the elements deployed at the line of separation will come under command of the covering force commander who will then control the disengagement of both forces. This procedure must be examined very critically as it will result in the line of separation failing to achieve its primary function, ie, establishing the point at which the covering force terminates combat operations and disengages.
- f. Control of Reserve Demolitions. Paragraph 16a discusses at length the various possible delegations of authority to order the firing of reserve demolitions on the immediate approaches to the main defensive position. It is suggested that this examination can be abbreviated by adoption of the following doctrine.

"Until withdrawal of the covering force is complete the firing of reserve demolitions at the FEBA is controlled by the commander with responsibility for the conduct of both the covering force battle and the battle for the main defence position. Where a corps covering force is deployed the corps commander will control firing. In the case of divisional covering forces, authority to fire reserve demolitions will rest with individual division commanders".

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- 4 -

g. Terminology

- (1) "Line of Separation". This term has been superseded by the term "Handover Line" and is now defined in NATO as:
 - (a) "Handover Line: A control feature, preferably following easily defined terrain features, at which responsibility for the conduct of combat operations is passed from a moving force to an in-place force" (ATP 35(A) and Second Draft of the "Army Glossary").

- (2) "Brigade Covering Forces"
 - (a) The reference makes use of this term to describe elements of the forward brigades of the main defence position deployed along the handover line. It is suggested that these elements are not really a covering force in that they are not "operating apart from the main force". They are in fact the most forward elements of the main defence position. Further the use of the term "covering force" will almost certainly lead to some confusion with the withdrawing corps or division "covering force". Similarly the term "screen" is not entirely appropriate as these forces are not restricted to "fighting only in self-defence".

 - (b) As it is apparently difficult to identify an appropriate specific name for these forces, it is suggested that the ADTB accept a generic description such as: "handover line forces".


for T.J. Kaulbach
Lieutenant-Colonel
Directorate Land Combat Development 4
for Chief of the Defence Staff

L.M. Diebel, Maj/2-8550/DLCD 4/dd
DISTRIBUTION LIST (page 5)

- 5 -

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Internal

DLCD

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DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE

1

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION - CÔTE DE SÉCURITÉ

FILE NO. - NO DE DOSSIER

MINUTE SHEET - NOTE DE SERVICE

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SUBJECT - OBJET

DATED - DATÉE

Attached

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REMARKS - REMARQUES

(TO BE SIGNED IN FULL SHOWING APPOINTMENT, TELEPHONE NUMBER AND DATE)
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may be checked.

1. There are several points which are at variance with ATP 35 (A) in this document.

a. Para 6 Page A-3.

(1) I do not see a Divisional HQ commanding a Corps covering force. If it is a Corps covering force the Corps could well command it. If you have two or three Divs covering forces within a Corps, that is a different matter.

2 GO

PA to file

~~2910-CFP 301(1)~~

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Major
DLCS 4-2
4 JUN

b. Para 11 Page A-4.

(1) There cannot be two covering forces, Chie and Bde. If Corps a Chie provides a covering force Bde deploys a "screen" (a task that changed)

(2) "Line of separation" should read "Non-overlap line"


DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE



MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE

CANADIAN LAND FORCES COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
COLLEGE DE COMMANDEMENT ET D'ETAT-MAJOR DES FORCES TERRESTRES CANADIENNES

SC 2900-1
FORT FRONTENAC
KINGSTON, ONTARIO
K7K 2X8



27 April 1982

TERMS/SGDDN 3-3-2
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JUN 8 1982

File 9922-B-06-301-001 / FP-001
D.C.
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Distribution List

PROPOSED CHANGES TO CFP 301(1)
COVERING FORCES IN THE DEFENCE

Reference: CFCSC 2900-1 (DLS) dated 8 April 1982 (NOTAL)

- Attached as Annex A is a self-explanatory paper showing proposed changes to the present doctrine in CFP 301. If approved these changes should appear in the new CFP 301 presently being drafted.
- During a joint discussion with CFCSC in January 1982 it was agreed that the CLFCSC would initiate a draft proposal for amendment of our doctrine on the tactical handling of covering forces. The attached paper has been staffed and agreed to by CFCSC (Reference). What precipitated the need for change was that both Toronto and ourselves were having some difficulty teaching the present doctrine especially as it seemed to favour a system which would create an unnecessary number of passages of lines.
- The College wrestled a bit with the operational relationship terminology to be used when the withdrawing corps or divisional covering force enters the territory of the forward divisions/brigades. "Under command for movement" would suffice if the withdrawing covering force makes a clean break, and is merely being "passed through". However, it will not suffice in the situation described in paragraph 16c of Annex A, where a clean break is not achieved, and the forward formation commander may have to give tactical direction to the part of the covering force entering his FEBA. "Under command" is too strong. We therefore went for "operational control", although this term is not normally used between Canadian formations operating under Canadian command. It was also noted that CFP 301(1) Chapter 8 Paragraph 827.3 used the term "operational control" in discussing rearward passage of lines.

② ~~DLED~~ ~~CLDO~~

Yours. CLDO has not seen.

R 20/CLDO
29/4


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③ DLED
How does this sit
with Comm Consent
approved at CDLIII?
EM
3 May 82

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-2-

4. It is recommended that the ADTB secretariat approve Annex A for inclusion in CFP 301.


C.A. Conway
Lieutenant-Colonel
for Commandant

Attachment:

ANNEX A Proposed Rewrite of CFP 301(1) Chapter 6, Para 609

DISTRIBUTION LIST

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Sec ADTB (D Cos CD, FMC) < > Chairman ADTB (CLDO, NDHQ)

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ANNEX A
TO SC 2900-1
DATED 27 APR 82

PROPOSED REWRITE OF CFP 301(1) CHAPTER 6, PARA 609

609. THE COVERING FORCE STAGE

1. General. The employment of a strong covering force will only be possible in the initial stages of any battle. Once the enemy reaches the main defence area it will be virtually impossible to re-establish a covering force between a main defensive position and the enemy unless a withdrawal in contact is made. Consequently, although the covering force battle has historically received a good deal of emphasis its importance in the overall design of the defensive battle must be kept in perspective. It could well be one of the most important stages of the battle however it will probably be short-lived and once over it may not happen again.

2. Provision of Covering Forces. The corps commander may establish a corps covering force under a single commander, responsible for carrying out the covering force mission across the corps front. Alternatively, he may direct that forward divisions establish their own covering forces within division boundaries. Circumstances which would favour the establishment of division covering forces are:

- a. excessive corps frontage, making control of a corps covering force difficult;
- b. difficult terrain which inhibits a coordinated covering force battle across the entire corps front;
- c. an assessment of tasks which results in the majority of corps' resources being assigned to the forward divisions; and
- d. a situation where for reasons of mobilization, movement, etc, the corps reserve or depth formation is not completely deployed at or before the commencement of hostilities.

3. The main advantage of employing division covering forces is that it gives the forward division commanders direct control of the battle from the outset. The main disadvantage is that it necessitates the use of forces which may be required to carry out depth and reserve roles in the forward divisions during the main defence battle. These forces may return to the main defence area with considerably reduced combat power, and will have little time to rest, make up their losses and prepare for their main defence area tasks. Therefore, if forward divisions are tasked to provide the covering forces, they should be augmented by sufficient corps resources to enable the division commander to influence the battle out to the forward line own troops (air support, artillery, electronic warfare, etc); and also

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ANNEX A
TO SC 2900-1
DATED 21 APR 82

to limit the likely attrition of organic division resources so that they will be viable in their main defence area tasks, (additional armour, reconnaissance, engineers, anti-tank, aviation and possibly infantry).

4. In the case of a very deep covering force area, (for example, over 50 km) the corps commander may decide to employ both corps and division covering forces, the latter taking over from the former along a clearly defined line of separation. This option defines the areas of influence of the respective commanders, and has the advantage of limiting the duration of battle for the elements of each covering force, thereby giving each force a better chance of taking up its main defence area tasks in relatively good shape. This option, however, will necessitate complicated passages of lines, and should be avoided for that reason unless absolutely necessary!

5. Mission. As a covering force commander is trading space for time while inflicting the maximum number of casualties on the enemy, he must be told the minimum time he is expected to delay the arrival of the enemy at the FEBA or the degree of risk he is to accept. The two cannot be combined, as for example: "Impose 36 hours delay and accept no more than 30 per cent casualties." If the corps commander requires a specific amount of time to prepare the main defence position then the mission assigned to the covering force will reflect a requirement to delay for a certain period. If however, the covering force is required as an effective fighting force for subsequent operations then the mission will have to specify the degree of risk that is to be accepted and not commit the commander to delaying the enemy for a minimum period of time. (Obviously a strong covering force can only be provided at the expense of troops required for the main defence position or for the reserve. The corps or division covering force will normally operate in the guard role and be assigned the following tasks:

- a. inflict maximum damage and disruption to the enemy's leading formations within the constraints of the mission;
- b. impose delay, usually to cover the deployment and preparation of the main defensive position;
- c. identify and report the direction, strength and progress of the enemy advance with a view to assisting in the assessment of the main enemy thrust; and
- d. prevent enemy ground reconnaissance elements from obtaining information on friendly deployment.

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ANNEX A
TO SC 2900-1
DATED 21 APR 82

6. Strength and Composition. The strength and composition of covering forces will depend on the extent of the covering force area, the nature of the terrain, the desired or required period of delay, and the availability of forces from the main defence area. A corps covering force may be more than two brigades in strength, under command of a divisional headquarters, while a division covering force may exceed a brigade in strength. In any case, corps or division covering forces will usually require the following elements:

- a. reconnaissance; to screen all approaches and identify and report enemy strengths and axes of advance;
- b. armour; to engage enemy armour and reconnaissance, delay and disrupt the enemy advance, exploit counter-attack opportunities, and assist in extracting delaying forces;
- c. infantry; to block on likely approaches and force enemy deployment, to secure defiles and reserve demolitions on withdrawal routes, and protect mobile elements;
- d. heavy anti-armour weapons to engage enemy armour at long range;
- e. artillery; including air defence and locating artillery, to inflict damage, delay and casualties, cover the movement of the delaying force, and protect defiles and reserved demolitions;
- f. engineers; for the maintenance of mobility of the covering force, and denial of mobility to the advancing enemy;
- g. command and control facilities;
- h. electronic warfare capability;
- i. close air support;
- k. aviation including attack helicopters if available; helicopters for reconnaissance, liaison and forward observation; utility transport for movement of tank hunting teams, reserves, etc, and air ambulance transport; and
- m. combat service support.

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ANNEX A
TO SC 2900-1
DATED 27 APR 82

7. The covering force action will be conducted as a delay operation which is described in Section 5 of this chapter. The commander will employ his screen elements to maintain surveillance across his entire front. His remaining combat elements will be positioned to impose maximum delay where the ground and obstacles give the greatest advantage. The amount of delay and destruction of enemy forces, at successive delaying positions will be greatly enhanced if time has permitted thorough preparation of obstacles and the construction of well dug-in positions.

8. The aspect of decisive engagement is critical to the covering force commander. If he has been directed to delay the enemy for a minimum specific period of time then he might well find himself having to accept decisive engagement in order to achieve his aim. Preferably however, decisive engagement will be the exception.

9. The covering force commander should retain a reserve prepared to counter-attack to extricate trapped guard elements or strike the enemy when he is over-stretched or presents an open flank.

10. The final delaying positions should be selected to enable the covering force to make a clean separation before withdrawing into the main defence area.

Screens

11. Regardless of whether corps or division covering forces are deployed, the forward brigades in the main defence area will deploy their own covering forces forward of the FEBA/obstacle to protect the main defensive position, assist in the orderly movement of the corps/division covering force, and to maintain contact with the enemy. These brigade covering forces will be light. The forward limit of the area of responsibility of the brigade covering force will be delineated by the line of separation. This line will most likely be at or just forward of the last good defensible ground before the main obstacle, probably about 5 km to 10 km from the obstacle. At the line of separation, by definition, the in-place force assumes responsibility for the defence of the area and the control of movement of the withdrawing force. It follows that the positions of the brigade covering force along the line of separation must be carefully and precisely coordinated with the withdrawing force, as it will be a critical factor in fire support coordination. The passage of lines is discussed in Chapter 8, Section 6.

Hand over line.

12. The disengagement of the corps/division covering force, the passage of lines through the brigade covering force and the move into the main defence area is a critical and difficult operation, requiring detailed coordination and clearly understood command relationships. This coordination must extend from unit level up to corps.

A-4

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ANNEX A
TO SC 2900-1
DATED 21 APR 82

13. The withdrawing corps or division covering force must attempt to make a clean break at the line of separation. Because the brigade covering forces in place will be lightly equipped, the withdrawing covering force must create the conditions for its own clean break. They have the fire-power to force the enemy to pause, and during that pause, the withdrawing covering force must break clean and move across the FEBA. The line of separation must be sited with this in mind.

Handwritten note:
Have a clean break

14. Brigade covering forces will assist the withdrawing covering force in the following ways:

- a. providing secure routes for rearward passage to the FEBA;
- b. providing guides and traffic control as required;
- c. coordination of real estate requirements for the withdrawing force;
- d. possibly providing assistance with recovery and casualty evacuation if necessary;
- e. taking over surveillance of the enemy; and at the appropriate time, taking over control of fire support; and
- f. supporting movement of the withdrawing forces with direct fire within the limits of the combat power contained in the brigade covering force.

15. After the corps or division covering force has withdrawn, the brigade covering forces will not likely remain forward of the FEBA for very long. The tasks of the brigade covering force, once the corps or division covering force has withdrawn, are:

- a. identify and report the direction, strength and progress of the enemy advance and define the main enemy thrust;
- b. when its strength permits, prevent enemy reconnaissance from reaching the main defence position, or at least disrupt its progress toward the main defence position;
- c. impose such delay as is possible within their resources, without accepting decisive engagement; and

A-5

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ANNEX A
TO SC 2900-1
DATED 27 APR 82

- d. withdrawing into the main defence area ahead of the enemy advance.

16. Command and Control - Movement Into Main Defence Area. Control of the movement of covering forces into the main defence area must be exercised at the level of command which can coordinate both the withdrawing force and the forward formation in the main defence area. In the case of a corps covering force, the corps commander must plan and coordinate its movements with forward divisions. The division commander must coordinate the movement of a division covering force into the forward brigade sectors. However, it will be a rare situation in which either a corps or division covering force can make a clean break in entirety into the main defence area. What is more probable is that a part of the covering force will be retiring under pressure, and may well be doing so astride the boundaries of two formations in the main defence area, while another part of the covering force is under no great pressure, and should remain forward in the covering force area. These possibilities must be foreseen and planned for by the corps and division commanders. Plans must be made for the following:

- a. Reserved Routes and Reserved Demolitions. The move of the covering force into the main defence area should be restricted to as few routes as is practicable. This consideration must be balanced against the risk of loss if routes or crossing sites are rendered unusable by enemy action. A brigade size force will need at least two routes into the main defence area. When these routes cross natural or artificial obstacles and involve gap closures or reserved demolitions, the corps commander will designate the commander authorized to fire the demolition or close the gap. This will normally be the lowest level commander who is exercising control over both the withdrawing force and the forces in the forward positions in the main defence area. In the case of a corps covering force, the corps commander will retain the authority for reserved demolitions until the corps covering force has withdrawn across the obstacle, or until he has delegated control of part of the corps covering force to the division commander into whose area it is withdrawing. Similarly, in the case of a division covering force, the division commander will retain authority for firing of reserved demolitions, at least until the point at which all troops on the enemy side of the obstacle are under control of the forward brigade commander.

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ANNEX A
TO SC 2900-1
DATED 27 APR 82

- b. Control Arrangement at the Line of Separation - Clean Break. When a clean break is achieved at the line of separation, the withdrawing force comes under operational control of the forward formation through whose area it is passing. In the case of a corps covering force, this must be coordinated at corps headquarters. LOs must be deployed at division, brigade and unit levels for detailed coordination. In the case of a division covering force, overall control will be exercised at division headquarters with liaison at brigade and unit level. In some circumstances it may be necessary for elements of the withdrawing covering force to be placed under operational control of forward brigades.
- c. Command and Control Arrangements If A Clean Break Is Not Achieved. If the withdrawing covering force is unable to make a clean break, then it follows that the much weaker brigade covering force will also be unable to force a pause in the enemy advance. In this circumstance, the brigade covering force should be placed under command of the withdrawing covering force, whose commander must then control the extraction of the combined forces. The covering force commander in turn will operate under operational control of the forward division commander into whose area he is withdrawing.

17. Responsibilities of the In-Place Formation. The forward formation through which the covering force is withdrawing has the following responsibilities:

- a. Take over control of fire support when the covering force withdraws across the line of separation, and control the rearward movement of the covering force through the formation sector.
- b. Provide guides at minefield lanes, reserved demolitions, etc.
- c. Provide traffic control for the movement of the covering force through its sector.
- d. Provide harbours along the route for use by the covering force if necessary.

A-7

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ANNEX A
TO SC 2900-1
DATED 21 APR 82

- e. Provide air defence coverage of defiles in its sector through which the covering force must pass.
- f. Provide assistance with recovery, casualties, emergency refuelling or ammunition resupply, and handling of prisoners of war as required.

18. The withdrawing covering force will revert to the operational control of its parent formation when it passes the rear boundary of the formation or formations through which it is withdrawing.

A-8

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~~2910-CFP 300~~ (Darty)

PA → 2910-CFP 301 ←

2922-B-06-301001/FR-001

National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0K2

90 January 1982

Distribution List

WRITING PLANS

CFP 300 - THE ARMY

CFP 301 - LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE

- References:
- A. FMC 2910-CFP 300 (CD)/301 dated 13 November 1981
 - B. FMC 2910-CFP 300 (Arty) dated 1 December 1981

1. An Artillery Doctrine Coordination Conference was held at CLFCSC Kingston from 11 to 15 January 1981. It was chaired by the Director of Artillery and the following were in attendance:

- a. DLR 2 (D Darty)
- b. SSO Arty, FMC HQ
- c. Comd, Arty School, CTC
- d. Senior Arty DS, CFCSC
- e. Senior Arty DS, CLFCSC
- f. DLR 2-3
- g. SO Arty Doc, FMC HQ

2. The purpose of this conference was as follows:

- a. To consider the writing plans for CFP 300 and 301 (Reference A) and to review the comments on that plan at Reference B.
- b. To draft CFPs 306(1) and 306(2).

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- 2 -

3. The drafts of the 306 series will be further staffed by the SO Arty Doc, FMC HQ. The aim of this letter is to circulate the recommendations that were agreed on the writing plans for CFP 300 and 301 which are at Annexes A and B respectively.

H.R. Wheatley
Colonel

Director of Artillery
for Chief of the Defence Staff

H.B. Ransome-Williams, Maj/2-0426/jm

Attachments: Annexes A and B

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Internal

DLCD 4
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Annex A
to 2910-CFP 300 (DARTY)
dated 20 January 1982

RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE
WRITING PLAN FOR CFP 300

<u>SERIAL</u>	<u>PAGE</u>	<u>CHAP/SECTION</u>	<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	-	Chapter Outline	Chapters 10 and 11 (Airspace Control and Air Defence) should remain as separate chapters. NGFS should not be a separate chapter but included in CFP 301.
2	4	5. 1c and 1d	Although it is agreed that artillery formations need not be treated separately, they should be included in the organizational diagrams that will accompany this section.
3	4	4. 2e	This sub-para should be split into two. (Field Artillery (includes locating) and Air Defence Artillery).
4	10	10. 1a	Although the NATO term is Control and is acceptable at this level of document, this sub-para should make it clear that the national term is Co-ordination.
5	11	11. 2b-f	The correct terms are as follows: b. Area Missiles (High Level) c. Area Missiles (Medium Level) d. Area Missiles (Low Level)

Annex A
to 2910-CFP 300 (DARTY)
dated 70 January 1982

<u>SERIAL</u> (a)	<u>PAGE</u> (b)	<u>CHAP/SECTION</u> (c)	<u>RECOMMENDATION</u> (d)
			e. Point Missiles
			f. Point Guns
			It was agreed to delete "self defence" in front of "point missiles".
6	11	11. 3g	Delete "Management" and insert "Co-ordination".
7	11	11. 5	Delete Section 5 (included in Chapter 10).
8	12	12. 1k	Delete "SAM Suppression". The appropriate term at this level is "Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defence. (JSEAD)".

Annex B
to 2910-CFP 301 (DARTY)
dated 70 January 1982

RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE
WRITING PLAN FOR CFP 301

<u>SERIAL</u>	<u>PAGE</u>	<u>CHAP/SECTION</u>	<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	2	2. Part A 3g	This para should read "Corps Artillery" and artillery formations will be highlighted here.
2	4	2. Part C 3	Add new sub-para e "Point Missile Battery". This battery is under comd of the Bde Comd and not the CDA except for arty matters (Trg and policy).
3	5	3. 3 and 4	Arty formation HQs will be discussed under advisors para.
4	6	3. 5	Add new sub-para e "Advisors" to incl arty.
5	7	4	A recommended plan for this chapter is at Appendix 1 to this Annex.
6	9	5. 3e	Nuclear Fire Planning is the correct heading for this sub-para e. It includes nuclear target analysis.
7	11	6. 2h	Delete "The Appreciation", insert "The Estimate of the Situation".
8	11	6	Locating artillery should be shown in a source matrix, including artillery intelligence.
9	29	13. Part C 2	Add new sub-para "Fire Plan".
10	31	13. Part D 2	Add new sub-para "Fire Plan".

CHAPTER 4 - FIRE SUPPORT AND AIRSPACE CO-ORDINATION

SECTION (a)	TITLE (b)	OUTLINE CONTENT (c)	REMARKS (d)
1	INTRODUCTION	401. General	Intro, aim, responsibility for FSC and ASC.
		402. FSCC	Elements Arty Supplement Ch 13.
		403. ASCC	Elements Arty Supplement Ch 12.
2	FIRE SUPPORT CO-ORDINATION	404. General	
		405. Allotment of Field Artillery	
		1. General	Includes locating artillery. Combination of comd and con terminology.
		2. Command Terminology	
		a. Under command	
		b. Under command for	
		c. Under command less	
		d. In location	
		e. With	
		3. Control Terminology	Principles - Allies Table in STANAG 2887 as Annex.

SECTION	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. General b. At Priority Call c. In Direct Support d. In Support <p>4. Examples</p> <p>406. Allotment of Air Defence Artillery</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. General 2. Command Terminology 3. Control Terminology <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. General b. Procedural c. Positive <p>407. Allotment of Ammunition</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. General 2. Assessment of Requirement and Supply 3. Control 	<p>To include examples.</p>

SECTION	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
3	AIRSPACE CO-ORDINATION	408. Offensive Air Support 409. Anti-Armour Support 410. Fire Support Co-ordination Measures 1. General 2. Specific Measures a. FSCC b. NFL c. FCL(?) 411. Fire Planning 1. General 2. Fire Planning Process 3. Nuclear Fire Planning	To be developed. To be developed. Boundaries etc. STANAG 2099. DFs, Quick Fire Plans etc etc. To be developed from: - Arty Supplement Ch 12 ATP 40 - Arty School - Div Arty in All Phases of War - Oct 81

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TO NDHQ DLO

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---REQUEST FOR INFO

MANY THANKS FOR INFORMATIVE DO LET OF 4DEC81.

2. MAJ GRAHAM MEHARG (RCR) CURRENTLY TACTICS INSTRUCTOR OF HIGH

REPUTE OF AUSTRLN ARMY LAND WARFARE CENTRE CANUNGRA, HAS

REQUIREMENT OF FOLLOWING MANUALS (A) CFP301 (1) LAND OPS (B) UPDATED

ATP 135 (NATO TRG PAMPHLET).

3. WILL BE GRATEFUL FOR ASSISTANCE. SEND TO ME AND I WILL FORWARD

TO MAJ MEHARG. DUCINUS.

UUU/264 180315Z YADRO101

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SUBJ: WRITING PLAN - CFP 300 AND 301

REF: FMC 2910 - CFP 300 (CD) OVER 2910 - CFP 301 13 NOV 81

1. FINAL PROMULGATION OF TWO KEYSTONE MANUALS WILL BE WELCOME
2. PARA 2 OF REF A SOMEWHAT MISLEADING. SUGGEST DOCTRINE OF BOTH PUBS SHOULD BE BASED ON CONCEPTS PRODUCED BY CBT SYSTEM STUDY TEAM AND BRANCH STUDIES WHO HAVE ALREADY REVIEWED ALL APPROPRIATE ALLIED PUBS AND PRODUCED A CANADIAN SYSTEM. BY BASING PUBS AT REF A ON CANADIAN CONCEPTS, DIALOGUE BETWEEN CONCEPT WRITERS AND DOCTRINE WRITERS SHOULD RESULT

REFERENCED LETTER PLACED ON

2910-CFP 300 TD 1327
2922-B-06-301-cel/FP-001 TD 1327
AND PASSED TO..... Cm DO

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